Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

I. Haec, Marcelle Vitori, ex tua voluntate maxime ingressus, tum si qua ex nobis ad iuvenes bonos pervenire posset utilitas, novissime paene etiam necessitate quadam officii delegati mihi sedulo laborabam, respiciens tamen illam curam meae voluptatis, quod filio, cuius eminens ingenium sollicitam quoque parentis diligentiam merebatur, hanc optimam partem relicturus hereditatis videbar, ut, si me, quod aecum et optabile fuit, fata intercepissent, praeceptore tamen patre uteretur. II. At me fortuna id agentem diebus ac noctibus festinantemque metu meae mortalitatis ita subito prostravit ut laboris mei fructus ad neminem minus quam ad me pertineret. Illum enim de quo summa conceperam, et in quo spem unicam senectutis reponebam, repetito vulnere orbitatis amisi.

1. These things, Marcellus Vitorius, I entered upon chiefly at your wish, then also, if any utility from us might be able to reach good youths, and, almost lastly, even by a certain necessity of the duty delegated to me, I was laboring diligently—yet having regard to that concern of my own gratification: that to my son, whose eminent ingenium deserved even the anxious diligence of a parent, I seemed about to bequeath this best part of an inheritance, so that, if the Fates had intercepted me—which was just and to-be-desired—that he would nevertheless have his father as preceptor. 2. But Fortune, while I was doing that and hastening day and night in fear of my mortality, so suddenly cast me down that the fruit of my labor pertained to no one less than to me; for him about whom I had conceived the highest hope, and in whom I was placing the sole hope of my old age, by the renewed wound of bereavement I lost.

III. Quid nunc agam? aut quem ultra esse usum mei dis repugnantibus credam?

3. What am I to do now? Or who any longer will have use for me, with the gods opposing?

Nam ita forte accidit ut eum quoque librum quem de causis corruptae eloquentiae emisi iam scribere adgressus ictu simili ferirer. Vnum igitur optimum fuit, infaustum opus et quidquid hoc est in me infelicium litterarum super inmaturum funus consumpturis viscera mea flammis inicere neque hanc impiam vivacitatem novis insuper curis fatigare. IV. Quis enim mihi bonus parens ignoscat si studere amplius possum, ac non oderit hanc animi mei firmitatem si quis in me alius usus vocis quam ut incusem deos superstes omnium meorum, nullam in terras despicere providentiam tester?

For it so chanced that, as I had now set about writing that book as well which I had issued, On the Causes of Corrupted Eloquence, I was struck by a similar blow. One course, therefore, was best: to cast this ill-omened work, and whatever this is of ill-fated letters in me, upon the untimely funeral, to the flames that would consume my vitals, and not to weary this impious liveliness with new cares besides. 4. For what good parent would forgive me, if I can study further, and would not hate this firmness of my mind, if there were in me any other use of voice than to accuse the gods, I surviving all my own, to bear witness that no providence looks down upon the earth?

- si non meo casu, cui tamen nihil obici nisi quod vivam potest, at illorum certe quos utique inmeritos mors acerba damnavit, erepta prius mihi matre eorundem, quae nondum expleto aetatis undevicesimo anno duos enixa filios, quamvis acerbissimis rapta fatis,(non) infelix decessit. V. Ego vel hoc uno malo sic eram adflictus ut me iam nulla fortuna posset efficere felicem. Nam cum, omni virtute quae in feminas cadit functa, insanabilem attulit marito dolorem, tum aetate tam puellari, praesertim meae comparata, potest et ipsa numerari inter vulnera orbitatis.

- if not my own mishap, against which, however, nothing can be alleged except that I live, then at least those of them whom, surely undeserving, a bitter death condemned, their mother of the same having first been snatched from me, who, with her nineteenth year not yet completed, having borne two sons, though seized by most bitter fates, departed (not) unfortunate. 5. I was by this single evil so afflicted that now no fortune could make me happy. For since, having fulfilled every virtue that falls to women, she brought to her husband an incurable grief, then, at so girlish an age, especially compared with my own, she herself can be numbered among the wounds of bereavement.

VI. Liberis tamen superstitibus et - quod nefas erat [sera] sed optabat ipsa - me salvo, maximos cruciatus praecipiti via effugit. Mihi filius minor quintum egressus annum prior alterum ex duobus eruit lumen. VII.

6. With the children, however, surviving, and — which was nefarious [late] but she herself desired it — with me safe, she escaped the greatest torments by a precipitate way. To me the younger son, having passed his fifth year, first tore out one light of the two. 7.

Non sum ambitiosus in malis nec augere lacrimarum causas volo, utinamque esset ratio minuendi: sed dissimulare qui possum quid ille gratiae in vultu, quid iucunditatis in sermone, quos ingenii igniculos, quam substantiam placidae et (quod scio vix posse credi) iam tum altae mentis ostenderit: qualis amorem quicumque alienus infans mereretur. VIII. Illud vero insidiantis quo me validius cruciaret fortunae fuit, ut ille mihi blandissimus me suis nutricibus, me aviae educanti, me omnibus qui sollicitare illas aetates solent anteferret.

I am not ambitious in evils, nor do I wish to augment the causes of tears, and would that there were a method of diminishing them; but how can I dissimulate what charm in his countenance, what jucundity in his speech, what little sparks of genius, what substance of a placid and (which I know can scarcely be believed) even then lofty mind he displayed—such as love any child not one’s own would have merited. 8. But this, indeed, was Fortune lying in wait, that she might torture me the more forcefully: that he, most coaxing toward me, preferred me to his own nurses, me to his grandmother who was rearing him, me to all who are wont to captivate those ages.

IX. Quapropter illi dolori quem ex matre optima atque omnem laudem supergressa paucos ante menses ceperam gratulor. Minus enim est quod flendum meo nomine quam quod illius gaudendum est. Vna post haec Quintiliani mei spe ac voluptate nitebar, et poterat sufficere solacio.

9. Wherefore I am grateful for that grief which a few months before I had conceived from my mother, best and surpassing all praise. For less is that which must be wept for in my name than that which must be rejoiced at in hers. Alone after this I was leaning on the hope and delight of my Quintilian, and it could suffice for solace.

X. Non enim flosculos, sicut prior, sed iam decimum aetatis ingressus annum certos ac deformatos fructus ostenderat. Iuro per mala mea, per infelicem conscientiam, per illos manes, numina mei doloris, has me in illo vidisse virtutes, non ingenii modo ad percipiendas disciplinas, quo nihil praestantius cognovi plurima expertus, studiique iam tum non coacti (sciunt praeceptores), sed probitatis pietatis humanitatis liberalitatis, ut prorsus posset hinc esse tanti fulminis metus, quod observatum fere est celerius occidere festinatam maturitatem, et esse nescio quam quae spes tantas decerpat invidiam, ne videlicet ultra quam homini datum est nostra provehantur. XI. Etiam illa fortuita aderant omnia, vocis iucunditas claritasque, oris suavitas et in utracumque lingua, tamquam ad eam demum natus esset, expressa proprietas omnium litterarum.

10. For he had shown not little blossoms, as before, but now, having entered upon the 10th year of age, sure and well-shaped fruits. I swear by my ills, by my unlucky conscience, by those Manes, the divinities of my grief, that I saw in him these virtues: not of talent only for apprehending disciplines—than which I have known nothing more preeminent, having experienced very many things—and of study already then not compelled (the preceptors know), but of probity, piety, humanity, liberality, so that there might quite be hence a fear of so great a thunderbolt; for it is commonly observed that hastened maturity is cut down more swiftly, and that there exists, I know not what, an envy which plucks off such great hopes, lest, indeed, our things be borne forward beyond what is given to a human. 11. Also all those fortuitous things were present: the pleasantness and clarity of voice, the sweetness of countenance, and, in either language, as though he had been born for that one at last, an articulated propriety of all letters.

Sed hae spes adhuc: illa matura, constantia, gravitas, contra dolores etiam ac metus robur. Nam quo ille animo, qua medicorum admiratione mensum octo valetudinem tulit! Vt me in supremis consolatus est!

But these were hopes as yet; that was mature—constancy, gravity, strength against pains and even fears. For with what spirit, to the admiration of the physicians, he bore an illness of eight months! How he consoled me in the last extremity!

Quam etiam deficiens iamque non noster ipsum illum alienatae mentis errorem circa scholas, litteras habuit! XII. tuosne ego, o meae spes inanes, labentis oculos, tuum fugientem spiritum vidi?

How even, failing and now no longer ours, he had that very error of an alienated mind about schools, letters! 12. Did I, O my vain hopes, see your eyes slipping, your fleeing spirit?

tuum corpus frigidum exsangue complexus, animam recipere auramque communem haurire amplius potui, dignus his cruciatibus quos fero, dignus his cogitationibus? XIII. Tene consulari nuper adoptione ad omnium spes honorum propius admotum, te avunculo praetori generum destinatum, te [omnium spes] avitae eloquentiae candidatum, superstes parens tantum in, poenas: et si non cupido lucis, certe patientia vindicet te reliqua mea aetate; nam frustra mala omnia ad crimen fortunae relegamus.

having embraced your cold, bloodless body, was I any longer able to recover breath and to drink in the common air—am I worthy of these torments which I bear, worthy of these thoughts? 13. Is it you—by a recent consular adoption brought nearer to everyone’s hopes of honors, you destined as a son-in-law to your uncle the praetor, you, the [hope of all], a candidate of ancestral eloquence—that I, a surviving parent, remain only for punishments; and if not desire for the light, assuredly let patience vindicate you by the remainder of my lifetime; for in vain do we relegate all evils to the charge of Fortune.

Nemo nisi sua culpa diu dolet. XIV. Sed vivimus et aliqua vivendi ratio quaerenda est, credendumque doctissimis hominibus, qui unicum adversorum solacium litteras putaverunt.

No one grieves for a long time except through his own culpability. 14. But we live, and some plan of living must be sought, and the most learned men must be believed, who have considered letters to be the sole solace against adversities.

Si quando tamen ita resederit praesens impetus ut aliqua tot luctibus alia cogitatio inseri possit, non iniuste petierim morae veniam. Quis enim dilata studia miretur quae potius non abrupta esse mirandum est? XV. tum si qua fuerint minus effecta iis quae levius adhuc adflicti coeperamus, imperitanti fortunae remittantur, quae si quid mediocrium alioqui in nostro ingenio virium fuit, ut non extinxerit, debilitavit tamen.

If ever, however, the present impetus should so subside that some other cogitation can be inserted amid so many mournings, I would not unjustly ask pardon for delay. For who would marvel at studies postponed, at which rather it is to be marveled that they are not broken off? 15. Then, if anything shall have been accomplished less than what we had begun when as yet more lightly afflicted, let it be remitted to unskilled Fortune, who, if there was otherwise any moderate vigor in our native talent, though she has not extinguished it, has nevertheless debilitated it.

Sed vel propter hoc nos contumacius erigamus, quod illam ut perferre nobis difficile est, ita facile contemnere. Nihil enim sibi adversus me reliquit, et infelicem quidem sed certissimam tamen attulit mihi ex his malis securitatem. XVI.

But even on account of this let us more obstinately raise ourselves up, because, although it is difficult for us to endure it, yet it is easy to contemn it. For she has left herself nothing against me, and she has brought me from these evils a security—unhappy indeed, yet most certain. 16.

Boni autem consulere nostrum laborem vel propter hoc aequum est, quod in nullum iam proprium usum perseveramus, sed omnis haec cura alienas utilitates, si modo quid utile scribi, spectat. Nos miseri sicut facultates patrimonii nostri, ita hoc opus aliis praeparabamus, aliis relinquemus.

But it is equitable that the good look kindly upon our labor even for this reason: that we now persevere for no private use, but all this care regards others’ utility, if only anything useful is being written. We wretches—just as with the resources of our patrimony—so with this work: we were preparing it for others, and to others we shall leave it.

[1] I. Peroratio sequebatur, quam cumulum quidam, conclusionem alii vocant. Eius duplex ratio est, posita aut in rebus aut in adfectibus. Rerum repetitio et congregatio, quae Graece dicitur anakephalaiosis, a quibusdam Latinorum enumeratio, et memoriam iudicis reficit et totam simul causam ponit ante oculos, et, etiam si per singula minus moverat, turba valet.

[1] 1. The peroration followed, which some call the heap, others the conclusion. Its method is twofold, placed either in things or in affections. The repetition and gathering of points, which in Greek is called anakephalaiosis, by some of the Latins enumeration, both refreshes the judge’s memory and sets the whole case at once before the eyes, and, even if it had moved less in its individual parts, in the aggregate it has force.

II. In hac quae repetemus quam brevissime dicenda sunt, et, quod Graeco verbo patet, decurrendum per capita. Nam si morabimur, non iam enumeratio, sed quasi altera fiet oratio. Quae autem enumeranda videntur, cum pondere aliquo dicenda sunt et aptis excitanda sententiis et figuris utique varianda: alioqui nihil est odiosius recta illa repetitione velut memoriae iudicum diffidentis.

2. In this part, in which we shall repeat, the things to be said must be expressed as briefly as possible, and, as the Greek word makes plain, one must run down through the heads. For if we linger, it will no longer be an enumeration, but as it were a second oration. Moreover, the things that seem fit to be enumerated must be spoken with a certain weight, and must be stirred by apt sentences and surely varied with figures: otherwise nothing is more odious than that straight repetition, as though distrustful of the judges’ memory.

III. sunt autem innumerabiles, optimeque in Verrem Cicero: "si pater ipse iudicaret, quid diceret cum haec probarentur? " et deinde subiecit enumerationem; aut cum idem et in eundem per invocationem deorum spoliata a praetore templa dinumerat.

3. there are moreover innumerables, and most excellently Cicero in Against Verres: "if the father himself were judging, what would he say when these things were being proved? " and then he subjoined an enumeration; or when the same man, and against the same man, by an invocation of the gods, counts up the temples despoiled by the praetor.

Licet et dubitare num quid nos fugerit, et quid responsurus sit adversarius his et his, aut quam spem accusator habeat omnibus ita.defensis. IV. Illa vero iucundissima, si contingat aliquo ex adversario ducere argumentum, ut si dicas: "reliquit hanc partem causae", aut "invidia premere maluit", aut "ad preces confugit merito, cum sciret haec et haec". V. Sed non sunt singulae species persequendae, ne sola videantur quae forte to nunc dixero, cum occasiones et ex causis et ex dictis adversariorum et ex quibusdam fortuitis quoque oriantur. Nec referenda modo nostra, sed postulandum etiam ab adversariis ut ad quaedam respondeant:VI. id autem si et actionis supererit locus et ea proposuerimus quae refelli non possint; nam provocare quae inde sint fortia non arguentis est sed monentis.

It is also permitted to doubt whether anything has escaped us, and what the adversary will be about to answer to this and that, or what hope the accuser has with everything thus defended. 4. But those are most delightful indeed, if it happens to draw some argument from the adversary, as if you should say: "he has left this part of the case," or "he preferred to press with invidia," or "he fled for refuge to prayers with good reason, since he knew this and that." 5. But the individual types are not to be pursued, lest the only ones seem to be those which perhaps I have now said, since opportunities arise both from the cases and from the utterances of adversaries and even from certain fortuitous things. Nor must our own things only be reported, but it must also be demanded from the adversaries that they answer certain matters:6. but that, if both there shall remain room for action and we shall have proposed those things which cannot be refuted; for to provoke with things which would be strong from that source is not the part of one arguing but of one admonishing.

VII. Id unum epilogi genus visum est plerisque Atticorum, et philosophis fere omnibus qui de arte oratoria scriptum aliquid reliquerunt. Id sensisse Atticos credo quia Athenis adfectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator.

7. That one kind of epilogue seemed right to most of the Attics, and to almost all philosophers who have left something written on the oratorical art. I believe the Attics felt this because at Athens the orator was prohibited from moving the emotions, even by means of a herald.

Philosophos minus miror, apud quos vitii loco est adfici, nec boni moris videtur sic a vero iudicem averti, nec convenire bono viro vitiis uti. Necessarios tamen adfectus fatebuntur si aliter optineri vera et iusta et in commune profutura non possint. VIII.

I marvel less at the philosophers, among whom to be affected is held as a vice, nor does it seem of good morals thus to turn a judge away from the truth, nor does it befit a good man to employ vices. Nevertheless they will acknowledge necessary affections, if otherwise the true and the just and what will profit the common good cannot be obtained. 8.

Ceterum illud constitit inter omnes, etiam in aliis partibus actionis, si multiplex causa sit et pluribus argumentis defensa, utiliter anakephalaiosin fieri solere, sicut nemo dubitaverit multas esse causas in quibus nullo loco sit necessaria, si breves et simplices fuerint. Haec pars perorationis accusatori patronoque ex aequo communis est.

Moreover, this has been agreed among all—even in other parts of the action—that if a case is multiplex and defended by more arguments, it is useful for an anakephalaiosis to be made; just as no one would doubt that there are many cases in which it is nowhere necessary, if they are brief and simple. This part of the peroration is in equal measure common to the accuser and the patron (advocate).

IX. Adfectibus quoque isdem fere utuntur, sed aliis hic, aliis ille saepius ac magis; nam huic concitare iudices, illi flectere convenit. Verum et accusator habet interim lacrimas ex miseratione eius [rei] quem ulciscitur, et reus de indignitate calumniae conspirationis vehementius interim queritur. Dividere igitur haec officia commodissimum, quae plerumque sunt, ut dixi, prohoemio similia, sed liberiora plenioraque.

9. They also employ almost the same affections, but this party more often and more strongly certain ones, that party others; for it suits this one to stir up the judges, that one to bend them. Yet even the accuser at times has tears from commiseration for the one whom he avenges, and the defendant at times complains more vehemently of the indignity of a calumnious conspiracy. To divide, therefore, these offices is most expedient—offices which, for the most part, are, as I said, similar to the proem, but freer and fuller.

X. Inclinatio enim iudicum ad nos petitur initio parcius, cum admitti satis est et oratio tota superest: in epilogo vero est qualem animum iudex in consilium ferat, et iam nihil amplius dicturi sumus, nec restat quo reservemus. XI. Est igitur utrisque commune conciliare sibi, avertere ab adversario iudicem, concitare adfectus et componere. Et brevissimum quidem hoc praeceptum dari utrique parti potest, ut totas causae suae vires orator ponat ante oculos, et cum viderit quid invidiosum favorabile invisum miserabile aut sit in rebus aut videri possit, ea dicat quibus, si iudex esset, ipse maxime moveretur.

10. For the inclination of the judges toward us is sought at the beginning more sparingly, since it is enough to be admitted and the whole oration still remains: but in the epilogue the point is what mind the judge will carry into deliberation, and now we are going to say nothing further, nor is there anything left to hold in reserve. 11. Therefore it is common to both sides to conciliate the judge to themselves, to turn him away from the adversary, to stir up the affections and to compose them. And this very brief precept can be given to each party: that the orator set before the eyes all the forces of his cause, and when he has seen what is invidious, favorable, hateful, or miserable either is in the matters or can seem to be, let him say those things by which, if he were the judge, he himself would be moved most.

Sed certius est ire per singula.

But it is more certain to go through the particulars one by one.

XII. Et quae concilient quidem accusatorem in praeceptis exordii iam diximus. Quaedam tamen, quae illic ostendere sat est, in peroratione implenda sunt magis, si contra inpotentem invisum perniciosum suscepta causa est, si iudicibus ipsis aut gloriae damnatio rei aut deformitati futura absolutio.

12. And the things that conciliate the accuser we have already said in the precepts of the exordium. Yet certain things which it is enough to show there must be more fully accomplished in the peroration, if the case has been undertaken against an overbearing, hateful, pernicious man, if for the judges themselves either the condemnation of the defendant will be for glory, or the acquittal will be for disgrace.

XIII. Nam egregie in Vatinium Calvus "factum" inquit "ambitum scitis omnes, et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt". Cicero quidem in Verrem etiam emendari posse infamiam iudiciorum damnato reo dicit, quod est unum ex supra dictis. Metus etiam, si est adhibendus, ut facit idem, hunc habet locum fortiorem quam in prohoemio.

13. For Calvus, in Against Vatinius, excellently says, "you all know that bribery has been committed, and everyone knows that you know this." Cicero indeed, in Against Verres, says that even the infamy of the courts can be amended by the defendant being condemned, which is one of the above-said points. Fear also, if it is to be applied—as he likewise does—has a stronger place here than in the proem.

Qua de re quid sentirem, alio iam libro exposui. XIV. Concitare quoque invidiam odium iram liberius in peroratione contingit: quorum invidiam gratia, odium turpitudo, iram offensio iudici facit, si contumax adrogans securus sit: quae non ex facto modo dictove aliquo sed vultu habitu aspectu moveri solet, egregieque nobis adulescentibus dixisse accusator Cossutiani Capitonis videbatur, Graece quidem, sed in hunc sensum: "erubescis Caesarem timere". XV. summa tamen concitandi adfectus accusatori in hoc est, ut id quod obiecit aut quam atrocissimum aut etiam, si fieri potest, quam maxime miserabile esse videatur.

What I thought about this matter, I have already set forth in another book. 14. It also falls more freely in the peroration to stir up envy, hatred, anger: of which envy is made in the judge by favor, hatred by turpitude, anger by offense, if the man be contumacious, arrogant, unconcerned; which is wont to be moved not from some deed or word only, but by countenance, bearing, aspect; and it seemed to us young men that the accuser of Cossutianus Capito had spoken excellently—indeed in Greek, but to this effect: “You blush to be afraid of Caesar.” 15. Yet the sum for an accuser of rousing the affections is this: that what he has objected may appear either as most atrocious or also, if it can be, as most pitiable.

Atrocitas crescit ex his: quid factum sit, a quo, in quem, quo animo, quo tempore, quo loco, quo modo; quae omnia infinitos tractatus habent. XVI. pulsatum querimur: de re primum ipsa dicendum, tum si senex, si puer, si magistratus, si probus, si bene de re publica meritus, etiam si percussus sit a vili aliquo contemptoque vel ex contrario a potente nimium vel ab eo quo minime oportuit, et si die forte sollemni aut iis temporibus cum iudicia eius rei maxime exercerentur, aut in sollicito civitatis statu, item in theatro, in templo, in contione; XVII.

Atrocity grows from these: what was done, by whom, against whom, with what mind, at what time, in what place, in what mode; all of which admit infinite treatments. 16. we complain that a man was struck: about the matter itself one must first speak, then whether he was an old man, a boy, a magistrate, an upright man, one who has deserved well of the commonwealth; likewise whether he was struck by some base and despised person, or, on the contrary, by one excessively powerful, or by him by whom it was least fitting; and whether on a solemn day, or at those times when judgments for that matter were most being conducted, or when the condition of the state was anxious; likewise in the theater, in the temple, in the public assembly; 17.

crescit invidia et si non errore nec ira, vel etiam, si forte ira, sed iniqua, quod patri adfuisset, quod respondisset, quod honores contra peteret, et si plus etiam videri potest voluisse quam fecit; plurimum tamen adfert atrocitatis modus, si graviter, si contumeliose, ut Demosthenes ex parte percussi corporis, ex vultu ferientis, ex habitu invidiam Midiae quaerit. XVIII. Occisum queror: ferro an igne an veneno, uno vulnere an pluribus, subito an exspectatione tortus, ad hanc partem maxime pertinet.

envy grows also if not by error nor by anger, or even, if by chance by anger, yet unjust, because he had been present to his father, because he had responded, because he was seeking honors in opposition, and even if he can seem to have wished more than he did; yet the manner contributes the most of atrocity, if grievously, if contumeliously, as Demosthenes seeks envy against Midias from the part of the body struck, from the face of the smiter, from the bearing. 18. I complain of one slain: by iron or by fire or by poison, by one wound or by more, suddenly or tortured by expectation—this pertains most especially to this part.

Vtitur frequenter accusator et miseratione, cum aut eius casum quem ulciscitur aut liberorum ac parentium solitudinem conqueritur. XIX. Etiam futuri temporis imagine iudices movet, quae maneant eos qui de vi et iniuria questi sunt nisi vindicentur: fugiendum de civitate, cedendum bonis, aut omnia quaecumque inimicus fecerit perferenda.

Frequently the accuser also uses commiseration, when he laments either the downfall of him whom he avenges, or the desolation of his children and parents. 19. He also moves the judges by an image of the future—what may await those who have complained of force and injury unless they be vindicated: that they must flee from the city, cede their goods, or bear whatever things the enemy has done.

XX. Sed saepius id est accusatoris, avertere iudicem a miseratione qua reus sit usurus, atque ad fortiter [ad] iudicandum concitare. cuius loci est etiam occupare quae dicturum facturumve adversarium putes. Nam et cautiores ad custodiam suae religionis iudices facit, et gratiam responsuris aufert cum ea (quae) praedicta sunt ab accusatore iam, si pro reo repetentur, non sint nova, ut +Servius sulpicius contra Aufidiam+ ne signatorum, ne ipsius discrimen obiciatur sibi praemonet.

20. But more often it is the accuser’s part to turn the judge away from the commiseration which the defendant will use, and to incite him to judge with fortitude [ad]. of which topic it is also to preoccupy what you think the adversary will say or do. For it both makes the judges more cautious for the custody of their own conscience, and takes away the grace from those who are going to respond, since those things (which) have already been foretold by the accuser, if they are repeated on behalf of the defendant, are not new, as +Servius Sulpicius against Aufidia+ forewarns, lest the jeopardy of the signers, nor his own, be objected to him.

Nec non ab Aeschine quali sit usurus Demosthenes actione praedictum est. Docendi quoque interim iudices quid rogantibus respondere debeant, quod est unum repetitionis genus.

And likewise it was foretold by Aeschines what kind of action Demosthenes would use. The judges, too, are in the meantime to be taught what they ought to answer to those asking, which is one genus of repetition.

XXI. Periclitantem vero commendat dignitas et studia fortia et susceptae bello cicatrices et nobilitas et merita maiorum. Hoc quod proxime dixi Cicero atque Asinius certatim sunt usi, pro Scauro patre hic, ille pro filio.

21. What commends one actually in peril is dignity, resolute pursuits, scars incurred in war, nobility, and the merits of his ancestors. This point which I have just said Cicero and Asinius employed in rivalry: the former for Scaurus the father, the latter for the son.

XXII. Commendat et causa periculi, si suscepisse inimicitias ob aliquod factum honestum videtur, praecipue bonitas humanitas misericordia; iustius enim petere ea quisque videtur a iudice quae aliis ipse praestiterit. Referenda pars haec quoque ad utilitatem rei publicae, ad iudicum gloriam, ad exemplum, ad memoriam posteritatis.

22. The very circumstance of peril also commends, if he seems to have incurred enmities on account of some honorable deed—above all, goodness, humanity, mercy; for each person seems more justly to ask from the judge those things which he himself has bestowed upon others. This part too should be referred to the utility of the commonwealth, to the glory of the judges, to example, to the memory of posterity.

XXIII. Plurimum tamen valet miseratio, quae iudicem non flecti tantum cogit, sed motum quoque animi sui lacrimis confiteri. Haec petetur aut ex iis quae passus est reus, aut iis quae [quam] cum maxime patitur, aut iis quae damnatum manent: quae et ipsa duplicantur cum dicimus ex qua illi fortuna et in quam reccidendum sit.

23. Yet commiseration avails most of all, which compels the judge not only to be bent, but also to confess, by his tears, the movement of his own soul. This will be sought either from the things which the defendant has suffered, or the things which he is at this very moment suffering, or the things which await him when condemned: which are themselves doubled when we say out of what fortune he is and into what he must fall back.

XXIV. Adfert in his momentum et aetas et sexus et pignora, liberi, dico, et parentes et propinqui. Quae omnia tractari varie solent.

24. And in these matters, age and sex and pledges—children, I say—and parents and relatives also bring weight. All of these are accustomed to be treated variously.

Nonnumquam etiam ipse patronus has partes subit (ut Cicero pro Milone: "O me miserum! O te infelicem! Revocare me tu in patriam, Milo, potuisti per hos, ego te in patria per eosdem retinere non potero?") maximeque si, ut tum accidit, non conveniunt ei qui accusatur preces; XXV.

Sometimes even the patron himself undertakes these parts (as Cicero on behalf of Milo: "O wretched me! O unhappy you! You, Milo, were able to recall me into my fatherland through these men; shall I not be able to retain you in your fatherland by means of the same men?") and especially if, as then happened, entreaties do not suit him who is accused; 25.

nam quis ferret Milonem pro capite suo supplicantem qui a se virum nobilem interfectum quia id fieri oportuisset fateretur? Ergo et illi captavit ex ipsa praestantia animi favorem et in locum lacrimarum eius ipse successit.

for who would endure Milo supplicating for his life, he who confessed that a noble man had been slain by him because it ought to have been done? Therefore he too courted favor for that man from the very preeminence of his spirit, and he himself stepped into the place of his tears.

His praecipue locis utiles sunt prosopopoeiae, id est fictae alienarum personarum orationes. +Quale litigatore dicit patronum nudae tantum res movent: at cum ipsos loqui fingimus, ex personis quoque trahitur adfectus. XXVI.

In these places chiefly prosopopoeias are useful, that is, feigned orations of other persons. +For example, a litigant says the patron is moved only by bare facts: but when we pretend that they themselves are speaking, affect too is drawn from the personae. 26.

Non enim audire iudex videtur aliena mala deflentis, sed sensum ac vocem auribus accipere miserorum, quorum etiam mutus aspectus lacrimas movet: quantoque essent miserabiliora si ea dicerent ipsi, tanto sunt quadam portione ad adficiendum potentiora cum velut ipsorum ore dicuntur, ut scaenicis actoribus eadem vox eademque pronuntiatio plus ad movendos adfectus sub persona valet. XXVII. Itaque idem Cicero, quamquam preces non dat Miloni eumque potius animi praestantia commendat, accommodavit tamen ei verba, convenientis etiam forti viro conquestiones: "Frustra" inquit "mei suscepti labores!

For the judge does not seem to hear the alien evils of one bewailing them, but to receive into his ears the feeling and the voice of the wretched, whose mute aspect too moves tears: and by as much as they would be more pitiable if they themselves were saying these things, by so much are they, in a certain portion, more potent for affecting when they are said as it were by their very mouth, just as for stage actors the same voice and the same pronuntiation has more power for moving affections under a persona. 27. Therefore the same Cicero, although he does not give prayers for Milo and rather commends him for the excellence of spirit, nevertheless accommodated to him words, complaints suitable even to a brave man: "In vain," he says, "my undertaken labors!"

O spes fallaces! O cogitationes inanes meas!"

O fallacious hopes! O my vain cogitations!"

Numquam tamen debet longa esse miseratio. Nec sine causa dictum est nihil facilius quam lacrimas inarescere. XXVIII.

Never, however, ought commiseration to be long. Nor without cause has it been said that nothing is easier than for tears to dry. 28.

Nam cum etiam veros dolores mitiget tempus, citius evanescat necesse est illa quam dicendo effinximus imago: in qua si moramur, fatigatur lacrimis auditor et requiescit et ab illo quem ceperat impetu ad rationem redit. XXIX. Non patiamur igitur frigescere hoc opus, et adfectum cum ad summum perduxerimus relinquamus, nec speremus fore ut aliena mala quisquam diu ploret, ideoque cum in aliis, tum in hac maxime parte crescere debet oratio, quia quidquid non adicit prioribus etiam detrahere videtur, et facile deficit adfectus qui descendit.

For since even true dolores are mitigated by time, that image which we have fashioned by speaking must of necessity vanish more quickly: in which, if we linger, the auditor is wearied with tears and takes rest and returns from that impetus which he had seized back to reason. 29. Let us not, therefore, allow this work to grow cold, and when we have led the affect up to the summit, let us leave off; nor let us hope that anyone will long weep over others’ evils; and therefore, as in other parts, so most especially in this part the oration ought to grow, because whatever does not add to the prior things even seems to detract, and the affect that descends easily fails.

XXX. Non solum autem dicendo, sed etiam faciendo quaedam lacrimas movemus, unde et producere ipsos qui periclitentur squalidos atque deformes et liberos eorum ac parentis institutum, et ab accusatoribus cruentum gladium ostendi et lecta e vulneribus ossa et vestes sanguine perfusas videmus, et vulnera resolvi, verberata corpora nudari. XXXI.

30. Not only, moreover, by speaking, but even by doing certain things we move tears, whence too we produce those very persons who are on trial, squalid and deformed, and their children and the parent’s instituted character; and we see a blood-stained sword displayed by the accusers, and bones gathered from the wounds, and garments perfused with blood, and wounds unbound, bodies that have been scourged laid bare. 31.

Quarum rerum ingens plerumque vis est velut in rem praesentem animos hominum ducentium, ut populum Romanum egit in furorem praetexta C. Caesaris praelata in funere cruenta. Sciebatur interfectum eum, corpus denique ipsum impositum lecto erat, [at] vestis tamen illa sanguine madens ita repraesentavit imaginem sceleris ut non occisus esse Caesar sed tum maxime occidi videretur. XXXII.

The force of these things is for the most part immense, as if leading the minds of men into the very present scene, as the blood-stained praetexta of Gaius Caesar, brought forth at the funeral, drove the Roman people into frenzy. It was known that he had been killed; the body itself, moreover, had been placed upon the bier, [but] that garment, dripping with blood, so made present the image of the crime that Caesar seemed not to have been slain, but to be being slain at that very moment. 32.

Sed non ideo probaverim, quod factum et lego et ipse aliquando vidi, depictam in tabula sipariove imaginem rei cuius atrocitate iudex erat commovendus: quae enim est actoris infantia qui mutam illam effigiem magis quam orationem pro se putet locuturam? XXXIII. At sordes et squalorem et propinquorum quoque similem habitum scio profuisse, et magnum ad salutem momentum preces attulisse; quare et obsecratio illa iudicum per carissima pignora, utique si et reo sint liberi coniux parentes, utilis erit, et deorum etiam invocatio velut ex bona conscientia profecta videri solet;XXXIV.

But I would not therefore approve what has been done—and which I read of and have myself sometimes seen—namely, a painted image on a panel or on a curtain of a matter by whose atrocity the judge was to be moved: for what childishness of the accuser is it, who thinks that that mute effigy will speak for him rather than the oration? 33. But I know that filth and squalor, and a similar attire of kinsfolk too, have been of profit, and that prayers have brought great momentum toward safety; wherefore that adjuration of the judges by their dearest pledges, especially if the defendant too has children, a spouse, parents, will be useful, and the invocation of the gods also is wont to seem as though proceeding from a good conscience;34.

stratum denique iacere et genua complecti, nisi si tamen persona nos et ante acta vita et rei condicio prohibebit; quaedam enim tam fortiter tuenda quam facta sunt. Verum sic habenda est auctoritatis ratio ne sit invisa securitas. XXXV.

to lie prostrate, finally, and to clasp the knees—unless, to be sure, our persona and our previously lived life and the condition of the matter will prohibit us; for certain things must be defended as bravely as they were done. But regard for authority must be maintained in such a way that security be not hated. 35.

fuit quondam inter haec omnia potentissimum quo L. Murenam Cicero accusantibus clarissimis viris eripuisse praecipue videtur, persuasitque nihil esse ad praesentem rerum statum utilius quam duos kal. Ian. ingredi consulatum.

Once, among all these things, there was a most potent argument, by which Cicero seems especially to have rescued L. Murena from very illustrious men who were accusing him; and he persuaded that nothing was more useful to the present state of affairs than that two should enter upon the consulship on January 1.

Quod genus nostris temporibus totum paene sublatum est, cum omnia curae tutelaeque unius innixa periclitari nullo iudicii exitu possint.

This kind has in our times been almost entirely taken away, since, with everything leaning upon the care and tutelage of one person, they can be in peril with no outcome of judgment.

XXXVI. De accusatoribus et reis sum locutus quia in periculis maxime versatur adfectus. Sed privatae quoque causae utrumque habent perorationis genus, et illud quod est ex enumeratione probationum et hoc quod ex lacrimis, si aut statu periclitari aut opinione litigator videtur.

36. I have spoken about accusers and defendants, because emotion is most especially involved in perils. But private cases also have both types of peroration, both that which is from the enumeration of proofs and that which is from tears, if the litigant seems to be at risk either in status or in reputation.

Nam in parvis quidem litibus has tragoedias movere tale est quasi si personam Herculis et coturnos aptare infantibus velis.

For in small suits, to stage such tragedies is like wishing to fit Hercules’ persona and the cothurni onto infants.

XXXVII. Ne illud quidem indignum est admonitione, ingens in epilogis meo iudicio verti discrimen quo modo se dicenti qui excitatur accommodet. Nam et imperitia et rusticitas et rigor et deformitas adferunt interim frigus, diligenterque sunt haec actori providenda.

37. Nor is that unworthy of admonition: in epilogues, in my judgment, a huge critical difference turns on how the one who is stirred accommodates himself to the speaker. For both inexperience and rusticity and rigidity and deformity at times bring a chill; and these things must be carefully provided for by the speaker.

XXXVIII. Equidem repugnantis patrono et nihil vultu commotos et intempestive residentis et facto aliquo vel ipso vultu risum etiam moventis saepe vidi, praecipue vero cum aliqua velut scaenice fiunt [aliam cadunt]. XXXIX. Transtulit aliquando patronus puellam, quae soror esse adversarii dicebatur (nam de hoc lis erat), in adversa subsellia, tamquam in gremio fratris relicturus; at is a nobis praemonitus discesserat.

38. Indeed I have often seen an advocate who resists, and who is not at all moved in countenance, and who sits down untimely, and who by some act or by his very look even provokes laughter, especially when certain things are done, as it were, scenically [fall another way]. 39. On one occasion an advocate transferred a girl, who was said to be the adversary’s sister (for the suit was about this), onto the opposite benches, as though about to leave her in her brother’s lap; but he, having been forewarned by us, had gone away.

tum ille, alioqui vir facundus, inopinatae rei casu obmutuit et infantem suam frigidissime reportavit. XL. Alius imaginem mariti pro rea proferre magni putavit, at ea risum saepius fecit. Nam et ii quorum officii erat ut traderent eam, ignari qui esset epilogus, quotiens respexisset patronus offerebant palam, et prolata novissime deformitate ipsa (nam senis cadaveri cera erat infusa) praeteritam quoque orationis gratiam perdidit.

Then he, a man otherwise eloquent, by the accident of an unexpected matter was struck dumb and carried back his child most coldly. 40. Another thought it a great thing to bring forward the image of the husband in place of the accused woman, but this repeatedly provoked laughter. For those whose duty it was to hand it over, unaware what the epilogue was, whenever the patron looked back kept offering it openly; and when at the very end it was produced, by the deformity itself (for wax had been poured onto an old man’s cadaver) he even lost the grace of the speech that had gone before.

XLI. Nec ignotum quid Glyconi, cui Spiridion fuit cognomen, acciderit. huic puer, quem is productum quid fleret interrogabat, a paedagogo se vellicari respondit.

41. Nor is it unknown what happened to Glycon, whose cognomen was Spiridion. to him a boy, whom he, after he had been brought forward, was asking why he was weeping, replied that he was being pinched by the pedagogue.

Sed nihil illa circa Caepasios Ciceronis fabula efficacius ad pericula epilogorum. XLII. Omnia tamen haec tolerabilia iis quibus actionem mutare facile est: at qui a stilo non recedunt aut conticescunt ad hos casus aut frequentissime falsa dicunt.

But nothing is more efficacious than that tale of Cicero about the Caepasii for the perils of epilogues. 42. Yet all these things are tolerable for those to whom it is easy to alter the action: but those who do not depart from the stylus either fall silent at such contingencies or most frequently speak falsehoods.

Inde est enim "tendit ad genua vestra supplices manus" et "haeret in complexu liberorum miser" et "revocat ecce me" etiam si nihil horum is de quo dicitur faciat. XLIII. Ex scholis haec vitia, in quibus omnia libere fingimus et inpune, quia pro facto est quidquid voluimus; non admittit hoc idem veritas, egregieque Cassius dicenti adulescentulo: "quid me torvo vultu intueris, Severe?" "non mehercule" inquit "faciebam, sed sic scripsisti: ecce!" et quam potuit truculentissime eum aspexit.

Hence comes, indeed, “he stretches suppliant hands toward your knees” and “the wretched man clings in the embrace of his children” and “look, he calls me back,” even if the one of whom it is said does none of these things. 43. From the schools are these vices, in which we freely feign everything and with impunity, because whatever we wished is as good as done; truth does not admit this same thing, and most excellently Cassius to a young man who was speaking: “Why do you gaze upon me with a grim countenance, Severus?” “By Hercules, I was not doing so,” he said, “but thus you wrote: look!” and he stared at him as truculently as he could.

XLIV. Illud praecipue monendum, ne qui nisi summis ingenii viribus ad movendas lacrimas adgredi audeat; nam ut est longe vehementissimus hic cum invaluit adfectus, ita si nil efficit tepet; quem melius infirmus actor tacitis iudicum cogitationibus reliquisset. XLV.

44. This must be especially admonished: let no one dare to approach the moving of tears unless with the highest powers of genius; for just as this emotion is by far most vehement when it has prevailed, so, if it effects nothing, it grows tepid—something which a feeble performer would have done better to leave to the silent reflections of the judges. 45.

Nam et vultus et vox et ipsa illa excitati rei facies ludibrio etiam plerumque sunt hominibus quos non permoverunt. Quare metiatur ac diligenter aestimet vires suas actor, et quantum onus subiturus sit intellegat: nihil habet ista res medium, sed aut lacrimas meretur aut risum.

For both the countenance and the voice and even that very visage of the aroused matter are for derision, for the most part, to those whom they have not moved. Therefore let the actor measure and diligently estimate his own forces, and understand how great a burden he is about to undergo: this matter has no middle ground, but either merits tears or laughter.

XLVI. Non autem commovere tantum miserationem sed etiam discutere epilogi est proprium, cum oratione continua, quae motos lacrimis iudices ad iustitiam reducat, tum etiam quibusdam urbane dictis, quale est "date puero panem, ne ploret", XLVII. et corpulento litigatori, cuius adversarius, item puer, circa iudices erat ab advocato latus: "Quid faciam?

XLVI. It is proper to the epilogue not only to move commiseration but also to disperse it, both by a continuous speech, which may lead back judges moved to tears to justice, and also by certain urbane sayings, such as is "give the boy bread, lest he cry," XLVII. and to a corpulent litigant, whose adversary, likewise a boy, was borne around the judges by his advocate: "What am I to do?"

Ego te baiulare non possum". Sed haec tamen non debent esse nimica. Itaque nec illum probaverim, quamquam inter clarissimos sui temporis oratores fuit, qui pueris in epilogum productis talos iecit in medium, quos illi diripere coeperunt; namque haec ipsa discriminis sui ignorantia potuit esse miserabilis: XLVIII. neque illum qui, cum esset cruentus gladius ab accusatore prolatus, quo is hominem probabat occisum, subito ex subsellis ut territus fugit, et capite ex parte velato, cum ad tagendumt ex tarba prospexisset, interrogavit an iam ille cum gladio recessisset.

"I cannot carry you." But these, nevertheless, ought not to be too inimical. Accordingly, I would not approve that man either, although he was among the most renowned orators of his time, who, when boys had been brought forward in the epilogue, threw knucklebones into the middle, which they began to snatch up; for this very ignorance of their own crisis could have been pitiable: 48. nor that man who, when a bloody sword had been produced by the accuser, by which he was proving that a man had been slain, suddenly fled from the benches as though terrified, and, with his head partly veiled, when he had peered out from the crowd to take a look, asked whether that fellow had now withdrawn with the sword.

Fecit enim risum, sed ridiculus fuit. XLIX. Discutiendae tamen oratione eius modi scaenae, egregieque Cicero, qui contra imaginem Saturnini pro Rabirio graviter, et contra iuvenem cuius subinde vulnus in iudicio resolvebatur pro Vareno multa dixit urbane.

For he did make laughter, but he was ridiculous. 49. Nevertheless scenes of this sort should be dispelled by speech; and Cicero did this excellently, who, against the image of Saturninus on behalf of Rabirius, spoke gravely, and, against the youth whose wound was repeatedly being unbound in the court, on behalf of Varenus, said many things urbanely.

L. sunt et illi leniores epilogi, quibus adversario satisfacimus, si forte sit eius persona talis ut illi debeatur reverentia, aut cum amice aliquid commonemus et ad concordiam hortamur. Quod est genus egregie tractatum a Passieno, cum in Domitiae uxoris suae pecuniaria lite adversus fratrem eius Aenobarbum ageret; nam cum de necessitudine multa dixisset, de fortuna quoque, qua uterque abundabat, adiecit: "nihil vobis minus deest quam de quo contenditis".

50. there are also those gentler epilogues, in which we satisfy the adversary, if perchance his persona is such that reverence is owed to him, or when we amicably admonish something and exhort to concord. This is a kind excellently handled by Passienus, when, in the pecuniary suit of his wife Domitia against her brother Aenobarbus, he was conducting the case; for when he had said many things about kinship, about fortune too, in which each abounded, he added: "nothing is less lacking to you than that about which you contend".

LI. Omnis autem hos adfectus, etiam si quibusdam videntur in prohoemio atque in epilogo sedem habere, in quibus sane sint frequentissimi, tamen aliae quoque partes recipiunt, sed breviores, ut cum ex iis plurima sint reservanda. At hic, si usquam, totos eloquentiae aperire fontes licet. LII.

51. All these affects, moreover, even if to some they seem to have their seat in the proem and in the epilogue, in which indeed they are most frequent, yet other parts also admit them, but in briefer form, since the greater part of them ought to be reserved for these. But here, if anywhere, it is permitted to open the full springs of eloquence. 52.

Nam et, si bene diximus reliqua, possidebimus iam iudicum animos, et e confragosis atque asperis evecti tota pandere possumus vela, et, cum sit maxima pars epilogi amplificatio, verbis atque sententiis uti licet magnificis et ornatis. tunc est commovendum theatrum cum ventum est ad ipsum illud quo veteres tragoediae comoediaeque cluduntur "plodite".

For also, if we have spoken the rest well, we shall already possess the minds of the judges, and, borne out of the rugged and rough places, we can spread all the sails, and, since the greatest part of the epilogue is amplification, it is permitted to use words and thoughts magnificent and adorned. then the theater must be stirred when it has come to that very point with which the old tragedies and comedies are closed, "applaud".

LIII. In aliis autem partibus tractandus erit adfectus ut quisque nascetur; nam neque exponi sine hoc res atroces et miserabiles debent, cum de qualitate alicuius rei quaestio est, et probationibus unius cuiusque rei recte subiungitur. LIV.

53. In the other parts, however, affect must be handled as each arises; for neither ought atrocious and miserable matters to be set forth without this, when the question is about the quality of some matter, and it is rightly subjoined to the proofs of each particular point. 54.

Vbi vero coniunctam ex pluribus causam agimus, etiam necesse erit uti pluribus quasi epilogis, ut in Verrem Cicero fecit; nam et Philodamo et navarchis et cruci civis Romani et aliis plurimis suas lacrimas dedit. LV. Sunt qui hos merikous epilogous vocent, quo partitam perorationem significant. Mihi non tam partes eius quam species videntur, si quidem et epilogi et perorationis nomina ipsa aperte satis ostendunt hanc esse consummationem orationis.

When indeed we plead a case conjoined out of several, it will even be necessary to use several, as it were, epilogues, as Cicero did in Verrem; for he gave his tears to Philodamus and to the navarchs and to the cross of a Roman citizen and to very many others. 55. There are those who call these merikous epilogous, by which they signify a divided peroration. To me they seem not so much its parts as its species, since indeed the very names epilogue and peroration themselves plainly enough show that this is the consummation of the oration.

[2] I. Quamvis autem pars haec iudicialium causarum summe praecipueque constet adfectibus et aliqua de iis necessario dixerim, non tamen potui ac ne debui quidem istum locum in unam speciem concludere. Quare adhuc opus superest cum ad optinenda quae volumus potentissimum, tum supra dictis multo difficilius, movendi iudicum animos atque in eum quem volumus habitum formandi et velut transfigurandi. II. Qua de re pauca quae postulabat materia sic attigi ut magis quid oporteret fieri quam quo id modo consequi possemus ostenderem.

[2] 1. Although this part of judicial causes in the highest degree and especially consists of affections, and I have necessarily said some things about them, yet I could not, and indeed ought not, to confine this place to one kind. Wherefore there still remains work, both that which is most powerful for obtaining the things we wish, and, much more difficult than the aforesaid, that of moving the minds of the judges and of shaping them into the disposition which we desire and, as it were, transfiguring them. 2. On which matter I have touched upon a few things that the subject demanded, in such a way that I showed rather what ought to be done than by what method we could achieve it.

Nunc altius omnis rei repetenda ratio est.

Now the rationale of the whole matter must be resumed from a higher point.

Nam et per totam, ut diximus, causam locus est adfectibus, et eorum non simplex natura nec in transitu tractanda. III. Quo nihil adferre maius vis orandi potest: nam cetera forsitan tenuis quoque et angusta ingeni vena, si modo vel doctrina vel usu sit adiuta, generare atque ad frugem aliquam perducere queat: certe sunt semperque fuerunt non parum qui satis perite quae essent probationibus utilia reperirent.

Nam both through the whole, as we have said, case there is place for affections, and their nature is not simple nor to be handled in passing. 3. Than which the force of pleading can bring nothing greater: for the rest perhaps even a slender and narrow vein of talent, if only it be aided by doctrine or by use, can generate and bring to some fruition: certainly there are and always have been not a few who quite skillfully discover the things that are useful for proofs.

Quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo, ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum, atque (ut dicam quod sentio) dignos a quibus causam diserti docerentur: qui vero iudicem rapere et in quem vellet habitum animi posset perducere, quo dicente flendum irascendum esset, rarus fuit. IV. Atqui hoc est quod dominetur in iudiciis: hic eloquentia regnat. Namque argumenta plerumque nascuntur ex causa, et pro meliore parte plura sunt semper, ut qui per haec vicit tantum non defuisse sibi advocatum sciat:V. ubi vero animis iudicum vis adferenda est et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est.

Whom indeed I do not contemn, but I believe them useful thus far, lest anything be unknown to the judge through them, and (to say what I feel) men worthy by whom the eloquent might be taught the case: but he who could snatch the judge and lead him into whatever disposition of mind he wished, at whose speaking it would be time to weep, to grow angry, has been rare. 4. And yet this is what dominates in trials: here eloquence reigns. For arguments for the most part are born from the case, and on the better side they are always more numerous, so that he who has prevailed by these may know that he all but lacked an advocate:5. but where a force must be brought to the minds of the judges and the mind must be led away from the very contemplation of the true, there is the proper work of the orator.

Hoc non docet litigator, hoc causarum libellis non continetur. Probationes enim efficiant sane ut causam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus praestant ut etiam velint; sed id quod volunt credunt quoque. VI. Nam cum irasci favere odisse misereri coeperunt, agi iam rem suam existimant, et, sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt quia sensum oculorum praecipit animus, ita omnem veritatis inquirendae rationem iudex omittit occupatus adfectibus: aestu fertur et velut rapido flumini obsequitur.

This the litigant does not teach; this is not contained in the briefs of causes. For proofs indeed may bring it to pass that the judges think our case the better; affections procure that they even will it; but what they will they also believe. 6. For when they have begun to be angry, to favor, to hate, to pity, they suppose that their own affair is already being transacted; and, just as lovers cannot judge of beauty because the animus overrules the sense of the eyes, so the judge, occupied with affections, omits every method of inquiring into truth: he is carried along by the surge and, as it were, complies with a rapid river.

VII. Ita argumenta ac testes quid egerint pronuntiatio ostendit, commotus autem ab oratore iudex quid sentiat sedens adhuc atque audiens confitetur. An cum ille qui plerisque perorationibus petitur fletus erupit, non palam dicta sententia est?

7. Thus delivery shows what the arguments and witnesses have done, and a judge, moved by the orator, confesses—still sitting and listening—what he feels. Or when that weeping which is sought in most perorations bursts forth, is not the verdict openly spoken?

huc igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus eius, hic labor est, sine quo cetera nuda ieiuna infirma ingrata sunt: adeo velut spiritus operis huius atque animus est in adfectibus.

To this, therefore, let the orator apply himself; this is his work, this is his labor, without which the rest are naked, jejune, infirm, ungrateful: so much so that, as it were, the spirit of this work and its soul are in the affections.

VIII. Horum autem, sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci pathos vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus, alteram ethos, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus: mores appellantur, atque inde pars quoque illa philosophiae ethike moralis est dicta. IX. Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur quam morum quaedam proprietas; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus mentis continetur.

8. Of these, moreover, as we have received handed down from ancient times, there are two species: the Greeks call the one pathos, which, translating it, we rightly and properly call affect, the other ethos, for whose name, as I for my part think, the Roman speech lacks: they are called mores, and from this that part also of philosophy has been called ethical, moral. 9. But to me, looking to the very nature of the matter, it seems that not so much mores are signified as a certain property of mores; for in mores themselves indeed every habit of mind is contained.

Cautiores voluntatem complecti quam nomina interpretari maluerunt. Adfectus igitur hos concitatos, illos mites atque compositos esse dixerunt: in altero vehementes motus, in altero lenes, denique hos imperare, illos persuadere, hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere. X. Adiciunt quidam ethos perpetuum, pathos temporale esse.

The more cautious preferred to embrace the intention rather than to interpret the names. Therefore they said that these affections are stirred, those mild and composed: in the one vehement motions, in the other gentle; finally, that these command, those persuade; that these prevail toward perturbation, those toward benevolence. 10. Some add that ethos is perpetual, pathos temporal.

Quod ut accidere frequentius fateor, ita nonnullas credo esse materias quae continuum desiderent adfectum. Nec tamen minus artis aut usus hi leniores habent, virium atque impetus non tantundem exigunt. In causis vero etiam pluribus versantur, immo secundum quendam intellectum in omnibus.

Although I confess that this happens more frequently, yet I believe there are some materials that desire a continuous affect. Nor, however, do these gentler ones have less of art or of use; they do not require as much strength and impetus. In causes, indeed, they are employed in even more cases—nay, in a certain understanding, in all.

XI. Nam +cum ex illo et hoc loco nihil non ab oratore tractetur+, quidio quid de honestis et utilibus, denique faciendis ac non faciendis dicitur, ethos vocari potest. Quidam commendationem atque excusationem propria huius officii putaverunt, nec abnuo esse ista in hac parte, sed non concedo ut sola sint. XII.

11. For +since from both that and this topic the orator handles everything+, whatever is said about honorable and useful things, and finally about things to be done and not to be done, can be called ethos. Certain people have thought commendation and excuse to be proper to this office; nor do I deny that these belong in this part, but I do not concede that they are the only things. 12.

Quin illud adhuc adicio, pathos atque ethos esse interim ex eadem natura, ita ut illud maius sit, hoc minus, ut amor pathos, caritas ethos, interdum diversa inter se, sicut in epilogis; nam quae pathos concitavit, ethos solet mitigare. Proprie tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari videtur. XIII.

Nay, I add this besides, that pathos and ethos are sometimes from the same nature, such that the former is greater, the latter lesser—so that love is pathos, charity is ethos—yet at times they are different from each other, as in epilogues; for the things which pathos has stirred up, ethos is wont to mitigate. Properly, however, the nature of this name must be expressed by me, inasmuch as by the appellation itself it does not seem to be sufficiently signified. 13.

Ethos, quod intellegimus quodque a dicentibus desideramus, id erit quod ante omnia bonitate commendabitur, non solum mite ac placidum, sed plerumque blandum et humanum et audientibus amabile atque iucundum, in quo exprimendo summa virtus ea est, ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur, quo mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodam modo agnoscantur. XIV. Quod est sine dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas, quotiens ferimus ignoscimus satisfacimus monemus, procul ab ira, procul ab odio.

Ethos, which we understand and which we desire from speakers, will be that which before all else is commended by goodness, not only mild and placid, but for the most part ingratiating and humane and, to the listeners, amiable and pleasant; in expressing which the highest excellence is this: that all things seem to flow from the nature of things and of men, whereby the character of the speaker shines through from the oration and is in a certain manner recognized. 14. Which is without doubt especially among persons most closely connected, whenever we forbear, forgive, make amends, admonish, far from anger, far from hatred.

Sed tamen alia patris adversus filium, tutoris adversus pupillum, mariti adversus uxorem moderatio est (hi enim praeferunt eorum ipsorum a quibus laeduntur caritatem, neque alio modo invisos eos faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur), alia cum senex adulescentis alieni convicium, honestus inferioris fert; hic enim tantum concitari, illic etiam adfici debet. XV. sunt et illa ex eadem natura, sed motus adhuc minoris, veniam petere adulescentiae, defendere amores. Nonnumquam etiam lenis caloris affeni derisus ex hac forma venit, sed is non ex iocis tantum.

But yet there is one kind of moderation of a father against a son, of a tutor against a ward, of a husband against a wife (for these set before themselves the charity of the very persons by whom they are hurt, nor do they make them odious in any other way than that they themselves seem to love), another when an old man bears the abuse of another’s youth, an honorable man that of an inferior; here he ought only to be stirred, there he ought also to be affected. 15. There are also those from the same nature, but with a motion still smaller: to ask pardon for youth, to defend love affairs. Sometimes even a derision akin to gentle warmth comes from this form, but that not from jests only.

Verum aliquanto magis propria fuerit virtutis simulatio satisfaciendi rogandi, et eironeia, quae diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit. XVI. Hinc etiam ille maior ad concitandum odium nasci adfectus solet, cum hoc ipso quod nos adversariis summittimus intellegitur tacita inpotentiae exprobratio: namque eos gravis et intolerabiles id ipsum demonstrat, quod cedimus.

But somewhat more proper will be the simulation of virtue in making satisfaction and in requesting, and eironeia, which seeks an understanding different from what it says. 16. Hence also that greater affect for stirring up hatred is wont to arise, when in this very thing that we lower ourselves to our adversaries there is understood a silent exprobration of impotence: for that very thing, that we yield, demonstrates them to be grievous and intolerable.

Et ignorant cupidi maledicendi aut adfectatores libertatis plus invidiam quam convicium posse; nam invidia adversarios, convicium nos invisos facit. XVII. Ille iam paene medius adfectus est ex amoribus, ex desideriis amicorum et necessariorum; nam et hoc maior est et ino minor.

And those greedy for slander or affectators of liberty are ignorant that envy can do more than reviling; for envy makes the adversaries hated, reviling makes us hated. 17. That is now an almost middle affect, arising from loves, from the desires of friends and kinsmen; for in this it is greater and in that lesser.

Non parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ethe dixerimus, quibus plerumque rusticos superstitiosos avaros timidos secundum condicionem positionum effingimus; nam si mores ethe sunt, cum hos imitamur ex his ducimus orationem.

Not without notable significance we have also in the schools called those things ethe, by which we most often portray rustics, superstitious, avaricious, timid, according to the condition of the positions; for if mores are ethe, when we imitate these, from these we draw the speech.

XVIII. Denique ethos omne bonum et comem virum poscit. Quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, adprobare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur.

18. Finally, ethos demands a good and affable man. Which virtues, since the orator ought, if possible, to approve even in the litigator, he should surely either have himself or be believed to have.

Sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem. Nam qui dum dicit malus videtur utique male dicit [non enim videtur iusta dicere, alioqui ethos non videretur). XIX. Quare ipsum etiam dicendi genus in hoc placidum esse debet ac mite, nihil superbum, nihil elatum saltem ac sublime desiderat: proprie iucunde credibiliter dicere sat est, ideoque ei medius ille orationis modus maxime convenit.

Thus it will be of the greatest benefit to causes, for which by his own goodness he will create trust. For he who, while he speaks, seems evil undoubtedly speaks ill [for he does not seem to speak just things, otherwise ethos would not seem). 19. Wherefore the very kind of speaking in this matter ought to be calm and gentle, desires nothing proud, nothing exalted, nor anything lofty or sublime: to speak appropriately, pleasantly, credibly is enough, and therefore that middle mode of oration is most fitting for it.

XX. Diversum est huic quod pathos dicitur quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus, et, ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile. Haec pars circa iram odium metum invidiam miserationem fere tota versatur, quae quibus ex locis ducenda sint et manifestum omnibus et a nobis in ratione prohoemii atque epilogi dictum est. XXI.

20. Different from this is what is called pathos, and what we properly call affect; and, to mark briefly the difference of the two, the former is more like comedy, the latter more like tragedy. This part is occupied almost entirely with anger, odium (hatred), fear, envy, and commiseration; and from which topics (loci) these are to be drawn is both manifest to all and has been stated by us in the discussion of the proem and the epilogue. 21.

Et metum tamen duplicem intellegi volo, quem patimur et quem facimus, et invidiam: namque altera invidum, altera invidiosum facit. Hoc autem hominis, illud rei est, in quo +et plus+ habet operis oratio. Nam quaedam videntur gravia per se, parricidium caedes veneficium, quaedam efficienda sunt.

And yet I want fear to be understood as twofold, the kind we undergo and the kind we cause, and envy: for the one makes a man envious, the other invidious. The former is of the person, the latter of the matter, in which +and more+ of work the speech has. For certain things seem grave in themselves, parricide, slaughter, poisoning; others must be made so.

XXII. Id autem contingit cum magnis alioqui malis gravius esse id quod passi sumus ostenditur, quale est apud Vergilium:"o felix una ante alias Priameia virgo,hostilem ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altisiussa mori" -quam miser enim casus Andromachae si comparata ei felix Polyxena:XXIII. aut cum ita exaggeramus iniuriam nostram ut etiam quae multo minora sunt intoleranda dicamus: "si pulsasses, defendi non poteras: vulnerasti". Sed haec diligentius cum de amplificatione dicemus.

22. This, moreover, happens when, amid otherwise great evils, that which we have suffered is shown to be more grievous, as it is in Vergil: "O happy above others, Priamian maiden, ordered to die at the hostile tomb beneath the lofty walls of Troy" — how wretched indeed the lot of Andromache, if, compared to her, happy Polyxena: 23. or when we so exaggerate our injury that we say that even things much smaller are intolerable: "If you had struck, you could not be defended: you have wounded." But we shall discuss these matters more carefully when we speak about amplification.

Interim notasse contentus sum non id solum agere adfectus, ut quae sunt ostendantur acerba ac luctuosa, sed etiam ut quae toleranda haberi solent gravia videantur, ut cum in maledicto plus iniuriae quam in manu, in infamia plus poenae dicimus quam in morte. XXIV. Namque in hoc eloquentiae vis est, ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat in quod ipsa rei natura ducetur, sed aut qui non est aut maiorem quam est faciat adfectum.

Meanwhile I have been content to have noted that affect does not aim only that the things be shown as bitter and mournful, but also that things which are wont to be held tolerable seem grave, as when we say in slander there is more injury than in the hand, and in infamy more penalty than in death. 24. For in this is the force of eloquence, that it compels the judge not only to that to which the nature of the matter itself would be led, but either to produce an affect that is not, or to make it greater than it is.

Haec est illa quae dinosis vocatur, rebus indignis asperis invidiosis addens vim oratio, qua virtute praeter alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit.

This is that which is called deinosis, an oration adding force to unworthy, harsh, and invidious matters, in which virtue, beyond others, Demosthenes was most powerful.

XXV. Quod si tradita mihi sequi praecepta sufficeret, satisfeceram huic parti nihil eorum quae legi vel didici, quod modo probabile fuit, omittendo: sed promere in animo est quae latent et penitus ipsa huius loci aperire penetralia, quae quidem non aliquo tradente sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi. XXVI.

25. But if it were sufficient for me to follow the precepts handed down, I would have satisfied this part by omitting nothing of those things which I have read or learned, which for the moment was plausible: but it is in my mind to bring forth the things that lie hidden and to open up thoroughly the very inner sanctums of this place, which indeed I have received not with someone handing them down, but with my own experience and Nature herself as guide. 26.

summa enim, quantum ego quidem sentio, circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur ipsi. Nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio, si verba vultumque tantum, non etiam animum accommodarimus. Quid enim aliud est causae ut lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare videantur, et ira nonnumquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat, quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum?

For the sum, so far as I at least perceive, in stirring the affects is placed in this: that we ourselves be moved. For both grief and anger and indignation will sometimes have a laughable imitation, if we have accommodated only the words and the countenance, and not the mind as well. For what else is the cause that mourners, especially in recent pain, seem to cry out certain things most eloquently, and that anger sometimes makes even the unlearned eloquent, than that there is in them a force of mind and the very truth of their mores?

XXVII. Quare, in iis quae esse veri similia volemus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur adfectibus, et a tali animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudici volet. An ire dolebit qui audiet me, qui in hoc dicam, non dolentem?

27. Wherefore, in those things which we would have be verisimilar, let us ourselves be like those who truly suffer the affections, and let the oration proceed from such a mind as he will wish to make in the judge. Or will he grieve who will hear me, I who in this speak not grieving?

Irascetur, si nihil ipse qui in iram concitat ei quod exigit simile patietur? Siccis agentis oculis lacrimas dabit? Fieri non potest:XXVIII.

Will he be angry, if he who incites to anger himself endures nothing similar to that which he exacts? With the dry eyes of one acting will he give tears? It cannot be done:28.

nec incendit nisi ignis nec madescimus nisi umore "nec res ura dat alteri colorem quem non ipsa habet". Primum est igitur ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud iudicem volumus, adficiamurque antequam adficere conemur. XXIX. At quo modo fiet ut adficiamur?

nor does anything ignite except fire, nor do we become wet except by moisture "nor does a thing give to another a color which it does not itself have". Therefore the first point is that the things which we wish to prevail with the judge should prevail with us, and that we be affected before we attempt to affect. 29. But how will it come about that we are affected?

Neque enim sunt motus in nostra potestate. Temptabo etiam de hoc dicere. Quas phantasias Graeci vocant (nos sane visiones appellemus),per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur, has quisquis bene ceperit is erit in adfectibus potentissimus.

For the motions are not in our power. I will attempt also to speak about this. Those which the Greeks call phantasies (let us indeed call them visions), through which images of absent things are so represented to the mind that we seem to discern them with the eyes and to have them as present, whoever shall have well seized these will be most powerful in the affections.

XXX. [Has] Quidam dicunt euphantasioton qui sibi res voces actus secundum verum optime finget: quod quidem nobis volentibus facile continget; nisi vero inter otie animorum et spes inanes et velut somnia quaedam vigilantium ita nos hae de quibus loquor imagines prosecuntur ut peregrinari navigare proeliari, populos adloqui, divitiarum quas non habemus usum videamur disponere, nec cogitare sed facere: hoc animi vitium ad utilitatem non transferemus. XXXI.

30. [These] Some call “euphantasioton” the one who will most excellently fashion for himself things, voices, actions according to the truth: which indeed will easily befall us if we are willing; unless in truth, amid the leisures of our minds and vain hopes and, as it were, certain dreams of those awake, these images of which I speak so pursue us that we seem to travel abroad, to sail, to do battle, to address peoples, to dispose the use of riches which we do not have, and not to think but to do: this fault of the mind we shall not transfer to utility. 31.

[Ad] Hominem occisum queror: non omnia quae in re praesenti accidisse credibile est in oculis habebo? non percussor ille subitus erumpet? non expavescet circumventus, exclamabit vel rogabit vel fugiet?

[Ad] I lodge a complaint that a man has been slain: shall I not have before my eyes all the things which in the present matter it is credible happened? will not that sudden assassin burst forth? will he not, when hemmed in, grow terrified, will he cry out or beg or flee?

non ferientem, non concidenten videbo? non animo sanguis et pallor et gemitus, extremus denique exspirantis hiatus insident? XXXII.

Shall I not see him striking, shall I not see him collapsing? Will not blood and pallor and a groan, and finally the last gasp of the expiring man, settle upon the mind? 32.

Insequentur enargeia, quae a Cicerone inlustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere, et adfectus non aliter quam si rebus ipsis intersimus sequentur. An non ex his visionibus illa sunt:"excussi manibus radii revolutaque pensa","levique patens in pectore vulnus",equus ille in funere Pallantis "positis insignibus"? XXXIII. Quid?

There will follow enargeia, which is named by Cicero illustration and evidence, which seems not so much to speak as to show, and emotions will ensue no otherwise than if we were present at the things themselves. Or are not among such visions those: "the spindles shaken from their hands and the wools rolled back," "a wound lying open on the smooth breast," that horse at the funeral of Pallas "with the insignia laid aside"? 33. What?

non idem poeta penitus ultimi fati cepit imaginem, ut diceret:"et dulcis moriens reminiscitur Argos"? XXXIV. Vbi vero miseratione opus erit, nobis ea de quibus queremur accidisse credamus, atque id animo nostro persuadeamus. nec agamus rem quasi alienam, sed adsumamus parumper illum dolorem: ita dicemus quae in nostro simili casu dicturi essemus.

did not the same poet deeply seize the image of the ultimate fate, so as to say: "and, dying, he remembers sweet Argos"? 34. Where indeed there will be need of commiseration, let us believe that the things about which we complain have happened to us, and let us persuade our own mind of it. Nor let us conduct the matter as though it were alien, but let us assume for a little while that grief: thus we shall say what we would be going to say in a similar case of our own.

XXXV. Vidi ego saepe histriones atque comoedos, cum ex aliquo graviore actu personam deposuissent, flentes adhuc egredi. Quod si in alienis scriptis sola pronuntiatio ita falsis accendit adfectibus, quid nos faciemus, qui illa cogitare debemus ut moveri periclitantium vice possimus?

35. I have often seen actors and comedians, when after some graver act they had laid aside the persona, go out still weeping. And if, in others’ writings, mere pronuntiation thus inflames affections that are feigned, what shall we do—we who ought to think on those things, so that we may be able to be moved in the stead of those in peril?

XXXVI. Sed in schola quoque rebus ipsis adfici convenit, easque veras sibi fingere, hoc magis quod illic litigatores loquimur frequentius quam ut advocati: orbum agimus et naufragum et periclitantem, quorum induere personas quid attinet nisi adfectus adsumimus?

36. But in the school too it is fitting to be affected by the things themselves, and to imagine them as true for oneself, all the more because there we speak more often as litigants than as advocates: we play the orphan, the shipwrecked man, and the one in peril; what is the point of putting on their personae unless we assume the affects?

Haec dissimulanda mihi non fuerunt, quibus ipse, quantuscumque sum aut fui, pervenisse me ad aliquod nomen ingeni credo: frequenter motus sum ut me non lacrimae solum deprenderent, sed paror et veri similis dolor.

These things were not to be dissimulated by me, by which I myself, however great I am or was, believe that I have come to some name of ingenuity: I have frequently been moved, so that not tears only caught me, but terror and a verisimilar pain.

[3] I. huic diversa virtus quae risum iudicis movendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat. Quanta sit autem in ea difficultas vel duo maximi oratores, alter Graecae, alter Latinae eloquentiae princeps, docent:II. nam plerique Demostheni facultatem defuisse huius rei credunt, Ciceroni modum. Nec videri potest noluisse Demosthenes, cuius pauca admodum dicta nec sane ceteris eius virtutibus respondentia palam ostendunt non displicuisse illi iocos sed non contigisse.

[3] 1. to this belongs a different virtue, which, by moving the judge’s laughter, both dissolves those sad affections and frequently diverts the mind from the tension of matters, and sometimes even refreshes it and renews it from satiety or from fatigue. But how great the difficulty is in it, the two greatest orators—one the prince of Greek eloquence, the other of Latin—teach: 2. for most believe that to Demosthenes the faculty of this thing was lacking, to Cicero the moderation. Nor can Demosthenes be thought to have been unwilling, of whom very few sayings, and indeed not answering to his other virtues, plainly show that jokes were not displeasing to him, but did not befall him.

III. Noster vero non solum extra iudicia sed in ipsis etiam orationibus habitus est nimius risus adfectator. Mihi quidem, sive id recte iudico sive amore inmodico praecipui in eloquentia viri labor, mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas.

3. Our man indeed was considered not only outside the courts but even in the very speeches themselves an excessive affecter of laughter. To me, indeed, whether I judge this rightly or whether I suffer from an immoderate love for the preeminent man in eloquence, there seems to have been in him a certain marvelous urbanity.

IV. Nam et in sermone cotidiano multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam quisquam dixit facete, et illa ipsa quae sunt in Verrem dicta frigidius aliis adsignavit et testimonii loco posuit, ut, quo sunt magis vulgaria, eo sit credibilius illa non ab oratore ficta sed passim esse iactata. V. Vtinamque libertus eius Tiro, aut alius, quisquis fuit, qui tris hac de re libros edidit, parcius dictorum numero indulsissent et plus iudicii in eligendis quam in congerendis studii adhibuissent: minus obiectus calumniantibus foret, qui tamen nunc quoque, ut in invenient. VI. Adfert autem rei summam difficultatem primum quod ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est [hoc semper humile], saepe ex industria depravatum, praeterea numquam honorificum: tum varia hominum iudicia in eo quod non ratione aliqua sed motu animi quodam nescio an enarrabili iudicatur.

4. For both in everyday speech he said many things wittily, and in altercations and in questioning witnesses more than anyone, and those very things which are spoken in the Verrine he attributed, more coolly, to others and put them in the place of testimony, so that, the more common they are, the more believable it may be that they were not forged by the orator but were bandied about everywhere. 5. And would that his freedman Tiro, or another, whoever it was, who published three books on this matter, had indulged more sparingly the number of sayings and had applied more judgment in choosing than zeal in heaping together: he would be less exposed to calumniators, who nevertheless even now too, as in such matters, will find. 6. Moreover, what brings the greatest difficulty to the case is, first, that a jesting remark is for the most part false [this always low], often deliberately corrupted, and, besides, never honorific; then the varied judgments of men in that which is judged not by any reasoning but by a certain movement of the mind, I know not whether explicable.

VII. Neque enim ab ullo satis explicari puto, licet multi temptaverint, unde risus, qui non solum facto aliquo dictove, sed interdum quodam etiam corporis tactu lacessitur. Praeterea non una ratione moveri solet: neque enim acute tantum ac venuste, sed stulte iracunde timide dicta ac facta ridentur, ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est, quod a derisu non procul abest risus.

7. For I do not think it can be sufficiently explicated by anyone, though many have attempted, whence laughter, which is provoked not only by some deed or word, but sometimes even by a certain touch of the body. Moreover, it is not wont to be moved by a single rationale: for not only acute and charming things, but foolish, irate, timid words and deeds are laughed at; and therefore the rationale of this matter is two-edged, because laughter is not far from derision.

VIII. Habet enim, ut Cicero dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine: quae cum in aliis demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos dicentis reccidunt, stultitia vocatur.

8. For it has, as Cicero says, its seat in some deformity and turpitude: which, when they are shown in others, is called urbanity; when they fall back upon the very speaker, it is called stupidity.

Cum videatur autem res levis, et quae a scurris, miniis, insipientibus denique saepe moveatur, tamen habet vim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repugnari minime potest. IX. Erumpit etiam invitis saepe, nec vultus modo ac vocis exprimit confessionem, sed totum corpus vi sua concutit. Rerum autem saepe, ut dixi, maximarum momenta vertit, ut cum odium iramque frequentissime frangat.

Although it seems a light thing, and one which is often stirred by buffoons, mimes, and, in fine, the insipient, yet it has a force—I know not whether the most imperious—and one to which it is least possible to resist. 9. It also bursts forth often even against the unwilling; and it expresses a confession not only by the face and the voice, but shakes the whole body by its own force. Moreover, it often, as I said, turns the moments of the greatest matters, as when it most frequently breaks hatred and anger.

X. Documento sunt iuvenes Tarentini, qui multa de rege Pyrrho sequius inter cenam locuti, cum rationem facti reposcerentur et neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu sunt et oportuno ioco elapsi. Namque unus ex iis "immo", inquit, "nisi lagona defecisset, occidissemus te", eaque urbanitate tota est invidia dissoluta.

10. As a proof are the Tarentine youths, who, having spoken many things rather unfavorably about King Pyrrhus during dinner, when an account of the deed was demanded and the matter could neither be denied nor defended, slipped away by laughter and a timely joke. For one of them said, “Nay rather, if the flagon had not failed, we would have killed you,” and by that urbanity all the ill-will was dissolved.

XI. Verum hoc quidquid est, ut non ausim dicere carere omnino arte, quia nonnullam observationem habet suntque ad id pertinentia et a Graecis et a Latinis composita praecepta, ita plane adfirmo praecipue positum esse in natura et in occasione. XII. Porro natura non tantum in hoc valet, ut acutior quis atque habilior sit ad inveniendum (nam id sane doctrina possit augeri), sed inest proprius quibusdam decor in habitu ac vultu, ut eadem illa minus alio dicente urbana esse videantur.

11. But this, whatever it is, though I would not dare to say it is altogether devoid of art—for it has some observation, and precepts pertaining to it have been composed both by Greeks and by Latins—yet I plainly affirm that it is chiefly situated in nature and in occasion. 12. Moreover, nature avails not only in this, that one be sharper and more habil (handy) for invention (for that indeed can be increased by doctrine), but there is inherent in certain persons a peculiar decor in bearing and countenance, such that those same things, when another is the speaker, seem less urbane.

XIII. Occasio vero et in rebus est, (cuius est) tanta vis ut saepe adiuti ea non indocti modo sed etiam rustici salse dicant, et in eo, quid aliquis dixerit prior; sunt enim longe venustiora omnia in respondendo quam in provocando. XIV.

13. Occasion truly is also in the matters themselves, whose force is so great that, aided by it, not only the unlearned but even rustics speak wittily; and in this too, in what someone has said prior; for all things are by far more charming in responding than in provoking. 14.

Accedit difficultati quod eius rei nulla exercitatio est, nulli praeceptores. Itaque in conviviis et sermonibus multi dicaces, quia in hoc usu cotidiano proficimus: oratoria urbanitas rara, nec ex arte propria sed ad hanc consuetudine commodata. XV. Nihil autem vetabat et componi materias in hoc idoneas, ut controversiae permixtis salibus fingerentur, vel res proponi singulas ad iuvenum talem exercitationem.

It is added to the difficulty that there is no exercise of that matter, no preceptors. And so at banquets and in conversations many are witty, because in this everyday use we make progress: oratorical urbanity is rare, and not from its own art but lent to this by custom. 15. Nothing, however, was hindering that materials suitable for this should be composed, so that controversies with salts (witticisms) intermingled might be fashioned, or individual matters be proposed for such an exercise of young men.

XVI. Quin ipsae illae (dicta sunt ac vocantur) quas certis diebus festae licentiae dicere solebamus, si paulum adhibita ratione fingerentur aut aliquid in his senum quoque esset admixtum, plurimum poterant utilitatis adferre: quae nunc iuvenum vel sibi ludentium exercitatio est.

16. Indeed, those very [sayings] (are said and are called) which we were accustomed to utter on certain days of festal license, if they were shaped with a little reason applied, or if something of the elders were mixed into them as well, could bring a very great amount of utility: whereas now they are the exercise of youths, playing for their own amusement.

XVII. Pluribus autem nominibus in eadem re vulgo utimur: quae tamen si diducas, suam quandam propriam vim ostendent. Nam et urbanitas dicitur, qua quidem significari video sermonem praeferentem in verbis et sono et usu proprium quendam gustum urbis et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas.

17. Moreover, we commonly use several names for the same thing; which, however, if you draw them apart, will display a certain proper force of their own. For “urbanity” is also said, by which indeed I see to be signified a speech that in words and in sound and in usage exhibits a certain taste proper to the city and, taken from the conversation of the learned, a tacit erudition—finally, to which the contrary is rusticity.

XVIII. Venustum esse quod cum gratia quadam et venere dicatur apparet. Salsum in consuetudine pro ridiculo tantum accipimus: natura non utique hoc est, quamquam et ridicula esse oporteat salsa.

18. It is apparent that what is said with a certain grace and Venus (loveliness) is charming. “Salty” in common usage we take as only “ridiculous”; by nature this is not necessarily so, although salty things ought also to be laughable.

Nam et Cicero omne quod salsum sit ait esse Atticorum non quia sunt maxime ad risum compositi, et Catullus, cum dicit:"nulla est in corpore mica salis",non hoc dicit, nihil in corpore eius esse ridiculum. XIX. Salsum igitur erit quod non erit insulsum, velut quoddam simplex orationis condimentum, quod sentitur latente iudicio velut palato, excitatque et a taedio defendit orationem.

For Cicero also says that everything which is salty is Attic, not because they are most composed for laughter; and Catullus, when he says: "there is not in the body a grain of salt," is not saying this, that there is nothing ridiculous in his body. 19. Therefore salty will be what is not insipid (unsalted), as a certain simple condiment of oration, which is sensed by a latent judgment as by a palate, and it both excites the oration and defends it from tedium.

Sales enim, ut ille in cibis paulo liberalius adspersus, si tamen non sit inmodicus, adfert aliquid propriae voluptatis, ita hi quoque in dicendo habent quiddam quod nobis faciat audiendi sitim. XX. Facetum quoque non tantum circa ridicula opinor consistere; neque enim diceret Horatius facetum carminis genus natura concessum esse Vergilio. Decoris hanc magis et excultae cuiusdam elegantiae appellationem puto.

For “salts,” just as that one sprinkled a little more liberally on foods, if only it be not immoderate, brings a certain proper pleasure, so these too in speaking have a certain something that makes in us a thirst for hearing. 20. I think the facetum likewise does not consist only around the laughable; for Horace would not say that a facetum kind of song was granted by nature to Vergil. I reckon this rather an appellation of decor and of a certain cultivated elegance.

Ideoque in epistulis Cicero haec Bruti refert verba: "ne illi sunt pedes faceti ac *deliciis ingredienti mollius".+ Quod convenit cum illo Horatiano:"molle atque facetum Vergilio". XXI. Iocum vero id accipimus quod est contrarium serio: nam et fingere et terrere et promittere interim iocus est. Dicacitas sine dubio a dicendo, quod est omni generi commune, ducta ist, proprie tamen significat sermonem cum risu aliquos incessentem.

And so in his letters Cicero reports these words of Brutus: "surely his feet are facet and, for one stepping with *delights, rather softer".+ Which agrees with that line of Horace: "soft and facet for Vergil." 21. A joke, indeed, we take to be that which is contrary to the serious: for both feigning and frightening and promising are at times a joke. Dicacity, without doubt drawn from speaking—which is common to every kind—yet properly signifies a discourse assailing some with laughter.

Ideo Demosthenen urbanum fuisse dicunt, dicacem negant.

Therefore they say that Demosthenes was urbane; they deny him dicacity.

XXII. Proprium autem materiae de qua nunc loquimur est ridiculum, ideoque haec tota disputatio a Graecis peri geloion inscribitur. Eius prima divisio traditur eadem quae est omnis orationis, ut sit positum in rebus ac verbis.

22. But the proper element of the material about which we are now speaking is the ridiculous; and so this whole disputation is inscribed by the Greeks peri geloion. Its first division is handed down as the same as that of every oration: that it is positioned in things and in words.

XXIII. Vsus autem maxime triplex: aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis. Aliena aut reprendimus aut refutamus aut elevamus aut repercutimus aut eludimus.

23. The use, moreover, is chiefly threefold: for we seek laughter either from others, or from ourselves, or from intermediate matters. What is another’s we either reprehend, or refute, or make light of, or repercuss (turn back), or elude.

Nostra ridicule indicamus et, ut verbo Ciceronis utar, dicimus aliqua subabsurda. Namque eadem quae si inprudentibus excidant stulta sunt, si simulamus venusta creduntur. XXIV.

We point out our own things in jest, and, to use Cicero’s word, we say some somewhat-absurd things. For the same things which, if they slip out from the imprudent, are foolish, if we simulate them, are believed charming. 24.

Tertium est genus, ut idem dicit, in decipiendis exspectationibus, dictis aliter accipiendis, ceteris, quae neutram personam contingunt ideoque a me media dicuntur. XXV. Item ridicula aut facimus aut dicimus.

The third kind, as the same man says, lies in deceiving expectations, in sayings being taken otherwise, and in the rest, which touch neither person and therefore by me are called “middle.” 25. Likewise, ridiculous things we either do or say.

Facto risus conciliatur interim admixta gravitate, ut M. Caelius praetor, cum senam eius curulem consul Isauricus fregisset, alteram posuit loris intentam (dicebatur autem consul a patre flagris aliquando caesus): interim sine respectu pudoris, ut in illa pyxide Caeliana, quod neque oratori neque ulli viro gravi conveniat. XXVI. Idem autem de vultu gestuque ridiculo dictum sit: in quibus est quidem sua gratia, sed maior cum captare risum non videntur; nihil enim est iis quae +dicenti+ salsa dicuntur insulsius.

Laughter is procured by a deed, sometimes with gravity mixed in, as when M. Caelius, praetor, after the consul Isauricus had broken his curule chair, set up another stretched with thongs (it was said, moreover, that the consul had at some time been beaten by his father with scourges): sometimes without regard for modesty, as in that Caelian pyx, which is not fitting either for an orator or for any serious man. 26. But let the same be said about a ridiculous countenance and gesture: in these there is indeed their own grace, but a greater one when they do not seem to be hunting for laughter; for nothing is more insipid than “salty” things that are said by one who is seen to be speaking to catch a laugh.

Quamquam autem gratiae plurimum dicentis severitas adfert, fitque ridiculum id ipsum, quod qui dicit illa non ridet, est tamen interim et aspectus et habitus oris et gestus non inurbanus, cum iis modus contingit. XXVII. Id porro quod dicitur aut est lascivum et hilare, qualia Gabbae pleraque, aut contumeliosum, qualia nuper Iuni Bassi, aut asperum, qualia Cassi Severi, aut lene, qualia Domiti Afri.

Although, moreover, the speaker’s severity contributes very much to grace, and that very fact becomes laughable—that the one who says those things does not laugh—yet meanwhile both the aspect and the habit of the face and the gesture are not un-urbane, when a measure accompanies them. 27. Furthermore, what is said is either lascivious and cheerful, such as most of Gabba’s, or contumelious, such as those lately of Junius Bassus, or harsh, such as those of Cassius Severus, or smooth, such as those of Domitius Afer.

XXVIII. Refert his ubi quis utatur. Nam in convictibus et cotidiano sermone lasciva humilibus, hilaria omnibus convenient.

28. It makes a difference, in these matters, where one uses them. For in convivial gatherings and in quotidian conversation, lascivious things will be fitting for the humble, cheerful things for all.

Laedere numquam velimus, longeque absit illud propositum, potius amicum quam dictum perdendi. In hac quidem pugna forensi malim mihi lenibus uti licere. Nonnumquam et contumeliose et aspere dicere in adversarios permissum est, cum accusare etiam palam et caput alterius iuste petere concessum sit.

We would never wish to wound, and far be that purpose from us, of losing a friend rather than a saying. In this forensic combat indeed I would rather it were allowed me to use gentle means. Sometimes it is permitted to speak both contumeliously and harshly against adversaries, since it is granted even to accuse openly and to justly demand another’s head.

Sed hic quoque tamen inhumana videri solet fortunae insectatio, vel quod culpa caret vel quod redire etiam in ipsos qui obiecerunt potest. Primum itaque considerandum est et quis et in qua causa et apud quem et in quem et quid dicat. XXIX.

But here too, nevertheless, the persecution of Fortune is wont to seem inhumane, either because it is without fault or because it can also return upon the very ones who have objected it. First, therefore, it must be considered both who and in what cause and before whom and against whom and what he says. 29.

Oratori minime convenit distortus vultus gestusque, quae in mimis rideri solent. Dicacitas etiam scurrilis et scaenica huic personae alienissima est: obscenitas vero non a verbis tantum abesse debet, sed etiam a significatione. Nam si quando obici potest, non in ioco exprobranda est.

A distorted countenance and gestures, the sort that are wont to be laughed at in mimes, least befit the orator. Scurrilous and theatrical drollery is most alien to this persona: obscenity ought to be absent not only from the words but even from the signification. For if ever it can be objected, it is not to be reproached in jest.

XXX. Oratorem praeterea ut dicere urbane volo, ita videri adfectare id plane nolo. Quapropter ne dicet quidem salse quotiens poterit, et dictum potius aliquando perdet quam minuet auctoritatem.

30. Moreover, while I wish the orator to speak urbanely, I plainly do not wish him to seem to affect that. Wherefore he will not even speak wittily as often as he can, and he will rather sometimes lose a witticism than lessen his authority.

XXXI. Nec accusatorem autem atroci in causa nec patronum in miserabili iocantem feret quisquam. sunt etiam iudices quidam tristiores quam ut risum libenter patiantur.

31. Nor will anyone endure a prosecutor joking in an atrocious case, nor a patron in a miserable one. There are also certain judges too gloomy to tolerate laughter willingly.

XXXII. Solet interim accidere ut id quod in adversarium dicimus aut in iudicem conveniat aut in nostrum quoque litigatorem, quamquam aliqui reperiuntur qui ne id quidem quod in ipsos reccidere possit evitent. Quod fecit Longus sulpicius, qui, cum ipse foedissimus esset, ait eum contra quem iudicio liberali aderat ne faciem quidem habere liberi hominis: cui respondens Domitius Afer "ex tui" inquit "animi sententia, Longe, qui malam faciem habet liber non est?" XXXIII.

32. In the meantime it is wont to happen that what we say against the adversary fits either the judge or even our own litigant, although some are found who do not avoid even that which could fall back upon themselves. This Longus Sulpicius did, who, although he himself was very ugly, said that the man against whom he was present in a suit about liberty did not even have the face of a free man: to whom Domitius Afer, responding, said, "according to your" he said "mind’s judgment, Longus, is he who has an ugly face not free?" 33.

Vitandum etiam ne petulans, ne superbum, ne loco, ne tempore alienum, ne praeparatum et domo ablatum videatur quod dicimus: nam adversus miseros, Sicut supra dixeram, inhumanus est iocus. Sed quidam ita sunt receptae auctoritatis ac notae verecundiae ut nocitura sit in eos dicendi petulantia; nam de amicis iam praeceptum est. XXXIV.

It must also be avoided lest what we say seem petulant, haughty, out of place, out of time, pre-prepared and carried from home: for against the wretched, as I said above, a joke is inhuman. But certain men are of such accepted authority and noted modesty that petulance in speaking would be harmful toward them; for already a precept has been given about friends. 34.

Illud non ad oratoris consilium, sed ad hominis pertinet: lacessat hoc modo quem laedere sit periculosum, ne aut inimicitiae graves insequantur aut turpis satisfactio. Male etiam dicitur quod in pluris convenit, si aut nationes totae incessantur aut ordines aut condicio aut studia multorum. XXXV.

That pertains not to the orator’s counsel but to the man’s: let him not provoke in this manner one whom it is dangerous to injure, lest either grievous enmities follow or a shameful satisfaction be required. It is also ill-said when what is spoken fits several, if either whole nations are assailed, or orders, or condition, or the pursuits of many. 35.

Ea quae dicet vir bonus omnia salva dignitate ac verecundia dicet: nimium enim risus pretium est si probitatis inpendio constat.

Whatever a good man says, he will say it all with dignity and modesty intact: for the price of laughter is too high if it is paid at the expense of probity.

Vnde autem concilietur risus et quibus ex locis peti soleat, difficillimum dicere. Nam si species omnis persequi velimus, nec modum reperiemus et frustra laborabimus. XXXVI.

Whence moreover laughter is conciliated and from what sources it is wont to be sought, it is most difficult to say. For if we should wish to pursue every species, we shall not find a measure and we shall labor in vain. 36.

Neque enim minus numerosi sunt loci ex quibus haec dicta quam illi ex quibus eae quas sententias vocamus ducuntur, neque alii. Nam hic quoque est inventio et elocutio, atque ipsius elocutionis vis aba in verbis, alia in figuris. XXXVII.

For the topics are no less numerous from which these sayings come than those from which the things we call “sententiae” are derived, nor are they different. For here too there is invention and elocution, and the force of elocution itself is one in words, another in figures. 37.

Risus igitur oriuntur aut ex corpore eius in quem dicimus, aut ex animo, qui factis ab eo dictisque colligitur, aut ex iis quae sunt extra posita; intra haec enim est omnis vituperatio: quae si gravius posita sit, severa est, si levius, ridicula. Haec aut ostenduntur aut narrantur aut dicto notantur. XXXVIII.

Therefore laughter arises either from the body of the person about whom we speak, or from the mind, which is gathered from his deeds and sayings, or from those things that are set outside; for within these lies all vituperation: which, if it be set more gravely, is severe; if more lightly, ridiculous. These are either exhibited or narrated or are noted by a dictum. XXXVIII.

Rarum est ut oculis subicere contingat, ut fecit C. Iulius: qui cum Helvio Manciae saepius obstrepenti sibi diceret: "iam ostendam qualis sis", isque plane instaret interrogatione qualem tandem se ostensurus esset, digito demonstravit imaginem Galli in scuto Cimbrico pictam, cui Mancia tum simillimus est visus: tabernae autem erant circa forum ac scutum illud signi gratia positum. XXXIX. Narrare quae salsa sint in primis est subtile et oratorium, ut Cicero pro Cluentio narrat de Caepasio atque Fabricio aut M. Caelius de illa D. Laeli collegaeque eius in provinciam festinantium contentione.

It is rare that it falls out to set something before the eyes, as C. Julius did: who, when Helvius Mancia was repeatedly heckling him, would say, "Now I will show what sort you are," and as he plainly pressed with the question of what sort, pray, he was going to show him to be, he pointed with his finger to the image of a Gaul painted on a Cimbrian shield, to which Mancia then seemed most similar: and there were taverns around the Forum, and that shield had been set up for the sake of a sign. 39. To narrate things that are salty is especially subtle and oratorical, as Cicero in his speech for Cluentius narrates about Caepasius and Fabricius, or M. Caelius about that contention of D. Laelius and his colleague as they were hurrying to their province.

Sed in his omnibus cum elegans et venusta exigitur tota expositio, tum id festivissimum est quod adicit orator. XL. Nam et a Cicerone sic est Fabrici fuga illa condita: "itaque cum callidissime se putaret dicere et cum illa verba gravissima ex intimo artificio deprompsisset: "respicite, iudices, hominum fortunas, respicite C. Fabrici senectutem", cum hoc "respicite" ornandae orationis causa saepe dixisset, respexit ipse: at Fabricius a subselliis demisso capite discesserat", et cetera quae adiecit (nam est notus locus), cum in re hoc solum esset, Fabricium a iudicio recessisse;XLI. et Caelius cum omnia venustissime finxit, tum illud ultimum: "hic subsecutus quo modo transierit, utrum rati an piscatorio navigio, nemo sciebat: Siculi quidem, ut sunt lascivi et dicaces, aiebant in delphino sedisse et sic tamquam Ariona transvectum". XLII.

But in all these cases, while an elegant and winsome whole exposition is required, then that is most facetious which the orator adds. 40. For even by Cicero that flight of Fabricius was thus composed: "and so, when he supposed he was speaking most cunningly and when he had drawn forth those most weighty words from his inmost art: 'look back, judges, upon the fortunes of men, look back upon the senectitude of C. Fabricius,' when for the sake of ornamenting the oration he had often said this 'look back,' he himself looked back; but Fabricius had departed from the benches with head lowered," and the rest which he added (for the passage is well known), whereas in the fact there was only this, that Fabricius had withdrawn from the trial;41. and Caelius, although he fashioned everything most charmingly, then that last thing: "as for how this follower crossed over, whether by a raft or by a fishing craft, no one knew: the Sicilians indeed, as they are wanton and witty, were saying that he sat on a dolphin and thus was carried across as if Arion." 42.

In narrando autem Cicero consistere facetias putat, dicacitatem in iaciendo. Mire fuit in hoc genere venustus Afer Domitius, cuius orationibus complures huius modi narrationes insertae reperiuntur, sed dictorum quoque ab eodem urbane sunt editi libri. XLIII.

In narrating, however, Cicero thinks that facetiae consist, and dicacity in the hurling; Domitius Afer was wondrously charming in this kind, in whose speeches numerous narratives of this sort are found inserted, but books of sayings too were published by the same man urbanely. 43.

Illud quoque genus est, positum non in hac veluti iaculatione dictorum et inclusa breviter urbanitate, sed in quodam longiore actu, quod de L. Crasso contra Brutum Cicero in secundo de Oratore libro et aliis quibusdam locis narrat. XLIV. Nam cum Brutus in accusatione C. Planci excitatis duobus lectoribus ostendisset contraria L. Crassum patronum eius in oratione quam de colonia Narbonensi habuerat suasisse iis quae de lege Servilia dixerit, tris excitavit et ipse lectores, iisque patris eius dialogos dedit legendos; quorum cum in Privernati unus, alter in Albano, tertius in Tiburti sermonem habitum complecteretur, requirebat ubi essent eae possessiones.

That too is a kind, set not in this, as it were, javelin-throwing of sayings and briefly enclosed urbanity, but in a certain longer act, which Cicero narrates about L. Crassus against Brutus in the second book of On the Orator and in some other places. 44. For when Brutus, in the accusation of C. Plancius, after two readers had been summoned, had shown that L. Crassus, his patron, in the oration which he had delivered about the Narbonese colony, had urged things contrary to what he said concerning the Servilian law, he too summoned three readers, and to them he gave his father’s Dialogues to be read; of which, since one embraced a discourse held at the Privernate, another at the Alban, a third at the Tiburtine, he was inquiring where those estates were.

Omnis autem illas Brutus vendiderat, et tum paterna emancupare praedia turpius habebatur. Similis in apologis quoque et quibusdam interim etiam historiis exponendis gratia consequi solet.

But Brutus had sold all those, and at that time it was held more disgraceful to emancipate paternal estates. A similar grace is wont to be attained also in expounding apologues and, at times, even certain histories.

XLV. Sed acutior est illa atque velocior in urbanitate brevitas, cuius quidem duplex forma est, dicendi ac respondendi, sed ratio communis in parte; nihil enim, quod in lacessendo dici potest, non etiam in repercutiendo: at quaedam propria sunt respondentium. XLVI.

45. But that brevity in urbanity is sharper and swifter, whose form indeed is twofold—of speaking and of responding—yet the method is in part common; for nothing that can be said in provoking cannot also be said in repercussing; but certain things are proper to those responding. 46.

Illa meditata atque cogitata adferri solent, haec plerumque in altercatione aut in rogandis testibus reperiuntur. cum sint autem loci plures ex quibus dicta ridicula ducantur, repetendum est mihi non omnis eos oratoribus convenire,XLVII. in primis ex amphibolia, neque illa obscura quae Atellanio more captant, nec qualia vulgo iactantur a vilissimo quoque, conversa in maledictum fere ambiguitate: ne illa quidem quae Ciceroni aliquando sed non in agendo exciderunt, ut dixit, cum is candidatus qui coci filius habebatur coram eo suffragium ab alio peteret: "ego quoque tibi favebo";XLVIII.

Those things that have been meditated and cogitated are wont to be brought forward, these are for the most part found in altercation or in interrogating witnesses. But since there are many places from which ridiculous sayings are drawn, it must be repeated by me that not all of them are suitable for orators,47. especially from amphiboly, nor those obscure ones which they snatch at in the Atellan manner, nor such as are commonly bandied about by every most worthless fellow, turned almost by ambiguity into an insult: not even those which at some time fell from Cicero, but not in pleading, as when he said, when that candidate who was held to be a cook’s son was asking a vote from another in his presence: "I too will favor you";48.

non quia excludenda sint omnino verba duos sensus significantia, sed quia raro belle respondeant, nisi cum prorsus rebus ipsis adiuvantur. Quare [non] hoc [modo] paene et ipsum scurrile Ciceronis est in eundem de quo supra dixi Isauricum: "miror quid sit quod pater homo constantissimus, te nobis varium reliquit". XLIX. Sed illud ex eodem genere praeclarum: cum obiceret Miloni accusator, in argumentum factarum Clodio insidiarum, quod Bovillas ante horam nonam devertisset, ut exspectaret dum Clodius a villa sua exiret, et identidem interrogaret quo tempore Clodius occisus esset, respondit "sero": quod vel solum sufficit ut hoc genus non totum repudietur.

not because words signifying two senses ought altogether to be excluded, but because they rarely answer neatly, unless they are thoroughly aided by the facts themselves. Wherefore [not] this [way] is almost even the scurrilous jest of Cicero himself against that same Isauricus of whom I spoke above: "I marvel what it is that a father, a most constant man, has left you to us inconstant." 49. But that from the same genus is illustrious: when the accuser was objecting to Milo, as an argument of ambushes made against Clodius, that he had turned aside to Bovillae before the ninth hour, so that he might wait until Clodius went out from his villa, and kept asking again and again at what time Clodius had been slain, he replied "late": which even by itself suffices that this genus not be wholly repudiated.

L. Nec plura modo significari solent, sed etiam diversa, ut Nero de servo pessimo dixit: "nulli plus apud se fidei haberi, nihil ei nec clusum neque signatum esse". LI. pervenit res usque ad aenigma, quale est Ciceronis in Plaetorium Fontei accusatorem, cuius matrem dixit dum vixisset ludum, postquam mortua esset magistros habuisse (dicebantur autem, dum vixit, infames feminae convenire ad eam solitae, post mortem bona eius venierant): quamquam hic "ludus" per tralationem dictum est, "magistri" per ambiguitatem. LII. In metalempsin quoque cadit eadem ratio dictorum, ut Fabius Maximus, incusans Augusti congiariorum quae amicis dabantur exiguitatem, heminaria esse dixit (nam congiarium commune liberalitatis atque mensurae) a mensura ducta inminutione rerum.

50. Not only are more things wont to be signified, but even divergent ones, as Nero said about a most wicked slave: "that no one had more credit with him, that nothing for him was either shut or sealed." 51. the matter goes even as far as an enigma, such as Cicero’s against Plaetorius, the accuser of Fonteius, whose mother he said, while she lived, had been a "school," after she died had had "teachers" (for it was said that, while she lived, infamous women were wont to resort to her; after her death her goods had been sold): although here "school" was said by transference (metaphor), "teachers" by ambiguity. 52. Into metalepsis also falls the same rationale of sayings, as when Fabius Maximus, accusing the scantiness of Augustus’s congiaria which were given to friends, said they were heminary (from hemina) (for congiarium is common to both liberality and measure), the diminution of the things being drawn from a measure.

LIII. Haec tam frigida quam est nominum fictio adiectis detractis mutatis litteris, ut Acisculum, quia esset pactus, "Pacisculum", et Placidum nomine, quod is acerbus natura esset, "Acidum", et turium, cum fur esset, "Tollium" dictos invenio. LIV.

53. These are as frigid as is the coinage of names with letters added, subtracted, or altered, as I find that Acisculus, because he had bargained, "Pacisculus," and one named Placidus, because he was acerbic by nature, "Acidus," and Turius, since he was a thief, "Tollius," were called. 54.

Sed haec eadem genera commodius in rebus quam in nominibus respondent. Afer enim venuste Manlium suram multum in agendo discursantem salientem, manus iactantem, togam deicientem et reponentem, non agere dixit sed satagere. Est enim dictum per se urbanum "satagere", etiam si nulla subsit alterius verbi similitudo.

But these same kinds fit more aptly in deeds than in names. For Afer wittily said of Manlius Sura, who in pleading was running about and leaping, flinging his hands, dropping and replacing his toga, that he was not “agere” but “satagere.” For “satagere” is an urbane expression in itself, even if no likeness to another verb underlies it.

LV. Fiunt et adiecta et detracta adspiratione et divisis coniunctisque verbis similiter saepius frigida, aliquando tamen recipienda: eademque condicio est in iis quae a nominibus trahuntur. Multa ex hoc (genere) Cicero in Verrem, sed ut ab aliis dicta: modo futurum ut omnia verreret [cum diceretur Verres], modo Herculi, quem expilaverat, molestiorem quam aprum Erymanthium fuisse, modo malum sacerdotem qui tam nequam verrem reliquisset, quia Sacerdoti Verres successerat. LVI.

55. Things are made both by added and by subtracted aspiration and by divided and conjoined words, likewise more often cold, yet sometimes to be received; and the same condition holds in those which are drawn from names. Many from this (genus) Cicero, in Against Verres, but as if spoken by others: now that he would sweep everything [when he was called Verres], now that he had been more troublesome to Hercules, whom he had pillaged, than the Erymanthian boar, now a bad priest who had left behind so wicked a boar, because Verres had succeeded Sacerdos. 56.

Praebet tamen aliquando occasionem quaedam felicitas hoc quoque bene utendi, ut pro Caecina Cicero in testem Sex. Clodium Phormionem: "nec minus niger" inquit "nec minus confidens quam est ille Terentianus Phormio".

Nevertheless, some felicity sometimes provides an occasion of using this well too, as Cicero in For Caecina against the witness Sextus Clodius Phormio: “no less black,” he says, “and no less confident than that Terentian Phormio.”

LVII. Acriora igitur sunt et elegantiora quae trahuntur ex vi rerum. In iis maxime valet similitudo, si tamen ad aliquid inferius leviusque referatur: qualia veteres illi iocabantur, qui Lentulum "Spintherem" et Scipionem "Serapionem" esse dixerunt.

57. Sharper therefore and more elegant are those which are drawn from the force of the facts. In these the similitude is most effective, provided it is referred to something inferior and lighter: such as those jests of the ancients, who said that Lentulus was “Spinther” and Scipio “Serapion.”

Sed ea non ab hominibus modo petitur, verum etiam ab animalibus, ut nobis pueris Iunius Bassus, homo in primis dicax,LVIII. "asinus albus" vocabatur, et Sarmentus ... +seu P. Blessius+ Iulium, hominem nigrum et macrum et pandum, "fibulam ferream" dixit. Quod nunc risus petendi genus frequentissimum est.

But this is sought not only from men, but even from animals, as, when we were boys, Junius Bassus, a man supremely witty,58. was called "the white donkey," and Sarmentus ... +or P. Blessius+ called Julius, a man black and lean and bow-legged, "the iron fibula." Which now is the most frequent kind of eliciting laughter.

LIX. Adhibetur autem similitudo interim palam, interim +solet parabolae+: cuius est generis <illud> Augusti, qui militi libellum timide porrigenti "noh" inquit "tamquam assem elephanto des". LX. sunt quaedam +vi+ similia, unde Vatinius dixit hoc dictum, cum reus agente in eum Calvo frontem candido sudario tergeret idque ipsum accusator in invidiam vocaret: "quamvis reus sum", inquit, "et panem tamen candidum edo". LXI. Adhuc est subtilior illa ex simili tralatio, cum quod in alia re fieri solet in aliam mutuamur; ea dicatur sane fictio: ut Chrysippus, cum in triumpho Caesaris eborea oppida essent tralata et post dies paucos Fabi Maximi lignea, thecas esse oppidorum Caesaris dixit.

59. The similitude is applied, however, sometimes openly, sometimes +it is wont to be of a parable+: of which genus is of Augustus, who, to a soldier timidly proffering a little book, said "noh," "as if you were giving an as to an elephant." 60. There are certain similes by +force+, whence Vatinius spoke this quip, when, being a defendant with Calvus prosecuting him, he was wiping his forehead with a white sudarium, and the accuser called that very thing into odium: "Although I am a defendant," he said, "yet I eat white bread." 61. There is still a subtler transference from a simile, when we borrow what is wont to be done in one thing into another; let that be called, to be sure, a fiction: as Chrysippus, when in Caesar’s triumph ivory towns had been carried by, and after a few days those of Fabius Maximus wooden ones, said that they were the cases of Caesar’s towns.

Et Pedo de myrmillone qui retiarium consequebatur nec feriebat "vivum" inquit "capere vult". LXII. Iungitur amphiboliae similitudo, ut a L. Galba, qui pilam neglegenter petenti "sic" inquit "petis tamquam Caesaris candidatus". Nam illud "petis" ambiguum est, securitas similis. Quod hactenus ostendisse satis est.

And Pedo, about a murmillo who was pursuing the net-man and was not striking, said, "he wants to take him 'alive'." 62. A similitude is joined to amphiboly, as by L. Galba, who said to a man asking for the ball carelessly, "thus," he said, "you 'seek/ask' as though you were Caesar’s candidate." For that "petis" is ambiguous, the unconcern is similar. Which it is enough to have shown thus far.

LXIII. Ceterum frequentissima aliorum generum cum aliis mixtura est, eaque optima quae ex pluribus constat. Eadem dissimilium ratio est.

63. Moreover, the most frequent thing is the mixture of other kinds with others, and the best is that which consists of several. The same rationale holds for dissimilars.

Hinc eques Romanus, ad quem in spectaculis bibentem cum misisset Augustus qui ei diceret: "ego si prandere volo, domum eo", "tu enim" inquit "non times ne locum perdas". LXIV. Ex contrario non una species. Neque enim eodem modo dixit Augustus praefecto quem ignominia mittebat, subinde interponenti precibus: "quid respondebo patri meo?" "dic me tibi displicuisse", quo Gabba paenulam roganti: "non possum commodare, domi maneo", cum cenaculum eius perplueret.

Hence, a Roman equestrian, to whom—when he was drinking at the spectacles—Augustus had sent someone to say: "I, if I want to lunch, go home," said, "for you do not fear lest you lose your place." 64. On the contrary, there is not a single species. For neither did Augustus speak in the same way to the prefect whom he was sending away in ignominy, who kept inserting into his entreaties: "What shall I answer my father?" "Say that I have displeased you"; whereas Gabba, to a man asking for a paenula, said: "I cannot lend it; I am staying at home," since his garret was being rained through completely.

Tertium adhuc illud, nisi quod ut ne auctorem ponam verecundia ipsius facit: "libidinosior es quam ullus spado", quo sine dubio et opinio decipitur, sed ex contrario. Et hoc ex eodem loco est, sed nulli priorum simile, quod dixit M. Vestinus cum ei nuntiatum esset ... "aliquando desinet putere". LXV. Onerabo librum exemplis, similemque iis qui risus gratia componuntur efficiam, si persequi voluero singula veterum.

A third, still, is this, except that his own modesty brings it about that I do not set down the author: "you are more libidinous than any eunuch," by which without doubt even opinion is deceived, but on the contrary. And this too is from the same locus, yet like none of the former, what M. Vestinus said when it had been announced to him ... "it will someday cease to stink." 65. I will load the book with examples, and I will make it similar to those that are composed for the sake of laughter, if I should wish to pursue each particular of the ancients.

Ex omnibus argumentorum locis eadem occasio est. Nam et finitione usus est Augustus de pantomimis duobus qui alternis gestibus contendebant, cum eorum alterum saltatorem dixit, LXVI. alterum interpellatorem, et partitione Gabba, cum paenulam roganti respondit: "non pluit, non opus est tibi: si pluet, ipse utar". Proinde genere specie propriis differentibus iugatis adiunctis consequentibus antecedentibus repugnantibus causis effectis, comparatione parium maiorum minorum similis materia praebetur, sicut in tropos quoque omnis cadit.

From all the places of arguments the same occasion arises. For Augustus too used definition about two pantomimes who were contending with alternate gestures, when he called one of them a dancer, 66. the other an interrupter; and Gabba used partition, when to one asking for a cloak he replied: "it is not raining, there is no need for you: if it rains, I myself will use it." Accordingly, from genus, species, properties, differences, things yoked, adjuncts, consequents, antecedents, incompatibles, causes and effects, by comparison of equals, of greater, and of lesser, similar material is furnished, just as everything also falls into tropes.

LXVII. An non plurima dicuntur (per hyperbolen? ut) quod refert Cicero de homine praelongo, caput eum ad fornicem Fabium offendisse, et quod P. Oppius dixit de genere Lentulorum, cum assidue minores parentibus liberi essent, nascendo interiturum.

67. Are not very many things said (by hyperbole? for example), as what Cicero reports about a very tall man, that he struck his head against the Fabian arch, and what P. Oppius said about the clan of the Lentuli, that, since the children were continually smaller than their parents, it would perish by being born.

LXVIII. Quid ironia? nonne etiam quae severissime fit ioci paene genus est?

68. What of irony? Is not even what is done most sternly almost a kind of jest?

Qua urbane usus zo est Afer, cum Didio Gallo, qui provinciam ambitiosissime petierat, deinde, impetrata ea, tamquam coactus querebatur: "age" inquit "aliquid et rei publicae causa". Metaphora quoque Cicero lusit, cum Vatini morte nuntiata, cuius parum certus dicebatur auctor: "interim" inquit "usura fruar". LXIX. Idem per allegorian M. Caelium, melius obicientem crimina quam defendentem, bonam dextram, malam sinistram habere dicebat. Emphasi A. Vivius dixit ferrum in tuccium incidisse.

How urbane Afer was in his use, when with Didius Gallus, who had most ambitiously sought a province and then, once it was obtained, complained as though compelled: “come,” he said, “do something also for the Republic’s sake.” Cicero too played with a metaphor, when the death of Vatinus was announced, whose reporter was said to be not very sure: “in the meantime,” he said, “I will enjoy the interest.” 69. The same man, by allegory, used to say that M. Caelius, better at bringing charges than at defending them, had a good right hand, a bad left. By emphasis A. Vivius said that the iron had fallen upon Tuccius.

LXX. Figuras quoque mentis, quae schemata dianoias dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnis, in quas nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum. Nam et interrogamus et dubitamus et adfirmamus et minamur et optamus; quaedam ut miserantes, quaedam ut irascentes dicimus.

70. The figures too of the mind, which are called schemata dianoias, this same matter receives all, into which some have divided the species of sayings. For we both interrogate and doubt and affirm and menace and wish; certain things we say as pitying, certain as being angry.

Ridiculum est autem omne quod aperte fingitur. LXXI. Stulta reprehendere facillimum est, nam per se sunt ridicula; sed rem urbanam facit aliqua ex nobis adiectio.

Ridiculous, moreover, is everything that is openly feigned. 71. To reprehend foolish things is most easy, for they are ridiculous in themselves; but some addition from us makes the thing urbane.

Stulte interrogaverat exeuntem de theatro Campatium Titius Maximus an spectasset. Fecit Campatius dubitationem eius stultiorem dicendo: "(non), sed in orchestra pila lusi".

Foolishly Titius Maximus had interrogated Campatius, as he was exiting from the theater, whether he had spectated. Campatius made his doubt more foolish by saying: "(no), but in the orchestra I played ball".

LXXII. Refutatio cum sit in negando redarguendo defendendo elevando, ridicule negavit Manius curius; nam cum eius accusator in sipario omnibus locis aut nudum eum in nervo aut ab amicis redemptum ex alea pinxisset, "ergo ego" inquit "numquam vici". LXXIII. Redarguimus interim aperte, ut Cicero Vibium curium multum de annis aetatis suae mentientem: "tum ergo cum una declamabamus non eras natus", interim et simulata adsensione, ut idem Fabia Dolabellae dicente triginta se annos habere: "verum est", inquit, "nam hoc illam iam viginti annis audio". LXXIV.

72. Since Refutation is in denying, redarguing, defending, elevating, Manius Curius denied comically; for when his accuser had painted him on the stage-curtain in every scene either naked in the stocks or ransomed by friends from dice-gambling, “so then I,” he said, “have never won.” 73. We redargue sometimes openly, as Cicero [did] Vibius Curius, who was much lying about the years of his age: “then, at that time when we were declaiming together, you were not born”; and sometimes with simulated assent, as the same man to Fabia, when Dolabella was saying that she had thirty years: “it is true,” he said, “for I have been hearing this from that woman for twenty years already.” 74.

Belle interim subicitur pro eo quod neges aliud mordacius, ut Iunius Bassus, querente Domitia Passieni quod incusans eius sordes calceos eam veteres diceret vendere solere,"non mehercules" inquit "hoc umquam dixi, sed dixi emere te solere". Defensionem imitatus est eques Romanus, qui obicienti Augusto quod patrimonium comedisset,"meum" inquit "putavi". LXXV. Elevandi ratio est duplex, ut aut nimiam quis iactantiam minuat (quem ad modum C. Caesar Pomponio ostendenti vulnus ore exceptum in seditione Sulpiciana, quod is se passum pro Caesare pugnantem gloriabatur, "numquam fugiens respexeris" inquit) aut crimen obiectum, ut Cicero obiurgantibus quod sexagenarius publiliam virginem duxisset "cras mulier erit" inquit. LXXVI.

Neatly, meanwhile, something more mordacious is subjoined in place of denying, as with Junius Bassus: when Domitia Passieni complained that, accusing her sordidness, he used to say she was accustomed to sell old shoes, “not by Hercules,” he said, “did I ever say this, but I said you were accustomed to buy them.” A Roman eques imitated a defense, who, when Augustus objected that he had eaten up his patrimony, said, “I thought it was mine.” 75. The method of lightening is twofold, so that either one may diminish excessive vaunting (in the way that Gaius Caesar, to Pomponius showing a wound caught on the face in the Sulpician sedition—because he was boasting that he had suffered it while fighting for Caesar—said, “you must never have looked back while fleeing”) or the charge alleged, as Cicero, to those reproaching him that, a sexagenarian, he had married Publilia a virgin, said, “tomorrow she will be a woman.” 76.

Hoc genus dicti consequens vocant quidam, estque illi simile quod Cicero curionem, semper ab excusatione aetatis incipientem, facilius cotidie prohoemium habere dixit, quia ista natura sequi et cohaerere videantur. LXXVII. Sed elevandi genus est etiam causarum relatio, qua Cicero est usus in Vatinium.

Some call this kind of saying “consequent,” and it is similar to that which Cicero said about Curio, who, always beginning from an excuse of age, had, he said, an easier prooemium every day, because such things seem by nature to follow and cohere. 77. But a kind of “elevating” is also a relation of causes, which Cicero employed against Vatinius.

Qui pedibus aeger cum vellet videri commodioris valetudinis factus et diceret se iam bina milia passuum ambulare, "dies enim" inquit "longiores sunt". Et Augustus, nuntiantibus Terraconensibus palmam in ara eius enatam, "apparet" inquit "quam saepe accendatis". LXXVIII. Transtulit crimen Cassius Severus; nam cum obiurgaretur a praetore quod advocati eius L. Vaxo Epicurio, Caesaris amico, convicium fecissent, "nescio" inquit "qui conviciati sint, et puto Stoicos fuisse".

A man lame in his feet, when he wanted to seem to have gotten into more commodious health and would say that he now walked two miles, “for,” he said, “the days are longer.” And Augustus, when the Terraconenses announced that a palm had sprung up on his altar, said, “it is apparent how often you kindle it.” 78. Cassius Severus shifted the charge; for when he was being rebuked by the praetor because his advocates had hurled abuse at L. Vaxus the Epicurean, a friend of Caesar, he said, “I do not know who did the abusing, and I think they were Stoics.”

Repercutiendi multa sunt genera, venustissimum quod etiam similitudine aliqua verbi adiuvatur, ut, Trachalus dicenti suelio "si hoc ita est, is in exilium", "si non est ita, redis" inquit. LXXIX. Elusit Cassius Severus, obiciente quodam quod ei domo sua Proculeius interdixisset, respondendo "numquid ergo illuc accedo?" Sed eluditur et ridiculum ridiculo (ut divus Augustus, cum ei Galli torquem aureum centum pondo dedissent, et Dolabella per iocum, temptans tamen ioci sui eventum, dixisset: "imperator, torque me dona", "malo" inquit "te civica donare"), LXXX.

There are many kinds of parrying; the most charming is that which is even aided by some similarity of the word, as, Trachalus to suelio saying "if this is so, he goes into exile," "if it is not so, you return," he said. 79. Cassius Severus eluded it, when someone objected that Proculeius had interdicted him from his house, by replying "Do I at all go there, then?" But the ridiculous is also eluded by the ridiculous (as the deified Augustus, when the Gauls had given him a golden torque of a hundred pounds, and Dolabella by way of a joke, yet testing the outcome of his joke, had said: "commander, present me with the torque," "I prefer," he said, "to present you with the Civic crown"), 80.

mendacium quoque mendacio, ut Gabba, dicente quodam victoriato se uno in Sicilia quinque pedes longam murenam emisse, "nihil" inquit "mirum; am ibi tam longae nascuntur ut iis piscatores pro restibus cingantur". LXXXI. Contraria est neganti confessionis simulatio, sed ipsa quoque multum habet urbanitatis. Sic Afer, cum ageret contra libertum Claudi Caesaris et ex diverso quidam condicionis eiusdem cuius erat litigator exclamasset: "praeterea tu semper in libertos Caesaris dicis", "nec mehercule" inquit "quicquam proficio". cui vicinum est non negare quod obicitur, cum et id palam falsum est et inde materia bene respondendi datur, ut Catulus dicenti Philippo: "quid latras?" "furem video" inquit.

A lie too with a lie, as Gabba, when someone was saying that with one victoriatus he had bought in Sicily a moray five feet long, “nothing,” he said, “marvelous; for there they are born so long that fishermen are girded with them instead of ropes.” 81. Opposite to denial is the simulation of confession, but this too has much urbanity. Thus Afer, when he was pleading against a freedman of Claudius Caesar and, from the opposite side, a certain man of the same condition as the litigant had shouted: “besides, you are always speaking against the Caesar’s freedmen,” “nor, by Hercules,” he said, “do I accomplish anything.” Neighboring to this is not to deny what is alleged, even when it is openly false and from it matter is given for responding well, as Catulus to Philippus saying to him: “why are you barking?” “I see a thief,” said he.

LXXXII. In se dicere non fere est nisi scurrarum et in oratore utique minime probabile: quod fieri totidem modis quot in alios potest, ideoque hoc, quamvis frequens sit, transeo. LXXXIII.

82. To speak against oneself is generally only the part of buffoons, and in an orator is certainly least acceptable: since it can be done in just as many modes as against others, therefore this, although frequent, I pass over. 83.

Illud vero, etiam si ridiculum est, indignum tamen est homine liberali, quod aut turpiter aut potenter dicitur: quod fecisse quendam scio qui humiliori libere adversus se loquenti "colaphum" inquit "tibi ducam, et formulam scribes quod caput durum habeas". Hic enim dubium est utrum ridere audientes an indignari debuerint.

That, indeed, even if it is ridiculous, is nevertheless unworthy of a liberal man, namely what is said either basely or with overbearing power: which I know that a certain fellow did, who, to a humbler man speaking freely against him, said, “I will deal you a cuff, and you will draw up a formula that you have a hard head.” For here it is doubtful whether the hearers ought to have laughed or to have been indignant.

LXXXIV. superest genus decipiendi opinionem aut dicta a intellegendi, quae sunt in omni hac materia vel venustissima. Inopinatum et a lacessente poni solet, quale est quod refert Cicero: "quid huic abest nisi res et virtus?" aut illud Afri: "homo in agendis causis optime vestitus": et in occurrendo, ut Cicero audita falsa Vatini morte, cum obvium libertum eius interrogasset "rectene omnia?" dicenti "recte" "mortuus est!" inquit.

84. there remains a kind of deceiving the expectation, or of keeping utterances from being understood, which in all this material are the most charming. The unexpected is wont to be set forth by the assailant, such as that which Cicero reports: "What is lacking to this man except property and virtue?" or that of Afer: "a man most excellently dressed for conducting cases": and in countering, as when Cicero, on hearing the false report of Vatinius’s death, when he had asked his freedman whom he met, "Are all things right?" and he saying "Right," he said, "He is dead!"

LXXXV. Plurimus autem circa simulationem <et dissimulationem> risus est, quae sunt vicina et prope eadem, sed simulatio est certam opinionem animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se parum intellegere fingentis. Simulavit Afer cum in causa subinde dicentibus Celsinam de re cognovisse (quae erat potens femina) "quis est" inquit "iste?" Celsinam enim videri sibi virum finxit.

85. But the most laughter is about simulation , which are neighboring and almost the same, but simulation is the imitation of a fixed opinion of one’s own mind, dissimulation is the feigning that one understands another’s matters too little. Afer simulated when, in a case, as people kept saying that Celsina had knowledge of the matter (she was a powerful woman), he said, "Who is that fellow?" For he pretended that Celsina seemed to him to be a man.

LXXXVI. Dissimulavit Cicero cum Sex. Annalis testis reum laesisset et instaret identidem accusator: "dic, M. tulli, si quid potes de Sexto Annali"; versus enim dicere coepit de libro Enni annali sexto: "quis potis ingentis causas evolvere belli?" LXXXVII.

86. Cicero dissimulated when Sextus Annalis, a witness, had injured the defendant and the accuser kept pressing again and again: ‘Say, Marcus Tullius, if you can, something about Sextus Annalis’; for he began to recite a verse from the sixth Annal of Ennius: ‘Who is able to unroll the mighty causes of war?’ 87.

cui sine dubio frequentissimam dat occasionem ambiguitas, ut Cascellio, qui consultatori dicenti "navem dividere volo" "perdes" inquit. Sed averti intellectus et a solet, cum ab asperioribus ad leniora deflectitur: ut qui, interrogatus quid sentiret de eo qui in adulterio deprehensus esset, tardum fuisse respondit. LXXXVIII.

to which, without doubt, ambiguity most frequently gives occasion, as for Cascellius, who, to a consultant saying "I want to divide a ship," said "you will lose it." But the understanding also is wont to be turned aside, when it is deflected from harsher to gentler meanings: as when someone, asked what he thought about a man who had been caught in adultery, replied that he had been slow. 88.

Ei confine est quod dicitur per suspicionem, quale illud apud Ciceronem querenti quod uxor sua ex fico se suspendisset: "rogo des mihi surculum ex illa arbore ut inseram"; intellegitur enim quod non dicitur. LXXXIX. Et hercule omnis salse dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est rectum verumque dicatur: quod fit totum fingendis aut nostris aut alienis persuasionibus aut dicendo quod fieri non potest.

Bordering upon it is what is said by suspicion, such as that instance in Cicero, to one complaining that his wife had hanged herself from a fig-tree: "I ask that you give me a shoot from that tree that I may graft it"; for what is not said is understood. 89. And, by Hercules, the whole method of speaking wittily is this: that it be said otherwise than is right and true; which is done wholly by feigning either our own or others’ persuasions, or by saying what cannot be done.

XC. Alienam finxit Iuba, qui querenti quod ab equo suo esset adspersus "quid? tu" inquit "me Hippocentaurum putas?" suam C. Cassius, qui militi sine gladio decurrenti "heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris" inquit, et Gabba de piscibus, qui, cum pridie ex parte adesi et versati postera die positi essent, "festinemus, alii subcenant" inquit. Tertium illud Cicero, ut dixi, adversus curium; fieri enim certe non poterat ut cum declamaret natus non esset.

90. Juba fashioned an alien persuasion, who, to one complaining that he had been splashed by his horse, said, "What? Do you think me a Hippocentaur?"—his own, Gaius Cassius, who, to a soldier running without a sword, said, "Hey, fellow soldier, you use your fist well"; and Gabba about the fishes, who, when on the following day they were set out having the day before been partly eaten and turned over, said, "Let us hurry; others are taking the late supper." The third is that of Cicero, as I said, against Curius; for it certainly could not come about that, while he was declaiming, he had not been born.

XCI. Est et illa ex ironia fictio, qua usus est C. Caesar. Nam cum testis diceret a reo femina sua ferro petita, et esset facilis reprehensio, cur illam potissimum partem corporis vulnerare voluisset, "quid enim faceret", inquit, "cum tu galeam et loricam haberes?" XCII.

91. There is also that pretense from irony, of which C. Caesar made use. For when a witness said that the defendant’s woman had been attacked with iron, and there was an easy refutation—why he had wished to wound that part of the body above all—“for what indeed was he to do,” he said, “when you had a helmet and a cuirass?” 92.

Vel optima est autem simulatio contra simulantem, qualis illa Domiti Afri fuit. Vetus habebat testamentum, et unus ex amicis recentioribus, sperans aliquid ex mutatione tabularum, falsam fabulam intulerat, consulens eum an primipilari seni intestato suaderet ordinare suprema iudicia: "noli" inquit "facere; offendis illum."

But the very best simulation is against a simulator, such as that of Domitius Afer. He had an old testament, and one of his more recent friends, hoping for something from a mutation of the tablets, had introduced a false fable, consulting him whether he should advise an old primipilaris, being intestate, to arrange his last judgments: “do not do it,” he said, “you will offend him.”

XCIII. Iucundissima sunt autem ex his omnibus lenta et, ut sic dixerim, boni stomachi: ut Afer idem ingrato litigatori conspectum eius in foro vitanti per nomenclatorem missum ad eum "amas me", inquit, "quod te non vidi?" et dispensatori, qui, cum reliqua non reponeret, dicebat subinde "non comedi; pane et aqua vivo", "passer, redde quod debes": quae +hypo to ethos+ vocant. XCIV.

93. But of all these the most delightful are the slow ones and, so to speak, of a good stomach: as when the same Afer, to an ungrateful litigant who was avoiding his sight in the forum, sent by a nomenclator to him, said, "Do you love me because I have not seen you?" and to a dispensator (steward) who, although he did not replace the arrears, kept saying again and again, "I have not eaten; I live on bread and water," "Sparrow, give back what you owe": which they call +hypo to ethos+. 94.

Est gratus iocus qui minus exprobrat quam potest, ut idem dicenti candidato "semper domum tuam colui", cum posset palam negare, "credo", inquit, +"et verum".+ Interim de se dicere ridiculum est: et, quod in alium si absentem diceretur urbanum non erat, quoniam ipsi palam exprobratur movet risum; XCV. quale Augusti est cum ab eo miles nescio quid improbe peteret et veniret contra Marcianus, quem suspicabatur et ipsum aliquid iniuste rogaturum: "non magis" inquit "faciam, commilito, quod petis quam quod Marcianus a me petiturus est".

A pleasing jest is that which reproaches less than it can, as when that same man, to a candidate saying “I have always cultivated your house,” although he could have openly denied it, said, “I believe it,” +"and true".+ Meanwhile, it is laughable to speak about oneself; and what, if it were said of another when absent, would not be urbane—since it is openly cast in his teeth to the man himself—provokes laughter; 95. such is that of Augustus, when a soldier was asking I-know-not-what improperly from him, and there came up on the other side Marcianus, whom he suspected would also ask something unjust: “No more,” he said, “fellow-soldier, will I do what you ask than what Marcianus is going to ask of me.”

XCVI. Adiuvant urbanitatem et versus commode positi, seu toti ut sunt (quod adeo facile est ut Ovidius ex tetrastichon Macri carmine librum in malos poetas composuerit), quod fit gratius si qua etiam ambiguitate conditur, ut Cicero in Lartium, hominem callidum et versutum, cum is in quadam causa suspectus esset:"nisi si qua Vlixes lintre evasit Lartius": XCVII. seu verbis ex parte mutatis, ut in eum qui, cum antea stultissimus esset habitus, post acceptam hereditatem primus sententiam rogabatur: "hereditas est quam vocant sapientiam"pro illo "felicitas est": seu ficti notis versibus similes quae paroidia dicitur:XCVIII.

96. Urbanity too is aided by verses suitably placed, whether whole as they are (which is so easy that Ovid, from Macer’s tetrastichon, composed a book against bad poets), which turns out more pleasing if it is even seasoned with some ambiguity, as Cicero against Lartius, a cunning and wily man, when he was under suspicion in a certain case: "unless some Lartius escaped by skiff like Ulysses": 97. or with the words changed in part, as in the case of the man who, although previously he had been held most foolish, after receiving an inheritance was asked first for his opinion: "it is inheritance which they call wisdom" instead of that "it is felicity": or fictive verses similar to well-known ones, which is called parody:98.

et proverbia oportune aptata, ut homini nequam lapso et ut adlevaretur roganti "tollat te qui non novit". Ex historia etiam ducere urbanitatem eruditum est, ut Cicero fecit cum ei testem in iudicio Verris roganti dixisset Hortensius: "non intellego haec aenigmata"; "atqui debes", inquit, "cum Sphingem domi habeas"; acceperat autem ille a Verre Sphingem aeneam magnae pecuniae.

and proverbs opportunely apted, as to a worthless man who had lapsed and, asking that he be lifted up, “let him lift you who does not know you.” From history also to derive urbanity is erudite, as Cicero did when, as he was asking him for a witness in the trial of Verres, Hortensius said to him: “I do not understand these enigmas”; “and yet you ought,” he said, “since you have a Sphinx at home”; moreover, that man had received from Verres a bronze Sphinx of great pecuniary value.

XCIX. subabsurda illa constant stulti simulatione: [et] quae nisi fingantur stulta sunt, ut qui mirantibus quod humile candelabrum emisset "pransorium erit" inquit. Sed illa similia absurdis sunt acria quae tamquam sine ratione dicta feruntur, ut servus Dolabellae, cum interrogaretur an dominus eius auctionem proposuisset, "domum" inquit "vendidit". C. Deprensi interim pudorem suum ridiculo aliquo explicant, ut qui testem dicentem a reo vulneratum interrogaverat an cicatricem haberet, cum ille ingentem in femine ostendisset, "latus" inquit "oportuit". Contumeliis quoque uti belle datur: ut Hispo +obicientibus arbore+ crimina accusatori "me ex te metiris?" inquit.

99. Those somewhat-absurd depend upon a pretense of stupidity: [and] things which, unless they are feigned, are foolish, as when, people marveling that he had bought a low candelabrum, he said, "it will be for luncheon." But those, like the absurdities, are sharp which are carried as if spoken without reason, as when the slave of Dolabella, when he was asked whether his master had proposed an auction, said, "he sold the house." 100. Those caught out meanwhile unravel their own embarrassment by some witticism, as the man who, having asked a witness saying he had been wounded by the defendant whether he had a scar, when he showed a huge one on his thigh, said, "it ought to have been the side." Insults too may be used nicely: as when Hispo, with people +bringing up 'the tree'+ as charges against the accuser, said, "do you measure me by yourself?"

Et fulvius propincus legatario interroganti an in tabulis quas proferebat chirographus esset "et verus", inquit, "domine".

And Fulvius, a kinsman to the legatee, to the one asking whether in the tablets which he was producing there was a chirograph, said, "and a true one, sir."

CI. Has aut accepi species aut inveni frequentissimas ex quibus ridicula ducerentur; sed repetam necesse est infinitas esse tam salse dicendi quam severe, quas praestat persona locus tempus, casus denique, qui est maxime varius. CII. Itaque haec ne omisisse viderer attigi: illa autem quae de usu ipso et modo iocandi complexus sum adfirmarim esse plane necessaria.

101. I have either received or myself found these types most frequent, from which jests are drawn; but I must repeat that there are infinitely many, as much for speaking wittily as for speaking gravely, which are furnished by the person, the place, the time, and, finally, by chance, which is most variable. 102. Accordingly, I have touched on these lest I might seem to have omitted them; but those matters which I have embraced concerning the very use and the manner of jesting I would affirm to be plainly necessary.

His adicit Domitius Marsus, qui de urbanitate diligentissime scripsit, quaedam non ridicula, sed cuilibet severissimae orationi convenientia eleganter dicta et proprio quodam lepore iucunda: quae sunt quidem urbana, sed risum tamen non habent. CIII. Neque enim ei de risu sed de urbanitate est opus institutum, quam propriam esse nostrae civitatis et sero sic intellegi coeptam, postquam urbis appellatione, etiam si nomen proprium non adiceretur, Romam tamen accipi sit receptum.

To these Domitius Marsus adds, who wrote most diligently about urbanity, certain things not laughable, but spoken elegantly and suitable to any most severe oration, and pleasing by a certain proper charm: which are indeed urbane, but nevertheless do not have laughter. 103. For his work was instituted not about laughter but about urbanity, which is proper to our city, and only late began thus to be understood, after it became accepted that by the appellation of “city,” even if a proper name were not added, Rome was nevertheless understood.

CIV. Eamque sic finit: "urbanitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta et apta ad delectandos movendosque homines in omnem adfectum animi, maxime idonea ad resistendum vel lacessendum, prout quaeque res ac persona desiderat". cui si brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnis orationis virtutes complexa sit. Nam si constat rebus et personis, quod in utrisque oporteat dicere perfectae eloquentiae est.

104. And he thus finishes it: "urbanity is a certain virtue compacted into a brief dictum and apt for delighting and moving men to every affect of mind, most suitable for resisting or provoking, as each matter and person requires." If you remove from it the exception of brevity, it would have encompassed all the virtues of oration. For since it consists in matters and persons, to say what it is proper to say in both is of perfect eloquence.

CV. cur autem brevem esse eam voluerit, nescio, cum idem atque in eodem libro dicat fuisse et in multis narrandi urbanitatem. Paulo post ita finit, Catonis, ut ait, opinionem secutus: "Vrbanus homo [non] erit cuius multa bene dicta responsaque erunt, et qui in sermonibus circulis conviviis, item in contionibus, omni denique loco ridicule commodeque dicet. Risus erit quicumque haec faciet orator". CVI.

105. why, however, he wished it to be brief, I do not know, since the same man, and in the same book, says that there is urbanity even in many instances of narrating. A little later he thus defines it, following, as he says, the opinion of Cato: "An urbane man [will not] be one who has many well-said things and replies, and who in conversations, circles, and dinner-parties, likewise in public assemblies, in every place, in fine, will speak wittily and aptly. Laughter will belong to whatever orator does these things." 106.

Quas si recipimus finitiones, quidquid bene dicetur et urbane dicti nomen accipiet. Ceterum illi qui hoc proposuerat consentanea fuit illa divisio, ut dictorum urbanorum alia seria, alia iocosa, alia media faceret: nam est eadem omnium bene dictorum. Verum mihi etiam iocosa quaedam videntur posse in non satis urbana referri.

If we accept these definitions, whatever shall be well said will also receive the name of an urbane saying. Moreover, for the man who had proposed this, that division was congruent, namely, to make some urbane sayings serious, others jocose, and others middle; for the same quality belongs to all well-said sayings. Yet to me even certain jests seem able to be referred to the not quite urbane.

CVII. Nam meo quidem iudicio illa est urbanitas, in qua nihil absonum, nihil agreste, nihil inconditum, nihil peregrinum neque sensu neque verbis neque ore gestuve possit deprendi, ut non tam sit in singulis dictis quam in toto colore dicendi, qualis apud Graecos atticismos ille reddens Athenarum proprium saporem. CVIII.

107. For, in my judgment, that is urbanity in which nothing out-of-tune, nothing rustic, nothing uncomposed, nothing foreign can be detected—neither in sense nor in words nor in countenance or gesture—so that it is seated not so much in single sayings as in the whole color of speaking, such as among the Greeks that Atticism which renders the proper savor of Athens. 108.

Ne tamen iudicium Marsi, hominis eruditissimi, subtraham, seria partitur in tria genera, honorificum contumeliosum medium. Et honorifici ponit exemplum Ciceronis pro Q. Ligario apud Caesarem: "qui nihil soles oblivisci nisi iniurias",CIX. et contumeliosi quod Attico scripsit de Pompeio et Caesare: "habeo quem fugiam, quem sequar non habeo", et medii, quod apophthegmatikon vocat +et est ita cum dixerit+ neque gravem mortem accidere viro forti posse nec immaturam consulari nec miseram sapienti.

Yet, lest I withdraw the judgment of Marsus, a most erudite man, he partitions the serious utterances into three genera: honorific, contumelious, and middle. And for the honorific he sets an example from Cicero’s For Quintus Ligarius before Caesar: “you are accustomed to forget nothing except injuries,” 109. and for the contumelious, that which he wrote to Atticus about Pompey and Caesar: “I have someone to flee; I have no one to follow,” and for the middle, which he calls apophthegmatic +and it is thus when he has said+ that death can be neither grave for a brave man, nor untimely for a consular, nor wretched for a wise man.

Quae omnia sunt optime dicta, sed cur proprie nomen urbanitatis accipiant non video. CX. Quod si non totius, ut mihi videtur, orationis color meretur, sed etiam singulis dictis tribuendum est, illa potius urbana esse dixerim, quae sunt generis eiusdem ex quo ridicula ducuntur et tamen ridicula non sunt, ut de Pollione Asinio seriis iocisque pariter accommodato dictum est esse eum omnium horarum,CXI. et de actore facile dicente ex tempore, ingenium eum in numerato habere: etiam Pompei, quod refert Marsus, in Ciceronem diffidentem partibus: "transi ad Caesarem, me timebis". Erat enim, si de re minore aut alio animo aut denique non ab ipso dictum fuisset, quod posset inter ridicula numerari.

All of which are most excellently said, but why they should properly receive the name of urbanity I do not see. 110. But if not only the color of the whole oration, as it seems to me, merits it, but it is also to be attributed to single sayings, I would rather say those are urbane which are of the same kind from which the ridicula are drawn and yet are not ridicula, as it was said of Asinius Pollio, equally accommodated to serious and jocular things, that he was a man of all hours, 111. and of an actor speaking easily ex tempore, that he has his talent in ready coin: also of Pompey, as Marsus reports, against Cicero distrustful of his party: “go over to Caesar; you will fear me.” For it was something which, if it had been said about a lesser matter or with a different spirit or finally not by the man himself, could be numbered among the ridicula.

CXII. Etiam illud quod Cicero Caerelliae scripsit, reddens rationem cur illa C. Caesaris tempora tam patienter toleraret: "haec aut animo Catonis ferenda sunt aut Ciceronis stomacho"; stomachus enim ille habet aliquid ioco simile. Haec quae monebam dissimulanda mihi non fuerunt: in quibus ut erraverim, legentis tamen non decepi, indicata et diversa opinione, quam sequi magis probantibus liberum est.

112. Also that which Cicero wrote to Caerellia, rendering an account of why she tolerated the times of Gaius Caesar so patiently: "these things must be borne either by the spirit of Cato or by Cicero’s stomach"; for that "stomach" has something similar to a jest. These things which I was noting were not to be dissimulated by me: in which, granted that I have erred, yet I have not deceived the reader, a diverse opinion having been indicated as well, which it is free for those who approve it more to follow.

[4] I. Altercationis praecepta poterant videri tunc inchoanda cum omnia quae ad continuam orationem pertinent peregissem: nam est usus eius ordine ultimus; sed cum sit posita in sola inventione neque habere dispositionem possit nec elocutionis ornamenta magnopere desideret aut circa memoriam et pronuntiationem laboret, prius quam secundam quinque partium hanc quae tota ex prima pendet tractaturus non alieno loco videor. Quam scriptores alii fortasse ideo reliquerunt quia satis ceteris praeceptis in hanc quoque videbatur esse prospectum. II. Constat enim aut intentione aut depulsione, de quibus satis traditum est, quia quidquid in actione perpetua circa probationes utile est, idem in hac brevi atque concisa prosit necesse est.

[4] 1. The precepts of altercation might seem then to be begun when I had finished all the things that pertain to a continuous oration: for its use is last in order; but since it is placed in invention alone and can neither have disposition nor greatly desire the ornaments of elocution, nor labor around memory and pronuntiation, before, about to treat the second of the five parts, to handle this which depends wholly on the first, I do not seem to be in an unfitting place. Which other writers perhaps for this reason have left aside, because it seemed that sufficient provision had been made for this also by the other precepts. 2. For it consists either of assertion or of repulsion (defense), about which enough has been handed down, since whatever in continuous pleading concerning proofs is useful, the same in this brief and concise form must necessarily be of use.

Neque alia dicuntur in altercatione, sed aliter, aut interrogando aut respondendo. cuius rei fere omnis observatio in illo testium loco excussa nobis est. III.

Nor are other things said in altercation, but the same things otherwise, either by questioning or by answering. The whole observance of which matter was for the most part sifted by us in that passage on witnesses. 3.

Tamen quia latius hoc opus adgressi sumus neque perfectus orator sine hac virtute dici potest, paulum inpendamus huic quoque peculiaris operae, quae quidem in quibusdam causis ad victoriam vel plurimum valet. IV. Nam ut in qualitate generali, in qua rectene factum quid an contra sit quaeritur, perpetua dominatur oratio, et quaestionem finitionis actiones plerumque satis explicant et omnia paene in quibus de facto constat aut coniectura artificiali ratione colligitur: ita in iis causis, quae sunt frequentissimae, quae vel solis extra artem probationibus vel mixtis continentur, asperrima in hac parte dimicatio est, nec alibi dixeris magis mucrone pugnari. V. Nam et firmissima quaeque memoriae iudicis inculcanda sunt et praestandum quidquid in actione promisimus et referenda mendacia: nusquam est denique qui cognoscit intentior.

Yet, because we have undertaken this work more broadly and a perfect orator cannot be said to exist without this virtue, let us expend a little peculiar labor on this as well, which indeed in certain causes avails very greatly for victory. 4. For just as in the general quality, in which it is asked whether something has been done rightly or the contrary, the continuous oration holds dominion, and actions for the question of definition for the most part sufficiently explicate the issue, and almost everything in which the matter of fact is agreed or is gathered by an artificial reasoning of conjecture: so in those causes—which are most frequent—which are contained either by proofs outside the art alone or by mixed proofs, the struggle in this part is most asperous, nor would you say anywhere else that the fighting is more at the blade’s point. 5. For both each of the firmest points must be inculcated into the judge’s memory, and whatever we promised in the speech must be made good, and the falsehoods must be brought back and exposed: nowhere, in fine, is the one who conducts the inquiry more intent.

Nec inmerito quidam quamquam in dicendo mediocres hac tamen altercandi praestantia meruerunt nomen patronorum. VI. At quidam, litigatoribus suis illum modo ambitiosum declamandi sudorem praestitisse contenti, cum turba laudantium destituunt subsellia, pugnamque illam decretoriam imperitis ac saepe pullatae turbae relincunt. Itaque videas alios plerumque in iudiciis privatis ad actiones advocari, alios ad probationem.

And not without merit certain men, although mediocre in speaking, yet by this excellence in altercation have earned the name of patrons. 6. But some, content to have furnished to their litigants only that ambitious sweat of declaiming, leave the benches deserted along with the crowd of applauders, and abandon that decisive battle to the unskilled and often to the black-clad crowd. And so you may see some for the most part in private trials called in for the actions, others for the proof.

VII. Quae si dividenda sunt officia, hoc certe magis necessarium est, pudendumque dictu si plus litigantibus prosunt minores. In publicis certe iudiciis vox illa praeconis +praeter patronos+ ipsum qui egerit citat.

7. If these duties must be divided, this one is certainly more necessary, and—shameful to say—if the juniors are of greater use to the litigants. In public trials, certainly, that voice of the crier +besides the patrons+ summons the very man who has conducted the case.

VIII. Opus est igitur in primis ingenio veloci ac mobili, animo praesenti et acri. Non enim cogitandum, sed dicendum statim est et prope sub conatu adversarii manus exigenda.

VIII. There is need, then, in the first place, of a swift and mobile ingenium, and of a present and keen spirit. For it is not for thinking, but for speaking at once, and almost, under the adversary’s very attempt, applause must be exacted.

Quare cum in omni parte huiusce officii plurimum facit totas non diligenter modo sed etiam familiariter [nos] nosse causas, tum in altercatione maxime necessarium est omnium personarum instrumentorum temporum locorum habere notitiam: alioqui et tacendum erit saepe et aliis subicientibus (plerumque autem studio loquendi fatue modo monent) accedendum: quo nonnumquam accidit ut nostra credulitate aliena stultitia erubescamus. IX. Neque tamen cum his ipsis monitoribus clam res erit: quidam faciunt ut aperte quoque rixemur. Videas enim plerosque ira percitos exclamantis, ut iudex audiat contrarium id esse quod admoneant, sciatque ille qui pronuntiaturus est in causa malum quod tacetur.

Wherefore, since in every part of this office it makes very much that we know the cases in their entirety not only diligently but even familiarly, then in altercation it is most necessary to have knowledge of all the persons, documents, times, and places: otherwise we shall often have to be silent, and we must accede to others as they suggest (but for the most part, from a zeal for speaking, they foolishly only give warnings); whence it sometimes happens that, through our credulity, we blush at another’s stupidity. 9. Nor yet will the matter be hidden with these selfsame monitors: certain persons bring it about that we even wrangle openly. For you may see many, inflamed with anger, shouting out, so that the judge may hear that what they advise is the contrary, and that he who is about to pronounce in the case may know the evil that is kept silent.

X. Quare bonus altercator vitio iracundiae careat; nullus enim rationi magis obstat adfectus et fert extra causam plerumque et deformia convicia facere ac mereri cogit et in ipsos nonnumquam iudices incitat. Melior moderatio ac nonnumquam etiam patientia; neque enim refutanda tantum quae ex contrario dicuntur, sed contemnenda elevanda ridenda sunt, nec usquam plus loci recipit urbanitas. Hoc, dum ordo est et pudor: contra turbantis audendum et impudentiae fortiter resistendum.

10. Therefore let the good practitioner of altercation be free from the vice of irascibility; for no affect more obstructs reason, and it for the most part carries one outside the case, and drives one to make and to merit disgraceful contumelies, and sometimes it incites against the judges themselves. Better is moderation, and sometimes even patience; for not only must the things said on the other side be refuted, but they must be despised, made light of, laughed at, and nowhere does urbanity find more room. This, so long as there is order and modesty: against those who disturb, one must dare, and impudence must be stoutly resisted.

XI. sunt enim quidam praeduri in hoc oris, ut obstrepant ingenti clamore et medios sermones intercipiant et omnia tumultu confundant, quos ut non imitari, sic acriter propulsare oportebit, et ipsorum improbitatem retundendo, et iudices vel praesidentis magistratus appellando frequentius ut loquendi vices serventur. Non est res animi iacentis et mollis supra modum frontis, fallitque plerumque quod probitas vocatur quae est inbecillitas. XII.

11. for there are certain men quite hard‑mouthed in this, such that they drown things out with huge clamor and intercept speeches in the middle and confound everything with tumult; whom, just as we must not imitate, so we ought sharply to repel, both by blunting their improbity and by appealing more frequently to the judges or to the presiding magistrate, so that turns for speaking may be preserved. It is not a matter for a prostrate spirit and a face soft beyond measure; and what is commonly called probity often deceives, when it is weakness. 12.

Valet autem in altercatione plurimum acumen, quod sine dubio ex arte non venit (natura enim non docetur), arte tamen adiuvatur. XIII. In qua praecipuum est semper id in oculis habere de quo quaeritur et quod volumus efficere: quod propositum tenentes nec in rixam ibimus nec causae debita tempora conviciando conteremus, gaudebimusque si hoc adversarius facit.

But in altercation acumen avails very much, which without doubt does not come from art (for nature is not taught), yet it is aided by art. 13. In which the principal thing is always to have before one’s eyes that about which inquiry is being made and what we wish to effect: holding fast to that proposal, we will neither go into wrangling nor wear down the times owed to the cause by reviling, and we will even rejoice if the adversary does this.

XIV. Omnia +tempore+ fere parata sunt meditatis diligenter quae [quid] aut ex adverso dici aut responderi a nobis possunt. Nonnumquam tamen solet hoc quoque esse artis genus, ut quaedam in actione dissimulata subito in altercando proferantur (est inopinatis eruptionibus aut incursioni ex insidiis factae simillimum); id autem tum faciendum est cum (est) aliquid cui responderi non statim possit, potuerit autem si tempus ad disponendum fuisset.

14. Almost everything is, +in time+, prepared by carefully premeditating [what] either can be said from the opposite side or answered by us. Sometimes, however, this too is wont to be a kind of art: that certain things, concealed in the actio, are suddenly brought forth in altercation (it is very like unexpected eruptions or an incursion made from ambush); and this is to be done then when (it is) something to which a reply cannot be made at once, but could have been if there had been time for arranging.

Nam quod fideliter firmum est, a primis statim actionibus arripere optimum est, quo saepius diutiusque dicatur. XV. Illud vix saltem praecipiendum videtur, ne turbidus et clamosus tantum sit altercator, et quales fere sunt qui litteras nesciunt. Nam improbitas, licet adversario molesta sit, iudici invisa est.

For that which is faithfully firm, it is best to seize upon from the very first actions, so that it may be said more often and for a longer time. 15. That scarcely even seems to need to be prescribed: that the wrangler not be merely turbulent and clamorous, such as for the most part are those who are unlettered. For impudence, although it is troublesome to the adversary, is hateful to the judge.

Nocet etiam diu pugnare in iis quae optinere non possis. XVI. Nam ubi vinci necesse est, expedit cedere, quia, sive plura sunt de quibus quaeritur, facilior erit in ceteris fides, sive unum, mitior solet poena inrogari verecundiae.

It also harms to fight long over those matters which you cannot maintain. 16. For when it is necessary to be conquered, it is expedient to yield, because, whether there are more things about which inquiry is made, trust will be easier in the rest; or if it is a single one, a milder penalty is wont to be imposed upon modesty.

Nam culpam, praesertim deprensam, pertinaciter tueri culpa altera est.

For to defend a fault, especially one detected, pertinaciously is another fault.

XVII. dum stat acies, multi res consilii atque artis est ut errantem adversarium trahas et ire quam longissime cogas, ut vana interim spe exultet. Ideo quaedam bene dissimulantur instrumenta; instant enim et saepe discrimen omne committunt quod deesse nobis putant et faciunt probationibus nostris auctoritatem postulando.

17. while the battle-line stands, much is a matter of counsel and art: to draw along the erring adversary and to compel him to go as far as possible, so that meanwhile he may exult in vain hope. Therefore certain instruments are well dissimulated; for they press on and often risk all the hazard, because they suppose that to be lacking to us, and by demanding proofs they confer authority upon our proofs.

XVIII. Expedit etiam dare aliquid adversario quod pro se putet, quod adprehendens maius aliquid cogatur dimittere: duas interim res proponere quarum utramlibet male sit electurus, quod in altercatione fit potentius quam in actione, quia in illa nobis ipsi respondemus, in hac adversarium quasi confessum tenemus. XIX.

18. It is expedient also to give something to the adversary which he may think to be for himself, which, on seizing, he is compelled to let go of something greater: meanwhile to propose two matters, of which whichever he is going to elect, he will elect ill; which is done more powerfully in altercation than in action, because in the former we ourselves answer for us, in the latter we hold the adversary as if confessed. 19.

Est in primis acuti videre quo iudex dicto moveatur, quid respuat: quod et vultu saepissime et aliquando etiam dicto aliquo factove eius deprehenditur. Et instare proficientibus et ab iis quae non adiuvent quam mollissime pedem oportet referre. Faciunt hoc medici quoque, ut remedia proinde perseverent adhibere vel desinant ut illa recipi ime pedem oportet vident.

It is among the first marks of the acute to see by what utterance the judge is moved, what he rejects: which is most often detected both by his countenance and sometimes also by some word or deed of his. And one ought to press upon the points that are making progress, and from those that do not help to withdraw one’s foot as gently as possible. Physicians do this too, so that they likewise persist in applying remedies, or cease, as they see those being received.

XX. Nonnumquam, si rem evolvere propositam facile non sit, inferenda est alia quaestio, atque in eam iudex, si fieri potest, avocandus. Quid enim, cum respondere non possis, agendum est nisi ut aliud invenias cui adversarius respondere non possit? XXI.

20. Sometimes, if it is not easy to unravel the proposed matter, another question must be brought in, and toward it the judge, if it can be done, must be called away. For what, indeed, when you cannot respond, is to be done except that you find something else to which the adversary cannot respond? 21.

In plerisque idem est, ut dixi, qui circa testes locus, et personis modo distat, quod hic patronorum inter se certamen, illic pugna inter testem et patronum.

In most respects it is the same, as I said, the locus that concerns witnesses, and it differs only in the persons, because here there is a contest of patrons among themselves, there a fight between the witness and the patron.

Exercitatio vero huius rei longe facilior. Nam est utilissimum frequenter cum aliquo qui sit studiorum eorundem sumere materiam vel verae vel etiam fictae controversiae et diversas partes altercationis modo tueri: quod idem etiam in simplici genere quaestionum fieri potest. XXII.

But the exercise of this matter is far easier. For it is most useful frequently, with someone who is of the same studies, to take up a subject either of a real or even a fictitious controversy and to maintain in turn the different parts of the altercation: the same thing can also be done in the simple kind of questions. 22.

Ne illud quidem ignorare advocatum volo, quo quaeque ordine probatio sit apud iudicem proferenda, cuius rei eadem quae in argumentis ratio est, ut potentissima prima et summa ponantur; illa enim ad credendum praeparant iudicem, haec ad pronuntiandum.

Nor do I wish the advocate to be ignorant of this either: in what order each piece of proof is to be brought forward before the judge; in which matter the same rationale holds as in arguments, namely that the most powerful be set first and last; for those prepare the judge to believe, these to pronounce judgment.

[5] I. His pro nostra facultate tractatis non dubitassem transire protinus ad dispositionem, quae ordine ipso sequitur, nisi vererer ne, quoniam fuerunt qui iudicium inventioni subiungerent, praeterisse hunc locum quibusdam viderer: qui mea quidem opinione adeo partibus operis huius omnibus conexus ac mixtus est ut ne a sententiis quidem aut verbis saltem singulis possit separari, nec magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor. II. Ideoque nos quid in quaque re sequendum cavendumque sit docemus ac deinceps docebimus, ut ad ea iudicium derigatur. Praecipiam igitur ne quod effici non potest adgrediamur, ut contraria vitemus et communia, ne quid in eloquendo corruptum obscurum sit?

[5] 1. With these matters handled according to our ability, I would not have hesitated to pass straight on to disposition, which follows in the order itself, unless I feared that, since there have been those who subjoin judgment to invention, I might seem to some to have passed over this place: which, in my opinion, is so connected and mingled with all the parts of this work that it cannot be separated even from the sentences, or even from single words, nor is it conveyed by art any more than taste or odor. 2. And therefore we teach, and will hereafter teach, what in each matter is to be followed and what is to be avoided, so that judgment may be directed to these things. I will prescribe, then, that we not attempt what cannot be effected, that we avoid contraries and commonplaces, lest anything in speaking be corrupt or obscure?

Referatur oportet ad sensus, qui non docentur.

It ought to be referred to the senses, which are not taught.

III. Nec multum a iudicio credo distare consilium, nisi quod illud ostendentibus se rebus adhibetur, hoc latentibus et aut omnino nondum repertis aut dubiis: et iudicium frequentissime certum est, consilium vero ratio est quaedam alte petita et plerumque plura perpendens et comparans habensque in se et inventionem et iudicationem. IV. Sed ne de hoc quidem praecepta in universum exspectanda sunt: nam ex re sumitur; cuius locus ante actionem est frequenter (nam Cicero summo consilio videtur in Verrem vel contrahere tempora dicendi maluisse quam in eum annum quo erat Q. Hortensius consul futurus incidere),V. et in ipsis actionibus primum ac potentissimum optinet locum: nam quid dicendum, quid tacendum, quid differendum sit exigere consilii est: negare sit satius an defendere, ubi prohoemio utendum et quali, narrandumne et quo modo, iure prius pugnandum an aequo, qui sit ordo utilissimus, tum omnes colores, aspere an leniter an etiam summisse loqui expediat.

III. Nor do I believe counsel differs much from judgment, except that the latter is applied to things showing themselves, the former to things lying hidden and either not yet found at all or doubtful: and judgment is most frequently certain, whereas counsel is a certain reasoning fetched from deep sources and for the most part weighing and comparing more things and having in itself both invention and judicatio. IV. But not even about this are precepts to be looked for universally: for it is taken from the matter; whose place is often before the action (for Cicero, with the highest counsel, seems in the case against Verres to have preferred either to contract the times of speaking rather than to fall into that year in which Q. Hortensius was going to be consul), V. and in the actions themselves it holds the first and most powerful place: for to determine what must be said, what kept silent, what deferred, is a matter of counsel: whether it is preferable to deny or to defend, where a prooemium is to be used and of what kind, whether there is to be a narration and in what manner, whether one should fight first by law or by equity, what order is most useful; then all the colors—whether it is expedient to speak harshly or gently or even submissively.

VI. Sed haec quoque ut quisque passus est locus monuimus, idemque in reliqua parte faciemus, pauca tamen exempli gratia ponam, quibus manifestius appareat quid sit quod demonstrari posse praeceptis non arbitror. VII. Laudatur consilium Demosthenis, quod, cum suaderet bellum Atheniensibus parum id prospere expertis, nihil adhuc factum esse ratione monstravit: poterat enim emendari neglegentia, at si nihil esset erratum, melioris in posterum spei non erat ratio.

6. But these matters too we have admonished as each occasion has allowed, and we shall do the same in the remaining part; nevertheless I will set down a few things for example’s sake, by which it may appear more manifestly what it is that I do not think can be demonstrated by precepts. 7. The counsel of Demosthenes is praised, because, when he was urging war upon the Athenians, who had experienced it with too little prosperity, he showed by reasoning that nothing had yet been done: for negligence could be corrected; but if nothing had been erred, there was no ground of better hope for the future.

VIII. Idem cum offensam vereretur si obiurgaret populi segnitiam in adserenda libertate rei publicae, maiorum laude uti maluit, qui rem publicam fortissime administrassent; nam et faciles habuit aures et natura sequebatur ut meliora probantis peiorum paeniteret. IX. Ciceronis quidem vel una pro Cluentio quamlibet multis exemplis sufficiet oratio.

8. Likewise, when he feared offense if he should upbraid the people’s sluggishness in asserting the commonwealth’s liberty, he preferred to use the praise of the ancestors, who had most bravely administered the commonwealth; for he both had receptive ears, and it followed by nature that, as they approved the better, they would repent of the worse. 9. Indeed, even Cicero’s single Oration Pro Cluentio will suffice for however many examples.

Nam quod in eo consilium maxime mirer? primamne expositionem, qua matri, cuius filium premebat auctoritas, abstulit fidem? an quod iudicii corrupti crimen transferre in adversarium maluit quam negare propter inveteratam, ut ipse dicit, infamiam?

For what counsel in him should I most admire? The first exposition, by which he removed credit from the mother, whose authority was pressing upon her son? Or that he preferred to transfer the charge of a corrupted judgment onto the adversary rather than to deny it, on account of the inveterate, as he himself says, infamy?

an quod in re invidiosa legis auxilio novissime est usus? - quo genere defensionis etiam offendisset nondum praemonitas iudicum mentes; an quod se ipsum invito Cluentio facere testatus est? Quid pro Milone?

or that in an odious matter he, most recently, made use of the aid of the law? — by which kind of defense he would even have offended the minds of the judges not yet forewarned; or that he declared that he himself did it with Cluentius unwilling? What of the speech For Milo?

X. quod non ante narravit quam praeiudiciis omnibus reum liberaret? quod insidiarum invidiam in Clodium vertit, quamquam re vera fuerat pugna fortuita? quod factum et laudavit et tamen a voluntate Milonis removit?

10. that he did not recount it before he had freed the defendant from all prejudgments? that he turned the odium for the ambush upon Clodius, although in very truth the fight had been fortuitous? that he both praised the deed and yet removed it from the will of Milo?

quod illi preces non dedit et in earum locum ipse successit? Infinitum est enumerare ut Cottae detraxerit auctoritatem, ut pro Ligario se opposuerit, Cornelium ipsa confessionis fiducia eripuerit. XI. Illud dicere satis habeo, nihil esse non modo in orando sed in omni vita prius consilio, frustraque sine eo tradi ceteras artis, plusque vel sine doctrina prudentiam quam sine prudentia facere doctrinam.

that he did not grant him entreaties and in their place himself stepped in? It is infinite to enumerate how he detracted Cotta’s authority, how he set himself in opposition on behalf of Ligarius, how by the very confidence of confession he snatched Cornelius away. 11. This I have enough to say: that there is nothing, not only in orating but in the whole of life, prior to counsel, and that the other arts are handed down in vain without it, and that prudence accomplishes more even without doctrine than doctrine does without prudence.

Aptare etiam orationem locis temporibus personis est eiusdem virtutis. Sed hic quia latius fusus est locus mixtusque cum elocutione, tractabitur cum praecipere de apte dicendo coeperimus.

To adapt the speech also to places, times, and persons is of the same virtue. But this topic, because it is more broadly diffused and mingled with elocution, will be treated when we begin to lay down precepts about speaking aptly.