Pseudoplatonica: De virtute

So. But let us consider this very thing thus. Come now, if someone wished to become good by that faculty by which cooks are good, who are considered experts above all, whence would he become so?

Am. Inde videlicet, si de bonis coquis disceret.

Am. From that source, evidently, if he were to learn from good cooks.

So. Quid, si vellet bonus fieri medicus, ad quem profectus, bonus fieret medicus?

So. What if he wished to become a good medic—by going to whom would he become a good medic?

Am. Ad eorum aliquem, qui boni sunt medici.

Am. To one of those who are good physicians.

So. Si vero cuperet arte bonus esse illa, qua boni sunt fabri?

So. If indeed he desired to be good in that art by which craftsmen are good?

Am. Ad fabrorum aliquem.

Am. To one of the craftsmen.

So. Sed, si peroptaret ea virtute bonus evadere, qua viri sunt et boni, et sapientes, quo profectum illum oporteret dicere?

So. But, if he should exceedingly desire to become good by that virtue by which men are both good and wise, to whom ought we say he had gone?

Am. Arbitror, ad eorum aliquem, qui boni sunt viri, si modo is, qui discere cupiat, ad eam virtutem perdiscendam sit idoneus: nam quo alio proficisci posset?

Am. I judge, to some one of those who are good men, provided that he who desires to learn be fit for that virtue to be thoroughly learned: for to whom else could he set out?

So. Age, quinam viri boni in urbe nostra fuerunt, ut expendamus, an viri huiusmodi bonos item alios faciant?

So. Come now, which good men have there been in our city, so that we may weigh whether men of this sort likewise make others good?

Am. Thucydides, Themistocles, Aristides, et Pericles.

Am. Thucydides, Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles.

So. Uniuscuiusque horum magistrum possumus referre?

So. Can we name a master for each of these?

Am. Non possumus: non enim id dicitur.

Am. We cannot: for that is not said.

So. Quidni? discipulum possumus vel peregrinum, vel civem, vel liberum, vel servum nominare, qui possit affirmare, se per eorum consuetudinem bonumque et sapientem factum?

So. Why not? We can name a disciple, either a foreigner, or a citizen, or a free man, or a slave, who can affirm that, through their consuetude, he has been made good and wise?

Am. Neque hoc dicitur.

Am. Nor is this said.

So. Numquid invidi erant ita, ut nollent virtutem caeteris impertire?`

So. Surely they were not envious to such a degree that they were unwilling to impart virtue to the others?`

Am. Fortasse.

Am. Perhaps.

So. Ob idne, quod vereretur, ne sibi alii fierent aemuli, quemadmodum coqui, et medici, et fabri faciunt? Nanque ii necque utile sibi existimant esse, si multi sibi in arte adversarii fiant: neque commodum, si ipsi inter multos sui similes habitent. Eodemnne igitur modo et viris bonis incommodum est, cum sui similibus habitare?

So. Was it for this, that he was afraid lest others become rivals to him, just as cooks, physicians, and craftsmen do? For indeed they consider it neither useful to themselves if many become adversaries to them in the art, nor commodious if they themselves dwell among many of their similars. In the same way, then, is it also incommodious for good men to dwell with their similars?

Am. Fieri potest.

Fr. It is possible.

So. Nonne sunt iidem boni, et iusti?

So. Are not the good and the just the same?

Am. Sunt.

Am. They are.

So. Estne aliquis, cui possit utile esse, non cum bonis, sed cum improbis versari?

So. Is there anyone to whom it could be useful to consort not with the good, but with the wicked?

Am. Non possum dicere.

Am. I cannot say.

So. An igitur neque hoc potes dicere, utrum sit bonorum quidem nocere, sed improborum prodesse: an contra?

So. Can you then not even say this, whether it be to harm the good indeed, but to benefit the wicked; or the contrary?

Am. Contra.

Am. On the contrary.

So. Asserisne, bonos iuvare, improbos vero laedere?

So. Do you assert that one helps the good, but harms the wicked?

Am. Assero.

Am. I assert.

So. Estne igitur aliquis, qui laedi malit quam iuvari?

So. Is there then anyone who would rather be harmed than helped?

Am. Nullus certe.

Am. Certainly no one.

So. Nullus ergo mavult inter nocentes quam inter utiles vivere.

So. Therefore no one prefers to live among the nocent rather than among the useful.

Am. Res est, ut dicis.

Am. It is as you say.

So. Nullus igitur e viris bonis moleste fert, alium bonum, et sui similem fieri.

So. Therefore, none of the good men takes it ill that another become good, and similar to himself.

Am. Nullus, ut ex hac ratione apparet.

Am. No one, as appears from this reasoning.

So. Audisti Themistocli Cleophantum filium fuisse?

So. Have you heard that Cleophantus was the son of Themistocles?

Am. Audivi.

Am. I have heard.

So. Themistocles certe, qui bonitatem nemini invidebat, si modo bonus erat, ut vere fuit, et a nobis dicitur, nunquam filium quam optimum fieri per invidiam prohibuisset.

So. Themistocles, certainly, who envied goodness to no one—provided only that he was good, as indeed he truly was, as we say—would never have prevented his son from becoming as excellent as possible out of envy.

Am. Nunquam.

Am. Never.

So. Propterea filium equitandi artem ita doceri voluit, ut in ea peritus, et bonus esset. Nam rectus in equum ascendebat, ex equisque rectus iaculabatur, atque alia multa, et mira faciebat. Multis enim praeterea rebus illum instituendum curavit, et edocendum, quaecunque a bonis praeceptoribus traduntur.

So. Therefore he wished his son to be taught the equestrian art in such a way that in it he might be experienced and good. For he mounted the horse upright, and from horseback, upright, he would hurl the javelin, and he did many other things, and wondrous. For besides, he took care that he be to-be-trained and thoroughly taught in many matters, whatever things are handed down by good preceptors.

Haec nonne de natur maioribus audisti?

Have you not heard these things from your elders?

Am. Et quidem saepe.

Am. And indeed often.

So. Nemo igitur huius filii naturam ut malam accusare potest.

So. Therefore no one can accuse this son's nature as evil.

Am. Nemo quidem iuste, ut ex his, quae tu dicis, manifestum est.

Am. No one indeed justly, as is manifest from these things which you say.

So. Cleophantum vero ipsum Themistoclis filium in his, in quibus pater sapiens erat, audistine unquam ex aliquo vel iuvene, vel sene, virum et bonum, et sapientem fuisse?

So. But Cleophantus himself, the son of Themistocles—have you ever heard from anyone, whether a youth or an old man, that he was both a good and wise man in those things in which his father was wise?

Am. Nunquam.

Am. Never.

So. An igitur censendum est, Themistoclem his quidem, quae diximus, filium suum institui, sed sapientia, qua sapiens erat ipse, nihilo meliorem quovis vicino fieri voluisse, si virtus acquiri potuisset?

So. Are we then to judge that Themistocles indeed had his son instructed in those things which we have mentioned, but that, in the sapience whereby he himself was sapient, he wished him to become no whit better than any neighbor, if virtue could have been acquired?

Am. Haud simile vero.

Am. Not at all like the truth.

So. Huiusmodi quidem magister virtutis fuit, is, quem tu supposuisti. Sed de Aristide videamus. Hic Lysimachum educavit quidem, deditque operam, ut omnium Atheniensium pulcherrime his omnibus, quae sunt in magistrorum facultate, erudiretur: sed virum tamen nemine meliorem fecit.

So. Such a magister of virtue indeed was he, the one whom you supposed. But let us see about Aristides. He indeed educated Lysimachus, and took pains that, of all the Athenians, he should be most excellently instructed in all those things which are in the faculty of teachers; yet he made the man better than no one.

Hunc enim ego et tu non solum vidimus, sed etiam conveniumus.

For this man, both you and I not only saw, but also met.

Am. Verum.

Am. True.

So. Iam vero nosti Paralum, et Xanthippum, quorum tu mihi alterum videris amavisse, sic a Pericle altos, et institutos fuisse, ut Atheniensium nemini in arte equitandi cederent: in musica praeterea, aliisque certandi generibus, atque adeo aliis omnibus, quae traduntur arte, ut illi non minus quam caeteri, essent eruditi, ipsum vehementer elaborasse: viros autem bonos an fieri noluit pater?

So. Now indeed you know Paralus and Xanthippus, of whom you seem to me to have loved the one, that they were reared and instituted by Pericles in such a way that they yielded to no one of the Athenians in the art of equitation: in music, moreover, and in other genres of contest, and indeed in all other things which are handed down by art, that they were no less erudite than the rest, he himself labored vehemently to effect: but did their father not wish them to become good men?

Am. Fortasse facti fuissent, o Socrates, nisi mortem iuvenes obiissent.

Am. Perhaps they would have been, O Socrates, had the youths not met death.

So. Tu iure quidem tuis amoribus succurris: sed Pericles tamen, si virtus parabilis fuisset, ipseque bonos potuisset facere, multo potius illos in sua ipsius virtute sapientes, quam in musica, et certandi studio fecisset. Sed ea comparari non potest. Nam et Thucydides duos aluit filios Milesiam, et Stephanum, pro quibus tu non ea posses dicere, quae pro Periclis filiis modo dixisti.

So. You do indeed rightly come to the aid of your loves; but Pericles, nevertheless, if virtue had been attainable, and he himself had been able to make men good, would much rather have made them wise in his own proper virtue than in music and in the zeal of competing. But that cannot be acquired. For Thucydides too reared two sons, Milesias and Stephanus, on whose behalf you would not be able to say the things which you just said on behalf of Pericles’ sons.

Horum enim et tu alterum nosti usque ad senectutem, alterum vero etiam ultra pervenisse. Atque hos quidem pater cum doceri voluit, ut bene alia scirent, tum vero in primis, ut Atheniensium omnium pulcherrime luctaretur. Illos enim alterum quidem Xanthiae, alterum vero Eudoro, erudiendos tradidit.

For of these, you knew the one even up to old age, but the other to have even come beyond it. And their father, when he wished them to be taught, so that they might know other things well, then indeed especially that they might wrestle most beautifully of all the Athenians. For he handed them over to be trained, the one to Xanthias, the other to Eudorus.

Ipsi porro magistri tunc omnibus in arte luctandi excellere videbantur.

The masters themselves, moreover, then seemed to excel everyone in the art of wrestling.

Am. Notum est.

Am. It is known.

So. Videlicet igitur ille unquam, ubi multum oportebat in eos qui docerent, haec filios doceri voluisset: ubi vero nihil impensae erat faciendum in eum qui viros faceret bonos, hoc illos non docuisset, si quidem tradi potuisset?

So. Evidently, then, would he ever, when it was necessary to spend much upon those who teach, have wished his sons to be taught these things; but when in truth no expense had to be made for the man who would make men good, would he not have had them taught this, if indeed it could have been handed down?

Am. Non mirum dicis.

Am. You say nothing surprising.

So. At enim Thucydides fortasse ignobilis erat, nec multos vel ex civibus, vel ex sociis amicos habebat. Quin erat et ampla familia, et plurimum cum apud cives tum apud Graecos alios poterat. Quare, si hoc ipsum potuisset acquiri, invenisset ille profecto aliquem vel ex civibus vel ex peregrinis, qui filios fecisset bonos, si per reipublicae administrationem ipsi non licuisset.

So. But indeed Thucydides perhaps was obscure, and did not have many friends either from the citizens or from the allies. Nay rather, he had both an ample household, and had very great influence both among his fellow-citizens and among other Greeks. Therefore, if this very thing could have been acquired, he would surely have found someone either from the citizens or from foreigners who would have made his sons good men, if, owing to the administration of the republic, it had not been permitted to himself.

Sed enim virtus, amice, acquiri non potest.

But indeed virtue, my friend, cannot be acquired.

Am. Ita est fortasse.

Friend. Perhaps it is so.

So. At enim, si virtus acquiri non potest, an boni natura nascuntur homines? Atque hoc ipsum hac ratione contemplantes, fortasse inveniemus. Dic enim: Suntne nobis notae bonorum equorum naturae?

So. But indeed, if virtue cannot be acquired, are good men born by nature? And contemplating this very thing by this line of reasoning, perhaps we shall find it. Say then: Are the natures of good horses known to us?

Am. Sunt.

Am. They are.

So. Suntne igitur homines, qui teneant artem, qua bonorum equorum naturas cognoscant, atque adeo intelligant, qui sint equi et corpore ad cursum, et animo fortes, quique contra ignavi?

So. Therefore, are there men who possess the art by which they may recognize the natures of good horses, and even understand which horses are strong both in body for the course and in spirit, and which, on the contrary, are craven?

Am. Sunt.

Am. There are.

So. Quae igitur ars illa? Quod est illi nomen?

So. What, then, is that art? What is its name?

Am. Equestris.

Am. Equestrian.

So. Est et circa canes ars eodem modo, qua naturas canum bonas, et malas discernant?

So. Is there also an art concerning dogs in the same way, by which they may discern the good, and the bad natures of dogs?

Am. Est.

Am. There is.

So. Quae sit illa?

So. What is that?

Am. Canina.

Am. Canine.

So. Sed de auro, atque argento an idem dicendum, quod sint probatores, qui, quod melius, quodque deterius sit, spectatione iudicent?

So. But about gold, and silver, is the same thing to be said, since there are assayers, who, by inspection, judge which is better and which worse?

Am. Dicendum.

Am. It must be said.

So. Quosnam igitur illos vocas?

So. Whom, then, do you call those men?

So. Argentarios.

So. Bankers.

Am. Hi vero magistri, qui corporibus exercendis praesunt, nonne quum corporum naturas contemplantur, cognoscunt, quae sint ad ferendos labores aptae, et quae contra ineptae: animadvertuntque et senum, et iuvenum corpora, quae laude digna sint futura, atque in quibus spes sit, futurum, ut opera omnia, quae corporis sint, optime faciant?

Am. Indeed, those masters who preside over the exercising of bodies—when they contemplate the natures of bodies, do they not recognize which are apt for bearing labors and which, on the contrary, are inept; and do they not also take note, in the bodies both of the old and of the young, which will be worthy of laud, and in which there is hope that they will perform in the best way all works that are of the body?

Am. Sunt haec.

Am. So they are.

So. Utrum igitur rebuspublicis maiori curae sunt equi, et canes boni, aliaque huiusmodi, an viri boni?

So. Therefore, are good horses and dogs, and other things of this kind, or good men, of greater concern to republics?

Am. Viri boni.

Am. Good men.

So. Nonne igitur putas, an hominum naturae ad virtutem essent bonae, homines ipsos, ut eas cognoscerent, omnia excogitasse?

So. Do you not then think that men themselves have devised everything, so that they might come to know whether the natures of men are good for virtue?

Am. Puto, et consentaneum est.

Am. I think so, and it is consistent.

So. Et tamen ars illa plurimi facta fuisset, et qui illam calluissent. Nobis enim iuvenes ipsos, qui futuri fuissent boni, vel pueros adhuc indicassent: quos in arce nos non aliter, atque argentum, et multo etiam diligentius custodiendos curassemus, ut nihil mali neque in pugna, neque in alio quovis periculo paterentur: sed reipublicae deponerentur, servatores et benefici tunc futuri, quum ad aetatem pervenissent. Sed virtus neque natura, neque disciplina videtur hominibus adesse.

So. And yet that art would have been held of the greatest value, and those who had mastered it. For they would have pointed out to us the youths themselves who were going to be good, or even boys still: whom we would have taken care to guard in the citadel no otherwise than silver, and even much more diligently, so that they might suffer nothing evil either in battle or in any other danger whatsoever: but they would be laid up for the commonwealth, saviors and benefactors then, when they had come to age. But virtue seems to be present to men neither by nature nor by discipline.

Am. Quo igitur pacto, Socrates, boni tibi fieri videntur? Si enim natura, neque disciplina fiunt, quonam tandem alio modo fiant boni?

Am. In what way, then, Socrates, do they seem to you to become good? For if they become neither by nature nor by discipline, by what, pray, other way do they become good?

So. Reor equidem hoc ipsum non ita facile posse declarari: siquidem suspicor huiusce rei possessionem quiddam maxime divinum esse, et si bonos fieri similiter, atque divini vates et fatidici fiunt, sed spiritu, quo divinitus afflantur. Sic et viri boni, rebuspublicis eventur, futuraque, ex afflatu quodam divino multo clarius et manifestius, quam fatidici, saepe praedicunt. Hinc et foeminae virum huiusmodi divinum esse dicunt.

So. I reckon indeed that this very thing cannot so easily be declared: since I suspect that the possession of this matter is something most divine, and that men become good in a similar way as divine vates and fatidical seers become such—by the spirit by which they are divinely afflated. Thus also good men, for commonwealths, come to be, and they often foretell future things from a certain divine afflatus much more clearly and manifestly than the fatidical seers. Hence even women say that a man of this sort is divine.

Quin et Lacedaemonii, quando aliquem magnifice laudare volunt, virum illum divinum appellant: quod ipsum et Homerus, et reliqui poetae frequenter usurpant. Quando igitur Deus alicui reipublicae maxime vult prodesse, viros ei bonos ingenerat: quando vero obesse, eosdem, si qui sunt, ex ea tollit. Sic videtur virtus neque disciplina, neque natura comparari: sed his divina forte, qui illa praediti sunt, inesse.

Indeed even the Lacedaemonians, whenever they wish to praise someone magnificently, call that man divine: which very expression both Homer and the remaining poets frequently employ. Therefore, when God most wishes to benefit some commonwealth, he engenders for it good men; but when he wishes to harm it, he removes from it those same men, if there are any. Thus virtue seems to be procured neither by discipline nor by nature, but that perhaps something divine inheres in those who are endowed with it.