Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis eisdem et vetustate amicitiae coniunctum; itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus. paulumque cum ab eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus; atque illum complexi, ut mos amicorum est (satis enim longo inter vallo **), ad suam villam reduximus.

[1] At Cumae recently, when our Atticus was with me, a message was announced to us from M. Varro that he had come from Rome the evening before, and that, unless he were tired from the road, he would have come to us immediately. When we heard this, we thought no delay should be interposed to our seeing a man conjoined with us both by the same studies and by the antiquity of friendship; and so we straightway proceeded to go to him. And when we were a little way off from his villa, we saw him himself coming toward us; and embracing him, as is the custom of friends (for indeed after a sufficiently long interval **), we led him back to his villa.

hic pauca primo atque ea percunctantibus nobis ecquid forte Roma novi. <Tum> Atticus 'Omitte ista quae nec percunctari nec audire sine molestia possumus quaeso' inquit 'et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare sed celare quae scribat existimo.' 'Minime vero' inquit ille; 'intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit; sed habeo magnum opus in manihus, quae iam pridem; ad hunc enim ipsum' (me autem dicebat) 'quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius.'

here at first a few things, and those as we were inquiring whether perchance anything new [was] from Rome. <Then> Atticus said, 'Please omit those matters which we can neither ask about nor hear without vexation, and rather ask whether he himself has anything new. For Varro’s Muses are silent longer than they were wont, and yet I think that this man is not ceasing but concealing what he writes.' 'By no means, indeed,' said he; 'for I reckon it to be a mark of an intemperate man to write what he would wish to be hidden; but I have a great work in hand, which I have had for a long time now; for to this very man' (and he meant me) 'I have instituted certain things, which are indeed quite great and are being polished by me more finely.'

Et ego 'Ista quidem' inquam Varro iam diu expectans non audeo tamen flagitare; audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium (nihil enim eius modi celare possumus), non te ea intermittere sed accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere. sed nunc postea quam sum ingressus res eas quas tecum simul didici mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur cum multa scribas genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus antccedat.'

And I, 'Those matters indeed,' I say, 'Varro, having long been expecting, I do not dare, however, to pressingly demand; for I have heard from our Libo, whose zeal you know (for we can hide nothing of that sort), that you are not intermitting those things but treating them more accurately and never setting them down from your hands. But this has never before this time come into my mind to inquire from you. But now, after I have entered upon committing to monuments those matters which I learned together with you and to illustrate with Latin letters that ancient philosophy sprung from Socrates, I inquire what it is why, although you write many things, you pretermit this genus, especially since you yourself excel in it and that pursuit and that whole matter far antecede the others both in studies and in arts.'

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[2] Tum ille: 'Rem a me saepe deliberatam ei multum agitatam requiris. itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re multum ut dixi et diu cogitavi. nam cum philosophium viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos, sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt.

[2] Then he: 'You ask of me a matter often deliberated and much agitated. Therefore, not hesitating, I will respond, but I will say those things which are at hand for me, since about this very matter, as I said, I have thought much and long. For when I saw philosophy most diligently explained in Greek letters, I judged that if any of our people were held by zeal for it, if they were erudite in Greek doctrines, they would read Greek rather than our own; but if they abhorred the arts and disciplines of the Greeks, they would not care for these either, which cannot be intelligible without Greek erudition.'

itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. Vides autem eadem ipse; didicisti enim non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similes esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant, nihil definiunt nihil partiuntur nihil apta interrogatione concludunt nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant; nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes ut legibus verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, qune docti ut dixi a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur <labor>.

Therefore I did not wish to write those things which neither the unlearned could understand nor the learned would care to read. You yourself see the same things; for you have learned that we cannot be like Amafinius or Rabirius, who, with no art applied, dispute in vulgar speech about matters set before the eyes, define nothing, partition nothing, conclude nothing by apt interrogation, and, in fine, think there is no art either of speaking or of disputing. But we, obeying the precepts of the dialecticians and even of the orators, since our people think both powers to be a virtue, thus obeying them as laws are compelled to use even new words, which the learned, as I said, prefer to seek from the Greeks, while the unlearned will not accept them even from us, so that all is undertaken in vain.

Iam vero physica, si Epicurum id est si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane ut Amafinius. quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,de corpusculorum (ita enim appellat atomos) concursione fortuita loqui? nostra tu physica nosti; quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est; quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere?

Now indeed, as for physics, if I approved Epicurus, that is to say Democritus, I could write just as plainly as Amafinius. For what is there great, when you have removed the efficient causes of things, in talking about the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles (for thus he calls the atoms)? You know our physics; and since it is contained both in effection and in matter—that which effection fashions and forms—geometry too must be applied; which, by what words could anyone enunciate, or whom could he bring to understanding?

Haec ipsa de vita et moribus et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus illi simpliciter, pecudis enim et hominis idem bonum esse censent; apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.

These very matters about life and morals and about things to be sought and to be fled they handle simply; for they consider that the same good belongs to a beast and to a human; but among our own you are not unaware what and how great subtlety there is.

sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intellegat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum quod non possit ab honestate seiungi (quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus <se> sine voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari <quidem>; si vero Academiam veterem persequemur, quam nos ut scis probamus quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis, quam argute quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum. Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi nec ullum arbitror ut apud Platonem est maius aut melius a deis datum munus homini;

for whether you follow Zeno, it is a great thing to bring it about that someone understand what that true and simple good is which cannot be separated from honorableness (what sort of good that is Epicurus altogether denies that he could suspect without pleasures that move the sense); but if indeed we pursue the old Academy, which, as you know, we approve, how acutely will that have to be explained by us, how shrewdly, how obscurely even, must there be arguing against the Stoics. Therefore that whole pursuit of philosophy I, for my part, take upon myself both for the constancy of life, as far as I can, and for the delectation of the mind, nor do I think, as it is in Plato, that any greater or better gift has been given to man by the gods;

sed meos amicos in quibus est studium in Graeciam mitto id est ad Graecos ire iubeo ut ex [a] fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. quae autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent ea quantum potui (nihil enim magnopere meorum miror) feci ut essent nota nostris. a Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem.

but my friends, in whom there is zeal, I send to Greece, that is, I order them to go to the Greeks, so that they may draw from [a] fountains rather than pursue rivulets. But those things which no one had yet taught, nor was there any source whence the studious might be able to know, these, as far as I could (for I admire nothing greatly of my own), I brought it about to be known to our people. For they could not be sought from the Greeks, and after the death of our L. Aelius, not even from the Latins.

et tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippium imitati nom interpretati quadam hilaritate conspersimus multa admixta ex intima philosophia multa dicta dialectice quae quo facilius minus docti intellegerent iucunditate quadam ad legendum invitati; in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquatatum prooemiis philosophiae <more> scribere voluimus si modo consecuti sumus.'

and yet in those our old works, which, imitating Menippus, not interpreting him, we sprinkled with a certain hilarity, many things were admixed from the inmost philosophy, many things said dialectically, so that the less learned might the more easily understand, invited to reading by a certain agreeableness; in the laudations, in these very prefaces of the Antiquities we wished to write in the manner of philosophy, if only we have achieved it.'

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[3] Tum ego 'Sunt' inquam 'ista Varro. nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. tu aetatem patriae tu descriptiones temporum tu sacrorum iura tu sacerdotum tu domesticam tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedum regionum locorum tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina genera officia causas aperuisti; plurimum quidem poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque multis locis inchoasti, ad impellandum satis, ad edocendorum parum.

[3] Then I said, 'Those things are so, Varro. For we, in our own city wandering and erring like strangers, your books have, as it were, led home, so that at last we could recognize who and where we were. You have laid open the age of the fatherland, you the descriptions of the times, you the rights of sacred rites, you those of the priests, you the domestic and the warlike discipline, you the seats, regions, and places, you the names, kinds, offices, and causes of all divine and human things; you have brought very much, indeed, to our poets and to the Latins altogether and to letters, both light and words; and you yourself have made a variegated and elegant poem in almost every meter, and you have begun philosophy in many places—enough for impelling, too little for thoroughly instructing.'

Causam autem probabilem tu quidem affers: aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nescient. sed eam mihi non sane probas immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua. quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi legant philosophos non legant?

You, indeed, bring forward a plausible cause: for either those who will be erudite will prefer to read Greek, or those who do not know that will not read these either. But you do not really make that persuasive to me; on the contrary, both those who will not be able to do that will read these, and those who will be able in Greek will not contemn what is their own. For what cause is there why men educated in Greek letters should read Latin poets but not read philosophers?

an quia delectat Ennius Pacuvius Accius multi alii qui non verba seri vim Graecorum expresserunt poetarum—quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si ut illi Aeschylum Sophociem Euripidem sic hi Platonem imitentur Aristotelem Theophrastum. oratores quidem laudari video si qui nostris Hyperidem sint aut Demosthenem imitati.

Or is it because Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius, and many others delight, who expressed not the words but the force of the Greek poets—how much more will the philosophers delight, if, as those imitated Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, so these imitate Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. I see orators indeed praised, if any among our men have imitated Hyperides or Demosthenes.

Ego autem Varro (dicam enim ut res est), dum me ambitio dum honores dum causae dum rei publicae non solum cura sed quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat aninno haec inclusa habebam et ne obsolescerent renovabam cum licebat legendo; nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus vulnere et administratione rei publicae liberatus doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissmam iudico. aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime aptum est, aut his rebus si quas dignas laude gessimus hoc in primis consentaneum, aut etiam ad nostros cives erudiendos nilil utilius, aut si haec ita non sunt nihil aliud video quod agere possimus.

But I, Varro (for I will speak as the matter is), while ambition, while honors, while causes, while the res publica held me—entangled and bound by many duties—not only by care but even by a certain procuration of public affairs, I kept these things enclosed in mind and, lest they grow obsolete, I renewed them by reading whenever it was allowed; but now, both struck by fortune’s most grievous wound and freed from the administration of the res publica, I seek the medicine for grief from philosophy, and I judge this the most honorable delight of leisure. For either this is most apt for this age, or—if we have accomplished any deeds worthy of praise—this above all is most consentaneous with them, or even for educating our fellow citizens nothing is more useful; or, if these things are not so, I see nothing else that we can do.

Brutus quidem noster excellens omni genere laudis sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur nihil ut isdem de rebus Graeca desideres; et eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu, nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquamdiu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. quam ob rem da quaeso te huic etiam generi litterarum.'

Indeed our Brutus, outstanding in every kind of praise, thus pursues philosophy in Latin letters that you would desire nothing Greek on the same subjects; and indeed he follows the same doctrine as you, for he listened for some time at Athens to Aristo, whose brother Antiochus you heard. Wherefore give, I beg, yourself to this kind of letters also.'

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[4] Tum ille: 'Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. sed de te ipso quid est' inquit 'quod audio?'
'Quanam' inquam 'de re?'
Va. 'Relictam a te veterem Academiam' inquit,'tractari autem novam.'
'Quid ergo' inquam 'Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir ut tu existimas ipse negaret in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarquit.'
Va. 'Est' inquit 'ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit.'
Ci. 'Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum tam diu, renovari a te nisi molestum est velim', et simul 'adsidamus' inquam 'si videtur.

[4] Then he: 'That indeed I will consider, and not, in truth, without you. But about yourself, what is it,' he says, 'that I hear?'
'About what matter,' I say, 'namely?'
Va. 'That the Old Academy has been left by you,' he says, 'and that the New is being taken up.'
'What then,' I say, 'was it more permitted for Antiochus, our intimate, to migrate back into the old house from the new, than for us into the new from the old? For surely the most recent things are, each, most corrected and emended. Although Antiochus’s teacher Philo, a great man as you yourself think, denied in his books—which we also used to hear from him face to face—that there are two Academies, and he convicts of error those who thought so.'
Va. 'It is,' he says, 'as you say; but I do not suppose you to be ignorant of what Antiochus wrote against Philo.'
Ci. 'On the contrary, both those matters and the whole Old Academy, from which I have been absent so long, I should like to be renewed by you, unless it is troublesome,' and at the same time, 'let us sit down,' I say, 'if it seems good.

Va. 'Sane istuc quidem' inquit, 'sum enim admodum infirmus. sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me quod te velle video.'
'Mihi vero' ille; quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possint Latine?
Quae cam essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus omnes.

Va. 'Certainly as to that,' he said, 'for I am very infirm. But let us see whether it also pleases Atticus that the same be done by me which I see you wish.'
'To me indeed,' he said; 'for what is there that I would prefer than to recall the things long since heard from Antiochus and at the same time to see whether they can be said sufficiently commodiously in Latin?'
When these things had been said, we all sat down in sight of one another.

Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum.

Then Varro began thus: 'Socrates seems to me—what is agreed among all—to have been the first to call philosophy away from hidden matters and from nature herself veiled, in which all the philosophers before him had been occupied, and to bring it to common life, so that it might inquire about virtues and vices and altogether about good things and bad; but he judged the celestial things either to be far from our cognition or, even if most fully known, nevertheless to contribute nothing to living well.

hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hommis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest.

here, in almost all the discourses, which by those who heard him have been written out variously and copiously, he argues in such a way that he himself affirms nothing, but refutes others, says that he knows nothing except this very thing, and by this he excels the rest, because they think that they know the things they do not know, whereas he knows this one thing, that he knows nothing; and for that reason he deems that he was declared by Apollo to be the wisest of all, because this was the one human wisdom: not to suppose oneself to know what one does not know. Since he said these things consistently and remained in that opinion, all his discourse was consumed solely in virtue’s being praised and in men’s being exhorted to the pursuit of virtue, as can be understood from the books of the Socratics, and especially of Plato.

Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. nam cum Speusippum sororis fillum Plato philosophine quasi heredem reliquisset, duo autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, qula disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illum autem Socraticam dubitanter de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.

But by the authority of Plato—who was various and multiplex and copious—one and consenting form of philosophy was instituted under two appellations, of the Academics and of the Peripatetics, who, being congruent in things, differed in names. For when Plato had left Speusippus, his sister’s son, as the quasi-heir of philosophy, there were also two men of most excellent zeal and doctrine, Xenocrates the Chalcedonian and Aristotle the Stagirite. Those who were with Aristotle were called Peripatetics, because they used to dispute while walking about in the Lyceum; the others, however, because by Plato’s institution they were accustomed to hold gatherings and conversations in the Academy, which is the other gymnasium, had their name from the appellation of the place. But both parties, filled with Plato’s abundance, composed a certain fixed formula of discipline—indeed full and replete—yet they left behind that Socratic habit of discoursing with hesitation about all things and with no affirmation employed.

ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae.

thus there came to be, which Socrates least approved, a certain art of philosophy and an order of things and a description of discipline.

Quae quidem erat primo duobus ut dixi nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat. abundantia quadam ingenii prnestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

Which indeed at first, as I said, was one under two names; for nothing differed between the Peripatetics and that old Academy. Aristotle, as it seems to me, excelled by a certain abundance of genius, but the same source was common to both and the same partition of things to be sought and to be shunned.

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[5] Sed quid ago' inquit 'aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet.'
Tum Atticus 'Tu vero' inquit 'perge Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo.'
'Quid me' inquam 'putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro me exhibiturum.'
Va. 'Pergamus igitur' inquit, 'quoniam placet. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera dc natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve quid consentiens quid repugnet iudicando.

[5] 'But what am I doing,' he says, 'or am I sane that I teach you these things? For although, as they say, it is not the sow to Minerva, nevertheless whoever teaches Minerva teaches ineptly.'
Then Atticus says, 'You indeed, go on, Varro; for I greatly love our things and our own, and these things delight me when they are said in Latin and in that way.'
'What do you think me,' I say, 'I who have already professed philosophy, that I am going to present myself to our people?'
Va. 'Let us proceed then,' he says, 'since it pleases. Therefore there has already been received from Plato a threefold method of philosophizing: one about life and morals, another about nature and hidden matters, a third about disserting and, by judging, what is true, what false, what right in speech or depraved, what is consenting, what is repugnant.'

Ac primum illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicibant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum csse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetentiarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam iocum impressionem;

And first, they were seeking that part of living well from nature and were saying that she must be obeyed, and that in no other matter than in nature must that highest good be sought to which all things are referred; and they established that the ultimate of things to be desired and the end of goods is to have obtained all things from nature and in mind and in body and in life. As for the body, moreover, they posited that some things are in the whole, others in the parts: health, strength, beauty in the whole; but in the parts, unimpaired senses and some excellency of the several parts, as in the feet speed, force in the hands, clarity in the voice, and in the tongue too a clear imprint of articulation;

animi autem quae essent ad comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab his in naturam et mores dividebantur. naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant, quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingenii; morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem, quam partim assiduitate exercitationis partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat ipsa philosophia; in qua quod inchoatum est neque <absolutum> progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur, quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum quas in animis ponunt una res optuna. ergo haec animorum;

but as for the things of the mind that were suitable for comprehending virtue by innate talents, these were divided by them into nature and morals. to nature they assigned quickness for learning and memory, each of which was proper to the mind and to inborn genius; but of morals they thought there were pursuits and as it were habit, which they shaped partly by assiduity of exercise, partly by reason, among which was philosophy itself; in which that which is begun and not <absolute> is called a certain progression toward virtue, but that which is absolute, that is, virtue, is as it were the perfection of nature and of all the things which they place in souls, the one best thing. therefore these things of minds;

vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Iam virtus in animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. hominem enim esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate.

and to life (for that was the third) they said there are adjuncts which avail for the use of virtue. Now virtue is discerned in the goods of the mind and of the body, and in certain things which are not so much adjunct to nature as to the blessed life. For they deemed man to be, as it were, a certain part of the civitas and of the universal human race, and that he is conjoined with men by a certain human society.

ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut [ad] tenendum, ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam.

and indeed concerning the highest and natural good they deal thus; but they think that the rest pertains to it either for augmenting it or [for] holding it—such as riches, such as resources, such as glory, such as favor.

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[6] Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum. atque haec illa sunt tria genera quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. id quidem non falso; est enim haec partitio illorum; illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos qui tum appellarentur alios Peripateticos arbitrantur.

[6] Thus a tripartite account of goods is introduced by these men. And these are those three genera which most suppose the Peripatetics to assert. That, indeed, is not falsely said; for this partition is theirs; but this is imprudently assumed, if they think that those who were then called Academics were one group, and the Peripatetics another.

communis haec ratio, et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima in natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda aut omnia aut maxima; ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute versantur. itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam nisi adiungerentur etiam corporis et cetera quae supra dicta sunt ad virtutis usum idonea.

This is the common rationale, and to both parties here the end of the goods seemed to be to attain the things that are primary in nature and that are to be sought per se—either all of them or the greatest; and the greatest, moreover, are those which are engaged in the mind itself and in virtue itself. And so all that ancient philosophy held that a blessed life was set in virtue alone, yet not the most blessed, unless there were added also things of the body and the other things mentioned above, suitable for the use of virtue.

Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur, quod erat in conservatione <sui et in appetitione> earum rerum quas natura praescriberet. hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio, ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum magnorum<que> recti honestique causa et earum rerum quae erant congruentes cum praescriptione naturae; unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas, eaeque et voluptatibus et multis vitue commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis quam primam posui forma atque descriptio.

From this description there was also found some beginning of acting in life and of duty itself, which lay in the conservation <of oneself and in the appetite> of those things which nature prescribed. Hence there was born a flight from sloth and a contempt of pleasures, whence the undertaking of labors and pains for the sake of many and great<and> things of the right and the honorable, and of those things which were congruent with the prescription of nature; whence also friendship arose and justice and equity, and these were preferred both to pleasures and to many commodities of life. This indeed was among them the institution of morals and the form and description of that part which I set first.

De natura autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque efficeretur aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potilisse si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur. sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant—dabitis enim profecto ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum inauditis.'

About nature, however (for that indeed followed), they said thus: that they divided it into two things, so that one was efficient, the other, as it were, offering itself to this, and by it something was effected. In that which effected they judged there to be a force; in that, however, which was effected, only a certain matter; yet in both, nevertheless, each of the two: for matter itself could not cohere if it were not contained by some force, nor could force exist without some matter; for there is nothing which is not compelled to be somewhere. But what is from both, this they now named a body and, as it were, a certain quality—you will assuredly grant that, in unusual matters, as the Greeks themselves do, by whom these things have long been treated, we should sometimes use unheard-of words.'

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[7] 'Nos vero' inquit Atticus; 'quin etiam Graecis licebit utare cum voles, si te Latina forte deficient.' Va. 'Bene sane facis; sod enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. qualitates igitur appellavipoiotaetas Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graccos non est vulgi verbum sed philosophorum, atque id in multis; dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica, suis utuntur. et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium; aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.

[7] 'For our part,' says Atticus, 'nay rather, you will even be allowed to use Greek whenever you wish, if perchance the Latin should fail you.' Va. 'You do very well; but I will strive to speak in Latin, except in words of this sort, as when I call something philosophy or rhetoric or physics or dialectic, which, like many others, custom already uses as if Latin. Qualities, therefore, I have called—the Greeks callpoiotaetas—which very word among the Greeks is not a word of the crowd but of the philosophers, and so in many matters; indeed the words of the dialecticians are not public at all, they use their own. And that indeed is common to almost all arts; for either new names must be made for new things, or transferred from others.'

quod si Gracci faciunt qui in his rebus tot iam saecla versantur, quanto id nobis magis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur.'

But if the Greeks do this, who have been occupied in these matters for so many ages already, how much more ought that to be conceded to us, who are now for the first time trying to treat these things.'

'Tu vero' inquam 'Varro bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris ut effecisti, sed etiam verborum.' VA. 'Audebimus ergo' inquit 'novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. earum igitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes aliae ex his ortae. principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.

'You indeed,' I say, 'Varro, you seem to me likely to deserve well of your fellow citizens, if you have enriched them not only with an abundance of things, as you have brought it about, but also with words.' VA. 'We shall then dare,' he says, 'to use new words with you as our author, if it will be necessary. Of those qualities, therefore, some are principal, others have arisen from these. The principal are of one kind and simple; but those arisen from these are various and as it were multiform.'

itaque aer (hoc quoque utimur enim pro Latino) et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra. ergo illa initia et ut e Gracco vertam elementa dicuntur; e quibus aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et qasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.

therefore air (this too we use, in fact, as Latin), and fire and water and earth, are primary; and from these arise the forms of living beings and of those things which are begotten from the earth. therefore those are called beginnings, and, to translate from the Greek, elements; of these, air and fire have the power of moving and of effecting, while the remaining parts have the power of receiving and, as it were, of suffering—I mean water and earth. a fifth kind, from which the stars and minds are, singular and unlike those four which I mentioned above, Aristotle supposed to be a certain thing.

Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex ipia omnia expressa atque effecta sint, quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum sed in suos partes, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat. quae autem moveantur omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint.

But they think that underlying all things, without any species and lacking all that quality (for by handling let us make this word more usual and more well-worn), there is a certain matter, from which itself all things have been expressed and effected, which as a whole can receive all things and be changed in all ways and from every part and therefore even perish, not into nothing but into its own parts, which can be cut and divided infinitely, since there is absolutely nothing in the nature of things minimal which cannot be divided. And as for the things which are moved, all are moved by intervals, which intervals likewise can be divided infinitely.

et cum ita moveatur illa vis quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro citroque versetur, et materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa effici quae appellant qualia; e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et continuata cum omnibus suis partibus unum effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus. Partis autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat);

and when that force which we have said to be a quality is moved thus, and when it is turned to and fro in this way, they think that the matter itself, whole and entire, is thoroughly changed and that those things are brought about which they call “qualia”; from which, in the whole nature cohering and continuous with all its parts, the world is one effect, outside of which there is no part of matter and no body. Moreover, that all things which are in it are parts of the world, which are held by a sentient nature, in which perfect reason is present, which is itself the same everlasting (for there is nothing more powerful by which it might perish);

quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse mentem sapientiumque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt ei subiectae quasi prudentiam quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter <dum> ** quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non numquam quidem eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

which force they say is the soul of the world, and that it is the mind and perfect wisdom, which they call god, and a kind of prudence of all things that are subjected to it, administering the heavenly things most of all, then on earth those things that pertain to human beings; which at times they call Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it has been constituted by it, at <times> ** as a, as it were, fatal and immutable continuation of the sempiternal order, sometimes indeed the same they call Fortune, because it brings about many things unforeseen and unanticipated for us on account of the obscurity and ignorance of causes.

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[8] Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, qune erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamqunm oriretur a sensibus tamen non esse indicium veritatis in sensibus. mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illiidean appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere).

[8] The third part then of philosophy, which was in reason and in discoursing, was thus handled by both sides. Although it arose from the senses, nevertheless the indication of truth is not in the senses. They wished the mind to be the judge of things; they deemed it alone suitable to be believed, because it alone discerned that which is always simple and of one mode and such as it is (this they called theidean, already so named by Plato; we can rightly call it a species).

Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipcre ullo modi, res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset <et> constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant;

However, they judged all sense to be obtuse and tardy, and not to perceive in any way the things which seemed subjected to the senses, because they were either so small that they could not fall under sense, or so mobile and agitated that nothing ever was one <and> constant, not even the same, because all things continually slipped and flowed. And so they called this whole part of things opinable;

scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus. qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has adl omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam etymologian appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant. in qua tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendam accommodatae.

but they judged that knowledge existed nowhere except in the mind’s notions and reasons. For which cause they approved definitions of things and applied these to everything about which there was disputation; the explication of words also was approved, that is, for what cause each thing had been so named, which they called etymologian (etymology); afterwards they used certain arguments and, as it were, the signs of things as guides for proving and concluding that which they wished to explain. In this was conveyed the whole discipline of dialectic, that is, of discourse concluded by reason; to this, as if from the other side, the oratorical power of speaking was applied, the explicatrix of continuous discourse adapted to persuading.

Haec forma erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes si vultis exponam.'
'Nos vero volumus' inquam, 'ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.'
Att. 'Et recte quidem' inquit 'respondes; pracclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas.'

'This form was for them the first, handed down by Plato; of which, if you wish, I will expound the disputations that I have received.'
'We indeed wish it,' I said, 'so that I may also answer on Atticus’s behalf.'
Att. 'And rightly indeed,' he says, 'you answer; for the authority of the Peripatetics and of the old Academy is excellently explicated.'

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[9] Va. 'Aristoteles igitur primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione snavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.

[9] Va. 'Aristotle therefore first undermined the species which I said a little before, which Plato had marvelously embraced, so that he said that in them there was a certain something divine. Theophrastus, however, a man both suave in oration and so mannered as to carry before himself a certain probity and ingenuousness, even more vehemently in a certain way broke the authority of the ancient discipline; for he despoiled virtue of its own decorum and made it weak, because he denied that to live blessedly was placed in it alone.

Nam Strato eius auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae, posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemquc susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas.

For Strato, his auditor, although he was of sharp genius, nevertheless must be altogether removed from that discipline; who, when he had left behind the most necessary part of philosophy, which is set in virtue and in morals, and had devoted himself wholly to the investigation of nature, even in that very thing dissented very greatly from his own. Speusippus, however, and Xenocrates, who were the first to assume Plato’s ratio and authority, and after them Polemo and Crates, and together with them Crantor, congregated in the Academy, diligently were defending the things which they had received from their superiors. By now Zeno and Arcesilaus had assiduously listened to Polemo.

Sed Zeno, cum Arcesilum anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter clissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus.'
'Mihi vero'inquam 'videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.'

But Zeno, although he was ahead of Arcesilaus in age and discoursed very subtly and argued very acutely, tried to correct the discipline; that correction also, if it seems good, I will explain, just as Antiochus used to.'
'To me indeed,'I say 'it seems that you see Pomponius to signify the same thing.'

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[10] Va. 'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrasttis nervos virtutis inciderit, sed contra qui omnia quae[que] ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret hi bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum.

[10] Va. 'Therefore Zeno was in no way the sort of man who, as Theophrastus did, cut the sinews of virtue; but on the contrary, he placed all the things that pertain to a blessed life in virtue alone, and counted nothing else among goods; and he called that the honestum—the honorable—which was a certain simple and sole and single good.'

cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat alia naturae esse contraria, his is ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. quae autem secundum naturam essent ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria; neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.

but the rest, although they were neither good nor bad, he nevertheless said that some were according to nature, others contrary to nature, and among these very things he counted some as interposed and middle. And he taught that the things which were according to nature were to be taken and to be deemed worthy by a certain estimation, and, conversely, the contrary ones; but he left the neutral ones in the middle, in which he posited that there was nothing at all of moment.

sed quae essent sumenda, ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda alia minoris. quae pluris ea praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis mutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum officium et contra officim media locabat quaedam, recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponetis, prave id est peccata in malis; officia autem conservata praetermissaque media putabat ut dixi.

but, of the things that were to be taken, among these some were to be valued more, others less. Those of greater value he called preferred, but rejected those of lesser. And just as he had altered these not so much in realities as in vocables, so between a right-deed and a sin he placed certain media: duty and against-duty; placing right-deeds alone among good actions, the wrongly done—that is, sins—among bad, while duties preserved and pretermitted he judged to be media, as I said.

cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent sed quasdam virtutes quasi natura aut more perfectas. hic ornnis in ratione ponebat. cumque illi ea genera virtutum quae supra dixi seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat, nec virtutis usum modo ut superiores sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adessc qquin ea semper uteretur.

and whereas the predecessors said that not all virtue was in reason but that certain virtues were, as it were, perfected by nature or by custom, he placed all of it in reason. And whereas they thought that those genera of virtues which I mentioned above could be sundered, he argued that this could in no way be done; and that not the use of virtue only, as the predecessors held, but the very habit (habitus) itself was preeminent in itself; nor yet that virtue could be present to anyone unless he were always using it.

cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent. sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem.

and whereas those men did not remove perturbation of mind from man, and said that by nature one both condoles, and concupisces, and dreads, and is carried away by joy; but they would contract these and reduce them into a narrow compass, he wished the wise man to be free from all these, as if from diseases.

cumque eas perturbationes antiquti naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia rationem rollocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur; nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitrabatur immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

and although the ancients said that those perturbations were natural and devoid of reason, and placed desire in one part of the mind and reason in another, not even to these did he assent; for he thought both that perturbations are voluntary and are undertaken by the judgment of opinion, and he deemed the mother of all perturbations to be a certain immoderate intemperance. these things, for the most part, about morals.

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[11] De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensus. discrepabat etiam ab isdem, quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.

[11] As to natures, however, he felt thus: first, that among the four beginnings/principles of things he would not add this fifth nature, from which the higher senses and the mind were thought to be effected; for he posited that fire is the very nature which generates each thing, including mind and the senses. He also disagreed with those same men, in that he thought in no way could anything be effected by that which was devoid of body, of which sort Xenocrates and the earlier thinkers had said the soul too was; nor indeed could either that which effected anything or that which was effected be able to be not a body.

Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus. quam ille phantasian nos visum appellemus licet, et teramus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius—sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animomorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam.

But he altered very many things in that third part of philosophy. In which, first, he said some new things about the senses themselves, which he judged to be joined from a certain, as it were, impulse offered from without. Which he called phantasian; we may call it a “visum” (appearance), and let us wear this word down, indeed, for it will have to be used rather often in the remaining discourse—but to these things which have been seen and, as it were, received by the senses, he adds the assent of the mind, which he wants to be set within us and voluntary.

visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehenibile—feretis haec?' Att. 'nos vero' inquit; 'quonam enim alio modo katalaempton diceres?'—Va. 'Sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat [at] cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis.

he did not adjoin trust to all things seen, but only to those which had a certain proper declaration of the things that seemed; and that appearance, when it was discerned by itself on its own, he called “comprehensible”—‘will you bear these?’ Att. ‘indeed we will,’ he says; ‘for in what other way would you say katalaempton?’—Va. ‘But when it had already been received and approved, he called it comprehension, similar to things which are grasped by hand; whence also he had derived this name, [at] since before no one had used that word in such a matter, and he employed very many new words likewise (for he said they were new). But that which was grasped by sense he called “sense” itself; and if it was so grasped that it could not be torn away by reason, he named it science (i.e., knowledge), but if otherwise, inscience (ignorance); from which there arose also opinion, which was feeble and shared with the false and the unknown.

sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur; e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et susppcionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis assensionis a virtute.

but between science and inscience he placed that comprehension which I mentioned, and he counted it neither among right things nor among depraved ones, but said that it alone was to be believed. From which he also assigned faith to the senses, because, as I said above, a comprehension made by the senses seemed to him both true and faithful—not because it comprehended all the things that are in the object, but because it left nothing that could fall under it; and because nature had given, as it were, a norm of science and a principle of itself, whence afterward notions of things are imprinted upon minds; from which are found not only first principles but also certain broader ways for finding reason. But he set down error and rashness and ignorance and opinion and suspicion, and, under one name, all things that are alien to firm and constant assent, as apart from virtue.

sapientiaque removebat.

and he removed wisdom as well.

Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.'

And in these things, for the most part, consisted all the alteration and the dissension of Zeno from his predecessors.'

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[12] Quae cum dixisset [et], 'Breviter sane minimeque obscure eita est' inquam 'a te Varro et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum. horum esse autem arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam diciplinam putandam.'

[12] When he had said these things [and], 'It has been set forth briefly indeed and by no means obscurely,' I said, 'by you, Varro, both the rationale of the Old Academy and that of the Stoics. Moreover, I judge that these, as it pleased our familiar friend Antiochus, are to be considered a correction of the Old Academy rather than any new discipline.'

Tum Varro 'Tuae sunt nunc partes' inquit qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea quae ab Arcesila novata sunt probas, docere quod et qua de causa discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio.'

Then Varro 'It is now your part' he says, you who defect from the reasoning of the ancients and approve the things innovated by Arcesilaus, to teach both what the schism was and for what cause the split was made, so that we may see whether that defection is sufficiently just.'

Tum ego 'Cum Zenone' inquam 'ut accepimus Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et [vel ut] iam ante Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedociem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus imbecillos animos brevia curricula vitae et ut Democritus in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tellebris circumfusa esse dixerunt.

Then I: 'With Zeno,' I said, 'as we have received, Arcesilaus instituted for himself every contest, not from pertinacity or a zeal for conquering, as indeed it seems to me, but because of the obscurity of those matters which had led Socrates to a confession of ignorance, and [or as] already before Socrates Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, almost all the ancients, who said that nothing can be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood; that the senses are narrow, the spirits feeble, the courses of life brief; and, as Democritus [said], that truth is sunk in the deep; that all things are held by opinions and institutions, nothing is left to truth; thereafter that all things are encompassed in darkness.'

itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, ut nihil scire se sciret; sic omnia latere censebat in occulto neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset; quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque affirmare quemquam neque assensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur neque hoc quicquam esse turpias quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. huic rationi quod erat consentaneum faciebat ut contra omnium sententias disserens de sua plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur facilius ab utraque parte assensio sustinerctur.

accordingly Arcesilaus used to deny that there was anything that could be known, not even that very thing which Socrates had left to himself, namely, that he knew that he knew nothing; thus he judged that everything lies hidden in the occult and that there is nothing that can be discerned or understood; for which causes no one ought either to profess or to affirm or to approve by assent, and one should always restrain and contain rashness from every lapse, which was then conspicuous when either a false or an unknown matter was approved; nor is this anything more shameful than for assent and approbation to run ahead of cognition and perception. to this reasoning he did what was consonant, so that, arguing against everyone’s opinions, he would lead most people away from their own, since, when in the same matter equal weights of arguments were found on the opposing sides, assent could more easily be held back from either side.

Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur—sed tamen illa quam euisti vetus, haec nova nominetur. quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex is qui illum audierant maximeque ex Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret unum tamen praeter ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate et

They call this Academy the new one, which seems to me old, if indeed we reckon Plato among that older school, in whose books nothing is affirmed and much is argued on either side, inquiry is made about all things, nothing certain is said—but nevertheless let that which you called old be named old, and this one new. Which, carried down as far as Carneades, who was the fourth after Arcesilaus, remained in the same method of Arcesilaus. Now Carneades, ignorant of no part of philosophy and, as I learned from those who had heard him, especially from the Epicurean Zeno, who, although he differed very greatly from him, nevertheless marveled at one thing beyond the rest, was of an incredible kind of ability and

* * *

quid autem stomachatur Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?

But what is Mnesarchus fretting at, and why does Antipater cross swords with Carneades in so many volumes?

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LIBER SECUNDUS

BOOK TWO

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atqui si in crederemus. nun egeremus perpendiculis non normis non regulis

and yet, if we were to believe. we would not need plumb-lines, not norms (squares), not rules

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quid lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere [ne] cuius et nascentis et inseniscentis alias hebetiora alias acutiora videntur cornua.

can you say what the lineaments of the moon are [ne], whose horns both when nascent and when senescent seem sometimes duller, sometimes sharper.

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quid tam planum videtur quam mare; e quo etiam aequor illud poetae vocant

what seems so plain as the sea; whence also the poets call it the level expanse

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*in aqua remum integrum quasi fractum videmus
quid mare nonne caeruleum? at eius unda cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit, et quidem aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum

*in water we see an intact oar as if broken
what? is not the sea cerulean? but its wave, when it is struck by oars, purples, and indeed is in a certain way tinged and dyed by the water

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alius adultis, alius valentibus alius. aegris, alius siccis alius vinulentis

one for adults, another for the hale, another for the ailing, another for the abstemious, another for the wine-soaked

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si quando enim nos demersimus ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum cernimus

for whenever we have submerged ourselves like those who dive, we discern either nothing of the things above, or very obscurely indeed

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quibus etiam alabaster plenus unguenti putre esse videtur

to whom even an alabaster full of unguent seems putrid

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nihil ab homine percipi posse, nihilque remanere sapienti diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis propterea quia si incertis rebus esset asseneus etiam si fortasse verae forent liberari errore non posset. quae maxima est culpa aapientis.

that nothing can be perceived by man, and that for the sapient man the most diligent inquisition of truth does not remain, for this reason: because if he were to assent to uncertain matters, even if perhaps they were true, he could not be liberated from error. which is the greatest culpability of the sapient man.

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quae cum similitudine veri concinere maxime sibi videretur

which seemed to him to harmonize most with the similitude of truth

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probabile vel veri simile ... quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potest invitare; sine adsensione autem dito ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut nos id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. ... talia mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda; quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno; satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem.

probable or verisimilar ... which can invite us to act without assent; and by ‘without assent’ I say that we should not suppose that what we are doing is true or deem that we know it, and yet let us act nonetheless. ... all things of this sort seem to me to be what I have thought ought to be named ‘probable’ or ‘verisimilar’; if you wish to call them by another name, I do not oppose at all; for it is enough for me that you have already well apprehended what I am saying, that is, upon what things I assign these names; for it befits a wise man to be not a craftsman of words but an inquirer into things.

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frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum iuventuti

to shatter avarice, to set aside crimes, to set forth one’s life for the youth to imitate

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qui enim serius honores adamaverunt, vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.

for those who have later come to love honors are scarcely admitted to them, nor can they be sufficiently commended to the multitude.

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Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum qui sibi sapinentis videntur secundas partes dari, cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse sit, ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo qui omnium ceterorum iudicio sit secundus. fac enim verbi causa Stoicum adesse sapientem; contra eos potissmum Academicorum exarsit ingenium. ergo Zeno vel Chrysippus si interrogetur qui sit sapiens, respondebit eum esse quem ipse descripserit; contra Epicurus vel quis alius adversariorum negabit suumque potius peritissimum voluptatum aucupem sapientem esse contendet.

To the Academic sage, by all of the other sects who seem to themselves to be sages, second place is given, since it is necessary that each one claim first place for himself; whence it can be probably concluded that he is rightly first in his own judgment who is second in the judgment of all the rest. For suppose, for the sake of argument, that a Stoic sage is present; against them especially the ingenium of the Academics has flared up. Therefore Zeno or Chrysippus, if asked who is a sage, will reply that it is the one whom he himself has described; on the contrary Epicurus or some other of the opponents will deny this and will contend rather that his own man—the most skilled fowler of pleasures—is the sage.

inde ad iurgium. clamat Zeno et tota illa porticus tumultuatur, hominem natum ad nihil aliud esse quam honestatem, ipsam suo splendore ad se animos ducere nullo prorsus commodo extrinsecus posito et quasi lenocinante mercede, voluptatemque illam Epicuri solis inter se pecoribus esse communem, in quorum societatem et hominem et sapientem trudere nefas esse. contra ille convocata de hortulis in auxilium quasi liber turba temulenlorum quaerentium tamen quam incomptis unguibus bacchantes asperoque ore discerpant, voluptatis nomen suavitatem quietem teste populo exaggerans instat acriter ut nisi ea beatus nemo esse posse videatur.

thence to a quarrel. Zeno shouts and that whole portico is in tumult, that man is born for nothing other than honesty, that she by her own splendor draws minds to herself, with no advantage at all placed from without and with, as it were, a pandering wage; and that that pleasure of Epicurus is common only with the herd-beasts among themselves, into whose society it is unspeakable to shove both a man and a sage. In reply the other, having summoned in to his aid from the little gardens a kind of free-for-all, a temulent crowd of drunkards, seeking rather what they may tear with unkempt nails, Bacchantes with harsh mouth, magnifying the name of pleasure as sweetness and repose, with the people as witness, presses keenly that unless by this no one can seem to be blessed.

in quorum rixam si Academnicus incurrerit, utrosque audiet trahentes se ad suas partes. sed si in illos aut in istos concesserit, ab eis quos deseret insanus imperitus temerariusque clamabitur. itaque cum et hac et illac aurem diligenter admoverit.

if an Academic has run into their quarrel, he will hear both sides dragging him over to their own parties. but if he has conceded to those or to these, by those whom he deserts he will be cried out against as insane, unskilled, and temerarious. and so, when he has carefully applied his ear both here and there.

interrogatus quid ei videatur dubitare se dicet. roga nunc Stoicum qui sit melior, Epicurusne qui delirare illum clamat, an Academicas qui sibi adhuc de re tanta deliberandum esse pronuntiat: nemo dubitat Academicum praelatum iri. rursus te ad illum converte et quaere quem magis amet, Zenonem a quo bestia vocatur, an Arcesilan a quo audit 'tu fortasse verum dicis sed requiram diligentius': nonne apertum est totam illam porticum insanam, Academicos autem prae illis modestos cautosque homines videri Epicuro?

asked what seems to him, he will say that he is in doubt. ask now the Stoic who is the better—Epicurus, who cries that that man is raving, or the Academic, who pronounces that he must still deliberate about so great a matter: no one doubts that the Academic will be preferred. again turn yourself to him and ask whom he loves more, Zeno, by whom he is called a beast, or Arcesilaus, from whom he hears, “you perhaps speak true, but I will inquire more carefully”: is it not plain that to Epicurus that whole Portico is insane, but that, in comparison with them, the Academics seem modest and cautious men?

* * *

(Academicis) marem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam, nec eam cuiquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent aperire consuesse.

(For the Academics) it had been a custom to conceal their own opinion, nor were they accustomed to disclose it to anyone except those who had lived with them all the way to old age.

LIBER TERTIUS

BOOK THREE

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in tanta animantium varietate homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae

in so great a variety of living beings, that in man alone the desire of cognition and of science was engendered

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quod si liceret ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent sic vitam deviam secutos corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis

but if it were permitted that those who had strayed on the journey should thus, after having followed a deviating life, correct their error by repenting, the emendation of temerity would be easier

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digladiari autem semper, depugnare in facinorosis et audacibus quis non cum miserrimum tum etiam stultissimum dixerit?

However, to be always crossing swords, to fight it out with facinorous and audacious men—who would not call it both most miserable and even most foolish?

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aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem

if there be any power, let him vindicate himself into freedom

* * *

mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte verni videantur hebetes et obtunsi

to me, however, we seem not only blind toward sapience but, with respect to those very things which seem in some part true, dull and obtuse

* * *

disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone homine omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo

that he had held a disputation with M. Varro, a man by far the most acute of all and, without any doubt, the most learned

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fixus

fixed

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