Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum; id secus est, nam alterum est multiplex. Poematis enim tragici, comici, epici, melici, etiam ac dithyrambici, quod magis est tractatum a Graecis quam a Latinis, suum cuiusque est, diversum a reliquis. Itaque et in tragoedia comicum vitiosum est et in comoedia turpe tragicum; et in ceteris suus est cuique certus sonus et quaedam intellegentibus nota vox.

[1] The kinds of orators are said to be as those of poets; that is otherwise, for the orator’s is manifold. For in poems—tragic, comic, epic, melic, and even dithyrambic, which has been more treated by the Greeks than by the Latins—each has its own, different from the rest. And so in tragedy the comic is faulty, and in comedy the tragic is disgraceful; and in the others each has its own fixed sound and a certain voice known to the intelligent.

[2] Oratorum autem si quis ita numerat plura genera, ut alios grandis aut gravis aut copiosos, alios tenuis aut subtilis aut brevis, alios eis interiectos et tamquam medios putet, de hominibus dicit aliquid, de re parum. In re enim quid optimum sit quaeritur, in homine dicitur quod est. Itaque licet dicere et Ennium summum epicum poetam, si cui ita videtur, et Pacuvium tragicum et Caecilium fortasse comicum.

[2] But if anyone thus enumerates more genera of orators, so that he thinks some are grand or grave or copious, others thin or subtle or brief, others interposed between these and, as it were, middle, he says something about persons, little about the matter. For in the matter one inquires what is best; in the man it is said what is. Accordingly, it is permitted to say both that Ennius is the highest epic poet, if it so seems to anyone, and that Pacuvius is tragic and Caecilius perhaps comic.

[3] Oratorem genere non divido; perfectum enim quaero. Unum est autem genus perfecti, a quo qui absunt, non genere differunt, ut Terentius ab Accio, sed in eodem genere non sunt pares. Optimus est enim orator qui dicendo animos audientium et docet et delectat et permovet.

[3] I do not divide the orator by genre; for I seek the perfect. Moreover, there is one genre of the perfect; and those who are absent from it do not differ by genre, as Terence from Accius, but within the same genre they are not equals. For the best orator is he who, by speaking, both teaches and delights and profoundly moves the minds of the hearers.

Docere debitum est, delectare honorarium, permovere necessarium.

To teach is due, to delight is honorary, to move is necessary.

[4] Haec ut alius melius quam alius, concedendum est; verum id fit non genere sed gradu. Optimum quidem unum est et proximum quod ei simillimum. Ex quo perspicuum est, quod optimo dissimillimum sit, id esse deterrimum.

[4] That one man does these things better than another must be conceded; but that comes about not by genus but by degree. The best indeed is one, and next is that which is most similar to it. From which it is clear that what is most dissimilar to the best is the worst.

[II] Nam quoniam eloquentia constat ex verbis et ex sententiis, perficiendum est, ut pure et emendate loquentes, quod est Latine, verborum praeterea et propriorum et translatorum elegantiam persequamur: in propriis ut lautissima eligamus, in translatis ut similitudinem secuti verecunde utamur alienis.

[II] For since eloquence consists of words and of thoughts, it must be brought to perfection that, speaking purely and correctly—which is to speak in Latin—we furthermore pursue the elegance of words both proper and translated: in proper words, that we choose the most polished; in translated, that, following similitude, we use those of another modestly.

[5] Sententiarum autem totidem genera sunt quot dixi esse laudum. Sunt enim docendi acutae, delectandi quasi argutae, commovendi graves. Sed et verborum est structura quaedam duas res efficiens, numerum et levitatem, et sententiae suam compositionem habent, et ad probandam rem accommodatum ordinem.

[5] But the kinds of sentences are just as many as I said there are of praises: for those for instructing are acute, those for delighting are, as it were, argute (witty), those for stirring emotion are grave. But there is also a certain structure of words producing two things, number and lightness; and sentences have their own composition, and an order accommodated to proving the matter.

Sed earum omnium rerum ut aedificiorum memoria est quasi fundamentum, lumen actio.

But of all these things, as in buildings, memory is as it were the foundation, delivery the light.

[6] Ea igitur omnia in quo summa erunt, erit perfectissimus orator; in quo media, mediocris; in quo minima, deterrimus. Et appellabuntur omnes oratores, ut pictores appellantur etiam mali, nec generibus inter sese, sed facultatibus different. Itaque nemo est orator qui Demostheni se similem nolit esse; at Menander Homeri noluit; genus enim erat aliud.

[6] Therefore, he in whom all those things will be at their highest will be the most perfect orator; in whom they are at the middle, mediocre; in whom at the least, the very worst. And all will be called orators, just as painters—even bad ones—are called painters; and they will differ not by genera among themselves, but by faculties. And so there is no orator who does not wish to be like Demosthenes; but Menander did not wish to be like Homer; for the genus was different.

Id non est in oratoribus aut, etiam si est ut alius gravitatem sequens subtilitatem fugiat, contra alius acutiorem se quam ornatiorem velit, etiam si est in genere tolerabilis, certe non est optimus, si quidem, quod omnis laudes habet, id est optimum.

That is not the case among orators; or, even if it is—that one, following gravitas, shuns subtlety, and conversely another wishes to be more acute than ornate—though this may be tolerable in its genus, surely it is not the best, since indeed that which has all praises is the best.

[III]

[3]

[7] Haec autem dixi brevius quidem quam res petebat, sed ad id quod agimus non fuit dicendum pluribus; unum enim cum sit genus, id quale sit quaerimus. Est autem tale quale floruit Athenis; ex quo Atticorum oratorum ipsa vis ignota est, nota gloria. Nam alterum multi viderunt, vitiosi nihil apud eos esse, alterum pauci, laudabilia esse multa.

[7] These things, however, I have said more briefly indeed than the matter demanded, but for what we are doing it was not necessary to speak at greater length; for since there is one genus, we inquire of what quality it is. And it is such as flourished at Athens; whence the very force of the Attic orators is unknown, their glory known. For the one many have seen—that there is nothing vicious among them; the other few—that there are many laudable things.

Est enim vitiosum in sententia si quid absurdum aut alienum aut non acutum aut subinsulsum est; in verbis si inquinatum, si abiectum, si non aptum, si durum, si longe petitum.

For it is vicious in the thought if anything is absurd or alien or not acute or somewhat insipid; in the words, if polluted, if abject, if not apt, if harsh, if far-fetched.

[8] Haec vitaverunt fere omnes qui aut Attici numerantur aut dicunt Attice. Sed qui eatenus valuerunt, sani et sicci dumtaxat habeantur, sed ita ut palaestritae; spatiari in xysto ut liceat, non ab Olympiis coronam petant. Qui, cum careant omni vitio, non sunt contenti quasi bona valetudine, sed viris, lacertos, sanguinem quaerunt, quandam etiam suavitatem coloris, eos imitemur si possumus; si minus, illos potius qui incorrupta sanitate sunt, quod est proprium Atticorum, quam eos quorum vitiosa abundantia est, qualis Asia multos tulit.

[8] These things nearly all have avoided who either are counted Attic or speak Attically. But those who have prevailed only to that extent should be held to be sound and dry merely, yet in such a way as palaestritae; let it be permitted to stroll in the xystus, let them not seek a crown from Olympia. Those who, while they lack every vice, are not content with, as it were, good health, but seek sinews, biceps, blood, and even a certain sweetness of complexion—let us imitate them if we can; if not, rather those who are of incorrupt health, which is the proper mark of the Attics, than those whose abundance is vicious, such as Asia produced many.

[9] Quod cum faciemus—si modo id ipsum assequemur; est enim permagnum—imitemur, si potuerimus, Lysiam et eius quidem tenuitatem potissimum; est enim multis locis grandior, sed quia et privatas ille plerasque et eas ipsas aliis et parvarum rerum causulas scripsit, videtur esse ieiunior, cum se ipse consulto ad minutarum causarum genera limaverit. [IV] Quod qui ita faciet, ut, si cupiat uberior esse, non possit, habeatur sane orator, sed de minoribus; magno autem oratori etiam illo modo saepe dicendum est in tali genere causarum.

[9] And when we do this—if only we attain that very thing; for it is very great—let us imitate, if we can, Lysias, and indeed his tenuity most of all; for he is in many places grander, but because he wrote most private causes and those very ones for others, and little causes of small matters, he seems more jejune, since he himself deliberately has filed himself down to the kinds of minute causes. [4] Now whoever shall do this in such a way that, even if he should desire to be more copious, he cannot, let him be held indeed an orator, but of lesser matters; however, a great orator too must often speak in that manner in such a kind of causes.

[10] Ita fit ut Demosthenes certe possit summisse dicere, elate Lysias fortasse non possit. Sed si eodem modo putant exercitu in foro et in omnibus templis, quae circum forum sunt, collocato dici pro Milone decuisse, ut si de re privata ad unum iudicem diceremus, vim eloquentiae sua facultate, non rei natura metiuntur.

[10] Thus it comes about that Demosthenes certainly can speak in a low key, while Lysias perhaps cannot speak in an elevated style. But if they think that, with an army posted in the forum and in all the temples that are around the forum, it ought to have been spoken on behalf of Milo in the same way as if we were speaking about a private matter before a single judge, they measure the force of eloquence by their own capacity, not by the nature of the case.

[11] Qua re quoniam non nullorum sermo iam increbruit, partim se ipsos Attice dicere, partim neminem nostrum dicere, alteros neglegamus; satis enim eis res ipsa respondet, cum aut non adhibeantur ad causas aut adhibiti derideantur; nam si rideretur, esset id ipsum Atticorum. Sed qui dici a nobis Attico more nolunt, ipsi autem se non oratores esse profitentur, si teretes auris habent intellegensque iudicium, tamquam ad picturam probandam adhibentur etiam inscii faciendi cum aliqua sollertia iudicandi;

[11] Wherefore, since the discourse of some has now grown frequent—partly that they themselves speak Attically, partly that none of us speaks—let us disregard the latter; for the very matter itself answers them sufficiently, since either they are not summoned to causes, or, when summoned, they are laughed to scorn; for if it were laughed at, that would itself be the very thing of the Attics. But those who do not wish to be said by us to speak in the Attic manner, while they themselves profess that they are not orators—if they have polished ears and an intelligent judgment—are brought in, as for approving a painting, even though unskilled in the making, yet with some dexterity in judging;

[12] sin autem intellegentiam ponunt in audiendi fastidio neque eos quicquam excelsum magnificumque delectat, dicant se quiddam subtile et politum velle, grande ornatumque contemnere; id vero desinant dicere, qui subtiliter dicant, eos solos Attice dicere, id est quasi sicce et integre. Et ample et ornate et copiose cum eadem integritate Atticorum est. Quid?

[12] But if they place their conception of understanding in a fastidiousness of listening and nothing lofty and magnificent delights them, let them say that they wish for something subtle and polished, and that they despise what is grand and ornate; but let those who speak subtly stop saying that they alone speak in the Attic manner, that is, as if dryly and purely. And to speak amply and ornately and copiously, with the same integrity, is Attic as well. What?

dubium est utrum orationem nostram tolerabilem tantum an etiam admirabilem esse cupiamus? Non enim iam quaerimus quid sit Attice, sed quid sit optime dicere.

It is doubtful whether we desire our oration to be only tolerable or even admirable. For we are no longer inquiring what is Attic, but what it is to speak optimally.

[13] Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam Graecorum oratorum praestantissimi sint ei qui fuerint Athenis, eorum autem princeps facile Demosthenes, hunc si qui imitetur, eum et Attice dicturum et optime, ut, quoniam Attici nobis propositi sunt ad imitandum, bene dicere id sit Attice dicere.

[13] From which it is understood that, since among the Greek orators the most preeminent are those who have been at Athens, and their prince is easily Demosthenes, whoever imitates this man will speak both Attically and optimally; so that, since the Attics have been set before us for imitation, to speak well is to speak Attically.

[V] Sed cum in eo magnus error esset, quale esset id dicendi genus, putavi mihi suscipiendum laborem utilem studiosis, mihi quidem ipsi non necessarium.

[5] But since in this there was great error as to what that kind of speaking was, I thought I should undertake a labor useful to the studious, indeed not necessary to me myself.

[14] Converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque contrarias, Aeschinis et Demosthenis; nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi. Non enim ea me adnumerare lectori putavi oportere, sed tamquam appendere.

[14] For I have converted from the Attics the most noble orations of two most eloquent men, and contrary to each other, Aeschines and Demosthenes; nor did I convert as an interpreter, but as an orator, with the same sentences and their forms as if figures, with words adapted to our usage. In these I did not hold it necessary to render word for word, but I preserved the whole genus of the wording and its force. For I thought that I ought not to enumerate these things to the reader, but, as it were, to weigh them.

[15] Hic labor meus hoc assequetur, ut nostri homines quid ab illis exigant, qui se Atticos volunt, et ad quam eos quasi formulam dicendi revocent intellegant.

[15] This labor of mine will achieve this: that our people understand what to exact from those who wish to be Attic, and to what, as it were, formula of speaking they should recall them.

'Sed exorietur Thucydides; eius enim quidam eloquentiam admirantur.' Id quidem recte; sed nihil ad eum oratorem quem quaerimus. Aliud est enim explicare res gestas narrando, aliud argumentando criminari crimenve dissolvere; aliud narrantem tenere auditorem, aliud concitare. 'At loquitur pulchre.'

'But Thucydides will arise; for certain people admire his eloquence.' That indeed is right; but it is nothing to that orator whom we seek. For one thing is to explicate deeds by narrating, another to incriminate by arguing or to dissolve a charge; one thing is for a narrator to hold the auditor, another to stir him. 'But he speaks beautifully.'

[16] Num melius quam Plato? Necesse est tamen oratori quem quaerimus controversias explicare forensis dicendi genere apto ad docendum, ad delectandum, ad permovendum. [VI] Qua re si quis erit qui se Thucydideo genere causas in foro dicturum esse profiteatur, is abhorrebit etiam a suspicione eius quod versatur in re civili et forensi; sin Thucydidem laudabit, ascribat suae nostram sententiam.

[16] Any better than Plato? Nevertheless it is necessary for the orator whom we seek to set forth controversies by a forensic manner of speaking, apt for teaching, for delighting, for moving. [6] Wherefore, if there shall be someone who professes that he will plead causes in the forum in the Thucydidean kind, he will be out of harmony even with the very notion of that which is engaged in civic and forensic business; but if he will praise Thucydides, let him ascribe our opinion to his own.

[17] Quin ipsum Isocratem, quem divinus auctor Plato suum fere aequalem admirabiliter in Phaedro laudari fecit ab Socrate quemque omnes docti summum oratorem esse dixerunt, tamen hunc in numerum non repono. Non enim in acie versatur nec ferro, sed quasi rudibus eius eludit oratio. A me autem, ut cum maximis minima conferam, gladiatorum par nobilissimum inducitur, Aeschines, tamquam Aeserninus, ut ait Lucilius, non spurcus homo, sed acer et doctus cum Pacideiano hic componitur,—optimus longe post homines natos—. Nihil enim illo oratore arbitror cogitari posse divinius.

[17] Nay, Isocrates himself, whom the divine author Plato caused to be admirably praised by Socrates in the Phaedrus, and whom all the learned said to be the highest orator, yet I do not place him in this number. For he does not engage in the battle-line nor with steel, but his speech plays, as it were, with practice-cudgels. By me, however—to compare the least with the greatest—the most noble pair of gladiators is brought on: Aeschines, as an Aeserninus, as Lucilius says, not a filthy man, but keen and learned, is here matched with a Pacideianus—by far the best since men were born. For I judge that nothing can be conceived more divine than that orator.

[18] Huic labori nostro duo genera reprehensionum opponuntur. Unum hoc: 'Verum melius Graeci.' A quo quaeratur ecquid possint ipsi melius Latine? Alterum: 'Quid istas potius legam quam Graecas?' Idem Andriam et Synephebos nec minus Andromacham aut Antiopam aut Epigonos Latinos recipiunt.

[18] Two kinds of criticisms are opposed to this our labor. One is this: 'But truly, the Greeks do it better.' From such a one let it be asked whether they themselves can do anything better in Latin. The other: 'Why should I read these rather than the Greek ones?' Yet these same people admit the Andriam and Synephebos, and no less the Andromacham or Antiopam or Epigonos in Latin.

Quod igitur est eorum in orationibus e Graeco conversis fastidium, nullum cum sit in versibus?

What, then, is their fastidiousness toward orations converted from Greek, when there is none in verses?

[VII]

[7]

[19] Sed adgrediamur iam quod suscepimus, si prius euerimus quae causa in iudicium deducta sit. Cum esset lex Athenis, ne qvis popvli scitvm faceret vt qvisqvam corona donaretvr in magistratv privs qvam rationes rettvlisset; et altera lex, eos qvi a popvlo donarentvr, in contione donari debere; qvi a senatv, in senatv, Demosthenes curator muris reficiendis fuit eosque refecit pecunia sua; de hoc igitur Ctesiphon scitum fecit nullis ab illo rationibus relatis, ut corona aurea donaretur eaque donatio fieret in theatro populo convocato, qui locus non est contionis legitimae, atque ita praedicaretur, evm donari virtvtis ergo benevolentiaeqve qvam is erga popvlvm atheniensem haberet.

[19] But let us now approach what we have undertaken, if first we shall have refuted the case that has been brought into judgment. Since there was a law at Athens that no one should make a people’s decree that anyone be awarded a crown while in office before he had rendered his accounts; and another law, that those who were to be honored by the people ought to be honored in an assembly, those by the senate, in the senate, Demosthenes was curator for repairing the walls and repaired them at his own expense; about this, therefore, Ctesiphon made a decree, with no accounts having been rendered by him, that he be awarded a golden crown and that this bestowal be made in the theater with the people convened, which place is not that of a lawful assembly, and that it be so proclaimed, that he was being honored for the sake of his virtue and the goodwill which he had toward the Athenian people.

[20] Hunc igitur Ctesiphontem in iudicium adduxit Aeschines quod contra leges scripsisset, ut et rationibus non relatis corona donaretur et ut in theatro, et quod de virtute eius et benevolentia falsa scripsisset, cum Demosthenes nec vir bonus esset nec bene meritus de civitate.

[20] Therefore Aeschines brought this Ctesiphon into court because he had written contrary to the laws, namely that, with the accounts not rendered, a crown be bestowed, and that it be in the theater, and because he had written falsehoods about his virtue and benevolence, since Demosthenes was neither a good man nor well-deserving of the state.

Causa ipsa abhorret illa quidem a formula consuetudinis nostrae, sed est magna. Habet enim et legum interpretationem satis acutam in utramque partem et meritorum in rem publicam contentionem sane gravem.

The case itself indeed is at odds with the formula of our custom, but it is great. For it has both an interpretation of the laws sufficiently acute on either side, and a truly grave contention over merits toward the commonwealth.

[21] Itaque causa fuit Aeschini, cum ipse a Demosthene esset capitis accusatus, quod legationem ementitus esset, ut ulciscendi inimici causa nomine Ctesiphontis iudicium fieret de factis famaque Demosthenis. Non enim tam multa dixit de rationibus non relatis, quam de eo quod civis improbus ut optimus laudatus esset.

[21] And so this was Aeschines’ case: since he himself had been accused by Demosthenes on a capital charge, on the ground that he had fabricated his embassy, he contrived that, for the sake of avenging an enemy, in the name of Ctesiphon there should be a trial concerning the deeds and fame of Demosthenes. For he said not so many things about the accounts not having been rendered, as about this: that a wicked citizen had been praised as the best.

[22] Hanc multam Aeschines a Ctesiphonte petivit quadriennio ante Philippi Macedonis mortem; sed iudicium factum est aliquot annis post Alexandro iam Asiam tenente; ad quod iudicium concursus dicitur e tota Graecia factus esse. Quid enim tam aut visendum aut audiendum fuit quam summorum oratorum in gravissima causa accurata et inimicitiis incensa contentio?

[22] This fine Aeschines sought from Ctesiphon four years before the death of Philip the Macedonian; but the trial was held several years later, with Alexander already holding Asia; to which trial a concourse is said to have been made from the whole of Greece. For what, indeed, was either so to be seen or to be heard as the contention of the highest orators in a most grave cause, painstaking and inflamed by enmities?

[23] Quorum ego orationes si, ut spero, ita expressero virtutibus utens illorum omnibus, id est sententiis et earum figuris et rerum ordine, verba persequens eatenus, ut ea non abhorreant a more nostro—quae si e Graecis omnia conversa non erunt, tamen ut generis eiusdem sint, elaboravimus—, erit regula, ad quam eorum dirigantur orationes qui Attice volent dicere. Sed de nobis satis. Aliquando enim Aeschinem ipsum Latine dicentem audiamus.

[23] If I shall have expressed their orations, as I hope, employing all their virtues—that is, their sentences and the figures of these, and the order of things—pursuing the words so far as they do not abhor our usage—which, if not all shall have been converted from the Greek, nevertheless we have labored that they be of the same genus—there will be a rule, to which may be directed the orations of those who wish to speak Attically. But enough about us. For at last let us hear Aeschines himself speaking in Latin.