Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Reliquum est ut examinem an res materiales existant. Et quidem jam ad minimum scio illas, quatenus sunt purae Matheseos objectum, posse existere, quandoquidem ipsas clare & distincte percipio. Non enim dubium est quin Deus sit capax ea omnia efficiendi quae ego sic percipiendi sum capax; nihilque unquam ab illo fieri non posse judicavi, nisi propter hoc quòd illud a me distincte percipi repugnaret.

1. It remains that I examine whether material things exist. And indeed already at the least I know that they, insofar as they are the pure object of Mathematics, can exist, since I perceive them clearly and distinctly. For it is not doubtful that God is capable of effecting all those things which I am thus capable of perceiving; and I have never judged that anything could not be done by Him, except on account of this, that it would be repugnant to be distinctly perceived by me.

Praeterea ex imaginandi facultate, quâ me uti experior, dum circa res istas materiales versor, sequi videtur illas existere; nam attentius consideranti quidnam sit imaginatio,

Moreover, from the faculty of imagining, which I experience myself to employ, while I am occupied about these material things, it seems to follow that they exist; for, to one considering more attentively what imagination is,

[72] nihil aliud esse apparet quàm quaedam applicatio facultatis cognoscitivae ad corpus ipsi intime praesens, ac proinde existens.

[72] it appears to be nothing else than a certain application of the cognitive faculty to a body intimately present to it, and therefore existing.

2. Quo ut planum fiat, primò examino differentiam quae est inter imaginationem & puram intellectionem. Nempe, exempli causâ, cùm triangulum imaginor, non tantùm intelligo illud esse figuram tribus lineis comprehensam, sed simul etiam istas tres lineas tanquam praesentes acie mentis intueor, atque hoc est quod imaginari appello. Si verò de chiliogono velim cogitare, equidem aeque bene intelligo illud esse figuram constantem mille lateribus, ac intelligo triangulum esse figuram constantem tribus; sed non eodem modo illa mille latera imaginor, sive tanquam praesentia intueor.

2. That this may be made plain, first I examine the difference which is between imagination & pure intellection. Namely, for example,
when I imagine a triangle, I not only understand it to be a figure encompassed by three lines, but at the same time I also behold those three lines as though present with the gaze of the mind, and this is what I call imagining. But if
I should wish to think about a chiliagon, indeed I equally well understand it to be a figure consisting of a thousand sides, just as I understand a triangle to be a figure consisting of
three; but I do not in the same way imagine those thousand sides, or regard them as though present.

Et quamvis tunc, propter consuetudinem aliquid semper imaginandi, quoties de re corporeâ cogito, figuram forte aliquam confuse mihi repraesentem, patet tamen illam non esse chiliogonum, quia nullâ in re est diversa ab eâ quam mihi etiam repraesentarem, si de myriogono aliâve quâvis figurâ plurimorum laterum cogitarem; nec quicquam juvat ad eas proprietates, quibus chiliogonum ab aliis polygonis differt, agnoscendas. Si verò de pentagono quaestio sit, possum quidem ejus figuram intelligere, sicut figuram chiliogoni, absque ope imaginationis; sed possum etiam eandem imaginari, applicando scilicet aciem mentis ad ejus quinque latera, simulque ad aream iis contentam; & manifeste hîc animadverto mihi pecu

And although then, because of the habit of always imagining something, whenever I think about a corporeal thing I perhaps confusedly represent to myself some figure, nevertheless it is clear that it is not a chiliagon, because it is in no respect different from that which I would also represent to myself if I were thinking about a myriagon or any other figure of very many sides; nor does it help at all toward recognizing those properties by which a chiliagon differs from other polygons. But if the question be about a pentagon, I can indeed understand its figure, just as the figure of a chiliagon, without the aid of imagination; but I can also imagine the same, namely by applying the mind’s gaze to its five sides, and at the same time to the area contained by them; & I plainly here observe to myself pecu

[73]liari quâdam animi contentione opus esse ad imaginandum, quâ non utor ad intelligendum: quae nova animi contentio differentiam inter imaginationem & intellectionem puram clare ostendit.

[73] a certain peculiar exertion of mind is needed for imagining, which I do not employ for understanding: and this new exertion of mind clearly shows the difference between imagination & pure intellection.

3. Ad haec considero istam vim imaginandi quae in me est, prout differt a vi intelligendi, ad meî ipsius, hoc est ad mentis meae essentiam non requiri; nam quamvis illa a me abesset, proculdubio manerem nihilominus ille idem qui nunc sum; unde sequi videtur illam ab aliquâ re a me diversâ pendere. Atque facilè intelligo, si corpus aliquod existat cui mens sit ita conjuncta ut ad illud veluti inspiciendum pro arbitrio se applicet, fieri posse ut per hoc ipsum res corporeas imaginer; adeo ut hic modus cogitandi in eo tantùm a purâ intellectione differat, quòd mens, dum intelligit, se ad seipsam quodammodo convertat, respiciatque aliquam ex ideis quae illi ipsi insunt; dum autem imaginatur, se convertat ad corpus, & aliquid in eo ideae vel a se intellectae vel sensu perceptae conforme intueatur. Facilè, inquam, intelligo imaginationem ita perfici posse, siquidem corpus existat; & quia nullus alius modus aeque conveniens occurrit ad illam explicandam, probabiliter inde conjicio corpus existere; sed probabiliter tantùm, & quamvis accurate omnia investigem, nondum tamen video ex eâ naturae corporeae ideâ distinctâ, quam in imaginatione meâ invenio, ullum sumi posse argumentum, quod necessariò concludat aliquòd corpus existere.

3. To this I consider that power of imagining which is in me, inasmuch as it differs from the power of understanding, not to be required for myself, that is, for the essence of my mind; for even if it were absent from me, I should nevertheless without doubt remain the very same who I now am; whence it seems to follow that it depends on some thing diverse from me. And I easily understand that, if some body exists to which the mind is so conjoined that it applies itself to it, as it were for inspection, at will, it can come about that through this very thing I imagine corporeal things; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only in this, that the mind, while it understands, in a certain manner turns itself toward itself and regards some one of the ideas which are in it itself; but while it imagines, it turns itself toward the body, & beholds in it something conformable to the idea either understood by itself or perceived by sense. Easily, I say, I understand imagination to be able to be thus accomplished, if indeed a body exists; & since no other mode equally convenient occurs for explaining it, I thence probably conjecture that a body exists; but only probably, & although I examine everything accurately, nevertheless I do not yet see that from that distinct idea of corporeal nature which I find in my imagination any argument can be taken which would necessarily conclude that some body exists.

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4. Soleo verò alia multa imaginari, praeter illam naturam corpoream, quae est purae Matheseos objectum, ut colores, sonos, sapores, dolorem, & similia, sed nulla tam distincte; & quia haec percipio meliùs sensu, a quo videntur ope memoriae ad imaginationem pervenisse, ut commodiùs de ipsis agam, eâdem operâ etiam de sensu est agendum, videndumque an ex iis quae isto cogitandi modo, quem sensum appello, percipiuntur, certum aliquod argumentum pro rerum corporearum existentiâ habere possim.

4. I am indeed accustomed to imagine many other things, besides that corporeal nature which is the object of pure Mathematics, such as colors, sounds, sapors, pain, & the like, yet none so distinctly; & because I perceive these better by sense, from which they seem, by the help of memory, to have come to imagination, in order that I may treat of them more commodiously, it must at the same time also be treated of sense, and it must be seen whether from those things which, in that mode of thinking which I call sense, are perceived, I can have some certain argument for the existence of corporeal things.

5. Et primo quidem apud me hîc repetam quaenam illa sint quae antehac, ut sensu percepta, vera esse putavi, & quas ob causas id putavi; deinde etiam causas expendam propter quas eadem postea in dubium revocavi; ac denique considerabo quid mihi nunc de iisdem sit credendum.

5. And first indeed I will here review with myself what those things are which previously, as perceived by sense, I judged to be true, and for what causes I thought so; then I will also weigh the causes on account of which I afterward recalled those same things into doubt; and finally I will consider what I ought now to believe about those same things.

6. Primo itaque sensi me habere caput, manus, pedes, & membra caetera ex quibus constat illud corpus, quod tanquam meî partem, vel forte etiam tanquam me totum spectabam; sensique hoc corpus inter alia multa corpora versari, a quibus variis commodis vel incommodis affici potest, & commoda ista sensu quodam voluptatis, & incommoda sensu doloris metiebar. Atque, praeter dolorem & voluptatem, sentiebam etiam in me famem, sitim, aliosque ejusmodi appetitus; itemque corporeas quasdam propensiones ad hilaritatem, ad tristitiam, ad iram, similesque alios affectus; foris verò, praeter corporum extensionem, & figuras, &

6. First, then, I perceived that I had a head, hands, feet, & the other members
out of which that body is composed, which I regarded as a part of myself, or
perhaps even as my whole self; and I perceived this body to be among many other
bodies, by which it can be affected with various conveniences or inconveniences,
& I measured those conveniences by a certain sense of pleasure, & the inconveniences by a sense of pain.
And, besides pain & pleasure, I felt also within me
hunger, thirst, and other appetites of that sort; likewise certain bodily propensities
to hilarity, to sadness, to anger, and other similar affections; outwardly,
moreover, besides the extension of bodies, & their figures, &

[75] motus, sentiebam etiam in illis duritiem, & calorem, aliasque tactiles qualitates; ac praeterea lumen, & colores, & odores, & sapores, & sonos, ex quorum varietate caelum, terram, maria, & reliqua corpora ab invicem distinguebam. Nec sane absque ratione, ob ideas istarum omnium qualitatum quae cogitationi meae se offerebant, & quas solas proprie & immediate sentiebam, putabam me sentire res quasdam a meâ cogitatione plane diversas, nempe corpora a quibus ideae istae procederent; experiebar enim illas absque ullo meo consensu mihi advenire, adeo ut neque possem objectum ullum sentire, quamvis vellem, nisi illud sensûs organo esset praesens, nec possem non sentire cùm erat praesens. Cùmque ideae sensu perceptae essent multo magis vividae & expressae, & suo etiam modo magis distinctae, quàm ullae ex iis quas ipse prudens & sciens meditando effingebam, vel memoriae meae impressas advertebam, fieri non posse videbatur ut a meipso procederent; ideoque supererat ut ab aliis quibusdam rebus advenirent.

[75] motion,
I also sensed in them hardness, and heat, and other tactile qualities;
and besides, light, and colors, and odors, and tastes, and sounds,
from the variety of which I distinguished heaven, earth, seas, and the remaining bodies from one another.
Nor indeed without reason, on account of the ideas of all these qualities
which presented themselves to my thought, and which alone I properly and immediately
sensed, did I think that I sensed certain things entirely different from my thought,
namely bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I experienced
that they came to me without any consent of mine, to such a degree that I could not sense any object,
although I wished, unless it were present to the organ of sense,
nor could I not sense it when it was present. And since the ideas
perceived by sense were much more vivid and expressed, and in their own way also
more distinct than any of those which I myself, deliberately and knowingly,
was fashioning by meditating, or was noticing as impressed upon my memory,
it seemed impossible that they proceeded from myself; and so it remained
that they came from certain other things.

Quarum rerum cùm nullam aliunde notitiam haberem quàm ex istis ipsis ideis, non poterat aliud mihi venire in mentem quàm illas iis similes esse. Atque etiam quia recordabar me prius usum fuisse sensibus quàm ratione, videbamque ideas quas ipse effingebam non tam expressas esse, quàm illae erant quas sensu percipiebam, & plerumque ex earum partibus componi, facile mihi persuadebam nullam plane me habere in intellectu, quam non prius habuissem in sensu. Non etiam sine ratione corpus illud, quod speciali quodam jure meum ap

Since I had no knowledge of these things from anywhere else than from those very ideas, nothing else could come into my mind but that they were similar to them. And also, because I remembered that I had made use of the senses earlier than of reason, and saw that the ideas which I myself was fashioning were not so express as those which I perceived by sense, and for the most part were composed from their parts, I easily persuaded myself that I had plainly nothing in the intellect which I had not previously had in sense. Nor, moreover, without reason, that body which by a certain special right I called my own

[76]pellabam, magis ad me pertinere quàm alia ulla arbitrabar: neque enim ab illo poteram unquam sejungi, ut a reliquis; omnes appetitus & affectus in illo & pro illo sentiebam; ac denique dolorem & titillationem voluptatis in ejus partibus, non autem in aliis extra illud positis, advertebam. Cur verò ex isto nescio quo doloris sensu quaedam animi tristitia, & ex sensu titillationis laetitia quaedam consequatur, curve illa nescio quae vellicatio ventriculi, quam famem voco, me de cibo sumendo admoneat, gutturis verò ariditas de potu, & ita de caeteris, non aliam sane habebam rationem, nisi quia ita doctus sum a naturâ; neque enim ulla plane est affinitas (saltem quam ego intelligam) inter istam vellicationem & cibi sumendi voluntatem, sive inter sensum rei dolorem inferentis, & cogitationem tristitiae ab isto sensu exortae. Sed & reliqua omnia, quae de sensuum objectis judicabam, videbar a naturâ didicisse: priùs enim illa ita se habere mihi persuaseram, quàm rationes ullas quibus hoc ipsum probaretur expendissem.

[76] that body, which by a certain special right I called my own, I judged to pertain to me more than any other: for I could never be separated from it, as from the rest; I felt all appetites and affections in it and for it; and finally I noticed pain and the titillation of pleasure in its parts, but not in other things placed outside it. But why from that I-know-not-what sense of pain a certain sadness of mind follows, and from the sense of titillation a certain joy arises, why that I-know-not-what twitching of the stomach, which I call hunger, admonishes me to take food, and the dryness of the throat to drink, and so with the rest, I truly had no other reason, except that I was taught thus by nature; for there is plainly no affinity (at least that I understand) between that twitching and the will to take food, or between the sense of a thing bringing pain and the thought of sadness arising from that sense. And likewise all the other things that I judged about the objects of the senses, I seemed to have learned from nature: for I had persuaded myself that they were so before I had weighed any reasons by which this very thing might be proved.

7. Postea verò multa paulatim experimenta fidem omnem quam sensibus habueram labefactarunt; nam & interdum turres, quae rotundae visae fuerant è longinquo, quadratae apparebant è propinquo, & statuae permagnae, in eorum fastigiis stantes, non magnae è terrâ spectanti videbantur; & talibus aliis innumeris in rebus sensuum externorum judicia falli deprehendebam. Nec externorum duntaxat, sed etiam interno

7. Afterwards indeed many experiments, little by little, undermined all the trust which I had had in the senses; for sometimes towers which had seemed round from afar appeared square from near at hand, and very large statues, standing on their pinnacles, did not seem large to one viewing from the ground; and in countless other such matters I detected the judgments of the external senses to be deceived. Nor of the external only, but also of the internal

[77]rum; nam quid dolore intimius esse potest? Atqui audiveram aliquando ab iis, quibus crus aut brachium fuerat abscissum, se sibi videri adhuc interdum dolorem sentire in eâ parte corporis quâ carebant; ideoque etiam in me non plane certum esse videbatur membrum aliquod mihi dolere, quamvis sentirem in eo dolorem. Quibus etiam duas maxime generales dubitandi causas nuper adjeci: prima erat, quòd nulla unquam, dum vigilo, me sentire crediderim, quae non etiam inter dormiendum possim aliquando putare me sentire; cùm que illa, quae sentire mihi videor in somnis, non credam a rebus extra me positis mihi advenire, non advertebam quare id potius crederem de iis quae sentire mihi videor vigilando.

[77]of the internal ones; for what can be more intimate than pain? And yet I had at some time heard
from those whose leg or arm had been cut off, that they seemed to themselves still sometimes to feel pain
in that part of the body which they lacked; and therefore even in my own case it did not seem altogether certain that some limb
was hurting me, although I felt pain in it. To these I lately added two most general causes for doubting: the first was, that I have never, while
awake, believed that I was sensing anything which I could not also, while sleeping, at some time think that I sensed; and since those things which I seem to myself to sense in dreams,
I do not believe to come to me from things placed outside me, I did not notice why
I should rather believe this of those things which I seem to myself to sense while awake.

Altera erat, quòd cùm authorem meae originis adhuc ignorarem, vel saltem ignorare me fingerem, nihil videbam obstare quominus essem naturâ ita constitutus ut fallerer, etiam in iis quae mihi verissima apparebant. Et quantum ad rationes quibus antea rerum sensibilium veritatem mihi persuaseram, non difficulter ad illas respondebam. Cùm enim viderer ad multa impelli a naturâ, quae ratio dissuadebat, non multùm fidendum esse putabam iis quae a naturâ docentur.

The other was, that since I still ignored the author of my origin, or at least was pretending to be ignorant, I saw nothing to prevent my being constituted by nature so as to be deceived, even in those things which appeared to me most true. And as for the reasons by which I had previously persuaded myself of the truth of sensible things, I replied to them without difficulty. For since I seemed to be impelled by nature to many things which reason dissuaded, I judged that not much trust was to be placed in those things which are taught by nature.

Et quamvis sensuum perceptiones a voluntate meâ non penderent, non ideo concludendum esse putabam illas a rebus a me diversis procedere, quia forte aliqua esse potest in meipso facultas, etsi mihi nondum cognita, illarum effectrix.

And although the perceptions of the senses did not depend on my will, I did not on that account think it should be concluded that they proceed from things diverse from me, because perhaps there may be in myself some faculty, although not yet known to me, their efficient cause.

8. Nunc autem, postquam incipio meipsum meaeque authorem originis melius nosse, non quidem omnia, quae habere videor a sensibus, puto esse temere admit

8. Now, however, after I begin to know myself and the author of my origin better, I do not indeed think that all the things which I seem to have from the senses are to be rashly admitted

[78]tenda; sed neque etiam omnia in dubium revocanda.

[78]to be admitted rashly; but neither are all things to be called into doubt.

9. Et primò, quoniam scio omnia quae clare & distincte intelligo, talia a Deo fieri posse qualia illa intelligo, satis est quòd possim unam rem absque alterâ clare & distincte intelligere, ut certus sim unam ab alterâ esse diversam, quia potest saltem a Deo seorsim poni; & non refert a quâ potentiâ id fiat, ut diversa existimetur; ac proinde, ex hoc ipso quòd sciam me existere, quòdque interim nihil plane aliud ad naturam sive essentiam meam pertinere animadvertam, praeter hoc solum quòd sim res cogitans, recte concludo meam essentiam in hoc uno consistere, quòd sim res cogitans. Et quamvis fortasse (vel potiùs, ut postmodum dicam, pro certo) habeam corpus, quod mihi valde arcte conjunctum est, quia tamen ex unâ parte claram & distinctam habeo ideam meî ipsius, quatenus sum tantùm res cogitans, non extensa, & ex aliâ parte distinctam ideam corporis, quatenus est tantùm res extensa, non cogitans, certum est me a corpore meo revera esse distinctum, & absque illo posse existere.

9. And first, since I know that all things which I clearly & distinctly understand can be made by God such as I understand them, it is enough that I can clearly & distinctly understand one thing without the other, to be certain that the one is different from the other, because it can at least be set apart by God; & it does not matter by what power this is done, for them to be considered diverse; and therefore, from this very fact that I know I exist, and that meanwhile I notice that plainly nothing else pertains to my nature or essence, except this alone, that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this one thing, that I am a thinking thing. And although perhaps (or rather, as I shall say afterward, for certain) I have a body, which is very closely conjoined to me, yet because on the one hand I have a clear & distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking thing, not extended, & on the other hand a distinct idea of body, in so far as it is only an extended thing, not thinking, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, & can exist without it.

10. Praeterea invenio in me facultates specialibus quibusdam modis cogitandi, puta facultates imaginandi & sentiendi, sine quibus totum me possum clare & distincte intelligere, sed non vice versâ illas sine me, hoc est sine substantiâ intelligente cui insint: intellectionem enim nonnullam in suo formali conceptu includunt, unde percipio illas a me, ut modos a re, distingui. Agnosco etiam quasdam alias facultates, ut locum mutandi, varias figuras induendi, & similes, quae quidem non magis quàm praecedentes, absque

10. Moreover I find in me faculties for thinking in certain special modes, to wit faculties of imagining & sensing, without which I can clearly & distinctly understand my whole self, but not conversely them without me, that is, without an intelligent substance in which they inhere: for they include some intellection in their formal concept, whence I perceive that they are distinguished from me as modes from a thing. I also recognize certain other faculties, such as of changing place, of assuming various figures, & the like, which indeed no more than the preceding, without

[79] aliquâ substantiâ cui insint, possunt intelligi, nec proinde etiam absque illâ existere: sed manifestum est has, siquidem existant, inesse debere substantiae corporeae sive extensae, non autem intelligenti, quia nempe aliqua extensio, non autem ulla plane intellectio, in earum claro & distincto conceptu continetur. Jam verò est quidem in me passiva quaedam facultas sentiendi, sive ideas rerum sensibilium recipiendi & cognoscendi, sed ejus nullum usum habere possem, nisi quaedam activa etiam existeret, sive in me, sive in alio, facultas istas ideas producendi vel efficiendi. Atque haec sane in me ipso esse non potest, quia nullam plane intellectionem praesupponit, & me non cooperante, sed saepe etiam invito, ideae istae producuntur: ergo superest ut sit in aliquâ substantiâ a me diversâ, in quâ quoniam omnis realitas vel formaliter vel eminenter inesse debet, quae est objective in ideis ab istâ facultate productis (ut jam supra animadverti), vel haec substantia est corpus, sive natura corporea, in quâ nempe omnia formaliter continentur quae in ideis objective; vel certe Deus est, vel aliqua creatura corpore nobilior, in quâ continentur eminenter.

[79] by some substance in which
they inhere, they can be understood, nor therefore exist without it:
but it is manifest that these, if indeed they exist, must inhere in a corporeal
or extended substance, not however in an intelligent one, because namely some extension,
but plainly no intellection, is contained in their clear & distinct concept. Now indeed there is in me a certain passive faculty of sensing, or
of receiving & knowing the ideas of sensible things, but I could have no use
of it, unless there also existed some active faculty, either in me or in
another, of producing or effecting those ideas. And this certainly cannot be in
myself, because it presupposes plainly no intellection,
& without my cooperating, but often even against my will, those ideas are produced:
therefore it remains that it is in some substance diverse from me,
in which, since all reality ought to be present either formally or eminently,
which is objective in the ideas produced by that faculty (as
I have already noticed above), either this substance is a body, or corporeal nature,
in which namely all things are contained formally which are objective in the ideas;
or certainly it is God, or some creature nobler than body, in which they are contained
eminently.

Atqui, cùm Deus non sit fallax, omnino manifestum est illum nec per se immediate istas ideas mihi immittere, nec etiam mediante aliquâ creaturâ, in quâ earum realitas objectiva, non formaliter, sed eminenter tantùm contineatur. Cùm enim nullam plane facultatem mihi dederit ad hoc agnoscendum, sed contrà magnam

But, since God is not fallacious, it is altogether manifest that he neither by himself immediately inserts these ideas into me, nor yet by the mediation of some creature in which their objective reality is contained not formally, but only eminently. For since he has plainly given me no faculty for recognizing this, but on the contrary a great

[80] propensionem ad credendum illas a rebus corporeis emitti, non video quâ ratione posset intelligi ipsum non esse fallacem, si aliunde quàm a rebus corporeis emitterentur. Ac proinde res corporeae existunt. Non tamen forte omnes tales omnino existunt, quales illas sensu comprehendo, quoniam ista sensuum comprehensio in multis valde obscura est & confusa; sed saltem illa omnia in iis sunt, quae clare & distincte intelligo, id est omnia, generaliter spectata, quae in purae Matheseos objecto comprehenduntur.

[80] a propensity to believe that they are emitted by corporeal things, I do not see by what rationale it could be understood that he is not deceitful, if they were emitted from elsewhere than from corporeal things. And accordingly corporeal things exist. Yet perhaps not all such exist altogether as I comprehend them by sense, since that comprehension of the senses is in many respects very obscure & confused; but at least all those things are in them which I clearly & distinctly understand, that is, all, considered generally, which are included in the object of pure Mathematics.

11. Quantum autem attinet ad reliqua quae vel tantùm particularia sunt, ut quòd sol sit talis magnitudinis aut figurae &c., vel minus clare intellecta, ut lumen, sonus, dolor, & similia, quamvis valde dubia & incerta sint, hoc tamen ipsum, quòd Deus non sit fallax, quòdque idcirco fieri non possit ut ulla falsitas in meis opinionibus reperiatur, nisi aliqua etiam sit in me facultas a Deo tributa ad illam emendandam, certam mihi spem ostendit veritatis etiam in iis assequendae. Et sane non dubium est quin ea omnia quae doceor a naturâ aliquid habeant veritatis: per naturam enim, generaliter spectatam, nihil nunc aliud quàm vel Deum, ipsum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam intelligo; nec aliud per naturam meam in particulari, quàm complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tributa.

11. As for the rest, which are either only particular things, such as that the sun is of such a magnitude or figure, &c., or less clearly understood, such as light, sound, pain, & the like, although they are very doubtful and uncertain, nevertheless this very fact, that God is not fallacious, and that therefore it cannot happen that any falsity be found in my opinions, unless there is also in me some faculty granted by God for amending it, shows me a sure hope of attaining truth even in these. And truly it is not doubtful that all those things which I am taught by nature have something of truth: for by nature, considered generally, I now understand nothing else than either God himself, or the coordination of created things instituted by God; nor anything else by my nature in particular, than the complexion of all those things which have been bestowed on me by God.

12. Nihil autem est quod me ista natura magis expresse doceat, quàm quòd habeam corpus, cui male est cùm dolorem sentio, quod cibo vel potu indiget, cùm famem aut sitim patior, & similia; nec proinde dubitare debeo, quin aliquid in eo sit veritatis.

12. But there is nothing that this nature teaches me more expressly than that I have a body, which fares ill when I feel pain, which is in need of food or drink when I suffer hunger or thirst, & the like; nor therefore ought I to doubt that there is something of truth in it.

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13. Docet etiam natura, per istos sensus doloris, famis, sitis & c., me non tantùm adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid cum illo componam. Alioqui enim, cùm corpus laeditur, ego, qui nihil aliud sum quàm res cogitans, non sentirem idcirco dolorem, sed puro intellectu laesionem istam perciperem, ut nauta visu percipit si quid in nave frangatur; & cùm corpus cibo vel potu indiget, hoc ipsum expresse intelligerem, non confusos famis & sitis sensus haberem. Nam certe isti sensus sitis, famis, doloris &c., nihil aliud sunt quàm confusi quidam cogitandi modi ab unione & quasi permixtione mentis cum corpore exorti.

13. Nature also teaches, through those senses of pain, hunger, thirst & c., that I am not only present to my body as a sailor is present to a ship, but that I am most closely conjoined to it and as it were commixed, to such a degree that I compose one thing with it. Otherwise, when the body is injured, I, who am nothing other than a thinking thing, would not therefore feel pain, but by pure intellect would perceive that lesion, as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in the ship is broken; and when the body needs food or drink, this very thing I would understand expressly, I would not have the confused senses of hunger and thirst. For certainly those senses of thirst, hunger, pain, &c., are nothing other than certain confused modes of thinking arising from the union and as-it-were commixture of mind with body.

14. Praeterea etiam doceor a naturâ varia circa meum corpus alia corpora existere, ex quibus nonnulla mihi prosequenda sunt, alia fugienda. Et certe, ex eo quòd valde diversos sentiam colores, sonos, odores, sapores, calorem, duritiem, & similia, recte concludo, aliquas esse in corporibus, a quibus variae istae sensuum perceptiones adveniunt, varietates iis respondentes, etiamsi forte iis non similes; atque ex eo quòd quaedam ex illis perceptionibus mihi gratae sint, aliae ingratae, plane certum est meum corpus, sive potius me totum, quatenus ex corpore & mente sum compositus, variis commodis & incommodis a circumjacentibus corporibus affici posse.

14. Moreover, I am also taught by nature that, around my body, various other bodies exist, some of which are to be pursued by me, others to be shunned. And certainly, from the fact that I sense very diverse colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, hardness, & the like, I rightly conclude that there are in the bodies, from which those various perceptions of the senses come, varieties corresponding to them, even if perhaps not similar to them; and from the fact that some of those perceptions are pleasing to me, others displeasing, it is plainly certain that my body, or rather my whole self, in so far as I am composed of body & mind, can be affected by the surrounding bodies with various conveniences & inconveniences.

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15. Multa verò alia sunt quae, etsi videar a naturâ doctus esse, non tamen revera ab ipsâ, sed a consuetudine quâdam inconsiderate judicandi accepi, atque ideo falsa esse facile contingit: ut quòd omne spatium, in quo nihil plane occurrit quod meos sensus moveat, sit vacuum; quòd in corpore, exempli gratiâ, calido aliquid sit plane simile ideae caloris quae in me est, in albo aut viridi sit eadem albedo aut viriditas quam sentio, in amaro aut dulci idem sapor, & sic de caeteris; quòd & astra & turres, & quaevis alia remota corpora ejus sint tantùm magnitudinis & figurae, quam sensibus meis exhibent, & alia ejusmodi. Sed ne quid in hac re non satis distincte percipiam, accuratiùs debeo definire quid proprie intelligam, cùm dico me aliquid doceri a naturâ. Nempe hîc naturam strictiùs sumo, quàm pro complexione eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo tributa sunt; in hac enim complexione multa continentur quae ad mentem solam pertinent, ut quòd percipiam id quod factum est infectum esse non posse, & reliqua omnia quae lumine naturali sunt nota, de quibus hîc non est sermo; multa etiam quae ad solum corpus spectant, ut quòd deorsum tendat, & similia, de quibus etiam non ago, sed de iis tantùm quae mihi, ut composito ex mente & corpore, a Deo tributa sunt. Ideoque haec natura docet quidem ea refugere quae sensum doloris inferunt, & ea prosequi quae sensum voluptatis, & talia; sed non apparet illam praeterea nos docere ut quicquam ex istis sensuum perceptionibus sine praevio intellectûs examine de rebus extra nos positis concludamus, quia de iis verum scire

15. But there are many other things which, although I seem to have been taught by nature, I have not in truth received from it itself, but from a certain habit of judging inconsiderately, and therefore it easily happens that they are false: as that every space in which there plainly occurs nothing that moves my senses is a vacuum; that in a body, for example, that is hot there is something wholly similar to the idea of heat which is in me, in what is white or green there is the same whiteness or greenness that I feel, in what is bitter or sweet the same savor, and so for the rest; that both the stars and the towers, and any remote bodies whatsoever, are only of that magnitude and figure which they exhibit to my senses, and other things of the kind. But lest I should not perceive this matter distinctly enough, I ought more accurately to define what I properly understand when I say that I am taught something by nature. Namely, here I take nature more strictly than as the complexion of all those things which have been bestowed on me by God; for in this complexion many things are contained which pertain to mind alone, as that I perceive that what has been done cannot be undone, and all the rest which are known by the natural light, of which there is here no discourse; many also which regard body alone, as that it tends downward, and the like, of which I likewise do not treat, but only of those which, as a composite of mind and body, have been bestowed on me by God. And so this nature indeed teaches us to shun the things which introduce the sense of pain, and to pursue those which introduce the sense of pleasure, and suchlike; but it does not appear that it moreover teaches us to conclude anything from these perceptions of the senses about things placed outside us without a prior examination of the intellect, because to know the truth about them

[83] ad mentem solam, non autem ad compositum, videtur pertinere. Ita quamvis stella non magis oculum meum quàm ignis exiguae facis afficiat, nulla tamen in eo realis sive positiva propensio est ad credendum illam non esse majorem, sed hoc sine ratione ab ineunte aetate judicavi; & quamvis ad ignem accedens sentio calorem, ut etiam ad eundem nimis prope accedens sentio dolorem, nulla profecto ratio est quae suadeat in igne aliquid esse simile isti calori, ut neque etiam isti dolori, sed tantummodo in eo aliquid esse, quodcunque demum sit, quod istos in nobis sensus caloris vel doloris efficiat; & quamvis etiam in aliquo spatio nihil sit quod moveat sensum, non ideo sequitur in eo nullum esse corpus: sed video me in his aliisque permultis ordinem naturae pervertere esse assuetum, quia nempe sensuum perceptionibus, quae proprie tantùm a naturâ datae sunt ad menti significandum quaenam composito, cujus pars est, commoda sint vel incommoda, & eatenus sunt satis clarae & distinctae, utor tanquam regulis certis ad immediate dignoscendum quaenam sit corporum extra nos positorum essentia, de quâ tamen nihil nisi valde obscure & confuse significant.

[83] seems to pertain to the mind alone, not
however to the composite. Thus, although a star affects my eye no more than the fire of a small torch, yet there is in it no real or positive propensity to believe that it is not greater, but I judged this without reason from my earliest age; and although, on approaching a fire, I feel heat, and also, on approaching the same too close, I feel pain, there is assuredly no reason that should persuade that there is in the fire anything similar to this heat, nor even to this pain, but only that there is in it, whatever it may be, something which produces in us these sensations of heat or of pain; and although in some space there is nothing that moves the sense, it does not therefore follow that there is in it no body: but I see that in these and very many other matters I have been accustomed to overturn the order of nature, namely because I use the perceptions of the senses, which were given by nature properly only to signify to the mind what things are advantageous or disadvantageous to the composite of which it is a part, and to that extent are sufficiently clear and distinct, as if they were fixed rules for immediately discerning what the essence is of bodies placed outside us, about which, however, they signify nothing except very obscurely and confusedly.

16. Atqui jam ante satis perspexi quâ ratione, non obstante Dei bonitate, judicia mea falsa esse contingat. Sed nova hîc occurrit difficultas circa illa ipsa quae tanquam persequenda vel fugienda mihi a naturâ exhibentur, atque etiam circa internos sensus in quibus errores videor deprehendisse: ut cùm quis, grato cibi alicujus sapore delusus, venenum intus latens assumit.

16. And yet already I have sufficiently perceived by what method, notwithstanding the goodness of God, it may befall that my judgments are false. But a new difficulty here presents itself concerning those very things which are exhibited to me by nature as to be pursued or to be fled, and also concerning the internal senses in which I seem to have detected errors: as when someone, deluded by the pleasing savor of some food, takes in poison lying hidden within.

[84] Sed nempe tunc tantùm a naturâ impellitur ad illud appetendum in quo gratus sapor consistit, non autem ad venenum, quod plane ignorat; nihilque hinc aliud concludi potest, quàm naturam istam non esse omnisciam: quod non mirum, quia, cùm homo sit res limitata, non alia illi competit quàm limitatae perfectionis.

[84] But indeed then he is only impelled by nature toward desiring that in which the agreeable savor consists, not, however, toward the poison, which he plainly does not know; and nothing else can be concluded from this than that that nature is not omniscient: which is not a wonder, because, since man is a limited thing, there belongs to him no other than a limited perfection.

17. At verò non raro etiam in iis erramus ad quae a naturâ impellimur: ut cùm ii qui aegrotant, potum vel cibum appetunt sibi paulo post nociturum. Dici forsan hîc poterit, illos ob id errare, quòd natura eorum sit corrupta; sed hoc difficultatem non tollit, quia non minus vere homo aegrotus creatura Dei est quàm sanus; nec proinde minus videtur repugnare illum a Deo fallacem naturam habere. Atque ut horologium ex rotis & ponderibus confectum non minus accurate leges omnes naturae observat, cùm male fabricatum est & horas non recte indicat, quàm cùm omni ex parte artificis voto satisfacit: ita, si considerem hominis corpus, quatenus machinamentum quòddam est ex ossibus, nervis, musculis, venis, sanguine & pellibus ita aptum & compositum, ut, etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem tamen haberet omnes motus qui nunc in eo non ab imperio voluntatis nec proinde a mente procedunt, facile agnosco illi aeque naturale fore, si, exempli causâ, hydrope laboret, eam faucium ariditatem pati, quae sitis sensum menti inferre solet, atque etiam ab illâ ejus nervos & reliquas partes ita disponi ut potum sumat ex quo morbus augeatur, quàm, cùm nullum tale in eo vitium est, a simili

17. But indeed we not rarely err even in those things to which we are impelled by nature: as when those who are sick desire drink or food that will harm them a little later. It may perhaps be said here that they err for this reason, because their nature is corrupted; but this does not remove the difficulty, because the sick man is no less truly a creature of God than the healthy; nor accordingly does it seem less repugnant that he should have from God a deceitful nature. And just as a clock constructed from wheels & weights observes all the laws of nature no less accurately when it is badly fabricated and does not indicate the hours rightly than when it in every respect satisfies the artificer’s design: so, if I consider the human body, in so far as it is a certain mechanism made of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood & skins, so fitted & composed that, even if no mind existed in it, it would nevertheless have all the same motions which now in it do not proceed from the command of the will and thus not from the mind, I readily recognize that it will be equally natural for it, if, for example, it labors under dropsy, to suffer that dryness of the throat which is wont to bring to the mind the sense of thirst, and also that by it its nerves & the remaining parts are so disposed that it takes drink by which the disease is increased, as, when there is no such fault in it, by a similar

[85] faucium siccitate moveri ad potum sibi utile assumendum. Et quamvis, respiciens ad praeconceptum horologii usum, dicere possim illud, cùm horas non recte indicat, a naturâ suâ deflectere; atque eodem modo, considerans machinamentum humani corporis tanquam comparatum ad motus qui in eo fieri solent, putem illud etiam a naturâ suâ aberrare, si ejus fauces sint aridae, cùm potus ad ipsius conservationem non prodest; satis tamen animadverto hanc ultimam naturae acceptionem ab alterâ multùm differre: haec enim nihil aliud est quàm denominatio a cogitatione meâ, hominem aegrotum & horologium male fabricatum cum ideâ hominis sani & horologii recte facti comparante, dependens, rebusque de quibus dicitur extrinseca; per illam verò aliquid intelligo quod revera in rebus reperitur, ac proinde nonnihil habet veritatis.

[85] to be moved by dryness of the throat to take for oneself a drink that is useful. And although, looking to the preconception of the use of a clock, I can say that it, when it does not indicate the hours correctly, deflects from its nature; and in the same way, considering the mechanism of the human body as fitted to the motions that are wont to occur in it, I may think that it too deviates from its nature, if its throat is dry when a drink does not conduce to its preservation; nevertheless I sufficiently observe that this last acceptation of nature differs much from the other: for this is nothing else than a denomination dependent on my thought, comparing the sick man and the badly made clock with the idea of a healthy man and a correctly made clock, and it is extrinsic to the things of which it is said; whereas by the other I understand something which is truly found in things, and thus has not a little of truth.

18. Ac certe, etiamsi respiciendo ad corpus hydrope laborans, sit tantùm denominatio extrinseca, cùm dicitur ejus natura esse corrupta, ex eo quòd aridas habeat fauces, nec tamen egeat potu; respiciendo tamen ad compositum, sive ad mentem tali corpori unitam, non est pura denominatio, sed verus error naturae, quòd sitiat cùm potus est ipsi nociturus; ideoque hîc remanet inquirendum, quo pacto bonitas Dei non impediat quominus natura sic sumpta sit fallax.

18. And certainly, even if, looking to the body suffering from dropsy, it be only an extrinsic denomination when it is said that its nature is corrupt, from the fact that it has a dry throat and yet does not need drink; yet, looking to the composite, or to the mind united to such a body, it is not a pure denomination, but a true error of nature, that it is thirsty when drink is going to be harmful to it; and therefore it remains here to be inquired in what manner the goodness of God does not prevent nature, thus taken, from being fallacious.

19. Nempe imprimis hîc adverto magnam esse differentiam inter mentem & corpus, in eo quòd corpus ex naturâ suâ sit semper divisibile, mens autem plane

19. Namely, in the first place I here observe that there is a great difference between mind & body, in that body from its own nature is always divisible, but the mind plainly

[86] indivisibilis; nam sane cùm hanc considero, sive meipsum quatenus sum tantùm res cogitans, nullas in me partes possum distinguere, sed rem plane unam & integram me esse intelligo; & quamvis toti corpori tota mens unita esse videatur, abscisso tamen pede, vel brachio, vel quâvis aliâ corporis parte, nihil ideo de mente subductum esse cognosco; neque etiam facultates volendi, sentiendi, intelligendi &c. ejus partes dici possunt, quia una & eadem mens est quae vult, quae sentit, quae intelligit. Contrà verò nulla res corporea sive extensa potest a me cogitari, quam non facile in partes cogitatione dividam, atque hoc ipso illam divisibilem esse intelligam: quod unum sufficeret ad me docendum, mentem a corpore omnino esse diversam, si nondum illud aliunde satis scirem.

[86] indivisible; for indeed when I consider this, or myself insofar as I am only a thinking thing, I can distinguish no parts in me, but I understand that I am a thing plainly one & entire; & although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, with a foot nevertheless cut off, or an arm, or any other part of the body, I recognize that nothing on that account is subtracted from the mind; nor can the faculties of willing, sensing, understanding &c. be said to be its parts, because it is one & the same mind that wills, that senses, that understands. On the contrary, no corporeal or extended thing can be thought by me, which I cannot easily divide into parts in thought, and by this very fact I understand it to be divisible: which alone would suffice to teach me that the mind is altogether different from the body, if I did not already know that sufficiently from elsewhere.

20. Deinde adverto mentem non ab omnibus corporis partibus immediate affici, sed tantummodo a cerebro, vel forte etiam ab unâ tantùm exiguâ ejus parte, nempe ab eâ in quâ dicitur esse sensus communis; quae, quotiescunque eodem modo est disposita, menti idem exhibet, etiamsi reliquae corporis partes diversis interim modis possint se habere, ut probant innumera experimenta, quae hîc recensere non est opus..

20. Next I observe that the mind is not immediately affected by all the parts of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps even by a single very small part of it, namely by that in which what is called the common sense is said to be; which, whenever it is disposed in the same way, exhibits the same to the mind, even if the remaining parts of the body may meanwhile be in different states, as innumerable experiments prove, which it is not necessary to recount here..

21. Adverto praeterea eam esse corporis naturam, ut nulla ejus pars possit ab aliâ parte aliquantum remotâ moveri, quin possit etiam moveri eodem modo a quâlibet ex iis quae interjacent, quamvis illa remotior nihil agat. Ut, exempli causâ, in fune A, B, C, D, si trahatur ejus ultima pars D, non alio pacto movebitur prima A, quàm moveri etiam posset, si traheretur una ex intermediis B vel C, & ultima D maneret immota. Nec dissimili ratione, cùm sentio dolorem pedis, docuit me Physica sensum illum fieri ope nervorum per pedem sparsorum, qui, inde ad cerebrum usque funium instar extensi, dum trahuntur in pede, trahunt etiam intimas cerebri partes ad quas pertingunt, quemdamque motum in iis excitant, qui institutus est a naturâ ut mentem afficiat sensu doloris tanquam in pede existentis.

21. I further observe this to be the nature of body, that no part of it can be moved by another part somewhat remote, without its being able also to be moved in the same way by any one of those which lie between, although that more remote part does nothing. As, for example, in a rope A, B, C, D, if its last part D is pulled, the first A will be moved in no other manner than it could also be moved if one of the intermediate parts B or C were pulled, and the last D remained unmoved. Nor by a dissimilar reasoning, when I feel a pain of the foot, Physics has taught me that that sensation is produced by the help of the nerves scattered through the foot, which, stretched thence all the way to the brain after the fashion of cords, while they are pulled in the foot, also pull the inmost parts of the brain to which they reach, and excite in them a certain motion, which has been instituted by nature to affect the mind with a sense of pain as if existing in the foot.

Sed quia illi nervi per tibiam, crus, lumbos, dorsum, & collum transire debent, ut a pede ad cerebrum perveniant, potest contingere ut, etiamsi eorum pars, quae est in pede, non attingatur, sed aliqua tantùm ex intermediis, idem plane ille motus fiat in cerebro qui fit pede male affecto, ex quo necesse erit ut mens sentiat eundem dolorem. Et idem de quolibet alio sensu est putandum.

But because those nerves must pass through the tibia, the leg, the loins, the back, & the neck, in order to reach from the foot to the brain, it can happen that, even if their part which is in the foot is not touched, but only some one of the intermediates, that very same motion is produced in the brain which is produced when the foot is ill-affected, from which it will necessarily follow that the mind feels the same pain. And the same is to be thought concerning any other sense.

22. Adverto denique, quandoquidem unusquisque ex motibus, qui fiunt in eâ parte cerebri quae immediate mentem afficit, non nisi unum aliquem sensum illi infert, nihil hac in re melius posse excogitari, quàm si eum inferat qui, ex omnibus quos inferre potest, ad hominis sani conservationem quàm maxime & quàm frequentissime conducit. Experientiam autem testari, tales esse omnes sensus nobis a naturâ inditos; ac proinde nihil plane in iis reperiri, quod non Dei potentiam bonitatemque testetur. Ita, exempli causâ,

22. I observe finally, since each of the motions that occur in that part of the brain which immediately affects the mind imparts to it only some one sense, that nothing better can be devised in this matter than if it impart that one which, of all those it can impart, conduces to the conservation of a healthy man as much as possible & as most frequently. Experience moreover testifies that all the senses implanted in us by nature are such; and hence plainly nothing is found in them that does not bear witness to the power and goodness of God. Thus, for example,

[88] cùm nervi qui sunt in pede vehementer & praeter consuetudinem moventur, ille eorum motus, per spinae dorsi medullam ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad aliquid sentiendum, nempe dolorem tanquam in pede existentem, a quo illa excitatur ad ejus causam, ut pedi infestam, quantum in se est, amovendam. Potuisset verò natura hominis a Deo sic constitui, ut ille idem motus in cerebro quidvis aliud menti exhiberet: nempe vel seipsum, quatenus est in cerebro, vel quatenus est in pede, vel in aliquo ex locis intermediis, vel denique aliud quidlibet; sed nihil aliud ad corporis conservationem aeque conduxisset. Eodem modo, cùm potu indigemus, quaedam inde oritur siccitas in gutture, nervos ejus movens & illorum ope cerebri interiora; hicque motus mentem afficit sensu sitis, quia nihil in toto hoc negotio nobis utilius est scire, quàm quòd potu ad conservationem valetudinis egeamus, & sic de caeteris.

[88] when the nerves which are in the foot are moved vehemently & beyond what is customary, that motion of them, reaching through the marrow of the spine to the inmost parts of the brain, there gives the mind a sign to sense something, namely pain as existing in the foot, by which it is aroused toward its cause, as hostile to the foot, to remove it, so far as is in its power. But the nature of man could have been constituted by God in such a way that that same motion in the brain would exhibit to the mind anything else: namely either itself, insofar as it is in the brain, or insofar as it is in the foot, or in some one of the intermediate places, or finally anything whatsoever; but nothing else would have conduced equally to the conservation of the body. In the same way, when we are in need of drink, a certain dryness arises in the throat from that, moving its nerves & by their aid the inner parts of the brain; and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst, because nothing in this whole affair is more useful for us to know than that we are in need of drink for the conservation of health, & so with the rest.

23. Ex quibus omnino manifestum est, non obstante immensâ Dei bonitate, naturam hominis ut ex mente & corpore compositi non posse non aliquando esse fallacem. Nam si quae causa, non in pede, sed in aliâ quâvis ex partibus per quas nervi a pede ad cerebrum porriguntur, vel etiam in ipso cerebro, eundem plane motum excitet qui solet excitari pede male affecto, sentietur dolor tanquam in pede, sensusque naturaliter falletur, quia, cùm ille idem motus in cerebro non possit nisi eundem semper sensum menti inferre, multoque frequentius oriri soleat a causâ quae laedit pedem, quàm ab aliâ alibi existente, rationi consenta

23. From which it is altogether manifest that, notwithstanding the immense goodness of God, the nature of man, as composed of mind and body, cannot but be sometimes fallacious. For if some cause, not in the foot, but in any other of the parts through which the nerves extend from the foot to the brain, or even in the brain itself, should excite the very same motion which is wont to be excited by an ill-affected foot, pain will be felt as if in the foot, and the sense will naturally be deceived; because, since that same motion in the brain can only ever bring the same sense to the mind, and is wont to arise much more frequently from a cause which harms the foot than from another existing elsewhere, it agrees with reason

[89]neum est ut pedis potius quàm alterius partis dolorem menti semper exhibeat. Et si quando faucium ariditas, non ut solet ex eo quòd ad corporis valetudinem potus conducat, sed ex contrariâ aliquâ causâ oriatur, ut in hydropico contingit, longe melius est illam tunc fallere, quàm si contrà semper falleret, cùm corpus est bene constitutum; & sic de reliquis.

[89]
it is in accordance with reason that it should present to the mind the pain of the foot rather than of some other part. And if ever dryness of the throat arises, not as it is wont from the fact that drink conduces to the health of the body, but from some contrary cause, as happens in a dropsical person, it is far better that it then deceive it, than if, on the contrary, it should always deceive when the body is well constituted; & so with the rest.

24. Atque haec consideratio plurimum juvat, non modo ut errores omnes quibus natura mea obnoxia est animadvertam, sed etiam ut illos aut emendare aut vitare facile possim. Nam sane, cùm sciam omnes sensus circa ea, quae ad corporis commodum spectant, multo frequentius verum indicare quàm falsum, possimque uti fere semper pluribus ex iis ad eandem rem examinandam, & insuper memoriâ, quae praesentia cum praecedentibus connoctit, & intellectu, qui jam omnes errandi causas perspexit; non amplius vereri debeo ne illa, quae mihi quotidie a sensibus exhibentur, sint falsa, sed hyperbolicae superiorum dierum dubitationes, ut risu dignae, sunt explodendae. Praesertim summa illa de somno, quem a vigiliâ non distinguebam; nunc enim adverto permagnum inter utrumque esse discrimen, in eo quòd nunquam insomnia cum reliquis omnibus actionibus vitae a memoriâ conjungantur, ut ea quae vigilanti occurrunt; nam sane, si quis, dum vigilo, mihi derepente appareret, statimque postea dispareret, ut fit in somnis, ita scilicet ut nec unde venisset, nec quo abiret, viderem, non immerito spectrum potius, aut phantasma in cerebro meo effictum, quàm verum hominem esse judicarem.

24. And this consideration helps very much, not only that I may notice all the errors to which my nature is liable, but also that I may be able easily either to amend or to avoid them. For indeed, since I know that all the senses, concerning those things which look to the convenience of the body, indicate the true much more frequently than the false, and that I can use almost always several of them for examining the same matter, & in addition memory, which connects the present with the preceding, & the intellect, which has now surveyed all the causes of erring; I ought no longer to fear lest those things which are daily exhibited to me by the senses be false, but the hyperbolic doubts of the preceding days, as worthy of laughter, are to be exploded. Especially that chief one about sleep, which I did not distinguish from wakefulness; for now I notice that there is a very great difference between the two, in that dreams are never conjoined by memory with all the other actions of life, as are the things that occur to one awake; for indeed, if someone, while I am awake, were suddenly to appear to me, and immediately afterward to disappear, as happens in dreams, namely in such a way that I would see neither whence he had come nor whither he went, I should not without reason judge it to be a specter, or a phantasm fashioned in my brain, rather than a true man.

Cùm verò eae res occurrunt, quas distincte, unde, ubi, & quando mihi adveniant, adverto, earumque perceptionem absque ullâ interruptione cum totâ reliquâ vitâ connecto, plane certus sum, non in somnis, sed vigilanti occurrere. Nec de ipsarum veritate debeo vel minimum dubitare, si, postquam omnes sensus, memoriam & intellectum ad illas examinandas convocavi, nihil mihi, quod cum caeteris pugnet, ab ullo ex his nuntietur. Ex eo enim quòd Deus non sit fallax, sequitur omnino in talibus me non falli.

But when those things occur, which I distinctly observe whence, where, and when they come to me, and I connect their perception without any interruption with the whole remaining life, I am plainly certain that they occur not in dreams, but to me awake. Nor ought I to doubt even the least about their truth, if, after I have called together all the senses, memory, and intellect to examine them, nothing is reported to me by any of these which conflicts with the others. For from the fact that God is not fallacious, it altogether follows that in such cases I am not deceived.

Sed quia rerum agendarum necessitas non semper tam accurati examinis moram concedit, fatendum est humanam vitam circa res particulares saepe erroribus esse obnoxiam, & naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda.

But because the necessity of things to be done does not always grant the delay of so exact an examination, it must be confessed that human life, in particular matters, is often liable to errors, & the weakness of our nature is to be acknowledged.