Boethius de Dacia: DE MUNDI AETERNITATE

[1.] Quia sicut in his quae ex lege credi debent, quae tamen pro se rationem non habent, quaerere rationem stultum est, quia qui hoc facit, quaerit quod impossibile est inveniri, - et eis nolle credere sine ratione haereticum est, sic in his quae non sunt manifesta de se, quae tamen pro se rationem habent, eis velle credere sine ratione philosophicum non est, ideo - volentes sententiam christianae fidei de aeternitate mundi et sententiam Aristotelis et quorundam aliorum philosophorum reducere ad concordiam, ut sententia fidei firmiter teneatur quamquam in quibusdam demonstrari non possit, - ne incurramus stultitiam, quaerendo demonstrationem ubi ipsa non est possibilis, ne etiam incurramus haeresim, nolentes credere quod ex fide teneri debet, quia pro se demonstrationem non habet, sicut fuit mos quibusdam philosophis quibus nulla lex posita placuit, quia articuli legis positae pro se non habebant demonstrationem, ut etiam sententia philosophorum salvetur, quantum ratio eorum concludere potest, - nam eorum sententia in nullo contradicit christianae fidei nisi apud non intelligentes: sententia enim philosophorum innititur demonstrationibus et certis rationibus possibilibus in rebus de quibus loquuntur, fides autem in multis, innititur miraculis et non rationibus: quod enim tenetur propter hoc quod per rationes conclusum est, non est fides sed scientia, - et ut appareat quod fides et philosophia sibi non contradicunt de aeternitate mundi, ut etiam pateat quod rationes quorundam haereticorum non habent vigorem per quas contra christianam fidem mundum tenent esse aeternum, de hoc per rationem inquiramus, scilicet utrum mundus sit aeternus.

[1.] Because just as in those things which by law must be believed, which nevertheless do not have a reason on their own behalf, to seek a reason is foolish, because he who does this seeks what is impossible to find, - and to be unwilling to believe them without a reason is heretical, so in those things which are not manifest of themselves, which nevertheless have a reason on their own behalf, to be willing to believe them without a reason is not philosophical, therefore - wishing to bring back into concord the opinion of the Christian faith concerning the eternity of the world and the opinion of Aristotle and of certain other philosophers, so that the opinion of faith may be held firmly although in certain points it cannot be demonstrated, - lest we incur foolishness by seeking a demonstration where it is not possible, and lest we also incur heresy, being unwilling to believe what must be held from faith because it does not have a demonstration on its own behalf, just as it was the custom with certain philosophers to whom no positive law was pleasing, because the articles of the positive law did not have a demonstration on their own behalf, so that the opinion of the philosophers also may be saved, as far as their reason can conclude, - for their opinion in no way contradicts the Christian faith except among the not-understanding: for the opinion of the philosophers rests upon demonstrations and sure reasons possible in the matters of which they speak, but faith in many things rests upon miracles and not upon reasons: for what is held on account of the fact that it has been concluded through reasons is not faith but science, - and so that it may appear that faith and philosophy do not contradict each other concerning the eternity of the world, and also that it may be evident that the reasons of certain heretics do not have force, by which they hold against the Christian faith that the world is eternal, let us inquire about this through reason, namely, whether the world is eternal.

[2.] Et videtur quod non: primum principium est causa substantiae mundi, quia si non, tunc plura essent prima principia; quod autem habet esse ab alio, hoc sequitur illud in duratione, ergo mundus sequitur primum principium in duratione; ens autem aeternum nullum sequitur in duratione; ergo mundus non est aeternus.

[2.] And it seems that not: the first principle is the cause of the substance of the world, because if not, then there would be several first principles; but that which has being from another follows that in duration, therefore the world follows the first principle in duration; but an eternal being follows none in duration; therefore the world is not eternal.

Item, nihil potest Deo adaequari; si ergo mundus esset aeternus, mundus adaequaretur Deo in duratione; hoc autem est impossibile; ergo, etc.

Likewise, nothing can be equated to God; if therefore the world were eternal, the world would be equated to God in duration; but this is impossible; therefore, etc.

Item, virtus finita non potest facere durationem infinitam, quia duratio non excedit virtutem facientem ipsam; virtus autem caeli finita est, sicut et virtus cuiuslibet corporis finiti; ergo virtus caeli non facit durationem aeternam, ergo caelum non est aeternum, ergo nec totus mundus, cum mundus non praecedat caelum.

Likewise, a finite virtue (power) cannot make an infinite duration, because duration does not exceed the power making it; but the power of the heaven is finite, just as the power of any finite body; therefore the power of the heaven does not make an eternal duration, therefore the heaven is not eternal, therefore neither is the whole world, since the world does not precede the heaven.

Item, Deus praecedit mundum secundum naturam, in Deo autem idem est natura et duratio; ergo Deus praecedit mundum secundum durationem. Ergo mundus non est aeternus.

Likewise, God precedes the world according to nature, in God, however, nature and duration are the same; therefore God precedes the world according to duration. Therefore the world is not eternal.

Item, omne creatum est ex nihilo factum: in hoc enim differunt creatio et generatio, quia generatio omnis est ex subiecto et materia: ideo generans non potest in totam substantiam rei; creatio autem non est ex subiecto et materia, et ideo creans potest in totam substantiam rei. Mundus autem est creatus, quia ante mundum non erat subiectum et materia ex qua fieret mundus, ergo mundus est ex nihilo: tale autem est ens postquam fuit non ens; cum igitur simul non potuit esse ens et non-ens, ergo prius fuit non-ens et postmodum ens; sed omne illud quod habet esse post non-esse, illud est novum; mundus igitur est novus, ergo non est aeternus, cum novum et aeternum non se compatiantur in eodem.

Likewise, every created thing has been made out of nothing: for in this the creation and the generation differ, because every generation is from a subject and matter; therefore the generating agent cannot extend to the whole substance of the thing; but creation is not from a subject and matter, and therefore the one creating can extend to the whole substance of the thing. The world, however, is created, because before the world there was not a subject and matter from which the world might be made, therefore the world is out of nothing: but such is a being after it was non-being; since therefore it could not be at the same time being and non-being, therefore earlier it was non-being and afterward being; but everything which has being after non-being, that is new; therefore the world is new, therefore it is not eternal, since the new and the eternal do not be compatible together in the same.

Item, cui potest fieri additio, illo potest aliquid esse maius; toti tempori quod praecessit, potest fieri additio temporis, ergo et toto tempore quod praecessit potest esse aliquid maius; infinito autem nihil potest esse maius, ergo totum tempus quod praecessit non est infinitum; ergo neque motus, nec mundus.

Likewise, that to which an addition can be made, something can be greater than it; to the whole time which has preceded, an addition of time can be made, therefore also something can be greater than the whole time which has preceded; but nothing can be greater than the infinite, therefore the whole time which has preceded is not infinite; therefore neither motion, nor the world.

Item, si mundus esset aeternus, tunc generatio animalium et plantarum et corporum simplicium esset aeterna; ergo individuum demonstratum esset ex infinitis causis generantibus: quia, si generatio esset aeterna, tunc hoc individuum hominis praecederet aliud, et illud aliud, et sic in infinitum; unum autem effectum esse ex infinitis causis agentibus est imposibile: quoniam, si non sit primum agens vel movens, non est motus, quia primum movens est causa totius motus, ut scribitur II Metaphysicae, et de se patet, inter autem infinita agentia nullum potest esse primum; ergo haec generatio non est aeterna, ergo neque mundus.

Likewise, if the world were eternal, then the generation of animals and plants and of simple bodies would be eternal; therefore the demonstrated individual would be from infinite generating causes: because, if generation were eternal, then this individual of man would be preceded by another, and that other by another, and so on to infinity; however, for one effect to be from infinite efficient causes is impossible: since, if there is not a first agent or mover, there is no motion, because the first mover is the cause of the whole motion, as is written in Metaphysics 2, and it is evident of itself; but among infinite agents none can be first; therefore this generation is not eternal, therefore neither is the world.

Item, vult Aristoteles VI Physicorum quod eiusdem rationis est magnitudo, motus et tempus, quantum ad finitatem et infinitatem; cum igitur nulla magnitudo sit infinita, sicut probat Aristoteles III Physicorum, ergo nec motus est infinitus, nec tempus, ergo nec mundus: cum mundus non sit sine istis.

Likewise, Aristotle in Physics 6 holds that magnitude, motion, and time are of the same account with respect to finitude and infinitude; since therefore no magnitude is infinite, as Aristotle proves in Physics 3, therefore neither is motion infinite, nor time; therefore nor is the world: since the world is not without these.

Item, si mundus esset aeternus, tunc infiniti homines essent generati et corrupti, homine autem corrupto manet substantia quae in corpore erat, anima [scilicet] rationalis, cum ipsa sit ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, et sic tales substantiae infinitae essent simul in actu; infinita autem esse [simul] in actu est impossibile; ergo etc.

Likewise, if the world were eternal, then infinitely many men would have been generated and corrupted; however, with the man corrupted, the substance which was in the body remains, the soul [namely] rational, since it itself is ingenerable and incorruptible, and thus such infinite substances would be together in act; but for infinites to be [at once] in act is impossible; therefore, etc.

Item, si mundus esset aeternus, tunc motus infinitus esset pertransitus et infinitum tempus, quia, si mundus esset aeternus, tunc tempus praecedens hoc instans esset infinitum; sed infinitum esse pertransitum et acceptum est impossibile; ergo, etc.

Likewise, if the world were eternal, then an infinite motion and an infinite time would have been passed through, because, if the world were eternal, then the time preceding this instant would be infinite; but for the infinite to be passed through and taken is impossible; therefore, etc.

Item, quod habet causam aliam, hoc habet initium; mundus habet causam aliam: ergo mundus habet initium; "mare enim factum est, quia mundus factus est", sicut dicitur II Meteororum; quod habet initium, non est aeternum; ergo, etc.

Again, what has another cause, this has a beginning; the world has another cause: therefore the world has a beginning; "for the sea was made, because the world was made," as is said in Meteorology 2; what has a beginning is not eternal; therefore, etc.

[3.] In contrarium arguitur, et primo: quod mundus possit esse aeternus, et quod ex hoc nullum sequatur impossibile; secundo ostenditur quod mundus sit aeternus. Primum sic: licet effectus sequatur suam causam naturaliter, potest tamen simul esse cum sua causa in duratione; mundus et totum ens causatum est effectus primi entis; ergo, cum primum ens sit aeternum, mundus potest sibi esse coeternus. Maior patet, quia prioritas et posterioritas naturae et simultas durationis compatiuntur se. Minor etiam patet, quia, sicut in omni genere oportet quod primum sit causa omnium aliorum, sic et in genere entis oportet quod primum ens sit causa aliorum, et ex hoc sequitur quod illud primum ens sit ens non causatum, quoniam ipsum debet esse causa sufficiens rerum; sed nulla res causata est sufficiens causa alicuius sui effectus, quoniam a quo dependet essentia entis causati, ab eodem dependet omnis eius effectus, ergo primum ens oportet esse ens non habens aliam causam: aliter enim primum ens non esset.

[3.] On the contrary it is argued, and first: that the world can be eternal, and that from this no impossibility follows; secondly it is shown that the world is eternal. The first thus: although an effect follows its cause naturally, nevertheless it can be together with its cause in duration; the world and the whole caused being is the effect of the first being; therefore, since the first being is eternal, the world can be coeternal with it. The major is clear, because priority and posteriority of nature and the simultaneity of duration are compatible with one another. The minor also is clear, because, just as in every genus it is necessary that the first be the cause of all the others, so also in the genus of being it is necessary that the first being be the cause of the others, and from this it follows that that first being is an uncaused being, since it ought to be the sufficient cause of things; but no caused thing is a sufficient cause of any of its effects, since upon that on which the essence of a caused being depends, upon the same depends its every effect; therefore the first being must be a being not having another cause: otherwise indeed the first being would not be.

Hoc idem, apparet per Aristotelem VIII Physicorum, qui dicit quod, licet aliquid sit aeternum, non tamen debet poni principium: triangulum enim habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis est aeternum, huius tamen aeterni quaerenda est altera causa; ergo aeternum potest habere causam; cum igitur nihil in duratione potest praecedere illud quod est aeternum, igitur effectus potest esse coaeternus suae causae; mundus est effectus primi entis; ergo mundus potest esse sibi coaeternus.

This same point appears through Aristotle, Physics 8, who says that, although something is eternal, nevertheless a beginning ought not to be posited: for a triangle’s having three angles equal to two right angles is eternal; yet for this eternal thing another cause is to be sought; therefore the eternal can have a cause; since, therefore, nothing in duration can precede that which is eternal, therefore an effect can be coeternal with its cause; the world is an effect of the First Being; therefore the world can be coeternal with it.

Item, patet per exemplum: si sol semper fuisset in nostro haemisphaerio, lumen semper fuisset in medio, et fuisset lumen coaeternum soli, et tamen effectus eius; quod non esset, nisi effectus posset esse simul cum sua causa in duratione.

Likewise, it is clear by an example: if the sun had always been in our hemisphere, light would always have been in the medium, and the light would have been coeternal with the sun, and yet its effect; which would not be the case, unless an effect could be simultaneous with its cause in duration.

Item, si pes semper fuisset in pulvere, vestigium sibi fuisset coaeternum, et tamen effectus eius.

Likewise, if a foot had always been in the dust, the footprint would have been coeternal with it, and yet its effect.

Item, hoc idem arguitur per rationem sic: nihil est aeternum in futuro absque praeterito, quia virtus quae potest facere durationem aeternam alicuius rei in futuro, ipsa potest fecisse durationem aeternam eiusdem rei in praeterito: cum illa virtus sit intransmutabilis et semper se uno modo habens; mundus autem est aeternus in futuro et secundum sententiam christianae fidei, et secundum quorundam philosophorum opinionem; ergo per eandem virtutem potuit fuisse aeternus in praeterito. Sic ergo mundus potest esse aeternus, et ex hoc nullum videtur sequi impossibile per rationem, nec ex hoc potest argumentari aliquod inconveniens. Et hoc apparebit illi qui studium suum posuerit ad hoc.

Likewise, this same thing is argued by reason thus: nothing is eternal in the future without the past, because the virtue which can make the eternal duration of some thing in the future, that very one could have made the eternal duration of the same thing in the past: since that virtue is intransmutable and always holding itself in one way; moreover the world is eternal in the future both according to the tenet of the Christian faith, and according to the opinion of certain philosophers; therefore by the same virtue it could have been eternal in the past. Thus therefore the world can be eternal, and from this nothing impossible seems to follow by reason, nor from this can any inconvenience be argued. And this will appear to him who shall have applied his study to this.

[4.] Quod autem mundus sit aeternus, arguitur sic:

[4.] But that the world is eternal is argued thus:

<1> Omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper; quia si talem virtutem non haberet, incorruptibile non esset. Mundus autem est incorruptibilis, quia omne ingenitum est incorruptibile; ergo mundus habet virtutem ut sit semper; res autem per totam durationem ad quam virtus sua essendi se extendit: ergo mundus est aeternus.

<1> Every incorruptible has the virtue/power to be always; because if it did not have such a virtue, it would not be incorruptible. But the world is incorruptible, because every ungenerated is incorruptible; therefore the world has the power to be always; moreover, a thing endures through the whole duration to which its virtue of being extends itself: therefore the world is eternal.

<2> Item, illud est aeternum quod non habet ante se aliquam durationem: omne enim novum habet ante se aliquam durationem; sed mundus ante se nullam habuit durationem, quoniam non tempus: tempus enim non erat ante mundum, quia tempus sequitur motum primi mobilis, ut passio subiectum; neque erat aeternitas ante mundum, quoniam illud nunquam est quod habet ante se aeternam durationem; si ergo ante mundum fuisset aeterna duratio, mundus nunquam fuisset.

<2> Likewise, that is eternal which does not have any duration before itself: for every new thing has some duration before itself; but the world had no duration before itself, since there was no time: for time was not before the world, because time follows the motion of the first mobile, as a passion does its subject; nor was eternity before the world, since that never is which has before itself an eternal duration; if, therefore, before the world there had been an eternal duration, the world would never have been.

<3> Item, quod fit de novo, hoc potest fieri, quia si non, tunc fieret quod impossibile est fieri; quo autem res potest fieri, haec est materia; sed ante mundi factionem non erat aliqua materia ex qua mundus fieret; ergo mundus non est de novo factus, ergo est aeternus: cum inter novum et aeternum non sit medium.

<3> Likewise, what is made anew, this can be made, because if not, then what is impossible to be made would be made; but that by which a thing can be made—this is matter; yet before the fashioning of the world there was not any matter from which the world might be made; therefore the world was not made anew, therefore it is eternal: since between the new and the eternal there is no middle.

<4> Item, omne novum factum est per transmutationem; quoniam qui tollit transmutationem, tollit omnem novitatem; omnis autem transmutatio habet subiectum et materiam, ut scribitur principio VIII Metaphysicae et VII eiusdem et III Physicorum: quoniam motus et omnis mutatio est actus entis in potentia [et quidem] secundum quod huiusmodi; cum igitur ante mundum non fuerit aliqua materia et subiectum transmutationis quae exigeretur ad novam factionem mundi, si mundus esset factum novum; ergo mundus non est novum factum, sed aeternum.

<4> Likewise, every new thing has been made through transmutation; for whoever takes away transmutation takes away all novelty; but every transmutation has a subject and matter, as is written at the beginning of the 8 Metaphysics and the 7 of the same and the 3 Physics: since motion and every mutation is the act of a being in potency [and indeed] insofar as it is such; since therefore before the world there was not any matter and subject of transmutation which would be required for a new making of the world, if the world were a newly made thing; therefore the world is not a newly made thing, but eternal.

<5> Item, omne novum est in tempore, quoniam novum in aliqua duratione, oportet quod fiat in parte illius: quod enim fit in toto die, non est novum in die, et quod est in toto anno, illud non est novum in anno, sed illud quod est novum in anno oportet quod sit in aliqua parte anni, inter autem durationes omnes solum tempus partes habet; mundus autem naturaliter est ante tempus; ergo mundus non est novus, sed aeternus.

<5> Likewise, every new thing is in time, since what is new, being within some duration, must come to be in a part of it: for what happens in the whole day is not new in the day, and what is in the whole year is not new in the year; rather, that which is new in the year must be in some part of the year; but among all durations only time has parts; moreover, the world naturally is before time; therefore the world is not new, but eternal.

<6> Item, omnis generatio est ex corrupto, et omne corruptum est prius generatum; similiter omnis corruptio est ex generato, et omne generatum est ex corrupto; ergo ante omnem generationem est generatio, et ante omnem corruptionem est corruptio; ergo non convenit dare primam generationem nec primam corruptionem, ergo generatio et corruptio est aeterna; ergo mundus est aeternus, quia quae generantur et corrumpuntur sunt partes mundi quae non possunt praecedere mundum in duratione.

<6> Likewise, every generation is from something corrupted, and everything corrupted was previously generated; similarly, every corruption is from something generated, and everything generated is from something corrupted; therefore before every generation there is a generation, and before every corruption there is a corruption; therefore it is not fitting to posit a first generation nor a first corruption; therefore generation and corruption are eternal; therefore the world is eternal, because the things which are generated and corrupted are parts of the world which cannot precede the world in duration.

<7> Item, effectus suam causam sufficientem non potest sequi in duratione. Causa sufficiens mundi est aeterna, quia ipsa est primum principium; ergo mundus non potest ipsam sequi in duratione; quia primum principium est aeternum, ergo mundus est sibi coaeternus. Et confirmatur ratio: ens aeternum, et secundum suam substantiam, et secundum omnem suam dispositionem, cui nihil acquisitum est in futuro, et cui nihil deficit in praeterito ex his per quae effectum suum produceret, facit effectum suum immediatum sibi coaeternum; Deus est ens aeternum secundum substantiam et secundum omnem, quaecunque in eo est, dispositionem, cui nihil acquisitum est in futuro, [et cui] nihil deficit in praeterito ex his per quae effectum suum produceret, et mundus est suus effectus immediatus; ergo mundus est Deo coeternus.

<7> Likewise, an effect cannot follow its sufficient cause in duration. The sufficient cause of the world is eternal, because it is the first principle; therefore the world cannot follow it in duration; since the first principle is eternal, therefore the world is coeternal with it. And the reasoning is confirmed: an eternal being, both according to its substance and according to its every disposition, to which nothing is acquired in the future, and to which nothing is lacking in the past of those things by which it would produce its effect, makes its immediate effect coeternal with itself; God is an eternal being according to substance and according to every disposition, whatever there is in him, to whom nothing is acquired in the future, [and to whom] nothing is lacking in the past of those things by which he would produce his effect, and the world is his immediate effect; therefore the world is coeternal with God.

<8> Item, Aristoteles dicit in IX Metaphysicae quod "agens per voluntatem, cum potest et vult, tunc agit, nec oportet addere, si non sit impeditum: quoniam posse removet impedimentum"; sed Deus ab aeterno habuit potentiam et voluntatem faciendi mundum; ergo mundus est factum aeternum.

<8> Likewise, Aristotle says in Metaphysics 9 that "an agent by will, when he is able and wills, then he acts, nor is it necessary to add, if it be not impeded: since being able removes the impediment"; but God from eternity had the power and the will to make the world; therefore the world is an eternal product.

<9> Item, omnis effectus novus aliquam novitatem requirit in aliquo suorum principiorum: quoniam, si omnia principia alicuius effectus semper se haberent uno modo, ex eis non posset fieri effectus, cum prius non esset; sed in principio mundi, - quod est ens primum -, nulla est novitas possibilis; ergo mundus non est effectus novus. Et confirmatur ratio: aliquod agens, si ipsum est novum secundum substantiam suam, ipsum potest esse causa novi effectus, aut quia ipsum est aeternum secundum substantiam, novum tamen secundum aliquam virtutem vel situm - sicut apparet in corpore caeli - aut quia prius subiacebat impedimento, aut quia in subiecto ex quo agit, facta est nova dispositio; in causa mundi nullum istorum est possibile, ut de se apparet; ergo mundus non est causatum novum.

<9> Likewise, every new effect requires some newness in one of its principles: for if all the principles of some effect were always disposed in one way, from them the effect could not be made, since previously it was not; but in the principle of the world, - which is the first being -, no novelty is possible; therefore the world is not a new effect. And the argument is confirmed: some agent, if it is itself new according to its substance, can itself be the cause of a new effect, either because it is eternal according to substance yet new according to some virtue (power) or position - as appears in the body of the heaven - or because previously it was subject to an impediment, or because in the subject from which it acts a new disposition has been made; in the cause of the world none of these is possible, as is evident of itself; therefore the world is not a new caused thing.

<10> Item, omne quod movetur post quietem, reducitur ad motum continuum qui semper est: quoniam quod aliquid quandoque moveatur, quandoque quiescit, non potuit contingere ex causa immobili; cum igitur in motibus non poterit procedere in infinitum, quorum unus est causa alterius; ergo oportet primum motum esse continuum et aeternum. Et propter hanc rationem Aristoteles VIII Physicorum omnem motum novum reducit ad motum primum, sicut ad causam suam, qui secundum opinionem suam est aeternus; et hanc opinionem tenet Aristoteles propter hanc rationem. Motus qui semper habet causas sufficientes, non potest esse novus; sed primus motus habet semper causas sufficientes; quia, si non, tunc ipsum praecessisset alius motus, per quem facta esset sufficientia in causis suis, cum prius non esset, ergo ipse esset primus et non-primus, quod est impossibile.

<10> Likewise, everything that is moved after rest is reduced to a continuous motion which always is: since that something is at one time moved, at another time rests, could not have happened from an immobile cause; therefore, since in motions one cannot proceed to the infinite, where one is the cause of another; therefore it is necessary that the first motion be continuous and eternal. And on account of this reason Aristotle, in Physics 8, reduces every new motion to the first motion, as to its cause, which according to his opinion is eternal; and Aristotle holds this opinion on account of this reason. A motion which always has sufficient causes cannot be new; but the first motion always has sufficient causes; because, if not, then another motion would have preceded it, through which sufficiency would have been made in its causes, whereas before it was not; therefore it would be both first and not-first, which is impossible.

<11> Item, voluntas quae postponit volitum, aliquid exspectat in futuro; ante mundum non est aliqua exspectatio: quia ante mundum non est tempus, et nulla exspectatio est nisi in tempore; ergo mundus non est postpositus voluntati divinae, illa autem est aeterna, ergo mundus voluntati divinae est coaeternus.

<11> Likewise, a will that postpones the willed expects something in the future; before the world there is no expectation: because before the world there is no time, and no expectation exists except in time; therefore the world is not postponed by the divine will; but that is eternal, therefore the world is coeternal with the divine will.

<12> Item, omnis effectus qui sufficienter dependet ab aliqua voluntate inter quem et ipsam voluntatem nulla cadit duratio, simul est cum illa voluntate: quia simul sunt in duratione, inter quae nulla cadit duratio, sed mundus sufficienter dependet a voluntate divina, - aliam enim causam non habet - et inter illa nulla cadit duratio, quia non tempus; ante mundum enim non erat tempus nec aeternitas, quia tunc nonesse mundi esset in aeternitate; cum igitur illud est aeternum quod est in aeternitate, tunc nonesse mundi esset aeternum; ergo mundus nunquam esset quod est impossibile, ergo mundus coaeternus est voluntati divinae.

<12> Likewise, every effect which sufficiently depends upon some will, between which and that very will no duration falls, is simultaneous with that will: for they are simultaneous in duration, between which no duration falls; but the world sufficiently depends on the divine will — for it has no other cause — and between them no duration falls, because there is no time; for before the world there was neither time nor eternity, because then the non-being of the world would be in eternity; since therefore that is eternal which is in eternity, then the non-being of the world would be eternal; therefore the world would never be, which is impossible; therefore the world is coeternal with the divine will.

<13> Item, omnis effectus novus ante se requirit aliquam transmutationem vel in agente suo, vel in subiecto ex quo fit, vel saltem illam quae est adventus horae in qua agens, semper uno modo se habens, vult agere; ante mundum nulla potuit esse transmutatio; ergo mundus non potest esse effectus novus.

<13> Likewise, every new effect requires before itself some transmutation either in its agent, or in the subject from which it is made, or at least that which is the advent of the hour in which the agent, always holding itself in one manner, wills to act; before the world no transmutation could have been; therefore the world cannot be a new effect.

[5.] Respondebit aliquis quod immo mundus est factum novum, quia haec fuit forma voluntatis divinae ab aeterno, ut mundum produceret in hora in qua factus est: ab antiqua enim voluntate potest procedere effectus novus, et propter hoc non oportet quod contingat aliqua transmutatio vel in voluntate vel in volente: habet enim aliquis nunc voluntatem faciendi aliquid post tres dies, adveniente tertia die facit tunc quod prius voluit et ab antiquo, nec tamen facta est aliqua transmutatio in voluntate nec in volente; et hoc modo mundus potest esse novus, quamquam habet causam aeternam [et] sufficientem.

[5.] Someone will answer that, nay rather, the world is a new-made thing, because this was the form of the divine will from eternity: that it should produce the world in the hour in which it was made; for from an ancient will a new effect can proceed, and on account of this it is not necessary that any transmutation occur either in the will or in the one willing: indeed someone now has the will of doing something after three days; at the advent of the third day he then does what he previously willed and from of old, and yet no transmutation has been made either in the will or in the one willing; and in this way the world can be new, although it has an eternal [and] sufficient cause.

Sed contra hunc modum ponendi arguitur sic: qui fingit antecedens, fingit omne, quod ex ipso sequitur, nec ipsum certificat; tu autem fingis in Deo talem formam voluntatis ab aeterno, nec eam potes declarare, et sic facile est omnia fingere: dicet enim tibi aliquis quod non fuit talis forma divinae voluntatis ab aeterno, nec habes, unde sibi contradicas; ergo etiam fingis mundum esse novum, nec hoc poteris declarare.

But against this manner of positing, it is argued thus: whoever feigns the antecedent, feigns everything that follows from it, nor does he certify it; but you feign in God such a form of will from eternity, nor can you declare it, and thus it is easy to feign everything: for someone will say to you that there was not such a form of the divine will from eternity, nor do you have whence you might contradict him; therefore you also feign that the world is new, nor will you be able to declare this.

Item, contra eundem modum ponendi arguitur sic: volitum procedit a voluntate secundum formam voluntatis; si ergo talis fuit forma voluntatis divinae quod ab aeterno voluit producere mundum in hora, ut tu dicis, ergo fuisset Deo impossibile prius mundum produxisse quod videtur inconveniens, cum Deus sit agens per libertatem voluntatis.

Likewise, against the same mode of positing it is argued thus: the willed proceeds from the will according to the form of the will; if therefore such was the form of the divine will that from eternity it willed to produce the world at an hour, as you say, then it would have been impossible for God to have produced the world earlier—which seems incongruous, since God is an agent through the freedom of will.

Ad hanc rationem respondebis quod, immo Deus potuit prius fecisse mundum, quia, sicut habuit hanc formam voluntatis ab aeterno, sic potuit habere aliam, et ideo, sicut mundum produxit in hora in qua factus est, sic potuit ipsum prius produxisse.

To this reasoning you will respond that, nay rather, God could have made the world earlier, because, just as he had this form of will from eternity, so he could have had another, and therefore, just as he produced the world at the hour in which it was made, so he could have produced it earlier.

Sed contra hanc rationem arguitur sic: quod unius formae voluntatis est et potest esse alterius, hoc est transmutabile secundum voluntates; sed Deus penitus est intransmutabilis; ergo non potest habere aliam formam voluntatis quam illam quam habuit ab aeterno.

But against this argument it is argued thus: that which is of the form of the will of one and can be of another, this is transmutable according to wills; but God is utterly intransmutable; therefore he cannot have another form of will than that which he had from eternity.

<14> Item, ab antiqua voluntate, inter quam et suum effectum non cadit transmutatio, non potest fieri novus effectus: quod enim effectus non est simul cum causa in duratione, hoc facit transmutatio cadens inter illa: qui enim transmutationem tollit, ipse tollit omnem exspectationem; sed inter voluntatem Dei, quae aeterna est et mundum nulla potest cadere transmutatio; ergo ante mundum nulla potest esse transmutatio; ergo mundus coaeternus est voluntati divinae.

<14> Likewise, from an ancient will, between which and its effect no transmutation falls, a new effect cannot come to be: for that an effect is not together with the cause in duration, this a transmutation falling between them brings about; for whoever removes transmutation removes all expectation. But between the will of God, which is eternal, and the world no transmutation can fall; therefore before the world no transmutation can be; therefore the world is coeternal with the divine will.

<15> Item, secundum exemplum quod positum est, non est conveniens in proposito; scilicet quod homo aliquis nunc habet voluntatem faciendi aliquid post tres dies, adveniente autem tertia die facit illud quod ab antiquo voluit, illud exemplum inconveniens est in proposito: quia, licet in voluntate non sit facta transmutatio nec in volente, tamen facta est transmutatio quae est adventus horae, scilicet tertiae diei. Quodsi nec facta esset transmutatio in volente, nec in passivo ex quo fieri debuit novus effectus; nec illa transmutatio quae est adventus horae, tunc ex aliqua voluntate non posset fieri novus effectus, quia omnis novus effectus requirit ante se aliquam transmutationem, ut diceret aliquis. Et quia ante mundum non est facta transmutatio in voluntate ex qua factus est mundus, nec in materia ex qua fieri deberet mundus - quoniam mundum non antecedit materia - nec etiam facta est illa transmutatio ante mundum quae est adventus alicuius horae, tunc videtur quod ex voluntate aeterna non potuerit fieri mundus novus.

<15> Likewise, according to the example that has been posited, it is not fitting to the matter at hand; namely, that some man now has the will of doing something after three days, and with the third day arriving he does that which he willed from of old—that example is unfitting to the matter at hand: because, although no transmutation has been made in the will nor in the one willing, nevertheless a transmutation has been made which is the coming of the hour, namely of the third day. But if neither a transmutation had been made in the one willing, nor in the passive subject in which the new effect ought to be brought about; nor that transmutation which is the arrival of the hour, then from any will a new effect could not be made, because every new effect, as someone would say, requires some transmutation before itself. And because before the world no transmutation was made in the will from which the world was made, nor in the matter from which the world ought to be made—since matter does not precede the world—nor moreover was that transmutation made before the world which is the arrival of some hour, then it seems that from an eternal will a new world could not have been made.

Et ideo illud exemplum inconveniens est in proposito.

And therefore that example is inconvenient in the matter at hand.

Istae sunt rationes per quas quidam haeretici, tenentes aeternitatem mundi nituntur impugnare sententiam christianae fidei, quae ponit mundum esse novum; contra quas expedit, ut christianus studeat diligenter, ut sciat eas perfecte solvere, si haereticus aliquis eas opponat. Haec sunt rationes:

These are the reasons by which certain heretics, maintaining the eternity of the world, strive to impugn the position of the Christian faith, which posits the world to be new; against which it is expedient that a Christian study diligently, so that he may know how to solve them perfectly, if some heretic should oppose them. These are the reasons:

Solutio

Solution

[6.] Primo hic diligenter considerandum est quod nulla quaestio [potest esse quae] disputabilis est per rationes, quam philosophus non debeat disputare et determinare, quomodo se habeat veritas in illa, quantum per rationem humanam comprehendi potest. Et huius declaratio est, quia omnes rationes per quas disputatur, ex rebus acceptae sunt: aliter enim essent figmentum intellectus; philosophus autem omnium rerum naturas docet: sicut enim philosophia docet ens, sic partes philosophiae docent partes entis, ut scribitur IV Metaphysicae, et de se patet; ergo philosophus omnem quaestionem per rationem disputabilem habet determinare: omnis enim quaestio disputabilis per ratione cadit in aliqua parte entis, philosophus autem omne ens speculatur: naturale, mathematicum et divinum; ergo omnem quaestionem per rationes disputabilem habet philosophus determinare, et qui contrarium dicit, sciat se proprium sermonem ignorare.

[6.] First, it must here be carefully considered that there is no question [can be one which] is disputable by reasons, which the philosopher ought not to dispute and determine how the truth stands in it, insofar as can be comprehended by human reason. And the elucidation of this is that all the reasons by which one disputes are taken from things; otherwise they would be a figment of the intellect; but the philosopher teaches the natures of all things: for just as philosophy teaches being, so the parts of philosophy teach the parts of being, as is written in Metaphysics 4, and it is evident of itself; therefore the philosopher has to determine every question disputable by reason: for every question disputable by reason falls within some part of being, but the philosopher speculates the whole of being: the natural, the mathematical, and the divine; therefore the philosopher has to determine every question disputable by reasons, and whoever says the contrary, let him know that he is ignorant of his proper discourse.

Secundo est notandum quod nec naturalis, nec mathematicus, nec metaphysicus potest ostendere per rationes motum primum et mundum novum esse.

Secondly, it is to be noted that neither the natural philosopher, nor the mathematician, nor the metaphysician can show by reasons that the first motion and the world are new.

[7.] Quod autem naturalis non potest hoc ostendere, declaratur sic accipiendo duas suppositiones per se notas, quarum prima est: quod nullus artifex potest aliquid causare, concedere vel negare nisi ex principiis suae scientiae. Secunda suppositio est: quod, quamvis natura non sit primum principium simpliciter, est tamen primum principium in genere rerum naturalium, et primum principium quod naturalis considerare potest. Et ideo Aristoteles hoc considerans in libro Physicorum, qui est primus liber doctrinae naturalium, incepit non a primo principio simpliciter, sed a primo principio rerum naturalium, scilicet a materia prima, quam in II eiusdem dicit esse naturam.

[7.] That the natural philosopher cannot show this is clarified thus, by taking two self-evident suppositions, of which the first is: that no artificer can cause, concede, or deny anything except from the principles of his science. The second supposition is: that, although nature is not the first principle simply, yet it is the first principle in the genus of natural things, and the first principle that the natural philosopher can consider. And therefore Aristotle, considering this in the book of the Physics, which is the first book of the doctrine of natural things, began not from the first principle simply, but from the first principle of natural things, namely from prime matter, which in 2 of the same he says is nature.

Ex his autem ad propositum.

From these, however, to the proposition.

Natura non potest causare aliquem motum novum, nisi ipsum praecedat alius motus qui sit causa eius; sed primum motum non potest alius motus praecedere, quia tunc ipse non esset primus motus; ergo naturalis, cuius primum principium est natura, non potest ponere secundum sua principia primum motum esse novum. Maior patet, quia natura materialis nihil agit de novo nisi prius agatur ab alio: natura enim materialis non potest esse primus motor. Quomodo enim ens genitum erit primus motor?

Nature cannot cause any new motion, unless it is preceded by another motion which is its cause; but the first motion cannot be preceded by another motion, because then it would not be the first motion; therefore the natural philosopher, whose first principle is nature, cannot posit, according to his principles, that the first motion is new. The major is evident, because material nature does nothing anew unless it is first acted upon by another: for material nature cannot be the first motor. For how will a generated being be the first motor?

Et omne agens materiale est ens genitum. Nec est instantia de corpore caeli, quia si sit ens materiale, tamen non habet materiam univoce cum rebus generabilibus; transmutabilia enim sunt ad invicem quae materiam unius naturae communicant.

And every material agent is a begotten being. Nor is there a counter‑instance from the body of heaven, because even if it is a material being, nevertheless it does not have matter univocally with generable things; for those are transmutable into one another which communicate matter of one nature.

Item, omnis effectus naturalis novus aliquam requirit novitatem in suis immediatis principiis; novitas autem non potest esse in aliquo ente sine transmutatione praecedente: qui enim tollit transmutationem, ipse tollet novitatem; ergo natura nullum motum vel effectum novum causare potest sine transmutatione praecedente. Ideo secundum naturalem, cuius primum principium est natura, motus primus, quem nulla transmutatio praecedere potest, non potest esse novus. Maior patet, quia, si omnia principia immediata alicuius effectus naturalis semper fuissent in eadem dispositione, ex eis non posset ille effectus nunc esse, cum prius non esset.

Likewise, every new natural effect requires some novelty in its immediate principles; but novelty cannot be in any entity without a preceding transmutation: for he who removes transmutation thereby removes novelty; therefore nature can cause no new motion or effect without a preceding transmutation. Therefore, according to the naturalist, whose first principle is nature, the first motion, which no transmutation can precede, cannot be new. The major is evident, because, if all the immediate principles of some natural effect had always been in the same disposition, from them that effect could not now be, since previously it was not.

Quaeram enim, quare magis nunc quam prius, nec habes, unde respondebis. Dico autem in hac ratione "principia immediata", quia, licet effectus naturalis sit novus, non propter hoc oportet quod in suis principiis mediatis et primis facta sit aliqua transmutatio et novitas. Quamvis enim proxima principia rerum generabilium transmutantur et quandoque sunt, et quandoque non sunt, primae tamen causae earum semper sunt.

For I shall ask why rather now than prior, and you have not whence you will respond. But I say in this reasoning “immediate principles,” because, although a natural effect be new, not on that account is it necessary that in its mediate and first principles some transmutation and novelty have been made. For although the proximate principles of generable things are transmuted and sometimes are, and sometimes are not, nevertheless their first causes always are.

Ex his apparet manifeste quod naturalis non potest ponere aliquem motum novum, nisi ipsum praecedat aliquis motus qui sit causa eius; ergo, cum necesse sit in mundo ponere aliquem motum primum -, non enim contingit abire in infinitum in motibus quorum unus sit causa alterius - sequitur quod naturalis ex sua scientia et suis principiis quibus ipse utitur, non potest ponere primum motum novum.

From these things it appears manifestly that the natural philosopher cannot posit any new motion, unless some motion precedes it which is its cause; therefore, since it is necessary to posit in the world some first motion -, for it does not happen to go on to infinity in motions one of which is the cause of another - it follows that the natural philosopher, from his own science and the principles which he employs, cannot posit a first new motion.

Ideo quod Aristoteles VIII Physicorum quaerens utrum motus aliquando factus sit, cum prius non esset, et utens his principiis, quae modo dicta sunt, et loquens ut naturalis, ponit motum primum aeternum ex utraque parte. Ipse etiam in eodem VIII Physicorum quaerens, quare quaedam quandoque moventur, quandoque quiescunt, respondet quod hoc est, quia moventur a motore semper moto. Quia enim motor a quo moventur, est motor motus, ideo diversimode se habet, propter hoc facit sua mobilia quandoque moveri et quandoque quiescere.

Therefore Aristotle in Book 8 of the Physics, inquiring whether motion ever was made, when previously it was not, and using those principles which have just been spoken, and speaking as a natural philosopher, posits the first motion eternal on both sides. He likewise in that same Book 8 of the Physics, asking why certain things are at times moved and at times rest, replies that this is because they are moved by a mover always moved. For since the mover by which they are moved is a moved mover, therefore it is disposed in diverse modes; on account of this it makes its movables sometimes be moved and sometimes be at rest.

Illa autem quae semper moventur, ut corpora caeli, moventur a motore immobili, semper uno modo se habente in se et ad sua mobilia.

But those which are always moved, such as the bodies of heaven, are moved by an immobile mover, always holding itself in one manner both in itself and toward its own movables.

Si ergo naturalis non potest secundum sua principia ponere motum primum novum, ergo nec ipsum mobile [primum], quia mobile causaliter praecedit motum, cum ipsum sit aliqua causa eius. Ergo nec naturalis potest ponere mundum novum, cum mobile primum non praecessit mundum in duratione.

If therefore the natural philosopher cannot, according to his principles, posit a new first motion, then neither can he posit the mobile [first] itself, because the mobile causally precedes the motion, since it itself is some cause of it. Therefore neither can the natural philosopher posit a new world, since the first mobile did not precede the world in duration.

Ex hoc etiam contingit manifeste quod si quis diligenter inspexerit quae iam diximus, quod naturalis creationem considerare non potest. Natura enim omnem suum effectum facit ex subiecto et materia, factio autem ex subiecto et materia generatio est et non creatio. Ideo naturalis creationem considerare non potest.

From this also it clearly follows that, if anyone has diligently inspected the things we have already said, the natural philosopher cannot consider creation. For nature makes every one of its effects out of a subject and matter, but a making from a subject and matter is generation and not creation. Therefore the natural philosopher cannot consider creation.

Quomodo enim naturalis illud considerat quod ad sua principia non se extendunt? Et cum factio mundi, sive productio eius in esse non possit esse generatio, ut de se patet, sed est creatio, ex hoc contingit quod in nulla parte scientiae naturalis factio mundi sive productio in esse docetur, quia illa productio naturalis non est et ideo ad naturalem non pertinet.

For how, indeed, does the natural philosopher consider that which does not extend to his own principles? And since the making of the world, or its production into being, cannot be generation, as is evident of itself, but is creation, from this it follows that in no part of natural science is the making of the world or the production into being taught, because that production is not natural and therefore does not pertain to the natural philosopher.

Ex his etiam, quae dicta sunt, contingit quod naturalis ex sua scientia non potest ponere primum hominem, et ratio est, quia natura de qua intendit naturalis, nihil potest facere nisi per generationem, et primus homo non potest esse generatus. Homo enim generat hominem et sol. Modus enim fiendi primi hominis alius est quam per generationem, nec debet esse mirabile alicui quod naturalis non potest illa considerare ad quae principia suae scientiae se non extendunt.

From these things too, which have been said, it follows that the natural philosopher, from his own science, cannot posit the first man; and the reason is that the nature which the natural philosopher treats can make nothing except through generation, and the first man cannot be generated. For a man and the sun generate a man. For the mode of the first man’s coming-to-be is other than by generation; nor ought it be a marvel to anyone that the natural philosopher cannot consider those things to which the principles of his science do not extend.

Qui enim diligenter considerabit quae per se potest naturalis considerare, illi apparebit rationabile esse quod dictum est: non enim cuilibet artifex considerare potest quamlibet veritatem.

For whoever will diligently consider what the natural philosopher can consider in his own right, to him it will appear reasonable what has been said: for not every artificer can consider just any truth.

Si autem opponas, cum haec sit veritas christianae fidei et etiam veritas simpliciter quod mundus sit novus et non aeternus, et quod creatio sit possibilis, et quod primus homo erat, et quod homo mortuus redibit vivus sine generatione et idem numero, et quod ille idem homo in numero qui iam ante erat corruptibilis, erit incorruptibilis, et sic in una specie atoma erunt istae duae differentiae corruptibile et incorruptibile, quamvis naturalis istas veritates causare non possit nec scire, eo quod principia suae scientiae ad tam ardua et tam occulta opera sapientiae divinae non se extendunt, tamen istas veritates negare non debet. Licet enim unus artifex non possit causare vel scire ex suis principiis veritates scientiarum aliorum artificum, non tamen eas negare debet. Ergo, licet naturalis haec quae praedicta sunt, ex suis principiis scire non possit, nec asserere, eo quod principia suae scientiae ad talia se non extendunt, non tamen debet ea negare, si alius ea ponat, non tamen tanquam vera per rationes, sed per revelationem factam ab aliqua causa superiori.

But if you object that, since this is the truth of the Christian faith and also simply the truth, that the world is new and not eternal, and that creation is possible, and that there was a first man, and that a dead man will return living without generation and the same in number, and that that same man in number who previously was corruptible will be incorruptible, and thus in one species, in the same individual (atom), there will be these two differentiae, corruptible and incorruptible—although the natural philosopher cannot cause nor know these truths, for the principles of his science do not extend themselves to works so arduous and so occult of divine wisdom—nevertheless he ought not to deny these truths. For although one craftsman cannot cause or know from his own principles the truths of the sciences of other craftsmen, yet he ought not to deny them. Therefore, although the natural philosopher cannot know from his own principles these things that have been said, nor assert them, because the principles of his science do not extend to such matters, nevertheless he ought not to deny them if another posits them, not, however, as true by reasons, but by revelation made by some superior cause.

Dicendum est ad hoc quod veritates quas naturalis non potest causare ex suis principiis nec scire, quae tamen non contrariantur suis principiis, nec destruunt suam scientiam, negare non debet: ut quod circa quemlibet punctum signatum in superficie sunt quattuor recti anguli possibiles, habeat veritatem, naturalis ex suis principiis causare non potest, nec tamen debet eam negare, quia non contrariatur suis principiis, nec destruit suam scientiam. Veritatem tamen illam quam ex suis principiis causare non potest nec scire, quae tamen contrariatur suis principiis et destruit suam scientiam, negare debet, quia sicut consequens ex principiis est concedendum, sic repugnans est negandum: ut hominem mortuum immediate redire vivum et rem generabilem fieri sine generatione - ut ponit christianus, qui ponit resurrectionem mortuorum, ut debeat et corruptum redire idem numero - ista debet negare naturalis, quia naturalis nihil concedit, nisi quod videt esse possibile per causas naturales. Christianus autem concedit haec esse possibilia per causam superiorem quae est causa totius naturae, ideo sibi non contradicunt in hic, sicut nec in aliis.

It must be said to this, that the truths which the natural philosopher cannot cause from his own principles nor know, which nevertheless do not contravene his principles nor destroy his science, he ought not to deny: for example, that around any point marked on a surface four right angles are possible has truth—the natural philosopher cannot from his principles cause this, nor yet ought he deny it, because it is not contrary to his principles, nor does it destroy his science. However, that truth which he cannot from his principles cause nor know, which nevertheless is contrary to his principles and destroys his science, he ought to deny; for just as what follows from principles is to be conceded, so what is repugnant is to be denied: for instance, that a dead man should immediately return living, and that a generable thing be made without generation—as the Christian posits, who posits the resurrection of the dead, such that also what has been corrupted should return the same in number—these the natural philosopher ought to deny, because the naturalist concedes nothing except what he sees to be possible through natural causes. But the Christian concedes these to be possible through a higher cause which is the cause of the whole of nature; therefore they do not contradict one another in this, nor in other matters.

Si autem ulterius opponas, cum haec sit veritas quod homo mortuus immediate redit vivus et idem numero, sicut ponit fides christiana quae in suis articulis verissima est, nonne naturalis negans hoc dicit falsum?

But if you further object, since this is the truth that a dead man immediately returns alive and the same in number, as the christian faith posits, which in its articles is most true, does not the natural philosopher, denying this, say it is false?

Dicendum ad hoc quod simul stant motum primum et mundum esse novum [per causas superiores], et tamen non esse novum per causas naturales et principia naturalia, sic simul stant, si quis diligenter inspiciat, mundum et motum primum esse novum et naturalem negantem mundum et motum primum esse novum dicere verum, quia naturalis negat mundum et motum primum esse novum sicut naturalis, et hoc est ipsum negare ex principiis naturalibus esse novum: quicquid enim naturalis, secundum quod naturalis, negat vel concedit, ex causis et principiis naturalibus hoc negat vel concedit. Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum non esse novum, accepta absolute, falsa est, sed si referatur in rationes et principia ex quibus ipse eam concludit, ex illis sequitur. Scimus enim quod qui dicit Socratem esse album et qui negat Socratem esse album, secundum quaedam uterque dicit verum.

It must be said to this that it stands together that the first motion and the world are new [through higher causes], and yet are not new through natural causes and natural principles; thus they stand together, if one inspects diligently, both that the world and the first motion are new, and that the natural philosopher denying that the world and the first motion are new speaks true, because the natural philosopher denies that the world and the first motion are new as a natural philosopher, and this is itself to deny that they are new from natural principles: for whatever the natural philosopher, insofar as he is a natural philosopher, denies or concedes, he denies or concedes this from natural causes and principles. Whence the conclusion in which the natural philosopher says that the world and the first motion are not new, taken absolutely, is false; but if it is referred to the reasons and principles from which he himself concludes it, it follows from those. For we know that both he who says that Socrates is white and he who denies that Socrates is white, in certain respects each says true.

Sic verum dicit christianus, dicens mundum et motum primum esse novum, et primum hominem fuisse, et hominem redire vivum et eundem numero, et rem generabilem fieri sine generatione, cum tamen hoc concedatur possibile esse per causam cuius virtus est maior, quam sit virtus causae naturalis; verum etiam dicit naturalis qui dicit hoc non esse possibile ex causis et principiis naturalibus: nam naturalis nihil concedit vel negat nisi ex principiis et causis naturalibus, sicut etiam nihil negat vel concedit grammaticus secundum quod huiusmodi nisi ex principiis et causis grammaticalibus. Et quia naturalis solum considerans virtutes causarum naturalium, dicit mundum et motum primum non [posse esse] novum, ex eis, fides autem christiana, considerans causam superiorem quam sit natura, dicit mundum posse esse novum ex illa, ideo non contradicunt in aliquo. Sic ergo patent duo: unum est quod naturalis non contradicit christianae fidei de aeternitate mundi, et aliud est quod per rationes naturales non potest ostendi mundum et motum primum esse novum.

Thus the Christian speaks true, saying that the world and the first motion are new, and that there was a first man, and that man returns alive and the same in number, and that a generable thing comes to be without generation, although this is conceded to be possible through a cause whose power is greater than the power of a natural cause; the natural philosopher also speaks true who says that this is not possible from natural causes and principles: for the natural philosopher grants or denies nothing except from natural principles and causes, just as likewise the grammarian, as such, denies or grants nothing except from grammatical principles and causes. And because the natural philosopher, considering only the powers of natural causes, says that the world and the first motion cannot [to be able to be] new from them, whereas the Christian faith, considering a cause higher than nature, says that the world can be new from that cause, therefore they do not contradict in any respect. Thus, then, two things are evident: one is that the natural philosopher does not contradict the Christian faith concerning the eternity of the world, and the other is that by natural reasons it cannot be shown that the world and the first motion are new.

[8.] Quod autem mathematicus hoc non possit ostendere, sic declaratur manifeste: quia mathematicarum una pars est astrologia, et ipsa habet duas partes: unam scilicet quae docet diversos motus stellarum et velocitates earum, quae scilicet velocius et tardius complent cursum suum, et distantias et coniunctiones et aspectus earum et caetera talia; alia pars scientiae astrorum est quae docet effectus quos agunt in toto corpore quod sub orbe est. Quia nec illa quae docet pars prima, nec quae docet pars secunda, ostendunt mundum et motum primum esse novum, quia tales possunt esse tarditates et velocitates quarundam stellarum in suis sphaeris respectu aliarum et etiam tales coniunctiones earum ad invicem, etiam si mundus et motus primus esset aeternus. Et propter hoc idem quod modo dictum est, nec secunda pars scientiae astrorum ostendere potest mundum et motum primum esse novum, quia ex quo eosdem quos modo habent, possent habere motus stellae et coniunctiones et virtutes, etiam si mundus et motus primus esset aeternus, tunc etiam consimiles effectus facere possent in mundo inferiori eis quos modo faciunt, etiam si mundus et motus primus esset aeternus, ergo nec secunda pars scientiae astrorum potest ostendere motum primum et mundum esse novum.

[8.] But that the mathematician cannot show this is thus clearly made manifest: for one part of the mathematical disciplines is astrology, and it has two parts: one, namely, which teaches the diverse motions of the stars and their velocities—those which more quickly and more slowly complete their course—and their distances and conjunctions and aspects, and other such things; the other part of the science of the stars is that which teaches the effects which they produce in the whole body that is beneath the orb. Because neither that which the first part teaches, nor that which the second part teaches, shows the world and the first motion to be new, since such slownesses and velocities of certain stars in their spheres with respect to others, and likewise such conjunctions of them with one another, could exist even if the world and the first motion were eternal. And for this same reason just now stated, neither can the second part of the science of the stars show the world and the first motion to be new, because, since the stars could have the same motions and conjunctions and powers as they now have, even if the world and the first motion were eternal, then they could also produce similar effects in the lower world to those which they now produce, even if the world and the first motion were eternal; therefore neither can the second part of the science of the stars show the first motion and the world to be new.

Sicut nec pars prima, nec etiam pars [secunda] mathematicarum scientiarum quae geometria est, potest hoc ostendere. Hoc enim non sequitur ex principiis geometriae, quia oppositum consequentis potest stare cum antecedente, scilicet primum motum et mundum esse aeternum potest stare cum principiis geometriae et omnibus suis conclusionibus. Dato enim hoc falso quod motus primus et mundus sit aeternus, numquid propter hoc erunt principia geometriae falsa, ut "a puncto ad punctum rectam lineam ducere", vel etiam "punctus est, cuius pars non est", et caetera talia, vel etiam suae conclusiones?

Just as neither the first part, nor even the [second] part of the mathematical sciences, which is geometry, can show this. For this does not follow from the principles of geometry, because the opposite of the consequent can stand with the antecedent—namely, that the first motion and the world are eternal can stand with the principles of geometry and all its conclusions. For granted this falsehood, that the first motion and the world are eternal, would the principles of geometry on that account be false, such as "to draw a straight line from point to point," or also "a point is that of which there is no part," and other such things, or also its conclusions?

Constat quod non. Numquid omnes passiones [possibiles] in magnitudine eodem modo essent demonstrabiles de suis substantiis et per easdem causas, etiam si mundus esset aeternus, sicut et si mundus esset novus? Constat quod sic.

It is established that not. Would all [possible] passions in magnitude be demonstrable from their substances and through the same causes, even if the world were eternal, just as if the world were new? It is established that so.

Et hoc idem dico de tertia et quarta parte scientiarum mathematicarum quae sunt arithmetica et musica, et per eundem modum ut declaratum est de geometria. Et hoc manifestum est illi qui provectus est in his scientiis et qui scit posse earum.

And I say the same about the third and fourth part of the mathematical sciences, which are arithmetic and music, and by the same mode as has been declared concerning geometry. And this is manifest to him who has advanced in these sciences and who knows their capacity.

[9.] Quod autem nec metaphysicus possit ostendere mundum esse novum, patet sic: mundus dependet ex voluntate divina, sicut ex sua causa sufficiente; sed metaphysicus non potest demonstrare aliquem effectum in duratione posse sequi suam causam sufficientem, sive posse postponi suae causae sufficienti; ergo metaphysicus non potest demonstrare quod mundus sit coaeternus voluntati divinae, mundus sit factus nisi divine.

[9.] But that neither can the metaphysician show the world to be new is clear thus: the world depends upon the divine will as upon its sufficient cause; but the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that any effect in duration can follow its sufficient cause, that is, can be set after its sufficient cause; therefore the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that the world is coeternal with the divine will, nor that the world has been made except divinely.

Item, qui non potest demonstrare hanc fuisse formam voluntatis divinae, ut ab aeterno voluerit mundum producere in hora in qua factus est, ille non potest demonstrare mundum esse novum nec coaeternum voluntati divinae, quia volitum est a volente secundum formam voluntatis; sed metaphysicus non potest demonstrare talem fuisse formam voluntatis divinae ab aeterno: dicere enim quod metaphysicus possit hoc demonstrare, non solum figmento, sed etiam, credo, [cuidam] dementiae simile est: unde enim homini ratio, per quam voluntatem divinam perfecte investiget?

Likewise, whoever cannot demonstrate that this was the form of the divine will, namely that from eternity it willed to produce the world at the hour in which it was made, that one cannot demonstrate the world to be new nor coeternal with the divine will, because the thing-willed is from the willing one according to the form of the will; but the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that such was the form of the divine will from eternity: for to say that the metaphysician can demonstrate this is like not only a figment, but also, I believe, [a certain] dementia; for whence to man is there a reason by which he might perfectly investigate the divine will?

[10.] Et ex his quae dicta sunt componitur syllogismus: nulla est quaestio cuius conclusio potest ostendi per rationem, quam philosophus non debeat disputare et determinare, quantum per rationem est possibile, ut declaratum est; nullus autem philosophus per rationem potest ostendere motum primum et mundum esse novum, quia nec naturalis, nec mathematicus, nec divinus, ut patet ex praedictis, ergo per nullam rationem humanam potuit ostendi motus primus et mundus esse novus, nec etiam potest ostendi quod sit aeternus; quia qui hoc demonstraret, deberet demonstrare formam voluntatis divinae. Et quis eam investigabit? Ideo dicit Aristoteles, in libro Topicorum, quod "aliquid est problema de quo neutro modo opinamur, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus" vel non.

[10.] And from these things which have been said a syllogism is composed: there is no question whose conclusion can be shown by reason, which the philosopher ought not to dispute and determine, insofar as by reason is possible, as has been declared; but no philosopher by reason can show that the prime motion and the world are new, since neither the natural philosopher, nor the mathematician, nor the divine, as is clear from the aforesaid; therefore by no human reason could it be shown that the prime motion and the world are new, nor can it be shown that it is eternal either; because whoever would demonstrate this would have to demonstrate the form of the divine will. And who will investigate it? Therefore Aristotle says, in the book Topics, that "there is some problem about which we opine in neither way, as whether the world is eternal" or not.

Sunt enim multa in fide quae per rationem demonstrari non possunt, ut quod mortuum redit vivum idem in numero, et quod res generabilis redit sine generatione; et qui his non credit haereticus est, qui autem quaerit scire per rationem fatuus est.

For there are many things in the faith which cannot be demonstrated by reason, such as that what is dead returns alive, numerically the same, and that a generable thing returns without generation; and whoever does not believe these is a heretic, while whoever seeks to know them by reason is a fool.

Quia ergo effectus et opera sunt ex virtute, et virtus ex substantia, quis audet dicere se perfecte per rationem cognoscere [substantiam divinam et omnes eius virtutem? Ille dicat se perfecte cognoscere] omnes effectus immediatos Dei: quomodo ex ipso sunt, utrum de novo vel ab aeterno, et quomodo per ipsum in esse conservantur, et quomodo in ipso sunt. Nam in ipso et ex ipso et per ipsum fiunt omnia vel sunt.

Therefore, since effects and works are from power, and power from substance, who dares to say that he perfectly knows by reason [the divine substance and all its power? Let him say that he perfectly knows] all the immediate effects of God: how they are from him, whether anew or from eternity, and how through him they are conserved in being, and how they are in him. For in him and from him and through him all things either come to be or are.

Et quis est qui hoc possit sufficienter investigare? Et, quia multa sunt de talibus quae fides ponit, quae per rationem humanam investigari non possunt, ideo ubi deficit ratio, ibi suppleat fides, quae confiteri debet potentiam divinam esse super cognitionem humanam. Nec propter hoc decredas articulis fidei, quia demonstrari non possunt aliqui eorum, quia si sic procedas, in nulla lege stabis, eo quod nulla est lex cuius omnes articuli possint demonstrari.

And who is there who can sufficiently investigate this? And, because there are many things of such a kind which faith posits, which cannot be investigated by human reason, therefore where reason fails, there let faith supply, which ought to confess that the divine potency is above human cognition. Nor on account of this should you disbelieve the articles of faith, because some of them cannot be demonstrated; for if you proceed thus, you will stand in no law, since there is no law all of whose articles can be demonstrated.

Sic ergo apparet manifeste quod nulla est contradictio inter fidem christianam et philosophiam de aeternitate mundi, si praedicta diligenter inspicientur, sicut etiam manifestabimus, Deo auxiliante in caeteris quaestionibus, in quibus fides christiana et philosophia superficietenus et hominibus minus diligenter considerantibus videbuntur discordare.

Thus therefore it appears manifestly that there is no contradiction between the Christian faith and philosophy concerning the eternity of the world, if the aforesaid things are diligently inspected, as we shall also make manifest, God aiding, in the other questions, in which the Christian faith and philosophy, on the surface and to men considering less diligently, will seem to disagree.

Dicimus ergo quod mundus non est aeternus, sed de novo creattus, quamvis hoc per rationes demonstrari non possit, ut superius visum est, sicut quaedam alia etiam quae pertinent ad fidem: si enim demonstrari possent, non esset fides, sed scientia. Unde pro fide non debet adduci ratio sophistica, [sicut per se patet,] nec ratio dialectica, quia ipsa non facit firmum habitum, sed solum opinionem, et firmior debet esse fides quam opinio, nec ratio demonstrativa, quia tunc fides non esset nisi de his quae demonstrari possent.

We say therefore that the world is not eternal, but created anew, although this cannot be demonstrated by reasons, as was seen above, just as certain other things also which pertain to faith: for if they could be demonstrated, it would not be faith, but science. Whence, on behalf of faith, a sophistical argument ought not to be adduced, [as is evident of itself,] nor a dialectical argument, because that does not make a firm habit but only opinion, and faith ought to be firmer than opinion; nor a demonstrative argument, because then faith would be only about those things which could be demonstrated.

[11.] Tunc ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas respondendum est, et primo ad rationes quae nituntur probare contrarium veritati, scilicet mundum esse Deo coaeternum.

[11.] Then a response must be made to the reasons adduced on either side, and first to the reasons which strive to prove what is contrary to the truth, namely that the world is coeternal with God.

<1> Ad primam. Omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut semper existat, si intelligas per hoc nomen incorruptibile quod, cum sit ens, non potest deficere neque per corruptionem - de qua loquitur Philosophus in fine I Physicorum: "omne quod corrumpitur, abibit in hoc ultimum", id est in materiam, - nec etiam per corruptionem, largius accipiendo nomen, quam unquam accipit ipse Philosophus, quae scilicet corruptio cadere potest in omni ente quod habet aliam causam, quantum de se est. Nam omnis effectus, quamdiu durat, tamdiu conservatur in esse per aliquam suarum causarum, sicut apparet inducenti; quod autem per aliud in esse conservatur, deficere potest quantum de se est.

<1> To the first. Every incorruptible has the power to exist always, if you understand by this name “incorruptible” that, since it is a being, it cannot fail either by corruption — about which the Philosopher speaks at the end of Physics 1: “everything that is corrupted will depart into this ultimate,” that is, into matter — nor even by corruption, taking the name more broadly than the Philosopher himself ever takes it, namely that corruption which can befall every being that has another cause, considered in itself. For every effect, so long as it lasts, is conserved in being by some one of its causes, as appears to one who makes an induction; but that which is conserved in being by another can fail, considered in itself.

Si utroque istorum modorum intelligitur incorruptibile, tunc vera est propositio maior quae dicit: omne incorruptibile habet virtutem, ut semper existat; et sic non est incorruptibilis [immo] nec aliquod ens habens aliam causam.

If by both of those modes “incorruptible” is understood, then the major proposition which says: “every incorruptible has the potency to exist always” is true; and thus it is not incorruptible [immo], nor is any being having another cause.

Et tu probas: quod est ingenitum, est incorruptibile. Verum est corruptione quae opponitur generationi, quia sicut generatio est ex materia, sic corruptio sibi opposita est in materiam, scilicet in contrarium et non in puram negationem. Si tamen aliquid sit ingenitum, non oportet quod propter hoc ipsum sit incorruptibile corruptione largius sumpta, quae scilicet est non [in materiam nec] in contrarium, sed in puram negationem, sicut potest corrumpi omne ens causatum circumscripta virtute conservantis.

And you prove: that which is ungenerated is incorruptible. It is true of the corruption which is opposed to generation, because just as generation is from matter, so the corruption opposed to it is into matter, namely into the contrary and not into pure negation. If, however, something is ungenerated, it need not on that account be incorruptible by corruption taken more largely, which namely is not [into matter nor] into the contrary, but into pure negation, just as every caused being can be corrupted, the conserving power being circumscribed.

Et hanc conservationem vocabant antiqui philosophi auream catenam, qua omne ens in suo ordine a primo ente conservatur, ipsum autem primum ens, sicut ante se non habet causam, sic ante se non habet conservans. Et, quia iam tactum est quod omne ens [quod est] citra primum conservatur in esse virtute primi principii, ideo magis hoc declaretur.

And this conservation the ancient philosophers called the golden chain, by which every being is conserved in its order by the first being, but the first being itself, just as it has not a cause before itself, so it has not a conserver before itself. And, because it has already been touched upon that every being [which is] on this side of the first is conserved in being by the virtue of the first principle, therefore let this be more clearly declared.

Et primo per dicta auctorum. In Libro de causis scribitur sic: "Omnis intelligentiae fixio et essentia est per bonitatem puram quae est prima causa." Per eius essentiam intelligit eius productionem in esse, et per eius fixionem intelligit eius durationem. Et, si intelligentia durat per virtutem primi principii, tunc multo magis omnia entia alia.

And first, through the sayings of the authors. In the Book of Causes it is written thus: "Every intelligence’s fixion and essence is through the pure goodness which is the first cause." By its essence he understands its production into being, and by its fixion he understands its duration. And, if an intelligence endures by the virtue of the first principle, then much more all the other entities.

Et huic concordat illud quod scribitur in lege: "ex ipso et per ipsum sunt omnia".

And with this concords that which is written in the Law: "from him and through him are all things".

Item, Plato dicit loquens in persona primi principii ipsis inteligentiis haec verba: "plus valent ad aeternitatis vestrae custodiam mea voluntas quam vestra natura".

Likewise, Plato says, speaking in the person of the first principle, these words to the intelligences themselves: "my will is more powerful for the guardianship of your eternity than your nature."

Et idem ostenditur ratione. Ens causatum non habet de se naturam ut existat, quia, si de se naturam haberet ut existeret, alterius causatum non esset, sed quod durat et in esse conservatur virtute propria et non ex alia virtute superiori, hoc de se habet naturam ut existat; ergo nullum ens causatum in esse conservatur per se. Et ideo, sicut omnia entia quae sunt citra primum principium, sunt ex ipso, sic et per ipsum in esse conservantur, et si primum principium virtutem suam entibus auferret, entia penitus non essent. Et hoc est quod scribitur in Libro de Causis: "omnes virtutes dependentes sunt ex una prima virtute quae est virtus virtutum". Et Averroes Super secundum Metaphysicae loquens de hoc primo principio dicit: "quod illa causa magis est digna et in esse et in virtute quam omnia entia; omnia enim entia non acquirunt esse et virtutem nisi ab ista causa; est igitur ipsum ens per se et verum per se, et omnia entia alia [sunt] sunt entia et vera per esse et per veritatem eius".

And the same is shown by reason. A caused being does not have from itself the nature that it should exist, because if it had from itself the nature to exist, it would not be caused by another; but that which endures and is conserved in being by its own virtue and not from another higher virtue, this has from itself the nature that it should exist; therefore no caused being is conserved in being through itself. And therefore, just as all beings which are on this side of the first principle are from it, so also through it they are conserved in being; and if the first principle were to take away its virtue from beings, the beings would not be at all. And this is what is written in the Book of Causes: "all dependent virtues are from one first virtue, which is the virtue of virtues." And Averroes, On the Second of the Metaphysics, speaking about this first principle, says: "that this cause is more worthy both in being and in virtue than all beings; for all beings do not acquire being and virtue except from this cause; therefore it is Being per se and Truth per se, and all other beings [are] are beings and true by its being and by its truth."

Item, virtus quae facit durationem aeternam, est virtus infinita, quia, si esset finita, tunc posset accipi virtus maior; ergo, cum non possit esse duratio maior quam sit duratio aeterna, sequeretur quod virtus maior non faceret maiorem durationem quam virtus minor, quod est impossibile; sed in nullo ente causato est virtus infinita, quia omne causatum est per transitum, sive per factionem acceptum, et hoc repugnat virtuti infinitae.

Likewise, the virtue which makes eternal duration is an infinite virtue, because, if it were finite, then a greater virtue could be taken; therefore, since there cannot be a duration greater than eternal duration, it would follow that a greater virtue would not make a greater duration than a lesser virtue, which is impossible; but in no caused being is there an infinite virtue, because every caused thing is by transition, or received through making, and this is repugnant to an infinite virtue.

Hoc idem etiam probatur ex alio. Quia virtus primi motoris maior est quam virtus alicuius motoris posterioris et infinito non potest aliquid esse maius, ergo in nullo ente causato est virtus infinita, nec duratio aeterna per se, sed per virtutem primi principii cuius virtus per se est aeterna et infinita. Et declaratur ratio: sicut duratione quae semper est non potest accipi maior duratio, sic oportet quod virtus quae facit durationem quae semper est sive aeterna, sit talis quod ea non potuit accipi virtus maior, et talis solum est virtus infinita.

This same thing also is proved from another [consideration]. For the virtue of the first mover is greater than the virtue of any subsequent mover, and nothing can be greater than the infinite; therefore in no caused being is there an infinite virtue, nor an eternal duration per se, but [there is such] through the virtue of the first principle, whose virtue per se is eternal and infinite. And the rationale is made clear: just as a greater duration cannot be taken than a duration which always is, so it is necessary that the virtue which makes the duration that always is, that is, eternal, be such that by it a greater virtue could not be taken; and such a thing is only an infinite virtue.

<2> Ad secundam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: illud est aeternum quod non habet ante se aliquam durationem, dico quod falsum est. Licet enim tempus non sit ante mundum, aeternitas tamen est ante mundum: ipsa enim semper est.

<2> To the second argument it must be said. When you say: “that is eternal which does not have any duration before itself,” I say that this is false. For although time is not before the world, nevertheless eternity is before the world: for it itself always is.

Tu dicis: illud nunquam est quod habet ante se durationem aeternam. Dico quod non oportet. Illud enim novum quod hodie factum est, habet ante se durationem aeternam, quia ipsam aeternitatem quae semper est, et tamen non est dicere quod ipsum nunquam est.

You say: that thing never is which has before itself an eternal duration. I say that this need not be so. For that new thing which was made today has before itself an eternal duration, namely eternity itself which always is, and yet it is not to be said that it itself never is.

<3> Ad tertiam rationem dicendum quod, licet ens, cuius productio est ex subiecto et materia, sive per generationem, dependeat ex duplici potentia, scilicet ex potentia activa sui agentis et ex potentia suae materiae, nihil enim fit ex materia, nisi illud ad quod ipsa habuit potentiam passivam, tamen illa quorum factio non est generatio nec ex materia, illa solum dependent ex sola potentia agentis principii, non materiae. Quomodo enim potes dicere quod illud dependet ex potentia materiae cuius productio non est ex materia, sicut est mundus? Apparet enim cuilibet quod factio mundi non potuit esse generatio.

<3> To the third reason it must be said that, although a being whose production is from a subject and matter, that is, by generation, depends on a twofold potency—namely, on the active power of its agent and on the potency of its matter (for nothing is made from matter except that for which it had passive potency)—nevertheless those things whose making is not generation nor from matter depend only on the sole potency of the agent-principle, not of matter. For how can you say that that depends on the power of matter, whose production is not from matter, as is the case with the world? For it appears to anyone that the making of the world could not have been generation.

Unde, si non esset alius modus fiendi nisi generatio, nihil universaliter esset factum. Dico ergo quod mundus factus est et de novo factus est, quia non est coaeternus Deo. Et cum dicis: ergo potuit fieri, dico quod verum est: potuit fieri sola potentia agentis, non subiecti et materiae.

Whence, if there were no other mode of being-made except generation, nothing would universally have been made. I say therefore that the world was made, and was made anew, because it is not coeternal with God. And when you say: therefore it could come to be, I say that this is true: it could come to be by the sole potency of the agent, not of a subject and of matter.

Et quia iam in solutione tactum est quod aliquis effectus sufficienter dependeat ex sola potentia agentis, de quo aliquis dubitaret, ideo hoc declaratur sic:

And because already in the solution it has been touched upon that some effect sufficiently depends on the sole power of the agent, about which someone might doubt, therefore this is declared thus:

Omne illud cuius factio dependet ex materia, si materia non sit, ipsum [esse] impossibile est; totum ens quod est citra primum principium, factum est, quia causam habet, et illud voco ens factum quod habet aliam suae productionis; si ergo omnis factio dependet a materia, et nulla ex sola potentia agentis principii, et praeter totum ens quod est citra primum principium non erat materia aliqua, sequitur quod totum ens, quod est primum principium, esset impossibile; factum est ergo aliquid quod est impossibile esset fieri.

Every thing whose making depends on matter—if matter is not—its very [to be] is impossible; the whole being which is on this side of the first principle has been made, because it has a cause, and I call “made being” that which has another for its production; if therefore every making depends on matter, and none on the sole power of the acting principle, and besides the whole being which is on this side of the first principle there was no matter at all, it follows that the whole being which is the first principle would be impossible; therefore something has been made which it would be impossible to be made.

<4> Ad quartam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: omne novum factum est per transmutationem, verum est solum de entibus quorum factio est per generationem: nam solum in generabilibus invenitur transmutatio. Unde et corpora caelestia quae habent substantias ingenitas, sicut transmutantur secundum situm, sic et generantur secundum situm.

<4> To the fourth argument it must be said. When you say: every new thing has been made through transmutation, this is true only of beings whose production is through generation: for transmutation is found only in generables. Whence also the celestial bodies, which have ingenerate substances, just as they are transmuted according to position, so too they are generated according to position.

<5> Ad quintam rationem. Cum dicis: omne novum est in tempore, quoniam novum in aliqua duratione debet fieri in aliqua parte eius, quoniam si esset simul cum qualibet parte durationis illius, non esset novum in illa duratione, et sola duratio quae partes habet, tempus est, dico ad hoc quod aliquid potest dici novum duobus modis: aut quia est, cum prius non esset, sed habendo esse post suum contradictorium, non quod sit in aliqua parte durationis in qua est, et in alia non; et sic mundus est novus, et tale novum non oportet esse in tempore. Alio modo potest aliquid dici novum, quia in aliqua parte durationis in qua est, habet esse, in alia parte non-esse; et omne quod sic novum est, necessario est in tempore, quia sola duratio quae partes habet, tempus est; et sic mundus non est novus.

<5> To the fifth reason. When you say: every new thing is in time, since the new, in some duration, must come to be in some part of it, since if it were simultaneous with any part of that duration, it would not be new in that duration, and the only duration which has parts is time, I say to this that a thing can be called new in two ways: either because it is, when previously it was not, but by having being after its contradictory, not that it is in some part of the duration in which it is, and in another not; and thus the world is new, and such a new does not have to be in time. In another way a thing can be called new, because in some part of the duration in which it is, it has being, in another part non-being; and everything which is new thus is necessarily in time, because the only duration which has parts is time; and thus the world is not new.

Unde mundus in nulla duratione potest esse novus: non in tempore, quia mundus incepit cum tempore, ideo nulla pars temporis antecedit mundum; nec in aeternitate, quia aeternitas est indivisibilis, et quod est in aeternitate, semper uno modo se habet.

Whence the world can be new in no duration: not in time, because the world began with time; therefore no part of time precedes the world; nor in eternity, because eternity is indivisible, and what is in eternity is always in one and the same mode.

<6> Ad sextam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: omnis generatio est ex corrupto, verum est. Cum dicis secundo: omne corruptum prius est generatum, dico quod istam propositionem concedit naturalis, quia ipse ex suis principiis non potest ponere factionem rei generabilis et corruptibilis nisi per generationem.

<6> To the sixth argument it must be said. When you say: every generation is from the corrupt, it is true. When you say secondly: every corrupt thing was previously generated, I say that the natural philosopher concedes this proposition, because he, from his own principles, cannot posit the fashioning of a generable and corruptible thing except through generation.

Qui tamen ponit factionem rei generabilis non esse per generationem, sicut debet ponere qui ponit primum hominem - homo enim est res generabilis, et eius productio non potest esse per generationem, si sit primus - ipse debet negare illam propositionem quae dicit: omne corruptum prius est generatum, quia ipsa contradicit suae positioni; primus enim homo aliquando corruptus est, cum tamen nunquam fuerit generatus. Unde illa ratio sexta innititur principiis naturalibus, et dictum est superius quod qui ponit mundum esse factum novum, dimittere debet causas naturales et quaerere causam superiorem.

Yet whoever posits that the making of a generable thing is not through generation—as he must posit who posits the first man (for man is a generable thing, and his production cannot be through generation, if he is first)—he must deny that proposition which says: every corrupt thing was previously generated, because it contradicts his position; for the first man was at some time corrupted, although he was never generated. Hence that sixth argument rests upon natural principles, and it was said above that whoever posits the world to be made new ought to dismiss natural causes and seek a superior cause.

<7> Ad septimam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis quod effectus in duratione non potest sequi suam causam sufficientem, dicendum quod hoc verum est de causa agente per naturam, non de agente voluntarie. Sicut enim Deus aeterno intellectu potest nova intelligere, licet illa respectu sui non sint nova, sic aeterna voluntate potest nova agere.

<7> To the seventh argument it must be said. When you say that an effect in duration cannot follow its sufficient cause, it must be said that this is true of a cause acting by nature, not of one acting voluntarily. For just as God, with an eternal intellect, can understand novel things, although those, with respect to themselves, are not novel, so, with an eternal will, he can bring about novel things.

<8> Ad octavam rationem dicendum. Quod potens et volens de necessitate agit, hoc est verum in hora ad quam voluntas est determinata. Modo, licet aeterna sit potestas Dei qua potuit mundum facere, et voluntas qua voluit, quia tamen illa voluntas solum erat respectu horae in qua mundus factus sit, ideo mundus est novus, licet voluntas Dei sit aeterna.

<8> To the eighth argument it must be said. That the one able and willing acts by necessity—this is true in the hour to which the will is determined. Now, although the power of God by which he was able to make the world is eternal, and the will by which he willed, yet because that will was only with respect to the hour in which the world was made, therefore the world is new, although the will of God is eternal.

<9> Ad aliam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: omnis effectus novus aliquam requirit novitatem in aliquo suorum principiorum, dico quod illud non oportet in agente per voluntatem, quia secundum antiquam voluntatem possunt fieri actiones novae praeter hoc quod facta sit transmutatio in voluntate vel in volente. Ad confirmationem rationis dicendum quod non solum potuit agens agere novum effectum, quia ipsum habet novam substantiam, aut, quia ipsum habet aliquam novam virtutem vel situm, vel, quia prius subiacebat impedimento, aut, quia in suo passivo ex quo agit, facta est nova dispositio, sed etiam aliquod agens potest producere effectum novum per hoc quod ipsum habet voluntatem aeternam determinatam ad aliquam horam in qua vult agere, secundum illam voluntatem.

<9> To another reasoning it must be said. When you say: every new effect requires some newness in some of its principles, I say that this is not required in an agent by will, because according to an ancient will new actions can be done apart from a transmutation having been made in the will or in the willing subject. For the confirmation of the reasoning it must be said that the agent could produce a new effect not only because it itself has a new substance, or because it has some new virtue or site, or because previously it was subject to an impediment, or because in its passive, from which it acts, a new disposition has been made, but also some agent can produce a new effect by the fact that it itself has an eternal will determined to some hour in which it wills to act, according to that will.

<10> Ad sequentem rationem dicendum est quod non oportet quod omne quod movetur post quietem reducatur ad motum aeternum, sed oportet quod omne quod movetur post quietem reducatur ad motum primum sicut ad aliquam suam causam qui non est post quietem; unde licet motus primus sit novus, ipse tamen non est post quietem: non enim quaelibet immobilitas quies est, sed immobilitas eius quod natum est moveri, ut scribitur III Physicorum. Et ante motum primum non erat aliquod mobile natum moveri, et dico ante in duratione.

<10> To the subsequent argument it must be said that it is not necessary that everything which is moved after rest be reduced to eternal motion, but it is necessary that everything which is moved after rest be reduced to the first motion as to its cause, which is not after rest; whence, although the first motion is new, nevertheless it itself is not after rest: for not every immobility is rest, but the immobility of that which is by nature born to be moved, as is written in Physics 3. And before the first motion there was no mobile thing by nature apt to be moved, and I say “before” in duration.

<11> Ad aliam rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: voluntas quae postponit volitum, exspectat aliquid in futuro, verum est solum de voluntate cuius actio est in tempore, quia solum in tempore est futuratio et exspectatio, sed de voluntate cuius actio est ante tempus, non est hoc verum; et actio voluntatis divinae est ante tempus, saltem illa qua mundum et tempus agebat.

<11> To another argument it must be said. When you say: a will which postpones the thing willed expects something in the future, this is true only of a will whose action is in time, because only in time are futurity and expectation; but of a will whose action is before time, this is not true; and the action of the divine will is before time, at least that by which it produced the world and time.

<12> Ad sequentem rationem dicendum est quod illa duo quae sunt in eadem duratione, simul sunt, si nulla pars durationis illius cadit inter illa, sicut duo temporalia simul sunt in tempore inter quae nulla pars temporis cadit; si tamen inter aliqua duo nulla cadit duratio propter hoc quod unum est in nunc aeternitatis et alterum est in nunc temporis, et sic nulla inter ea cadit duratio, non oportet quod talia sint simul. Sic se habet voluntas Dei quae est in nunc aeternitatis, et factio mundi quae est in nunc temporis.

<12> To the subsequent argument it must be said that those two things which are in the same duration are simultaneous, if no part of that duration falls between them, just as two temporal things are simultaneous in time between which no part of time falls; if, however, between certain two no duration falls for the reason that one is in the now of eternity and the other is in the now of time, and thus no duration falls between them, it is not necessary that such be simultaneous. So it stands with the will of God, which is in the now of eternity, and the making of the world, which is in the now of time.

<13> Ad aliam rationem dicendum, sicut dicebatur. Tu arguis in contrarium, quia ponere talem formam voluntatis in Deo, hoc est fingere. Dicendum quod non est verum: non enim omnia figmenta sunt quae demonstrari non possunt.

<13> To another argument it must be said, as was being said. You argue on the contrary, because to posit such a form of will in God is to feign. It must be said that this is not true: for not everything that cannot be demonstrated is a figment.

Ad illud quod tu secundo arguis, dico quod ex quo fuerit talis forma voluntatis divinae ab aeterno, talem oportuit esse modum procedendi voliti ex voluntate, ut volitum perfecte sit sic conforme voluntati.

As to that which you argue in the second place, I say that, since there has been such a form of the divine will from eternity, there ought to have been such a mode of proceeding of the willed thing from the will, that the willed be thus perfectly conform to the will.

<14> Ad sequentem rationem dicendum. Cum dicis: ab antiqua voluntate inter quam et suum effectum non cadit transmutatio, non potest fieri novus effectus, hoc solum verum est de voluntate a qua procedit effectus per transmutationem; talis non est voluntas divina.

<14> To the following reasoning it must be said. When you say: from an ancient will, between which and its effect no transmutation falls, a new effect cannot come to be—this is true only of a will from which an effect proceeds through transmutation; such is not the divine will.

<15> Ad aliud dico quod illud exemplum in aliquo est conveniens, licet non perfecte.

<15> To the other I say that that example is in some respect fitting, albeit not perfectly.

Rationes ad partem oppositam gratia conclusionis concedantur, licet solvi possint, cum sint sophisticae.

Let the reasons to the opposite part be conceded for the sake of the conclusion, although they can be resolved, since they are sophistical.

[12.] Ex his ergo apparet quod philosophum dicere aliquid esse possibile vel impossibile, hoc est illud: dicere esse possibile vel impossibile per rationes investigabiles ab homine. Statim enim quando aliquis dimittit rationes, cessat esset philosophus, nec innititur philosophia revelationibus et in miraculis. Cum ergo tu ipse dicis et dicere debes multa esse vera, quae tamen, si non affirmes vera nisi quantum ratio humana te inducere potest, illa nunquam concedere debes, sicut est ressurectio hominum quam ponit fides.

[12.] From these things, therefore, it appears that for a philosopher to say something is possible or impossible means this: to say it is possible or impossible through reasons investigable by man. For immediately when someone abandons reasons, he ceases to be a philosopher, nor does philosophy lean upon revelations and upon miracles. Since, therefore, you yourself say and ought to say that many things are true, which nevertheless, if you do not affirm to be true except insofar as human reason can lead you, those you ought never to concede—such as the resurrection of men, which faith posits.

Et bene enim in talibus creditur auctoritati divinae et non rationi humanae. Quaeram enim a te: quae ratio hoc demonstrat? Quaeram etiam: quae ratio demonstrat rem generabilem post suam corruptionem iterum redire sine generatione, et etiam eandem in numero quae prius ante suam corruptionem erat, sicut oportet fieri in resurrectione hominum secundum sententiam nostrae fidei?

For indeed in such matters one rightly trusts to divine authority and not to human reason. For I will ask of you: what reasoning demonstrates this? I will also ask: what reasoning demonstrates that a generable thing, after its corruption, returns again without generation, and even that it is numerically the same as it was before its corruption, as it ought to occur in the resurrection of men according to the doctrine of our faith?

Philosophus tamen in fine II De generatione dicit rem corruptam posse redire eandem in specie, sed non eandem in numero. Nec propter hoc contradicit fidei, quia ipse dicit hoc non esse possibile secundum causas naturales. Ex talibus enim ratiocinatur naturalis.

Nevertheless the Philosopher, at the end of Book 2 of On Generation and Corruption, says that a thing that has been corrupted can return the same in species, but not the same in number. Nor on this account does he contradict the faith, since he himself says this is not possible according to natural causes. For from such things the natural philosopher ratiocinates.

Fides autem nostra dicit hoc esse possibile per causam superiorem quae est principium et finis nostrae fidei, Deus gloriosus et benedictus.

Our faith, however, says that this is possible through a higher cause, who is the principle and the end of our faith, God, glorious and blessed.

[13.] Ideo non est contradictio inter fidem et philosophum. Quare ergo murmuras contra philosophum, cum idem secum concedis? Nec credas quod philosophus qui vitam suam posuit in studio sapientiae, contradixit veritati fidei catholicae in aliquo, sed magis studeas, quia modicum habes intellectum respectu philosophorum qui fuerunt et sunt sapientes mundi, ut possis intelligere sermones eorum.

[13.] Therefore there is no contradiction between faith and the philosopher. Why then do you murmur against the philosopher, when you grant the same as he does? Nor should you believe that the philosopher, who set his life on the study of wisdom, contradicted the verity of the Catholic faith in any respect; but rather strive the more, since you have but a small intellect with respect to the philosophers who were and are the wise of the world, so that you may be able to understand their discourses.

Sermo enim magistri intelligendus est ad melius, nec valet quod dicunt quidam maligni ponentes studium suum ad hoc quod possint invenire rationes repugnantes in aliquo veritati christianae fidei, quod tamen procul dubio est impossibile. Dicunt enim quod christianus, secundum quod huiusmodi, non potest esse philosophus, quia ex lege sua cogitur destruere principia philosophiae. Illud enim falsum est, quia christianus concedit conclusionem per rationes philosophicas conclusam non posse aliter se habere per illa per quae concluditur, et si concludatur per causas naturales.

For the discourse of the master is to be understood in the best light, and what certain malicious men say does not hold—those who set their study to this end, that they might be able to find reasons in any respect repugnant to the truth of the Christian faith—which, however, is beyond doubt impossible. For they say that a Christian, as such, cannot be a philosopher, because by his law he is compelled to destroy the principles of philosophy. But that is false, because the Christian concedes that a conclusion concluded by philosophical reasons cannot be otherwise, in view of the very things by which it is concluded, even when it is reached through natural causes.

Quod mortuum non redibit vivum immediate idem numero, hoc concedit non posse aliter se habere per causas naturales per quas concluditur; concedit tamen hoc posse se aliter habere per causam superiorem quae est causa totius naturae et totius entis causati. Ideo christianus subtiliter intelligens non cogitur ex lege sua destruere principia philosophiae, sed salvat fidem et philosophiam, neutram corripiendo. Si autem aliquis in dignitate constitutus sive non, et tam ardua non possit intelligere, tunc oboediat sapientiori et credat legi christianae, non propter rationem sophisticam, quia ipsa fallit, nec propter rationem dialecticam, quia ipsa non facit ita firmum habitum, sicut est fides, quia conclusio rationis dialecticae accipitur cum formidine alterius partis, nec per rationem demonstrativam, tum quia non est possibilis in omnibus quae ponit lex nostra, tum quia ipsa facit scientiam.

That the dead will not return alive immediately numerically the same, this he grants cannot be otherwise according to the natural causes by which it is concluded; he grants, however, that this can be otherwise by a higher cause which is the cause of the whole of nature and of every caused being. Therefore the Christian, understanding subtly, is not compelled by his law to destroy the principles of philosophy, but preserves faith and philosophy, rebuking neither. But if someone, whether placed in dignity or not, cannot understand matters so arduous, then let him obey one wiser and believe the Christian law—not on account of sophistic reason, because it deceives; nor on account of dialectic reason, because it does not produce so firm a habit as faith, since the conclusion of dialectic reason is received with fear of the other side; nor by demonstrative reason, both because it is not possible in all the things which our law posits, and because it makes science.

"Est enim demonstratio syllogismus faciens scire", ut scribitur I Posteriorum, et fides non est scientia. Hinc legi Christi quemlibet christianum adhaerere et credere secundum quod oportet faciat auctor eiusdem legis Christus gloriosus qui est Deus benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

"For a demonstration is a syllogism making to know," as it is written in Posterior Analytics 1, and faith is not science. Hence may the author of the same law, the glorious Christ, who is God blessed unto the ages of ages, bring it about that any Christian adhere to the law of Christ and believe as is fitting. Amen.