Spinoza: ETHICA

Transeo tandem ad alteram Ethices partem quæ est de modo sive via quæ ad libertatem ducit. In hac ergo de potentia rationis agam ostendens quid ipsa ratio in affectus possit et deinde quid mentis libertas seu beatitudo sit, ex quibus videbimus quantum sapiens potior sit ignaro. Quomodo autem et qua via debeat intellectus perfici et qua deinde arte corpus sit curandum ut possit suo officio recte fungi, huc non pertinet; hoc enim ad medicinam, illud autem ad logicam spectat.

I pass at last to the other part of Ethics, which is about the mode or way that leads to liberty. In this, therefore, I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what reason itself can do regarding the affects, and then what the mind’s liberty, or beatitude, is; from which we shall see how much the wise man is superior to the ignorant. But how and by what way the intellect ought to be perfected, and by what art the body should then be cared for so that it can rightly perform its office, does not pertain here; for this latter pertains to medicine, but that former to logic.

Hic igitur ut dixi de sola mentis seu rationis potentia agam et ante omnia quantum et quale imperium in affectus habeat ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum ostendam. Nam nos in ipsos imperium absolutum non habere jam supra demonstravimus. Stoici tamen putarunt eosdem a nostra voluntate absolute pendere nosque iis absolute imperare posse.

Here, then, as I said, I shall treat of the sole power of the mind, or reason, and before all I shall show how great and of what sort a command it has over the affects for coercing and moderating the same. For we have already shown above that we do not have absolute dominion over them. The Stoics, however, thought that these same affects depend absolutely on our will, and that we are able to command them absolutely.

Attamen ab experientia reclamante, non vero ex suis principiis coacti sunt fateri usum et studium non parvum requiri ad eosdem coercendum et moderandum; quod quidam exemplo duorum canum (si recte memini) unius scilicet domestici, alterius venatici conatus est ostendere nempe quia usu efficere tandem potuit ut domesticus venari, venaticus contra a leporibus sectandis abstinere assuesceret. Huic opinioni non parum favet Cartesius. Nam statuit animam seu mentem unitam præcipue esse cuidam parti cerebri, glandulæ scilicet pineali dictæ cujus ope mens motus omnes qui in corpore excitantur, et objecta externa sentit quamque mens eo solo quod vult, varie movere potest.

Nevertheless, with experience protesting, they were compelled, not indeed by their own principles, to confess that no small use and study are required for coercing and moderating the same; which a certain man tried to show by the example of two dogs (if I remember rightly), to wit, one domestic, the other venatic, namely because by use he could at last bring it about that the domestic one should hunt, while the venatic, conversely, became accustomed to abstain from pursuing hares. This opinion is not a little favored by Descartes. For he lays down that the soul or mind is united chiefly to a certain part of the brain, namely the gland called the pineal, by whose help the mind senses all the motions which are excited in the body and the external objects, and which the mind, by this alone that it wills, can move in various ways.

Hanc glandulam in medio cerebri ita suspensam esse statuit ut minimo spirituum animalium motu possit moveri. Deinde statuit quod hæc glans tot variis modis in medio cerebro suspendatur quot variis modis spiritus animales in eandem impingunt et quod præterea tot varia vestigia in eadem imprimantur quot varia objecta externa ipsos spiritus animales versus eandem propellunt, unde fit ut si glans postea ab animæ voluntate illam diversimode movente hoc aut illo modo suspendatur quo semel fuit suspensa a spiritibus hoc aut illo modo agitatis, tum ipsa glans ipsos spiritus animales eodem modo propellet et determinabit ac antea a simili glandulæ suspensione repulsi fuerant. Præterea statuit unamquamque mentis voluntatem natura esse unitam certo cuidam glandis motui.

He posits that this gland is so suspended in the middle of the brain that by the slightest movement of the animal spirits it can be moved. Then he posits that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many various ways as the animal spirits impinge upon it in various ways, and that moreover so many various vestiges are imprinted on it as various external objects propel the animal spirits toward it; whence it happens that if afterwards the gland, by the soul’s will moving it diversely, is suspended in this or that manner in which it was once suspended by spirits agitated in this or that way, then the gland itself will propel and determine those same animal spirits in the same way as they had previously been driven by a similar suspension of the gland. Moreover, he posits that each will of the mind is by nature united to a certain motion of the gland.

Exempli gratia si quis voluntatem habet objectum remotum intuendi, hæc voluntas efficiet ut pupilla dilatetur sed si de sola dilatanda pupilla cogitet, nihil proderit ejus rei habere voluntatem quia natura non junxit motum glandis qui inservit impellendis spiritibus versus nervum opticum modo conveniente dilatandæ vel contrahendæ pupillæ cum voluntate eandem dilatandi vel contrahendi sed demum cum voluntate intuendi objecta remota vel proxima. Denique statuit quod etsi unusquisque motus hujus glandulæ videatur connexus esse per naturam singulis ex nostris cogitationibus ab initio nostræ vitæ, aliis tamen per habitum possunt jungi, quod probare conatur articulo 50 partis I de passionibus animæ. Ex his concludit nullam esse tam imbecillem animam quæ non possit cum bene dirigitur, acquirere potestatem absolutam in suas passiones. Nam hæ ut ab eo definiuntur, sunt "perceptiones aut sensus aut commotiones animæ quæ ad eam speciatim referuntur quæque nota bene producuntur, conservantur et corroborantur per aliquem motum spirituum" (vide articulum 27 partis I passionum animæ). At quandoquidem cuilibet voluntati possumus jungere motum quemcunque glandis et consequenter spirituum et determinatio voluntatis a sola nostra potestate pendet, si igitur nostram voluntatem certis et firmis judiciis secundum quæ nostræ vitæ actiones dirigere volumus, determinemus et motus passionum quas habere volumus, hisce judiciis jungamus, imperium acquiremus absolutum in nostras passiones.

For example, if someone has the will to gaze at a remote object, this will bring it about that the pupil be dilated; but if he should think only of dilating the pupil, it will be of no avail to have the will for that thing, because nature did not join the motion of the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits toward the optic nerve in a mode suitable to dilating or contracting the pupil with the will to dilate or contract the same, but only with the will to gaze at remote or proximate objects. Finally, he lays down that although each motion of this gland seems by nature to be connected to each of our thoughts from the beginning of our life, yet by habit they can be joined to others, which he tries to prove in article 50 of part 1 of the Passions of the Soul. From these things he concludes that there is no soul so imbecile that, when it is well directed, it cannot acquire absolute power over its passions. For these, as they are defined by him, are “perceptions or senses or commotions of the soul which are referred to it especially, and which, note well, are produced, preserved, and corroborated by some motion of the spirits” (see article 27 of part 1 of the Passions of the Soul). But since to any will we can join whatever motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, and the determination of the will depends upon our power alone, if therefore we determine our will by certain and firm judgments according to which we wish to direct the actions of our life, and join to these judgments the motions of the passions which we wish to have, we shall acquire absolute dominion over our passions.

Hæc est clarissimi hujus viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis conjicio) quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatam esse si minus acuta fuisset. Profecto mirari satis non possum quod vir philosophus qui firmiter statuerat nihil deducere nisi ex principiis per se notis et nihil affirmare nisi quod clare et distincte perciperet et qui toties scholasticos reprehenderat quod per occultas qualitates res obscuras voluerint explicare, hypothesin sumat omni occulta qualitate occultiorem. Quid quæso per mentis et corporis unionem intelligit?

This is the opinion of this most illustrious man (so far as I conjecture from his own words), which I would scarcely have believed to have been proffered by so great a man, had it been less acute. Truly I cannot marvel enough that a philosopher who had firmly resolved to deduce nothing except from self-evident principles and to affirm nothing except what he clearly and distinctly perceived, and who had so often reprehended the Scholastics because they wished to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should assume a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he understand by the union of mind and body?

Quem inquam clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissime unitæ cuidam quantitatis portiunculæ? Vellem sane ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille mentem a corpore adeo distinctam conceperat ut nec hujus unionis nec ipsius mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit sed necesse ipsi fuerit ad causam totius Universi hoc est ad Deum recurrere. Deinde pervelim scire quot motus gradus potest glandulæ isti pineali mens tribuere et quanta cum vi eandem suspensam tenere potest.

What, I ask, clear and distinct concept does one have of a thought most strictly united to a certain little portion of quantity? I would indeed wish that he had explained this union by its proximate cause. But he had conceived the mind as so distinct from the body that he could assign no singular cause either of this union or of the mind itself, but was compelled to recur to the cause of the whole Universe, that is, to God. Then I would very much like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can attribute to that pineal gland, and with how great a force it can hold the same suspended.

Nam nescio an hæc glans tardius vel celerius a mente circumagatur quam a spiritibus animalibus et an motus passionum quos firmis judiciis arcte junximus, non possint ab iisdem iterum a causis corporeis disjungi; ex quo sequeretur ut quamvis mens firmiter proposuerit contra pericula ire atque huic decreto motus audaciæ junxerit, viso tamen periculo, glans ita suspendatur ut mens non nisi de fuga possit cogitare et sane cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires et consequenter hujus vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt. His adde quod nec hæc glans ita in medio cerebro sita reperiatur ut tam facile totque modis circumagi possit et quod non omnes nervi ad cavitates usque cerebri protendantur. Denique omnia quæ de voluntate ejusque libertate asserit, omitto quandoquidem hæc falsa esse satis superque ostenderim.

For I know not whether this gland is swung about more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely joined to firm judgments, cannot be separated from them again by bodily causes; whence it would follow that although the mind has firmly resolved to go against dangers and has conjoined motions of audacity to this decree, yet, when the danger is seen, the gland is so held suspended that the mind can think of nothing except flight; and indeed, since no rationale is given of the will for motion, no comparison is given between the power or forces of mind and body, and consequently the forces of the one can by no means be determined by the forces of the other. Add to these that this gland is not found to be situated so in the middle of the brain that it can be turned so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend all the way to the cavities of the brain. Finally, everything that he asserts about the will and its liberty, I pass over, since I have more than sufficiently shown these to be false.

Igitur quia mentis potentia ut supra ostendi, sola intelligentia definitur, affectuum remedia quæ omnes experiri quidem sed non accurate observare nec distincte videre credo sola mentis cognitione, determinabimus et ex eadem illa omnia quæ ad ipsius beatitudinem spectant, deducemus.

Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by intelligence alone, we shall determine the remedies of the affections, which I believe all indeed experience but do not accurately observe nor see distinctly, by the mind’s cognition alone; and from the same we shall deduce all those things which pertain to its beatitude.

AXIOMATA

AXIOMS

I. Si in eodem subjecto duæ contrariæ actiones excitentur, debebit necessario vel in utraque vel in una sola mutatio fieri donec desinant contrariæ esse.

1. If in the same subject two contrary actions are excited, it will be necessary that either in both or in one alone a change be made until they cease to be contrary.

II. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causæ quatenus ejus essentia per ipsius causæ essentiam explicatur vel definitur. Patet hoc axioma ex propositione 7 partis III.

2. The potency of the effect is defined as the potency of its cause, insofar as its essence is explicated or defined through the essence of its cause. This axiom is evident from Proposition 7 of Part 3.

PROPOSITIO I: Prout cogitationes rerumque ideæ ordinantur et concatenantur in mente, ita corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad amussim ordinantur et concatenantur in corpore.

PROPOSITION 1: Just as the cogitations and the ideas of things are ordered and concatenated in the mind, so the body’s affections, or the images of things, are exactly ordered and concatenated in the body.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ordo et connexio idearum idem est (per propositionem 7 partis II) ac ordo et connexio rerum et vice versa ordo et connexio rerum idem est (per corollaria propositionum 6 et 7 partis II) ac ordo et connexio idearum. Quare sicuti ordo et connexio idearum in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis (per propositionem 18 partis II) sic vice versa (per propositionem 2 partis III) ordo et connexio affectionum corporis fit prout cogitationes rerumque ideæ ordinantur et concatenantur in mente. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The order and connection of ideas is the same (by Proposition 7 of Part II) as the order and connection of things; and conversely the order and connection of things is the same (by the corollaries of Propositions 6 and 7 of Part II) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind occurs according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Proposition 18 of Part II), so conversely (by Proposition 2 of Part III) the order and connection of the affections of the body occurs in so far as thoughts and the ideas of things are ordered and concatenated in the mind. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO II: Si animi commotionem seu affectum a causæ externæ cogitatione amoveamus et aliis jungamus cogitationibus, tum amor seu odium erga causam externam ut et animi fluctuationes quæ ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur.

PROPOSITION 2: If we remove an emotion or affect from the thought of an external cause and conjoin it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external cause, as also the vacillations of mind which arise from these affects, will be destroyed.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id enim quod formam amoris vel odii constituit, est lætitia vel tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ (per definitiones 6 et 7 affectuum); hac igitur sublata, amoris vel odii forma simul tollitur adeoque hi affectus et qui ex his oriuntur, destruuntur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For that which constitutes the form of love or of hatred is joy or sadness with the concomitant idea of an external cause (per definitions 6 and 7 of the affects); this therefore being removed, the form of love or of hatred is removed at the same time, and so these affects, and those which arise from them, are destroyed. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO III: Affectus qui passio est, desinit esse passio simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.

PROPOSITION 3: An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus qui passio est, idea est confusa (per generalem affectuum definitionem). Si itaque ipsius affectus claram et distinctam formemus ideam, hæc idea ab ipso affectu quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, non nisi ratione distinguetur (per propositionem 21 partis II cum ejusdem scholio) adeoque (per propositionem 3 partis III) affectus desinet esse passio. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: An affect which is a passion is a confused idea (by the general definition of the affects). If therefore we form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea, inasmuch as it is referred to the mind alone, will be distinguished from the affect itself only by reason (by Proposition 21 of Part II with its Scholium), and therefore (by Proposition 3 of Part III) the affect will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Affectus igitur eo magis in nostra potestate est et mens ab eo minus patitur quo nobis est notior.

COROLLARY: Therefore the affect is the more in our power, and the mind suffers less from it, the more it is known to us.

PROPOSITIO IV: Nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum.

PROPOSITION 4: There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quæ omnibus communia sunt, non possunt concipi nisi adæquate (per propositionem 38 partis II) adeoque (per propositionem 12 et lemma 2 quod habetur post scholium propositionis 13 partis II) nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Things that are common to all cannot be conceived except adequately (by Proposition 38 of Part 2), and so (by Proposition 12 and Lemma 2, which is found after the Scholium of Proposition 13 of Part 2) there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur nullum esse affectum cujus non possumus aliquem clarum et distinctum formare conceptum. Est namque affectus corporis affectionis idea (per generalem affectuum definitionem) quæ propterea (per propositionem præcedentem) aliquem clarum et distinctum involvere debet conceptum.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concept. For an affect is the idea of a body's affection (by the general definition of affects), which therefore (by the preceding proposition) must involve some clear and distinct concept.

SCHOLIUM: Quandoquidem nihil datur ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur (per propositionem 36 partis I) et quicquid ex idea quæ in nobis est adæquata, sequitur, id omne clare et distincte intelligimus (per propositionem 40 partis II) hinc sequitur unumquemque potestatem habere se suosque affectus, si non absolute, ex parte saltem clare et distincte intelligendi et consequenter efficiendi ut ab iisdem minus patiatur. Huic igitur rei præcipue danda est opera ut unumquemque affectum quantum fieri potest clare et distincte cognoscamus ut sic mens ex affectu ad illa cogitandum determinetur quæ clare et distincte percipit et in quibus plane acquiescit atque adeo ut ipse affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ separetur et veris jungatur cogitationibus; ex quo fiet ut non tantum amor, odium etc. destruantur (per propositionem 2 hujus) sed ut etiam appetitus seu cupiditates quæ ex tali affectu oriri solent, excessum habere nequeant (per propositionem 61 partis IV). Nam apprime notandum est unum eundemque esse appetitum per quem homo tam agere quam pati dicitur.

SCHOLIUM: Since nothing is given from which some effect does not follow (by proposition 36 of part 1), and whatever follows from an idea which in us is adequate, all of that we understand clearly and distinctly (by proposition 40 of part 2), hence it follows that each person has the power of understanding himself and his affects, if not absolutely, at least in part, clearly and distinctly, and consequently of bringing it about that he suffers less from the same. Therefore to this matter effort must chiefly be given, that we may know each affect, as far as can be done, clearly and distinctly, so that thus the mind may be determined from the affect to think upon those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it plainly acquiesces, and so that the affect itself may be separated from the cogitation of an external cause and be joined to true cogitations; from which it will come about that not only love, hatred, etc., are destroyed (by proposition 2 of this part), but also that the appetite or cupidities which are wont to arise from such an affect cannot have excess (by proposition 61 of part 4). For it is to be especially noted that it is one and the same appetite by which a human is said both to act and to suffer.

Exempli gratia cum natura humana ita comparatum esse ostendimus ut unusquisque appetat ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant (vide corollarium propositionis 31 partis III) qui quidem appetitus in homine qui ratione non ducitur, passio est quæ ambitio vocatur nec multum a superbia discrepat et contra in homine qui ex rationis dictamine vivit, actio seu virtus est quæ pietas appellatur (vide scholium I propositionis 37 partis IV et II demonstrationem ejusdem propositionis). Et hoc modo omnes appetitus seu cupiditates eatenus tantum passiones sunt quatenus ex ideis inadæquatis oriuntur atque eædem virtuti accensentur quando ab ideis adæquatis excitantur vel generantur. Nam omnes cupiditates quibus ad aliquid agendum determinamur, tam oriri possunt ab adæquatis quam ab inadæquatis ideis (vide propositionem 59 partis IV). Atque hoc (ut eo unde digressus sum revertar) affectuum remedio quod scilicet in eorum vera cognitione consistit, nullum præstantius aliud quod a nostra potestate pendeat, excogitari potest quandoquidem nulla alia mentis potentia datur quam cogitandi et adæquatas ideas formandi, ut supra (per propositionem 3 partis III) ostendimus.

For example, since we have shown human nature to be so constituted that each person appetites that the rest should live according to his own temperament (see the corollary of proposition 31 of part 3), which appetite, in a man who is not led by reason, is a passion which is called ambition and does not differ much from superbia; and conversely, in a man who lives by the dictate of reason, it is an action or virtue which is called piety (see scholium 1 of proposition 37 of part 4 and the second demonstration of the same proposition). And in this way all appetites or cupidities are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and the same are enrolled under virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the cupidities by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (see proposition 59 of part 4). And this (that I may return to the point whence I digressed), the remedy of the affects—which namely consists in their true cognition—no other more excellent one that depends on our power can be devised, since no other power of the mind is given than that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as above (by proposition 3 of part 3) we have shown.

PROPOSITIO V: Affectus erga rem quam simpliciter et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem neque ut contingentem imaginamur, cæteris paribus omnium est maximus.

PROPOSITION 5: The affect toward a thing which we imagine simply, and not as necessary nor as possible nor as contingent, other things being equal, is the greatest of all.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major est quam erga necessariam (per propositionem 49 partis III) et consequenter adhuc major quam erga illam quam ut possibilem vel contingentem imaginamur (per propositionem 11 partis IV). At rem aliquam ut liberam imaginari nihil aliud esse potest quam quod rem simpliciter imaginamur dum causas a quibus ipsa ad agendum determinata fuit, ignoramus (per illa quæ in scholio propositionis 35 partis II ostendimus); ergo affectus erga rem quam simpliciter imaginamur, cæteris paribus major est quam erga necessariam, possibilem vel contingentem et consequenter maximus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The affect toward a thing which we imagine to be free is greater than toward one that is necessary (by proposition 49 of Part 3), and consequently still greater than toward that which we imagine as possible or contingent (by proposition 11 of Part 4). But to imagine some thing as free can be nothing else than that we imagine the thing simply, while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to act (by those points which we showed in the scholium to proposition 35 of Part 2); therefore the affect toward a thing which we imagine simply, other things being equal, is greater than toward one that is necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently is the greatest. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VI: Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit eatenus majorem in affectus potentiam habet seu minus ab iisdem patitur.

PROPOSITION 6: Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, to that extent it has a greater power over the affects, or suffers less from the same.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens res omnes necessarias esse intelligit (per propositionem 29 partis I) et infinito causarum nexu determinari ad existendum et operandum (per propositionem 28 partis I) adeoque (per propositionem præcedentem) eatenus efficit ut ab affectibus qui ex iis oriuntur, minus patiatur et (per propositionem 48 partis III) minus erga ipsas afficiatur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The mind understands all things to be necessary (by proposition 29 of part 1) and to be determined by an infinite nexus of causes to exist and to act (by proposition 28 of part 1), and thus (by the preceding proposition) to that extent it brings it about that it suffers less from the affects which arise from them, and (by proposition 48 of part 3) that it is less affected with respect to them. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quo hæc cognitio quod scilicet res necessariæ sint, magis circa res singulares quas distinctius et magis vivide imaginamur, versatur, eo hæc mentis in affectus potentia major est, quod ipsa etiam experientia testatur. Videmus enim tristitiam boni alicujus quod periit mitigari simulac homo qui id perdidit, considerat bonum illud servari nulla ratione potuisse. Sic etiam videmus quod nemo miseretur infantis propterea quod nescit loqui, ambulare, ratiocinari et quod denique tot annos quasi sui inscius vivat.

SCHOLIUM: In proportion as this cognition—that namely things are necessary—is engaged more about singular things which we imagine more distinctly and more vividly, to that degree this power of the mind over the affects is greater, as experience itself also attests. For we see the sadness for some good that has perished mitigated as soon as the man who lost it considers that that good could by no rational means have been preserved. So too we see that no one pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, to walk, to ratiocinate, and that, finally, it lives for so many years as if unaware of itself.

At si plerique adulti et unus aut alter infans nascerentur, tum unumquemque misereret infantum quia tum ipsam infantiam non ut rem naturalem et necessariam sed ut naturæ vitium seu peccatum consideraret et ad hunc modum plura alia notare possemus.

But if for the most part adults and one or two infants were born, then each person would pity the infants, because then infancy itself would be considered not as a natural and necessary thing but as a defect of nature or a sin; and in this manner we could note many other things.

PROPOSITIO VII: Affectus qui ex ratione oriuntur vel excitantur, si ratio temporis habeatur, potentiores sunt iis qui ad res singulares referuntur quas ut absentes contemplamur.

PROPOSITION 7: Affects which arise from reason or are excited by it, if regard be had to time, are more potent than those which are referred to singular things that we contemplate as absent.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rem aliquam ut absentem non contemplamur ex affectu quo eandem imaginamur sed ex eo quod corpus alio afficitur affectu qui ejusdem rei existentiam secludit (per propositionem 17 partis II). Quare affectus qui ad rem quam ut absentem contemplamur, refertur, ejus naturæ non est ut reliquas hominis actiones et potentiam superet (de quibus vide propositionem 6 partis IV) sed contra ejus naturæ est ut ab iis affectionibus quæ existentiam externæ ejus causæ secludunt, coerceri aliquo modo possit (per propositionem 9 partis IV). At affectus qui ex ratione oritur, refertur necessario ad communes rerum proprietates (vide rationis definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II) quas semper ut præsentes contemplamur (nam nihil dari potest quod earum præsentem existentiam secludat) et quas semper eodem modo imaginamur (per propositionem 38 partis II). Quare talis affectus idem semper manet et consequenter (per axioma 1 hujus) affectus qui eidem sunt contrarii quique a suis causis externis non foventur, eidem magis magisque sese accommodare debebunt donec non amplius sint contrarii et eatenus affectus qui ex ratione oritur, est potentior. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: We do not contemplate any thing as absent from the affect by which we imagine that same thing, but from the fact that the body is affected by another affect which excludes the existence of that same thing (by Proposition 17 of Part II). Wherefore the affect which is referred to a thing which we contemplate as absent is not of such a nature as to surpass the remaining actions and power of the man (see Proposition 6 of Part IV), but on the contrary it is of such a nature that it can in some manner be coerced by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (by Proposition 9 of Part IV). But the affect which arises from reason is referred necessarily to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in the Second Scholium of Proposition 40 of Part II), which we always contemplate as present (for nothing can be given which would exclude their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same way (by Proposition 38 of Part II). Wherefore such an affect remains always the same; and consequently (by Axiom 1 of this Part) affects which are contrary to it and which are not fostered by their external causes will have to accommodate themselves more and more to it, until they are no longer contrary; and to that extent the affect which arises from reason is more potent. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO VIII: Quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul concurrentibus excitatur, eo major est.

PROPOSITION 8: The more some affect is excited by several causes concurring at once, the greater it is.

DEMONSTRATIO: Plures causæ simul plus possunt quam si pauciores essent (per propositionem 7 partis III) adeoque (per propositionem 5 partis IV) quo affectus aliquis a pluribus causis simul excitatur, eo fortior est. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: More causes together can do more than if there were fewer (by proposition 7 of part 3), and so (by proposition 5 of part 4) the more an affect is excited by more causes at once, the stronger it is. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio patet etiam ex axiomate 2 hujus partis.

SCHOLIUM: This proposition is evident also from axiom 2 of this part.

PROPOSITIO IX: Affectus qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur quas mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est et minus per ipsum patimur et erga unamquamque causam minus afficimur quam alius æque magnus affectus qui ad unam solam vel pauciores causas refertur.

PROPOSITION 9: An affect which is referred to more and diverse causes, which the mind contemplates together with the affect itself at the same time, is less noxious, and we suffer less by it, and we are less affected toward each single cause, than another equally great affect which is referred to one sole or to fewer causes.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus eatenus tantum malus seu noxius est quatenus mens ab eo impeditur quominus possit cogitare (per propositiones 26 et 27 partis IV) adeoque ille affectus a quo mens ad plura simul objecta contemplandum determinatur, minus noxius est quam alius æque magnus affectus qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione ita detinet ut de aliis cogitare nequeat, quod erat primum. Deinde quia mentis essentia hoc est (per propositionem 7 partis III) potentia in sola cogitatione consistit (per propositionem 11 partis II) ergo mens per affectum a quo ad plura simul contemplandum determinatur, minus patitur quam per æque magnum affectum qui mentem in sola unius aut pauciorum objectorum contemplatione occupatam tenet, quod erat secundum. Denique hic affectus (per propositionem 48 partis III) quatenus ad plures causas externas refertur, est etiam erga unamquamque minor.

DEMONSTRATION: An affect is bad or noxious only insofar as the mind is impeded by it from being able to think (by propositions 26 and 27 of part 4); and so that affect by which the mind is determined to contemplate several objects at once is less noxious than another equally great affect which so detains the mind in the contemplation of a single object or of a few objects that it cannot think about others—which was the first point. Next, because the essence of the mind, that is (by proposition 7 of part 3) its power, consists solely in thought (by proposition 11 of part 2), therefore the mind suffers less through an affect by which it is determined to contemplate several things at once than through an equally great affect which holds the mind occupied in the contemplation of a single or of a few objects—which was the second point. Finally, this affect (by proposition 48 of part 3), insofar as it is referred to several external causes, is also less with respect to each one.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITIO X: Quamdiu affectibus qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii, non conflictamur tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum.

PROPOSITION 10: So long as we are not assailed by affects which are contrary to our nature, so long we have the power of ordering and concatenating the body’s affections according to the order of the intellect.

DEMONSTRATIO: Affectus qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii hoc est (per propositionem 30 partis IV) qui mali sunt, eatenus mali sunt quatenus impediunt quominus mens intelligat (per propositionem 27 partis IV). Quamdiu igitur affectibus qui nostræ naturæ contrarii sunt, non conflictamur tamdiu mentis potentia qua res intelligere conatur (per propositionem 26 partis IV) non impeditur atque adeo tamdiu potestatem habet claras et distinctas ideas formandi et alias ex aliis deducendi (vide II scholium propositionis 40 et scholium propositionis 47 partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 1 hujus) tamdiu potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi affectiones corporis secundum ordinem ad intellectum. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The affects that are contrary to our nature, that is (by proposition 30 of part 4) those which are evil, are evil to the extent that they hinder the mind from understanding (by proposition 27 of part 4). Therefore, as long as we are not contending with affects which are contrary to our nature, so long the power of the mind by which it endeavors to understand things (by proposition 26 of part 4) is not impeded, and thus so long it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and of deducing others from others (see the second scholium of proposition 40 and the scholium of proposition 47 of part 2), and consequently (by proposition 1 of this) so long we have the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the body according to the order to the intellect. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hac potestate recte ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones efficere possumus ut non facile malis affectibus afficiamur. Nam (per propositionem 7 hujus) major vis requiritur ad affectus secundum ordinem ad intellectum ordinatos et concatenatos coercendum quam incertos et vagos. Optimum igitur quod efficere possumus quamdiu nostrorum affectuum perfectam cognitionem non habemus, est rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitæ dogmata concipere eaque memoriæ mandare et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur et nobis in promptu sint semper.

SCHOLIUM: By this power of rightly ordering and concatenating the affections of the body we can bring it about that we are not easily affected by bad affects. For (by proposition 7 of this) a greater force is required to coerce affects ordered and concatenated according to the order to the intellect than those uncertain and vague. Therefore the best thing we can effect, so long as we do not have perfect cognition of our affects, is to conceive a right rule of living, or certain dogmas of life, and to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to the particular things frequently met with in life, so that thus our imagination may be broadly affected by the same and they may be always at the ready for us.

Exempli gratia inter vitæ dogmata posuimus (vide propositionem 46 partis IV cum ejusdem scholio) odium amore seu generositate vincendum, non autem reciproco odio compensandum. Ut autem hoc rationis præscriptum semper in promptu habeamus ubi usus erit, cogitandæ et sæpe meditandæ sunt communes hominum injuriæ et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur; sic enim imaginem injuriæ imaginationi hujus dogmatis jungemus et nobis (per propositionem 18 partis II) in promptu semper erit ubi nobis injuria afferetur. Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur et præterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentia oriatur (per propositionem 52 partis IV) et quod homines ut reliqua, ex naturæ necessitate agant, tum injuria sive odium quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur; vel si ira quæ ex maximis injuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione, longe minore temporis spatio quam si hæc non ita præmeditata habuissemus, ut patet ex propositione 6, 7 et 8 hujus partis.

For example, among the dogmas of life we have posited (see proposition 46 of Part 4 with the same’s scholium) that hatred must be conquered by love or by generosity, and not compensated by reciprocal hatred. But so that we may have this prescript of reason always in readiness when there will be use, the common injuries of men are to be thought of and often meditated upon, and how and by what way they may be best repelled by generosity; for thus we shall join the image of the injury to the imagination of this dogma, and for us (by proposition 18 of Part 2) it will always be at hand whenever an injury is brought upon us. And if we shall also have in readiness the rationale of our true utile and likewise the good that follows from mutual friendship and common society, and, moreover, that from a right method of living the highest acquiescence of mind arises (by proposition 52 of Part 4), and that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature, then the injury, or the hatred which is wont to arise therefrom, will occupy the least part of the imagination and will easily be overcome; or, if anger, which is wont to arise from the greatest injuries, is not so easily overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not without a fluctuation of spirit, in a far shorter space of time than if we had not had these things premeditated in this way, as is clear from propositions 6, 7, and 8 of this Part.

De animositate ad metum deponendum eodem modo cogitandum est; enumeranda scilicet sunt et sæpe imaginanda communia vitæ pericula et quomodo animi præsentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt. Sed notandum quod nobis in ordinandis nostris cogitationibus et imaginibus semper attendendum est (per corollarium propositionis 63 partis IV et propositionem 59 partis III) ad illa quæ in unaquaque re bona sunt ut sic semper ex lætitiæ affectu ad agendum determinemur. Exempli gratia si quis videt se nimis gloriam sectari, de ejus recto usu cogitet et in quem finem sectanda sit et quibus mediis acquiri possit sed non de ipsius abusu et vanitate et hominum inconstantia vel aliis hujusmodi de quibus nemo nisi ex animi ægritudine cogitat; talibus enim cogitationibus maxime ambitiosi se maxime afflictant quando de assequendo honore quem ambiunt desperant et dum iram evomunt, sapientes videri volunt.

Concerning high-spiritedness to lay down fear, we must think in the same way; namely, the common dangers of life are to be enumerated and often imagined, and how by presence of mind and fortitude they can best be avoided and overcome. But it must be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images we must always attend (by the corollary of proposition 63 of part 4 and proposition 59 of part 3) to those things which in each matter are good, so that we may always be determined to act by the affect of joy. For example, if someone sees himself pursuing glory too much, let him think of its right use, and to what end it ought to be pursued, and by what means it can be acquired, but not of its abuse and vanity and the inconstancy of men, or other things of this kind, which no one thinks on except from soul-sickness; for with such thoughts the most ambitious most grievously afflict themselves when they despair of attaining the honor which they strive after, and, while they vomit out wrath, they wish to seem wise.

Quare certum est eos gloriæ maxime esse cupidos qui de ipsius abusu et mundi vanitate maxime clamant. Nec hoc ambitiosis proprium sed omnibus commune est quibus fortuna est adversa et qui animo impotentes sunt. Nam pauper etiam, avarus de abusu pecuniæ et divitum vitiis non cessat loqui, quo nihil aliud efficit quam se afflictare et aliis ostendere se non tantum paupertatem suam sed etiam aliorum divitias iniquo animo ferre.

Wherefore it is certain that those are most desirous of glory who cry out most about its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all for whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in spirit. For the poor man too, being avaricious, does not cease to speak of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, whereby he effects nothing other than to afflict himself and to show others that he bears with a resentful spirit not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others.

Sic etiam qui male ab amasia excepti sunt, nihil aliud cogitant quam de mulierum inconstantia et fallaci animo et reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis quæ omnia statim oblivioni tradunt simulac ab amasia iterum recipiuntur. Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is quantum potest nitetur virtutes earumque causas noscere et animum gaudio quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere. Atque hæc qui diligenter observabit (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, næ ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.

Thus also those who have been ill received by a mistress think of nothing else than the inconstancy of women and their fallacious mind and the remaining oft-sung vices of the same, all of which they straightway consign to oblivion as soon as they are received again by the mistress. Therefore, he who strives to moderate his affections and appetites from the sole love of liberty will, as far as he can, endeavor to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy that arises from their true cognition; but least of all to contemplate the vices of men, to disparage men, and to rejoice in a false appearance of liberty. And whoever shall diligently observe these (for they are not difficult) and practice them, verily, in a brief space of time he will be able for the most part to direct his actions by the command of reason.

PROPOSITIO XI: Quo imago aliqua ad plures res refertur, eo frequentior est seu sæpius viget et mentem magis occupat.

PROPOSITION 11: The more an image is referred to a greater number of things, the more frequent it is, or the more often it thrives, and the more it occupies the mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo enim imago seu affectus ad plures res refertur, eo plures dantur causæ a quibus excitari et foveri potest quas omnes mens (per hypothesin) ex ipso affectu simul contemplatur atque adeo affectus eo frequentior est seu sæpius viget et (per propositionem 8 hujus) mentem magis occupat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the more an image or affect is referred to more things, the more numerous are the causes by which it can be excited and fostered, all of which the mind (by hypothesis) contemplates at the same time from the affect itself; and so the affect is thereby more frequent or thrives more often, and (by Proposition 8 of this) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XII: Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus quæ ad res referuntur quas clare et distincte intelligimus, junguntur quam aliis.

PROPOSITION 12: Images of things are more easily conjoined with the images which are referred to things that we understand clearly and distinctly, than with others.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res quas clare et distincte intelligimus, vel rerum communes proprietates sunt vel quæ ex iis deducuntur (vide rationis definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II) et consequenter sæpius (per propositionem præcedentem) in nobis excitantur adeoque facilius fieri potest ut res alias simul cum his quam cum aliis contemplemur et consequenter (per propositionem 18 partis II) ut facilius cum his quam cum aliis jungantur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The things which we understand clearly and distinctly are either the common properties of things or those which are deduced from them (see the definition of reason in scholium 2 of proposition 40 of part 2), and consequently more often (by the preceding proposition) are excited in us, and so it can more easily happen that we contemplate other things together with these rather than with others, and consequently (by proposition 18 of part 2) that they are more easily joined with these than with others. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XIII: Quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo sæpius viget.

PROPOSITION 13: The more an image is joined to many other images, the more frequently it flourishes.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quo imago aliqua pluribus aliis juncta est, eo (per propositionem 18 partis II) plures causæ dantur a quibus excitari potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the more any image is joined with more others, the more (by proposition 18 of part 2) there are causes by which it can be excited. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XIV: Mens efficere potest ut omnes corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines ad Dei ideam referantur.

PROPOSITION 14: The mind can effect that all the affections of the body, or images of things, be referred to the idea of God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nulla est corporis affectio cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possit mens formare conceptum (per propositionem 4 hujus) adeoque efficere potest (per propositionem 15 partis I) ut omnes ad Dei ideam referuntur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by Proposition 4 of this Part), and so it can bring it about (by Proposition 15 of Part 1) that all are referred to the idea of God. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XV: Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat et eo magis quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit.

PROPOSITION 15: He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affections loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affections.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, lætatur (per propositionem 53 partis III) idque concomitante idea Dei (per propositionem præcedentem) atque adeo (per 6 affectuum definitionem) Deum amat et (per eandem rationem) eo magis quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly rejoices (by proposition 53 of part 3), and this with the concomitant idea of God (by the preceding proposition); and thus (by definition 6 of the affects) he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) the more, the more he understands himself and his affects. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XVI: Hic erga Deum amor mentem maxime occupare debet.

PROPOSITION 16: This love toward God ought to occupy the mind most of all.

DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim hic amor junctus omnibus corporis affectionibus (per propositionem 14 hujus) quibus omnibus fovetur (per propositionem 15 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 11 hujus) mentem maxime occupare debet. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For this love is conjoined with all the affections of the body (by Proposition 14 of this), by all of which it is fostered (by Proposition 15 of this), and therefore (by Proposition 11 of this) it ought to occupy the mind most. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XVII: Deus expers est passionum nec ullo lætitiæ aut tristitiæ affectu afficitur.

PROPOSITION 17: God is devoid of passions, and is affected by no affection of joy or sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ideæ omnes quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt (per propositionem 32 partis II) hoc est (per definitionem 4 partis II) adæquatæ atque adeo (per affectuum generalem definitionem) Deus expers est passionum. Deinde Deus neque ad majorem neque ad minorem perfectionem transire potest (per II corollarium propositionis 20 partis I) adeoque (per 2 et 3 affectuum definitiones) nullo lætitiæ neque tristitiæ affectu afficitur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: All ideas, insofar as they are referred to God, are true (by proposition 32 of part 2), that is (by definition 4 of part 2) adequate, and thus (by the general definition of the affects) God is devoid of passions. Next, God can pass to neither greater nor lesser perfection (by the 2nd corollary of proposition 20 of part 1) and so (by definitions 2 and 3 of the affects) he is affected by no affect of joy nor sadness. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat neque odio habet. Nam Deus (per propositionem præcedentem) nullo lætitiæ neque tristitiæ affectu afficitur et consequenter (per 6 et 7 affectuum definitiones) neminem etiam amat neque odio habet.

COROLLARY: God, properly speaking, loves no one nor holds anyone in hatred. For God (by the preceding proposition) is affected by no affect of joy nor sadness, and consequently (by definitions 6 and 7 of the affects) He neither loves anyone nor holds anyone in hatred.

PROPOSITIO XVIII: Nemo potest Deum odio habere.

PROPOSITION 18: No one can hate God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea Dei quæ in nobis est, est adæquata et perfecta (per propositiones 46 et 47 partis II) adeoque quatenus Deum contemplamur eatenus agimus (per propositionem 3 partis III) et consequenter (per propositionem 59 partis III) nulla potest dari tristitia concomitante idea Dei hoc est (per 7 affectuum definitionem) nemo Deum odio habere potest. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (by Propositions 46 and 47 of Part 2); and so, insofar as we contemplate God, to that extent we act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3), and consequently (by Proposition 59 of Part 3) no sadness can be given accompanying the idea of God, that is (by the 7th definition of the affects), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Amor erga Deum in odium verti nequit.

COROLLARY: Love toward God cannot be turned into hatred.

SCHOLIUM: At objici potest quod dum Deum omnium rerum causam intelligimus, eo ipso Deum tristitiæ causam consideramus. Sed ad hoc respondeo quod quatenus tristitiæ causas intelligimus eatenus (per propositionem 3 hujus) ipsa desinit esse passio hoc est (per propositionem 59 partis III) eatenus desinit esse tristitia atque adeo quatenus Deum tristitiæ causam esse intelligimus eatenus lætamur.

SCHOLIUM: But it can be objected that while we understand God to be the cause of all things, by that very fact we consider God the cause of sadness. But to this I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of sadness, to that extent (by proposition 3 of this Part) it ceases to be a passion, that is (by proposition 59 of Part III) to that extent it ceases to be sadness; and therefore, insofar as we understand God to be the cause of sadness, to that extent we rejoice.

PROPOSITIO XIX: Qui Deum amat, conari non potest ut Deus ipsum contra amet.

PROPOSITION 19: He who loves God cannot endeavor that God should love him in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo (per corollarium propositionis 17 hujus) ut Deus quem amat non esset Deus et consequenter (per propositionem 19 partis III) contristari cuperet, quod (per propositionem 28 partis III) est absurdum. Ergo qui Deum amat etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: If a man were to attempt this, he would desire (by the corollary of proposition 17 of this) that the God whom he loves should not be God, and consequently (by proposition 19 of Part 3) he would desire to be saddened, which (by proposition 28 of Part 3) is absurd. Therefore, he who loves God, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XX: Hic erga Deum amor neque invidiæ neque zelotypiæ affectu inquinari potest sed eo magis fovetur quo plures homines eodem amoris vinculo cum Deo junctos imaginamur.

PROPOSITION 20: This love toward God can be polluted by neither the affect of envy nor that of jealousy, but is all the more fostered the more men we imagine conjoined with God by the same bond of love.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hic erga Deum amor summum bonum est quod ex dictamine rationis appetere possumus (per propositionem 28 partis IV) et omnibus hominibus commune est (per propositionem 36 partis IV) et omnes ut eodem gaudeant cupimus (per propositionem 37 partis IV) atque adeo (per 23 affectuum definitionem) invidiæ affectu maculari nequit neque etiam (per propositionem 18 hujus et definitionem zelotypiæ, quam vide in scholio propositionis 35 partis III) zelotypiæ affectu sed contra (per propositionem 31 partis III) eo magis foveri debet quo plures homines eodem gaudere imaginamur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: This love toward God is the highest good which we can desire by the dictate of reason (by Proposition 28 of Part 4), and is common to all men (by Proposition 36 of Part 4), and we desire that all should rejoice in the same (by Proposition 37 of Part 4); and thus (by Definition 23 of the Affects) it cannot be stained by the affect of envy, nor even (by Proposition 18 of this Part and the definition of jealousy—zelotypy, which see in the Scholium to Proposition 35 of Part 3) by the affect of jealousy; but on the contrary (by Proposition 31 of Part 3) it ought to be fostered all the more, the more men we imagine to rejoice in the same. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Possumus hoc eodem modo ostendere nullum dari affectum qui huic amori directe sit contrarius, a quo hic ipse amor possit destrui atque adeo concludere possumus hunc erga Deum amorem omnium affectuum est constantissimum nec quatenus ad corpus refertur, posse destrui nisi cum ipso corpore. Cujus autem naturæ sit quatenus ad solam mentem refertur, postea videbimus. Atque his omnia affectuum remedia sive id omne quod mens in se sola considerata adversus affectus potest, comprehendi; ex quibus apparet mentis in affectus potentiam consistere Iƒ in ipsa affectuum cognitione (vide scholium propositionis 4 hujus). IIƒ in eo quod affectus a cogitatione causæ externæ quam confuse imaginamur, separat (vide propositionem 2 cum eodem scholio propositionis 4 hujus). IIIƒ in tempore quo affectiones quæ ad res quas intelligimus referuntur, illas superant quæ ad res referuntur quas confuse seu mutilate concipimus (vide propositionem 7 hujus). IVƒ in multitudine causarum a quibus affectiones quæ ad rerum communes proprietates vel ad Deum referuntur, foventur (vide propositiones 9 et 11 hujus). Vƒ denique in ordine quo mens suos affectus ordinare et invicem concatenare potest (vide scholium propositionis 10 et insuper propositiones 12, 13 et 14 hujus). Sed ut hæc mentis in affectus potentia melius intelligatur, venit apprime notandum quod affectus a nobis magni appellantur quando unius hominis affectum cum affectu alterius comparamus et unum magis quam alium eodem affectu conflictari videmus; vel quando unius ejusdemque hominis affectus ad invicem comparamus eundemque uno affectu magis quam alio affici sive moveri comperimus.

SCHOLIUM: We can show in this same way that no affect is given which is directly contrary to this love, by which this very love could be destroyed; and thus we can conclude that this love toward God is the most constant of all affects and, insofar as it is referred to the body, cannot be destroyed except with the body itself. Of what nature it is, insofar as it is referred to the mind alone, we shall see later. And in these are comprised all remedies of the affects, or everything that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against the affects; from which it appears that the mind’s power over the affects consists Iƒ in the very cognition of the affects (see the scholium of proposition 4 of this part). IIƒ in this, that it separates the affects from the thought of an external cause which we imagine confusedly (see proposition 2 together with the same scholium of proposition 4 of this part). IIIƒ in the fact that, in time, the affections which are referred to the things that we understand surpass those which are referred to things that we conceive confusedly or mutilatedly (see proposition 7 of this part). IVƒ in the multitude of causes by which the affections that are referred to the common properties of things or to God are fostered (see propositions 9 and 11 of this part). Vƒ finally in the order in which the mind can order its affects and concatenate them with one another (see the scholium of proposition 10 and moreover propositions 12, 13, and 14 of this part). But that this power of the mind over the affects may be better understood, it is especially to be noted that affects are called great by us when we compare one man’s affect with another’s and see that the one is more than the other conflicted by the same affect; or when we compare the affects of one and the same man with one another and find that he is affected or moved more by one affect than by another.

Nam (per propositionem 5 partis IV) vis cujuscunque affectus definitur potentia causæ externæ cum nostra comparata. At mentis potentia sola cognitione definitur; impotentia autem seu passio a sola cognitionis privatione hoc est ab eo per quod ideæ dicuntur inadæquatæ, æstimatur; ex quo sequitur mentem illam maxime pati cujus maximam partem ideæ inadæquatæ constituunt ita ut magis per id quod patitur quam per id quod agit dignoscatur et illam contra maxime agere cujus maximam partem ideæ adæquatæ constituunt ita ut quamvis huic tot inadæquatæ ideæ quam illi insint, magis tamen per illas quæ humanæ virtuti tribuuntur quam per has quæ humanam impotentiam arguunt, dignoscatur. Deinde notandum animi ægritudines et infortunia potissimum originem trahere ex nimio amore erga rem quæ multis variationibus est obnoxia et cujus nunquam compotes esse possumus.

For (by Proposition 5 of Part 4) the force of any affect is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the mind’s power is defined solely by cognition; impotence, however, or passion, is estimated from the privation of cognition alone, that is, from that whereby ideas are called inadequate; whence it follows that that mind suffers most whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas, so that it is recognized more by what it undergoes than by what it does; and, on the contrary, that mind acts most whose greatest part is constituted by adequate ideas, so that, although as many inadequate ideas inhere in this as in that, yet it is recognized more by those which are attributed to human virtue than by those which argue human impotence. Next it must be noted that sicknesses of soul and misfortunes draw their origin especially from an excessive love toward a thing which is subject to many variations and of which we can never be in full possession.

Nam nemo de re ulla nisi quam amat sollicitus anxiusve est neque injuriæ, suspiciones, inimicitiæ etc. oriuntur nisi ex amore erga res quarum nemo potest revera esse compos. Ex his itaque facile concipimus quid clara et distincta cognitio et præcipue tertium illud cognitionis genus (de quo vide scholium propositionis 47 partis II) cujus fundamentum est ipsa Dei cognitio, in affectus potest quos nempe quatenus passiones sunt, si non absolute tollit (vide propositionem 3 cum scholio propositionis 4 hujus) saltem efficit ut minimam mentis partem constituant (vide propositionem 14 hujus). Deinde amorem gignit erga rem immutabilem et æternam (vide propositionem 15 hujus) et cujus revera sumus compotes (vide propositionem 45 partis II) et qui propterea nullis vitiis quæ in communi amore insunt, inquinari sed semper major ac major esse potest (per propositionem 15 hujus) et mentis maximam partem occupare (per propositionem 16 hujus) lateque afficere.

For no one is solicitous or anxious about any thing except what he loves, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc., arise except from love toward things of which no one can in truth be in full possession. From these, therefore, we easily conceive what clear and distinct cognition, and especially that third kind of cognition (on which see the scholium of proposition 47 of part 2), whose foundation is the cognition of God himself, can do in regard to the affects, namely insofar as they are passions: if it does not absolutely remove them (see proposition 3 with the scholium of proposition 4 of this), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind (see proposition 14 of this). Then it engenders love toward an immutable and eternal thing (see proposition 15 of this), and of which we are truly in possession (see proposition 45 of part 2), and which therefore can be stained by none of the vices that are in common love, but can always be greater and greater (by proposition 15 of this), and occupy the greatest part of the mind (by proposition 16 of this) and affect it broadly.

Atque his omnia quæ præsentem hanc vitam spectant, absolvi. Nam quod in hujus scholii principio dixi me his paucis omnia affectuum remedia amplexum esse, facile poterit unusquisque videre qui ad hæc quæ in hoc scholio diximus et simul ad mentis ejusque affectuum definitiones et denique ad propositiones 1 et 3 partis III attenderit. Tempus igitur jam est ut ad illa transeam quæ ad mentis durationem sine relatione ad corpus pertinent.

And with these I have completed everything that concerns this present life. For what I said at the beginning of this scholium—that with these few points I had embraced all the remedies of the affects—anyone will easily be able to see who attends to the things we have said in this scholium, and at the same time to the definitions of the mind and its affects, and finally to propositions 1 and 3 of part 3. The time, therefore, is now that I pass on to those matters which pertain to the mind’s duration without relation to the body.

PROPOSITIO XXI: Mens nihil imaginari potest neque rerum præteritarum recordari nisi durante corpore.

PROPOSITION 21: The mind can imagine nothing, nor recall things past, except while the body endures.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens actualem sui corporis existentiam non exprimit neque etiam corporis affectiones ut actuales concipit nisi durante corpore (per corollarium propositionis 8 partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 26 partis II) nullum corpus ut actu existens concipit nisi durante suo corpore ac proinde nihil imaginari (vide imaginationis definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II) neque rerum præteritarum recordari potest nisi durante corpore (vide definitionem memoriæ in scholio propositionis 18 partis II). Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The Mind does not express the actual existence of its own body, nor even conceive the body’s affections as actual, except while the body endures (by the corollary to proposition 8 of part 2), and consequently (by proposition 26 of part 2) it conceives no body as actually existing except while its own body endures, and hence it can imagine nothing (see the definition of imagination in the scholium to proposition 17 of part 2) nor recall things past except while the body endures (see the definition of memory in the scholium to proposition 18 of part 2). Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXII: In Deo tamen datur necessario idea quæ hujus et illius corporis humani essentiam sub æternitatis specie exprimit.

PROPOSITION 22: In God, however, there is necessarily given an idea which expresses the essence of this and of that human body under the species of eternity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Deus non tantum est causa hujus et illius corporis humani existentiæ sed etiam essentiæ (per propositionem 25 partis I) quæ propterea per ipsam Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi (per axioma 4 partis I) idque æterna quadam necessitate (per propositionem 16 partis I) qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet (per propositionem 3 partis II). Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: God is not only the cause of the existence of this and that human body but also of the essence (by proposition 25 of part 1), which therefore must necessarily be conceived through God’s very essence (by axiom 4 of part 1), and that with a certain eternal necessity (by proposition 16 of part 1); and this concept indeed must necessarily be given in God (by proposition 3 of part 2). Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXIII: Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui sed ejus aliquid remanet quod æternum est.

PROPOSITION 23: The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.

DEMONSTRATIO: In Deo datur necessario conceptus seu idea quæ corporis humani essentiam exprimit (per propositionem præcedentem) quæ propterea aliquid necessario est quod ad essentiam mentis humanæ pertinet (per propositionem 13 partis II). Sed menti humanæ nullam durationem quæ tempore definiri potest, tribuimus nisi quatenus corporis actualem existentiam quæ per durationem explicatur et tempore definiri potest, exprimit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 8 partis II) ipsi durationem non tribuimus nisi durante corpore. Cum tamen aliquid nihilominus sit id quod æterna quadam necessitate per ipsam Dei essentiam concipitur (per propositionem præcedentem) erit necessario hoc aliquid quod ad mentis essentiam pertinet, æternum. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: In God there is necessarily given a concept or idea which expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding proposition), which therefore is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by proposition 13 of part 2). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explicated through duration and can be defined by time; that is (by the corollary of proposition 8 of part 2), we attribute duration to it only while the body endures. Since nevertheless there is, notwithstanding, something which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (by the preceding proposition), this something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Est uti diximus hæc idea quæ corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis exprimit, certus cogitandi modus qui ad mentis essentiam pertinet quique necessario æternus est. Nec tamen fieri potest ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari nec æternitas tempore definiri nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest. At nihilominus sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse.

SCHOLIUM: This idea, which expresses the body’s essence under the species of eternity, as we have said, is a certain mode of thinking which pertains to the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal. Nor, however, can it come about that we remember ourselves to have existed before the body, since neither in the body can any traces of it be found, nor can eternity be defined by time, nor have any relation to time. But nonetheless we feel and experience that we are eternal.

Nam mens non minus res illas sentit quas intelligendo concipit quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi quibus res videt observatque, sunt ipsæ demonstrationes. Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen mentem nostram quatenus corporis essentiam sub æternitatis specie involvit, æternam esse et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri sive per durationem explicari non posse.

For the mind no less perceives those things which it conceives by understanding than those which it holds in memory. For the eyes of the mind, with which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves. Although therefore we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, insofar as it envelops the essence of the body under the aspect of eternity, is eternal, and that this its existence cannot be defined by time or explained through duration.

Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare ejusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest quatenus actualem corporis existentiam involvit et eatenus tantum potentiam habet rerum existentiam tempore determinandi easque sub duratione concipiendi.

Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure only to that extent, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body; and only to that extent does it have the power of determining the existence of things in time and of conceiving them under duration.

PROPOSITIO XXIV: Quo magis res singulares intelligimus eo magis Deum intelligimus.

PROPOSITION 24: The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex corollario propositionis 25 partis I.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident from the corollary of proposition 25 of part 1.

PROPOSITIO XXV: Summus mentis conatus summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.

PROPOSITION 25: The highest endeavor of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third genus of cognition.

DEMONSTRATIO: Tertium cognitionis genus procedit ab adæquata idea quorundam Dei attributorum ad adæquatam cognitionem essentiæ rerum (vide hujus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II) et quo magis hoc modo res intelligimus eo magis (per propositionem præcedentem) Deum intelligimus ac proinde (per propositionem 28 partis IV) summa mentis virtus hoc est (per definitionem 8 partis IV) mentis potentia seu natura sive (per propositionem 7 partis III) summus conatus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: The third kind of cognition proceeds from the adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the essence of things (see its definition in the second scholium of proposition 40 of part 2), and the more we understand things in this way, the more (by the preceding proposition) we understand God; and accordingly (by proposition 28 of part 4) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (by definition 8 of part 4) the mind’s power or nature, or (by proposition 7 of part 3) the highest endeavor, is to understand things by the third kind of cognition. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVI: Quo mens aptior est ad res tertio cognitionis genere intelligendum, eo magis cupit res eodem hoc cognitionis genere intelligere.

PROPOSITION 26: The more the mind is apt to understand things by the third kind of cognition, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of cognition.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam quatenus concipimus mentem aptam esse ad res hoc cognitionis genere intelligendum eatenus eandem determinatam concipimus ad res eodem cognitionis genere intelligendum et consequenter (per 1 affectuum definitionem) quo mens ad hoc aptior est, eo magis hoc cupit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: It is evident. For insofar as we conceive the mind to be apt to understand things by this kind of cognition, so far we conceive that same mind to be determined to understand things by the same kind of cognition, and consequently (by Definition 1 of the Affects) the more the mind is apt for this, the more it desires this. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVII: Ex hoc tertio cognitionis genere summa quæ dari potest mentis acquiescentia, oritur.

PROPOSITION 27: From this third kind of cognition there arises the highest acquiescence of mind which can be given.

DEMONSTRATIO: Summa mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere (per propositionem 28 partis IV) sive res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere (per propositionem 25 hujus); quæ quidem virtus eo major est quo mens hoc cognitionis genere magis res cognoscit (per propositionem 24 hujus) adeoque qui res hoc cognitionis genere cognoscit, is ad summam humanam perfectionem transit et consequenter (per 2 affectuum definitionem) summa lætitia afficitur idque (per propositionem 43 partis II) concomitante idea sui suæque virtutis ac proinde (per 25 affectuum definitionem) ex hoc cognitionis genere summa quæ dari potest oritur acquiescentia. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The highest virtue of the mind is to cognize God (by proposition 28 of part 4), that is, to understand things by the third kind of cognition (by proposition 25 of this); and indeed this virtue is the greater, the more the mind by this kind of cognition cognizes things (by proposition 24 of this), and so he who cognizes things by this kind of cognition passes over to the highest human perfection, and consequently (by definition 2 of the affects) is affected with the highest joy, and this (by proposition 43 of part 2) with the concomitant idea of himself and of his virtue, and hence (by definition 25 of the affects) from this kind of cognition there arises the highest acquiescence that can be given. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXVIII: Conatus seu cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere oriri non potest ex primo, at quidem ex secundo cognitionis genere.

PROPOSITION 28: The endeavor or cupidity of knowing things by the third kind of cognition cannot arise from the first, but indeed from the second kind of cognition.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio per se patet. Nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per aliud quod per se concipitur, intelligimus hoc est ideæ quæ in nobis claræ et distinctæ sunt sive quæ ad tertium cognitionis genus referuntur (vide II scholium propositionis 40 partis II) non possunt sequi ex ideis mutilatis et confusis quæ (per idem scholium) ad primum cognitionis genus referuntur sed ex ideis adæquatis sive (per idem scholium) ex secundo et tertio cognitionis genere ac proinde (per 1 affectuum definitionem) cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere non potest oriri ex primo, at quidem ex secundo. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, that we understand either through itself or through another which is conceived through itself; that is, the ideas which in us are clear and distinct, or which are referred to the third kind of cognition (see Scholium 2 of Proposition 40 of Part 2), cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas which (by the same Scholium) are referred to the first kind of cognition, but from adequate ideas, that is (by the same Scholium), from the second and third kind of cognition; and accordingly (by the 1st definition of the affects) the desire of knowing things by the third kind of cognition cannot arise from the first, but indeed from the second. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXIX: Quicquid mens sub specie æternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit quod corporis præsentem actualem existentiam concipit sed ex eo quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie æternitatis.

PROPOSITION 29: Whatever the mind understands under the aspect of eternity, it does not understand it from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under the aspect of eternity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus mens præsentem sui corporis existentiam concipit eatenus durationem concipit quæ tempore determinari potest et eatenus tantum potentiam habet concipiendi res cum relatione ad tempus (per propositionem 21 hujus et propositionem 26 partis II). At æternitas per durationem explicari nequit (per definitionem 8 partis I et ipsius explicationem). Ergo mens eatenus potestatem non habet concipiendi res sub specie æternitatis sed quia de natura rationis est res sub specie æternitatis concipere (per II corollarium propositionis 44 partis II) et ad mentis naturam etiam pertinet corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis concipere (per propositionem 23 hujus) et præter hæc duo nihil aliud ad mentis essentiam pertinet (per propositionem 13 partis II) ergo hæc potentia concipiendi res sub specie æternitatis ad mentem non pertinet nisi quatenus corporis essentiam sub specie æternitatis concipit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATIO: Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, to that extent it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and only to that extent does it have the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by proposition 21 of this [part] and proposition 26 of part 2). But eternity cannot be explained through duration (by definition 8 of part 1 and its explanation). Therefore the mind, to that extent, does not have the power of conceiving things under the aspect of eternity; but since it belongs to the nature of reason to conceive things under the aspect of eternity (by corollary 2 of proposition 44 of part 2) and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the body’s essence under the aspect of eternity (by proposition 23 of this [part]) and, besides these two, nothing else pertains to the essence of the mind (by proposition 13 of part 2), therefore this power of conceiving things under the aspect of eternity does not belong to the mind except insofar as it conceives the body’s essence under the aspect of eternity. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Res duobus modis a nobis ut actuales concipiuntur vel quatenus easdem cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum existere vel quatenus ipsas in Deo contineri et ex naturæ divinæ necessitate consequi concipimus. Quæ autem hoc secundo modo ut veræ seu reales concipiuntur, eas sub æternitatis specie concipimus et earum ideæ æternam et infinitam Dei essentiam involvunt, ut propositione 45 partis II ostendimus, cujus etiam scholium vide.

SCHOLIUM: Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive the same to exist with relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things which in this second way are conceived as true or real, we conceive under the species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we have shown in Proposition 45 of Part II; see also its Scholium.

PROPOSITIO XXX: Mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub æternitatis specie cognoscit eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet scitque se in Deo esse et per Deum concipi.

PROPOSITION 30: Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under the species of eternity, to that extent necessarily has a cognition of God and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

DEMONSTRATIO: æternitas est ipsa Dei essentia quatenus hæc necessariam involvit existentiam (per definitionem 8 partis I). Res igitur sub specie æternitatis concipere est res concipere quatenus per Dei essentiam ut entia realia concipiuntur sive quatenus per Dei essentiam involvunt existentiam adeoque mens nostra quatenus se et corpus sub specie æternitatis concipit eatenus Dei cognitionem necessario habet scitque etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: eternity is the very essence of God, insofar as this involves necessary existence (by definition 8 of part 1). Therefore to conceive things under the aspect of eternity is to conceive things insofar as through God’s essence they are conceived as real entities, or insofar as through God’s essence they involve existence; and so our mind, insofar as it conceives itself and the body under the aspect of eternity, to that extent necessarily has a cognition of God and knows, etc. Q.E.D.

PROPOSITIO XXXI: Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a mente tanquam a formali causa quatenus mens ipsa æterna est.

PROPOSITION 31: The third genus of cognition depends upon the mind as upon a formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens nihil sub æternitatis specie concipit nisi quatenus sui corporis essentiam sub æternitatis specie concipit (per propositionem 29 hujus) hoc est (per propositiones 21 et 23 hujus) nisi quatenus æterna est adeoque (per propositionem præcedentem) quatenus æterna est, Dei habet cognitionem, quæ quidem cognitio est necessario adæquata (per propositionem 46 partis II) ac proinde mens quatenus æterna est, ad illa omnia cognoscendum est apta quæ ex data hac Dei cognitione consequi possunt (per propositionem 40 partis II) hoc est ad res tertio cognitionis genere cognoscendum (vide hujus definitionem in II scholio propositionis 40 partis II) cujus propterea mens (per definitionem 1 partis III) quatenus æterna est, causa est adæquata seu formalis. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The mind conceives nothing under the aspect of eternity except insofar as it conceives the essence of its body under the aspect of eternity (by proposition 29 of this Part), that is (by propositions 21 and 23 of this Part), except insofar as it is eternal; and thus (by the preceding proposition), insofar as it is eternal, it has knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (by proposition 46 of part 2), and therefore the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is apt for knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God (by proposition 40 of part 2), that is, for knowing things by the third kind of cognition (see its definition in the second scholium of proposition 40 of part 2), of which therefore the mind (by definition 1 of part 3), insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quo igitur unusquisque hoc cognitionis genere plus pollet, eo melius sui et Dei conscius est hoc est eo est perfectior et beatior, quod adhuc clarius ex sequentibus patebit. Sed hic notandum quod tametsi jam certi sumus mentem æternam esse quatenus res sub æternitatis specie concipit, nos tamen, ut ea quæ ostendere volumus facilius explicentur et melius intelligantur, ipsam tanquam jam inciperet esse et res sub æternitatis specie intelligere jam inciperet, considerabimus, ut huc usque fecimus; quod nobis absque ullo erroris periculo facere licet modo nobis cautio sit nihil concludere nisi ex perspicuis præmissis.

SCHOLIUM: Therefore, the more each person prevails in this genus of cognition, the more conscious he is of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and more blessed he is—a thing which will appear still more clearly from what follows. But it should here be noted that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things under the aspect of eternity, nevertheless, in order that the things we wish to show may be more easily explained and better understood, we shall consider the mind as though it were now beginning to be and were now beginning to understand things under the aspect of eternity, as we have done up to this point; which it is permitted for us to do without any danger of error, provided only that we are cautious to conclude nothing except from perspicuous premises.

PROPOSITIO XXXII: Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur et quidem concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa.

PROPOSITION 32: Whatever we understand by the third kind of cognition, by that we are delighted, and indeed with the accompanying idea of God as cause.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex hoc cognitionis genere summa quæ dari potest mentis acquiescentia (per propositionem 27 hujus) hoc est (per 25 affectuum definitionem) lætitia oritur eaque concomitante idea sui et consequenter (per propositionem 30 hujus) concomitante etiam idea Dei tanquam causa. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: From this genus of cognition there arises the highest acquiescence of mind that can be given (by proposition 27 of this), that is (by the 25th definition of the affects) joy, and this with a concomitant idea of self, and consequently (by proposition 30 of this) also with a concomitant idea of God as cause. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur necessario amor Dei intellectualis. Nam ex hoc cognitionis genere oritur (per propositionem præcedentem) lætitia concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa hoc est (per 6 affectuum definitionem) amor Dei non quatenus ipsum ut præsentem imaginamur (per propositionem 29 hujus) sed quatenus Deum æternum esse intelligimus et hoc est quod amorem Dei intellectualem voco.

COROLLARY: From the third kind of cognition there necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of cognition there arises (by the preceding proposition) joy with the concomitant idea of God as cause; that is (by the 6th definition of the affects) love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by proposition 29 of this), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal; and this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

PROPOSITIO XXXIII: Amor Dei intellectualis qui ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur, est æternus.

PROPOSITION 33: The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of cognition, is eternal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Tertium enim cognitionis genus (per propositionem 31 hujus et axioma 3 partis I) est æternum adeoque (per idem axioma partis I) amor qui ex eodem oritur, est etiam necessario æternus. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: For the third kind of cognition (by proposition 31 of this and axiom 3 of part 1) is eternal, and so (by the same axiom of part 1) the love which arises from the same is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quamvis hic erga Deum amor principium non habuerit (per propositionem præcedentem) habet tamen omnes amoris perfectiones perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in corollario propositionis præcedentis finximus. Nec ulla hic est differentia nisi quod mens easdem has perfectiones quas eidem jam accedere finximus æternas habuerit idque concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa æterna. Quod si lætitia in transitione ad majorem perfectionem consistit, beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet quod mens ipsa perfectione sit prædita.

SCHOLIUM: Although this love toward God has not had a beginning (by the preceding proposition), nevertheless it has all the perfections of love just as if it had arisen, as we have feigned in the corollary of the preceding proposition. Nor is there any difference here, except that the mind has these same perfections—which we have already supposed to accrue to it—as eternal, and this with the concomitant idea of God as an eternal cause. But if joy consists in a transition to a greater perfection, beatitude surely ought to consist in this: that the mind itself is endowed with perfection.

PROPOSITIO XXXIV: Mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus qui ad passiones referuntur.

PROPOSITION 34: The Mind is subject to the affects that are referred to the passions only while the body endures.

DEMONSTRATIO: Imaginatio est idea qua mens rem aliquam ut præsentem contemplatur (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 17 partis II) quæ tamen magis corporis humani præsentem constitutionem quam rei externæ naturam indicat (per II corollarium propositionis 16 partis II). Est igitur affectus (per generalem affectuum definitionem) imaginatio quatenus corporis præsentem constitutionem indicat atque adeo (per propositionem 21 hujus) mens non nisi durante corpore obnoxia est affectibus qui ad passiones referuntur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Imagination is the idea by which the mind contemplates some thing as present (see its definition in the scholium on proposition 17 of part 2), which nevertheless indicates rather the present constitution of the human body than the nature of the external thing (by the corollary of proposition 16 of part 2). Therefore imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body, is an affect (by the general definition of affects), and thus (by proposition 21 of this part) the mind is subject to affects which are referred to passions only while the body endures. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur nullum amorem præter amorem intellectualem esse æternum.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that no love, except intellectual love, is eternal.

SCHOLIUM: Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus eos suæ mentis æternitatis esse quidem conscios sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere eamque imaginationi seu memoriæ tribuere quam post mortem remanere credunt.

SCHOLIUM: If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they themselves confound the same with duration, and attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe remains after death.

PROPOSITIO XXXV: Deus se ipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat.

PROPOSITION 35: God loves himself with infinite intellectual love.

DEMONSTRATIO: Deus est absolute infinitus (per definitionem 6 partis I) hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis II) Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione idque (per propositionem 3 partis II) concomitante idea sui hoc est (per propositionem 11 et definitionem 1 partis I) idea suæ causæ et hoc est quod in corollario propositionis 32 hujus amorem intellectualem esse diximus.

DEMONSTRATION: God is absolutely infinite (by definition 6 of part 1), that is (by definition 6 of part 2) the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection, and this (by proposition 3 of part 2) with a concomitant idea of himself, that is (by proposition 11 and definition 1 of part 1) an idea of his cause; and this is what, in the corollary of proposition 32, we said to be the intellectual love of God.

PROPOSITIO XXXVI: Mentis amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei amor quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus per essentiam humanæ mentis sub specie æternitatis consideratam explicari potest hoc est mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris quo Deus se ipsum amat.

PROPOSITION 36: The mind’s intellectual love toward God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as it can be explicated through the essence of the human mind considered under the aspect of eternity; that is, the mind’s intellectual love toward God is a part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hic mentis amor ad mentis actiones referri debet (per corollarium propositionis 32 hujus et per propositionem 3 partis III) qui proinde actio est qua mens se ipsam contemplatur concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa (per propositionem 32 hujus et ejus corollarium) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I et corollarium propositionis 11 partis II) actio qua Deus quatenus per mentem humanam explicari potest, seipsum contemplatur concomitante idea sui atque adeo (per propositionem præcedentem) hic mentis amor pars est infiniti amoris quo Deus seipsum amat. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: This love of the mind must be referred to the actions of the mind (by the corollary of proposition 32 of this and by proposition 3 of part 3), which accordingly is the action by which the mind contemplates itself, with the concomitant idea of God as cause (by proposition 32 of this and its corollary), that is (by the corollary of proposition 25 of part 1 and the corollary of proposition 11 of part 2) the action by which God, insofar as he can be explicated through the human mind, contemplates himself, with the concomitant idea of himself; and thus (by the preceding proposition) this love of the mind is a part of the infinite love by which God loves himself. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod Deus quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat et consequenter quod amor Dei erga homines et mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis unum et idem sit.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves human beings, and consequently that God’s love toward human beings and the mind’s intellectual love toward God are one and the same.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his clare intelligimus qua in re nostra salus seu beatitudo seu libertas consistit nempe in constanti et æterno erga Deum amore sive in amore Dei erga homines. Atque hic amor seu beatitudo in sacris codicibus gloria appellatur nec immerito. Nam sive hic amor ad Deum referatur sive ad mentem, recte animi acquiescentia quæ revera a gloria (per 25 et 30 affectuum definitiones) non distinguitur, appellari potest.

SCHOLIUM: From these things we clearly understand wherein our salvation or beatitude or liberty consists, namely in a constant and eternal love toward God, or in the love of God toward human beings. And this love, or beatitude, in the sacred codices is called glory, nor undeservedly. For whether this love is referred to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called the acquiescence of the spirit, which in truth is not distinguished from glory (by the 25 and 30 definitions of the affects).

Nam quatenus ad Deum refertur, est (per propositionem 35 hujus) lætitia, liceat hoc adhuc vocabulo uti, concomitante idea sui ut et quatenus ad mentem refertur (per propositionem 27 hujus). Deinde quia nostræ mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit cujus principium et fundamentum Deus est (per propositionem 15 partis I et scholium propositionis 47 partis II) hinc perspicuum nobis fit quomodo et qua ratione mens nostra secundum essentiam et existentiam ex natura divina sequatur et continuo a Deo pendeat; quod hic notare operæ pretium duxi ut hoc exemplo ostenderem quantum rerum singularium cognitio quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi (vide II scholium propositionis 40 partis II) polleat potiorque sit cognitione universali quam secundi generis esse dixi. Nam quamvis in prima parte generaliter ostenderim omnia (et consequenter mentem etiam humanam) a Deo secundum essentiam et existentiam pendere, illa tamen demonstratio tametsi legitima sit et extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ita tamen mentem nostram afficit quam quando id ipsum ex ipsa essentia rei cujuscunque singularis quam a Deo pendere dicimus, concluditur.

For insofar as it is referred to God, it is (by proposition 35 of this) joy—let it be permitted still to use this term—accompanied by the idea of itself; and insofar as it is referred to the mind (by proposition 27 of this). Then, since the essence of our mind consists in sole cognition, whose beginning and foundation God is (by proposition 15 of part 1 and the scholium to proposition 47 of part 2), hence it becomes clear to us how and for what reason our mind, according to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and continually depends upon God; which I have deemed worth the effort to note here, so that by this example I might show how much the cognition of singular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (see the scholium to proposition 40 of part 2), prevails and is superior to the universal cognition which I have said is of the second kind. For although in the first part I have generally shown that all things (and consequently even the human mind) depend upon God according to essence and existence, nevertheless that demonstration, although legitimate and set beyond the hazard of doubt, does not affect our mind so much as when that very thing is concluded from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends upon God.

PROPOSITIO XXXVII: Nihil in natura datur quod huic amori intellectuali sit contrarium sive quod ipsum possit tollere.

PROPOSITION 37: Nothing in nature is given which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which could abolish it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hic intellectualis amor ex mentis natura necessario sequitur quatenus ipsa ut æterna veritas per Dei naturam consideratur (per propositiones 33 et 29 hujus). Si quid ergo daretur quod huic amori esset contrarium, id contrarium esset vero et consequenter id quod hunc amorem posset tollere, efficeret ut id quod verum est, falsum esset, quod (ut per se notum) est absurdum. Ergo nihil in natura datur etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in so far as the mind itself is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (by propositions 33 and 29 of this). If, then, anything were given that was contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; and consequently that which could remove this love would bring it about that what is true would be false, which (as self-evident) is absurd. Therefore nothing is given in nature, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Partis quartæ axioma res singulares respicit quatenus cum relatione ad certum tempus et locum considerantur, de quo neminem dubitare credo.

SCHOLIUM: The axiom of Part Four regards singular things, insofar as they are considered with relation to a certain time and place, about which I believe no one doubts.

PROPOSITIO XXXVIII: Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet.

PROPOSITION 38: The more things the mind understands by the second and third kind of cognition, the less it itself suffers from affects that are evil, and the less it fears death.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia in cognitione consistit (per propositionem 11 partis II); quo igitur mens plures res cognoscit secundo et tertio cognitionis genere, eo major ejus pars remanet (per propositiones 23 et 29 hujus) et consequenter (per propositionem præcedentem) eo major ejus pars non tangitur ab affectibus qui nostræ naturæ sunt contrarii hoc est (per propositionem 30 partis IV) qui mali sunt. Quo itaque mens plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere intelligit, eo major ejus pars illæsa manet et consequenter minus ab affectibus patitur etc. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The essence of the mind consists in cognition (by Proposition 11 of Part 2); therefore, the more the mind knows things by the second and third kind of cognition, the greater a part of it remains (by Propositions 23 and 29 of this Part) and consequently (by the preceding Proposition) the greater a part of it is not touched by affects which are contrary to our nature, that is (by Proposition 30 of Part 4) which are bad. Therefore, the more the mind understands things by the second and third kind of cognition, the greater a part of it remains unharmed and, consequently, it suffers less from the affects, etc. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus id quod in scholio propositionis 39 partis IV attigi et quod in hac parte explicare promisi nempe quod mors eo minus est noxia quo mentis clara et distincta cognitio major est et consequenter quo mens magis Deum amat. Deinde quia (per propositionem 27 hujus) ex tertio cognitionis genere summa quæ dari potest oritur acquiescentia, hinc sequitur mentem humanam posse ejus naturæ esse ut id quod ejus cum corpore perire ostendimus (vide propositionem 21 hujus) in respectu ad id quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti. Sed de his mox prolixius.

SCHOLIUM: From this we understand that which in the scholium to proposition 39 of part 4 I touched upon, and which in this part I promised to explain, namely that death is the less noxious the greater the mind’s clear and distinct cognition is, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Then, since (by proposition 27 of this) from the third kind of cognition there arises the highest acquiescence that can be given, hence it follows that the human mind can be of such a nature that that which we have shown of it to perish along with the body (see proposition 21 of this), in respect to that which of it remains, is of no moment. But of these things more at length soon.

PROPOSITIO XXXIX: Qui corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is mentem habet cujus maxima pars est æterna.

PROPOSITION 39: He who has a body adapted to very many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui corpus ad plurima agendum aptum habet, is minime affectibus qui mali sunt, conflictatur (per propositionem 38 partis IV) hoc est (per propositionem 30 partis IV) affectibus qui naturæ nostræ sunt contrarii atque adeo (per propositionem 10 hujus) potestatem habet ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum et consequenter efficiendi (per propositionem 14 hujus) ut omnes corporis affectiones ad Dei ideam referantur, ex quo fiet (per propositionem 15 hujus) ut erga Deum afficiatur amore qui (per propositionem 16 hujus) mentis maximam partem occupare sive constituere debet ac proinde (per propositionem 33 hujus) mentem habet cujus maxima pars est æterna. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: He who has a body apt for doing very many things is least assailed by affects which are evil (by proposition 38 of part 4), that is (by proposition 30 of part 4), by affects which are contrary to our nature; and thus (by proposition 10 of this) he has the power of ordering and concatenating the body’s affections according to an order to the intellect, and consequently of bringing it about (by proposition 14 of this) that all the body’s affections are referred to the idea of God, whence it will follow (by proposition 15 of this) that he is affected toward God with love, which (by proposition 16 of this) ought to occupy or constitute the greatest part of the mind; and therefore (by proposition 33 of this) he has a mind the greatest part of which is eternal. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Quia corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est quin ejus naturæ possint esse ut ad mentes referantur quæ magnam sui et Dei habeant cognitionem et quarum maxima seu præcipua pars est æterna atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant. Sed ut hæc clarius intelligantur, animadvertendum hic est quod nos in continua vivimus variatione et prout in melius sive in pejus mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimur. Qui enim ex infante vel puero in cadaver transiit, infelix dicitur et contra id felicitati tribuitur, quod totum vitæ spatium mente sana in corpore sano percurrere potuerimus.

SCHOLIUM: Because human bodies are apt for very many things, it is not doubtful that they can be of such a nature as to be referred to minds which have great cognition of themselves and of God, and of which the greatest or principal part is eternal, and thus scarcely fear death. But that these things may be understood more clearly, it is to be noted here that we live in continual variation, and inasmuch as we are changed for the better or for the worse, by so much are we called happy or unhappy. For he who has passed from an infant or a boy into a corpse is called unhappy; and conversely, that is attributed to happiness, that we have been able to run through the whole span of life with a sound mind in a sound body.

Et revera qui corpus habet ut infans vel puer ad paucissima aptum et maxime pendens a causis externis, mentem habet quæ in se sola considerata nihil fere sui nec Dei nec rerum sit conscia et contra qui corpus habet ad plurima aptum, mentem habet quæ in se sola considerata multum sui et Dei et rerum sit conscia. In hac vita igitur apprime conamur ut corpus infantiæ in aliud quantum ejus natura patitur eique conducit, mutetur quod ad plurima aptum sit quodque ad mentem referatur quæ sui et Dei et rerum plurimum sit conscia atque ita ut id omne quod ad ipsius memoriam vel imaginationem refertur, in respectu ad intellectum vix alicujus sit momenti, ut in scholio propositionis præcedentis jam dixi.

And in truth, he who has a body like an infant or a boy, apt for very few things and most dependent on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself nor of God nor of things; and on the contrary, he who has a body apt for very many things has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is much conscious of itself and of God and of things. In this life, therefore, we especially strive that the body of infancy be changed into another, so far as its nature allows and as is conducive to it, one which is apt for very many things and is referred to a mind which is most of all conscious of itself and of God and of things, and thus that all that which is referred to its memory or imagination, in respect to the intellect, be of scarcely any moment, as I have already said in the scholium of the preceding proposition.

PROPOSITIO XL: Quo unaquæque res plus perfectionis habet, eo magis agit et minus patitur et contra quo magis agit, eo perfectior est.

PROPOSITION 40: The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it suffers; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo unaquæque res perfectior est, eo plus habet realitatis (per definitionem 6 partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 3 partis III cum ejus scholio) eo magis agit et minus patitur; quæ quidem demonstratio inverso ordine eodem modo procedit, ex quo sequitur ut res contra eo sit perfectior quo magis agit. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: The more perfect each thing is, the more reality it has (by definition 6 of part 2), and consequently (by proposition 3 of part 3 together with its scholium) the more it acts and the less it suffers; and indeed the demonstration proceeds in the same way in the inverse order, whence it follows that conversely a thing is the more perfect the more it acts. Q.E.D.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur partem mentis quæ remanet quantacunque ea sit, perfectiorem esse reliqua. Nam pars mentis æterna (per propositiones 23 et 29 hujus) est intellectus per quem solum nos agere dicimur (per propositionem 3 partis III); illa autem quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (per propositionem 21 hujus) per quam solam dicimur pati (per propositionem 3 partis III et generalem affectuum definitionem) atque adeo (per propositionem præcedentem) illa quantacunque ea sit, hac est perfectior. Q.E.D.

COROLLARY: Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, whatever it be, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (by Propositions 23 and 29 of this) is the intellect, by which alone we are said to act (by Proposition 3 of Part 3); but that which we have shown to perish is imagination itself (by Proposition 21 of this), by which alone we are said to suffer/be passive (by Proposition 3 of Part 3 and the general definition of the affects), and therefore (by the preceding Proposition) that, whatever it be, is more perfect than this. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc sunt quæ de mente quatenus sine relatione ad corporis existentiam consideratur, ostendere constitueram; ex quibus et simul ex propositione 21 partis I et aliis apparet quod mens nostra quatenus intelligit æternus cogitandi modus sit qui alio cogitandi modo determinatur et hic iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum ita ut omnes simul Dei æternum et infinitum intellectum constituant.

SCHOLIUM: These are the things which I had resolved to show concerning the mind, insofar as it is considered without relation to the existence of the body; from which, and at the same time from proposition 21 of part 1 and others, it appears that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking which is determined by another mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on to infinity, so that all together they constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect.

PROPOSITIO XLI: Quamvis nesciremus mentem nostram æternam esse, pietatem tamen et religionem et absolute omnia quæ ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus in quarta parte, prima haberemus.

PROPOSITION 41: Although we did not know that our mind is eternal, nevertheless we would hold piety and religion, and absolutely all the things which we have shown in Part Four to be referred to courage and generosity, in the first place.

DEMONSTRATIO: Primum et unicum virtutis seu recte vivendi rationis fundamentum (per corollarium propositionis 22 et per propositionem 24 partis IV) est suum utile quærere. Ad illa autem determinandum quæ ratio utilia esse dictat, nullam rationem habuimus mentis æternitatis quam demum in hac quinta parte novimus. Quamvis igitur tum temporis ignoraverimus mentem esse æternam, illa tamen quæ ad animositatem et generositatem referri ostendimus, prima habuimus atque adeo quamvis etiam nunc hoc ipsum ignoraremus, eadem tamen præscripta prima haberemus.

DEMONSTRATION: The first and unique foundation of virtue, or of the rule of right living (by the corollary of proposition 22 and by proposition 24 of part 4), is to seek one’s own utility. But for determining those things which reason dictates to be useful, we had no consideration of the mind’s eternity, which we have only at length come to know in this fifth part. Although, therefore, at that time we were ignorant that the mind is eternal, nevertheless those things which we have shown to be referred to animosity and generosity we held as first; and thus, even if even now we were ignorant of this very thing, we would nevertheless have the same prescriptions as first.

Q.E.D.

Which was to be demonstrated.

SCHOLIUM: Communis vulgi persuasio alia videtur esse. Nam plerique videntur credere se eatenus liberos esse quatenus libidini parere licet et eatenus de suo jure cedere quatenus ex legis divinæ præscripto vivere tenentur. Pietatem igitur et religionem et absolute omnia quæ ad animi fortitudinem referuntur, onera esse credunt quæ post mortem deponere et pretium servitutis nempe pietatis et religionis accipere sperant nec hac spe sola sed etiam et præcipue metu ne diris scilicet suppliciis post mortem puniantur, inducuntur ut ex legis divinæ præscripto quantum eorum fert tenuitas et impotens animus, vivant et nisi hæc spes et metus hominibus inessent, at contra si crederent mentes cum corpore interire nec restare miseris pietatis onere confectis vivere longius, ad ingenium redirent et ex libidine omnia moderari et fortunæ potius quam sibi parere vellent.

SCHOLIUM: The common persuasion of the vulgar seems to be otherwise. For most seem to believe that they are free to just so far as it is permitted to obey libido, and that they cede from their own right to just so far as they are held to live by the prescript of the divine law. Therefore they believe piety and religion, and absolutely all things that are referred to fortitude of mind, to be burdens which they hope to lay down after death, and to receive the price of servitude—namely of piety and religion; and not by this hope alone, but also and chiefly by fear lest they be punished after death with dire punishments, they are induced to live according to the prescript of the divine law, as far as their tenuity and impotent spirit bears; and unless this hope and fear were in men, but on the contrary if they believed that minds perish with the body and that for the wretched, worn out by the burden of piety, nothing remains except to live longer, they would return to their natural disposition and regulate everything by libido, and would wish to obey fortune rather than themselves.

Quæ mihi non minus absurda videntur quam si quis propterea quod non credit se posse bonis alimentis corpus in æternum nutrire, venenis potius et lethiferis se exsaturare vellet vel quia videt mentem non esse æternam seu immortalem, ideo amens mavult esse et sine ratione vivere: quæ adeo absurda sunt ut vix recenseri mereantur.

These things seem to me no less absurd than if someone, because he does not believe that he can nourish the body for eternity with good aliments, should rather wish to glut himself with poisons and lethal things; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, therefore prefers to be mad and to live without reason: things so absurd that they scarcely deserve to be recounted.

PROPOSITIO XLII: Beatitudo non est virtutis præmium sed ipsa virtus nec eadem gaudemus quia libidines coercemus sed contra quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coercere possumus.

PROPOSITION 42: Beatitude is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself; nor do we rejoice in it because we coerce libidinous desires, but on the contrary, because we rejoice in it, therefore we can coerce libidinous desires.

DEMONSTRATIO: Beatitudo in amore erga Deum consistit (per propositionem 36 hujus et ejus scholium) qui quidem amor ex tertio cognitionis genere oritur (per corollarium propositionis 32 hujus) atque adeo hic amor (per propositiones 59 et 3 partis III) ad mentem quatenus agit referri debet ac proinde (per definitionem 8 partis IV) ipsa virtus est, quod erat primum. Deinde quo mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine magis gaudet, eo plus intelligit (per propositionem 32 hujus) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 3 hujus) eo majorem in affectus habet potentiam et (per propositionem 38 hujus) eo minus ab affectibus qui mali sunt, patitur atque adeo ex eo quod mens hoc amore divino seu beatitudine gaudet, potestatem habet libidines coercendi et quia humana potentia ad coercendos affectus in solo intellectu consistit, ergo nemo beatitudine gaudet quia affectus coercuit sed contra potestas libidines coercendi ex ipsa beatitudine oritur. Q.E.D.

DEMONSTRATION: Beatitude consists in love toward God (by Proposition 36 of this Part and its Scholium), and this love indeed arises from the third kind of cognition (by the Corollary of Proposition 32 of this Part); and so this love (by Propositions 59 and 3 of Part 3) must be referred to the mind insofar as it acts, and accordingly (by Definition 8 of Part 4) is virtue itself—which was the first point. Then, the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or beatitude, the more it understands (by Proposition 32 of this Part), that is (by the Corollary of Proposition 3 of this Part), by so much the greater power it has over the affects; and (by Proposition 38 of this Part) by so much the less it suffers from the affects which are evil. And thus, from the fact that the mind rejoices in this divine love or beatitude, it has the power of coercing lusts; and because human power for coercing the affects consists in the intellect alone, therefore no one rejoices in beatitude because he has coerced the affects, but on the contrary the power of coercing lusts arises from beatitude itself. Q.E.D.

SCHOLIUM: His omnia quæ de mentis in affectus potentia quæque de mentis libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi. Ex quibus apparet quantum sapiens polleat potiorque sit ignaro qui sola libidine agitur. Ignarus enim præterquam quod a causis externis multis modis agitatur nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit præterea sui et Dei et rerum quasi inscius et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit.

SCHOLIUM: With these I have completed all the things which I had wished to show about the mind’s power over the affects and about the mind’s liberty. From these it appears how much the wise man prevails and is superior to the ignorant man who is driven solely by libido. For the ignorant man, besides being in many ways agitated by external causes and never attaining true acquiescence of mind, lives moreover as if unknowing of himself and of God and of things; and as soon as he ceases to suffer (to undergo), at the same time he also ceases to be.

Cum contra sapiens quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur sed sui et Dei et rerum æterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur. Si jam via quam ad hæc ducere ostendi, perardua videatur, inveniri tamen potest. Et sane arduum debet esse quod adeo raro reperitur.

Whereas, by contrast, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in mind; but, conscious of himself and of God and of things by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of mind. If now the way which I have shown leads to these things seems most arduous, yet it can be found. And indeed what is discovered so rarely ought to be arduous.

Qui enim posset fieri si salus in promptu esset et sine magno labore reperiri posset ut ab omnibus fere negligeretur? Sed omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt.

For how could it come to pass, if salvation were at hand and could be found without great labor, that it would be neglected by almost all? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.

Finis

End