William of Conches: [Moralium dogma philosophorum]

Moralium dogma philosophorum per multa dispersum uolumina tuo quidem instinctu, uir optime et liberalis, (Henrice R.), contrahere meditabar. Dumque primo conticinii silentio super hac re scrutabundus memoriam consulerem, repente sompnus obrepsit. Et ecce uir sobrio decore laudabilis quasdam personas non minus matura grauitate reuerendas antecedebat.

I was meditating to contract the moral dogma of the philosophers, scattered through many volumes, at your prompting, most excellent and liberal man, (Henry R.). And while, in the first silence of the conticinium, as I, searching, consulted my memory concerning this matter, suddenly sleep crept upon me. And behold, a man praiseworthy for sober decorum was leading certain persons, no less to be revered for mature gravity.

Statimque, ut fit, solo animi augurio primum illum esse latine eloquentie auctorem Tullium mihi innotuit; post quem ille moralitatis eruditor elegantissimus Seneca cum quibusdam aliis, quos tibi eorum uerba deinceps significabunt, se agebat. Vna igitur conferentes arbitrabar descriptionibus distributionibusque moralem (philo)sophiam quasi in artem nos colligere; michique ipsi fas erat, que uel ab his uel ab aliis audieram eorum prouerbiis interponere. Expergefactus autem stili officio audita designans, breuitati insistendum decreui.

And immediately, as happens, by the mind’s augury alone it became known to me that the first of them was Tullius, the author of Latin eloquence; after whom that most elegant eruditor of morality, Seneca, took his place with certain others, whom their words thereafter will signify to you. Therefore, conversing together, I supposed that we were collecting moral philosophy, as it were, into an art by descriptions and distributions; and to me myself it was lawful to interpose, among their proverbs, the things which I had heard either from them or from others. Having been roused, moreover, setting down what I had heard by the office of the stylus, I resolved to insist upon brevity.

Primum ideo quia fragilis est memoria et rerum turbe non sufficit; necesse est (enim) quantum recipit emittat et antiqua recentibus obruat. Ideo egregie scriptorem formare uidetur qui dicit:

First, therefore, because memory is fragile and does not suffice for the throng of things; it is necessary (indeed) that it emit as much as it receives and that it bury the ancient things with the recent. Therefore, he seems to form the writer excellently who says:

Quicquid precipies, esto breuis, ut cito dicta

Whatever you prescribe, be brief, so that the things said quickly

percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles;

may perceive docile minds and the faithful retain;

omne superuacuum pleno de pectore manat.

all superfluity flows from a full heart.

Preter hec tua diligens instancia me tam sepe pol1ici(ti) consumpmationem posscebat, quod illud certum expertus sum, quia animo desideranti nichil satis festinatur quodque desiderio mora est etiam celeritas.

Besides these things, your diligent insistence so often was demanding from me the consummation of what was promised, that I have learned this for certain: that for a desiring mind nothing is hastened enough, and that for desire even swiftness is a delay.

Ipsius preterea operis fructus cel(lu)la memoriali diligenter reponendus (nullatenus) diffusius se tractari permitteret. Nulla enim uite pars, neque publicis neque priuatis, neque forensibus neque domesticis (in) rebus, morali philosophia uacare potest. In hac excolenda sita est uite honestas et in negligenda turpitudo.

Moreover, the fruit of the work itself, to be carefully stored in a memorial cell, would (by no means) allow itself to be treated more diffusely. For no part of life—neither in public nor in private, neither in forensic nor in domestic (in) affairs—can be vacant of moral philosophy. In cultivating this lies the honorableness of life, and in neglecting it, turpitude.

De ea igitur accipe conpendiosam particulam, ac si de magno flumine ciatum tibi sorbillandum quis propinet. Puto autem te huic honestatis forme non minimam impendere diligentiam. Adeo namque arto atque insolubili complexu (inheres) honesto, quod nec uehemens tumultus huius perniciosissime sedicionis honestatis curam tibi excutit.

Of it, therefore, receive a compendious little portion, as if someone were to proffer to you a cyathus to be sipped from a great river. I think, moreover, that you expend no small diligence upon this form of honesty. For you so (inhere) in the honest with a close and indissoluble embrace, that not even the vehement tumult of this most pernicious sedition shakes from you the care of honesty.

Videmus enim, quod licet temporis necessitas ad flagitia te pertrahat, mens tua contradicit et reclamat. Presentis doctrine expressa mihi in te uno occurrit imago; quocirca uehementer compatior tibi, imo tue odiosa morbi pressura lacessite liber(ali)tati.

For we see that, although the necessity of the time may drag you to flagitious deeds, your mind contradicts and cries out. The expressed image of the present doctrine occurs to me in you alone; wherefore I vehemently commiserate with you—nay, with your liberality, provoked by the odious pressure of disease.

De consilii capiendi deliberatione

On the deliberation of taking counsel

Triplex est capiendi consilii deliberatio: prima est de honesto tantum, secunda de utili tantum, tercia de conflictu utriusque. Prima subdiuiditur in duas. Namque dubitamus utrum honestum an turpe sit factum; dubitamus etiam de duobus honestis quod eorum honestius.

There is a threefold deliberation for taking counsel: the first is about the honorable only, the second about the useful only, the third about the conflict of both. The first is subdivided into two. For we doubt whether the deed is honorable or disgraceful; we also doubt, concerning two honorable things, which of them is more honorable.

Similiter secunda species, id est consultacio utilis duplex est. Inquirunt enim utrum utile uel inutile sit factum; inquirunt etiam (de duobus) utilibus propositis utrum eorum utilius sit. Tercia pars, que est de pugna utilis et honesti, indiuisa est.

Similarly, the second species, that is, the consultation of the useful, is twofold. They inquire whether the deed is useful or useless; they inquire also (about two) useful things set forth, which of them is more useful. The third part, which is about the conflict of the useful and the honest, is undivided.

Sunt itaque quinque consultationes: prima quid honestum, secunda de comparatione honestorum, tercia quid utile, quarta de comparatione utilium, quinta consultacio est quando uidentur utile et honestum sibi aduersari. De his igitur in ordine prefatis dicendum est.

There are, therefore, five consultations: first, what is honorable; second, concerning the comparison of honorable things; third, what is useful; fourth, concerning the comparison of useful things; the fifth consultation is when the useful and the honorable seem to be at odds with one another. Of these, then, it must be spoken in the aforesaid order.

I.De honesto

1.On the Honorable

Honestum est quod sua ui nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit. (Virtus uero est habitus animi in modum nature rationi consentaneus). Virtus igitur et honestum nomina diuersa (sunt), res autem subiecta prorsus eadem. Adeo enim gratiosa est uirtus, ut insitum sit etiam malis probare meliora.

The honorable is that which draws us by its own force and allures us by its own dignity. (But virtue is a habit of mind, after the manner of nature, consonant with reason.) Therefore virtue and the honorable are different names, but the underlying reality is altogether the same. For virtue is so pleasing that it is implanted even in the wicked to approve the better.

Quis est enim qui non inter scelera opinionem bonitatis affectet? Neminem reperies qui nequitie premiis sine nequitia frui non malit.

For who is there who does not, among crimes, affect the opinion of goodness? You will find no one who would not prefer to enjoy the rewards of wickedness without wickedness.

Diuiditur itaque honestum in prudentiam, iusticiam, fortitudinem, temperanciam. Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum et utrarumque discretio. Iusticia est uirtus ius suum cuique conferens.

Therefore the honorable is divided into prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. Prudence is the discrimination of good things and bad things and of both. Justice is the virtue conferring to each his right.

Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Temperantia est uirtus cohibens motus suasu prosperitatis in nos impetum facientes.

Fortitude is the considered undertaking of dangers and the endurance of labors. Temperance is the virtue restraining the motions which, by the suasion of prosperity, make an assault upon us.

Inter has prudentia reliquas tres precedit quasi serens lucernam et aliis monstrans uiam. Eius enim est consulere, aliarum trium agere; consilium autem preuenire debet actum. Vnde ait poeta: Priusquam incipias consulto, et postquam consulueris mature facto opus est.

Among these prudence precedes the remaining three, as if bearing a lantern and showing the way to others. For it is its part to consult, of the other three to act; moreover counsel ought to precede the act. Whence the poet says: Before you begin, consult, and after you have consulted, timely action is needed.

Et Salomon: Palpebre (tue) gressus tuos precedant. Id autem est quod consilia actus tuos preueniant.

And Solomon: Let your eyelids (your) precede your steps. That, moreover, is that counsels should anticipate your acts.

Prudentiam sequitur iusticia. Sed eius officium duo affectus, scilicet timor et cupiditas, et due fortune, scilicet aduersitas et prosperitas, prepediunt. Sit enim aliquis quem sapientia sua dignum beneficio tuo faciat, sit etiam alius dicens tibi quod si illum sapientem tibi adiungas, incurres odium potentis alicuius: ecce timor ab offitio iusticie faciet te cessare.

Justice follows prudence. But its office is hampered by two affections, namely fear and cupidity, and by two fortunes, namely adversity and prosperity. Suppose there is someone whom his wisdom makes worthy of your benefit; suppose also there is another saying to you that if you adjoin that wise man to yourself, you will incur the hatred of some powerful person: lo, fear will make you cease from the office of justice.

Rursus sit aliquis erga quem debeam esse munificus, tunc si cupio feruare quod habeo, uel quia utile mihi uideo, uel quia non facile recupero, cupiditas iusticie obuiat. Iccirco iusticiam duabus columpnis fulcire oportet, scilicet fortitudine contra timorem (et aduersitatem) et temperantia contra cupiditatem (et prosperitatem). [[In fortunis patens (est) quia prosperitati opponenda est temperantia, fortitudo aduersitati; aliter enim illa extolleret, (hec deiceret)]].

Again, let there be someone toward whom I ought to be
munificent; then, if I desire to preserve what I have, either because I see it as useful to me, or
because I do not easily recover it, cupidity opposes justice. Therefore it is necessary to buttress justice with two
columns, namely with fortitude against fear (and
adversity) and with temperance against cupidity (and prosperity). [[In
fortunes it is evident (that) temperance must be set against prosperity, fortitude against
adversity; otherwise the former would exalt, (the latter would cast down) ]].

I.A.De prudentia

I.A.On prudence

Prudentiam diximus ese discretionem rerum bonarum et malarum et utrarumque. Hec namque uirtus discernit bona a malis et bona ab inuicem, mala ab inuicem. Hec quidem, cum sua ui nos trahat, sub honesto continetur.

We have said prudence to be the discretion of good and evil things, and of both. For this virtue discerns goods from evils and goods from one another, evils from one another. This indeed, when by its own force it draws us, is contained under the honorable.

Omnes (enim) trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulcrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe. Huius partes sunt prouidentia, circumpectio, cautio, docilitas.

We are all (indeed) drawn and led to the desire of cognition,
in which we think it fair to excel; but to slip, to err,
not to know, to be deceived, is both evil and shameful. The parts of this are providence, circumspection,
caution, docility.

I.A.1.De prouidentia

1.A.1.On foresight

Prouidentia est presens notio futurum pretractans euentum. Huius offitia sunt ex presentibus futura perpendere, aduersus uenientem calamitatem consilio premunire. Neque enim quod ante occulos situm est sufficit intueri: rerum exitus prudencia metitur.

Providence is a present notion anticipating the future event. Its offices are to weigh the future from present things, to pre-arm by counsel against the coming calamity. Nor indeed does it suffice to gaze at what is set before the eyes: prudence measures the outcomes of things.

Illud quidem ingenii est ante constituere quid accidere possit in utramque partem et quid agendum sit, cum quid euenerit, nec committere ut aliquando dicendum sit: non putarem. Consiliatoris autem debet esse, ne homo felicitati sue credat, efficere, stultam fiduciam semper permansure potencie illi excutere, docere etiam omnia mobilia esse, que dedit casus, et maiore cursu fugere quam ueniunt, nec hisdem gradibus, quibus ad summum uentum est, retroiri, sed inter maximam et ultimam fortunam nichil interesse.

It is indeed a mark of ingenuity to determine beforehand what can happen on either side and what must be done when something has occurred, and not to allow it to happen that one should ever have to say: I would not have thought it. But it ought to be the part of a counselor to bring it about that a man not trust in his own felicity, to shake off from him that foolish confidence in a power supposed to endure forever, to teach also that all things which chance has given are mobile, and flee with a greater course than they come, and that one does not go back by the same steps by which the summit has been reached, but that between the greatest fortune and the last there is no difference.

Sed falsi amici pro consilio adulationem afferunt et una eorum (est) contentio, quis blandissime fallat. Ex quo innumerabilia ueniunt peccata, cum homines inflati oppinionibus turpiter irridentur. Vnde poeta:

But false friends, in place of counsel, bring adulation, and their one contention is, who can most blandishingly deceive. From which innumerable sins come, since men, inflated by opinions, are shamefully derided. Whence the poet:

Nichil est quod credere de se

There is nothing to believe about oneself

non possit, cum laudatur diis equa potestas.

not be able, when a power equal to the gods is lauded.

Tales enim nos esse putamus ut iure laudemur. Idcirco multi ignorauere uires suas et dum credunt se tam magnos quam audiunt, attraxere superuacua bella et in discrimen peruentura. Exemplum adulantium blande fallentium et ueri consiliatoris sit istud.

For we think ourselves to be such that we are praised by right. Therefore many have been ignorant of their own powers, and while they believe themselves as great as they hear, they have drawn upon themselves superfluous wars, destined to come to a critical pass. Let this be an example of flatterers who blandly deceive, and of a true counselor.

Medorum rex Xerxes grecis bellum indixit. Cui familiarium alius dicebat grecos nuntium belli non expectaturos sed ad primam aduentus famam terga uersuros; alius dicebat Gretiam non uinci sed obrui mole exercitus; alius timendum esse ne urbes desertas et uacuas inuenirent: non habiturum regem ubi tantas uires exercere posset; alius dicebat uix illi rerum naturam sufficere: angusta esse classibus maria, militibus castra, explicandis copiis equestribus campestria, uix patere celum sagittis. Dum in hunc modum regem nimia existimatione sui furentem concitarent, dixit Demaratus: Multitudo ista, que tibi placet, tibi metuenda est.

Xerxes, king of the Medes, declared war on the Greeks. To him one of his familiars was saying that the Greeks would not await the message of war, but at the first rumor of his advent would turn their backs; another was saying that Greece would not be conquered but overwhelmed by the mass of the army; another said it was to be feared lest they would find the cities deserted and empty: that the king would not have where he could exercise such great forces; another was saying that scarcely would the nature of things suffice for him: that the seas were narrow for fleets, the camps for soldiers, the plains for the explicating of cavalry troops, that the sky scarcely lay open for the arrows. While in this way they were exciting the king, raging with an excessive estimation of himself, Demaratus said: That multitude, which pleases you, is to be feared by you.

Verum est enim immodica numquam posse regi; nec diu durare potest quod regi non potest. Nichil tam magnum quod perire non possit. Acciderunt que dixit Demaratus.

For it is true that the immoderate can never be ruled; nor can that which cannot be ruled long endure. Nothing is so great that it cannot perish. What Demaratus said came to pass.

Ex quo apparet plus prouidentie inesse ueris consiliatoribus quam assentatoribus.

Whence it appears that there is more providence in true counselors than in flatterers.

I.A.2.De circumspectione

1.A.2.On circumspection

Circumspectio est contrariorum uitiorum cautela. Huius officium est frugalitatem sic seruare quod auaritie fuga dissipationem non incurrat, sic a temeritate recedere quod in timorem non cadat. Huius officium persuadebat qui dicebat: Omni custodia serua cor tuum.

Circumspection is the caution against contrary vices. The office of this is to preserve frugality in such a way that in fleeing avarice it does not incur dissipation; thus to recede from temerity in such a way that it does not fall into fear. This office was being recommended by the one who said: With all custody guard your heart.

Dicturus enim custodia premisit omni, ne hinc hostibus fores claudas et aliunde aditum pandas.

For, about to say “with custody,” he prefixed “with all,” lest you close the doors to the enemies on this side and open access from elsewhere.

I.A.3.De cautione

1.A.3.On caution

Cautio est discernere a uirtutibus uitia uirtutum speciem preferentia. Ad offitia huius ducit Ysidorus dicens: Quedam uitia uirtutum speciem preferunt, unde perniciosius suos sectatores decipiunt, quia se sub uelamine uirtutis tegunt. Nam sub pretextu iusticie crudelitas agitur et remissa segnicies mansuetudo creditur.

Caution is to discern from the virtues the vices presenting the appearance of virtues. To the offices of this Isidore leads, saying: Certain vices present the appearance of virtues, whence they more perniciously deceive their followers, because they cover themselves under the veil of virtue. For under the pretext of justice cruelty is perpetrated, and remiss sloth is believed to be meekness.

Et Cicero: Nulle sunt occultiores insidie quam hee que latent in similitudine offitii. Nam troianus equus idcirco fefellit, quia formam Minerue mentitus est.

And Cicero: No ambushes are more occult than these which lie hidden in the similitude of duty. For the Trojan horse deceived for that reason, because the form of Minerva it feigned.

I.A.4.De docilitate

1.A.4.On docility

Docilitas est prudencia erudiendi imperitos. Huius (officium) est ut per eam homo prius se ipsum, post alios formet, iuxta illud sapientis: Fili mi, bibe aquam de cisterna tua et fluenta putei tui. Diriuentur fontes tui foras et in plateis aquas (tuas) sparge.

Docility is the prudence of educating the inexpert. Its (office) is that through it a man first form himself, afterwards others, according to that of the wise man: My son, drink water from your cistern and the streams of your well. Let your springs be channeled forth abroad, and in the streets scatter (your) waters.

Bibere aquam de cisterna (sua) est haurire sapientiam de mente sua. Omnium autem hominum natura ita comparata est ut aliena melius iudicent quam sua, quod ideo fit quia in re nostra aut gaudio sumus prepediti nimio ant egritudine. Fontes foras diriuare est scientias in alios docendo transfundere.

To drink water from one’s (own) cistern is to draw sapience from one’s own mind. But the nature of all human beings is so prepared that they judge alien things (i.e., others’ things) better than their own, which happens for this reason: because in our own affair we are impeded either by excessive joy or by affliction. To divert the fountains outward is to transfuse the sciences into others by teaching.

Circa hanc uirtutem duo sunt uitanda. Vnum ne ignota pro cognitis habeamus hisque temere assentiamur. Hoc enim est presumptio; quod uitium effugere qui uolet — omnes autem uelle debent — adhibebit ad res considerandas tempus et meditationem.

Concerning this virtue two things are to be avoided. One: lest we hold unknown things as known and rashly assent to them. For this is presumption; which vice whoever will wish to escape — all, moreover, ought to wish — will apply time and meditation to the consideration of things.

Alterum est magnum studium conferre in res obscuras, difficiles et non necesarias, quod uitium curiositas dicitur. Est enim curiositas non magne utilitati nimiam operam impendere, sicuti si relicta morali philosophia astrologiam uel abacum uel geometriam studiose legas. Nam melius est, si pauca sapientie precepta teneas sed illa in promtu et in usu tibi sint, quam si multa didiceris sed illa non habeas ad manum.

The other is to devote great zeal to obscure, difficult, and non-necessary matters, which vice is called curiosity. For curiosity is to expend excessive effort on what is not of great utility, as if, moral philosophy left aside, you were to study diligently astrology or the abacus or geometry. For it is better, if you hold a few precepts of wisdom but have them at the ready and in use for yourself, than if you have learned many but do not have them at hand.

Quemadmodum magnus luctator est non qui omnes nexus didicit, quorum rarus est usus, sed qui in uno aut altero diligenter se exercuit. Non enim refert quam multa sciat, si scit quantum uictorie satis est. Sic in disciplinis multa delectant, pauca iuuant.

Just as a great wrestler is not the one who has learned all the holds,
whose use is rare, but the one who has diligently exercised himself in one or two.
For it does not matter how many things he knows, if he knows as much as is sufficient for victory. Thus in disciplines many things delight, few aid.

Licet nescias que ratio occeanum effundat, quid sit quod gemellorum conceptum separet, partum iungat, cur simul natis fata diuersa sint: non multum tibi nocebit transire quod nec licet scire, nec prodest.

Though you may not know by what reason the Ocean is poured forth, what it is that separates the conception of twins and joins their birth, why those born at the same time have diverse fates: it will not harm you much to pass over what it is neither permitted to know nor profitable.

I.B.De iustitia

1.B.On justice

Iusticia est uirtus conseruatrix humane societatis et uite communitatis. Societatem, id est cohabitacionem hominum, sic seruat iusticia: dum homines cohabitant, obtinet unus uel agros uel alias possessiones quibus eget alius; idcirco concitaretur inuidia et sedicio nisi iusticia adesset, que cuique ius suum conferret. Vite autem communitatem, id est negotia, taliter custodit: dum eundem modum uiuendi, ut mercaturam uel militiam, plures sectantur, questus unius minuit lucrum alterius; que res liuorem moueret, nisi iusticia adesset.

Justice is the conserving virtue of human society and of the life of community. Society, that is, the cohabitation of human beings, justice preserves thus: while humans cohabit, one holds either fields or other possessions which another needs; therefore envy and sedition would be stirred up unless justice were present, which confers to each his own right. The community of life, however, that is, affairs, it guards in this way: while several follow the same mode of living, such as merchandizing or military service, the profit of one diminishes the gain of another; which thing would move ill-will, unless justice were present.

Hec uirtus etiam omnia aspera transcendit. Nemo enim iustus esse potest qui mortem, qui exilium, qui dolorem, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea que sunt his contraria equitati anteponit. Ac mea quidem sentencia omnis institutio uite adiumenta hominum desiderat que per iusticiam parantur, in primis ut habeat homo cum quibus (familiares) possit conferre sermones.

This virtue also transcends all hardships. For no one can be just who fears death, who fears exile, who fears pain, who fears poverty, or who prefers to equity those things that are contrary to these. And, indeed, in my judgment every institution of life desires the aids of men which are procured through justice, chiefly that a man may have those with whom (familiar friends) he can confer conversations.

Atque his qui uendunt, emunt, conducunt, locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur necessaria est iusticia. Cuius tanta uis est, ut nec illi, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula iusticie uiuere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is nec in latrocinio sibi locum relinquit.

And for those who sell, buy, hire, let, and are entangled in contracting business, justice is necessary. So great is its force that not even those who are nourished by malefaction and crime can live without some particle of justice. For whoever steals something or snatches it from any one of those who together practice brigandage leaves no place for himself even in brigandage.

Archipirata, si non equabiliter predam dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur.

The arch-pirate, if he does not distribute the booty equally, either is slain by his associates or is abandoned.

I.B.1De seueritate

I.B.1On severity

Diuiditur autem iusticia in seueritatem et liberalitatem. Seueritas est uirtus debito supplicio cohercens iniuriam. Primum ergo seueritatis offitium (est) ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria; secundum ut communibus utatur pro communibus, priuatis pro priuatis.

But justice is divided into severity and liberality. Severity is a virtue coercing injury with due punishment. Therefore the first duty of severity (is) that no one harm anyone, unless provoked by an injury; the second, that one use common things for common matters, private things for private matters.

Sunt (autem) priuata nulla natura sed aut uetere occupatione, ut qui quondam in uacua uenerunt, aut uictoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege, ut qui testamento patrum heredes facti sunt. Et quia eorum, que natura erant communia, proprium cuiusque fit quod cuique optigit, id quisque teneat. Si quis plus apetet, uiolabit ius humane societatis, et inde omnis seditio, quod in tuum usum mea priuata transferre conaris.

There are, however, no private things by nature, but either by old occupation, as those who once came into vacant lands, or by victory, as those who by war got possession, or by law, as those who by the testament of their fathers were made heirs. And since, of those things which by nature were common, that becomes the property of each which has befallen each, let each hold that. If anyone seeks more, he will violate the law of human society, and from that comes every sedition, because you are trying to transfer my private property into your use.

Nam quietissime homines uiuerent, si duo uerba tollerentur: meum et tuum.

For men would live most quietly, if two words were removed: mine and yours.

Tercium seueritatis officium est exterminare ex hominum communitate pestiferum genus hominum. Vt enim quedam membra amputantur, si sanguine et spiritu carere ceperint et nocent ceteris, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et inmanitas belue a communi uita segreganda est; sunt enim homines non re sed nomine. Nam quid interest, utrum ex homine se conuertat quis in beluam an sub hominis figura inmanitatem belue gerat?

The third duty of severity is to exterminate from the community of men the pestiferous kind of men. For just as certain limbs are amputated, if they have begun to lack blood and spirit and harm the others, so this ferocity and the immanity of a beast under the figure of a man must be segregated from common life; for they are men not in reality but in name. For what difference is there, whether someone turns himself from a man into a beast, or bears the beast’s immanity under the figure of a man?

Non ergo talibus est parcendum. Nam iudex dampnatur, cum nocens absoluitur. Cauenda est (autem) maxime ira in puniendo, cum qua nemo tenebit mediocritatem, que est inter nimium et parum.

Therefore, such people are not to be spared. For the judge is condemned, when the guilty is absolved. To be guarded against is (however) especially wrath in punishing, with which no one will hold the mediocrity, which is between too much and too little.

I.B.2.De liberalitate

1.B.2.On liberality

Liberalitas est uirtus beneficiorum erogatrix, quam eandem pro affectu benignitatem, pro effectu beneficientiam dicimus. Hec uirtus in tribuendo et retribuendo tota consistit.

Liberality is a virtue, a dispenser of benefits, which same we call, for the affect, benignity; for the effect, beneficence. This virtue wholly consists in bestowing and in re-bestowing.

I.B.2.a_I . De beneficiis tribuendis

I.B.2.a₁ . On benefits to be bestowed

In tribuendo caue ne sis durus. Quis enim hominum contentus fuit aut leuiter rogari, aut semel? Quis, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem non abduxit, uultum auertit, occupationes simulauit?

In granting, beware lest you be hard. For who among men has been content to be asked either lightly, or only once? Who, when he has suspected that something is being sought from him, has not drawn back his brow, turned his countenance away, and feigned occupations?

Eodem animo beneficium debetur quo datur, et ideo non est negligenter dandum; sibi enim quisque debet quod a nesciente accepit. Nemo autem libenter debet quod non accepit sed extorsit.

The benefit is owed with the same mind with which it is given, and therefore it is not to be given negligently; for each person owes to himself what he received from one who was unaware. No one, moreover, willingly owes what he did not receive but extorted.

Secundo caue dilationem. Errat qui sperat responsurum sibi quem dilatione lassauit, expectatione torsit. Ingratum est beneficium quod diu inter manus dantis hesit.

Secondly, beware delay. He errs who hopes for an answer from one whom he has wearied by delay and tortured with expectation. Thankless is the benefit that has long lingered between the hands of the giver.

Proximus est enim neganti qui dubitauit: qui tarde fecit diu noluit. Tantum gratie demis, quantum more adicis. Cum roganti suffundatur rubor, qui hoc remittit, multiplicat munus suum.

For he who has doubted is next to denying; he who did it tardy long was unwilling. You take away as much of the grace as you add of delay. When a blush is suffused upon the one asking, he who remits this multiplies his gift.

Optimum est enim antecedere desiderium cuiusque, proximum sequi. Non tulit gratis qui, cum rogaret, accepit; nulla enim res carius constat quam que precibus empta est. Nam molestum uerbum et honorosum et dimisso uultu dicendum: rogo.

For it is best to anticipate each one’s desire, next-best to follow it. He did not receive it gratis who received it when he had to ask; for nothing costs more dearly than that which has been bought by prayers. For the word is troublesome and onerous, and to be spoken with a downcast countenance: I ask.

Victurum autem est beneficium quod obuiam uenit. Gratius est quod de facili quam quod de plena manu sumitur, quia actori detrahit quisquis post illum rogandus est. Nichil eque amarum quam diu pendere; equiore animo quidam ferunt prescindi spem suam quam trahi.

A benefaction that comes to meet one will live. More welcome is what is taken readily than what is taken from a full hand, because he detracts from the doer who must, after him, be asked. Nothing is equally bitter as to hang long in suspense; with a more equable mind some endure to have their hope cut off rather than drawn out.

Tercio caue ne beneficium obsit his quibus uidetur benigne dari uel aliis. Qui dant cuipiam quod obsit illi, non benefici neque liberales, sed pernitiosi assentatores iudicandi sunt. Sunt autem multi cupidi glorie, qui eripiunt aliis quod aliis largiantur.

Third, beware lest a benefit harm those to whom it seems to be benignly given, or others. They who give to someone what harms him are to be judged not beneficent nor liberal, but pernicious assentators. There are moreover many greedy for glory, who snatch from some what they lavish upon others.

Id autem tam abest ab officio, ut nil magis sit officio contrarium. Ille ambitioni dedit, non mihi. Ea igitur utamur liberalitate que prosit amicis, noceat nemini.

But that is so far from duty that nothing is more contrary to duty. He gave to ambition, not to me. Let us, therefore, use that liberality which benefits friends and harms no one.

Quarto caue ne beneficium maius sit facultate tua. Inest enim in tali liberalitate cupiditas rapiendi, ut ad largiendum suppetant copie.

Fourth, beware lest the benefit be greater than your capacity. For in such liberality there inheres a cupidity of snatching, so that resources may be at hand for largessing.

Quinto caue exprobrationem. Lex enim beneficii (est) inter duos quod alter statim debet obliuisci dati, alter memor esse accepti. Numquam data uir bonus cogitat, nisi ammonitus a reddente.

Fifth, beware reproach. For the law of a benefit between two is that one ought at once to forget what has been given, the other to be mindful of what has been received. A good man never thinks of what he has given, unless reminded by the one repaying.

Multum obligauit qui accipere se putauit, cum daret; dedit tamquam recepturus, recepit tamquam non dedisset. Graues autem exprobratores et leues, quos paulo post sui muneris penitet, gratiam omnem corrumpunt. Quibus dicitur: O superbia, nichil a te accipere libet; quicquid das corrumpis.

He has greatly obliged who thought he was receiving when he was giving; he gave as though about to receive, he received as though he had not given. But harsh reproachers, and light ones—who a little after repent of their own gift—corrupt all goodwill. To such it is said: O Pride, it is agreeable to receive nothing from you; whatever you give, you corrupt.

Sexto caue maliciosam astuciam inficiandi. Dixit Antigonus cinico petenti talentum plus esse quam cinicus debeat petere; petenti uero nummum respondit minus esse quam regem opporteat dare. Ecce maliciose negabat; nam posset dare talentum quia ipse rex erat, uel nummum qua ille cinicus.

Sixth, beware the malicious astuteness of denying. Antigonus said to a Cynic asking for a talent that it was more than a Cynic ought to ask; but to one asking for a coin he replied that it was less than it behooves a king to give. Behold, he was refusing maliciously; for he could give a talent, since he himself was a king, or a coin, as that Cynic could.

Melius Alexander qui, cum daret ciuitatem cuidam dicenti non conuenire ciuitatem humili fortune sue, respondit: Non quero quid te opporteat accipere sed quid me dare.

Better was Alexander who, when he was granting citizenship to a certain man saying that citizenship did not befit his humble fortune, replied: I do not inquire what it is fitting for you to receive, but what for me to give.

Septimo caue de ingrato querelam facere. Meliorem facies ingratum ferendo, peiorem conquerendo. Dubiam uerecundiam uox conuitiantis clarior rupit.

Seventh, beware of making a complaint about an ingrate. You will make the ingrate better by bearing it, worse by complaining. A clearer voice of the reviler broke through hesitant modesty.

Nemo id esse, quod iam uidetur, timet; deprehensus pudor emittitur. Non est ille qualem sperauimus: simus quales fuimus, ei dissimiles. Ingratus est aduersus unum beneficium: aduersus alterum non erit; duorum oblitus est: tercium in eorum que exciderant memoriam reducet.

No one fears that a thing is what it already seems; shame, once apprehended, is let go. He is not such as we hoped for: let us be such as we were, unlike him. He is ungrateful against one benefit: against another he will not be; he has forgotten two: the third, of those things which had fallen out, will recall to memory.

Que ratio est exacerbare eum in quem magna contuleris, ut ex amico fiat inimicus? Sis munificus in dando, non acerbus in exigendo. Nam cum altius iniurie quam merita descendant, quid expectat qui offendit, dum obligat?

What reason is there to exacerbate him upon whom you have conferred great things, so that from a friend he becomes an enemy? Be munificent in giving, not acerbic in exacting. For since injuries descend deeper than merits, what does he who offends, while obliging, expect?

Officium itaque liberalitatis est omni petenti dare, deos imitari. Si deos imitaris, da etiam ingratis; nam et sceleratis sol oritur et piratis patent maria. Dii, rerum omnium optimi actores, ignorantibus beneficia dare incipiunt, ingratis perseuerant.

Therefore the office of liberality is to give to every petitioner, to imitate the gods. If you imitate the gods, give even to the ungrateful; for the sun rises even for the wicked, and the seas stand patent to pirates. The gods, the best agents of all things, begin to give benefactions to the ignorant, and they persevere with the ungrateful.

Non cessant dii beneficia congerere, unam sortiti intencionem, scilicet prodesse. Imitemur illos: demus etiam si multa in irritum data sunt. Ingratus est: non mihi fecit iniuriam sed sibi.

The gods do not cease to heap up benefactions, having been allotted one intention, namely, to be of profit. Let us imitate them: let us give even if many things have been given to no effect. He is ungrateful: he has done an injury not to me but to himself.

Nam gratum semper beneficium delectat, ingratum semel. Non est magni animi beneficium dare et perdere, perdere autem et dare magni animi est. Hec est uirtus dare beneficia non utique reditura.

For a benefit delights the grateful always; the ungrateful, once. It is not magnanimous to give a benefit and lose; but to lose and to give is magnanimous. This is virtue: to give benefits not assuredly to return.

Malim non recipere quam non dare. Qui non dat, uitium ingrati antecedit, et beneficium accipere est libertatem uendere. Ideo si promittis indigno, da non tamquam munus, sed dictum tuum redime.

I would prefer not to receive rather than not to give. He who does not give is preceded by the vice of the ungrateful, and to accept a benefit is to sell one’s liberty. Therefore, if you promise to an unworthy person, give it not as a gift, but redeem your word.

Quamuis autem omni petenti dare debeas, tamen in beneficio habendus est delectus dignitatis. In quo spectandi sunt mores eius cui datur et animus erga nos et cohabitacio et uite societas et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata. Etiam si non uiuitur cum perfectis sed simulacra uirtutis habentibus, neminem puto negligendum in quo aliqua significatio uirtutis appareat.

Although, however, you ought to give to everyone who asks, nevertheless in the benefaction there must be a selection according to dignity. In this, the morals of the one to whom it is given are to be considered, and his spirit toward us, and cohabitation and the companionship of life, and the services previously conferred to our benefit. Even if one does not live with the perfect but with those possessing simulacra of virtue, I think no one should be neglected in whom any signification of virtue appears.

Colendus est maxime quisque in quantum lenioribus uirtutibus, modestia scilicet et temperantia, ornatior erit. Nam fortis animus plerumque feruentior est in non sapiente.

Each person is to be especially honored in proportion as he will be more adorned with gentler virtues—namely modesty and temperance. For a brave spirit is, for the most part, more fervent in one who is not wise.

Primum illud est in officio, ut a quo plurimum diligimur, ei plurimum tribuamus. Multa enim faciunt multi repentino impetu animi, quasi quodam uento incitati; que beneficia eque magna non sunt habenda atque ea que considerate delata sunt. Iterum alia causa est eius qui calamitate premitur, alia eius qui res meliores querit nullis suis rebus aduersis.

First, this is the rule in duty: that to the one by whom we are most cherished, we allot the most. For many do many things by a sudden impulse of spirit, as if incited by a certain wind; and such benefactions are not to be held as equally great as those which have been bestowed with consideration. Again, the case of one who is pressed by calamity is one thing, that of one who seeks better conditions with nothing adverse in his own affairs is another.

Propensior enim benignitas debebitur in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In his tamen, qui altiorem gradum ascendere uolunt, omnino restricti esse non debemus. Iterum melius apud bonos quam apud diuites puto collocari beneficium.

For a more inclined benignity will be owed to the calamitous, unless perhaps they are worthy of the calamity. Yet, in the case of those who wish to ascend to a higher grade, we ought not to be altogether restricted. Again, I think a benefaction is better placed with the good than with the rich.

Nam qui locupletes sunt obligari beneficio nolunt, sed cum acceperint beneficium quamuis magnum, beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, aut aliquod a se expectari suspicantur. Item si malo opulento benefacias, in illo uno aut forte in eius familia manet gratia; si autem inopi et bono, omnes inopes boni presidium sibi paratum uident. Et cum inopi bono benefacias, spectatum se, non suam fortunam putat.

For those who are wealthy do not wish to be obligated by a benefit; but when they have received a benefit, however great, they think that they themselves have given a benefit, or they suspect that something is expected from them. Likewise, if you bestow a benefit upon an evil opulent man, the gratitude remains in that one person or perhaps in his household; but if upon a needy and good man, all the needy see a good protection prepared for themselves. And when you bestow a benefit upon a needy good man, he thinks that he himself, not his fortune, has been regarded.

Ideo si in contentionem ueniet res, sequere Temistoclem qui ait: Malo uirum qui peccunia egeat, quam peccuniam que uiro.

Therefore, if the matter comes into contention, follow Themistocles, who says: I prefer a man who is in need of money, rather than money that is in need of a man.

Dabimus munera non superuacua: mulieri non dabis arma militaria. Dabimus munera non exprobratura cuique suum morbum: ebrioso non dabis uina. Munera duratura queramus, quia numquam ammonere debemus; munera non tam pretiosa quam rara.

We will give gifts not superfluous: you will not give military arms to a woman. We will give gifts that will not upbraid each person with his own malady: to an inebriate you will not give wines. Let us seek gifts lasting, because we ought never to remind; gifts not so much precious as rare.

Hactenus hec ad tribuentes.

Thus far these things to the givers.

I.B.2.a_II . De beneficiis retribuendis

I.B.2.a₂ . On retributing benefits

Nullum officium referenda gratia magis necessarium. Nam si Hesiodus iubet reddere maiore mensura que acceperis utenda, quid debemus facere prouocati beneficio? Imitari agros fertiles qui multo plus afferunt quam acceperunt.

No duty is more necessary than returning a favor. For if Hesiod bids us to repay with a greater measure the things which you have received for use, what ought we to do, prompted by a benefaction? Imitate fertile fields, which bring forth much more than they have received.

Quia si non dubitamus officia conferre his quos speramus nobis profuturos, quales debemus esse in eos qui iam profuerunt? Nam demus uel non demus, in nostra potestate est; non reddere uero bono uiro non licet, si absque iniuria id facere possit.

Because if we do not hesitate to confer good offices upon those whom we hope will be profitable to us, what sort ought we to be toward those who have already profited us? For whether we give or do not give is in our power; but not to render in return to a good man is not permitted, if one can do it without injustice.

Primo ergo caue ne obliuiscaris beneficii. Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam sibi etiam fieri putant in liberalitate deterrenda. Nam ingratus est qui negat se accepisse beneficium, ingratus qui dissimulat, ingratus qui non reddit, ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus est.

First therefore beware lest you forget the benefaction. For all hate one unmindful of a benefit, and they think that wrong is even being done to themselves, in deterring liberality. For ungrateful is he who denies that he has received a benefit, ungrateful he who dissimulates, ungrateful he who does not repay, most ungrateful of all he who has forgotten.

Numquam gratus fieri potest cui totum beneficium elapsum est. Apparet illum non sepe de reddendo cogitasse cui obrepsit obliuio. Numquam uoluit esse gratus qui beneficium tam longe proiecit ut extra conspectum suum poneret.

Never can he become grateful, for whom the whole benefaction has slipped away. It appears that he has not often thought about rendering in return, upon whom oblivion has crept. He never wished to be grateful who has thrown the benefaction so far as to set it beyond his own sight.

Memoria enim nil perdit, nisi ad quod non sepe respexit. Ideo dico ne obliuiscaris preteriti benefitii. Ad preterita enim beneficia pauci animum retorquent.

For memory loses nothing, except to that which it has not often looked back. Therefore I say: do not forget the past benefit. For to past benefits few turn their mind back.

Nemo, quod fuit, in preterito, sed tamquam in perdito ponit. Si ad iudicem te uocat, incipit non esse beneficium sed creditum. Et cum res honestissima sit referre gratiam, desinit esse honesta, si est necessaria.

No one files what has been under the past, but as if
under the lost. If he summons you before a judge, it begins to be not a benefit but
a loan. And although to render gratitude is a most honorable thing, it ceases to be honorable, if
it is necessary.

Secundo caue ne ad beneficium per iniuriam accedas. Sunt enim quidam nimis grati; hii aliquid incommodi precari solent his quibus obligati sunt, ut probent affectum beneficii memorem. Horum animus similis est prauo amore flagrantibus; illi enim amice sue optant exilium ut fugientem comitentur, optant inopiam ut magis desideranti donent, optant morbum ut assideant, et quicquid optaret inimicus amantes uouent.

Secondly beware lest you approach a benefit through an injury. There are indeed some too grateful; these are accustomed to pray for some inconvenience for those to whom they are obligated, in order to prove an affection mindful of the benefit. The spirit of these is similar to those blazing with perverse love; for they wish exile for their friend so that they may accompany the one fleeing, they wish indigence so that they may give more to one desiring, they wish disease so that they may sit beside, and whatever an enemy would wish, lovers vow.

Fere idem exitus est odii et amoris insani. Sed nequitia est ut extrahas mergere, euertere ut suscites, includere ut emittas. Non enim beneficium iniurie finis, ne(c) umquam id detraxisse meritum est, quod ipse qui detraxit intulerat.

Almost the same outcome is that of hatred and of mad love. But it is wickedness to submerge in order to draw out, to overturn in order to raise up, to shut in in order to send out. For a benefaction is not the end of an injury, nor is it ever a merit to have removed what the very one who removed it had himself inflicted.

Tertio caue ne nimis festines ostendere te gratum. Qui antecedit tempus retribuendi eque peccat quam qui non sequitur. Quod apud te non uis morari honus iudicas, non munus.

Thirdly, beware lest you hasten too much to show yourself grateful. He who anticipates the time of recompense sins just as much as he who does not follow it. What you do not wish to linger with you, you judge a burden, not a gift.

Reiciendi signum est protinus aliud inuicem mittere et munus munere expungere. Penitet accepti beneficii quem nondum redditi piget.

It is a sign of rejection to forthwith send another in return and to cancel a gift with a gift. He repents of the accepted benefit whom the not-yet repayment irks.

Quarto caue ne clam gratiam referas. Ingratus est qui remotis arbitris gratias agit. Hoc autem obserua in primis ut benigne accipias.

Fourth, beware lest you return a favor in secret. He is an ingrate who renders thanks with the arbiters removed. But observe this first of all: that you receive kindly.

Si benigne accipis, retulisti gratiam, non ut solutum te putes, sed ut securior debeas. Voluntati enim uoluntate satisfecimus, rem rei debemus.

If you receive benignly, you have rendered gratitude, not so that you think yourself paid off, but that you may owe more securely. For to the will with will we have satisfied, we owe the thing for the thing.

I.B.2.b_I. De beneficentia (benignitate) operae et pecuniae

1.B.2.b₁. On the beneficence (benignity) of service and of money

Rursus beneficientia alia opere, alia pecunie. Facilior est ea que est peccunie, presertim locupleti; prima splendidior et uiro bono dignior. De illa scriptum est: Nulli preclusa est uirtus, omnibus patet; non querit domum, non censum: nudo homine contempta est.

Again, beneficence is one thing by work, another by money. Easier is that which is of money, especially for the wealthy; the former is more splendid and more worthy of a good man. Of that it has been written: Virtue is shut to no one, it is open to all; it does not seek a house, nor a census: with a man naked it is content.

Et quamuis utraque gratum faci(a)t, tamen altera ex archa, altera ex uirtute depromitur. Item ea que est peccunie materiam suam exhaurit. Itaque benignitate tollitur benignitas; hac quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis.

And although each makes for gratitude, yet the one is drawn forth from a coffer, the other from virtue. Likewise, that which is pecuniary exhausts its own material. Accordingly, by benignity benignity is taken away; by this, the more you have used it toward more persons, the less you are able to use it toward many.

Altera uero consuetudine benefaciendi paraciores et exercitaciores facit. Dum macedonum fauorem peccunie largicione captaret Alexander, scripsit ad eum pater hec uerba: Quis error in istam spem te induxit ut eos tibi fideles putares quos peccunia corrupisses. An tu id agis ut macedones non te regem sed ministrum et prebitorem putent?

The other, however, by the habit of doing good, makes people readier and more exercised. While Alexander was trying to capture the favor of the Macedonians by largess of money, his father wrote to him these words: What error led you into that hope, that you thought those faithful to you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are you aiming at this, that the Macedonians should consider you not a king but a minister and purveyor?

Fit enim deterior qui accipit atque ad idem semper expectandum paracior.

For indeed he becomes worse who receives and is more ready always to be expecting the same.

Non tamen hoc genus benignitatis omnino refutandum est. Nam sepe idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari impertiendum est, sed diligenter et moderate. Multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo.

Nevertheless, this kind of benignity is not to be altogether rejected. For often to suitable men in need something from the family property ought to be imparted, but carefully and moderately. For many have poured out their patrimonies by indiscreet largess.

Nichil autem stultius est quam curare ut id diutius facere non possis quod libenter facias. Secuntur etiam largicionem rapine. Cum enim dando egere ceperint, alienis bonis manus inferre coguntur, et maiora odia eorum assecuntur quibus ademerunt, quam fauores eorum quibus dederunt.

Nothing, however, is more foolish than to see to it that you cannot for a longer time do what you gladly do. Rapine, too, follows largess. For when by giving they have begun to be in need, they are compelled to lay hands on others’ goods, and they incur greater odium from those from whom they have taken than the favors of those to whom they have given.

Duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri dissipatores, alteri liberales. Dissipatores, qui epulis et muneribus histrionum et lenonum peccunias profundunt, quarum memoriam aut breuem aut nullam omnino sunt relicturi. Liberales, qui suis facultatibus aut captos a predonibus redimunt aut amicos in filiarum collocatione iuuant uel in alia re querenda uel augenda.

There are two kinds of the generous: some are dissipators, others liberal. Dissipators are those who pour out pecuniary sums on banquets and on the gifts of histrions and panders, of which they will leave a remembrance either brief or none at all. The liberal are those who with their own resources either redeem persons captured by brigands, or help friends in the arranging of daughters in marriage, or in acquiring or augmenting some other matter.

Beneficientia opere exercetur iuuando consilio, defendendo in causis eloquio. Sed ammonendi sunt, cum iuuare alios uelint, ne alios offendant. Sepe enim aut eos ledunt quos non debent, aut eos quos non expedit.

Beneficence is exercised by deed, by helping with counsel, by defending in causes with eloquence. But they must be admonished, when they wish to help others, not to offend others. For often they either hurt those whom they ought not, or those whom it is not expedient to hurt.

Si inprudentes, negligentie est; si scientes, temeritatis. Vtendum est excusatione aduersus eos quos inuitus offendas, quare aliter facere non potueris, ceterisque offitiis id quod uiolatum est, recompensandum erit. Sed cum ex acusatione et defensione constet causa, laudabilior est defensio; sed tamen accusatio persepe probata, quam tamen semel et non sepe suscipere debemus.

If unwitting, it is negligence; if knowing, temerity. One must employ an excuse against those whom you offend unwillingly, as to why you could not have done otherwise, and by other offices make good what has been violated. But since a cause consists of accusation and defense, defense is more laudable; yet nevertheless accusation is very often approved—though we ought to undertake it once, and not often.

Duri enim hominis, uel potius uix hominis, uidetur esse periculum capitis inferre multis. Sordidum etiam est ad famam committere, ut accusator nomineris. Diligenter quoque tenendum est, ne innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas quod absque scelere nequit fieri.

For it seems to be the part of a harsh man, or rather scarcely of a man, to bring capital peril upon many. It is also sordid for one’s reputation to stake it so as to be named an accuser. It must likewise be carefully maintained that you do not arraign an innocent person to a capital judgment, which cannot be done without crime.

Nam quid tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam ad salutem hominum datam ad bonorum perniciem conuertere.

For what is so inhuman as to convert eloquence, given for the salvation of human beings, to the destruction of good men.

Iudicis est semper uerum sequi, patroni non numquam ueri simile, etiam si minus sit uerum, defendere. Omnes autem, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia uacuos esse decet. Haut facile animus uerum prouidet, ubi illa officiunt.

It is the judge’s part always to follow the truth, the advocate’s sometimes to defend the verisimilar, even if it be less true. Moreover, it befits all who consult about doubtful matters to be free from hatred, friendship, anger, and compassion. Not easily does the mind apprehend the truth where those impede.

Nam iudices

For judges

sepe propter inuidiam adimunt diuiti

often, on account of envy, they take away from the wealthy man

et propter misericordiam addunt pauperi.

and out of mercy they add to the poor.

Deponit autem quisque personam amici, cum induit personam iudicis.

However, each person lays aside the persona of a friend, when he puts on the persona of a judge.

Curandum est etiam ne, tamquam in suam possessionem uenerit sermo, excludant alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in sermone communi uicissitudinem non iniquam putent. Videant etiam ne sermo uitium indicet inesse moribus; quod solet euenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per ridiculum aut maledice aliquid dicitur.

Care must also be taken lest, as though the conversation had come into their own possession, they exclude others, but as in the rest of things, so in common discourse let them consider a not-unjust reciprocity. Let them also see that speech not indicate a vice to be present in their morals; which is wont to happen, when studiously for the sake of detraction about the absent, either by ridicule or maliciously, something is said.

Curandum est etiam ut eos, cum quibus sermonem conferamus, et uereri et diligere uideamur. Obiurgationes non numquam incidunt necessarie, in quibus utendum est et uocis contencione et uerborum grauitate acriore. Id agendum est etiam ut ea facere non uideamur irati, sed ut ad urendum et secandum sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro et inuiti ueniemus.

Care must also be taken that we seem both to revere and to love those with whom we confer discourse. Objurgations sometimes occur of necessity, in which one must use both a straining of the voice and a keener gravity of words. We must also aim that we do not seem to do these things in anger, but—just as we come to burning and cutting—so to this kind of chastising we should come rarely and reluctantly.

Sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nil recte, nil considerate fieri potest. Illud etiam acerbitatis quod habet obiurgatio significandum est causa illius, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum. In illis etiam contencionibus que cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, rectum est grauitatem retinere, iracundiam pellere.

But yet let ire be far away, with which nothing rightly, nothing considerately can be done. That element of acerbity also which an objurgation has must be made to signify that it has been undertaken for the sake of him who is being objurgated. In those contentions too which are carried on with the most inimical persons, even if we hear things unworthy of us, it is right to retain gravity and to drive away irascibility.

Que enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec constanter fieri possunt, nec ab his, qui adsunt, probari. Deforme etiam de se ipso predicare, presertim falsa, et cum irrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.

For those things which are done with some perturbation cannot be done consistently, nor can they, by those who are present, be approved. It is also unseemly to proclaim about oneself, especially false things, and, with the derision of the hearers, to imitate the braggart soldier.

In his omnibus mores hominum, non fortunam, sequi oportebit. Sed quis est qui cause inopis et boni non anteponat gratiam fortunati et potentis? A quo enim expeditior remuneratio uidetur, in eum est uoluntas nostra propensior.

In all these matters it will be proper to follow the morals of men, not fortune. But who is there who does not prefer the favor of the fortunate and powerful to the cause of the poor and good man? For toward him from whom a more expeditious remuneration seems [likely], our will is more inclined.

I.B.2.b_II. De alia benignitatis partitione

I.B.2.b₂. On another partition of benignity

Rursus alia benignitatis particio. Quecumque enim uirtutes bonis reddunt debitum eius sunt partes. Reddit enim deo ius suum religio, pietas parentibus, innocentia minoribus, amicitia equalibus, reuerentia maioribus, concordia conciuibus, misericordia egenis.

Again another partition of benignity. For whatever virtues render to the worthy their due are its parts. For religion renders to God his right, piety to parents, innocence to juniors, friendship to equals, reverence to elders, concord to fellow-citizens, mercy to the needy.

I.B.2.b_II .α. De religione

I.B.2.b₂ .α. On religion

Religio est uirtus diuinitatis curam cerimoniamque afferens. Huius officium primum est perpetrati sceleris penitere.

Religion is a virtue bringing the care and ceremony of divinity. Its first duty is to do penance for a perpetrated crime.

Scelerum si bene penitet,

If one repents well of crimes,

eradenda praui cupidinis

the evils of depraved desire are to be eradicated

sunt elementa, et tenere nimis

are the elements, and to hold excessively

mentes asperioribus

minds by harsher asperities

formande studiis.

to be formed by studies.

Ideoque religionis officium secundum est temporalium mutabilitatem paruipendere. Namque

And therefore the second office of religion is to make light of the mutability of temporal things. For

truditur dies die

day is driven on by day

noueque pergunt interire lune.

and new moons go on perishing.

Inmortalia ne speres, monet annus et almum

Do not hope for immortal things, the year warns, and the life-giving

que rapit hora diem.

and the hour snatches the day.

Dampna tamen celeres reparant celestia lune:

Losses however the swift celestial things of the moon repair:

nos, ubi decidimus,

we, when we fall,

quo pius Eneas, quo Tullus diues et Ancus,

whither pious Aeneas, whither rich Tullus and Ancus,

puluis et umbra sumus.

we are dust and shadow.

Debemur morti nos nostraque.

We are owed to death, we and ours.

Ideo tercium sit huius uirtutis officium uitam nostram ex toto deo committere, iuxta illud poete:

Therefore let the third office of this virtue be to commit our life wholly to God, according to that of the poet:

Si consilium uis,

If you want counsel,

permittes ipsis expendere numinibus quid

you will permit the numina themselves to weigh what

conueniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris.

may be convenient for us and be useful for our affairs.

Nam pro iocundis aptissima queque dabunt dii.

For, instead of delights, the gods will give whatever things are most fitting.

Carior est illis homo quam sibi.

Man is dearer to them than to himself.

Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano.

One should pray that there be a sound mind in a sound body.

Non tamen uotis auxilia deorum parantur, sed uigilando, agendo, bene consulendo prospere omnia cedunt. Vbi socordie atque ignauie te tradideris, nequicquam deos implores: sunt enim irati et infesti. Tunc scito te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum, cum en perueneris ut nichil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis palam.

Not, however, by vows are the aids of the gods procured, but by keeping vigil, by acting, and by counseling well all things go prosperously. When you have handed yourself over to sloth and cowardice, you implore the gods in vain: for they are irate and hostile. Then know yourself to be freed from all desires, when you have come to the point that you ask nothing of the gods, except what you can ask openly.

Quanta dementia est hominum! Turpissima uota diis insusurrant, et si quis admouerit aurem, conticescent; et quod scire hominem nolunt, a deo petunt. Tu uero sic uiue cum hominibus, tamquam deus uideat, sic loquere cum deo, tanquam homines audiant.

How great is the madness of men! They whisper the most shameful vows to the gods, and if anyone should lend an ear, they fall silent; and what they do not want a man to know, they ask from God. But you—live with men as though God sees; speak with God as though men hear.

Quartum religionis officium ueritatem seruare. Nam liberi et serui personam ueritas separat, mendacium iungit. Ideo hanc uirtutem putant fidem appellatam, eo quod per eam fiat dictum.

The fourth duty of religion is to preserve truth. For truth separates the person of the free and of the slaves, mendacity joins them. Hence they think this virtue has been appellated “faith,” for this reason, that through it a dictum is made.

Non tamen promissa seruanda sunt ea que sint his quibus promiseris inutilia; nec, si tibi plus noceant quam illi prosint, contra officium est dampnum maius anteponi minori. Vt si institueris cuipiam te aduocatum in causam illius uenturum atque interim grauiter egrotare filius ceperit, non est contra officium non facere quod dixeris. Sed nec deposita semper reddenda.

Nevertheless, promises are not to be observed which would be useless to those to whom
you have promised; nor, if they would hurt you more than they would profit him, is it against
duty for the greater damage to be put before the lesser. For example, if you have instituted to someone that you
will come as an advocate in his cause, and meanwhile your son begins to be gravely ill,
it is not against duty not to do what you said. But neither are deposits
always to be returned.

Si enim gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit et repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum est, officium non reddere. Si is qui apud te peccuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patrie, non reddas depositum; faceres enim contra rempublicam que tibi debet esse carissima. Sic multa que honesta uidentur natura, temporibus fiunt inhonesta.

If indeed someone has deposited a sword with you in a sound mind and, insane, demands it back, to return it is a sin; duty is not to return it. If he who has deposited money with you brings war upon the fatherland, do not return the deposit; for you would be acting against the republic, which ought to be dearest to you. Thus many things which seem honorable by nature become dishonorable by the times.

I.B.2.b_II .β. De pietate

I.B.2.b₂ .β. On piety

Pietas est per quam sanguine iunctis et patrie beniuolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus. In officia huius ipsa natura ducit. Quemadmodum nemo in amorem sui coartandus est, sic nec lex iubet amare parentes, indulgere liberis.

Piety is that by which to those joined by blood and to the fatherland a duty and diligent cultivation is attributed. Into the offices of this, nature herself leads. Just as no one is to be constrained into love of himself, so neither does law bid to love parents, to be indulgent to children.

Superuacuum est enim in quod imus nos impelli. Quocirca plus cauendum est ne aliquam nostris moliamur iniuriam. Quem enim alienum tibi fidum inueneris, si tuis hostis fueris?

For it is superfluous to be impelled toward that to which we are going.
Wherefore we must be more cautious lest we contrive any injury against our own.
For what alien will you have found faithful to you, if you have been an enemy to your own?

Qui fallere audebit patrem, qualis erit in ceteros?

He who will dare to deceive his father, what will he be like toward the others?

I.B.2.b_II .γ. De innocentia

I.B.2.b₂ .γ. On innocence

Innocentia est puritas animi omnem iniurie illationem abhorrens. Hac uirtute dii placantur:

Innocence is the purity of mind abhorring every infliction of injury. By this virtue the gods are placated:

Inmunis aram si tetigit manus,

If a guiltless hand has touched the altar,

non sumptuosa blandior hostia

no sumptuous victim is more soothing

mollibit aduersos penates.

will mollify the adverse Penates.

Hanc seruare qui uolet, omnia scelera sua, licet minima, estimet magna.

Whoever will wish to preserve this, let him estimate all his crimes, though the least, as great.

Nam uitiis nemo sine nascitur; optimus ille est

For no one is born without vices; he is best

qui minimis urgetur.

who is pressed by the smallest [vices].

Nemo satis credit tantum delinquere, quantum

No one believes enough that he transgresses as much as

permittas: adeo indulgent sibi latius omnes.

you would permit: so much do all indulge themselves more liberally.

I.B.2.b_II .δ. De amicitia

I.B.2.b₂ .δ. On friendship

Huius officium multos allicere nullius lesione. Nam multis minatur qui uni facit iniuriam. Aliud officium ultionem non querere.

Its office is to allure many, with the injury of no one. For he menaces many who does injury to one. Another office is not to seek vengeance.

Ridiculum est enim odio nocentis innocentiam perdere. Neque umquam scelus scelere uindicandum est. Multos pessumdedit quod iniurias suas acerbius ulcisci uoluerunt.

For it is ridiculous to lose innocence out of hatred for the guilty. Nor must crime ever be avenged by crime. Many have been ruined because they wished to avenge their injuries too bitterly.

Amicitia est uoluntas bona erga aliquem causa illius. Huius officium idem uelle et idem nolle; alterum secreto amonere, palam laudare.

Friendship is good will toward someone for his sake. Its duty: to will the same and to not-will the same; to admonish the other in secret, to praise openly.

Hec quidem lex est in amicitia ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati. Alia lex est ut cum amico cuncta deliberes, sed prius de ipso. Tercia ne studeas nosse quod ille uult latere.

This indeed is a law in friendship: that we neither ask for base things, nor do them when asked. Another law is that with a friend you deliberate all things, but first about him. A third: do not strive to know what he wishes to lie hidden.

Dissimulare enim magis humanum est, quam dare operam id scire quo nos amicus oderit. Quarta ne asperitas amicitiam dirimat, iuxta illud poete:

For to dissemble is more humane than to take pains to know that by which our friend would hate us. Fourth, let not asperity sever friendship, according to that of the poet:

Aduersis non deesse decet sed leta secutos.

It is seemly not to be lacking in adversities, but to have followed in joys.

Nulla fides umquam miseros elegit amicos.

No faith has ever selected miserable friends.

Si autem uis amari, ama.

But if you wish to be loved, love.

I.B.2.b_II .ε. De reuerentia

1.B.2.b₂ .ε. On reverence

Reuerentia est uirtus personis grauibus uel aliqua prelatione sublimatis debite honorificationis cultum exhibens. Huius officium est imitari maiores. Optimum est enim maiorum uestigia sequi, si recta precedunt.

Reverence is a virtue that renders to grave persons, or to those exalted by some prelation, the observance of due honorification. Its office is to imitate the elders. For it is best to follow the footsteps of the elders, if they precede in what is right.

Eligendus est autem nobis uir bonus et semper ante occulos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante uiuamus et omnia tamquam illo uidente faciamus. Magna enim peccatorum pars tollitur, si peccatis testis assistat. Ideo nullum locum putaueris esse sine teste.

A good man, however, is to be chosen by us and always to be kept before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were looking on, and do all things as if he were seeing. For a great part of sins is removed, if a witness stands by our sins. Therefore, you should think no place to be without a witness.

I.B.2.b_II.ζ. De concordia

1.B.2.b₂.ζ. On concord

Concordia est uirtus conciues et compatriotas in eodem iure et cohabitacione spontanee uinciens. Huius hec sunt officia, ut preclare a Platone scriptum est: Non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria uendicat, partem amici; atque, ut placet stoicis, omnia ad usum hominum creari, homines autem hominum causa generatos esse, uerum est, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodessent. Idcirco in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre, deuincire hominum inter homines societatem mutacione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus, tum facile multa multis de iure suo cedendo.

Concord is the virtue that binds fellow-citizens and compatriots in the same law and cohabitation, spontaneously. Its duties are these, as it is excellently written by Plato: We are not born for ourselves alone, and our fatherland claims a share of our origin, a share our friends; and, as it pleases the Stoics, that all things are created for the use of humankind, and that human beings are generated for the sake of human beings, is true, so that they might profit one another, each to each. Therefore in this we ought to follow nature as our guide, to bring common advantages into the common stock, to bind fast the fellowship of humans among humans by an exchange of offices—by giving and receiving—both by arts, and by labor, and by resources, and also by readily yielding many things to many from one’s own right.

Est enim non modo liberale sed interdum etiam fructuosum paulum de suo iure decedere. Nam concordia parue res crescunt, discordia maxime dilabuntur.

For it is not only liberal but sometimes even fruitful to cede a little of one’s own right. For by concord small things grow, by discord most of all they are dissolved.

I.B.2.b_II.η. De misericordia

I.B.2.b₂.η. On mercy

Misericordia est uirtus per quam animus super calamitate afflictorum mouetur.

Mercy is the virtue by which the mind is moved at the calamity of the afflicted.

Hec uirtus nichil humani a se alienum putat: aliorum commoda uel dampna sua existimat. Qui autem in calamitoso misericors est sui meminit.

This virtue thinks nothing human alien to itself: it considers others’ advantages or losses as its own. But he who is merciful toward the man in calamity remembers himself.

Est tamen difficilis cura rerum alienarum.

Nevertheless the care of others' affairs is difficult.

I.B_I . De iniustitia

I.B₁ . On injustice

Duobus prefatis iusticie generibus totidem contraposita iniusticie genera summopere cauere oportet, scilicet truculentiam et negligentiam. Et est truculentia iniusticia inferens iniuriam, negligentia uero non propulsare iniuriam, cum possit et debeat. Est autem negligentia seueritati contraria; contraponuntur enim defendere et defensionem contempnere.

With the two aforesaid kinds of justice, there are just as many opposing kinds of injustice that must be guarded against above all, namely truculence and negligence. And truculence is injustice inflicting injury; negligence, however, is not warding off injury when one can and ought. Moreover, negligence is contrary to severity; for to defend and to contemn defense are set in opposition.

Similiter truculentia liberalitati repugnat; repugnant enim beneficium dare et iniuriam irrogare.

Similarly, truculence is repugnant to liberality; for to give a benefit and to inflict an injury are repugnant.

I.B_I .1. De truculentia

1.B₁ .1. On Truculence

Truculentie cause (sunt) metus, auaricia, ambitio. Metus, cum his, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet ne, nisi id fecerit, ipse afficiatur incommodo. Auaritia autem, cum iniuriam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea que cupiunt.

The causes of truculence are fear, avarice, ambition. Fear, when the one who cogitates to harm another fears lest, unless he does it, he himself be affected by inconvenience. Avarice, moreover, when they commit an injustice in order to acquire the things which they desire.

Ambitio quoque, id est amor prelationum, multos mortales falsos fieri coegit, aliud clausum in pectore, aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex comodo estimare magisque uultum quam ingenium bonum habere.

Ambition also, that is
the love of preferments, has compelled many mortals to become false, to have one thing shut in
the breast, another ready on the tongue, to estimate friendships and enmities not by the reality
but by convenience, and rather to have a good countenance than a good character.

Est autem in hoc genere hoc molestum quod in magnanimis et rnunificis sepius incidit potencie cupiditas. Magnanimitas autem promptiores facit ad impugnandum, munificentia uero plura dat illis auxilia; unde ex eorum ambitione maius prouenit flagitium. Preterea uerum est illud quod legitur:

But in this kind there is this troublesome thing: that in magnanimous and munificent men the cupidity of power more often occurs. Magnanimity, moreover, makes them readier to impugn, while munificence gives them more aids; whence from their ambition a greater flagitious disgrace results. Moreover, true is that which is read:

Nulla fides regni sociis omnisque potestas

No faith for the associates of the kingdom, and every power

inpatiens consortis erit.

will be intolerant of a partner.

Proh cecus et amens

Alas, blind and mad

ambitione furor;

fury from ambition;

Nulla fides pietasque uiris, qui castra secuntur,

No faith nor piety in the men who follow the camp,

uenalesque manus: ibi fas ubi maxima merces.

and venal hands: right is there where the greatest price is.

I.B_I .1.a-b. De ui et fraude

1.B₁ .1.a-b. On force and fraud

Diuiditur truculentia in uim et fraudem. Fraus quasi uulpecule, uis leonis uidetur. Vtrumque ab homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore.

Truculence is divided into force and fraud. Fraud seems, as it were, a little fox; force, a lion. Both are most alien to a human being, but fraud is worthy of greater odium.

Totius enim iniusticie nulla capitalior quam eorum qui tum, maxime cum fallunt, id agunt ut uiri boni uideantur. Idcireo

For of all injustice, none is more capital than that of those who then, especially when they deceive, aim at this: that they may seem to be good men. Therefore

numquam te fallant animi fub uulpe latentes.

never let the spirits hiding under the fox deceive you.

Hispida membra quidem et dure per brachia sete

Bristly limbs indeed, and hard bristles along the arms

promittunt atrocem animum.

they promise an atrocious spirit.

Frontis nulla fides; quis enim non uicus habundat

No trust in a face; for what street does not abound

tristibus obscenis?

with grim obscenities?

I.B_I .2. De negligentia

I.B₁ .2. On negligence

Pretermittende autem defensionis, id est negligentie, he sunt cause: aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt, aut suis occupationibus sic detinentur aut odio ita elongantur, quod eos quos tueri debent desertos esse patiuntur. Tucius autem bonum quam malum negligere: bonus tantummodo segnior fit ubi negligas, malus improbior. Tutius quoque locupletem quam calamitosum: omnes enim, quibus res minus secunde sunt, nescio quomodo suspiciosi; ad contumeliam omnia accipiunt; magis propter suam impotenciam se semper credunt negligi.

As for the passing over of a defense, that is, negligence, these are the causes: either they are unwilling to undertake enmities or labor or expenses, or they are so detained by their own occupations, or so drawn away by hatred, that they allow those whom they ought to protect to be left deserted. Safer, moreover, to neglect the good than the bad: the good man only becomes more sluggish when you neglect him, the bad man more reprobate. Safer also to neglect the wealthy man than the calamity-stricken: for all those whose affairs are less prosperous are somehow suspicious; they take everything as contumely; the more, on account of their own impotence, they always believe themselves to be neglected.

In omni autem iniusticia permultum interest, utrum perturbacione animi an consulto fiat iniuria. Perturbatio enim plerumque breuis et ad tempus. Ideo leuiora sunt que repentino motu accidunt, quam ea que premeditata inferuntur.

In every injustice, however, it matters very much whether the injury is done from perturbation of mind or by design. For perturbation is for the most part brief and for a time. Therefore those things are lighter which happen by a sudden motion, than those which are inflicted with premeditation.

I.C.De fortitudine

1.C.On fortitude

Fortitudo est uirtus retundens impetus aduersitatis. Huius autem partes sunt quecumque hoc efficiunt; he autem sunt magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, magnificentia, constancia, paciencia.

Fortitude is the virtue that blunts the impulses of adversity. Its parts are whatever bring this about; and these are magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, patience.

Magnanimitas (est) difficilium spontanea et rationabilis aggressio. Fiducia est certa spes animi perducendi ad finem rem incoatam. Securitas est incomoditates imminentes et rei incoate affines non formidare.

Magnanimity (is) a spontaneous and reasonable aggression upon difficult things. Confidence is a certain hope of mind of leading the thing begun through to its end. Security is to not fear the imminent incommodities and those allied to the thing begun.

Magnificentia est difficilium et praecla(ro)rum consummatio. Constancia est stabilitas animi firma et in proposito perseuerans. Paciencia est uirtus contumeliarum et omnis aduersitatis impetus equanimiter portans.

Magnificence is the consummation of difficult and illustrious things. Constancy is a firm stability of mind and persevering in its purpose. Patience is the virtue bearing contumelies and every onrush of adversity with equanimity.

I.C.1.De magnanimitate

I.C.1.On magnanimity

Ad magnanimitatis officium persuadet poeta dum dicit:

To the office of magnanimity the poet persuades while he says:

Componite mentes

Compose your minds

ad magnum uirtutis opus summosque labores.

to the great work of virtue and the highest labors.

Et alius poeta dicit:

And another poet says:

Virtus, recludens immeritis mori

Virtue, opening for the undeserving to die

celum, negata temptat ire uia

heaven, attempts to go by the denied way

cetusque uulgares et udam

and the vulgar crowds and the humid

spernit humum fugiente penna.

he spurns the ground with wing in flight.

Hec enim uirtus, cum ad aspera ineunda pronum faciat, potius communem utilitatem quam sua commoda attendit. Sicut enim sciencia remota a iusticia calliditas potius quam sapiencia appellanda est, sic animus ad periculum paratus, si sua cupiditate, non communi utilitate impellitur, temeritatis potius nomen habet quam fortitudinis.

This virtue, since it makes one prone to undertake hardships, attends rather to the common utility than to its own advantages. For just as science removed from justice is to be called cunning rather than sapience, so a mind ready for peril, if it is impelled by its own cupidity and not by the common utility, has rather the name of temerity than of fortitude.

Hec uirtus torporem sic excitat:

This virtue thus rouses torpor:

Tolle moras! semper nocuit differre paratis.

Remove delays! It has always harmed the prepared to defer.

Incipe! uiuendi recte qui prorogat horam,

Begin! he who defers the hour of living rightly,

rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille

the rustic waits until the river flows away; but it

labitur et labetur in omne uolubilis euum.

it glides and will glide, rolling, into all time.

Cras hoc fiet idem. Cras fiet? Qui(d), quasi magnum

Tomorrow this same thing will be done. Will it be done tomorrow? What, as if it were something great

nempe diem, donas! Sed cum lux altera uenit,

indeed, you are giving a day! But when another light comes,

iam cras hesternum consumpsimus: ecce aliud cras

already we have consumed yesterday’s tomorrow: behold another tomorrow

egerit hos annos et semper paulum erit ultra.

will have spent these years, and there will always be a little beyond.

Huius officium sic monstrat philosophus: Magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt sed qui propulsant iniuriam.

The philosopher thus shows the duty of this: the magnanimous are to be considered not those who commit injury but those who repel injury.

Prima sit in hac uirtute cautela auaricie. Non est enim consentaneum qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate, nec qui inuictum se a labore prestiterit, eum uinci a uoluptate.

Let the first caution in this virtue be against avarice. For it is not consistent that he who is not broken by fear be broken by cupidity, nor that he who has shown himself unconquered by labor be conquered by pleasure.

Secunda est cautela ambitionis. Per difficultates enim queritur claritudo. Quod enim difficilius, hoc preclarius.

The second caution is of ambition. For through difficulties renown is sought. For the more difficult a thing is, the more illustrious it is.

(Vix) enim inuenitur qui laboribus susceptis non quasi mercedem desideret gloriam. Virtutis enim fructum sapiens in conscientia, stultus autem in gloria ponit. Per gloriam autem ad prelationes arbitrantur se ascensuros.

(Hardly) indeed is there found anyone who, with labors undertaken, does not desire glory as if a wage. For the wise man places the fruit of virtue in conscience, but the fool in glory. And through glory they suppose that they will ascend to prelations.

Vera autem magnitudo principem se esse mauult quam uideri. Qui autem errore imperite multitudinis pendet in magnis uiris non est habendus. Idcirco per gloriam non sunt honores querendi; uerum est enim illud poete:

But true magnitude prefers to be a prince rather than to seem so. Moreover, he who depends upon the error of the unskilled multitude is not to be accounted among great men. Therefore honors are not to be sought through glory; for that saying of the poet is true:

Virtus, repulse nescia sordide,

Virtue, unacquainted with sordid repulse,

intaminatis fulget honoribus,

it shines with uncontaminated honors,

nec sumit aut ponit secures

nor does she take up or lay down the axes

arbitrio popularis aure.

by the judgment of the popular ear.

Tercia est temeritatis cautela. Temere namque in acie uersari et manu cum hoste confligere inmane quiddam est et belluarum simile. Si tamen necessitas postulat, decertandum erit et mors turpitudini anteponenda.

The third is the safeguard against temerity. For to be rashly engaged in the battle line and to clash hand-to-hand with the enemy is something monstrous and akin to beasts. If, however, necessity demands, the fight must be pressed, and death is to be preferred to turpitude.

Numquam periculi fuga committendum est, ut inbelles et timidi uideamur. Verum est enim illud poete:

Never by a flight from peril
is it to be permitted that we seem unwarlike and timid. For true indeed is that saying of the poet:

Ignauum scelus est tantum fuga.

Mere flight is a cowardly crime.

Sed fugiendum illud etiam est ne offeramus nos periculis absque causa, quo nichil potest esse stultius. Quare in adeundis periculis imitemur medicorum consuetudinem. Illi enim leuiter egrotantes leuiter curant, grauioribus autem morbis ancipites curaciones adhibere coguntur.

But that too must be shunned: that we not expose ourselves to perils without cause, than which nothing can be more foolish. Wherefore, in approaching perils, let us imitate the consuetude of physicians. For they treat those who are lightly sick lightly, but for graver maladies they are compelled to apply hazardous curations.

Quare in tranquillo tempestatem aduersam optare dementis est, subuenire autem tempestati quauis ratione sapientis est, eoque magis si plus adhipiscare re explicata boni quam formidata mali. Verum est enim quod in poeta legitur:

Therefore, in tranquillity to wish for an adverse tempest is the part of a demented man, but to come to the aid in a tempest by whatever method is the part of a wise man, and so much the more if, with the matter unfolded, you obtain more of good than of dreaded evil. For it is true what is read in the poet:

Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua,

Force devoid of counsel collapses by its own mass,

uim temperatam dii quoque prouehunt

the gods also promote temperate force

in maius; idem odere uires

into the greater; these same gods hate strength in men

omne nefas animo mouentes.

stirring up all nefariousness in their mind.

I.C.2.De fiducia

1.C.2.On confidence

Fiducie officium est ad consummationem rei festinare, iuxta illud:

The office of fiduciary trust is to hasten to the consummation of the matter, according to that:

Nil credens actum, cum quid superesset agendum.

Believing nothing accomplished, when anything remained to be done.

I.C.3.De securitate

1.100.3.On security

Securitatis officium est contra aspera fortune solatium dare, iuxta illud:

The office of security is to give solace against the asperities of fortune, according to that:

Sperat infestis, metuit secundis

He hopes in hostile times, he fears in favorable ones.

alteram fortem bene preparatum

the other strong, well prepared

pectus. Informes hiemes reducit

breast. He brings back formless winters

Iupiter, idem

Jupiter, the same

summouet. Nec, si male nunc, et olim

he removes them. Nor, if things are bad now, also at another time

sic erit.

so it will be.

Grata superueniet que non sperabitur hora.

A welcome hour will supervene which will not be hoped for.

Contra hanc uirtutem sic confligit timor: Morieris. Securitas: Ista est hominis natura, non pena. Hac conditione intraui, ut exirem.

Against this virtue fear thus conflicts: You will die. Security: This is the nature of man, not a penalty. On this condition I entered, that I might go out.

Gentium lex est quod acceperis reddere. Peregrinatio est uita; cum multum ambulaueris, redeundum est. Stultum est timere quod non possis uitare.

The law of nations is to render back what you have received. Life is a pilgrimage; when you have walked much, one must return. It is foolish to fear what you cannot avoid.

Mors ultima pena,

Death is the ultimate penalty,

non metuenda uiris.

not to be feared by men.

Mortem non effugit etiam qui distulit. Moriar nec primus, nec ultimus. Omnes me antecesserunt, omnes sequentur.

Not even he who has deferred it escapes death. I shall die, neither first nor last. All have preceded me, all will follow.

Hae condicione cuncta gignuntur: quod cepit et desinet.

All things are generated under this condition: that which has begun will also cease.

Timor: Sed decollaberis. Securitas: (Quid interest, cesim moriar an punctim?

Fear: But you will be decollated. Security: (What difference is there, whether I die by cutting or by puncture?

Timor: Sed sepe ferieris et multi in te gladii conuenient. Securitas: (Quid refert quam multa sint uulnera? Non potest amplius quam unum mortiferum esse.

Fear: But you will often be struck, and many swords will converge upon you. Security: (What does it matter how many the wounds are? No more than one can be mortiferous.

(Timor: Sed peregre morieris. Securitas: Non est grauior foris quam domi somnus.)

(Fear: But you will die abroad. Security: Sleep is not heavier abroad than at home.)

Timor: Sed iuuenis morieris. Securitas: Optimum est ante mori quam optes.

Fear: But you will die young. Security: It is optimum to die before you might wish it.

Hec data pena diu uiuentibus, ut renouata

This penalty has been given to those who live long, so that, renewed

semper clade domus multis in luctibus inque

always the house in calamity, in many griefs and in

perpetuo merore et nigra ueste senesca(n)t.

they grow old in perpetual sorrow and in black clothing.

Ideo optimum est mori, cum iuuat uiuere. Nam

Therefore it is best to die, when it pleases to live. For

Nisi sum(m)a dies pariter cum fine bonorum

Unless the last day comes together with the end of good things

affuit et celeri preuertit tristia leto,

was present and with swift lethal death forestalled the sad things,

dedecori est fortuna prior. Quisquamne secundis

the former fortune is a disgrace. Does anyone in prosperous circumstances

tradere se satis audet, nisi morte parata?

to deliver himself does one dare enough, unless death is prepared?

Iuuenis moriar. Fortasse alicui me malo fortuna subducit, ut nulli alii, certe uel senectuti.

Young I shall die. Perhaps fortune withdraws me from some ill, so that it may befall no other—certainly not even old age.

Non prematuri cineres, non funus acerbum

No premature ashes, no bitter funeral

luxurie, sed morte magis metuenda senectus.

of luxury, but old age, more to be feared than death.

Non refert quot annos habeam, sed quot acceperim. Si plus to uiuere non possum, hec est mea senectus. Quicumque ad extremum fati sui uenit, senex moritur.

It does not matter how many years I have, but how many I have received. If I cannot live any longer, this is my old age. Whoever comes to the end of his fate dies an old man.

Timor: Insepultus eris. Securitas:

Fear: You will be unsepulchered. Security:

Facilis iactura sepulcri.

Easy is the loss of a sepulcher.

Tabesne cadauera soluat

Will decay dissolve the cadavers?

an rogus, haut refert; placido natura receptat

or the pyre, it makes no difference; nature receives them back in placid peace

cuncta sinu, finemque sui sibi corpora debent.

all into her bosom, and bodies owe to themselves their own end.

Libera fortuna mors est; capit omnia tellus

Death is free from Fortune; the earth takes in all

que genuit. Celo tegitur qui non habet urnam.

which it begot. He who has no urn is covered by the sky.

Si nichil sentio, non pertinet ad me corporis insepulti (iniuria); si sentio, omnis sepultura tormentum. Non defunctorum causa sed uiuorum inuenta est sepultura. Alios terra obruit, alios ignis consumit, in quo parcitur occulis nostris.

If I feel nothing, the (injury) of an unburied body does not concern me; if I do feel, every sepulture is a torment. Sepulture was devised not for the sake of the defunct but of the living. Some the earth covers over, others fire consumes, wherein our eyes are spared.

(T[imor]): Sed egrotabis. (S[ecuritas]): Aut relinquam febrem, aut ipsa me. Cum a morbo mihi res est, aut uincetur, aut uincet.

(F[ear]): But you will be sick. (S[ecurity]): Either I will leave the fever behind, or it will leave me. When I have to do with a disease, either it will be conquered, or it will conquer.

T[imor]: Male de te homines locuntur. S[ecuritas]: Malis diplicere est laudari. Nullam auctoritatem habet sentencia, ubi qui dampnandus est dampnat.

T[imor]: Men speak ill of you. S[ecuritas]: To displease the wicked is to be lauded. A sentence has no authority, where he who is to be condemned condemns.

Male de me locuntur qui bene nesciunt loqui. Faciunt non quod mereor sed quod solent. Equo animo audienda sunt imperitorum conuitia et ad honesta uadenti contempnendus est ipse contemptus.

They speak ill of me who do not know how to speak well. They do not do what I merit but what they are wont. With equanimity the invectives of the unskilled are to be listened to, and for one advancing toward honorable things the contempt itself is to be contemned.

T[imor]: Dolor imminet. S[ecuritas]: Si exiguus est, feramus, quia leuis est pacientia; si grauis, feramus, quia non leuis est gloria.

F[ear]: Pain is imminent. S[ecurity]: If it is slight, let us endure, because patience is light; if it is grave, let us endure, because glory is not light.

Sed dicit homo: Dura res est dolor. (S[ecuritas]): Imo tu mollis.

But the man says: Pain is a hard thing. (S[ecurity]): Nay, you are soft.

(Homo): Pauci dolorem ferre possunt. (S[ecuritas]): Simus ex illis!

(Man): Few can bear pain. (S[ecurity]): Let us be among them!

Homo: Fugiamus dolorem. S[ecuritas]: Quid, quod ille sequitur fugientem?

Man: Let us flee pain. S[ecurity]: What of the fact that it follows the one fleeing?

Homo: Paupertas michi grauis est. S[ecuritas]: Imo tu paupertati. Non est in paupertate uitium sed in paupere.

Man: Poverty is grievous to me. S[ecurity]: Nay rather, you are grievous to poverty. The vice is not in poverty but in the pauper.

Pauper es quia tibi pauper uideris.

You are a pauper because you seem a pauper to yourself.

Homo: Non sum potens. S[ecuritas]: Gaude, impotens non eris.

Man: I am not potent. S[ecurity]: Rejoice, you will not be impotent.

Homo: Iniuriam potero accipere. S[ecuritas]: Gaude, facere non poteris.

Man: I shall be able to receive an injury. S[ecurity]: Rejoice, you will not be able to do it.

Homo: Magnam peccuniam habet ille. S[ecuritas]: Hominem illum iudicas: archa est. Quis plenis inuidet loculis?

Man: He has a great deal of money. S[ecurity]: You judge that one a man: he is a coffer. Who envies full coffers?

Homo: Multum habet ille. S[ecuritas]: Si auarus, non habet; si prodigus, non habebit.

Man: That man has much. S[ecuritas]: If avaricious, he does not have; if prodigal, he will not have.

Homo: Multi illum secuntur. S[ecuritas]: Mel musce secuntur, Cadauera lupi, frumenta formice. Predam, non hominem, sequitur ista turba.

Man: Many follow him. S[ecurity]: Honey the flies follow, cadavers the wolves, grain the ants. It is prey, not the man, that this crowd follows.

Homo: Peccuniam perdidi. S[ecuritas]: Fortasse te illa perderet.

Man: I have lost money. S[ecurity]: Perhaps that would have ruined you.

H[omo]: Peccuniam perdidi. S[ecuritas]: Et illa quam multos.

H[omo]: I have lost money. S[ecuritas]: And that has ruined how many.

H[omo]: Peccuniam perdidi. S[ecuritas]: O te felicem, si cum illa auariciam perdidisti.

M[an]: I have lost money. S[ecurity]: O fortunate you, if together with it you have lost avarice.

H[omo]: Peccuniam perdidi. S[ecuritas]: Quam ut tu haberes, alius ante (te) perdiderat.

H[omo]: I have lost money. S[ecuritas]: Which, so that you might have it, another had previously lost before (you).

H[omo]: Occulos (perdidi). S[ecuritas]: (Sed) habet (et) nox uoluptates suas.

M[an]: My eyes (I have lost). S[ecurity]: (But) night has (also) its pleasures.

H[omo]: Occulos perdidi. S[ecuritas]: Quam multis cupiditatibus uia incisa est.

H[uman]: Eyes I have lost. S[ecurity]: By how many desires the way has been incised.

H[omo]: Amisi liberos. S[ecuritas]: Stultus est qui mortem mortalium deflet. Perierunt perituri.

M[an]: I have lost my children. S[ecurity]: He is foolish who laments the death of mortals. They have perished, destined to perish.

Recepit eos deus, non abstulit.

God received them, he did not take them away.

In hunc modum numquam fidele consilium daturus timor, cum uirtute init bellum. Sed uerum est quod in poeta legitur:

In this manner fear, never going to give faithful counsel, begins war against virtue. But true is what is read in the poet:

Iustum et tenacem propositi uirum

A just and tenacious man of purpose

non ardor ciuium praua iubentium,

not the ardor of citizens commanding depraved things,

non uultus instantis tyranni

not the visage of a threatening tyrant

mente quatit solida.

shakes him from his solid mind.

Sed contra:

But on the contrary:

Multos in summa pericula misit

He sent many into utmost perils

uenturi timor ipse mali; fortissimus ille est

the very fear of the coming evil; he is most brave

qui promptus metuenda pati.

who is prompt to suffer what is to be feared.

Fortis enim et constantis animi est non perturbari in rebus aduersis, nec tumultuantem de gradu dehici, sed presente consilio uti, nec a ratione discedere. Plura enim sunt que nos terrent quam que premunt et sepius opinione quam re laboramus. Ideo ne sis miser ante tempus, cum illa que uelut imminentia expauisti fortasse numquam uentura sint.

For it belongs to a strong and constant mind not to be perturbed in adverse circumstances, nor in a tumult to be cast down from one’s standing, but to employ present counsel, and not to depart from reason. For there are more things that terrify us than that oppress us, and we labor more often under opinion than under reality. Therefore do not be miserable before the time, since those things which you have dreaded as if imminent perhaps will never come.

I.C.4.De magnificentia

1.C.4.On magnificence

Magnificentie officia partim paccata, partim bellica.

The offices of magnificence, partly pacific, partly warlike.

In paccatis duo precepta Platonis tenenda sunt prelatis: unum ut utilitatem ciuium sic tueantur, ut quecumque agunt ad eam referant, obliti commodorum suorum; alterum ut totum corpus ciuitatis curent, ne dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Qui enin parti consulunt, partem deserunt, pernitiosissimam seditionem in ciuitatem inducunt. Caueant etiam contentionem.

In peace-time two precepts of Plato are to be held by prelates: one, that they so safeguard the utility of the citizens that whatever they do they refer to it, forgetful of their own advantages; the other, that they care for the whole body of the city, lest while they protect some part, they desert the rest. For they who look after a part and desert a part introduce a most pernicious sedition into the city. Let them also beware contention.

Dicit enim Plato similiter facere eos qui inter se contenderent uter potius ciuitatem amministraret, ut si naute certarent quis eorum potissimum gubernaret.

For Plato says that those who contend among themselves as to which of them should rather administer the commonwealth do similarly, as if sailors were contesting which of them should most of all govern the ship.

In bellicis autem officiis illud primum (est) ea intentione suscipere bella, ut sine iniuria in pace uiuatur.

In military duties, however the first thing is to undertake wars with this intention, that without injustice one may live in peace.

Secundum priusquam aggrediare adhibere diligentem preparationem. Longa enim belli preparatio celerem affert uictoriam. Hic autem apparatus in quatuor rebus cernitur, scilicet in clientelis, municipiis, sumptu et armis.

Secondly, before you attack, apply diligent preparation. For long preparation of war brings swift victory. This apparatus, however, is discerned in four things, namely in clienteles, municipalities, expense, and arms.

Omnia autem prius experiri quam armis decertare sapientem decet; et melius est tibi prospicere quam aduersarium ulcisci accepta iniuria.

But it befits a wise man to try all things first rather than to decide by arms; and it is better for you to take forethought for yourself than to take vengeance on an adversary for an injury received.

Tercium officium est ne temere desperes propter ignauiam aut nimis confidas propter cupiditatem. In pericula enim ducit amor habendi inmoderatus iuxta illud:

The third duty is that you not rashly despair because of sloth, or trust too much because of cupidity. For an immoderate love of having leads into dangers, according to that saying:

Aurum per medios ire satellites

Gold goes through the midst of the guards

et perrumpere amat saxa potencius

and loves to break through rocks more potently

hictu fulmineo.

by a thunderbolt stroke.

Munera

Gifts

seuos illaqueant duces.

savage leaders they ensnare.

Quartum officium est plus turpitudinem quam mortem horrere, plus ad honestatem quam ad salutem uel alia commoda spectare, non tamen rumores saluti preponere.

The fourth duty is to abhor turpitude more than death, to look more to honesty than to safety or other advantages, yet not to prefer rumors to safety.

Quintum officium est copias suas crebris laboribus exercere. Verum est enim quod in poeta legitur:

The fifth office is to exercise his forces with frequent labors. For indeed, what is read in the poet is true:

Variam semper dant otia mentem.

Leisure always gives a varied mind.

Sextum officium est, postquam ad bellandum uentum est, hortando bonam indolem erigere, modo laudibus animos afficere, (modo) ammonitionibus desidiam discutere.

The sixth duty is, after it has come to making war, by exhorting to raise up good innate disposition, now to affect the spirits with praises, (now) by admonitions to shake off idleness.

Septimum officium est in concursu ad primos impetus adcurrere, inclinatis opem ferre, labentes fulcire.

The seventh duty is, in the concourse, to run up to the first onsets, to bring aid to the wavering, to prop up those slipping.

Octauum officium (est) parta uictoria conseruare eos qui non crudeles, non immanes fuerunt.

The eighth duty is, once victory has been won, to preserve those who have not been cruel, not monstrous.

Nonum uero federa et promissa hostibus seruare. Non enim his adquiescendum est qui dicunt:

The ninth indeed: to keep treaties and promises to enemies. For one must not acquiesce to those who say:

Dolus an uirtus, quis in hoste requirat?

Deceit or virtue, who would inquire in the case of an enemy?

Indicat hoc Regulus qui captus a penis, cum de captiuis commutandis Romam missus esset, iurauit se rediturum, primum ut uenit captiuos reddendos non censuit, deinde cum retineretur ab amicis, ad supplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere.

Regulus indicates this, who, captured by the Punics, when he had been sent to Rome about exchanging captives, swore that he would return; first, when he came, he did not judge that the captives should be given back; then, when he was being held back by friends, he preferred to return to punishment rather than to break the faith given to the enemy.

Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est hec opinio. Multi enim bella quesiuerunt propter glorie cupiditatem. Vere autem si uolumus iudicare, parua sunt arma foris, si non est consilium domi.

But since many suppose military affairs to be greater than urban ones, this opinion must be diminished. For many have sought wars because of a craving for glory. Truly, however, if we wish to judge, arms abroad are of little account if there is no counsel at home.

De talibus audi poetam dicentem: Omnes homines, qui se(se) student prestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet ne uitam silentio transeant ueluti peccora. Sed nostra omnis uis in animo et corpore sita est. Animi imperio, corporis seruitio magis utimur.

Concerning such things, hear the poet speaking: All men, who strive to render themselves preeminent above the other animals, ought with utmost effort to strive lest they pass their life in silence like cattle. But all our force is situated in mind and body. We make greater use of the command of the mind, of the service of the body.

Rectius uidetur ingenii quam uirium opibus gloriam querere. Omnino enim illud honestum, quod animo excelso querimus, animi efficitur, non corporis uiribus. Exercendum tamen est corpus, ut obedire consilio et rationi possit.

It seems more right to seek glory by the resources of genius rather than of strength.
Indeed, that honorable thing which we seek with an exalted mind is accomplished by the mind, not by the body’s strengths.
Yet the body must be exercised, so that it can obey counsel and reason.

I.C.5.De constantia

1.C.5.On Constancy

Constancie uero officium est in utraque fortuna grauitatem retinere. Preclara est enim in omni uita eadem frons et idem uultus. Nam argumentum bene composite mentis est posse consistere et secum morari, unde precipit poeta dicens:

The office of Constancy is to retain gravity in either fortune. For preeminent in every life is the same brow and the same countenance. For it is an argument of a well-composed mind to be able to stand firm and to abide with oneself, whence the poet enjoins, saying:

Equam memento rebus in arduis

Remember an even mind in arduous affairs

seruare mentem, non secus in bonis

to preserve the mind, not otherwise in good times

ab insolenti temperatam

tempered from insolence

leticia.

joy.

Idem:

The same:

Rebus angustis animosus atque

In straitened circumstances high-spirited and

fortis appare sapienter idem.

appear brave, likewise sapient.

Contrahes uento nimium secundo

You will reef in a too favorable wind.

turgida uela.

swollen sails.

Hec quidem est lex constancie ut nec in malis persistamus, nec in bonis simus uagi. Est enim etiam in malis constancia, sed que uirtus non est. Audi poetam:

This indeed is the law of constancy, that we neither persist in evils, nor in good things be vagrant. For there is also constancy in evils, but which is not virtue. Hear the poet:

Pars hominum uitiis gaudet constanter et urget

A portion of men rejoices constantly in vices and urges them on

propositum; pars multa natat, modo recta capessens,

the purpose; a great part swims, now taking up the straight course,

interdum prauis obnoxia.

at times subject to depraved things.

Et alius poeta dicit:

And another poet says:

Mobilis et uaria est ferme natura malorum.

The nature of evils is for the most part mobile and various.

Cum scelus admittunt, superest constancia: quid fas

When they admit a crime, constancy remains: what is permitted by divine law?

atque nefas, tandem incipiunt sentire peractis

and what is right and what is nefarious, at last they begin to perceive once the deeds are done

criminibus. Tamen ad mores natura recurrit

crimes. Nevertheless nature recurs to its mores.

dampnatos, fixa et mutari nescia. Nam quis

to condemned mores, fixed and not knowing how to be changed. For who

peccandi finem posuit sibi? quando recepit

has he set an end to sinning for himself? when has he received

eiectum semel attrita de fronte ruborem?

the blush once expelled from the worn-down brow?

Quis hominum est quem tu contemptum uideris uno

Who among men is there whom you have seen despised by one alone

flagicio?

disgrace?

Huic uirtuti contraponitur inconstancia, que est motus animi circa uarias occupationes. In quo uitio adeo absque intermissione laborant quidam ut hec dicatur eorum constancia, scilicet esse instabiles. Sunt enim qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, uoluptatem seuerissime contempnant, in dolore sint molliores, gloriam negligant, frangantur infamia.

To this virtue there is set in opposition inconstancy, which is the motion of the mind around various occupations. In which vice certain men labor so without intermission that this is called their constancy, namely, to be unstable. For there are those who in contrary matters are scarcely self-consistent: they most sternly contemn pleasure, are softer in pain, neglect glory, are broken by infamy.

Hoc uitium tangit poeta, dum dicit:

The poet touches this vice, when he says:

Mea pugnat sententia secum,

My sentiment fights with itself,

quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit.

he spurns what he sought, he repeats what he lately omitted.

Item:

Diruit, edificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.

He demolishes, he builds, he changes squares for rounds.

Alibi:

Elsewhere:

Rome Tibur amo, uentosus Tibure Romam.

At Rome I love Tibur; fickle, at Tibur, Rome.

In culpa est animus qui se non effugit umquam.

The culpability lies in the mind that never escapes itself.

Celum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt.

They change the sky, not the mind, who run across the sea.

Alibi:

Elsewhere:

Quo teneam nodo mutantem Prothea uultus?

With what knot shall I hold Proteus, mutating his faces?

Ex hoc uitio oritur quod nemo sua sorte

From this vice arises that no one is content with his own lot

contentus uiuat, sed laudet diuersa sequentes.

let him live content, but praise those following diverse ways.

Vnde idem poeta:

Whence the same poet:

Optat ephipia bos piger, optat arare caballus.

The lazy ox longs for saddles; the horse longs to plow.

Quam scit uterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem.

Let each, willingly, I opine, exercise the art he knows.

I.C.6.De patientia

I.C.6.On patience

Pacientie officium monstrabat qui dicebat:

He was showing the duty of patience who said:

Gaudet paciencia duris.

Patience rejoices in hardships.

Letius est, quotiens magno sibi constat, honestum.

The honorable is more delightful, whenever it costs one greatly.

Hec uirtus iniuriarum remedium est, nam

This virtue is a remedy for injuries, for

leuius fit patientia

it becomes lighter by patience

quicquid corrigere est nefas.

whatever it is sacrilege to correct.

Sicut econtra inpatientia sortem exacerbabis quam mutare non possis. Vnde poeta:

Just so, on the contrary, by impatience you will exacerbate the fortune which you cannot change. Whence the poet:

Quod sors fert feramus equo animo.

What fortune brings, let us bear with an equable spirit.

Inscitia est enim aduersus stimulum ut calces, quia asperum medicum intemperans facit. Neque ulla res tam facilis, quin difficilis sit, quam inuitus facias.

For ignorance is to kick, as it were, against the goad, since the intemperate man makes the physician harsh. Nor is any thing so easy but that it is difficult, when you do it unwillingly.

I.D.De temperantia

I.D.On temperance

Temperantia est dominium rationis in libidinem et alios motus inportunos. Hec quidem uirtus totius uite ornatus omniumque perturbationum sedatio. Hanc uirtutem persuadet poeta dicens:

Temperance is the dominion of reason over libido and other inopportune motions. This indeed is the virtue, the adornment of the whole life and the sedation of all perturbations. This virtue the poet persuades, saying:

Sincerum (est) nisi uas, quodcumque infundis acescit.

Unless the vessel is pure, whatever you pour in turns acid.

Sperne uoluptates! Nocet empta dolore uoluptas.

Spurn pleasures! Pleasure purchased at the cost of pain harms.

Semper auarus eget; certum uoto pete finem!

An avaricious man is always in need; seek a certain end by a vow!

Inuidus alterius rebus macrescit opimis.

The envious man grows lean over another’s opulent possessions.

Qui non moderabitur ire,

He who will not moderate anger,

infectum uolet esse, dolor quod suaserit et mens.

he will wish it to be undone, what pain and mind have urged.

Ira furor breuis est. Animum rege! Qui nisi paret,

Anger is a brief fury. Rule your mind! He who does not obey,

imperat; hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce cathena.

it commands; curb it with reins, curb it with a chain.

Huius uirtutis partes sunt que in fedis motibus dominantur. He autem sunt modestia, uerecundia, abstinentia, honestas, moderantia, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia.

The parts of this virtue are those which hold sway over base impulses. These, moreover, are modesty, verecundity, abstinence, honesty, moderation, parsimony, sobriety, chastity.

I.D.1.De modestia

I.D.1.On modesty

Modestia est cultum et motum et omnem nostram occupationem ultra defectum et citra excessum sistere. De hac dicit poeta:

Modesty is to set our dress, our movement, and our every occupation beyond deficiency and on this side of excess. About this the poet says:

Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,

There is a measure in things; there are, finally, certain bounds,

quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.

beyond which and on this side the right cannot stand.

In cultu obseruandum est quod a forma remoueatur omnis uiro non dignus ornatus. Malus enim ornatus exterior male composite mentis nuntius est. Adhibenda est autem mundicia non odiosa neque exquisita nimis tantumque fugiat aggrestem et inhumanam negligentiam.

In attire it is to be observed that from the form every ornament not worthy for a man be removed. For bad exterior ornament is a messenger of an ill-composed mind. However, cleanliness is to be applied not odious nor too exquisite and let it shun rustic and inhuman negligence.

Motus autem alius corporis, alius animi. In corporeo cauendum est ne in tardationibus adeo molli gressu utamur, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse uideamur, aut in festinationibus non suscipiamus nimias celeritates. Que cum fiunt, anelitus mouentur, uultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constanciam.

But motion of the body is one thing, of the mind another. In the corporeal it must be guarded against, lest in delays we use so soft a gait that we seem to be like the platters of processions, or in hastenings we not assume excessive celerities. Which, when they occur, the breath is moved, the countenance is changed, the mouths are twisted; from which a great signification arises that constancy is not present.

Motus autem animorum duplices sunt: cogitacio rationis et appetitus uoluntatis. Cogitacio in exquirendo uero exercetur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum igitur est ut ratio presit, appetitus obtemperet.

But movements of minds are twofold: cogitation of reason and the appetite of will. Cogitation is exercised in inquiring the true, the appetite impels to act. Therefore it must be cared for that reason presides, the appetite obeys.

Si enim non pareant appetitus rationi, cui sunt subiecti lege nature, non modo animi perturbantur sed etiam corpora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut metu commoti sunt, aut nimia uoluptate gestiunt; quorum omnium uultus, uoces, motus, status mutantur. Nam ire stimulis accessum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se prepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur occuli et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti.

For if the appetites do not obey reason,
to which they are subjected by the law of nature, not only are the minds perturbed but even
the bodies. You may discern in the very faces of the angry, or of those who are moved by fear,
or who exult in excessive pleasure; the faces, voices, motions, and stance of all these
are changed. For, at the access of the goads of anger, the heart palpitates, the body trembles, the tongue
hampers itself, the face ignites, the eyes grow fierce, and acquaintances are by no means
recognized.

Verum est enim illud poete:

For that saying of the poet is indeed true:

Deprendas animi tormenta latentis in egro

You may detect the torments of the mind lying hidden in the sick man.

corpore, deprendas et gaudia; sumit utrumque

in the body, you may catch the joys as well; it takes up both

inde habitum facies.

from there the face takes its habit.

Ex quibus intelligitur appetitus omnes contrahendos et sedandos.

From which it is understood that all appetites are to be restrained and assuaged.

Occupationes autem pro diuersitate morum, etatum, negotiorum uarie sunt. Quemadmodum enim in corporibus magne sunt dissimilitudines, cum alios uideas uelocitate ad cursum, alios uiribus ad luctandum ualere, sic in animis maiores sunt morum uarietates. Quibusdam enim inest lepos, id est fandi urbanitas, his hilaritas, illis seueritas; alios autem uides callidos ad celandum, dissimulandum; sunt alii simplices et aperti, qui nichil ex occulto, nichil insidiis agendum putant, ueritatis cultores, fraudis inimici.

Occupations, moreover, vary according to the diversity of mores, ages, and affairs. For just as in bodies there are great dissimilarities, since you see some to excel in velocity for running, others to prevail by strength for wrestling, so in minds there are greater varieties of mores. In some, indeed, there is charm, that is, an urbanity of speaking; in these, hilarity; in those, severity; but you see others cunning for concealing, dissembling; there are others simple and open, who think nothing should be done from the hidden, nothing by ambush, cultivators of truth, enemies of fraud.

Quid enumerem per singula?

Why should I enumerate item by item?

Mille hominum species et rerum decolor usus,

A thousand species of men and the variegated use of things,

uelle suum cuique est, nec uoto uiuitur uno.

Each has his own desire, nor is life lived by a single wish.

Quot homines, tot sentencie, suus cuique mos.

As many men, so many opinions, to each his own custom.

Ad quas igitur res erimus apti, in his potissimum occupati simus. Et quamuis sint grauiora alia atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostre regule metiamur. Verbi gratia: si debilis est corpore, ingeniosus et uiuacis memorie, non miliciam sed studium litterarum sectetur; si autem ualidus et hebes, militiam non studium litterarum.

Therefore, to the things for which we shall be apt, in these let us be chiefly occupied. And although there are other things graver and better, nevertheless let us measure our studies by our rule. For example: if one is weak in body, clever and of a lively memory, let him follow not soldiery but the study of letters; but if strong and dull, let him follow soldiery, not the study of letters.

Neque enim attinet nature repugnare, nec quicquam sequi quod assequi nequeas. Si uero necessitas nos detruserit ad ea que nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis cura adhibenda est ut ea, si non decore, saltem parum indecore faciamus; nec tam enitendum est ut bona, que nobis data non sunt, sequamur, quam ut uitia fugiamus.

Nor indeed is it pertinent to resist nature, nor to follow anything which you cannot attain. But if necessity has thrust us down to those things that are not of our natural talent, every care must be applied that we do them, if not decorously, at least with little indecorum; and we should not so much strive to pursue goods that have not been given to us, as to flee vices.

Etatum propria compendiose pandit poeta his uerbis:

The poet compendiously unfolds the proper characteristics of the ages in these words:

Reddere qui uoces iam scit puer et pede certo

The boy who already knows how to render voices and with a sure foot

signat humum, gestit pari(bus) colludere et iram

he marks the ground, he longs to play with peers, and anger

colligit et ponit temere et mutatur in horas.

it collects and sets down rashly, and is changed from hour to hour.

Inberbis iuuenis, tandem custode remoto,

The beardless youth, at last with the custodian removed,

gaudet equis canibusque et aprici gramine campi,

he delights in horses and dogs and in the sunlit grass of the field,

cereus in uitium flecti, monitoribus asper,

waxy to be bent toward vice, harsh to admonishers,

utilium tardus prouisor, prodigus eris,

tardy in foreseeing useful things, you will be prodigal,

sublimis cupidusque et amata relinquere pernix.

sublime and desirous, and quick to relinquish beloved things.

Conuersis studiis etas animusque uirilis

With studies converted, age and a virile spirit

querit opes et amicitias inferuit honori,

he seeks wealth and friendships, and has brought them to bear in the service of honor,

commisisse cauet quod mox mutare laboret.

he is wary of having committed what he will soon labor to change.

Multa senem circumueniunt incommoda, uel quod

Many incommodities beset the old man, either because

querit et inuentis miser abstinet et timet uti,

he seeks, and, when things are found, the wretch abstains and fears to use them,

uel quod res omnes timide gelideque ministrat,

or because he administers all things timidly and coldly,

dilator, spe longus, inhers auidusque futuri,

a delayer, long in hope, inert and avid of the future,

difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti

difficult, querulous, a praiser of times past

se puero, castigator censorque minorum.

a praiser of time past when he was a boy, a chastiser and censor of his juniors.

Ideo autem

Therefore, however

laudat preteritos, presentes despicit annos,

he lauds the bygone years, he despises the present years,

quia in nostra uita est continuum detrimentum. Quod alibi monstrat idem poeta dicens:

because in our life there is a continuous detriment. Which elsewhere the same poet demonstrates, saying:

Dampnosa quid non imminuit dies?

What does the ruinous day not diminish?

Etas parentum, peior auis, tulit

The age of the parents, worse than the grandsires, has borne

nos nequiores, mox daturos

we more wicked, soon to give

progeniem uiciosiorem.

a progeny more vicious.

His ita se habentibus, adholescentis sit officium maiores natu uereri atque ex his deligere probatissimos, quorum consilio nitatur. Ineuntis enim etatis inscitia senum regenda est prudentia. Dum enim animus in dubio est, paruo momento huc et illuc impellitur.

With things being thus, it should be the duty of an adolescent to revere his elders and from these choose the most approved, on whose counsel he may rely. For the inexperience of a beginning age must be governed by the prudence of old men. For while the mind is in doubt, by a slight impulse hither and thither it is impelled.

Ineunte enim adole(sce)ntia maxima est inbecillitas consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus uite degende constituit quod maxime adamauit. Itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo cursu uiuendi quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare. Ideo iuuenis sit officium tamquam in speculo uitas omnium inspicere atque ex aliis sibi exemplum sumere.

For at the beginning of adolescence there is the greatest imbecility of counsel,
then each person establishes for himself the kind of life to be lived which he has most loved. And so
he is entangled in some fixed course of living before he could judge what would be best,
to judge. Therefore let it be a young man’s duty, as if in a mirror, to inspect the lives of all,
and to take from others an example for himself.

Bonum est enim in alieno malo fugienda intueri. Maxime autem hec etas a libidinibus arcenda est, iuxta illud:

For it is good to contemplate, in another’s misfortune, the things that are to be fled. But especially this age must be warded off from lusts, according to that saying:

Breue sit quod turpiter audes;

Let what you dare disgracefully be brief;

quedam cum prima resecentur crimina barba.

let certain crimes be cut away with the first beard.

Exercenda est etiam in labore animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in ciuilibus officiis ualeat industria; unde poeta:

Exercise is also to be done in the labor of mind and of body, so that their industry may avail in both military and civil offices; whence the poet:

Angustam, amice, pauperiem pati

To endure straitened paupery, my friend,

robustus acri militia puer

a robust boy for fierce military service

condiscat.

let him learn.

Et alibi:

And elsewhere:

Nunc te melioribus offer!

Now offer yourself to better things!

Quo semel est inbuta recens seruabit odorem

What once has been imbued, when fresh, will keep the odor

testa diu.

the jar for a long time.

Et alius poeta dicit:

And another poet says:

Vdum et molle lutum es, nunc nunc properandus et acri

You are damp and soft clay, now now needing to be hastened and with a keen

fingendus sine fine rota.

to be fashioned without end by the keen wheel.

Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et dare uoluptati uolent, caueant intemperantiam, meminerint uerecundie; quod erit facilius, si ludo suo maiores natu uelint interesse. Ludo enim et ioco uti licet, sed sicut sompno et quietibus ceteris, tum scilicet, cum seriis rebus satis fecerimus. Neque enim facti sumus a natura ad ludum sed ad seueritatem.

And moreover, when they wish to relax their spirits and give themselves to pleasure, let them beware intemperance; let them remember modesty; which will be easier, if in their play they are willing that their elders take part. Play and jest may be used, but as with sleep and the other rests, then, namely, when we have satisfied the claims of serious matters. For we were not made by nature for play but for severity.

Nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis

Surely, to be wise is useful, with trifles cast aside

et tempestiuum pueris concedere ludum.

and it is timely to concede the game to boys.

Ludus enim genuit trepidum certamen et iram,

For indeed play has engendered anxious contest and ire,

ira truces inimicitias et funebre bellum.

anger truculent enmities and funereal war.

Duplex est omnino iocandi genus: unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum; alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum.

There is altogether a twofold kind of jesting: one illiberal, petulant, flagitious, obscene; the other elegant, urbane, ingenious, facetious.

Viri uero officia ea sunt que superius poeta numerauit, in quibus nil est aliqua lege corrigendum.

Indeed, the duties of a man are those which the poet enumerated above, in which there is nothing to be corrected by any law.

Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitaciones uero animi augende uidentur. Numquam enim quisquam ita bene subducta ratione fuit, quin res, etas, usus semper aliquid adportet noui: ut illa que credas te scire nescias, et que tibi putaris prima in experiendo repudies. Danda est etiam opera ut amicos et iuuentutem consilio iuuent.

But for the elderly, the labors of the body seem to be diminished, while the exercises of the mind to be augmented. For never has anyone had his reckoning so well drawn up that circumstance, age, and experience do not always bring something new: so that those things which you believe you know you do not know, and those which you had supposed to be foremost in testing you repudiate. Effort must also be given that they may aid friends and the youth with counsel.

Nichil autem magis cauendum est senectuti quam ne desidie se dedat. Alioquin dicetur illi:

Nothing, however, is more to be guarded against by old age than that it give itself over to idleness. Otherwise it will be said to it:

Inuidiam placare paras uirtute relicta?

Do you prepare to placate envy, with virtue relinquished?

Luxuria uero cum omni etati turpis, tum senectuti fedissima est. Si enim libidinum accessit intemperantia, duplex malum est. Ipsa enim senectus dedecus concipit et intemperantia(m) iuuenum inpudentiorem reddit.

Luxury indeed, while disgraceful for every age, is most foul for old age. For if the intemperance of libidinous desires is added, the evil is twofold. For old age itself conceives disgrace, and intemperance renders the young more impudent.

Verum est enim quod scriptum est:

For indeed, what is written is true:

Velocius et citius nos

More swiftly and more quickly us

corrumpunt exempla domestica.

domestic examples corrupt.

Dociles imitandis

Docile for imitating

turpibus et prauis omnes sumus.

the shameful and the depraved we all are apt to imitate.

Negotiorum quoque diuersa sunt offitia. Prelati quidem officium est estimare se gerere personam ciuitatis, retinere decus, seruare leges, meminisse eas esse commissas fidei sue. Priuati autem officium est pari iure uiuere cum ciuibus, non nimis summissum nec nimis se efferentem, uelle in re puplica tranquilla et honesta.

The duties of affairs are diverse as well. Indeed, the duty of the prelate is to consider that he bears the person of the city, to retain honor, to preserve the laws, to remember that they have been committed to his trust. But the duty of the private citizen is to live with his fellow citizens under equal right, neither too submissive nor too self-exalting, to desire that the commonwealth be tranquil and honorable.

Caueat autem ne in eum cadat illud poete: Semper in ciuitate quibus opes nulle sunt bonis inuident, malos extollunt, uetera odere, noua exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student. Peregrini officium est nil preter suum negotium agere, nichil de alio inquirere. Sordidum est eorum officium qui emunt a mercatoribus quod statim uendant.

Let him beware, moreover, lest that of the poet fall upon him: “Always in the civic community those to whom resources are none
envy the good, exalt the bad, hate the old things, long for new things, out of hatred of their own
affairs they strive that all things be changed.” The foreigner’s office is to do nothing beyond his own business,
to inquire nothing about another. Sordid is the office of those who buy from
merchants what they sell straightway.

Nichil enim proficiunt nisi admodum mentiantur, nec uero est quicquam turpius uanitate. Idcirco res familiaris queri debet questibus a quibus abest turpitudo, conseruari autem parsimonia. Nullus enim tantus questus est quam quod habeas arcere.

For they profit nothing unless they lie exceedingly, nor indeed is anything more shameful than vanity.
Therefore the household estate ought to be sought by gains from which turpitude is absent, and preserved by parsimony.
For no gain is so great as to ward what you have from loss.

Sic tamen queri debet ut imitemur eum de quo legitur: Demetrius noster sic uiuit, non tamquam omnia contempserit, sed tamquam habenda aliis permiserit. Medicina, architectura honeste sunt his quorum ordini conueniunt. Mercatura, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans, multis sine uanitate impartiens, non est admodum uituperanda.

Thus, however, it ought to be sought
that we imitate him of whom it is read: “Our Demetrius lives thus, not as though he had despised all things,
but as though he had allowed them to be had by others.” Medicine and architecture
are honorable for those to whose order they are suitable. Trade, if it is slight, is to be thought sordid;
but if great and copious, bringing many things from everywhere, imparting to many without
vanity, it is not to be much censured.

Agricultura nichil melius, nichil uberius, nichil homine libero dignius. Hanc laudat poeta his uerbis:

Agriculture, nothing better, nothing more abundant, nothing more worthy of a free man. The poet praises this with these words:

Beatus ille qui procul negotiis,

Blessed he who, far from business,

ut prisca gens mortalium,

as the primeval race of mortals,

paterna rura bobus exercet suis,

he works his paternal fields with his own oxen,

solutus omni fenore.

free from all usury.

I.D.2.De uerecundia

1.D.2.On modesty

Verecundia est in gestu et uerbo honestatem seruare. In compositione namque corporis nostri magnam rationem uidetur habuisse natura. Figuram enim nostram, in qua est honesta species, in aperto posuit, partes autem ad necessitatem nature datas ideo abdidit, quia deformem aspectum habiture erant.

Modesty is to preserve seemliness in gesture and in word. For in the composition of our body Nature seems to have had great reason. For our figure, in which there is a seemly aspect, she set in the open, but the parts given for the necessity of nature she therefore concealed, because they would have a deformed aspect.

Hanc diligentem fabricam nature imitata est hominum uerecundia. Que enim natura occultauit, ea remouent ab occulis omnes sanam mentem habentes; dant etiam operam ut quam occultissime pareant necessitati.

This diligent workmanship of nature has been imitated by the modesty of human beings. For the things that nature has concealed, all who have a sound mind remove from the eyes; they also take pains to obey necessity as secretly as possible.

In uerbis quoque seruanda est uerecundia. Quarum enim partium usus sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus apellant. Viciosum est etiam in re seuera delicatum inferre sermonem.

In words also modesty is to be observed. For those parts whose uses are necessary, they call neither the parts nor their uses by their own names. It is also a vice, in a severe matter, to introduce delicate discourse.

Cum college in pretura Pericles et Sophocles de communi officio conuenissent et casu formosus puer transiret, dixit Sophocles: O Pericle, pulcrum puerum! Respondit Pericles: Pretorem, Sophocle, decet habere non solum manus sed etiam occulos continentes. Si Sophocles in conuiuio idem dixisset, iusta caruisset reprehensione.

When Pericles and Sophocles, colleagues in the praetorship, had come together about their common office and by chance a handsome boy was passing by, Sophocles said: O Pericles, a beautiful boy! Pericles replied: A praetor, Sophocles, ought to have not only hands but also eyes continent. If Sophocles had said the same at a banquet, he would have lacked just censure.

De hac uerborum uerecundia docet poeta dicens:

Concerning this modesty of words the poet teaches, saying:

Tristia mestum

Sad things make one sad

uerba decent uultum, iratum plena minarum,

words befit the countenance, when angry, full of threats,

ludentem lasciua, seuerum seria dictu.

lascivious things befit the one playing, serious things the severe to say.

Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem

For nature indeed first forms us inwardly for every

fortunarum habitum; iuuat aut impellit ad iram

of fortunes the habit; it delights or impels to ire

aut ad humum merore graui deducit et angit.

or it brings us down to the ground with grave sorrow and constricts.

Post effert animi motus interprete lingua.

Afterwards it brings forth the motions of the mind, with the tongue as interpreter.

Si dicentis erunt fortunis absona uerba,

If the words of the speaker will be discordant with his fortunes,

romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum.

the romans will raise, horsemen and foot-soldiers, a cachinnation.

Intererit multum, Dauusne loquatur an heros,

It will make much difference, whether Davus speaks or a hero,

maturusue senex an adhuc florente iuuenta

whether a mature old man or still in flourishing youth

feruidus, an matrona potens an sedula nutrix,

fervid, or a potent matron or a sedulous nurse,

mercatorne uagus cultorne uirentis agelli.

a wandering merchant or a cultivator of a verdant little field.

Quartum uero officium tradit ubi dicit:

Indeed he transmits the fourth office where he says:

Archanum neque tu scrutaberis ullius umquam.

You shall not ever scrutinize the arcanum of anyone.

Quintum uero statim cum subdit:

And the fifth, indeed, immediately when he adds:

Commissumque teges, et uino tortus et ira.

And you will cover what has been entrusted, even when tortured by wine and by ire.

Quid de quoque uiro (et) cui dicas sepe uideto!

See to it often what you say about each man, and to whom you say it!

Percunctatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem (est),

Shun the interrogator, for he is likewise garrulous.

nec retinent patule commissa fideliter aures

nor do patulous ears faithfully retain things entrusted

et uolat, emissum semel, inreuocabile uerbum.

and the word, once emitted, flies, irrevocable.

Idcirco garrulo archanum minime aperies; non enim potes ab alio exigere silentium, si tibi non prestiteris. Si enim garrulum accuses, respondet: Plenus sum rimarum, hac et illac perfluo. Idcirco in hoc incumbe, ut libentius audias quam loquaris.

Therefore to a garrulous you will by no means lay open an arcanum; for you cannot exact silence from another, if you have not afforded it to yourself. For if you accuse the garrulous man, he replies: I am full of cracks, this way and that I flow through. Therefore apply yourself to this, that you may more willingly hear than speak.

Summopere autem fuge iurgia; nam contra parem contendere anceps est, cum superiore furiosum, cum inferiore sordidum. Maxime autem sordidum est contra fatuum (uel ebrium) contentionem inire. Namque absentem ledit qui cum ebrio litigat.

But by all means flee quarrels; for to contend against an equal is two-edged, when
with a superior it is mad, with an inferior sordid. But most sordid of all is to enter into contention against
a fool (or a drunk). For he harms the absent who litigates with a drunk.

I.D.3-6.De abstinentia, honestate, moderantia, parcitate

1.D.3-6.On abstinence, honesty, moderation, parsimony

Abstinencia uero et honestas, moderantia et parcitas edulii irritamenta cohibent. Horum autem primum est statutum prandendi tempus preuenire; secundum lautiores cibos querere. Primum arguit poeta ubi dicit:

Abstinence indeed and honesty, moderation and parsimony restrain the enticements of victuals. Of these, the first is to anticipate the fixed time of taking lunch; the second, to seek more sumptuous foods. The poet arraigns the first when he says:

Exul ab octaua Marius bibit et fruitur (diis

An exile from the eighth, Marius drinks and enjoys (the gods

iratis).

angry).

Secundum autem ibi:

Secondly, however, there:

Noscenda est mensura sui spectandaque rebus

One must know one’s own measure and look to circumstances

in summis minimisque, etiam cum piscis emetur,

in the highest and the least, even when a fish will be bought,

nec cupias mulum, cum sit tibi gobio tantum

nor should you desire a mullet, when you have only enough for a goby

in loculis.

in your purse.

Tercium est uitium in accurato apparato operam dare, quod tangit idem poeta dicens:

The third vice is to devote effort to a carefully prepared apparatus, which the same poet touches upon, saying:

Non minimo sane discrimine refert,

It certainly makes no small difference,

quo gestu lepores et quo gallina secetur.

with what gesture hares and with what gesture a hen should be carved.

Alius poeta dicit:

Another poet says:

O prodiga rerum

O prodigal of things

luxuries, numquam paruo contempta paratu

luxury, never contemned with a small preparation

et quesitorum terra pelagoque ciborum

and of foods sought from land and sea

ambiciosa fames et laute gloria mense,

ambitious hunger and the glory at a lavish table,

discite quam paruo liceat producere uitam

learn how with very little it is permitted to prolong life

et quantum natura petat:

and how much nature seeks:

satis est populis fluuiusque ceresque.

the river and ceres are enough for peoples.

Quartum est nimio appetitu inhiare. Quintum mensuram refectionis excedere, quod intelligitur ubi dicitur:

The fourth is to gape after with excessive appetite. The fifth, to exceed the measure of refection, which is understood where it is said:

Male uerum examinat omnis

Everyone examines the truth badly

corruptus iudex.

corrupt judge.

Nempe inamarescunt epule sine fine petite.

Indeed the banquets sought without end grow bitter.

I.D.3.De abstinentia

1.D.3.On abstinence

Abstinentia ergo est statutum prandendi terminum non preuenire. Hec quidem uoluptatem esus gratiorem reddit. Nichil enim iocundum, nisi quod reficit uarietas, atque

Abstinence, therefore, is not to forestall the established terminus of lunching. This indeed renders the pleasure of eating more agreeable. For nothing is jocund, except what variety refreshes, and

uoluptates commendat rarior usus.

pleasures are commended by rarer use.

Ieiunus raro stomachus uulgaria tempnit.

A fasting stomach rarely contemns vulgar fare.

I.D.4.De honestate

1.D.4.On honesty

Honestas est nec lauciores cibos querere, nec in apparatu operam dare. Hec uirtus commendatur, ubi dicitur:

Honorableness is neither to seek more sumptuous foods, nor to give effort to the apparatus. This virtue is commended, where it is said:

Plerumque grate diuitibus uices

Most often reciprocations to the rich are made gratefully

mundeque paruo sub lare pauperum

and neat under the small hearth of the poor

cene sine auleis et ostro

dinners without hangings and purple

sollicitam explicuere frontem.

have smoothed the anxious brow.

I.D.5.De moderantia

I.D.5.On moderation

Moderantia est nimium ciborum appetitum rationis imperio reuocare.

Moderation is to recall an excessive appetite for foods under the command of reason.

I.D.6.De parcitate

I.D.6.On Parsimony

Parcitas est mensura(m) refectionis non excedere.

Parcity is not to exceed the measure of refection.

I.D.7.De sobrietate

I.D.7.On sobriety

Sobrietas est excessum in potu cohibere. Huius officium est arcere mala ebrietatis, que his uersibus pandit poeta:

Sobriety is to restrain excess in drink. Its office is to ward off the evils of drunkenness, which the poet sets forth in these verses:

Quid non ebrietas designat? Operta recludit,

What does ebriety not designate? It unseals what is covered,

spes iubet esse ratas, ad prelia trudit inhermem,

hope bids things to be ratified, thrusts the unarmed to battles,

sollicitis animis honus eximit, addocet artes.

it removes the burden from anxious minds, it teaches arts.

Fecundi calices quem non fecere disertum?

Fecund chalices—whom have they not made eloquent?

I.D.8.De pudicitia

1.D.8.On Pudicity

Pudicicia est moderamine rationis petulantiam domare. Nam si libido animum possidet, ea dominatur, animus nichil ualet. Nemo enim umquam libidini simul et usui paruit.

Pudicity is to tame petulance by the governance of reason. For if libido possesses the mind, it rules; the mind avails nothing. For no one has ever obeyed libido and use at the same time.

Voluptas enim fragilis est, breuis, fastidio obiecta, quo auidius acta est, citius in contrarium recedens, cuius subinde necesse est aut peniteat aut pudeat quemquam. In qua nichil magnificum aut quod naturam hominis diis proximi deceat; res humilis, membrorum turpium ministerio ueniens, exitu feda. Illud quidem abhominabile est propter fetidum scortum et ignominiosam corporis partem, anime libertatem in seruiles delicias inclinare et laborem suum alienas delitias facere.

Pleasure, indeed, is fragile, brief, exposed to fastidious disgust; the more greedily it has been pursued, the more quickly it recedes into the contrary, and it is necessary that one soon either repent of it or be ashamed. In it there is nothing magnificent or that befits the nature of man proximate to the gods; a low thing, coming by the ministry of shameful members, foul in its outcome. That, indeed, is abominable—on account of the fetid harlot and the ignominious part of the body—to incline the freedom of the soul into servile delights and to make its labor another’s (alien) delights.

Ideo semper in promptu habeat uir fortis quantum natura hominis bestiis antecedat. Ille nichil sentiunt nisi uoluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu; hominis autem mens alitur discendo, meditando. Quocirca si quis est ad uoluptates paulo propensior, modo ne sit ex pecudum genere.

Therefore let the brave man always have at hand how much the nature of man precedes beasts. Those creatures feel nothing except pleasure, and are borne toward it with every impulse; but the mind of man is nourished by learning and by meditating. Wherefore, if someone is a little more inclined to pleasures, only let him not be of the cattle-kind.

Ex hoc quidem intelligitur uoluptatem non satis dignam esse hominis prestantia, quia latebras querit. Si quis enim paulo erectior, quamuis uoluptate capiatur, occultat appetitum uoluptatis propter uerecundiam. Idcirco fugiamus blandissimum uoluptatum dominium.

From this indeed it is understood that pleasure is not sufficiently worthy of the preeminence of man, because it seeks hiding-places. For if someone is even a little more upright, although he is captivated by pleasure, he conceals the appetite for pleasure on account of modesty. Therefore let us flee the most flattering dominion of pleasures.

Nam uoluptates, blandissime domine, maximas partes a uirtute detorquent.

For pleasures, most gracious lord, turn the greatest parts away from virtue.

II.De comparatione honestorum

2.On the comparison of the honorable

Restat secundam questionem, eam scilicet que est de comparatione honestorum, pertractare.

It remains to treat the second question, namely that which is about the comparison of the honorable.

Cum ad cognitionem prudentia, relique uero tres ad actionem pertineant, cognitioni anteponenda est actio. Hoc autem sic probari potest. Sit enim aliquis uehementer cupidus in cognoscenda rerum natura.

Since prudence pertains to cognition, but the remaining three to action, action is to be set before cognition. This, however, can be proved thus. Let there be someone vehemently desirous in cognizing the nature of things.

Huic, dum contemplabitur res cognitione dignissimas, subito nuntiet aliquis discrimen patrie cui opitulari ipse possit: nonne omne studium suum abitiet, etiam si estimet (se) posse numerare stellas et mundi magnitudinem metiri? Prudentia ergo posterior est tribus reliquis.

To such a man, while he is contemplating matters most worthy of cognition, if someone should suddenly announce a crisis of the fatherland which he himself can help, will he not abandon all his study, even if he estimates himself able to number the stars and to measure the magnitude of the world? Prudence, therefore, is posterior to the remaining three.

In tribus autem preferenda est temperancia reliquis duabus. Temperancia enim regit homo se ipsum, fortitudine et iusticia familiam et ciuitatem. Sed melius est homini dominium sui quam externum, secundum illud poete:

Among the three, however, temperance is to be preferred to the other two. For by temperance a man rules himself, by fortitude and justice the household and the city. But dominion over oneself is better for a man than external dominion, according to that saying of the poet:

Latius regnes auidum domando

More broadly you will reign by taming the greedy

spiritum, quam si Libiam remotis

the spirit, than if Libya with the far-off

Gadibus iungas et uterque Penus

you join to Gades and both the Carthaginians

seruiat tibi.

let it serve you.

Si uis omnia tibi subicere, te subice rationi. Multos enim regis, si ratio te rexerit. Nichil enim homini bonum sine se bono.

If you wish to subject all things to yourself, subject yourself to reason. For you rule many, if reason has ruled you. For nothing is good to a man without himself being good.

Numquam amore aliarum uirtutum contra temperantiam agendum est. Sunt enim quedam ita feda, ut nec causa conseruande patrie facturus sit ea sapiens, que etiam dictu obscena uidentur.

Never, out of love for other virtues, must one act against temperance. For there are certain things so foul that not even for the cause of conserving the fatherland would a wise man do them—things which even to speak of seem obscene.

Inter duas autem melior est iusticia fortitudine. Magnitudo enim animi, si a communitate humana sit remota, feritas quedam erit et inmanitas. In ipsa autem iusticia sunt gradus officiorum: prima enim diis inmortalibus debentur, secunda patrie, tercia parentibus, reliqua deinceps gradatim.

Between the two, however justice is better than fortitude. For magnanimity, if it be removed from the human community will be a certain ferity and inhumanity. But within justice itself there are degrees of duties: the first are owed to the immortal gods, the second to the fatherland, the third to parents, the remaining thereafter in succession, by degrees.

III.De utili

3.On the useful

Hactenus pars honestatis confecta est. Hoc autem quod nunc agimus, id ipsum est quod utile dicitur.

Thus far the part of the honorable has been completed. But this which we are now handling, this very thing is what is called the useful.

Vtile est quod propter fructum est expetendum. Hoc autem in bona animi et bona corporis et commoda fortune quidam distribuunt.

The useful is that which is to be sought for the sake of the fruit. Some, moreover, distribute this into the goods of the mind, the goods of the body, and the commodities of fortune.

III.A.De bonis animi

3.A.On the goods of the mind

Animi uero bona in scientias et uirtutes disperguntur, de qui‚bus, agentes de honesto, diseruimus.

The goods of the mind, indeed, are spread into sciences and virtues, about which, as we were treating of the honorable, we have discoursed.

III.B.De bonis corporis

3.B.On the goods of the body

Corporis bona sunt ut pulcritudo, nobilitas, uelocitas, robur, magnitudo, ualetudo. Que sepe plus incommodi quam fructus afferunt, dum bonos mores iuxta illud poete inuertunt:

The goods of the body are pulchritude, nobility, velocity, robustness, magnitude, health. Which often bring more incommodity than profit, while they overturn good morals, according to that of the poet:

Rara est concordia forme

Rare is the concord of form

atque pudicitie.

and of chastity.

Nobilitas quoque plus ignominie quam laudis degenerantibus solet afferre. Quanto enim uita maiorum preclarior, tanto posteriorum socordia flagitiosior. Et profecto ita res se habet: maiorum gloria posteris quasi lumen est; neque bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur.

Nobility too is wont to bring more ignominy than praise to degenerates. For the more illustrious the life of the ancestors, the more scandalous the sloth of their posterity. And indeed the matter stands thus: the glory of the ancestors is to their descendants as if a light; nor does it allow either their good things or their bad to be in hiding.

Qui autem demissi in obscuro uitam agunt, si quid deliquere, pauci sciunt: fama atque fortuna eorum par est. Sic e contrario:

But those who, sunk in obscurity, pass their life—if they have committed any delinquency, few know: their fame and their fortune are equal. Thus, on the contrary:

Omne animi uitium tanto conspectius in se

Every vice of the mind is by that much more conspicuous in itself

crimen habet, quanto qui peccat maior habetur.

counts as a crime, in proportion as he who sins is considered greater.

Quod si ueram requiris nobilitatem, audi poetam:

But if you seek true nobility, listen to the poet:

Nobilitas sola est atque unica uirtus.

Virtue is the sole and only nobility.

Prima mihi debes animi bona.

First you owe me the goods of the mind.

Quis enim generosum dixerit hunc qui

For who would call this man noble who

indignus genere est, preclaro nomine tantum

he is unworthy of his lineage, illustrious in name only

insignis?

distinguished?

Miserum est aliorum incumbere fame.

It is wretched to lean upon the fame of others.

Malo pater tibi sit Tersites, dum modo tu sis

I would rather that Thersites be your father, so long as you yourself are

Eacide similis uulcaniaque arma capessas,

be like the Aeacid and take up Vulcanian arms,

quam te Tersite similem producat Achilles.

than that Achilles produce you similar to Thersites.

Quodsi in hac nobilitate aliquis fructus est, profecto is est quem monstrat philosophus his uerbis: Optima hereditas a patribus traditur liberis, omni patrimonio prestantior, gloria uirtutis et rerum gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas iudicandum est.

But if in this nobility there is any fruit, surely it is that which the philosopher points out with these words: The best inheritance is handed down by fathers to children, preeminent over every patrimony, the glory of virtue and of deeds accomplished, to which it must be judged nefarious to be a disgrace.

In aliis autem corporis commodis quis fructus est homini? quem in eisdem bestie preeunt. Non enim elefantes mole, tauros robore, tigres uelocitate prehibitis.

But in other advantages of the body, what profit is there for man? in these same things the beasts outstrip him. For man does not surpass elephants in mass, bulls in strength, tigers in velocity.

Mors sola fatetur

Death alone confesses

quantula sint hominum corpuscula.

how small men’s little bodies are.

III.C.De bonis fortunae

3.C.On the goods of fortune

Fortune autem bona sunt ista: opulentia, prelatio, gloria.

But the goods of Fortune are these: opulence, prelation, glory.

III.C.1.De opulentia

3.C.1.On opulence

Ad opulentiam referuntur predia, clientele, peculium, thesaurus, ornatus.

To opulence are referred estates, clientele, peculium, treasure, ornament.

III.C.1.a.De praediis

3.C.1.a.On estates

In prediis edificia et agri numerantur. Cauendum est autem, si ipse edifices, ne extra modum sumptus prodeas. Obseruanda autem in edificando mediocritas.

In estates, edifices and fields are reckoned. One must beware, however, if you yourself build, not to go beyond measure in expenses. Moreover, in building, mediocrity—the mean—is to be observed.

Auream quisquis mediocritatem

whoever cherishes the golden mean

diligit, tutus caret obsoleti

loves, safe, he lacks the obsolete

sordibus tecti, caret inuidenda

the sordidness of the outworn roof, he lacks the enviable

sobrius aula.

sober from the court.

Ornanda est enim dignitas domo, non ex domo tota querenda; nec domo dominus sed domus domino debet honestari. Nulla quidem domus parua que multos recipit amicos; ampla autem domus, si in ea est solitudo, dedecori est domino, maxime si alio domino solita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a pretereuntibus dicitur:

For dignity is indeed to be adorned by the house, not to be sought wholly from the house; nor ought the master to be honored by the house, but the house by the master. No house, indeed, is small which receives many friends; but a spacious house, if there is solitude in it, is a disgrace to the master, especially if it used to be frequented by another master. For it is odious when it is said by those passing by:

O domus antiqua, quam dispari

O ancient house, how disparate

dominaris domino!

you are lorded over by a master!

Audi poetam:

Hear the poet:

Quem res plus nimio delectauere secunde,

He whom prosperous affairs have delighted more than too much,

mutate quatient. Si quid mirabere, pones

changed fortunes will shake him. If you marvel at anything, you will set it down

inuitus. Fuge magna, licet sub paupere tecto

unwilling. Flee great things, though beneath a poor roof

reges et regum uita precurrere amicos.

to outstrip kings and the friends of kings in life.

Et alius poeta dicit:

And another poet says:

O uite tuta facultas

O life’s safe resource

pauperis angustique lares! O munera nondum

of the poor and straitened hearths! O gifts not yet

intellecta deum!

understood of the gods!

Ideo sequamur in edificio temperantiam illius de quo legitur:

Therefore let us follow in building the temperance of him about whom it is read:

Huic epule uicisse famem, magnique penates

For this man, banquets had vanquished hunger, and the great Penates

submouisse hiemem tecto.

to have removed winter by a roof.

Laudabilis est enim multa suppellex in paruo lare, namque

Laudable indeed is much household furniture in a small home, for

exilis domus est, ubi non et multa (super)sunt

it is an exiguous house, where not also many things are left over

et dominum fallunt et prosunt furibus.

and they deceive the master and profit thieves.

Magnitudo enim domus sollicitudines non expellit.

For the greatness of a house does not expel anxieties.

Intactis opulentior

Richer with things left untouched

thesauris arabum et diuitis Indie

the treasures of the Arabs and of rich India

cementis licet occupes

although you may occupy with cements

tirrenum omne tuis;

all the Tyrrhenian with your own;

si figat adamantinos

if he should fix adamantine fastenings

summis uerticibus seua necessitas

on the highest summits, cruel Necessity

clauos, non animum metu,

nails, not the spirit with fear,

non mortis laqueis expedies capud.

you will not extricate your head from the nooses of death.

Diuesne prisco natus ab Inacho

Whether rich, born from ancient Inachus

nil interest, an pauper et infima

it makes no difference, whether a pauper and of the lowest

de gente sub diuo morieris:

of the lowest race, you will die under the open sky:

uictima nil miserantis Orci.

a victim of unpitying Orcus.

Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium

We are all compelled to the same place, of all

uersatur urna serius ocius

the urn is shaken, sooner or later

sors exitura.

the lot that is to come forth.

Non domus et fundus, non eris aceruus et auri

Not a house and estate, not a heap of bronze and of gold

egroto domini deduxit corpore febres.

from the master’s sick body he drew away the fevers.

Qui cupit aut metuit iuuat illum sic domus et res

He who desires or fears, in this way house and property help him.

ut lippum picte tabule, fomenta podagram.

as painted tablets to a bleary-eyed man, fomentations to gout.

Pallida mors equo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas

Pallid Death knocks with an equal foot at the hovels of the poor

regumque turres.

and the towers of kings.

III.C.1.b.De clientelis

3.C.1.b.On clienteles

In clientelis officium sit domini primum necessaria prebere, secundum opera exigere. Errat dominus, si estimat seruitutem in totum hominem descendere: pars melior eius excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt dominis, mens sui iuris est, adeo libera et uaga, ut nec ab hoc carcere, cui inclusa (est), teneri possit, quo minus impetu suo utatur et ingentia agat et in infinitum comes celestibus exeat.

In clienteles let the duty of the lord be first to provide the necessaries, second to exact works. The lord errs, if he esteems servitude to descend upon the whole man: the better part of him is excepted. Bodies are subject to lords, the mind is sui juris, so free and vagrant that not even by this prison, in which it is enclosed, can it be held from using its own impetus and doing mighty things and from going forth into the infinite as a companion to the celestials.

Ideo sic cum inferiore uiuas, quemadmodum superiorem tecum uelis uiuere. Quotiens in mentem uenerit quantum tibi in seruum (liceat), ueniat in mentem tantundem in te domino tuo licere.

Therefore live thus with an inferior, as you would wish a superior to live with you. Whenever it comes to mind how much is permitted to you over a servant (be permitted), let it come to mind that just as much over you is permitted to your own master.

Familiaris domini officium est primum ad mores domini suos reducere, quem his uerbis format poeta:

It is the office of a master's familiar first to recall his master to his own morals, whom the poet forms with these words:

Dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici,

Sweet to the inexperienced is the cultivation of a powerful friend,

expertus metuet. Tu, dum tua nauis in alto est,

the expert will fear. You, while your ship is on the deep,

hoc caue ne mutata retrorsum te ferat aura.

Beware of this, lest a changed breeze carry you backward.

Oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque iocosi,

The sad hate the cheerful, and the jocose the sad,

sedatum celeres, agilem gnauumque remissi;

the swift [hate] the sedate, the relaxed [hate] the agile and industrious;

potores bibuli media de nocte falerni

bibulous drinkers of Falernian in the middle of the night

oderunt porrecta negantem pocula.

they hate the one refusing the proffered cups.

Deme supercilio nubem; plerumque modestus

Remove the cloud from your brow; for the most part, be modest.

occupat obscuri speciem, taciturnus acerbi.

assumes the appearance of the obscure, the taciturn of the acerbic.

Consentire suis studiis qui crediderit te,

Whoever will have believed that you consent to his studies,

fautor utroque tuum laudabit pollice ludum.

a supporter will praise your game with both thumbs.

Secundum officium est dignos domino commendare, indignos cauere. Vnde poeta:

The second office is to commend the worthy to the lord, to beware of the unworthy. Whence the poet:

Qualem commendes etiam atque etiam aspice, ne mox

What sort of man you commend, look again and again, lest soon

incutiant aliena tibi peccata pudorem.

another’s sins may strike shame into you.

Fallimur et quondam non dignum tradimus: ergo

We are deceived, and at times we hand over one not worthy: therefore

quem sua culpa premet, deceptus omitte tueri,

him whom his own guilt will press, deceived, cease to protect,

ut penitus notum, si temptent crimina, serues

so that, thoroughly known, if they attempt crimes, you keep it

tuterisque tuo fidentem presidio.

and protect the one trusting in your protection.

Nam

For

iam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet,

now your affair is at stake, when the nearest wall is burning,

et neglecta solent incendia sumere uires.

and neglected fires are wont to assume strength.

Tercium est cohibere auaritiam et libidinem, unde idem poeta:

The third is to restrain avarice and libido, whence the same poet:

Non te semper inobs agitet uexetque cupido.

Let not a needy desire always agitate and vex you.

Non ancilla tuum iecur ulceret ulla.

Let no maidservant ulcerate your liver.

Quartum est abicere elationem, iuxta illud:

The fourth is to cast aside elation, in accordance with that:

Nec tua laudabis studia aut aliena reprendes.

Nor will you praise your own pursuits or reprove those of others.

Tu cede potentis amici

Yield to the powerful friend

lenibus imperiis.

to gentle commands.

Quintum est a querimoniis supersedere, unde idem poeta:

The fifth is to refrain from querimonies (complaints), whence the same poet:

Coram rege suo de paupertate tacentes

Before their king, silent about poverty

plus poscente ferent; distat, sumasne pudenter

more to one who asks they will bring; it makes a difference whether you take modestly

aut rapias.

or you snatch.

Nam tacitus pasci si posset coruus, haberet

For if the crow could feed tacitly, he would have

plus dabis et rixe multo minus inuidieque.

you will give more, and much less of quarrel and envy.

Quare autem tam studiose hec sint seruanda, docet dum dicit:

Why, moreover, these things are to be so diligently observed, he teaches as he says:

Principibus placuisse uiris non ultima laus est.

To have pleased princes is not the least praise.

Serui officium est quicquid ab eo exigitur complere, nec aliqua grauari penuria. Verum (est) illud poete:

It is the duty of a servant to fulfill whatever is exacted of him, and not to be burdened by any penury. True is that of the poet:

Non sibi sed domino grauis est, que seruit, egestas.

Poverty is burdensome not to herself who serves, but to the master.

Summopere autem caueat garrulitatem.

However, let him most of all beware of garrulity.

Nam lingua mali pars pessima serui.

For the tongue is the worst part of a bad slave.

Talem autem, si fas est, dominum eligat cui seruire non sit indecorum. Dignitate enim dominantium honestantur obsequia seruorum.

Such a master, moreover, if it is permissible, let him choose, to serve whom would not be indecorous. For by the dignity of those who rule the services of servants are honored.

III.C.1.c-e.De peculio, thesauro, ornatu

3.C.1.c-e.On the peculium, the treasure, the ornament

De peculio uero, thesauro, ornatu, que communi nomine diuitie dicuntur, est illud philosophi satis eleganter dictum: Nichil, inquit, est tam angusti animi tamque parui quam amare diuitias. Ideo magnus est qui sic utitur auro ut fictilibus, nec minor ille qui sic fictilibus ut auro. Nichil honestius magnificentiusque quam peccuniam contempnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad liberalitatem conferre.

On the peculium, the treasure, the ornament, which by a common name are called riches, there is that saying of the philosopher stated quite elegantly: “Nothing,” he says, “is so narrow and so small of mind as to love riches.” Therefore, he is great who uses gold as earthenware, nor is he lesser who uses earthenware as gold. Nothing is more honest and more magnificent than to contemn money, if you do not have it; if you have it, to contribute it to liberality.

Nimis enim illiberalis uidetur fuisse qui dixit:

Excessively indeed illiberal he seems to have been who said:

Ego spem pretio non emo.

I do not buy hope at a price.

A cuius re(i) nimio desiderio his causis reuocari debemus. Prima est quia breuis est uita.

From the excessive desire for this matter we ought to be recalled by these causes. The first is that life is brief.

Vite sum(m)a breuis spem nos uetat inchoare longam.

The brief sum of life forbids us to inchoate long hope.

Qui(s) scit an adiciant hodierne crastina uite

Who knows whether tomorrow will add to today’s life?

tempora dii superi?

times, O gods above?

Idcirco

Therefore

quid sit futurum cras fuge querere!

shun to inquire what will be tomorrow!

Prudens futuri temporis exitum

Prudent concerning the outcome of future time

caliginosa nocte premit deus

the god shrouds it in caliginous night

ridetque, si mortalis ultra

and he laughs, if a mortal beyond

fas trepidat. Quod adest memento

divine law trembles. Remember what is present

componere equus!

to compose what is at hand, calm!

Ille potens

That potent one

letusque degit cui licet in diem

and glad he lives, to whom it is permitted for the day

dixisse uixi; cras uel atra

to have said, “I have lived”; tomorrow either black

nube polum pater occupato

let the Father occupy the sky with a cloud

uel sole puro.

or with the pure sun.

Letus in presens animus quod ultra est

Let the mind be joyful in the present; as for what lies beyond

oderit curare et amara lento

let it hate to care, and take bitter things with a gentle spirit

temperet risu: nichil est ab omni

let him temper with laughter: nothing is from every

parte beatum.

in every part blessed.

In hoc quidem omnes fallimur quod mortem non prospicimus: magna pars eius iam preteriit. Quicquid etatis retro est, mors tenet. Ideo fige in animo te sine intermissione cotidie mori.

In this, indeed, we all are deceived, that we do not foresee death: a great part of it has already passed by. Whatever of your age lies behind, death holds. Therefore fix in your mind that you are, without intermission, dying every day.

Secunda causa: quia amor habendi uirtutes inuertit, iuxta illud:

Second cause: because the love of having inverts the virtues, according to that:

Perdidit arma, locum uirtutis deseruit qui

He has lost his arms, has deserted the place of virtue, he who

semper in augenda festinat et obruitur re.

always hastens in augmenting and is overwhelmed by the thing.

Nam neque diuitibus contingunt gaudia solis,

For joys do not befall the wealthy alone,

nec uixit male qui natus moriensque fefellit.

nor has he lived badly who, at his birth and in dying, has escaped notice.

Sed dicit auarus:

But the avaricious man says:

Vnde habeas querit nemo, sed oportet habere.

Whence you have it no one asks, but it is requisite to have it.

Et genus et uirtus, nisi cum re, uilior alga est.

And lineage and virtue, unless with wealth, are viler than seaweed.

Nil satis est, inquit, quia tanti quantum habeas sis.

Nothing is enough, he says, because you are worth as much as what you have.

Quantum quisque sua nummorum seruat in archa,

As much as each person keeps of his coins in his chest,

tantum habet et fidei.

so much he has of faith.

Nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se

Unhappy poverty has nothing harsher in itself

quam quod ridiculos homines facit.

than that it makes men ridiculous.

Magnum pauperies obprobrium iubet

Poverty bids great opprobrium.

quiduis et facere et pati.

to do and to suffer anything.

Sed genus et formam regina Pecunia donat.

But queen Money bestows lineage and form.

Virtus, fama, decus, diuina humanaque pulcris

Virtue, fame, honor, divine and human things for the fair

parent diuitiis; quas qui contraxerit, ille

obey riches; whoever has amassed them, he

clarus erit, fortis, iustus, sapiens, etiam rex.

he will be famous, brave, just, sapient, even a king.

Sed tamen hoc in contrarium cedit illi. Pro uirtutibus enim affert peccunia uicium et infamiam, que est tercia causa contempnendi ea(m). Audi poetam:

But yet this turns to his disadvantage. For in place of virtues money brings vice and infamy, which is the third cause for contemning it. Hear the poet:

Prima peregrinos obscena peccunia mores

First, obscene money [brought in] peregrine morals

intulit et turpi fregerunt secula luxu

it brought in and with base luxury they shattered the ages

diuitie molles.

soft riches.

Fecunda culpe secula nuptias

The ages, fecund in fault, brought forth marriages

primum inquinauere et genus et domos.

first they polluted both the lineage and the homes.

Quod nobilitas nulla (sit) ex peccunia monstrat qui dicit:

That no nobility (is) from pecuniary wealth is shown by the one who says:

Licet superbus ambules peccunia,

Granted you strut proudly by pecuniary means,

fortuna non mutat genus.

fortune does not change lineage.

Quarta causa: quia amorem habendi nullus satiat questus, nam

Fourth cause: because the love of having no profit satiates, for

improbe

wickedly

crescunt diuitie, tamen

riches grow, nevertheless

curte nescio quid semper abest rei.

some I-know-not-what curtailed is always absent from the matter.

Crescentem sequitur cura peccuniam

Care follows the money as it grows

rnaiorumque fames.

and the hunger for greater things.

Quanto quisque sibi plura negauerit,

The more each person has denied himself more things,

a diis plura feret.

he will receive more from the gods.

Multa petentibus

To those asking for many things

desunt multa. Bene est cui deus obtulit

many things are lacking. It is well for him to whom god has offered

parca, quod satis est, manu.

with a sparing hand, what is sufficient.

Pauper enim non est cui rerum suppetit usus.

For he is not poor for whom the use of things suffices.

Si uentri bene, si lateri est pedibusque tuis, nil

If the belly is well, if your side and your feet are well, nothing

diuitie poterunt regales addere maius.

will regal riches be able to add anything greater.

Crescit amor nummi, quantum (ipsa) peccunia crescit,

The love of coin grows, as much as money (itself) grows,

et minus hanc optat qui non habet.

and he who does not have it desires it less.

Diues qui fieri uult

He who wishes to become rich

et cito uult fieri.

and he wants to become it quickly.

Quinta causa timor quem inuehit peccunia.

The fifth cause is fear which money brings in.

Pauca licet portes argenti uascula puri,

Though you may carry a few small vessels of pure silver,

nocte iter ingressus comptum gladiumque timebis.

setting out on a journey at night, you will fear the well-combed man and the sword.

Cantabit uacuus coram latrone uiator.

The empty traveler will sing before a robber.

Sexta causa est quia uult seruitutem querentis.

The sixth cause is because he desires the complainant’s servitude.

Sed certe misera est magni custodia census.

But certainly the custody of great wealth is miserable.

Imperat aut seruit collecta peccunia cuique,

The collected money either commands or serves each person,

tortum digna sequi potius quam ducere funem.

worthy to follow a twisted rope rather than to lead it.

Idcirco assentior dicenti:

Therefore I assent to the one saying:

Et mihi res, non me rebus submittere conor.

And I strive to submit things to myself, not myself to things.

Cum hec ita sint,

Since these things are thus,

non possidentem multa uocaueris

you will not call one possessing many things

recte beatum; rectius occupat

rightly blessed; more rightly he appropriates

nomen beati qui deorum

the name of the blessed, he who of the gods

muneribus sapienter uti

to use the gifts wisely

duramque callet pauperiem pati

and is skilled to endure hard poverty

peiusque leto flagitium timet.

and he fears shame worse than death.

Honesta enim res est leta paupertas. Illa uero non est paupertas, si leta est. Cui cum paupertate bene conuenit, diues est.

For cheerful poverty is an honorable thing. Indeed, that is not poverty, if it is cheerful. He who gets on well with poverty is rich.

Pauper est non qui parum habet sed qui plus cupit. Si uis diues fieri, non peccunie est adiciendum sed cupiditati detrahendum. Breuissima uia ad diuitias est contemptus diuitiarum.

Poor is not he who has little, but he who desires more. If you wish to become rich, it is not money that must be added but cupidity that must be detracted. The briefest way to riches is the contempt of riches.

Contempnere enim omnia aliquis potest, habere omnia non potest. Ideo locupletior erat uacuus Diogenes omnia possidente Alexandro. Plus enim erat quod hic nollet accipere quam quod ille posset dare.

For indeed someone can contemn all things; he cannot have all things. Therefore the empty Diogenes was more wealthy than Alexander, possessing everything. For there was more in what this man would not wish to accept than in what that man was able to give.

Quid refert quantum illi in archa, quantum in horreis iaceat, si alieno im(m)inet, si non ques(i)ta sed querenda computat. Qui(s) sit diuitiarum modus queris: primus habere quod necesse est, proximus quod sat est. Parabile autem et appositum est quod natura desiderat; ad superuacua sudatur, ad manum est quod sat est.

What does it matter how much lies for him in the chest, how much in the granaries, if he leans on another’s, if he computes not what has been acquired but what is to be sought? You ask what the measure of riches is: first, to have what is necessary; next, what is sufficient. What nature desires is procurable and ready to hand; one sweats for superfluities; what is sufficient is at hand.

III.C.2.De praelatione

3.C.2.On prelation

Prelationum quoque temperandus est appetitus. Grauior est enim casus altitudinis. Verum quidem (de) eis legitur:

The appetite for prelations also must be tempered. For the fall from altitude is graver. Truly indeed (concerning) them it is read:

Quosdam precipitat subiecta potencia magne

A subjected power, O great one, precipitates certain persons.

inuidie; mergit longa atque insignis honorum

of envy; a long and distinguished series of honors submerges

pagina.

page.

Inuida fatorum series summis(que) negatum

the invidious series of fates, and what is denied to the highest

stare diu nimioque graues sub pondere lapsus.

to stand long, and grave downfalls beneath an excessive weight.

In se magna ruunt; letis hunc numina rebus

Great things collapse upon themselves; to lethal affairs the numina assign this man

crescendi posuere modum.

to growth they have set a limit.

O faciles dare summa deos eademque tueri

O how ready are the gods to grant the highest things and likewise to guard the same

difficiles!

difficult!

Fortunam enim citius reperias quam retineas.

For indeed, you may more quickly find Fortune than retain her.

Sepius uentis agitatur ingens

More often something huge is agitated by the winds

pinus et celse grauiore casu

the pine and the lofty with a graver downfall

decidunt turres feriuntque summos

lofty towers fall, and lightning strikes the highest summits

fulgura montes.

lightnings strike the mountains.

Fortuna seuo leta negotio,

Fortune, glad in savage business,

ludum insolentem ludere pertinax,

pertinacious to play an insolent game,

transmutat incertos honores,

she transmutes uncertain honors,

nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.

now benign to me, now to another.

Laudo manentem; si celeres quatit

I praise her remaining; if she shakes her swift

pennas, resigno que dedit et mea

wings, I resign what she gave and my

uirtute me inuoluo probamque

I enfold myself in virtue and what is upright

pauperiem sine dote quero.

I seek poverty without a dowry.

O fortuna ut numquam es perpetuo bona!

O fortune, how you are never perpetually good!

Secunda uero causa est quia simulationem aperit. Illis enim difficile est in potestatibus temperare qui per ambitionem sese probos simulauere. Sunt enim multi non ex animo sed ex fortuna modo humiles, modo elati, iuxta illud: Profecto sic est: omnibus nobis ut res se dant, ita magni atque humiles sumus.

The second cause indeed is that it lays open simulation. For it is difficult for those in positions of power to keep temper who, through ambition, have simulated themselves as men of probity. For there are many, not from spirit but from fortune, now humble, now exalted, according to that: Surely thus it is: for all of us, as affairs present themselves, so are we great and humble.

Prelati itaque sit officium studia multitudinis ad suas utilitates allicere. Omnium enim rerum nec aptius quicquam ad prelationes tenendas quam diligi, nec alienius quam timeri. Tutius est enim uolentibus quam coactis imperare.

Therefore let it be the office of prelates to allure the zeal of the multitude to their own advantages. For of all things there is nothing more apt for holding prelacies than to be loved, nor more alien than to be feared. For it is safer to rule the willing than the compelled.

Subiecti enim

For the subjects indeed

quem metuunt oderunt; quem quisque odit perisse expetit.

whom they fear they hate; whom each person hates, he seeks to have perished.

Malus enim custos diuturnitatis metus; unde est illud:

For fear is a bad custodian of long duration; whence is that saying:

Ad generum cereris sine cede et sanguine pauci

To the son-in-law of Ceres without slaughter and blood, few

descendunt reges et sicca morte tiranni.

kings descend, and tyrants by a dry death.

Econtra beniuolentia fidelis custos est etiam ad perpetuitatem; preconio enim laudis defunctum perhennem facit. Qui se metui uolent, a quibus timentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. Vnde philosophus: Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit, qui quos terret ipse plus metuit?

On the contrary, benevolence is a faithful guardian even unto perpetuity; for by the proclamation of praise it makes the deceased perennial. Those who wish themselves to be feared must themselves fear those by whom they are feared, those same ones. Whence the philosopher: Do you deem powerful him who encircles his flank with a satellite, who himself fears more those whom he terrifies?

Dionisius, cultros metuens tonsorios, candente carbone sibi adurebat capillos. Alexander Phereus ex epulis in cubiculum ueniens ad uxorem, premittebat stipatores suos qui scrutarentur archas muliebres, ne quod in uestibus telum absconderetur.

Dionysius, fearing tonsorial knives (razors), with white-hot charcoal singed his own hair. Alexander of Pherae, coming from banquets into the bedchamber to his wife, would send ahead his bodyguards to search the women’s chests, lest any weapon be hidden in the garments.

Meminerit prelatus se priuatum fuisse. Nam sepe (spes) improbissimas amplectuntur insperata assecuti; omnesque deteriores sumus licentia. Prelatos torquent

Let the prelate remember that he was a private person. For often, having attained the unexpected, they embrace the most depraved (hopes); and we all are worse through license. They torment prelates.

miseri tumultus

miserable tumults

mentis et cure laqueata circum

of the mind and cares laced around

tecta uolantes.

roofs flying.

Et, qua non grauior mortalibus addita cura,

And, than which no heavier care has been laid upon mortals,

Spes ubi longa uenit.

Hope when long comes.

III.C.3.De gloria

3.C.3.On glory

Gloria stt alicuius magnifici uel bone artis late patens preconium. Ad hanc ob hoc (spectat) humana intencio, quia absque ea nostra uirtus non multis ignotescit, iuxta illud:

Glory is the widely spreading proclamation of someone’s magnificent or good art. Toward this (looks) human intention for this reason, because without it our virtue becomes unknown to many, according to that saying:

Paulum sepulte distat inertie

It differs little from buried inertia

celata uirtus.

hidden virtue.

Preterea:

Moreover:

ut perhibent qui de magnis maiora locuntur,

as they report who speak greater things about great things,

secundam uitam dat gloria. Ait poeta:

glory gives a second life. The poet says:

Dignum laude uirum musa uetat mori.

The Muse forbids a man worthy of praise to die.

Quam rem, ut monstr(ar)et serio se non dixisse, alibi posuit:

Which thing, in order to demonstrate that he had not said it in earnest, he placed elsewhere:

Cum bene notum

Since it is well known

porticus Agrippe, uia te conspexerit Apii,

the Portico of Agrippa, the Appian Way will have seen you,

ire tamen restat, Numa quo deuenit et Ancus.

to go however remains, to where Numa and Ancus have descended.

Mors spernit altam gloriam,

Death spurns lofty glory,

inuoluit pariter humile et celsum capud

it envelops alike the humble and the lofty head

equatque summis infima.

and equates the lowest with the highest.

Gloriam adeo inmoderato affectu querimus, quod boni magis uideri quam esse, mali autem magis esse quam uideri uolumus. Verum est enim illud in poeta:

We seek glory with so immoderate an affection, because we wish to seem good rather than to be, but we wish to be evil rather than to seem. For that saying in the poet is true:

Falsus honor iuuat et mendax infamia terret.

False honor gratifies, and mendacious infamy frightens.

Glorie autem fructus persepe fuit superbia. Vnde grecus tragicus exclamat: Gloria, gloria, in milibus mortalium nichil aliud facta quam aurium inflatio magna. In qua nil fructus esse, si aliis bonis destituta sit, monstrat qui dicit:

But the fruit of glory has very often been pride. Whence the Greek tragedian exclaims: Glory, glory, in the thousands of mortals made nothing else than a great inflation of the ears. In which he shows there to be no fruit, if it be destitute of other goods, who says:

Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est?

Glory however great, what will it be, if it is only glory?

Si quis tamen ad gloriam assequendam laborat, talem se efficiat qualis uult haberi. Quod si osten(ta)tione inani et ficto sermone uel uultu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse oppinatur, uehementer errat. Vera enim gloria radices agit, ficta autem omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum quicquam postest esse diuturnum.

If anyone nevertheless labors to attain glory, let him make himself such as he wishes to be regarded. But if he supposes that by inane osten(t)ation and by fictitious speech or countenance he can obtain stable glory for himself, he errs vehemently. For true glory strikes root; but all things feigned quickly fall away like little blossoms, nor can anything simulated be long-lasting.

IV.De comparatione utilium

4.On the comparison of advantages

Quarta questio, que est de comparatione utilium, hoc modo tractatur. Nam commoda corporis cum externis conferuntur hoc modo, ualere ut malis quam diues esse. Rursus externa sic preferuntur bonis corporeis: malis diues esse quam maximis corporis uiribus uti.

The fourth question, which is about the comparison of useful things, is treated in this way. For the advantages of the body are compared with externals thus: to be healthy, as you prefer, rather than to be rich. Conversely, externals are preferred to bodily goods thus: as you prefer, to be rich rather than to employ the greatest bodily powers.

Ea quoque que sunt corporis sibi inuicem (comparantur; nam bona ualitudo melior est magnitudine, uires celeritate. Externa quoque sibi inuicem): melior est enim gloria diuitiis, uectigalia urbana rusticis.

Those things also which are of the body are compared among themselves (are compared; for good health is better than magnitude, strength than celerity. External things also among themselves): for glory is better than riches, urban revenues than rustic.

V.De conflictu honesti et utilis

5.On the conflict between the honorable and the useful

Quintam capiendi consilii inuestigationem prediximus esse questionem de pugna utilitatis et honestatis. Si enim est utile ad se trahere, honestum uero aliis erogare, persepe in deliberando animus noster habet ancipitem cogitandi curam, utrum scilicet spreta utilitate honesto adhereat uel contra. Horum duorum oppositionem Phtolomeo regi persuadere nitebatur qui sic perorabat:

We have previously declared the fifth investigation of taking counsel to be the question about the conflict of utility and honesty. For if it is useful to draw to oneself, but honorable to disburse to others, very often in deliberating our mind has a double, wavering care of thinking, namely whether, utility having been spurned, it should adhere to the honorable, or the contrary. Someone was striving to persuade King Ptolemy of the opposition of these two, who thus perorated:

Ius et fas multos faciunt, Phtolomee, nocentes,

Law and divine right make many guilty, Ptolemy,

dat penas laudata fides, cum sustinet illos

lauded fidelity pays penalties, when it sustains them

quos fortuna premit. Fatis accede deisque

whom Fortune presses. Side with the Fates and with the gods

et cole felices, miseros fuge. Sidera terra

and cultivate the fortunate, flee the wretched. The stars, the earth

ut distant et flamma mari, sic utile recto.

as even flame is far from the sea, so the useful is from the right.

Sceptrorum uis tota perit, si pendere iusta

The entire force of scepters perishes, if to weigh what is just

incipit, euertitque arces respectus honesti.

begins, and the respect for the honorable overturns citadels.

Libertas scelerum est que regna inuisa tuetur.

The liberty of crimes is what protects hated kingdoms.

Sublatusque modus gladiis.

And the measure has been removed by swords.

Hac exeat aula

Let him leave this court.

qui uolet esse pius; uirtus et summa potestas

whoever wishes to be pious; virtue and supreme power

non coeunt: semper metuet quem seua pudebunt.

do not come together: he will always fear, the one whom his savage deeds will put to shame.

Summa uero auctoritate philosophi tria hec, scilicet bonum, honestum, utile sic permiscent, ut quicquid bonum est, id etiam utile censeant, et quicquid honestum (est), idem bonum esse astruant. Vnde sequitur omne honestum utile esse.

But indeed, with the highest authority of the philosopher, they so commingle these three, namely the good, the honorable, the useful, that whatever is good, that they also deem useful, and whatever is honorable (is), they assert the same to be good. Whence it follows that every honorable thing is useful.

Firmissime itaque tene et nullatenus dubites ita omne honestum utile esse, quod nichil est utile nisi sit honestum, nec duo ista numero differre sed sola proprietate. Verbi gratia: hic homo et hoc animal numero non discrepant, quia et hic homo est hoc animal, et nichil est hoc animal nisi hic homo. Tamen qua ad hoc, quod sit hoc animal, non exigitur nisi substantia cum animatione et sensibilitate, ad hoc autem, ut hic homo sit, oportet esse rationabilitatem cum mortalitate, proprietate dicuntur hec discrepare.

Therefore hold most firmly and in no way doubt thus: that every honest thing is useful, in that nothing is useful unless it be honest, and that these two do not differ in number but only by property. For example: this man and this animal do not differ in number, because this man is this animal, and this animal is nothing other than this man. Yet, as to this, that it be this animal, nothing is required except substance with animation and sensibility; but for this, that it be this man, there must be rationality with mortality—by property these are said to differ.

Similis ratio est utilis et honesti. Cum enim idem sint numero, ad hoc quod aliquid sit utile, exigit(ur) quod fructum habeat; ad hoc uero ut honestum sit, requirit(ur) ut sua dignitate nos alliciat. Cum ergo unum et idem sint, sequitur nullius rei utilem esse usum qui a uirtutibus discrepet.

A similar rationale applies to the useful and the honest. For since they are the same in number, for this—that something be useful—it is required that it have fruit; for this, however, that it be honest, it is required that by its own dignity it allure us. Since therefore they are one and the same, it follows that no use of anything is useful which is at variance with the virtues.

Idcirco nulla omnino est utilis et honesti oppositio. Quia uero uulgus quemcumque temporalium usum utilem credit, illicitus autem honesto obuiat, ideo de controuersia utilis et honesti proposita est questio.

Therefore there is absolutely no opposition of the useful and the honest. But because the common crowd believes any use of temporal things to be useful, while the illicit runs counter to the honest, therefore a question has been proposed about the controversy of the useful and the honest.

Sed uidetur utile hominem incommodo alterius commodum suum augere et alterum alteri aliquid detrahere. Hoc autem magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor. Nam principio conuictum hominum tollit.

But it seems useful for a man to augment his own advantage by another’s disadvantage and to take something away from one person and transfer it to another. But this is more against nature than death, than poverty, than pain. For, in the first place, it removes the fellowship of human beings.

Si enim hec affectio nobis insit ut quisque propter suum emolumentum spoliet aut uiolet alterum, necesse est dirumpi societatem humani generis que est secundum naturam. Vt si unum quodque membrum putaret se plus ualere, si proximi membri ualitudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset: ita est et in humana societate. Nam sicut concessum est ut quisque malit sibi adquirere quod ad usum uite pertineat quam alteri, et hoc natura non repugnante, ita non patitur natura ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates augeamus.

For if this affect be implanted in us, that each man, for his own emolument, despoil or violate another, it is necessary that the society of the human race, which is according to nature, be torn asunder. As, if each single member should think itself to be stronger if it had drawn over to itself the health of the neighboring member, it would be necessary that the whole body be debilitated and perish: so it is also in human society. For just as it is conceded that each prefers to acquire for himself what pertains to the use of life rather than for another, and this with nature not gainsaying, so nature does not suffer that we enlarge our faculties by the spoils of others.

Sed sicut contra naturam magis est detrahere alteri causa sui commodi quam mors, quam dolor, ita magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus, si fieri possit, labores et molestias suscipere quam uiuere sine molestiis in maximis uoluptatibus. Preterea qui alterum uiolat, ut ipse aliquid commodi assequatur, aut nil estimat se facere contra naturam, aut censet magis fugiendam paupertatem quam facere cuique iniuriam. Si nichil estimat se contra naturam facere, inhumanus est; si censet facere iniuriam malum esse, sed deterius paupertatem uel mortem, errat.

But just as it is more against nature to detract from another for the sake of one’s own advantage than death, than pain, so it is more according to nature, for all, if it can be done, to undertake labors and annoyances rather than to live without annoyances amid the greatest pleasures. Furthermore, he who violates another, in order that he himself may attain something of advantage, either esteems that he is doing nothing against nature, or judges poverty more to be fled than doing injury to anyone. If he esteems that he is doing nothing against nature, he is inhuman; if he judges that to do injury is an evil, but that poverty or death is worse, he errs.

Grauius est enim uitium animi, quod est iniusticia, quam corporis, quam fortune: mors et paupertas.

Graver
for the vice of the mind, which is injustice, than that of the body, than of fortune: death
and poverty.

Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili. Minime, inquam. Non enim est mihi uita utilior quam talis affectio animi, scilicet ut neminem uiolem causa mei commodi.

Perhaps someone will say: Would not, then, the sage, if he himself were being consumed by hunger, take away food from another man useful for no purpose? By no means, I say. For life is not more useful to me than such an affection of mind, namely, that I violate no one for the sake of my own advantage.

Dum enim uita perditur, corruptio corporis, scilicet mors, incurritur; si uero hanc affectionem abiciam, uicium animi incurram. Et sicut grauius est animi quam corporis uitium, sic melius est animi quam corporis bonum, uirtus scilicet quam uita. Preterea cadit in bonum uirum mentiri, criminari, preripere, fallere causa sui emolumenti?

For, while life is lost, the corruption of the body, namely death, is incurred;
but if I should discard this affection, I would incur a vice of the mind. And just as graver is
a vice of the mind than of the body, so better is a good of the mind than of the body, virtue
namely than life. Moreover, does it befit a good man to lie, to criminate,
to snatch away in advance, to deceive for the sake of his own emolument?

Nil profecto minus. Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut uiri boni nomen amittas? Quid est quod afferre tantum ista, que dicitur utilitas, possit, quantum aufert, si nomen boni uiri eripuerit, fidem iusticiamque detraxerit?

Assuredly, nothing less. Is there, then, any thing of such worth, or any advantage so to be sought, that you would lose the name of a good man? What is there that this so‑called utility can bring as much as it takes away, if it has snatched away the name of a good man and stripped off faith and justice?

Quare ergo homines emolumenta rerum uident, penam uero non tantum legum sed turpitudinis, que acerbissima est, non uident?

Why then do men see the emoluments of things, yet do not see the penalty, not only of the laws but of turpitude, which is most bitter?

Quamobrem hec deliberatio pellatur e medio. Deliberant utrum id sequantur quod honestum esse uideant, an se scientes scelere contaminent. In ipsa quidem dubitacione facinus inest, etiam si ad id non peruenerint.

Wherefore let this deliberation be banished from the midst. They deliberate whether to follow that which they see to be honorable, or knowingly to contaminate themselves with crime. In the very dubitation itself a crime is present, even if they have not come to it.

Ergo deliberanda omnino non sunt in quibus turpis est ipsa deliberatio. Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi spes remouenda est. Satis enim nobis persuasum debet esse, etiam si deos omnes celare possimus, nichil tamen auare, nichil libidinose nichil inconuenienter esse faciendum.

Therefore, those matters in which the deliberation itself is disgraceful are by no means to be deliberated. And moreover, from every deliberation the hope of concealing is to be removed. For we ought to be sufficiently persuaded that, even if we could conceal it from all the gods, nevertheless nothing is to be done avariciously, nothing libidinously, nothing inconveniently.

Non enim utile potest esse factum tot uitiis inquinatum. Et si uir sapiens anulum habeat huius efficacie, quod eum inuisibilem reddat, non tamen sibi plus licere putet peccare, quam si non haberet. Honesta enim bonis uiris non occulta queruntur.

For a deed stained with so many vices cannot be useful. And if a wise man should have a ring of such efficacy, which renders him invisible, he would not, however, think himself to have more license to sin than if he did not have it. For by good men, honorable things are not sought in secret.

Nec quicquam audebit uir bonus uelle quod non audeat predicare. Quod si a flagitio ideo te reuocas quod hoc homines non lateret, non bonitatem diligis, sed penam metuis. Atque in hoc ferarum imitaris naturam:

Nor will a good man dare to desire anything that he would not
dare to preach. But if you therefore draw yourself back from a flagitious offense because this would not
be hidden from men, you do not love goodness, but you fear the penalty. And in this you imitate the nature of wild beasts:

Cautus enim metuit foueam lupus accipiterque

For the cautious wolf fears the pit, and the hawk as well

suspensos laqueos et opertum miluis amum.

the suspended nooses and the hook covered for kites.

Oderunt peccare mali formidine pene,

The wicked hate to sin from dread of penalty,

Oderunt peccare boni uirtutis amore.

The good hate to sin out of love of virtue.

Cum ex predictis pateat solum honestum utile esse, si aliqua tibi obiecta sit utilitatis species, cui, animum dum attenderis, uideas turpitudinem adiunctam, non dico quod tunc utilitas sit relinquenda, sed intelligendum esse, ubi turpitudo sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Vere autem si uolumus iudicare, quotiens utilitatis speciem prefert turpitudo, euentu ipsius rei solet redargui. Videmus enim, quando id quod honestum est inutile uidetur, ad hunc tamen finem reduci ut ex eo insperatum ueniat commodum.

Since from the aforesaid it is evident that only the honorable is useful, if some species of utility be presented to you, to which, while you attend your mind, you see turpitude joined, I do not say that utility is then to be relinquished, but that it must be understood that where turpitude is, there utility cannot be. But truly, if we wish to judge, as often as turpitude puts forward the species of utility, it is wont to be refuted by the event of the thing itself. For we see that, when that which is honorable seems useless, yet it is brought back to this end, that from it an unexpected benefit comes.

Vt ecce: Dammonem et Phinthiam ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut cum alteri eorum Dionisius tirannus diem necis destinasset, is qui morti addictus erat causa disponendi (de) suis rebus paucos dies postulauit. Interim uas factus est alter illius sistendi hac conditione, ut si ille non rediret, isti moriendum esset. Cum autem ad diem ille se recepisset, ammiratus eorum fidem tirannus petiuit ab eis ut se in amicitia(m) tercium reciperent.

As, for example: they report Damon and Phintias to have been of this mind between themselves, that when Dionysius the tyrant had appointed a day of execution for one of them, he who was consigned to death, for the sake of arranging (about) his own affairs, requested a few days. Meanwhile the other was made a surety for producing him on this condition, that if he did not return, this man must die. But when he had returned on the day, the tyrant, admiring their fidelity, asked of them that they receive him as a third into their friendship(m).

Vide quomodo utile fuit et hunc pro amico remansisse et illum pro amico rediisse, licet utrumque primo periculosum crederetur. Sic semper iuxta numinum dispensationem utilem et insperatum exitum habet honestas, turpitudo autem tam pernitiosum quam inhonestum.

See how it was useful that this one remained for his friend and that that one returned for his friend, although each was at first believed dangerous. Thus, always according to the dispensation of the numina, honesty has a useful and unhoped-for outcome, but turpitude has an outcome as pernicious as it is dishonorable.

Idcirco semper dum id quod utile uidetur cum eo quod honestum est comparatur, utilitatis species iaceat, honestas ualeat.

Therefore always, whenever that which seems useful is compared with that which is honorable, let the appearance of utility lie low, let honesty prevail.

Conclusio operis

Conclusion of the work

Hec prescripta seruantem licet in tranquillo honestatis uiuere et ad normam rationis uitam reducere. Vt enim in fidibus aut tibiis quamuis paulum discrepent, tamen id ab artifice animaduerti solet, sic nobis ducenda est uita, ne forte quid discrepet, uel etiam multo magis in quantum melior est actionum quam sonorum concentus. Itaque ut in fidibus musicorum aures uel minima sentiunt, sic nos, si uolumus esse acres uitiorum animaduersores, magna sepe intelligemus ex paruis: ex occulorum obtutu, ex remissis aut contractis superciliis, ex mesticia, ex hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex contentione uocis, ex summissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte fiat quidue ab officio discrepet.

He who keeps these prescriptions may live in the tranquility of rectitude and bring life back to the norm of reason. For as on strings or pipes, although they differ ever so little, yet that is wont to be noticed by the craftsman, so our life must be led, lest perchance anything be out of tune—indeed much more so, inasmuch as the harmony of actions is better than that of sounds. And so, as on strings the ears of musicians perceive the very least things, so we, if we wish to be keen observers of vices, will often understand great things from small: from the gaze of the eyes, from relaxed or contracted eyebrows, from sadness, from cheerfulness, from laughter, from speech, from the straining of the voice, from its lowering, from the other similar things we shall easily judge what of these is done aptly and what deviates from duty.

Quo in genere non est incommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudicare; ut si quid in aliis dedeceat, uitemus et ipsi. Fit enim, nescio quomodo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, si quid delinquitur, quam in nobis ipsis. Vnde poeta:

In this kind of matter it is not inconvenient to judge, from others, what sort each of them is; so that, if anything is unbecoming in others, we too may avoid it. For it happens, I know not how, that we discern more in others, if anything is done amiss, than
in our own selves. Whence the poet:

Cum tua peruideas occulis mala lippus inunctis,

When you, bleary‑eyed, with un-anointed eyes, see through your evils,

cur in amicorum uitiis tam cernis acutum?

why do you discern so acutely in the vices of friends?

His ergo prescriptis uir amator honestatis crebrum et assiduum adhibeat usum. Fere enim omnia moralium doctorum elegantiora uerba hec angusta particula comprehendit. Vnde hic facilius intueri ea poteris, quam si per multorum uolumina uagando dispersa colligeres.

With these prescriptions, then, having been set forth, let the man, a lover of honor, apply frequent and assiduous use. For this narrow little part comprehends nearly all the more elegant words of the moral doctors. Whence here you will be able to survey them more easily, than if by wandering through the volumes of many you gathered them scattered.

Multorum enim actorum lectio et omnis generis uoluminum aliquid uagum et instabile habet. Verum est namque quia nusquam est qui ubique est. Vitam in peregrinatione agentibus hoc euenit ut multa habeant hospitia, paucas amicitias.

For the reading of many acts and of volumes of every kind has something vague and unstable. For it is true that he is nowhere who is everywhere. To those who conduct their life in peregrination this happens: that they have many hostelries, few friendships.

Idem accidat necesse est his qui nullis (ingeniis) familiariter se applicant, sed omnia cursim et properanter transcurrunt. Non prodest cibus, nec corpori accedit qui statim sumptus emittitur. Nichil eque sanitatem impedit quam remediorum crebra mutacio; nec uenit uulnus ad cicatricem in quo medicamenta temptantur; non conualescit planta que sepe transfertur nichilque tam utile est ut in transitu prosit.

The same must necessarily befall those who apply themselves familiarly to no (ingenia), but run through everything cursorily and hastily. Food does no good, nor does it accede to the body, which, immediately after being taken, is expelled. Nothing impedes health as much as the frequent changing of remedies; nor does a wound come to a cicatrix in which medicaments are being tried; a plant does not grow strong which is often transplanted; and nothing is so useful as to be of benefit in transit.

Distrait librorum multitudo. Itaque cum legere

The multitude of books distracts. And so, when reading

non possis quantum habeas, satis est habere quantum legas. Fastidientis enim stomachi est multa degustare, quia ubi uaria sunt (et diuersa), inquinant, non alunt. Probatos itaque semper lege; et si quando ad alios diuerti libuerit, ad priores redi; et cum multa percurreris, unum excerpe quod illo die concoquas.

since you cannot take in as much as you have, it is sufficient to have as much as you read. For it is of a fastidious stomach to degustate many things, because where things are various (and diverse), they foul, they do not nourish. Therefore always read the approved; and if at any time it shall please you to diverge to others, return to the former; and when you shall have run through many things, excerpt one which you may concoct on that day.

Illud enim bonum curandum est quod uetustate sit melius.

For that good is to be cared for which is better with age.

Preter hec etiam ea que de moribus precepta uidebis re ipsa et actu complere incessanter satage. Vt enim medici uel oratores, quamuis precepta perceperint, quicquam dignum laude sine usu consequi nequeunt, sic offitii conseruandi precepta traduntur illa quidem ut faciamus; sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat.

Beyond these, also strive incessantly to complete in reality and in act those precepts concerning morals that you will see. For just as physicians or orators, although they have received precepts, cannot attain anything worthy of praise without use, so the precepts for preserving office/duty are handed down indeed that we may do them; but the greatness of the matter demands use and exercise as well.