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Dig. 45.3.0. De stipulatione servorum.
45.2.0. On constituting two joint parties.
Dig. 45.3.0. On the stipulation of slaves.
Stipulatio non potest confici nisi utroque loquente: et ideo neque mutus neque surdus neque infans stipulationem contrahere possunt: nec absens quidem, quoniam exaudire invicem debent. si quis igitur ex his vult stipulari, per servum praesentem stipuletur, et adquiret ei ex stipulatu actionem. item si quis obligari velit, iubeat et erit quod iussu obligatus.
A stipulation cannot be effected unless both are speaking; and therefore neither a mute nor a deaf person nor an infant can contract a stipulation, nor indeed one who is absent, since they must hear one another. If, then, anyone of these wishes to stipulate, let him stipulate through a present slave, and the slave will acquire for him an action ex stipulatu. Likewise, if someone wishes to be obligated, let him give an order, and he will be bound by order.
Si quis ita interroget " dabis?" responderit " quid ni?", et is utique in ea causa est, ut obligetur: contra si sine verbis adnuisset. non tantum autem civiliter, sed nec naturaliter obligatur, qui ita adnuit: et ideo recte dictum est non obligari pro eo nec fideiussorem quidem.
If someone should ask thus, " will you give?" and he answered, " why not?", then he is assuredly in such a case as to be obligated: contrariwise, if he had nodded assent without words. not only, moreover, is he not bound civilly, but neither even naturally is he bound, who has so nodded; and therefore it has been rightly said that he is not bound, nor indeed is a surety bound for him.
Si quis simpliciter interrogatus responderit: " si illud factum erit, dabo", non obligari eum constat: aut si ita interrogatus: " intra kalendas quintas?" responderit: " dabo idibus", aeque non obligatur: non enim sic respondit, ut interrogatus est. et versa vice si interrogatus fuerit sub condicione, responderit pure, dicendum erit eum non obligari. cum adicit aliquid vel detrahit obligationi, semper probandum est vitiatam esse obligationem, nisi stipulatori diversitas responsionis ilico placuerit: tunc enim alia stipulatio contracta esse videtur.
If someone, having been asked simply, should answer: " if that has been done, I will give," it is established that he is not bound: or if, having been asked thus: " by the fifth day before the Kalends?" he should answer: " I will give on the Ides," likewise he is not bound: for he did not answer as he was asked. And, vice versa, if he shall have been asked under a condition, and answered purely, it must be said that he is not bound. When he adds something to or detracts from the obligation, it must always be proved that the obligation has been vitiated, unless the stipulator immediately approved the difference of the response: then indeed another stipulation is seen to have been contracted.
Si stipulanti mihi " decem" tu " viginti" respondeas, non esse contractam obligationem nisi in decem constat. ex contrario quoque si me " viginti" interrogante tu " decem" respondeas, obligatio nisi in decem non erit contracta: licet enim oportet congruere summam, attamen manifestissimum est viginti et decem inesse.
If, when I stipulate " ten," you answer " twenty," it is established that no obligation is contracted except for ten. Conversely also, if I ask " twenty" and you answer " ten," the obligation will not be contracted except for ten: for although the sum ought to agree, nevertheless it is most manifest that twenty contains ten as well.
Sed si mihi pamphilum stipulanti tu pamphilum et stichum spoponderis, stichi adiectionem pro supervacuo habendam puto: nam si tot sunt stipulationes, quot corpora, duae sunt quodammodo stipulationes, una utilis, alia inutilis, neque vitiatur utilis per hanc inutilem.
But if, when I am stipulating for Pamphilus, you have promised Pamphilus and Stichus, I think the addition of Stichus is to be held as superfluous: for if there are as many stipulations as there are bodies, there are in a certain way two stipulations, one useful, the other useless, nor is the useful vitiated by this useless one.
Eadem an alia lingua respondeatur, nihil interest. proinde si quis latine interrogaverit, respondeatur ei graece, dummodo congruenter respondeatur, obligatio constituta est: idem per contrarium. sed utrum hoc usque ad graecum sermonem tantum protrahimus an vero et ad alium, poenum forte vel assyrium vel cuius alterius linguae, dubitari potest.
whether the reply be in the same or in another language, it makes no difference. accordingly, if someone has asked in latin, let him be answered in greek, provided that he be answered congruently, the obligation is constituted: the same by the contrary. but whether we extend this only as far as the greek speech, or indeed also to another—punic perhaps or assyrian or of whatever other language—can be doubted.
Et harum omnium quaedam partium praestationem recipiunt, veluti cum decem dari stipulamur: quaedam non recipiunt, ut in his, quae natura divisionem non admittunt, veluti cum viam iter actum stipulamur: quaedam partis quidem dationem natura recipiunt, sed nisi tota dantur, stipulationi satis non fit, veluti cum hominem generaliter stipulor aut lancem aut quodlibet vas: nam si stichi pars soluta sit, nondum in ulla parte stipulationis liberatio nata est, sed aut statim repeti potest aut in pendenti est, donec alius detur. eiusdem condicionis est haec stipulatio: " stichum aut pamphilum dari?"
And of all these, some admit performance in parts, as when we stipulate that ten be given; some do not admit it, as in those things which by nature do not allow division, as when we stipulate for a road, a footpath, a drove-way; some indeed by nature admit the giving of a part, but unless they are given in whole, the stipulation is not adequately satisfied, as when I stipulate generally for a human being or a platter or any vessel: for if a part of Stichus has been delivered, release under the stipulation has not yet arisen in any respect, but it can either be reclaimed at once or is in suspense until another is given. Of the same condition is this stipulation: “that Stichus or Pamphilus be given?”
Ex his igitur stipulationibus ne heredes quidem pro parte solvendo liberari possunt, quamdiu non eandem rem omnes dederint: non enim ex persona heredum condicio obligationis immutatur. et ideo si divisionem res promissa non recipit, veluti via, heredes promissoris singuli in solidum tenentur: sed quo casu unus ex heredibus solidum praestiterit, repetitionem habebit a coherede familiae erciscundae iudicio. ex quo quidem accidere pomponius ait, ut et stipulatoris viae vel itineris heredes singuli in solidum habeant actionem: sed quidam hoc casu extingui stipulationem putant, quia per singulos adquiri servitus non potest: sed non facit inutilem stipulationem difficultas praestationis.
From these stipulations, therefore, not even the heirs can be released by paying a part, so long as all have not delivered the same thing: for the condition of the obligation is not altered by the person of the heirs. And therefore, if the promised thing does not admit division, as a right of way, the promisor’s heirs are each held in solidum: but in the case where one of the heirs has rendered the whole, he will have repetition from his coheir by the action for dividing the family estate. From which, indeed, Pomponius says it follows that the heirs of the stipulator, too, in the matter of a right of way or of passage, each have an action in solidum: but some think that in this case the stipulation is extinguished, because a servitude cannot be acquired by individuals severally: yet the difficulty of performance does not make the stipulation ineffectual.
Item si in facto sit stipulatio, veluti si ita stipulatus fuero: " per te non fieri neque per heredem tuum, quo minus mihi ire agere liceat?" et unus ex pluribus heredibus prohibuerit, tenentur quidem et coheredes eius, sed familiae erciscundae iudicio ab eo repetent quod praestiterint. hoc et iulianus et pomponius probant.
Likewise, if the stipulation be in factum, as if I should have stipulated thus: " that nothing be done by you nor by your heir to prevent my going and bringing suit?" and one out of several heirs has prohibited it, his coheirs are indeed held liable as well, but by the familiae erciscundae action they will recover from him what they have paid. This is approved by Julianus and Pomponius also.
Contra autem si stipulator decesserit, qui stipulatus erat sibi heredique suo agere licere, et unus ex heredibus eius prohibeatur, interesse dicemus, utrum in solidum committatur stipulatio an pro parte eius, qui prohibitus est. nam si poena stipulationi adiecta sit, in solidum committetur, sed qui non sunt prohibiti, doli mali exceptione summovebuntur: si vero poena nulla posita sit, tunc pro parte eius tantum qui prohibitus est committetur stipulatio.
Conversely, however, if the stipulator has died—who had stipulated that it be permitted to sue for himself and his heir—and one of his heirs is prevented, we shall say it matters whether the stipulation is triggered in solidum or for the share (pro parte) of the one who is prevented. For if a penalty has been added to the stipulation, it will be triggered in solidum, but those who are not prevented will be repelled by the defense of fraud; if, however, no penalty has been set, then the stipulation will be triggered only for the part of the one who is prevented.
Sed haec differentia illam habet rationem, quod, ubi unus ex heredibus prohibetur, non potest coheres ex stipulatu agere, cuius nihil interest, nisi poena subiecta sit: nam poena subiecta efficit, ut omnibus committatur, quia hic non quaerimus, cuius intersit. enimvero ubi unus ex heredibus prohibet, omnes tenentur heredes: interest enim prohibiti a nemine prohiberi.
But this difference has this rationale, that, where one of the heirs is prohibited, a coheir, to whom it is of no concern, cannot bring an action ex stipulatu, unless a penalty is attached: for an attached penalty brings it about that it is incurred in favor of all, because here we do not ask whose interest is involved. But indeed, where one of the heirs prohibits, all the heirs are held liable: for it is in the interest of the person prohibited to be prohibited by no one.
Cato libro quinto decimo scribit poena certae pecuniae promissa, si quid aliter factum sit, mortuo promissore si ex pluribus heredibus unus contra quam cautum sit fecerit, aut ab omnibus heredibus poenam committi pro portione hereditaria aut ab uno pro portione sua: ab omnibus, si id factum, de quo cautum est, individuum sit, veluti " iter fieri", quia quod in partes dividi non potest, ab omnibus quodammodo factum videretur: at si de eo cautum sit, quod divisionem recipiat, veluti " amplius non agi", tum eum heredem, qui adversus ea fecit, pro portione sua solum poenam committere. differentiae hanc esse rationem, quod in priore casu omnes commisisse videntur, quod nisi in solidum peccari non poterit, illam stipulationem " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi ire agere liceat?" sed videamus, ne non idem hic sit, sed magis idem, quod in illa stipulatione " titium heredemque eius ratum habiturum": nam hac stipulatione et solus tenebitur, qui non habuerit ratum, et solus aget, a quo fuerit petitum: idque et Marcello videtur, quamvis ipse dominus pro parte ratum habere non potest.
Cato, in the fifteenth book, writes that when a penalty of a fixed sum has been promised if anything be done otherwise, then, the promisor having died, if out of several heirs one has acted contrary to what was provided, either the penalty is incurred by all the heirs in proportion to the hereditary share, or by the one alone in proportion to his own share: by all, if that which was done, about which provision was made, is indivisible, for example, “that a right of way be made,” because what cannot be divided into parts would be seen as in a certain way done by all; but if provision has been made about something that admits division, for example, “that no further action be brought,” then that heir who acted contrary thereto incurs the penalty only for his own share. The rationale of this difference is that in the former case all are seen to have committed the breach, because it cannot be sinned otherwise than in solidum, in that stipulation, “that it be not brought about by you whereby it is less permitted for me to go or to sue?” But let us consider whether this is not the same here, but rather the same as in that stipulation, “that Titius and his heir will hold it ratified”: for by this stipulation he alone will be bound who has not held it ratified, and he alone will sue by whom it was demanded; and this also seems right to Marcellus, although the owner himself cannot hold it ratified in part.
Si is, qui duplam stipulatus est, decesserit pluribus heredibus relictis, unusquisque ob evictionem suae partis pro portione sua habebit actionem. idemque est in stipulatione quoque fructuaria et damni infecti et ex operis novi nuntiatione: restitui tamen opus ex operis novi nuntiatione pro parte non potest. haec utilitatis causa ex parte stipulatorum recepta sunt: ipsi autem promissori pro parte neque restitutio neque defensio contingere potest.
If the one who has stipulated for the double has died leaving several heirs, each will have an action, on account of the eviction of his share, for his proportion. And the same holds in a fructuary stipulation and in the stipulation for damnum infectum and from a denunciation of a new work: however, the work cannot be restored in part by reason of a denunciation of a new work. These rules have been adopted, for the sake of utility, in favor of the stipulators; but to the promisor himself neither restitution nor defense can arise in part.
Stipulationum aliae iudiciales sunt, aliae praetoriae, aliae conventionales, aliae communes praetoriae et iudiciales. iudiciales sunt dumtaxat, quae a mero iudicis officio proficiscuntur, veluti de dolo cautio: praetoriae, quae a mero praetoris officio proficiscuntur, veluti damni infecti. praetorias autem stipulationes sic audiri oportet, ut in his contineantur etiam aediliciae: nam et hae ab iurisdictione veniunt.
Some stipulations are judicial, others praetorian, others conventional, others common to praetorian and judicial. judicial are only those which proceed from the mere office of the judge, for example a caution regarding fraud; praetorian are those which proceed from the mere office of the praetor, for example for damage not yet done (damni infecti). and praetorian stipulations ought to be taken thus, that within them are included also the aedilician ones: for these too come from jurisdiction.
conventional are those which arise from the convention of the parties, of which there are just as many kinds as, I would almost say, of the matters to be contracted: for they are made both on account of the verbal obligation itself and depend upon the business contracted. common are stipulations, for example, that the ward’s property shall be kept safe: for both the praetor orders that security be given that the ward will have his property safe, and sometimes the judge, if this matter cannot be otherwise settled: likewise, the stipulation for the double comes from the judge or from the edict of the aediles.
Satis autem accipere dictum est eodem modo, quo satis facere: nam quia id, quo quis contentus erat, ei praestabatur, satis fieri dictum est: et similiter quia tales, quibus contentus quis futurus esset, ita dabantur, ut verbis obligarentur, satis accipi dictum est.
Moreover, “to receive satis” has been said in the same way as “to make satis”: for since that by which someone was content was furnished to him, it was said that satisfaction was made; and similarly, because such persons, with whom one would be content, were thus given so as to be bound by words, it was said that satis was received.
In illa stipulatione: " si kalendis stichum non dederis, decem dare spondes?" mortuo homine quaeritur, an statim ante kalendas agi possit. sabinus proculus exspectandum diem actori putant, quod est verius: tota enim obligatio sub condicione et in diem collata est et licet ad condicionem committi videatur, dies tamen superest. sed cum eo, qui ita promisit: " si intra kalendas digito caelum non tetigerit", agi protinus potest.
In that stipulation: " if on the kalends you do not deliver stichus, do you promise to give ten?" the slave having died, it is asked whether one can sue immediately before the kalends. sabinus proculus think the plaintiff must await the day, which is truer: for the whole obligation is placed under a condition and for a day, and although it may seem to be incurred upon the condition, nevertheless the day remains. but against one who thus promised: " if before the kalends he shall not have touched the sky with his finger", one can sue at once.
Hoc iure utimur, ut ex hac stipulatione: " si lucius titius ante kalendas maias in italiam non venerit, decem dare spondes?" non ante peti quicquam possit, quam exploratum sit ante eam diem in italiam venire titium non posse neque venisse, sive vivo sive mortuo id acciderit.
we use this law, that from this stipulation: " if lucius titius does not come to italy before the kalends of may, do you promise to give ten?" nothing can be demanded before it is ascertained that before that day titus cannot come into italy nor has come, whether this has happened with him alive or dead.
Si ita stipulatus essem abs te " domum aedificari ? " vel heredem meum damnavero insulam aedificare, celso placet non ante agi posse ex ea causa, quam tempus praeterisset, quo insula aedificari posset: nec fideiussores dati ante diem tenebuntur:
If I had in this way stipulated from you " domum aedificari ? " or if I shall have charged my heir to build a tenement, Celsus holds that no action can be brought on that account before the time has elapsed within which the tenement could be built: nor will the sureties furnished be bound before the due day:
Et ideo haesitatur, si aliqua pars insulae facta sit, deinde incendio consumpta sit, an integrum tempus computandum sit rursus ad aedificandam insulam an vero reliquum dumtaxat exspectandum quod deerat. et verius est, ut integrum ei detur.
And therefore it is a matter of doubt, if some part of a tenement has been made and then has been consumed by fire, whether the entire period is to be computed anew for building the tenement, or rather only the remainder that was lacking is to be awaited. And the truer view is that the whole be granted to him.
Si divortio facto ea, quae nihil in dote habeat, dotis nomine centum dari stipuletur, vel quae centum dumtaxat habeat, ducenta dotis nomine dari stipuletur: proculus ait, si ducenta stipuletur quae centum habeat, sine dubio centum quidem in obligationem venire, alia autem centum actione de dote deberi. dicendum itaque est, etiamsi nihil sit in dote, centum tamen venire in stipulationem, sicuti, cum filiae vel matri vel sorori vel alii cuilibet dotis nomine legaretur, utile legatum esset.
If, a divorce having been effected, a woman who has nothing in her dowry stipulates that one hundred be given under the name of dowry, or one who has only one hundred stipulates that two hundred be given under the name of dowry: Proculus says that if she who has one hundred stipulates for two hundred, without doubt one hundred indeed come into obligation, but another one hundred are owed by the action concerning dowry. Therefore it must be said that, even if there is nothing in the dowry, nevertheless one hundred come into the stipulation, just as, when a legacy were left to a daughter or mother or sister or to anyone else under the name of dowry, it would be a useful legacy.
Scire debemus in stipulationibus tot esse stipulationes, quot summae sunt, totque esse stipulationes, quot species sunt. secundum quod evenit, ut mixta una summa vel specie, quae non fuit in praecedenti stipulatione, non fiat novatio, sed efficit duas esse stipulationes. quamvis autem placuerit tot esse stipulationes, quot summae, totque esse stipulationes quot res: tamen si pecuniam quis, quae in conspectu est, stipulatus sit, vel acervum pecuniae, non tot sunt stipulationes, quot nummorum corpora, sed una stipulatio: nam per singulos denarios singulas esse stipulationes absurdum est.
we ought to know that in stipulations there are as many stipulations as there are sums, and just as many stipulations as there are species. accordingly it happens that, if one sum or one species, which was not in the preceding stipulation, be mixed in, there is no novation, but it brings it about that there are two stipulations. and although it has been agreed that there are as many stipulations as sums, and just as many stipulations as things: nevertheless, if someone has stipulated for money which is in sight, or for a heap of money, there are not as many stipulations as there are bodies of the coins, but one stipulation; for it is absurd that there be single stipulations for individual denarii.
Si a fure hominem sim stipulatus, quaesitum est, an stipulatio valeat. movet quaestionem, quod stipulatus hominem plerumque meum videor: non valet autem huiusmodi stipulatio, ubi quis rem suam stipulatus est. et constat, si quidem ita stipulatus sim: " quod ex causa condictionis dare facere oportet?", stipulationem valere: si vero hominem dari stipulatus fuero, nullius momenti esse stipulationem.
If I have stipulated from a thief for a man, the question has been raised whether the stipulation is valid. What prompts the question is that, when I have stipulated for a man, I for the most part seem to be stipulating for my own; but a stipulation of this kind is not valid where someone has stipulated for his own thing. And it is agreed that, if indeed I have stipulated thus: " quod, on the ground of a condictio, it is proper to give or to do?", the stipulation is valid; but if I have stipulated that the man be given, the stipulation is of no effect.
but if afterward it is asserted that the slave died without delay, Marcellus says that the thief is not held by condiction: for so long as he lives, he can be claimed by condiction; but if it is asserted that he has died, he is in such a condition that the condiction evaporates on account of the stipulation.
Item quod leges fieri prohibent, si perpetuam causam servaturum est, cessat obligatio, veluti si sororem nupturam sibi aliquis stipuletur: quamquam etiamsi non sit perpetua causa, ut reccidit in sorore adoptiva, idem dicendum sit, quia statim contra mores sit.
Likewise, where the laws forbid something to be done, if it will maintain a perpetual impediment, the obligation ceases, as for instance if someone stipulates that his sister is to marry him: although even if the impediment is not perpetual, as occurs in the case of an adoptive sister, the same must be said, because it is at once against morals.
Si quis, cum aliter eum convenisset obligari, aliter per machinationem obligatus est, erit quidem suptilitate iuris obstrictus, sed doli exceptione uti potest: quia enim per dolum obligatus est, competit ei exceptio. idem est et si nullus dolus intercessit stipulantis, sed ipsa res in se dolum habet: cum enim quis petat ex ea stipulatione, hoc ipso dolo facit, quod petit.
If someone, although it had been agreed that he be obligated in one way, has been obligated in another way through machination, he will indeed be bound by the subtlety of the law, but he can make use of the exception of fraud: for since he has been obligated through fraud, the exception is available to him. The same holds even if no fraud of the stipulator intervened, but the matter itself contains fraud: for when someone demands on the basis of that stipulation, by that very fact he acts fraudulently in making the demand.
Stipulatio ista: " habere licere spondes?" hoc continet, ut liceat habere, nec per quemquam omnino fieri, quo minus nobis habere liceat. quae res facit, ut videatur reus promisisse per omnes futurum, ut tibi habere liceat: videtur igitur alienum factum promisisse, nemo autem alienum factum promittendo obligatur, et ita utimur. sed se obligat, ne ipse faciat, quo minus habere liceat: obligatur etiam, ne heres suus faciat vel quis ceterorum successorum efficiat, ne habere liceat.
This stipulation: " habere licere spondes?" contains this, that it be permitted to have, and that by absolutely no one anything be done whereby it is less permitted for us to have. This fact makes it appear that the defendant has promised, as against all persons, that it will be the case that it is permitted for you to have; thus he seems to have promised another’s act. But no one is bound by promising another’s act, and such is our practice. Yet he binds himself that he himself will not do anything whereby it is not permitted to have; he is also bound that his heir will not do so, nor that any of his other successors will bring it about that it is not permitted to have.
At si quis velit factum alienum promittere, poenam vel quanti ea res sit potest promittere. sed quatenus habere licere videbitur? si nemo controversiam faciat, hoc est neque ipse reus, neque heredes eius heredumve successores.
But if someone should wish to promise an alien act (another’s deed), he can promise a penalty or as much as that matter is worth. But to what extent will it seem lawful to maintain it? If no one raises a controversy, that is, neither the obligor himself, nor his heirs, nor the successors of his heirs.
Si quis forte non de proprietate, sed de possessione nuda controversiam fecerit vel de usu fructu vel de usu vel de quo alio iure eius, quod distractum est, palam est committi stipulationem: habere enim non licet ei, cui aliquid minuitur ex iure quod habuit.
If someone perchance has made a controversy not about property, but about naked possession, or about usufruct, or about use, or about any other right in that which has been alienated, it is clear that the stipulation is committed: for “to have” is not permitted to him whose right which he had is diminished in any respect.
Quaesitum est, utrum propriam demum rem an et alienam promittere possit habere licere. et magis est, ut et aliena promitti possit: quae res ita effectum habebit, si propria esse promissoris coeperit. quare si perseveraverit aliena, dicendum erit stipulationem non committi, nisi poena adiecta sit, cum neque per eum neque per successorem eius quicquam factum sit.
It has been asked whether one can promise, under the clause “that it be lawful to have,” only his own thing, or also another’s; and the better view is that another’s thing also can be promised: and this matter will have effect if it begins to be the promisor’s own. Therefore, if it remains another’s, it must be said that the stipulation is not incurred, unless a penalty has been added, since nothing has been done by him nor by his successor.
Sicut autem ex parte rei successores eius cum ipso tenentur, ita etiam ex parte actoris committitur stipulatio ipsi stipulatori ceterisque, quicumque ei succedunt, scilicet si rem ipsi habere non licuerit. ceterum si alii habere non licuit, certo certius est non committi stipulationem, et nihil intererit, utrum ita stipuler " habere licere" an " mihi habere licere".
Just as on the part of the defendant his successors are bound along with him, so also on the part of the plaintiff the stipulatio is incurred to the stipulator himself and to all others, whoever succeed to him, namely if it has not been permitted for him himself to have the thing. ceterum if it has not been permitted for another to have it, it is more than certain that the stipulatio is not incurred, and it will make no difference whether I so stipulate " to be permitted to have" or " for me to be permitted to have".
Hi, qui sunt in aliena potestate, his, in quorum sunt potestate, habere licere stipulari possunt ea ratione, qua cetera quoque his possunt stipulari. sed si servus fuerit stipulatus sibi habere, quaesitum est, an recte stipulatus videatur. et ait iulianus libro quinquagensimo secundo digestorum, si servus stipuletur sibi habere licere aut per se non fieri, quo minus habere stipulatori liceat, promittat: stipulatio, inquit, non committitur, quamvis auferri res ei et ipse auferre eandem possit: non enim factum, sed ius in hac stipulatione vertitur.
Those who are under another’s power can stipulate “that it be permitted to have” for those in whose power they are, on the same reasoning by which other things too can be stipulated for them. But if a slave has stipulated “that he may have for himself,” the question has been raised whether he appears to have stipulated rightly. And Julian says in book 52 of the Digest: if a slave stipulates that it be permitted for himself to have, or exacts a promise that it shall not be brought about by himself that it be any less permitted for the stipulator to have, the stipulation, he says, is not incurred, although the thing may be taken from him and he himself can take the same away; for in this stipulation it is not the act, but the right, that is at issue.
but when it is stipulated that nothing be done by the promissor to prevent his being allowed to go and to bring suit, “not a right of the stipulation,” he says, “but a fact is involved.” Yet it seems to me that, although this stipulation contains words of right, “to be permitted to have,” nevertheless it must be understood thus: that, in the case of a slave and of a son under paternal power, the matter is seen to concern possession being retained or not taken away, and that the stipulation has force.
Haec quoque stipulatio: " possidere mihi licere spondes?" utilis est: quam stipulationem servus an possit utiliter in suam personam concipere, videamus. sed quamvis civili iure servus non possideat, tamen ad possessionem naturalem hoc referendum est, et ideo dubitari non oportet, quin et servus recte ita stipuletur.
This stipulation too: " do you promise that it is permitted for me to possess?" is useful: let us see whether a slave can usefully frame such a stipulation in his own person. But although by civil law a slave does not possess, nevertheless this is to be referred to natural possession, and therefore it ought not to be doubted that even a slave may rightly stipulate thus.
Sed si quis uti frui licere sibi heredique suo stipulatus sit, videamus, an heres ex stipulatu agere possit. et putem posse, licet diversi sint fructus: nam et si ire agere stipuletur sibi heredique suo licere, idem probaverimus.
But if someone has stipulated that it be permitted for himself and his heir to use and to enjoy, let us see whether the heir can sue ex stipulatu. And I think he can, although the fruits are different; for even if one stipulates that it be permitted to go and to drive for himself and his heir, we have approved the same.
Si quis dolum malum promissoris heredisque eius abesse velit, sufficere " abesse afuturumque esse" stipulari: si vero de plurium dolo cavere velit, necessarium esse adici: " cui rei dolus malus non abest, non afuerit, quanti ea res erit, tantam pecuniam dari spondes?"
If anyone should wish the bad fraud (dolus malus) of the promisor and his heir to be absent, it suffices to stipulate " abesse afuturumque esse": but if he wishes to guard against the fraud of several persons, it is necessary to add: " cui rei dolus malus non abest, non afuerit, for how much that matter will be worth, do you promise that so much money will be given?"
Inter incertam certamque diem discrimen esse ex eo quoque apparet, quod certa die promissum vel statim dari potest: totum enim medium tempus ad solvendum liberum promissori relinquitur: at qui promisit " si aliquid factum sit" vel " cum aliquid factum sit", nisi cum id factum fuerit, dederit, non videbitur fecisse quod promisit.
That there is a distinction between an uncertain and a certain day also appears from this: that what is promised for a certain day can even be given immediately; for the whole intermediate time is left free to the promisor for paying. But he who has promised " if something has been done" or " when something has been done," unless he gives when that has been done, will not be seen to have done what he promised.
Alteri stipulari nemo potest, praeterquam si servus domino, filius patri stipuletur: inventae sunt enim huiusmodi obligationes ad hoc, ut unusquisque sibi adquirat quod sua interest: ceterum ut alii detur, nihil interest mea. plane si velim hoc facere, poenam stipulari conveniet, ut, si ita factum non sit, ut comprehensum est, committetur stipulatio etiam ei, cuius nihil interest: poenam enim cum stipulatur quis, non illud inspicitur, quid intersit, sed quae sit quantitas quaeque condicio stipulationis.
No one can stipulate for another, except if a slave stipulates for his master, a son for his father: for obligations of this kind were devised for this purpose, that each person may acquire for himself what is of his own interest; but that it be given to another is of no concern to my interest. Plainly, if I should wish to do this, it will be fitting to stipulate a penalty, so that, if it is not done as it has been set out, the stipulation will become due even to him whose interest is nothing: for when someone stipulates a penalty, it is not examined what the interest is, but what the amount is and what the condition of the stipulation is.
Si stipuler alii, cum mea interesset, videamus, an stipulatio committetur. et ait Marcellus stipulationem valere in specie huiusmodi. is, qui pupilli tutelam administrare coeperat, cessit administratione contutori suo et stipulatus est rem pupilli salvam fore.
If I should stipulate for another, when it concerned my own interest, let us see whether the stipulation becomes operative. and Marcellus says that the stipulation is valid in a case of this kind. the man who had begun to administer the tutelage of a pupil yielded the administration to his co-tutor and stipulated that the pupil’s property would be kept safe.
Si quis insulam faciendam promiserit aut conduxerit, deinde ab aliquo insulam stipulatori fieri stipulatus sit: aut si quis, cum promisisset titio fundum maevium daturum aut, si is non dedisset, poenam se daturum, stipulatus a maevio fuerit fundum titio datu iri: item si quis id locaverit faciendum quod ipse conduxerit: constat habere eum utilem ex locato actionem.
If someone has promised a tenement (insula) to be made or has hired it to be made, and then has stipulated from someone that a tenement be made for the stipulator: or if someone, when he had promised that he would give Titius the estate (fundus) of Maevius, or, if he did not give it, that he would give a penalty, has stipulated from Maevius that the estate would be given to Titius: likewise, if someone has let out to be done that which he himself has hired to be done: it is agreed that he has a useful action ex locato.
Eum, qui " kalendis ianuariis" stipulatur, si adiciat " primis" vel " proximis", nullam habere dubitationem palam est: sed et si dicat " secundis" vel " tertiis" vel quibus aliis, aeque dirimit quaestionem. si autem non addat quibus ianuariis, facti quaestionem inducere, quid forte senserit, hoc est quid inter eos acti sit ( utique enim hoc sequimur quod actum est), easque adsumemus. si autem non appareat, dicendum est quod sabinus, primas kalendas ianuarias spectandas.
He who stipulates " Kalends of January", if he adds " first" or " nearest", it is manifest that there is no doubt: but even if he says " second" or " third" or " whatever others", it equally resolves the question. If, however, he does not add which Januaries, he introduces a question of fact—what perhaps he intended, that is, what was transacted between them ( for in any case we follow that which was transacted), and we will assume these. If, however, it does not appear, it must be said, as sabinus holds, that the first Kalends of January are to be regarded.
Quotiens autem in obligationibus dies non ponitur, praesenti die pecunia debetur, nisi si locus adiectus spatium temporis inducat, quo illo possit perveniri. verum dies adiectus efficit, ne praesenti die pecunia debeatur: ex quo apparet diei adiectionem pro reo esse, non pro stipulatore.
However, whenever in obligations no day is set, the money is owed on the present day, unless, if a place has been added, it introduces a span of time within which that place can be reached. But an added day brings it about that the money is not owed on the present day: whence it appears that the addition of a day is for the debtor, not for the stipulator.
Si quis arbitratu puta lucii titii restitui sibi stipulatus est, deinde ipse stipulator moram fecerit, quo minus arbitretur titius: promissor quasi moram fecerit, non tenetur. quid ergo si ipse, qui arbitrari debuit, moram fecerit? magis probandum est a persona non esse recedendum eius, cuius arbitrium insertum est.
If someone has stipulated that restoration to himself be made at, say, the arbitration of Lucius Titius, and then the stipulator himself has made delay, so that Titius does not arbitrate: the promissor is not held, as though he had been in delay. What then if the very person who ought to arbitrate has made delay? It is rather to be approved that one should not depart from the person whose arbitration has been inserted.
Si decem " cum petiero" dari fuero stipulatus, admonitionem magis quandam, quo celerius reddantur et quasi sine mora, quam condicionem habet stipulatio: et ideo licet decessero priusquam petiero, non videtur defecisse condicio.
If I shall have stipulated that ten be given " when I shall have demanded," the stipulation has rather a certain admonition—so that they be rendered more quickly and, as it were, without delay—than a condition; and therefore, even if I have died before I have demanded, the condition is not seen to have failed.
Cum filius familias stichum dari spoponderit et, cum per eum staret, quo minus daret, decessit stichus, datur in patrem de peculio actio, quatenus maneret filius ex stipulatu obligatus. at si pater in mora fuit, non tenebitur filius, sed utilis actio in patrem danda est. quae omnia et in fideiussoris persona dicuntur.
When a son under paternal power has promised that Stichus be given, and, while it was through him that he failed to deliver, Stichus died, an action against the father de peculio is granted, to the extent that the son would have remained bound ex stipulatu. But if the father was in mora, the son will not be liable, but a useful action is to be granted against the father. All of this likewise is said in the case of a surety.
In hac stipulatione: " neque per te neque per heredem tuum fieri?" per heredem videtur fieri, quamvis absit et ignoret et ideo non facit, quod fieri ex stipulatu oportet. non videtur autem per pupillum stetisse ex huiusmodi stipulatione, si pupillus heres erit.
In this stipulation: "that it be done neither by you nor by your heir?" it is deemed to be done through the heir, although he is absent and unaware and therefore does not do what ought to be done under the stipulation. It does not, however, seem to have depended on the ward under a stipulation of this kind, if the ward will be heir.
In stipulationibus alias species, alias genera deducuntur. cum species stipulamur, necesse est inter dominos et inter heredes ita dividi stipulationem, ut partes corporum cuique debebuntur. quotiens autem genera stipulamur, numero fit inter eos divisio: veluti cum stichum et pamphilum quis stipulatus duos heredes aequis partibus reliquit, necesse est utrique partem dimidiam stichi et pamphili deberi: si idem duos homines stipulatus fuisset, singuli homines heredibus eius deberentur.
In stipulations, sometimes species, sometimes genera are contemplated. When we stipulate for species, it is necessary that, between owners and between heirs, the stipulation be divided in such a way that parts of the bodies are owed to each. But whenever we stipulate for genera, the division among them is made by number: for example, when someone who has stipulated for stichus and pamphilum has left two heirs in equal shares, it is necessary that a half share of stichus and of pamphilum be owed to each; if the same person had stipulated for two men, a single man would be owed to each of his heirs.
Operarum stipulatio similis est his stipulationibus, in quibus genera comprehenduntur: et ideo divisio eius stipulationis non in partes operarum, sed in numerum cedit. quod si unam operam servus communis stipulatus fuerit, necesse est utrique dominorum partem operae tantam, quantam in servo habuerit, petere. solutio autem eius obligationis expeditissima est, si aestimationem operae malit libertus offerre aut si consentiant patroni, ut is communiter operae edantur.
The stipulation of services is similar to those stipulations in which genera are comprehended: and therefore the division of that stipulation falls not into parts of the services, but into number. But if a common slave shall have stipulated for one service, it is necessary that each of the owners demand a share of the service as great as he has in the slave. The performance, moreover, of that obligation is most expeditious, if the freedman prefers to offer an estimation of the service, or if the patrons consent that the services be rendered jointly.
Eum, qui ita stipulatur: " mihi et titio decem dare spondes?" vero similius est semper una decem communiter sibi et titio stipulari, sicuti qui legat titio et sempronio, non aliud intellegitur quam una decem communiter duobus legare.
He who stipulates thus: "Do you promise to give ten to me and to Titius?"—it is more probable that he is always stipulating one ten in common for himself and Titius, just as when someone bequeaths to Titius and Sempronius, nothing else is understood than that he bequeaths one ten in common to the two.
" te et titium heredem tuum decem daturum spondes?" titii persona supervacua comprehensa est: sive enim solus heres exstiterit, in solidum tenebitur, sive pro parte, eodem modo, quo ceteri coheredes eius, obligabitur. et quamvis convenisse videatur, ne ab alio herede quam a titio peteretur, tamen inutile pactum conventum coheredibus eius erit.
" do you promise that you and Titius, your heir, will give ten?" the person of Titius has been included superfluously: for whether he shall have appeared as sole heir, he will be held liable for the whole; or whether for a share, he will be bound in the same manner as his other coheirs. and although it may seem to have been agreed that it should not be sought from any heir other than Titius, nevertheless such a pact-convention will be ineffectual as to his coheirs.
Qui sibi aut filio suo dari stipulatur, manifeste personam filii in hoc complectitur, ut ei recte solvatur: neque interest, sibi aut extraneo cuilibet, an sibi aut filio suo quis stipuletur: quare vel manenti in potestate vel emancipato filio recte solvitur. neque ad rem pertinet, quod qui filio suo dari stipulatur, sibi adquirit, quia coniuncta sua persona stipulator efficit, ut non adquirendae obligationis gratia, sed solutionis causa personam filii adprehendisse intellegatur.
He who stipulates that it be given to himself or to his son plainly includes the person of the son in this, so that payment may rightly be made to him: nor does it make a difference whether one stipulates that it be given to himself or to any outsider, or to himself or to his son: wherefore payment is rightly made either to a son remaining under power or to an emancipated son. Nor does it pertain to the matter that he who stipulates that it be given to his son acquires for himself, because by joining his own person the stipulator brings it about that he is understood to have taken hold of the person of the son not for the sake of acquiring the obligation, but for the purpose of payment.
Qui ita stipulatur: " decem, quoad vivam, dari spondes?", confestim decem recte dari petit: sed heres eius exceptione pacti conventi summovendus est: nam stipulatorem id egisse, ne heres eius peteret, palam est, quemadmodum is, qui usque in kalendas dari stipulatur, potest quidem etiam post kalendas petere, sed exceptione pacti summovetur. nam et heres eius, cui servitus praedii ita concessa est, ut, quoad viveret, ius eundi haberet, pacti conventi exceptione submovebitur.
He who thus stipulates: " ten, so long as I live, do you promise will be given?", forthwith rightly demands that ten be given: but his heir must be removed by the exception of pactum conventum; for it is clear that the stipulator aimed at this, that his heir should not demand, just as he who stipulates that it be given up to the Kalends can indeed also demand after the Kalends, but he is removed by the exception of a pact. For also the heir of him to whom a servitude of a praedium has been granted on these terms, that, so long as he should live, he would have the right of going, will be removed by the exception of pactum conventum.
Si a te stipulatus fuero fundum sempronianum, deinde eundem fundum detracto usu fructu ab alio stipulor, prior stipulatio non novabitur, quia nec solvendo fundum detracto usu fructu liberaberis, sed adhuc a te recte fundi usum fructum peterem. quid ergo est? cum mihi fundum dederis, is quoque liberabitur, a quo detracto usu fructu fundum stipulatus fueram.
If I have stipulated from you the Sempronian estate, and then I stipulate the same estate with the usufruct deducted from another, the prior stipulation will not be novated, because you would not be released by performance by tendering an estate with the usufruct carved out; rather, I would still rightly demand from you the usufruct of the estate. What then? When you have delivered the estate to me, he too will be released, from whom I had stipulated the estate with the usufruct deducted.
Si hominem, quem a titio pure stipulatus fueram, seius mihi sub condicione promiserit et is pendente condicione post moram titii decesserit, confestim cum titio agere potero, nec seius existente condicione obligetur: at si titio acceptum fecissem, seius existente condicione obligari potest. idcirco haec tam varie, quod homine mortuo desinit esse res, in quam seius obligaretur: acceptilatione interposita superest homo, quem seius promiserat.
If the person whom I had stipulated unconditionally from titio, seius has promised to me under a condition, and he, while the condition is pending, after the delay (mora) of titio, has died, I will be able at once to bring suit against titio, nor is seius bound when the condition comes to exist; but if I had made an acceptilation to titio, seius can be bound when the condition comes to exist. For this is thus varied for the following reason: because, with the man dead, there ceases to be the thing in which seius would be obligated; with an acceptilation interposed, the man remains whom seius had promised.
Qui usum fructum fundi stipulatur, deinde fundum, similis est ei, qui partem fundi stipulatur, deinde totum, quia fundus dari non intellegitur, si usus fructus detrahatur. et e contrario qui fundum stipulatus est, deinde usum fructum, similis est ei, qui totum stipulatur, deinde partem. sed qui actum stipulatur, deinde iter, posteriore stipulatione nihil agit, sicuti qui decem, deinde quinque stipulatur, nihil agit.
He who stipulates for the usufruct of an estate, then for the estate, is like one who stipulates for a part of an estate, then for the whole, because an estate is not understood to be given if the usufruct is subtracted. and conversely, he who has stipulated for the estate, then for the usufruct, is like one who stipulates for the whole, then for a part. but he who stipulates for an actus, then for an iter, by the later stipulation does nothing, just as he who stipulates for ten, then five, does nothing.
likewise, if anyone has stipulated the fruits (fructus), and then the use (usus), he achieves nothing—unless he has expressly specified that he does this, in all these cases, with novating intent: for then, with the prior obligation expiring, an action is introduced from the second, and both the right of way (iter) and the use, as well as the five, can be exacted.
Si ita quis stipuletur: " sive navis ex asia venerit sive titius consul factus fuerit", utra prius condicio exstitisset, stipulatio committetur et amplius committi non potest. sed enim cum ex duabus disiunctivis condicionibus altera defecerit, necesse est, ut ea, quae exstiterit, stipulationem committat.
If someone should stipulate thus: "whether a ship shall have come from Asia or Titius shall have been made consul," whichever condition shall have existed first, the stipulation will be incurred, and it cannot be incurred further. But indeed, when out of two disjunctive conditions one has failed, it is necessary that the one which has come to pass incurs the stipulation.
Huiusmodi stipulatio interposita est: " si titius consul factus fuerit, tum ex hac die in annos singulos dena dari spondes?" post triennium condicio exstitit: an huius temporis nomine agi possit, non immerito dubitabitur. respondit eam stipulationem utilem esse ita, ut in ea eorum quoque annorum, qui ante impletam condicionem intercesserint, praestatio in id tempus collata intellegatur, ut sententia eius sit talis: tunc cum titius consul factus fuerit, in annos singulos, etiam praeteriti temporis habita ratione, dena praestentur.
A stipulation of this kind was interposed: " if Titius shall have been made consul, then from this day do you promise that ten are to be given in each single year?" after three years the condition occurred: whether action can be brought for this time’s account will not without merit be doubted. he answered that that stipulation is effective in such a way that in it the performance even of those years which have intervened before the condition was fulfilled is understood as allocated to that time, so that its meaning is this: then, when Titius has been made consul, ten are to be rendered year by year, account also being taken of the time already past.
Sed et si in rei quae promittitur aut personae appellatione varietur, non obesse placet: nam stipulanti denarios eiusdem quantitatis aureos spondendo obligaberis: et servo stipulanti lucio domino suo, si titio, qui idem sit, daturum te spondeas, obligaberis.
But also, if there is variation in the appellation of the thing that is promised or of the person, it is held not to be detrimental: for if, to one stipulating for denarii, you by promising aurei of the same quantity are bound; and if, when a slave is stipulating for Lucius his master, you promise that you will give to Titius, who is the same person, you will be bound.
Stipulationes non dividuntur earum rerum, quae divisionem non recipiunt, veluti viae itineris actus aquae ductus ceterarumque servitutium. idem puto et si quis faciendum aliquid stipulatus sit, ut puta fundum tradi vel fossam fodiri vel insulam fabricari, vel operas vel quid his simile: horum enim divisio corrumpit stipulationem. celsus tamen libro trigensimo octavo digestorum refert tuberonem existimasse, ubi quid fieri stipulemur, si non fuerit factum, pecuniam dari oportere ideoque etiam in hoc genere dividi stipulationem: secundum quem celsus ait posse dici iusta aestimatione facti dandam esse petitionem.
Stipulations are not divided for those things which do not receive division, for example a right of way by road, a right of passage, a right of driving (cattle), a water-conduit, and the other servitudes. I think the same also if someone has stipulated that something be done, as, for instance, that an estate be delivered, or that a ditch be dug, or that an island be constructed, or services, or anything of this kind: for division of these vitiates the stipulation. Celsus, however, in the thirty-eighth book of the Digest reports that Tuberon thought that, where we stipulate that something be done, if it has not been done, money ought to be given, and therefore that even in this genus the stipulation is divided: according to whom Celsus says it can be said that a claim is to be given for a just aestimation of the performance.
Si quis ita stipulatus sit: " si ante kalendas martias primas opus perfectum non erit, tum quanti id opus erit, tantam pecuniam dari?", diem promissionis cedere non ex quo locatum est opus, sed post kalendas martias, quia nec conveniri ante kalendas martias reus promittendi poterat.
If someone has stipulated thus: " if before the Kalends of March the work shall not be completed, then as much money be given as that work will be worth?", the due date of the promise runs not from the time the work was let out on hire, but after the Kalends of March, because the promisor as defendant could not be sued before the Kalends of March.
Plane si " insulam fulciri" quis stipulatus sit, non est exspectandum, ut insula ruat, sic deinde agi possit: nec " insulam fieri", ut tantum temporis praetereat, quanto insula fabricari possit: sed ubi iam coepit mora faciendae insulae fieri, tunc agetur diesque obligationi cedit.
Plainly, if someone has stipulated " the tenement be shored up," one ought not wait for the tenement to collapse so that only then an action could be brought; nor " the tenement be built," so that as much time should pass as a tenement might take to be constructed: but when delay has already begun in having the tenement made, then suit will be brought, and the day accrues to the obligation.
Interdum pura stipulatio ex re ipsa dilationem capit, veluti si id quod in utero sit aut fructus futuros aut domum aedificari stipulatus sit: tunc enim incipit actio, cum ea per rerum naturam praestari potest. sic qui carthagini dari stipulatur, cum romae sit, tacite tempus complecti videtur, quo perveniri carthaginem potest. item si operas a liberto quis stipulatus sit, non ante dies earum cedit, quam indictae fuerint nec sint praestitae.
Sometimes a pure stipulation takes a dilation from the thing itself, for instance if one has stipulated that that which is in the womb, or future fruits, or a house to be built, be given: for then the action begins when these things can, by the nature of things, be rendered. Thus he who stipulates that payment be made at Carthage, when he is at Rome, seems tacitly to comprise a time within which Carthage can be reached. Likewise, if someone has stipulated for services from a freedman, the day for them does not accrue before they have been appointed and not performed.
Stipulationum quaedam certae sunt, quaedam incertae. certum est, quod ex ipsa pronuntiatione apparet quid quale quantumque sit, ut ecce aurei decem, fundus tusculanus, homo stichus, tritici africi optimi modii centum, vini campani optimi amphorae centum.
Some stipulations are certain, some uncertain. That is certain which from the very pronouncement it appears what it is, of what sort, and how much, as, for example: ten gold pieces, the Tusculan estate, the slave Stichus, one hundred modii of the best African wheat, one hundred amphorae of the best Campanian wine.
Usque adeo, ut, si quis ita stipulatus sit " tritici africi boni modios centum" " vini campani boni amphoras centum", incertum videatur stipulari, quia bono melius inveniri potest: quo fit, ut boni appellatio non sit certae rei significativa, cum id, quod bono melius sit, ipsum quoque bonum sit. at cum optimum quisque stipulatur, id stipulari intellegitur, cuius bonitas principalem gradum bonitatis habet: quae res efficit, ut ea appellatio certi significativa sit.
To such a degree that, if someone has so stipulated " one hundred modii of good African wheat" " one hundred amphoras of good Campanian wine", he seems to be stipulating for something uncertain, because something better than good can be found: whence it follows that the appellation "good" is not significant of a certain thing, since that which is better than good is itself also good. But when one stipulates for the best, he is understood to stipulate for that whose goodness has the principal grade of goodness; which fact brings it about that that appellation is significant of something certain.
Illud dubitationem recipit, si quis id, quod ex arethusa ancilla natum erit, aut fructus, qui in fundo tusculano nati erunt, dari sibi stipulatus sit, an certum stipulatus videatur. sed ipsa natura manifestissimum est incerti esse hanc stipulationem.
That admits of doubt: if someone has stipulated that that which will be born from the maidservant Arethusa, or the fruits which will be produced on the Tusculan farm, be given to him, does he appear to have stipulated for a certain thing? But by its very nature it is most manifest that this stipulation is for an uncertain thing.
Qui vero a titio ita stipulatur: " quod mihi seius debet, dare spondes?" et qui ita stipulatur: " quod ex testamento mihi debes, dare spondes?", incertum in obligationem deducit, licet seius certum debeat vel ex testamento certum debeatur. quamvis istae species vix separari possint ab ea, quam proposuimus de vino vel oleo vel tritico, quod in horreo repositum est: et adhuc occurrit, quod fideiussores certum videntur promittere, si modo et is, pro quo obligentur, certum debeat, cum alioquin ita interrogentur: " id fide tua esse iubes?"
But he who stipulates from titius in this way: " quod mihi seius debet, dare spondes?" and he who stipulates thus: " quod ex testamento mihi debes, dare spondes?", brings an indeterminate thing into obligation, although seius owes a determinate thing, or although a determinate thing is owed under the testament. although these species can scarcely be separated from that case which we set forth about wine or oil or wheat that is stored in the granary: and further it occurs that fidejussors (sureties) seem to promise a determinate thing, provided that he also, for whom they are bound, owes a determinate thing, since otherwise they are questioned thus: " id fide tua esse iubes?"
Qui id, quod in faciendo aut non faciendo consistit, stipulatur, incertum stipulari videtur: in faciendo, veluti " fossam fodiri" " domum aedificari" " vacuam possessionem tradi": in non faciendo, veluti " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi per fundum tuum ire agere liceat" " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi hominem erotem habere liceat".
He who stipulates for that which consists in doing or not doing is thought to stipulate for an uncertain thing: in doing, for example, " a ditch to be dug" " a house to be built" " vacant possession to be delivered": in not doing, for example, " that it not be brought about by you, whereby it is less permitted to me to go and drive across your farm" " that it not be brought about by you, whereby it is less permitted to me to have the slave Erotus".
Qui illud aut illud stipulatur, veluti " decem vel hominem stichum", utrum certum an incertum deducat in obligationem, non immerito quaeritur: nam et res certae designantur et utra earum potius praestanda sit, in incerto est. sed utcumque is, qui sibi electionem constituit adiectis his verbis " utrum ego velim", potest videri certum stipulatus, cum ei liceat vel hominem tantum vel decem tantum intendere sibi dari oportere: qui vero sibi electionem non constituit, incertum stipulatur.
Who stipulates this or that, as for example " ten or the slave Stichus," it is not unreasonably asked whether he brings a certain or an uncertain thing into obligation: for both definite things are designated, and which of them is rather to be rendered is uncertain. But however, he who has constituted the election for himself by adding these words " whether I wish", may be seen to have stipulated for a certain thing, since it is permitted to him to claim that either the slave only or the ten only ought to be given to him: whereas he who has not constituted the election for himself stipulates for an uncertain thing.
Cum stipulamur " quidquid te dare facere oportet", id quod praesenti die dumtaxat debetur in stipulationem deducitur, non ( ut in iudiciis) etiam futurum: et ideo in stipulatione adicitur verbum " oportebit" vel ita " praesens in diemve". hoc ideo fit, quia qui stipulatur " quidquid te dare oportet" demonstrat eam pecuniam quae iam debetur: quod si totam demonstrare vult, dicit ^ dici^ " oportebitve" vel ita " praesens in diemve".
When we stipulate " whatever you ought to give or do", only that which is owed as of the present day is brought into the stipulation, not ( as in actions) also what is to be owed in the future: and therefore in the stipulation the word " will be owed" is added, or thus " present or for a future day". This is done for this reason, because he who stipulates " whatever you ought to give" demonstrates that money which is already owed: but if he wishes to demonstrate the whole, he says ^ to be said^ " or will be owed" or thus " present or for a future day".
Quotiens quis alium sisti promittit nec adicit poenam, puta vel servum suum vel hominem liberum, quaeritur, an committatur stipulatio. et celsus ait, etsi non est huic stipulationi additum " nisi steterit, poenam dari", in id, quanti interest sisti, contineri. et verum est, quod celsus ait: nam qui alium sisti promittit, hoc promittit id se acturum, ut stet.
Whenever someone promises that another be produced to appear and does not add a penalty—say, either his slave or a free man—the question arises whether the stipulation is breached. And Celsus says that, even if there has not been added to this stipulation, "unless he appears, a penalty is to be paid," it is covered to the amount of the interest that he appear. And what Celsus says is true: for he who promises that another be produced to appear is promising this—that he will do what is needed so that he appear.
Si procurator sisti aliquem sine poena stipulatus sit, potest defendi non suam, sed eius, cuius negotium gessit, utilitatem in ea re deduxisse: idque fortius dicendum, si " quanti ea res sit" stipulatio proponatur procuratoris.
If a procurator has stipulated that someone be made to appear without penalty, it can be defended that he has brought into account, not his own utility, but that of the one whose business he transacted, in that matter: and this is to be said more strongly, if the procurator’s stipulation is put forward, " for how much that matter is".
Inter stipulantem et promittentem negotium contrahitur. itaque alius pro alio promittens daturum facturumve eum non obligatur: nam de se quemque promittere oportet. et qui spondet " dolum malum abesse afuturumque esse", non simplex abnutivum spondet, sed curaturum se, ut dolus malus absit: idemque in illis stipulationibus " habere licere" item " neque per te neque per heredem tuum fieri, quo minus fiat".
Between the stipulator and the promisor the transaction is contracted. therefore one who, promising for another, says that he will give or do, is not bound: for each person ought to promise concerning himself. and he who promises "that malicious deceit be absent and will be absent" does not promise a simple denial, but that he will take care that malicious deceit be absent: and the same holds in those stipulations "that it be permitted to have," likewise "that nothing be done by you nor by your heir to prevent its being done".
Si stichum stipulatus de alio sentiam, tu de alio, nihil actum erit. quod et in iudiciis aristo existimavit: sed hic magis est, ut is petitus videatur, de quo actor sensit. nam stipulatio ex utriusque consensu valet, iudicium autem etiam in invitum redditur et ideo actori potius credendum est: alioquin semper negabit reus se consensisse.
If, having stipulated for Stichus, I am thinking of one person and you of another, nothing will have been done. This Aristo also thought in the matter of judgments; but here it is rather that he is deemed to have been sued whom the plaintiff had in mind. For a stipulation is valid by the consent of both, but a judgment is rendered even against one unwilling, and therefore the plaintiff is to be believed rather; otherwise the defendant will always deny that he consented.
Sacram vel religiosam rem vel usibus publicis in perpetuum relictam ( ut forum aut basilicam) aut hominem liberum inutiliter stipulor, quamvis sacra profana fieri et usibus publicis relicta in privatos usus reverti et ex libero servus fieri potest. nam et cum quis rem profanam aut stichum dari promisit, liberatur, si sine facto eius res sacra esse coeperit aut stichus ad libertatem pervenerit, nec revocantur in obligationem, si rursus lege aliqua et res sacra profana esse coeperit et stichus ex libero servus effectus sit. quoniam una atque eadem causa et liberandi et obligandi esset, quod aut dari non possit aut dari possit: nam et si navem, quam spopondit, dominus dissolvit et isdem tabulis compegerit, quia eadem navis esset, inciperet obligari.
I stipulate in vain for a sacred or religious thing, or for something left to public uses in perpetuity ( ut forum or a basilica), or for a free man, although sacred things can become profane and things left to public uses can revert to private uses and one who is free can become a slave. For also when someone has promised that a profane thing or Stichus be given, he is released, if without his act the thing has begun to be sacred or Stichus has arrived at liberty; nor are they called back into the obligation, if again by some law both the sacred thing has begun to be profane and Stichus has been made a slave from being free. Since one and the same cause would be both for releasing and for obligating, namely that either it cannot be given or it can be given: for even if the owner has dismantled the ship which he promised and has put it together with the same planks, because it would be the same ship, he would begin to be obligated.
On which point Pedius also writes that this too can be said: if I have stipulated from an estate for one hundred amphorae of wine, I ought to wait until it is produced; and if what has been produced has, without the promisor’s fault, been consumed, I ought again to wait until it is produced anew and can be given; and by these alternations the stipulation will either be in abeyance or be in force. But these are dissimilar: for when a free man has been promised, the time of slavery is not to be regarded to such a degree that not even this stipulation concerning a free man is to be approved: "Do you promise to give that man when he has begun to be a slave?" Likewise: "that place, when from sacred or religious it has begun to be profane, to be given?"—because neither can it admit an obligation of the present time, and only those things which by their nature are possible are brought under obligation. But as to wine, we seem to stipulate not for a specific thing but for a genus, and time is tacitly contained therein; a free man, however, is contained under a determinate individual.
and for chance and adverse fortune to be taken into account in the case of a free man is neither civil nor natural: for we conduct business rightly concerning those things which can be subjected to our uses and dominion at once. and if a ship has been taken apart with this intention, that the planks be destined for another use, although, with the plan changed, it be completed, nevertheless the prior ship is to be said to have been done away with, and this is to be called another; but if for the sake of repairing the ship all the planks have been unfastened, the ship is not yet seen to have perished, and when they are put together again it begins to be the same; just as, in the case of a house, beams laid down with the intention that they be replaced belong to the house, but if it has been taken down even to the ground-plot, although it be restored with the same material, it will be another. this treatment also pertains to praetorian stipulations, in which provision is made about the restoration of a thing and it is inquired whether it is the same thing.
Si rem, quam ex causa lucrativa stipulatus sum, nactus fuero ex causa lucrativa, evanescit stipulatio. sed si heres exstitero domino, extinguitur stipulatio. si vero a me herede defunctus eam legavit, potest agi ex stipulatu: idemque esse et si sub condicione legata sit, quia et, si ipse debitor rem sub condicione legatam dedisset, non liberaretur: sed si condicione deficiente remanserit, petitio infirmabitur.
If I have obtained the thing which I stipulated for from a lucrative cause, the stipulation vanishes. But if I have become heir to the owner, the stipulation is extinguished. If, however, the deceased has bequeathed it from me as heir, an action ex stipulatu can be brought; and the same holds even if it has been left under a condition, for also, if the debtor himself had given a thing left under a condition, he would not be released. But if, the condition failing, it remains, the claim will be invalidated.
Stichum, qui decessit, si stipuler, si quidem condici etiam mortuus potuit, ut furi, utiliter me stipulatum sabinus ait: si vero ex aliis causis, inutiliter, quia et si deberetur, morte promissor liberetur. idem ergo diceret et si mora facta defunctum stipularer.
If I should stipulate for Stichus, who has died: if indeed he could be made the object of a condictio even when dead—as in the case of a thief—Sabinus says I have stipulated usefully; but if on other grounds, ineffectually, because even if it were owed, the promisor would be released by death. He would say the same, therefore, even if, after delay had occurred, I were to stipulate for one deceased.
In exsecutione obligationis sciendum est quattuor causas esse: nam interdum est aliquid, quod a singulis heredibus divisum consequi possumus: aliud, quod totum peti necesse est nec divisum praestari potest: aliud quod pro parte petitur, sed solvi nisi totum non potest: aliud, quod solidum petendum est, licet in solutionem admittat secutionem.
In the execution of an obligation it must be known that there are four causes: for sometimes there is something which we can obtain, divided, from individual heirs: another, which must be sought as a whole and cannot be rendered divided: another which is sought for a part, but cannot be paid unless as a whole: another, which must be sought in solidum, although in payment it admits pursuit.
Quod si stipulatus fuero: " per te heredemve tuum non fieri, quo minus eam agam: si adversus ea factum sit, tantum dari?" et unus ex pluribus heredibus promissoris me prohibeat, verior est sententia existimantium unius facto omnes teneri, quoniam, licet ab uno prohibeor, non tamen in partem prohibeor: sed ceteri familiae erciscundae iudicio sarcient damnum.
But if I have stipulated: " that through you or your heir nothing be done, whereby I be hindered from bringing that action: if anything be done contrary to these terms, that so much be given?" and one of the several heirs of the promisor prevents me, the truer opinion is that all are bound by the act of one, since, although I am prohibited by one, I am not prohibited only as to a share; but the others shall make good the loss by the action for partition of an inheritance (familiae erciscundae iudicium).
Pro parte autem peti, solvi autem nisi totum non potest, veluti cum stipulatus sum hominem incertum: nam petitio eius scinditur, solvi vero nisi solidus non potest. alioquin in diversis hominibus recte partes solventur: quod non potuit defunctus facere, nec quod stipulatus sum consequar. idem iuris est, et si quis decem milia aut hominem promiserit.
However, it can be demanded for a part, but it cannot be paid unless as a whole, as when I have stipulated for an uncertain person: for the claim regarding him is split, but payment cannot be made except in solidum. Otherwise, with different persons, parts will rightly be paid: what the deceased could not do, nor do I obtain what I stipulated. The same law holds even if someone has promised ten thousand or a person.
In solidum vero agi oportet et partis solutio adfert liberationem, cum ex causa evictionis intendimus: nam auctoris heredes in solidum denuntiandi sunt omnesque debent subsistere et quolibet defugiente omnes tenebuntur, sed unicuique pro parte hereditaria praestatio iniungitur.
But one ought to sue for the whole, and payment of a part brings release, when we bring suit on the ground of eviction: for the warrantor’s heirs must be given notice for the whole, and all ought to stand, and if any one evades, all will be held; but the prestation is imposed on each according to his hereditary share.
Item si ita stipulatio facta sit: " si fundus titianus datus non erit, centum dari?", nisi totus detur, poena committitur centum nec prodest partes fundi tradere cessante uno, quemadmodum non prodest ad pignus liberandum partem creditori solvere.
Likewise, if a stipulation has been made thus: " if the Titian estate shall not be given, 100 to be given?", unless it is given in its entirety, the penalty of 100 is incurred; nor does it profit to deliver parts of the estate, with one part lacking, just as it does not profit, for freeing a pledge, to pay the creditor a part.
Si a colono, cui fundum in quinquennium locaveram, post tres annos ita stipulatus fuero: " quidquid te dare facere oportet?", non amplius in stipulationem deducitur, quam quod iam dari oportet: in stipulationem enim deducitur, quod iam dari oportet. si autem adiciatur " oportebitve", etiam futura obligatio deducitur.
If from a tenant-farmer, to whom I had leased the estate for a five-year term, after three years I should stipulate thus: " quidquid te dare facere oportet?", no more is brought into the stipulation than what already ought to be given: for what is already owed to be given is brought into the stipulation. But if there is added " oportebitve", even a future obligation is brought in.
Si servum stipulatus fuero et nulla mora intercedente servus decesserit: si quidem occidat eum promissor, expeditum est. sin autem neglegat infirmum, an teneri debeat promissor, considerantibus, utrum, quemadmodum in vindicatione hominis, si neglectus a possessore fuerit, culpae huius nomine tenetur possessor, ita et cum dari promisit, an culpa, quod ad stipulationem attinet, in faciendo accipienda sit, non in non faciendo? quod magis probandum est, quia qui dari promisit, ad dandum, non faciendum tenetur.
If I have stipulated for a slave and, with no delay intervening, the slave has died: if indeed the promissor kills him, it is settled. But if he neglects him when sick, whether the promissor ought to be held liable, we consider whether, just as in the vindication of a person, if he has been neglected by the possessor, the possessor is held liable under the name of this fault, so also when he has promised that it be given, whether fault, so far as a stipulation pertains, is to be taken in doing, not in not doing? Which is more to be approved, because he who has promised that it be given is bound to giving, not to doing.
Sed si sit quidem res in rebus humanis, sed dari non possit, ut fundus religiosus puta vel sacer factus vel servus manumissus, vel etiam ab hostibus si capiatur, culpa in hunc modum diiudicatur, ut, si quidem ipsius promissoris res vel tempore stipulationis vel postea fuerit et quid eorum acciderit, nihilo minus teneatur, idemque fiat et si per alium, posteaquam ab hoc alienatus sit, id contigerit. sin autem alienus fuit et ab alio tale quid accidit, non tenetur, quia nihil fecit, nisi si posteaquam moratus est solutionem, aliquid huiusmodi acciderit: quam distinctionem et iulianus sequitur. item si homo, qui fuit promissoris, ex praecedenti causa ablatus ei fuerit, quod statuliber fuit, perinde habendus sit, ac si alienum promisisset, quia sine facto ipsius desiit eius esse.
But if indeed the thing be among human things, yet cannot be given—say, for instance, a farm made religious or made sacred, or a slave manumitted, or even if it be taken by enemies—fault is adjudged in this manner: namely, if the thing belonged to the promisor either at the time of the stipulation or thereafter and one of these events happened, he is nonetheless held liable; and the same is to be done even if, through another, after it had been alienated by him, that occurred. But if it belonged to another and such a thing happened through another, he is not held, because he did nothing, unless after he delayed the performance something of this sort occurred: which distinction Julianus also follows. Likewise, if a person, who was the promisor’s, has been taken from him by a pre-existing cause, to wit, that he was statuliber, he is to be held just as if he had promised another’s, because without his own act it ceased to be his.
Sequitur videre de eo, quod veteres constituerunt, quotiens culpa intervenit debitoris, perpetuari obligationem, quemadmodum intellegendum sit. et quidem si effecerit promissor, quo minus solvere possit, expeditum intellectum habet constitutio: si vero moratus sit tantum, haesitatur, an, si postea in mora non fuerit, extinguatur superior mora. et celsus adulescens scribit eum, qui moram fecit in solvendo sticho quem promiserat, posse emendare eam moram postea offerendo: esse enim hanc quaestionem de bono et aequo: in quo genere plerumque sub auctoritate iuris scientiae perniciose, inquit, erratur.
It follows to see how that is to be understood which the ancients established, that whenever the debtor’s fault intervenes the obligation is perpetuated. And indeed, if the promisor has brought it about that he cannot pay, the rule has a straightforward understanding; but if he has only delayed, it is debated whether, if thereafter he is no longer in delay, the prior delay is extinguished. And Celsus the Younger writes that he who has caused delay in paying Stichus whom he had promised can amend that delay by later tendering; for this question is one of the good and the equitable, in which kind, he says, under the authority of legal science one very often errs perniciously.
Nunc videamus, in quibus personis haec constitutio locum habeat. quae inspectio duplex est, ut primo quaeramus, quae personae efficiant perpetuam obligationem, deinde quibus eam producant. utique autem principalis debitor perpetuat obligationem: accessiones an perpetuent, dubium est.
Now let us see in which persons this constitution has place. This inspection is twofold, so that first we inquire which persons effect a perpetual obligation, then by whom they produce it. In any case, however, the principal debtor perpetuates the obligation: whether the accessories perpetuate it is doubtful.
It pleases Pomponius that it be perpetuated: for why should a fideiussor, by his own act, remove his obligation? His opinion is true: and so the obligation is perpetuated both of themselves and of their successors. By their accessories too, that is, by their fideiussors (sureties), they perpetuate the obligation, because they have promised for the whole cause.
Effectus huius ^ huis^ constitutionis ille est, ut adhuc homo peti possit: sed et acceptum ei posse ferri creditur et fideiussorem accipi eius obligationis nomine. novari autem an possit haec obligatio, dubitationis est, quia neque hominem qui non est neque pecuniam quae non debetur stipulari possumus. ego puto novationem fieri posse, si hoc actum inter partes sit, quod et iuliano placet.
The effect of this ^ huis^ constitution is this: that the slave can still be demanded; but it is also believed that he can be credited with payment, and that a fidejussor (surety) can be accepted in the name of that obligation. As to whether this obligation can be novated, it is a matter of doubt, since we cannot stipulate either for a man who does not exist or for money that is not owed. I think that novation can be effected, if this has been transacted between the parties—which also pleases Julianus.
Triticum dare oportere stipulatus est aliquis: facti quaestio est, non iuris. igitur si de aliquo tritico cogitaverit, id est certi generis certae quantitatis, id habebitur pro expresso: alioquin si, cum destinare genus et modum vellet, non fecit, nihil stipulatus videtur, igitur ne unum quidem modium.
Someone has stipulated that wheat ought to be given: it is a question of fact, not of law. therefore, if he has had in mind some particular wheat, that is, of a determinate kind and determinate quantity, that will be held as if expressed: otherwise, if, when he wished to determine the kind and the measure, he did not do so, he seems to have stipulated nothing, therefore not even a single modius.
Possum utiliter a te ita stipulari: " titii nomine te soluturum?", neque enim hoc simile est illi " titium daturum?": sed ex ea stipulatione, dum interest mea, agere possum, et ideo, si locuples sit titius, nihil ex hac stipulatione consequi possim: quid enim mea interest id a te fieri, quod si non feceris, aeque salvam pecuniam habiturus sum?
I can usefully stipulate from you thus: " that you will pay in Titius’s name?", for this is not similar to that " that you will give Titius?": but from that stipulation, so long as it is to my interest, I can bring an action, and therefore, if Titius is solvent, I could obtain nothing from this stipulation: for what, indeed, is it to my interest that this be done by you, seeing that, if you do not do it, I am going to have my money safe all the same?
Existimo posse id quod meum est sub condicione stipulari, item viam stipulari ad fundum posse, quamquam interim fundus non sit meus: aut, si hoc verum non est et alienum fundum sub condicione stipulatus fuero isque ex lucrativa causa meus esse coeperit, confestim peremeretur stipulatio, et si fundi dominus sub condicione viam stipulatus fuerit, statim fundo alienato evanescit stipulatio, et maxime secundum illorum opinionem, qui etiam ea, quae recte constiterunt, resolvi putant, cum in eum casum recciderunt, a quo non potuissent consistere.
I think that I can stipulate under a condition for that which is mine, likewise that one can stipulate for a way to an estate, although in the meantime the estate is not mine: or, if this is not true and I shall have stipulated under a condition for another’s estate and it shall have begun to be mine from a lucrative cause, the stipulation would be extinguished immediately; and if the owner of the estate shall have stipulated under a condition for a way, the stipulation vanishes at once upon the alienation of the estate, and most especially according to the opinion of those who think that even things which have been rightly constituted are resolved, when they have fallen back into that case in which they could not have consisted.
Ex hac stipulatione: " insulam fulciri spondes?" quando nascatur actio, quaeritur. et utique non est exspectandum, ut ruat: nec enim nihil stipulatoris interest fultam potius esse, quam non esse: nec tamen recte agetur, si nondum praeterierit temporis tantum, quo fulcire potuerit redemptor.
From this stipulation: " do you promise that the tenement be shored up?" it is asked when an action arises. And certainly one need not wait until it collapses; for it is not of no concern to the stipulator that it be supported rather than not be: yet it will not be properly brought if there has not yet elapsed so much time within which the contractor could have shored it up.
Quidquid adstringendae obligationis est, id nisi palam verbis exprimitur, omissum intellegendum est: ac fere secundum promissorem interpretamur, quia stipulatori liberum fuit verba late concipere. nec rursum promissor ferendus est, si eius intererit de certis potius vasis forte aut hominibus actum.
Whatever pertains to the binding of an obligation, unless it is plainly expressed in words, is to be understood as omitted: and we generally interpret in favor of the promisor, because it was free to the stipulator to frame the words broadly. Nor, again, is the promisor to be put at a disadvantage, if it is to his interest that the matter concerned certain specific vases, perhaps, or persons.
Si stipulatus hoc modo fuero: " si intra biennium capitolium non ascenderis, dari?", non nisi praeterito biennio recte petam: nam etsi ambigua verba sunt, sic tamen exaudiuntur, si immutabiliter verum fuit te capitolium non ascendisse.
If I have stipulated in this way: "if within two years you do not ascend the Capitol, is it to be given?", I shall not rightly demand except after the two-year period has elapsed: for although the words are ambiguous, nevertheless they are understood thus, if it has been immutably true that you did not ascend the Capitol.
Venditores emptori caverant pro evictione, quanti eius interesset: sed et specialiter adgnituros, si in lite mota sumptus fecisset, emptori stipulanti promiserant. post mortem emptoris unus ex venditoribus ad iudicium vocavit, pretium sibi deberi dicens, heredes eius: qui sumptus in defensione causae factos, cum probarent pretium solutum fuisse, ex stipulatione petebant. modestinus respondit, si in eas impensas venditores promiserunt, quae ob litem de proprietate institutam factae essent, minime ex stipulatu peti posse, quod erogatum est, dum alter ex venditoribus pretium, quod iam fuerat exsolutum, petit.
The sellers had given security to the buyer for eviction, in the amount of his interest; but they had also specifically promised to the stipulating buyer that they would acknowledge this if, once litigation was brought, he had incurred expenses. After the buyer’s death, one of the sellers summoned his heirs to judgment, saying the price was owed to him; they, since they proved that the price had been paid, demanded from the stipulation the expenses made in the defense of the case. Modestinus replied that, if the sellers had promised for those outlays which were made on account of a suit instituted concerning ownership, by no means can what was disbursed be demanded from the stipulation while one of the sellers is claiming the price which had already been paid.
Stipulatus sum damam aut erotem servum dari: cum damam dares, ego quo minus acciperem, in mora fui: mortuus est dama: an putes me ex stipulatu actionem habere? respondit: secundum massurii sabini opinionem puto te ex stipulatu agere non posse: nam is recte existimabat, si per debitorem mora non esset, quo minus id quod debebat solveret, continuo eum debito liberari.
I stipulated that a fallow-deer or the slave Eros be given: when you were giving the deer, I, as to my not accepting, was in default: the deer died: do you think I have an action on the stipulation? He replied: according to the opinion of Massurius Sabinus, I think you cannot sue on the stipulation: for he rightly judged that, if there was no default on the part of the debtor to prevent him from discharging what he owed, he is immediately released from the debt.
Qui ex pluribus fundis, quibus idem nomen impositum fuerat, unum fundum sine ulla nota demonstrationis stipuletur, incertum stipulatur, id est eum fundum stipulatur, quem promissor dare voluerit. tamdiu autem voluntas promissoris in pendenti est, quamdiu id quod promissum est solvatur.
He who, from several estates to which the same name had been imposed, stipulates one estate without any identifying note of specification, stipulates an uncertain thing, that is, he stipulates that estate which the promisor shall have wished to give. But the will of the promisor remains in suspense so long as that which was promised is performed.
Utrum turpem talem stipulationem putes an non, quaero. pater naturalis filium, quem titius habebat in adoptionem, heredem instituit, si patria potestate liberatus esset: pater eum adoptivus non alias emancipare voluit, quam si ei dedisset, a quo stipularetur certam summam, si eum manumisisset: post emancipationem adiit heres filius: petit nunc pecuniam pater ex stipulatione supra relata. respondit: non puto turpem esse causam stipulationis, utpote cum aliter filium emancipaturus non fuerit: nec potest videri iniusta causa stipulationis, si aliquid adoptivus pater habere voluerit, propter quod a filio post emancipationem magis curaretur.
Whether you think such a stipulation disgraceful or not, I ask. The natural father appointed as heir the son whom Titius had in adoption, on condition that he be freed from paternal power: the adoptive father was unwilling to emancipate him otherwise than if there were given to him someone from whom he might stipulate a fixed sum, if he should manumit him: after emancipation the son entered upon the inheritance: now the father seeks the money from the stipulation above related. He answered: I do not think the cause of the stipulation disgraceful, inasmuch as otherwise he would not have been about to emancipate the son; nor can the cause of the stipulation seem unjust, if the adoptive father wished to have something on account of which he would be better cared for by the son after emancipation.
A titio ita stipulatus sum: " si qua mihi nupserit, decem dotis eius nomine dare spondes?" quaerebatur, an consistat talis stipulatio. respondit: si stipulanti mihi dos ita promissa est: " quamcumque uxorem duxero, dotis eius nomine decem dare spondes?", nihil in causa est, quare ea pecunia condicione expleta non debeatur: nam cum condicio etiam ex incertae personae facto parere obligationem possit, veluti " si quis in capitolium ascenderit, decem dare spondes?" " si quis a me decem petierit, tot dare spondes?", cur non idem et in dote promissa respondeatur, ratio reddi non potest.
From Titius I thus stipulated: "If someone should marry me, do you promise to give ten under the name of her dowry?" The question was asked whether such a stipulation stands. He responded: If to me, the stipulator, a dowry has thus been promised: "Whomever I shall take as wife, do you promise to give ten under the name of her dowry?", there is nothing in the case why that money, the condition having been fulfilled, should not be owed: for since a condition can bring forth an obligation even from the act of an uncertain person, as for example "If someone shall ascend the Capitol, do you promise to give ten?" "If someone shall ask ten from me, do you promise to give that amount?", why the same should not be answered also in the case of a dowry having been promised, a reason cannot be rendered.
Si ita stipulatus fuero: " decem aut quindecim dabis?", decem debentur. item si ita: " post annum aut biennium dabis?", post biennium debentur, quia in stipulationibus id servatur, ut quod minus esset quodque longius, esse videretur in obligationem deductum.
If I have so stipulated: " will you give ten or fifteen?", ten are owed. likewise if thus: " will you give after one year or after two years?", they are owed after two years, because in stipulations this is observed: that what is lesser and what is longer is considered to have been brought into the obligation.
Si stipulatus fuero de te: " vestem tuam, quaecumque muliebris est, dare spondes?", magis ad mentem stipulantis quam ad mentem promittentis id referri debet, ut quid in re sit, aestimari debeat, non quid senserit promissor. itaque si solitus fuerat promissor muliebri quadam veste uti, nihilo minus debetur.
If I shall have stipulated from you: " your garment, whatever is women’s, do you promise to give?", this ought to be referred rather to the intention of the stipulator than to the intention of the promisor, so that what the matter is should be assessed, not what the promisor had in mind. And so, if the promisor had been accustomed to use a certain women’s garment, it is owed nonetheless.
Si stipulatus fuero " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi illa domo uti liceat", an etiam, si me non prohibeas, uxorem autem meam prohiberes, vel contra uxore mea stipulata me prohibeas, an committatur stipulatio? et latius est haec verba sic accipi. nam et si stipulatus fuero " per te non fieri, quo minus mihi via itinere actu uti liceat", etsi non me, sed alium nomine meo ingredientem prohibeas, sciendum erit committi stipulationem.
If I shall have stipulated, "that by you it not be done whereby it is less permitted for me to use that house," then also, if you do not prohibit me, but you would prohibit my wife, or conversely, my wife having stipulated, you prohibit me— is the stipulation breached? And it is broader to take these words thus. For if I shall have stipulated, "that by you it not be done whereby it is less permitted for me to use the way, the path, and the drive," even if you prohibit not me but another entering in my name, it must be understood that the stipulation is breached.
Si quis stipulatus sit stichum aut pamphilum, utrum ipse vellet: quem elegerit, petet et is erit solus in obligatione. an autem mutare voluntatem possit et ad alterius petitionem transire, quaerentibus respiciendus erit sermo stipulationis, utrumne talis sit, " quem voluero" an " quem volam": nam si talis fuerit " quem voluero", cum semel elegerit, mutare voluntatem non poterit: si vero tractum habeat sermo illius et sit talis " quem volam", donec iudicium dictet, mutandi potestatem habebit.
If someone has stipulated for Stichus or Pamphilus, whichever he should wish: the one whom he has chosen he will claim, and that one alone will be in the obligation. But whether he can change his will and pass over to a claim for the other—when this is asked, the wording of the stipulation must be considered, whether it is of this sort, “whom I shall have wished (quem voluero),” or “whom I shall wish (quem volam)”: for if it is of the sort “whom I shall have wished,” once he has chosen he will not be able to change his will; but if the wording carries a continued sense and is of this sort “whom I shall wish,” he will have the power of changing until he declares the action (iudicium dictet).
Si quis ita stipulatus fuerit: " pro centum aureis satis dabis?" et reum dederit in istam summam: proculus ait semper in satisdationis stipulatione venire, quod interesset stipulantis, ut alias tota sors inesset, veluti si idoneus promissor non sit, alias minus, si in aliquid idoneus esset debitor, alias nihil si tam locuples esset, ut nostra non intersit satis ab eo accipere: nisi quod plerumque idonei non tam patrimonio quam fide quoque aestimarentur.
If someone has stipulated thus: " will you give surety for a hundred gold pieces?" and has tendered a defendant for that sum, Proculus says that in a stipulation for surety what comes into consideration is always what the stipulator’s interest would be, so that at one time the whole principal would be included—namely, if the promisor is not suitable—at another time less, if the debtor were suitable to some extent, and at another time nothing, if he were so wealthy that it is not in our interest to receive surety from him; except that for the most part “suitable” persons were assessed not so much by patrimony as also by faith (credit).
Cum stipulatus sim mihi, procule, si opus arbitratu meo ante kalendas iunias effectum non sit, poenam, et protuli diem: putasne vere me posse dicere arbitratu meo opus effectum non esse ante kalendas iunias, cum ipse arbitrio meo aliam diem operi laxiorem dederim? proculus respondit: non sine causa distinguendum est interesse, utrum per promissorem mora non fuisset, quo minus opus ante kalendas iunias ita, uti stipulatione comprehensum erat, perficeretur, an, cum iam opus effici non posset ante kalendas iunias, stipulator diem in kalendis augustis protulisset. nam si tum diem stipulator protulit, cum iam opus ante kalendas iunias effici non poterat, puto poenam esse commissam nec ad rem pertinere, quod aliquod tempus ante kalendas iunias fuit, quo stipulator non desideravit id ante kalendas iunias effici, id est quo non est arbitratus ut fieret quod fieri non poterat.
Since I have stipulated for myself, Proculus, a penalty if the work, to be done at my discretion, should not be effected before the Kalends of June, and I have extended the day: do you think I can truly say that at my discretion the work was not effected before the Kalends of June, since I myself, by my own discretion, gave another, more lax day for the work? Proculus replied: not without reason it must be distinguished whether there had not been delay on the part of the promisor, by reason of which the work, before the Kalends of June, in the manner it had been comprehended in the stipulation, was not brought to completion; or whether, when already the work could not be effected before the Kalends of June, the stipulator extended the day to the Kalends of August. For if the stipulator then extended the day, when already the work could not be effected before the Kalends of June, I think the penalty has been incurred, nor does it pertain to the matter that there was some time before the Kalends of June during which the stipulator did not desire it to be effected before the Kalends of June, that is, during which he did not judge that to be done which could not be done.
or if this is false, even if the stipulator had died on the day before the Kalends of June, the penalty would not have been incurred, since, being dead, he could not have formed a judgment, and some time after his death would have remained for completing the work. and almost likewise, even if before the Kalends of June it began to be the case that the work could not be completed before that day, the penalty has been incurred.
Cum venderet aliquis, promisit emptori fideiussores praestari et rem venditam liberari: quae ut liberetur, nunc desiderat emptor: in mora est is, qui ea stipulatione id futurum promisit: quaero quid iuris sit. proculus respondit: tanti litem aestimari oportet, quanti actoris interest.
When someone was selling, he promised the buyer that sureties would be furnished and that the thing sold would be freed; the buyer now desires that it be freed. The one who by that stipulation promised that this would happen is in default: I ask what the law is. Proculus replied: the suit ought to be assessed at as much as the plaintiff’s interest amounts to.
Ita stipulatus sum: " te sisti in certo loco: si non steteris, quinquaginta aureos dari spondes?" si dies in stipulatione per errorem omissus fuerit, cum id ageretur, ut certo die sisteres, imperfecta erit stipulatio. non secus ac si quod pondere numero mensura continetur sine adiectione ponderis numeri mensurae stipulatus essem, vel insulam aedificari non demonstrato loco, vel fundum dari non adiecto nomine. quod si ab initio id agebatur, ut quocumque die sisteres et, si non stetisses, pecuniam dares, quasi quaelibet stipulatio sub condicione concepta vires habebit, nec ante committetur, quam fuerit declaratum reum promittendi sisti non posse.
I thus stipulated: "that you be presented at a certain place: if you shall not have appeared, do you promise that fifty gold pieces will be given?" If the day in the stipulation has been omitted by mistake, when the business was being done so that you should appear on a certain day, the stipulation will be imperfect; no otherwise than if I had stipulated for something that is contained by weight, number, or measure without the addition of the weight, number, or measure, or for a tenement to be built with the place not indicated, or for an estate to be given without the name being added. But if from the beginning the matter was being arranged that you should appear on whatever day and, if you had not appeared, you should give money, it will have force as, so to speak, a stipulation conceived under a condition, nor will it be incurred before it has been declared that the promissor, as defendant, cannot be made to appear.
Sed et si ita stipulatus fuero: " si in capitolium non ascenderis" vel " alexandriam non ieris, centum dari spondes?" non statim committetur stipulatio, quamvis capitolium ascendere vel alexandriam pervenire potueris, sed cum certum esse coeperit te capitolium ascendere vel alexandriam ire non posse.
But also, if I shall have stipulated thus: " if you do not ascend to the capitol" or " if you do not go to alexandria, do you promise that a hundred be given?" the stipulation will not be incurred at once, although you could have ascended to the capitol or reached alexandria, but when it has begun to be certain that you are not able to ascend to the capitol or to go to alexandria.
Item si quis ita stipuletur: " si pamphilum non dederis, centum dari spondes?" pegasus respondit non ante committi stipulationem, quam desisset posse pamphilus dari. sabinus autem existimabat ex sententia contrahentium, postquam homo potuit dari, confestim agendum et tamdiu ex stipulatione non posse agi, quamdiu per promissorem non stetit, quo minus hominem daret, idque defendebat exemplo penus legatae. mucius etenim heredem, si dare potuisset penum nec dedisset, confestim in pecuniam legatam teneri scripsit, idque utilitatis causa receptum est ob defuncti voluntatem et ipsius rei naturam.
Likewise, if someone stipulates thus: " if you do not give Pamphilus, do you promise that a hundred will be given?" Pegasus answered that the stipulation is not incurred before it has ceased to be possible for Pamphilus to be given. But Sabinus thought that, according to the intention of the contracting parties, after the man could be given, suit may be brought at once, and that one cannot sue on the stipulation so long as it did not depend on the promisor that the man was not given; and he defended this by the example of a penus that had been bequeathed. For Mucius wrote that an heir, if he could have given the penus and did not give it, is immediately liable for the money legacy; and this has been received for the sake of utility, on account of the will of the deceased and the nature of the thing itself.
thus Sabinus’s opinion can be accepted, if the stipulation did not begin from a condition, for example, " if you do not deliver Pamphilus, do you promise to give a sum?", but the stipulation is conceived thus: " do you promise Pamphilus to be delivered? if you do not deliver, do you promise a sum to be given?" which will, without doubt, be true, since it is proved that this was transacted: that, if the person has not been delivered, both the person and the money are owed. but also if it has been provided thus, that only the money shall be owed with the person not having been rendered, the same is to be defended, since the will is proved to have been that either the person be rendered or the money be demanded.
Decem stipulatus a titio postea, quanto minus ab eo consequi posses, si a maevio stipularis, sine dubio maevius universi periculum potest subire. sed et si decem petieris a titio, maevius non erit solutus, nisi iudicatum titius fecerit. paulus notat: non enim sunt duo rei maevius et titius eiusdem obligationis, sed maevius sub condicione debet, si a titio exigi non poterit: igitur nec titio convento maevius liberatur ( qui an debiturus sit, incertum est) et solvente titio non liberatur maevius ( qui nec tenebatur), cum condicio stipulationis deficit, nec maevius pendente stipulationis condicione recte potest conveniri: a maevio enim ante titium excussum non recte petetur.
Having stipulated ten from Titius, thereafter, for whatever less you might be able to obtain from him, if you stipulate from Maevius, without doubt Maevius can assume the risk for the whole. But also, if you demand ten from Titius, Maevius will not be discharged unless Titius satisfies the judgment. Paulus notes: for Maevius and Titius are not two co-debtors of the same obligation, but Maevius owes under a condition, if it cannot be exacted from Titius. Therefore neither by Titius being sued is Maevius released (whether he will be a debtor is uncertain), and with Titius paying Maevius is not released (who was not even bound), since the condition of the stipulation fails; nor, while the condition of the stipulation is pending, can Maevius rightly be sued: for from Maevius, before Titius has been thoroughly proceeded against (exhausted), it will not be rightly demanded.
Liber homo, qui bona fide servit mihi, quod stipulanti mihi promittit, prope est, ut omnimodo sit utile, quamvis ex re mea promittat: nam quid aliud dici potest, quo minus liber homo teneatur? nec tamen ideo si stipulanti eidem ex eadem causa spondeam, tenebor: quemadmodum etenim habebit eius actionem adversus me, quod ab alio stipulatus quaereret mihi? hoc itaque latere fructuario servo vel alieno, qui bona fide servit, comparabitur.
A free man who serves me in good faith—what he promises to me, the stipulator—is almost in every way effective, even though he promises in my interest; for what else could be said, whereby a free man would not be held liable? Yet not for that reason, if I for the same cause promise to the same stipulator, shall I be bound: for how, indeed, will he have his action against me for that which, having stipulated from another, he would be seeking for me? In this respect, therefore, it will be likened to a usufructuary’s slave or to another’s slave, who serves in good faith.
" decem hodie dari spondes?" dixi posse vel eo die pecuniam peti nec videri praematurius agi non finito stipulationis die, quod in aliis temporibus iuris est ( nam peti non debet, quod intra tempus comprehensum solvi potest): in proposito enim diem non differendae actionis insertum videri, sed quo praesens ostendatur, esse responsum.
" do you promise that ten be given today?" I said that the money can be demanded even on that very day, and that it does not seem more premature to proceed before the day of the stipulation is finished, which in other cases involving terms of time is the law (for that ought not to be demanded which can be paid within the time included): for in the case proposed the day seems to have been inserted not for the deferring of the action, but in order to show that it is present (i.e., presently due); this has been the response.
" decem mihi aut titio, utrum ego velim, dare spondes?" ex eo, quod mihi dandum est, certi stipulatio est, ex eo, quod illi solvendum, incerti: finge mea interesse titio potius quam mihi solvi, quoniam poenam promiseram, si titio solutum non fuisset.
"Do you promise to give ten to me or to Titius, whichever I wish?" Insofar as it is to be given to me, the stipulation is of a certain thing; insofar as it is to be paid to him, it is of an uncertain thing: suppose it is to my interest that it be paid to Titius rather than to me, since I had promised a penalty if it had not been paid to Titius.
Si ita stipulatus fuero: " hanc summam centum aureorum dari spondes?", etsi maxime ita exaudiatur ille sermo: " si modo centum aureorum est", non facit condicionem haec adiectio, quoniam si centum non sint, stipulatio nulla est: nec placuit instar habere condicionis sermonem, qui non ad futurum, sed ad praesens tempus refertur, etsi contrahentes rei veritatem ignorant.
If I have stipulated thus: " do you promise that this sum of one hundred gold coins be given?", even if that wording is most of all understood thus: " provided only that it is of one hundred gold coins", this addition does not make a condition, since if they are not a hundred, the stipulation is null; nor did it seem right that speech have the likeness of a condition which is referred not to the future but to the present time, even if the contracting parties are ignorant of the truth of the matter.
Stipulationis utiliter interponendae gratia mulier ab eo, in cuius matrimonium conveniebat, stipulata fuerat ducenta, si concubinae tempore matrimonii consuetudinem repetisset. nihil causae esse respondi, cur ex stipulatu, quae ex bonis moribus concepta fuerat, mulier impleta condicione pecuniam adsequi non possit.
For the sake of usefully interposing a stipulation, the woman had stipulated two hundred from him into whose marriage she was entering, if he should resume concubinage during the time of the marriage. I replied that there was no cause why, on the stipulation, which had been conceived in accordance with good morals, the woman, the condition having been fulfilled, should not obtain the money.
Qui romae mutuam pecuniam acceperat solvendam in longinqua provincia per menses tres eamque ibi dari stipulanti spopondisset, post paucos dies romae testato creditori dixit paratum se esse romae eam numerare detracta ea summa, quam creditori suo usurarum nomine dederat. quaesitum est, cum in integrum summam, qua stipulatione obligatus est, optulerit, an eo loco, in quo solvenda promissa est, sua die integra peti posset. respondit posse stipulatorem sua die ibi, ubi solvendam stipulatus est, petere.
He who at Rome had received money as a loan to be paid in a distant province within three months, and had promised to give it there to the stipulator, after a few days at Rome told the creditor, with witnesses, that he was ready at Rome to count it out, deducting the amount which he had given his creditor by way of interest. It was asked whether, since he has tendered the entire sum by which he is bound by the stipulation, it could be demanded, in full, on its due day in the place where payment was promised to be made. He answered that the stipulator can, on its due day, demand it there where he stipulated it to be paid.
Callimachus mutuam pecuniam nauticam accepit a sticho servo seii in provincia syria civitate beryto usque brentesium: idque creditum esse in omnes navigii dies ducentos, sub pignoribus et hypothecis mercibus a beryto comparatis et brentesium perferendis et quas brentesio empturus esset et per navem beryto invecturus: convenitque inter eos, uti, cum callimachus brentesium pervenisset, inde intra idus septembres, quae tunc proximae futurae essent, aliis mercibus emptis et in navem mercis ipse in syriam per navigium proficiscatur, aut, si intra diem supra scriptam non reparasset merces nec enavigasset de ea civitate, redderet universam continuo pecuniam quasi perfecto navigio et praestaret sumptus omnes prosequentibus eam pecuniam, ut in urbem romam eam deportarent: eaque sic recte dari fieri fide roganti sticho servo lucii titii promisit callimachus. et cum ante idus supra scriptas secundum conventionem mercibus in navem impositis cum erote conservo stichi quasi in provinciam syriam perventurus enavigavit: quaesitum est nave submersa, cum secundum cautionem callimachus merces debito perferendas in nave mansisset eo tempore, quo iam pecuniam brentesio reddere romae perferendam deberet, an nihil prosit erotis consensus, qui cum eo missus erat, cuique nihil amplius de pecunia supra scripta post diem conventionis permissum vel mandatum erat, quam ut eam receptam romam perferret, et nihilo minus actione ex stipulatu callimachus de pecunia domino stichi teneatur. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur teneri.
callimachus received a maritime loan of money from stichus, the slave of seius, in the province of syria, in the city berytus, up to brentesium: and that it was lent for all the days of the voyage, 200, under pledges and hypothecs of the goods bought at berytus and to be carried to brentesium, and of those which he would buy at brentesium and bring by ship into berytus: and it was agreed between them that, when callimachus had reached brentesium, then, within the ides of september, which would then be the next upcoming, after buying other goods and loading the cargo into the ship he himself should set out into syria by vessel, or, if by the aforesaid day he had not replenished the goods nor sailed out from that city, he should straightway return the whole money as if the voyage had been completed and should provide all expenses to those accompanying that money, so that they might carry it to the city of rome: and callimachus promised to stichus, the slave of lucius titius, who was asking on good faith, that these things would rightly be given and done. and when, before the aforesaid ides, according to the agreement, with the goods placed on the ship, he sailed out with eros, the fellow-slave of stichus, as if about to arrive in the province of syria: the question was raised, after the ship was sunk, since according to the security instrument callimachus had remained on the ship with the goods to be duly delivered at the time when already he ought to repay the money at brentesium to be carried to rome, whether the assent of eros, who had been sent with him, avails nothing—he to whom nothing more concerning the aforesaid money after the day of the agreement had been permitted or mandated than to carry it, once received, to rome—and nonetheless whether callimachus is held, by an action ex stipulatu, for the money to the master of stichus. he responded that, according to the matters proposed, he is liable.
I also ask, if Eros, the aforesaid slave, consented to Callimachus’s sailing after the above‑written day, whether he could have taken away from his master an action once acquired. He answered that he could not, but that there would be room for an exception, if to the slave had been given the arbitrium that that money be returned at whatever time and to whatever place.
Flavius hermes hominem stichum manumissionis causa donavit et ita de eo stipulatus est: " si hominem stichum, de quo agitur, quem hac die tibi donationis causa manumissionisque dedi, a te heredeque tuo manumissus vindictaque liberatus non erit, quod dolo malo meo non fiat, poenae nomine quinquaginta dari stipulatus est flavius hermes, spopondit claudius". quaero, an flavius hermes claudium de libertate stichi convenire potest. respondit nihil proponi, cur non potest. item quaero, an, si flavii hermetis heres a claudii herede poenam supra scriptam petere voluerit, claudii heres libertatem sticho praestare possit, ut poena liberetur.
Flavius Hermes gave the man Stichus as a gift for the sake of manumission and thus stipulated concerning him: “If the man Stichus at issue, whom on this day I have given to you for the cause of donation and manumission, shall not have been manumitted by you and your heir and freed by vindicta, provided that this does not come about by my malicious fraud, Flavius Hermes stipulated that fifty be given by way of penalty; Claudius promised.” I ask whether Flavius Hermes can sue Claudius concerning the freedom of Stichus. He responded that nothing is set forth why he cannot. Likewise I ask whether, if the heir of Flavius Hermes should wish to seek from the heir of Claudius the above-written penalty, the heir of Claudius can provide freedom to Stichus, so that the penalty be discharged.
he answered that he can. likewise I ask: if the heir of Flavius Hermes should not wish to bring an action with the heir of Claudius on the aforesaid cause, whether nonetheless liberty for Stichus, from the convention which was between Hermes and Claudius, as is shown by the stipulation written above, ought to be provided by the heir of Claudius. he answered that it ought.
Coheredes cum praedia hereditaria diviserant, unum praedium commune reliquerunt sub hoc pacto, ut, si quis eorum partem suam alienare voluisset, eam vel coheredi suo vel eius successori venderet centum viginti quinque: quod si quis aliter fecisset, poenam centum invicem stipulati sunt: quaero, cum coheres mulier coheredis liberorum tutores saepius testato convenerit et desideraverit, ut secundum conventionem aut emant aut vendant, hique nihil tale fecerint, an, si mulier extero vendiderit, poena ab ea centum exigi possit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur obstaturum doli mali exceptionem.
When the coheirs had divided the hereditary estates, they left one estate in common under this pact: that, if any of them wished to alienate his share, he should sell it either to his coheir or to his successor for 125; and if anyone did otherwise, they reciprocally stipulated a penalty of 100. I ask: when the coheir, a woman, has repeatedly, with formal attestation, met with the tutors (guardians) of the other coheir’s children and has desired that, according to the agreement, they either buy or sell, and these have done nothing of the sort, whether, if the woman sells to an outsider, the penalty of 100 can be exacted from her. He answered that, on the basis of what was set forth, the exception of dolus malus (fraud) would stand in the way.
Agerius filius familias servo publii maevii stipulanti spopondit se daturum, quidquid patrem suum publio maevio debere constitisset: quaesitum est patre defuncto, antequam constitisset, quid quantumque deberet, an, si adversus heredem eius actum fuisset aliumve successorem et de debito constitisset, agerius teneatur. respondit, si condicio non exstitisset, stipulationem non commissam.
Agerius, a son under paternal power, promised to the slave of Publius Maevius, who was stipulating, that he would give whatever should be determined that his father owed to Publius Maevius: the question was asked, after the father died before it had been determined what and how much he owed, whether, if suit had been brought against his heir or another successor and the debt had been determined, Agerius would be bound. He answered that, if the condition had not arisen, the stipulation had not become operative.
Seia heres unius tutoris, cum herede pupillae transactione pacto solo facta, maiorem partem solvit, residuam cavit: sed ilico negavit heres se transactionem servare et apud iudicem tutelae egit et victus provocavit ad competentem iudicem et ab eo quoque ad principem idem provocavit et iniusta haec quoque provocatio eius pronuntiata est. quaesitum est, cum per heredem pupillae mora intercesserit, quo minus pecunia in stipulationem deducta ab herede tutoris solveretur nec umquam petierit, an ei hodie debeantur usurae ab herede tutoris. respondit, si seia non cessasset ex stipulatione pecuniam offerre, iure usuras non deberi.
Seia, the heir of one tutor, with the heir of the girl-ward, a settlement made by pact alone, paid the greater part and gave security for the remainder: but immediately the heir denied that he would observe the settlement and litigated before the guardianship judge; and, being defeated, he appealed to the competent judge, and from him likewise he appealed to the Emperor, and this appeal of his too was pronounced unjust. It was asked, since through the heir of the ward delay (mora) had intervened, whereby the money reduced into stipulation, to be paid by the heir of the tutor, was not paid, and he never demanded it, whether interest is owed to him today by the heir of the tutor. He answered: if Seia did not cease to offer the money under the stipulation, by law interest is not owed.
Duo fratres hereditatem inter se diviserunt et caverunt sibi nihil se contra eam divisionem facturos et, si contra quis fecisset, poenam alter alteri promisit: post mortem alterius qui supervixit petit ab heredibus eius hereditatem quasi ex causa fideicommissi sibi a patre relicti debitam et adversus eum pronuntiatum est, quasi de hoc quoque transactum fuisset: quaesitum est, an poena commissa esset. respondit poenam secundum ea quae proponuntur commissam.
Two brothers divided the inheritance between themselves and secured for themselves that they would do nothing against that division, and, if anyone acted against it, each promised a penalty to the other: after the death of the one, the survivor demanded from his (the decedent’s) heirs the inheritance as if owed to him by reason of a fideicommissum left to him by the father, and a pronouncement was made against him, as if about this too there had been a settlement: it was asked whether the penalty had been incurred. He answered that the penalty, according to the facts proposed, had been incurred.
" insulam intra biennium illo loco aedificari spondes?" ante finem biennii stipulatio non committitur, quamvis reus promittendi non aedificaverit et tantum residui temporis sit, quo aedificium extrui non possit: neque enim stipulationis status, cuius dies certus in exordio fuit, ex post facto mutatur. idque et in stipulatione iudicio sistendi causa facta placuit, scilicet ut ante diem stipulatio non committatur, si certum esse coeperit parere stipulationi residuo tempore non posse.
"Do you pledge that an apartment-building will be built in that place within a biennium?" Before the end of the biennium the stipulation is not forfeit, although the promisor has not built and only so much time remains that the building cannot be erected: for the status of the stipulation, whose day was certain at the outset, is not altered by an ex post facto event. And the same has been approved also in a stipulation made for the purpose of appearing in court, namely that the stipulation is not forfeit before the day, if it has become certain that one cannot comply with the stipulation in the remaining time.
Titius a maevio fundum detracto usu fructu stipulatus est et ab eodem eiusdem fundi usum fructum: duae sunt stipulationes et minus est in eo usu fructu, quem per se quis promisit, quam in eo, qui proprietatem comitatur. denique si ille usum fructum dederit eumque stipulator non utendo amiserit, tradendo postea fundum detracto usu fructu liberabitur. non idem contingit ei, qui fundum pleno iure promisit et usum fructum dedit, deinde amisso eo proprietatem sine usu fructu tradidit: ille liberatus est dando usum fructum, hic nulla parte obligationis exoneratur, nisi pleno iure fundum effecerit stipulatoris.
Titius stipulated from Maevius for an estate with the usufruct subtracted, and from the same man the usufruct of the same estate: there are two stipulations, and there is less in that usufruct which one has promised by itself than in that which accompanies ownership. Finally, if he has given the usufruct and the stipulator has lost it by not using it, he will be freed by later delivering the estate with the usufruct deducted. The same does not befall one who promised the estate with full right and gave the usufruct, then, after that was lost, delivered the ownership without the usufruct: that man is freed by giving the usufruct; this man is discharged from no part of the obligation unless he has made the estate the stipulator’s with full right.
" chrysogonus flavii candidi servus actor scripsit, coram subscribente et adsignante domino meo, accepisse eum a iulio zosa, rem agente iulii quintilliani absentis, mutua denaria mille. quae dari quintilliano heredive eius, ad quem ea res pertinebit, kalendis novembribus, quae proximae sunt futurae, stipulatus est zosas libertus et rem agens quintilliani, spopondit candidus dominus meus. sub die supra scripta si satis eo nomine factum non erit, tunc quo post solvetur, usurarum nomine denarios octo praestari stipulatus est iulius zosas, spopondit flavius candidus dominus meus". subscripsit dominus.
" Chrysogonus, slave and business-manager of Flavius Candidus, wrote, in the presence of my master subscribing and signing, that he had received from Julius Zosas, the agent managing the affairs of Julius Quintillianus, who is absent, a loan of one thousand denarii. Which sum Zosas, the freedman and business-agent of Quintillianus, stipulated to be given to Quintillianus, or to his heir to whom that matter shall pertain, on the Kalends of November which are next to come; my master Candidus promised it. Under the above-written date, if satisfaction shall not have been made on that account, then thereafter, for the time after until it is paid, Julius Zosas stipulated that eight denarii be furnished by way of interest; my master Flavius Candidus promised it". the master subscribed.
I responded: Through a free person who is neither subject to our law nor serves us in good faith (bona fide), we can acquire no obligation. Clearly, if a free man were to give money in our name, either his own or ours, so that it be paid to us, an obligation of credited (loaned) money would be acquired for us; but what the freedman stipulated to be given to his patron is ineffectual, so that not even the addition of the absent person, for whom the obligation was being principally sought, avails toward payment. It remains to ask whether, from the counting-out, he himself who contracted can claim the credited money: for whenever those giving money as a loan also stipulate the same, not two obligations arise, but one, of words.
plainly, if the paying-out precedes and the stipulation follows, it must not be said that there has been a retreat from the natural obligation. the subsequent stipulation, in which without the addition of a name he stipulated interest, does not suffer from the same defect ( for nor is it to be taken captiously that interest seems to have been stipulated for the same person for whom also the principal), and therefore in the person of the freedman the stipulation of interest is valid, and he is compelled to assign it to the patron. for in stipulations the words, from which the obligation arises, are for the most part to be examined: rarely are the time or the condition to be understood as included from what will appear to be being transacted: never the person, unless it is expressed.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate stichum promittat et fideiussorem dedit, servus autem post moram a pupillo factam decedat, nec fideiussor erit propter pupilli moram obligatus: nulla enim intellegitur mora ibi fieri, ubi nulla petitio est. esse autem fideiussorem obligatum ad hoc, ut vivo homine conveniatur vel ex mora sua postea.
If a ward, without the authority of his tutor, should promise Stichus and has given a fideiussor, and the slave dies after delay caused by the ward, neither will the fideiussor be bound on account of the ward’s delay: for no delay is understood to occur where there is no claim. However, the fideiussor is understood to be obligated to this extent, that he may be sued while the man is alive, or thereafter on account of his own delay.
Si duo rei stipulandi ita extitissent, ut alter utiliter, alter inutiliter stipularetur, ei, qui non habet promissorem obligatum, non recte solvitur, quia non alterius nomine ei solvitur, sed suae obligationis, quae nulla est. eadem ratione qui stichum aut pamphilum stipulatur, si in unum constiterit obligatio, quia alter stipulatoris erat, etiamsi desierit eius esse, non recte solvitur, quia utraque res ad obligationem ponitur, non ad solutionem.
If two co-stipulators should have arisen in such a way that one stipulated effectively and the other ineffectively, payment is not rightly made to him who does not have a promisor bound, because it is not paid to him on another’s account, but on account of his own obligation, which is none. By the same reasoning, he who stipulates for Stichus or Pamphilus, if the obligation has settled upon one only because the other belonged to the stipulator, then even if it has ceased to belong to him, payment is not rightly made, because both things are set with reference to the obligation, not to the payment.
Si quis ita stipulatus fuerit: " decem aureos das, si navis venit et titius consul factus est?" non alias dabitur, quam si utrumque factum sit. idem in contrarium: " dare spondes, si nec navis venit nec titius consul factus sit?" exigendum erit, ut neutrum factum sit. huic similis scriptura est: " si neque navis venit neque titius consul factus est?" at si sic: " dabis, si navis venit aut titius consul factus sit?" sufficit unum factum.
If someone has stipulated thus: " will you give ten aurei, if the ship comes and titius has been made consul?" it will not be due except if both have happened. the same in the contrary case: " do you promise to give, if neither the ship comes nor titius has been made consul?" it will be demandable only if neither has happened. a similar wording to this is: " if neither the ship comes nor titius has been made consul?" but if thus: " you will give, if the ship comes or titius has been made consul?" one event suffices.
Quod dicitur patrem filio utiliter stipulari, quasi sibi ille stipularetur, hoc in his verum est, quae iuris sunt quaeque adquiri patri possunt: alioquin si factum conferatur in personam filii, inutilis erit stipulatio, veluti ut tenere ei vel ire agere liceat. contra autem filius etiam ut ire patri liceat stipulando adquiret ei: immo et quod in suam personam conferre non potest, hoc patri adquirat.
That which is said, that a father stipulates usefully for a son, as if he were stipulating for himself, is true in those matters which are of right and which can be acquired for the father: otherwise, if an act is conferred upon the person of the son, the stipulation will be useless, for example, that it be permitted for him to hold or to go or to sue. On the contrary, however, the son also, by stipulating that it be permitted to go for the father, will acquire it for him: indeed, he acquires for the father even that which he cannot confer upon his own person.
Qui fundum sibi aut titio dari stipulatur, quamvis fundus titio traditus sit, nihilo minus petere fundum potest, ut sibi de evictione promittatur: nam interest eius, quia mandati actione fundum recepturus sit a titio. sed si donationis causa titium interposuit, dicetur traditione protinus reum liberari.
He who stipulates that a piece of land be given to himself or to titio, although the land has been delivered to titio, nonetheless can sue for the land, so that a promise concerning eviction be made to him: for it is to his interest, since by the action of mandate he is going to recover the land from titio. But if he interposed titio for the sake of a donation, it will be said that by the delivery the debtor is immediately released.
Quidam cum filium alienum susciperet, tradenti promiserat certam pecuniae quantitatem, si eum aliter quam ut filium observasset. quaero, si postmodum domo eum propulerit vel moriens nihil ei testamento reliquerit, an stipulatio committetur, et quid intersit, utrum filius an alumnus vel cognatus agentis fuerit. praeterea quaero, si filium suum quis legitime in adoptionem dederit et ita, ut supra scriptum est, stipulatio intercesserit eumque pater adoptivus exheredaverit vel emancipaverit, an stipulatio committatur.
A certain man, when he was taking up another’s son, had promised to the one handing him over a fixed sum of money, if he should have treated him otherwise than as a son. I ask, if afterwards he has driven him from the house or, when dying, has left him nothing by will, whether the stipulation is incurred, and what difference it makes whether he was the son or a fosterling or a kinsman of the party bringing the action. Furthermore I ask, if someone has lawfully given his own son into adoption and thus, as has been written above, a stipulation has intervened, and the adoptive father has disinherited him or emancipated him, whether the stipulation is incurred.
I answered: the stipulation is effective in each case; therefore, if it has been done contrary to the agreement, the stipulation will be incurred. But let us first consider, in the case of one who has lawfully adopted, whether it can be incurred if he has disinherited or emancipated him: for these are things a father is wont to do with respect to a son; therefore he has not treated him otherwise than as a son. Therefore let the disinherited bring an action de inofficioso (for an undutiful will).
In which case, however, the stipulation having been forfeited, it can be asked whether the disinherited should be permitted to plead on the inofficiousness; especially, if he has become heir to his natural father, is the action ex stipulatu to be denied to him when defeated? But if, for him who stipulated, it ought not to have been denied when the son was defeated, neither will the execution of the money owed be denied to him.
But in the case of one who did not adopt, what meaning this clause “if he had treated him otherwise than as a son” should have, I do not foresee: are we to require here too disinheritance or emancipation—things inept for an outsider? But if he who has lawfully adopted does nothing contrary to the words of the stipulation when he uses paternal right, he who has not done these things speaks to no purpose; nevertheless it can be said that the stipulation has been forfeit.
Si sic stipulatus sim: " neque per te neque per heredem tuum vim fieri spondes?" et egi, quod mihi vim feceris, recte remanere factum heredis in stipulatione. nam et ex ipsius posteriore vi potest committi stipulatio: non enim ad unam vim pertinet. nam sicut et ipsius et heredis caput, ita ipsius vis vel saepius facta complectitur, ut condemnetur quanti interest.
If I have so stipulated: "Do you promise that force shall be done neither by you nor by your heir?" and I brought an action because you used force against me, it is proper that the act of the heir remains within the stipulation. For the stipulation can also be incurred by a later act of force by the promisor himself; for it does not pertain to a single act of force. For just as it embraces the person of both himself and the heir, so it also embraces his force even if done repeatedly, so that he is condemned in the amount of the interest.
or if we wish the stipulation to have been made thus: "that neither by you nor by your heir shall violence be done?", so that it holds for one violence, the first: if he has committed violence, it could no longer be committed on account of the heir: therefore, if action has been brought as though on his own violence, the whole would be consumed: which is not true.
Titia, quae ex alio filium habebat, in matrimonium coit gaio seio habente familiam: et tempore matrimonii consenserunt, ut filia gaii seii filio titiae desponderetur, et interpositum est instrumentum et adiecta poena, si quis eorum nuptiis impedimento fuisset: postea gaius seius constante matrimonio diem suum obiit et filia eius noluit nubere: quaero, an gaii seii heredes teneantur ex stipulatione. respondit ex stipulatione, quae proponeretur, cum non secundum bonos mores interposita sit, agenti exceptionem doli mali obstaturam, quia inhonestum visum est vinculo poenae matrimonia obstringi sive futura sive iam contracta.
Titia, who had a son by another man, enters into marriage, gaio seio being paterfamilias: and at the time of the marriage they agreed that the daughter of gaius seius should be betrothed to Titia’s son, and an instrument was interposed and a penalty added, if any of them should be an impediment to the nuptials: afterwards gaius seius, the marriage standing, met his day and his daughter was unwilling to marry: I ask whether the heirs of gaius seius are held liable from the stipulation. He responded that from the stipulation which is proposed, since it was interposed not according to good morals, an exception of fraud (dolus malus) would obstruct the plaintiff, because it seemed dishonorable for marriages, whether future or already contracted, to be bound by the bond of a penalty.
Idem respondit, cum septicius litteris suis praestaturum se caverit pecuniam et usuras eius semisses, quae apud sempronium depositae sint: si inter praesentes actum est, intellegendum etiam a parte lucii titii praecessisse verba stipulationis.
He likewise replied, when septicius by his own letter had guaranteed that he would render the money and its usury at the half-rate, which have been deposited with sempronius: if the matter was transacted between persons present, it is to be understood that the words of stipulation had also previously proceeded from the side of lucius titius.
Si ita quis promiserit: " decem tibi dabo, qua die petieris, et eorum usuras in dies triginta", quaero, usurae utrum ex die stipulationis an ex die, qua petita sors fuerit, debeantur. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur ex die stipulationis deberi, nisi aliud actum manifeste probaretur.
If someone should thus promise: " ten I will give you, on the day you shall have demanded, and their interest for thirty days," I ask whether the interest is owed from the day of the stipulation, or from the day on which the principal was demanded. he responded that, according to the terms proposed, it is owed from the day of the stipulation, unless it were clearly proved that something else had been agreed.
Seia cavit lucio titio, quo mandante eo hortos emisset, cum pretium omne cum usuris ab eo recepisset, se in eum proprietatem hortorum translaturam: deinde in continenti inter utrumque convenit, ut intra kalendas apriles primas universam summam mandator numeraret et hortos acciperet. quaeritur, cum ante kalendas apriles non omne pretium cum usuris a lucio titio seiae solutum sit, interposito tamen modico tempore reliquum pretium cum usuris seiae titius solvere paratus fuerit neque seia accipere voluit et usque in hodiernum per titium non stet, quo minus reliquum solveret, an nihilo minus lucius titius, si seiae universam pecuniam solvere paratus sit, ex stipulatu agere possit. respondit posse, si non multo post optulisset nec mulieris quicquam propter eam moram interesset: quod omne ad iudicis cognitionem remittendum est.
Seia gave a guaranty to Lucius Titius, at whose mandate she had purchased the gardens, that, when she had received the whole price with interest from him, she would transfer to him the proprietorship of the gardens: then immediately it was agreed between the two that by the first Kalends of April the mandator should pay out the entire sum and receive the gardens. The question is, since before the Kalends of April not all the price with interest was paid by Lucius Titius to Seia, yet, a short time having intervened, Titius was prepared to pay Seia the remaining price with interest, and Seia was unwilling to accept, and down to the present it has not been through Titius that the remainder was not paid, whether nevertheless Lucius Titius, if he is prepared to pay Seia the entire money, can sue on the stipulation. He answered that he can, if he had tendered not much later and nothing of the woman’s interest was involved on account of that delay: all of which is to be remitted to the judge’s cognizance.
Ea lege donatum sibi esse a seia servum et traditum, ut ne ad fratrem eius aut filium aut uxorem aut socrum perveniret, scripsit et haec ita stipulante seia spopondit titius, qui post biennium heredes reliquit seiam et fratrem, cui ne serviret, expressum erat: quaeritur an seia cum fratre et coherede ex stipulatu agere possit. respondit posse in id quod eius interest.
He wrote that a slave had been donated to him by seia and delivered on this condition, that it should not come to his brother or his son or his wife or his mother-in-law; and with seia so stipulating, titius promised this, who after two years left as heirs seia and his brother, to whom it had been expressly provided that the slave was not to serve: it is asked whether seia can bring an action ex stipulatu against the brother and coheir. He answered that she can, to the extent of her interest.
Filia, quae de inofficioso agere instituit et transegit postea cum heredibus stipulatione interposita et subiecta doli clausula, apud praefectum de falso testamento egit nec probavit: quaero, an ex doli clausula possit conveniri. respondi nihil ad eam stipulationem id, quod postea actum proponeretur, pertinere.
A daughter, who instituted an action on an inofficious testament and afterward settled with the heirs, a stipulation having been interposed and a clause of dolus subjoined, brought suit before the prefect concerning a false testament and did not prove it: I ask whether she can be proceeded against under the clause of dolus. I replied that what is proposed as having been done afterward does not pertain to that stipulation.
Continuus actus stipulantis et promittentis esse debet ( ut tamen aliquod momentum naturae intervenire possit) et comminus responderi stipulanti oportet: ceterum si post interrogationem aliud acceperit, nihil proderit, quamvis eadem die spopondisset.
The act of the stipulating party and the promising party ought to be continuous (yet such that some moment of nature may intervene), and the stipulator ought to be answered at close hand; moreover, if after the interrogation he has taken up something else, it will be of no avail, although he may have promised on the same day.
Cum ita stipulatus sum " ephesi dari?" inest tempus: quod autem accipi debeat, quaeritur. et magis est, ut totam eam rem ad iudicem, id est ad virum bonum remittamus, qui aestimet, quanto tempore diligens pater familias conficere possit, quod facturum se promiserit, ut qui ephesi daturum se spoponderit, neque duplomate diebus ac noctibus et omni tempestate contempta iter continuare cogatur neque tam delicate progredi debeat, ut reprehensione dignus appareat, sed habita ratione temporis aetatis sexus valetudinis, cum id agat, ut mature perveniat, id est eodem tempore, quo plerique eiusdem condicionis homines solent pervenire. eoque transacto, quamvis romae remanserit nec possit ephesi pecuniam dare, nihilo minus ei recte condicetur, vel quia per ipsum steterit, quo minus ephesi daret, vel quoniam per alium ephesi possit dari vel quia ubique potest solvere: nam et quod in diem debetur, ante solvi potest, licet peti non potest.
When I have so stipulated, “to be given at Ephesus?”, time is implied; but what length ought to be accepted is in question. And the sounder view is that we remit that whole matter to the judge, that is, to a good man, to assess in how much time a diligent paterfamilias could accomplish what he has promised to do—so that one who has pledged that he will give at Ephesus is neither compelled, with a diploma, to continue the journey by days and nights, every kind of weather disregarded, nor ought he to proceed so delicately as to appear worthy of censure; but, regard being had to season, age, sex, and health, while he aims to arrive in due time—that is, at the same time at which most men of the same condition are wont to arrive. And when that time has passed, although he has remained at Rome and cannot give the money at Ephesus, nonetheless a condiction will rightly be brought against him, either because it was through himself that he failed to give at Ephesus, or because it can be given at Ephesus through another, or because he can pay anywhere: for even what is owed on a fixed day may be paid beforehand, although it cannot be demanded.
Item qui insulam fieri spopondit, non utique conquisitis undique fabris et plurimis operis adhibitis festinare debet nec rursus utroque aut altero contentus esse, sed modus adhibendus est secundum rationem diligentis aedificatoris et temporum locorumque. item si non inchoetur opus, id tantum aestimetur, quod in illo intervallo effici potuit. transactoque tempore, quo insulam consummare oportuerit, si postea aedificetur, liberetur reus, sicut liberatur, qui se daturum spopondit, si quandoque tradit.
Likewise, he who promised that a tenement (insula) would be made ought not, to be sure, to hurry by gathering craftsmen from everywhere and employing very many workforces, nor, conversely, be content with either extreme; rather, a proper measure must be applied according to the plan of a diligent builder and according to times and places. Likewise, if the work is not begun, only that is to be assessed which could have been accomplished in that interval. And after the time has elapsed within which it ought to have been completed, if it is built thereafter, let the defendant be released, just as he is released who promised that he would give, if at some time he delivers.
Illud inspiciendum est, an qui centum dari promisit confestim teneatur an vero cesset obligatio, donec pecuniam conferre possit. quid ergo, si neque domi habet neque inveniat creditorem? sed haec recedunt ab impedimento naturali et respiciunt ad facultatem dandi.
It must be inspected whether the one who promised that one hundred be given is held immediately, or whether rather the obligation is suspended until he can furnish the money. What then, if he neither has it at home nor can find the creditor? But these things fall away from a natural impediment and have regard to the faculty of giving.
Now the faculty concerns the person’s convenience and inconvenience, not the things that are promised. And otherwise, if someone has promised that stichus be given, we shall inquire where stichus is; or, if “that he will give at Ephesus” seems not to matter much, whether, because it is at Ephesus while he himself is at Rome, he is promising to give: for this too pertains to the faculty of giving, since in money and in stichus there is this common point, that the promisor cannot give on the spot. And generally the cause of difficulty pertains to the inconvenience of the promisor, not to the impediment of the stipulator, lest it begin to be said that he too cannot give who has promised to give another’s slave whom the master does not sell.
Cum quis sub hac condicione stipulatus sit, si rem sacram aut religiosam titius vendiderit vel forum aut basilicam et huiusmodi res, quae publicis usibus in perpetuum relictae sint: ubi omnino condicio iure impleri non potest vel id facere ei non liceat, nullius momenti fore stipulationem, proinde ac si ea condicio, quae natura impossibilis est, inserta esset. nec ad rem pertinet, quod ius mutari potest et id, quod nunc impossibile est, postea possibile fieri: non enim secundum futuri temporis ius, sed secundum praesentis aestimari debet stipulatio.
When someone has stipulated under this condition: if Titius should sell a sacred or religious thing, or a forum or a basilica, and things of this kind, which have been left to public uses in perpetuity—where the condition cannot at all be fulfilled by law or it is not permitted for him to do this, the stipulation will be of no moment, just as if a condition which is by nature impossible had been inserted. Nor does it pertain to the matter that the law can be changed and that what is now impossible may later become possible: for the stipulation ought to be assessed not according to the law of future time, but according to that of the present.
Si ut aliquid fiat stipulemur, et usitatius et elegantius esse labeo ait sic subici poenam: " si ita factum non erit": at cum quid ne fiat stipulemur, tunc hoc modo: " si adversus ea factum erit": et cum alia fieri, alia non fieri coniuncte stipulemur, sic comprehendendum: " si non feceris, si quid adversus ea feceris".
If we stipulate that something be done, Labeo says that it is both more usual and more elegant to subjoin the penalty thus: " si ita factum non erit": but when we stipulate that something not be done, then in this way: " si adversus ea factum erit": and when we stipulate conjointly that some things be done and others not be done, it should be comprehended thus: " si non feceris, si quid adversus ea feceris".
Eum, qui certarum nundinarum diebus dari stipuletur, primo die petere posse sabinus ait: proculus autem et ceteri diversae scholae auctores, quamdiu vel exiguum tempus ex nundinarum spatio superesset, peti posse existimant. sed ego cum proculo sentio.
He who stipulates that it be given on the days of certain market-days, Sabinus says may demand it on the first day; but Proculus and the other authors of the opposing school think that, so long as even a small portion of the span of the market-days remains, it can be demanded. But I agree with Proculus.
Cum ex causa duplae stipulationis aliquid intendimus, venditoris heredes in solidum omnes conveniendi sunt omnesque debent subsistere, et quolibet eorum defugiente ceteris subsistere nihil prodest, quia in solidum defendenda est venditio, cuius indivisa natura est. sed cum uno defugiente omnes defugisse videantur ideoque omnes teneantur, unicuique pro parte hereditaria praestatio incumbit.
When we assert something on account of the stipulation for double, the seller’s heirs are all to be convened in solidum, and all must stand; and if any one of them evades, it profits nothing that the others stand, because the sale, whose nature is indivisible, must be defended in solidum. But since, when one evades, all are considered to have evaded and therefore all are held, performance falls upon each according to his hereditary share.
Etsi placeat extingui obligationem, si in eum casum inciderit, a quo incipere non potest, non tamen hoc in omnibus verum est. ecce stipulari viam iter actum ad fundum communem socius non potest, et tamen si is, qui stipulatus fuerat, duos heredes reliquerit, non extinguitur stipulatio. et per partem dominorum servitus adquiri non potest, adquisita tamen conservatur et per partem domini: hoc evenit, si pars praedii servientis vel cui servitur alterius domini esse coeperit.
Although it is accepted that an obligation is extinguished if it has fallen into a case from which it cannot begin, yet this is not true in all instances. For example, a partner cannot stipulate a way—iter, via, actus—to a common estate; and yet, if the one who had stipulated left two heirs, the stipulation is not extinguished. Likewise, a servitude cannot be acquired for a part of the owners; nevertheless, once acquired it is preserved even for a part of the owner: this occurs if a share of the servient estate, or of the estate to which service is owed, has begun to belong to another owner.
Pupillus licet ex quo fari coeperit, recte stipulari potest, tamen, si in parentis potestate est, ne auctore quidem patre obligatur: pubes vero, qui in potestate est, proinde ac si pater familias obligari solet. quod autem in pupillo dicimus, idem et in filia familias impubere dicendum est.
Although a pupil, from the time he has begun to speak, can stipulate rightly, nevertheless, if he is in the power of a parent, he is not obligated, not even with his father as auctor; but a pubes, who is in power, is accustomed to be obligated just as if he were pater familias. And what we say about the pupil must likewise be said also about a filia familias not yet of puberty.
Si inter eos, qui romae sunt, talis fiat stipulatio: " hodie carthagine dare spondes?", quidam putant non semper videri impossibilem causam stipulationi contineri, quia possit contingere, ut tam stipulator quam promissor ante aliquod tempus suo quisque dispensatori notum fecerit in eum diem futuram stipulationem ac demandasset promissor quidem suo dispensatori, ut daret, stipulator autem suo, ut acciperet: quod si ita factum fuerit, poterit valere stipulatio.
If between those who are at Rome such a stipulation is made: " today at Carthage do you promise to give?", some think that it is not always to be seen that an impossible cause is contained in the stipulation, because it can happen that both the stipulator and the promissor, some time beforehand, have each made it known to his own dispensator that the stipulation would be for that day, and that the promissor has instructed his dispensator to give, while the stipulator has instructed his to receive: and if it has been done thus, the stipulation can be valid.
Cum " mihi aut titio" stipulor, dicitur aliam quidem rem in personam meam, aliam in titii designari non posse, veluti " mihi decem aut titio hominem": si vero titio ea res soluta sit, quae in eius persona designata fuerit, licet ipso iure non liberetur promissor, per exceptionem tamen defendi possit.
When I stipulate “ to me or to Titius,” it is said that one thing cannot be designated for my person and another for Titius’s person, as, for example, “ to me ten or to Titius a slave/man.” But if to Titius there be paid that thing which was designated for his person, although the promisor is not released by the law itself, nevertheless he can be defended by an exception.
Tempora vero diversa designari posse, veluti " mihi kalendis ianuariis aut titio kalendis februariis?" immo etiam citeriorem diem in titii personam conferri posse, veluti " mihi kalendis februariis, titio kalendis ianuariis?" quo casu talem esse stipulationem intellegemus: " si titio kalendis ianuariis non dederis, mihi kalendis februariis dare spondes?"
Different times, moreover, can be designated, for example: "to me on the Kalends of January, or to Titius on the Kalends of February?" Nay even an earlier day can be conferred upon the person of Titius, for example: "to me on the Kalends of February, to Titius on the Kalends of January?" in which case we will understand the stipulation to be of this kind: "if you do not give to Titius on the Kalends of January, do you promise to give to me on the Kalends of February?"
Sed rursus mihi quidem pure aut titio sub condicione stipulari possum. contra vero si mihi sub condicione aut titio pure, inutilis erit tota stipulatio, nisi in meam personam condicio extiterit, scilicet quia, nisi quod ad me vim acceperit obligatio, adiectio nihil potest valere. hoc tamen ita demum tractari potest, si evidenter apparet pure titii persona adiecta: alioquin cum ita stipulor: " si navis ex africa venerit, mihi aut titio dari spondes?" titii quoque persona sub eadem condicione adici videtur.
But again, I can indeed stipulate purely for myself, or under a condition for Titius. Conversely, if for me under a condition and for Titius purely, the whole stipulation will be invalid, unless the condition has been fulfilled as to my person; namely because, unless the obligation has taken force with respect to me, the addition can have no validity. Yet this can be dealt with in this way only if it is evident that Titius’s person was added purely: otherwise, when I stipulate thus: "If a ship has come from Africa, do you promise that it will be given to me or to Titius?" the person of Titius also seems to be added under the same condition.
Ex hoc apparet, si diversa condicio in meam personam, diversa in titii posita sit nec in meam personam extiterit condicio, totam stipulationem nullius momenti futuram: exstante vero mea condicione, si quidem titii quoque condicio extiterit, poterit vel titio solvi: si vero in illius persona defecerit, quasi non adiectus habebitur.
From this it appears that, if one condition is placed upon my person and a different one upon titius, and the condition has not come to pass in my person, the whole stipulation will be of no moment; but if my condition is in existence, then, if titius’s condition has also come to pass, it can even be paid to titius; if, however, it has failed in his person, he will be regarded as if not added.
In duobus reis promittendi frustra timetur novatio: nam licet ante prior responderit posterior etsi ex intervallo accipiatur, consequens est dicere pristinam obligationem durare et sequentem accedere: et parvi refert, simul spondeant an separatim promittant, cum hoc actum inter eos sit, ut duo rei constituantur: neque ulla novatio fiet.
In the case of two co-promisors, fear of a novation is in vain: for although the first has already answered, the second, even if he is accepted after an interval, it is consequent to say that the original obligation endures and the subsequent one is added; and it matters little whether they pledge at the same time or promise separately, since it has been transacted between them that two co-debtors be constituted; nor will any novation be effected.
Ubi duo rei facti sunt, potest vel ab uno eorum solidum peti: hoc est enim duorum reorum, ut unusquisque eorum in solidum sit obligatus possitque ab alterutro peti. et partes autem a singulis peti posse nequaquam dubium est, quemadmodum et a reo et fideiussore petere possumus. utique enim cum una sit obligatio, una et summa est, ut, sive unus solvat, omnes liberentur, sive solvatur, ab altero liberatio contingat.
Where two are made debtors, the whole (solidum) can be demanded even from one of them: for this is the nature of two co-debtors, that each is bound for the whole (in solidum) and it can be demanded from either one. And that the shares can be demanded from each individually is by no means doubtful, just as we can demand from both the debtor and the surety. For since the obligation is one, the sum is one, so that, whether one pays, all are released; and if payment is made, release ensues with respect to the other.
Nemo est qui nesciat alienas operas promitti posse et fideiussorem adhiberi in ea obligatione. et ideo nihil prohibet duos reos stipulandi constitui vel promittendi, sicuti si ab eodem fabro duo rei stipulandi easdem operas stipulentur: et ex contrario duo fabri eiusdem peritiae easdem operas promittere intelleguntur et duo rei promittendi fieri.
No one is unaware that another’s services can be promised and that a surety can be brought in for that obligation. And therefore nothing prevents two co-stipulators or co-promisors from being constituted, as, for instance, if from the same craftsman two co-stipulators should stipulate the same services; and conversely two craftsmen of the same expertise are understood to promise the same services and to become two co-promisors.
Duos reos promittendi facturus si utrumque interrogavero, sed alter dumtaxat responderit, verius puto eum qui responderit obligari: neque enim sub condicione interrogatio in utriusque persona fit, ut ita demum obligetur, si alter quoque responderit.
If, intending to make two promisors, I shall have questioned each of them, but only one shall have answered, I think it more correct that he who has answered is obligated: for the interrogation is not made under a condition in the person of each, such that only then he is obligated if the other also has answered.
Duo rei sine dubio ita constitui possunt, ut et temporis ratio habeatur, intra quod uterque respondeat: modicum tamen intervallum temporis, item modicus actus, qui modo contrarius obligationi non sit, nihil impedit, quo minus duo rei sunt. fideiussor quoque interrogatus inter duorum reorum responsa si responderit, potest videri non impedire obligationem reorum, quia nec longum spatium interponitur nec is actus, qui contrarius sit obligationi.
Two parties (rei) can without doubt be constituted in such a way that account is also taken of the time within which each shall respond; yet a small interval of time, likewise a modest act, provided only that it is not contrary to the obligation, hinders nothing, so that they are two parties (rei). A fideiussor as well, if questioned and if he answers between the answers of the two parties (rei), can be seen not to impede the obligation of the parties, because neither is a long span interposed nor is it an act that is contrary to the obligation.
His verbis: " eaque praestari stipulanti tibi spopondimus " interesse, quid inter contrahentes actum sit: nam si duo rei facti sint, eum qui absens fuit non teneri, praesentem autem in solidum esse obligatum, aut si minus, in partem fore obstrictum.
By these words: " eaque be rendered to you, the stipulator, we promised " it matters what was transacted between the contracting parties: for if two have been made co-obligors, the one who was absent is not held, but the one present is bound for the whole; or, if less, he will be bound for his share.
Eandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidem in solidum secutus, vel eandem rem duobus similiter commodavi: fiunt duo rei promittendi, quia non tantum verbis stipulationis, sed et ceteris contractibus, veluti emptione venditione, locatione conductione, deposito, commodato testamento, ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit: " titius et maevius sempronio decem dato".
I have deposited the same thing with two persons alike, relying on the trust of each for the whole, or I have similarly lent the same thing for use to two: two persons become liable as promisors, because obligations arise not only by the words of a stipulation, but also by other contracts, such as purchase and sale, lease and hire, deposit, commodatum, and by testament; for instance, if, several heirs having been instituted, the testator said: " titius and maevius, give ten to sempronius".
Sed si quis in deponendo penes duos paciscatur, ut ab altero culpa quoque praestaretur, verius est non esse duos reos, a quibus inpar suscepta est obligatio. non idem probandum est, cum duo quoque culpam promisissent, si alteri postea pacto culpa remissa sit, quia posterior conventio, quae in alterius persona intercessit, statum et naturam obligationis, quae duos initio reos fecit, mutare non potest. quare si socii sint et communis culpa intercessit, etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum proderit.
But if someone, in depositing with two, makes an agreement that fault also be made good by the other, the truer view is that there are not two debtors, since an unequal obligation has been undertaken by them. The same is not to be approved when both likewise had promised fault, if fault was later remitted by pact to one of them, because the posterior convention, which has intervened in the person of one, cannot change the status and nature of the obligation which made two debtors at the beginning. Therefore, if they are partners and a common fault has intervened, a pact made with one will benefit the other as well.
Reos promittendi vice mutua fideiussores non inutiliter accipi convenit. reus itaque stipulandi actionem suam dividere si velit ( neque enim dividere cogendus est), poterit eundem ut principalem reum, item qui fideiussor pro altero exstitit, in partes convenire, non secus ac si duos promittendi reos divisis actionibus conveniret.
It is agreed that sureties are not ineffectually taken as promisors in a mutual capacity. reus itaque stipulandi, if he wishes to divide his action ( neque enim dividere cogendus est), will be able to sue that same man as the principal defendant, and likewise the one who stood as surety for the other, for their shares, just as if he were suing two promisors with the actions divided.
Et e contrario cum ita cautum inveniretur: " tot aureos recte dari stipulatus est iulius carpus, spopondimus ego antoninus achilleus et cornelius dius", partes viriles deberi, quia non fuerat adiectum singulos in solidum spopondisse, ita ut duo rei promittendi fierent.
And on the contrary, when it was found to have been thus provided: "Julius Carpus stipulated that so many aurei be duly given, we promised—I, Antoninus Achilleus, and Cornelius Dius," virile shares were owed, because it had not been added that each had promised in solidum, so that the two became co-promisors.
Si ex duobus, qui promissuri sint, hodie alter, alter postera die responderit, proculus non esse duos reos ac ne obligatum quidem intellegi eum, qui postera die responderat, cum actor ad alia negotia discesserit vel promissor, licet peractis illis rebus responderit.
If, out of two who are to make a promise, one has responded today and the other on the following day, Proculus says that there are not two defendants, and that not even is he understood to be obligated who responded on the following day, since the actor has departed to other business, or the promissor, although he responded after those matters were completed.
Si a titio et pupillo sine tutoris auctoritate stipulatus fuero eadem decem, vel a servo, et quasi duos reos promittendi constitui, obligatum titium solum iulianus scribit, quamquam, si servus spoponderit, in actione de peculio eadem observari debent, ac si liber fuisset.
If I have stipulated the same ten from titius and from a pupil without the authority of a tutor, or from a slave, and as it were have constituted two promisors, iulianus writes that titius alone is bound; although, if the slave has promised, in the action de peculio the same should be observed as if he had been free.
Si reus promittendi altero reo heres extiterit, duas obligationes eum sustinere dicendum est. nam ubi quidem altera differentia obligationum esse possit, ut in fideiussore et reo principali, constitit alteram ab altera perimi: cum vero eiusdem duae potestatis sint, non potest repperiri qua altera potius quam alteram consummari. ideoque et si reus stipulandi heres exstiterit, duas species obligationis eum sustinere.
If the promisor, being one party, has become heir to the other party, he is to be said to bear two obligations. For where indeed the one can be of a different kind of obligations, as in a surety (fideiussor) and the principal debtor, it has been established that the one is extinguished by the other; but when they are two of the same potestas, it cannot be found by which the one should rather than the other be consummated. And therefore also, if the promisee has become heir, he bears two species of obligation.
Si id, quod ego et titius stipulamur, in singulis personis proprium intellegatur, non poterimus duo rei stipulandi constitui, veluti cum usum fructum aut dotis nomine dari stipulemur: idque et iulianus scribit. idem ait, et si titius et seius decem aut stichum, qui titii sit, stipulati fuerint, non videri eos duos reos stipulandi, cum titio decem tantum, seio stichus aut decem debeantur: quae sententia eo pertinet, ut, quamvis vel huic vel illi decem solverit vel seio stichum, nihilo minus alteri obligatus manet. sed dicendum est, ut, si decem alteri solverit, ab altero liberetur.
If that which I and Titius stipulate is understood as proper to each individual person, we will not be able to have two co-creditors in stipulation constituted, as when we stipulate that a usufruct or something in the name of a dowry be given; and Julianus also writes this. The same man says that, if Titius and Seius have stipulated for ten or for Stichus, who belongs to Titius, they are not seen as two co-creditors in stipulation, since to Titius only ten are owed, and to Seius either Stichus or ten are owed. This opinion tends to this result: that, although he has paid ten either to this one or that one, or has delivered Stichus to Seius, nonetheless he remains obligated to the other. But it must be said that, if he pays ten to the one, he is released from the other.
Sive a certis personis heredum nominatim legatum esset, sive ab omnibus excepto aliquo, atilicinus sabinus cassius pro hereditariis partibus totum eos legatum debituros aiunt, quia hereditas eos obligat. idem est, cum omnes heredes nominantur.
Whether the legacy were bequeathed by name from certain persons among the heirs, or by all except some one, atilicinus, sabinus, cassius say that they will owe the whole legacy in proportion to their hereditary shares, because the inheritance obliges them. The same holds when all the heirs are named.
Cum duo eandem pecuniam debent, si unus capitis deminutione exemptus est obligatione, alter non liberatur. multum enim interest, utrum res ipsa solvatur an persona liberetur. cum persona liberatur manente obligatione, alter durat obligatus: et ideo si aqua et igni interdictum est alicuius ^ alicui^ fideiussor postea ab eo datus tenetur.
When two owe the same money, if one is removed from the obligation by capitis deminutio, the other is not freed. For it makes much difference whether the thing itself is paid or the person is freed. When the person is freed with the obligation remaining, the other remains bound: and therefore, if interdict from water and fire has been pronounced of someone ^ to someone^, a surety later given by him is liable.
Si servus communis meus et tuus ex peculio, quod ad te solum pertinebat, mutuam pecuniam dederit, obligationem tibi adquiret et, si eandem mihi nominatim stipulatus fuerit, debitorem a te non liberabit, sed uterque nostrum habebit actionem, ego ex stipulatu, tu quod pecunia tua numerata sit: debitor tamen me doli mali exceptione summovere poterit.
If a slave common to me and you, out of the peculium which pertained to you alone, has given money as a loan, he will acquire the obligation for you; and, if he has expressly stipulated the same to me by name, he will not discharge the debtor as against you, but each of us will have an action, I from stipulation, you because your money was paid out: nevertheless the debtor will be able to repel me by the exceptio doli mali.
Communis servus duorum servorum personam sustinet. idcirco si proprius meus servus communi meo et tuo servo stipulatus fuerit, idem iuris erit in hac una conceptione verborum, quod futurum esset, si separatim duae stipulationes conceptae fuissent, altera in personam mei servi, altera in personam tui servi: neque existimare debemus partem dimidiam tantum mihi adquiri, partem nullius esse momenti, quia persona servi communis eius condicionis est, ut in eo, quod alter ex dominis potest adquirere, alter non potest, perinde habeatur, ac si eius solius esset, cui adquirendi facultatem habeat.
A common slave sustains the persona of two slaves. Therefore, if my own slave has stipulated from our common slave of me and you, the same law will stand in this single conception of words as would come about if two stipulations had been framed separately, one in the person of my slave, the other in the person of your slave: nor ought we to think that only a half share is acquired to me and that a part is of no effect, because the persona of a common slave is of such a condition that, in regard to that which one of the masters can acquire and the other cannot, he is treated just as if he belonged solely to him who has the faculty of acquiring.
Si fructuarius servus stipulatus esset fructuario aut proprietario, si quidem ex re fructuarii stipulatus esset, inutilis est stipulatio, quia utrique ex re fructuarii actionem adquirere potuisset: sed si aliud stipulatus fuisset, proprietarium petere posse, et, si promissor fructuario solvisset, liberatur.
If a slave held in usufruct had stipulated for the usufructuary or for the proprietor, if indeed he had stipulated in the usufructuary’s interest, the stipulation is ineffective, because either of them could have acquired an action on account of the usufructuary’s matter; but if he had stipulated something else, the proprietor can demand, and if the promisor had paid the usufructuary, he is discharged.
Cum servus communis titii et maevii stipulatur in hunc modum: " decem kalendis titio dare spondes? si decem kalendis titio non dederis, tunc maevio viginti dare spondes?" duae stipulationes esse videntur, sed si kalendis decem data non fuerint, uterque dominus ex stipulatu agere poterit, sed in secunda obligatione maevio commissa titius exceptione doli summovebitur.
When a slave common to titius and maevius stipulates in this manner: " do you promise to give ten to titius on the Kalends? if on the Kalends you shall not have given ten to titius, then do you promise to give twenty to maevius?" two stipulations seem to exist; but if the ten are not given on the Kalends, each master will be able to sue ex stipulatu, yet in respect of the second obligation incurred to maevius, titius will be removed by the exception of dolus (fraud).
Servus communis sic omnium est non quasi singulorum totus, sed pro partibus utique indivisis, ut intellectu magis partes habeant quam corpore: et ideo si quid stipulatur vel quaqua alia ratione adquirit, omnibus adquirit pro parte, qua dominium in eo habent. licet autem ei et nominatim alicui ex dominis stipulari vel traditam rem accipere, ut ei soli adquirat. sed si non nominatim domino stipuletur, sed iussu unius dominorum, hoc iure utimur, ut soli ei adquirat, cuius iussu stipulatus est.
A common slave is thus of all, not as though wholly of each individual, but according to shares, indeed undivided, so that they have parts more in understanding than in body; and therefore, if he stipulates or acquires by any other mode, he acquires for all in proportion to the share in which they have dominion over him. But it is permitted to him also to stipulate naming one of the masters, or to receive a thing delivered, so that he acquires for that one alone. Yet if he does not stipulate naming a master, but by the order of one of the masters, we use this law: that he acquires for that one alone at whose order he stipulated.
Proinde et si quattuor forte dominos habuerit et duorum iussu stipulatus sit, his solis adquiret qui iusserunt, magisque est, ut non aequaliter, sed pro portione dominica totum eis adquiratur. idem puto et si nominatim eis stipulatus esse proponatur: nam et si omnium iussu stipulatus sit vel omnibus nominatim, non dubitaremus omnibus pro dominicis eum portionibus, non pro virilibus adquirere.
Accordingly, even if he should happen to have four masters and should have stipulated at the order of two, he will acquire only for those who ordered; and the sounder view is that the whole is acquired to them not equally, but in proportion to their ownership share. I think the same even if it is alleged that he stipulated for them by name: for even if he stipulated by the order of all or for all by name, we would not hesitate that he acquires for all according to ownership portions, not per capita.
Si servus communis ab uno ex sociis stipulatus sit, si quidem nominatim alteri socio, ei soli debetur: sin autem sine ulla adiectione pure stipulatus sit, reliquas partes is servus ceteris sociis praeter eam partem, ex qua promissor dominus esset, adquiret. sed si iussu unius socii stipulatus est, idem iuris est, quod esset, si eidem illi socio nominatim dari stipulatus esset. interdum etiamsi neque iussu neque nominatim alteri ex dominis stipularetur, ei tamen soli adquirere eum iuliano placuit: ut puta si quid forte stipuletur, quod utrique adquiri non potest.
If a common slave has stipulated from one of the partners, then, if indeed he stipulated by name to the other partner, it is owed to him alone; but if he has stipulated purely, without any addition, that slave will acquire the remaining shares for the other partners, except for that share with respect to which the promisor was owner. But if he stipulated by the order of one partner, the same rule of law applies as if he had stipulated by name that it be given to that same partner. Sometimes, even if he stipulated neither by order nor by name to one of the owners, nevertheless Julian held that he acquires to him alone: for instance, if he happens to stipulate something which cannot be acquired to both.
Item si servus duorum titii et maevii hominem, qui titii erat, stipulatus fuerit, ei soli adquirit, cuius non fuit. sed si stipulatus sit stichum sibi et " maevio et titio dari spondes?", totum eum maevio adquirit: quod enim alteri ex dominis adquirere non potest, id ad eum, qui ad obligationem admittitur, pertinet.
Likewise, if the slave of two, of titii and maevii, has stipulated a man who was titii’s, he acquires him for that one alone to whom he did not belong. But if he has stipulated stichus for himself and " do you promise that it be given to maevio and titio?", he acquires the whole of him for maevio: for what he cannot acquire for one of the masters pertains to him who is admitted to the obligation.
Sed si sibi aut primo aut secundo dominis suis stipulatus sit, et hic tantundem erit probandum, quod iulianus, inutilem esse stipulationem. sed utrum adiectio inutilis est aut tota stipulatio utilis non est? puto adiectionem solam esse inutilem: eo enim quod ait " mihi" omnibus adquisiit ex stipulatu actionem.
But if he has stipulated either for himself or for his first or second masters, here too the same must be proved, as Julian holds, that the stipulation is ineffectual. But is it the addition that is ineffectual, or is the whole stipulation not valid? I think only the addition is ineffectual: for by his saying "to me" he has acquired for all an action ex stipulatu.
Then, does payment have a place in the person of the others, on the example of an extraneous person? And I think that it can even be paid to them, just as when I stipulate for myself or for Titius. Why then, when the stipulation has not been constituted with the first or second masters, is there neither a stipulation nor a payment?
Servus meus cum apud furem esset, furi dari stipulatus est: negat furi deberi sabinus, quia eo tempore, quo stipulatus est, ei non serviret: sed nec ego ex ea stipulatione agere potero. sed si detracta furis persona stipulatus est, mihi quidem adquiritur actio, sed furi nec mandati nec alia actio adversus me dari debet.
My slave, when he was with a thief, stipulated that it be given to the thief: Sabinus denies that it is owed to the thief, because at the time he stipulated he was not serving him; but neither shall I be able to sue on that stipulation. But if, with the thief’s persona removed, he stipulated, an action is indeed acquired for me, but to the thief neither an action of mandate nor any other action against me ought to be granted.
Si communis servus meus et tuus viam vel iter vel actum stipuletur sine adiectione nominis nostri, cum ego solus fundum vicinum habeam, soli mihi eam adquirit: quod et si tu fundum habeas, mihi quoque in solidum servitus adquiritur.
If a slave common to me and to you stipulates a way or a path or a cattle-drive (via, iter, or actus) without the addition of our name(s), when I alone have the neighboring estate, he acquires it for me alone; and if you also have an estate, the servitude (easement) is acquired for me too in full (in solidum).
Si servus communis maevii et castrensis peculii defuncto filio familias milite, antequam adeat institutus hereditatem, stipuletur, socio, qui solus interim dominus invenitur, tota stipulatio quaeretur, quoniam partem non facit hereditas eius quae nondum est. non enim, si quis heredem existere filio familias dixerit, statim et hereditatem eius iam esse consequens erit, cum beneficium principalium constitutionum in eo locum habet, ut filius familias de peculio testari possit: quod privilegium cessat, priusquam testamentum aditione fuerit confirmatum.
If a slave common to Maevius and to the castrense peculium, the filius familias being deceased, a soldier, before the instituted heir enters upon the inheritance, should stipulate, the whole stipulation will be claimable by the partner, who meanwhile is found to be the sole owner, since an inheritance which does not yet exist makes no part. For if someone should say that an heir exists for the filius familias, it will not at once follow that his inheritance already exists, since the beneficium of the imperial constitutions has place in this, that a filius familias can make a testament concerning the peculium: which privilege does not take effect before the testament has been confirmed by aditio (acceptance).
Si servus titii et maevii partem, quae maevii est, sibi dari stipuletur, nulla stipulatio est, cum, si titio dari stipulatus fuisset, titio adquireretur. quod si simpliciter concepta est stipulatio, veluti: " partem eam, quae maevii est, dare spondes?" non adiecto " mihi", prope est, ut, quia sine vitio concepta est stipulatio, sequatur eius personam, cuius potest.
If a slave of Titius and Maevius stipulates that the share which is Maevius’s be given to himself, there is no stipulation, since, if he had stipulated that it be given to Titius, it would be acquired for Titius. But if the stipulation is conceived simply, for example: " that share which is Maevius’s, do you promise to give?" without adding " to me", it is almost the case that, because the stipulation is conceived without defect, it follows the person of that one for whom it can.
Servus capto domino ab hostibus domino dari stipulatus est. quamvis quae simpliciter stipulatur vel ab alio accepit, etiam ad heredem captivi pertinent aliudque sit iuris in persona filii, quia nec tunc fuit in potestate, cum stipularetur, nec postea deprehenditur ( ut servus) in hereditate, tamen in proposito potest quaeri, num ex hac stipulatione nihil adquisitum heredi videtur, quomodo si servus hereditarius defuncto aut etiam heredi futuro stipulatus fuisset. sed in hac specie servus filio exaequabitur: nam et si filius captivi patri suo stipulatus fuerit dari, res in pendenti erit et si pater apud hostes decesserit, nullius momenti videbitur fuisse stipulatio, quoniam alii, non sibi stipulatus est.
A slave, with his master captured by enemies, stipulated that something be given to his master. Although the things which he simply stipulates, or received from another, also pertain to the heir of the captive, and the law is different in the person of a son, because he was not then in the father’s power when he stipulated, nor is he afterwards found (as a slave is) in the inheritance, nevertheless in the case proposed it can be asked whether from this stipulation nothing seems to have been acquired for the heir, just as if a hereditary slave had stipulated for one deceased, or even for one who would be heir in the future. But in this species the slave will be equated to a son: for even if the son of the captive shall have stipulated that it be given to his father, the matter will be in suspense; and if the father shall have died among the enemies, the stipulation will seem to have been of no moment, since he stipulated for another, not for himself.
Cum servus fructuarius operas suas locasset et eo nomine pecuniam in annos singulos dari stipulatus esset, finito fructu domino residui temporis adquiri stipulationem iulianus scriptum reliquit. quae sententia mihi videtur firmissima ratione subnixa: nam si in annos forte quinque locatio facta sit, quoniam incertum est, fructus in quem diem duraturus sit, singulorum annorum initio cuiusque anni pecunia fructuario quaereretur: secundum quae non transit ad alterum stipulatio, sed unicuique tantum adquiritur, quantum ratio iuris permittit. nam et cum idem servus ita stipuletur: " quantam pecuniam tibi intra illum diem dedero, tantam dari spondes?" in pendenti est, quis ex stipulatu sit habiturus actionem: si enim ex re fructuarii vel operis suis pecuniam dedero, fructuario, si vero aliunde, domino stipulatio quaeretur.
When a slave held in usufruct had let out his services and on that account had stipulated that money be paid year by year, Julianus left written that, when the usufruct ended, the stipulation for the remaining time is acquired by the owner. Which opinion seems to me most solidly grounded in reason: for if the letting were made, say, for five years, since it is uncertain up to what day the usufruct is going to last, at the beginning of each of the several years the money for each year would be acquired for the usufructuary; accordingly the stipulation does not pass to the other, but is acquired to each only so far as the reason of law permits. For even when the same slave should so stipulate: “How much money I shall have given you within that day, do you promise that so much will be given?” it is in suspense who will have the action ex stipulatu: for if I have given the money from the property of the usufructuary or from my own services, it will be for the usufructuary; but if from elsewhere, the stipulation will be acquired for the owner.
Si alienus servus duobus bonae fidei serviens ex unius eorum re adquirat, ratio facit, ut ei ex cuius re adquisiit id totum ei adquirat, sive ei soli sive quasi duobus serviat: nam et in veris dominis quotiens utrique adquiritur, totiens partes adquiri: ceterum si alii non adquiratur, alium solidum habiturum. igitur eadem ratio erit et in proposito, ut hic servus alienus, qui mihi et tibi bona fide servit, mihi solidum ex re mea adquirat, quia tibi non potest adquiri, quia non sit ex re tua.
If another’s slave, serving two persons in good faith, should acquire from the property of one of them, reason dictates that he acquire the whole of it for him from whose property he acquired it, whether he serves him alone or as it were two: for even in the case of true owners, whenever acquisition is made for both, then shares are acquired; but if it is not acquired for the other, the one for whom it is acquired will have the whole (the solid). Therefore the same rationale will apply also in the case proposed, namely that this slave of another, who serves me and you in good faith, acquires for me the entirety from my property, because it cannot be acquired for you, since it is not from your property.
Liber homo bona fide mihi servit: stipulatur ex re mea vel ex operis suis stichum, qui ipsius est: magis est, ut mihi adquirat, quia et si servus esset meus, adquireret mihi: nec enim illud dici debet, quasi ille quoque in peculio eius esset. sed si ex re mea stichum, qui meus est, stipulatur, sibi adquiret.
A free man serves me in good faith: he stipulates, from my property or from his own works, for Stichus, who is his: it is rather the case that he acquires for me, because even if he were my slave, he would acquire for me; for it ought not to be said, as though he too were in his peculium. But if, from my property, he stipulates for Stichus, who is mine, he will acquire for himself.
Apud labeonem ita scriptum est: filium et filiam in sua potestate pater intestatus reliquit: filia eo animo fuit semper, ut existimaret nihil ad se ex hereditate patris pertinere: deinde frater eius filiam procreavit et eam infantem reliquit: tutores servo avito eius imperaverunt, ut ab eo, cui res avi hereditatis vendiderunt, stipularetur, quanta pecunia ad eum pervenisset: ex ea stipulatione quid pupillae adquisitum sit, peto rescribas. paulus: est quidem verum bona fide possessum servum ex re eius cui servit stipulantem possessori adquirere: sed si res, quae ex hereditate avi communes fuerunt, in venditionem hereditatis venerunt, non videtur ex re pupillae totum pretium stipulari ideoque utrisque adquirit.
It is written thus in Labeo: a father left a son and a daughter in his own power, intestate. The daughter was always of the mind that nothing from her father’s inheritance pertained to her. Then her brother begot a daughter and left her an infant. The tutors ordered her grandfather’s slave to stipulate from him to whom they sold the assets of the grandfather’s inheritance, for as much money as had come to him. From that stipulation, what has been acquired for the girl ward, I ask you to write back. Paulus: It is indeed true that a slave possessed in good faith, when stipulating ex re of the one whom he serves, acquires for the possessor. But if the things which were common from the inheritance of the grandfather came under the sale of the inheritance, he does not seem to stipulate the whole price ex re of the girl ward; and therefore he acquires for both.
Si servus communis ita stipuletur: " kalendis ianuariis decem titio aut maevio dominis, uter eorum tunc vivet, dare spondes?", inutilem esse stipulationem iulianus scribit, quia non possit in pendenti esse stipulatio nec apparere, utri eorum sit adquisitum.
If a common slave should so stipulate: " on the Kalends of January ten to Titius or Maevius, the masters, whichever of them shall then be alive, do you promise to give?", Julianus writes that the stipulation is useless, because a stipulation cannot be in suspense, nor can it appear to which of them it has been acquired.
Si servus hereditarius stipulatus fuerit et fideiussores acceperit posteaque adita fuerit hereditas, dubitatur, utrum ex die interpositae stipulationis tempus cedat an ex adita hereditate: item si servus eius, qui apud hostes sit, fideiussores acceperit. et cassius existimat tempus ex eo computandum, ex quo agi cum eis potuerit, id est ex quo adeatur hereditas aut postliminio dominus revertatur.
If a hereditary slave shall have stipulated and has taken sureties, and afterwards the inheritance shall have been entered upon, it is a matter of doubt whether the time runs from the day of the stipulation interposed or from the entry upon the inheritance; likewise, if the slave of one who is among the enemy has taken sureties. And Cassius considers that the time is to be computed from the point at which action could be brought against them, that is, from the time when the inheritance is entered upon or when the master returns by postliminy.
Usus fructus sine persona esse non potest et ideo servus hereditarius inutiliter usum fructum stipulatur. legari autem ei posse usum fructum dicitur, quia dies eius non cedit statim: stipulatio autem pura suspendi non potest. quid ergo, si sub condicione stipuletur?
Usufruct cannot exist without a person, and therefore a slave belonging to an inheritance stipulates for a usufruct to no effect. But it is said that a usufruct can be bequeathed to him, because its day does not accrue at once; whereas a pure stipulation cannot be suspended. What then, if he should stipulate under a condition?
Si servus communis ex re unius stipulatus erit, magis placuit utrique adquiri, sed eum, cuius ex re facta est stipulatio, cum socio communi dividundo aut societatis iudicium de parte reciperanda recte acturum: idemque esse dicendum et si ex operis suis alteri ex dominis servus adquirit.
If a slave held in common has stipulated on account of the resources of one of the owners, the better view is that it is acquired to both; but he on whose account the stipulation was made will properly proceed against his partner, either by the action for dividing common property or by the partnership action, to recover his share: and the same is to be said if, from his own work, the slave acquires for one of the masters.
Sicuti uni nominatim stipulando ei soli adquirit, ita placet et si rem emat nomine unius ex dominis, ei soli servum adquirere. item si credat pecuniam, ut uni ex dominis solveretur, vel quodlibet aliud negotium gerat, posse eum nominatim exprimere, ut uni ex dominis restituatur aut solvatur.
Just as, by stipulating expressly for one person, he acquires to that one alone, so it is the settled view that, if he buys a thing in the name of one of the owners, he acquires the slave for that one alone. Likewise, if he lends money so that it be paid to one of the owners, or conducts any other business, he can express by name that it be restored or paid to one of the owners.
Illud quaesitum est, an heredi futuro servus hereditarius stipulari possit. proculus negavit, quia is eo tempore extraneus est. cassius respondit posse, quia qui postea heres extiterit, videretur ex mortis tempore defuncto successisse: quae ratio illo argumento commendatur, quod heredis familia ex mortis tempore funesta facta intellegitur, licet post aliquod tempus heres extiterit: manifestum igitur est servi stipulationem ei adquiri.
The question was raised whether a slave belonging to the estate can stipulate for an heir-to-be. Proculus denied it, because at that time he is extraneous. Cassius replied that he can, because he who afterwards has become heir is deemed to have succeeded to the defunct from the time of death: which reasoning is commended by this argument, that the heir’s household is understood to have been made funereal (funesta) from the time of death, although the heir has emerged only after some time: therefore it is manifest that the slave’s stipulation accrues to him.
Si, cum duorum usus fructus esset in servo, et is servus uni nominatim stipulatus sit ex ea re, quae ad utrosque pertinet, sabinus ait, quoniam soli obligatus esset, videndum esse, quemadmodum alter usuarius partem suam recipere possit, quoniam inter eos nulla communio iuris esset. sed verius est utili communi dividundo iudicio inter eos agi posse.
If, when the usufruct in a slave belonged to two, and that slave stipulated by name in respect of that matter which pertains to both, Sabinus says that, since he was obligated to one alone, it must be considered how the other usufructuary can recover his share, since there is no communion of right between them. But the truer view is that a useful action communi dividundo can be brought between them.
Si servus testamento manumissus, cum se liberum esse ignoraret et in causa hereditaria maneret, pecuniam heredi stipulatus est, nihil debebitur heredibus, si modo scierint eum testamento manumissum, quia non potest videri iustam servitutem servisse iis, qui illum liberum esse non ignorabant. distat ista causa eius, qui liber emptus bona fide servit, quia in eo et ipsius et emptoris existimatio consentit: ceterum is, qui scit hominem liberum esse, quamvis ille condicionem suam ignoret, ne possidere quidem eum potest videri.
If a slave manumitted by testament, while he was unaware that he was free and remained in the hereditary cause, stipulated money from the heir, nothing will be owed to the heirs, provided only that they knew he had been manumitted by the will, because he cannot be seen to have served a just servitude to those who did not ignore that he was free. This case differs from that of one who, being a free man purchased, serves in good faith, because in that case both his own and the buyer’s estimation concurs: moreover, he who knows the man to be free, although the latter is ignorant of his condition, cannot even be seen to possess him.
Quod servus stipulatus est, quem dominus pro derelicto habebat, nullius est momenti, quia qui pro derelicto rem habet, omnimodo a se reiecit nec potest eius operibus uti, quem eo iure ad se pertinere noluit. quod si ab alio adprehensus est, stipulatione ei adquirere poterit: nam et haec genere quodam donatio est. inter hereditarium enim servum et eum, qui pro derelicto habetur, plurimum interest, quoniam alter hereditatis iure retinetur, nec potest relictus videri qui universo hereditatis iure continetur, alter voluntate domini derelictus non potest videri ad usum eius pertinere, a quo relictus est.
What a slave has stipulated, whom the master was holding as derelict, is of no moment, because one who holds a thing as derelict has in every way cast it away from himself and cannot make use of the services of him whom he did not wish, under that juridical status, to pertain to himself. But if he has been apprehended by another, that person will be able by stipulation to acquire through him; for this too is in a certain genus a donation. For between a hereditary slave and one who is held as derelict there is very great difference, since the former is retained by the right of the inheritance, nor can he be seen as abandoned who is encompassed within the universal right of the inheritance; the other, abandoned by the will of the master, cannot be seen to pertain to the use of him by whom he was abandoned.
Si communis servus ita stipularetur: " lucio titio et gaio seio dari spondes?", qui sunt domini illius, pro virilibus partibus eis ex stipulatione debetur: si vero ita: " dominis meis dare spondes?", pro parte, qua domini essent: si vero ita: " lucio titio et gaio seio dominis meis dare spondes?", dubitaretur, utrumne viriles partes an pro dominica portione eis deberetur. et interesset, quid cuius demonstrandi gratia esset adiectum et quae pars eius stipulationis principalem causam haberet: sed cum ad nomina prius decursum est, rationabilius esse videtur pro virili parte stipulationem eis adquiri, quod dominorum vocabula pro demonstratione habeantur.
If a common slave should stipulate thus: " Lucius Titius and Gaius Seius be given, do you promise?", who are that man’s masters, there is owed to them from the stipulation in virile portions; but if thus: " to my masters to give, do you promise?", then for the share in which they were masters; but if thus: " to Lucius Titius and Gaius Seius, my masters, to give, do you promise?", it would be doubted whether virile portions or according to the proprietary portion should be owed to them. And it would make a difference what had been added for the sake of the demonstration of which person, and which part of that stipulation had the principal cause: but since recourse is had first to the names, it seems more rational that the stipulation is acquired for them per virile share, because the words “my masters” are held by way of demonstration.
Cum servus, in quo usum fructum habemus, proprietatis domino ex re fructuarii vel ex operis eius nominatim stipuletur, adquiritur domino proprietatis: sed qua actione fructuarius reciperare possit a domino proprietatis, requirendum est. item si servus bona fide nobis serviat et id, quod nobis adquirere poterit, nominatim domino suo stipulatus fuerit, ei adquirit: sed qua actione id reciperare possumus, quaeremus. et non sine ratione est, quod gaius noster dixit, condici id in utroque casu posse domino.
When a slave, over whom we have a usufruct, expressly stipulates for the owner of the property, in respect of the matter of the usufructuary or from his services, it is acquired for the owner of the property: but by what action the usufructuary can recuperate it from the owner of the property is to be inquired. Likewise, if a slave serves us in good faith and, as to that which he could acquire for us, has expressly stipulated for his own master, he acquires it for him: but by what action we can recuperate it, we shall inquire. And it is not without reason that our gaius said that in both cases it can be recoverable by condiction by the owner.
Quidquid contraxit servus, dum nobis servit, etiam si stipulationem contulit in alienationem vel manumissionem suam, tamen nobis id adquisitum erit, quia potestas eius tunc, cum id contraheret, nostra fuit. idque est, si filius familias contrahat: namque etiam quod in emancipationis suae tempus contulerit, nobis debebitur, si tamen dolo malo id fecerit.
Whatever a slave has contracted, while he serves us, even if he has made a stipulation payable upon his alienation or manumission, nevertheless that will have been acquired for us, because his power then, when he contracted it, was ours. And the same holds if a son under paternal power contracts: for even what he has referred to the time of his emancipation will be owed to us, if, however, he has done this with fraudulent intent.