Seneca: EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM

(1) Exigis a me frequentiores epistulas. Rationes conferamus: soluendonon eris. Conuenerat quidem ut tua priora essent: tu scriberes, ego rescriberem.

(1) You demand more frequent epistles from me. Let us compare accounts: you will not be solvent. It had indeed been agreed that yours should be the earlier: you would write, I would write back.

Sed non ero difficilis: bene credi tibi scio. Itaque in anticessum dabonec faciam quod Cicero, uir disertissimus, facere Atticum iubet, ut etiam'si rem nullam habebit, quod in buccam uenerit scribat'. (2) Numquam potestdeesse quod scribam, ut omnia illa quae Ciceronis implent epistulas transeam:quis candidatus laboret; quis alienis, quis suis uiribus pugnet; quis consulatumfiducia Caesaris, quis Pompei, quis arcae petat; quam durus sit feneratorCaecilius, a quo minoris centesimis propinqui nummum mouere non possint. Sua satius est mala quam aliena tractare, se excutere et uidere quam multarumrerum candidatus sit, et non suffragari.

But I will not be difficult: I know you may be well trusted. And so I will give in advance, nor will I do what Cicero, a most eloquent man, bids Atticus to do, that even if he will have no matter, he should ‘write whatever comes into his mouth.’ (2) There can never be lacking something for me to write, even if I pass over all those things which fill Cicero’s letters: which candidate is toiling; who fights with others’ forces, who with his own; who seeks the consulship by confidence in Caesar, who in Pompey, who in the strongbox; how harsh a money‑lender Caecilius is, from whom the relatives cannot move a coin at less than hundredths. It is better to handle one’s own ills than others’, to shake oneself out and see of how many things one is a candidate, and not to canvass.

(3) Hoc est, mi Lucili, egregium,hoc securum ac liberum, nihil petere et tota fortunae comitia transire. Quam putas esse iucundum tribubus uocatis, cum candidati in templis suispendeant et alius nummos pronuntiet, alius per sequestrem agat, alius eorummanus osculis conterat quibus designatus contingendam manum negaturus est,omnes attoniti uocem praeconis expectent, stare otiosum et spectare illasnundinas nec ementem quicquam nec uendentem? (4) Quanto hic maiore gaudiofruitur qui non praetoria aut consularia comitia securus intuetur, sedmagna illa in quibus alii honores anniuersarios petunt, alii perpetuaspotestates, alii bellorum euentus prosperos triumphosque, alii diuitias,alii matrimonia ac liberos, alii salutem suam suorumque!

(3) This, my Lucilius, is the outstanding thing, this the secure and free: to petition for nothing and to pass by the entire elections of Fortune. How pleasant do you think it is, when the tribes are summoned, while the candidates hang about in their own temples and one proclaims coins, another acts through a sequester, another wears down their hands with kisses—those hands which, once he is designated, he will refuse to let be touched—while all, thunderstruck, await the crier’s voice, to stand idle and look upon that fair, neither buying anything nor selling? (4) With how much greater joy does he enjoy who looks on securely not at praetorian or consular elections, but at those great ones in which some seek anniversary honors, others perpetual powers, others prosperous outcomes of wars and triumphs, others riches, others marriages and children, others the safety of themselves and their own!

Quanti animi resest solum nihil petere, nulli supplicare, et dicere, 'nihil mihi tecum,fortuna; non facio mei tibi copiam. Scio apud te Catones repelli, Vatiniosfieri. Nihil rogo.

How great a thing of spirit it is to seek nothing, to supplicate no one, and to say, 'I have nothing to do with you, Fortune; I do not place myself at your disposal. I know that with you the Catos are repelled, the Vatiniuses are made. I ask for nothing.'

' Hoc est priuatam facere fortunam. (5) Licet ergo haec in uicem scribere et hanc semper integram egereremateriam circumspicientibus tot milia hominum inquieta, qui ut aliquidpestiferi consequantur per mala nituntur in malum petuntque mox fugiendaaut etiam fastidienda. (6) Cui enim adsecuto satis fuit quod optanti nimiumuidebatur?

' This is to make Fortune private. (5) Therefore it is permitted to write these things in turn and to keep bringing forth this subject-matter ever intact, with so many thousands of restless people looking around, who, that they may obtain something pestiferous, strive through evils toward evil and seek things soon to be fled or even to be loathed. (6) For to whom, once he has attained it, has that which seemed excessive while he was desiring it ever sufficed?

Non est, ut existimant homines, auida felicitas sed pusilla;itaque neminem satiat. Tu ista credis excelsa quia longe ab illis iaces;ei uero qui ad illa peruenit humilia sunt. Mentior nisi adhuc quaerit escendere:istud quod tu summum putas gradus est.

Felicity is not, as men suppose, avid, but paltry; and so it satisfies no one. You believe those things to be exalted because you lie far from them; but to him who has reached them, they are low. I speak falsely unless he is still seeking to ascend: that which you think the summit is a step.

(7) Omnes autem male habet ignorantiaueri. Tamquam ad bona feruntur decepti rumoribus, deinde mala esse autinania aut minora quam sperauerint adepti ac multa passi uident; maiorquepars miratur ex interuallo fallentia, et uulgo bona pro magnis sunt.

(7) But ignorance of the truth afflicts everyone. Deceived by rumors, they are borne as though toward goods; then, once they have obtained them and suffered many things, they see that they are evils, or empty, or smaller than they had hoped; and the greater part admires, from a distance, things that deceive, and commonly goods pass for great things.

(8) Hoc ne nobis quoque eueniat, quaeramus quid sit bonum. Varia eiusinterpretatio fuit, alius illud aliter expressit. Quidam ita finiunt: 'bonumest quod inuitat animos, quod ad se uocat'. Huic statim opponitur: quidsi inuitat quidem sed in perniciem?

(8) Lest this also befall us, let us inquire what the good is. Its interpretation has been various; one has expressed that thing in one way, another in another. Some define it thus: 'the good is that which invites minds, which calls to itself.' To this there is straightway opposed: what if it does indeed invite, but into pernicious ruin?

scis quam multa mala blanda sint. Verumet ueri simile inter se differunt. Ita quod bonum est uero iungitur; nonest enim bonum nisi uerum est.

You know how many evils are alluring. The true and the verisimilar differ from each other. Thus what is good is joined to the true; for it is not good unless it is true.

At quod inuitat ad se et adlicefacit uerisimile est: subrepit, sollicitat, adtrahit. (9) Quidam ita finierunt: 'bonumest quod adpetitionem sui mouet, uel quod impetum animi tendentis ad semouet. ' Et huic idem opponitur; multa enim impetum animi mouent quae petanturpetentium malo.

But that which invites to itself and entices seems plausible: it creeps in, solicits, draws in. (9) Some have thus defined: 'the good is that which moves toward the petition for itself, or that which moves the impulse of the mind tending toward itself.' And to this the same objection is opposed; for many things move the mind’s impulse which are sought to the harm of the seekers.

Melius illi qui ita finierunt: 'bonum est quod ad se impetumanimi secundum naturam mouet et ita demum petendum est cum coepit esseexpetendum'. Iam et honestum est; hoc enim est perfecte petendum. (10) Locus ipse me admonet ut quid intersit inter bonum honestumque dicam. Aliquidinter se mixtum habent et inseparabile: nec potest bonum esse nisi cuialiquid honesti inest, et honestum utique bonum est.

Better are those who have defined thus: 'the good is that which moves the mind’s impulse toward itself according to nature, and it is then and only then to be sought when it has begun to be to-be-sought.' Already the honorable too is in view; for this is what is to be sought perfectly. (10) The very place reminds me to say what the difference is between the good and the honorable. They have something mixed with one another and inseparable: nor can it be good unless there is in it something of the honorable, and the honorable is assuredly good.

Quid ergo inter duointerest? Honestum est perfectum bonum, quo beata uita completur, cuiuscontactu alia quoque bona fiunt. (11) Quod dico talest: sunt quaedam nequebona neque mala, tamquam militia, legatio, iurisdictio.

What, then, is the difference between the two? The honorable is the perfect good, by which the blessed life is completed, by whose contact other things also become good. (11) What I say is of this sort: there are certain things neither good nor bad, as, for instance, military service, a legation, jurisdiction.

Haec cum honesteadministrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt et ex dubio in bonum transeunt. Bonum societate honesti fit, honestum per se bonum est;bonum ex honestofluit, honestum ex se est. Quod bonum est malum esse potuit; quod honestumest nisi bonum esse non potuit.

These things, when they have been honorably administered, begin to be good things and pass from the doubtful into the good. The good comes to be by association with the honorable, the honorable is good per se; the good flows from the honorable, the honorable is from itself. What is good could have been evil; what is honorable could not have been anything except good.

(12) Hanc quidam finitionem reddiderunt: 'bonum est quod secundum naturamest'. Adtende quid dicam: quod bonum, est secundum naturam: non protinusquod secundum naturam est etiam bonum est. Multa naturae quidem consentiunt,sed tam pusilla sunt ut non conueniat illis boni nomen; leuia enim sunt,contemnenda. Nullum est minimum contemnendum bonum; nam quamdiu exiguumest bonum non est: cum bonum esse coepit, non est exiguum.

(12) Certain people have rendered this definition: 'the good is what is according to nature'. Attend to what I say: what is good is according to nature; not forthwith is whatever is according to nature also good. Many things indeed consent to nature, but they are so exiguous that the name of “good” does not befit them; for they are light, to be contemned. No minimal good is to be contemned; for so long as it is exiguous, it is not a good: when it has begun to be good, it is not exiguous.

Unde adcognoscitur bonum? si perfecte secundum naturam est. (13) 'Fateris' inquis 'quod bonumest secundum naturam esse; haec eius proprietas est.

Whence is the good recognized? If it is perfectly according to nature. (13) 'You admit,' you say, 'that the good is to be according to nature; this is its property.'

Fateris et alia secundum naturam quidem esse sed bona non esse. Quomodo ergo illud bonum est cumhaec non sint? quomodo ad aliam proprietatem peruenit cum utrique praecipuum illud commune sit, secundum naturam esse?

You admit also that other things indeed are according to nature, but are not good. How then is that a good when these are not? how does it come to another property, when that preeminent thing is common to both, to be according to nature?

(14) Ipsa scilicet magnitudine. Nec hoc nouum est, quaedam crescendo mutari. Infans fuit; factus est pubes:alia eius proprietas fit; ille enim inrationalis est, hic rationalis.

(14) By the magnitude itself, to be sure. Nor is this new, that certain things are changed by growing. He was an infant; he has become pubescent:another property of him comes to be; for that one is irrational, this one rational.

Quaedamincremento non tantum in maius exeunt sed in aliud. (15) 'Non fit' inquit'aliud quod maius fit. Utrum lagonam an dolium impleas uino, nihil refert:in utroque proprietas uini est.

Certain things by increment go forth not only into something greater but into something other. (15) 'It does not become,' he says, 'other, that which becomes greater. Whether you fill a flagon or a dolium with wine, it makes no difference: in each the property of wine is present.'

Et exiguum mellis pondus et magnum saporenon differt. ' Diuersa ponis exempla; in istis enim eadem qualitas est;quamuis augeantur, manet. (16) Quaedam amplificata in suo genere et insua proprietate perdurant; quaedam post multa incrementa ultima demum uertitadiectio et nouam illis aliamque quam in qua fuerunt condicionem inprimit.

And a small weight of honey and a great one do not differ in savor. ' You set diverse examples; for in these the same quality is; although they are augmented, it remains. (16) Certain things, when amplified, endure in their own kind and insua property; certain things, after many increments, at last a final addition uertitadiectio and imprints upon them a new and other condition than that in which they were.

Unus lapis facit fornicem, ille qui latera inclinata cuneauit et interuentusuo uinxit. Summa adiectio quare plurimum facit uel exigua? quia non augetsed implet.

One stone makes the arch, that one which wedged the inclined sides and bound them by its own interposition. Why does the final addition do the most, even if slight? because it does not augment but completes.

(17) Quaedam processu priorem exuunt formam et in nouam transeunt. Ubi aliquid animus diu protulit et magnitudinem eius sequendo lassatusest, infinitum coepit uocari; quod longe aliud factum est quam fuit cummagnum uideretur sed finitum. Eodem modo aliquid difficulter secari cogitauimus:nouissime crescente hac difficultate insecabile inuentum est.

(17) Certain things, by progression, shed their prior form and pass into a new one. When the mind has long extended something and, by following its magnitude, has grown weary, it began to be called infinite; which became something far other than it had been, when it seemed great but finite. In the same way we conceived of something as being cut with difficulty: finally, with this difficulty increasing, the insecable was discovered.

Sic ab eoquod uix et aegre mouebatur processimus ad inmobile. Eadem ratione aliquidsecundum naturam fuit: hoc in aliam proprietatem magnitudo sua transtulitet bonum fecit. Vale.

Thus from that which scarcely and with difficulty was being moved, we proceeded to the immobile. By the same reason, something was according to nature: its own magnitude transferred this into another property and made it a good. Farewell.

CXIX. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM.

119. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS.

(1) Quotiens aliquid inueni, non expecto donec dicas 'in commune': ipse mihi dico. Quid sit quod inuenerim quaeris? Sinum laxa, merum lucrum est.

(1) Whenever I find something, I do not wait until you say 'into the common'; I say it myself. What it is that I have found, you ask? Loosen your purse: it is mere lucre.

Docebo quomodo fieri diues celerrime possis. Quam ualde cupis audire! nec inmerito: ad maximas te diuitias conpendiaria ducam.

I will teach you how you can become rich most swiftly. How greatly you long to hear it! And not without reason: I will lead you by a compendious shortcut to the greatest riches.

Opus erit tamen tibi creditore: ut negotiari possis, aes alienum facias oportet, sed nolo per intercessorem mutueris, nolo proxenetae nomen tuum iactent. (2) Paratum tibi creditorem dabo Catonianum illum, a te mutuum sumes. Quantulumcumque est, satis erit si, quidquid deerit, id a nobis petierimus.

You will, however, have need of a creditor: in order that you may negotiate, you must incur debt; but I do not want you to borrow through an intercessor, I do not want brokers to bandy your name about. (2) I will give you a creditor ready to hand—of the Catonian sort: you will take a loan from yourself. However little it is, it will suffice, if we ask from ourselves whatever is lacking.

Nihil enim,mi Lucili, interest utrum non desideres an habeas. Summa rei in utroque eadem est: non torqueberis. Nec illud praecipio, ut aliquid naturae neges — contumax est, non potest uinci, suum poscit — sed ut quidquid naturam excedit scias precarium esse, non necessarium.

For there is no difference, my Lucilius, whether you do not desire or whether you have. The sum of the matter is the same in both: you will not be tormented. Nor do I prescribe this, that you deny anything to nature — it is contumacious, cannot be conquered, demands its own — but that you know whatever exceeds nature to be precarious, not necessary.

(3) Esurio: edendum est. Utrum hic panis sit plebeius an siligineus ad naturam nihil pertinet: illauentrem non delectari uult sed impleri. Sitio: utrum haec aqua sit quamex lacu proximo excepero an ea quam multa niue clusero, ut rigore refrigeretur alieno, ad naturam nihil pertinet.

(3) I am hungry: something must be eaten. Whether this bread is plebeian or siliginous pertains to nature not at all: she wants the belly not to be delighted but to be filled. I am thirsty: whether this water is what I have drawn from the nearest lake or that which I have enclosed with much snow, so that it be refrigerated by an alien rigor, pertains to nature not at all.

Illa hoc unum iubet, sitim extingui; utrum sit aureum poculum an crustallinum an murreum an Tiburtinus calixan manus concaua, nihil refert. (4) Finem omnium rerum specta, et superuacua dimittes. Fames me appellat: ad proxima quaeque porrigatur manus; ipsa mihi commendabit quodcumque conprendero.

She bids this one thing: that thirst be extinguished; whether there be a golden cup or a crystalline or murrhine one, or a Tiburtine chalice or a concave hand, it makes no difference. (4) Look to the end of all things, and you will dismiss the superfluous. Hunger calls me: let the hand be extended to whatever is nearest; hunger itself will commend to me whatever I grasp.

Nihil contemnit esuriens. (5) Quid sit ergo quod me delectauerit quaeris? Videtur mihi egregie dictum, 'sapiens diuitiarum naturalium est quaesitor acerrimus'. 'Inanime' inquis 'lance muneras.

The hungry man despises nothing. (5) You ask, then, what it is that has delighted me? It seems to me excellently said, 'the wise man is the most keen seeker of natural riches.' 'The inanimate,' you say, 'you bestow upon with a platter.'

Quid est istud? Ego iam paraueram fiscos; circumspiciebam in quod me mare negotiaturus inmitterem, quod publicum agitarem, quas arcesserem merces.

What is this? I had already prepared the money-chests; I was looking around into what sea I should launch myself to negotiate, what public revenue-contract I should manage, what merchandise I should fetch.

Decipere est istud, docere paupertatem cum diuitias promiseris. 'Ita tu pauperem iudicas cui nihil deest? 'Suo' inquis 'et patientiae suae beneficio, non fortunae.

That is to deceive: to teach poverty when you have promised riches. 'So do you judge poor the one to whom nothing is lacking? 'By his own,' you say, 'and by the benefit of his patience, not of Fortune.'

' Ideo ergo illum non iudicas diuitem quia diuitiae eius desinere non possunt? (6) Utrum mauis habere multum an satis? Qui multum habet plus cupit, quod est argumentum nondum illum satis habere; qui satis habet consecutus est quod numquam diuiti contigit, finem.

' Therefore do you not judge him a rich man because his riches cannot cease? (6) Which do you prefer to have, much or enough? He who has much desires more, which is an argument that he does not yet have enough; he who has enough has attained what never befell a rich man: an end.

An has ideo non putas esse diuitias quia propter illas nemo proscriptus est? quia propter illas nulli uenenum filius, nulli uxor inpegit? quia in bello tutae sunt?

Or do you therefore not think these to be riches because on account of them no one has been proscribed? because on account of them no son, no wife has laid poison? because in war they are safe?

quia in pace otiosae? quia nec habere illas periculosum est nec operosum disponere?

because in peace they are idle? because neither is it dangerous to have them nor toilsome to arrange them?

(7) 'At parum habet qui tantum non alget, non esurit, non sitit. ' Plus Iuppiter non habet. Numquam parum est quod satis est, et numquam multum est quod satis non est.

(7) 'But he has too little who only is not cold, does not hunger, does not thirst. ' More than this Jupiter does not have. What is enough is never too little, and what is not enough is never much.

Post Dareum et Indos pauper est Alexander. Mentior? Quaerit quod suum faciat, scrutatur maria ignota, in oceanum classes nouas mittit et ipsa, ut ita dicam, mundi claustra perrumpit.

After Darius and the Indians, Alexander is poor. Do I lie? He seeks what he may make his own, he scrutinizes unknown seas, he sends new fleets into the Ocean, and the very, so to speak, bars of the world he breaks through.

Quod naturae satis est homini non est. (8) Inuentus est qui concupisceret aliquid post omnia: tanta est caecitas mentium et tanta initiorum suorum unicuique, cum processit, obliuio. Ille modo ignobilis anguli non sine controuersia dominus tacto fine terrarum per suum rediturus orbem tristis est.

What suffices to nature does not suffice to man. (8) There has been found one who would covet something even after everything: so great is the blindness of minds, and so great, for each one, when he has progressed, is the oblivion of his beginnings. He, only just now the lord— not without controversy— of an ignoble corner, with the boundary of the lands touched, about to return through his own orb, is sad.

(9) Neminem pecunia diuitem fecit, immo contra nulli non maiorem sui cupidinem incussit. Quaeris quae sit huius rei causa? plus incipit habere posse qui plus habet.

(9) Money has made no one wealthy; nay rather, on the contrary, it has instilled in everyone a greater desire for itself. You ask what is the cause of this thing? He who has more begins to be able to have more.

Ad summam quem uoles mihi ex his quorum nomina cum Crasso Licinoque numerantur in medium licet protrahas; adferat censum et quidquid habet et quidquid sperat simul conputet: iste, si mihi credis, pauper est, si tibi, potest esse. (10) At hic qui se ad quod exigit natura composuit non tantum extra sensum est paupertatis sed extra metum. Sed ut scias quam difficile sit res suas ad naturalem modum coartare, hic ipse quem circumcidimus, quem tu uocas pauperem, habet aliquid et superuacui.

To sum up, whichever one you will from those whose names are numbered with Crassus and Licinius you may bring forward into the open; let him bring his assessment and compute at once whatever he has and whatever he hopes for: that man, if you trust me, is poor; if you, he can be. (10) But this man who has composed himself to what nature requires is not only beyond the feeling of poverty but beyond fear. But that you may know how difficult it is to confine one’s affairs to the natural measure, this very man whom we are paring down, whom you call poor, has something even of superfluity.

(11) At excaecant populum et in se conuertunt opes, si numerati multum ex aliqua domo effertur, si multum auri tecto quoque eius inlinitur, si familia aut corporibus electa aut spectabilis cultu est. Omnium istorum felicitas in publicum spectat: ille quem nos et populo et fortunae subduximus beatus introsum est. (12) Nam quod ad illos pertinet apud quos falso diuitiarum nomen inuasit occupata paupertas, sic diuitias habent quomodo habere dicimur febrem, cum illa nos habeat.

(11) But wealth blinds the people and draws them to itself, if much counted cash is carried out from some house, if even its roof is smeared with much gold, if the household is either selected for bodies or remarkable for attire. The felicity of all those things looks toward the public: that man whom we have withdrawn from both the people and Fortune is blessed on the inside. (12) For as concerns those among whom poverty, having taken possession, has falsely usurped the name of riches, they “have” riches in the way we are said to have a fever, when it is the fever that has us.

E contrario dicere solemus 'febris illum tenet': eodem modo dicendum est 'diuitiae illum tenent'. Nihil ergo monuisse te malim quam hoc, quod nemo monetur satis, ut omnia naturalibus desideriis metiaris, quibus aut gratis satis fiat aut paruo: tantum miscere uitia desideriis noli. (13) Quaeris quali mensa, quali argento, quam paribus ministeriis et leuibus adferatur cibus? Nihil praeter cibum natura desiderat.

On the contrary, we are accustomed to say, 'a fever holds him': in the same way it must be said, 'riches hold him.' Therefore I would prefer to have advised you of nothing rather than this—something about which no one is sufficiently advised—that you measure all things by natural desires, for which satisfaction is given either gratis or at little cost: only do not mix vices with desires. (13) You ask on what kind of table, with what kind of silver, with how matching and light pieces of service the food should be brought? Nature desires nothing besides food.

Num, tibi cum fauces urit sitis, aurea quaeris
pocula? num esuriens fastidis omnia praeter
pauonem rhombumque?

Do you, when thirst burns your throat, seek golden
cups? Do you, hungry, become fastidious about everything except
peacock and turbot?

(14) Ambitiosa non est fames, contenta desinere est; quo desinat non nimis curat. Infelicis luxuriae ista tormenta sunt: quaerit quemadmodum post saturitatem quoque esuriat, quemadmodum non impleat uentrem sed farciat, quemadmodum sitim prima potione sedatam reuocet. Egregie itaque Horatius negat ad sitim pertinere quo poculo (aquae) aut quam eleganti manu ministretur.

(14) Hunger is not ambitious; it is content to cease; it does not much care where it should cease. These are the torments of unlucky luxury: it seeks how, even after satiety, it may still be hungry; how it may not fill the belly but stuff it; how it may recall thirst that was settled by the first draught. Excellently, therefore, Horace denies that it pertains to thirst in what cup (of water) or by what elegant hand it is ministered.

Nam si pertinere ad te iudicas quam crinitus puer et quam perlucidum tibi poculum porrigat, non sitis.

For if you judge it to pertain to you how long‑haired the boy is and how pellucid the cup he proffers to you, it is not thirst.

(15) Inter reliqua hoc nobis praestitit natura praecipuum, quod necessitati fastidium excussit. Recipiunt superuacua dilectum: 'hoc parum decens, illud parum lautum, oculos hoc meos laedit'. Id actum est ab illo mundi conditore, qui nobis uiuendi iura discripsit, ut salui essemus, non ut delicati: ad salutem omnia parata sunt et in promptu, delicis omnia misere ac sollicite comparantur. (16) Utamur ergo hoc naturae beneficio inter magna numerando et cogitemus nullo nomine melius illam meruisse de nobis quam quia quidquid ex necessitate desideratur sine fastidio sumitur.

(15) Among the rest nature has bestowed on us this as a chief thing: that it has stripped necessity of fastidiousness. Superfluities admit selection: 'this is not quite decorous, that not quite polished, this hurts my eyes.' This was brought about by that Maker of the world, who prescribed for us the rights of living, that we might be safe, not dainty: for health all things are prepared and at the ready, for delicacies all things are procured miserably and anxiously. (16) Let us therefore use this beneficence of nature, counting it among great things, and let us consider that in no respect has she better deserved of us than in this: that whatever is desired from necessity is taken without fastidiousness.

Vale.

Farewell.

CXX. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM.

120. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS.

(1) Epistula tua per plures quaestiunculas uagata est sed in una constititet hanc expediri desiderat, quomodo ad nos boni honestique notitia peruenerit. Haec duo apud alios diuersa sunt, apud nos tantum diuisa. (2) Quid sithoc dicam.

(1) Your letter wandered through several little questions, but it halted on one; this it desires to have disentangled: how the notion of the good and of the honorable has come to us. These two among others are different; among us they are only divided. (2) What this is, I will say.

Bonum putant esse aliqui id quod utile est. Itaque hoc et diuitiiset equo et uino et calceo nomen inponunt; tanta fit apud illos boni uilitaset adeo in sordida usque descendit. Honestum putant cui ratio recti officiiconstat, tamquam pie curatam patris senectutem, adiutam amici paupertatem,fortem expeditionem, prudentem moderatamque sententiam.

Some think the Good is that which is useful. And so they impose this name upon riches and a horse and wine and a shoe; so great becomes among them the cheapness of the good, and it descends even into the sordid. They think the Honorable is that which consists in the reason of right duty, as, for example, a father’s old age piously cared for, a friend’s poverty aided, a brave expedition, a prudent and moderate sentence (judgment).

(3) <nos> istaduo quidem facimus, sed ex uno.

(3) we indeed make those two, but from one.

Nihil est bonum nisi quod honestum est;quod honestum, est utique bonum. Superuacuum iudico adicere quid interista discriminis sit, cum saepe dixerim. Hoc unum dicam, nihil nobis uideri<bonum> quo quis et male uti potest; uides autem diuitiis, nobilitate,uiribus quam multi male utantur.

Nothing is good except what is honorable;what is honorable is assuredly good. I judge it superfluous to add what difference there is between these, since I have often said it. This one thing I will say, that nothing seems to us which someone can also use badly; and yet you see how many make bad use of riches, nobility,and strength.

Nunc ergo ad id reuertor de quo desideras dici, quomodo ad nos primaboni honestique notitia peruenerit. (4) Hoc nos natura docere non potuit:semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit. Quidam aiunt nos innotitiam incidisse, quod est incredibile, uirtutis alicui speciem casuoccucurrisse.

Now therefore I return to that of which you desire to be told, how the first notion of the good and the honest reached us. (4) Nature could not teach us this: it gave us the seeds of knowledge; it did not give knowledge. Some say that we fell into cognizance—which is incredible—by chance having run into the appearance of some virtue.

Nobis uidetur obseruatio collegisse et rerum saepe factaruminter se conlatio; per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonumiudicant. Hoc uerbum cum Latini grammatici ciuitate donauerint, ego damnandumnon puto, <immo> in ciuitatem suam redigendum. Utar ergo illo non tantumtamquam recepto sed tamquam usitato.

It seems to us that observation and the collation of things often done with one another have gathered this; through analogy they make our intellect judge both the honorable and the good. Since the Latin grammarians have endowed this word with citizenship, I do not think it should be condemned; nay rather, it should be brought back into its own commonwealth. I will therefore use it not only as accepted but as customary.

Quae sit haec analogia dicam. (5) Noueramus corporis sanitatem: ex hac cogitauimus esse aliquam et animi. Noueramus uires corporis: ex his collegimus esse et animi robur.

What this analogy is I will say. (5) We had known the health of the body: from this we thought that there is also some of the mind. We had known the strengths of the body: from these we gathered that there is also a robustness of the mind.

Aliquabenigna facta, aliqua humana, aliqua fortia nos obstupefecerant: haec coepimustamquam perfecta mirari. Suberant illis multa uitia quae species conspicuialicuius facti fulgorque celabat: haec dissimulauimus. Natura iubet augere laudanda, nemo non gloriam ultra uerum tulit: ex his ergo speciem ingentis boni traximus.

Some deeds kindly, some humane, some brave had stupefied us: these we began to admire as though perfect. Beneath them lay many vices which the appearance and the splendor of some conspicuous act concealed: these we dissimulated. Nature bids us to augment things worthy of praise; no one has not borne glory beyond the truth: from these, therefore, we drew the semblance of a vast good.

(6) Fabricius Pyrrhi regis aurum reppulit maiusque regno iudicauit regias opes posse contemnere. Idem medico Pyrrhi promittente uenenum se regi daturum monuit Pyrrhum caueret insidias.

(6) Fabricius repelled the gold of King Pyrrhus and judged it greater than a kingdom to be able to contemn royal wealth. Likewise, when Pyrrhus’s physician promised to give venom to the king, he warned Pyrrhus to beware insidious plots.

Eiusdem animi fuit auro non uinci, ueneno non uincere. Admirati sumus ingentem uirum quem non regis, non contra regem promissa flexissent, boni exempli tenacem,quod difficillimum est, in bello innocentem, qui aliquod esse crederetetiam in hostes nefas, qui in summa paupertate quam sibi decus feceratnon aliter refugit diuitias quam uenenum. 'Viue' inquit 'beneficio meo,Pyrrhe, et gaude quod adhuc dolebas, Fabricium non posse corrumpi.

It was of the same spirit not to be conquered by gold, not to conquer by poison. We admired the mighty man whom neither the promises of the king nor the promises against the king would have bent, tenacious of good example—which is most difficult—innocent in war, who believed that there is something nefarious even against enemies, who in extreme paupery, which he had made a glory to himself, shunned riches no otherwise than poison. “Live,” he says, “by my beneficence, Pyrrhus, and rejoice in what you were just now grieving over: that Fabricius cannot be corrupted.”

' (7) Horatius Cocles solus impleuit pontis angustias adimique a tergo sibi reditum,dummodo iter hosti auferretur, iussit et tam diu prementibus restitit donecreuulsa ingenti ruina tigna sonuerunt. Postquam respexit et extra periculumesse patriam periculo suo sensit, 'ueniat, si quis uult' inquit 'sic euntemsequi' iecitque se in praeceps et non minus sollicitus in illo rapido alueo fluminis ut armatus quam ut saluus exiret, retento armorum uictricium decoretam tutus redit quam si ponte uenisset. (8) Haec et eiusmodi facta imaginem nobis ostendere uirtutis.

' (7) Horatius Cocles alone filled the narrows of the bridge and ordered that his return be taken away from behind him, provided that the route be taken from the enemy; and he stood fast against those pressing him until the beams, torn out with a vast ruin, resounded. After he looked back and perceived that his fatherland was outside danger by his own danger, 'let him come, if anyone wills,' he said, 'to follow one going thus,' and he hurled himself headlong; and he was no less solicitous, in that swift channel of the river, to come out armed than to come out safe, and, the honor of his victorious arms retained, he returned as secure as if he had come by the bridge. (8) These and deeds of such a kind present to us an image of virtue.

Adiciam quod mirum fortasse uideatur: mala interdum speciem honestiobtulere et optimum ex contrario enituit. Sunt enim, ut scis, uirtutibusuitia confinia, et perditis quoque ac turpibus recti similitudo est: sic mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciatan seruare nesciat. Multi, inquam, sunt, Lucili, qui non donant sed proiciunt:non uoco ego liberalem pecuniae suae iratum.

I will add what may perhaps seem wondrous: evils have sometimes offered the appearance of the honorable, and the best has shone forth from the contrary. For, as you know, vices are confining to virtues, and even for the ruined and the base there is a likeness of the right: thus the prodigal counterfeits the liberal, although it makes a very great difference whether someone knows how to give or does not know how to keep. Many, I say, are, Lucili, who do not give but cast away: I do not call liberal one angry at his own money.

Imitatur neglegentia facilitatem,temeritas fortitudinem. (9) Haec nos similitudo coegit adtendere et distinguerespecie quidem uicina, re autem plurimum inter se dissidentia. Dum obseruamuseos quos insignes egregium opus fecerat, coepimus adnotare quis rem aliquam generoso animo fecisset et magno impetu, sed semel.

Negligence imitates facility; temerity, fortitude. (9) This similarity has compelled us to attend and to distinguish things indeed near in appearance, but in reality very greatly differing among themselves. While we observe those whom a remarkable work had made distinguished, we began to annotate who had done some deed with a generous spirit and with great impetus—but only once.

Hunc uidimus in bellofortem, in foro timidum, animose paupertatem ferentem, humiliter infamiam: factum laudauimus, contempsimus uirum.

This man we saw brave in war, timid in the forum, bearing poverty spiritedly, infamy humbly: we praised the act, we contemned the man.

(10) Alium uidimus aduersus amicosbenignum, aduersus inimicos temperatum, et publica et priuata sancte acreligiose administrantem; non deesse ei in iis quae toleranda erant patientiam,in iis quae agenda prudentiam. Vidimus ubi tribuendum esset plena manudantem, ubi laborandum, pertinacem et obnixum et lassitudinem corporisanimo subleuantem. Praeterea idem erat semper et in omni actu par sibi,iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus ut non tantum recte facereposset, sed nisi recte facere non posset.

(10) We saw another man benign toward friends, temperate toward enemies, administering both public and private matters holily and religiously; that he did not lack patience in those things which had to be borne, prudence in those things which had to be done. We saw that, where something was to be bestowed, he gave with a full hand; where there was work to be done, he was pertinacious and resolute, lifting the weariness of the body by spirit. Moreover, he was the same always and in every act equal to himself, now good not by counsel, but by custom brought to such a point that he not only was able to do rightly, but could not do otherwise than rightly.

(11) Intelleximus in illo perfectamesse uirtutem. Hanc in partes diuisimus: oportebat cupiditates refrenari,metus conprimi, facienda prouideri, reddenda distribui: conprehendimustemperantiam, fortitudinem, prudentiam, iustitiam et suum cuique dedimusofficium. Ex quo ergo uirtutem intelleximus?

(11) We understood that in him perfectvirtue was present. We divided this into parts: it was proper that desires be reined in,fears be checked, things to be done be provided for, things to be rendered be distributed: we comprehendedtemperance, fortitude, prudence, justice and we gave to each his ownoffice. From what, then, did we understand virtue?

ostendit illam nobis ordoeius et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudosuper omnia efferens sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata uita secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. (12) Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis apparuit?

its order and decor and constancy and the concord of all actions with one another, and a magnitude lifting itself above all things, showed that to us. Hence that blessed life, flowing down with a favorable course, wholly of its own arbitrement, was understood. (12) How then did this very thing appear to us?

dicam. Numquam uir ille perfectus adeptusque uirtutem fortunae maledixit,numquam accidentia tristis excepit, ciuem esse se uniuersi et militem credenslabores uelut imperatos subit. Quidquid inciderat non tamquam malum aspernatusest et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum sibi.

I will say. Never did that perfect man, having attained virtue, curse Fortune; never did he receive the accidents with sadness, believing himself a citizen of the universe and a soldier he undergoes labors as if commanded. Whatever befell, he did not spurn as an evil and as something delivered upon him by chance, but as if delegated to himself.

'Hoc qualecumque est'inquit 'meum est; asperum est, durum est, in hoc ipso nauemus operam. '(13) Necessario itaque magnus apparuit qui numquam malis ingemuit, numquamde fato suo questus est; fecit multis intellectum sui et non aliter quamin tenebris lumen effulsit aduertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placiduset lenis, humanis diuinisque rebus pariter aequus. (14) Habebat perfectumanimum et ad summam sui adductum, supra quam nihil est nisi mens dei, exquo pars et in hoc pectus mortale defluxit; quod numquam magis diuinumest quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat et scit in hoc natum hominem, utuita defungeretur, nec domum esse hoc corpus sed hospitium, et quidem breuehospitium, quod relinquendum est ubi te grauem esse hospiti uideas.

'This, whatever it is,' he says, 'is mine; it is rough, it is hard; on this very thing let us expend effort.' (13) By necessity, therefore, he appeared great, who never groaned at evils, never complained about his fate; he made many gain an understanding of himself, and, not otherwise than as a light shining forth in darkness, he turned the minds of all toward himself, since he was placid and gentle, equally equable in human and divine matters alike. (14) He possessed a perfect mind and brought to the summit of itself, above which there is nothing except the mind of God, from which a part too has flowed down into this mortal breast; which is never more divine than when it thinks upon its mortality and knows that man was born for this—to be done with life—and that this body is not a home but a lodging, and indeed a brief lodging, which must be abandoned when you perceive that you are burdensome to the host.

(15) Maximum, inquam, mi Lucili, argumentum est animi ab altiore sedeuenientis, si haec in quibus uersatur humilia iudicat et angusta, si exirenon metuit; scit enim quo exiturus sit qui unde uenerit meminit. Non uidemusquam multa nos incommoda exagitent, quam male nobis conueniat hoc corpus? (16) Nunc de capite, nunc de uentre, nunc de pectore ac faucibus querimur;alias nerui nos, alias pedes uexant, nunc deiectio, nunc destillatio; aliquandosuperest sanguis, aliquando deest: hinc atque illinc temptamur et expellimur.

(15) The greatest, I say, my Lucilius, argument of a mind coming from a higher seat is this: if it judges as low and narrow the things amid which it is engaged, if it does not fear to exit; for he who remembers whence he has come knows whither he is about to exit. Do we not see how many inconveniences harry us, how ill this body suits us? (16) Now about the head, now about the belly, now about the chest and throat we complain; at one time the sinews, at another the feet vex us, now an evacuation, now a distillation; sometimes blood is in excess, sometimes it is lacking: on this side and on that we are assailed and expelled.

Hoc euenire solet in alieno habitantibus. (17) At nos corpus tam putresortiti nihilominus aeterna proponimus et in quantum potest aetas humanaprotendi, tantum spe occupamus, nulla contenti pecunia, nulla potentia. Quid hac re fieri inpudentius, quid stultius potest?

This is wont to happen to those dwelling in another’s property. (17) But we, having received by lot so rotten a body, nonetheless propose things eternal, and in proportion as the human span can be prolonged, by so much we pre-empt by hope, satisfied by no money, by no power. What can be more impudent than this, what more foolish can be?

Nihil satis est morituris,immo morientibus; cotidie enim propius ab ultimo stamus, et illo unde nobiscadendum est hora nos omnis inpellit. (18) Vide in quanta caecitate mensnostra sit: hoc quod futurum dico cum maxime fit, et pars eius magna iamfacta est; nam quod uiximus tempus eo loco est quo erat antequam uiximus. Erramus autem qui ultimum timemus diem, cum tantumdem in mortem singuliconferant.

Nothing is enough for those about to die, nay rather, for the dying; for every day we stand nearer to the final end, and every hour impels us to that point from which we must fall. (18) See in what great blindness our mind is: this which I say will be is at this very moment coming to pass, and a great part of it is already done; for the time we have lived is in the same place where it was before we lived. We err, moreover, who fear the last day, since each single day contributes the same toward death.

Non ille gradus lassitudinem facit in quo deficimus, sed illeprofitetur; ad mortem dies extremus peruenit, accedit omnis; carpit nosilla, non corripit. Ideo magnus animus conscius sibi melioris naturae datquidem operam ut in hac statione qua positus est honeste se atque industriegerat, ceterum nihil horum quae circa sunt suum iudicat, sed ut commodatisutitur, peregrinus et properans.

Not the step on which we fail makes the weariness, but that one proclaims it; to death the last day arrives, every day draws near; that one nibbles at us, it does not snatch us. Therefore the great spirit, conscious to itself of a better nature, indeed gives effort that in this station in which it is placed it may conduct itself honorably and industriously; but it judges none of the things which are around as its own, rather it uses them as on loan, a peregrine and in haste.

(19) Cum aliquem huius uideremus constantiae, quidni subiret nos speciesnon usitatae indolis? utique si hanc, ut dixi, magnitudinem ueram esseostendebat aequalitas. Vero tenor permanet, falsa non durant.

(19) When we saw someone of this constancy, why should not the appearance of an unaccustomed inborn character come over us? especially if an equability, as I said, was showing this greatness to be true. The true tenor remains; false things do not endure.

Quidam alternisVatinii, alternis Catones sunt; et modo parum illis seuerus est Curius,parum pauper Fabricius, parum frugi et contentus uilibus Tubero, modo Licinumdiuitis, Apicium cenis, Maecenatem delicis prouocant. (20) Maximum indiciumest malae mentis fluctuatio et inter simulationem uirtutum amoremque uitiorumadsidua iactatio. (is)

Some are by turns Vatinii, by turns Catos; and now Curius is too little severe for them, Fabricius too little poor, Tubero too little frugal and content with cheap things, now they challenge Licinus in riches, Apicius in banquets, Maecenas in delicacies. (20) The greatest indication of a bad mind is fluctuation and, between the simulation of virtues and the love of vices, incessant tossing. (is)

Habebat saepe ducentos,
saepe decem seruos; modo reges atque tetrarchas,
omnia magna loquens, modo 'sit mihi mensa tripes et
concha salis puri, toga quae defendere frigus
quamuis crassa queat'. Decies centena dedisses
huic parco, paucis contento: quinque diebus
nil erat.

He often had 200,
often 10 slaves; now kings and tetrarchs,
speaking all grand things; now, “let me have a three‑legged table and
a shell of pure salt, a toga which, although coarse,
can defend against the cold.” You would have given one million
to this frugal man, content with few things: in five days
nothing remained.

(21) Homines multi tales sunt qualem hunc describit Horatius Flaccus, numquameundem, ne similem quidem sibi; adeo in diuersum aberrat. Multos dixi? prope est ut omnes sint.

(21) Many men are such as Horace Flaccus describes this fellow—never the same, not even similar to themselves; to such a degree do they stray into the contrary. Did I say many? It is almost the case that they are all so.

Nemo non cotidie et consilium mutat et uotum:modo uxorem uult habere, modo amicam, modo regnare uult, modo id agit nequis sit officiosior seruus, modo dilatat se usque ad inuidiam, modo subsiditet contrahitur infra humilitatem uere iacentium, nunc pecuniam spargit,nunc rapit. (22) Sic maxime coarguitur animus inprudens: alius prodit atquealius et, quo turpius nihil iudico, inpar sibi est. Magnam rem puta unumhominem agere.

No one fails every day to change both counsel and vow:now he wants to have a wife, now a mistress, now he wants to reign, now he contrives that no servant be more dutiful than himself, now he dilates himself up to envy, now he sinks and is contracted beneath the humility of those truly lying low, now he scatters money,now he seizes it. (22) Thus most of all an imprudent mind is convicted: one comes forth andanother and, than which I judge nothing more disgraceful, he is unequal to himself. Count it a great thing to act oneman.

Praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, ceteri multiformessumus. Modo frugi tibi uidebimur et graues, modo prodigi et uani; mutamussubinde personam et contrariam ei sumimus quam exuimus. Hoc ergo a te exige,ut qualem institueris praestare te, talem usque ad exitum serues; efficeut possis laudari, si minus, ut adgnosci.

But aside from the wise man no one plays one part; the rest of us are multiform. Now we will seem thrifty and grave to you, now prodigal and vain; we change our persona repeatedly and take up one contrary to that which we have stripped off. Therefore demand this of yourself: that the sort you have established yourself to present, such you maintain all the way to the end; bring it about that you can be praised—if not, at least that you can be recognized.

De aliquo quem here uidisti meritodici potest 'hic qui est? ': tanta mutatio est. Vale.

About someone whom you saw yesterday it can deservedly be said 'who is this? ' : so great is the change. Farewell.

CXXI. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM.

121. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS.

(1) Litigabis, ego uideo, cum tibi hodiernam quaestiunculam, in quasatis diu haesimus, exposuero; iterum enim exclamabis 'hoc quid ad mores? 'Sed exclama, dum tibi primum alios opponam cum quibus litiges, Posidoniumet Archidemum (hi iudicium accipient) , deinde dicam: non quidquid moraleest mores bonos facit.

(1) You will litigate, I see, when I have set forth to you today’s little question, in which we have stuck quite long enough; for again you will exclaim, 'what has this to do with morals? 'But cry out, while I first set up others for you with whom you may litigate, Posidonius and Archidemus (these will receive judgment) , then I will say: not whatever is moral makes good morals.

(2) Aliud ad hominem alendum pertinet, aliud adexercendum, aliud ad uestiendum, aliud ad docendum, aliud ad delectandum;omnia tamen ad hominem pertinent, etiam si non omnia meliorem eum faciunt. Mores alia aliter attingunt: quaedam illos corrigunt et ordinant, quaedamnaturam eorum et originem scrutantur. (3) Cum <quaero> quare hominemnatura produxerit, quare praetulerit animalibus ceteris, longe me iudicasmores reliquisse?

(2) One thing pertains to feeding a human being, another to exercising, another to vesting, another to teaching, another to delighting; yet all pertain to the human, even if not all make him better. Morals touch things in different ways: some correct and order them, some scrutinize their nature and origin. (3) When <I ask> why nature has produced the human being, why she has preferred him to the other animals, do you judge that I have left morals far behind?

falsum est. Quomodo enim scies qui habendi sint nisiquid homini sit optimum inueneris, nisi naturam eius inspexeris? Tunc demumintelleges quid faciendum tibi, quid uitandum sit, cum didiceris quid naturaetuae debeas.

It is false. For how, indeed, will you know what things are to be had, unless you have discovered what is best for a human being, unless you have inspected his nature? Only then will you understand what must be done by you, what must be avoided, when you have learned what you owe to your nature.

(4) 'Ego' inquis 'uolo discere quomodo minus cupiam, minustimeam. Superstitionem mihi excute; doce leue esse uanumque hoc quod felicitasdicitur, unam illi syllabam facillime accedere. ' Desiderio tuo satis faciam:et uirtutes exhortabor et uitia conuerberabo.

(4) 'I,' you say, 'I want to learn how I may desire less, fear less. Shake off superstition from me; teach that this thing which is called felicity is light and vain, that one syllable very easily comes to it.' I will satisfy your desire: and I will exhort virtues and scourge vices.

Licet aliquis nimium inmoderatumquein hac parte me iudicet, non desistam persequi nequitiam et adfectus efferatissimosinhibere et uoluptates ituras in dolorem conpescere et uotis obstrepere. Quidni? cum maxima malorum optauerimus, et ex gratulatione natum sit quidquidadloquimur.

Although someone may judge me too excessive and immoderate in this matter, I will not cease to prosecute wickedness, to inhibit the most feral affections, to restrain pleasures that are going to pass into pain, and to drown out wishes. Why not? since we have desired the greatest of evils, and whatever we address is born from congratulation.

(5) Interim permitte mihi ea quae paulo remotiora uidentur excutere. Quaerebamus an esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus. Esseautem ex eo maxime apparet quod membra apte et expedite mouent non aliterquam in hoc erudita; nulli non partium suarum agilitas est.

(5) Meanwhile permit me to examine those things which seem a little more remote. We were inquiring whether there is in all animals a sense of their own constitution. That there is, however, appears especially from this: that they move their limbs aptly and expeditiously, not otherwise than as if instructed in this; to none is the agility of its own parts lacking.

Artifex instrumentasua tractat ex facili, rector nauis scite gubernaculum flectit, pictorcolores quos ad reddendam similitudinem multos uariosque ante se posuitcelerrime denotat et inter ceram opusque facili uultu ac manu commeat:sic animal in omnem usum sui mobilest.

The artificer handles his instruments with facility, the pilot of a ship skilfully bends the rudder, the painter very swiftly marks out the colors, many and various, which he has set before himself for rendering likeness, and he goes to and fro between the wax and the work with a facile look and hand: thus the living creature is mobile for every use of itself.

(6) Mirari solemus saltandi peritosquod in omnem significationem rerum et adfectuum parata illorum est manuset uerborum uelocitatem gestus adsequitur: quod illis ars praestat, hisnatura. Nemo aegre molitur artus suos, nemo in usu sui haesitat. Hoc editaprotinus faciunt; cum hac scientia prodeunt; instituta nascuntur.

(6) We are accustomed to marvel at those skilled in dancing, that their hand is prepared for every signification of things and of affections, and that gesture overtakes the velocity of words: what art furnishes to those, nature to these. No one with difficulty maneuvers his own limbs, no one hesitates in the use of himself. They do this straightway when brought forth; with this science they come forth; they are born instructed.

(7) 'Ideo' inquit 'partes suas animalia apte mouent quia, si alitermouerint, dolorem sensura sunt. Ita, ut uos dicitis, coguntur, metusqueilla in rectum, non uoluntas mouet. ' Quod est falsum; tarda enim sunt quaenecessitate inpelluntur, agilitas sponte motis est.

(7) 'Therefore,' he says, 'animals move their parts aptly because, if they were to move them otherwise, they would be going to feel pain. Thus, as you say, they are compelled, and fear moves them aright, not will. ' Which is false; for those things are slow which are impelled by necessity, agility belongs to things moved of their own accord.

Adeo autem non adigitilla ad hoc doloris timor ut in naturalem motum etiam dolore prohibentenitantur. (8) Sic infans qui stare meditatur et ferre se adsuescit, simultemptare uires suas coepit, cadit et cum fletu totiens resurgit donec seper dolorem ad id quod natura poscit exercuit. Animalia quaedam tergi duriorisinuersa tam diu se torquent ac pedes exerunt et obliquant donec ad locumreponantur.

So far, moreover, does fear of pain not drive them to this, that they strive toward their natural motion even with pain forbidding. (8) Thus the infant who practices standing and becomes accustomed to bearing himself, as soon as he begins to test his powers, falls, and with weeping rises again so often until he has exercised himself through pain for that which nature demands. Certain animals, when turned over, with a harder back, twist themselves so long and thrust out and angle their feet until they are restored to their place.

Nullum tormentum sentit supina testudo, inquieta est tamendesiderio naturalis status nec ante desinit niti, quatere se, quam in pedesconstitit. (9) Ergo omnibus constitutionis suae sensus est et inde membrorumtam expedita tractatio, nec ullum maius indicium habemus cum hac illa aduiuendum uenire notitia quam quod nullum animal ad usum sui rude est.

The supine tortoise feels no torment; nevertheless it is unquiet from desire of its natural status, nor does it cease to strive, to shake itself, until it has set itself upon its feet. (9) Therefore in all there is a sense of their own constitution, and from that such an expeditious tractation of the members; nor have we any greater indication that this knowledge comes to them for aiding themselves than that no animal is rude for the use of itself.

(10) 'Constitutio' inquit 'est, ut uos dicitis, principale animi quodammodo se habens erga corpus. Hoc tam perplexum et subtile et uobis quoqueuix enarrabile quomodo infans intellegit? Omnia animalia dialectica nascioportet ut istam finitionem magnae parti hominum togatorum obscuram intellegant.

(10) 'Constitution,' he says, 'is, as you say, the ruling principle of the mind in a certain manner disposed with respect to the body. This thing so perplex and subtle, and to you as well scarcely explicable—how does an infant understand it? All animals must be born dialecticians, so that they may understand that definition, obscure to a great part of the toga-wearing men.'

'(11) Verum erat quod opponis si ego ab animalibus constitutionis finitionemintellegi dicerem, non ipsam constitutionem. Facilius natura intellegiturquam enarratur. Itaque infans ille quid sit constitutio non nouit, constitutionemsuam nouit; et quid sit animal nescit, animal esse se sentit.

'(11) It would be true, what you object, if I were saying that the definition of constitution is understood by animals, not the constitution itself. Nature is more easily understood than it is expounded. And so that infant does not know what constitution is, he knows his own constitution; and he does not know what an animal is, he feels that he is an animal.

(12) Praetereaipsam constitutionem suam crasse intellegit et summatim et obscure. Nosquoque animum habere nos scimus: quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit autunde nescimus. Qualis ad nos (peruenerit) animi nostri sensus, quamuisnaturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionissuae sensus est.

(12) Moreover, he understands his own constitution itself coarsely and summarily and obscurely. We too know that we have a mind: what the mind is, where it is, of what sort it is, or whence, we do not know. Such as there (has come) to us a sense of our mind, although we are ignorant of its nature and its seat, such is, for all animals, the sense of their own constitution.

Necesse est enim id sentiant per quod alia quoque sentiunt;necesse est eius sensum habeant cui parent, a quo reguntur. (13) Nemo nonex nobis intellegit esse aliquid quod impetus suos moueat: quid sit illudignorat. Et conatum sibi esse scit: quis sit aut unde sit nescit.

For it is necessary that they sense that through which they also sense other things; it is necessary that they have the sense of the one whom they obey, by whom they are governed. (13) Not one of us fails to understand that there is something which moves his impulses: what that thing is, he is ignorant of. And he knows that there is conation in himself: what it is or whence it is, he does not know.

Sic infantibusquoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidusnec expressus.

Thus in infants as well as in animals, the sense of their principal part is not sufficiently lucid nor expressed.

(14) 'Dicitis' inquit 'omne animal primum constitutioni suae conciliari,hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse et ideo conciliari hominemsibi non tamquam animali sed tamquam rationali; ea enim parte sibi carusest homo qua homo est. Quomodo ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationalipotest, cum rationalis nondum sit? ' (15) Unicuique aetati sua constitutioest, alia infanti, alia puero, <alia adulescenti>, alia seni: omnesei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt.

(14) 'You say,' he says, 'that every animal is at first conciliated to its own constitution, but that the constitution of a human being is rational, and therefore a human is conciliated to himself not as an animal but as a rational being; for by that part a man is dear to himself by which he is a man. How, then, can an infant be conciliated to a rational constitution, since he is not yet rational?' (15) To each age its own constitution belongs: one to an infant, another to a boy, <another to an adolescent>, another to an old man; all are conciliated to the constitution in which they are.

Infans sine dentibus est: huicconstitutioni suae conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic constitutioni conciliatur. Nam et illa herba quae in segetem frugemque uentura est aliam constitutionemhabet tenera et uix eminens sulco, aliam cum conualuit et molli quidemculmo, sed quo ferat onus suum, constitit, aliam cum flauescit et ad areamspectat et spica eius induruit: in quamcumque constitutionem uenit, eamtuetur, in eam componitur.

An infant is without teeth: it is conciliated to this its constitution. Teeth have come forth: it is conciliated to this constitution. For that plant also which is going to come into a standing crop and into grain has one constitution when tender and scarcely emerging from the furrow, another when it has grown strong and, with a soft stalk indeed, yet one with which it has taken its stand to bear its own burden, another when it grows golden and looks toward the threshing-floor and its ear has hardened: into whatever constitution it comes, it maintains that, into it it is composed.

(16) Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis,senis; ego tamen idem sum qui et infans fui et puer et adulescens. Sic,quamuis alia atque alia cuique constitutio sit, conciliatio constitutionissuae eadem est. Non enim puerum mihi aut iuuenem aut senem, sed me naturacommendat.

(16) The age of an infant, of a boy, of an adolescent, of an old man, is different; yet I am the same person who was both an infant and a boy and an adolescent. Thus, although one constitution and then another belongs to each, the conciliation to one’s own constitution is the same. For nature commends to me not a boy or an adolescent or an old man, but myself.

Ergo infans ei constitutioni suae conciliatur quae tunc infantiest, non quae futura iuueni est; neque enim si aliquid illi maius in quodtranseat restat, non hoc quoque in quo nascitur secundum naturam est. (17) Primum sibi ipsum conciliatur animal; debet enim aliquid esse ad quod aliareferantur. Voluptatem peto.

Therefore the infant is conciliated to that constitution of his which at that time belongs to the infant, not to that which will belong to the youth; for even if something greater remains into which he may pass, yet this also, in which he is born, is according to nature. (17) First, the animal is conciliated to itself; for there ought to be something to which other things are referred. I ask for pleasure.

Cui? mihi; ergo mei curam ago. Dolorem refugio.

For whom? For me; therefore I take care of myself. I shun pain.

Pro quo? pro me; ergo mei curam ago. Si omnia propter curam mei facio,ante omnia est mei cura.

For whose sake? For myself; therefore I take care of myself. If I do everything on account of the care of myself, before all things my care comes first.

Haec animalibus inest cunctis, nec inseritur sedinnascitur. (18) Producit fetus suos natura, non abicit; et quia tutelacertissima ex proximo est, sibi quisque commissus est. Itaque, ut in prioribusepistulis dixi, tenera quoque animalia et materno utero uel ouo modo effusaquid sit infestum ipsa protinus norunt et mortifera deuitant; umbram quoquetransuolantium reformidant obnoxia auibus rapto uiuentibus.

This is inherent in all animals, and is not inserted but is inborn. (18) Nature brings forth her offspring, she does not cast them away; and because the most certain tutelage is from what is nearest, each one is entrusted to himself. And so, as I said in earlier letters, even tender animals, and those just poured out from the maternal womb or from the egg, at once know what is hostile and avoid the deadly; they also dread the shadow of things flying across, being obnoxious to birds that live by rapine.

Nullum animalad uitam prodit sine metu mortis.

No animal comes forth to life without fear of death.

(19) 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'editum animal intellectum habere aut salutarisaut mortiferae rei potest? ' Primum quaeritur an intellegat, non quemadmodumintellegat. Esse autem illis intellectum ex eo apparet quod nihil amplius,si intellexerint, facient.

(19) 'How,' he says, 'can a newborn animal have an intellect of a thing either salutary or mortiferous?' First, the question is whether it understands, not how it understands. That there is intellect in them appears from this: that they will do nothing more, if they have understood.

Quid est quare pauonem, quare anserem gallinanon fugiat, at tanto minorem et ne notum quidem sibi accipitrem? quarepulli faelem timeant, canem non timeant? Apparet illis inesse nocituriscientiam non experimento collectam; nam antequam possint experisci, cauent.

Why is it that the hen does not flee the peacock or the goose, but does flee the hawk, so much smaller and not even known to her? why do the chicks fear the cat, but do not fear the dog? It is apparent that there is in them a knowledge of one about to harm, not collected by experiment; for before they can learn by experience, they are on their guard.

(20) Deinde ne hoc casu existimes fieri, nec metuunt alia quam debent necumquam obliuiscuntur huius tutelae et diligentiae: aequalis est illis apernicioso fuga. Praeterea non fiunt timidiora uiuendo; ex quo quidem apparetnon usu illa in hoc peruenire sed naturali amore salutis suae. Et tardumest et uarium quod usus docet: quidquid natura tradit et aequale omnibusest et statim.

(20) Then, lest you think this happens by chance, they neither fear other things than they ought nor ever forget this tutelage and diligence: their flight from what is pernicious is uniform with them. Moreover, they do not become more timid by living; whence indeed it appears that they arrive at this not by use but by a natural love of their own safety. And what use teaches is both slow and variable; whatever nature delivers is both equal to all and immediate.

(21) Si tamen exigis, dicam quomodo omne animal perniciosaintellegere cogatur. Sentit se carne constare; itaque sentit quid sit quosecari caro, quo uri, quo obteri possit, quae sint animalia armata ad nocendum:horum speciem trahit inimicam et hostilem. Inter se ista coniuncta sunt;simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuuatura petit, laesura formidat.

(21) If, however, you insist, I will say how every animal is compelled to understand what is pernicious. It perceives that it consists of flesh; and so it perceives what may cut flesh, what may burn it, what may crush it, which animals are armed for harming: the appearance of these it takes as inimical and hostile. These things are connected among themselves; for at the same time each creature is inclined toward its own safety and seeks what will aid, it fears what will injure.

Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspernationes sunt;sine ulla cogitatione quae hoc dictet, sine consilio fit quidquid naturapraecepit. (22) Non uides quanta sit subtilitas apibus ad fingenda domicilia,quanta diuidui laboris obeundi undique concordia? Non uides quam nullimortalium imitabilis illa aranei textura, quanti operis sit fila disponere,alia in rectum inmissa firmamenti loco, alia in orbem currentia ex densorara, qua minora animalia, in quorum perniciem illa tenduntur, uelut retibusinplicata teneantur?

Natural impulses toward useful things, natural rejections from contraries are; without any cogitation to dictate this, without counsel whatever nature has prescribed is done. (22) Do you not see how great the subtility is in bees for fashioning domiciles, how great the concord from every side for undertaking divided labor? Do you not see how that spider’s texture is imitable by no mortals, of how great a work it is to dispose the threads, some sent straight in the place of a firmament, others running in a circle, thinning out from dense, by which the smaller animals, for whose ruin those are stretched, may be held entangled as if in nets?

(23) Nascitur ars ista, non discitur. Itaque nullumest animal altero doctius: uidebis araneorum pares telas, par in fauisangulorum omnium foramen. Incertum est et inaequabile quidquid ars tradit:ex aequo uenit quod natura distribuit.

(23) That art is born, it is not learned. And so no animal is more learned than another: you will see equal webs of spiders, an equal opening in the honeycombs, with all the angles equal. Uncertain and unequal is whatever art hands down: what nature distributes comes on equal terms.

Haec nihil magis quam tutelam suiet eius peritiam tradidit, ideoque etiam simul incipiunt et discere etuiuere. (24) Nec est mirum cum eo nasci illa sine quo frustra nascerentur. Primum hoc instrumentum <in> illa natura contulit ad permanendum, (in) conciliationem et caritatem sui.

These have handed down nothing more than the guardianship of self and the expertise of it, and therefore they even begin at the same time both to learn and to live. (24) Nor is it a marvel that those things are born together with that without which they would be born in vain. First, nature has bestowed this instrument <in> upon them for enduring, (in) conciliation and love of self.

Non poterant salua esse nisi uellent;nec (non) hoc per se profuturum erat, sed sine hoc nulla res profuisset. Sed in nullo deprendes uilitatem sui, <ne> neglegentiam quidem; tacitisquoque et brutis, quamquam in cetera torpeant, ad uiuendum sollertia est. Videbis quae aliis inutilia sunt sibi ipsa non deesse.

They could not be safe unless they willed it; nor was this (not) going to be profitable in itself, but without this nothing would have profited. Yet you will find in it no cheapness of self, not even negligence; even in the tacit and the brute, although they are torpid in other things, there is ingenuity for living. You will see that the things which are unprofitable to others are not lacking to themselves.

Vale.

Farewell.

CXXII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM.

122. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING.

(1) Detrimentum iam dies sensit; resiluit aliquantum, ita tamen ut liberale adhuc spatium sit si quis cum ipso, ut ita dicam, die surgat. Officiosiormeliorque si quis illum expectat et lucem primam excipit: turpis qui altosole semisomnus iacet, cuius uigilia medio die incipit; et adhuc multishoc antelucanum est. (2) Sunt qui officia lucis noctisque peruerterintnec ante diducant oculos hesterna graues crapula quam adpetere nox coepit. Qualis illorum condicio dicitur quos natura, ut ait Vergilius, pedibusnostris subditos e contrario posuit,

(1) The day has already felt a detriment; it has rebounded somewhat, yet in such a way that there is still a liberal space if one rises with the day itself, so to speak. More dutiful and better is he who awaits it and catches the first light: disgraceful is he who, with the sun high, lies half-asleep, whose wakefulness begins at midday; and for many this is still “antelucan.” (2) There are those who have inverted the offices of light and night and do not pry their eyes apart, heavy with yesterday’s debauch, until night has begun to approach. Such is said to be the condition of those whom Nature, as Vergil says, has placed contrariwise, set under our feet with their feet opposite to ours,

nosque ubi primus equis Oriens adflauit anhelis,
illis sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,

and when the Orient has first breathed upon us with its panting horses,
for them the late, ruddy Vesper kindles its lights,

talis horum contraria omnibus non regio sed uita est. (3) Sunt quidam ineadem urbe antipodes qui, ut M. Cato ait, nec orientem umquam solem uideruntnec occidentem. Hos tu existimas scire quemadmodum uiuendum sit, qui nesciuntquando?

such for these is a contrariety to all men, not of region but of life. (3) There are certain antipodes in the same city who, as M. Cato says, have never seen the sun rising nor the sun setting. Do you think these men know in what manner one ought to live, who do not know when?

Et hi mortem timent, in quam se uiui condiderunt? tam infausti ominisquam nocturnae aues sunt. Licet in uino unguentoque tenebras suas exigant,licet epulis et quidem in multa fericula discoctis totum peruersae uigiliaetempus educant, non conuiuantur sed iusta sibi faciunt.

And do these men fear death, into which they have entombed themselves alive? They are of so ill an omen as nocturnal birds. Granted that in wine and unguent they drive out their darkness, granted that with banquets, and indeed with dishes decocted into many courses, they spin out the whole time of a perverse vigil, they do not banquet but perform funeral rites for themselves.

Mortuis certe interdiuparentatur. At mehercules nullus agenti dies longus est. Extendamus uitam:huius et officium et argumentum actus est.

Surely, in the daytime, funeral rites are performed for the dead. But, by Hercules, to one who is acting, no day is long. Let us extend life: action is both its office and its argument.

Circumscribatur nox et aliquidex illa in diem transferatur. (4) Aues quae conuiuiis comparantur, ut inmotaefacile pinguescant, in obscuro continentur; ita sine ulla exercitationeiacentibus tumor pigrum corpus inuadit et ~superba umbra~ iners saginasubcrescit. At istorum corpora qui se tenebris dicauerunt foeda uisuntur,quippe suspectior illis quam morbo pallentibus color est: languidi et euanidialbent, et in uiuis caro morticina est.

Let the night be circumscribed, and something from it be transferred into the day. (4) Birds that are prepared for convivials, so that immobile they may easily grow fat, are kept in the obscure; thus, with no exercise at all for those lying idle, swelling invades the sluggish body, and beneath the ~proud shade~ an inert stuffing/fattening grows up. But the bodies of those who have dedicated themselves to the darkness are seen as foul, since their color is more suspect than that of those who grow pallid with disease: languid and evanescent they grow white, and in the living the flesh is carrion.

Hoc tamen minimum in illis malorumdixerim: quanto plus tenebrarum in animo est! ille in se stupet, ille caligat,inuidet caecis. Quis umquam oculos tenebrarum causa habuit?

Yet I would call this the least of their evils: how much more darkness there is in the mind! This one is stupefied in himself, that one is in the dark; he envies the blind. Who ever had eyes for the sake of darkness?

(5) Interrogas quomodo haec animo prauitas fiat auersandi diem et totamuitam in noctem transferendi? Omnia uitia contra naturam pugnant, omniadebitum ordinem deserunt; hoc est luxuriae propositum, gaudere peruersisnec tantum discedere a recto sed quam longissime abire, deinde etiam econtrario stare. (6) Non uidentur tibi contra naturam uiuere <qui> ieiunibibunt, qui uinum recipiunt inanibus uenis et ad cibum ebrii transeunt?

(5) You ask how this depravity in the mind comes about—of shunning the day and transferring the whole life into night? All vices fight against nature, all abandon the due order; this is the purpose of luxury: to rejoice in perverse things, and not only to depart from the straight course but to go as far away as possible, and then even to stand on the contrary. (6) Do they not seem to you to live against nature who drink while fasting, who receive wine into empty veins and, drunk, proceed to food?

Atqui frequens hoc adulescentium uitium est, qui uires excolunt <ut>in ipso paene balinei limine inter nudos bibant, immo potent et sudoremquem mouerunt potionibus crebris ac feruentibus subinde destringant. Postprandium aut cenam bibere uulgare est; hoc patres familiae rustici faciuntet uerae uoluptatis ignari: merum illud delectat quod non innatat cibo,quod libere penetrat ad neruos; illa ebrietas iuuat quae in uacuum uenit. (7) Non uidentur tibi contra naturam uiuere qui commutant cum feminis uestem?

And yet this is a frequent vice of adolescents, who cultivate their strength so that almost on the very threshold of the bath they drink among the naked—nay, they quaff, and at once rub down the sweat they have stirred up with frequent and seething potations. To drink after lunch or dinner is vulgar; this is what rustic heads of household, ignorant of true pleasure, do: that pure wine delights which does not float upon food, which freely penetrates to the nerves; that ebriety pleases which comes into an empty vessel. (7) Do they not seem to you to live against nature who exchange clothing with women?

Non uiuunt contra naturam qui spectant ut pueritia splendeat tempore alieno? Quid fieri crudelius uel miserius potest? numquam uir erit, ut diu uirumpati possit?

Do they not live contrary to nature who look to have puerility shine at an alien time? What can be done more cruel or more miserable? He will never be a man, able to endure manhood for long.

et cum illum contumeliae sexus eripuisse debuerat, non neaetas quidem eripiet? (8) Non uiuunt contra naturam qui hieme concupiscuntrosam fomentoque aquarum calentium et locorum apta mutatione bruma lilium(florem uernum) exprimunt? Non uiuunt contra naturam qui pomaria in summisturribus serunt?

and though the contumely of his sex ought to have snatched him away, will not even age snatch him away? (8) Do not those live against nature who in winter covet a rose, and by the fomentation of hot waters and by a suitable change of places at midwinter squeeze out a lily (a vernal flower)? Do not those live against nature who plant orchards on the topmost towers?

quorum siluae in tectis domuum ac fastigiis nutant, indeortis radicibus quo inprobe cacumina egissent? Non uiuunt contra naturamqui fundamenta thermarum in mari iaciunt et delicate natare ipsi sibi nonuidentur nisi calentia stagna fluctu ac tempestate feriantur? (9) Cum institueruntomnia contra naturae consuetudinem uelle, nouissime in totum ab illa desciscunt.

whose woods sway upon the roofs of houses and on the gables, their roots sprung from there—whither have they impelled their treetops shamelessly? Do not those live against nature who cast the foundations of baths into the sea, and do not even seem to themselves to swim delicately unless warm pools are smitten by wave and tempest? (9) When they have set themselves to will everything contrary to the custom of nature, at last they defect from her altogether.

'Lucet: somni tempus est. Quies est: nunc exerceamur, nunc gestemur, nuncprandeamus. Iam lux propius accedit: tempus est cenae.

'It is light: it is time for sleep. There is rest: now let us exercise, now let us be carried, nowlet us have lunch. Now the light draws nearer: it is time for dinner.

Non oportet id facerequod populus; res sordida est trita ac uulgari uia uiuere. Dies publicusrelinquatur: proprium nobis ac peculiare mane fiat. ' (10) Isti uero mihidefunctorum loco sunt; quantulum enim a funere absunt et quidem acerboqui ad faces et cereos uiuunt?

It is not fitting to do what the populace does; it is a sordid thing to live on the trodden and vulgar way. Let the public day be relinquished: let the morning become our own and peculiar. ' (10) Those people, indeed, are to me in the place of the deceased; for how little are they removed from a funeral—and a bitter one at that—who live by torches and candles?

Hanc uitam agere eodem tempore multos meminimus, inter quos et Acilium Butam praetorium, cui post patrimonium ingens consumptum Tiberius paupertatemconfitenti 'sero' inquit 'experrectus es'. (11) Recitabat Montanus Iuliuscarmen, tolerabilis poeta et amicitia Tiberi notus et frigore. Ortus etoccasus libentissime inserebat; itaque cum indignaretur quidam illum totodie recitasse et negaret accedendum ad recitationes eius, Natta Pinariusait: 'numquid possum liberalius agere? paratus sum illum audire ab ortu ad occasum'.

We remember that many conducted this life at the same time, among whom also Acilius Buta, a praetorian, to whom, after an immense patrimony had been consumed, as he confessed his poverty, Tiberius said: 'too late,' he said, 'you have woken up.' (11) Montanus Julius was reciting a poem, a tolerable poet and known to Tiberius by friendship and by frigidity. He most gladly would insert sunrise and sunset; and so, when a certain person was indignant that he had recited for the whole day and said one ought not to attend his recitations, Natta Pinarius said: 'Can I act more liberally in any way? I am ready to listen to him from sunrise to sunset.'

(12) Cum hos uersus recitasset
incipit ardentes Phoebus producere flammas,
spargere <se> rubicunda dies; iam tristis hirundo
argutis reditura cibos inmittere nidis
incipit et molli partitos ore ministrat,

(12) When he had recited these verses
Phoebus begins to produce burning flames,
the rubicund day to scatter itself; now the sad swallow
about to return, begins to send food into the shrilling nests
and with a soft mouth ministers the portioned food,

Varus eques Romanus, M. Vinicii comes, cenarum bonarum adsectator, quasinprobitate linguae merebatur, exclamauit 'incipit Buta dormire'. (13) Deinde cum subinde recitasset

Varus, a Roman eques, companion of M. Vinicius, a follower of good dinners, as though he earned it by the shamelessness of his tongue, cried out, 'Buta begins to sleep.' (13) Then, when he kept on reciting again and again,

iam sua pastores stabulis armenta locarunt,
iam dare sopitis nox pigra silentia terris
incipit,

now the shepherds have placed their herds in the stables,
now the sluggish night begins to grant silences to the lulled lands
begins,

idem Varus inquit 'quid dicis? iam nox est? ibo et Butam salutabo'. Nihil erat notius hac eius uita in contrarium circumacta; quam, utdixi, multi eodem tempore egerunt.

the same Varus says, 'what are you saying? is it already night? I will go and salute Buta.' Nothing was more notorious than this life of his turned in the opposite direction; which, as I said, many at the same time carried out.

(14) Causa autem est ita uiuendi quibusdam,non quia aliquid existiment noctem ipsam habere iucundius, sed quia nihiliuuat solitum, et grauis malae conscientiae lux est, et omnia concupiscentiaut contemnenti prout magno aut paruo empta sunt fastidio est lumen gratuitum. Praeterea luxuriosi uitam suam esse in sermonibus dum uiuunt uolunt; namsi tacetur, perdere se putant operam. Itaque aliquotiens faciunt quod excitetfamam.

(14) The cause, moreover, of living thus for certain people is not that they suppose the night itself has something more pleasant, but because what is customary profits nothing, and light is burdensome to an evil conscience, and to every concupiscent person—as to one who contemns things according as they were bought at a great or small price—the gratuitous light is a disgust. Besides, the luxurious want their life to be in discourses while they live; for if there is silence, they think they are losing their labor. And so at times they do something that may rouse rumor.

Multi bona comedunt, multi amicas habent: ut inter istos nomen inuenias,opus est non tantum luxuriosam rem sed notabilem facere; in tam occupataciuitate fabulas uulgaris nequitia non inuenit. (15) Pedonem Albinouanumnarrantem audieramus (erat autem fabulator elegantissimus) habitasse sesupra domum Sex. Papini.

Many eat good things, many have girlfriends: in order to find a name among these, there is need not only to do a luxurious thing but a notable one; in so busy a city, vulgar knavery does not find tales. (15) We had heard Albinovanus Pedo telling (and he was the most elegant fabulist) that he had lived above the house of Sex. Papinius.

Is erat ex hac turba lucifugarum. 'Audio' inquit'circa horam tertiam noctis flagellorum sonum. Quaero quid faciat: diciturrationes accipere.

He was from this mob of lucifuges. 'I hear,' he says'around the third hour of the night the sound of whips. I ask what he is doing: it is said he is taking accounts.'

Audio circa horam sextam noctis clamorem concitatum. Quaero quid sit: dicitur uocem exercere.

I hear, around the sixth hour of the night, a stirred-up clamor. I ask what it is: it is said he is exercising his voice.

Quaero circa horam octauam noctisquid sibi ille sonus rotarum uelit: gestari dicitur. (16) Circa lucem discurritur,pueri uocantur, cellarii, coqui tumultuantur. Quaero quid sit: diciturmulsum et halicam poposcisse, a balneo exisse.

I ask around the eighth hour of the night what that sound of wheels means: he is said to be carried. (16) Around daybreak there is running about,boys are called, cellarers, cooks are in a tumult. I ask what it is: he is said to have demanded mulsum and halica, to have come out from the bath.

"Excedebat" inquit "huiusdiem cena. " Minime; ualde enim frugaliter uiuebat; nihil consumebat nisinoctem. ' Itaque Pedo dicentibus illum quibusdam auarum et sordidum 'uos'inquit 'illum et lychnobium dicetis'. (17) Non debes admirari si tantas inuenis uitiorum proprietates: uariasunt, innumerabiles habent facies, conprendi eorum genera non possunt.

"The dinner," he said, "was exceeding this day." "By no means; for he lived very frugally; he consumed nothing except the night." And so Pedo, when certain people were calling him avaricious and sordid, 'you,' he said, 'will call him a lychnobite as well'. (17) You ought not to marvel if you find so many proper characteristics of vices: they are various, they have innumerable faces, their kinds cannot be grasped.

Simplex recti cura est, multiplex praui, et quantumuis nouas declinationescapit. Idem moribus euenit: naturam sequentium faciles sunt, soluti sunt,exiguas differentias habent; (his) distorti plurimum et omnibus et interse dissident. (18) Causa tamen praecipua mihi uidetur huius morbi uitaecommunis fastidium.

Simple is the care of the right, manifold of the depraved, and it takes on however many new declinations. The same happens in morals: those following nature are easy, unbound, they have exiguous differences; (these) the distorted differ very greatly both from everyone and among themselves. (18) Nevertheless, the chief cause of this disease seems to me to be a disgust for the common life.

Quomodo cultu se a ceteris distinguunt, quomodo elegantiacenarum, munditiis uehiculorum, sic uolunt separari etiam temporum dispositione. Nolunt solita peccare quibus peccandi praemium infamia est. Hanc petuntomnes isti qui, ut ita dicam, retro uiuunt.

Just as they distinguish themselves from the rest by their attire, by the elegance of their dinners, by the cleanliness of their vehicles, so they wish to be separated even by the disposition of their times. They do not want to sin in the usual ways, for which the reward of sinning is infamy. This is what all those seek who, so to speak, live retrograde.

(19) Ideo, Lucili, tenendanobis uia est quam natura praescripsit, nec ab illa declinandum: illamsequentibus omnia facilia, expedita sunt, contra illam nitentibus non aliauita est quam contra aquam remigantibus. Vale.

(19) Therefore, Lucilius, the way which nature has prescribed is to be held by us, nor is there to be any deviation from it: for those following it, all things are easy, expeditious; for those striving against it, life is nothing other than that of men rowing against the water. Farewell.

CXXIII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

123. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS GREETING

(1) Itinere confectus incommodo magis quam longo in Albanum meum multanocte perueni: nihil habeo parati nisi me. Itaque in lectulo lassitudinempono, hanc coci ac pistoris moram boni consulo. Mecum enim de hoc ipsoloquor, quam nihil sit graue quod leuiter excipias, quam indignandum nihil<dum nihil> ipse indignando adstruas. (2) Non habet panem meus pistor;sed habet uilicus, sed habet atriensis, sed habet colonus.

(1) Worn out by a journey troublesome rather than long, I reached my Alban villa late at night: I have nothing prepared except myself. And so on a little couch I set down my weariness; I take in good part this delay of the cook and the baker. For I speak with myself about this very point, how nothing is burdensome which you take lightly, how nothing is to be the object of indignation <so long as nothing> you yourself add by becoming indignant. (2) My baker does not have bread; but the bailiff has it, but the house-steward has it, but the tenant-farmer has it.

'Malum panem'inquis. Expecta: bonus fiet; etiam illum tibi tenerum et siligineum famesreddet. Ideo non est ante edendum quam illa imperat.

"Bad bread," you say. Wait: it will become good; hunger will render even that for you tender and siliginous. Therefore it is not to be eaten before she commands.

Expectabo ergo necante edam quam aut bonum panem habere coepero aut malum fastidire desiero. (3) Necessarium est paruo adsuescere: multae difficultates locorum, multaetemporum etiam locupletibus et instructis ~aduobus optantem prohibent et~occurrent. Quidquid uult habere nemo potest, illud potest, nolle quod nonhabet, rebus oblatis hilaris uti.

Therefore I will wait, and I will not eat before I have begun to have good bread or have ceased to disdain the bad. (3) It is necessary to accustom oneself to little: many difficulties of localities, and many of times, even for the wealthy and furnished, ~they prevent one desiring both, and~ will occur. Whatever one wishes to have no one can have; this he can: to not want what he does not have, to use with cheerfulness the things that are offered.

Magna pars libertatis est bene moratusuenter et contumeliae patiens. (4) Aestimari non potest quantam uoluptatemcapiam ex eo quod lassitudo mea sibi ipsa adquiescit: non unctores, nonbalineum, non ullum aliud remedium quam temporis quaero. Nam quod laborcontraxit quies tollit.

A great part of liberty is a well-mannered belly and patient of contumely. (4) It cannot be estimated how much pleasure I take from this, that my lassitude acquiesces of itself: I seek no anointers, no bath, no any other remedy than that of time. For what labor has contracted, quiet removes.

Haec qualiscumque cena aditiali iucundior erit. (5) ~Aliquod enim~ experimentum animi sumpsi subito; hoc enim est simpliciuset uerius. Nam ubi se praeparauit et indixit sibi patientiam, non aequeapparet quantum habeat uerae firmitatis: illa sunt certissima argumentaquae ex tempore dedit, si non tantum aequus molestias sed placidus aspexit;si non excanduit, non litigauit; si quod dari deberet ipse sibi non desiderandosuppleuit et cogitauit aliquid consuetudini suae, sibi nihil deesse.

This dinner, whatever sort it be, will be more pleasant than an inaugural one. (5) ~Some~ experiment of my spirit I have taken suddenly; for this is simpler and truer. For when it has prepared itself and has proclaimed patience to itself, it does not equally appear how much true firmness it has: those are the most certain arguments which it has given on the spur of the moment, if it has not only been equable toward annoyances but has looked on them placid; if it has not flared up, has not litigated; if, when something ought to be given, he himself has made it up to himself by not desiring it, and has thought something to his own custom, that nothing is lacking to himself.

(6) Multa quam superuacua essent non intelleximus nisi deesse coeperunt; utebamur enim illis non quia debebamus sed quia habebamus. Quam multa autem paramus quia alii parauerunt, quia apud plerosque sunt! Inter causas malorum nostrorum est quod uiuimus ad exempla, nec ratione componimur sed consuetudine abducimur.

(6) We did not understand how many things were superfluous until they began to be lacking; for we were using them not because we ought, but because we had them. How many things, moreover, we procure because others have procured them, because they are in the possession of the majority! Among the causes of our evils is that we live by examples, and we are not ordered by reason but are led away by custom.

Quod si pauci facerent nollemus imitari, cum plures facere coeperunt quasi honestius sit quia frequentius, sequimur; et recti apud nos locum tenet error ubi publicus factus est. (7) Omnes iam sic peregrinantur utillos Numidarum praecurrat equitatus, ut agmen cursorum antecedat: turpeest nullos esse qui occurrentis uia deiciant, (ut) qui honestum hominemuenire magno puluere ostendant. Omnes iam mulos habent qui crustallinaet murrina et caelata magnorum artificum manu portent: turpe est uiderieas te habere sarcinas solas quae tuto concuti possint.

But if a few were doing it we would be unwilling to imitate; when more people have begun to do it, we follow, as though it were more honest because more frequent; and error holds the place of the right among us where it has become public. (7) Already everyone travels in such a way that the cavalry of the Numidians runs ahead, that a column of runners goes before: it is disgraceful that there be none to drive those meeting us off the road, (as if) there should be those to show that a respectable man is coming with a great cloud of dust. Already everyone has mules to carry crystalware and murrhine and chased pieces by the hand of great craftsmen: it is a shame to be seen to have only such packs as can safely be jolted.

Omnium paedagogiaoblita facie uehuntur ne sol, ne frigus teneram cutem laedat: turpe estneminem esse in comitatu tuo puerorum cuius sana facies medicamentum desideret.

Everyone’s pupils, with face plastered over, are borne along, lest sun or cold harm the tender skin: it is disgraceful that in your company there is no boy whose sound face does not require a medicament.

(8) Horum omnium sermo uitandus est: hi sunt qui uitia tradunt et alioaliunde transferunt. Pessimum genus (horum) hominum uidebatur qui uerbagestarent: sunt quidam qui uitia gestant. Horum sermo multum nocet; nametiam si non statim proficit, semina in animo relinquit sequiturque nosetiam cum ab illis discessimus, resurrecturum postea malum.

(8) The talk of all these is to be avoided: these are those who hand down vices and transfer them from one place to elsewhere. The worst kind of (these) men seemed to be those who carry words; there are certain people who carry vices. The talk of these does much harm; for even if it does not immediately make progress, it leaves seeds in the mind and follows us even when we have departed from them, the evil to resurrect afterward.

(9) Quemadmodumqui audierunt synphoniam ferunt secum in auribus modulationem illam acdulcedinem cantuum, quae cogitationes inpedit nec ad seria patitur intendi,sic adulatorum et praua laudantium sermo diutius haeret quam auditur. Necfacile est animo dulcem sonum excutere: prosequitur et durat et ex interuallo recurrit. Ideo cludendae sunt aures malis uocibus et quidem primis; namcum initium fecerunt admissaeque sunt, plus audent.

(9) Just as those who have heard a symphony carry with them in their ears that modulation and the sweetness of songs, which impedes thoughts and does not allow one to be intent upon serious matters, so the discourse of flatterers and of those who praise perversely clings longer than it is heard. Nor is it easy for the mind to shake off a sweet sound: it follows on and endures and, after an interval, returns. Therefore the ears must be closed to evil voices, and indeed at the very first; for when they have made a beginning and have been admitted, they dare more.

(10) Inde ad haec peruenituruerba: 'uirtus et philosophia et iustitia uerborum inanium crepitus est;una felicitas est bene uitae facere; esse, bibere, frui patrimonio, hocest uiuere, hoc est se mortalem esse meminisse. Fluunt dies et inreparabilisuita decurrit. Dubitamus?

(10) Thence one comes to these words: 'virtue and philosophy and justice are the rattle of empty words; there is one felicity: to make good use of life; to be, to drink, to enjoy one’s patrimony—this is to live, this is to remember oneself to be mortal. The days flow and irreparable life runs down. Do we hesitate?'

Quid iuuat sapere et aetati non semper uoluptatesrecepturae interim, dum potest, dum poscit, ingerere frugalitatem? ~Eo~mortem praecurre et quidquid illa ablatura est iam sibi ~interere~. Nonamicam habes, non puerum qui amicae moueat inuidiam; cottidie sobrius prodis;sic cenas tamquam ephemeridem patri adprobaturus: non est istud uiueresed alienae uitae interesse. (11) Quanta dementia est heredis sui res procurareet sibi negare omnia ut tibi ex amico inimicum magna faciat hereditas;plus enim gaudebit tua morte quo plus acceperit.

What does it profit to be wise and, upon an age not always going to receive pleasures, meanwhile—while it can, while it demands— to thrust in frugality? ~Therefore~ anticipate death, and let whatever she is going to take be already ~perished~ to you. You have no mistress, no boy to stir jealousy in the mistress; every day you go out sober; you dine in such a way as if you were going to have your daybook approved by your father: that is not to live, but to be in attendance upon another’s life. (11) How great a madness it is to manage the affairs of your heir and to deny everything to yourself, so that a large inheritance makes for you, out of a friend, an enemy; for he will rejoice the more at your death the more he has received.

Istos tristes et superciliososalienae uitae censores, suae hostes, publicos paedagogos assis ne fecerisnec dubitaueris bonam uitam quam opinionem bonam malle. ' (12) Hae uocesnon aliter fugiendae sunt quam illae quas Ulixes nisi alligatus praeteruehinoluit. Idem possunt: abducunt a patria, a parentibus, ab amicis, a uirtutibus,et ~inter spem uitam misera nisi turpis inludunt~. Quanto satius est rectumsequi limitem et eo se perducere ut ea demum sint tibi iucunda quae honesta!(13) Quod adsequi poterimus si scierimus duo esse genera rerum quae nosaut inuitent aut fugent.

Do not reckon at an as those gloomy and supercilious censors of another’s life, enemies of their own, public pedagogues, nor hesitate to prefer a good life to a good opinion. ' (12) These voices are to be fled no otherwise than those which Ulysses refused to pass by unless bound. They can do the same: they draw one away from fatherland, from parents, from friends, from virtues, and ~they make sport, amid hope, of a life wretched unless base~. How much more satisfying it is to follow the straight boundary and to bring oneself to this point: that at last those things be pleasing to you which are honorable! (13) We shall be able to attain this if we know that there are two kinds of things which either invite us or put us to flight.

Inuitant (ut) diuitiae, uoluptates, forma, ambitio,cetera blanda et adridentia: fugat labor, mors, dolor, ignominia, uictusadstrictior. Debemus itaque exerceri ne haec timeamus, ne illa cupiamus. In contrarium pugnemus et ab inuitantibus recedamus, aduersus petentiaconcitemur.

Invite us (as) riches, pleasures, beauty, ambition, the other bland and smiling-on things; put us to flight toil, death, pain, ignominy, a more constrained way of living. We ought, therefore, to be exercised, that we may not fear these, nor desire those. Let us fight to the contrary and withdraw from the inviting things; let us be stirred up against the assailing things.

(14) Non uides quam diuersus sit descendentium habitus et escendentium? qui per pronum eunt resupinant corpora, qui in arduum, incumbunt. Nam sidescendas, pondus suum in priorem partem dare, si escendas, retro abducere,cum uitio, Lucili, consentire est.

(14) Do you not see how diverse is the posture of those descending and of those ascending? Those who go along a downward slope throw their bodies backward, those who into the arduous way, lean forward. For if you should descend, to give your weight to the former part, and if you should ascend, to draw it back, is, with the fault, Lucili, to consent.

In uoluptates descenditur, in asperaet dura subeundum est: hic inpellamus corpora, illic refrenemus. (15) Hoc nunc me existimas dicere, eos tantum perniciosos esse auribusnostris qui uoluptatem laudant, qui doloris metus, per se formidabilesres, incutiunt? Illos quoque nocere nobis existimo qui nos sub specie Stoicaesectae hortantur ad uitia.

Into pleasures one descends; to rough and hard things one must be undergone: here let us drive our bodies forward, there let us rein them in. (15) Do you think I am now saying this—that only those are pernicious to our ears who praise pleasure, who instill the fear of pain, things formidable in themselves? I judge that those also harm us who, under the guise of the Stoic sect, urge us toward vices.

Hoc enim iactant: solum sapientem et doctumesse amatorem. 'Solus aptus est ad hanc artem; aeque conbibendi et conuiuendisapiens est peritissimus. Quaeramus ad quam usque aetatem iuuenes amandisint.

For this they vaunt: that only the wise and learned man is a lover. 'He alone is apt for this art; equally for imbibing and for conviviality the wise man is most skilled. Let us inquire up to what age young men ought to be loved.

' (16) Haec Graecae consuetudini data sint, nos ad illa potius auresderigamus: 'nemo est casu bonus: discenda uirtus est. Voluptas humilisres et pusilla est et in nullo habenda pretio, communis cum mutis animalibus,ad quam minima et contemptissima aduolant. Gloria uanum et uolubile quiddamest auraque mobilius.

' (16) Let these be granted to Greek consuetude; let us rather direct our ears to those things: 'no one is good by chance: virtue must be learned. Pleasure is a low and petty thing and is to be held at no price, common with mute animals, toward which the smallest and most contemptible flock. Glory is a vain and volatile something, and more mobile than a breeze.

Paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti. Mors malumnon est: quid <sit> quaeris? sola ius aequum generis humani.

Poverty is an evil to no one except to the one resisting it. Death is not an evil: you ask what it is? the sole equal law of the human race.

Superstitioerror insanus est: amandos timet, quos colit uiolat. Quid enim interestutrum deos neges an infames? ' (17) Haec discenda, immo ediscenda sunt:non debet excusationes uitio philosophia suggerere.

Superstition is a mad error: it fears those who ought to be loved; those whom it worships, it violates. For what, indeed, is the difference, whether you deny the gods or defame them?' (17) These things must be learned—nay, learned by heart: philosophy ought not to suggest excuses to vice.

Nullam habet spem salutisaeger quem ad intemperantiam medicus hortatur. Vale.

The sick man whom a doctor urges toward intemperance has no hope of recovery. Farewell.

CXXIV. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM.

124. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING.

(1) Possum multa tibi ueterum praecepta referre,
ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas.

(1) I can recount many precepts of the ancients to you,
unless you shrink back and it irks you to learn of slender cares.

Non refugis autem nec ulla te subtilitas abigit: non est elegantiae tuae tantum magna sectari, sicut illud probo, quod omnia ad aliquem profectum redigis et tunc tantum offenderis ubi summa subtilitate nihil agitur. Quod ne nunc quidem fieri laborabo.

You do not shrink, moreover, nor does any subtlety drive you away: it is not characteristic of your elegance to pursue only great things; just as I approve this, that you render everything toward some progress and are offended only when, with the utmost subtlety, nothing is accomplished. I shall take pains that this not happen now either.

Quaeritur utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum; huic adiunctumest in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse. (2) Quicumque uoluptatem in summo ponunt sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus. Si de bono sensus iudicarent, nullam uoluptatem reiceremus; nulla enim non inuitat, nulla non delectat; et e contrario nullum dolorem uolentes subiremus; nullus enim non offendit sensum.

It is asked whether the good is grasped by sense or by intellect; to this is joined the point that it is not present in mute animals and infants. (2) Whoever place pleasure in the highest judge the good to be sensible; we, on the contrary, intelligible, who assign it to the mind. If the senses judged concerning the good, we would reject no pleasure; for none fails to invite, none fails to delight; and conversely we would willingly undergo no pain; for none fails to offend the sense.

(3) Praeterea non essent digni reprehensione quibus nimium uoluptas placet quibusque summus est doloris timor. Atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemni musillos qui nihil uiriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu. Quid autem peccant si sensibus, id est iudicibus boni ac mali, parent?

(3) Moreover, those for whom pleasure pleases too much and for whom the utmost fear of pain prevails would not be worthy of reprehension. And yet we disapprove men addicted to gluttony and lust, and we despise those who, through fear of pain, will venture nothing manfully. But what fault do they commit if they obey the senses, that is, the judges of good and evil?

his enim tradidistis ad petitionis et fugae arbitrium. (4) Sed uidelicet ratio isti rei praeposita est: illa quemadmodum de beata uita, quemadmodum de uirtute, de honesto, sic et de bono maloque constituit. Nam apud istos uilissimae parti datur de meliore sententia, ut de bono pronuntiet sensus, obtunsa res et hebes et in homine quam in aliis animalibus tardior.

for you have handed these over to the decision of appetition and flight. (4) But plainly reason is set over this matter: that, just as it determines about the blessed life, just as about virtue, about the honorable, so also it determines about the good and the bad. For among those people the judgment concerning the better is given to the most base part, so that sense—a blunt and dull thing, and slower in man than in other animals—should pronounce about the good.

(5) Quid si quis uellet non oculis sed tactu minuta discernere? Subtilior adhoc acies nulla quam oculorum et intentior daret bonum malumque dinoscere. Vides in quanta ignorantia ueritatis uersetur et quam humi sublimia ac diuina proiecerit apud quem de summo, bono malo, iudicat tactus.

(5) What if someone should wish to discern minute things not with the eyes but by touch? For this, no acuity is subtler or more intent than that of the eyes—would you grant it to distinguish good and evil? You see in how great an ignorance of truth he is involved, and how he has cast down to the ground the sublime and the divine, in whose case touch judges about the highest, good and evil.

(6) 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum sensuque conprehensum ex quo oriatur et crescat, sic beata uita fundamentum et initium a manifestis ducit et eo quod sub sensum cadat. Nempe uos a manifestis beatam uitam initium sui capere dicitis. ' (7) Dicimus beata esse quae secundum naturam sint; quid autem secundum naturam sit palam et protinus apparet, sicut quid sit integrum.

(6) 'Just as,' he says, 'every science and art ought to have something manifest and apprehended by sense from which it arises and grows, so the blessed life draws its foundation and beginning from things manifest and from that which falls under sense. Surely you say that the blessed life takes its own beginning from manifest things.' (7) We say that those things are blessed which are according to nature; but what is according to nature is plain and at once appears, just as what is whole.

Quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum, sed initium boni. Tu summum bonum, uoluptatem, infantiae donas, ut inde incipiat nascens quo consummatus homo peruenit; cacumen radicis loco ponis. (8) Si quis diceret illum in materno utero latentem, sexus quoque incerti, tenerum et inperfectum et informem iam in aliquo bono esse, aperte uideretur errare.

What is according to nature, that which befalls the newborn immediately, I do not call a good, but the beginning of good. You bestow the highest good, pleasure, upon infancy, so that the one being born may begin from that point to which the consummated man has arrived; you place the summit in the place of the root. (8) If someone were to say that he, lying hidden in the maternal womb, with even his sex uncertain, tender and imperfect and unformed, is already in some good, he would plainly seem to err.

Atqui quantulum interest inter eum qui cum (que) maxime uitam accipit et illum qui maternorum uiscerum latens onus est? Uterque, quantum ad intellectum boni ac mali, aeque maturus est, et non magis infans adhoc boni capax est quam arbor aut mutum aliquod animal. Quare autem bonum in arbore animalique muto non est?

And yet how little is the difference between him who is at that very moment receiving life and him who is a hidden burden in his mother’s viscera? Each, as regards the intellect of good and evil, is equally “mature,” and the infant is no more as yet capable of good than a tree or some mute animal. But why, then, is the good not in a tree and in a mute animal?

quia nec ratio. Ob hoc in infante quoque non est; nam et huic deest. Tunc ad bonum perueniet cum ad rationem peruenerit.

because there is not even reason. On account of this, it is not in the infant either; for this one too lacks it. Then he will arrive at the good when he has arrived at reason.

(9) Est aliquod inrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale, est rationale sed inperfectum: in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert. Quid ergo inter ista quaeret tuli distat? In eo quod inrationale est numquam erit bonum; in eo quod nondum rationale est tunc esse bonum non potest; <in eo quod rationale est> sed inperfectum iam potest bonum <esse>, sed non est.

(9) There is some irrational animal, there is some not-yet rational, there is rational but imperfect: in none of these is the good; reason brings it along with itself. What, then, is the difference among these? In that which is irrational the good will never be; in that which is not yet rational, then the good cannot be; <in that which is rational> but imperfect, already the good can <be>, but it is not.

(10) Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate inuenitur et tantum abest ab infantia quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum; ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est. Quidni non sit? non magis quam in semine.

(10) Thus I say, Lucilius: the good is not found in just any body, not in just any age; and it is as far removed from infancy as the last from the first, as the perfected from the beginning; therefore it is not in the tender, just-coalescing corpuscle. Why should it not be? no more than in a seed.

(11) Hoc sic dicas: aliquod arboris ac sati bonum nouimus: hoc non est in prima fronde quae emissa cum maxime solum rumpit. Est aliquod bonum tritici: hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit. Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est.

(11) Say it thus: we know some good of a tree and of a sowing; this is not in the first frond which, just sent forth, at the very moment breaks the soil. There is some good of wheat: this is not yet in the lactescent blade, nor when the soft spike thrusts itself out from the follicle, but when summer and due maturity have cooked the grain. Just as every nature does not bring forth its own good unless consummated, so the good of a human is not in a human unless reason is perfect in him.

(12) Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute si ad illud longo studio intentoque peruenit.

(12) But what is this good? I will say: a free spirit, upright, subjecting other things to itself, itself to no one. Infancy so little receives this good that boyhood does not hope for it, adolescence hopes for it improperly; it fares well with old age if, by long and intent study, it reaches it.

Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est. (13) 'Dixisti' inquit 'aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis. ' Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus: hoc quod in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur.

If this is the good, it is also intelligible. (13) 'You have said,' he says, 'that there is some good of a tree, some of grass; therefore there can be some also of an infant. ' The true good is neither in trees nor in mute animals: that which is good in them is called good only by courtesy.

'Quod est? ' inquis. Hoc quod secundum cuiusque naturam est.

'What is it?' you ask. This: that which is in accordance with each one's nature.

Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est. Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est. (14) Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei: haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diuersa sunt quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est.

The good indeed can in no way befall a mute animal; it is of a happier and better nature. Unless where there is room for reason, there is no good. (14) There are four natures: of tree, of animal, of man, of god: these two, which are rational, have the same nature; they differ in this, that the one is immortal, the other mortal.

Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non uere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est quod secundum uniuersam naturam perfectum, uniuersa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta.

Of these, then, the good of the one—namely, of God—is perfected by nature; of the other—of man—by care. The rest are only perfect in their own nature, not truly perfect, from which reason is absent. For that alone is perfect which is perfect according to universal nature, and universal nature is rational: the rest can be perfect in their own genus.

(15) In quo non potest beata uita esse nec id potest quo beata uita efficitur; beata autem uita bonis efficitur. Inmuto animali non est beata uita <nec id quo beata uita> efficitur: inmuto animali bonum non est. (16) Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia; praeteritorum reminiscitur cum <in> id incidit quo sensus admoneretur, tamquam equus reminiscitur uiae cum ad initium eius admotus est.

(15) In which there cannot be a blessed life, nor can that by which a blessed life is brought about; but a blessed life is brought about by goods. In a mute animal there is not a blessed life <nor that by which a blessed life> is brought about: in a mute animal the good is not. (16) A mute animal apprehends present things by sense; it reminisces of past things when it falls <into> that by which its sense would be admonished, just as a horse reminisces of the road when it has been brought to its beginning.

In stabulo quidem nulla illi uia est quamuis saepe calcatae memoria (est) . Tertium uero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet. (17) Quomodo ergo potest eorum uideri perfecta natura quibus usus perfecti temporis non est? Tempus enim tribus partibus constat, praeterito, praesente, uenturo.

In the stall indeed there is no path for it, although there is a memory (of a path) often trodden (is) . But the third time, that is, the future, does not pertain to the mute. (17) How, then, can their nature seem perfect, for whom there is no use of perfect time? For time consists of three parts: the past, the present, the future.

Animalibus tantum quod breuissimum est <et> in transcursu datum, praesens: praeteriti rara memoria est nec umquam reuocatur nisi praesentium occursu. (18) Non potest ergo perfectae naturae bonum in inperfecta esse natura, aut si natura talis (habet) hoc habet, habent et sata. Nec illud nego, ad ea quae uidentur secundum naturam magnos esse mutis animalibus impetus et concitatos, sed inordinatos ac turbidos; numquam autem aut inordinatum est bonum aut turbidum.

To animals there is only that which is most brief given in passing, the present: of the past there is a rare memory, nor is it ever recalled except by the encounter of present things. (18) Therefore the good of a perfect nature cannot be in an imperfect nature, or if a nature of such a sort (has) has this, the sown things have it as well. Nor do I deny this, that toward those things which seem according to nature there are great and excited impulses in mute animals, but disordered and turbid; yet never is the good either inordinate or turbid.

(19) 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'muta animalia perturbate et indisposite mouentur?' Dicerem illa perturbate et indisposite moueri si natura illorum ordinem caperet: nunc mouentur secundum naturam suam. Perturbatum enim id est quod esse aliquando et non perturbatum potest; sollicitum est quod potest esse securum. Nulli uitium est nisi cui uirtus potest esse: mutis animalibus talis ex natura sua motus est.

(19) 'What then?' you ask, 'do mute animals move in a perturbed and indisposite way?' I would say that they are moved perturbedly and indispositely if their nature could admit order; as it is, they are moved according to their own nature. For that is perturbed which at some time can be so and can also be not perturbed; solicitous is that which can be secure. No one has vice except one to whom virtue can belong: for mute animals such motion is from their nature.

(20) Sed ne te diu teneam, erit aliquod bonum in muto animali, erit aliqua uirtus, erit aliquid perfectum, sed nec bonum absolute nec uirtus nec perfectum. Haec enim rationalibus solis contingunt, quibus datum est scire quare, quatenus, quemadmodum. Ita bonum in nullo est nisi in quo ratio.

(20) But, so as not to hold you long, there will be some good in a mute animal, there will be some virtue, there will be something perfect, but neither good absolutely nor virtue nor perfect. For these befall rational beings alone, to whom it has been given to know why, to what extent, in what manner. Thus good is in no one except in whom reason is.

(21) Quo nunc pertineat ista disputatio quaeris, et quid animo tuo profutura sit? Dico: et exercet illum et acuit et utique aliquid acturum occupatione honesta tenet. Prodest autem etiam quo moratur ad praua properantes.

(21) You ask to what this disputation now pertains, and what it will be profitable for your mind? I say: it both exercises it and sharpens it, and in any case, since it is going to do something, it keeps it in honorable occupation. Moreover, it also does good in that it delays those who are hastening to depraved things.

Sed <et> illud dico: nullo modo prodesse possum magis quam si tibi bonum tuum ostendo, si te a mutis animalibus separo, si cum deo pono. (22) . (23) Vis tu relictis in quibus uinci te necesse est, dum in aliena niteris, ad bonum reuerti tuum? Quod est hoc?

But I also say this: in no way can I profit you more than if I point out to you your own good, if I separate you from mute animals, if I set you with God. (22) . (23) Do you wish, leaving behind those things in which it is necessary for you to be vanquished, while you lean upon what is another’s, to return to your own good? What is this?

animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? perfecta ratio.

the mind, of course, emended and pure, an emulator of God, lifting itself above human things, placing nothing of its own outside itself. You are a rational animal. What, therefore, is the good in you? perfect reason.

Hanc tu ad suum finem hinc euoca, <sine> in quantum potest plurimum crescere. (24) Tunc beatum esse te iudica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne nascetur, cum uisis quae homines eripiunt, optant, custodiunt, nihil inueneris, nondico quod malis, sed quod uelis. Breuem tibi formulam dabo qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse iam sentias: tunc habebis tuum cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices.

Call this forth to its own end from here, <sine> it to grow as much as it can to the utmost. (24) Then judge yourself to be blessed when all joy is born for you from yourself, when, upon viewing the things which men snatch away, crave, and keep under guard, you have found nothing—not to say that you would prefer, but even that you would wish. I shall give you a brief formula by which you may measure yourself, by which you may sense that you are already perfect: then you will have what is yours when you understand that the “happy” are most unhappy.

Vale.

Farewell.