Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Nunc ad ea ipsa consequenter enodatius explicanda limatior accedat intentio. Ac primum quia rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest, diligenter intuendum est cuiusmodi sit amor studentium, id est non iam scientium sed adhuc scire cupientium quamque doctrinam. Et in his quippe rebus in quibus non usitate dicitur studium solent exsistere amores ex auditu dum cuiusque pulchritudinis fama ad uidendum ac fruendum animus accenditur quia generaliter nouit corporum pulchritudines ex eo quod plurimas uidit, et inest intrinsecus unde approbetur cui forinsecus inhiatur.

[1 1] Now let our intention more polished approach to explaining those very things consecutively more unknottedly. And first, since no one at all can love a thing utterly unknown, it must be carefully considered of what sort is the love of students, that is, not of those already knowing but of those still desiring to know any doctrine. And indeed, in those matters in which “study” is not customarily said, loves are wont to arise from hearing, while by the report of any beauty the mind is kindled to see and to enjoy, because it generally knows the beauties of bodies from the fact that it has seen very many, and there is within something from which that which is gaped after from without is approved.

Quod cum fit non rei penitus incognitae amor excitatur cuius genus ita notum est. Cum autem uirum bonum amamus cuius faciem non uidimus, ex notitia uirtutum amamus quas nouimus in ipsa ueritate.

When this happens, it is not the love of a thing utterly unknown that is aroused—a genus whose kind is thus known. But when we love a good man whose face we have not seen, we love from a notitia of virtues which we have come to know in verity itself.

Ad doctrinas autem cognoscendas plerumque nos laudantium atque praedicantium accendit auctoritas, et tamen nisi breuiter impressam cuiusque doctrinae haberemus in animo notionem, nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus. Quis enim sciendae uerbi gratia rhetoricae ullam curam et operam impenderet nisi ante sciret eam dicendi esse scientiam? Aliquando etiam ipsarum doctrinarum fines auditos expertosue miramur et ex hoc inardescimus facultatem comparare discendo qua ad eos peruenire possimus, tamquam si litteras nescienti dicatur quandam esse doctrinam qua quisque ualeat quamuis longe absenti uerba mittere manu facta in silentio quae rursus ille cui mittuntur non auribus, sed oculis colligat idque fieri uideat.

To come to know doctrines, moreover, for the most part the authority of those praising and proclaiming enkindles us; and yet unless we had in the mind a briefly imprinted notion of each doctrine, we would burn with no zeal to learn it. For who, for the sake of knowing, for example, rhetoric, would expend any care and effort unless he first knew that it is the science of speaking? Sometimes too we marvel at the ends of the doctrines themselves, heard or experienced, and from this we blaze to acquire by learning the faculty by which we may be able to reach them, as if to one not knowing letters it were said that there is a certain doctrine by which anyone may be able, although far away and absent, to send words made by the hand in silence, which in turn the one to whom they are sent gathers not with the ears but with the eyes, and he sees that this is done.

Nonne dum concupiscit nosse quo id possit omni studio circa illum finem mouetur quem iam notum tenet? Sic accenduntur studia discentium. Nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat amare nullo pacto potest.

Surely, while he longs to know by what means that may be possible, he is moved with all zeal around that end which he already holds as known? Thus the studies of learners are enkindled. For what each one altogether ignores he can in no way love.

[2] Ita etiam signum si quis audiat incognitum ueluti uerbi alicuius sonum quo quid significetur ignorat, cupit scire quidnam sit, id est sonus ille cui rei commemorandae institutus sit, ueluti audiat cum dicitur 'temetum,' et ignorans quid sit requirat. Iam itaque oportet ut nouerit signum esse, id est non esse inanem illam uocem sed aliquid ea significari; alioquin iam notum est hoc trisyllabum, et articulatam speciem suam impressit animo per sensum aurium. Quid amplius in eo requiratur quo magis innotescat cuius omnes litterae omniaque soni spatia nota sunt nisi quia simul innotuit signum esse mouitque sciendi cupiditatem cuius rei signum sit?

[2] Thus also, if someone hears an unknown sign, as it were the sound of some word by which he is ignorant what is signified, he desires to know what indeed it is—that is, what that sound has been instituted for, for the commemorating of what thing—just as when he hears it said 'temetum,' and, being ignorant what it is, asks. Already therefore it must be that he has come to know that it is a sign, that is, that that voice is not empty but that by it something is signified; otherwise this trisyllable is already known, and its articulated form has impressed itself upon the mind through the sense of the ears. What further is to be sought in it, whereby it may be more fully known, when all its letters and all the spaces of sound are known, except that, as soon as it became known to be a sign, it moved the desire of knowing of what thing it is a sign?

Quo igitur amplius notum est sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est; si enim tantummodo esse istam uocem nosset eamque alicuius rei signum esse non nosset, nihil iam quaereret sensibili re quantum poterat sentiendo percepta. Quia uero non solum esse uocem sed et signum esse iam nouit, perfecte id nosse uult; neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur nisi cuius rei signum sit cognoscatur. Hoc ergo qui ardenti cura quaerit ut nouerit studioque accensus insistit, num potest dici esse sine amore?

The more therefore it is known, yet not fully known, the more the mind desires to know what remains about it; for if it knew only that that voice exists and did not know that it is a sign of some thing, it would now seek nothing further, the sensible thing having been perceived by sensing as much as it could. But because it now knows not only that there is a voice but also that it is a sign, it wishes to know it perfectly; nor is any sign known perfectly unless it is ascertained of what thing it is a sign. Therefore, he who with ardent care seeks to know this and, inflamed with zeal, persists—can he be said to be without love?

Quid igitur amat? Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. Neque enim ille istas tres syllabas amat quas iam notas habet (quod si iam hoc in eis amat quia scit eas significare aliquid, non inde nunc agitur; non enim hoc nosse quaerit). Sed in eo quod scire studet quid amet inquirimus, quod profecto nondum nouit, et propterea miramur cur amet quoniam firmissime nouimus amari nisi nota non posse.

What, therefore, does he love? Certainly, for something cannot be loved unless it is known. Nor does he love those three syllables which he already has as known (and if now he loves this in them because he knows that they signify something, this is not what is being treated now; for this he does not seek to know). But in that which he is eager to know we inquire what he loves—something which indeed he does not yet know—and therefore we wonder why he loves, since we most firmly know that nothing can be loved unless it is known.

Quid ergo amat nisi quia nouit atque intuetur in rationibus rerum quae sit pulchritudo doctrinae qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium; et quae sit utilitas in ea peritia qua inter se humana societas sensa communicat ne sibi hominum coetus deteriores sint quauis solitudine si cogitationes suas conloquendo non misceant? Hanc ergo speciem decoram et utilem cernit anima et nouit et amat, eamque in se perfici studet quantum potest quisquis uocum significantium quaecumque ignorat inquirit; aliud est enim quod eam in ueritatis luce conspicit, aliud quod in sua facultate concupiscit. Conspicit namque in luce ueritatis quam magnum et quam bonum sit omnes omnium gentium linguas intellegere ac loqui nullamque ut alienigenam audire et a nullo ita audiri.

What then does he love, except that he knows and beholds, in the reasons/principles of things, what the beauty of doctrine is, by which the knowledge of all signs is contained; and what usefulness there is in that expertise whereby human society communicates percepts among themselves, lest the gatherings of men be worse for themselves than any solitude if they do not mingle their thoughts by colloquy? This form, then, decorous and useful, the soul discerns and knows and loves, and strives to have it perfected in itself as far as it can—whoever inquires into the significations of words for whatever things he is ignorant of; for one thing is what it beholds in the light of truth, another what it desires within its own capacity. For it beholds in the light of truth how great and how good it would be to understand and to speak the tongues of all nations, and to hear none as alien, and to be so heard by none.

Cuius notitiae decus cogitatione iam cernitur amaturque res nota, quae ita conspicitur atque inflammat studia discentium ut circa eam moueantur eique inhient in omni opera quam impendunt consequendae tali facultati ut etiam usu amplectantur quod ratione praenoscunt, atque ita quisque cui facultati spe propinquat ei feruentius amore inardescit. Eis doctrinis quippe studetur uehementius quae capi posse non desperantur. Nam cuius rei adipiscendae spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat aut omnino non amat, quamuis quam pulchra sit uideat.

The adornment of this knowledge is already discerned by thought, and the known thing is loved, which is so beheld and enflames the studies of learners that they are moved about it and gape toward it in every effort which they expend for the achieving of such a faculty, so that by use they also embrace what they foreknow by reason; and thus each person, the nearer by hope he approaches to that faculty, the more fervently he kindles with love for it. For indeed those doctrines are pursued more vehemently which are not despaired of as able to be grasped. For whoever does not carry the hope of attaining some thing either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, although he sees how beautiful it is.

Quocirca quia omnium linguarum scientia fere ab omnibus desperatur, suae gentis quisque maxime studet ut nouerit. Quod si et illi ad perfectum percipiendae se non sufficere sentit, nemo tamen tam desidiosus est huius notitiae qui non cum audierit incognitum uerbum uelit nosse quid illud sit et si potest quaerat ac discat. Quod dum quaerit utique in studio discendi est et uidetur amare rem incognitam, quod non ita est.

Wherefore, because the science of all languages is despaired of by almost all, each one is especially zealous to know that of his own nation. But if he also feels himself not sufficient for receiving that to perfection, nevertheless no one is so slothful in regard to this knowledge that, when he has heard an unknown word, he does not wish to know what that is and, if he can, to seek and to learn it. While he seeks this, to be sure, he is in the pursuit of learning and seems to love the unknown thing—which is not so.

Species namque illa tangit animum quam nouit et cogitat in qua elucet decus consociandorum animorum in uocibus notis audiendis atque reddendis, eaque accendit studio quaerentem quidem quod ignorat, sed notam formam quo id pertineat intuentem et amantem. Itaque si quaerenti uerbi gratia quid sit 'temetum' (hoc enim exempli causa posueram), dicatur: 'Quid ad te pertinet?', respondebit: 'Ne forte audiam loquentem et non intellegam, aut uspiam forte id legam et quid scriptor senserit nesciam.' Quis tandem huic dicat et: 'Noli intellegere quod audis; noli nosse quod legis'? Omnibus enim fere animis rationalibus in promptu est ad uidendum huius peritiae pulchritudo qua hominum inter se cogitata significantium uocum enuntiatione noscuntur; propter hoc notum decus et ob hoc amatum quia notum studiose quaeritur uerbum illud ignotum. Itaque cum audierit atque cognouerit 'temetum' a ueteribus uinum appellatum sed iam ex usu loquendi quem nunc habemus hoc uocabulum emortuum, propter nonnullos fortasse ueterum libros sibi necessarium deputabit.

For that species touches the mind which it knows and ponders, in which there shines the grace of the consociation of minds in hearing and rendering back known voices; and it kindles with zeal the one seeking indeed what he is ignorant of, yet beholding and loving the known form to which it pertains. And so, if to the inquirer, for example, what ‘temetum’ is (for I had set this for the sake of example), it be said: ‘What does it pertain to you?’, he will answer: ‘Lest by chance I hear someone speaking and not understand, or somewhere perhaps I read it and not know what the writer meant.’ Who, then, would say to him as well: ‘Do not understand what you hear; do not know what you read’? For to almost all rational souls the beauty of this expertise is at hand to be seen, whereby human beings come to be known among themselves by the enunciation of voices signifying their thoughts; on account of this the beauty is known and for this reason loved, because, it being known, that unknown word is zealously sought. Therefore, when he shall have heard and come to know that ‘temetum’ was called ‘wine’ by the ancients, but that now, from the usage of speech which we have at present, this vocable is deceased, he will deem it necessary for himself on account of perhaps some books of the ancients.

Si autem et illos superuacaneos habet, forte iam nec dignum quod memoriae commendet existimat quia uidet ad illam speciem doctrinae quam notam mente intuetur atque amat minime pertinere.

But if he even holds those to be superfluous, perhaps he now even thinks it not worthy to commend to memory, because he sees that it least pertains to that species of doctrine which he beholds as known in his mind and loves.

[3] Quamobrem omnis amor studentis animi, hoc est uolentis scire quod nescit, non est amor eius rei quam nescit sed eius quam scit propter quam uult scire quod nescit. Aut si tam curiosus est ut non propter aliquam notam causam sed solo amore rapiatur incognita sciendi, discernendus quidem est ab studiosi nomine iste curiosus; sed nec ipse amat incognita, immo congruentius dicitur, 'odit incognita,' quae nulla esse uult dum uult omnia cognita. Sed ne quisquam nobis difficiliorem referat quaestionem asserens tam non posse quemquam odisse quod nescit quam non potest amare quod nescit, non resistimus ueris, sed intellegendum est non hoc idem dici cum dicitur: 'Amat scire incognita,' ac si diceretur: 'Amat incognita'; illud enim fieri potest ut amet quisque scire incognita, ut autem amet incognita non potest.

[3] Wherefore every love of a studious mind, that is, of one willing to know what he does not know, is not the love of the thing he does not know but of that which he does know, on account of which he wants to know what he does not know. Or if he is so curious that he is carried off to the knowing of unknowns not because of some known cause but by the mere love of knowing the unknown, this curious man is indeed to be distinguished from the name of the studious; but neither does he himself love unknown things—rather, it is more congruously said, 'he hates unknown things,' since he wants there to be none while he wants all things to be known. But lest anyone bring back to us a more difficult question, asserting that just as no one can hate what he does not know so neither can he love what he does not know, we do not resist truths; but it must be understood that the same thing is not said when it is said: 'He loves to know unknown things,' as if it were said: 'He loves unknown things'; for this can happen, that each one loves to know unknown things, but that he loves unknown things cannot.

Non enim frustra ibi est positum 'scire' quoniam qui scire amat incognita non ipsa incognita sed ipsum scire amat. Quod nisi haberet cognitum, neque scire se quidquam posset fidenter dicere neque nescire. Non solum enim qui dicit: 'Scio,' et uerum dicit necesse est ut quid sit scire sciat; sed etiam qui dicit: 'Nescio,' idque fidenter et uerum dicit et scit uerum se dicere, scit utique quid sit scire quia et discernit ab sciente nescientem cum ueraciter se intuens dicit: 'Nescio'. Et cum id se scit uerum dicere, unde sciret si quid sit scire nesciret?

For it is not in vain that ‘to know’ is set there, since he who loves to know unknown things does not love the unknown things themselves but the very knowing. And unless he had this known, he could not confidently say either that he knows anything or that he does not know. For not only must he who says: ‘I know,’ and says it truly, know what it is to know; but even he who says: ‘I do not know,’ and says this confidently both speaks true and knows that he is speaking true—he certainly knows what it is to know, because he also distinguishes the not-knowing from the knowing when, truly looking into himself, he says: ‘I do not know.’ And since he knows that he is saying this truly, whence would he know it if he did not know what it is to know?

[II 4] Quilibet igitur studiosus, quilibet curiosus non amat incognita etiam cum ardentissimo appetitu instat scire quod nescit. Aut enim iam genere notum habet quod amat idque nosse expetit etiam in aliqua singula uel in singulis rebus quae illi nondum notae forte laudantur, fingitque animo imaginariam formam qua excitetur in amorem. (Vnde autem fingit nisi ex his quae iam nouerat?

[2 4] Therefore, any studious person, any curious person does not love unknown things even when, with a most ardent appetite, he presses to know what he does not know. For either he already has what he loves known in kind, and he strives to know it also in certain particulars or in individual things which, not yet known to him, are perhaps praised; and he fashions in his mind an imaginary form by which he is excited into love. (But whence does he fashion it except from those things which he had already known?

Cuius tamen formae animo figuratae atque in cogitatione notissimae si eam quae laudabatur dissimilem inuenerit, fortasse non amabit; quod si amauerit, ex illo amare incipiet ex quo didicit. Paulo ante quippe alia erat quae amabatur quam sibi animus formans exhibere consueuerat. Si autem illi formae similem inuenerit quam fama praedicauerat cui uere possit dicere: 'Iam te amabam,' nec tunc utique amabat incognitam quam in illa similitudine nouerat.) Aut in specie sempiternae rationis uidemus aliquid et ibi amamus, quod cum expressum in aliqua rei temporalis effigie illis qui experti sunt laudantibus credimus et amamus, non aliquid amamus incognitum unde iam supra satis disseruimus.

Yet if he should find the one that was being praised dissimilar to that form which had been figured to his mind and was most well-known in cogitation, perhaps he will not love; but if he does love, from that point he will begin to love from which he learned. For a little before, what was being loved was other than what the mind, forming it for itself, was accustomed to exhibit. But if he finds similar to that form which fame had proclaimed one to which he can truly say: 'Already I was loving you,' neither even then was he loving an unknown thing, which he had known in that similitude.) Or we see something in the species of the sempiternal reason and there we love it, which, when expressed in some effigy of a temporal thing, upon the commendation of those who have experienced it we believe and love; we do not love something unknown, about which above we have already discoursed sufficiently.

Aut aliquid notum amamus propter quod ignotum aliquid quaerimus, cuius ignoti amor nequaquam nos tenet sed illius cogniti quo pertinere nouimus ut illud etiam quod adhuc ignotum quaerimus nouerimus sicut de incognito uerbo paulo ante locutus sum. Aut ipsum scire quisque amat, quod nulli scire aliquid cupienti esse incognitum potest. His causis uidentur amare incognita qui scire aliquid uolunt quod nesciunt et propter ardentiorem quaerendi appetitum sine amore esse dici non possunt.

Or we love some known thing on account of which we seek some unknown; the love of that unknown by no means holds us, but the love of that known, to which we know it to pertain, so that we may also know that which we still seek as unknown—just as I spoke a little earlier about an unknown word. Or each person loves knowing itself, which can be unknown to no one who desires to know anything. For these causes, those who wish to know something they do not know seem to love unknowns, and on account of a more ardent appetite for seeking they cannot be said to be without love.

Sed quam se res aliter habeat neque omnino quidquam ametur incognitum, arbitror me persuasisse uerum diligenter intuentibus. Sed quid exempla quae dedimus eorum sunt qui aliquid quod ipsi non sunt nosse cupiunt, uidendum est ne forte aliquod nouum genus appareat cum se ipsa mens nosse desiderat.

But that the matter stands otherwise, and that nothing whatsoever unknown is loved, I think I have persuaded as true to those looking diligently. But as for the examples we have given, they are of those who desire to know something which they themselves are not; we must see whether perhaps some new genus appears when the mind itself desires to know itself.

[III 5] Quid ergo amat mens cum ardenter se ipsam quaerit ut nouerit dum incognita sibi est? Ecce enim mens semetipsam quaerit ut nouerit et inflammatur hoc studio. Amat igitur.

[III 5] What, then, does the mind love when it ardently seeks itself in order that it may know [it], while it is unknown to itself? Behold, the mind seeks itself in order that it may know [it], and is inflamed by this zeal. Therefore, it loves.

Sed quid amat? Si se ipsam, quomodo cum se nondum nouerit, nec quisquam possit amare quod nescit? An ei fama praedicauit speciem suam sicut de absentibus solemus audire?

But what does it love? If it loves itself, how can it, since it has not yet known itself, nor can anyone love what he does not know? Or has fame proclaimed to it its own appearance, as we are wont to hear about the absent?

Forte ergo non se amat, sed quod de se fingit hoc amat longe fortasse aliud quam ipsa est. Aut si se mens sui similem fingit et ideo cum hoc figmentum amat se amat antequam nouerit quia id quod sui simile est intuetur, nouit ergo alias mentes ex quibus se fingat et genere ipso sibi nota est. Cur ergo cum alias mentes nouit se non nouit cum se ipsa nihil sibi possit esse praesentius?

Perhaps, then, it does not love itself, but loves what it fashions of itself—something perhaps far other than what it itself is. Or if the mind fashions itself as like to itself, and therefore, when it loves this figment, loves itself before it has known itself, because it beholds that which is similar to itself, then it knows other minds from which it might fashion itself, and by the very genus it is known to itself. Why, then, when it knows other minds, does it not know itself, when nothing can be more present to itself than itself?

Quod si ut oculis corporis magis alii oculi noti sunt quam ipsi sibi, non se ergo quaerat numquam inuentura; numquam enim se oculi praeter specula uidebunt, nec ullo modo putandum est etiam rebus incorporeis contemplandis tale aliquid adhiberi ut mens tamquam in speculo se nouerit. An in ratione ueritatis aeternae uidet quam speciosum sit nosse semetipsam, et hoc amat quod uidet studetque in se fieri quia, quamuis sibi nota non sit, notum ei tamen est quam bonum sit ut sibi nota sit? Et hoc quidem permirabile est nondum se nosse et quam sit pulchrum se nosse iam nosse.

If, however, as with the eyes of the body, other eyes are more known to them than they are to themselves, let her therefore not seek herself, since she will never find; for eyes will never see themselves except by mirrors, nor must it in any way be thought that, even in the contemplation of incorporeal things, something of this sort is applied such that the mind, as if in a mirror, should know itself. Or does she see, in the reason of eternal Truth, how fair a thing it is to know herself, and love what she sees and strive for it to come to be in herself, because, although she is not known to herself, yet it is known to her how good it is that she be known to herself? And this indeed is very marvelous: not yet to know herself, and already to know how beautiful it is to know herself.

An aliquem finem optimum, id est securitatem et beatitudinem suam, uidet per quandam occultam memoriam quae in longinqua eam progressam non deseruit, et credit ad eundem finem nisi se ipsam cognouerit se peruenire non posse? Ita dum illud amat hoc quaerit, et notum amat illud propter quod quaerit ignotum. Sed cur memoria beatitudinis suae potuit et memoria sui cum ea perdurare non potuit ut tam se nosset quae uult peruenire quam nouit illud quo uult peruenire?

Does she see some best end, that is, her security and beatitude, through a certain occult memory which did not desert her as she advanced into far places, and does she believe that to that same end she cannot arrive unless she knows herself? Thus, while she loves that, she seeks this, and she loves the known for the sake of which she seeks the unknown. But why could the memory of her own beatitude perdure, and the memory of herself not be able to perdure along with it, so that she might know herself—she who wishes to arrive—just as she knows that to which she wishes to arrive?

An cum se nosse amat, non se quam nondum nouit sed ipsum nosse amat acerbiusque tolerat se ipsam deesse scientiae suae qua uult cuncta comprehendere? Nouit autem quid sit nosse, et dum hoc amat quod nouit etiam se cupit nosse. Vbi ergo nosse suum nouit si se non nouit?

Or when it loves to know itself, does it not love, not itself which it does not yet know, but the very knowing, and more bitterly endure that it itself is absent from its own science by which it wishes to comprehend all things? Moreover, it knows what it is to know, and while it loves this which it knows, it also desires to know itself. Where then does it know its knowing, if it does not know itself?

Nam nouit quod alia nouerit, se autem non nouerit; hinc enim nouit et quid sit nosse. Quo pacto igitur se aliquid scientem scit quae se ipsam nescit? Neque enim alteram mentem scientem scit sed se ipsam.

For she knows that she has known other things, but herself she has not known; from this, indeed, she knows also what it is to know. In what manner, then, does she know herself as knowing something, she who does not know herself? For she does not know another mind as knowing, but herself.

Scit igitur se ipsam. Deinde cum se quaerit ut nouerit, quaerentem se iam nouit. Iam se ergo nouit.

Therefore she knows herself. Then, when she seeks herself so that she may know, she already knows herself as seeking. Now, therefore, she knows herself.

Quapropter non potest omnino nescire se quae dum se nescientem scit se utique scit. Si autem se nescientem nesciat, non se quaeret ut sciat. Quapropter eo ipso quo se quaerit magis se sibi notam quam ignotam esse conuincitur.

Wherefore she cannot altogether be ignorant of herself, who, while she knows herself to be ignorant, surely knows herself. But if she does not know herself to be ignorant, she will not seek herself in order to know. Therefore by that very fact whereby she seeks herself, she is proved to be more known to herself than unknown.

Nouit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem dum se quaerit ut nouerit.

For she knows herself as seeking and not-knowing while she seeks herself in order that she may know.

[6] Quid ergo dicemus? An quod ex parte se nouit, ex parte non nouit? Sed absurdum est dicere non eam totam scire quod scit.

[6] What then shall we say? Perhaps that in part it knows itself, and in part it does not know itself? But it is absurd to say that it does not know entirely what it knows.

Non dico: 'Totum scit,' sed: 'Quod scit tota scit.' Cum itaque aliquid de se scit quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit autem se aliquid scientem, nec potest quidquam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam.

I do not say: 'She knows the whole,' but: 'What she knows, she knows as a whole.' Therefore, when she knows something about herself which she cannot unless she is whole, she knows herself as whole. Moreover, she knows herself as knowing something, nor can she know anything unless she is whole. She therefore knows herself as whole.

Deinde quid eius ei tam notum est quam se uiuere? [IV] Non potest autem et mens esse et non uiuere quando habet etiam amplius ut intellegat, nam et animae bestiarum uiuunt sed non intellegunt. Sicut ergo mens tota mens est, sic tota uiuit.

Then what of itself is as known to it as that it lives? [4] Nor can the mind both be and not live, since it even has something more, namely, that it understands; for the souls of beasts also live but do not understand. Therefore, just as the mind is wholly mind, so it wholly lives.

Nouit autem uiuere se; totam se igitur nouit. Postremo cum se nosse mens quaerit, mentem se esse iam nouit; alioquin utrum se quaerat ignorat, et aliud pro alio forsitan quaerat. Fieri enim potest ut ipsa non sit mens, atque ita dum mentem nosse quaerit non se ipsam quaerat.

Moreover it knows that it lives; therefore it knows itself whole. Finally, when the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows itself to be mind; otherwise it is ignorant whether it is seeking itself, and perhaps seeks one thing in place of another. For it can come to pass that it itself is not mind, and thus, while it seeks to know mind, it does not seek itself.

Quapropter quoniam cum quaerit mens quid sit mens nouit quod se quaerat, profecto nouit quod ipsa sit mens. Porro si hoc in se nouit quod mens est et tota mens est, totam se nouit.

Wherefore, since when the mind inquires what the mind is it knows that it is seeking itself, assuredly it knows that it itself is mind. Furthermore, if it knows this in itself, that it is mind and wholly mind, it knows itself wholly.

Sed ecce non se nouerit esse mentem cum autem se quaerit; hoc tantummodo nouerit quod se quaerat. Potest enim etiam sic aliud pro alio quaerere si hoc nescit; ut autem non quaerat aliud pro alio, procul dubio nouit quid quaerat. At si nouit quid quaerat et se ipsam quaerit, se ipsam utique nouit.

But behold, it may not know itself to be mind when, however, it seeks itself; it may know only this, that it seeks itself. For indeed it can thus also seek one thing in place of another, if it does not know this; but so that it may not seek one thing for another, beyond doubt it knows what it seeks. But if it knows what it seeks and seeks itself, then assuredly it knows itself.

Quid ergo adhuc quaerit? Quod si ex parte se nouit, ex parte autem adhuc quaerit, non se ipsam sed partem suam quaerit; cum enim ea ipsa dicitur, tota dicitur. Deinde quia nouit nondum se a se inuentam totam, nouit quanta sit tota.

What, then, does it still seek? And if it knows itself in part, but in part still seeks, it is not seeking itself but its part; for when that very self is spoken of, the whole is spoken of. Then, since it knows that it has not yet found itself whole by itself, it knows how great the whole is.

Atque ita quaerit quod deest quemadmodum solemus quaerere ut ueniat in mentem quod excidit, nec tamen penitus excidit quia potest recognosci cum uenerit hoc esse quod quaerebatur. Sed quomodo mens ueniat in mentem quasi possit mens in mente non esse? Huc accedit quia si parte inuenta, non se totam quaerit; tamen tota se quaerit.

And thus it seeks what is lacking, just as we are accustomed to seek that what has slipped out may come into mind; nor has it wholly slipped out, because, when it has come, it can be recognized to be this which was being sought. But how does mind come into mind, as though mind could be not in mind? To this is added that, even if, with a part found, it does not seek itself entire; nevertheless, as a whole it seeks itself.

Tota ergo sibi praesto est, et quid adhuc quaeratur non est; hoc enim deest quod quaeritur, non illa quae quaerit. Cum itaque tota se quaerit, nihil eius deest. Aut si non tota se quaerit sed pars quae inuenta est quaerit partem quae nondum inuenta est, non se ergo mens quaerit cuius se nulla pars quaerit.

Therefore she is whole and at hand to herself, and there is not anything that is still being sought; for what is lacking is what is sought, not she who seeks. Accordingly, when as a whole she seeks herself, nothing of her is lacking. Or if she does not as a whole seek herself, but the part that has been found seeks the part not yet found, then, therefore, the mind does not seek herself; for no part of her seeks itself.

Pars enim quae inuenta est non se quaerit; pars autem quae nondum inuenta est nec ipsa se quaerit quoniam ab ea quae iam inuenta est parte quaeritur. Quocirca quia nec tota se quaerit mens nec pars eius ulla se quaerit, se mens omnino non quaerit.

For the part that has been found does not seek itself; but the part that has not yet been found neither seeks itself, since it is sought by the part that has already been found. Wherefore, because neither the whole mind seeks itself nor any part of it seeks itself, the mind does not seek itself at all.

[V 7] Vtquid ergo ei praeceptum est ut se ipsa cognoscat? Credo ut se cogitet et secundum naturam suam uiuat, id est ut secundum suam naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. Multa enim per cupiditatem prauam tamquam sui sit oblita sic agit.

[5 7] Why then has the precept been given to it that it know itself? I believe, so that it may think upon itself and live according to its nature—that is, so that it may desire to be ordered according to its nature: under that, namely, to which it ought to be subjected; above those to which it ought to be preferred; under him by whom it ought to be ruled; above those which it ought to rule. For in many ways, through perverse cupidity, it acts thus as though it were forgetful of itself.

Videt enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra in praestantiore natura quae deus est. Et cum stare debeat ut eis fruatur, uolens ea sibi tribuere et non ex illo similis illius sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est auertitur ab eo, moueturque et labitur in minus et minus quod putatur amplius et amplius quia nec ipsa sibi nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit. Ideoque per egestatem ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit; atque ita cupiditate adquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat et sentit amitti posse nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus cogitat quanto magis secura est quod se non possit amittere.

She sees, indeed, certain things inwardly beautiful in a more preeminent nature, which is God. And whereas she ought to stand so that she may enjoy them, wishing to attribute them to herself and to be, not from Him like unto Him, but from herself what He is, she is turned away from Him, and is moved and slips into less and less, which is thought to be more and more, because neither does she suffice to herself, nor does anything suffice to one withdrawing from Him who alone suffices. And therefore, through want and difficulty, she becomes too intent upon her own actions and the restless delectations which she gathers through them; and thus, by a cupidity of acquiring knowledges from those things which are outside, whose known kind she loves and feels can be lost unless they are held with lavish care, she loses security, and so much the less does she think upon herself, the more she is secure that she cannot lose herself.

Ita cum aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare (neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum ignorare grammaticam dicimus cum eam non cogitat quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat), cum ergo aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare, tanta uis est amoris ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitauerit eisque curae glutino inhaeserit attrahat secum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo redit. Et quia illa corpora sunt quae foris per sensus carnis adamauit eorumque diuturna quadam familiaritate implicata est, nec secum potest introrsus tamquam in regionem incorporeae naturae ipsa corpora inferre, imagines eorum conuoluit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa. Dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae; seruat autem aliquid quo libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc est magis mens, id est rationalis intellegentia quae seruatur ut iudicet.

Ita since it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think oneself (for we do not say that a man skilled in many doctrines is ignorant of grammar when he does not think of it, because at that time he is thinking about the art of medicine), since therefore it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think oneself, so great is the force of love that the things which it has long cogitated with love and to which it has stuck with the glue of care it draws along with itself even when it in a certain way returns to think itself. And because those are bodies which it has loved from outside through the senses of the flesh, and it has been entangled with them by a certain long familiarity, and it cannot, together with itself, carry those very bodies inward as into the region of incorporeal nature, it rolls up and snatches their images, made in itself out of itself. For indeed, in forming them, it gives something of its own substance; but it preserves something by which it may freely judge concerning the species (form) of such images, and this is more the mind, that is, rational intelligence, which is preserved in order that it may judge.

Nam illas animae partes quae corporum similitudinibus informantur etiam cum bestiis nos communes habere sentimus.

For those parts of the soul which are informed by the similitudes of bodies, we perceive that we have even in common with beasts.

[VI 8] Errat autem mens cum se istis imaginibus tanto amore coniungit ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet. Ita enim conformatur eis quodam modo non id exsistendo sed putando, non quo se imaginem putet sed omnino illud ipsum cuius imaginem secum habet. Viget quippe in ea iudicium discernendi corpus quod foris relinquit ab imagine quam de illo secum gerit nisi cum ita exprimuntur eaedem imagines tamquam foris sentiantur non intus cogitentur sicut dormientibus aut furentibus aut in aliqua extasi accidere solet.

[6 8] But the mind errs when it conjoins itself to those images with so great a love that it even supposes itself to be something of this sort. For thus it is conformed to them in a certain manner, not by existing as that but by thinking; not that it deems itself an image, but outright that very thing of which it bears the image with itself. For indeed there thrives in it a judgment for discerning the body which it leaves outside from the image which it carries with itself of it—except when those same images are expressed in such a way that they are sensed as if outside, not thought within, as is wont to happen to sleepers or the frenzied or in some ecstasy.

[VII 9] Cum itaque se tale aliquid putat, corpus esse se putat.

[7 9] When therefore it supposes itself to be such a thing, it supposes itself to be a body.

Et quia sibi bene conscia est principatus sui quo corpus regit, hinc factum est ut quidam quaererent quid corporis amplius ualet in corpore, et hoc esse mentem uel omnino totam animam existimarent. Itaque alii sanguinem, alii cerebrum, alii cor (non sicut scriptura dicit: Confitebor tibi, domine, in toto corde meo, et: Diliges dominum deum tuum ex toto corde tuo; hoc enim abutendo uel transferendo uocabulo dicitur a corpore ad animum), sed ipsam omnino particulam corporis quam in uisceribus dilaniatis uidemus eam esse putauerunt. Alii ex minutissimis indiuiduisque corpusculis quas atomos dicunt concurrentibus in se atque cohaerentibus eam confici crediderunt.

And because it is well conscious to itself of its principate by which it rules the body, hence it has come about that certain people asked what of the body has greater power in the body, and they supposed this to be the mind, or even the whole soul. And so some thought it to be the blood, others the brain, others the heart (not as Scripture says: I will give thanks to you, Lord, with my whole heart, and: You shall love the Lord your God out of your whole heart; for this is said by abusing or transferring the term from the body to the mind), but they thought it to be the very particle of the body itself which we see in torn entrails. Others believed it to be composed by the running-together and cohering in themselves of the tiniest and individual corpuscles which they call atoms.

Alii aerem, alii ignem substantiam eius esse dixerunt. Alii eam nullam esse substantiam quia nisi corpus nullam substantiam poterant cogitare et eam corpus esse non inueniebant, sed ipsam temperationem corporis nostri uel compagem primordioruum quibus ista caro tamquam connectitur esse opinati sunt. Eique omnes eam mortalem esse senserunt quia siue corpus esset siue aliqua compositio corporis non posset utique immortaliter permanere.

Others said air, others fire to be its substance. Others said it to be no substance at all, because apart from body they could conceive of no substance, and they did not find it to be a body; but they supposed it to be the very tempering (temperament) of our body, or the compages of the primordials by which this flesh, as it were, is connected. And all of them held it to be mortal, because whether it were a body or some composition of body, it could by no means remain immortally.

Qui uero eius substantiam uitam quandam nequaquam corpoream, quandoquidem uitam omne uiuum corpus animantem ac uiuificantem esse repererunt, consequenter et immortalem quia uita carere uita non potest ut quisque potuit, probare conati sunt. Nam de quinto illo nescio quo corpore quod notissimis quattuor huius mundi elementis quidam coniungentes hinc animam esse dixerunt, hoc loco diu disserendum non puto; aut enim hoc uocant corpus quod nos cuius in loci spatio pars toto minor est, et in illis adnumerandi sunt qui mentem corpoream esse crediderunt; aut si uel omnem substantiam uel omnem mutabilem substantiam corpus appellant, cum sciant non omnem locorum spatiis aliqua longitudine et latitudine et altitudine contineri, non cum eis de uocabuli quaestione pugnandum est.

Those, however, who held its substance to be a certain life by no means corporeal, since indeed they found life to be what animates and vivifies every living body, consequently also [held it] immortal, because life cannot be without life, tried to prove this as each was able. For as to that fifth I-know-not-what body which some, conjoining it to the most well-known four elements of this world, said that the soul is hence, I do not think it should be long discoursed upon in this place; for either they call “body” what we do—of which, in the space of place, the part is less than the whole—and they are to be numbered among those who believed the mind to be corporeal; or, if they call “body” either every substance or every mutable substance, since they know that not everything is contained by the spaces of places with some longitude and latitude and altitude, one ought not to fight with them about a question of a word.

[10] In his omnibus sententiis quisquis uidet mentis naturam et esse substantiam et non esse corpoream, id est non minore sui parte minus occupare loci spatium maiusque maiore, simul oportet uideat eos qui opinantur esse corpoream non ob hoc errare quod mens desit eorum notitiae, sed quod adiungunt ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam; sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid iussi fuerint cogitare nihil omnino esse arbitrantur, ideoque non se tamquam sibi desit mens requirat. Quid enim tam cognitioni adest quam id quod menti adest, aut quid tam menti adest quam ipsa mens? Vnde et ipsa quae appellatur inuentio si uerbi originem retractemus, quid aliud resonat nisi quia inuenire est in id uenire quod quaeritur?

[10] In all these opinions, whoever sees that the nature of the mind both is a substance and is not corporeal—that is, does not occupy a lesser space of place with its lesser part and a greater with its greater—ought at the same time to see that those who opine it to be corporeal do not err on this account because the mind is lacking to their knowledge, but because they adjoin those things without which they are unable to think any nature; for without the phantasies of bodies, whatever they may be bidden to think they judge to be absolutely nothing, and therefore they do not search themselves, as though the mind were lacking to them. For what is so present to cognition as that which is present to the mind, or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself? Whence even that which is called “invention,” if we trace back the word’s origin, what else does it resound but that to find is to come into that which is sought?

Propterea quae quasi ultro in mentem ueniunt non usitate dicuntur inuenta, quamuis cognita dici possint quia non in ea quaerendo tendebamus ut in ea ueniremus, hoc est ea inueniremus. Quapropter sicut ea quae oculis aut ullo alio corporis sensu requiruntur ipsa mens quaerit (ipsa enim etiam sensus carnis intendit, tunc autem inuenit cum in ea quae requiruntur idem sensus uenit), sic alia quae non corporeo sensu internuntio sed per se ipsam nosse debet cum in ea uenit, inuenit aut in superiore substantia, id est in deo, aut in ceteris animae partibus sicut de ipsis imaginibus corporum cum iudicat; intus enim in anima eas inuenit per corpus impressas.

Therefore those things which, as it were, come into the mind of their own accord are not usually said to be “found,” although they can be called “known,” because we were not aiming at them by seeking, so that we might come into them—that is, find them. Wherefore, just as in the case of things that are sought by the eyes or by any other sense of the body, it is the mind itself that seeks (for it is the mind that also directs the senses of the flesh), and it finds when that same sense comes into the things that are sought, so in the case of other things which it ought to know not by the intermediary of a corporeal sense but by itself, when it comes into them it finds them, either in the higher substance—that is, in God—or in the other parts of the soul, as when it judges concerning the very images of bodies; for it finds them within, in the soul, impressed through the body.

[VIII 11] Ergo se ipsam quemadmodum quaerat et inueniat, mirabilis quaestio est quo tendat ut quaerat aut quo ueniat ut inueniat. Quid enim tam in mente quam mens est? Sed quia in his est quae cum amore cogitat, sensibilibus autem, id est corporalibus, cum amore assuefacta est, non ualet sine imaginibus eorum esse in semetipsa.

[8 11] Therefore how it may seek itself and find itself is a marvelous question—whither it tends in order to seek, or whither it comes in order to find. For what is so in the mind as the mind itself? But because it is in those things which it thinks with love, and it has been habituated with love to sensibles, that is, corporeals, it cannot be in itself without their images.

Hinc ei oboritur erroris dedecus dum rerum sensarum imagines secernere a se non potest ut se solam uideat; cohaeserunt enim mirabiliter glutino amoris. Et haec est eis immunditia quoniam dum se solam nititur cogitare hoc se putat esse sine quo se non potest cogitare. Cum igitur ei praecipitur ut se ipsam cognoscat, non se tamquam sibi detracta sit quaerat, sed id quod sibi addidit detrahat.

From this there arises for her the disgrace of error, while she cannot separate from herself the images of sensed things so as to see herself alone; for they have marvelously stuck fast by the glue of love. And this is an uncleanness for her, because while she strives to think herself alone, she thinks herself to be that without which she cannot think herself. Therefore, when it is enjoined upon her to know herself, let her not seek herself as though she had been detracted from herself, but let her subtract what she has added to herself.

Interior est enim ipsa non solum quam ista sensibilia quae manifeste foris sunt, sed etiam quam imagines eorum quae in parte quadam sunt animae quam habent et bestiae, quamuis intellegentia careant, quae mentis est propria. Cum ergo sit mens interior, quodam modo exit a semetipsa cum in haec quasi uestigia multarum intentionum exerit amoris affectum. Quae uestigia tamquam imprimuntur memoriae quando haec quae foris sunt corporalia sentiuntur ut etiam cum absunt ista, praesto sint tamen imagines eorum cogitantibus.

For it itself is more interior not only than those sensibles which are manifestly outside, but even than their images, which are in a certain part of the soul—a part which even beasts have, although they lack intelligence, which is proper to the mind. Since therefore the mind is interior, in a certain manner it goes out from itself when, onto these as-it-were footprints of many intentions, it puts forth the affection of love. These footprints are, as it were, imprinted upon memory when these corporeal things which are outside are sensed, so that even when those things are absent, nevertheless their images are at hand for those who are thinking.

Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem uoluntatis qua per alia uagabatur statuat in se ipsa et se cogitet. Ita uidebit quod numquam se non amauerit, numquam nescierit, sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concreuit quodam modo, atque ita dum sicut unum diuersa complectitur, unum putauit esse quae diuersa sunt.

Let her therefore know herself, and let her not seek herself as if absent, but let her set the intention of the will, by which she was wandering through other things, in herself, and think upon herself. Thus she will see that she has never not loved herself, has never been ignorant of herself, but by loving another thing along with herself she in a certain way confounded herself with it and coalesced with it; and thus, while embracing diverse things as if they were one, she supposed the things which are diverse to be one.

[XI 12] Non itaque uelut absentem se quaerat cernere, sed praesentem se curet discernere. Nec se quasi non norit cognoscat, sed ab eo quod alterum nouit dinoscat. Ipsum enim quod audit: Cognosce te ipsam, quomodo agere curabit si nescit aut quid sit cognosce aut quid sit te ipsam?

[XI 12] Let her therefore not seek to behold herself as though absent, but let her take care to discern herself as present. Nor let her recognize herself as if she did not already know herself, but let her distinguish herself from that which she knows as other. For as to that very thing which she hears, “Know yourself,” how will she take care to do so, if she does not know either what “know” is or what “yourself” is?

Si autem utrumque nouit, nouit et se ipsam quia non ita dicitur menti: Cognosce te ipsam sicut dicitur: 'Cognosce cherubim et seraphim'; de absentibus enim illis credimus secundum quod caelestes quaedam potestates esse praedicantur. Neque sicut dicitur: 'Cognosce uoluntatem illius hominis,' quae nobis nec ad sentiendum ullo modo nec ad intellegendum praesto est nisi corporalibus signis editis, et hoc ita ut magis credamus quam intellegamus. Neque ita ut dicitur homini: 'Vide faciem tuam,' quod nisi in speculo fieri non potest.

But if she knows both, she also knows herself, because it is not thus said to the mind: Know yourself, as it is said: 'Know the cherubim and seraphim'; for concerning those absent beings we believe according to the fact that they are proclaimed to be certain heavenly powers. Nor as it is said: 'Know the will of that man,' which is in no way at hand for us either for sensing or for understanding unless when bodily signs have been produced, and this in such a way that we believe rather than understand. Nor in the way it is said to a man: 'See your face,' which cannot be done except in a mirror.

Nam et ipsa nostra facies absens ab aspectu nostro est quia non ibi est quo ille dirigi potest. Sed cum dicitur menti: Cognosce te ipsam, eo ictu quo intellegit quod dictum est te ipsam cognoscit se ipsam, nec ob aliud quam eo quod sibi praesens est. Si autem quod dictum est non intellegit, non utique facit.

For even our own face is absent from our sight, because it is not in the place to which that can be directed. But when it is said to the mind: 'Know yourself,' by that stroke whereby it understands what has been said—'yourself'—it knows itself, and for no other reason than that it is present to itself. If, however, it does not understand what has been said, then assuredly it does not do it.

Hoc igitur ei praecipitur ut faciat quod cum praeceptum ipsum intellegit facit.

Therefore this is prescribed to it: that it do what it does when it understands the precept itself.

[13] Non ergo adiungat aliud ad id quod se ipsam cognoscit cum audit ut se ipsam cognoscat. Certe enim nouit sibi dici, sibi scilicet quae est et uiuit et intellegit. Sed est et cadauer, uiuit et pecus; intellegit autem nec cadauer nec pecus.

[13] Therefore let her not adjoin anything else to that by which she knows herself when she hears that she should know herself. For certainly she knows it is said to herself—namely to herself who is and lives and understands. But a cadaver also “is,” and a beast lives; however, neither cadaver nor beast understands.

Sic ergo se esse et uiuere scit quomodo est et uiuit intellegentia.

Thus, therefore, she knows herself to be and to live, as intelligence is and lives.

[X] Cum ergo uerbi gratia mens aerem se putat, aerem intellegere putat, se tamen intellegere scit; aerem autem se esse non scit sed putat. Secernat quod se putat, cernat quod scit; hoc ei remaneat unde ne illi quidem dubitauerunt qui aliud atque aliud corpus esse mentem putauerunt. Neque enim omnis mens aerem se esse existimat, sed aliae ignem, aliae cerebrum, aliaeque aliud corpus et aliud aliae sicut supra commemoraui; omnes tamen se intellegere nouerunt et esse et uiuere, sed intellegere ad quod intellegunt referunt, esse autem et uiuere ad se ipsas.

[10] When, therefore, for example, the mind thinks itself to be air, it thinks it understands air; yet it knows that it understands itself. But that it is air it does not know, but thinks. Let it separate what it thinks itself to be; let it discern what it knows. Let this remain to it, from which not even those doubted who supposed the mind to be one body or another. For not every mind estimates itself to be air, but some fire, some the brain, and others another body, and others yet another, as I have mentioned above; yet all know that they understand, and that they are and live; but they refer understanding to that which they understand, whereas being and living they refer to themselves.

Et nulli est dubium nec quemquam intellegere qui non uiuat, nec quemquam uiuere qui non sit. Ergo consequenter et esse et uiuere id quod intellegit, non sicuti est cadauer quod non uiuit, nec sicut uiuit anima quae non intellegit, sed proprio quodam eodemque praestantiore modo. Item uelle se sciunt neque hoc posse quemquam qui non sit et qui non uiuat pariter sciunt, itemque ipsam uoluntatem referunt ad aliquid quod ea uoluntate uolunt.

And it is in doubt to no one that no one understands who does not live, nor does anyone live who is not. Therefore, consequently, that which understands both is and lives—not as a cadaver is, which does not live, nor as a soul lives which does not understand, but in a certain proper and likewise more excellent mode. Likewise, they know that they will, and they likewise know that no one can do this who does not exist and who does not live, and likewise they refer the will itself to something which they will by that will.

Meminisse etiam se sciunt simulque sciunt quod nemo meminisset nisi esset ac uiueret, sed et ipsam memoriam referimus ad aliquid quod ea meminimus. Duobus igitur horum trium, memoria et intellegentia, multarum rerum notitia atque scientia continetur; uoluntas autem adest per quam fruamur eis uel utamur. Fruimur enim cognitis in quibus uoluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit; utimur uero eis quae ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est.

They also know that they remember, and at the same time they know that no one would have remembered unless he existed and lived; but we also refer memory itself to something, namely that by it we remember. Therefore, in two of these three, memory and intelligence, there is contained acquaintance and knowledge of many things; but will is present by which we may enjoy them or use them. For we enjoy the things known, in which the will, delighted in them for their own sake, comes to rest; but we use those things which we refer to something else which is to be enjoyed.

Nec est alia uita hominum uitiosa atque culpabilis quam male utens et male fruens, de qua re non est nunc disserendi locus.

Nor is there any other life of men vicious and culpable than one badly using and badly enjoying; concerning which matter this is not now the place for discoursing.

[14] Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, remoueamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis, et ea quae posuimus omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse dilegentius attendamus. Vtrum enim aeris sit uis uiuendi, reminiscendi, intellegendi, uolendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor elementa quinti nescio cuius corporis, an ipsius carnis nostrae compago uel temperamentum haec efficere ualeat dubitauerunt homines, et alius hoc, alius illud affirmare conatus est. Viuere se tamen et meminisse et intellegere et uelle et cogitare et scire et iudicare quis dubitet?

[14] But since the nature of the mind is being treated, let us remove from our consideration all the knowledges that are taken from without through the senses of the body, and let us attend more diligently to those points which we have posited—that all minds know themselves and are certain about themselves. For whether the power of living, remembering, understanding, willing, thinking, knowing, judging belongs to air, or to fire, or to the brain, or to blood, or to atoms, or, beyond the customary four elements, to some fifth I-know-not-what body, or whether the very structure or temperament of our flesh is able to bring these about—men have doubted, and one has tried to affirm this, another that. Yet who would doubt that he lives and remembers and understands and wills and thinks and knows and judges?

Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, uiuit; si dubitat, unde dubitet meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intellegit; si dubitat, certus esse uult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, iudicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur alicunde dubitat de his omnibus dubitare non debet quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset.

Since indeed even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers whence he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he is doubting; if he doubts, he wants to be certain; if he doubts, he cogitates; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to consent rashly. Whoever, therefore, doubts from any source ought not to doubt all these things, which, if they did not exist, he would not be able to doubt about anything.

[15] Haec omnia qui uel corpus uel compositionem seu temperationem corporis esse mentem putant in subiecto esse uolunt uideri ut substantia sit aer uel ignis siue aliud aliquod corpus quod mentem putant, intellegentia uero ita insit huic corpori sicut qualitas eius ut illud subiectum sit, haec in subiecto, subiectum scilicet mens quam corpus esse arbitrantur, in subiecto autem intellegentia siue quid aliud eorum quae certa nobis esse commemorauimus. Iuxta opinantur etiam illi qui mentem ipsam negant esse corpus sed compaginem aut temperationem corporis. Hoc enim interest quod illi mentem ipsam dicunt esse substantiam in quo subiecto sit intellegentia; isti autem ipsam mentem in subiecto esse dicunt, corpore scilicet cuius compositio uel temperatio est.

[15] All these who think the mind to be either a body or the composition or temperament of the body want it to be seen as being in a subject, so that the substance be air or fire or some other body which they take to be the mind, while intelligence is in this body as its quality, so that that is the subject, these things in the subject—the subject to wit being the mind, which they judge to be a body—and in the subject, moreover, intelligence, or anything else of those which we have recalled are certain to us. Similarly also think those who deny that the mind itself is a body but say it is the framework (compagination) or temperament of the body. For this is the difference: the former say that the mind itself is the substance in which, as in a subject, intelligence resides; but the latter say that the mind itself is in a subject, namely in the body whose composition or temperament it is.

Vnde consequenter etiam intellegentiam quid aliud quam in eodem subiecto corpore existimant?

Whence, consequently, do they also consider intelligence to be anything other than in the same subject, the body?

[16] Qui omnes non aduertunt mentem nosse se etiam cum quaerit se sicut iam ostendimus. Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res dum eius ignoratur substantia. Quapropter dum se mens nouit substantiam suam nouit, et cum de se certa est de substantia sua certa est.

[16] All of them fail to advert that the mind knows itself even while it seeks itself, as we have already shown. Moreover, in no way can it be rightly said that any thing is known while its substance is unknown. Wherefore, while the mind knows itself, it knows its substance; and when it is certain about itself, it is certain about its substance.

Certa est autem de se sicut conuincunt ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nec omnino certa est utrum aer an ignis sit an aliquod corpus uel aliquid corporis. Non est igitur aliquid eorum.

It is certain about itself, as those things that were said above convince. Nor is it at all certain whether it is air or fire or some body or something of body. Therefore it is not any of those.

Totumque illud quod se iubetur ut nouerit, ad hoc pertinet ut certa sit non se esse aliquid eorum de quibus incerta est, idque solum esse se certa sit quod solum esse se certa est. Sic enim cogitat ignem ut aerem et quidquid aliud corporis cogitat, neque ullo modo fieri posset ut ita cogitaret id quod ipsa est quemadmodum cogitat id quod ipsa non est. Per phantasiam quippe imaginariam cogitat haec omnia, siue ignem siue aerem siue illud uel illud corpus partemue ullam seu compaginem temperationemque corporis, nec utique ista omnia sed aliquid horum esse dicitur.

And the whole of that which it is bidden that it should know itself pertains to this: that it be certain that it is not any of those things about which it is uncertain, and that it be certain that it is only that which alone it is certain that it is. For thus it thinks fire as it thinks air and whatever else of body it thinks, nor could it in any way come about that it would so think that which it itself is as it thinks that which it itself is not. For through imaginary phantasy it cogitates all these things, whether fire or air or this or that body, or any part, or the compagination and temperation of body; and it is, of course, said not to be all these, but something of these.

Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam cetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum sicut cogitantur absentia quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, siue omnino ipsa siue eiusdem generis aliqua, sed quadam interiore non simulata sed uera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius), sicut cogitat uiuere se et meminisse et intellegere et uelle se. Nouit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur. Ex quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat ut tale aliquid esse se putet, quidquid ei de se remanet hoc solum ipsa est.

But if any of these were the case, she would think that thing otherwise than the rest—not, to be sure, through an imaginal figment, as absences are thought which have been touched by bodily sense, whether the very things themselves or some of the same genus, but by a certain interior presence, not simulated but true (for there is nothing to her more present than herself), just as she thinks herself to live and to remember and to understand and to will. For she knows these things in herself, nor does she imagine them as though outside herself she had touched them by sense, as corporeal things are touched. From the thoughts of which, if she should not feign anything to herself so as to suppose herself to be something of that sort, whatever of herself remains to her—this alone is what she herself is.

[XI 17] Remotis igitur paulisper ceteris quorum mens de se ipsa certa est, tria haec potissimum considerata tractemus, memoriam, intellegentiam, uoluntatem. In his enim tribus inspici solent etiam ingenia paruulorum cuiusmodi praeferant indolem. Quanto quippe tenacius et facilius puer meminit quantoque acrius intellegit et studet ardentius, tanto est laudabilioris ingenii.

[11 17] Therefore, with the others, whose mind is certain about itself, set aside for a little while, let us chiefly treat these three, having been taken into consideration: memory, intelligence, and will. For in these three there are wont even the talents of little children to be examined—what sort of disposition they display. For the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more keenly he understands and is ardent in study, by so much the more is his talent laudable.

Cum uero de cuiusque doctrina quaeritur, non quanta firmitate ac facilitate meminerit uel quanto acumine intellegat, sed quid meminerit et quid intellegat quaeritur. Et quia non tantum quam doctus sit consideratur laudabilis animus sed etiam quam bonus, non tantum quid meminerit et quid intellegat, uerum etiam quid uelit attenditur; non quanta flagrantia uelit, sed quid uelit prius, deinde quantum uelit. Tunc enim laudandus est animus uehementer amans cum id quod amat uehementer amandum est.

But when the doctrine of anyone is inquired into, the question is not with what firmness and facility he remembers or with what acumen he understands, but what he remembers and what he understands. And because a praiseworthy mind is considered not only by how learned it is but also by how good, attention is paid not only to what it remembers and what it understands, but also to what it wills; not with what fervor it wills, but what it wills first, then how much it wills. For then the mind is to be praised as vehemently loving, when that which it loves is something to be loved vehemently.

Cum ergo dicuntur haec tria, ingenium, doctrina, usus, primum horum consideratur in illis tribus quid possit quisque memoria, intellegentia, uoluntate. Secundum eorum consideratur quid habeat quisque in memoria et intellegentia, quo studiosa uoluntate peruenerit. Iam uero usus tertius in uoluntate est pertractante illa quae memoria et intellegentia continentur, siue ad aliquid ea referat siue eorum fine delectata conquiescat.

Therefore, when these three are spoken of—ingenuity, learning, practice—first of these is considered, in those three, what each person can do by memory, intelligence, and will. Secondly of them is considered what each person has in memory and intelligence, to which he has arrived by a studious will. Now indeed practice, the third, is in the will as it thoroughly handles those things which are contained by memory and intelligence, whether it refer them to something, or, delighted with their end, it come to rest.

Vti est enim assumere aliquid in facultatem uoluntatis; frui est autem uti cum gaudio non adhuc spei sed iam rei. Proinde omnis qui fruitur utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem uoluntatis cum fine delectationis. Non autem omnis qui utitur fruitur si id quod in facultatem uoluntatis assumit non propter illud ipsum sed propter aliud appetiuit.

For to use is to assume something into the faculty of the will; but to enjoy is to use with joy, no longer of hope but now of the thing. Accordingly, everyone who enjoys uses; for he assumes something into the faculty of the will with the end of delectation. Not, however, does everyone who uses enjoy, if that which he assumes into the faculty of the will he has desired not on account of it itself but on account of something else.

[18] Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas, quoniam non sunt tres uitae sed una uita, nec tres mentes sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt sed una substantia. Memoria quippe quod uita et mens et substantia dicitur ad se ipsam dicitur; quod uero memoria dicitur ad aliquid relatiue dicitur. Hoc de intellegentia quoque et de uoluntate dixerim, et intellegentia quippe et uoluntas ad aliquid dicitur.

[18] These three, therefore—memory, intelligence, will—since they are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, accordingly indeed neither are they three substances but one substance. For memory, inasmuch as it is called life and mind and substance, is predicated of itself; but inasmuch as it is called memory, it is predicated relatively, with reference to something. This I would say also of intelligence and of will; for both intelligence and will are said with reference to something.

Vita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo uero tria quo ad se inuicem referuntur.

But, with respect to itself, each is life and mind and essence. Wherefore these three are one in that there is one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else is predicated of them severally with respect to themselves is also said of them together, not in the plural but in the singular. But they are three in that they are referred to one another.

Quae si aequalia non essent non solum singula singulis sed etiam omnibus singula, non utique se inuicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, uerum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem, et intellego me intellegere et uelle atque meminisse, et uolo me uelle et meminisse et intellegere, totamque meam memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem simul memini.

Which things, if they were not equal—not only each to each but also each to all—would assuredly not comprehend one another. For not only are singles comprehended by singles, but even all things are comprehended by singles. For I remember that I have memory and intelligence and will, and I understand that I understand and will and remember, and I will that I will and remember and understand, and I remember my whole memory and intelligence and will together.

Quod enim memoriae meae non memini non est in memoria mea. Nihil autem tam in memoria quam ipsa memoria est. Totam igitur memini.

For whatever of my memory I do not remember is not in my memory. But nothing is so in memory as memory itself is. Therefore I remember it whole.

Item quidquid intellego intellegere me scio, et scio me uelle quidquid uolo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam igitur intellegentiam totamque uoluntatem meam memini. Similiter cum haec tria intellego tota simul intellego.

Likewise, whatever I understand, I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; moreover, whatever I know, I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence and my whole will. Similarly, when I understand these three, I understand them wholly together at once.

Neque enim quidquam intellegibilium non intellego nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro nec memini nec uolo. Quidquid itaque intellegibilium non intellego consequenter etiam nec memini nec uolo.

For indeed I do not fail to understand anything among the intelligibles except what I am ignorant of. But what I am ignorant of I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore of the intelligibles I do not understand, consequently I also neither remember nor will.

Quidquid ergo intellegibilium memini et uolo consequenter intellego. Voluntas etiam mea totam intellegentiam totamque memoriam meam capit dum toto utor quod intellego et memini. Quapropter quando inuicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis, et haec tria unum, una uita, una mens, una essentia.

Therefore whatever of the intelligibles I remember and will, I consequently understand. My will also comprehends my whole intelligence and my whole memory while I use wholly what I understand and remember. Wherefore, since in turn by each both the whole and all things are comprehended, the whole of each is equal to the whole of each of the others, and the whole of each at once to all the wholes; and these three are one—one life, one mind, one essence.

[XII 19] Iamne igitur ascendendum est qualibuscumque intentionis uiribus ad illas summam et altissimam essentiam cuius impar imago est humana mens sed tamen imago? An adhuc eadem tria distinctius declaranda sunt in anima per illa quae extrinsecus sensu corporis capimus ubi temporaliter imprimitur rerum corporearum notitia? Mentem quippe ipsam in memoria et intellegentia et uoluntate suimetipsius talem reperiebamus ut quoniam semper se nosse semperque se ipsam uelle comprehendebatur, simul etiam semper sui meminisse semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare comprehenderetur, quamuis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est.

[12 19] So then, must we now ascend, with whatever powers of intention, to that supreme and most lofty essence, of which the human mind is an unequal image, yet an image nonetheless? Or are the same three still to be declared more distinctly in the soul through those things which we apprehend from without by the sense of the body, where the cognizance of bodily things is imprinted temporally? For we were finding the mind itself, in the memory and intelligence and will of its very self, to be such that, since it was comprehended as always knowing itself and always willing itself, at the same time it was also comprehended as always remembering itself and always understanding and loving itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinct from those things which are not what it itself is.

Ac per hoc difficile in ea dinoscitur memoria sui et intelligentia sui. Quasi enim non sint haec duo sed unum duobus uocabulis appelletur, sic apparet in ea re ubi ualde ista coniuncta sunt et aliud alio nullo praeceditur tempore; amorque ipse non ita sentitur esse cum eum non prodit indigentia quoniam semper praesto est quod amatur. Quapropter etiam tardioribus dilucescere haec possunt dum ea tractantur quae ad animum tempore accedunt et quae illi temporaliter accidunt cum meminit quod antea non meminerat et cum uidet quod antea non uidebat et cum amat quod antea non amabat.

And through this it is difficult in it to discern the memory of self and the intelligence of self. For as though these two were not two but one, called by two vocables, so it appears in that matter where these are very closely conjoined, and the one is at no time preceded by the other; and love itself is not thus felt to be, when indigence does not betray it, since that which is loved is always at hand. Wherefore even for the slower these things can grow lucid, while those things are treated which come to the mind in time and which befall it temporally: when it remembers what before it did not remember, and when it sees what before it did not see, and when it loves what before it did not love.

Sed aliud haec tractatio iam poscit exordium propter huius libelli modum.

But this tractation now demands another exordium on account of the mode of this little book.