Dante: MONARCHIA

I.1. "Conclusit ora leonum, et non nocuerunt michi: quia coram eo iustitia inventa est in me". In principio huius operis propositum fuit de tribus questionibus, prout materia pateretur, inquirere; de quarum duabus primis in superioribus libris, ut credo, sufficienter peractum est. 2. Nunc autem de tertia restat agendum: cuius quidem veritas, quia sine rubore aliquorum emergere nequit, forsitan alicuius indignationis in me causa erit. 3. Sed quia de trono immutabili suo Veritas deprecatur, Salomon etiam silvam Proverbiorum ingrediens meditandam veritatem, impium detestandum in se facturo nos docet, ac preceptor morum Phylosophus familiaria destruenda pro veritate suadet; assumpta fiducia de verbis Danielis premissis, in quibus divina potentia clipeus defensorum veritatis astruitur, iuxta monitionem Pauli fidei loricam induens, in calore carbonis illius quem unus de Seraphin accepit de altari celesti et tetigit labia Ysaie, gignasium presens ingrediar, et in brachio Illius qui nos de potestate tenebrarum liberavit in sanguine suo impium atque mendacem de palestra, spectante mundo, eiciam.

1.1. "He closed the mouths of the lions, and they did not harm me: because before Him justice was found in me." At the beginning of this work the purpose was to inquire into three questions, as the material would allow; of which the first two, in the preceding books, as I believe, have been sufficiently accomplished. 2. Now, however, it remains to deal with the third: the truth of which, because it cannot emerge without the blush of some, will perhaps be a cause of someone’s indignation against me. 3. But since Truth from her immutable throne makes intercession, Solomon also, entering the forest of the Proverbs to meditate truth, teaches us that the one who is about to do so will make the impious detestable to himself; and the Philosopher, preceptor of morals, advises that what is familiar and dear be destroyed for the sake of truth; having taken confidence from the aforesaid words of Daniel, in which the divine power is established as the shield of the defenders of truth, and putting on, according to Paul’s admonition, the breastplate of faith, in the heat of that coal which one of the Seraphim took from the heavenly altar and touched to the lips of Isaiah, I will enter the present gymnasium, and by the arm of Him who freed us from the power of darkness in His own blood I will cast the ungodly and the mendacious out of the palestra, the world looking on.

4. Quid timeam, cum Spiritus Patri et Filio coecternus aiat per os David: "In memoria ecterna erit iustus, ab auditione mala non timebit"? 5. Questio igitur presens, de qua inquisitio futura est, inter duo luminaria magna versatur: romanum scilicet Pontificem et romanum Principem; et queritur utrum auctoritas Monarche romani, qui de iure Monarcha munii est, ut in secundo libro probatum est, inmediate a Deo dependeat an ab aliquo Dei vicario vel ministro, quem Petri successorem intelligo, qui vere claviger est regni celorum.

4. What should I fear, since the Spirit coeternal with the Father and the Son says through the mouth of David: "In eternal memory the just man will be; he will not fear an evil report"? 5. The present question, therefore, about which inquiry is to be made, revolves between two great luminaries: namely the Roman Pontiff and the Roman Prince; and it is asked whether the authority of the Roman Monarch, who by right is Monarch of the world, as was proven in the second book, depends immediately on God or on some vicar or minister of God, whom I understand to be the successor of Peter, who truly is the key-bearer of the kingdom of the heavens.

II.1. Ad presentem questionem discutiendam, sicut in superioribus est peractum, aliquod principium est assummendum in virtute cuius aperiende veritatis argumenta formentur; nam sine prefixo principio etiam vera dicendo laborare quid prodest, cum principium solum assummendorum mediorum sit radix? 2. Hec igitur irrefragabilis veritas prefigatur: scilicet quod illud quod nature intentioni repugnat Deus nolit. Nam si hoc verum non esset, contradictorium eius non esset falsum, quod est: Deum non nolle quod nature intentioni repugnat.

II.1. For discussing the present question, as has been accomplished in the foregoing, some principle must be assumed, by virtue of which arguments may be formed for the opening of the truth; for without a prefixed principle, what does it profit to labor even in speaking true things, since the principle alone is the root of the means to be assumed? 2. Therefore let this irrefragable truth be prefixed: namely, that God does not will that which repugns the intention of nature. For if this were not true, its contradictory would not be false, which is: that God does not not-will that which repugns the intention of nature.

3. Et si hoc non falsum, nec ea que secuntur ad ipsum; impossibile enim est in necessariis consequentiis falsum esse consequens antecedente non falso existente. 4. Sed ad non nolle alterum duorum sequitur de necessitate: aut velle aut non velle; sicut ad non odire necessario sequitur aut amare aut non amare; non enim non amare est odire, nec non velle est nolle, ut de se patet. Que si falsa non sunt, ista non erit falsa: 'Deus vult quod non vult'; cuius falsitas non habet superiorem.

3. And if this is not false, neither are those things which follow upon it; for in necessary consequences it is impossible for the consequent to be false with the antecedent not false. 4. But from not being unwilling there follows of necessity one of two: either to will or to not-will; just as from not hating there necessarily follows either to love or to not-love; for to not-love is not to hate, nor is to not-will to be unwilling, as is clear of itself. Which things if they are not false, this will not be false: 'God wills what he does not will'; whose falsity has no superior.

5. Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur sic declaro: manifestum est quod Deus finem nature vult, aliter celum otiose moveret; quod dicendum non est. Si Deus vellet impedimentum finis, vellet etiam finem impedimenti, aliter etiam otiose vellet; et cum finis impedimenti sit non esse rei impedite, sequeretur Deum velle non esse finem nature, quem dicitur velle esse. 6. Si enim Deus non vellet impedimentum finis, prout non vellet sequeretur ad non velle nichil de impedimento curare, sive esset sive non esset; sed qui impedimentum non curat, rem que potest impediri non curat, et per consequens non habet in voluntate; et quod quis non habet in voluntate, non vult.

5. But that what is said is true, thus I declare: it is manifest that God wills the end of nature; otherwise he would move the heaven idly; which must not be said. If God were to will the impediment of the end, he would will also the end of the impediment; otherwise he would also will idly; and since the end of an impediment is the non-being of the impeded thing, it would follow that God wills the end of nature not to be, which he is said to will to be. 6. For if God did not will the impediment of the end, inasmuch as he did not will it there would follow, from the not willing, to care nothing about the impediment, whether it existed or did not exist; but he who does not care about the impediment does not care about the thing that can be impeded, and consequently does not have it in his will; and what one does not have in his will, he does not will.

7. Propter quod si finis nature impediri potest—quod potest—de necessitate sequitur quod Deus finem nature non vult; et sic sequitur quod prius: videlicet Deum velle quod non vult. Verissimum igitur est illud principium ex cuius contradictorio tam absurda secuntur.

7. Wherefore, if the end of nature can be impeded—which it can—of necessity it follows that God does not will the end of nature; and thus follows what was prior: namely, that God wills what he does not will. Most true, therefore, is that principle, from whose contradictory such absurdities follow.

III.1. In introitu ad questionem hanc notare oportet quod prime questionis veritas magis manifestanda fuit ad ignorantiam tollendam, quam ad tollendum litigium; sed que fuit secunde questionis, quasi equaliter ad ignorantiam et litigium se habebat: multa etenim ignoramus de quibus non litigamus. 2. Nam geometra circuli quadraturam ignorat non tamen de ipsa litigat; theologus vero numerum angelorum ignorat; non tamen de illo litigium facit; Egiptius vero civilitatem Scitharum ignorat, non propter hoc de ipsorum civilitate contendit. 3. Huius quidem tertie questionis veritas tantum habet litigium, ut, quemadmodum in aliis ignorantia solet esse causa litigii, sic et hic litigium causa ignorantie sit magis.

3.1. At the entrance to this question it ought to be noted that the truth of the first question had to be made more manifest for the removing of ignorance than for the removing of litigation; but that which belonged to the second question stood, as it were, equally toward ignorance and litigation: for we are ignorant of many things about which we do not litigate. 2. For the geometer is ignorant of the quadrature of the circle, yet he does not litigate about it; the theologian indeed is ignorant of the number of angels; nevertheless he does not make litigation about that; the Egyptian indeed is ignorant of the civilization of the Scythians, yet not on that account does he contend about their civilization. 3. But the truth of this third question has so much litigation that, just as elsewhere ignorance is wont to be the cause of litigation, so here litigation is rather the cause of ignorance.

4. Hominibus nanque rationis intuitu voluntatem prevolantibus hoc sepe contingit: ut, male affecti, lumine rationis postposito, affectu quasi ceci trahantur et pertinaciter suam denegent cecitatem. 5. Unde fit persepe quod non solum falsitas patrocinium habeat, sed—ut plerique—de suis terminis egredientes per aliena castra discurrant; ubi nichil intelligentes, ipsi nichil intelliguntur: et sic provocant quosdam ad iram, quosdam ad dedignationem, nonnullos ad risum. 6. Igitur contra veritatem que queritur tria hominum genera maxime colluctantur.

4. For to men who, by the intuition of reason, anticipate the will, this often happens: that, ill-affected, with the light of reason set aside, they are drawn by affect as if blind and pertinaciously deny their own blindness. 5. Whence it very often comes about that not only does falsity have patronage, but—as very many—going forth beyond their own termini they run about through alien camps; where, understanding nothing, they themselves are understood not at all: and thus they provoke some to anger, some to disdain, and some to laughter. 6. Therefore against the truth that is sought three genera of men wrestle most.

7. Summus nanque Pontifex, domini nostri Iesu Cristi vicarius et Petri successor, cui non quicquid Cristo sed quicquid Petro debemus, zelo fortasse clavium, necnon alii gregum cristianorum pastores, et alii quos credo zelo solo matris Ecclesie promoveri, veritati quam ostensurus sum de zelo forsan—ut dixi—non de superbia contradicunt. 8. Quidam vero alii, quorum obstinata cupiditas lumen rationis extinxit—et dum ex patre dyabolo sunt, Ecclesie se filios esse dicunt—non solum in hac questione litigium movent, sed sacratissimi principatus vocabulum aborrentes superiorum questionum et huius principia inpudenter negarent. 9. Sunt etiam tertii—quos decretalistas vocant—qui, theologie ac phylosophie cuiuslibet inscii et expertes, suis decretalibus—quas profecto venerandas existimo—tota intentione innixi, de illarum prevalentia—credo—sperantes, Imperio derogant.

7. For the Supreme Pontiff, the vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ and the successor of Peter, to whom we owe not whatever to Christ but whatever to Peter, perhaps by zeal for the keys, and likewise other shepherds of the Christian flocks, and others whom I believe to be moved by the zeal only of Mother Church, oppose the truth which I am about to set forth perhaps out of zeal—as I said—not out of pride. 8. But certain others, whose obstinate cupidity has extinguished the light of reason—and though they are of the father the Devil, they say that they are sons of the Church—not only stir up contention in this question, but, abhorring the name of the most sacred principate, shamelessly deny the principles of the previous questions and of this one. 9. There are also a third group—whom they call decretalists—who, unknowing and unexperienced in any theology and philosophy, leaning with their whole intention upon their decretals—which indeed I consider to be venerable—hoping, I believe, in the prevalence of those, derogate from the Empire.

10. Nec mirum, cum iam audiverim quendam de illis dicentem et procaciter asserentem traditiones Ecclesie fidei fundamentum: quod quidem nefas de oppinione mortalium illi summoveant qui ante traditiones Ecclesie in Filium Dei Cristum sive venturum sive presentem sive iam passum crediderunt, et credendo speraverunt, et sperantes karitate arserunt, et ardentes ei coheredes factos esse mundus non dubitat. 11. Et ut tales de presenti gignasio totaliter excludantur, est advertendum quod quedam scriptura est ante Ecclesiam, quedam cum Ecclesia, quedam post Ecclesiam. 12. Ante quidem Ecclesiam sunt vetus et novum Testamentum, quod "in ecternum mandatum est" ut ait Propheta; hoc enim est quod dicit Ecclesia loquens ad sponsum: "Trahe me post te". 13. Cum Ecclesia vero sunt veneranda illa concilia principalia quibus Cristum interfuisse nemo fidelis dubitat, cum habeamus ipsum dixisse discipulis ascensurum in celum "Ecce ego vobiscum sum in omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi", ut Matheus testatur.

10. Nor is it a marvel, since I have already heard a certain one of them saying and procaciously asserting the traditions of the Church to be the foundation of faith: which impiety let those remove from the opinion of mortals who, before the traditions of the Church, believed in the Son of God Christ—whether about to come, or present, or already having suffered—and by believing hoped, and while hoping burned with charity, and burning have been made his coheirs, as the world does not doubt. 11. And so that such men be totally excluded from the present gymnasium, it is to be noted that certain Scripture is before the Church, certain with the Church, certain after the Church. 12. Before the Church indeed are the Old and New Testament, which “is a commandment unto eternity,” as the Prophet says; for this is what the Church, speaking to the Bridegroom, says: “Draw me after you.” 13. With the Church, however, are those venerable principal councils at which no faithful person doubts that Christ was present, since we have him say to the disciples as he was about to ascend into heaven, “Behold, I am with you on all the days even to the consummation of the age,” as Matthew attests.

Sunt etiam Scripture doctorum, Augustini et aliorum, quos a Spiritu Sancto adiutos qui dubitat, fructus eorum vel omnino non vidit vel, si vidit, minime degustavit. 14. Post Ecclesiam vero sunt traditiones quas 'decretales' dicunt: que quidem etsi auctoritate apostolica sunt venerande, fundamentali tamen Scripture postponendas esse dubitandum non est, cum Cristus sacerdotes obiurgaverit de contrario. 15. Cum enim interrogassent: "Quare discipuli tui traditionem seniorum transgrediuntur?"—negligebant enim manuum lotionem—Cristus eis, Matheo testante, respondit: "Quare et vos transgredimini mandatum Dei propter traditionem vestram?". In quo satis innuit traditionem postponendam.

There are also the Scriptures of the doctors, of Augustine and of others; whoever doubts that they were aided by the Holy Spirit either has not seen their fruits at all, or, if he has seen, has in no wise tasted them. 14. After the Church, moreover, are the traditions which they call 'decretals': which indeed, although to be venerated by apostolic authority, are nevertheless beyond doubt to be postponed to fundamental Scripture, since Christ rebuked the priests for the contrary. 15. For when they had asked: "Why do your disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?"—for they were neglecting the washing of hands—Christ, Matthew bearing witness, answered them: "Why do you also transgress the commandment of God for the sake of your tradition?". In which he sufficiently intimates that tradition is to be postponed.

16. Quod si traditiones Ecclesie post Ecclesiam sunt, ut declaratum est, necesse est ut non Ecclesie a traditionibus, sed ab Ecclesia traditionibus accedat auctoritas. Hiique solas traditiones habentes ab hoc—ut dicebatur—gignasio excludendi sunt: oportet enim, hanc veritatem venantes, ex hiis ex quibus Ecclesie manat auctoritas investigando procedere. 17. Hiis itaque sic exclusis, excludendi sunt alii qui, corvorum plumis operti, oves albas in grege Domini se iactant.

16. But if the traditions of the Church are after the Church, as has been declared, it is necessary that authority come not to the Church from the traditions, but to the traditions from the Church. And those who have traditions alone are to be excluded from this—as it was said—gymnasium: for it is meet, hunting this truth, to proceed by investigating from those sources whence the Church’s authority flows. 17. These therefore thus excluded, others are to be excluded who, covered with the feathers of ravens, vaunt themselves as white sheep in the Lord’s flock.

Hii sunt impietatis filii qui, ut flagitia sua exequi possint, matrem prostituunt, fratres expellunt, et denique iudicem habere nolunt. Nam cur ad eos ratio quereretur, cum sua cupiditate detenti principia non viderent? 18. Quapropter cum solis concertatio restat qui, aliquali zelo erga matrem Ecclesiam ducti, ipsam que queritur veritatem ignorant: cum quibus illa reverentia fretus quam pius filius debet patri, quam pius filius matri, pius in Cristum, pius in Ecclesiam, pius in pastorem, pius in omnes cristianam religionem profitentes, pro salute veritatis in hoc libro certamen incipio.

These are the sons of impiety who, in order that they may carry out their flagitious deeds, prostitute their mother, expel their brothers, and finally are unwilling to have a judge. For why should reasoning be sought with them, since, held fast by their own cupidity, they do not see first principles? 18. Wherefore, a contest remains only with those who, led by some zeal toward mother Church, are ignorant of the very truth that is being sought: with whom, relying on that reverence which a pious son owes to a father, which a pious son to a mother, pious toward Christ, pious toward the Church, pious toward the pastor, pious toward all professing the Christian religion, for the welfare of truth in this book I begin the contest.

IV.1. Isti vero ad quos erit tota disputatio sequens, asserentes auctoritatem Imperii ab auctoritate Ecclesie dipendere velut artifex inferior dependet ab architecto, pluribus et diversis argumentis moventur; que quidem de Sacra Scriptura eliciunt et de quibusdam gestis tam summi Pontificis quam ipsius Imperatoris, nonnullum vero rationis indicium habere nituntur. 2. Dicunt enim primo, secundum scripturam Geneseos, quod Deus fecit duo magna luminaria—luminare maius et luminare minus—ut alterum preesset diei et alterum preesset nocti: que allegorice dicta esse intelligebant ista duo regimina: scilicet spirituale et temporale. 3. Deinde arguunt quod, quemadmodum luna, que est luminare minus, non habet lucem nisi prout recipit a sole, sic nec regnum temporale auctoritatem habet nisi prout recipit a spirituali regimine.

4.1. But those indeed to whom the entire following disputation will be directed, asserting that the authority of the Empire depends upon the authority of the Church, just as a lower artificer depends upon the architect, are moved by many and diverse arguments; which indeed they elicit from Sacred Scripture and from certain deeds both of the Supreme Pontiff and of the Emperor himself, and they strive to have some indication of reason as well. 2. For they say first, according to the writing of Genesis, that God made two great luminaries—the greater luminary and the lesser luminary—so that the one should preside over the day and the other should preside over the night: which they understood to have been said allegorically of these two regimens: namely, the spiritual and the temporal. 3. Then they argue that, just as the moon, which is the lesser luminary, has no light except insofar as it receives from the sun, so neither does the temporal kingdom have authority except insofar as it receives from the spiritual regimen.

4. Propter hanc et propter alias eorum rationes dissolvendas prenotandum quod, sicut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De sophisticis elenchis, solutio argumenti est erroris manifestatio. Et quia error potest esse in materia et in forma argumenti, dupliciter peccare contingit: aut scilicet assummendo falsum, aut non sillogizando; que duo Phylosophus obiciebat contra Parmenidem et Melissum dicens: "Quia falsa recipiunt et non sillogizantes sunt". Et accipio hic largo modo 'falsum' etiam pro 'inoppinabili', quod in materia probabili habet naturam falsi. 5. Si vero in forma sit peccatum, conclusio interimenda est ab illo qui solvere vult, ostendendo formam sillogisticam non esse servatam.

4. For the sake of this and of dissolving their other reasonings, it should be pre-noted that, as it pleases the Philosopher in those matters which are in On Sophistical Refutations, the solution of an argument is the manifestation of error. And since error can be in the matter and in the form of an argument, it happens that one may sin in a twofold way: namely either by assuming the false, or by not syllogizing; which two things the Philosopher objected against Parmenides and Melissus, saying: "because they admit false [premises] and are non-syllogizing." And I take here “false” in a broad way also for “non-opinable,” which in probable matter has the nature of the false. 5. If, however, the fault be in the form, the conclusion must be interrupted by the one who wishes to solve, by showing that the syllogistic form has not been observed.

Si vero peccatum sit in materia, aut est quia 'simpliciter' falsum assumptum est, aut quia falsum 'secundum quid'. Si 'simpliciter', per interemptionem assumpti solvendum est; si 'secundum quid', per distinctionem. 6. Hoc viso, ad meliorem huius et aliarum inferius factarum solutionum evidentiam advertendum quod circa sensum misticum dupliciter errare contingit: aut querendo ipsum ubi non est, aut accipiendo aliter quam accipi debeat. 7. Propter primum dicit Augustinus in Civitate Dei: "Non omnia que gesta narrantur etiam significare aliquid putanda sunt, sed propter illa que aliquid significant etiam ea que nichil significant actexuntur.

But if the fault be in the matter, either it is because something 'simply' false has been assumed, or because something false 'in a certain respect'. If 'simply', it must be solved by interemption of the assumption; if 'in a certain respect', by distinction. 6. This having been seen, for the better evidence of this solution and of the others made below, it should be noted that concerning the mystical sense it is possible to err in two ways: either by seeking it where it is not, or by taking it otherwise than it ought to be taken. 7. On account of the first Augustine says in the City of God: "Not all things that are narrated to have been done are to be thought also to signify something; but on account of those that do signify something, even those that signify nothing are woven on."

Solo vomere terra proscinditur; sed ut hoc fieri possit, etiam cetera aratri membra sunt necessaria". 8. Propter secundum idem ait in Doctrina Cristiana, loquens de illo aliud in Scripturis sentire quam ille qui scripsit eas dicit, quod "ita fallitur ac si quisquam deserens viam eo tamen per girum pergeret quo via illa perducit"; et subdit: "Demonstrandum est ut consuetudine deviandi etiam in transversum aut perversum ire cogatur". 9. Deinde innuit causam quare cavendum sit hoc in Scripturis, dicens: "Titubabit fides, si Divinarum Scripturarum vacillat autoritas". 10. Ego autem dico quod si talia fiunt de ignorantia, correctione diligenter adhibita ignoscendum est sicut ignoscendum esset illi qui leonem in nubibus formidaret; si vero industria. non aliter cum sic errantibus est agendum, quam cum tyrampnis, qui publica iura non ad comunem utilitatem secuntur, sed ad propriam retorquere conantur. 11. O summum facinus, etiamsi contingat in sompniis, ecterni Spiritus intentione abuti!

"The earth is plowed by the plowshare alone; but in order that this can be done, the other members of the plow are also necessary". 8. On account of the second, the same man says in On Christian Doctrine, speaking of him who senses in the Scriptures something other than what he who wrote them says, that "he is thus deceived as if someone, deserting the road, should nevertheless proceed by a circuit to the place to which that road leads"; and he adds: "It must be demonstrated, so that by a habit of deviating he be compelled to go even crosswise or perversely". 9. Then he intimates the cause why this must be guarded against in the Scriptures, saying: "Faith will totter, if the authority of the Divine Scriptures wavers". 10. I, however, say that if such things are done out of ignorance, with correction diligently applied one must grant pardon just as pardon would have to be granted to one who would fear a lion in the clouds; but if by design. not otherwise is it to be dealt with those erring thus than with tyrants, who do not follow the public laws for the common utility, but try to retort them to their own. 11. O highest crime, even if it should happen in dreams, to abuse the intention of the eternal Spirit!

Non enim peccatur in Moysen, non in David, non in Iob, non in Matheum, non in Paulum, sed in Spiritum Sanctum qui loquitur in illis. Nam quanquam scribe divini eloquii multi sint, unicus tamen dictator est Deus, qui beneplacitum suum nobis per multorum calamos explicare dignatus est. 12. Hiis itaque prenotatis, ad id quod superius dicebatur dico per interemptionem illius dicti quo dicunt illa duo luminaria typice importare duo hec regimina: in quo quidem dicto tota vis argumenti consistit.

For one does not sin against Moses, nor against David, nor against Job, nor against Matthew, nor against Paul, but against the Holy Spirit who speaks in them. For although the scribes of the divine eloquence are many, yet there is one sole Dictator, God, who has deigned to unfold his good-pleasure to us through the pens of many. 12. With these things, then, pre-noted, to that which was said above I speak by interemption of that saying by which they say that those two luminaries typically import these two regimens: in which saying, indeed, the whole force of the argument consists.

13. Quod autem ille sensus omnino sustineri non possit, duplici via potest ostendi. Primo quia, cum huiusmodi regimina sint accidentia quedam ipsius hominis, videretur Deus usus fòisse ordine perverso accidentia prius producendo quam proprium subicctum: quod absurdum est dicere dc Deo; nam illa duo luminaria producta sunt die quarto et homo die sexto, ut patet in Lictera. 14. Preterea, cum ista regimina sint hominum directiva in quosdam fines, ut infra patebit, si homo stetisset in statu innocentie in quo a Deo factus est, talibus directivis non indiguisset: sunt ergo huiusmodi regimina remedia contra infirmitatem peccati.

13. But that that sense cannot at all be sustained can be shown in a double way. First, because, since regimina of this sort are certain accidents of man himself, it would seem that God had used a perverse order, producing the accidents earlier than the proper subject: which is absurd to say of God; for those two luminaries were produced on the fourth day and man on the sixth, as is evident in the Letter. 14. Moreover, since these regimina are directives of men toward certain ends, as will be evident below, if man had stood in the state of innocence in which he was made by God, he would not have needed such directives: therefore regimina of this sort are remedies against the infirmity of sin.

15. Cum ergo non solum in die quarto peccator homo non erat, sed etiam simpliciter homo non erat, producere remedia fuisset otiosum: quod est contra divinam bonitatem. Stultus enim esset medicus qui, ante nativitatem hominis, pro apostemate futuro illi emplastrum conficeret. 16. Non igitur dicendum est quod quarto die Deus hec duo regimina fecerit; et per consequens intentio Moysi esse non potuit illa quam fingunt.

15. Since, therefore, not only on the fourth day was there not a sinful man, but even simply there was no man, to produce remedies would have been idle: which is against divine goodness. A foolish physician indeed would be he who, before the birth of the man, would prepare for him a plaster for a future abscess. 16. Therefore it must not be said that on the fourth day God made these two regimina; and consequently the intention of Moses could not have been that which they feign.

17. Potest etiam hoc, mendacio tollerando, per distinctionem dissolvi: mitior nanque est in adversarium solutio distinctiva; non enim omnino mentiens esse videtur, sicut interemptiva illum videri facit. Dico ergo quod licet luna non habeat lucem habundanter nisi ut a sole recipit, non propter hoc sequitur quod ipsa luna sit a sole. 18. Unde sciendum quod aliud est esse ipsius lune, aliud virtus eius, et aliud operari.

17. This too can be dissolved, by tolerating the falsehood, through a distinction: for a solution by distinction is gentler toward an adversary; for he does not seem to be utterly lying, as an interemptive one makes him appear. I say, therefore, that although the moon does not have light abundantly except insofar as it receives it from the sun, it does not on that account follow that the moon herself is from the sun. 18. Whence it must be known that the being of the moon is one thing, its virtue another, and its operating another.

Quantum est ad esse, nullo modo luna dependet a sole, nec etiam quantum ad virtutem, nec quantum ad operationem simpliciter; quia motus eius est a motore proprio, influentia sua est a propriis eius radiis: habet enim aliquam lucem ex se, ut in eius eclipsi manifestum est. 19. Sed quantum ad melius et virtuosius operandum, recipit aliquid a sole, quia lucem habundantem: qua recepta, virtuosius operatur. 20. Sic ergo dico quod regnum temporale non recipit esse a spirituali, nec virtutem que est eius auctoritas, nec etiam operationem simpliciter; sed bene ab eo recipit ut virtuosius operetur per lucem gratie quam in celo et in terra benedictio summi pontificis infundit illi.

As regards being, in no way does the moon depend on the sun, nor even as regards virtue, nor as regards operation simply; because its motion is from its own proper mover, its influence is from its own proper rays: for it has some light from itself, as is manifest in its eclipse. 19. But as regards working better and more virtuously, it receives something from the sun, namely abundant light: which, having been received, it operates more virtuously. 20. Thus therefore I say that the temporal kingdom does not receive being from the spiritual, nor the virtue which is its authority, nor even operation simply; but indeed it receives from it so that it may operate more virtuously through the light of grace which in heaven and on earth the blessing of the Supreme Pontiff pours into it.

21. Et ideo argumentum peccabat in forma, quia predicatum in conclusione non est extremitas maioris, ut patet; procedit enim sic: luna recipit lucem a sole qui est regimen spirituale; regimen temporale est luna; ergo regimen temporale recipit auctoritatem a regimine spirituali. 22. Nam in extremitate maioris ponunt 'lucem', in predicato vero conclusionis 'auctoritatem': que sunt res diverse subiecto et ratione, ut visum est

21. And therefore the argument erred in form, because the predicate in the conclusion is not the extremity of the major, as is evident; for it proceeds thus: the moon receives light from the sun, which is the spiritual regime; the temporal regime is the moon; therefore the temporal regime receives authority from the spiritual regime. 22. For in the extremity of the major they set “light,” but in the predicate of the conclusion “authority”: which are things diverse in subject and in reason, as has been seen.

V.1. Assummunt etiam argumentum de lictera Moysi, dicentes quod de femore Iacob fluxit figura horum duorum regiminum, quia Levi et Iudas: quorum alter fuit pater sacerdotii, alter vero regiminis temporalis. Deinde sic arguunt ex hiis: sicut se habuit Levi ad Iudam, sic se habet Ecclesia ad Imperium; Levi precessit Iudam in nativitate, ut patet in Lictera: ergo Ecclesia precedit Imperium in auctoritate. 2. Et hoc vero de facili solvitur; nam cum dicunt quod Levi et Iudas, filii Iacob, figurant ista regimina, possem similiter hoc interimendo dissolvere: sed concedatur.

5.1. They also assume an argument from the Letter of Moses, saying that from the thigh of Jacob issued forth the figure of these two regimes, namely Levi and Judah: of whom the one was father of the priesthood, the other indeed of the temporal regime. Then thus they argue from these: as Levi stood in relation to Judah, so the Church stands to the Empire; Levi preceded Judah in birth, as is clear in the Letter: therefore the Church precedes the Empire in authority. 2. And this indeed is easily solved; for when they say that Levi and Judah, sons of Jacob, figure these regimes, I could likewise dissolve this by denying it; but let it be conceded.

3. Et cum arguendo inferunt 'sicut Levi precedit in nativitate sic Ecclesia in auctoritate', dico similiter quod aliud est predicatum conclusionis et aliud maior extremitas: nam aliud est 'auctoritas'et aliud 'nativitas', subiecto et ratione; propter quod peccatur in forma. Et est similis processus huic: A precedit B in C; D et E se habent ut A et B: ergo D precedit E in F; F vero et C diversa sunt. 4. Et si ferrent instantiam dicentes quod F sequitur ad C, hoc est auctoritas ad nativitatem, et pro antecedente bene infertur consequens, ut animal pro homine, dico quod falsum est: multi enim sunt maiores natu qui non solum in auctoritate non precedunt, sed etiam preceduntur a iunioribus; ut patet ubi episcopi sunt tempore minores quam sui archipresbyteri.

3. And when, by arguing, they infer ‘as Levi precedes in nativity so the Church in authority,’ I say similarly that the predicate of the conclusion is one thing and the major extremity another: for ‘authority’ is one thing and ‘nativity’ another, in subject and in rationale; wherefore there is a fault in the form. And the process is similar to this: A precedes B in C; D and E stand as A and B: therefore D precedes E in F; but F and C are diverse. 4. And if they were to bring an instance, saying that F follows upon C, that is, authority upon nativity, and that from the antecedent the consequent is well inferred, as ‘animal’ for ‘man,’ I say that this is false: for there are many elders by birth who not only do not precede in authority, but are even preceded by their juniors; as is clear where bishops are in time younger than their archpresbyters.

5. Et sic instantia videtur errare secundum 'non causam ut causa'.

5. And thus the instance seems to err according to 'non causam ut causa'.

VI.1. De lictera vero primi libri Regum assummunt etiam creationem et depositionem Saulis, et dicunt quod Saul rex intronizatus fuit et de trono depositus per Samuelem, qui vice Dei de precepto fungebatur, ut in Lictera patet. 2. Et ex hoc arguunt quod, quemadmodum ille Dei vicarius auctoritatem habuit dandi et tollendi regimen temporale et in alium transferendi, sic et nunc Dei vicarius, Ecclesie universalis antistes, auctoritatem habet dandi et tollendi et etiam transferendi sceptrum regiminis temporalis; ex quo sine dubio sequeretur quod auctoritas Imperii dependeret ut dicunt. 3. Et ad hoc dicendum per interemptionem eius quod dicunt Samuelem Dei vicarium, quia non ut vicarius sed ut legatus spetialis ad hoc, sive nuntius portans mandatum Domini expressum, hoc fecit: quod patet quia quicquid Deus dixit, hoc fecit solum et hoc retulit.

6.1. From the letter of the first book of Kings they also assume the creation and deposition of Saul, and they say that King Saul was enthroned and deposed from the throne by Samuel, who, in God’s stead, was discharging his office by precept, as is evident in the text. 2. And from this they argue that, just as that vicar of God had authority of giving and taking away temporal governance and of transferring it to another, so also now the vicar of God, the prelate of the universal Church, has authority of giving and taking away and even of transferring the scepter of temporal governance; from which it would without doubt follow that the authority of the Empire would depend, as they say. 3. And to this one must reply by interemption of their statement that Samuel was God’s vicar, because it was not as a vicar but as a special legate for this purpose, or as a messenger bearing the express mandate of the Lord, that he did this: which is evident because whatever God said, this alone he did and this he reported.

4. Unde sciendum quod aliud est esse vicarium, aliud est esse nuntium sive ministrum: sicut aliud est esse doctorem, aliud est esse interpretem. 5. Nam vicarius est cui iurisdictio cum lege vel cum arbitrio commissa est; et ideo intra terminos iurisdictionis commisse de lege vel de arbitrio potest agere circa aliquid, quod dominus omnino ignorat. Nuntius autem non potest in quantum nuntius; sed quemadmodum malleus in sola virtute fabri operatur, sic et nuntius in solo arbitrio eius qui mictit illum.

4. Whence it should be known that it is one thing to be a vicar, another to be a messenger or minister: just as it is one thing to be a doctor, another to be an interpreter. 5. For a vicar is one to whom jurisdiction with law or with arbitrium (discretion) has been committed; and therefore within the bounds of the jurisdiction committed, by law or by arbitrium, he can act concerning something which the lord altogether does not know. A messenger, however, cannot insofar as a messenger; but just as a hammer works only by the power of the smith, so too the messenger only by the arbitrium of him who sends him.

6. Non igitur sequitur, si Deus per nuntium Samuelem fecit hoc, quod vicarius Dei hoc facere possit. Multa enim Deus per angelos fecit et facit et facturus est que vicarius Dei, Petri successor, facere non posset. 7. Unde argumentum istorum est 'a toto ad partem', construendo sic: 'homo potest videre et audire: ergo oculus potest videre et audire'. Et hoc non tenet; teneret autem 'destrucrive' sic: 'homo non potest volare: ergo nec brachia hominis possunt volare'. Et similiter sic: 'Deus per nuntium facere non potest genita non esse genita, iuxta sententiam Agathonis: ergo nec vicarius eius facere potest.

6. It therefore does not follow, if God did this through the messenger Samuel, that the vicar of God can do this. For God has done, does, and will do many things through angels which the vicar of God, the successor of Peter, could not do. 7. Whence their argument is 'from the whole to the part', constructing thus: 'a man can see and hear: therefore an eye can see and hear'. And this does not hold; it would hold, however, 'destrucrive' thus: 'a man cannot fly: therefore neither can a man's arms fly'. And likewise thus: 'God through a messenger cannot make things begotten not to have been begotten, according to the opinion of Agathon: therefore neither can His vicar do so'.

VII.1. Assummunt etiam de lictera Mathei Magorum oblationem, dicentes Cristum recepisse simul thus et aurum ad significandum se ipsum dominum et gubernatorem spiritualium et temporalium; ex quo inferunt Cristi vicarium dominum et gubernatorem eorundem, et per consequens habere utrorunque auctoritatem. 2. Ad hoc respondens, licteram Mathei et sensum confiteor, sed quod ex illa inferre conantur interimo. Sillogizant enim sic: 'Deus est dominus spiritualium et temporalium; summus Pontifex est vicarius Dei: ergo est dominus spiritualium et temporalium'. 3. Utraque nanque propositio vera est, sed medium variatur et arguitur in quatuor terminis, in quibus forma sillogistica non salvatur, ut patet ex hiis que de sillogismo simpliciter.

VII.1. They also take from the letter of Matthew the offering of the Magi, saying that Christ received at once frankincense and gold to signify himself the lord and governor of spiritual and temporal things; from which they infer the vicar of Christ to be lord and governor of the same, and consequently to have the authority of both. 2. Responding to this, I acknowledge the letter of Matthew and the sense, but I do away with what they try to infer from it. For they syllogize thus: 'God is lord of spirituals and temporals; the Supreme Pontiff is the vicar of God: therefore he is lord of spirituals and temporals'. 3. For each proposition is true, but the middle is varied and it is argued in four terms, in which the syllogistic form is not preserved, as is clear from those things which are about the syllogism in general.

Nam aliud est 'Deus', quod subicitur in maiori, et aliud 'vicarius Dei', quod predicatur in minori. 4. Et si quis instaret de vicarii equivalentia, inutilis est instantia; quia nullus vicariatus, sive divinus sive humanus, equivalere potest principali auctoritati: quod patet de levi. 5. Nam scimus quod successor Petri non equivalet divine auctoritati saltem in operatione nature: non enim posset facere terram ascendere sursum, nec ignem descendere deorsum per offitium sibi commissum.

Now, ‘God’ is one thing, which is the subject in the major premise, and ‘vicar of God’ is another, which is predicated in the minor. 4. And if someone were to press the equivalency of the vicar, the insistence is useless; because no vicariate, whether divine or human, can be equivalent to the principal authority: which is readily evident. 5. For we know that the successor of Peter is not equivalent to the divine authority at least in the operation of nature: for he could not make earth ascend upward, nor fire descend downward, by the office committed to him.

6. Nec etiam possent omnia sibi commicti a Deo, quoniam potestatem creandi et similiter baptizandi nullo modo Deus commictere posset, ut evidenter probatur, licet Magister contrarium dixerit in quarto. 7. Scimus etiam quod vicarius hominis non equivalet ei, quantum in hoc quod vicarius est, quia nemo potest dare quod suum non est. Auctoritas principalis non est principis nisi ad usum, quia nullus princeps se ipsum auctorizare potest; recipere autem potest atque dimictere, sed alium creare non potest, quia creatio principis ex principe non dependet.

6. Nor indeed could all things be committed to him by God, since the power of creating and likewise of baptizing God could in no wise commit, as is evidently proved, although the Master said the contrary in the Fourth. 7. We know also that a vicar of a man is not equivalent to him, insofar as he is a vicar, because no one can give what is not his own. The principal authority is not the prince’s except for use, because no prince can authorize himself; he can receive it and also resign it, but he cannot create another, because the creation of a prince does not depend on a prince.

8. Quod si ita est, manifestum est quod nullus princeps potest sibi substituere vicarium in omnibus equivalentem: qua re instantia nullam efficaciam habet.

8. But if it is so, it is manifest that no prince can substitute for himself a vicar equivalent to him in all things: for which reason the objection has no efficacy.

VIII.1. Item assummunt de lictera eiusdem illud Cristi ad Petrum: "Et quodcunque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in celis; et quodcunque solveris super terram, erit solutum et in celis"; quod etiam omnibus apostolis est dictum. 2. Similiter accipiunt de lictera Mathei, similiter et Iohannis: ex quo arguunt successorem Petri omnia de concessione Dei posse tam ligare quam solvere; et inde inferunt posse solvere leges et decreta Imperii, atque leges et decreta ligare pro regimine temporali: unde bene sequeretur illud quod dicunt. 3. Et dicendum ad hoc per distinctionem circa maiorem sillogismi quo utuntur.

8.1. Likewise they assume from the letter of the same that saying of Christ to Peter: "And whatever you bind upon earth will be bound also in the heavens; and whatever you loose upon earth will be loosed also in the heavens"; which also was said to all the apostles. 2. Similarly they take from the letter of Matthew, and likewise of John: from which they argue that the successor of Peter, by concession of God, is able to bind as well as to loose all things; and from this they infer that he can dissolve the laws and decrees of the Empire, and bind laws and decrees for temporal governance: whence that which they say would well follow. 3. And to this it must be said by a distinction concerning the major [premise] of the syllogism which they use.

Sillogizant enim sic: 'Petrus potuit solvere omnia et ligare; successor Petri potest quicquid Petrus potuit; ergo successor Petri potest omnia solvere et ligare'. Unde inferunt auctoritatem et decreta Imperii solvere et ligare ipsum posse. Minorem concedo, maiorem vero non sine distinctione. 4. Et ideo dico quod hoc signum universale 'omne', quod includitur in 'quodcunque', nunquam distribuit extra ambitum termini distributi.

Syllogize they, indeed, thus: 'Peter could loose all things and bind; the successor of Peter can whatever Peter could; therefore the successor of Peter can loose and bind all things.' Whence they infer that he himself can loose and bind the authority and decrees of the Empire. I grant the minor, but not the major without distinction. 4. And therefore I say that this universal sign 'all', which is included in 'whatever', never distributes beyond the scope of the distributed term.

5. Nam si dico 'omne animal currit', 'omne' distribuit pro omni eo quod sub genere animalis comprehenditur; si vero dico 'omnis homo currit', tunc signum universale non distribuit nisi pro suppositis huius termini 'homo'; et cum dico 'omnis grammaticus', tunc distributio magis coartatur. 6. Propter quod semper videndum est quid est quod signum universale habet distribuire: quo viso, facile apparebit quantum sua distributio dilatetur, cognita natura et ambitu termini distributi. 7. Unde cum dicitur 'quodcunque ligaveris', si illud 'quodcunque' summeretur absolute, verum esset quod dicunt; et non solum hoc facere posset, quin etiam solvere uxorem a viro et ligare ipsam alteri vivente primo: quod nullo modo potest.

5. For if I say 'every animal runs', 'every' distributes for everything that is comprehended under the genus 'animal'; but if I say 'every man runs', then the universal sign distributes only for the supposits of this term 'man'; and when I say 'every grammarian', then the distribution is more coarctated. 6. Wherefore one must always see what it is that the universal sign has to distribute: which once seen, it will easily appear how far its distribution is dilated, the nature and ambit of the distributed term being known. 7. Whence when it is said 'whatsoever you shall bind', if that 'whatsoever' were taken absolutely, what they say would be true; and not only could he do this, but even loose a wife from her husband and bind her to another while the first was living: which in no way can be done.

Posset etiam solvere me non penitentem: quod etiam facere ipse Deus non posset. 8. Cum ergo ita sit, manifestum est quod non absolute summenda est illa distributio, sed respective ad aliquid. Quod autem illa respiciat satis est evidens considerato illo quod sibi conceditur, circa quod illa distributio subiungitur.

He could also absolve me not penitent: which even God himself could not do. 8. Since therefore it is so, it is manifest that that distribution is not to be taken absolutely, but respectively in relation to something. But what it has regard to is sufficiently evident, considering that which is conceded to him, around which that distribution is subjoined.

9. Dicit enim Cristus Petro: "Tibi dabo claves regni celorum", hoc est 'Faciam te hostiarium regni celorum'. Deinde subdit "et quodcunque": quod est 'omne quod', id est 'et omne quod ad istud offitium spectabit solvere poteris et ligare'. 10. Et sic signum universale quod includitur in 'quodcunque' contrahitur in sua distributione ab offitio clavium regni celorum: et sic assummendo, vera est illa propositio; absolute vero non, ut patet. 11. Et ideo dico quod etsi successor Petri, secundum exigentiam offitii commissi Petro, possit solvere et ligare, non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod possit solvere seu ligare decreta Imperii sive leges ut ipsi dicebant, nisi ulterius probaretur hoc spectare ad offitium clavium: cuius contrarium inferius ostendetur.

9. For Christ says to Peter: "I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of the heavens," that is, 'I will make you the ostiary of the kingdom of the heavens.' Then he adds "and whatever": which is 'every what,' that is, 'and everything which shall pertain to that office you will be able to loose and to bind.' 10. And thus the universal sign which is included in 'whatever' is contracted in its distribution by the office of the keys of the kingdom of the heavens: and so assuming it, that proposition is true; absolutely, however, it is not, as is evident. 11. And therefore I say that even if the successor of Peter, according to the exigency of the office committed to Peter, can loose and bind, nevertheless it does not follow from this that he can loose or bind the decrees of the Empire or the laws, as they used to say, unless it were further proved that this pertains to the office of the keys: the contrary of which will be shown below.

IX.1. Accipiunt etiam illud Luce, quod Petrus dixit Cristo, cum ait "Ecce duo gladii hic"; et dicunt quod per illos duos gladios duo predicta regimina intelliguntur, que quidem Petrus dixit esse ibi ubi erat, hoc est apud se: unde arguunt illa duo regimina secundum auctoritatem apud successorem Petri consistere. 2. Et ad hoc dicendum per interemptionem sensus in quo fundant argumentum. Dicunt enim illos duos gladios, quos assignavit Petrus, duo prefata regimina importare: quod omnino negandum est, tum quia illa responsio non fuisset ad intentionem Cristi, tum quia Petrus de more subito respondebat ad rerum superficiem tantum.

9.1. They also take that passage of Luke, where Peter said to Christ, when he said "Behold, here are two swords"; and they say that by those two swords the two aforesaid regimens are understood, which indeed Peter said to be there where he was, that is, with himself: whence they argue that those two regimens, as to authority, reside with the successor of Peter. 2. And to this it must be answered by the annihilation of the sense on which they found the argument. For they say that those two swords, which Peter designated, import the two aforesaid regimens: which must utterly be denied, both because that response would not have been according to Christ’s intention, and because Peter, as was his wont, was suddenly answering to the surface of things only.

3. Quod autem responsio non fuisset ad intentionem Cristi non erit immanifestum, si considerentur verba precedente et causa verborum. Propter quod sciendum quod hoc dictum fuit in die Cene; unde Lucas incipit superius sic: "Venit autem dies azimorum in quo necesse erat occidi Pascha", in qua quidem cena prelocutus fuit Cristus de ingruente passione, in qua oportebat ipsum separari a discipulis suis. 4. Item sciendum quod ubi ista verba intervenerunt erant simul omnes duodecim discipuli; unde parum post verba premissa dicit Lucas: "Et cum facta esset hora discubuit, et duodecim apostoli cum eo". 5. Et ex hinc continuato colloquio venit ad hec: "Quando misi vos sine sacculo et pera et calciamentis, nunquid aliquid defuit vobis?

3. But that the response would not have been according to Christ’s intention will not be unclear, if the preceding words and the cause of the words are considered. For which reason it must be known that this was said on the day of the Supper; whence Luke begins a little above thus: “Now there came the day of Unleavened Bread, on which it was necessary that the Pasch be sacrificed,” at which Supper Christ had previously spoken about the impending Passion, in which it was necessary that he be separated from his disciples. 4. Likewise it must be known that when these words intervened all twelve disciples were together; whence a little after the aforesaid words Luke says: “And when the hour had come, he reclined, and the twelve apostles with him.” 5. And from here, the conversation being continued, he came to this: “When I sent you without purse and bag and sandals, did you lack anything?”

At illi dixerunt: Nichil. Dixit ergo eis: Sed nunc qui habet sacculum tollat, similiter et peram; et qui non habet, vendat tunicam et emat gladium". 6. In quo satis aperte intentio Cristi manifestatur; non enim dixit 'ematis vel habeatis duos gladios'—ymo duodecim, cum ad duodecim discipulos diceret "qui non habet emat"—ut quilibet haberet unum. 7. Et hoc etiam dicebat premonens eos pressuram futuram et despectum futurum erga eos, quasi diceret: 'Quousque fui vobiscum, recepti eratis; nunc fugabimini.

But they said: Nothing. Therefore he said to them: But now whoever has a moneybag, let him take it, and likewise a pouch; and whoever does not have, let him sell his tunic and buy a sword." 6. In this the intention of Christ is made sufficiently clear; for he did not say, 'buy or have two swords'—nay, twelve, since to the twelve disciples he was saying "whoever does not have, let him buy"—so that each might have one. 7. And he said this also, forewarning them of the pressure to come and the disdain to come toward them, as if he were saying: 'So long as I was with you, you were received; now you will be driven away.'

Unde oportet vos preparare vobis etiam ea que iam prohibui vobis propter necessitatem'. 8. Itaque si responsio Petri, que est ad hoc, fuisset sub intentione illa, iam non fuisset ad eam que erat Cristi: de quo Cristus ipsum increpasset sicut multotiens increpavit, cum inscie responderet. Hic autem non fecit, sed acquievit dicens ei "Satis est"; quasi diceret. 'Propter necessitatem dico; sed si quilibet habere non potest, duo sufficere possunt'. 9. Et quod Petrus de more ad superficiem loqueretur, probat eius festina et inpremeditata presumptio, ad quam non solum fidei sinceritas impellebat, sed, ut credo, puritas et simplicitas naturalis.

Whence it is necessary that you prepare for yourselves even those things which I have already forbidden you, on account of necessity. 8. Therefore, if Peter’s response, which is to this, had been under that intention, it would not now have been to that which was Christ’s: for which Christ would have rebuked him, as he rebuked many times when he answered ignorantly. But here he did not do so, but acquiesced, saying to him “It is enough”; as if he were saying: ‘Because of necessity I say it; but if each one cannot have, two can suffice.’ 9. And that Peter, according to his custom, spoke at the surface, is proved by his hasty and unpremeditated presumption, to which not only the sincerity of faith impelled him, but also, as I believe, natural purity and simplicity.

Hanc suam presumptionem scribe Cristi testantur omnes. 10. Scribit autem Matheus, cum Iesus interrogasset discipulos "Quem me esse dicitis?", Petrum ante omnes respondisse: "Tu es Cristus, filius Dei vivi". Scribit etiam quod, cum Cristus diceret discipulis quia oportebat eum ire in Ierusalem et multa pati, Petrus assumpsit eum et cepit increpare illum dicens "Absit a te, Domine; non erit tibi hoc"; ad quem Cristus, redarguens, conversus dixit: "Vade post me, Sathana". 11. Item scribit quod in monte transfigurationis, in conspectu Cristi, Moysi et Elye et duorum filiorum Zebedei, dixit: "Domine, bonum est nos hic esse; si vis, faciamus hic tria tabernacula: tibi unum, Moysi unum et Elye unum". 12. Item scribit quod, cum discipuli essent in navicula tempore noctis et Cristus ambularet super aquam, Petrus dixit: "Domine, si tu es, iube me ad te venire super aquas. 13. Item scribit quod, cum Cristus prenuntiaret scandalum discipulis suis, Petrus respondit: "Etsi omnes scandalizati fuerint in te, ego nunquam scandalizabor"; et infra: "Etiamsi oportuerit me mori tecum, non te negabo". 14. Et hoc etiam contestatur Marcus; Lucas vero scribit Petrum etiam dixisse Cristo, parum supra verba premissa de gladiis: "Domine, tecum paratus sum in carcerem et in mortem ire". 15. Iohannes autem dicit de illo quod, cum Cristus vellet sibi lavare pedes, Petrus ait: "Domine, tu michi lavas pedes?"; et infra: "Non lavabis michi pedes in ecternum". 16. Dicit etiam ipsum gladio percussisse ministri servum: quod etiam conscribunt omnes quatuor.

All the scribes of Christ testify to this presumption of his. 10. Moreover Matthew writes that, when Jesus had asked the disciples, “Whom do you say that I am?”, Peter before all answered: “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.” He also writes that, when Christ said to the disciples that it was necessary for him to go to Jerusalem and suffer many things, Peter took him aside and began to rebuke him, saying, “Far be it from you, Lord; this shall not be for you”; to whom Christ, turning and reproving, said: “Go behind me, Satan.” 11. Likewise he writes that on the mount of Transfiguration, in the sight of Christ, Moses and Elijah, and the two sons of Zebedee, he said: “Lord, it is good for us to be here; if you will, let us make here three tabernacles: one for you, one for Moses, and one for Elijah.” 12. Likewise he writes that, when the disciples were in the little boat in the time of night and Christ was walking upon the water, Peter said: “Lord, if it is you, command me to come to you upon the waters. 13. Likewise he writes that, when Christ was foretelling a scandal to his disciples, Peter answered: “Even if all shall be scandalized at you, I will never be scandalized”; and below: “Even if it should be necessary for me to die with you, I will not deny you.” 14. And Mark also attests this; but Luke writes that Peter also said to Christ, a little earlier than the words set forth about the swords: “Lord, I am ready to go with you into prison and into death.” 15. But John says of him that, when Christ wished to wash his feet, Peter said: “Lord, do you wash my feet?”; and below: “You shall not wash my feet forever.” 16. He also says that he struck with the sword the servant of the minister: which all four likewise write down.

Dicit etiam Iohannes ipsum introivisse subito, cum venit in monumentum, videns alium discipulum cunctantem ad hostium. Dicit iterum quod, existente Iesu in litore post resurrectionem, "Cum Petrus audisset quia Dominus est, tunica succinxit se, erat enim nudus, et misit se in mare". Ultimo dicit quod, cum Petrus vidisset Iohannem, dixit Iesu: "Domine, hic autem quid?". 17. Iuvat quippe talia de Archimandrita nostro in laudem sue puritatis continuasse, in quibus aperte deprehenditur quod, cum de duobus gladiis loquebatur, intentione simplici respondebat ad Cristum. 18. Quod si verba illa Cristi et Petri typice sunt accipienda, non ad hoc quod dicunt isti trahenda sunt, sed referenda sunt ad sensum illius gladii de quo scribit Matheus sic: "Nolite ergo arbitrari quia veni mictere pacem in terram: non veni pacem mictere, sed gladium.

John also says that he himself entered suddenly, when he came to the tomb, seeing the other disciple hesitating at the doorway. He says again that, with Jesus being on the shore after the resurrection, "When Peter had heard that it is the Lord, he girded himself with his tunic—for he was naked—and cast himself into the sea." Finally he says that, when Peter had seen John, he said to Jesus: "Lord, but this man, what?" 17. It is indeed helpful to have continued such things about our Archimandrite in praise of his purity, in which it is clearly perceived that, when he was speaking of the two swords, he was responding to Christ with simple intention. 18. But if those words of Christ and Peter are to be taken typically, they are not to be dragged to what these men say, but are to be referred to the sense of that sword of which Matthew writes thus: "Do not therefore suppose that I have come to send peace upon the earth: I have not come to send peace, but a sword."

Veni enim separare hominem adversus patrem suum" etc. 19. Quod quidem fit tam verbo quam opere; propter quod dicebat Lucas ad Theophilum "que cepit Iesus facere et docere". Talem gladium Cristus emere precipiebat, quem duplicem ibi esse Petrus etiam respondebat. Ad verba enim et opera parati erant, per que facerent quod Cristus dicebat se venisse facturum per gladium, ut dictum est.

"For I came to separate a man against his father," etc. 19. Which indeed is done both by word and by work; on account of which Luke said to Theophilus "the things which Jesus began to do and to teach." Christ was enjoining such a sword to be bought, which Peter also replied there to be two. For they were prepared for words and works, through which they might do what Christ said he had come to do by the sword, as has been said.

X.1. Dicunt adhuc quidam quod Constantinus imperator, mundatus a lepra intercessione Silvestri tunc summi Pontificis Imperii sedem, scilicet Romam, donavit Ecclesie cum multis aliis Imperii dignitatibus. 2. Ex quo arguunt dignitates illas deinde neminem assummere posse nisi ab Ecclesia recipiat, cuius eas esse dicunt; et ex hoc bene sequeretur auctoritatem unam ab alia dipendere, ut ipsi volunt. 3. Positis et solutis igitur argumentis que radices in divinis eloquiis habere videbantur, restant nunc illa ponenda et solvenda que in gestis humanis et ratione humana radicantur.

10.1. Certain people still say that Emperor Constantine, cleansed from leprosy by the intercession of Sylvester, then supreme Pontiff, donated to the Church the seat of the Empire, namely Rome, along with many other dignities of the Empire. 2. Whence they argue that thereafter no one can assume those dignities unless he receive them from the Church, to which they say they belong; and from this it would well follow that one authority depends upon another, as they wish. 3. Therefore, the arguments which seemed to have roots in the divine utterances having been set forth and resolved, there now remain to be set forth and resolved those which are rooted in human deeds and in human reason.

Ex quibus primum est quod premictitur, quod sic sillogizant: 'ea que sunt Ecclesie nemo de iure habere potest nisi ab Ecclesia'—et hoc conceditur—'romanum regimen est Ecclesie: ergo ipsum nemo habere potest de iure nisi ab Ecclesia'; et minorem probant per ea que de Constantino superius tacta sunt. 4. Hanc ergo minorem interimo et, cum probant, dico quod sua probatio nulla est, quia Constantinus alienare non poterat Imperii dignitatem, nec Ecclesia recipere. 5. Et cum pertinaciter instant, quod dico sic ostendi potest: nemini licet ea tacere per offitium sibi deputatum que sunt contra illud offitium; quia sic idem, in quantum idem, esset contrarium sibi ipsi: quod est inpossibile; sed contra offitium deputatum Imperatori est scindere Imperium, cum offitium eius sit humanum genus uni velle et uni nolle tenere subiectum, ut in primo huius de facili videri potest; ergo scindere Imperium Imperatori non licet.

Of which the first is that which is premised, which they syllogize thus: 'the things which are the Church’s no one can of right have unless from the Church'—and this is conceded—'the Roman regimen is the Church’s: therefore no one can have it of right unless from the Church'; and they prove the minor by those things touched on above concerning Constantine. 4. Therefore I annihilate this minor and, when they attempt to prove it, I say that their proof is null, because Constantine could not alienate the imperial dignity, nor could the Church receive it. 5. And when they persist pertinaciously, what I say can be shown thus: it is permitted to no one, by reason of the office deputed to him, to keep silence about those things which are against that office; for thus the same, insofar as the same, would be contrary to itself: which is impossible; but to sunder the Empire is against the office deputed to the Emperor, since his office is to hold the human race subject to one—to will one and to will not more than one—as can easily be seen in Book 1 of this; therefore to sunder the Empire is not permitted to the Emperor.

6. Si ergo alique dignitates per Constantinum essent alienate—ut dicunt—ab Imperio, et cessissent in potestatem Ecclesie, scissa esset tunica inconsutilis, quam scindere ausi non sunt etiam qui Cristum verum Deum lancea perforarunt. 7. Preterea, sicut Ecclesia suum habet fundamentum, sic et Imperium suum. Nam Ecclesie fundamentum Cristus est; unde Apostolus ad Corinthios: "Fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere preter id quod positum est, quod est Cristus Iesus". Ipse est petra super quam hedificata est Ecclesia.

6. Therefore, if certain dignities had been alienated by Constantine—as they say—from the Empire, and had passed into the power of the Church, the seamless tunic would have been torn, which even those who pierced Christ, true God, with a lance did not dare to tear. 7. Moreover, just as the Church has its own foundation, so too the Empire its own. For the foundation of the Church is Christ; whence the Apostle to the Corinthians: 'No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Jesus Christ.' He himself is the rock upon which the Church has been built.

Imperii vero fundamentum ius humanum est. 8. Modo dico quod, sicut Ecclesie fondamento suo contrariari non licet, sed debet semper inniti super illud iuxta illud Canticorum "Que est ista, que ascendit de deserto delitiis affluens, innixa super dilectum?", sic et Imperio licitum non est contra ius humanum aliquid tacere. Sed contra ius humanum esset, si se ipsum Imperium destrueret: ergo Imperio se ipsum destruere non licet.

But indeed the foundation of the Empire is human law. 8. Now I say that, just as it is not permitted to the Church to be contrary to its foundation, but it ought always to lean upon it, according to that of the Song of Songs, "Who is this who ascends from the desert abounding in delights, leaning upon the beloved?", so too it is not licit for the Empire to keep silence about anything against human law. But it would be against human law if the Empire were to destroy itself: therefore it is not licit for the Empire to destroy itself.

9. Cum ergo scindere Imperium esset destruere ipsum, consistente Imperio in unitate Monarchie universalis, manifestum est quod Imperii auctoritate fungenti scindere Imperium non licet. Quod autem destruere Imperium sit contra ius humanum, ex superioribus est manifestum. 10. Preterea, omnis iurisdictio prior est suo iudice: iudex enim ad iurisdictionem ordinatur, et non e converso; sed Imperium est iurisdictio omnem temporalem iurisdictionem ambitu suo comprehendens: ergo ipsa est prior suo iudice, qui est Imperator, quia ad ipsam Imperator est ordinatus, et non e converso.

9. Therefore, since to cleave the Empire would be to destroy it itself, the Empire consisting in the unity of the universal Monarchy, it is manifest that it is not permitted to the one exercising the authority of the Empire to cleave the Empire. But that to destroy the Empire is against human law is manifest from the foregoing. 10. Moreover, every jurisdiction is prior to its judge: for the judge is ordained to the jurisdiction, and not conversely; but the Empire is the jurisdiction comprehending within its scope every temporal jurisdiction: therefore it itself is prior to its judge, who is the Emperor, because to it the Emperor is ordained, and not conversely.

Ex quo patet quod Imperator ipsam permutare non potest in quantum Imperator, cum ab ea recipiat esse quod est. 11. Modo dico sic: aut ille Imperator erat cum dicitur Ecclesie contulisse, aut non; et si non, planum est quod nichil poterat de Imperio conferre; si sic, cum talis collatio esset minoratio iurisdictionis, in quantum Imperator hoc facere non poterat. 12. Amplius, si unus Imperatot aliquam particulam ab Imperii iurisdictione discindere posset, cadem ratione et alius.

From which it is evident that the Emperor cannot transmute it, insofar as Emperor, since from it he receives the being which he is. 11. Now I speak thus: either he was Emperor when he is said to have conferred to the Church, or he was not; and if not, it is plain that he could confer nothing of the Empire; if so, since such a conferment would be a diminution of jurisdiction, insofar as Emperor he could not do this. 12. Further, if one Emperor could sever some particle from the jurisdiction of the Empire, by the same rationale another could as well.

Et cum iurisdictio temporalis finita sit et omne finitum per finitas decisiones assummatur, sequeretur quod iurisdictio prima posset annichilari: quod est irrationabile. 13. Adhuc, cum conferens habeat se per modum agentis et cui confertur per modum patientis, ut placet Phylosopho in quarto ad Nicomacum, non solum ad collationem esse licitam requiritur dispositio conferentis, sed etiam eius cui conf»rtur: videtur enim in patiente et disposito actus activorum inesse. 14. Sed Ecclesia omnino indisposita erat ad temporalia recipienda per preceptum prohibitivum expressum, ut habemus per Matheum sic : "Nolite possidere aurum, neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris, non peram in via" etc.

And since temporal jurisdiction is finite, and every finite thing is taken up by finite decisions, it would follow that the first jurisdiction could be annihilated: which is irrational. 13. Further, since the one conferring has himself in the mode of an agent, and the one upon whom it is conferred in the mode of a patient, as it pleases the Philosopher in the fourth to Nicomachus, not only is the disposition of the conferrer required for the conferral to be licit, but also that of the one upon whom it is conferred: for it seems that in the patient who is disposed the act of the agents inheres. 14. But the Church was altogether indisposed to receive temporal things by an express prohibitive precept, as we have through Matthew thus: "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your belts, not a bag on the way," etc.

Nam etsi per Lucam habemus relaxationem precepti quantum ad quedam, ad possessionem tamen auri et argenti licentiatam Ecclesiam post prohibitionem illam invenire non potui. 15. Qua re, si Ecclesia recipere non poterat, dato quod Constantinus hoc facere potuisset de se, actio tamen illa non erat possibilis propter patientis indispositionem. Patet igitur quod nec Ecclesia recipere per modum possessionis, nec ille conferre per modum alienationis poterat.

For although through Luke we have a relaxation of the precept as to certain things, yet I have not been able to find the Church licensed for the possession of gold and silver after that prohibition. 15. Wherefore, if the Church could not receive, granted that Constantine could have done this of himself, nevertheless that action was not possible on account of the patient’s indisposition. It is clear, therefore, that neither could the Church receive by mode of possession, nor could he confer by mode of alienation.

16. Poterat tamen Imperator in patrocinium Ecclesie Patrimonium et alia deputare, inmoto semper superiori dominio, cuius unitas divisionem non patitur. 17. Poterat et vicarius Dei recipere non tanquam possessor, sed tanquam fructuum pro Ecclesia pro Cristi pauperibus dispensator: quod apostolos fecisse non ignoratur. 18. Adhuc dicunt quod Adrianus papa Carolum Magnum sibi et Ecclesie advocavit ob iniuriam Longobardorum, tempore Desiderii regis eorum; et quod Carolus ab eo recepit Imperii dignitatem non obstante quod Michael imperabat apud Constantinopolim.

16. Yet the Emperor could assign the Patrimony and other things into the patronage of the Church, with the superior dominion ever unmoved, whose unity does not suffer division. 17. And the Vicar of God could receive not as possessor, but as dispenser of the fruits for the Church, for the poor of Christ: which it is not unknown that the apostles did. 18. Further they say that Pope Hadrian called Charles the Great to himself and to the Church as advocate on account of the injury of the Lombards, in the time of Desiderius their king; and that Charles received from him the dignity of the Empire, notwithstanding that Michael was reigning at Constantinople.

19. Propter quod dicunt quod omnes qui fuerunt Romanorum Imperatores post ipsum, et ipsi advocati Ecclesie sunt et debent ab Ecclesia advocari: ex quo etiam sequeretur illa dependentia quam concludere volunt. 20. Et ad hoc infringendum dico quod nichil dicunt: usurpatio enim iuris non facit ius. Nam si sic, eodem modo auctoritas Ecclesie probaretur dipendere ab Imperatore, postquam Octo imperator Leonem papam restituit et Benedictum deposuit, necnon in exilium in Saxoniam duxit.

19. On account of which they say that all who were Roman Emperors after him are themselves advocates of the Church and ought to be advocated by the Church; from which there would also follow that dependency which they wish to conclude. 20. And to break this I say that they say nothing: for the usurpation of a right does not make right. For if so, in the same way the authority of the Church would be proved to depend on the Emperor, after Otto the emperor restored Pope Leo and deposed Benedict, and likewise led him into exile into Saxony.

XI.1. Ratione vero sic arguunt. Summunt etenim sibi principium de decimo Prime phylosophie dicentes: omnia que sunt unius generis reducuntur ad unum, quod est mensura omnium que sub illo genere sunt; sed omnes homines sunt unius generis: ergo debent reduci ad unum, tanquam ad mensuram omnium eorum. 2. Et cum summus Antistes et Imperator sint homines, si conclusio illa est vera, oportet quod reducantur ad unum hominem.

11.1. By reason, indeed, they argue thus. For they take for themselves a principle from the tenth of the First Philosophy, saying: all things that are of one genus are reduced to one, which is the measure of all things that are under that genus; but all men are of one genus: therefore they ought to be reduced to one, as to the measure of them all. 2. And since the Supreme Pontiff and the Emperor are men, if that conclusion is true, it is necessary that they be reduced to one man.

Et cum Papa non sit reducendus ad alium, relinquitur quod Imperator cum omnibus aliis sit reducendus ad ipsum, tanquam ad mensuram et regulam: propter quod sequitur etiam idem quod volunt. 3. Ad hanc rationem solvendam dico quod, cum dicunt 'Ea que sunt unius generis oportet reduci ad aliquod unum de illo genere, quod est metrum in ipso', verum dicunt. Et similiter verum dicunt dicentes quod omnes homines sunt unius generis; et similiter verum concludunt cum inferunt ex hiis omnes homines esse reducendos ad unum metrum in suo genere.

And since the Pope is not to be reduced to another, it remains that the Emperor with all others is to be reduced to him, as to the measure and rule: wherefore there follows also the same thing that they desire. 3. To solve this argument I say that, when they say, 'Things which are of one genus ought to be reduced to some one of that genus, which is the measure in it,' they speak true. And similarly they speak true in saying that all men are of one genus; and similarly they conclude truly when they infer from these that all men must be reduced to one measure in their genus.

Sed cum ex hac conclusione subinferunt de Papa et Imperatore, falluntur 'secundum accidens'. 4. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod aliud est esse hominem et aliud est esse Papam; et eodem modo aliud est esse hominem, aliud esse Imperatorem, sicut aliud est esse hominem, et aliud est esse patrem et dominum. 5. Homo enim est id quod est per formam substantialem, per quam sortitur spetiem et genus, et per quam reponitur sub predicamento substantie; pater vero est id quod est per formam accidentalem, que est relatio per quam sortitur spetiem quandam et genus, et reponitur sub genere 'ad aliquid', sive 'relationis'. Aliter omnia reducerentur ad predicamentum substantie, cum nulla forma accidentalis per se subsistat absque ypostasi substantie subsistentis: quod est falsum. 6. Cum ergo Papa et Imperator sint id quod sunt per quasdam relationes, quia per Papatum et per Imperiatum, que relationes sunt altera sub ambitu paternitatis et altera sub ambitu dominationis, manifestum est quod Papa et Imperator, in quantum huiusmodi, habent reponi sub predicamento relationis, et per consequens reduci ad aliquod existens sub illo genere.

But when from this conclusion they subinfer concerning the Pope and the Emperor, they are deceived "according to accident". 4. For the evidence of which, it must be known that it is one thing to be a man and another to be Pope; and in the same way it is one thing to be a man, another to be Emperor, just as it is one thing to be a man, and another to be a father and a lord. 5. For man is that which he is through the substantial form, through which he obtains species and genus, and through which he is set under the predicament of substance; but father is that which he is through an accidental form, which is relation, through which he obtains a certain species and genus, and is set under the genus "to something", or "of relation". Otherwise all things would be reduced to the predicament of substance, since no accidental form subsists per se without the hypostasis of a subsisting substance: which is false. 6. Since therefore the Pope and the Emperor are what they are through certain relations, namely through the Papacy and through the Emperorship, which relations are the one under the compass of paternity and the other under the compass of domination, it is manifest that the Pope and the Emperor, inasmuch as such, have to be set under the predicament of relation, and consequently to be reduced to something existing under that genus.

7. Unde dico quod alia est mensura ad quam habent reduci prout sunt homines, et alia prout sunt et Papa et Imperator. Nam, prout sunt homines, habent reduci ad optimum hominem, qui est mensura omnium aliorum, et ydea ut dicam—quisquis ille sit—ad existentem maxime unum in genere suo ut haberi potest ex ultimis ad Nicomacum. 8. In quantum vero sunt relativa quedam, ut patet, reducenda sunt vel ad invicem, si alterum subalternatur alteri vel in spetie comunicant per naturam relationis, vel ad aliquod tertium, ad quod reducantur tanquam ad comunem unitatem.

7. Whence I say that one measure is that to which they have to be reduced insofar as they are men, and another insofar as they are both Pope and Emperor. For, insofar as they are men, they have to be reduced to the best man, who is the measure of all the others, and—an idea, so to speak—whoever he may be, to the one existing as maximally one in his genus, as can be had from the last books to Nicomachus. 8. Insofar, however, as they are certain relatives, as is clear, they must be reduced either to one another, if the one is subalternated to the other or they communicate in species by the nature of relation, or to some third, to which they may be reduced as to a common unity.

9. Sed non potest dici quod alterum subalternetur alteri, quia sic alterum de altero predicaretur: quod est falsum; non enim dicimus 'Imperator est Papa', nec e converso. Nec potest dici quod comunicent in spetie, cum alia sit ratio Pape, alia Imperatoris, in quantum huiusmodi. ergo reducuntur ad aliquid in quo habent uniri.

9. But it cannot be said that the one is subalternated to the other, because thus the one would be predicated of the other: which is false; for we do not say 'The Emperor is the Pope', nor conversely. Nor can it be said that they communicate in species, since the rationale of the Pope is one thing, that of the Emperor another, insofar as such. Therefore they are reduced to something in which they are to be united.

10. Propter quod sciendum quod, sicut se habet relatio ad relationem, sic relativum ad relativum. Si ergo Papatus et Imperiatus, cum sint relationes superpositionis, habeant reduci ad respectum superpositionis, a quo respectu cum suis differentialibus descendunt, Papa et Imperator, cum sint relativa, reduci habebunt ad aliquod unum in quo reperiatur ipse respectus superpositionis absque differentialibus aliis. 11. Et hoc erit vel ipse Deus, in quo respectus omnis universaliter unitur, vel aliqua substantia Deo inferiori in qua respectus superpositionis per differentiam superpositionis a simplici respectu descendens particuletur.

10. For which reason it must be understood that, as relation stands to relation, so the relative to the relative. If, therefore, the Papacy and the Imperiate, since they are relations of superposition, must be reduced to the respect of superposition, from which respect, with its differentials, they descend, the Pope and the Emperor, since they are relatives, will have to be reduced to some one thing in which the very respect of superposition is found without other differentials. 11. And this will be either God Himself, in whom every respect is universally unified, or some substance inferior to God, in which the respect of superposition, descending by the difference of superposition from simple respect, is particularized.

12. Et sic patet quod Papa et Imperator, in quantum homines, habent reduci ad unum; in quantum vero Papa et Imperator, ad aliud: et per hoc patet ad rationem.

12. And thus it is patent that the Pope and the Emperor, insofar as they are men, are to be reduced to one; but insofar as Pope and Emperor, to another; and through this it is patent with respect to the reasoning.

XII.1. Positis et exclusis erroribus quibus potissime innituntur qui romani Principatus auctoritatem dependere dicunt a romano Pontifice, redeundum est ad ostendendum veritatem huius tertie questionis, que a principio discutienda proponebatur: que quidem veritas apparebit sufficienter si, sub prefixo principio inquirendo, prefatam auctoritatem immediate dipendere a culmine totius entis ostendero, qui Deus est. 2. Et hoc erit ostensum vel si auctoritas Ecclesie removeatur ab illa—cum de alia non sit altercatio—vel si 'ostensive' probetur a Deo immediate dependere. 3. Quod autem auctoritas Ecclesie non sit causa imperialis auctoritatis probatur sic: illud, quo non esistente aut quo non virtuante, aliud habet totam suam virtutem, non est causa illius virtutis; sed, Ecclesia non esistente aut non virtuante, Imperium habuit totam suam virtutem: ergo Ecclesia non est causa virtutis Imperii et per consequens nec auctoritatis, cum idem sit virtus et auctoritas eius.

12.1. The errors having been set forth and excluded, on which those chiefly rely who say that the authority of the Roman Principate depends on the Roman Pontiff, we must return to show the truth of this third question, which from the beginning was proposed to be discussed: and this truth will appear sufficiently if, under the prefixed principle to be inquired into, I shall show that the aforesaid authority depends immediately on the summit of the whole of being, who is God. 2. And this will be shown either if the authority of the Church is removed from that—since there is no altercation about another—or if it be proved ‘ostensively’ to depend immediately on God. 3. But that the authority of the Church is not the cause of imperial authority is proved thus: that, the non-existence of which or the non-operating of which, another thing has its whole power, is not the cause of that power; but, the Church not existing or not operating, the Empire had its whole power: therefore the Church is not the cause of the power of the Empire and, consequently, neither of its authority, since its power and its authority are the same.

4. Sit Ecclesia A, Imperium B, auctoritas sive virtus Imperii C; si, non existente A, C est in B, inpossibile est A esse causam eius quod est C esse in B, cum inpossibile sit effectum precedere causam in esse. Adhuc si, nichil operante A, C est in B, necesse est A non esse causam eius quod est C esse in B, cum necesse sit ad productionem effectus preoperari causam, presertim efficientem, de qua intenditur. 5. Maior propositio huius demonstrationis declarata est in terminis; minorem Cristus et Ecclesia confirmat.

4. Let the Church be A, the Empire B, the authority or virtue of the Empire C; if, with A not existing, C is in B, it is impossible for A to be the cause of that which is C’s being in B, since it is impossible for the effect to precede the cause in being. Furthermore, if, with A doing nothing, C is in B, it is necessary that A not be the cause of that which is C’s being in B, since for the production of an effect it is necessary that the cause preoperate, especially the efficient [cause], which is the one intended. 5. The major proposition of this demonstration has been made clear in the terms; Christ and the Church confirm the minor.

Cristus nascendo et moriendo, ut superius dictum est: Ecclesia, cum Paulus in Actibus Apostolorum dicat ad Festum: "Ad tribunal Cesaris sto, ubi me oportet iudicari"; cum etiam angelus Dei Paulo dixerit parum post: "Ne timeas, Paule, Cesari te oportet assistere"; et infra iterum Paulus ad Iudeos existentes in Ytalia: "Contradicentibus autem Iudeis, coactus sum appellare Cesarem, non quasi gentem meam habens aliquid accusare, sed ut eruerem animam meam de morte". 6. Quod si Cesar iam tunc iudicandi temporalia non habuisset auctoritatem nec Cristus hoc persuasisset, nec angelus illa verba nuntiasset, nec ille qui dicebat "Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Cristo" incompetentem iudicem appellasset. 7. Si etiam Constantinus auctoritatem non habuisset, in patrocinium Ecclesie illa que de Imperio deputavit ei de iure deputare non potuisset; et sic Ecclesia illa collatione uteretur iniuste, cum Deus velit oblationes esse inmaculatas iuxta illud Levitici: "Omnis oblatio, quam conferetis Domino, absque fermento erit". 8. Quod quidem preceptum, licet ad offerentes faciem habere videatur, nichilominus est per consequens ad recipientes; stultum enim est credere Deum velle recipi quod prohibet exhiberi, cum etiam in eodem precipiatur Levitis: "Nolite contaminare animas vestras nec tangatis quicquid eorum, ne inmundi sitis". 9. Sed dicere quod Ecclesia sic abutatur patrimonio sibi deputato est valde inconveniens: ergo falsum erat illud ex quo sequebatur.

Christ by being born and by dying, as was said above: the Church, since Paul in the Acts of the Apostles says to Festus: "I stand at Caesar’s tribunal, where it is necessary that I be judged"; since also an angel of God said to Paul a little later: "Do not fear, Paul; it is necessary for you to stand before Caesar"; and below again Paul to the Jews existing in Italy: "But the Jews contradicting, I was compelled to appeal to Caesar, not as having anything to accuse my nation of, but so that I might rescue my soul from death".
6. But if Caesar had not already then had the authority of judging temporal matters, neither would Christ have persuaded this, nor would the angel have announced those words, nor would he who said "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" have appealed to an incompetent judge. 7. If also Constantine had not had authority, he could not have been able by right to depute to the patronage of the Church those things of the Empire which he deputed to it; and thus the Church would be using that grant unjustly, since God wills the oblations to be immaculate, according to that of Leviticus: "Every oblation that you shall offer to the Lord shall be without leaven". 8. Which precept indeed, although it seems to have its face toward the offerers, is nonetheless by consequence toward the receivers; for it is foolish to believe that God wishes to receive what He forbids to be presented, since in the same place it is also enjoined upon the Levites: "Do not contaminate your souls, nor touch anything of theirs, lest you be unclean". 9. But to say that the Church thus abuses the patrimony deputed to itself is very incongruous: therefore that from which it followed was false.

XIII.1. Amplius, si Ecclesia virtutem haberet auctorizandi romanum Principem, aut haberet a Deo, aut a se, aut ab Imperatore aliquo aut ab universo mortalium assensu, vel saltem ex illis prevalentium: nulla est alia rimula, per quam virtus hec ad Ecclesiam manare potuisset; sed a nullo istorum habet: ergo virtutem predictam non habet. 2. Quod autem a nullo istorum habeat sic apparet. Nam si a Deo recepisset, hoc fuisset aut per legem divinam aut per naturalem, quia quod a natura recipitur a Deo recipitur, non tamen convertitur.

13.1. Further, if the Church had the power of authorizing the Roman Emperor, either it would have it from God, or from itself, or from some Emperor, or from the assent of all mortals, or at least of those prevailing among them: there is no other little fissure through which this power could have flowed to the Church; but it has it from none of these: therefore it does not have the aforesaid power. 2. But that it has it from none of these appears thus. For if it had received it from God, this would have been either through the divine law or through the natural law, since what is received from nature is received from God—though not conversely.

3. Sed non per naturalem, quia natura non imponit legem nisi suis effectibus, cum Deus insufficiens esse non possit ubi sine secundis agentibus aliquid in esse producit. Unde, cum Ecclesia non sit effectus nature, sed Dei dicentis "Super hanc petram hedificabo Ecclesiam meam", et alibi "Opus consummavi quod dedisti michi ut faciam", manifestum est quod ei natura legem non dedit. 4. Sed nec per divinam: omnis nanque divina lex duorum Testamentorum gremio continetur; in quo quidem gremio reperire non possum temporalium sollicitudinem sive curam sacerdotio primo vel novissimo commendatam fuisse.

3. But not by the natural, because nature does not impose law except upon its own effects, since God cannot be insufficient where he brings something into being without secondary agents. Whence, since the Church is not an effect of nature, but of God saying "Upon this rock I will build my Church," and elsewhere "I have consummated the work which you gave me to do," it is manifest that nature did not give law to it. 4. But neither by the divine: for every divine law is contained in the bosom of the two Testaments; in which bosom, indeed, I cannot find that the solicitude or care of temporals has been commended to the priesthood, whether the earlier or the latest.

5. Quinymo invenio sacerdotes primos ab illa de precepto remotos, ut patet per ea que Deus ad Moysen; et sacerdotes novissimos, per ea que Cristus ad discipulos: quam quidem ab eis esse remotam possibile non est, si regiminis temporalis auctoritas a sacerdotio demanaret, cum saltem in auctorizando sollicitudo provisionis instaret, et deinde cautela continua ne auctorizatus a tramite rectitudinis deviaret. 6. Quod autem a se non receperit de facili patet. Nichil est quod dare possit quod non habet; unde omne agens aliquid actu esse tale oportet quale agere intendit, ut habetur in hiis que De simpliciter ente.

5. Nay rather, I find the first priests removed from that by precept, as is clear from those things which God [said] to Moses; and the most recent priests, from those things which Christ [said] to the disciples: which indeed it is not possible to be removed from them, if the authority of temporal regimen were to emanate from the priesthood, since at least, in authorizing, the solicitude of provision would press, and thereafter a continuous caution lest the authorized one should deviate from the path of rectitude. 6. But that it did not receive it from itself is easily plain. Nothing can give what it does not have; whence every agent must actually be such as it intends to act, as is held in those matters which are De simpliciter ente.

Sed constat quod, si Ecclesia sibi dedit illam virtutem, non habebat illam priusquam daret; et sic dedisset sibi quod non habebat; quod est inpossibile. 7. Quod vero ab aliquo Imperatore non receperit, per ea que superius manifesta sunt patet sufficienter. Et quod etiam ab assensu omnium vel prevalentium non habuerit quis dubitat, cum non modo Asyani et Affricani omnes, quinetiam maior pars Europam colentium hoc aborreat?

But it is clear that, if the Church gave that power to itself, it did not have it before it gave it; and thus it would have given to itself what it did not have; which is impossible. 7. But that it did not receive it from any Emperor is sufficiently evident through the things that above are manifest. And who doubts that it did not have it even from the assent of all or of the prevailing, since not only all Asians and Africans, but even the greater part of those inhabiting Europe abhor this?

Fastidium etenim est in rebus manifestissimis probationes adducere.

For it is tedious to adduce proofs in the most manifest matters.

XIV.1. Item, illud quod est contra naturam alicuius non est de numero suarum virtutum, cum virtutes uniuscuiusque rei consequantur naturam eius propter finis adeptionem; sed virtus auctorizandi regnum nostre mortalitatis est contra naturam Ecclesie: ergo non est de numero virtutum suarum. 2. Ad evidentiam autem minoris sciendum quod natura Ecclesie forma est Ecclesie: nam, quamvis natura dicatur de materia et forma, per prius tamen dicitur de forma, ut ostensum est in Naturali auditu. 3. Forma autem Ecclesie nichil aliud est quam vita Cristi, tam in dictis quam in factis comprehensa : vita enim ipsius ydea fuit et exemplar militantis Ecclesie, presertim pastorum, maxime summi, cuius est pascere agnos et oves.

XIV.1. Likewise, that which is against the nature of a thing is not among the number of its virtues, since the virtues of each thing follow its nature for the attainment of the end; but the virtue of authorizing the kingdom of our mortality is against the nature of the Church: therefore it is not among the number of its virtues. 2. For the evidence of the minor, however, it must be known that the nature of the Church is the form of the Church: for, although “nature” is said of matter and form, yet more primarily it is said of form, as has been shown in the Natural Hearing. 3. But the form of the Church is nothing other than the life of Christ, encompassed both in sayings and in deeds : for his life was the idea and exemplar of the Church Militant, especially of the shepherds, most of all the highest, whose office it is to feed the lambs and the sheep.

4. Unde ipse in Iohanne formam sue vite relinquens "Exemplum" inquit "dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciatis"; et spetialiter ad Petrum, postquam pastoris offitium sibi commisit, ut in eodem habemus, "Petre", inquit "sequere me". 5. Sed Cristus huiusmodi regimen coram Pilato abnegavit: "Regnum" inquit" meum non est de hoc mundo; si ex hoc mundo esset regnum meum, ministri mei utique decertarent ut non traderer Iudeis; nunc autem regnum meum non est hinc". 6. Quod non sic intelligendum est ac si Cristus, qui Deus est, non sit dominus regni huius; cum Psalmista dicat "quoniam ipsius est mare, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam fundaverunt manus eius"; sed quia, ut exemplar Ecclesie, regni huius curam non habebat. 7. Velut si aureum sigillum loqueretur de se dicens 'non sum mensura in aliquo genere'; quod quidem dictum non habet locum in quantum est aurum, cum sit metrum in genere metallorum, sed in quantum est quoddam signum receptibile per impressionem. 8. Formale igitur est Ecclesie illud idem dicere, illud idem sentire: oppositum autem dicere vel sentire, contrarium forme, ut patet, sive nature, quod idem est.

4. Whence he himself, leaving in John the form of his life, says, "Example I have given you, that just as I have done to you, so also you should do"; and specially to Peter, after he committed to him the office of shepherd, as we have in the same place, he says, "Peter, follow me". 5. But Christ denied such a regimen before Pilate: "My kingdom," he says, "is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, my ministers would certainly contend, that I might not be handed over to the Jews; but now my kingdom is not from here". 6. Which is not to be understood thus, as if Christ, who is God, were not lord of this kingdom; since the Psalmist says, "for his is the sea, and he made it, and the dry land his hands founded"; but because, as the exemplar of the Church, he did not have the care of this kingdom. 7. Just as if a golden seal were to speak about itself, saying 'I am not a measure in any genus'; which statement indeed has no place insofar as it is gold, since it is a measure in the genus of metals, but insofar as it is a certain sign receptive of impression. 8. Therefore it is formal for the Church to say that same thing, to think that same thing: but to say or to think the opposite is contrary to the form, as is clear, or to the nature, which is the same.

9. Ex quo colligitur quod virtus auctorizandi regnum hoc sit contra naturam Ecclesie: contrarietas enim in oppinione vel dicto sequitur ex contrarietate que est in re dicta vel oppinata, sicut verum et falsum ab esse rei vel non esse in oratione causatur, ut doctrina Predicamentorum nos docet. 10. Sufficienter igitur per argumenta superiora ducendo 'ad inconveniens' probatum est auctoritatem Imperii ab Ecclesia minime dipendere.

9. From which it is inferred that the virtue of authorizing this kingdom is against the nature of the Church: for contrariety in opinion or in saying follows from the contrariety which is in the thing said or opined, just as the true and the false in a speech are caused by the being or not-being of the thing, as the doctrine of the Predicaments teaches us. 10. Sufficiently, therefore, by the foregoing arguments leading 'to the inconvenient,' it has been proved that the authority of the Empire in no way depends on the Church.

XV.1. Licet in precedenti capitulo ducendo 'ad inconveniens' ostensum sit auctoritatem Imperii ab auctoritate summi Pontificis non causari, non tamen omnino probatum est ipsam inmediate dependere a Deo, nisi ex consequenti. Consequens enim est si ab ipso Dei vicario non dependet, quod a Deo dependeat. 2. Et ideo, ad perfectam determinationem propositi, 'ostensive' probandum est Imperatorem, sive mundi Monarcham, immediate se habere ad principem universi, qui Deus est.

15.1. Although in the preceding chapter, by leading 'to the inconvenient', it was shown that the authority of the Empire is not caused by the authority of the supreme Pontiff, nevertheless it has not altogether been proved that it immediately depends upon God, except by consequence. For it is a consequence that, if it does not depend upon God’s own vicar, it depends upon God. 2. And therefore, for the perfect determination of the proposed thesis, it must be proved 'ostensive' that the Emperor, or the world Monarch, stands in immediate relation to the prince of the universe, who is God.

3. Ad huius autem intelligentiam sciendum quod homo solus in entibus tenet medium corruptibilium et incorruptibilium; propter quod recte a phylosophis assimilatur orizonti, qui est medium duorum emisperiorum. 4. Nam homo, si consideretur secundum utranque partem essentialem, scilicet animam et corpus, corruptibilis est; si consideretur tantum secundum unam, scilicet animam, incorruptibilis est. Propter quod bene Phylosophus inquit de ipsa, prout incorruptibilis est, in secundo De anima cum dixit: "Et solum hoc contingit separari, tanquam perpetuum, a corruptibili". 5. Si ergo homo medium quoddam est corruptibilium et incorruptibilium, cum omne medium sapiat naturam extremorum, necesse est hominem sapere utranque naturam.

3. But for the understanding of this, it must be known that man alone among beings holds the medium of the corruptible and the incorruptible; wherefore he is rightly likened by the philosophers to the horizon, which is the mean of the two hemispheres. 4. For man, if he be considered according to both essential parts, namely soul and body, is corruptible; if he be considered only according to the one, namely the soul, he is incorruptible. Wherefore the Philosopher well says of it, insofar as it is incorruptible, in the second of On the Soul, when he said: “And this alone happens to be separated, as perpetual, from the corruptible.” 5. If therefore man is a certain medium of corruptibles and incorruptibles, since every medium savors of the nature of its extremes, it is necessary that man savor both natures.

6. Et cum omnis natura ad ultimum quendam finem ordinetur, consequitur ut hominis duplex finis existat : ut, sicut inter omnia entia solus incorruptibilitatem et corruptibilitatem partecipat, sic solus inter omnia entia in duo ultima ordinetur, quorum alterum sit finis eius prout corruptibilis est, alterum vero prout incorruptibilis. 7. Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit intendendos : beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; et beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur. 8. Ad has quidem beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet.

6. And since every nature is ordered to a certain ultimate end, it follows that a twofold end of man exists : that, just as among all beings he alone participates both incorruptibility and corruptibility, so he alone among all beings is ordered to two ultimates, of which the one is his end insofar as he is corruptible, but the other insofar as he is incorruptible. 7. Two ends, therefore, that ineffable providence has set before man to be intended: namely, the beatitude of this life, which consists in the operation of proper virtue and is figured through the earthly paradise; and the beatitude of eternal life, which consists in the fruition of the divine aspect, to which one’s own virtue cannot ascend unless aided by divine light, which is given to be understood through the celestial paradise. 8. To these beatitudes indeed, as to diverse conclusions, it is necessary to come through diverse means.

Nam ad primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas operando, fidem spem scilicet et karitatem. 9. Has igitur conclusiones et media, licet ostensa sint nobis hec ab humana ratione que per phylosophos tota nobis innotuit, hec a Spiritu Sancto qui per prophetas et agiographos, qui per coecternum sibi Dei filium Iesum Cristum et per eius discipulos supernaturalem veritatem ac nobis necessariam revelavit, humana cupiditas postergaret nisi homines, tanquam equi, sua bestialitate vagantes "in camo et freno" compescerentur in via. 10. Propter quod opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum duplicem finem: scilicet summo Pontifice, qui secundum revelata humanum genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, qui secundum phylosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret.

For to the first we come through philosophical documents, provided that we follow them by acting according to the moral and intellectual virtues; but to the second through spiritual documents which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them by acting according to the theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity. 9. These, then, conclusions and means—though these were shown to us, those by human reason, which became fully known to us through the philosophers, and these by the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets and hagiographers, through the coeternal to himself Son of God Jesus Christ and through his disciples, revealed the supernatural truth both necessary for us—human cupidity would postpone unless men, like horses, wandering in their bestiality, were restrained “in camo et freno” on the way. 10. Wherefore man had need of a double director in accordance with his twofold end: namely, the Supreme Pontiff, who, according to the things revealed, might lead the human race to eternal life, and the Emperor, who, according to philosophical documents, might direct the human race to temporal felicity.

11. Et cum ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci, et hii cum difficultate nimia, pervenire possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pacis tranquillitate quiescat, hoc est illud signum ad quod maxime debet intendere curator orbis, qui dicitur romanus Princeps, ut scilicet in areola ista mortalium libere cum pace vivatur. 12. Cumque dispositio mundi huius dispositionem inherentem celorum circulationi sequatur, necesse est ad hoc ut utilia documenta libertatis et pacis commode locis et temporibus applicentur, de curatore isto dispensari ab Illo qui totalem celorum dispositionem presentialiter intuetur. Hic autem est solus ille qui hanc preordinavit, ut per ipsam ipse providens suis ordinibus queque connecteret.

11. And since to this harbor either none or few—and these with exceeding difficulty—can arrive, unless, the waves of seductive cupidity having been stilled, the human race, free, may repose in the tranquillity of peace, this is that mark to which the curator of the world, who is called the Roman Prince, ought chiefly to aim: namely, that in this little plot of mortals one may live freely with peace. 12. And since the disposition of this world follows the disposition inherent in the circulation of the heavens, it is necessary, for this, that the useful teachings of liberty and peace be suitably applied to places and times, that the dispensation concerning this curator be made by Him who directly contemplates the total disposition of the heavens. But this is that one alone who preordained it, so that through it He Himself, in His providence, might connect each thing to His ordinances.

13. Quod si ita est, solus eligit Deus, solus ipse confirmat, cum superiorem non habeat. Ex quo haberi potest ulterius quod nec isti qui nunc, nec alii cuiuscunque modi dicti fuerint 'electores', sic dicendi sunt: quin potius 'denuntiatores divine providentie' sunt habendi. 14. Unde fit quod aliquando patiantur dissidium quibus denuntiandi dignitas est indulta, vel quia omnes vel quia quidam eorum, nebula cupiditatis ottenebrati, divine dispensationis faciem non discernunt.

13. If this is so, God alone chooses, He alone confirms, since He has no superior. From which it can further be gathered that neither those who now, nor others of whatever sort shall have been called ‘electors,’ are to be so called; rather, they are to be regarded as ‘denuntiators of divine providence.’ 14. Whence it happens that those to whom the dignity of denuntiating has been granted sometimes suffer dissension, either because all, or because some of them, darkened by the mist of cupidity, do not discern the face of the divine dispensation.

15. Sic ergo patet quod auctoritas temporalis Monarche sine ullo medio in ipsum de Fonte universalis auctoritatis descendit: qui quidem Fons, in arce sue simplicitatis unitus, in multiplices alveos influit ex habundantia bonitatis. 16. Et iam satis videor metam actigisse propositam. Enucleata nanque veritas est questionis illius qua querebatur utrum ad bene esse mundi necessarium esset Monarche offitium, ac illius qua querebatur an romanus populus de iure Imperium sibi asciverit, nec non illius ultime qua querebatur an Monarche auctoritas a Deo vel ab alio dependeret inmediate.

15. Thus therefore it is evident that the temporal authority of the Monarch descends into him without any medium from the Fount of universal authority: which Fount, united in the citadel of its simplicity, flows into multiple channels out of the abundance of goodness. 16. And now I seem to have sufficiently reached the proposed goal. For the truth has been elucidated of that question wherein it was asked whether the office of the Monarch were necessary for the well-being of the world, and of that wherein it was asked whether the Roman people by right appropriated to themselves the Imperium, and also of that last wherein it was asked whether the Monarch’s authority depended immediately on God or on another.

17. Que quidem veritas ultime questionis non sic stricte recipienda est, ut romanus Princeps in aliquo romano Pontifici non subiaceat, cum mortalis ista felicitas quodammodo ad inmortalem felicitatem ordinetur. 18. Illa igitur reverentia Cesar utatur ad Petrum qua primogenitus illius debet uti ad patrem: ut luce paterne gratie illustratus virtuosius orbem terre irradiet, cui ab Illo solo prefectus est, qui est omnium spiritualium et temporalium gubernator.

17. The truth of the last question is not to be received so strictly, that the Roman Prince be in no respect subject to the Roman Pontiff, since this mortal felicity is in a certain manner ordained to immortal felicity. 18. Therefore let Caesar use toward Peter that reverence which his firstborn ought to use toward a father: so that, illuminated by the light of paternal grace, he may more virtuously irradiate the orb of the earth, over which he has been appointed prefect by Him alone, who is the governor of all spiritual and temporal things.