Seneca: DE IRA

1. Primus liber, Nouate, benigniorem habuit materiam; facilis enim in procliui uitiorum decursus est. Nunc ad exiliora ueniendum est; quaerimus enim ira utrum iudicio an impetu incipiat, id est utrum sua sponte moueatur an quemadmodum pleraque quae intra nos insciis nobis oriuntur. 2. Debet autem in haec se demittere disputatio ut ad illa quoque altiora possit exsurgere; nam et in corpore nostro ossa neruique et articuli, firmamenta totius et uitalia, minime speciosa uisu, prius ordinantur, deinde haec ex quibus omnis in faciem aspectumque decor est; post haec omnia, qui maxime oculos rapit, color ultimus perfecto iam corpore adfunditur.

1. The first book, Novatus, had more benign material; for the course down the declivity of vices is easy. Now we must come to more slender points; for we inquire whether anger begins by judgment or by impulse, that is, whether it is moved of its own accord or in the same way as most things which arise within us, we being unaware. 2. The discussion ought, however, to lower itself into these matters so that it may be able to rise up also to those higher ones; for even in our body the bones and the nerves and the joints—the supports of the whole and the vital parts—least comely to the sight, are first arranged, then those from which all the adornment is for the face and the outward aspect; after all these, that which most snatches the eyes, color, last, is poured over the body now perfected.

3. Iram quin species oblata iniuriae moueat non est dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsam statim sequatur et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente moueatur quaerimus. 4. Nobis placet nihil illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi se debuisse et uindicari debere, non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur. Ille simplex est, hic compositus et plura continens: intellexit aliquid, indignatus est, damnauit, ulciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur adsensus est.

3. That anger is moved by the appearance of an injury offered is not in doubt; but we ask whether it follows that very appearance at once and, with the mind not joining, rushes forth, or whether it is moved with the mind assenting. 4. It is our view that it ventures nothing on its own, but with the mind approving; for to seize the appearance of an injury received and to desire its vengeance and to join both—that one ought not to have been harmed and that one ought to be avenged—is not the impetus that is stirred without our will. That one is simple; this one composite and containing more things: it has understood something, it has been indignant, it has condemned, it exacts vengeance: these things cannot be done unless the mind has assented to those by which it was being touched.

II.

1. 'Quorsus' inquis 'haec quaestio pertinet?' Vt sciamus quid sit ira; nam si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non uoluntate nostra fiunt inuicti et ineuitabiles sunt, ut horror frigida adspersis, ad quosdam tactus aspernatio; ad peiores nuntios surriguntur pili et rubor ad inproba uerba suffunditur sequiturque uertigo praerupta cernentis: quorum quia nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quominus fiant ratio persuadet. 2. Ira praeceptis fugatur; est enim uoluntarium animi uitium, non ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eueniunt ideoque etiam sapientissimis accidunt, inter quae et primus ille ictus animi ponendus est qui nos post opinionem iniuriae mouet.

1. 'To what end,' you ask, 'does this question pertain?' So that we may know what anger is; for if it is born in us against our will, it will never succumb to reason. For all motions which are not effected by our will are unconquered and inevitable, as a shiver in those sprinkled with cold, an aversion at certain touches; at worse messages the hairs are raised, and redness is suffused at shameless words, and vertigo follows one who discerns precipitous places: since none of these things is in our power, no reasoning persuades to the effect that they not happen. 2. Anger is put to flight by precepts; for it is a voluntary vice of the mind, not of those things which occur by a certain condition of the human lot and therefore befall even the wisest—among which must be placed that first blow of the mind which moves us after the opinion of an injury.

3. Hic subit etiam inter ludicra scaenae spectacula et lectiones rerum uetustarum. Saepe Clodio Ciceronem expellenti et Antonio occidenti uidemur irasci. Quis non contra Mari arma, contra Sullae proscriptionem concitatur?

3. Here it arises even amidst the ludic spectacles of the stage and the lections of ancient affairs. Often we seem to be angered at Clodius as he expels Cicero, and at Antony as he slays him. Who is not incited against the arms of Marius, against Sulla’s proscription?

Quis non Theodoto et Achillae et ipsi puero non puerile auso facinus infestus est? 4. Cantus nos nonnumquam et citata modulatio instigat Martiusque ille tubarum sonus; mouet mentes et atrox pictura et iustissimorum suppliciorum tristis aspectus; 5. inde est quod adridemus ridentibus et contristat nos turba maerentium et efferuescimus ad aliena certamina. Quae non sunt irae, non magis quam tristitia est quae ad conspectum mimici naufragii contrahit frontem, non magis quam timor qui Hannibale post Cannas moenia circumsidente lectorum percurrit animos, sed omnia ista motus sunt animorum moueri nolentium, nec adfectus sed principia proludentia adfectibus.

Who is not hostile to Theodotus and Achillas and to the boy himself, who dared a deed not boyish? 4. Now and then a song and a quickened modulation incite us, and that Martial sound of the trumpets; an atrocious picture moves minds, and the sad sight of most just punishments; 5. hence it is that we smile upon the smiling, and a crowd of mourners saddens us, and we effervesce at others’ contests. These are not angers, no more than that is sadness which wrinkles the brow at the sight of a mimic shipwreck, no more than that is fear which, with Hannibal after Cannae surrounding the walls, runs through the minds of readers, but all those are motions of souls unwilling to be moved, not passions but beginnings that prelude to passions.

6. Sic enim militaris uiri in media pace iam togati aures tuba suscitat equosque castrenses erigit crepitus armorum. Alexandrum aiunt Xenophanto canente manum ad arma misisse.

6. For thus the trumpet rouses the ears of the military man, now in the toga, in the very midst of peace, and the crepitation of arms rears the camp-horses. They say that Alexander, with Xenophantus singing, put his hand to his arms.

III.

1. Nihil ex his quae animum fortuito inpellunt adfectus uocari debet: ista, ut ita dicam, patitur magis animus quam facit. Ergo adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moueri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi. 2. Nam si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem umoris obsceni altumue suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus.

1. Nothing of those things which by chance impel the mind ought to be called an affect: these, so to speak, the mind suffers rather than does. Therefore an affect is not to be moved at the proffered appearances of things, but to permit oneself to them and to pursue this fortuitous motion. 2. For if anyone thinks pallor and the falling of tears and the irritation of the obscene humor and a deep sigh and eyes suddenly keener, or anything like these, to be an indication of affect and a sign of the mind, he is mistaken and does not understand that these are pulses of the body.

3. Itaque et fortissimus plerumque uir dum armatur expalluit et signo pugnae dato ferocissimo militi paulum genua tremuerunt et magno imperatori antequam inter se acies arietarent cor exiluit et oratori eloquentissimo dum ad dicendum componitur summa riguerunt. 4. Ira non moueri tantum debet sed excurrere; est enim impetus; numquam autem impetus sine adsensu mentis est, neque enim fieri potest ut de ultione et poena agatur animo nesciente. Putauit se aliquis laesum, uoluit ulcisci, dissuadente aliqua causa statim resedit: hanc iram non uoco, motum animi rationi parentem: illa est ira quae rationem transsilit, quae secum rapit.

3. And so even the most brave man, while he is being armed, often turned pale; and, when the signal of battle was given, the most ferocious soldier’s knees trembled a little; and to a great commander, before the battle-lines rammed together, the heart leapt; and for the most eloquent orator, while he is being composed for speaking, the extremities grew rigid. 4. Anger ought not only to be moved but to run out; for it is an impetus; but an impetus is never without the mind’s assent, nor indeed can it come to pass that there is dealing about vengeance and punishment with the mind unaware. Someone thought himself wronged, wished to avenge himself; with some cause dissuading, he immediately subsided: this I do not call anger, but a movement of the spirit obedient to reason; that is anger which overleaps reason, which carries it off with itself.

5. Ergo prima illa agitatio animi quam species iniuriae incussit non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species; ille sequens impetus, qui speciem iniuriae non tantum accepit sed adprobauit, ira est, concitatio animi ad ultionem uoluntate et iudicio pergentis. Numquam dubium est quin timor fugam habeat, ira impetum; uide ergo an putes aliquid sine adsensu mentis aut peti posse aut caueri.

5. Therefore that first agitation of the mind which the appearance of an injury has struck in is no more anger than the very appearance of the injury itself; that subsequent impetus, which not only received the appearance of injury but approved it, is anger—an incitation of the mind toward vengeance, proceeding by will and judgment. It is never in doubt that fear has flight, anger an impetus; see, therefore, whether you think that anything can either be sought or be avoided without the assent of the mind.

IV.

1. Et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur, est primus motus non uoluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum uoluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me uindicari cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare cum scelus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique, qui rationem euicit. 2. Primum illum animi ictum effugere ratione non possumus, sicut ne illa quidem quae diximus accidere corporibus, ne nos oscitatio aliena sollicitet, ne oculi ad intentationem subitam digitorum comprimantur: ista non potest ratio uincere, consuetudo fortasse et adsidua obseruatio extenuat. Alter ille motus, qui iudicio nascitur, iudicio tollitur.

1. And that you may know how the affections begin or grow or are carried away, there is a first motion not voluntary, as it were a preparation of the affection and a certain commination; a second, with a will not contumacious, as though it were proper that I be avenged when I have been injured, or that this man pay penalties when he has committed a crime; the third motion is now out of control, which wills to avenge not if it is proper, but in any case—one which has overcome reason. 2. We cannot by reason escape that first stroke of the mind, just as we cannot prevent those things which we said befall bodies, that another’s yawning not provoke us, that the eyes not be pressed shut at the sudden brandishing of fingers: reason cannot conquer these; habit, perhaps, and assiduous observation attenuate them. That second motion, which is born from judgment, is removed by judgment.

1. Illud etiamnunc quaerendum est, ii qui uulgo saeuiunt et sanguine humano gaudent, an irascantur cum eos occidunt a quibus nec acceperunt iniuriam nec accepisse ipsos existimant: qualis fuit Apollodorus aut Phalaris. 2. Haec non est ira, feritas est; non enim quia accepit iniuriam nocet, sed parata est dum noceat uel accipere, nec illi uerbera lacerationesque in ultionem petuntur sed in uoluptatem. 3. Quid ergo?

1. This too must still be asked, whether those who indiscriminately are savage and rejoice in human blood grow angry when they kill those from whom they have neither received an injury nor do they think that they themselves have received one: such as was Apollodorus or Phalaris. 2. This is not anger, it is ferity; for it harms not because it has received an injury, but is ready, provided that it may hurt, even to receive, and for such a one blows and lacerations are sought not for vengeance but for pleasure. 3. What then?

Origo huius mali ab ira est, quae ubi frequenti exercitatione et satietate in obliuionem clementiae uenit et omne foedus humanum eiecit animo, nouissime in crudelitatem transit; rident itaque gaudentque et uoluptate multa perfruuntur plurimumque ab iratorum uultu absunt, per otium saeui. 4. Hannibalem aiunt dixisse, cum fossam sanguine humano plenam uidisset, 'o formosum spectaculum!' Quanto pulchrius illi uisum esset, si flumen aliquod lacumque conplesset! Quid mirum si hoc maxime spectaculo caperis, innatus sanguini et ab infante caedibus admotus?

The origin of this evil is from anger, which, when by frequent exercise and satiety it comes into oblivion of clemency and has cast out from the mind every human compact, at last passes over into cruelty; thus they laugh and rejoice and thoroughly enjoy much pleasure, and are very far removed from the visage of the angry, fierce in their leisure. 4. They say Hannibal said, when he had seen a ditch filled with human blood, “O beautiful spectacle!” How much fairer would it have seemed to him, if he had filled some river and a lake as well! What wonder if you are captivated by this spectacle above all, inborn to blood and from infancy set to slaughters?

Sequetur te fortuna crudelitati tuae per uiginti annos secunda dabitque oculis tuis gratum ubique spectaculum; uidebis istud et circa Trasumennum et circa Cannas et nouissime circa Carthaginem tuam. 5. Volesus nuper, sub diuo Augusto proconsul Asiae, cum trecentos uno die securi percussisset, incedens inter cadauera uultu superbo, quasi magnificum quiddam conspiciendumque fecisset, graece proclamauit 'o rem regiam!' Quid hic rex fecisset? Non fuit haec ira sed maius malum et insanabile.

Fortune will follow you, favorable to your cruelty, for twenty years, and will give to your eyes a pleasing spectacle everywhere; you will see that both around Trasimene and around Cannae and, lastly, around your Carthage. 5. Volesus recently, under the deified Augustus, proconsul of Asia, when he had struck three hundred with the axe in one day, striding among the cadavers with a haughty visage, as if he had done something magnificent and to be looked upon, cried out in Greek, “O a royal thing!” What would a king have done here? This was not anger but a greater and incurable evil.

VI.

1. 'Virtus' inquit 'ut honestis rebus propitia est, ita turpibus irata esse debet.' Quid si dicat uirtutem et humilem et magnam esse debere? Atqui hoc dicit qui illam extolli uult et deprimi, quoniam laetitia ob recte factum clara magnificaque est, ira ob alienum peccatum sordida et angusti pectoris est. 2. Nec umquam committet uirtus ut uitia dum compescit imitetur; iram ipsam castigandam habet, quae nihilo melior est, saepe etiam peior iis delictis quibus irascitur.

1. 'Virtue,' he says, 'just as she is propitious to honorable things, so ought she to be wrathful at base ones.' What if he were to say that virtue ought to be both humble and great? And yet this is what he says who wishes that it be both exalted and depressed, since joy on account of a right deed is bright and magnificent, whereas anger on account of another’s fault is sordid and narrow of breast. 2. Nor will Virtue ever commit that, while she restrains vices, she imitates them; she has anger itself to be chastised, which is by no means better, and often even worse, than the offenses at which it is angered.

Gaudere laetarique proprium et naturale uirtutis est: irasci non est ex dignitate eius, non magis quam maerere; atqui iracundiae tristitia comes est et in hanc omnis ira uel post paenitentiam uel post repulsam reuoluitur. 3. Et si sapientis est peccatis irasci, magis irascetur maioribus et saepe irascetur: sequitur ut non tantum iratus sit sapiens sed iracundus. Atqui si nec magnam iram nec frequentem in animo sapientis locum habere credimus, quid est quare non ex toto illum hoc adfectu liberemus?

To rejoice and to be glad is proper and natural to virtue: to be angry is not of its dignity, no more than to mourn; and yet sadness is the companion of irascibility, and into this every anger is rolled back either after penitence or after a repulse. 3. And if it is the part of the wise man to be angry at sins, he will be more angry at the greater ones and will often be angry: it follows that the wise man is not only angry but irascible. But if we believe that neither great anger nor frequent anger has a place in the mind of the wise man, what is the reason why we should not free him altogether from this affect?

4. Modus enim esse non potest, si pro facto cuiusque irascendum est; nam aut iniquus erit, si aequaliter irascetur delictis inaequalibus, aut iracundissimus, si totiens excanduerit quotiens iram scelera meruerint.

4. For there can be no measure, if one must be angry in proportion to each person’s deed; for he will either be inequitable, if he is angry equally at unequal delicts, or most irascible, if he flares up as often as crimes have deserved wrath.

VII.

1. Et quid indignius quam sapientis adfectum ex aliena pendere nequitia? Desinet ille Socrates posse eundem uultum domum referre quem domo extulerat? Atqui si irasci sapiens turpiter factis debet et concitari contristarique ob scelera, nihil est aerumnosius sapiente: omnis illi per iracundiam maeroremque uita transibit.

1. And what is more unworthy than that the wise man’s affect depend on another’s wickedness? Will that Socrates cease to be able to bring back home the same countenance that he carried out from home? But indeed, if the wise man ought to be angry at shameful deeds and be stirred and be saddened on account of crimes, nothing is more full of hardship than the wise man: all his life will pass for him through wrath and grief.

2. Quod enim momentum erit quo non inprobanda uideat? Quotiens processerit domo, per sceleratos illi auarosque et prodigos et inpudentis et ob ista felices incedendum erit; nusquam oculi eius flectentur ut non quod indignentur inueniant: deficiet si totiens a se iram quotiens causa poscet exegerit. 3. Haec tot milia ad forum prima luce properantia, quam turpes lites, quanto turpiores aduocatos habent!

2. What moment will there be when he does not see things to be disapproved? As often as he has gone out from home, he will have to move among the criminal, the avaricious, the prodigal, the impudent, and—on account of these very things—the fortunate; nowhere will his eyes be turned without their finding something at which to be indignant: he will give out if he exacts anger from himself as often as the cause shall demand. 3. These so many thousands hastening to the forum at first light—how foul the lawsuits, and how much fouler the advocates they have!

Alius iudicia patris accusat, quae <non> mereri satius fuit, alius cum matre consistit, alius delator uenit eius criminis cuius manifestior reus est; et iudex damnaturus quae fecit eligitur et corona pro mala causa <stat> bona patroni uoce corrupta.

Another arraigns the verdicts against his father—verdicts it had been better not to incur; another goes to law with his mother; another comes as an informer of a crime of which he is the more manifest defendant; and as judge there is chosen a man who is about to condemn the very deeds he has himself done; and the crowd stands for the bad case, corrupted by the good voice of the patron.

VIII.

1. Quid singula persequor? Cum uideris forum multitudine refertum et saepta concursu omnis frequentiae plena et illum circum in quo maximam sui partem populus ostendit, hoc scito, istic tantundem esse uitiorum quantum hominum. 2. Inter istos quos togatos uides nulla pax est: alter in alterius exitium leui compendio ducitur; nulli nisi ex alterius iniuria quaestus est; felicem oderunt, infelicem contemnunt; maiorem grauantur, minori graues sunt; diuersis stimulantur cupiditatibus; omnia perdita ob leuem uoluptatem praedamque cupiunt.

1. Why do I pursue the particulars? When you have seen the forum crammed with a multitude and the enclosures full with the concourse of every crowd, and that circus in which the people display the greatest part of themselves, know this: that there, there are just as many vices as men. 2. Among those whom you see toga-clad, there is no peace: one is led to another’s destruction by the lure of an easy profit; to none is there gain except from another’s injury; they hate the fortunate, they despise the unfortunate; they are weighed down by the greater, to the lesser they are burdensome; they are goaded by diverse cupidities; they covet every depraved thing for a trivial pleasure and for plunder.

Non alia quam in ludo gladiatorio uita est cum isdem uiuentium pugnantiumque. 3. Ferarum iste conuentus est, nisi quod illae inter se placidae sunt morsuque similium abstinent, hi mutua laceratione satiantur. ~Hoc uno~ ab animalibus mutis differunt, quod illa mansuescunt alentibus, horum rabies ipsos a quibus est nutrita depascitur.

No life is other than in a gladiatorial school, with the same men both living and fighting. 3. This is a gathering of wild beasts, except that those are placid among themselves and abstain from the bite of their similars, whereas these are sated by mutual laceration. ~By this one thing~ they differ from mute animals, that those become tame toward their feeders, while the rabies of these feeds upon the very ones by whom it has been nourished.

IX.

1. Numquam irasci desinet sapiens, si semel coeperit: omnia sceleribus ac uitiis plena sunt; plus committitur quam quod possit coercitione sanari; certatur ingenti quidem nequitiae certamine. Maior cotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor uerecundia est; expulso melioris aequiorisque respectu quocumque uisum est libido se inpingit, nec furtiua iam scelera sunt: praeter oculos eunt, adeoque in publicum missa nequitia est et in omnium pectoribus eualuit ut innocentia non rara sed nulla sit. 2. Numquid enim singuli aut pauci rupere legem?

1. The wise man will never cease to grow angry, if once he begins: all things are filled with crimes and vices; more is committed than can be healed by coercion; there is a contest, indeed, of enormous iniquity. Each day the desire of sinning is greater, the shame less; with the regard for what is better and more equitable expelled, lust thrusts itself wherever it has seemed good, and crimes are no longer furtive: they pass before the eyes, and wickedness has been so sent into the public and has grown strong in the breasts of all that innocence is not rare but none. 2. For is it individuals or a few who have broken the law?

undique uelut signo dato ad fas nefasque miscendum coorti sunt:

From all sides, as if a signal had been given, they have sprung up for the commingling of right and wrong:

non hospes ab hospite tutus,
non socer a genero; fratrum quoque gratia rara est;
imminet exitio uir coniugis, illa mariti;
lurida terribiles miscent aconita nouercae,
filius ante diem patrios inquirit in annos.

no guest is safe from host,
no father-in-law from son-in-law; the favor of brothers too is rare;
the man threatens his wife with destruction, she her husband;
pale terrible stepmothers mix lurid aconites,
a son before the day inquires into his father’s years.

3. Et quota ista pars scelerum est? Non descripsit castra ex una parte contraria et parentium liberorumque sacramenta diuersa, subiectam patriae ciuis manu flammam et agmina infestorum equitum ad conquirendas proscriptorum latebras circumuolitantia et uiolatos fontes uenenis et pestilentiam manu factam et praeductam obsessis parentibus fossam, plenos carceres et incendia totas urbes concremantia dominationesque funestas et regnorum publicorumque exitiorum clandestina consilia, et pro gloria habita quae, quam diu opprimi possunt, scelera sunt, raptus ac stupra et ne os quidem libidini exceptum. 4. Adde nunc publica periuria gentium et rupta foedera et in praedam ualidioris quidquid non resistebat abductum, circumscriptiones furta fraudes infitiationes quibus trina non sufficiunt fora.

3. And what portion of crimes is that? Did he not describe camps on one side against the other, and the diverse oaths of parents and children, the flame applied to the fatherland by a citizen’s hand, and squadrons of hostile horsemen circling to search out the hiding-places of the proscribed, and springs violated with poisons, and pestilence made by hand, and a trench drawn before parents under siege, prisons packed, and conflagrations that burn to ashes whole cities, and baleful tyrannies, and clandestine counsels for the ruin of kingdoms and commonwealths, and things accounted as glory which, so long as they can be suppressed, are crimes—rapines and rapes, and not even the mouth exempted from lust. 4. Add now the public perjuries of nations and treaties broken, and whatever did not resist carried off for the plunder of the stronger—circumscriptions, thefts, frauds, denials—for which even three fora do not suffice.

Si tantum irasci uis sapientem quantum scelerum indignitas exigit, non irascendum illi sed insaniendum est.

If you wish the wise man to be angry as much as the indignity of crimes demands, it is not anger that should be required of him, but insanity.

10.

1. Illud potius cogitabis, non esse irascendum erroribus. Quid enim si quis irascatur in tenebris parum uestigia certa ponentibus? Quid si quis surdis imperia non exaudientibus?

1. You will rather consider this: that one ought not to grow angry at errors. For what if someone were to grow angry, in the dark, at people who set down footsteps insufficiently sure? What if at the deaf, who do not fully hear commands?

Quid si pueris, quod neglecto dispectu officiorum ad lusus et ineptos aequalium iocos spectent? Quid si illis irasci uelis qui aegrotant senescunt fatigantur? Inter cetera mortalitatis incommoda et hoc est, caligo mentium nec tantum necessitas errandi sed errorum amor.

What if it be boys, who, with the regard for duties neglected, look toward games and the inept jests of their equals? What if you should wish to be angry with those who are sick, grow old, are wearied? Among the other incommodities of mortality is also this: the caliginous gloom of minds, and not only a necessity of erring but a love of errors.

2. Ne singulis irascaris, uniuersis ignoscendum est, generi humano uenia tribuenda est. Si irasceris iuuenibus senibusque quod peccant, irascere infantibus: peccaturi sunt. Numquis irascitur pueris, quorum aetas nondum nouit rerum discrimina?

2. Do not be angry at individuals; one must forgive all in general, pardon is to be bestowed upon the human race. If you are angry at the young and the old because they sin, be angry at infants: they are going to sin. Does anyone grow angry at children, whose age does not yet know the distinctions of things?

maior est excusatio et iustior hominem esse quam puerum. 3. Hac condicione nati sumus, animalia obnoxia non paucioribus animi quam corporis morbis, non quidem obtusa nec tarda, sed acumine nostro male utentia, alter alteri uitiorum exempla: quisquis sequitur priores male iter ingressos, quidni habeat excusationem, cum publica uia errauerit? 4. In singulos seueritas imperatoris destringitur, at necessaria uenia est ubi totus deseruit exercitus.

It is a greater and more just excuse to be a human being than to be a boy. 3. We are born under this condition, animals obnoxious to no fewer diseases of the mind than of the body, not indeed obtuse nor slow, but making ill use of our own acumen, each to the other examples of vices: whoever follows predecessors who have entered the road badly—why should he not have an excuse, since he has gone astray on the public way? 4. Against individuals the emperor’s severity is drawn, but pardon is necessary where the whole army has deserted.

Quid tollit iram sapientis? turba peccantium. Intellegit quam et iniquum sit et periculosum irasci publico uitio.

What removes the wise man’s anger? the multitude of sinners. He understands how both iniquitous and perilous it is to be angry at a public vice.

5. Heraclitus quotiens prodierat et tantum circa se male uiuentium, immo male pereuntium uiderat, flebat, miserebatur omnium qui sibi laeti felicesque occurrebant, miti animo, sed nimis inbecillo: et ipse inter deplorandos erat. Democritum contra aiunt numquam sine risu in publico fuisse; adeo nihil illi uidebatur serium eorum quae serio gerebantur. Vbi istic irae locus est?

5. Heraclitus, whenever he went out and saw so many around him living badly—nay rather, perishing badly—would weep; he pitied all who met him as glad and happy, being of a gentle spirit, but too feeble; and he himself was among those to be deplored. Democritus, on the contrary, they say, was never without laughter in public; to such a degree nothing of the things that were being done seriously seemed serious to him. Where, in that case, is there a place for anger?

aut ridenda omnia aut flenda sunt.

either all things are to be laughed at or to be wept over.

6. Non irascetur sapiens peccantibus. Quare? quia scit neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri, scit paucissimos omni aeuo sapientis euadere, quia condicionem humanae uitae perspectam habet; nemo autem naturae sanus irascitur.

6. The sapient will not grow angry with those who err. Why? Because he knows that no one is born wise but becomes so; he knows that in every age very few turn out wise, because he has the condition of human life clearly surveyed; and no one who is sane grows angry with nature.

Quid enim si mirari uelit non in siluestribus dumis poma pendere? Quid si miretur spineta sentesque non utili aliqua fruge conpleri? Nemo irascitur ubi uitium natura defendit.

For what if he should wish to marvel that pomes do not hang on sylvan briars? What if he marvels that thorn-thickets and brambles are not filled with some useful fruit? No one grows angry where nature defends the vice.

7. Placidus itaque sapiens et aequus erroribus, non hostis sed corrector peccantium, hoc cotidie procedit animo: 'multi mihi occurrent uino dediti, multi libidinosi, multi ingrati, multi auari, multi furiis ambitionis agitati.' Omnia ista tam propitius aspiciet quam aegros suos medicus. 8. Numquid ille cuius nauigium multam undique laxatis conpagibus aquam trahit nautis ipsique nauigio irascitur? occurrit potius et aliam excludit undam, aliam egerit, manifesta foramina praecludit, latentibus et ex occulto sentinam ducentibus labore continuo resistit, nec ideo intermittit quia quantum exhaustum est subnascitur.

7. Therefore the wise man, placid and equitable toward errors, not an enemy but a corrector of sinners, advances daily with this mind: 'many devoted to wine will meet me, many lustful, many ungrateful, many avaricious, many agitated by the furies of ambition.' He will look upon all these as propitiously as a physician upon his own sick. 8. Does the man whose ship, with its joinings loosened, draws much water from every side grow angry at the sailors and at the ship itself? He rather meets the situation and excludes one wave, ejects another, precludes the manifest holes, and with continuous labor resists the latent ones which from out of hiding draw in bilge; nor for that reason does he intermit, because as much as has been exhausted arises anew.

Lento adiutorio opus est contra mala continua et fecunda, non ut desinant, sed ne uincant.

Slow aid is needed against evils continuous and fecund, not so that they cease, but lest they conquer.

XI.

11.

1. 'Vtilis est' inquit 'ira, quia contemptum effugit, quia malos terret.' Primum ira, si quantum minatur ualet, ob hoc ipsum quod terribilis est et inuisa est; periculosius est autem timeri quam despici. Si uero sine uiribus est, magis exposita contemptui est et derisum non effugit; quid enimest iracundia in superuacuum tumultuante frigidius? 2. Deinde non ideo quaedam, quia sunt terribiliora, potiora sunt, nec hoc sapienti dici uelim: 'quod ferae, sapientis quoque telum est, timeri.' Quid?

1. 'It is useful,' he says, 'anger, because it escapes contempt, because it terrifies the wicked.' First, anger—if it has as much power as it threatens—for this very reason is terrible and hated; but it is more dangerous to be feared than to be despised. If, however, it is without strength, it is more exposed to contempt and does not escape derision; for what is colder than anger making a tumult to no purpose? 2. Then, not for this reason are certain things better, because they are more terrible; nor would I wish this to be said to a wise man: 'that which is a weapon of beasts—to be feared—is also a weapon of the wise.' What?

non timetur febris, podagra, ulcus malum? Numquid ideo quicquam in istis boni est? At contra omnia despecta foedaque et turpia ~ipso quo~ timentur.

Is not fever, podagra, a malignant ulcer, feared? Is there therefore anything good in these? But on the contrary, all things despised and foul and base are feared ~for this very reason~.

Sic ira per se deformis est et minime metuenda, at timetur a pluribus sicut deformis persona ab infantibus. 3. Quid quod semper in auctores redundat timor nec quisquam metuitur ipse securus? Occurrat hoc loco tibi Laberianus ille uersus qui medio ciuili bello in theatro dictus totum in se populum non aliter conuertit quam si missa esset uox publici adfectus:

Thus anger is deformed per se and least to be feared, yet it is feared by the many like a deformed person by infants. 3. What of the fact that fear always flows back upon its authors, and no one is feared who is himself secure? Let that Laberian verse occur to you at this point, which, spoken in the theater in the midst of the civil war, turned the whole people toward itself no otherwise than if the voice of the public sentiment had been sent forth:

necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent.

it is necessary that he who is feared by many fear many.

4. Ita natura constituit ut quidquid alieno metu magnum est a suo non uacet. Leonum quam pauida sunt ad leuissimos sonos pectora! acerrimas feras umbra et uox et odor insolitus exagitat: quidquid terret et trepidat.

4. Thus nature has established that whatever is great by the fear of others is not vacant of its own. How timid are the hearts of lions at the slightest sounds! A shadow, a voice, and an unaccustomed odor agitates the fiercest beasts: whatever terrifies also trembles.

Non est ergo quare concupiscat quisquam sapiens timeri, nec ideo iram magnum quiddam putet quia formidini est, quoniam quidem etiam contemptissima timentur, ut uenena et ossa pestifera et morsus. 5. Nec mirum est, cum maximos ferarum greges linea pinnis distincta contineat et in insidias agat, ab ipso adfectu dicta formido; uanis enim uana terrori sunt. Curriculi motus rotarumque uersata facies leones redegit in caueam, elephantos porcina uox terret.

Therefore there is no reason why any wise man should desire to be feared, nor should he on that account suppose wrath to be something great because it is for dread, since indeed even the most contemptible things are feared, such as poisons and pestiferous bones and bites. 5. Nor is it a wonder, since a line marked with feathers holds the greatest herds of wild beasts and drives them into ambushes, the scare-line called “formido” from the very affect; for to the vain, vain things are a terror. The motion of the curricle and the wheels’ whirled face has driven lions back into the cage; a porcine voice terrifies elephants.

6. Sic itaque ira metuitur quomodo umbra ab infantibus, a feris rubens pinna. Non ipsa in se quicquam habet firmum aut forte, sed leues animos mouet.

6. Thus therefore anger is feared just as a shadow by infants, as a red feather by beasts. It has in itself nothing firm or strong, but it moves light minds.

XII.

12.

1. 'Nequitia' inquit 'de rerum natura tollenda est, si uelis iram tollere; neutrum autem potest fieri.' Primum potest aliquis non algere, quamuis [ex rerum natura] hiemps sit, et non aestuare, quamuis menses aestiui sint: aut loci beneficio aduersus intemperiem anni tutus est aut patientia corporis sensum utriusque peruicit. 2. Deinde uerte istud: necesse est prius uirtutem ex animo tollas quam iracundiam recipias, quoniam cum uirtutibus uitia non coeunt, nec magis quisquam eodem tempore et iratus potest esse et uir bonus quam aeger et sanus. 3. 'Non potest' inquit 'omnis ex animo ira tolli, nec hoc hominis natura patitur.' Atqui nihil est tam difficile et arduum quod non humana mens uincat et in familiaritatem perducat adsidua meditatio, nullique sunt tam feri et sui iuris adfectus ut non disciplina perdomentur.

1. 'Nequity,' he says, 'must be removed from the nature of things, if you wish to remove anger; yet neither can be done.' First, one can avoid feeling cold, although [by the nature of things] it is winter, and not swelter, although the months are summer: either by the benefit of the place he is safe against the intemperateness of the year, or by patience of the body he has overcome the sensation of both. 2. Next, turn that around: you must first remove virtue from your mind before you admit anger, since vices do not cohere with virtues; nor can anyone at the same time be both angry and a good man any more than sick and healthy. 3. 'It is not possible,' he says, 'for all anger to be removed from the mind, nor does human nature allow this.' And yet nothing is so difficult and arduous that the human mind does not conquer it and, by assiduous meditation, bring it into familiarity, and there are no passions so fierce and self-governed that they are not tamed by discipline.

4. Quodcumque sibi imperauit animus optinuit: quidam ne umquam riderent consecuti sunt; uino quidam, alii uenere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus; alius contentus breui somno uigiliam indefatigabilem extendit; didicerunt tenuissimis et aduersis funibus currere et ingentia uixque humanis toleranda uiribus onera portare et in inmensam altitudinem mergi ac sine ulla respirandi uice perpeti maria. Mille sunt alia in quibus pertinacia inpedimentum omne transcendit ostenditque nihil esse difficile cuius sibi ipsa mens patientiam indiceret. 5. Istis quos paulo ante rettuli aut nulla tam pertinacis studii aut non digna merces fuit — quid enim magnificum consequitur ille qui meditatus est per intentos funes ire, qui sarcinae ingenti ceruices supponere, qui somno non summittere oculos, qui penetrare in imum mare?

4. Whatever the mind has commanded itself, it has obtained: some have achieved that they never laugh; some have forbidden themselves wine, others Venus, some have interdicted all moisture to their bodies; another, content with brief sleep, has stretched out an indefatigable vigil; they learned to run upon the thinnest and slanting ropes, and to carry enormous loads scarcely tolerable by human strength, and to be plunged to an immense depth, and to endure the seas without any turn for breathing. A thousand other things there are in which pertinacity overleaps every impediment and shows that nothing is difficult, for which the mind itself would enjoin patience upon itself. 5. For those whom I related a little before, either there was no reward of so stubborn a pursuit, or not a worthy one — for what magnificent thing does he achieve who has practiced to go over taut ropes, who to put his neck under a huge pack, who not to lower his eyes to sleep, who to penetrate to the bottom of the sea?

— et tamen ad finem operis non magno auctoramento labor peruenit: 6. nos non aduocabimus patientiam, quos tantum praemium expectat, felicis animi inmota tranquillitas? Quantum est effugere maximum malum, iram, et cum illa rabiem saeuitiam crudelitatem furorem, alios comites eius adfectus!

— and yet the labor came to the end of the work with no great inducement: 6. shall we not summon patience, we whom so great a reward awaits, the unmoved tranquillity of a happy mind? How great a thing it is to escape the greatest evil, anger, and along with it rabies, savagery, cruelty, fury, the other affections that are its companions!

XIII.

13.

1. Non est quod patrocinium nobis quaeramus et excusatam licentiam, dicentes aut utile id esse aut ineuitabile; cui enim tandem uitio aduocatus defuit? Non est quod dicas excidi non posse: sanabilibus aegrotamus malis ipsaque nos in rectum genitos natura, si emendari uelimus, iuuat. Nec, ut quibusdam uisum est, arduum in uirtutes et asperum iter est: plano adeuntur.

1. There is no reason that we should seek advocacy for ourselves and an excused license, saying that it is either useful or inevitable; for what vice, pray, has ever lacked an advocate? There is no reason for you to say that it cannot be excised: we are ailing with sanable ills, and nature herself, having begotten us for the straight, helps us, if we are willing to be emended. Nor, as it has seemed to some, is the road into the virtues arduous and rough: they are approached on level ground.

2. Non uanae uobis auctor rei uenio. Facilis est ad beatam uitam uia: inite modo bonis auspiciis ipsisque dis bene iuuantibus. Multo difficilius est facere ista quae facitis.

2. I come to you not as the author of a vain matter. Easy is the way to the blessed life: only set out under good auspices, and with the very gods kindly aiding. It is much more difficult to do those things which you do.

Quid est animi quiete otiosius, quid ira laboriosius? Quid clementia remissius, quid crudelitate negotiosius? Vacat pudicitia, libido occupatissima est.

What is more otiose than the mind’s quiet, what more laborious than anger? What more remiss than clemency, what busier than cruelty? Pudicity is vacant; libido is most occupied.

Omnium denique uirtutum tutela facilis est, uitia magno coluntur. 3. Debet ira remoueri — hoc ex parte fatentur etiam qui dicunt esse minuendam: tota dimittatur, nihil profutura est. Sine illa facilius rectiusque scelera tollentur, mali punientur et transducentur in melius.

Finally, the tutelage of all virtues is easy; vices are cultivated at great cost. 3. Anger ought to be removed — this in part is admitted even by those who say it must be diminished: let it be dismissed entirely; it will be of no profit. Without it crimes will be taken away more easily and more rightly, the wicked will be punished and will be led over for the better.

Omnia quae debet sapiens sine ullius malae rei ministerio efficiet nihilque admiscebit cuius modum sollicitius obseruet.

The wise man will effect all that he ought without the ministry of any evil thing, and he will admix nothing whose measure he must observe more anxiously.

XIV.

14.

1. Numquam itaque iracundia admittenda est, aliquando simulanda, si segnes audientium animi concitandi sunt, sicut tarde consurgentis ad cursum equos stimulis facibusque subditis excitamus. Aliquando incutiendus est iis metus apud quos ratio non proficit: irasci quidem non magis utile est quam maerere, quam metuere. 2. 'Quid ergo?

1. Therefore irascibility must never be admitted; sometimes it must be simulated, if the sluggish minds of the hearers need to be stirred, just as we rouse horses that rise slowly to the course by putting goads and torches beneath them. Sometimes fear must be instilled into those with whom reason does not make progress: to be angry indeed is no more useful than to mourn, than to fear. 2. 'What then?

non incidunt causae quae iram lacessant?' Sed tunc maxime illi opponendae manus sunt. Nec est difficile uincere animum, cum athletae quoque, in uilissima sui parte occupati, tamen ictus doloresque patiantur ut uires caedentis exhauriant, nec cum ira suadet feriunt, sed cum occasio. 3. Pyrrhum, maximum praeceptorem certaminis gymnici, solitum aiunt iis quos exercebat praecipere ne irascerentur; ira enim perturbat artem et qua noceat tantum aspicit.

2. "Do not causes occur which provoke anger?" But then most of all hands must be set against it. Nor is it difficult to conquer the mind, since even athletes, occupied in the vilest part of themselves, nevertheless endure blows and pains in order to exhaust the strength of the smiter, and they do not strike when anger urges, but when occasion. 3. They say Pyrrhus, the greatest preceptor of the gymnic contest, was wont to enjoin those whom he trained not to grow angry; for anger perturbs the art and looks only to how it may harm.

Saepe itaque ratio patientiam suadet, ira uindictam, et qui primis defungi malis potuimus in maiora deuoluimur. 4. Quosdam unius uerbi contumelia non aequo animo lata in exilium proiecit, et qui leuem iniuriam silentio ferre noluerant grauissimis malis obruti sunt, indignatique aliquid ex plenissima libertate deminui seruile in sese adtraxerunt iugum.

Often therefore reason urges patience, anger vengeance, and we, who could have been done with the first evils, devolve into greater ones. 4. The contumely of a single word, not borne with an even mind, has cast some into exile; and those who had been unwilling to bear a light injury in silence have been overwhelmed by most serious evils, and, indignant that something be diminished from their fullest liberty, have drawn a servile yoke upon themselves.

XV.

15.

1. 'Vt scias' inquit 'iram habere in se generosi aliquid, liberas uidebis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythas.' Quod euenit quia fortia solidaque natura ingenia, antequam disciplina molliantur, prona in iram sunt. Quaedam enim non nisi melioribus innascuntur ingeniis, sicut ualida arbusta et laeta quamuis neglecta tellus creat et alta fecundi soli silua est; 2. itaque et ingenia natura fortia iracundiam ferunt nihilque tenue et exile capiunt ignea et feruida, sed inperfectus illis uigor est ut omnibus quae sine arte ipsius tantum naturae bono exsurgunt, sed nisi cito domita sunt, quae fortitudini apta erant audaciae temeritatique consuescunt. 3. Quid?

1. 'That you may know,' he says, 'that anger has in itself something of the generous, you will see free nations which are most irascible, such as the Germans and the Scythians.' This comes about because characters strong and solid by nature, before they are softened by discipline, are prone to anger. For certain things are born only in better characters, just as robust saplings and a luxuriant earth, although neglected, the soil brings forth, and a tall forest is of a fertile soil; 2. and so characters strong by nature also bear anger and, being fiery and fervid, take in nothing thin and slight; but their vigor is imperfect, as with all things which, without art, rise up by nature’s boon alone; but unless they are quickly tamed, the things that were suited to fortitude grow accustomed to audacity and temerity. 3. What?

non mitioribus animis uitia leniora coniuncta sunt, ut misericordia et amor et uerecundia? Itaque saepe tibi bonam indolem malis quoque suis ostendam; sed non ideo uitia non sunt si naturae melioris indicia sunt. 4. Deinde omnes istae feritate liberae gentes leonum luporumque ritu ut seruire non possunt, ita nec imperare; non enim humani uim ingenii, sed feri et intractabilis habent; nemo autem regere potest nisi qui et regi.

Are not milder vices conjoined to gentler minds, such as mercy and love and verecundity? And so I will often show you a good indole even by its own evils; but they are not on that account not vices, even if they are indicia of a better nature. 4. Then all those peoples free by ferity, in the manner of lions and wolves, just as they cannot serve, so neither can they rule; for they have not the force of human ingenuity, but of a feral and intractable one; moreover, no one can rule unless he also can be ruled.

5. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur: in frigora septemtrionemque uergentibus 'inmansueta ingenia' sunt, ut ait poeta,

5. Therefore, in general, empires have been in the hands of those peoples who make use of a milder sky: for those who incline toward colds and the Septentrion have 'untamed natures,' as the poet says,

suoque simillima caelo.

and most similar to their own climate.

1. 'Animalia' inquit 'generosissima habentur quibus multum inest irae.' Errat qui ea in exemplum hominis adducit quibus pro ratione est impetus: homini pro impetu ratio est. Sed ne illis quidem omnibus idem prodest: iracundia leones adiuuat, pauor ceruos, accipitrem impetus, columbam fuga. 2. Quid quod ne illud quidem uerum est, optima animalia esse iracundissima?

1. 'Animals,' he says, 'are held to be the most noble in which much anger is present.' He errs who brings forward as an exemplar for the human being those for whom impetus stands in place of reason: for the human being, in place of impetus, there is reason. But not even for all of them does the same thing profit: irascibility helps lions, fear helps stags, impetus the hawk, flight the dove. 2. What of the fact that not even this is true, that the best animals are the most irascible?

Feras putem, quibus ex raptu alimenta sunt, meliores quo iratiores: patientiam laudauerim boum et equorum frenos sequentium. Quid est autem cur hominem ad tam infelicia exempla reuoces, cum habeas mundum deumque, quem ex omnibus animalibus, ut solus imitetur, solus intellegit?
3. 'Simplicissimi' inquit 'omnium habentur iracundi.' Fraudulentis enim et uersutis comparantur et simplices uidentur quia expositi sunt.

Am I to think that wild beasts, whose nourishment is from rapine, are the better the more irate they are? I would rather praise the patience of oxen and of horses that follow the reins. What reason is there, moreover, for you to call man back to such ill-starred examples, when you have the world and God, whom, out of all animals, he alone understands, that he alone may imitate?
3. 'The very simplest,' he says, 'of all are held to be irascible.' For they are compared with the fraudulent and the wily, and seem simple because they are exposed.

Quos quidem non simplices dixerim sed incautos: stultis luxuriosis nepotibusque hoc nomen inponimus et omnibus uitiis parum callidis.

Those indeed I would not call simple but incautious: we impose this name upon fools, the luxurious, and profligates, and upon all who are inexpert in vices.

XVII.

17.

1. 'Orator' inquit 'iratus aliquando melior est.' Immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum mouent, sed iratum bene agentes; et apud iudices itaque et in contione et ubicumque alieni animi ad nostrum arbitrium agendi sunt, modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus, et saepe id quod ueri adfectus non effecissent effecit imitatio adfectuum.

1. 'The orator,' he says, 'is sometimes better when angry.' No—rather, one imitating an angry man; for even actors in delivery move the people not by being angry, but by acting an angry man well; and before judges, therefore, and in the assembly, and wherever the minds of others are to be acted upon at our discretion, now anger, now fear, now mercy, in order that we may instill them into others, we ourselves will simulate; and often what true affections (affects, emotions) would not have accomplished, the imitation of affections has accomplished.

2. 'Languidus' inquit 'animus est qui ira caret.' Verum est, si nihil habeat ira ualentius. Nec latronem oportet esse nec praedam, nec misericordem nec crudelem: illius nimis mollis animus, huius nimis durus est; temperatus sit sapiens et ad res fortius agendas non iram sed uim adhibeat.

2. 'Languid,' he says, 'is the mind that lacks anger.' It is true, if he have nothing stronger than anger. Nor ought one to be a robber nor prey, nor merciful nor cruel: that man’s mind is too soft, this one’s too hard; let the wise man be tempered, and for conducting affairs more stoutly let him employ not anger but force.

XVIII.

18.

1. Quoniam quae de ira quaeruntur tractauimus, accedamus ad remedia eius. Duo autem, ut opinor, sunt: ne incidamus in iram, et ne in ira peccemus. Vt in corporum cura alia de tuenda ualetudine, alia de restituenda praecepta sunt, ita aliter iram debemus repellere, aliter compescere.

1. Since we have treated the things that are inquired concerning anger, let us approach its remedies. There are, however, two, as I opine: that we not fall into anger, and that we not sin in anger. As in the care of bodies certain precepts are about preserving health, others about restoring it, so we ought in one way to repel anger, in another to restrain it.

Vt uitemus, quaedam ad uniuersam uitam pertinentia praecipientur: ea in educationem et in sequentia tempora diuidentur.

To avoid it, certain things pertaining to the whole life will be prescribed: these will be divided into education and into the subsequent times.

2. Educatio maximam diligentiam plurimumque profuturam desiderat; facile est enim teneros adhuc animos componere, difficulter reciduntur uitia quae nobiscum creuerunt.

2. Education demands the utmost diligence, and one that will be most beneficial; for it is easy to shape minds still tender, but the vices that have grown up with us are cut back with difficulty.

XIX.

19.

1. Opportunissima ad iracundiam feruidi animi natura est. Nam cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates pares his sunt, feruida frigida arida atque umida; et locorum itaque et animalium et corporum et morum uarietates mixtura elementorum facit, et proinde aliquo magis incumbunt ingenia prout alicuius elementi maior uis abundauit. Inde quasdam umidas uocamus aridasque regiones et calidas et frigidas.

1. Most opportune toward irascibility is the nature of a fervid mind. For since the elements are four—fire, water, air, earth—there are powers equal to these: fervid, frigid, arid, and humid; and thus the mixture of the elements makes the varieties of places, and of animals, and of bodies, and of mores; and accordingly temperaments incline more one way as the greater force of some element has abounded. Hence we call certain regions humid and arid and hot and cold.

2. Eadem animalium hominumque discrimina sunt: refert quantum quisque umidi in se calidique contineat; cuius in illo elementi portio praeualebit, inde mores erunt. Iracundos feruida animi natura faciet; est enim actuosus et pertinax ignis: frigidi mixtura timidos facit; pigrum est enim contractumque frigus. 3. Volunt itaque quidam ex nostris iram in pectore moueri efferuescente circa cor sanguine; causa cur hic potissimum adsignetur irae locus non alia est quam quod in toto corpore calidissimum pectus est.

2. The same discriminations belong to animals and to men: it matters how much of the moist and of the hot each one contains in himself; whichever portion of that element will prevail in him, from that will his character be. A fervid nature of the mind will make men irascible; for fire is active and pertinacious: a mixture of cold makes men timid; for cold is sluggish and contracted. 3. Accordingly some of our people wish that anger be moved in the breast by the blood effervescing around the heart; the reason why this place is most of all assigned to anger is no other than that the breast is the hottest in the whole body.

4. Quibus umidi plus inest, eorum paulatim crescit ira, quia non est paratus illis calor sed motu adquiritur; itaque puerorum feminarumque irae acres magis quam graues sunt leuioresque dum incipiunt. Siccis aetatibus uehemens robustaque est ira, sed sine incremento, non multum sibi adiciens, quia inclinaturum calorem frigus insequitur: senes difficiles et queruli sunt, ut aegri et conualescentes et quorum aut lassitudine aut detractione sanguinis exhaustus est calor; 5. in eadem causa sunt siti fameque tabidi et quibus exsangue corpus est maligneque alitur et deficit. Vinum incendit iras, quia calorem auget; pro cuiusque natura quidam ebrii efferuescunt, quidam saucii.

4. In those in whom there is more moisture, anger grows little by little, because heat is not ready for them but is acquired by motion; and so the angers of boys and of women are more sharp than weighty and lighter while they begin. In dry ages anger is vehement and robust, but without increment, not adding much to itself, because cold follows to incline the heat downward: old men are difficult and querulous, as are the sick and the convalescents and those whose heat has been exhausted either by weariness or by a detraction of blood; 5. in the same condition are those tabid with thirst and hunger, and those whose body is exsanguine and is meagerly nourished and fails. Wine inflames angers, because it augments heat; according to each one’s nature some when drunk effervesce, some are wounded.

Neque ulla alia causa est cur iracundissimi sint flaui rubentesque, quibus talis natura color est qualis fieri ceteris inter iram solet; mobilis enim illis agitatusque sanguis est.

Nor is there any other cause why the blond and the ruddy are the most irascible, they whose natural color is such as is wont to arise in others during anger; for their blood is mobile and agitated.

XX.

20.

1. Sed quemadmodum natura quosdam procliues in iram facit, ita multae incidunt causae quae idem possint quod natura: alios morbus aut iniuria corporum in hoc perduxit, alios labor aut continua peruigilia noctesque sollicitae et desideria amoresque; quidquid aliud aut corpori nocuit aut animo, aegram mentem in querellas parat. 2. Sed omnia ista initia causaeque sunt: plurimum potest consuetudo, quae si grauis est alit uitium. Naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nec licet semel mixta nascentium elementa conuertere; sed in hoc nosse profuerit, ut calentibus ingeniis subtrahas uinum, quod pueris Plato negandum putat et ignem uetat igne incitari.

1. But just as nature makes certain persons inclined to wrath, so many causes occur which can do the same as nature: disease or injuries of the body have brought some to this, others toil or continual vigils and anxious nights and desires and loves; whatever else has harmed either the body or the mind prepares a sick mind for complaints. 2. But all those are beginnings and causes: custom has the greatest power, which, if it is weighty, nourishes the vice. To change nature indeed is difficult, nor is it permitted to convert the elements of the newborn once mingled; but it will be useful to know this, that you withdraw wine from hot temperaments, which Plato thinks should be denied to boys, and he forbids fire to be incited by fire.

Ne cibis quidem inplendi sunt; distendentur enim corpora et animi cum corpore tumescent. 3. Labor illos citra lassitudinem exerceat, ut minuatur, non ut consumatur calor nimiusque ille feruor despumet. Lusus quoque proderunt; modica enim uoluptas laxat animos et temperat.

Nor are they to be filled up with foods; for the bodies will be distended, and the spirits will swell along with the body. 3. Let labor exercise them short of lassitude, so that the heat may be diminished, not consumed, and that that excessive fervor may shed its foam. Games, too, will be beneficial; for moderate pleasure loosens the spirits and tempers them.

4. Vmidioribus siccioribusque et frigidis non est ab ira periculum, sed inertiora uitia metuenda sunt, pauor et difficultas et desperatio et suspiciones; mollienda itaque fouendaque talia ingenia et in laetitiam euocanda sunt. Et quia aliis contra iram, aliis contra tristitiam remediis utendum est nec dissimillimis tantum ista sed contrariis curanda sunt, semper ei occurremus quod increuerit.

4. For the more moist, the drier, and the cold there is no danger from anger, but more inert vices are to be feared—fear, difficulty, desperation, and suspicions; therefore such natures must be softened and fostered and called forth into cheerfulness. And because for some people remedies must be used against anger, for others against sadness, and these things must be treated not only by very dissimilar but by contrary means, we will always counter whatever has grown in strength.

XXI.

21.

1. Plurimum, inquam, proderit pueros statim salubriter institui; difficile autem regimen est, quia dare debemus operam ne aut iram in illis nutriamus aut indolem retundamus. 2. Diligenti obseruatione res indiget; utrumque enim, et quod extollendum et quod deprimendum est, similibus alitur, facile autem etiam adtendentem similia decipiunt. 3. Crescit licentia spiritus, seruitute comminuitur; adsurgit si laudatur et in spem sui bonam adducitur, sed eadem ista insolentiam et iracundiam generant: itaque sic inter utrumque regendus est ut modo frenis utamur modo stimulis.

1. It will profit very greatly, I say, for boys to be at once salubriously instructed; but the regimen is difficult, because we must apply effort that we neither nourish anger in them nor blunt their inborn disposition. 2. The matter needs diligent observation; for both that which is to be extolled and that which is to be depressed are nourished by similar things, and likenesses easily deceive even one who is attentive. 3. The spirit grows in license, is diminished by servitude; it rises if it is praised and is led into a good hope of itself, but these same things generate insolence and irascibility: therefore he must be governed between the two in such a way that now we use the reins, now the spurs.

4. Nihil humile, nihil seruile patiatur; numquam illi necesse sit rogare suppliciter nec prosit rogasse, potius causae suae et prioribus factis et bonis in futurum promissis donetur. 5. In certaminibus aequalium nec uinci illum patiamur nec irasci; demus operam ut familiaris sit iis cum quibus contendere solet, ut in certamine adsuescat non nocere uelle sed uincere; quotiens superauerit et dignum aliquid laude fecerit, attolli non gestire patiamur; gaudium enim exultatio, exultationem tumor et nimia aestimatio sui sequitur. 6. Dabimus aliquod laxamentum, in desidiam uero otiumque non resoluemus et procul a contactu deliciarum retinebimus; nihil enim magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda.

4. Let him suffer nothing humble, nothing servile; let it never be necessary for him to ask suppliantly, nor let it be of profit to have asked; rather let it be granted to him on account of his cause, his prior deeds, and his good promises for the future. 5. In contests of equals let us allow him neither to be conquered nor to grow angry; let us take pains that he be familiar with those with whom he is accustomed to contend, so that in contest he may grow accustomed not to wish to harm but to conquer; whenever he has prevailed and has done something worthy of praise, let us not allow him to long to be lifted up; for joy is followed by exultation, exultation by swelling, and by an excessive self-estimation. 6. We will give some relaxation, but we will not loosen into sloth and idleness, and we will keep him far from the contact of luxuries; for nothing makes men more irascible than a soft and coaxing upbringing.

Ideo unicis quo plus indulgetur, pupillisque quo plus licet, corruptior animus est. Non resistet offensis cui nihil umquam negatum est, cuius lacrimas sollicita semper mater abstersit, cui de paedagogo satisfactum est. 7. Non uides ut maiorem quamque fortunam maior ira comitetur?

Therefore, the more is indulged to only children, and the more is permitted to wards, the more corrupted is the spirit. He will not withstand affronts who has never been denied anything, whose tears a solicitous mother has always wiped away, for whom satisfaction has been exacted from the pedagogue. 7. Do you not see how, the greater each fortune is, the greater wrath accompanies it?

In diuitibus et nobilibus et magistratibus praecipue apparet, cum quidquid leue et inane in animo erat secunda se aura sustulit. Felicitas iracundiam nutrit, ubi aures superbas adsentatorum turba circumstetit: 'tibi enim ille respondeat? Non pro fastigio te tuo metiris; ipse te proicis' et alia quibus uix sanae et ab initio bene fundatae mentes restiterunt.

It appears especially in the rich and the noble and in magistrates, when a propitious breeze has lifted up whatever was light and inane in the mind. Felicity nourishes irascibility, where a crowd of adulators has surrounded proud ears: 'For should he answer you? You do not measure yourself according to your own eminence; you are yourself casting yourself down'—and other things, to which even minds sane and from the beginning well-founded have scarcely resisted.

8. Longe itaque ab adsentatione pueritia remouenda est: audiat uerum. Et timeat interim, uereatur semper, maioribus adsurgat. Nihil per iracundiam exoret: quod flenti negatum fuerit quieto offeratur.

8. Therefore assentation must be removed far from boyhood: let him hear the truth. And let him fear meanwhile, let him revere always, let him rise before his elders. Let him obtain nothing through anger: what has been denied to him when weeping, let it be offered to him when quiet.

Et diuitias parentium in conspectu habeat, non in usu. 9. Exprobrentur illi perperam facta. Pertinebit ad rem praeceptores paedagogosque pueris placidos dari: proximis adplicatur omne quod tenerum est et in eorum similitudinem crescit; nutricum et paedagogorum rettulere mox adulescentium mores.

And let him have the riches of his parents in sight, not in use. 9. Let the things done amiss be upbraided to him. It will pertain to the matter that teachers and pedagogues be given to boys who are placid: everything that is tender attaches itself to those nearest and grows into their similitude; the manners of adolescents have soon reflected those of nurses and pedagogues.

10. Apud Platonem educatus puer cum ad parentes relatus uociferantem uideret patrem: 'numquam' inquit 'hoc apud Platonem uidi.' Non dubito quin citius patrem imitatus sit quam Platonem. 11. Tenuis ante omnia uictus et non pretiosa uestis et similis cultus cum aequalibus: non irascetur aliquem sibi comparari quem ab initio multis parem feceris.

10. A boy educated under Plato, when, having been brought back to his parents, he saw his father vociferating, said: 'never,' he says, 'did I see this with Plato.' I do not doubt that he more quickly imitated his father than Plato. 11. Above all, let the diet be frugal, and the garment not precious, and the style similar with his equals: he will not grow angry at someone being compared with him, whom from the beginning you have made equal to many.

XXII.

22.

1. Sed haec ad liberos nostros pertinent; in nobis quidem sors nascendi et educatio nec uitii locum nec iam praecepti habet: sequentia ordinanda sunt. 2. Contra primas itaque causas pugnare debemus; causa autem iracundiae opinio iniuriae est, cui non facile credendum est. Ne apertis quidem manifestisque statim accedendum; quaedam enim falsa ueri speciem ferunt.

1. But these matters pertain to our children; in our own case, indeed, the lot of being born and education now gives neither room for fault nor for precept: the subsequent points are to be ordered. 2. Against the first causes, therefore, we ought to fight; now the cause of anger is the opinion of an injury, to which credence is not easily to be given. Not even to things open and manifest must we at once accede; for certain false things bear the appearance of the true.

Dandum semper est tempus: ueritatem dies aperit. 3. Ne sint aures criminantibus faciles; hoc humanae naturae uitium suspectum notumque nobis sit, quod quae inuiti audimus libenter credimus et antequam iudicemus irascimur. 4. Quid quod non criminationibus tantum sed suspicionibus inpellimur et ex uultu risuque alieno peiora interpretati innocentibus irascimur?

Time must always be granted: the day reveals the truth. 3. Let our ears not be easy to accusers; let this vice of human nature be to us both suspect and known, that the things which we unwillingly hear we gladly believe, and before we judge we grow angry. 4. What of this, that we are driven not only by accusations but by suspicions, and, interpreting worse things from another’s countenance and laughter, we grow angry at the innocent?

Itaque agenda est contra se causa absentis et in suspenso ira retinenda; potest enim poena dilata exigi, non potest exacta reuocari.

Therefore the case of the absent must be pled against oneself, and anger must be held in suspense; for a penalty, when deferred, can be exacted, but once exacted it cannot be recalled.

XXIII.

23.

1. Notus est ille tyrannicida qui, inperfecto opere comprehensus et ab Hippia tortus ut conscios indicaret, circumstantes amicos tyranni nominauit quibusque maxime caram salutem eius sciebat. Et cum ille singulos, ut nominati erant, occidi iussisset, interrogauit ecquis superesset: 'tu' inquit 'solus; neminem enim alium cui carus esses reliqui.' Effecit ira ut tyrannus tyrannicidae manus accommodaret et praesidia sua gladio suo caederet. 2. Quanto animosius Alexander!

1. That tyrannicide is well known who, seized with the work unfinished and tortured by Hippias to point out his accomplices, named the friends of the tyrant standing around, and those whom he knew most cherished his safety. And when he had ordered each, as they were named, to be killed, he asked whether anyone remained: 'you,' he said, 'alone; for I left no one else to whom you were dear.' His anger brought it about that the tyrant lent his hands to the tyrannicide and cut down his own guards with his own sword. 2. How much more high-spirited Alexander!

qui cum legisset epistulam matris, qua admonebatur ut a ueneno Philippi medici caueret, acceptam potionem non deterritus bibit: plus sibi de amico suo credidit. Dignus fuit qui innocentem haberet, dignus qui faceret. 3. Hoc eo magis in Alexandro laudo quia nemo tam obnoxius irae fuit; quo rarior autem moderatio in regibus, hoc laudanda magis est.

who, when he had read the letter of his mother, in which he was admonished to beware of the poison of Philip the physician, not deterred, drank the potion he had received: he trusted more, on his own account, in his friend. He was worthy to have him innocent, worthy to do it. 3. This I the more praise in Alexander, because no one was so subject to wrath; and the rarer moderation is in kings, the more it is to be praised.

4. Fecit hoc et C. Caesar ille qui uictoria ciuili clementissime usus est: cum scrinia deprendisset epistularum ad Cn. Pompeium missarum ab iis qui uidebantur aut in diuersis aut in neutris fuisse partibus, combussit. Quamuis moderate soleret irasci, maluit tamen non posse; gratissimum putauit genus ueniae nescire quid quisque peccasset.

4. This also was done by that C. Caesar, who made most clement use of a civil victory: when he had intercepted letter-cases of letters sent to Cn. Pompeius by those who seemed to have been either in opposing or in neither parties, he burned them. Although he was accustomed to be angry in a moderate way, yet he preferred not to be able; he thought the most gratifying kind of pardon was not to know what each had sinned.

XXIV.

24.

1. Plurimum mali credulitas facit. Saepe ne audiendum quidem est, quoniam in quibusdam rebus satius est decipi quam diffidere. Tollenda ex animo suspicio et coniectura, fallacissima inritamenta: 'ille me parum humane salutauit; ille osculo meo non adhaesit; ille inchoatum sermonem cito abrupit; ille ad cenam non uocauit; illius uultus auersior uisus est.' 2. Non deerit suspicioni argumentatio: simplicitate opus est et benigna rerum aestimatione.

1. Credulity does a great deal of harm. Often it is not even to be listened to, since in certain matters it is preferable to be deceived than to distrust. Suspicion and conjecture must be removed from the mind, most fallacious incitements: 'he greeted me not very kindly; he did not adhere to my kiss; he quickly broke off a conversation once begun; he did not invite me to dinner; his face seemed more averted.' 2. Reasoning will not be lacking for suspicion: there is need of simplicity and a benign estimation of things.

Nihil nisi quod in oculos incurret manifestumque erit credamus, et quotiens suspicio nostra uana apparuerit, obiurgemus credulitatem; haec enim castigatio consuetudinem efficiet non facile credendi.

Let us believe nothing except what meets the eyes and is manifest, and whenever our suspicion has appeared vain, let us objurgate our credulity; for this castigation will produce a habit of not believing easily.

XXV.

25.

1. Inde et illud sequitur, ut minimis sordidissimisque rebus non exacerbemur. Parum agilis est puer aut tepidior aqua poturo aut turbatus torus aut mensa neglegentius posita: ad ista concitari insania est. Aeger et infelicis ualetudinis est quem leuis aura contraxit, adfecti oculi quos candida uestis obturbat, dissolutus deliciis cuius latus alieno labore condoluit.

1. Then this too follows: that we not be exasperated at the least and most sordid things. The boy is not very agile, or the water for drinking is rather tepid, or the couch is disordered, or the table is set more negligently: to be roused to rage at such things is insanity. He is sick and of unlucky health whom a light breeze has contracted; affected are the eyes which a white garment perturbs; dissolved by delights is the one whose side has felt pain at another’s labor.

2. Mindyriden aiunt fuisse ex Sybaritarum ciuitate qui, cum uidisset fodientem et altius rastrum adleuantem, lassum se fieri questus uetuit illum opus in conspectu suo facere; idem habere se peius questus est, quod foliis rosae duplicatis incubuisset. 3. Vbi animum simul et corpus uoluptates corrupere, nihil tolerabile uidetur, non quia dura sed quia mollis patitur. Quid est enim cur tussis alicuius aut sternutamentum aut musca parum curiose fugata in rabiem agat aut obuersatus canis aut clauis neglegentis serui manibus elapsa?

2. They say there was a Mindyrides from the city of the Sybarites, who, when he had seen a man digging and lifting the rake too high, complained that he was becoming tired, and forbade him to do that work in his sight; the same man complained that he felt worse because he had lain upon rose-leaves that had been doubled. 3. When pleasures have corrupted both mind and body at once, nothing seems tolerable, not because things are hard but because the soft man suffers. For what is the reason why someone’s cough or a sneeze, or a fly not quite carefully chased away, should drive one into a rage, or a dog appearing before one, or a key slipping from the hands of a negligent slave?

4. Feret iste aequo animo ciuile conuicium et ingesta in contione curiaue maledicta cuius aures tracti subsellii stridor offendit? Perpetietur hic famem et aestiuae expeditionis sitim qui puero male diluenti niuem irascitur? Nulla itaque res magis iracundiam alit quam luxuria intemperans et inpatiens: dure tractandus animus est ut ictum non sentiat nisi grauem.

4. Will that man bear with an even mind a civic reviling and the curses hurled in an assembly or curia, whose ears are offended by the screech of a dragged bench? Will he endure hunger and the thirst of a summer expedition, who grows angry at a boy badly diluting snow? Nothing, therefore, more nourishes irascibility than luxury—intemperate and impatient: the mind must be treated harshly, so that it does not feel a blow unless a grave one.

XXVI.

26.

1. Irascimur aut iis a quibus ne accipere quidem potuimus iniuriam, aut iis a quibus accipere iniuriam potuimus. 2. Ex prioribus quaedam sine sensu sunt, ut liber quem minutioribus litteris scriptum saepe proiecimus et mendosum lacerauimus, ut uestimenta quae, quia displicebant, scidimus: his irasci quam stultum est, quae iram nostram nec meruerunt nec sentiunt! 3. 'Sed offendunt nos uidelicet qui illa fecerunt.' Primum saepe antequam hoc apud nos distinguamus irascimur.

1. We grow angry either at those from whom we could not even receive an injury, or at those from whom we could receive an injury. 2. Among the former, some are without sensation, as a book which, written in smaller letters, we have often thrown aside and, being faulty, torn up; as garments which, because they displeased, we ripped: to be angry at these—how foolish it is!—which neither have deserved our anger nor feel it! 3. 'But, evidently, those who made those things offend us.' First, we are often angry before we make this distinction with ourselves.

Deinde fortasse ipsi quoque artifices excusationes iustas adferent: alius non potuit melius facere quam fecit, nec ad tuam contumeliam parum didicit; alius non in hoc ut te offenderet fecit. Ad ultimum quid est dementius quam bilem in homines collectam in res effundere? 4. Atqui ut his irasci dementis est quae anima carent, sic mutis animalibus, quae nullam iniuriam nobis faciunt, quia uelle non possunt; non est enim iniuria nisi a consilio profecta.

Then perhaps the artisans themselves too will bring just excuses: one could not do better than he did, nor, to your contumely, did he learn too little; another did not do this with the purpose of offending you. At the last, what is more demented than to pour out upon things the bile collected against men? 4. And yet, just as it is a madman’s part to be angry at those things which lack soul, so too at mute animals, which do us no injury, because they cannot will; for there is no injury unless it has proceeded from counsel.

Nocere itaque nobis possunt ut ferrum aut lapis, iniuriam quidem facere non possunt. 5. Atqui contemni se quidam putant, ubi idem equi obsequentes alteri equiti, alteri contumaces sunt, tamquam iudicio, non consuetudine et arte tractandi quaedam quibusdam subiectiora sint. 6. Atqui ut his irasci stultum est, ita pueris et non multum a puerorum prudentia distantibus; omnia enim ista peccata apud aequum iudicem pro innocentia habent inprudentiam.

Therefore they can harm us like iron or stone; indeed, they cannot do an injury. 5. And yet some think themselves contemned, when the same horses are obsequious to one rider, contumacious to another, as though by judgment, and not by custom and the art of handling, certain things were more subject to certain persons. 6. And just as it is foolish to be angry with these, so too with boys and with those not far removed from the prudence of boys; for all such faults, before a fair judge, have imprudence reckoned as innocence.

XXVII.

27.

1. Quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt nullamque uim nisi beneficam et salutarem habent, ut di inmortales, qui nec uolunt obesse nec possunt; natura enim illis mitis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena iniuria quam a sua. 2. Dementes itaque et ignari ueritatis illis inputant saeuitiam maris, inmodicos imbres, pertinaciam hiemis, cum interim nihil horum quae nobis nocent prosuntque ad nos proprie derigatur. Non enim nos causa mundo sumus hiemem aestatemque referendi: suas ista leges habent, quibus diuina exercentur; nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis uidemur propter quos tanta moueantur.

1. There are certain things which cannot harm and have no force except a beneficent and salutary one, such as the immortal gods, who neither wish to hurt nor are able; for their nature is mild and placid, so far removed from another’s injury as from their own. 2. Mad, therefore, and ignorant of the truth, men impute to them the savagery of the sea, immoderate rains, the pertinacity of winter, whereas meanwhile nothing of these things which harm us and benefit us is directed specifically toward us. For we are not the cause for the world of bringing back winter and summer: those things have their own laws, by which divine affairs are administered; we suspect too much of ourselves, if we seem to ourselves worthy for whose sake such great matters should be set in motion.

Nihil ergo horum in nostram iniuriam fit, immo contra nihil non ad salutem. 3. Quaedam esse diximus quae nocere non possint, quaedam quae nolint. In iis erunt boni magistratus parentesque et praeceptores et iudices, quorum castigatio sic accipienda est quomodo scalpellum et abstinentia et alia quae profutura torquent.

Nothing, therefore, of these is done to our injury; nay rather, on the contrary, everything is toward our well-being. 3. We have said that some things cannot harm, some do not wish to. Among these will be good magistrates and parents and preceptors and judges, whose castigation is to be received just as the scalpel and abstinence and other things which, while they torment, are going to be beneficial.

4. Adfecti sumus poena: succurrat non tantum quid patiamur sed quid fecerimus, in consilium de uita nostra mittamur; si modo uerum ipsi nobis dicere uoluerimus, pluris litem nostram aestimabimus.

4. We have been affected by punishment: let there come to mind not only what we suffer but what we have done; let us be sent into deliberation about our life; if only we are willing to speak the truth to ourselves, we shall estimate our suit at a higher value.

XXVIII.

28.

1. Si uolumus aequi rerum omnium iudices esse, hoc primum nobis persuadeamus, neminem nostrum esse sine culpa; hinc enim maxima indignatio oritur: 'nihil peccaui' et 'nihil feci'. Immo nihil fateris. Indignamur aliqua admonitione aut coercitione nos castigatos, cum illo ipso tempore peccemus, quod adicimus malefactis adrogantiam et contumaciam. 2. Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus legibus innocentem?

1. If we wish to be equitable judges of all things, let us first persuade ourselves of this: that none of us is without fault; for from this the greatest indignation arises: ‘I have committed nothing wrong’ and ‘I have done nothing.’ Nay, you confess nothing. We are indignant that we have been chastised by some admonition or coercion, when at that very moment we are sinning, because we add to our malefactions arrogance and contumacy. 2. Who is this who professes himself innocent in respect to all laws?

Vt hoc ita sit, quam angusta innocentia est ad legem bonum esse! Quanto latius officiorum patet quam iuris regula! Quam multa pietas humanitas liberalitas iustitia fides exigunt, quae omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt!

Granted that this is so, how narrow an innocence it is to be good according to the law! How much more widely the sphere of duties extends than the rule of law! How many things piety, humanity, liberality, justice, and faith require, all of which lie outside the statute-books!

3. Sed ne ad illam quidem artissimam innocentiae formulam praestare nos possumus: alia fecimus, alia cogitauimus, alia optauimus, aliis fauimus; in quibusdam innocentes sumus, quia non successit. 4. Hoc cogitantes aequiores simus delinquentibus, credamus obiurgantibus; utique bonis ne irascamur (cui enim non, si bonis quoque?), minime dis; non enim illorum , sed lege mortalitatis patimur quidquid incommodi accidit. 'At morbi doloresque incurrunt.' Vtique aliquo defungendum est domicilium putre sortitis.

3. But not even to that most constricted formula of innocence can we make good: we have done some things, thought others, desired others, favored others; in certain matters we are innocent, because it did not succeed. 4. Thinking this, let us be more equitable toward delinquents, let us believe those who objurgate; at any rate, let us not be angry with the good (for with whom indeed would we not be, if even with the good?), least of all with the gods; for we suffer whatever inconvenience befalls not by their , but by the law of mortality. 'But diseases and pains occur.' Assuredly, having been allotted a putrid domicile, one must be done with it at some point.

5. Dicetur aliquis male de te locutus: cogita an priorfeceris, cogita de quam multis loquaris. Cogitemus, inquam, alios non facere iniuriam sed reponere, alios pro nobis facere, alios coactos facere, alios ignorantes, etiam eos qui uolentes scientesque faciunt ex iniuria nostra non ipsam iniuriam petere: aut dulcedine urbanitatis prolapsus est, aut fecit aliquid, non ut nobis obesset, sed quia consequi ipse non poterat, nisi nos reppulisset; saepe adulatio dum blanditur offendit. 6. Quisquis ad se rettulerit quotiens ipse in suspicionem falsam inciderit, quam multis officiis suis fortuna speciem iniuriae induerit, quam multos post odium amare coeperit, poterit non statim irasci, utique si sibi tacitus ad singula quibus offenditur dixerit 'hoc et ipse commisi'. 7. Sed ubi tam aequum iudicem inuenies?

5. Someone will be said to have spoken ill of you: consider whether you did it first; consider about how many you speak. Let us consider, I say, that some do not commit an injury but repay, that some act on our behalf, some are compelled to act, some act in ignorance; even those who act willingly and knowingly aim, from our injury, not at the injury itself: either he slipped by the sweetness of urbanity, or he did something not in order to harm us, but because he could not attain it himself unless he had pushed us back; often adulation, while it flatters, offends. 6. Whoever shall refer to himself how often he himself has fallen into false suspicion, how often fortune has put upon his own services the appearance of an injury, how many people he began to love after hatred, will be able not to grow angry at once, especially if to himself, silently, at each thing by which he is offended he says, ‘this too have I committed.’ 7. But where will you find so equitable a judge?

Is qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit et satis iustas causas putat amandi quod aliena est, idem uxorem suam aspici non uult; et fidei acerrimus exactor est perfidus, et mendacia persequitur ipse periurus, et litem sibi inferri aegerrime calumniator patitur; pudicitiam seruulorum adtemptari non uult qui non pepercit suae. 8. Aliena uitia in oculis habemus, a tergo nostra sunt: inde est quod tempestiua filii conuiuia pater deterior filio castigat, et nihil alienae luxuriae ignoscit qui nihil suae negauit, et homicidae tyrannus irascitur, et punit furta sacrilegus. Magna pars hominum est quae non peccatis irascitur sed peccantibus.

He who covets the wife of no one not—that is, of everyone—and deems sufficiently just causes for loving the fact that she is another’s, this same man does not wish his own wife to be looked at; and, though a most sharp exactor of good faith, he is perfidious; and he prosecutes lies, he himself perjured; and, a calumniator, he most begrudgingly endures a suit being brought against himself; he who spared not his own wife does not wish the chastity of his slaves to be assailed. 8. We have others’ vices before our eyes, our own are at our back: hence it is that a father, worse than his son, castigates the son’s early drinking-parties, and he who denied nothing to his own luxury pardons nothing in another’s, and a tyrant grows angry at a homicide, and a sacrilegious man punishes thefts. A great part of mankind is such as grows angry not at sins but at sinners.

Faciet nos moderatiores respectus nostri, si consuluerimus nos: 'numquid et ipsi aliquid tale commisimus? Numquid sic errauimus? Expeditne nobis ista damnare?'

Our self-regard will make us more moderate, if we consult ourselves: 'have we too committed something of such a sort? Have we erred thus? Is it expedient for us to condemn those things?'

XXIX.

29.

1. Maximum remedium irae mora est. Hoc ab illa pete initio, non ut ignoscat sed ut iudicet: graues habet impetus primos; desinet, si expectat. Nec uniuersam illam temptaueris tollere: tota uincetur, dum partibus carpitur.

1. The greatest remedy for anger is delay. Ask this from it at the beginning, not that it forgive but that it judge: its first impulses are grave; it will desist, if it waits. Nor should you attempt to remove it entirely: it will be conquered as a whole, while it is plucked away in parts.

2. Ex iis quae nos offendunt alia renuntiantur nobis, alia ipsi audimus aut uidemus. De iis quae narrata sunt non debemus cito credere: multi mentiuntur ut decipiant, multi quia decepti sunt; alius criminatione gratiam captat et fingit iniuriam ut uideatur doluisse factam; est aliquis malignus et qui amicitias cohaerentis diducere uelit; est ~suspicax~ et qui spectare ludos cupiat et ex longinquo tutoque speculetur quos conlisit. 3. De paruula summa iudicaturo tibi res sine teste non probaretur, testis sine iureiurando non ualeret, utrique parti dares actionem, dares tempus, non semel audires; magis enim ueritas elucet quo saepius ad manum uenit: amicum condemnas de praesentibus?

2. Of those things which offend us, some are reported back to us, others we ourselves hear or see. About those things which have been narrated we ought not quickly to believe: many lie in order to deceive, many because they have been deceived; another courts favor by a crimination and feigns an injury so that he may seem to have smarted at what was done; there is someone malign and who wishes to draw apart cohering friendships; there is the ~suspicious~ sort, who longs to watch the games and from afar and in safety to spy upon those whom he has clashed together. 3. If you were about to judge concerning a tiny sum, a matter without a witness would not be proved to you, a witness without an oath would not have force; you would give an action to each party, give time, you would not hear them once only; for truth shines out more the more often it comes to hand: will you condemn a friend on the basis of the present things?

Antequam audias, antequam interroges, antequam illi aut accusatorem suum nosse liceat aut crimen, irasceris? Iam enim, iam utrimque <quid> diceretur audisti? 4. Hic ipse qui ad te detulit desinet dicere, si probare debuerit: 'non est' inquit 'quod me protrahas; ego productus negabo; alioqui nihil umquam tibi dicam.' Eodem tempore et instigat et ipse se certamini pugnaeque subtrahit.

Before you hear, before you interrogate, before it is permitted for him either to know his accuser or the charge, do you grow angry? For now, already, have you heard what on both sides would be said? 4. This very man who reported to you will cease to speak, if he should have to prove it: “there is no reason,” he says, “for you to drag me out; once produced I will deny; otherwise I will never tell you anything.” At the same time he both instigates and himself withdraws from the contest and the fight.

Qui dicere tibi nisi clam non uult, paene non dicit: quid est iniquius quam secreto credere, palam irasci?

He who is unwilling to speak to you except clandestinely scarcely speaks at all: what is more iniquitous than to give credence in secret, to be angry openly?

XXX.

30.

1. Quorundam ipsi testes sumus: in his naturam excutiemus uoluntatemque facientium. Puer est: aetati donetur, nescit an peccet. Pater est: aut tantum profuit ut illi etiam iniuriae ius sit, aut fortasse ipsum hoc meritum eius est quo offendimur.

1. Of certain persons we ourselves are witnesses: in their case we will examine the nature and the will of the doers. He is a boy: let it be granted to his age; he does not know whether he sins. He is a father: either he has so benefited us that even a right of injury belongs to him, or perhaps this very thing in which we are offended is his merit.

Mulier est: errat. Iussus est: necessitati quis nisi iniquus suscenset? Laesus est: non est iniuria pati quod prior feceris.

She is a woman: she errs. He was ordered: who, unless iniquitous, resents necessity? He has been injured: it is not an injury to suffer what you yourself did first.

Iudex est: plus credas illius sententiae quam tuae. Rex est: si nocentem punit, cede iustitiae, si innocentem, cede fortunae. 2. Mutum animal est aut simile muto: imitaris illud, si irasceris.

He is a judge: give more credence to his judgment than to your own. He is a king: if he punishes the guilty, yield to justice; if the innocent, yield to fortune. 2. It is a mute animal or like a mute: you imitate it, if you grow angry.

Morbus est aut calamitas: leuius transiliet sustinentem. Deus est: tam perdis operam cum illi irasceris quam cum illum alteri precaris iratum. Bonus uir est qui iniuriam fecit: noli credere.

It is a sickness or a calamity: it will more lightly overleap the one who sustains it. It is a god: you waste your effort just as much when you are angry at him as when you pray him wrathful against another. He is a good man who did the injury: do not believe it.

Malus: noli mirari; dabit poenas alteri quas debet tibi, et iam sibi dedit qui peccauit.

The bad man: do not marvel; he will pay penalties to another which he owes to you, and he who has sinned has already paid them to himself.

XXXI.

31.

1. Duo sunt, ut dixi quae iracundiam concitant: primum, si iniuriam uidemur accepisse — de hoc satis dictum est; deinde, si inique accepisse — de hoc dicendum est. 2. Iniqua quaedam iudicant homines quia pati non debuerint, quaedam quia non sperauerint. Indigna putamus quae inopinata sunt; itaque maxime commouent quae contra spem expectationemque euenerunt, nec aliud est quare in domesticis minima offendant, in amicis iniuriam uocemus neglegentiam.

1. There are two things, as I have said, that stir up irascibility: first, if we seem to have received an injury — enough has been said about this; then, if we seem to have received it unjustly — this must be spoken of. 2. Men judge certain things iniquitous because they ought not to have had to suffer them, others because they had not hoped for them. We deem those things indignities which are unforeseen; and so the things that have happened contrary to hope and expectation move us most, and there is no other reason why, in domestic matters, the smallest things give offense, and in the case of friends we call negligence an injury.

3. 'Quomodo ergo' inquit 'inimicorum nos iniuriae mouent?' Quia non expectauimus illas aut certe non tantas. Hoc efficit amor nostri nimius: inuiolatos nos etiam inimicis iudicamus esse debere; regis quisque intra se animum habet, ut licentiam sibi dari uelit, in se nolit. 4. Aut ignorantia itaque nos aut insolentia iracundos facit [ignorantia rerum]. Quid enim mirum est malos mala facinora edere?

3. 'How then,' he says, 'do the injuries of enemies move us?' Because we did not expect them, or at least not such great ones. An excessive love of ourselves brings this about: we judge that we ought to be inviolable even by enemies; each person has within himself a king’s spirit, so that he wants license to be given to himself, but does not want it against himself. 4. Therefore either ignorance or insolence makes us irascible [ignorance of things]. For what is marvelous about evil men bringing forth evil deeds?

Quid noui est, si inimicus nocet, amicus offendit, filius labitur, seruus peccat? Turpissimam aiebat Fabius imperatori excusationem esse 'non putaui', ego turpissimam homini puto. Omnia puta, expecta: etiam in bonis moribus aliquid existet asperius.

What is new, if an enemy harms, a friend offends, a son slips, a slave sins? Fabius used to say that for a commander the most shameful excuse is 'I did not think'; I deem it the most shameful for a human being. Think of everything, expect it: even in good morals something rather harsh will exist.

5. Fert humana natura insidiosos animos, fert ingratos, fert cupidos, fert impios. Cum de unius moribus iudicabis, de publicis cogita. Vbi maxime gaudebis, maxime metues; ubi tranquilla tibi omnia uidentur, ibi nocitura non desunt sed quiescunt.

5. Human nature bears insidious spirits, bears the ungrateful, bears the covetous, bears the impious. When you judge the morals of a single person, think of the public ones. Where you will rejoice most, you will fear most; where all things seem tranquil to you, there the noxious things are not lacking but are quiescent.

Semper futurum aliquid quod te offendat existima: gubernator numquam ita totos sinus securus explicuit ut non expedite ad contrahendum armamenta disponeret.

Always reckon that there will be something to offend you: the helmsman never so securely unfurled all the sails as not to have the rigging disposed for promptly drawing them in.

6. Illud ante omnia cogita, foedam esse et execrabilem uim nocendi et alienissimam homini, cuius beneficio etiam saeua mansuescunt. Aspice elephantorum iugo colla summissa et taurorum pueris pariter ac feminis persultantibus terga inpune calcata et repentis inter pocula sinusque innoxio lapsu dracones et intra domum ursorum leonumque ora placida tractantibus adulantisque dominum feras: pudebit cum animalibus permutasse mores. 7. Nefas est nocere patriae; ergo ciui quoque, nam hic pars patriae est — sanctae partes sunt, si uniuersum uenerabile est; ergo et homini, nam hic in maiore tibi urbe ciuis est.

6. Think this before all things: that the power of harming is foul and execrable and most alien to man, by whose beneficence even the savage are tamed. Look upon the necks of elephants bent to the yoke, and the backs of bulls trodden with impunity by boys and likewise by women leaping about, and dragons crawling among cups and bosoms with a harmless glide, and, within the house, the mouths of bears and lions handled peaceably, and wild beasts fawning upon their master: you will be ashamed to have exchanged ways with animals. 7. It is nefas to harm the fatherland; therefore also a citizen, for he is a part of the fatherland — the parts are sacred, if the whole is venerable; therefore also a human being, for he is a citizen to you in a greater city.

Quid si nocere uelint manus pedibus, manibus oculi? Vt omnia inter se membra consentiunt quia singula seruari totius interest, ita homines singulis parcent quia ad coetum geniti sunt, salua autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest. 8. Ne uiperas quidem et natrices et si qua morsu aut ictu nocent effligeremus, si in reliquum mansuefacere possemus aut efficere ne nobis aliisue periculo essent; ergo ne homini quidem nocebimus quia peccauit, sed ne peccet, nec umquam ad praeteritum sed ad futurum poena referetur; non enim irascitur sed cauet.

What if the hands should wish to harm the feet, or the eyes the hands? As all the members consent among themselves because it is to the interest of the whole that each be preserved, so men will spare individuals because they are born for a coming-together, and society cannot be safe except by the custody and love of its parts. 8. Not even vipers and grass-snakes, and whatever harms by bite or by blow, would we extirpate, if we could for the future tame them or bring it about that they were no danger to us or to others; therefore we will not harm a man either because he has sinned, but lest he sin, and punishment will never be referred to the past but to the future; for he does not grow angry but takes precautions.

Nam si puniendus est cuicumque prauum maleficumque ingenium est, poena neminem excipiet.

For if whoever has a depraved and maleficent nature is to be punished, punishment will except no one.

XXXII.

32.

1. 'At enim ira habet aliquam uoluptatem et dulce est dolorem reddere.' Minime; non enim ut in beneficiis honestum est merita meritis repensare, ita iniurias iniuriis. Illic uinci turpe est, hic uincere. Inhumanum uerbum est et quidem pro iusto receptum ultio [et talio]. Non multum differt nisi ordine qui dolorem regerit: tantum excusatius peccat.

1. 'But indeed anger has some pleasure and it is sweet to render pain.' By no means; for just as in benefits it is honorable to recompense deserts with deserts, not so injuries with injuries. There, to be conquered is shameful; here, to conquer. It is an inhuman word—and indeed received as just—vengeance [and talion]. He who renders back pain differs not much except in order: he only sins more excusably.

2. M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit inprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea satis facienti Cato,'non memini' inquit 'me percussum.' Melius putauit non agnoscere quam uindicare. 3. 'Nihil' inquis 'illi post tantam petulantiam mali factum est?' Immo multum boni: coepit Catonem nosse.

2. Someone, not recognizing M. Cato, struck him imprudently in the bath; for who would knowingly do him an injury? Afterwards, when he was offering satisfaction, Cato said, 'I do not remember being struck.' He thought it better not to recognize it than to avenge it. 3. 'Nothing,' you say, 'bad was done to him after such petulance?' On the contrary, much good: he began to know Cato.

Magni animi est iniurias despicere; ultionis contumeliosissimum genus est non esse uisum dignum ex quo peteretur ultio. Multi leues iniurias altius sibi demisere dum uindicant: ille magnus et nobilis qui more magnae ferae latratus minutorum canum securus exaudit.

It belongs to a great spirit to despise injuries; the most contumelious kind of vengeance is not to have seemed worthy from whom vengeance would be sought. Many have sunk slight injuries deeper into themselves while they avenge; he is great and noble who, in the manner of a great wild beast, hears out the barkings of little dogs without concern.

XXXIII.

33.

1. 'Minus' inquit 'contemnemur, si uindicauerimus iniuriam.' Si tamquam ad remedium uenimus, sine ira ueniamus, non quasi dulce sit uindicari, sed quasi utile; saepe autem satius fuit dissimulare quam ulcisci. Potentiorum iniuriae hilari uultu, non patienter tantum ferendae sunt: facient iterum, si se fecisse crediderint. Hoc habent pessimum animi magna fortuna insolentes: quos laeserunt et oderunt.

1. 'We shall be contemned less,' he says, 'if we have avenged the injury.' If we have come as to a remedy, let us come without ire, not as though it were sweet to be avenged, but as though it were useful; often, moreover, it has been wiser to dissimulate than to avenge. The injuries of the more powerful must be borne with a cheerful countenance, not merely patiently: they will do it again, if they think they have done it. This worst trait do minds made insolent by great fortune have: those whom they have injured, they also hate.

2. Notissima uox est eius qui in cultu regum consenuerat: cum illum quidam interrogaret quomodo rarissimam rem in aula consecutus esset, senectutem, 'iniurias' inquit 'accipiendo et gratias agendo'. Saepe adeo iniuriam uindicare non expedit ut ne fateri quidem expediat. 3. C. Caesar Pastoris splendidi equitis Romani filium cum in custodia habuisset munditiis eius et cultioribus capillis offensus, rogante patre ut salutem sibi filii concederet, quasi de supplicio admonitus duci protinus iussit; ne tamen omnia inhumane faceret aduersum patrem, ad cenam illum eo die inuitauit. 4. Venit Pastor uultu nihil exprobrante.

2. The most well‑known utterance is that of the man who had grown old in the court of kings: when someone asked him how he had achieved in a palace the rarest thing—old age—he said, 'by accepting injuries and giving thanks.' Often it is so inexpedient to vindicate an injury that it is not expedient even to confess it. 3. Gaius Caesar, when he had kept in custody the son of Pastor, a splendid Roman equestrian (knight), offended by his neatness and more cultivated hair, and when the father asked that he concede to him the safety of his son, as if reminded of execution he immediately ordered him to be led away; yet, lest he do everything inhumanely toward the father, he invited him to dinner that day. 4. Pastor came with a face that reproached nothing.

Propinauit illi Caesar heminam et posuit illi custodem: perdurauit miser, non aliter quam si fili sanguinem biberet. Vnguentum et coronas misit et obseruare iussit an sumeret: sumpsit. Eo die quo filium extulerat, immo quo non extulerat, iacebat conuiua centesimus et potiones uix honestas natalibus liberorum podagricus senex hauriebat, cum interim non lacrimam emisit, non dolorem aliquo signo erumpere passus est; cenauit tamquam pro filio exorasset.

Caesar proffered him a hemina and set a guard over him: the wretch endured, no otherwise than if he were drinking his son’s blood. He sent perfume and garlands and ordered it to be observed whether he would take them: he took them. On the very day on which he had carried out his son to burial—nay, on which he had not carried him out—he reclined as the hundredth guest, and the gouty old man was draining potations scarcely respectable for the birth-rank of his children; meanwhile he shed not a tear, did not allow his grief to burst forth by any sign; he dined as though he had prevailed upon him for his son’s pardon.

5. Quaeris quare? habebat alterum. Quid ille Priamus?

5. You ask why? He had another. What about that Priam?

Non dissimulauit iram et regis genua complexus est, funestam perfusamque cruore fili manum ad os suum rettulit, cenauit? Sed tamen sine unguento, sine coronis, et illum hostis saeuissimus multis solaciis ut cibum caperet hortatus est, non ut pocula ingentia super caput posito custode siccaret. 6. Contempsissem Romanum patrem, si sibi timuisset: nunc iram compescuit pietas.

He did not dissimulate his ire and, having embraced the king’s knees, he brought to his mouth the death-bringing hand drenched with the blood of his son; did he dine? But yet without unguent, without garlands, and that most savage enemy urged him with many solaces to take food, not to drain huge cups with a guardian set over his head. 6. I would have contemned the Roman father, if he had feared for himself: now piety has restrained his ire.

Dignus fuit cui permitteretur a conuiuio ad ossa fili legenda discedere; ne hoc quidem permisit benignus interim et comis adulescens: propinationibus senem crebris, ut cura leniretur admonens, lacessebat. Contra ille se laetum et oblitum quid eo actum esset die praestitit; perierat alter filius, si carnifici conuiua non placuisset.

He was worthy that it be permitted him to depart from the convivial banquet to gather the bones of his son; not even this did the meanwhile benign and affable youth allow: with frequent toasts, admonishing that his care be lenified, he was goading the old man. In turn he presented himself as cheerful and oblivious of what had been done that day; another son would have perished, if the dinner-companion had not pleased the executioner.

XXXIV.

34.

1. Ergo ira abstinendum est, siue par est qui lacessendus est siue superior siue inferior. Cum pare contendere anceps est, cum superiore furiosum, cum inferiore sordidum. Pusilli hominis et miseri est repetere mordentem: mures formicaeque, si manum admoueris, ora conuertunt; inbecillia se laedi putant, si tanguntur.

1. Therefore one must abstain from anger, whether the person to be provoked is an equal, a superior, or an inferior. To contend with an equal is two‑edged, with a superior frenzied, with an inferior sordid. It is of a pusillanimous and wretched man to retaliate against one who bites: mice and ants, if you move your hand toward them, turn their mouths; the feeble suppose themselves harmed if they are touched.

2. Faciet nos mitiores, si cogitauerimus quid aliquando nobis profuerit ille cui irascimur, et meritis offensa redimetur. Illud quoque occurrat, quantum nobis commendationis allatura sit clementiae fama, quam multos uenia amicos utiles fecerit. 3. Ne irascamur inimicorum et hostium liberis: inter Sullanae crudelitatis exempla est quod ab re publica liberos proscriptorum summouit; nihil est iniquius quam aliquem heredem paterni odii fieri.

2. It will make us gentler, if we consider what at some time the one at whom we are angry has profited us, and by his merits the offense will be redeemed. Let this, too, occur: how much commendation the fame of clemency will bring us, how many useful friends pardon has made. 3. Let us not be angry with the children of our enemies and foes: among the examples of Sullan cruelty is this, that he removed from the commonwealth the children of the proscribed; nothing is more iniquitous than for someone to become the heir of a father’s hatred.

4. Cogitemus, quotiens ad ignoscendum difficiles erimus, an expediat nobis omnes inexorabiles esse. Quam saepe ueniam qui negauit petit! Quam saepe eius pedibus aduolutus est quem a suis reppulit!

4. Let us consider, whenever we are difficult about forgiving, whether it is expedient for us that all be inexorable toward us. How often the one who denied pardon petitions for it! How often has he fallen at the feet of the very man whom he repelled from his own!

Quid est gloriosius quam iram amicitia mutare? Quos populus Romanus fideliores habet socios quam quos habuit pertinacissimos hostes? Quod hodie esset imperium, nisi salubris prouidentia uictos permiscuisset uictoribus?

What is more glorious than to change anger into friendship? Whom does the Roman people have as more faithful allies than those whom it once had as the most pertinacious enemies? What would the empire be today, if salutary providence had not mingled the conquered with the victors?

5. Irascetur aliquis: tu contra beneficiis prouoca; cadit statim simultas ab altera parte deserta; nisi paria non pugnant. Sed utrimque certabit ira, concurritur: ille est melior qui prior pedem rettulit, uictus est qui uicit. Percussit te: recede; referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et excusationem; non poteris reuelli, cum uoles.

5. Someone will grow angry: you, on the contrary, provoke by benefactions; the private feud falls at once, abandoned by the other side; unless they are matched, they do not fight. But if anger will contend from both sides, they run together: he is the better who first drew back his foot; conquered is the one who conquered. He struck you: step back; for by striking back you will give both the occasion for striking you more often and an excuse; you will not be able to be torn away when you wish.

XXXV.

35.

1. Numquid uelit quisquam tam grauiter hostem ferire ut relinquat manum in uulnere et se ab ictu reuocare non possit? Atqui tale ira telum est: uix retrahitur. Arma nobis expedita prospicimus, gladium commodum et habilem: non uitabimus impetus animi ~hos~ graues et onerosos et inreuocabiles?

1. Would anyone wish to strike an enemy so gravely as to leave his hand in the wound and not be able to recall himself from the blow? And yet such a weapon is anger: it is scarcely drawn back. We make provision for ourselves ready arms, a commodious and handy sword: shall we not avoid the impulses of the mind, ~these~ grave and onerous and irrevocable?

2. Ea demum uelocitas placet quae ubi iussa est uestigium sistit nec ultra destinata procurrit flectique et cursu ad gradum reduci potest; aegros scimus neruos esse, ubi inuitis nobis mouentur; senex aut infirmi corporis est qui cum ambulare uult currit: animi motus eos putemus sanissimos ualidissimosque qui nostro arbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur.
3. Nihil tamen aeque profuerit quam primum intueri deformitatem rei, deinde periculum. Non est ullius adfectus facies turbatior: pulcherrima ora foedauit, toruos uultus ex tranquillissimis reddit; linquit decor omnis iratos, et siue amictus illis compositus est ad legem, trahent uestem omnemque curam sui effundent, siue capillorum natura uel arte iacentium non informis habitus, cum animo inhorrescunt; tumescunt uenae; concutietur crebro spiritu pectus, rabida uocis eruptio colla distendet; tum artus trepidi, inquietae manus, totius corporis fluctuatio.

2. That speed alone pleases which, when it has been ordered, stops in its tracks and does not run beyond what is destined, and can be bent and brought back from a run to a walk; we know the nerves are sick when they move against our will; he is an old man or of an infirm body who, when he wishes to walk, runs: let us deem those motions of the mind the most sound and most strong which will go at our arbitration, and will not be borne along by their own impulse.
3. Nothing, however, will be equally profitable as first to behold the deformity of the thing, then the danger. No passion has a more disordered face: it has defiled the most beautiful features, it makes grim visages out of the most tranquil; all decorum leaves the angry, and whether their cloak is arranged on them according to rule, they will drag at their clothing and pour out all care of themselves, or whether the not-unshapely arrangement of hair lying smooth by nature or by art—when the spirit bristles, the hair bristles; the veins swell; the chest will be shaken with frequent breath, a rabid eruption of the voice will distend the neck; then trembling limbs, unquiet hands, a fluctuation of the whole body.

4. Qualem intus putas esse animum cuius extra imago tam foeda est? Quanto illi intra pectus terribilior uultus est, acrior spiritus, intentior impetus, rupturus se nisi eruperit! 5. Quales sunt hostium uel ferarum caede madentium aut ad caedem euntium aspectus, qualia poetae inferna monstra finxerunt succincta serpentibus et igneo flatu, quales ad bella excitanda discordiamque in populos diuidendam pacemque lacerandam deae taeterrimae inferum exeunt, talem nobis iram figuremus, flamma lumina ardentia, sibilo mugituque et gemitu et stridore et si qua his inuisior uox est perstrepentem, tela manu utraque quatientem (neque enim illi se tegere curae est), toruam cruentamque et cicatricosam et uerberibus suis liuidam, incessus uesani, offusam multa caligine, incursitantem uastantem fugantemque et omnium odio laborantem, sui maxime, si aliter nocere non possit, terras maria caelum ruere cupientem, infestam pariter inuisamque.

4. What sort of mind do you think there is within, whose outward image is so foul? How much more terrible is the countenance within that breast, how sharper the breath, how more intent the impetus, ready to burst unless it breaks forth! 5. Such as are the looks of enemies or of wild beasts dripping with slaughter, or going to slaughter, such as the poets have fashioned the infernal monsters, girt with serpents and with fiery breath, such as the most loathsome goddesses of the underworld go forth to kindle wars and to divide discord among peoples and to tear peace—such let us figure Anger for ourselves: eyes burning with flame, resounding with hissing and bellowing and groaning and screeching, and with whatever voice more hateful than these; brandishing weapons in either hand (for to it it is no concern to cover itself); grim, blood-stained, scarred, and bruised by its own lashes; with a mad gait; overcast with much gloom; charging, laying waste, putting to flight, and laboring under the hatred of all, most of all of itself; if it cannot hurt otherwise, desiring to bring crashing down lands, seas, and sky—hostile and equally hateful.

6. Vel, si uidetur, sit qualis apud uates nostros est

6. Or, if it seems good, let her be such as she is among our vates.

sanguineum quatiens dextra Bellona flagellum

Bellona, shaking the blood-stained scourge in her right hand

aut

scissa gaudens uadit Discordia palla

Discord goes rejoicing, her mantle rent

aut si qua magis dira facies excogitari diri adfectus potest.

or if any more dire face of dire passion can be excogitated.

XXXVI.

36.

1. Quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit aspexisse speculum. Perturbauit illos tanta mutatio sui; uelut in rem praesentem adducti non agnouerunt se: et quantulum ex uera deformitate imago illa speculo repercussa reddebat! 2. Animus si ostendi et si in ulla materia perlucere posset, intuentis confunderet ater maculosusque et aestuans et distortus et tumidus.

1. To certain men, as Sextius says, while angry, it proved beneficial to look into a mirror. So great a mutation of themselves perturbed them; as if brought into the present reality, they did not recognize themselves: and how little of the true deformity did that image, reflected by the mirror, render! 2. If the mind could be displayed and could shine through in any material, it would confound the onlooker, black and maculate and seething and distorted and tumid.

Nunc quoque tanta deformitas eius est per ossa carnesque et tot inpedimenta effluentis: quid si nudus ostenderetur? 3. Speculo quidem neminem deterritum ab ira credideris. Quid ergo?

Even now too there is such great deformity of it, through the bones and the flesh and amid so many impediments to its outflow: what if it were shown naked? 3. You would believe that no one has been deterred from anger by a mirror. What then?

qui ad speculum uenerat ut se mutaret, iam mutauerat: iratis quidem nulla est formosior effigies quam atrox et horrida qualesque esse etiam uideri uolunt.
4. Magis illud uidendum est, quam multis ira per se nocuerit. Alii nimio feruore rupere uenas et sanguinem supra uires elatus clamor egessit et luminum suffudit aciem in oculos uehementius umor egestus et in morbos aegri reccidere.

he who had come to the mirror to change himself had already changed: for the angry, indeed, no effigy is more beautiful than a fierce and horrid one, and such as they wish not only to be but also to seem.
4. Rather, that must be considered, how many people anger has harmed by itself. Others, through excessive fervor, have burst veins, and a clamor, lifted beyond their strength, has driven out blood, and a humor, expelled too violently into the eyes, has suffused the acuity of the sight, and, being sick, they have relapsed into diseases.

Nulla celerior ad insaniam uia est. 5. Multi itaque continuauerunt irae furorem nec quam expulerant mentem umquam receperunt: Aiacem in mortem egit furor, in furorem ira. Mortem liberis, egestatem sibi, ruinam domui inprecantur, et irasci se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi.

There is no swifter road to insanity. 5. Many therefore have continued the fury of anger and never recovered the mind which they had driven out: fury drove Ajax into death, anger into fury. They imprecate death upon their children, indigence upon themselves, ruin upon their house; and madmen deny that they are angry no less than that they are insane.

Amicissimis hostes uitandique carissimis, legum nisi qua nocent immemores, ad minima mobiles, non sermone, non officio adiri faciles, per uim omnia gerunt, gladiis et pugnare parati et incumbere. 6. Maximum enim illos malum cepit et omnia exsuperans uitia. Alia paulatim intrant, repentina et uniuersa uis huius est.

Enemies to their most intimate friends, and to be shunned by their dearest; unmindful of the laws, save in those points by which they do harm; quick to be moved at the slightest things; not easy to be approached either by speech or by service; they conduct everything by force, with swords ready both to fight and to bear down. 6. For the greatest evil has seized them, and vices surpassing all things. Other vices enter little by little; the violence of this one is sudden and all-at-once.

Omnis denique alios adfectus sibi subicit: amorem ardentissimum uincit, transfoderunt itaque amata corpora et in eorum quos occiderant iacuere complexibus; auaritiam, durissimum malum minimeque flexibile, ira calcauit, adactam opes suas spargere et domui rebusque in unum conlatis inicere ignem. Quid? non ambitiosus magno aestimata proiecit insignia honoremque delatum reppulit?

In the end, it subjects to itself all the other affections: it conquers the most ardent love, and so they pierced through beloved bodies and lay in the embraces of those whom they had killed; avarice, the hardest evil and least flexible, anger has trampled, having driven it to scatter its own wealth and to cast fire upon the house and upon the goods gathered into one. What? did not the ambitious man throw away the insignia, prized at a great value, and repel the honor that had been proffered?

Nullus adfectus est in quem non ira dominetur.

There is no passion over which wrath does not dominate.