Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[1] Diximus alibi ea dici proprie in illa trinitate distincte ad singulas personas pertinentia quae relatiue dicuntur ad inuicem sicut pater et filius et utriusque donum spiritus sanctus; non enim pater trinitas aut filius trinitas aut trinitas donum. Quod uero ad se dicuntur singuli non dici pluraliter tres sed unum ipsam trinitatem sicut deus pater, deus filius, deus spiritus sanctus; et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus spiritus sanctus; et omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus; nec tamen tres dii aut tres boni aut tres omnipotentes, sed unus deus, bonus, omnipotens, ipsa trinitas, et quidquid aliud non ad inuicem relatiue sed ad se singuli dicuntur. Hoc enim secundum essentiam dicuntur quia hoc est ibi esse quod magnum esse, quod bonum, quod sapientem esse, et quidquid aliud ad se unaquaeque ibi persona uel ipsa trinitas dicitur.

[1] We have said elsewhere that those things are said properly in that Trinity, distinctly pertaining to the individual persons, which are said relatively to one another, as Father and Son and the Holy Spirit, the Gift of both; for neither is the Father the Trinity, nor the Son the Trinity, nor the Trinity a gift. But as to what is said with respect to themselves, the individuals are not said in the plural, three, but one, the Trinity itself, as God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit; and good the Father, good the Son, good the Holy Spirit; and omnipotent the Father, omnipotent the Son, omnipotent the Holy Spirit; and yet not three gods or three good ones or three omnipotents, but one God, good, omnipotent, the Trinity itself, and whatever else the individuals are said not relatively to one another but with respect to themselves. For these are said according to Essence, because there to be is the same as to be great, as to be good, as to be wise, and whatever else each Person there, or the Trinity itself, is said to be with respect to itself.

Ideoque dici tres personas uel tres substantias non ut aliqua intellegatur diuersitas essentiae, sed ut uel uno aliquo uocabulo responderi possit cum dicitur quid tres uel quid tria; tantamque esse aequalitatem in ea trinitate ut non solum pater non sit maior quam filius quod attinet ad diuinitatem, sed nec pater et filius simul maius aliquid sint quam spiritus sanctus, aut singula quaeque persona quaelibet trium minus aliquid sit quam ipsa trinitas.

Therefore the phrase “three persons” or “three substances” is said not so that any diversity of essence may be understood, but so that one word or another may be available to answer when it is asked “what three” or “what three things”; and there is such equality in that Trinity that not only is the Father not greater than the Son in what pertains to the divinity, but neither are the Father and the Son together anything greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any single person, any one of the three, anything less than the Trinity itself.

Dicta sunt haec, et si saepius uersando repetantur, familiarius quidem innotescunt; sed et modus aliquis adhibendus est deoque supplicandum deuotissima pietate ut intellectum aperiat et studium contentionis absumat quo possit mente cerni essentia ueritatis sine ulla mole, sine ulla mutabilitate. Nunc itaque in quantum ipse adiuuat creator mire misericors attendamus haec quae modo interiore quam superiora tractauimus, cum sint eadem, seruata illa regula ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eluxerit a firmitate fidei non dimittatur.

These things have been said, and if by more frequent turning-over they are repeated, they indeed become more familiar; but also some measure must be applied, and there must be supplication to God with most devoted piety, that he may open the intellect and take away the zeal of contention, whereby the essence of truth may be discerned by the mind without any bulk, without any mutability. Now therefore, inasmuch as the Creator, wondrously merciful, himself aids, let us attend to these things which we have handled in a mode more interior than the foregoing, though they are the same, the rule being kept that what has not yet shone forth to our intellect be not dismissed from the firmness of faith.

[I 2] Dicimus enim non esse in hac trinitate maius aliquid duas aut tres personas quam unam earum, quod non capit consuetudo carnalis non ob aliud nisi quia uera quae creata sunt sentit ut potest, ueritatem autem ipsam qua creata sunt non potest intueri; nam si posset, nullo modo esset lux ista corporea manifestior quam hoc quod diximus. In substantia quippe ueritatis quoniam sola uere est non est maior aliqua nisi quae uerius est. Quidquid autem intellegibile atque incommutabile est non aliud alio uerius est quia aeque incommutabiliter aeternum est, nec quod ibi magnum dicitur aliunde magnum est quam eo quo uere est.

[1 2] For we say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not anything greater than one of them; which a carnal custom does not comprehend for no other reason except that it senses, as it can, the true things that have been created, but the very Truth by which they were created it cannot behold; for if it could, by no means would this corporeal light be more manifest than that which we have said. In the substance of Truth, indeed, since it alone truly is, nothing is greater there except what is more true. But whatever is intelligible and incommutable is not truer one thing than another, because it is equally, incommutably eternal; nor is what there is called great great from any other source than by that whereby it truly is.

Quapropter ubi magnitudo ipsa ueritas est quidquid plus habet magnitudinis necesse est plus habeat ueritatis; quidquid ergo plus ueritatis non habet non habet etiam plus magnitudinis. Porro quidquid plus habet ueritatis profecto uerius est sicut maius est quod plus habet magnitudinis; hoc ergo ibi est maius quod uerius. Non autem uerius est pater et filius simul quam singulus pater aut singulus filius.

Wherefore, where magnitude is truth itself, whatever has more of magnitude must of necessity have more of truth; therefore whatever does not have more of truth does not have more of magnitude. Furthermore, whatever has more of truth is assuredly more true, just as that which has more of magnitude is greater; therefore there the greater is that which is more true. But the Father and the Son together are not more true than the individual Father or the individual Son.

Non igitur maius aliquid utrumque simul quam singulum eorum. Et quoniam aeque uere est etiam spiritus sanctus, nec pater et filius simul maius aliquid est quam ipse quia nec uerius. Pater quoque et spiritus sanctus simul quoniam ueritate non superant filium, non enim ueritus sunt, nec magnitudine superant.

Therefore, both together are not anything greater than each one singly. And since the Holy Spirit also is equally in verity, neither are the Father and the Son together anything greater than he, because neither are they truer. Likewise, the Father and the Holy Spirit together, since in verity they do not surpass the Son—for they are not truer—do not surpass him in magnitude.

Atque ita filius et spiritus sanctus simul tam magnum aliquid sunt quam pater solus quia tam uere sunt. Sic et ipsa trinitas tam magnum est quam unaquaeque ibi persona; non enim ibi maior est quae uerior non est ubi est ipsa ueritas magnitudo quia in essentia ueritatis hoc est uerum esse quod est esse, et hoc est esse quod est magnum esse; hoc ergo magnum esse quod uerum esse. Quod igitur ibi aeque uerum est etiam aeque magnum sit necesse est.

And thus the son and the holy spirit together are something just as great as the father alone, because they are just as truly; so too the trinity itself is just as great as each person there; for there that is not greater which is not truer, where magnitude is the truth itself, because in the essence of truth this is to be true, namely to be, and this is to be, namely to be great; therefore, to be great is the same as to be true. Whatever therefore there is equally true must also of necessity be equally great.

[II 3] In corporibus autem; fieri potest ut aeque uerum sit hoc aurum atque illud, sed maius hoc sit quam illud quia non eadem ibi est magnitudo quae ueritas, aliudque illi est aurum esse, aliud magnum esse.

[2 3] In bodies, however; it can come about that this gold is equally true as that, but this is greater than that because the magnitude there is not the same as the truth, and for it to be gold is one thing, for it to be great is another.

Sic et in animi natura secundum quod dicitur magnus animus, non secundum hoc dicitur uerus animus; animum enim uerum habet etiam qui non est magnanimus quandoquidem corporis et animi essentia non est ipsius ueritatis essentia sicuti est trinitas, deus unus, solus, magnus, uerus, uerax, ueritas. Quem si cogitare conamur quantum sinit et donat, nullus cogitetur per locorum spatia contactus aut complexus quasi trium corporum, nulla compago iuncturae sicut tricorporem Geryonem fabulae ferunt; sed quidquid animo tale occurrerit ut maius sit in tribus quam in singulis minusque in uno quam in duobus sine ulla dubitatione respuatur; ita enim respuitur omne corporeum.

Sic too in the nature of the mind, insofar as it is called a great mind, not on that account is it called a true mind; for even one who is not magnanimous has a true mind, since the essence of body and of mind is not the essence of Truth itself, as is the Trinity—one God, alone, great, true, veracious, Truth. Whom, if we try to think of Him as far as He permits and grants, let Him be conceived as neither contacted nor encompassed through the spaces of places as if of three bodies, with no structure of juncture like the three-bodied Geryon, as the fables report; but whatever of such a sort occurs to the mind, such that it is greater in three than in individuals and less in one than in two, let it without any doubt be rejected; for thus every corporeal thing is rejected.

In spiritalibus autem omne mutabile quod occurrerit non putetur deus. Non enim paruae notitiae pars est cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus si antequam scire possimus quid sit deus, possumus iam scire quid non sit. Non est enim certe nec terra nec caelum nec quasi terra et caelum, nec tale aliquid quale uidemus in caelo, nec quidquid tale non uidemus et est fortassis in caelo.

In spiritual things, moreover, let every mutable thing that occurs not be thought God. For it is no small part of knowledge, when from this depth we breathe upward to that summit, if before we can know what God is, we can already know what he is not. For he is certainly neither earth nor heaven nor as it were earth and heaven, nor anything such as we see in heaven, nor whatever such we do not see and is perhaps in heaven.

Nec si augeas imaginatione cogitationis lucem solis quantum potes, siue quo sit maior siue quo sit clarior, millies tantum aut innumerabiliter, neque hoc est deus. Nec sicut cogitantur angeli mundi spiritus caelestia corpora inspirantes atque ad arbitrium quo seruiunt deo mutantes atque uersantes neque si omnes, cum sint milia millium, in unum conlati unus fiant, nec tale aliquid deus est. Nec si eosdem spiritus sine corporibus cogites, quod quidem carnali cogitationi difficillimum est.

Nor even if you augment by the imagination of cogitation the light of the sun as much as you can, whether so that it be greater or so that it be more brilliant, a thousandfold or beyond number, neither is this God. Nor as the angels are conceived—the world-spirits inspiring the celestial bodies and, at the arbitrament by which they serve God, changing and turning them—nor even if all of them, since they are thousands of thousands, being gathered into one should become one—God is anything of such a kind. Nor if you think those same spirits without bodies, which indeed is most difficult for carnal cogitation.

Ecce uide si potes, o anima praegrauata corpore quod corrumpitur et onusta terrenis cogitationibus multis et uariis, ecce uide si potes, deus ueritas est. Hoc enim scriptum est: Quoniam deus lux est, non quomodo isti oculi uident, sed quomodo uidet cor cum audit, ueritas est. Noli quaerere quid sit ueritas; statim enim se opponent caligines imgainum corporalium et nubila phantasmatum et perturbabunt serenitatem quae primo ictu diluxit tibi cum dicerem, ueritas.

Look, see if you can, O soul weighed down by a body which is corrupted and laden with many and various earthly cogitations, look, see if you can: God is Truth. For this is written: Since God is Light—not as these eyes see, but as the heart sees when it hears—he is Truth. Do not seek what Truth is; straightway the glooms of corporeal images and the clouds of phantasms will set themselves in opposition and will disturb the serenity which at the first stroke dawned for you when I said, “Truth.”

Ecce in ipso primo ictu qua uelut coruscatione perstringeris cum dicitur ueritas mane si potes; sed non potes. Relaberis in ista solita atque terrena. Quo tandem pondere, quaeso, relaberis nisi sordium contractarum cupiditatis uisco et peregrinationis erroribus?

Behold: in that very first stroke, in which you are, as by a coruscation, dazzled when “truth” is spoken, remain if you can; but you cannot. You will slip back into those accustomed and terrene things. By what weight, I ask, do you slip back, if not by the glue of cupidity’s accumulated filth and by the errors of your peregrination?

[III 4] Ecce iterum uide si potes. Non amas certe nisi bonum quia bona est terra altitudine montium et temperamento collium et planitie camporum, et bonum praedium amoenum ac fertile, et bona domus paribus membris disposita et ampla et lucida, et bona animalia animata corpora, et bonus aer modestus et salubris, et bonus cibus suauis atque aptus ualetudini, et bona ualetudo sine doloribus et lassitudine, et bona facies hominis dimensa pariliter et affecta hilariter et luculente colorata, et bonus animus amici consensionis dulcedine et amoris fide, et bonus uir iustus, et bonae diuitiae quia facile expediunt, et bonum caelum cum sole et luna et stellis suis, et boni angeli sancta obedientia, et bona locutio suauiter docens et congruenter mouens audientem, et bonum carmen canorum numeris et sententiis graue. Quid plura et plura?

[3 4] Behold again, see if you can. You certainly love nothing unless the good, because the earth is good by the altitude of mountains and the temperament of hills and the plainness of plains, and a good estate pleasant and fertile, and a good house disposed with equal members and ample and lucid, and good animals, animated bodies, and good air modest and salubrious, and good food suave and apt to health, and good health without pains and lassitude, and a good human face measured evenly and cheerfully disposed and splendidly colored, and the good spirit of a friend by the sweetness of consensus and the fidelity of love, and a good just man, and good riches because they easily expedite, and the good heaven with its sun and moon and its stars, and good angels in holy obedience, and good speech sweetly teaching and suitably moving the hearer, and a good song tuneful in its numbers and weighty in its sentences. Why more and more?

Bonum hoc et bonum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et uide ipsum bonum si potes; ita deum uidebis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Neque enim in his omnibus bonis uel quae commemoraui uel quae alia cernuntur siue cogitantur diceremus aliud alio melius cum uere iudicamus nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud alii praeponeremus.

This is good and that is good. Take away this and that, and see the good itself if you can; thus you will see God, not a good by another good, but the good of every good. For neither, in all these goods either which I have commemorated or which others are discerned or thought, would we say, when we truly judge, that one thing is better than another, unless there were impressed upon us a notion of the good itself, according to which we both approve something and prefer one thing to another.

Sic amandus est deus, non hoc et illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum; quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cui superuolitet iudicando, sed cui haereat amando, et quid hoc nisi deus? Non bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum caelum, sed bonum bonum.

Thus God is to be loved, not this good and that, but the good itself; for the good of the soul is to be sought, not that over which it may flit by judging, but that to which it may cling by loving—and what is this if not God? Not a good spirit or a good angel or a good heaven, but the good Good.

Sic enim forte facilius aduertitur quid uelim dicere. Cum enim audio uerbi gratia quod dicitur animus bonus, sicut duo uerba sunt ita ex eis uerbis duo quaedam intellego, aliud quo animus est, aliud quo bonus. Et quidem ut animus esset non egit ipse aliquid; non enim iam erat qui ageret ut esset.

Sic then perhaps it is more easily adverted to what I wish to say. For when I hear, for example, the phrase “good mind,” just as there are two words, so from these words I understand two certain things: one by which it is mind, another by which it is good. And indeed, in order that it might be a mind, it itself did not do anything; for there was not yet one who could act so that it might be.

Vt autem sit bonus animus uideo agendum esse uoluntate, non quia idipsum quo animus est non est aliquid boni (nam unde iam dicitur et uerissime dicitur corpore melior?), sed ideo nondum dicitur bonus animus quia restat ei actio uoluntatis qua sit praestantior. Quam si neglexerit, iure culpatur recteque dicitur non bonus animus; distat enim ab eo qui hoc agit, et quia ille laudabilis, profecto iste qui hoc non agit uituperabilis est. Cum uero agit hoc studio et fit bonus animus, nisi se ad aliquid conuertat quod ipse non est non potest hoc assequi.

But in order that the mind be good I see that it must act by will, not because that very thing whereby the mind is is not something good (for from what else is it called, and most truly called, better than the body?), but for this reason it is not yet called a good mind, because there remains to it an action of the will by which it may be more excellent. If it should neglect this, it is justly blamed and rightly called “not a good mind”; for it differs from him who does this, and since that one is laudable, surely this one who does not do it is blameworthy. But when in fact it does this with zeal and becomes a good mind, unless it convert itself to something which it itself is not, it cannot attain this.

Quo se autem conuertit ut fiat bonus animus nisi ad bonum, cum hoc amat et appetit et adipiscitur? Vnde se si rursus auertat fiatque non bonus, hoc ipso quod se auertit a bono, nisi maneat in se illud bonum unde se auertit, non est quo se iterum si uoluerit emendare conuertat.

To what does it turn itself, moreover, that the mind may become good, if not to the good, since it loves this and has appetite for it and attains it? Whence, if it again averts itself and becomes not good, by this very fact that it averts itself from the good, unless that good from which it averts remains in itself, there is nothing to which it may, if it should will, convert itself to emend.

[5] Quapropter nulla essent mutabilia bona nisi esset incommutabile bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris sine illis quae participatione boni bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cuius participatione bona sunt (simul enim et ipsum intellegis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum), si ergo potueris illis detractis per se ipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris deum. Et si amore inhaeseris, continuo beatificaberis.

[5] Wherefore there would be no mutable goods unless there were an incommutable Good. When, therefore, you hear “this good” and “that good,” which can at other times also be called not good, if you can, apart from those things which are good by participation in Good, perceive the Good itself, by participation in which they are good (for at the same time you also understand it itself, when you hear this or that good), if therefore you can, those being subtracted, perceive Good by itself, you will have perceived God. And if you adhere by love, you will straightway be beatified.

Pudeat autem cum alia non amentur nisi quia bona sunt, eis inhaerendo non amare bonum ipsum unde bona sunt. Illud etiam quod animus tantum quia est animus, etiam nondum eo modo bonus quo se conuertit ad incommutabile bonum, sed, ut dixi, tantum animus cum ita nobis placet ut eum omni etiam luci corporeae cum bene intellegimus, praeferamus, non in se ipso nobis placet sed in illa arte qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus ubi uidetur fuisse faciendus.

Let it be a shame, moreover, that while other things are not loved except because they are good, by adhering to them we do not love the Good itself whence they are good. Also this: that the mind, merely because it is mind—even when not yet good in that mode by which it turns itself to the incommutable Good—but, as I said, mind only, when it so pleases us that, when we understand well, we prefer it to every bodily light, does not please us in itself but in that art by which it was made. For from that source it is approved as having been made, where it is seen that it ought to have been made.

Haec est ueritas et simplex bonum; non enim est aliud aliquid quam ipsum bonum ac per hoc etiam summum bonum. Non enim minui uel augeri bonum potest nisi quod ex alio bono bonum est.

This is verity and the simple good; for it is not anything other than the good itself, and therefore also the supreme good. For the good cannot be diminished or augmented, except that which is good from another good.

Ad hoc se igitur animus conuertit ut bonus sit a quo habet ut animus sit. Tunc ergo uoluntas naturae congruit ut perficiatur in bono animus cum illud bonum diligitur conuersione uoluntatis unde est et illud quod non amittitur nec auersione uoluntatis. Auertendo enim se a summo bono amittit animus ut sit bonus animus; non autem amittit ut sit animus cum et hoc iam bonum sit corpore melius.

The mind, therefore, turns itself to this, in order that it may be good: to Him from whom it has that it is a mind. Then, accordingly, the will is congruent with nature, so that the mind may be perfected in the Good, when that Good is loved by a conversion of the will to Him whence it is, and to that which is not lost even by an aversion of the will. For by turning itself away from the Supreme Good, the mind loses being a good mind; but it does not lose being a mind, since even this is already a good, better than the body.

Hoc ergo amittit uoluntas quod uoluntas adipiscitur; iam enim erat animus qui conuerti ad id uellet a quo erat; qui autem uellet esse antequam esset nondum erat. Et hoc est bonum nostrum ubi uidemus utrum esse debuerit aut debeat quidquid esse debuisse aut debere comprehendimus, et ubi uidemus esse non potuisse nisi esse debuisset quidquid etiam quomodo esse debuerit non comprehendimus. Hoc ergo bonum non longe positum est ab unoquoque nostrum: In illo enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus.

Therefore the will loses what the will acquires; for already there was a mind that would will to turn to that from which it was; but he who would will to be before he was, was not yet. And this is our good, where we see whether whatever we grasp to have had to be or to have to be ought to have been or ought to be; and where we see that something could not have been unless it had had to be, even when we do not comprehend how it ought to have been. Therefore this good is not placed far from each one of us: In him we live and move and are.

[IV 6] Sed dilectione standum est ad illud et inhaerendum illi ut praesente perfruamur a quo sumus, quo absente nec esse possemus. Cum enim per fidem adhuc ambulamus non per speciem, nondum utique uidemus deum sicut idem ait facie ad faciem. Quem tamen nisi iam nunc diligamus, numquam uidebimus.

[4 6] But by love we must stand fast to that and adhere to him, that, with him present, we may fully enjoy the one by whom we are, in whose absence we could not even be. For since we still walk by faith, not by sight, we do not yet, assuredly, see God, as the same says, face to face. Yet unless we love him even now, we shall never see him.

Sed quis diligit quod ignorat? Sciri enim aliquid et non diligi potest; diligi autem quod nescitur, quaero utrum possit quia si non potest, nemo diligit deum antequam sciat. Et quid est deum scire nisi eum mente conspicere firmeque percipere?

But who loves what he does not know? For something can be known and not be loved; but that what is not known be loved, I ask whether it can be, because if it cannot, no one loves God before he knows. And what is it to know God, unless to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly?

Non enim corpus est, ut carneis oculis inquiratur.

For it is not a body, so that it might be inquired into with carnal eyes.

Sed et priusquam ualeamus conspicere atque percipere deum sicut conspici et percipi potest, quod mundis cordibus licet: Beati enim mundicordes quia ipsi deum uidebunt, nisi per fidem diligatur, non poterit cor mundari quo ad eum uidendum sit aptum et idoneum. Vbi sunt enim illa tria propter quae in animo aedificanda omnium diuinorum librorum machinamenta consurgunt, fides, spes, caritas nisi in animo credente quod nondum uidet et sperante atque amante quod credit? Amatur ergo et quod ignoratur sed tamen creditur.

But also, before we are able to behold and perceive God as he can be beheld and perceived—a thing permitted to pure hearts: for “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they themselves shall see God”—unless he be loved through faith, the heart will not be able to be cleansed, so that it may be apt and fit for seeing him. Where, then, are those three for the sake of which, in the soul, the machinery of all the divine books to be built rises up—faith, hope, charity—if not in a soul believing what it does not yet see, and hoping for and loving what it believes? Therefore even what is unknown is loved, yet nonetheless it is believed.

Nimirum autem cauendum est ne credens animus id quod non uidet fingat sibi aliquid quod non est et speret diligatque quod falsum est. Quod si fit, non erit caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, qui finis praecepti est sicut idem apostolus dicit.

Surely, however, it must be guarded against lest the believing mind, with respect to what it does not see, feign for itself something that is not, and hope for and love what is false. But if this happens, there will not be charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith not feigned, which is the end of the precept, as the same apostle says.

[7] Necesse est autem cum aliqua corporalia lecta uel audita quae non uidimus credimus, fingat sibi animus aliquid in lineamentis formisque corporum sicut occurrerit cogitanti, quod aut uerum non sit aut etiam si uerum est, quod rarissime potest accipere, non hoc tamen fide ut teneamus quidquam prodest, sed ad aliud aliquid utile quod per hoc insinuatur. Quis enim legentium uel audientium quae scripsit apostolus Paulus uel quae de illo scripta sunt non fingat animo et ipsius apostoli faciem et omnium quorum ibi nomina commemorantur? Et cum in tanta hominum multitudine quibus illae litterae notae sunt alius aliter lineamenta figuramque illorum corporum cogitet, quis propinquius et similius cogitet utique incertum est.

[7] It is necessary, however, that when we believe certain corporeal things read or heard which we have not seen, the mind should fashion for itself something in the lineaments and forms of bodies, as it occurs to the one thinking, which either is not true, or even if it is true—which it can most rarely apprehend—nevertheless it is of no benefit that we hold it by faith, but rather for some other useful thing that is insinuated through this. For who among those reading or hearing the things which the apostle Paul wrote or which have been written about him does not fashion in his mind both the face of the apostle himself and of all whose names are there commemorated? And since, in so great a multitude of people to whom those letters are known, one person thinks the lineaments and figure of those bodies in one way, another in another, who thinks more closely and more similarly is assuredly uncertain.

Neque ibi occupatur fides nostra qua facie corporis fuerint illi homines, sed tantum quia per dei gratiam ita uixerunt et ea gesserunt quae scriptura illa testatur. Hoc utile est credere et non desperandum et appetendum. Nam et ipsius facies dominicae carnis innumerabilium cogitationum diuersitate uariatur et fingitur, quae tamen una erat quaecumque erat.

Nor is our faith there occupied with what bodily face those men had, but only that by the grace of God they so lived and did the things which that Scripture testifies. This it is useful to believe, not to despair of, and to desire. For even the very visage of the Lord’s flesh is varied and imagined by the diversity of innumerable cogitations, which nevertheless was one, whatever it was.

Neque in fide nostra quam de domino Iesu Christo habemus illud salubre est quod sibi animus fingit longe fortasse aliter quam res habet, sed illud quod secundum speciem de homine cogitamus; habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam naturae humanae notitiam secundum quam quidquid tale aspicimus statim hominem esse cognoscimus uel hominis formam.

Nor in our faith which we have concerning the Lord Jesus Christ is that salutary which the mind fashions for itself, perhaps far otherwise than the matter stands, but rather that which we think concerning man according to the species; for we have, as it were, regularly in-fixed a notion of human nature, according to which, whatever of such a sort we behold, we immediately recognize to be a human being or the form of a human.

[V] Secundum hanc notitiam cogitatio nostra informatur cum credimus pro nobis deum hominem factum ad humilitatis exemplum et ad demonstrandam erga nos dilectionem dei. Hoc enim nobis prodest credere et firmum atque inconcussum corde retinere, humilitatem qua natus est deus ex femina et a mortalibus per tantas contumelias perductus ad mortem summum esse medicamentum quo superbiae nostrae sanaretur tumor et altum sacramentum quo peccati uinculum solueretur. Sic et uirtutem miraculorum et ipsius resurrectionis eius, quoniam nouimus quid sit omnipotentia, de omnipotente deo credimus et secundum species et genera rerum uel natura insita uel experientia collecta de factis huiuscemodi cogitamus ut non ficta sit fides nostra.

[5] According to this notion our thought is informed when we believe that for us God was made man for an example of humility and for demonstrating God’s love toward us. For it profits us to believe this and to hold it firm and unshaken in heart: that the humility whereby God was born of a woman and, by mortals, through such great insults was led to death, is the highest medicament by which the swelling of our pride might be healed, and a deep sacrament by which the bond of sin might be loosed. Thus also the power of the miracles and of his very resurrection—since we know what omnipotence is—we believe of the omnipotent God; and according to the forms and kinds of things, either by inborn nature or collected by experience, we think about deeds of this sort, so that our faith may not be fictitious.

Neque enim nouimus faciem uirginis Mariae ex qua ille a uiro intacta neque in ipso partu corrupta mirabiliter natus est; nec quibus membrorum lineamentis fuerit Lazarus nec Bethaniam nec sepulcrum lapidemque illum quem remoueri iussit cum eum resuscitaret uidimus; nec monumentum nouum excisum in petra unde ipse resurrexit; nec montem Oliueti unde ascendit in caelum; neque omnino scimus quicumque ista non uidimus an ita sint ut ea cogitamus; immo uero probabilius existimamus ita non esse. Namque cum alicuius facies uel loci uel hominis uel cuiuslibet corporis eadem occurrerit oculis nostris quae occurrebat animo cum eam priusquam uideremus cogitabamus, non paruo miraculo mouemur ita raro et pene numquam accidit; et tamen ea firmissime credimus quia secundum specialem generalemque notitiam quae certa nobis est cogitamus. Credimus enim dominum Iesum Christum natum de uirgine quae Maria uocabatur.

For neither do we know the face of the virgin Mary, from whom he, untouched by man and not corrupted even in the very birth, was wondrously born; nor what the lineaments of Lazarus’s limbs were, nor Bethany, nor have we seen the sepulcher and that stone which he ordered to be removed when he raised him; nor the new monument hewn in the rock whence he himself rose again; nor the Mount of Olives whence he ascended into heaven; nor at all do we, whoever have not seen these things, know whether they are as we imagine them; nay rather, we deem it more probable that they are not so. For when the face either of a place or of a person or of any body presents itself to our eyes the same as that which presented itself to the mind when we were thinking it before we saw it, we are moved by no small marvel, so rarely and almost never does it happen; and yet we most firmly believe these things, because we think according to the particular and the general notitia which is sure to us. For we believe the Lord Jesus Christ to have been born of a virgin who was called Mary.

Quid sit autem uirgo et quid sit nasci et quid sit nomen proprium non credimus sed prorsus nouimus. Vtrum autem illa facies Mariae fuerit quae occurrerit animo cum ista loquimur aut recordamur nec nouimus omnino nec credimus. Itaque hic salua fide licet dicere: 'Forte talem habebat faciem, forte non talem'; 'Forte' autem 'de uirgine natus est Christus,' nemo salua fide christiana dixerit.

But what a virgin is and what it is to be born and what a proper name is, we do not believe but we absolutely know. Whether, however, that face of Mary was the one that came to mind when we speak these things or remember them, we neither know at all nor believe. And so here, with faith safe, it is permitted to say: 'Perhaps she had such a face, perhaps not such'; but 'Perhaps Christ was born of a virgin,' no one with Christian faith intact will say.

[8] Quamobrem quoniam trinitatis aeternitatem et aequalitatem et unitatem quantum datur intellegere cupimus, prius autem quam intellegamus credere debemus uigilandumque nobis est ne ficta sit fides nostra. Eadem quippe trinitate fruendum est ut beate uiuamus; si autem falsum de illa crediderimus, inanis erit spes et non casta caritas. Quomodo igitur eam trinitatem quam non nouimus credendo diligimus?

[8] Wherefore, since we desire, in so far as it is granted, to understand the eternity and equality and unity of the Trinity, yet before we understand we ought to believe, and we must be vigilant lest our faith be fictitious. For by that same Trinity it is to be enjoyed, that we may live blessedly; but if we shall have believed something false about it, hope will be empty and charity not chaste. How, then, do we love by believing that Trinity which we do not know?

An secundum specialem generalemue notitiam secundum quam diligimus apostolum Paulum? Qui etiam si non ea facie fuit quae nobis occurrit de illo cogitantibus, et hoc penitus ignoramus, nouimus tamen quid sit homo. Vt enim longe non eamus, hoc sumus, et illum hoc fuisse et animam eius corpori copulatam mortaliter uixisse manifestum est.

Or is it according to a special or a general knowledge, according to which we love the Apostle Paul? Who, even if he did not have that face which occurs to us when we think about him—and this we utterly do not know—nevertheless we know what a human is. For, not to go far afield, this we are, and that he was this, and that his soul, coupled to his body, lived mortally, is manifest.

Hoc ergo de illo credimus quod inuenimus in nobis iuxta speciem uel genus quo humana omnis natura pariter continetur.

Therefore we believe this about him which we find in ourselves, according to the species or genus by which all human nature is equally contained.

Quid igitur de illa excellentia trinitatis siue specialiter siue generaliter nouimus quasi multae sint tales trinitates quarum aliquas experti sumus ut per regulam similitudinis impressam uel specialem uel generalem notitiam illam quoque talem esse credamus, atque ita rem quam credimus et nondum nouimus ex parilitate rei quam nouimus diligamus? Quod utique non ita est. An quemadmodum diligimus in domino Iesu Christo quod resurrexit a mortuis, quamuis inde neminem umquam resurrexisse uiderimus, ita trinitatem quam non uidemus et qualem nullam umquam uidimus, possumus credendo diligere?

What, then, do we know of that excellence of the Trinity, either specially or generally—as though there were many such trinities, some of which we have experienced—so that by the rule of impressed similitude, whether by a special or a general knowledge, we should believe that That likewise is such, and thus love, on the parity with a thing we know, the thing which we believe and do not yet know? Which assuredly is not so. Or, just as we love in the Lord Jesus Christ that he rose from the dead, although we have never seen anyone rise therefrom, so can we, by believing, love the Trinity which we do not see, and of such a kind as we have never ever seen?

Sed quid sit uiuere et quid sit mori utique scimus quia et uiuimus et mortuos ac morientes aliquando uidimus atque experti sumus. Quid est autem aliud resurgere nisi reuiuiscere, id est ex morte ad uitam redire? Cum ergo dicimus et credimus esse trinitatem, nouimus quid sit trinitas quia nouimus quid sint tria; sed hoc non diligimus.

But what it is to live and what it is to die we assuredly know, because we both live and have at some time seen and experienced the dead and the dying. Moreover, what is it to resurge except to re-vivify, that is, to return from death to life? When therefore we say and believe that there is a Trinity, we know what a Trinity is because we know what three are; but this we do not love.

Nam id ubi uolumus facile habemus, ut alia omittam uel micando digitis tribus. An uero diligimus non quod omnis trinitas sed quod trinitas deus? Hoc ergo diligimus in trinitate, quod deus est.

For that we easily have whenever we wish, to omit other things, even by showing three with the fingers. Or do we in truth love, not that it is any trinity, but that the Trinity is God? Therefore, this we love in the Trinity: that it is God.

Sed deum nullum alium uidimus aut nouimus quia unus est deus, ille solus quem nondum uidimus et credendo diligimus. Sed ex qua rerum notarum similitudine uel comparatione credamus quo etiam nondum notum deum diligamus, hoc quaeritur.

But we have seen or known no other god, because there is one God, that one alone whom we have not yet seen and, by believing, we love. But from what similitude or comparison of things known we may believe, whereby we may also love the God not yet known—this is inquired.

[VI 9] Redi ergo mecum et consideremus cur diligamus apostolum. Numquidnam propter humanam speciem quam notissimam habemus eo quod credimus eum hominem fuisse? Non utique; alioquin nunc non est quem diligamus quandoquidem homo ille iam non est; anima enim eius a corpore separata est.

[VI 9] Return, then, with me and let us consider why we love the apostle. Is it perhaps on account of the human form, which we know most fully, since we believe him to have been a man? Not at all; otherwise now there is not one whom we love, since that man is now no more; for his soul has been separated from his body.

Sed id quod in illo amamus etiam nunc uiuere credimus; amamus enim animum iustum. Ex qua ergo generali aut speciali regula nisi quia scimus et quid sit animus et quid sit iustus? Et animus quidem quid sit non incongrue nos dicimus ideo nosse quia et nos habemus animum; neque enim umquam oculis uidimus et ex similitudine uisorum plurium notionem generalem specialemue percepimus, sed potius, ut dixi, quia et nos habemus.

But that which we love in him we believe even now to live; for we love a just mind. From what general or special rule, then, if not because we know both what the mind is and what it is to be just? And as to what the mind is, we not incongruously say that we know it for this reason, because we too have a mind; for we have never seen it with our eyes, nor from the similitude of many things seen have we received a general or special notion, but rather, as I said, because we too have it.

Quid enim tam intime scitur seque ipsum esse sentit quam id quo etiam cetera sentiuntur, id est ipse animus? Nam et motus corporum quibus praeter nos alios uiuere sentimus ex nostra similitudine agnoscimus quia et nos ita mouemus corpus uiuendo sicut illa corpora moueri aduertimus. Neque enim cum corpus uiuum mouetur aperitur ulla uia oculis nostris ad uidendum animum, rem quae oculis uideri non potest; sed illi moli aliquid inesse sentimus qualem nobis inest ad mouendam similiter molem nostram, quod est uita et anima.

For what is known so intimately and feels itself to be itself as that by which even the rest are sensed, that is, the soul itself? For even the motions of bodies, by which we perceive that others besides us live, we recognize from our similitude, because we too move our body by living, just as we notice those bodies to be moved. For when a living body is moved, no way is opened to our eyes for seeing the soul, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes; but we sense that something is present in that mass, of the kind that is present in us for moving our mass similarly—that is, life and soul.

Neque quasi quippe sentiunt uiuere non tantum se ipsas sed etiam inuicem atque alterutrum et nos ipsos, nec animas nostras uident sed ex motibus corporis idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali. Animum igitur cuiuslibet ex nostro nouimus, et motibus corporis idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali. Animum igitur cuiuslibet ex nostro nouimus, et ex nostro credimus quem non nouimus.

Nor, assuredly, do they, as it were, sense as living not only themselves but also in turn and each other and us ourselves; nor do they see our souls, but from the motions of the body— and that immediately and most easily— by a certain natural conspiracy. Therefore the mind of anyone we know from our own, and from the motions of the body— and that immediately and most easily— by a certain natural conspiracy. Therefore the mind of anyone we know from our own, and from our own we believe the one whom we do not know.

Non enim tantum sentimus animum, sed etiam scire possumus quid sit animus consideratione nostri; habemus enim animum.

For we not only sense the mind, but we can also know what the mind is by consideration of ourselves; for we have a mind.

Sed quid sit iustus unde nouimus? Dixeramus enim apostolum nos non alia causa diligere nisi quod sit iustus animus. Nouimus ergo et quid sit iustus sicut quid sit animus.

But what “just” is, whence do we know? For we had said that we love the apostle for no other cause except that the mind is just. Therefore we know also what “just” is, just as what “mind” is.

Sed quid sit animus, ut dictum est, nouimus ex nobis; inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit iustus unde nouimus si iusti non sumus? Quod si nemo nouit quid sit iustus nisi qui iustus est, nemo diligit iustum nisi iustus; non enim potest diligere quem iustum esse credit ob hoc ipsum quia iustum esse credit si quid sit iustus ignorat secundum quod superius demonstrauimus neminem diligere quod credit et non uidet nisi ex aliqua regula notitiae generalis siue specialis.

But what the mind is, as has been said, we know from ourselves; for the mind is in us. But whence do we know what “just” is if we are not just? And if no one knows what “just” is except the one who is just, then no one loves the just except the just; for he cannot love the one whom he believes to be just, for this very reason because he believes him to be just, if he is ignorant what “just” is—according to what we have demonstrated above, that no one loves what he believes and does not see, except by some rule of general or of special knowledge.

Ac per hoc si non diligit iustum nisi iustus, quomodo uolet quisque iustus esse qui nondum est? Non enim uult quisquam esse quod non diligit. Vt autem sit iustus qui nondum est uolet utique iustus esse; ut autem uelit diligit iustum.

And therefore, if no one loves the just except the just man, how will anyone who is not yet [just] want to be just? For no one wants to be what he does not love. Yet, in order that he who is not yet [just] may be just, he will certainly want to be just; and in order that he may want it, he loves the just.

Diligit ergo iustum et qui nondum iustus est. Diligere autem iustum non potest si quid sit iustus ignorat. Proinde nouit quid sit iustus etiam qui nondum est.

Therefore even he who is not yet just loves the just. But he cannot love the just if he does not know what it is to be just. Accordingly, even he who is not yet just knows what it is to be just.

Vbi ergo nouit? Num oculis uidit aut ullum corpus iustum uelut album aut nigrum aut quadrum aut rotundum? Quis hoc dixerit?

Where then does he know it? Did he see it with his eyes, or any just body as though white or black or square or round? Who would say this?

At oculis non uidit nisi corpora; iustus autem in homine non est nisi animus, et cum homo iustus dicitur ex animo dicitur non ex corpore. Est enim quaedam pulchritudo animi iustitia qua pulchri sunt homines plerique etiam qui corpore distorti atque deformes sunt. Sicut autem animus non uidetur oculis ita nec pulchritudo eius.

But with the eyes he has seen nothing except bodies; yet in a human being the just is nothing except the soul, and when a human being is called just, he is said so from the soul, not from the body. For there is a certain pulchritude of the soul—justice—by which humans are beautiful, very many even who are in body distorted and deformed. And just as the soul is not seen by the eyes, so neither is its pulchritude.

Vbi ergo nouit quid sit iustus qui nondum est atque ut sit diligit iustum? An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant quibus ille aut ille homo esse iustus apparet? Sed unde nouit illa signa esse animi iusti nesciens quid omnino sit iustus?

Where then does he, who is not yet, know what a just man is, and love the just so that he may become such? Or do certain signs flash forth through the movement of the body, by which this or that man appears to be just? But whence does he know those signs to be of a just mind, when he does not know at all what “just” is?

Nouit ergo.

Therefore, he knows.

Sed ubi nouimus quid sit iustus etiam cum iusti nondum sumus? Si extra quam nos nouimus, in corpore aliquo nouimus. Sed non est ista res corporis.

But where do we know what a just man is, even when we are not yet just? If we know it outside ourselves, we know it in some body. But that thing is not a corporeal thing.

In nobis igitur nouimus quid sit iustus. Non enim alibi hoc inuenio cum quaero ut hoc eloquar nisi apud me ipsum; et si interrogem alium quid sit iustus, apud se ipsum quaerit quid respondeat; et quisquis hinc uerum respondere potuit apud se ipsum quid responderet inuenit. Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui uolo apud me ipsum quaero ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum inuenio phantasiam Carthaginis.

Therefore, in ourselves we know what “just” is. For I do not find this elsewhere, when I seek to utter it, except with myself; and if I should ask another what “just” is, he seeks within himself what he should answer; and whoever has been able to answer truly on this point has found within himself what he would answer. And Carthage indeed, when I wish to utter it, I seek with myself that I may utter it, and with myself I find the phantasy of Carthage.

Sed eam per corpus accepi, id est per corporis sensum quoniam praesens in ea corpore fui et eam uidi atque sensi memoriaque retinui ut apud me inuenirem de illa uerbum cum eam uellem dicere. Ipsa enim phantasia eius in memoria mea uerbum eius, non sonus iste trisyllabus cum Carthago nominatur uel etiam tacite nomen ipsum per spatia temporum cogitatur, sed illa quod in animo meo cerno cum hoc trisyllabum uoce profero uel antequam proferam. Sic et Alexandriam cum eloqui uolo quam numquam uidi praesto est apud me phantasma eius.

Sed I received it through the body, that is, through the sense of the body, since I was present in it with the body and saw it and sensed it, and retained it in memory so that I might find within myself the word about it when I wished to say it. For its very phantasy in my memory is its word—not this trisyllabic sound when Carthago is named, or even when silently the name itself is thought over stretches of time—but that which I discern in my mind when I utter this trisyllable with my voice, or even before I utter it. Thus also, when I wish to speak Alexandria, which I have never seen, its phantasm is present with me.

Cum enim a multis audissem et credidissem magnam esse illam urbem sicut mihi narrari potuit, finxi animo imaginem eius quam potui, et hoc est apud me uerbum eius cum eam uolo dicere antequam uoce quinque syllabas proferam, quod nomen eius fere omnibus notum est. Quam tamen imaginem si ex animo meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam nouerunt, profecto aut omnes dicerent: 'Non est ipsa,' aut si dicerent: 'Ipsa est,' multum mirarer atque ipsam intuens in animo meo, id est imaginem quasi picturam eius, ipsam tamen esse nescirem sed eis crederem qui uisam tenerent. Non autem ita quaero quid sit iustus, nec ita inuenio nec ita intueor cum id eloquor, nec ita probor cum audior, nec ita probo cum audio quasi tale aliquid oculis uiderim aut ullo corporis sensu didicerim aut ab eis qui ita didicissent audierim.

For when I had heard from many and had believed that that city was great, as it could be narrated to me, I fashioned in my mind an image of it as I could, and this is with me its word when I want to say it, before I utter with my voice five syllables, since its name is known to almost all. Which image, however, if I could bring it forth from my mind to the eyes of men who know Alexandria, surely either all would say: 'It is not the very thing,' or if they were to say: 'It is the very thing,' I would marvel greatly; and, gazing upon it in my mind—that is, the image as if a picture of it—nevertheless I would not know it to be the very thing, but I would believe those who held it as seen. But I do not so seek what a just man is, nor so do I find it, nor so do I look upon it when I utter it, nor am I so proved when I am heard, nor do I so prove when I hear, as though I had seen such a thing with my eyes or had learned it by any sense of the body or had heard it from those who had so learned.

Cum enim dico et sciens dico: 'Iustus est animus qui scientia atque ratione in uita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit,' non aliquam rem absentem cogito sicut Carthaginem aut fingo ut possum sicut Alexandriam, siue ita sit siue non ita; sed praesens quiddam cerno et cerno apud me etsi non sum ipse quod cerno, et multi si audiant, approbabunt. Et quisquis me audit atque scienter approbat apud se et ipse hoc idem cernit etiamsi non sit et ipse quod cernit. Iustus uero cum id dicit id quod ipse est cernit et dicit.

For when I say, and knowingly I say: 'A just mind is one which, by knowledge and by reason, in life and morals distributes to each his own,' I am not thinking of some absent thing like Carthage, nor am I fashioning, as I can, like Alexandria, whether it be so or not; but I discern a certain present thing, and I discern it within me, although I myself am not what I discern, and many, if they hear, will approve. And whoever hears me and knowingly approves, he too within himself discerns this same thing, even if he himself is not what he discerns. But the just man, when he says it, discerns and says that which he himself is.

Et ubi etiam ipse cernit nisi apud se ipsum? Sed hoc mirum non est; ubi enim se ipsum cerneret nisi apud se ipsum?

And where does he himself also discern, except within himself? But this is not a marvel; for where would he discern himself, except within himself?

Illud mirabile ut apud se animus uideat quod alibi nusquam uidit, et uerum uideat, et ipsum uerum iustum animum uideat, et sit ipse animus et non sit iustus animus quem apud se ipsum uidet. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto? Aut si non est, quem ibi uidet cum uidet et dicit quid sit animus iustus, nec alibi quam in se uidet, cum ipse non sit animus iustus?

That is marvellous, that the mind should see with itself what it has seen nowhere else, and should see the true, and should see the very true just mind, and be itself a mind and yet not be the just mind which it sees with itself. Is there another just mind in a mind not yet just? Or if there is not, what is it there that it sees when it sees and says what a just mind is, and sees it nowhere else than in itself, while it itself is not a just mind?

An illud quod uidet ueritas est interior praesens animo qui eam ualet intueri? Neque omnes ualent, et qui intueri ualent hoc etiam quod intuentur non omnes sunt, hoc est non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi sicut possunt uidere ac dicere quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse poterunt nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi, non tantum cernentes et dicentes iustum esse animum 'qui scientia atque ratione in uita ac moribus morati sint sua cuique distribuendo ut nemini quidquam debeant nisi ut inuicem diligant?

And is that which it sees the truth, inwardly present to the mind which is able to gaze upon it? Not all are able, and those who are able to gaze are not all themselves that which they gaze upon; that is, they themselves are not also just minds, even as they can see and say what a just mind is. Whence will they be able to be this, unless by adhering to that very Form which they behold, that from it they may be formed and be just minds—not only discerning and saying that the mind is just ‘which with knowledge and reason have been conducted in life and morals, by distributing to each his own, so that they owe nothing to anyone except that they love one another mutually’?

Et unde inhaeretur illi formae nisi amando? Cur ergo alium diligimus quem credimus iustum et non diligimus ipsam formam ubi uidemus quid sit iustus animus ut et nos iusti esse possimus? An uero nisi et istam diligeremus nullo modo eum diligeremus quem ex ista diligimus, sed dum iusti non sumus minus eam diligimus quam ut iusti esse ualeamus?

And how is that Form adhered to, unless by loving? Why, then, do we love another whom we believe to be just, and not love the Form itself, where we see what a just mind is, so that we too may be able to be just? Or truly, unless we also loved that same Form, in no way would we love him whom we love by reason of that Form; but, while we are not just, do we love it less than would suffice for us to be able to be just?

Homo ergo qui creditur iustus ex ea forma et ueritate diligitur quam cernit et intellegit apud se ille qui diligit; ipsa uero forma et ueritas non est quomodo aliunde diligatur. Neque enim inuenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam ut eam cum incognita est credendo diligamus ex eo quod iam tale aliquid nouimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris ipsa est, et non est quidquam tale quoniam sola ipsa talis est qualis ipsa est.

Therefore the man who is believed to be just is loved from that Form and Truth which the one who loves beholds and understands within himself; but the Form itself and the Truth is not such as to be loved from elsewhere. For we do not find anything of such a kind apart from it, so that, when it is unknown, we might love it by believing on the basis that we already know something of that kind. For whatever such thing you look upon, it is itself, and there is nothing such, since it alone is such as it itself is.

Qui ergo amat homines, aut quia iusti sunt aut ut iusti sint amare debet. Sic enim et se ipsum amare debet aut quia iustus est aut ut iustus sit; sic enim diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum sine ullo periculo. Qui enim aliter se diligit iniuste se diligit quoniam se ad hoc diligit ut sit iniustus, ad hoc ergo ut sit malus, ac per hoc iam non se diligit: Qui enim diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam.

Therefore he who loves human beings ought to love them either because they are just or in order that they may be just. So too he ought to love himself either because he is just or in order that he may be just; thus he loves his neighbor as himself without any peril. For he who loves himself otherwise loves himself unjustly, since he loves himself to this end, that he may be unjust—to this end, therefore, that he may be evil—and through this he no longer loves himself: for he who loves iniquity hates his own soul.

[VII 10] Quapropter non est praecipue uidendum in hac quaestione quae de trinitate nobis est et de cognoscendo deo nisi quid sit uera dilectio, immo uero quid sit dilectio. Ea quippe dilectio dicenda quae uera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita cupidi abusiue dicuntur diligere quemadmodum cupere abusiue dicuntur qui diligunt. Haec est autem uera dilectio ut inhaerentes ueritati iuste uiuamus, et ideo contemnamus omnia mortalia prae amore hominum quo eos uolumus iuste uiuere.

[7 10] Wherefore, in this question that is ours about the Trinity and about knowing God, nothing is chiefly to be considered except what true dilection is—indeed, rather, what dilection is. For that is to be called dilection which is true; otherwise it is cupidity. And thus the covetous are said, abusively, to love, just as those who love are said, abusively, to desire. Now this is true dilection: that, clinging to Truth, we live justly, and therefore we contemn all mortal things in comparison with the love of human beings, by which we will them to live justly.

Ita enim et mori pro fratribus utiliter parati esse poterimus, quod nos exemplo suo dominus Iesus Christus docuit. Cum enim duo praecepta sint in quibus tota lex pendet et prophetae, dilectio dei et dilectio proximi, non immerito plerumque scriptura pro utroque unum ponit. Siue tantum dei sicuti est illud: Scimus quoniam diligentibus deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, et iterum: Quisquis autem diligit deum hic cognitus est ab illo, et illud: Quoniam caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis, et alia multa quia et qui diligit deum, consequens est ut faciat quod praecepit deus et in tantum diligit in quantum facit; consequens ergo est ut et proximum diligat quia hoc praecepit deus.

For thus too we shall be able to be usefully ready to die for the brethren, which the Lord Jesus Christ taught us by his example. For since there are two precepts on which hang the whole Law and the Prophets, the love (dilection) of God and the love (dilection) of neighbor, not without reason does Scripture often put one for both. Either that of God alone, as is this: We know that for those who love God all things work together for good; and again: Whoever loves God, this one has been known by Him; and this: Because the charity of God has been diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us; and many other [passages], because he also who loves God, it follows that he does what God has commanded, and he loves in so far as he does; it follows, therefore, that he also loves his neighbor, because God has commanded this.

Siue tantum proximi dilectionem scriptura commemorat sicuti est illud: Inuicem onera uestra portate et sic adimplebitis legem Christi, et illud: Omnis enim lex in uno sermone impletur, in eo quod scriptum est: Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, et in euangelio: Omnia quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines bona, haec et uos facite illis; haec est enim lex et prophetae, et pleraque alia reperimus in litteris sanctis in quibus sola dilectio proximi ad perfectionem praecipi uidetur et taceri de dilectione dei cum in utroque praecepto lex pendeat et prophetae, sed et hoc ideo quia et qui proximum diligit consequens est ut ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est, et qui manet in dilectione in deo manet. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue deum diligat.

Either the Scripture commemorates only the love (dilection) of the neighbor, as in that: “Bear one another’s burdens, and so you will fulfill the law of Christ,” and in that: “For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, in that which is written: You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” and in the gospel: “All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you—good—these do you also to them; for this is the law and the prophets,” and we find very many other places in the holy writings in which the love of the neighbor alone seems to be commanded unto perfection and the love of God to be passed over in silence, though on both commandments the law and the prophets hang; but this too for the reason that he who loves his neighbor, it follows, also loves that very dilection especially. Now God is dilection, and he who abides in dilection abides in God. It follows, therefore, that he chiefly loves God.

[11] Quapropter qui quaerunt deum per istas potestates quae mundo praesunt uel partibus mundi auferuntur ab eo longeque iactantur non interuallis locorum sed diuersitate affectuum; exterius enim conantur ire et interiora sua deserunt quibus interior est deus. Itaque etiamsi aliquam sanctam caelitem potestatem uel audierint uel utcumque cogitauerint, facta magis eius appetunt quae humana miratur infirmitas; non imitantur pietatem qua diuina requies comparatur. Malunt enim superbe hoc posse quod angelus quam deuote hoc esse quod angelus.

[11] Wherefore those who seek God through those powers which preside over the world or over the parts of the world are carried away from Him and are tossed far—not by intervals of places but by the diversity of affections; for they strive to go outward and desert their own interiors, in which God is more interior. And so, even if they have heard of, or somehow conceived, some holy celestial power, they crave rather its deeds which human infirmity marvels at; they do not imitate the piety by which divine rest is acquired. For they prefer, in pride, to be able to do what an angel does, rather than, in devotion, to be what an angel is.

Non enim sanctus quisquam potestate sua gaudet sed eius a quo habet posse quidquid congruenter potest, et nouit potentius esse coniungi omnipotenti pia uoluntate quam propria uoluntate posse quod contremescant qui talia non possunt. Itaque ipse dominus Iesus Christus talia faciens ut mirantes doceret ampliora et temporalibus insolitis intentos atque suspensos ad aeterna atque interiora conuerteret: Venite, inquit, ad me qui laboratis et onerati estis, et ego uos reficiam; tollite iugum meum super uos. Et non dixit: 'Discite a me quia triduanos mortuos suscito,' sed ait: Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde.

For no holy person rejoices in his own power, but in His from whom he has the ability to do whatever he can congruently; and he knows it to be more potent to be conjoined to the Omnipotent by a pious will than by his own will to be able to do what those tremble at who cannot do such things. Therefore the Lord Jesus Christ himself, doing such things in order that he might teach those who marvel greater things, and might convert those intent and suspended upon unusual temporal things to the eternal and the interior, says: Come to me, you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you; take my yoke upon you. And he did not say: 'Learn from me because I raise the three-days-dead,' but he said: Learn from me because I am mild and humble of heart.

Potentior est enim et tutior solidissima humilitas quam uentosissima celsitudo. Et ideo sequitur dicens: Et inuenietis requiem animabus uestris. Dilecto enim non inflatur, et deus dilectio est, et fideles in dilectione adquiescunt illi reuocati ab strepitu qui foris est ad gaudia silentia.

For more potent and safer is the most solid humility than the most wind‑swollen loftiness. And therefore he continues, saying: And you will find rest for your souls. For by love one is not inflated, and God is love, and the faithful in love acquiesce to him, recalled from the noise which is outside to the joys of silence.

Ecce, deus dilectio est. Vtquid imus et currimus in sublimia caelorum et ima terrarum quaerentes eum qui est apud nos si nos esse uelimus apud eum?

Behold, God is love. Why do we go and run into the heights of the heavens and the depths of the earth, seeking him who is with us, if we are willing to be with him?

[VIII 12] Nemo dicat: 'Non noui quod diligam.' Diligit fratrem et diligat eandem dilectionem; magis enim nouit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligit. Ecce iam potest notiorem deum habere quam fratrem, plane notiorem quia praesentiorem, notiorem quia interiorem, notiorem quia certiorem. Amplectere dilectionem deum et dilectione amplectere deum.

[8 12] Let no one say: 'I do not know what I should love.' Let him love his brother, and let him love that same dilection; for he knows more the dilection with which he loves than the brother whom he loves. Behold, now he can have God more well-known than his brother—plainly more well-known because more present, more well-known because more interior, more well-known because more certain. Embrace dilection—God—and with dilection embrace God.

Ipsa est dilectio quae omnes bonos angelos et omnes dei seruos consociat uinculo sanctitatis, nosque et illos coniungit inuicem nobis et subiungit sibi. Quanto igitur saniores sumus a tumore superbiae tanto sumus dilectione pleniores. Et quo nisi deo plenus est qui plenus est dilectione?

It is dilection itself which consociates all good angels and all the servants of God by the bond of sanctity, and it conjoins both us and them mutually to one another and subjoins us to itself. Therefore, the healthier we are from the swelling-tumor of pride, the fuller we are of dilection. And with what, if not with God, is he full who is full of dilection?

'At enim caritatem uideo, et quantum possum eam mente conspicio, et credo scripturae dicenti: Quoniam deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate in deo manet. Sed cum eam uideo non in ea uideo trinitatem.' Immo uero uides trinitatem si caritatem uides. Sed commonebo si potero ut uidere te uideas; adsit tantum ipsa ut moueamur caritate ad aliquod bonum.

'But indeed I see charity, and, as far as I can, I behold it with my mind, and I believe the Scripture saying: Because God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God. But when I see it I do not see the Trinity in it.' Nay rather, you see the Trinity if you see charity. But I will remind you, if I can, that you may see that you see; only let her herself be present, that we may be moved by charity to some good.

Quia cum diligimus caritatem, aliquid diligentem diligimus propter hoc ipsum quia diligit aliquid. Ergo quid diligit caritas ut possit etiam ipsa caritas diligi? Caritas enim non est quae nihil diligit.

Because when we love charity, we love one loving something for this very reason, that it loves something. Therefore, what does charity love, so that charity itself may also be loved? For charity is not that which loves nothing.

Si autem se ipsam diligit, diligit aliquid oportet ut caritate se diligit. Sicut enim uerbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipsum, sed non se uerbum indicat nisi se aliquid indicare indicet; sic et caritas diligit quidem se, sed nisi se aliquid diligentem diligat non caritate se diligit. Quid ergo diligit caritas nisi quod caritate diligimus?

If, however, it loves itself, it must love something, so that by charity it loves itself. For just as a word indicates something, it also indicates itself; but a word does not indicate itself unless it indicate that it indicates something; so too charity does indeed love itself, but unless it loves itself as loving something, it does not love itself by charity. What, then, does charity love except what we love by charity?

Id autem ut a proximo prouehamur frater est. Dilectionem autem fraternam quantum commendet Iohannes apostolus attendamus: Qui diligit, inquit, fratrem suum in lumine manet, et scandalum in eo non est. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit; nam in quo scandalum non est utique perfectus est.

But the brother is that by which we are carried forward from the neighbor. And let us observe how greatly the Apostle John commends brotherly love: “He who loves his brother abides in the light, and scandal is not in him.” It is manifest that he has placed the perfection of justice in love of the brother; for he in whom there is no scandal is assuredly perfect.

Et tamen uidetur dilectionem dei tacuisse. Quod numquam faceret nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione uult intellegi deum. Apertissime enim in eadem epistula paulo post ita dicit: Dilectissimi, diligamus inuicem quia dilectio ex deo est, et omnis qui diligit ex deo natus est et cognouit deum.

And yet he seems to have kept silent about the dilection of God. He would never do this, except because he wants God to be understood in the very fraternal dilection. For most plainly in the same epistle a little later he says thus: “Beloved, let us love one another, because dilection is from God, and everyone who loves has been born from God and has known God.”

Qui non diligit non cognouit deum quia deus dilectio est. Ista contextio satis aperteque declarat eandem ipsam fraternam dilectionem (nam fraterna dilectio est qua diligimus inuicem) non solum ex deo sed etiam deum esse tanta auctoritate praedicari. Cum ergo de dilectione diligimus fratrem, de deo diligimus fratrem; nec fieri potest ut eandem dilectionem non praecipue diligamus qua fratrem diligimus.

He who does not love has not known God, because God is love. This connection declares clearly and plainly that that very same fraternal dilection (for fraternal dilection is that by which we love one another) is proclaimed with such authority to be not only from God but also to be God. Therefore, when by dilection we love the brother, by God we love the brother; nor can it come to pass that we do not especially love that same dilection by which we love the brother.

Vnde colligitur duo illa praecepta non posse sine inuicem. Quoniam quippe deus dilectio est, deum certe diligit qui diligit dilectionem; dilectionem autem necesse est diligat qui diligit fratrem. Et ideo quod paulo post ait: Non potest deum diligere quem non uidet qui fratrem quem uidet non diligit, quia haec illi causa est non uidendi deum quod non diligit fratrem.

Whence it is gathered that those two precepts cannot be without one another. For since God is dilection, surely he loves God who loves dilection; and it is necessary that he love dilection who loves his brother. And therefore what he says a little later: Non potest deum diligere quem non videt qui fratrem quem videt non diligit, because this is for him the cause of not seeing God, that he does not love his brother.

Qui enim non diligit fratrem non est in dilectione, et qui non est in dilectione non est in deo quia deus dilectio est. Porro qui non est in deo non est in lumine quia deus lumen est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Qui ergo non est in lumine quid mirum si non uidet lumen, id est non uidet deum quia in tenebris est?

For he who does not love the brother is not in dilection, and he who is not in dilection is not in God because God is dilection. Moreover, he who is not in God is not in light because God is light, and there is no darkness in him at all. Therefore, he who is not in light—what wonder if he does not see the light, that is, does not see God, because he is in darkness?

Fratrem autem uidet humano uisu quo uideri deus non potest. Sed si eum quem uidet humano uisu spiritali caritate diligeret, uideret deum qui est ipsa caritas uisu interiore quo uideri potest. Itaque qui fratrem quem uidet non diligit, deum, quem propterea non uidet quia deus dilectio est qua caret qui fratrem non diligit, quomodo potest diligere?

But he sees his brother with human vision, by which God cannot be seen. Yet if him whom he sees by human vision he were to love with spiritual charity, he would see God, who is charity itself, with the inner sight by which He can be seen. Therefore he who does not love the brother whom he sees—God, whom for that reason he does not see, because God is dilection, which he lacks who does not love his brother—how can he love?

Nec illa iam quaestio moueat quantum caritatis fratri debeamus impendere, quantum deo. Fratri enim quantum nobis ipsis; nos autem ipsos tanto magis diligimus quanto magis diligimus deum.

Nor let that question now move us, how much charity we ought to expend for the brother, how much for God. For the brother, as much as for ourselves; but we love ourselves so much the more, the more we love God.

Ex una igitur eademque caritate deum proximumque diligimus, sed deum propter deum, nos autem et proximum propter deum. [IX 13] Quid enim est, quaeso, quod exardescimus cum audimus et legimus: Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile, ecce nunc dies salutis. Nullam in quoquam dantes offensionem ut non reprehendatur ministerium nostrum, sed in omnibus commendantes nosmetipsos ut dei ministros, in multa patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis, in plagis, in carcerbius, in iactationibus, in laboribus, in uigiliis, in ieiuniis, in castitate, in scientia, in longanimitate, in bonitate, in spiritu sancto, in caritate non ficta, in uerbo ueritatis, in uirtute dei, per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra, per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam, ut seductores et ueraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur, quasi morientes et ecce uiuimus, ut coerciti et non mortificati, ut tristes semper autem gaudentes, sicut egeni multos autem ditantes, tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes?

From one and the same charity therefore we love God and neighbor, but God on account of God, while ourselves and neighbor on account of God. [9 13] For what is it, I pray, that we blaze up when we hear and read: Behold, now the acceptable time; behold, now the day of salvation. Giving no offense in anything, so that our ministry be not blamed, but in all things commending ourselves as ministers of God: in much patience, in tribulations, in necessities, in straits, in stripes, in imprisonments, in tossings, in labors, in vigils, in fastings, in chastity, in science, in longanimity, in goodness, in the Holy Spirit, in unfeigned charity, in the word of truth, in the virtue of God, through the arms of righteousness on the right and on the left, through glory and ignobility, through ill-fame and good fame, as seducers and truthful, as those who are unknown and are well known, as dying, and behold, we live; as chastened and not put to death; as sad, yet always rejoicing; as needy, yet enriching many; as having nothing and possessing all things?

Quid est quod accendimur in dilectione Pauli apostoli cum ista legimus nisi quod credimus eum ita uixisse? Viuendum tamen sic esse dei ministris non de aliquibus auditum credimus sed intus apud nos, uel potius supra nos in ipsa ueritate conspicimus. Illum ergo quem sic uixisse credimus ex hoc quod uidemus diligimus, et nisi hanc formam quam semper stabilem atque incommutabilem cernius praecipue diligeremus, non ideo diligeremus illum quia eius uitam cum in carne uiueret huic formae coaptatam et congruentem fuisse fide retinemus.

What is it by which we are kindled in the dilection of Paul the apostle when we read these things, except that we believe that he so lived? Yet that it must be so lived by the ministers of God we do not believe as something heard from some people, but we behold it within ourselves—or rather above ourselves—in Truth itself. Therefore him whom we believe to have so lived we love on account of this which we see; and unless we especially loved this form, which we discern to be ever stable and incommutable, we would not for that reason love him because we retain by faith that his life, when he lived in the flesh, was coapted and congruent to this form.

Sed nescio quomodo amplius et in ipsius formae caritatem excitamur per fidem qua credimus uixisse sic aliquem, et spem qua nos quoque ita posse uiuere qui homines sumus ex eo quod aliqui homines ita uixerunt minime desperamus ut hoc et desideremus ardentius et fidentius precemur. Ita et ipsorum uitam facit a nobis diligi formae illius dilectio secundum quam uixisse creduntur, et illorum uita credita in eandem formam flagrantiorem excitat caritatem ut quanto flagrantius diligimus deum, tanto certius sereniusque uideamus quia in deo conspicimus incommutabilem formam iustitiae secundum quam hominem uiuere oportere iudicamus. Valet ergo fides ad cognitionem et ad dilectionem dei, non tamquam omnino incogniti aut omnino non dilecti, sed quo cognoscatur manifestius et quo firmius diligatur.

But I know not how, we are more stirred into the charity of that very form by the faith whereby we believe someone to have so lived, and by the hope whereby we too, who are human beings, can so live—we by no means despair from the fact that some human beings have so lived—so that we both desire this more ardently and pray for it more confidently. Thus both the love of that form, according to which they are believed to have lived, causes their life to be loved by us, and their life, believed, arouses a more flaming charity toward the same form, so that the more ardently we love God, the more surely and serenely we see that in God we behold the incommutable form of justice, according to which we judge that a human ought to live. Therefore faith avails for the cognition and for the love of God, not as of one altogether unknown or altogether unloved, but in order that he may be known more manifestly and loved more firmly.

[X 14] Quid est autem dilectio uel caritas quam tantopere scriptura diuina laudat et praedicat nisi amor boni? Amor autem alicuius amantis est, et amore aliquid amatur. Ecce tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor.

[10 14] But what is dilection or charity, which divine scripture so greatly lauds and proclaims, if not love of the good? Now love is of some lover, and by love something is loved. Behold, there are three: the lover, that which is loved, and love.

Quid est ergo amor nisi quaedam uita duo aliqua copulans uel copulari appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur? Et hoc etiam in extremis carnalibusque amoribus ita est. Sed ut aliquid purius et liquidius hauriamus calcata carne ascendamus ad animum.

What, then, is love except a certain life coupling two things or desiring to be coupled, namely the lover and that which is loved? And this is so even in extreme and carnal loves. But that we may draw something purer and more limpid, with the flesh trampled underfoot let us ascend to the mind.

Quid amat animus in amico nisi animum? Et illic igitur tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor.

What does the mind love in a friend except the mind? And there too, therefore, there are three: the lover, and that which is loved, and the love.

Restat etiam hinc ascendere et superius ista quaerere quantum homini datur. Sed hic paululum requiescat intentio non ut se iam existimet inuenisse quod quaerit, sed sicut solet inueniri locus ubi quaerendum est aliquid. Nondum illud inuentum est, sed iam inuentum est ubi quaeratur.

It remains also from here to ascend and to seek these things higher up, as much as it is given to man. But here let the intention rest a little—not that it now should think itself to have found what it seeks, but just as there is wont to be found a place where something is to be sought. That has not yet been found, but already it has been found where it is to be sought.

Ita hoc dixisse suffecerit ut tamquam ab articulo alicuius exordii cetera contexamus.

Thus let it suffice to have said this, so that, as from the joint of a certain exordium, we may weave together the rest.