Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

PROHOEMIVM De inventione, ut arbitror, satis dictum est: neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus, verum etiam motus animorum tractavimus. Sed ut opera exstruentibus satis non est saxa atque materiam et cetera aedificanti utilia congerere nisi disponendis eis conlocandisque artificium manus adhibeatur: sic in dicendo quamlibet abundans rerum copia cumulum tantum habeat atque conio gestum nisi illas eadem dispositio in ordinem digestas atque inter se commissas devinxerit. Nec inmerito secunda quinque partium posita est, cum sine ea prior nihil valeat.

PROEM About invention, as I judge, enough has been said: for we have not only set forth those things which pertain to teaching, but we have also treated the motions of souls. But as for those erecting works, it is not enough to heap up stones and material and the other things useful to a building unless the craft of the hand be applied to disposing and placing them: so in speaking, however abundant a supply of matters may have only a heap and a congeries carried together, unless that same disposition has bound them fast, digested into order and joined among themselves. Nor without merit is the second of the five parts positioned, since without it the first avails nothing.

Neque enim quamquam fusis omnibus membris statua sit nisi conlocetur; et si quam in corporibus nostris aliorumve animalium partem permutes et transferas, licet habeat eadem omnia, prodigium sit tamen: et artus etiam leviter loco moti perdunt quo viguerunt usum, et turbati exercitus sibi ipsi sunt impedimento. Nec mihi videntur errare qui ipsam rerum naturam stare ordine putant, quo confuso peritura sint omnia. Sic oratio carens hac virtute tumultuetur necesse est et sine rectore fluitet nec cohaereat sibi, multa repetat, multa transeat, velut nocte in ignotis locis errans, nec initio nec fine proposito casum potius quam consilium sequatur.

For neither, although all its members have been cast, will a statue be a statue unless it is set in place; and if you permute and transpose any part in our bodies or in those of other animals, although it have all the same things, yet it is a monstrosity; and limbs even slightly moved from their place lose the use in which they have thriven, and disordered armies are an impediment to themselves. Nor do those seem to me to err who think that the very nature of things stands by order, with which, once confounded, all things would be doomed to perish. Thus an oration lacking this virtue must be in tumult and, without a helmsman, drift and not cohere with itself, repeat many things, pass by many, like one wandering by night in unknown places, and, with neither beginning nor end set forth, follow chance rather than counsel.

Quapropter totus hic liber serviat divisioni, quae quidem, si certa aliqua via tradi in omnis materias ullo modo posset, non tam paucis contigisset. Sed cum infinitae litium formae fuerint futuraeque sint et tot saeculis nulla reperta sit causa quae esset tota alteri similis, sapiat oportet actor et vigilet et inveniat et iudicet et consilium a se ipso petat. Neque infitias eo quaedam esse quae demonstrari possint, eaque non omittam.

Wherefore let this whole book be devoted to Division; which indeed, if some sure method could in any way be handed down for all subject-matters, would not have fallen to so few. But since the forms of litigations have been and will be infinite, and through so many ages no case has been found which was entirely similar to another, it behooves the advocate to be wise and keep watch and discover and judge, and to seek counsel from himself. Nor do I deny that there are certain things which can be demonstrated, and these I will not omit.

[1] I. Sit igitur, ut supra significavi, divisio rerum plurium in singulas, partitio singularum in partis discretio, ordo recta quaedam conlocatio prioribus sequentia adnectens, dispositio utilis rerum ac partium in locos distributio. Sed meminerimus ipsam dispositionem plerumque utilitate mutari, nec eandem semper primam quaestionem ex utraque parte tractandam. Cuius rei, ut cetera exempla praeteream, Demosthenes quoque atque Aeschines possunt esse documento, in iudicio Ctesiphontis diversum secuti ordinem, cum accusator a iure, quo videbatur potentior, coeperit, patronus omnia paene ante ius posuerit, quibus iudicem quaestioni legum praepararet.

[1] 1. Let there be then, as I signified above, the division of several things into singles, the partition of singles into parts, order a certain straight collocation annexing the following to the prior, disposition a useful distribution of things and parts into places. But let us remember that disposition itself is for the most part changed by utility, and that not the same question is always to be treated first on either side. Of which matter, to pass by the other examples, Demosthenes too and Aeschines can be evidence, in the trial of Ctesiphon having followed a different order, since the accuser began from the law, in which he seemed stronger, while the advocate set almost everything before the law, by which he prepared the judge for the question of the laws.

Aliud enim alii docere prius expedit, alioqui semper petitoris arbitrio diceretur: denique in accusatione mutua, cum se uterque defendat priusquam adversarium arguat, omnium rerum necesse est ordinem esse diversum. Igitur quid ipse sim secutus, quod partim praeceptis partim usu partim ratione cognoveram, promam nec umquam dissimulavi.

For it is expedient to teach one man one thing first, another another; otherwise it would always be argued at the petitioner’s discretion: finally, in a mutual accusation, since each defends himself before he arraigns his adversary, it is necessary that the order of all things be diverse. Therefore, what I myself have followed—what I had recognized partly by precepts, partly by use, partly by reason—I will disclose, nor have I ever dissimulated it.

Erat mihi curae in controversiis forensibus nosse omnia quae in causa versarentur: nam in schola certa sunt et pauca et ante declamationem exponuntur, quae themata Graeci vocant, Cicero proposita. cum haec in conspectu quodam modo conlocaveram, non minus pro adversa parte quam pro mea cogitabam. Et primum, quod non difficile dictu est sed tamen ante omnia intuendum, constituebam quid utraque pars vellet efficere, tum per quid, hoc modo.

It was a concern to me, in forensic controversies, to know everything that was involved in the case: for in the school they are fixed and few, and before the declamation they are set forth—the things which the Greeks call themata, Cicero proposita. When I had set these in view in a certain way, I used to think no less for the adverse side than for my own. And first, which is not difficult to say but nevertheless to be looked at before all, I would establish what each side wished to effect, then by what (means), in this way.

Cogitabam quid primum petitor diceret. Id aut confessum erat aut controversum. Si confessum, non poterat ibi esse quaestio.

I considered what the petitioner would say first. That was either confessed or controverted. If confessed, there could not be a question there.

Transibam ergo ad responsum partis alterius, idem intuebar: nonnumquam etiam quod inde optinebatur confessum erat. Vbi primum coeperat non convenire, quaestio oriebatur. Id tale est: "occidisti hominem", "occidi". Convenit, transeo.

I would then pass to the response of the other party, I was considering the same: sometimes even what was thereby being maintained was confessed. Where it first began not to agree, a question arose. It is of this sort: "you killed a man," "I killed." It is agreed; I move on.

Rationem reddere debet reus quare occiderit. "Adulterum" inquit "cum adultera occidere licet". Legem esse certum est. Tertium iam aliquid videndum est in quo pugna consistat.

The defendant ought to render an account of why he killed. “An adulterer,” he says, “it is permitted to kill together with the adulteress.” That there is a law is certain. Now a third thing must be considered, in which the contest consists.

"Non fuerunt adulteri": "fuerunt"; quaestio: de facto ambigitur, coniectura est. Interim et hoc tertium confessum est, adulteros fuisse: "sed tibi" inquit accusator "illos non licuit occidere: exul enim eras" aut "ignominiosus". De iure quaeritur. At si protinus dicenti "occidisti" respondeatur "non occidi", statim pugna est.

"They were not adulterers": "they were"; the question: there is ambiguity about the fact, it is a matter of conjecture. Meanwhile this third point too has been confessed, that they were adulterers: "but to you," says the accuser, "it was not permitted to kill those men: for you were an exile," or "ignominious." The inquiry is about law. But if forthwith to one saying "you killed" the answer is given "I did not kill," at once there is a contest.

Si explorandum est ubi controversia incipiat, considerari debet quae sit intentio quae primam quaestionem facit. Intentio simplex: "occidit Saturninum Rabirius", coniuncta: "lege de sicariis commisit L. Varenus: nam et C. Varenum occidendum et Cn. Varenum vulnerandum et Salarium item occidendum curavit" - nam sic diversae propositiones erunt: quod idem de petitionibus dictum sit. Verum ex coniuncta propositione plures esse quaestiones ac status possunt, si aliud negat reus, aliud defendit, aliud a iure actionis excludit.

If it must be explored where the controversy begins, it ought to be considered what the intention (the claim) is which makes the first question. A simple intention: “Rabirius killed Saturninus”; a conjoined one: “Under the law on assassins L. Varenus committed [an offense]: for he saw to it that C. Varenus be killed and that Cn. Varenus be wounded and that Salarius likewise be killed”—for thus there will be diverse propositions; as the same has been said concerning petitions. But from a conjoined proposition there can be more questions and statuses, if the defendant denies one thing, defends another, and excludes another by the law of the action.

In quo genere est agenti dispiciendum quid quoque loco diluat.

In this kind the advocate must discern what he should wash away at each point.

Quod pertinet ad actorem, non plane dissentio a Celso, qui sine dubio Ciceronem secutus instat tamen huic parti vehementius, ut putet primo firmum aliquid esse ponendum, summo firmissimum, inbecilliora media, quia et initio movendus sit iudex et summo inpellendus. At pro reo plerumque gravissimum quidque primum movendum est, ne illud spectans iudex reliquorum defensioni sit aversior. Interim tamen et hoc mutabitur, si leviora illa palam falsa erunt, gravissimi defensio difficilior, ut detracta prius accusatoribus fide adgrediamur ultimum, iam iudicibus omnia esse vana credentibus.

As concerns the accuser, I do not plainly dissent from Celsus, who, without doubt following Cicero, nevertheless presses this side more vehemently, to think that something firm should be set first, at the end the firmest, the more enfeebled matters in the middle, since the judge must both be moved at the beginning and impelled at the end. But on behalf of the defendant, for the most part the most grave point should be handled first, lest, fixing his gaze on that, the judge be more averse to the defense of the rest. Meanwhile, however, this too will be altered, if those lighter points are openly false and the defense of the most grave would be more difficult, so that, credibility having first been stripped from the accusers, we may approach the last, the judges now believing all things to be vain.

Opus erit tamen praefatione, qua et ratio reddatur dilati criminis et promittatur defensio, ne id quod non statim diluemus timere videamur. Ante actae vitae crimina plerumque prima purganda sunt, ut id de quo laturus est sententiam iudex audire propitius incipiat. Sed hoc quoque pro Vareno Cicero in ultimum distulit, non quid frequentissime sed quid tum expediret intuitus.

There will, however, be need of a preface, in which both an account be rendered of the deferred charge and a defense be promised, lest we seem to fear that which we will not at once dissolve. For the most part, the charges of a previously-lived life are first to be purged, so that the judge, about to deliver sentence, may begin to hear that matter propitiously. But this too Cicero, on behalf of Varenus, deferred to the last, having regard not to what is most frequent, but to what was then expedient.

Cum simplex intentio erit, videndum est unum aliquid respondeamus an plura. Si unum, in re quaestionem instituamus an in scripto: si in re, negandum sit quod obicitur an tuendum: si scripto, in qua specie iuris pugna sit, et in ea de verbis an de voluntate quaeratur. Id ita consequemur si intuiti fuerimus quae sit lex quae litem faciat, hoc est, qua iudicium sit constitutum.

When the intention is simple, it must be considered whether we answer one thing or several. If one, whether we institute the question in the matter or in the writing: if in the matter, whether what is objected is to be denied or to be defended; if in the writing, in what species of law the contest is, and in that, whether the inquiry is about the words or about the will. We shall thus achieve this if we have looked to what the law is that makes the suit, that is, by which the judgment has been constituted.

Nam quaedam in scholasticis ponuntur ad coniungendam modo actae rei seriem, ut puta: "Expositum qui agnoverit, solutis alimentis recipiat: minus dicto audientem filium liceat abdicare. Qui expositum recepit, imperat ei nuptias locupletis propinquae: ille deducere vult filiam pauperis educatoris". Lex de expositis ad adfectum pertinet: iudicium pendet ex lege abdicationis. Nec tamen semper ex una lege quaestio est, ut in antinomia.

For certain things are set in scholastic exercises for the sake of connecting only the sequence of the deed that has been done, for instance: "Let him who has acknowledged the exposed infant, the alimenta having been paid, receive him back: let it be permitted to disinherit a son less obedient to command. He who received the exposed infant orders for him the nuptials of a wealthy kinswoman: he wishes to lead to marriage the daughter of his poor foster-father." The law concerning the exposed pertains to affection; the judgment hangs on the law of disinheritance. Nor, however, is the question always from one law, as in antinomy.

is spectatis apparebit circa quod pugna sit.

Once these things have been examined, it will be apparent what the contest is about.

Coniuncta defensio est, qualis pro Rabirio: "si occidisset, recte fecisset, sed non occidit". Vbi vero multa contra unam propositionem dicimus, cogitandum est primum quidquid dici potest, tum ex his quo quidque loco dici expediat aestimandum. In quo non idem sentio quod de propositionibus paulo ante quodque de argumentis probationum loco concessi, posse aliquando nos incipere a firmioribus. Nam vis quaestionum semper crescere debet et ad potentissima ab infirmissimis pervenire, sive sunt eiusdem generis sive diversi.

A conjoined defense is such as on behalf of Rabirius: "if he had killed, he would have done rightly, but he did not kill." Where, however, we say many things against one proposition, we must first consider whatever can be said, then from these evaluate in what place it is expedient for each to be said. In this I do not feel the same as I conceded a little before about propositions and likewise about arguments in the place of proofs, namely, that we can sometimes begin from the firmer ones. For the force of the questions ought always to grow and to arrive at the most powerful from the weakest, whether they are of the same kind or of different.

Iuris autem quaestiones solent esse nonnumquam ex aliis atque aliis conflictionibus, facti semper idem spectant. In utroque genere similis ordo est; sed prius de dissimilibus: ex quibus infirmissimum quidque primum tractari oportet, ideo quod quasdam quaestiones exsecuti donare solemus et concedere: neque enim transire ad alias possumus nisi omissis prioribus. Quod ipsum ita fieri oportet non ut damnasse eas videamur, sed omisisse quia possimus etiam sine eis vincere.

Questions of law, however, are wont sometimes to arise from one and another conflicts, while questions of fact always look to the same point. In both kinds there is a similar order; but first about the unlike: of these, whatever is weakest ought to be handled first, for this reason—that, after running through certain questions, we are accustomed to remit and concede them; for we cannot pass on to others unless the former have been omitted. And this very thing ought to be done in such a way that we may not seem to have condemned them, but to have left them aside because we can prevail even without them.

Procurator alicuius pecuniam petit ex faenore hereditario: potest incidere quaestio, an huic esse procuratorem liceat. Finge nos, postquam tractavimus eam, remittere vel etiam convinci: quaeretur an ei cuius nomine litigatur procuratorem habendi sit ius. Discedamus hinc quoque: recipit natura quaestionem an ille cuius nomine agitur heres sit faeneratoris, an ex asse heres.

A procurator of someone demands money on an inherited loan at interest: a question can arise whether it is permissible for this man to have a procurator. Suppose that, after we have handled this, we remit it or even are refuted; it will be asked whether he in whose name the suit is litigated has the right to have a procurator. Let us depart from this also: the nature of the case admits the question whether the one in whose name the action is brought is the heir of the moneylender, or an heir of the whole.

Haec quoque concessa sint: quaeretur an debeatur. Contra nemo tam demens fuerit ut, cum id quod firmissimum duxerit se habere tractaverit, remittat illud et ad leviora transcendat. Huic in schola simile est: "non abdicabis adoptatum: ut hunc quoque, non virum fortem: ut et fortem, non quicumque voluntati tuae non paruerit: ut in alia omnia subiectus sit, non propter optionem: ut propter optionem, non propter talem optionem". Haec iuris quaestionum differentia est.

Let these things also be conceded: it will be inquired whether it is owed. On the contrary, no one would be so demented that, when he has argued that he possesses what he has deemed the most firm, he would remit that and transcend to lighter points. Similar to this in the school is: "you will not disown the adopted; granted this too, not the brave man; and, granted the brave man, not whoever has not obeyed your will; granted that he be subject in all other things, not on account of option; granted on account of option, not on account of such an option." This is the difference of legal questions.

In factis autem ad idem tendentia sunt plura, ex quibus aliqua citra summam quaestionem remitti solent, ut si is cum quo furti agitur dicat: "proba te habuisse, proba perdidisse, proba furto perdidisse, proba mea fraude". Priora enim remitti possunt, ultimum non potest.

But in matters of fact there are several things tending to the same point, some of which are wont to be waived short of the principal question, as, for instance, if the person against whom an action of theft is brought says: "prove that you had it, prove that you lost it, prove that you lost it by theft, prove that it was by my fraud." For the earlier demands can be waived; the last cannot.

Solebam et hoc facere [praecipere], ut vel ab ultima specie (nam ea fere est quae continet causam) retrorsum quaererem usque ad primam generalem quaestionem, vel a genere ad extremam speciem descenderem: etiam in suasoriis, ut deliberat Numa an regnum offerentibus Romanis recipiat. Primum, id est genus, an regnandum, tum an in civitate aliena, an Romae, an laturi sint Romani talem regem. Similiter in controversiis.

I used also to do [prescribe] this: either from the ultimate species (for that is generally what contains the cause) I would inquire backward up to the first general question, or from the genus I would descend to the extreme species: even in suasories, as Numa deliberates whether he should receive the kingship offered by the Romans. First, that is, the genus, whether one ought to rule; then whether in a foreign city, whether at Rome, whether the Romans would bear such a king. Similarly in controversies.

Optet enim vir fortis alienam uxorem. Vltima species est an optare possit alienam uxorem. Generale est an quidquid optarit accipere debeat; deinde, an ex privato, an nuptias, an maritum habentis.

For let a brave man desire another’s wife. The ultimate species is whether he can desire another’s wife. The general question is whether he ought to receive whatever he has desired; then, whether from a private person, whether nuptials, whether of one having a husband.

Sed hoc non quem ad modum dicitur ita et quaeritur. Primum enim occurrit fere quod est ultimum dicendum, ut hoc: "non debes alienam uxorem optare", ideoque divisionem perdit festinatio. Non oportet igitur offerentibus se contentum esse: quaere aliquid ultra, sic: "ne viduam quidem"; adhuc plus +si+ "nihil ex privato": ultimum retrorsum, quod idem a capite primum est, "nihil inicum". Itaque propositione visa, quod est facillimum, cogitemus, si fieri potest, quid naturale sit primum responderi.

But this is not inquired in the same way as it is stated. For what generally first occurs is what ought to be said last, as this: "you ought not to desire another man’s wife," and therefore haste ruins the division. One ought not, then, to be content with what offers itself: seek something beyond, thus: "not even a widow"; still more, if "nothing from private property"; the ultimate backward, which is the same as, at the head, the first, "nothing iniquitous." Therefore, the proposition having been seen—which is the easiest—let us consider, if it can be done, what it is natural to respond first.

Id si tamquam res agatur et nobis ipsis respondendi necessitas sit intueri voluerimus, occurrit. Si id non contigerit, seponamus id quod primum se optulerit, et ipsi nobiscum sic loquamur: quid si hoc non esset? Id iterum et tertium et dum nihil sit reliqui; itaque inferiora quoque scrutabimur, quae tractata faciliorem nobis iudicem in summa quaestione facient.

If we should wish to view it as though the case were being conducted and the necessity of responding lay upon us ourselves, it occurs. If that does not come to pass, let us set aside that which first has offered itself, and let us thus speak with ourselves: what if this were not? Do that again and a third time and until nothing remains; and so we will scrutinize the lower points as well, which, once handled, will make us a more facile judge in the main question.

Non dissimile huic est et illud praeceptum, ut a communibus ad propria veniamus: fere enim communia generalia sunt. Commune: "tyrannum occidit", proprium: "+tamen+ tyrannum occidit", "mulier occidit", "uxor occidit".

Not dissimilar to this is also that precept, that we should come from the common to the proper: for generally the common things are general. Common: "he killed a tyrant", proper: "+nevertheless+ he killed the tyrant", "a woman killed", "a wife killed".

Solebam et excerpere quid mihi cum adversario conveniret, si modo id pro me erat, nec solum premere confessionem sed partiendo multiplicare, ut in illa controversia: "Dux qui competitorem patrem in suffragiis vicerat captus est: euntes ad redimendum eum legati obvium habuerunt patrem revertentem ab hostibus. Is legatis dixit: sero itis. Excusserunt illi patrem et aurum in sinu eius invenerunt: ipsi perseverarunt ire quo intenderant, invenerunt ducem cruci fixum, cuius vox fuit: cavete proditorem.

I used also to pick out what agreed for me with my adversary, if only that was to my advantage, and not only to press the confession but to multiply it by partitioning, as in that controversy: "The leader who had defeated his competitor, his father, in the ballots was captured: ambassadors going to ransom him met the father returning from the enemies. He said to the ambassadors: you are going too late. They shook down the father and found gold in his bosom: they themselves persevered to go where they had intended, they found the leader fixed to the cross, whose utterance was: beware the traitor.

Reus est pater". Quid convenit? "Proditio nobis praedicta est et praedicta a duce": quaerimus proditorem. "Te isse ad hostes fateris et isse clam et ab his incolumem redisse, aurum retulisse et aurum occultum habuisse". Nam quod +fecit+, id nonnumquam potentius fit in propositione: quae si animos occupavit, prope aures ipsae defensioni praecluduntur.

"The father is the defendant." What is agreed? "Treason was foretold to us, and foretold by the leader": we seek the traitor. "You admit that you went to the enemy, and went secretly, and from them returned unharmed, brought back gold, and had gold concealed." For what he +did+, that is sometimes made more powerful in the proposition: which, if it has preoccupied minds, almost the very ears themselves are shut to the defense.

In totum autem congregatio criminum accusantem adiuvat, separatio defendentem.

But, taken as a whole, the congregation of crimes helps the accuser, the separation helps the defendant.

Solebam id, quod fieri et in argumentis dixi, in tota facere materia, ut propositis extra quae nihil esset omnibus, deinde ceteris remotis, solum id superesset quod credi volebam, ut in praevaricationum criminibus: "Vt absolvatur reus, aut innocentia ipsius fit aut interveniente aliqua potestate aut vi aut corrupto iudicio aut difficultate probationis aut praevaricatione. Nocentem fuisse confiteris: nulla potestas obstitit, nulla vis, corruptum iudicium non quereris, nulla probandi difficultas fuit: quid superest nisi ut praevaricatio fuerit"? Si omnia amoliri non poteram, plura amoliebar. "Hominem occisum esse constat, non in solitudine, ut a latronibus suspicer, non praedae gratia, quia inspoliatus est, non hereditatis spe, quia pauper fuit: odium igitur in causa.

I used to do, in the whole subject-matter, what I have said is to be done also in the arguments: namely, with all the alternatives laid out, outside of which there would be nothing, then, the rest removed, only that would remain which I wanted to be believed, as in charges of prevarication: "That the defendant be acquitted, either his own innocence brings it about or by the intervention of some power or force or a corrupted judgment or a difficulty of proof or prevarication. You admit that he was guilty: no power stood in the way, no force; you do not complain of a corrupted judgment; there was no difficulty of proving: what remains except that there was prevarication"? If I could not remove everything, I removed more. "It is agreed that a man was killed, not in solitude, so that I might suspect bandits, not for the sake of booty, because he was not despoiled, not from hope of an inheritance, because he was poor: therefore hatred was the motive.

Quis inimicus"? Quae res autem faciliorem divisioni viam praestat, eadem inventioni quoque: excutere quidquid dici potest et velut reiectione facta ad optimum pervenire. "Accusatur Milo quod Clodium occiderit". Aut fecit aut non: optimum erat negare, sed non potest; occidit ergo. Aut iure aut iniuria: utique iure; aut voluntate aut necessitate (nam ignorantia praetendi non potest): voluntas anceps est, sed, quia ita homines putant, attingenda defensio ut id pro re publica fuerit.

Who the enemy"? Which thing, moreover, provides an easier way for division, the same also for invention: to shake out whatever can be said and, as it were, by a rejection effected, to arrive at the optimum. "Milo is accused because he killed Clodius." Either he did it or not: it was best to deny, but he cannot; he killed, therefore. Either rightly or wrongfully: assuredly rightly; either by will or by necessity (for ignorance cannot be pleaded): will is two‑edged, but, since men think thus, the defense must be touched, that it was for the Republic.

Necessitate? Subita igitur pugna, non praeparata: alter igitur insidiatus est. Vter?

By necessity? Therefore a sudden fight, not prearranged: therefore the other lay in ambush. Which one?

Profecto Clodius. Videsne ut ipsa rerum necessitas diducat defensionem? Adhuc: aut utique voluit occidere insidiatorem Clodium aut non.

Assuredly Clodius. Do you see how the necessity of the facts themselves draws the defense apart? Further: either he certainly wished to kill Clodius the ambusher, or not.

Tutius si noluit: fecerunt ergo servi Milonis neque iubente neque sciente Milone. At haec tam timida defensio detrahit auctoritatem illi qua recte dicebamus occisum; adicietur: "quod suos quisque servos in tali re facere voluisset". Hoc eo est utilius quod saepe nihil placet et aliquid dicendum est. Intueamur ergo omnia: ita apparebit aut id quod optimum est aut id quod minime malum.

Safer, if he did not wish it: therefore Milo’s slaves did it neither with Milo ordering nor knowing. But this so timid a defense detracts the authority from that claim by which we were rightly saying he was slain; an addition will be made: “that each man would have wished his own slaves to do in such a matter.” This is the more useful for this reason, that often nothing pleases and yet something must be said. Let us then look at everything: thus there will appear either that which is best or that which is least bad.

Propositione aliquando adversarii utendum et esse nonnumquam communem eam suo loco dictum est.

It has been said in its proper place that one should sometimes make use of the adversary’s proposition, and that it is sometimes common.

Multis milibus versuum scio apud quosdam esse quaesitum quo modo inveniremus utra pars deberet prior dicere, quod in foro vel atrocitate formularum vel modo petitionum vel novissime sorte diiudicatur. In schola quaeri nihil attinet, cum in declamationibus isdem narrare et contradictiones solvere tam ab actore quam a possessore concessum sit. Sed in plurimis controversiis ne inveniri quidem potest, ut in illa: "Qui tris liberos habebat, oratorem philosophum medicum, testamento quattuor partes fecit et singulas singulis dedit, unam eius esse voluit qui esset utilissimus civitati.

I know that among certain people it has been inquired, in many thousands of verses, how we might discover which side ought to speak first—a matter which in the forum is adjudicated either by the atrocity/severity of the formulae, or by the mode of the petitions, or, most recently, by lot. In the school it is of no concern to ask, since in declamations it has been conceded that the same persons both narrate and solve the contradictions, as much on the part of the actor (plaintiff) as of the possessor. But in very many controversiae it cannot even be discovered, as in this one: "A man who had 3 children—an orator, a philosopher, a physician—made 4 parts in his will and gave single portions to each; he wanted one to belong to him who would be most useful to the state."

Contendunt". Quis primus dicat incertum est, propositio tamen certa: ab eo enim cuius persona utemur incipiendum erit. Et haec quidem de dividendo in universum praecipi possunt.

They contend". Who should speak first is uncertain, yet the proposition is certain: for we must begin from him whose persona we shall use. And indeed these things can be prescribed about dividing in general.

At quo modo inveniemus etiam illas occultiores quaestiones? Scilicet quo modo sententias verba figuras colores: ingenio cura exercitatione. Non tamen fere umquam nisi inprudentem fugerint, si, ut dixi, naturam sequi ducem velit.

But how shall we find even those more occult questions? To wit, how sentences, words, figures, colors: by ingenuity, care, and exercise. Yet they will scarcely ever escape anyone except the imprudent, if, as I said, he is willing to follow nature as a guide.

Sed plerique eloquentiae famam adfectantes contenti sunt locis speciosis modo vel nihil ad probationem conferentibus: alii nihil ultra ea quae in oculos incurrunt exquirendum putant. Quod quo facilius appareat, unam de schola controversiam, non ita sane difficilem aut novam, proponam in exemplum. "Qui reo proditionis patri non adfuerit, exheres sit: proditionis damnatus cum advocato exulet.

But most, aspiring to the fame of eloquence, are content with specious topics that contribute little or even nothing to proof; others think nothing beyond what meets the eyes need be sought. That this may the more easily appear, I will propose, as an example, one school controversy, not really so difficult or new. "He who has not been present for his father, a defendant on a charge of treason, let him be disinherited: one condemned for treason, let him go into exile with his advocate.

Reo proditionis patri disertus filius adfuit, rusticus non adfuit: damnatus abiit cum advocato in exilium. Rusticus cum fortiter fecisset, praemii nomine impetravit restitutionem patris et fratris. Pater reversus intestatus decessit: petit rusticus partem bonorum, orator totum vindicat sibi". Hic illi eloquentes, quibusque nos circa lites raras sollicitiores ridiculi videmur, invadent personas favorabiles: actio pro rustico contra disertum, pro viro forti contra inbellem, pro restitutore contra ingratum, pro eo qui parte contentus sit contra eum qui fratri nihil dare ex paternis velit.

To his father, a defendant for treason, the eloquent son was present; the rustic was not present: having been condemned, he went away with his advocate into exile. The rustic, since he had acted bravely, obtained, by way of a reward, the restitution of his father and brother. The father, having returned, died intestate: the rustic seeks a share of the goods, the orator vindicates the whole to himself". Here those eloquent men, to whom we, more solicitous about rare lawsuits, seem ridiculous, will seize upon favorable personae: an action for the rustic against the eloquent, for the brave man against the unwarlike, for the restorer against the ungrateful, for him who is content with a part against him who is willing to give his brother nothing from the paternal estate.

Quae omnia sunt in materia et multum iuvant, victoriam tamen non trahunt. In hac quaerentur sententiae, si fieri poterit, praecipites vel obscurae (nam ea nunc virtus est), et pulchre fuerit cum materia tumultu et clamore transactum. Illi vero quibus propositum quidem melius sed cura in proximo est haec velut innatantia videbunt: excusatum esse rusticum quod non interfuerit iudicio nihil conlaturus patri: sed ne disertum quidem habere quod inputet reo, cum is damnatus sit; dignum esse hereditate restitutorem: avarum impium ingratum qui dividere nolit cum fratre eoque sic merito: quaestionem quoque illam primam scripti et voluntatis, qua non expugnata non sit sequentibus locus.

All of which are in the material and help much, yet they do not drag along victory. In this, sentences will be sought, if it can be done, precipitate or obscure (for that is now the virtue), and it will have been thought fine that the matter was carried through with tumult and clamor. But those for whom the plan indeed is better, but whose care is for what is proximate, will see these points as if floating on the surface: that the rustic is excused because he did not attend the judicium, being about to contribute nothing to his father; but that not even the eloquent man has anything he can impute to the defendant, since he was convicted; that the restorer is worthy of the inheritance; that he is avaricious, impious, ungrateful who is unwilling to divide with his brother, and thus deservedly so; and also that first quaestio of the script and of the will (intention), without the carrying of which there is no place for the subsequent points.

At qui naturam sequetur, illa cogitabit profecto, primo hoc dicturum rusticum: "pater intestatus duos nos filios reliquit, partem iure gentium peto". Quis tam imperitus, quis tam procul a litteris quin sic incipiat, etiam si nescierit quid sit propositio? Hanc communem omnium legem leviter adornabit ut iustam. Nempe sequetur ut quaeramus quid huic tam aequae postulationi respondeatur.

But whoever follows nature will surely think this, that first the rustic will say: “Father, intestate, left us two sons; I seek a share by the law of nations.” Who is so unskilled, who so far from letters as not to begin thus, even if he does not know what a proposition is? He will lightly adorn this common law of all as just. Surely it will follow that we inquire what is to be answered to this so equitable a demand.

At id manifestum est: "lex est quae iubet exheredem esse eum qui patri proditionis reo non adfuerit, tu autem non adfuisti". Hanc propositionem necessaria sequitur legis laudatio et eius qui non adfuerit vituperatio. Adhuc versamur in confessis; redeat animus ad petitorem: numquid non hoc cogitet necesse est nisi qui sit plane hebes: "si lex obstat, nulla lis est, inane iudicium est: atqui et legem esse et hoc quod ea puniat a rustico factum extra dubitationem est". Quid ergo dicimus? "Rusticus eram". Si lex [eram] omnis complectitur, nihil proderit: quaeramus ergo num infirmari in aliquam partem lex possit.

But that is manifest: "there is a law which orders that he be disinherited who has not been present to his father when the father is a defendant on a charge of treason; you, however, were not present." A necessary accompaniment to this proposition is the laudation of the law and the vituperation of him who was not present. We are still dealing with points confessed; let the mind return to the petitioner: is it not necessary that he think this, unless he be plainly hebetous: "if the law stands in the way, there is no lawsuit, the trial is inane; and yet both that there is a law and that what it punishes was done by the rustic is beyond doubt." What then do we say? "I was a rustic." If the law [was] comprehends everything, nothing will profit: let us therefore inquire whether the law can be infirmed in some part.

Quid aliud (saepius dicam) natura permittit quam ut cum verba contra sint de voluntate quaeratur? Generalis igitur quaestio, verbis an voluntate sit standum; sed hoc in commune de iure omni disputandum semper nec umquam satis iudicatum est. Quaerendum igitur in hac ipsa qua consistimus, an aliquid inveniri possit quod scripto adversetur.

What else (I will say it more often) does nature permit than that, when the words are contrary, inquiry be made about the will? The general question, then, is whether one must stand by the words or by the will; but this, in general, concerning all law, must always be disputed and has never been judged sufficiently. We must therefore inquire, in this very matter in which we are engaged, whether anything can be found that is adverse to the writing.

"Ergo quisquis non adfuerit, exheres erit? quisquis sine exceptione"? Iam se illa vel ultro offerent argumenta: "et infans"? (filius enim est et non adfuit): "et qui aberat et qui militabat et qui in legatione erat"? Iam multum acti est: potest aliquis non adfuisse et heres esse. Transeat nunc idem ille qui hoc cogitavit, ut ait Cicero, tibicinis Latini modo ad disertum: "ut ista concedam, tu nec infans es nec afuisti nec militasti". Num aliud occurrit quam illud: "sed rusticus sum"? Contra quod palam est dici: "ut agere non potueris, adsidere potuisti", et verum est.

"Therefore, whoever has not been present, will he be disinherited? whoever, without exception?" Already those arguments will offer themselves even unbidden: "and an infant?" (for he is a son and was not present): "and he who was away, and he who was serving as a soldier, and he who was on a legation?" Already much has been accomplished: someone can have not been present and be an heir. Let that same man now pass over, who devised this, as Cicero says, after the manner of a Latin piper, to the eloquent one: "granting those points, you are neither an infant nor were you absent nor did you serve as a soldier." Does anything else occur except this: "but I am a rustic"? Against which it is plain to say: "though you could not plead, you could be in attendance," and it is true.

Quare redeundum rustico ad animum legum latoris: "impietatem punire voluit, ego autem impius non sum". Contra quod disertus "tum impie fecisti" inquit "cum exheredationem meruisti, licet te postea vel paenitentia vel ambitus ad hoc genus optionis adduxerit". Praeterea "propter te damnatus est pater, videbaris enim de causa pronuntiasse". Ad haec rusticus: "tu vero in causa damnationis fuisti, multos offenderas, inimicitias domui contraxeras". Haec coniecturalia: illud quoque, quod coloris loco rusticus dicit, patris fuisse tale consilium, ne universam domum periculo subiceret. Haec prima quaestione scripti et voluntatis continentur. Intendamus ultra animum, videamusque an aliquid inveniri praeterea possit.

Wherefore the rustic must return to the mind of the legislator: "he wished to punish impiety, but I am not impious." To this the eloquent man says: "then you acted impiously when you deserved disinheritance, although afterward either penitence or ambition may have brought you to this kind of option." Moreover: "on account of you the father was condemned, for you seemed to have delivered judgment on the case." To these the rustic: "nay rather, you were in the cause of the condemnation; you had offended many; you had contracted enmities against the house." These are conjectural; also that which the rustic says by way of color, that the father's plan was of such a kind, lest he subject the entire house to danger. These things are contained in the first question of the writing and the will. Let us strain beyond intent, and let us see whether anything further can be found.

Quo id modo fiet? Sedulo imitor quaerentem, ut quaerere doceam, et omisso speciosiore stili genere ad utilitatem me submitto discentium.

By what method will that be effected? I sedulously imitate one inquiring, so that I may teach to inquire, and, with the more specious genre of style set aside, I submit myself to the utility of the learners.

Omnes adhuc quaestiones ex persona petitoris ipsius duximus: cur non aliquid circa patrem quaerimus? Dictum enim est: "quisquis non adfuerit, exheres erit". Cur non conamur et sic quaerere: "num cuicumque non adfuerit"? Facimus hoc saepe in iis controversiis in quibus petuntur in vincula qui parentis suos non alunt, ut eam quae testimonium in filium peregrinitatis reum dixit, eum qui filium lenoni vendidit. In hoc de quo loquimur patre quid adprendi potest?

All the questions thus far we have derived from the persona of the petitioner himself: why do we not inquire something concerning the father? For it was said: "whoever shall not have been present will be disinherited." Why do we not also attempt to ask thus: "is it to be [applied] to anyone whatsoever who shall not have been present?" We do this often in those controversies in which those who do not sustain their parents are sought into bonds, as in the case of the woman who gave testimony against her son arraigned on the charge of peregrinity, and the man who sold his son to a pimp. In this father of whom we are speaking, what can be apprehended?

Damnatus est. Numquid igitur lex ad absolutos tantum patres pertinet? Dura prima fronte quaestio.

He was condemned. Does the law, then, pertain only to fathers who have been absolved? A hard question at first blush.

Non desperemus: credibile est hoc voluisse legum latorem, ne auxilia liberorum innocentibus deessent. Sed hoc dicere rustico verecundum est, quia innocentem fuisse patrem fatetur. Dat aliud argumentum controversia: "damnatus proditionis cum advocato exulet". Vix videtur posse fieri ut poena filio in eodem patre et si adfuerit et si non adfuerit constituta sit.

Let us not despair: it is credible that the lawgiver wished this, lest the aids of children be lacking to the innocent. But for the rustic it is embarrassing to say this, because he admits that the father was innocent. The controversy gives another argument: "condemned of treason, let him go into exile with an advocate." It scarcely seems able to be that, in regard to the same father, a penalty for the son should be constituted both if he was present and if he was not present.

Praeterea lex ad exules nulla pertinet; non ergo credibile est de advocato damnati scriptum: an possint enim bona esse ulla exulis? Rusticus in utramque partem dubium facit: disertus et verbis inhaerebit, in quibus nulla exceptio est, et propter hoc ipsum poenam esse constitutam eis qui non adfuerint, ne periculo exilii deterreantur advocatione, et rusticum innocenti non adfuisse dicet. Illud protinus non [id] indignum quod adnotetur, posse ex uno statu duas generales quaestiones fieri: an quisquis, an cuicumque.

Moreover, no law pertains to exiles; therefore it is not credible that it was written about the advocate of the condemned: for can there be any goods of an exile at all? The rustic makes it doubtful in both directions; the eloquent man will adhere to the words, in which there is no exception, and for this very reason (that a penalty is established for those who will not have been present), lest by the danger of exile they be deterred from advocacy, and he will say that the rustic was not present to the innocent. This at once is not unworthy to be noted: that from one status two general quaestiones can be made—whether “whoever,” or “to whomever.”

Haec ex duabus personis quaesita sunt. Ex tertia autem, quae est adversarii, nulla oriri quaestio potest, quia nulla fit ei de sua parte controversia. Nondum tamen cura deficiat: ista enim omnia dici possent etiam non restituto patre.

These things have been inquired from two persons. From the third, however, which is the adversary’s, no question can arise, because no controversy arises for him on his own part. Yet let care not fail: for all these things could be said even with the father not restored.

Nec statim eo tendamus quod occurrit ultro, a rustico restitutum. Qui subtiliter quaeret, aliquid spectabit ultra: nam, ut genus species sequitur, ita genus speciem praecedit. Fingamus ergo ab alio restitutum: ratiocinativa seu collectiva quaestio orietur, an restitutio pro sublatione iudicii sit et proinde valeat ac si iudicium non fuisset?

Nor let us at once aim at that which occurs of itself, that he was restored by the rustic. He who will inquire subtly will look to something beyond: for, as the genus follows the species, so the genus precedes the species. Let us therefore suppose that he was restored by another: a ratiocinative or collective question will arise, whether restitution is in lieu of the removal of the judgment and accordingly has the same force as if the judgment had not been.

Vbi temptabit rusticus dicere ne impetrare quidem aliter potuisse suorum restitutionem uno praemio nisi patre proinde ac si accusatus non esset revocato, quae res advocati quoque poenam, tamquam is non adfuisset, remiserit. Tum venimus ad id quod primum occurrebat, a rustico esse restitutum patrem: ubi rursus ratiocinamur an restitutor accipi debeat pro advocato, quando id praestiterit quod advocatus petit, nec improbum sit pro simili accipi quod plus est. Reliqua iam aequitatis, utrius iustius sit desiderium.

Where the rustic will try to say that he could not in any other way obtain the restitution of his own with a single reward, unless the father were recalled as if he had not been accused—which thing has also remitted the advocate’s penalty, as though he had not been present. Then we come to that which first occurred, that the father was restored by the rustic: where again we ratiocinate whether the restorer ought to be accepted in place of an advocate, since he has performed that which the advocate asks, nor is it improper to accept, for the similar, that which is more. The remaining points now belong to equity: whose desire is more just.

Id ipsum adhuc dividitur: etiam si uterque totum sibi vindicaret, nunc utique, cum alter semissem, alter universa fratre excluso. Sed his tractatis etiam habet magnum momentum apud iudices patris memoria, cum praesertim de bonis eius quaeratur. Erit ergo coniectura qua mente pater intestatus decesserit; sed ea pertinet ad qualitatem: alterius status instrumentum est.

That very point is still subdivided: even if each were to claim the whole for himself, now certainly, since one (claims) a half, the other the entirety, with the brother excluded. But with these matters handled, the memory of the father also has great moment with the judges, since especially inquiry is made concerning his goods. There will therefore be a conjecture with what mind the father deceased intestate; but that pertains to quality: it is the instrument of another status.

Plerumque autem in fine causarum de aequitate tractabitur, quia nihil libentius iudices audiunt. Aliquando tamen hunc ordinem mutabit utilitas, ut, si in iure minus fiduciae erit, aequitate iudicem praeparemus.

For the most part, however, the question of equity will be treated at the end of cases, because judges hear nothing more willingly. At times, however, utility will change this order, so that, if there is less confidence in law, we may prepare the judge by equity.

Nihil habui amplius quod in universum praeciperem. Nunc eamus per singulas causarum iudicialium partes, quas ut persequi ad ultimam speciem, id est ad singulas lites controversiasque, non possum, ita in generalibus scribere licet ut quae in quemque statum frequentissime incidant tradam. Et quia natura prima quaestio est factumne sit, ab hoc ordiar.

I had nothing further that I might prescribe in universal. Now let us go through the several parts of judicial causes, which, although I cannot pursue to the ultimate species, that is, to individual suits and controversies, yet it is permitted to write in generalities, so that I may hand down what most frequently falls into each status. And since by nature the first question is whether the fact was done, from this I shall begin.

[2] I. Coniectura omnis aut de re aut de animo est. Vtriusque tria tempora, praeteritum praesens futurum. De re et generales quaestiones sunt et definitae, id est, et quae non continentur personis et quae continentur.

[2] 1. Every conjecture is either about the matter or about the mind. Each has three times: past, present, future. As to the matter, there are both general questions and definite ones, that is, both those which are not contained by persons and those which are contained.

De animo quaeri non potest nisi ubi persona est et de facto constat. Ergo cum de re agitur aut quid factum sit in dubium venit aut quid fiat aut quid sit futurum, ut in generalibus "an atomorum concursu mundus sit effectus, an providentia regatur, an sit aliquando casurus": in definitis "an parricidium commiserit Roscius", "an regnum adfectet Manlius", "an recte Verrem sit accusaturus Q. Caecilius". In iudiciis praeteritum tempus maxime valet, nemo enim accusat nisi quae facta sunt: nam quae fiant et quae futura sint ex praeteritis colliguntur.

Inquiry concerning intent cannot be made except where there is a person and the fact is established. Therefore, when the matter concerns the thing, either what has been done comes into doubt, or what is being done, or what will be, as in generals: "whether by the concourse of atoms the world has been effected, whether it is governed by providence, whether it is at some time going to fall"; in definites: "whether Roscius has committed parricide," "whether Manlius aims at kingship," "whether Q. Caecilius is rightly going to accuse Verres." In trials the past time has the greatest force, for no one accuses except what has been done: for what is being done and what will be are inferred from past things.

Quaeritur et unde quid ortum, ut "pestilentia ira deum an intemperie caeli an corruptis aquis an noxio terrae halitu", et quae causa facti, ut "quare ad Troiam quinquaginta reges navigaverint, iure iurando adacti an exemplo moti an gratificantes Atridis". Quae duo genera non multum inter se distant. Ea vero quae sunt praesentis temporis, si non argumentis, quae necesse est praecessisse, sed oculis deprehendenda sunt, non egent coniectura, ut si apud Lacedaemonios quaeratur an Athenis muri fiant. Est et illud, quod potest videri extra haec positum, coniecturae genus, cum de aliquo homine quaeritur quis sit, ut est quaesitum contra Vrbiniae heredes is qui tamquam filius petebat bona Figulus esset an Sosipater.

It is also inquired from whence something has arisen, as “whether a pestilence is from the wrath of the gods or from the intemperance of the sky or from corrupted waters or from a noxious exhalation of the earth,” and what the cause of a deed is, as “why fifty kings sailed to Troy—compelled by an oath, or moved by example, or gratifying the Atreids.” These two kinds do not differ much from one another. But those things which are of the present time, if they must be apprehended not by arguments—which must have gone before—but by the eyes, do not need conjecture, as if among the Lacedaemonians it were asked whether walls are being built at Athens. There is also this, which can seem placed outside these, a kind of conjecture, when it is asked about some man who he is, as it was asked against the heirs of Urbinia whether he who was claiming the goods as if a son was Figulus or Sosipater.

Nam et substantia eius sub oculos venit, ut non possit quaeri an sit, quo modo an ultra oceanum, nec quid sit nec quale sit sed quis sit. Verum hoc quoque genus litis ex praeterito pendet: "an hic sit ex Vrbinia natus Clusinius Figulus". Fuerunt autem tales etiam nostris temporibus controversiae atque aliquae in meum quoque patrocinium inciderunt. Animi coniectura non dubie in omnia tempora cadit: "qua mente Ligarius in Africa fuerit", "qua mente Pyrrhus foedus petat", "quo modo laturus sit Caesar si Ptolomaeus Pompeium occiderit". Quaeritur per coniecturam et qualitatem circa modum speciem numerum: "an sol maior quam terra, luna globosa an plana an acuta, unus mundus an plures". Itemque extra naturales quaestiones: "maius bellum Troianum an Peloponnesium", "qualis clipeus Achillis", "an unus Hercules".

For the substance of him too comes under the eyes, so that it cannot be asked whether he is, as it might be asked in the case of what is beyond the Ocean, nor what he is nor of what sort he is, but who he is. Yet this kind of lawsuit also hangs on the past: “whether this Clusinius Figulus was born from Vrbinia.” There have, moreover, been such controversies even in our times, and some have even fallen into my own patronage. Conjecture concerning intention undoubtedly falls upon all times: “with what mind Ligarius was in Africa,” “with what mind Pyrrhus seeks a treaty,” “in what manner Caesar will bear it if Ptolemy kills Pompey.” It is also asked by conjecture concerning quality, around measure, form, number: “whether the sun is greater than the earth, whether the moon is globose or flat or pointed, one world or several.” Likewise beyond natural questions: “the Trojan war greater or the Peloponnesian,” “of what sort the shield of Achilles,” “whether there was one Hercules.”

In iis autem quae accusatione ac defensione constant, unum est genus in quo quaeritur et de facto et de auctore: quod interim coniunctam quaestionem habet et utrumque pariter negatur, interim separatam, cum et factum sit necne et, si de facto constet, a quo factum sit ambigitur. Ipsum quoque factum aliquando simplicem quaestionem habet, an homo perierit, aliquando duplicem, veneno an cruditate perierit. Alterum est genus de facto tantum, cum, si id certum sit, non potest de auctore dubitari: tertium de auctore tantum, cum factum constat sed a quo sit factum in controversiam venit.

In those matters which consist in accusation and defense, there is one kind in which inquiry is made both about the fact and about the author: which sometimes has a conjoined question and both are denied together, sometimes a separated one, when both whether the deed was done or not is in question, and, if it is agreed about the fact, by whom it was done is ambiguous. The fact itself also sometimes has a simple question, whether a man has perished, sometimes a double one, whether he perished by poison or by crudity (indigestion). Another kind is about the fact only, when, if that is certain, one cannot doubt about the author: a third is about the author only, when the deed is established but by whom it was done comes into controversy.

Et hoc quod tertio loco posui non est simplex. Aut enim reus fecisse tantum modo se negat aut alium fecisse dicit. Sed ne in alterum quidem transferendi criminis una forma est.

And this which I placed in the third place is not simple. For either the defendant merely denies that he himself did it, or says that another did it. But not even in transferring the charge onto another is there a single form.

Interdum enim substituitur mutua accusatio, quam Graeci anticategorian vocant, nostrorum quidam "concertativam": interdum in aliquam personam quae extra discrimen iudicii est transfertur, et alias certam, alias incertam: et cum certam, aut in extrariam [vitam] aut in ipsius qui perit voluntatem. In quibus similis atque in antikategoriai personarum causarum ceterorum comparatio est, ut Cicero pro Vareno in familiam Ancharianam, pro Scauro circa mortem Bostaris in matrem avertens crimen facit. Est etiam illud huic contrarium comparationis genus, in quo uterque a se factum esse dicit, et illud in quo non personae inter se sed res ipsae colliduntur, id est non uter fecerit, sed utrum factum sit.

Sometimes, indeed, a mutual accusation is substituted, which the Greeks call anticategoria, and some of our men “concertative”; sometimes it is transferred onto some person who is outside the peril of the judgment, now definite, now indefinite; and when definite, either upon an outsider’s [life] or upon the volition of the very one who perished. In these, as in the antikategoria, there is a similar comparison of the persons and of the other causes, as Cicero, in Pro Vareno, by diverting the charge onto the Ancharian family, and, in Pro Scauro, around the death of Bostar, makes the charge fall upon the mother. There is also that kind of comparison contrary to this, in which each says that it was done by himself, and that in which not persons clash with each other but the matters themselves, that is, not which of the two did it, but whether it was done.

cum de facto et de auctore constat, de animo quaeri potest.

when the fact and the author are settled, inquiry can be made about the intent.

Nunc de singulis. cum pariter negatur, hoc modo: "adulterium non commisi", "tyrannidem non adfectavi". In caedis ac veneficii causis frequens est illa divisio: "non est factum, et si factum est ego non feci". Sed cum dicimus "proba hominem occisum", accusatoris tantum partes sunt, a reo nihil dici contra praeter aliquas fortasse suspiciones potest: quas spargere quam maxime varie oportebit, quia, si unum aliquid adfirmaris, probandum est aut causa periclitandum. Nam cum inter id quod ab adversario et id quod a nobis propositum est quaeritur, videtur utique alterum verum; ita everso quo defendimur relicum est quo premimur: ut cum quaerimus de ambiguis signis cruditatis et veneni, nihil tertium est, ideoque utraque pars quod proposuit tuetur.

Now about the individual points. when it is denied in like fashion, in this way: "I did not commit adultery," "I did not aspire to tyranny." In cases of murder and poisoning that division is frequent: "it was not done, and if it was done I did not do it." But when we say "prove that the man was slain," it is only the accuser’s part; on the defendant’s side nothing can be said in reply except perhaps certain suspicions: which it will be proper to scatter as variously as possible, because, if you affirm any one thing, it must be proved or the case must be endangered. For when the inquiry is between that which is put forward by the adversary and that which is put forward by us, one or the other seems assuredly true; thus, if that by which we are defended is overthrown, what remains is that by which we are pressed: as when we inquire about the ambiguous signs of crudity and of poison, there is no third alternative, and therefore each party maintains what it has proposed.

Interim autem ex re quaeritur veneficium fuerit an cruditas, cum aliqua ex ipsa citra personam quoque argumenta ducuntur. Refert enim convivium praecesserit an tristitia, labor an otium, vigilia an quies. Aetas quoque eius qui perit discrimen facit.

Meanwhile, however, from the matter itself it is inquired whether it was poisoning or crudity (indigestion), since some arguments are drawn from the thing itself even apart from the person. For it matters whether a banquet or sadness preceded, labor or leisure, wakefulness or quiet. The age, too, of the one who perished makes a distinction.

Interest subito defecerit an longiore valetudine consumptus sit: liberior adhuc in utramque partem disputatio si tantum subita mors in quaestionem venit. Interim ex persona probatio rei petitur, ut propterea credibile sit venenum fuisse quia credibile est ab hoc factum veneficium, vel contra. cum vero de reo et de facto quaeritur, naturalis ordo est ut prius factum esse accusator probet, deinde a reo factum.

It makes a difference whether he failed suddenly or was consumed by a longer ill‑health: freer still is the disputation in either direction if only a sudden death comes into question. Meanwhile proof of the matter is sought from the person (persona), so that for that reason it is credible that it was poison because it is credible that a poisoning was done by this man, or the contrary. But when the inquiry is about the defendant and the deed, the natural order is that the accuser first prove that the deed was done, then that it was done by the defendant.

Si tamen plures in persona probationes habuerit, convertit hunc ordinem. Defensor autem semper prius negabit esse factum, quia si in hac parte vicerit reliqua non necesse habet dicere: victo superest ut tueri se possit.

If, however, he has more proofs concerning the person, he reverses this order. The defender, moreover, will always first deny that the act was done, because if he prevails in this part he has no need to say the rest; if defeated, what remains is that he be able to defend himself.

Illic quoque ubi de facto tantum controversia est, quod si probetur non possit de auctore dubitari, similiter argumenta et ex persona et ex re ducuntur, sed in unam facti quaestionem, sicut in illa controversia (utendum est enim et hic exemplis quae sunt discentibus magis familiaria): "Abdicatus medicinae studuit. cum pater eius aegrotaret, desperantibus de eo ceteris medicis adhibitus sanaturum se dixit si is potionem a se datam bibisset. Pater acceptae potionis epota parte dixit venenum sibi datum, filius quod relicum erat exhausit: pater decessit, ille parricidii reus est". Manifestum quis potionem dederit: quae si veneni fuit, nulla quaestio de auctore; tamen an venenum fuerit ex argumentis a persona ductis colligetur.

There also, where the controversy is only about the fact, such that, if it be proved, there can be no doubting about the author, similarly arguments are drawn both from the person and from the thing, but into one question of fact, just as in that controversy (for one must use here too examples which are more familiar to learners): "A disinherited son studied medicine. When his father was ill, the other doctors despairing of him, being called in he said that he would heal him if he drank a potion given by him. The father, after a part of the received potion had been drunk up, said that poison had been given to him; the son drained what remained: the father died, he is defendant on a charge of parricide." It is manifest who gave the potion: which, if it was of poison, leaves no question about the author; nevertheless whether it was poison will be collected from arguments drawn from the person.

Superest tertium in quo factum esse constat aliquid, a quo sit factum quaeritur. cuius rei supervacuum est ponere exemplum, cum plurima sint huius modi iudicia, ut hominem occisum esse manifestum sit vel sacrilegium commissum, is autem qui arguitur fecisse neget. Ex hoc nascitur anticategoria: utique enim factum esse convenit, quod duo invicem obiciunt.

There remains a third kind, in which it is established that something has been done, and the question is by whom it was done. To set an example of this is superfluous, since there are very many judgments of this sort, as when it is manifest that a man has been killed or a sacrilege committed, yet the one who is accused denies having done it. From this arises the anticategoria: for in any case it is agreed that the deed has been done, which the two parties mutually allege against one another.

In quo quidem genere causarum admonet Celsus fieri id in foro non posse, quod neminem ignorare arbitror: de uno enim reo consilium cogitur, et etiamsi qui sunt qui invicem accusent, alterum iudicium praeferre necesse est. Apollodorus quoque anticategorian duas esse controversias dixit, et sunt re vera secundum forense ius duae lites. Potest tamen hoc genus in cognitionem venire senatus aut principis.

In this kind of causes, Celsus warns that it cannot be done in the forum—a thing which I think no one is unaware of: for a council is convened for one defendant, and even if there are those who accuse one another, it is necessary to give precedence to one trial. Apollodorus also said that an anticategoria is two controversies, and in truth, according to forensic law, they are two suits. Nevertheless, this genus can come into the cognizance of the Senate or of the Princeps.

Sed in iudicio quoque nihil interest actionum utrum simul de utroque pronuntietur an etiamsi de uno fertur. Quo in genere semper prior debebit esse defensio, primum quia natura potior est salus nostra quam adversarii pernicies, deinde quod plus habebimus in accusatione auctoritatis si prius de innocentia nostra constiterit, postremum quod ita demum duplex causa erit. Nam qui dicit "ego non occidi", habet reliquam partem ut dicat "tu occidisti": at qui dicit "tu occidisti", supervacuum habet postea dicere "ego non occidi".

But in judgment too it makes no difference for the actions whether sentence is pronounced on both at once, or even if it is delivered concerning one. In which kind the defense ought always to be prior: first, because by nature our safety is preferable to the adversary’s perdition; then, because we shall have more authority in the accusation if our own innocence has first been established; lastly, because only then will there be a double cause. For he who says “I did not kill,” has the remaining part, namely to say “you killed”; but he who says “you killed,” has it superfluous afterwards to say “I did not kill.”

Hae porro actiones constant comparatione: ipsa comparatio non una via ducitur. Aut enim totam causam nostram cum tota adversarii causa componimus aut singula argumenta cum singulis. Quorum utrum sit faciendum non potest nisi ex ipsius litis utilitate cognosci.

These actions, moreover, consist in comparison: the comparison itself is not conducted in a single way. For either we set the whole of our case alongside the whole case of the adversary, or we match individual arguments with individual ones. Which of these ought to be done can be known only from the usefulness of the suit itself.

Cicero singula pro Vareno comparat in primo crimine: est enim superior* enim persona alieni cum persona matris temere compararetur. Quare optimum est, si fieri poterit, ut singula vincantur a singulis: sed si quando in partibus laborabimus, universitate pugnandum est. Et sive invicem accusant, sive crimen reus citra accusationem in adversarium vertit, ut Roscius in accusatores suos, quamvis reos non fecisset, sive in ipsos quos sua manu perisse dicemus factum deflectitur, non aliter quam in iis quae mutuam accusationem habent utriusque partis argumenta inter se comparantur.

Cicero compares point by point on behalf of Varenus in the first charge: for the person of an outsider was rashly compared with the person of a mother, the superior*. Wherefore it is best, if it can be done, that individual points be conquered by individual points; but if ever we struggle in the parts, we must fight by the totality. And whether they accuse in turn, or the defendant, without a formal accusation, turns the charge upon his adversary—as Roscius did upon his accusers, although he had not made them defendants—or the deed is deflected onto those whom we shall say perished by their own hand, the arguments of both parties are compared with each other in no other way than in those cases which involve mutual accusation.

Id autem genus de quo novissime dixi non solum in scholis saepe tractatur, sed etiam in foro. Nam id est in causa Naevi Arpiniani solum quaesitum, praecipitata esset ab eo uxor an se ipsa sua sponte iecisset. cuius actionem et quidem solam in hoc tempus emiseram, quod ipsum me fecisse ductum iuvenali cupiditate gloriae fateor.

That kind, however, about which I spoke most recently, is handled not only often in the schools, but also in the forum. For this alone was investigated in the case of Naevius of Arpinum: whether the wife had been precipitated by him, or had thrown herself of her own accord. The pleading of which case—and indeed the only one up to this time—I had published; and I confess that I did this, led by a youthful cupidity for glory.

Nam ceterae quae sub nomine meo feruntur neglegentia excipientium in quaestum notariorum corruptae minimam partem mei habent.

For the rest which are circulated under my name, corrupted by the negligence of the takers-down and for the gain of the notaries, have the least part of me.

Est et alia duplex coniectura, huic anticategoriae diversa, de praemiis, ut in illa controversia: "Tyrannus suspicatus a medico suo datum sibi venenum torsit eum, et cum is dedisse se pernegaret arcessit alterum medicum: ille datum ei venenum dixit sed se antidotum daturum, et dedit potionem ei, qua epota tyrannus decessit. De praemio duo medici contendunt". Nam ut illic factum in adversarium transferentium, ita hic sibi vindicantium personae causae facultates tempora instrumenta testimonia comparantur. Illud quoque, etiam si non est anticategoria, simili tamen ratione tractatur in quo citra accusationem quaeritur utrum factum sit.

There is also another twofold conjecture, different from this anticategoria, about rewards, as in that controversia: "A tyrant, suspecting that poison had been given to him by his physician, tortured him; and when he categorically denied that he had given it, he summons another physician: that one said that poison had been given to him but that he himself would give an antidote, and he gave him a potion, upon drinking which the tyrant died. About the reward the two physicians contend." For as there, of those transferring the deed onto the adversary, so here, of those claiming it for themselves, the persons, motives, means, times, instruments, and testimonies are compared. That also, even if it is not an anticategoria, is nevertheless handled by a similar rationale, in which, without an accusation, it is asked whether the deed was done.

Vtraque enim pars suam expositionem habet atque eam tuetur, ut in lite Vrbiniana petitor dicit Clusinium Figulum filium Vrbiniae acie victa in qua steterat fugisse, iactatumque casibus variis, retentum etiam a rege, tandem in Italiam ac patriam suam marginos venisse atque ibi agnosci: Pollio contra servisse eum Pisauri dominis duobus, medicinam factitasse, manu missum alienae se familiae venali inmiscuisse, a se rogantem ut ei serviret emptum. Nonne tota lis constat duarum causarum comparatione et coniectura duplici atque diversa? Quae autem accusantium ac defendentium, eadem petentium et infitiantium ratio est.

For each side has its own exposition and maintains it, as in the Urbino lawsuit the claimant says that Clusinius Figulus, the son of Urbina, with the battle-line in which he had stood defeated, fled, was tossed by various chances, even detained by a king, and at length came into Italy and to his own fatherland, Ariminum, and there was recognized; Pollio, on the contrary, says that he served at Pisaurum two masters, practiced medicine, after manumission mixed himself, for sale, into another’s household, and, asking me that he might serve me, was bought by me. Does not the whole lawsuit consist in a comparison of two cases and in a double and divergent conjecture? And the same rationale that belongs to accusers and defenders belongs also to claimants and deniers.

Ducitur coniectura primum a praeteritis: in his sunt personae causae consilia. Nam is ordo est, ut facere voluerit potuerit fecerit. Ideoque intuendum ante omnia qualis sit de quo agitur.

Conjecture is drawn first from the things past: in these are the persons, the causes, the counsels. For the order is this, that he willed to do it, was able to do it, did it. And therefore, before all else, one must consider what sort of person he is about whom the matter is conducted.

Accusatoris autem est efficere ut si quid obiecerit non solum turpe sit, sed etiam crimini de quo iudicium est quam maxime conveniat. Nam si reum caedis inpudicum vel adulterum vocet, laedat quidem infamia, minus tamen hoc ad fidem valeat quam si audacem petulantem crudelem temerarium ostenderit. Patrono, si fieri poterit, id agendum est ut obiecta vel neget vel defendat vel minuat: proximum est ut a praesenti quaestione separet.

But it is the accuser’s part to bring it about that whatever he has objected be not only disgraceful, but also fit as closely as possible the charge about which judgment is being held. For if he call the defendant in a case of slaying unchaste or an adulterer, he does indeed wound him with infamy, yet this will avail less for credibility than if he should show him audacious, insolent, cruel, reckless. The patron, if it can be done, must aim either to deny the allegations or to defend them or to lessen them: next best is to separate them from the present question.

sunt enim pleraque non solum [et] dissimilia sed etiam aliquando contraria, ut si reus furti prodigus dicatur aut neglegens: neque enim videtur in eundem et contemptus pecuniae et cupiditas cadere. Si deerunt haec remedia, ad illa declinandum est, non de hoc quaeri, nec eum qui aliqua peccaverit utique commisisse omnia, et hanc fiduciam fuisse accusatoribus falsa obiciendi, quod laesum et vulneratum reum speraverint hac invidia opprimi posse. Alii a propositione accusatoris contraque eam loci oriuntur.

For most things are not only [and] dissimilar but even sometimes contrary, as when a defendant of theft is called prodigal or negligent; for both contempt of money and cupidity do not seem to fall upon the same person. If these remedies are lacking, one must turn aside to those: that the inquiry is not about this, nor that he who has erred in some things has of course committed all things; and that this has been the confidence for accusers to allege falsehoods, because they have hoped that the defendant, hurt and wounded, could be overwhelmed by this ill-will. Other topics arise from the accuser’s proposition and against it.

Saepe a persona prior ducit argumenta defensor, et interim generaliter: incredibile esse a filio patrem occisum, ab imperatore proditam hostibus patriam. Facile respondetur, vel quod omnia scelera in malos cadant ideoque saepe deprensa sint, vel quod indignum sit crimina ipsa atrocitate defendi. Interim proprie, quod est varium: nam dignitas et tuetur reum et nonnumquam ipsa in argumentum facti convertitur, tamquam inde fuerit spes inpunitatis: proinde paupertas humilitas opes, ut cuique ingenio vis est, in diversum trahuntur.

Often the defender draws arguments first from the person, and sometimes in general: that it is incredible that a father was slain by a son, that the fatherland was betrayed to enemies by an emperor. It is easily answered, either that all crimes fall upon the wicked and therefore have often been detected, or that it is unworthy that crimes be defended by their very atrocity. At other times particularly, which is variable: for dignity/rank both protects the defendant and sometimes is itself converted into an argument of the deed, as if from it there had been a hope of impunity; accordingly poverty, lowliness, and wealth, as force belongs to each one’s ingenuity, are drawn in opposite directions.

Probi vero mores et ante actae vitae integritas numquam non plurimum profuerint. Si nihil obicietur, patronus quidem in hoc vehementer incumbet, accusator autem ad praesentem quaestionem de qua sola iudicium sit cognitionem alligabit, dicens neminem non aliquando coepisse peccare, nec pro +encenia+ ducendum scelus primum. Haec in respondendo: sic autem praeparabit actione prima iudicum animos ut noluisse potius obicere quam non potuisse credatur.

But indeed upright morals and the integrity of a previously lived life have never failed to be of the greatest profit. If nothing is alleged, the advocate will press this point vigorously; the accuser, however, will bind the inquiry to the present question, concerning which alone the judgment has cognizance, saying that no one has not at some time begun to sin, nor should the first crime be counted as an encaenia. These things in replying: and thus he will prepare, by his first action, the minds of the judges, so that he may be believed to have been unwilling rather than unable to make the objection.

Eoque satius est omni se ante actae vitae abstinere convicio quam levibus aut frivolis aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides ceteris detrahitur: et qui nihil obicit omisisse credi potest maledicta tamquam supervacua, qui vana congerit confitetur unum in ante actis argumentum, in quibus vinci quam tacere maluerit. Cetera quae a personis duci solent in argumentorum locis exposuimus.

And so it is better to abstain entirely from invective against the previously-lived life than to assail the defendant with slight, frivolous, or manifestly false charges, because credibility is detracted from the rest: and he who brings no objection can be believed to have omitted the revilings as superfluous, while he who heaps up empty charges admits there is one point in the prior deeds on which he preferred to be beaten rather than to keep silent. The remaining matters that are wont to be drawn from persons we have set forth under the topics of arguments.

Proxima est ex causis probatio, in quibus haec maxime spectantur: ira odium metus cupiditas spes: nam reliqua in horum species cadunt. Quorum si quid in reum conveniet, accusatoris est efficere +ad quidquid+ faciendum causae valere videantur, easque quas in argumentum sumet augere: si minus, illuc conferenda est oratio, aut aliquas fortasse latentes fuisse, aut nihil ad rem pertinere cur fecerit si fecit, aut etiam dignius esse odio scelus quod non habuerit causam. Patronus vero, quotiens poterit, instabit huic loco, ut nihil credibile sit factum esse sine causa.

The next proof is from causes, in which these are chiefly looked to: anger, hatred, fear, cupidity, hope; for the remaining things fall into species of these. If anything of these shall fit the defendant, it is the accuser’s part to bring it about that the causes seem to have force +to whatever+ is to be done, and to amplify those which he will take up into argument; if not, the oration must be directed thither—that perhaps some were lying hidden, or that it pertains nothing to the matter why he did it, if he did it, or even that a crime which had no cause is more worthy of hatred. The patron, however, as often as he can, will press this locus, that it is not credible that anything was done without a cause.

Quod Cicero vehementissime in multis orationibus tractat, praecipue tamen pro Vareno, qui omnibus aliis premebatur (nam et damnatus est). At si proponitur cur factum sit, aut falsam causam aut levem aut ignotam reo dicet. Possunt autem esse aliquae interim ignotae: an heredem habuerit, an accusaturus fuerit eum a quo dicetur occisus. Si alia defecerint, non utique spectandas esse causas, nam quem posse reperiri qui non metuat oderit speret, plurimos tamen haec salva innocentia facere.

This Cicero handles most vehemently in many orations, but especially in For Varenus, who was pressed in all other respects (for he was even condemned). But if it is put forward why it was done, he will say the cause is either false or slight or unknown to the defendant. Yet some things can at times be unknown: whether he had made an heir, or whether he was about to accuse the man by whom he will be said to have been slain. If other supports fail, one may contend that causes are not necessarily to be looked to, for who can be found who does not fear, hate, or hope? nevertheless very many do these things with their innocence preserved.

Neque illud est omittendum, non omnis causas in omnibus personis valere: nam ut alicui sit furandi causa paupertas, non erit idem in curio Fabricioque momentum.

Nor must this be omitted, that not all causes prevail in all persons: for, as poverty may be a cause of stealing for someone, it will not have the same weight in a Curio and a Fabricius.

De causa prius an de persona dicendum sit quaeritur, varieque est ab oratoribus factum, a Cicerone etiam praelatae frequenter causae. Mihi si neutro litis condicio praeponderet secundum naturam videtur incipere a persona. Nam hoc magis generale est rectiorque divisio: an ullum crimen credibile, an hoc.

It is asked whether one should speak about the cause first or about the person, and it has been done variously by orators, with the causes even frequently preferred by Cicero. To me, if in neither the condition of the lawsuit should preponderate, it seems according to nature to begin from the person. For this is more general and a straighter division: whether any crime is credible, or this one.

Potest tamen id ipsum, sicut pleraque, vertere utilitas. Nec tantum causae voluntatis sunt quaerendae, sed interim et erroris, ut ebrietas ignorantia. Nam ut haec in qualitate crimen elevant, ita in coniectura premunt.

Yet advantage can turn this very point, as it does most things. Nor must the causes of volition alone be sought, but sometimes also those of error—such as ebriety, ignorance. For just as these, in quality, alleviate the crime, so in conjecture they press it.

Et persona quidem nescio an umquam, utique in vero actu rei, possit incidere de qua neutra pars dicat: de causis frequenter quaeri nihil attinet, ut in adulteriis, ut in furtis, quia illas per se ipsa crimina secum habent.

And as for the person, indeed, I do not know whether ever—at any rate in the actual act of the matter—it can occur that there is a person about whom neither party speaks; as for causes, it is of no concern to inquire frequently, as in adulteries, as in thefts, because the crimes by themselves carry those causes along with them.

Post haec intuenda videntur et consilia, quae late patent: an credibile sit reum sperasse id a se scelus effici posse; an ignorari cum fecisset; an etiam si ignoratum non esset absolvi vel poena levi transigi vel tardiore vel ex qua minus incommodi consecuturus quam ex facto gaudii videretur; an etiam tanti putaverit poenam subire? Post haec, an alio tempore et aliter facere vel facilius vel securius potuerit, ut dicit Cicero pro Milone enumerans plurimas occasiones quibus ab eo Clodius inpune occidi potuerit. Praeterea cur potissimum illo loco, illo tempore, illo modo sit adgressus, qui et ipse diligentissime tractatur pro eodem locus, an etiam, si nulla ratione ductus est, impetu raptus sit et absque sententia (nam vulgo dicitur scelera non habere consilium), an etiam consuetudine peccandi sit ablatus.

After these, the counsels also seem to be to be considered, which lie open broadly: whether it is credible that the defendant hoped that that crime could be effected by himself; whether it would go unknown when he had done it; or even, if it were not unknown, that he would be acquitted or the matter be transacted with a light penalty, or a slower one, or one from which he would be about to incur less inconvenience than the joy from the deed seemed; whether he even thought it worth so much to undergo the penalty? After these, whether at another time and otherwise he could have done it either more easily or more securely, as Cicero says in defense of Milo, enumerating very many occasions on which by him Clodius could have been killed with impunity. Moreover, why most particularly in that place, at that time, in that manner he set about it—a point which also is handled most diligently in that same speech—or also, if he was led by no reasoning, whether he was snatched by impulse and without deliberation (for it is commonly said that crimes have no counsel), or also whether he was carried away by a habit of sinning.

Excussa prima parte "an voluerit", sequitur "an potuerit". Hic tractatur locus tempus, ut furtum in loco cluso frequenti, tempore vel diurno, cum testes plures, vel nocturno, cum maior difficultas. Inspiciuntur itaque difficultatis occasiones, quae sunt plurimae ideoque exemplis non egent. Hic sequens locus talis est ut si fieri non potuit sublata sit lis, si potuit sequatur quaestio an fecerit.

With the first part “whether he willed” shaken out, there follows “whether he was able.” Here the locus of time is handled, as in the case of theft in a closed, frequented place, at a time either by day, when there are more witnesses, or by night, when there is greater difficulty. Therefore the occasions of difficulty are inspected, which are very many and therefore do not need examples. Here the following locus is such that, if it could not be done, the suit is removed; if it could, let the inquiry follow whether he did it.

Sed haec etiam ad animi coniecturam pertinent: nam et ex his colligitur an speraverit. Ideo spectari debent et instrumenta, ut Clodi ac Milonis comitatus.

But these things also pertain to a conjecture of the mind: for even from these it is collected whether he had hoped. Therefore the instruments too ought to be inspected, such as the retinues of Clodius and Milo.

Quaestio "an fecerit" incipit a secundo tempore, id est praesenti aut [deinde] coniuncto, quorum sunt sonus clamor gemitus: deinde insequentis latitatio metus, similia. His accedunt signa, de quibus tractatum est, verba etiam et facta, quaeque antecesserunt quaeque insecuta sunt. Haec aut nostra sunt aut aliena.

The question “whether he did it” begins from the second time, that is, the present or the [then] conjoined, to which belong sound, clamor, groan; then, of what follows, hiding, fear, and the like. To these are added signs, about which it has been treated, words also and deeds, both the things which preceded and the things which followed. These are either our own or another’s.

Sed verba nobis magis nocent et minus [magis] prosunt nostra quam aliena, magis prosunt et minus nocent aliena quam nostra. Facta autem interim magis prosunt nostra, interim aliena, ut si quid quod pro nobis sit adversarius fecit: semper vero magis nocent nostra quam aliena. Est et illa in verbis differentia, quod aut aperta sunt aut dubia.

But words harm us more and profit us less—our own [more] than another’s; another’s profit us more and harm us less than our own. Deeds, however, sometimes our own profit us more, sometimes another’s, as when the adversary has done something that is on our side; yet our own always harm more than another’s. There is also this difference in words, that they are either open or doubtful.

Seu nostra seu aliena sunt, infirmiora in utrumque sint necesse dubia: tamen nostra saepe nobis nocent, ut in illa controversia: "interrogatus filius ubi esset pater, dixit: ubicumque est, bibit; at ille in puteo mortuus est inventus". Aliena quae sunt dubia numquam possunt nocere nisi aut incerto auctore aut mortuo. "Nocte audita vox est: cavete tyrannidem", et "interrogatus cuius veneno moreretur respondit: non expedit tibi scire". Nam si est qui possit interrogari, solvet ambiguitatem. cum autem dicta factaque nostra defendi solo animo possint, aliena varie refutantur.

Whether they are ours or others’, things that are doubtful must be weaker on either side: nevertheless our own often harm us, as in that controversy: "asked where his father was, the son said: wherever he is, he drinks; and yet he was found dead in a well." Doubtful statements that are others’ can never harm unless the author is either uncertain or dead. "By night a voice was heard: beware tyranny," and "asked by whose poison he was dying he replied: it is not expedient for you to know." For if there is someone who can be interrogated, he will resolve the ambiguity. But while our own words and deeds can be defended only by intention, those of others are variously refuted.

De uno quidem maximo genere coniecturalium controversiarum locuti videmur, sed in omnis aliquid ex his cadit. Nam furti, depositi, creditae pecuniae et a facultatibus argumenta veniunt ("an fuerit quod deponeretur") et a personis ("an ullum deposuisse apud hunc vel huic credidisse credibile sit, an petitorem calumniari, an reum infitiatorem esse vel furem"). Sed etiam in furti reo sicut in caedis quaeritur de facto et de auctore. Crediti et depositi duae quaestiones, sed numquam iunctae, an datum sit, an redditum.

We seem to have spoken about one chief kind of conjectural controversies, yet something of these applies to all. For in cases of theft, deposit, and credited money, arguments come both from the faculties (“whether there was anything that could be deposited”) and from persons (“whether it is credible that anyone deposited with this man or credited him, whether the plaintiff is calumniating, whether the defendant is a denier or a thief”). But even in a defendant for theft, as in homicide, inquiry is made about the deed and about the author. In credit and deposit there are two questions, but never joined: whether it was given, whether it was returned.

Habent aliquid proprii adulterii causae, quod plerumque duorum discrimen est et de utriusque vita dicendum, quamquam et id quaeritur, an utrumque pariter defendi oporteat. cuius rei consilium nascetur ex causa: nam si adiuvabit pars altera, coniungam, si nocebit, separabo. Ne quis autem mihi putet temere excidisse quod plerumque duorum crimen esse adulterium, non semper dixerim, potest accusari sola mulier incerti adulterii: "munera domi inventa sunt, pecunia cuius auctor non exstat, codicilli dubium ad quem scripti". In falso quoque ratio similis: aut enim plures in culpam vocantur aut unus.

Adultery cases have something proper to themselves, namely that for the most part it is a matter between two, and one must speak about the life of each, although this too is inquired, whether it is fitting that both be defended equally. The counsel for this matter will be born from the case: for if the other party will assist, I will conjoin; if it will harm, I will separate. However, lest anyone think that it slipped from me rashly that adultery is for the most part the crime of two, I would not say always; the woman alone can be accused of an adultery with the partner uncertain: "gifts have been found at home, money whose author does not appear, little letters written it is doubtful to whom." In the matter of forgery likewise the rationale is similar: for either several are called into fault or one.

Et scriptor quidem semper tueri signatorem necesse habet, signator scriptorem non semper, nam et decipi potuit. Is autem qui hos adhibuisse et cui id factum dicitur et scriptorem et signatores defendet. Idem argumentorum loci in causis proditionis et adfectatae tyrannidis.

And indeed the scribe must always defend the signatory; the signatory not always the scribe, for he too could have been deceived. But the one who is said to have employed these men, and for whom it is said that this was done, will defend both the scribe and the signatories. The same topics of arguments obtain in cases of treason and attempted tyranny.

Verum illa scholarum consuetudo ituris in forum potest nocere, quod omnia quae in themate non sunt pro nobis ducimus. Adulterium obicis: "quis testis? quis index"? Proditionem: "quod pretium?

But that custom of the schools can harm those going into the forum, in that we count everything which is not in the theme as in our favor. You allege adultery: "who is the witness? who the informer"? Treason: "what price?

quis conscius"? Venenum: "ubi emi? a quo? quando?

who was privy"? Poison: "where was it bought? from whom? when?

quanti? per quem dedi"? Pro reo tyrannidis adfectatae: "ubi sunt arma? quos contraxi satellites"? LV. Neque haec nego esse dicenda et ipsis utendum pro parte suscepta: nam et in foro aliqua, quando adversarius probare non poterit, desiderabo.

for how much? through whom did I deliver it"? For the defendant of attempted tyranny: "where are the arms? what satellites (bodyguards) have I assembled"? 55. Neither do I deny that these things are to be said, and that they themselves should use them for the side undertaken: for I too in the forum will at times, when the adversary will not be able to prove, call for certain things.

Sed in foro tantam illam facilitatem olim desideravimus, ubi non fere causa agitur ut non aliquid ex his aut plura ponantur. LVI. huic simile est quod in epilogis quidam quibus volunt liberos parentes nutrices accommodant: nisi quod magis concesseris ea quae non sint posita desiderare quam dicere.

But in the forum we once desired that very great indulgence, where hardly any case is conducted without something of these, or more, being put forward. 56. similar to this is that in epilogues certain people accommodate to whatever children they please parents and nurses: except that you would more readily concede their longing for things which have not been set forth than their saying them.

De animo quo modo quaeratur satis dictum est, cum ita diviserimus: an voluerit, an potuerit, an fecerit. Nam qua via tractatur an voluerit, eadem quo animo fecerit: id enim est, an male facere voluerit. LVII.

On the mind, in what way inquiry is to be made, enough has been said, since we have thus divided: whether he willed, whether he was able, whether he did it. For by the same way by which the question whether he willed is treated, the question with what mind he did it is treated: for that is, whether he willed to do ill. 57.

Ordo quoque rerum aut adfert aut detrahit fidem: multo scilicet magis res prout ponuntur congruunt aut repugnant. Sed haec nisi in ipso complexu causarum non deprehenduntur. Quaerendum tamen semper quid cuique conectatur et quid consentiat.

The order of things also either brings or detracts credence: plainly, matters, according to how they are set forth, either agree or are repugnant. But these are not discovered except in the very complex of the cases. Yet one must always inquire what is connected to each and what accords.

[3] I. Sequitur coniecturam finitio; nam qui non potest dicere nihil fecisse, proximum habebit ut dicat non id fecisse quod obiciatur. Itaque pluribus in legibus isdem quibus coniectura versatur, defensionis tantum genere mutato, ut in furtis depositis adulteriis. Nam quem ad modum dicimus "non feci furtum", "non accepi depositum", "non commisi adulterium", ita "non est hoc furtum", "non est hoc infitiatio", "non est hoc adulterium". Interim a qualitate ad finitionem descenditur ut in actionibus dementiae, malae tractationis, rei publicae laesae: in quibus si recte facta esse quae obiciuntur dici non potest, illud succurrit: "non est hoc dementem esse, male tractare, rem publicam [verbis] laedere". Finitio igitur est rei propositae propria et dilucida et breviter comprensa verbis enuntiatio.

[3] 1. Definition follows conjecture; for he who cannot say that he did nothing will have the next course to say that he did not do that which is objected. And so in more statutes the same matters are dealt with by definition as by conjecture, only the type of defense being changed, as in thefts, deposits, adulteries. For just as we say “I did not commit theft,” “I did not receive a deposit,” “I did not commit adultery,” so too, “this is not theft,” “this is not denial,” “this is not adultery.” Meanwhile one descends from Quality to Definition, as in actions of insanity, of maltreatment, of injury to the commonwealth: in which, if it cannot be said that the things objected were done rightly, this comes to the rescue: “this is not to be insane, to maltreat, to wound the commonwealth [with words].” Definition, therefore, is an enunciation of the proposed matter, proper to it, lucid, and briefly compressed in words.

Constat maxime, sicut est dictum, genere specie differentibus propriis: ut si finias equum (noto enim maxime utar exemplo), genus est animal, species mortale, differens inrationale (nam et homo mortale erat), proprium hinniens. Haec adhibetur orationi pluribus causis. Nam tum est certum de nomine sed quaeritur quae res ei subicienda sit, tum res est manifesta sed quod * nomine constat, de re dubium est, interim coniectura est, ut si quaeratur quid sit deus.

It consists chiefly, as has been said, of genus, species, differentia, and proprium: as if you define a horse (for I will use a most well-known example), the genus is animal, the species mortal, the differentia irrational (for man too was mortal), the proprium neighing. This is applied to discourse for several reasons. For sometimes the name is certain, but it is asked what thing ought to be subjected under it; sometimes the thing is manifest, but although what * by name is settled, about the thing there is doubt; meanwhile there is conjecture, as when it is asked what god is.

Nam qui neget deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus inmixtum, non hoc dicat, falsam esse divinae illius naturae appellationem, sicut Epicurus, qui humanam ei formam locumque inter mundos dedit. Nomine uterque uno utitur, utrum sit in re coniectat. Interim qualitas tractatur, ut "quid sit rhetorice, vis persuadendi an bene dicendi scientia". Quod genus est in iudiciis frequentissimum.

For he who denies that god is a spirit intermingled with all parts is not saying this, that the appellation of that divine nature is false, like Epicurus, who gave to him a human form and a place among the worlds. Both use one and the same name, but conjecture what it is in reality. Meanwhile quality is handled, as in “what is rhetoric, the power of persuading or the science of speaking well.” This kind is most frequent in the courts.

Sic enim quaeritur an deprehensus in lupanari cum aliena uxore adulter sit: quia non de appellatione sed de vi facti eius ambigitur, an omnino peccaverit; nam si peccavit, non potest esse aliud quam adulter. Diversum est genus cum controversia consistis in nomine quod pendet ex scripto, nec versatur in iudiciis nisi propter verba quae litem faciunt: an qui se interficit homicida sit, an qui tyrannum in mortem compulit tyrannicida, an carmina magorum veneficium. Res enim manifesta est sciturque non idem esse occidere se quod alium, non idem occidere tyrannum quod compellere ad mortem, non idem carmina ac mortiferam potionem, quaeritur tamen an eodem nomine appellanda sint.

Thus indeed the question is raised whether a man caught in a brothel with another’s wife is an adulterer: because the ambiguity is not about the appellation but about the force of his deed, whether he has sinned at all; for if he has sinned, he cannot be anything other than an adulterer. A different kind exists when the controversy consists in a name which depends on what is written, nor is it dealt with in the courts except on account of the words that make the lawsuit: whether he who kills himself is a homicide, whether he who drove a tyrant to death is a tyrannicide, whether the songs/spells of magi are veneficium. For the fact is manifest, and it is known that to kill oneself is not the same as to kill another, to kill a tyrant is not the same as to compel him to death, spells are not the same as a death-bringing potion; nevertheless it is asked whether they ought to be called by the same name.

Quamquam autem dissentire vix audeo a Cicerone, qui multos secutus auctores dicit finitionem esse de eodem et de altero (semper enim neganti aliquod esse nomen dicendum quod sit potius), tamen equidem tris habeo velut species. Nam interim convenit solum quaerere an hoc sit, ut an adulterium in lupanari. cum hoc negamus, non necesse est dicere quid id vocetur, quia totum crimen infitiamur.

Although, however, I scarcely dare to dissent from Cicero, who, following many authors, says that definition is about the same and the other (for the one who denies that something is of a given name must always say what it is rather), nevertheless I myself have, as it were, three species. For at times it suffices only to inquire whether this is so, as whether there is adultery in a brothel. When we deny this, it is not necessary to say what it should be called, because we deny the entire crime.

Interim quaeritur hoc an hoc: furtum an sacrilegium (non quin sufficiat non esse sacrilegium, sed quia satius sit dicere quid sit aliud); quo in loco utrumque finiendum est. Interim quaeritur in rebus specie diversis, an et hoc et hoc eodem modo sit appellandum, cum res utraque habet suum nomen, ut amatorium, venenum. In omnibus autem huius generis litibus quaeritur an etiam hoc, quia nomen de quo ambigitur utique in alia re certum est.

Meanwhile the question is this or that: theft or sacrilege (not that it would not suffice that it is not sacrilege, but because it is better to say what else it is); in which case both must be defined. At times the question is, in matters diverse in appearance, whether both this and that ought to be appellated in the same way, although each thing has its own name, as an amatorial potion and a venom. But in all lawsuits of this kind it is inquired whether this too (falls under it), because the name about which there is ambiguity is assuredly certain in another matter.

"Sacrilegium est rem sacram de templo surripere: an et privatam"? "Adulterium cum aliena uxore domi coire: an et in lupanari"? "Tyrannicidium occidere tyrannum: an et in mortem compellere"? Ideoque syllogismos, de quo postea dicam, velut infirmior est finitio, quia in hac quaeritur an idem sit huius rei nomen quod alterius, illo an proinde habenda sit haec [autem] atque illa. Est et talis finitionum diversitas, ut quae idem sentiunt non isdem verbis comprehendantur, ut "rhetorice est bene dicendi scientia", et eadem "bene inveniendi" et "bene enuntiandi" et "dicendi secundum virtutem orationis" et "dicendi quod sit officii": atque providendum +ut sit officii+ sensu non pugnant comprehensione dissentiant. Sed de his disputatur, non litigatur.

"Sacrilege is to filch a sacred thing from a temple: or also a private one"? "Adultery is to have intercourse with another man’s wife at home: or also in a brothel"? "Tyrannicide is to kill a tyrant: or also to drive him to death"? And therefore we use syllogisms—of which I shall speak later—since definition is, as it were, the weaker; because in this one it is asked whether the name of this thing is the same as that of another, in that one whether this [however] is to be held just as that. There is also such a diversity of definitions, that those which mean the same are not encompassed in the same words, as "rhetoric is the science of speaking well," and likewise "of finding well," and "of enunciating well," and "of speaking according to the virtue of speech," and "of speaking what is of office (duty)"; and care must be taken that +ut sit officii+ they do not clash in sense, though they disagree in formulation. But about these matters men dispute, they do not litigate.

Opus est aliquando finitione obscurioribus et ignotioribus verbis: quid sit clarigatio, erctum citum, interim notis nomine [videbis]: quid sit penus, quid litus.

There is need sometimes of a definition for words more obscure and more unknown: what a clarigation is, an erctum citum, for now known by name [you will see]: what a penus is, what a shore.

Quae varietas effecit ut eam quidam coniecturae, quidam qualitati, quidam legitimis quaestionibus subicerent. Quibusdam ne placuit quidem omnino subtilis haec et ad morem dialecticorum formata conclusio, ut in disputationibus potius arguta verborum cavillatrix quam in oratoris officio multum allatura momenti. Licet enim valeat in sermone tantum ut constrictum vinculis suis eum qui responsurus est vel tacere vel etiam invitum id quod sit contra cogat fateri, non eadem est tamen eius in causis utilitas.

Which variety has brought it about that some subjected it to conjecture, some to quality, and some to legitimate questions. To certain persons, indeed, this subtle conclusion, shaped according to the custom of the dialecticians, did not at all meet with approval, as being in disputations rather a clever quibbler of words than likely to bring much moment in the orator’s office. For although it may prevail in discourse to such an extent as to keep the one who is about to answer bound in its own chains, and either make him be silent or even, unwilling, force him to confess that which is against him, nevertheless its usefulness in causes is not the same.

Persuadendum enim iudici est, qui, etiam si verbis devictus est, tamen nisi ipsi rei accesserit tacitus dissentiet. Agenti vero quae tanta est huius praecisae comprehensionis necessitas? An, si non dixero "homo est animal mortale rationale", non potero, expositis tot corporis animique proprietatibus, latius oratione ducta vel a dis eum vel a mutis discernere?

For the judge must be persuaded, who, even if he has been conquered by words, yet, unless he has come over to the thing itself, will silently dissent. But for the one pleading, what so great a necessity is there for this sharp-cut comprehension? Or, if I do not say “man is a mortal rational animal,” shall I not be able, with so many properties of body and mind set forth, with the oration drawn out more broadly, to distinguish him either from the gods or from the mute creatures?

Quid quod +nec uno modo+ definitur res eadem (ut facit Cicero: "Quid est enim vulgo? Vniversos"), et latiore varioque tractatu, ut omnes oratores plerumque fecerunt: rarissime enim apud eos reperitur illa ex consuetudine philosophorum ducta servitus (est certe servitus) ad certa se verba adstringendi, idque faciendum in libris Ciceronis de Oratore vetat M. Antonius. Nam est etiam periculosum, cum, si uno verbo sit erratum, tota causa cecidisse videamur, optimaque est media illa via, qua utitur Cicero pro Caecina, ut res proponatur, verba non periclitentur: "etenim, recuperatores, non ea sola vis est quae ad corpus nostrum vitamque pervenit, sed etiam multo maior ea quae periculo mortis iniecto formidine animum perterritum loco saepe et certo statu demovet"; aut cum finitionem praecedit probatio, ut in Philippicis Cicero Servium sulpicium occisum ab Antonio colligit et in clausula demum ita finit: "is enim profecto mortem attulit qui causa mortis fuit". Non negaverim tamen haec quoque ut expediet causae esse facienda, et si quando firme comprehendi poterit brevi complexu verborum finitio, esse id tum elegans, tum etiam fortissimum, si modo erit illa inexpugnabilis.

What of the fact that the same thing is defined +not in one way+ (as Cicero does: "For what is vulgo? 'Everyone'"), and with a broader and more various handling, as almost all orators have for the most part done? For most rarely among them is found that servitude (it is certainly servitude) drawn from the custom of the philosophers, of binding oneself to fixed words; and M. Antonius forbids that this be done in Cicero’s books On the Orator. For it is also perilous, since, if one word has erred, we seem to have let the whole cause collapse; and best is that middle road which Cicero uses in the For Caecina, that the matter be proposed, the words not be imperiled: "for indeed, recuperators, not only is that force which reaches our body and life [to be counted], but also far greater is that which, the danger of death having been thrown in, by fear removes a thoroughly frightened mind from its place and often from a settled, fixed position"; or when the proof precedes the definition, as in the Philippics Cicero infers that Servium sulpicium was slain by Antonius and only in the close thus defines: "for assuredly he brought death who was the cause of death." I would not deny, however, that these things too should be done as the case will require, and that, if ever a definition can be firmly comprehended in a brief complex of words, it is then both elegant and also very strong, provided only that it be unassailable.

Eius certus ordo est: quid sit, an hoc sit, et in hoc fere labor maior est, ut finitionem confirmes, quam ut rei finitionem adplices. In eo "quid sit" duplex opus est: nam et nostra confirmanda est et adversae partis destruenda finitio. Ideoque in schola, ubi nobis ipsi fingimus contradictionem, duos ponere debemus fines quales utrimque esse optimi poterunt.

Its fixed order is: what it is, whether this be so; and in this the greater labor is to confirm the definition than to apply the definition to the matter. In that “what it is” there is a double task: for both our own definition must be confirmed and the definition of the adverse party must be destroyed. Therefore in the school, where we ourselves fashion the contradiction for ourselves, we ought to set down two definitions such as will be the best possible on either side.

At in foro providendum num forte supervacua et nihil ad causam pertinens an ambigua an contraria an communis sit finitio, quorum nihil accidere nisi agentis culpa potest. Vt recte autem finiamus ita fiet si prius in animo constituerimus quid velimus efficere: sic enim accommodari ad voluntatem verba poterunt. Atque ut a notissimo exemplo, quo sit res lucidior, non recedamus: "qui privatam pecuniam de templo surripuit, sacrilegii reus est": culpa manifesta est, quaestio [est] an huic crimini nomen quod est in lege conveniat.

But in the forum provision must be made as to whether perhaps the definition is superfluous and pertains nothing to the cause, or ambiguous, or contrary, or common—none of which can occur except by the fault of the agent. And that we may define rightly, it will come about thus: if we have first established in mind what we wish to effect; for thus the words will be able to be accommodated to the will. And so that we do not depart from a most well-known example, whereby the matter may be clearer: “he who has stolen away private money from a temple is guilty of sacrilege.” The fault is manifest; the question [is] whether to this crime the name which is in the law is fitting.

Ergo ambigitur an hoc sacrilegium sit. Accusator, quia de templo surrepta sit pecunia, utitur hoc nomine: reus, quia privatam surripuerit, negat esse sacrilegium, sed furtum fatetur. Actor ergo ita finiet: "sacrilegium est surripere aliquid de sacro"; reus: "sacrilegium est surripere aliquid sacri". Vterque finitionem alterius inpugnat.

Therefore it is disputed whether this is sacrilege. The accuser, because the money was snatched from the temple, uses this name; the defendant, because he surreptitiously stole private money, denies that it is sacrilege, but confesses theft. The prosecutor therefore will define thus: "sacrilege is to steal something from the sacred"; the defendant: "sacrilege is to steal something of the sacred." Each attacks the other’s definition.

Ea duobus generibus evertitur, si aut falsa est aut parum plena. Nam illud tertium nisi stultis non accidit, ut nihil ad quaestionem pertineat. [Falsa est si dicas "equus est animal rationale": nam est equus animal, sed inrationale.

It is overturned in two kinds, if either it is false or insufficiently full. For that third thing befalls none except fools, that it pertains nothing to the question. [It is false if you say "a horse is a rational animal": for a horse is an animal, but irrational.

Quod autem commune cum alio est desinet esse proprium]. Hic reus falsam dicit esse finitionem accusatoris, accusator autem non potest dicere falsam rei, nam est sacrilegium surripere aliquid sacri, sed dicit parum plenam, adiciendum enim "aut ex sacro". Maximus autem usus in adprobando refellendoque fine propriorum ac differentium, nonnumquam etiam etymologias. Quae tamen omnia, sicut in ceteris, confirmat aequitas, nonnumquam et coniectura mentis. "Etymologia maxime rara est: "quid enim est aliud tumultus nisi perturbatio tanta ut maior timor oriatur?

But that which is common with another will cease to be proper]. Here the defendant says that the accuser’s finition is false; the accuser, however, cannot say that the defendant’s is false, for it is sacrilege to filch something of the sacred, but he says it is too little full, for “or from the sacred” ought to be added. The greatest resort, moreover, in approving and refuting is to the boundary of proprieties and differences, sometimes also to etymologies. All of which, however, as in other matters, fairness confirms, and sometimes also a conjecture of the mind. “Etymology is especially rare: “for what is a tumult if not so great a perturbation that a greater fear arises?”

unde etiam nomen ductum est tumultus". Circa propria ac differentia magna subtilitas, ut cum quaeritur an addictus, quem lex servire donec solverit iubet, servus sit. Altera pars finit ita: "servus est qui est iure in servitute", altera: "qui in servitute est eo iure quo servus", aut, ut antiqui dixerunt, "qui servitutem servit". Quae finitio, etiam si distat aliquo, nisi tamen propriis et differentibus adiuvatur, inanis est. Dicet enim adversarius servire eum servitutem aut eo iure quo servum.

whence also the name “tumult” has been derived. Around properties and differences there is great subtlety, as when it is asked whether an addictus, whom the law bids to serve until he shall have paid, is a slave. One side defines thus: “a slave is he who is by law in servitude,” another: “he who is in servitude by that law by which a slave is,” or, as the ancients said, “he who serves servitude.” Which definition, even if it differs in some respect, nevertheless, unless it is aided by properties and differences, is empty. For the adversary will say that he “serves servitude,” or is under that law under which a slave is.

Videamus ergo propria et differentia, quae libro quinto leviter in transitu attigeram. Servus cum manu mittitur fit libertinus, addictus recepta libertate ingenuus: servus invito domino libertatem non consequetur, addictus * consequetur: ad servum nulla lex pertinet, addictus legem habet: propria liberi, quod nemo habet nisi liber, praenomen nomen cognomen tribum; habet haec addictus.

Let us then see the properties and the differences, which in book five I had lightly touched upon in passing. A slave, when he is manumitted, becomes a freedman; an addictus, with liberty received back, [becomes] freeborn: a slave will not obtain freedom with his master unwilling, an addictus * will obtain it: no law pertains to a slave, an addictus has a law: the properties of the free—what no one has unless he is free—are praenomen, nomen, cognomen, [and] tribe; the addictus has these.

Excusso "quid sit", prope peracta est quaestio "an hoc sit": id enim agimus, ut sit causae nostrae conveniens finitio. Potentissima est autem in ea qualitas: an amor insania. huc pertinebunt probationes quas Cicero dicit proprias esse finitionis, ex antecedentibus consequentibus adiunctis repugnantibus causis effectis, similibus, de quorum argumentorum natura dictum est.

With the "what it is" shaken out, the question "whether this is so" is nearly completed: for this is what we aim at, that there be a definition suitable to our cause. However, the most powerful point in it is quality: whether love is insanity. hither will pertain the proofs which Cicero says are proper to definition, from antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, repugnant things, causes, effects, similars, about the nature of which arguments it has been said.

Breviter autem pro Caecina Cicero initia causas effecta antecedentia consequentia complexus est: "Quid igitur fugiebant? Propter metum. Quid metuebant?

Briefly, however, on behalf of Caecina, Cicero embraced the beginnings, causes, effects, antecedents, consequents: "What then were they fleeing? Because of fear. What were they fearing?

Vim videlicet. Potestis igitur principia negare cum extrema concedatis"? Sed similitudine quoque usus est: "quae vis in bello appellatur, ea in otio non appellabitur"? Sed etiam ex contrario argumenta ducuntur, ut si quaeratur [an] amatorium venenum sit necne, quia venenum amatorium non sit.

Force, evidently. "Can you therefore deny the beginnings while you concede the extremes"?" But he also used a similitude: "what is called force in war, will it not be called so in peace"?" But arguments also are drawn from the contrary, as when it is asked [whether] an amatorial poison is a poison or not, because an amatorial poison is not a poison.

Illud alterum genus quo sit manifestius adulescentibus meis (meos enim semper adulescentes putabo), hic quoque fictae controversiae utar exemplo. Iuvenes qui convivere solebant constituerunt ut in litore cenarent: unius, qui cenae defuerat, nomen tumulo quem exstruxerant inscripserunt. Pater eius, a transmarina peregrinatione cum ad litus idem adpulisset, lecto nomine suspendit se. Dicuntur ii causa mortis fuisse.

That second kind, in order that it may be more manifest to my adolescents (for I shall always consider the adolescents mine), I will also use here an example of a fictitious controversy. Young men who were accustomed to dine together resolved to dine on the shore: the name of one who had been absent from the dinner they inscribed on a tomb which they had constructed. His father, from an overseas peregrination, when he had put in at that same shore, upon reading the name hanged himself. They are said to have been the cause of the death.

Hic finitio est accusatoris: "per quem factum est ut quis periret, causa mortis est", rei: "qui fecit quid sciens per quod perire homini necesse esset". Remota finitione accusatori sat est dicere: "causa mortis fuistis, per vos enim factum est ut homo periret: quia nisi vos illud fecissetis viveret". Contra: "Non statim per quem factum est ut quis periret is damnari debet, ut accusator, testis, iudex rei capitalis. Nec undecumque causa fluxit, ibi culpa est: ut si quis profectionem suaserit aut amicum arcessierit trans mare et is naufragio perierit, ad cenam invitarit et is cruditate illic contracta decesserit. Nec fuerit in causa mortis solum adulescentium factum, sed credulitas senis, in dolore ferendo infirmitas: denique si fortior fuisset aut prudentior viveret.

Here is the definition of the accuser: "he through whom it was brought about that someone perished is the cause of death"; of the defendant: "he who did something knowing that by it it would be necessary for a man to perish." With the definition set aside, it is enough for the accuser to say: "you were the cause of death, for through you it was brought about that the man perished: for unless you had done that, he would be living." On the contrary: "Not immediately must the one through whom it was brought about that someone perished be condemned, as, for instance, the accuser, the witness, the judge in a capital case. Nor is guilt wherever the cause has flowed from: as if someone has urged a departure or has summoned a friend across the sea and he perished by shipwreck, invited him to dinner and he died from indigestion contracted there. Nor was it solely the deed of the young men that was in the cause of death, but the credulity of the old man, the infirmity in bearing pain: finally, if he had been stronger or more prudent, he would be alive."

Nec mala mente fecerunt, et ille potuit vel ex loco tumuli vel ex opere tumultuario suspicari non esse monumentum. Qui ergo puniri debent in quibus omnia sunt homicidae praeter manum"?

Nor did they do it with an evil mind, and he could have suspected, either from the location of the mound or from the makeshift workmanship, that it was not a monument. Who, then, ought to be punished—those in whom everything of a homicide is present except the hand"?

Est interim certa finitio, de qua inter utramque partem convenit, ut Cicero dicit: "maiestas est in imperi atque in nominis populi Romani dignitate": quaeritur tamen an maiestas minuta sit, ut in causa Corneli quaesitum est. Sed hic, etiam si videri potest finitiva, tamen quia de finitione non ambigitur iudicatio est qualitatis, atque ad eum potius statum reducenda: ad cuius forte quidem venimus mentionem, sed erat ordine proximus locus.

There is, meanwhile, a certain definition, upon which agreement exists between both parties, as Cicero says: “majesty is in the dignity of the imperium and of the name of the Roman people”; it is asked, however, whether majesty has been diminished, as was asked in the case of Cornelius. But here, even if it can seem definitional, nevertheless, because there is no ambiguity about the definition, the judgment is of quality, and it ought rather to be referred back to that status; to the mention of which indeed we have perhaps now come, but it was the place next in order.

[4] I. Est autem qualitas alia de summo genere atque ea quidem non simplex. Nam et qualis sit cuiusque rei natura et quae forma quaeritur: an inmortalis anima, an humana specie deus, et de magnitudine ac numero: quantus sol, [et] an unus mundus. Quae omnia coniectura quidem colliguntur, quaestionem tamen habent in eo, qualia sint.

[4] 1. There is, moreover, another Quality of the highest genus, and indeed it is not simple. For both of what sort the nature of each thing is, and what form it has, is inquired: whether the soul is immortal, whether a god is of human species/appearance, and concerning magnitude and number: how great the sun is, [and] whether the world is one. All these things are indeed collected by conjecture; nevertheless they have their question in this, of what sort they are.

Haec et in suasoriis aliquando tractari solent, ut, si Caesar deliberet an Britanniam inpugnet, quae sit Oceani natura, an Britannia insula (nam tum ignorabatur), quanta in ea terra, quo numero militum adgredienda in consilium ferendum sit. Eidem qualitati succedunt facienda ac non facienda, adpetenda vitanda: quae in suasorias quidem maxime cadunt, sed in controversiis quoque sunt frequentia, hac sola differentia, quod illic de futuris, hic de factis agitur. Item demonstrativae partis omnia sunt in hoc statu: factum esse constat, quale sit factum quaeritur.

These topics too are wont sometimes to be handled in suasories, as, if Caesar should deliberate whether to assail Britain, what the nature of the Ocean is, whether Britain is an island (for at that time it was unknown), how much land there is in it, with what number of soldiers it ought to be approached—questions to be brought into deliberation. To the same quality there succeed things to be done and not to be done, things to be sought and to be avoided: which indeed fall most of all into suasories, but are frequent also in controversies, with this sole difference, that there the discussion is about future things, here about accomplished facts. Likewise all matters of the demonstrative part stand in this status: that it is agreed a deed has been done; inquiry is made what sort of deed it is.

Lis est omnis aut de praemio aut de poena aut de quantitate eorum. Genus causae aut simplex aut comparativum: illic quid aequum, hic quid aequius aut quid aequissimum sit excutitur. cum de poena iudicium est, a parte eius qui causam dicit aut defensio est criminis aut inminutio aut excusatio aut, ut quidam putant, deprecatio.

Every lawsuit is either about a reward, or about a penalty, or about the quantity of these. The genus of the case is either simple or comparative: there it is examined what is equitable, here what is more equitable or what is most equitable. When the judgment is about a penalty, on the part of him who pleads his case there is either a defense of the charge, or a diminution, or an excuse, or, as some think, a deprecation (a plea for mercy).

Defensio longe potentissima est qua ipsum [et] factum quod obicitur dicimus honestum esse. Abdicatur aliquis quod invito patre militarit, honores petierit, uxorem duxerit: tuemur quod fecimus. Hanc partem vocant Hermagorei kat'antilempsin, ad intellectum id nomen referentes: Latine ad verbum tralatam non invenio, absoluta appellatur.

The defense is by far the most potent by which we say that the very deed which is objected is honorable. Someone is disowned because, with his father unwilling, he has served as a soldier, has sought honors, has taken a wife: we defend what we have done. This type the Hermagoreans call kat'antilempsin, referring that name to the sense; in Latin I do not find it transferred verbatim; it is called “the absolute.”

Est enim de re sola quaestio, iusta sit ea necne. Iustum omne continetur natura vel constitutione. Natura, quod fit secundum cuiusque rei dignitatem.

For the inquiry is about the thing alone, whether it is just or not. Every just thing is contained under nature or constitution. By nature: that which is done according to the dignity of each thing.

Hinc sunt pietas fides continentia et alia. Adiciunt et id quod sit par. Verum id non temere intuendum est: nam et vis contra vim et talio nihil habent adversum eum qui prior fecit iniusti, et non, quoniam res pares sunt, etiam id est iustum quod antecessit.

From this come piety, faith, continence, and other such things. They also add that which is on a par. But that is not to be considered rashly: for both force against force and talion do not avail the one who first committed the unjust act, and it is not, because the matters are equal, that even what came before is just.

Illa utrimque iusta: eadem lex, eadem condicio; ac forsitan ne sint quidem paria quae ulla parte sunt dissimilia. Constitutio est in lege more iudicato pacto. Alterum est defensionis genus in quo factum per se inprobabile adsumptis extrinsecus auxiliis tuemur: id vocant kat'antithesin.

Those are just on both sides: the same law, the same condition; and perhaps things which are unlike in any part are not even equal. Constitution is in law, custom, adjudication, pact. The other kind of defense is that in which we uphold a deed in itself improbable by assuming extrinsic aids: they call this kat'antithesin.

Latine hoc quoque non ad verbum transferunt, adsumptiva enim dicitur causa. In quo genere fortissimum est si crimen causa facti tuemur, qualis est defensio Orestis Horati Milonis. Antenklema dicitur, quia omnis nostra defensio constat eius accusatione qui vindicatur: "occisus est sed latro", "excaecatus sed raptor". Est et illa ex causis facti ducta defensio priori contraria, in qua neque factum ipsum per se, ut in absoluta quaestione, defenditur, neque ex contrario facto, sed in aliqua utilitate aut rei publicae aut hominum multorum aut etiam ipsius adversarii, nonnumquam et nostra si modo id erit quod facere nostra causa fas sit: quod sub extrario accusatore et legibus agente prodesse numquam potest, in domesticis disceptationibus potest.

They do not render this, too, into Latin word-for-word, for the case is called “assumptive.” In which kind the strongest is, if we defend the charge by the cause of the deed, such as is the defense of Orestes, Horatius, Milo. It is called Antenklema, because our whole defense consists in the accusation of him who is being avenged: “he was killed, but a robber,” “he was blinded, but a ravisher.” There is also that defense drawn from the causes of the deed, contrary to the former, in which neither the deed itself by itself, as in the absolute question, is defended, nor by a contrary deed, but on some utility either of the commonwealth or of many men or even of the adversary himself—sometimes even of our own, if only it will be something that it is right to do for our sake: which, when an outsider is the accuser and the laws are acting, can never be of profit; in domestic disputations it can.

Nam et filius patri in iudicio abdicationis et maritus uxori si malae tractationis accusabitur et pater filio si dementiae causa erit non inverecunde dicet multum sua interfuisse. In quo tamen incommoda vitantis melior quam commoda petentis est causa. Quibus similia etiam in vera rerum quaestione tractantur.

For both a son to a father in a judgment of abdication, and a husband to a wife if he shall be accused of ill-tractation, and a father to a son if there is a case on the ground of dementia, will say without immodesty that much was of his own concern. In which, however, the cause of one shunning incommodities is better than that of one seeking commodities. Things similar to these also are handled in the true question of facts.

Nam quae in scholis abdicatorum, haec in foro exheredatorum a parentibus et bona apud centumviros repetentium ratio est: quae illic malae tractationis, hic rei uxoriae, cum quaeritur utrius culpa divortium factum sit: quae illic dementiae, hic petendi curatoris. subiacet utilitati etiam illa defensio, si peius aliquid futurum fuit. Nam in comparatione malorum boni locum optinet levius, ut si Mancinus foedus Numantinum sic defendat, quod periturus nisi id factum esset fuerit exercitus.

For the rationale which in the schools concerns cases of abdication, in the forum is that of those disinherited by parents and of those reclaiming goods before the centumviral court: what there pertains to ill-usage, here to the matrimonial matter, when it is inquired by whose fault the divorce was made; what there to dementia, here to the petitioning for a curator. That defense too is subject to utility, if something worse would have come about. For in a comparison of evils the lighter obtains the place of the good, as when Mancinus thus defends the Numantine treaty: that the army would have perished unless that had been done.

Hoc genus antistasis Graece nominatur, comparativum nostri vocant.

This kind of figure is called antistasis in Greek; our people call it the comparative.

Haec circa defensionem facti: quae si neque per se ipsa nec adhibitis auxiliis dabitur, proximum est in alium transferre crimen, si possumus. Ideoque etiam in hos qui citra scriptum sunt status visa est cadere tralatio. Interdum ergo culpa in hominem relegatur, ut si TI. Gracchus reus foederis Numantini (cuius metu leges populares tulisse in tribunatu videtur) missum se ab imperatore suo diceret; interim derivatur in rem, ut si is qui testamento quid iussus non fecerit dicat per leges id fieri non potuisse.

These things concern the defense of the deed: if this is afforded neither by itself nor with aids applied, the next thing is to transfer the charge onto another, if we can. And so the transference seemed also to fall upon those statuses which are beyond the written law. Sometimes therefore the blame is relegated onto a person, as if Tiberius Gracchus, defendant on account of the Numantine treaty (through fear of which he seems to have carried popular laws in his tribunate), should say that he had been sent by his own commander; at other times it is derived onto the matter, as when he who has not done something he was ordered by a will says that by the laws it could not be done.

Hoc metastasin dicunt.

They call this metastasis.

Hinc quoque exclusis excusatio superest. Ea est aut ignorantiae, ut si quis fugitivo stigmata scripserit eoque ingenuo iudicato neget se liberum esse eum scisse: aut necessitatis, ut cum miles ad commeatus diem non adfuit et dicit se fluminibus interclusum aut valetudine. XV. Fortuna quoque saepe substituitur culpae.

Hence also, with these excluded, an excuse remains. It is either ignorance, as when someone has inscribed stigmata upon a fugitive and, when that man has been adjudged ingenuous (freeborn), denies that he knew him to be free; or necessity, as when a soldier did not appear on the day of his furlough and says he was shut off by rivers or by ill health. 15. Fortune too is often substituted for culpability.

Nonnumquam male fecisse nos sed bono animo dicimus. Vtriusque rei multa et manifesta exempla sunt: idcirco non est eorum necessaria expositio.

Sometimes we say that we have done ill, but with good intent. Of each matter there are many and manifest examples; therefore an exposition of them is not necessary.

Si omnia quae supra scripta sunt deerunt, videndum an inminui culpa possit. Hic est ille qui a quibusdam fieri solet status quantitatis. Sed ea cum sit aut poenae aut honoris, ex qualitate facti constituitur, eoque nobis sub hoc esse statu videtur sicut eius quoque quae ad numerum refertur a Graecis.

If all the things that have been written above are lacking, it must be seen whether the fault can be diminished. This is that status of quantity which is wont to be made by some. But since that pertains either to penalty or to honor, it is constituted from the quality of the deed, and therefore it seems to us to be under this status, just as also that which is referred to number by the Greeks.

Nam et pelicoteta et posoteta dicunt, nos utrumque appellatione una complectimur.

For they say both poioteta and posoteta; we with a single appellation embrace both.

Vltima est deprecatio, quod genus causae plerique negarunt in iudicium umquam venire. Quin Cicero quoque pro Q. Ligario idem testari videtur, cum dicit: "causas, Caesar, egi multas et quidem tecum, dum te in foro tenuit ratio honorum tuorum, certe numquam hoc modo: ignoscite, iudices: erravit, lapsus est, non putavit, si umquam posthac", et cetera. In senatu vero et apud populum et apud principem et ubicumque sui iuris clementia est, habet locum deprecatio.

The last category is deprecation, which kind of cause most have denied ever to come to trial. Indeed, Cicero also, in defense of Q. Ligarius, seems to attest the same, when he says: "I have conducted many cases, Caesar, and indeed with you, while the consideration of your honors kept you in the forum, certainly never in this way: Forgive, judges: he has erred, he slipped, he did not think; if ever hereafter," and so forth. But in the senate and before the people and before the emperor and wherever clemency is its own master, deprecation has a place.

In qua plurimum valent ex ipso qui reus est haec tria: vita praecedens si innocens, si bene meritus; spes in futurum innocenter victuri et in aliquo usu futuri; praeterea, si vel aliis incommodis vel praesenti periculo vel paenitentia videatur satis poenarum dedisse. Extra nobilitas dignitas, propinqui amici. In eo tamen qui cognoscit plurimum ponendum est; laus enim misericordis potius quam reprensio dissoluti consecutura est.

In this kind, the following three things from the defendant himself avail most: a preceding life, if innocent, if well-deserving; a hope for the future of living innocently and of being in some use hereafter; moreover, if he seems to have paid enough penalties either by other incommodities, or by present peril, or by penitence. Outside of him: nobility, dignity, kinsmen, friends. Yet the greatest weight must be placed on the one who hears the case; for praise of the merciful rather than reprehension of the lax will ensue.

Verum et in iudiciis etiam si non toto genere causae, tamen ex parte magna hic locus saepe tractatur. Nam et divisio frequens est: etiam si fecisset, ignoscendum fuisse, idque in causis dubiis saepe praevaluit, et epilogi omnes in eadem fere materia versari solent. Sed nonnumquam etiam rei totius hic summa constituta.

But even in judicial proceedings, even if not in the whole kind of case, yet in great part this topic is often handled. For there is also a frequent division: even if he had done it, pardon ought to have been granted—and this has often prevailed in doubtful cases—and all epilogues are wont to be engaged almost with the same material. But sometimes even the whole sum of the matter is determined here.

An vero si exheredatum a se filium pater testatus fuerit elogio propterea quod is meretricem amaverit, non omnis hic erit quaestio, an huic delicto pater debuerit ignoscere et centumviri tribuere debeant veniam? Sed etiam in formulis, cum poenariae sunt actiones, ita causam partimur: an commissa sit poena, an exigi debeat. Id autem, quod illi viderunt, verum est, reum a iudicibus hoc defensionis modo liberari non posse.

But indeed, if a father shall have attested by a testamentary elogium that his son is disinherited by him for this reason, that he loved a meretrix, the whole question will not be whether the father ought to have pardoned this fault and whether the centumvirs ought to grant pardon. Rather, even in the formulae, when actions are penal, we divide the cause thus: whether the penalty has been incurred, and whether it ought to be exacted. And what those men perceived is true: the defendant cannot be freed by the judges by this mode of defense.

De praemiis autem quaeruntur duo: an ullo sit dignus qui petit, an tanto; ex duobus, uter dignior, ex pluribus, quis dignissimus. Quorum tractatus ex ipso meritorum genere ducuntur. Et intuebimur non rem tantum, sive adleganda sive comparanda erit, sed personam quoque (nam et multum interest, tyrannum iuvenis occiderit an senex, vir an femina, alienus an coniunctus) et locum multipliciter (in civitate tyrannis adsueta an libera semper, in arce an domi) et quo modo factum sit (ferro an veneno) ut quo tempore (bello an pace, cum depositurus esset eam potestatem an cum aliquid novi sceleris ausurus.) Habent in meritis gratiam periculum quoque et difficultas.

Concerning rewards, however, two points are inquired: whether the one who seeks is worthy at all, or worthy of so much; from two, which is more worthy, from more, who is most worthy. The treatment of these is derived from the very genus of merits. And we shall consider not only the thing itself, whether it is to be alleged or to be compared, but also the person (for it also makes much difference whether a tyrant was slain by a youth or by an old man, by a man or a woman, by an outsider or a kinsman) and the place in multiple respects (in a city accustomed to tyranny or ever free, in the citadel or at home) and in what manner it was done (by iron or by poison) as also at what time (in war or in peace, when he was about to lay down that power or when he was about to venture something of a new crime.) Peril and difficulty too have favor in the merits.

Similiter liberalitas a quo profecta sit refert: nam in paupere gratior quam in divite, dante beneficium quam reddente, patre quam orbo. Item in quam rem dederit et quo tempore et quo animo, id est, num in aliquam spem suam: similiter alia. Et ideo qualitas maxime oratoris recipit operam, quia in utramque partem plurimum est ingenio loci, nec usquam tantum adfectus valent.

Similarly, it matters from whom liberality has proceeded: for it is more pleasing in a poor man than in a rich, in one giving a benefit than in one repaying it, in a father than in an orphan. Likewise, for what purpose he has given, and at what time, and with what mind—that is, whether with some hope of his own; and similarly other factors. And therefore this kind of question most of all requires the orator’s effort, because in either direction there is the utmost scope for ingenuity in the argument, and nowhere do emotions prevail so much.

Nam coniectura extrinsecus quoque adductas frequenter probationes habet et argumenta ex materia sumit; quale quidque videatur, eloquentiae est opus: hic regnat, hic imperat, hic sola vincit.

For conjecture also frequently has proofs brought in from without and takes arguments from the material; what sort each thing seems is the work of eloquence: here she reigns, here she commands, here alone she conquers.

Huic parti subiungit Verginius causas abdicationis, dementiae, malae tractationis, orbarum nuptias indicentium. Nam et fere sic accidit, inventique sunt qui has materias officiorum vocarent. Sed alios quoque nonnumquam leges hae recipiunt status: nam et coniectura est aliquando in plerisque horum (cum se vel non fecisse vel bona mente fecisse contendunt: cuius generis exempla sunt multa) et quid sit dementia ac mala tractatio finitur.

To this part Verginius subjoins the causes of abdication, of dementia, of bad handling, of proclaiming the marriages of bereaved women. For it generally so happens, and there have even been found those who would call these topics “duties.” But these laws also sometimes admit other statuses: for conjecture too is at times present in many of these (when they contend that they either did not do it or did it with good intention—of which kind there are many examples), and it is defined what “dementia” and “bad handling” are.

Nam iuris leges plerumque quaestiones praecurrere solent, et ex quibus causae non fiat status; quod tamen facto defendi non poterit, iure nitetur: et quot et quibus causis abdicare non liceat, et in quae crimina malae tractationis actio non detur, et cui accusare dementiae non permittatur.

For the laws of right are for the most part wont to anticipate the inquiries, and from them the status of the cause is not constituted; that which, however, cannot be defended by the fact, will rely upon the law: both how many and in which causes it is not lawful to disown, and for what crimes an action for maltreatment is not given, and to whom it is not permitted to accuse of dementia.

Abdicationum formae sunt duae: altera criminis perfecti, ut si abdicetur raptor adulter, altera velut pendentis et adhuc in condicione positi, quales sunt in quibus abdicatur filius quia non pareat patri. Illa semper asperam abdicantis actionem habet (inmutabile est enim quod factum est), haec ex parte blandam et suadenti similem (mavult enim pater corrigere quam abdicare); at pro filiis in utroque genere summissa est et ad satis faciendum composita. A quo dissensuros scio qui libenter patres figura laedunt: quod non ausim dicere numquam esse faciendum - potest enim materia incidere quae hoc exigat: certe vitandum est quotiens aliter agi potest; sed de figuris alio libro tractabimus.

The forms of abdications are two: one of a perfected crimen, as if an abductor, adulterer were abdicated; the other, as it were, of one pending and still placed in a condition, such as are those in which a son is abdicated because he does not obey his father. The former always has a harsh action of the abdicating party (for what has been done is immutable), the latter in part a bland one and similar to persuading (for a father prefers to correct rather than to abdicate); but on behalf of sons in both kinds it is submissive and composed toward making satisfaction. From which, I know, those will dissent who gladly wound fathers by a figure: which I would not dare to say must never be done - for matter can occur which demands this: certainly it is to be avoided whenever it can be managed otherwise; but about figures we shall treat in another book.

Non dissimiles autem abdicationum actionibus sunt malae tractationis [actionis]: nam et ipsae habent eandem in accusationibus moderationem. Dementiae quoque iudicia aut propter id quod factum est aut propter id quod adhuc fieri vel non fieri potest instituuntur. Et actor in eo quod factum est liberum habet impetum, sic tamen ut factum accuset, ipsius patris tamquam valetudine lapsi misereatur: in eo vero cuius libera mutatio est diu roget et suadeat et novissime dementiam rationi queratur obstare non mores: quos quanto magis in praeteritum laudaverit, tanto facilius probabit morbo esse mutatos.

Not dissimilar, moreover, to the actions of abdications are the actions for ill‑treatment [action]: for they too have the same moderation in accusations. Judgments of dementia likewise are instituted either on account of that which has been done or on account of that which can still be done or not done. And the plaintiff, in that which has been done, has free impetus, yet in such a way that he accuses the deed while he pities the father himself as though lapsed in health; but in that case which admits of free alteration, let him long entreat and persuade, and at the last complain that dementia opposes reason, not morals: the more he shall have praised those morals in the past, by so much the more easily will he prove that they have been changed by disease.

Reus, quotiens causa patietur, debebit esse in defensione moderatus, quia fere ira et concitatio furori sunt similia. Omnibus his commune est quod rei non semper defensione facti, sed excusatione ac venia frequenter utuntur. Est enim domestica disceptatio, in qua et semel peccasse et per errorem et levius quam obiciatur absolutioni nonnumquam sufficit.

The defendant, whenever the case permits, ought to be moderate in his defense, because anger and agitation are almost similar to fury. Common to all these is that defendants do not always employ a defense of the deed, but frequently an excuse and pardon. For it is a domestic dispute, in which having sinned once, and through error, and more lightly than is alleged, sometimes suffices for absolution.

Sed alia quoque multa controversiarum genera in qualitatem cadunt. Iniuriarum: quamquam enim reus aliquando fecisse negat, plerumque tamen haec actio facto atque animo continetur. De accusatore constituendo, quae iudicia divinationes vocantur: in quo genere Cicero quidem, qui mandantibus sociis Verrem deferebat, hac usus est divisione: spectandum a quo maxime agi velint ii quorum de ultione quaeritur, a quo minime velit is qui accusatur.

But many other kinds of controversies also fall into the category of quality. Of injuries (insults): for although the defendant sometimes denies having done it, nevertheless for the most part this action is contained in the deed and the intent. On appointing the accuser, which judgments are called “divinations”: in which kind Cicero indeed—who, at the mandate of the allies, was prosecuting Verres—used this division: it must be considered by whom those whose vengeance is sought most wish the case to be prosecuted, and by whom the one accused least wishes it.

Frequentissimae tamen hae sunt quaestiones, uter maiores causas habeat, iter plus industriae aut virium sit allaturus ad accusandum, uter id fide meliore facturus. tutelae praeterea: in quo iudicio solet quaeri an alia de re quam de calculis cognosci oporteat, an fidem praestare debeat tantum, non etiam consilium et eventum. cui simile est male gestae procurationis, quae in foro negotiorum gestorum: nam et mandati actio est.

Yet these are the most frequent questions: which of the two has greater causes (grounds), which will bring more industry or strength to the accusing, which will do it with better good faith. Guardianships besides: in which judgment it is wont to be asked whether it ought to be examined about anything other than the accounts, whether he ought to furnish only good faith, not also counsel and outcome. To which is similar the case of a badly conducted procuration (agency), which belongs in the forum of negotiorum gestorum: for it is also an action of mandate (actio mandati).

Praeter haec finguntur in scholis et inscripti maleficii, in quibus aut hoc quaeritur, an inscriptum sit, aut hoc, an maleficium sit, raro utrumque. Male gestae legationis apud Graecos et veris causis frequens, ubi iuris loco quaeri solet an omnino aliter agere quam mandatum sit liceat, et quo usque sit legatus (quoniam aliae in nuntiando, aliae in renuntiando sunt), ut in Heio, qui testimonium in Verrem dixerat post perlatam legationem. Plurimum tamen est in eo, quale sit factum.

Besides these, in the schools there are also invented cases of an inscriptio for maleficium, in which either this is asked—whether there has been an inscriptio—or this, whether it is a maleficium, rarely both. The charge of a legation badly conducted, among the Greeks and in real causes, is frequent; in which, as a point of law, it is usually asked whether it is permitted at all to act otherwise than as it was mandated, and how far one is a legate (since one set applies in announcing, another in reporting back), as in the case of Heius, who had given testimony against Verres after the legation had been carried through. Most, however, turns on this: what sort of act it was.

Rei publicae laesae: hic moventur quidem illae iuris cavillationes: "quid sit rem publicam laedere" et "laeserit an non profuerit" et "ab ipso an propter ipsum laesa sit": in facto tamen plurimum est. Ingrati quoque: in quo genere quaeritur an is cum quo agitur acceperit beneficium (quod raro negandum est: ingratus est enim qui negat), quantum acceperit, an reddiderit; an protinus qui non reddidit ingratus sit, an potuerit reddere, an id quod exigebatur praestare debuerit, quo animo datum sit. Simpliciores illae iniusti repudii, sub qua lege controversiae illud proprium habent, quod a parte accusantis defensio est et defendentis accusatio.

Of the Republic injured: here indeed those cavillations of law are stirred—“what it is to injure the republic,” and “whether he has injured it or has not rather benefited it,” and “whether it has been injured by him or on account of him”: yet the most lies in the deed. The ungrateful also: in which kind it is asked whether the one with whom suit is brought received a beneficium (which is rarely to be denied: for he is ungrateful who denies it), how much he received, whether he returned it; whether straightway he who did not return it is ungrateful, whether he could have returned it, whether he ought to have rendered that which was being exacted, with what disposition it was given. Simpler are those cases of unjust repudiation, under which law of controversies they have this peculiarity: that on the part of the accuser there is a defense, and on the part of the defender an accusation.

Praeterea, cum quis rationem mortis in senatu reddit, ubi una quaestio est iuris, an is demum prohibendus sit qui mori vult ut se legum actionibus subtrahat, cetera qualitatis. Finguntur et testamenta, in quibus de sola qualitate quaeratur, ut in controversia quam supra exposui, in qua de parte patrimonii quarta quam pater dignissimo ex filiis reliquerat contendunt philosophus medicus orator. Quod idem accidit si orbae nuptias indicant pares gradu et si inter propinquos de idoneo quaeratur.

Moreover, when someone renders an account of a death in the senate, where there is one question of law—whether only he is to be prohibited who wishes to die so as to withdraw himself from the legal actions—the rest are matters of quality. Wills too are fabricated, in which only quality is inquired into, as in the controversy which I set forth above, in which the philosopher, the physician, and the orator contend for the fourth part of the patrimony which the father had left to the most worthy among his sons. The same occurs if equals in degree proclaim the nuptials of an orphan-girl, and if among the kinsmen inquiry is made about the suitable [guardian].

Sed mihi nec omnes persequi materias in animo est (fingi enim adhuc possunt), nec omnis earum quaestiones, quia positionibus mutantur; hoc tantum admiror, Flavum, cuius apud me summa est auctoritas, cum artem scholae tantum componeret, tam anguste materiam qualitatis terminasse.

But it is not my intention to pursue all the materials (for they can still be feigned), nor all their questions, because they are changed by the positions; this only do I marvel at: that Flavus, whose authority with me is highest, when he was composing only the art of the school, has so narrowly bounded the material of quality.

Quantitas quoque, ut dixi, etiam si non semper, plerumque tamen eidem subiacet, seu modi est seu numeri. Sed modus aliquando constat aestimatione facti, quanta sit culpa quantumve beneficium, aliquando iure, cum id in controversiam venit, qua quis lege puniendus vel honorandus sit: stuprator decem milia dare debeat, quae poena huic crimini constituta est, an, quia se stupratus suspendit, capite puniri tamquam causa mortis. Quo in genere falluntur qui ita dicunt tamquam inter duas leges quaeratur: nam de decem milibus nulla controversia est, quae non petuntur; iudicium redditur an reus causa sit mortis.

Quantity also, as I said, even if not always, yet for the most part lies under the same, whether it be of measure or of number. But measure sometimes consists in an estimation of the deed—how great the fault or how great the benefit—sometimes by law, when it comes into controversy by what law someone is to be punished or honored: whether the rapist ought to give ten thousand, which penalty has been established for this crime, or, because the one violated hanged himself, to be punished capitally as the cause of the death. In which kind those are mistaken who speak thus as though the question were between two laws: for about the ten thousand there is no controversy, since they are not demanded; judgment is rendered whether the defendant is the cause of the death.

In coniecturam quoque eadem species cadit, cum perpetuo an quinquennali sit exilio multandus in controversiam venerit: nam an prudens caedem commiserit quaeritur. Illa quoque quae ex numero ducitur pendet ex iure: "an Thrasybulo triginta praemia debeantur" et "cum duo fures pecuniam abstulerint, separatim quadruplum quisque an duplum debeat". Sed hic quoque factum aestimatur; et tamen ius ipsum pendet ex qualitate.

Into conjecture too the same species falls, when it has come into controversy whether he must be punished with perpetual or five-year exile: for it is asked whether he committed the killing with forethought. That also which is derived from number depends on law: "whether thirty rewards are owed to Thrasybulus" and "when two thieves have carried off money, whether each separately ought to owe quadruple or double." But here too the deed is appraised; and yet the law itself depends on quality.

[5] I. Qui neque fecisse se negabit neque aliud esse quod fecerit dicet neque factum defendet, necesse est in suo iure consistat, in quo plerumque actionis est quaestio. Ea non semper, ut quidam putaverunt, iudicium antecedit, qualia sunt praetorum curiosa consilia cum de iure accusatoris ambigitur, sed in ipsis frequentissime iudiciis versatur. Est enim duplex eius disceptationis condicio, quod aut intentio aut praescriptio habet controversiam.

[5] 1. He who will neither deny that he has done it nor say that what he did is something else nor defend the deed, must of necessity stand upon his own right, in which for the most part the question is one of the action. This does not always, as some have thought, precede the judgment—such as are the curious counsels of the praetors when the accuser’s right is in doubt—but most frequently is handled within the judgments themselves. For the condition of that disceptation is twofold, in that either the intention or the prescription has the controversy.

Ac fuerunt qui praescriptionis statum facerent, tamquam ea non isdem omnibus quibus ceterae leges quaestionibus contineretur. cum ex praescriptione lis pendet, de ipsa re quaeri non est necesse. Ignominioso filius praescribit: de eo solo iudicatio est, an liceat.

And there have been those who would make a status of praescriptio, as though it were not contained by the same questions as the other laws. When a suit hangs on a praescriptio, there is no need to inquire into the matter itself. A son enters a praescriptio against a man under ignominy: the adjudication is on that point alone, whether it is permitted.

Quotiens tamen poterimus, efficiendum est ut de re quoque iudex bene sentiat; sic enim iuri nostro libentius indulgebit: ut in sponsionibus quae ex interdictis fiunt etiam si non proprietatis est quaestio sed tantum possessionis, tamen non solum possedisse nos sed etiam nostrum possedisse docere oportebit. Sed frequentius etiam quaeritur de intentione. "Vir fortis optet quod volet": nego illi dandum quidquid optaverit: non habeo praescriptionem, sed tamen voluntate contra verba praescriptionis modo utor.

As often, however, as we shall be able, it must be brought about that the judge also think well of the matter itself; for thus he will more willingly indulge our right: as in sponsions which arise from interdicts, even if the question is not of proprietorship but only of possession, nevertheless it will be proper to show not only that we have possessed but also that we have possessed what is ours. But more frequently the inquiry too is about the intention. “Let a brave man opt for what he will”: I deny that whatever he has wished ought to be given to him: I do not have a praescription, but nonetheless by intention, contrary to the words, I in a manner make use of a praescription.

In utroque autem genere status idem sunt.

In both kinds, however, the statuses are the same.

Porro lex omnis aut tribuit aut adimit, aut honorat aut punit, aut iubet aut vetat aut permittit. Litem habet aut propter se ipsam aut propter alteram, quaestionem aut in scripto aut in voluntate. Scriptum aut apertum est aut obscurum aut ambiguum.

Moreover, every law either grants or takes away, either honors or punishes, either orders or forbids or permits. It has a controversy either for its own sake or for another’s, and an issue either in the writing or in the intention. The written text is either open/clear or obscure or ambiguous.

Quod de legibus dico, idem accipi volo de testamentis pactis stipulationibus, omni denique scripto: quod de scripto, idem de voce. Et quoniam quattuor eius generis quaestiones vel status fecimus, singulos percurram.

What I say concerning laws, I wish the same to be taken concerning testaments, pacts, stipulations, and, finally, every writing: what about writing, the same about voice. And since we have made four questions, or statuses, of that kind, I will run through them one by one.

[6] I. Scripti et voluntatis frequentissima inter consultos quaestio est, et pars magna controversi iuris hinc pendet. Quo minus id accidere in scholis mirum est: ibi etiam ex industria fingitur. Eius genus unum est in quo et de scripto et de voluntate quaeritur.

[6] 1. The question of the writing and of the intention is most frequent among the jurists, and a great part of controverted law depends on this. That it happens in the schools is the less to be wondered at: there it is even feigned by design. One genus of it is that in which inquiry is made both about the writing and about the intention.

Id tum accidit cum est in lege aliqua obscuritas. In ea aut uterque suam interpretationem confirmat, adversarii subuertit, ut hic: "fur quadruplum solvat: duo surripuerunt pariter decem milia: petuntur ab utroque quadragena, illi postulant ut vicena conferant". Nam et actor dicit hoc esse quadruplum quod petat, et rei hoc quod offerant: voluntas quoque utrimque defenditur. Aut cum de altero intellectu certum est, de altero dubium: "ex meretrice natus ne contionetur: quae filium habebat prostare coepit: prohibetur adulescens contione". Nam de eius filio quae ante partum meretrix fuit certum est: an eadem huius causa sit dubium est, quamquam ex hac natus est, et haec meretrix est.

That happens when there is some obscurity in a law. In it, either each side confirms its own interpretation and subverts the adversary’s, as here: "let the thief pay the quadruple: two together stole 10,000: 40,000 are sought from each, they demand that they contribute 20,000 apiece." For both the plaintiff says that what he seeks is the quadruple, and the defendants that what they offer is; the will is likewise defended on both sides. Or when, about one understanding it is certain, about the other doubtful: "let one born from a meretrix not address the assembly: a woman who had a son began to prostitute herself: the youth is prohibited from the assembly." For about the son of her who was a meretrix before giving birth it is certain; whether the same is the case in respect of this one is doubtful, although he was born from this woman, and this woman is a meretrix.

Solet et illud quaeri, quo referatur quod scriptum est: "bis de eadem re ne sit actio": id est, hoc "bis" ad actorem an actionem. Haec ex iure obscuro.

This too is wont to be asked, to what that which is written is referred: "let there not be an action twice concerning the same matter": that is, whether this "twice" pertains to the plaintiff or to the action. These things arise from obscure law.

Alterum genus est ex manifesto: quod qui solum viderunt, hunc statum plani et voluntatis appellarunt. In hoc altera pars scripto nititur, altera voluntate. V. Sed contra scriptum tribus generibus occurritur.

Another kind is from the manifest: those who saw only this called this a status of the plain sense and of will. In this, one side relies on the writing, the other on the will. 5. But the writing is met in three kinds.

Vnum est in quo ipso patet semper id servari non posse: "liberi parentis alant aut vinciantur": non enim alligabitur infans. Hinc erit ad alia transitus et divisio: "num quisquis non aluerit? num hic"? Propter hoc quidam tale genus controversiarum in quo nullum argumentum est quod ex lege ipsa peti possit, sed de eo tantum de quo lis est quaerendum est.

One case is that in which it is evident in itself that that cannot always be observed: “let the children support the parent or be bound”; for an infant will not be bound. Hence there will be a transition to other points and a division: “is it whoever has not supported? is it this man?” For this reason some [recognize] such a genus of controversies, in which there is no argument that can be sought from the law itself, but inquiry must be made only about the very matter over which the suit is.

"Peregrinus si murum escenderit capite puniatur. cum hostes murum escendissent, peregrinus eos depulit: petitur ad supplicium". Non erunt hic separatae quaestiones: "an quisquis, an hic", quia nullum potest adferri argumentum contra scriptum vehementius eo quod in lite est, sed hoc tantum, an ne servandae quidem civitatis causa. Ergo aequitate et voluntate pugnandum.

"A foreigner, if he shall have scaled the wall, let him be punished capitally. When the enemies had scaled the wall, a foreigner drove them off: he is sought for execution." There will not be separate questions here: "whether anyone whatsoever, or this man," because no argument can be brought against the written statute more vehement than the very matter that is in dispute, but only this: whether not even for the sake of preserving the state. Therefore, the fight must be waged by equity and intention.

Fieri tamen potest ut ex aliis legibus exempla ducamus, per quae appareat semper stari scripto non posse, ut Cicero pro Caecina fecit. Tertium cum in ipsis verbis legis reperimus aliquid per quod probemus aliud legum latorem voluisse, ut in hac controversia: "qui nocte cum ferro deprensus fuerit, alligetur: cum anulo ferreo inventum magistratus alligavit"; hic, quia est verbum in lege "deprensus", satis etiam significatum videtur non contineri lege nisi noxium ferrum.

Nevertheless it can happen that we draw examples from other laws, through which it becomes apparent that one cannot always stand by the written text, as Cicero did in the Pro Caecina. Thirdly, when in the very words of the law we find something by which we may prove that the law-bearer willed something else, as in this controversy: "whoever shall have been caught at night with iron, let him be bound: the magistrate bound a man found with an iron ring"; here, because the word in the law is "caught" (deprensus), it seems sufficiently indicated as well that only noxious iron (i.e., a weapon) is contained by the law.

Sed ut qui voluntate nitetur scriptum quotiens poterit infirmare debebit, ita qui scriptum tuebitur adiuvare se etiam voluntate temptabit. In testamentis et illa accidunt, ut voluntas manifesta sit, scriptum nihil sit, ut in iudicio curiano, in quo nota L. Crassi et Scaevolae fuit contentio. substitutus heres erat si postumus ante tutelae suae annos decessisset: non est natus: propinqui bona sibi vindicabant.

But just as he who will rely upon intent ought, as often as he can, to weaken the writing, so he who will defend the writing will attempt to help himself also by intent. In testaments these things too occur, that the intent is manifest, the writing is nothing, as in the Curian trial, in which the contention of L. Crassus and Scaevola was notable. A substituted heir had been appointed, if the posthumous child had died before the years of his own wardship: he was not born: the kinsmen were vindicating the goods to themselves.

Quis dubitaret quin ea voluntas fuisset testantis ut is non nato filio heres esset qui mortuo? Sed hoc non scripserat. Id quoque quod huic contrarium est accidit nuper, ut esset scriptum quod apparet scriptorem noluisse.

Who would doubt that the testator’s intention had been that the same man who would be heir if the son had died should be heir if the son were not born? But he had not written this. Moreover, the contrary of this also happened recently: it was written what the writer appears not to have wanted.

Qui sestertium nummum quinque milia legaverat, cum emendaret testamentum, sublatis sestertiis nummis "argenti pondo" posuit, "quinque milia" manserunt. Apparuit tamen "quinque pondo" dari voluisse, quia ille in argento legati modus et inauditus erat et incredibilis. sub hoc statu generales sunt quaestiones, scripto an voluntate standum sit, quae fuerit scribentis voluntas: tractatus omnes qualitatis aut coniecturae, de quibus satis dictum arbitror.

He who had bequeathed five thousand sesterces, when he was emending his testament, with “sesterces, coins” removed, inserted “by weight of silver,” the “five thousand” remained. It nevertheless appeared that he had wished “five pounds” to be given, because that measure of a legacy in silver was both unheard-of and unbelievable. Under this head there are general questions, whether one ought to stand by the writing or by the will, what the will of the writer was: all treatments are of quality or of conjecture, about which I judge enough has been said.

[7] I. Proximum est de legibus contrariis dicere, quia inter omnes artium scriptores constitit in antinomia duos esse scripti et voluntatis status: neque inmerito, quia, cum lex legi obstat, utrimque contra scriptum dicitur et quaestio est de voluntate; in utraque id ambigitur, an utique illa lege sit utendum. Omnibus autem manifestum est numquam esse legem legi contrariam iure ipso, quia, si diversum ius esset, alterum altero abrogaretur, sed eas casu collidi et eventu.

[7] 1. The next thing is to speak about contrary laws, since among all writers of the arts it has been established that in antinomy there are two statuses: of the written text and of the will; nor undeservedly, because, when a law stands against a law, on both sides it is said to be against the written letter and the question is about intention; in each case it is in doubt whether indeed that law ought to be used. Moreover, it is manifest to all that a law is never contrary to a law by the law itself, because, if the law were diverse, the one would be abrogated by the other; but that they collide by chance and by event.

Colliduntur autem aut pares inter se, ut si optio tyrannicidae et viri fortis comparentur, utrique data quod velit petendi potestate: hic meritorum temporis praemii conlatio est: aut secum ipsae, ut duorum fortium, duorum tyrannicidarum, duarum raptarum, in quibus non potest esse alia quaestio quam temporis, utra prior sit, aut qualitatis, utra iustior sit petitio. Diversae quoque leges confligunt aut similes aut inpares. Similium aliae quibus etiam citra adversam legem contradici possit, ut in hac controversia: "Magistratus ab arce ne discedat.

They collide either as equals among themselves, as if the option of a tyrant-slayer and of a brave man be compared, with power given to each to seek what he wishes: here there is a comparison of merits, time, and reward; or they collide among themselves, as of two brave men, two tyrant-slayers, two women carried off, in which there can be no other question than of time—which is prior—or of quality—whose petition is more just. Different laws also conflict, either similar or unequal. Of similar ones, there are some against which one can even object without an adverse law, as in this controversy: "Let the magistrate not depart from the citadel.

Vir fortis * vel alia nulla obstante quaeri potest an quidquid optarit accipere debeat, et in magistratus multa dicentur quibus scriptum expugnatur, si incendium in arce fuerit, si in hostis decurrendum. Aliae contra quas nihil opponi potest nisi lex altera: "Tyrannicidae imago in gymnasio ponatur. Mulieris imago in gymnasio ne ponatur.

A brave man *—or with no other obstacle standing in the way—can be asked whether he ought to receive whatever he has opted for; and concerning magistrates many points will be said by which the written law is overcome, if there should be a fire on the citadel, if there must be a sally against the enemy. Others, against which nothing can be opposed except another law: "Let the image of the tyrannicide be placed in the gymnasium. Let a woman’s image not be placed in the gymnasium.

Mulier tyrannum occidit". Nam neque mulieris imago ullo alio casu poni potest nec tyrannicidae ullo alio casu summoveri. VI. Inpares sunt cum alteri multa quae opponi possunt, alteri [si] nihil nisi quod in lite est, ut cum vir fortis inpunitatem desertoris petit. Nam contra legem viri fortis, ut supra ostendi, multa dicuntur, adversus desertores scripta non potest nisi optione subuerti.

A woman killed the tyrant". For neither can a woman’s image be set up in any other case, nor can that of a tyrant-slayer be in any other case removed. 6. They are unequal when to the one many things can be opposed, to the other [if] nothing except what is in the suit, as when a brave man seeks impunity for a deserter. For against the law of the brave man, as I showed above, many things are said; the writing against deserters cannot be overthrown except by option.

VII. Item aut confessum ex utraque parte ius est aut dubium. Si confessum est, haec fere quaeruntur: utra lex potentior, ad deos pertineat an ad homines, rem publicam an privatos, de honore an de poena, de magnis rebus an de parvis, permittat an vetet an imperet.

7. Likewise, either the law is confessed on both sides, or it is doubtful. If it is confessed, these things are generally inquired: which law is more potent, whether it pertains to the gods or to men, the commonwealth or private persons, about honor or about penalty, about great matters or about small, whether it permits or forbids or commands.

VIII. Solet tractari et utra sit antiquior: sed velut potentissimum utra minus perdat, ut in desertore et viro forti, quod illo non occiso lex tota tollatur, occiso sit reliqua viro forti alia optio. Plurimum tamen est in hoc, utrum fieri sit melius atque aequius: de quo nihil praecipi nisi proposita materia potest.

8. It is also wont to be handled which of the two is more ancient: but, as the most potent, that by which less is lost, as in the deserter and the brave man—because, if the former is not slain, the whole law is taken away; if he is slain, there remains for the brave man another option. Yet the greatest point in this is, which is better and more equitable to be done: about which nothing can be prescribed unless the material has been set forth.

IX. Si dubium, aut alteri aut invicem utrique de iure fit controversia, ut in re tali: "patri in filium, patrono in libertum manus iniectio sit, liberti heredem sequantur: liberti filium quidam fecit heredem: invicem petitur manus iniectio"; et pater * negat ius patris illi fuisse, quia ipse in manu patroni fuerit.

9. If it is doubtful, either one party or, in turn, both bring a controversy about the right, as in such a case: “let there be hand-seizure (manus iniectio) by a father upon a son, by a patron upon a freedman; let freedmen follow the heir: a certain freedman made his son heir: hand-seizure is demanded by them in turn”; and the father* denies that that man had a father’s right, because he himself had been under the hand of the patron.

X. Duplices leges sicut duae colliduntur, ut "nothus ante legitimum natus legitimus sit, post legitimum tantum civis". Quod de legibus, idem de senatus consultis dictum sit. Quae aut inter se pugnent aut obstent legibus: non tamen aliud sit eius status nomen.

10. Double laws, as it were two, collide, as in: "let a bastard born before a legitimate child be legitimate, after a legitimate only a citizen." What has been said about laws, let the same be said about senatorial decrees: which either clash among themselves or stand in the way of laws; yet the name of their status is not different.

[8] I. Syllogismus habet aliquid simile scripto et voluntati, quia semper pars in eo altera scripto nititur; sed hoc interest, quod illic dicitur contra scriptum, hic supra scriptum: illic qui verba defendit hoc agit, ut fiat utique quod scriptum est, hic ne aliud quam scriptum est. Ei nonnulla etiam cum finitione coniunctio: nam saepe, si finitio infirma est, in syllogismum delabitur. II. Sit enim lex: "Venefica capite puniatur.

[8] 1. The syllogism has something similar to the written text and to intention, because one part in it always relies on the writing; but this is the difference, that there it is said against the written text, here above the written text: there he who defends the words aims at this, that what is written be done in any case; here, that nothing other than what is written be done. It has also some conjunction with definition: for often, if the definition is weak, it slips into a syllogism. 2. For let there be a law: "Let a female poisoner be punished with capital punishment.

Saepe se verberanti marito uxor amatorium dedit, eundem repudiavit: per propinquos rogata ut rediret non est reversa: suspendit se maritus. Mulier veneficii rea est". Fortissima est actio dicentis amatorium venenum esse: id erit finitio. Quod si parum valebit, fiet syllogismus, ad quem velut remissa priore contentione veniemus: an proinde puniri debeat ac si virum veneno necasset.

Often, to a husband who was beating her frequently, the wife gave an amatory potion, and she repudiated that same man; when asked through relatives to return, she did not come back; the husband hanged himself. “The woman is defendant on a charge of venefice.” The strongest action is that of the one saying that the amatory potion is a poison: that will be the definitio. But if that shall be of too little strength, there will be a syllogism, to which we shall come as though the earlier contention were relaxed: whether she ought to be punished just as if she had killed her husband with poison.

III. Ergo hic status ducit ex eo quod scriptum est id quod incertum est: quod quoniam ratione colligitur, ratiocinativus dicitur. In has autem fere species venit: an quod semel ius est, idem et saepius: "incesti damnata et praecipitata de saxo vixit: repetitur". An quod in uno, et in pluribus: "qui duos uno tempore tyrannos occidit, duo praemia petit". An quod ante, et postea: "raptor profugit, rapta nupsit, reverso illo petit optionem". IV. An quod in toto, idem in parte: "aratrum accipere pignori non licet; vomerem accepit". An quod in parte, idem in toto: "lanas evehere Tarento non licet; oves evexit". V. In his syllogismus et scripto nititur: nam satis cautum esse dicit.

3. Therefore this status draws from that which is written what is uncertain: which, since it is gathered by reason, is called ratiocinative. Into these, for the most part, it comes in the following species: whether what is right once is the same also more often: "condemned for incest and hurled from the rock, she lived: is it to be repeated?" Whether what is in one, is also in more: "he who killed two tyrants at one time seeks two rewards." Whether what is before, is also afterwards: "the ravisher fled, the ravished woman married; when he returned he seeks the option." 4. Whether what is in the whole is the same in the part: "it is not permitted to take a plough in pledge; he took the ploughshare." Whether what is in the part is the same in the whole: "it is not permitted to carry out wools from Tarentum; he carried out sheep." 5. In these the syllogism also relies on the writing: for it says that it is sufficiently provided for.

"Postulo ut praecipitetur incesta: lex est", et "rapta optionem petit", et "in ove lanae sunt", similiter alia. VI. Sed quia responderi potest: "non est scriptum ut bis praecipitetur damnata, ut quandoque rapta optet, ut tyrannicida duo praemia accipiat: nihil de vomere cautum, nihil de ovibus", ex eo quod manifestum est colligitur quod dubium est. Maioris pugnae est ex scripto ducere quod scriptum non est: an quia hoc, et hoc: "qui patrem occiderit, culleo insuatur: matrem occidit"; "ex domo in ius educere ne liceat: ex tabernaculo eduxit". VII.

"I demand that the incestuous woman be hurled down: there is a law," and "the ravished woman demands the option," and "in the sheep there is wool," and other things similarly. VI. But because it can be answered: "it is not written that the condemned be hurled down twice, that the ravished woman at any time may choose, that a tyrannicide receive two rewards: nothing is provided about the ploughshare, nothing about the sheep," from that which is manifest is inferred that which is doubtful. It is a greater contest to draw from the written [law] what is not written: namely, because this, and this: "whoever shall have killed his father, let him be sewn into a sack: he killed his mother"; "let it not be permitted to lead out into court from a house: he led [him] out from a tent." VII.

In hoc genere haec quaeruntur: an, quotiens propria lex non est, simili sit utendum, an id de quo agitur ei de quo scriptum est simile sit. Simile autem et maius est et par et minus. In illo priore, an satis lege cautum sit, an, etsi parum cautum est, et hoc sit utendum.

In this kind, these things are asked: whether, whenever there is no proper law, one must use the similar one, and whether that which is being dealt with is similar to that about which it is written. Now the similar is greater, equal, or lesser. In that former case, whether it is sufficiently provided for by the law, or whether, even if it is provided for too little, this too must be employed.

In utroque de voluntate legum latoris. Sed de aequo tractatus potentissimi.

In both, it is about the will of the legislator. But arguments from equity are most potent.

[9] I. Amphiboliae species sunt innumerabiles, adeo ut philosophorum quibusdam nullum videatur esse verbum quod non plura significet; genera admodum pauca: aut enim vocibus accidit singulis aut coniunctis.

[9] 1. The species of amphiboly are innumerable, to such a degree that to certain philosophers there seems to be no word which does not signify more things; the genera are very few: for it happens to words either taken singly or conjoined.

II. Singula adferunt errorem cum pluribus rebus aut hominibus eadem appellatio est (omonymia dicitur), ut "gallus" avem an gentem an nomen an fortunam corporis significet incertum est, et "Aiax" Telamonius an Oilei filius. Verba quoque quaedam diversos intellectus habent, ut "cerno". III. Quae ambiguitas plurimis modis accidit.

II. Individual words bring error when the same appellation belongs to multiple things or persons (this is called homonymy), as it is uncertain whether “gallus” signifies a bird, or a people, or a proper name, or the fortune (i.e., endowment) of the body, and “Ajax,” whether the Telamonian or the son of Oileus. Certain words too have diverse senses, as “cerno.” III. Which ambiguity occurs in very many ways.

Vnde fere lites, praecipue ex testamentis, cum de libertate aut etiam hereditate contendunt ii quibus idem nomen est, aut quid sit legatum quaeritur. IV. Alterum est in quo alia integro verbo significatio est, alia diviso, ut ingenua et armamentum et Corvinum, ineptae sane cavillationis, ex qua tamen Graeci controversias ducunt: inde enim auletris illa vulgata, cum quaeritur utrum aula quae ter ceciderit an tibicina si ceciderit debeat publicari. V. Tertia est ex compositis, ut si quis corpus suum in culto loco poni iubeat, circaque monumentum multum agri ab heredibus in tutelam cinerum, ut solent, leget, sit litis occasio cultum locum dixerit an incultum.

Whence almost all litigations arise, especially from testaments, when those who have the same name contend about liberty or even inheritance, or inquiry is made as to what the legacy is. 4. A second kind is that in which one meaning belongs to a word kept whole, another when it is divided, as with ingenua and in genua (“freeborn” and “onto the knees”), armamentum and arma mentum (“armament” and “the chin of arms”), and Corvinum and cor vinum (the proper name “Corvinus” and “heart-wine”)—a truly silly cavillation, from which nevertheless the Greeks draw controversies: for from this comes that well‑known jest among the auletrides, when it is asked whether the aula which has fallen three times, or the tibicine (female flute‑player) if she has fallen, ought to be made public property. 5. The third is from compounds, as if someone should order his body to be placed in a cultivated place, and should bequeath, as they are wont, much land around the monument by the heirs into the tutelage of the ashes, there is occasion for a lawsuit whether he said a cultivated place or an uncultivated one.

VI. Sic apud Graecos contendunt Leon et Pantaleon, cum scriptura dubia est, bona omnia Leonti an bona Pantaleonti relicta sint.

6. Thus among the Greeks Leon and Pantaleon contend, when the writing is doubtful, whether all the goods have been left to Leon, or the goods to Pantaleon.

In coniunctis plus ambiguitatis est. Fit autem per casus, ut "aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse": VII. per conlocationem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri oporteat, ac frequentissime cum quod medium est utrimque possit trahi, ut de Troilo Vergilius "lora tenens tamen": hic utrum teneat tamen lora, an quamvis teneat tamen trahatur quaeri potest.

In connected constructions there is more ambiguity. It arises through cases, as “I say, Aeacid, that you can conquer the Romans”: 7. through collocation, where it is doubtful what ought to be referred to what, and most frequently when what is in the middle can be drawn to either side, as about Troilus in Vergil, “holding the reins, nevertheless”: here it can be asked whether he nevertheless holds the reins, or, although he holds them, nevertheless is dragged.

VIII. Vnde controversia illa: "testamento quidam iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem; quaeritur statua hastam tenens aurea esse debeat, an hasta esse aurea in statua alterius materiae". Fit per flexum idem magis: "quinquaginta ubi erant centum inde occidit Achilles". IX. Saepe utri duorum antecedentium sermo subiunctus sit in dubio est, unde et controversia: "heres meus uxori meae dare damnas esto argenti quod elegerit pondo centum; uter eligat quaeritur".

8. Whence that controversy: "in a testament someone ordered that a golden statue holding a spear be set up; it is asked whether the statue holding a spear ought to be golden, or the spear be golden in a statue of another material." The same comes about even more through inflection: "fifty where there were a hundred, from there Achilles slew." 9. Often it is in doubt to which of two antecedents the clause has been subjoined, whence also a controversy: "let my heir be under obligation to give to my wife of silver what she shall have chosen, one hundred pounds by weight; which of the two is to choose is asked."

Verum id quod ex his primum est mutatione casuum, sequens divisione verborum aut tralatione emendatur, tertium adiectione. X. Accusativi geminatione facta amphibolia solvitur ablativo, ut illud "Lachetem audivi percussisse Demean" fiat "a Lachete percussum Demean". Sed ablativo ipsi, ut in primo diximus, inest naturalis amphibolia: "caelo decurrit aperto": utrum per apertum caelum an cum apertum esset. XI. Divisio respiratione et mora constat: "statuam", deinde "auream hastam", vel "statuam auream", deinde "hastam". Adiectio talis est: "argentum quod elegerit ipse", ut heres intellegatur, vel "ipsa", ut uxor.

But that which of these is first is emended by a mutation of cases, the following by a division of words or by transference, the third by addition. 10. When a gemination of the accusative has been made, the amphiboly is resolved by the ablative, as that "Lachetem audivi percussisse Demean" becomes "a Lachete percussum Demean". But in the ablative itself, as we said in the first, there is an inherent, natural amphiboly: "caelo decurrit aperto": whether through an open sky, or when it was open. 11. Division consists in a respiration and a pause: "statuam", then "auream hastam", or "statuam auream", then "hastam". Addition is of this sort: "argentum quod elegerit ipse", so that the heir may be understood, or "ipsa", so that the wife.

Adiectione facta amphibolia, qualis fit "hunc flentes illos deprendimus", detractione solvetur. XII. Pluribus verbis emendandum ubi est id quod quo referatur dubium est, et "ipse" est ambiguum: "heres meus dare illi damnas esto omnia sua". In quod genus incidit Cicero loquens de C. Fannio: "is soceri instituto, quem, quia cooptatus in augurum collegium non erat, non admodum diligebat, praesertim cum ille Q. Scaevolam sibi minorem natu generum praetulisset". XIII.

An ambiguity produced by addition, such as is “hunc flentes illos deprendimus,” will be solved by subtraction. 12. It must be emended by more words wherever that to which it is to be referred is in doubt, and “ipse” is ambiguous: “heres meus dare illi damnas esto omnia sua”. Into which class falls Cicero speaking about Gaius Fannius: “he, by his father-in-law’s policy, whom, because he had not been co-opted into the college of augurs, he did not particularly esteem, especially since that man had preferred to him the younger by birth Q. Scaevola as a son-in-law.” 13.

Nam "sibi" et ad socerum referri et ad Fannium potest. Productio quoque in scripto et correptio in dubio relicta causa est ambiguitatis, ut in hoc "cato". Alium enim ostendit brevis secunda syllaba casu nominativo * Plurimae praeterea sunt aliae species, quas persequi nihil necesse est.

For "sibi" can be referred both to the father-in-law and to Fannius. Prolongation in writing and correption, when left in doubt, is a cause of ambiguity, as in this "cato". For a short second syllable shows another in the nominative case * Moreover, there are very many other forms, which there is no need to pursue.

XIV. Nec refert quo modo sit facta amphibolia aut quo resolvatur. duas enim res significari manifestum est et, quod ad scriptum vocemve pertinet, in utramque partem par est.

14. Nor does it matter in what way the amphiboly has been made or in what way it is resolved. For it is manifest that two things are signified, and, as far as it pertains to script or voice, it is equal to either side.

Ideoque frustra praecipitur ut in hoc statu vocem ipsam ad nostram partem conemur vertere: nam si id fieri potest amphibolia non est. XV. Amphiboliae autem omnis erit in his quaestio: aliquando uter sit secundum naturam magis sermo, semper utrum sit aequius, utrum is qui scripsit ac [sii] dixit voluerit. Quarum in utramque partem satis ex iis quae de coniectura et qualitate diximus praeceptum est.

And therefore it is vainly enjoined that, in this posture, we try to turn the word itself to our own side: for if that can be done, it is not an amphiboly. 15. But every question about amphiboly will be in these: at times, which wording is more according to nature; always, which is more equitable, what the one who wrote and [sii] said intended. Of which, on either side, enough has been prescribed from those things which we have said about conjecture and quality.

[10] I. Est autem quaedam inter hos status cognatio. Nam et in finitione quae sit voluntas nominis quaeritur (ut in syllogismo, qui secundus a finitione status est, +quae spectatur+ quid voluerit scriptor) et contrarias leges duos esse scripti et voluntatis status apparet. Rursus et finitio quodam modo est amphibolia, cum in duas partes diducatur intellectus nominis, et scriptum et voluntas habet in verbis iuris quaestionem, quod idem antinomia petitur.

[10] 1. Moreover, there is a certain kinship among these statuses. For in definition too it is inquired what the intention of the name is (as in the syllogism, which is the second status after definition, +which is considered+ what the writer wished), and it appears that the statuses of the written text and of intention are two contrary laws. Again, definition is in a certain way amphiboly, when the understanding of the name is drawn into two parts, and both the written text and intention have a question within the words of the law, which same thing is sought in antinomy.

II. Ideoque omnia haec quidam scriptum et voluntatem esse dixerunt, alii in scripto et voluntate amphiboliam esse quae facit quaestionem. Sed distincta sunt: aliud est enim obscurum ius, aliud ambiguum. III.

2. And therefore some have said that all these are the written text and the will; others that in the written text and the will there is an amphiboly which makes the question. But they are distinct: for an obscure law is one thing, an ambiguous another. 3.

Igitur finitio in natura ipsa nominis quaestionem habet generalem et quae esse etiam citra complexum causae possit: scriptum et voluntas de eo disputat iure quod est in lege, syllogismus de eo quod non est. Amphiboliae lis in diversum trahit, legum contrariarum ex diverso pugna est. IV. Neque inmerito et recepta est a doctissimis haec differentia et apud plurimos ac prudentissimos durat.

Therefore definition, in the very nature of the name, has a general question, and one which can exist even apart from the complex of the case: the writing and the will dispute concerning that which is by the law that is in the statute, the syllogism concerning that which is not. The controversy of amphiboly draws in a different direction; the fight of contrary laws is from the opposite side. 4. Nor undeservedly has this distinction been received by the most learned, and it endures among very many and most prudent men.

Et de hoc quidem genere dispositionis, etiam si non omnia, tradi tamen aliqua potuerunt. V. sunt alia quae nisi proposita de qua dicendum est materia viam docendi non praebeant. Non enim causa tantum universa in quaestiones ac locos diducenda est, sed hae ipsae partes habent rursus ordinem suum.

And concerning this kind of disposition, even if not all things, nevertheless some things could be handed down. 5. There are other things which, unless the material about which one must speak has been proposed, do not provide the way of teaching. For not only is the universal cause to be divided into questions and loci, but these very parts in turn have their own order.

Nam et in prohoemio primum est aliquid et secundum ac deinceps, et quaestio omnis ac locus habet suam dispositionem, ut thesis etiam simplices. VI. Nisi forte satis erit dividendi peritus qui controversiam in haec diduxerit, an omne praemium viro forti dandum sit, an ex privato, an nuptiae, an eius quae nupta sit, an hae: deinde, cum fuerit de prima quaestione dicendum, passim et ut quidque in mentem veniet miscuerit, non primum in ea scierit esse tractandum verbis legis standum sit an voluntate, huius ipsius particulae aliquod initium fecerit, deinde proxima subnectens struxerit orationem, ut pars hominis est manus, eius digiti, illorum quoque articuli. VII.

For even in the proem there is a first element and a second and so on in order, and every question and locus has its own disposition, as even simple theses do. 6. Unless perhaps it will be enough for a man skilled in division who will have drawn out the controversy into these points: whether every prize is to be given to the brave man, whether from a private source, whether the nuptials, whether of her who is married, whether these: then, when it is time to speak on the first question, he should not scatter things everywhere and mix them as each comes into mind, without first knowing that in it one must treat whether one should stand by the words of the law or by the intention; let him make some beginning of this very particle, then, subjoining what is next, construct the speech, as the hand is a part of a man, its fingers, and the joints of those as well. 7.

Hoc est quod scriptor demonstrare non possit nisi certa definitaque materia. VIII. Sed quid una faciet aut altera, quin immo centum ac mille in re infinita [que materia in se finita]? Praeceptoris est in alio atque alio genere cotidie ostendere quis ordo sit rerum et quae copulatio, ut paulatim fiat usus et ad similia transitus: tradi enim omnia quae ars efficit non possunt.

This is what a writer cannot demonstrate unless there is a certain and defined subject-matter. 8. But what will one do or another, nay rather a hundred and a thousand, in an infinite matter [while the material is finite in itself]? It is the preceptor’s part, in one and another kind, daily to show what the order of things is and what the connection, so that little by little practice may be formed and a passage made to similar cases: for all things which the art effects cannot be handed down.

IX. Nam quis pictor omnia quae in rerum natura sunt adumbrare didicit? Sed percepta semel imitandi ratione adsimulabit quidquid acceperit: quis non faber vasculum aliquod quale numquam viderat fecit?

IX. For what painter has learned to adumbrate everything that is in the nature of things? But, the method of imitating once perceived, he will simulate whatever he has received: what craftsman has not made some small vessel of a kind he had never seen?

X. Quaedam vero non docentium sunt sed discentium. Nam medicus quid in quoque valetudinis genere faciendum sit, quid quibusque signis providendum docebit: vim sentiendi pulsus venarum, caloris modos, spiritus meatum, coloris distantiam, quae sui cuiusque sunt ingenii, non dabit. Quare plurima petamus a nobis et cum causis deliberemus, cogitemusque homines ante invenisse artem quam docuisse.

10. Certain things truly belong not to those teaching but to those learning. For the physician will teach what in each genus of ailment is to be done, what is to be provided for by which signs: the power of perceiving the pulse of the veins, the modes of heat, the meatus/course of breath, the difference of color—which are of each one’s own natural ingenium—he will not give. Wherefore let us seek very many things from ourselves and deliberate together with the causes, and let us consider that men found/discovered the art before they taught it.

XI. Illa enim est potentissima quaeque vere dicitur oeconomia totius causae dispositio, quae nullo modo constitui nisi velut in re praesente potest: ubi adsumendum prohoemium, ubi omittendum: ubi utendum expositione continua, ubi partita: ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi more Homerico a mediis vel ultimis: XII. ubi omnino non exponendum: quando a nostris, quando ab adversariorum propositionibus incipiamus, quando a firmissimis probationibus, quando a levioribus: qua in causa proponendae prohoemiis quaestiones, qua praeparatione praemuniendae: quid iudicis animus accipere possit statim dictum, quo paulatim deducendus: singulis an universis opponenda refutatio: reservandi perorationi an per totam actionem diffundendi adfectus: de iure prius an de aequitate dicendum: ante acta crimina an de quibus iudicium est prius obicere vel diluere conveniat: XIII. si multiplices causae erunt, quis ordo faciendus, quae testimonia tabulaeve cuiusque generis in actione recitandae, quae reservandae.

11. For that is most potent which is truly called the oeconomy, the disposition of the whole cause, which can in no way be constituted except, as it were, in the matter present: where the proem is to be taken up, where to be omitted: where continuous exposition is to be used, where partitioned: where one must begin from the beginnings, where in the Homeric manner from the middle or the last: 12. where not to expound at all: when we should begin from our own propositions, when from those of the adversaries, when from the firmest proofs, when from the lighter: in what case questions are to be proposed in the proems, with what preparation they are to be fortified beforehand: what the mind of the judge can receive when said at once, to what he must be led down little by little: whether refutation is to be opposed to individual points or to all together: whether the emotions are to be reserved for the peroration or diffused through the whole action: whether one should speak first about law or about equity: whether it is fitting first to object or to refute the crimes done before, or those about which there is judgment: 13. if the causes are multiple, what order is to be made, which testimonies or tablets/documents of each kind are to be recited in the action, which to be reserved.

Haec est velut imperatoria virtus copias suas partim ad casus proeliorum retinentis, partim per castella tuenda custodiendasve urbes, petendos commeatus, obsidenda itinera, mari denique ac terra dividentis. XIV. Sed haec in oratione praestabit cui omnia adfuerint, natura doctrina studium.

This is, as it were, the imperatorial virtue: to hold his forces partly for the contingencies of battles, partly to distribute them through forts for defending or safeguarding cities, for seeking supplies, for blockading routes, and finally to divide them by sea and by land. 14. But in oratory he will excel in these things to whom all things have been present: nature, learning, zeal.

Quare nemo exspectet ut alieno tantum labore sit disertus: vigilandum (dicam iterum) enitendum pallendum est, facienda sua cuique vis, suus usus, sua ratio, non respiciendum ad haec, sed in promptu habenda, nec tamquam tradita sed tamquam innata. XV. Nam via demonstrari potest, velocitas sua cuique est; verum ars satis praestat si copias eloquentiae ponit in medio: nostrum est uti eis scire. XVI.

Wherefore let no one expect to be eloquent by another’s labor only: one must keep vigil (I will say it again), strive, grow pale; each must make his own force, his own use (practice), his own method; one must not look back to these things, but have them at the ready, and not as though handed down, but as though inborn. 15. For the way can be shown; the speed is each one’s own; indeed art does enough if it sets the resources of eloquence in the midst (before us): it is our part to know how to use them. 16.

Neque enim partium est demum dispositio, sed in his ipsis primus aliquis sensus et secundus et tertius: qui non modo ut sint ordine conlocati laborandum est, sed ut inter se vincti atque ita cohaerentes ne commissura perluceat: corpus sit, non membra. XVII. Quod ita continget si et quid quoque loco conveniat viderimus et, ut verba verbis adplicamus non pugnantia sed quae invicem complectantur, ita res non diversae distantibus ex locis quasi invicem ignotae collidentur, sed aliqua societate cum prioribus ac sequentibus copulatae tenebunt, ac videbitur non solum composita oratio sed etiam continua.

For it is not merely the arrangement of the parts, but within these very parts there is some first sense and a second and a third: concerning which one must labor not only that they be placed in order, but that they be bound among themselves and so cohere that the seam not shine through: let it be a body, not limbs. 17. This will thus come about if we both see what suits each place and, as we apply words to words not warring but such as mutually embrace one another, so the matters will not collide, diverse and from distant places as if unknown to each other, but, coupled by some fellowship with what precedes and follows, they will hold fast, and the discourse will appear not only composed but also continuous.

Verum longius fortasse progredior fallente transitu et a dispositione ad elocutionis praecepta labor, quae proximus liber inchoabit.

But perhaps I am advancing too far, the transition deceiving me, and I slip from disposition to the precepts of elocution, which the next book will commence.