Caesar•COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI III DE BELLO CIVILI
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[1] Litteris C. Caesaris consulibus redditis aegre ab his impetratum est summa tribunorum plebis contentione, ut in senatu recitarentur; ut vero ex litteris ad senatum referretur, impetrari non potuit. Referunt consules de re publica [in civitate]. [Incitat] L. Lentulus consul senatu rei publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum: habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum.
[1] With the letters of Gaius Caesar delivered to the consuls, it was obtained from them with difficulty, by the utmost contention of the tribunes of the plebs, that they be recited in the senate; but that, from the letters, a motion be brought before the senate could not be obtained. The consuls report concerning the commonwealth [in the state]. [Incites] L. Lentulus, the consul, promises the senate that he will not be lacking to the commonwealth, if they are willing to declare their opinions boldly and bravely; but if they look to Caesar and follow his favor, as they have done in former times, he will take counsel for himself and will not obey the authority of the senate: that he too has been received into Caesar’s favor and friendship. Scipio speaks in the same sense: that Pompey has it in mind not to be lacking to the commonwealth, if the senate follows; but if it delay and act more mildly, the senate will implore his aid in vain, if afterward it wishes.
[2] Haec Scipionis oratio, quod senatus in urbe habebatur Pompeiusque aberat, ex ipsius ore Pompei mitti videbatur. Dixerat aliquis leniorem sententiam, ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in eam orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad senatum referri, quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere senatus, quae vellet, decernere auderet; ut M. Calidius, qui censebat, ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur, ne qua esset armorum causa: timere Caesarem ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur; ut M. Rufus, qui sententiam Calidii paucis fere mutatis rebus sequebatur. Hi omnes convicio L. Lentuli consulis correpti exagitabantur.
[2] This oration of Scipio, because the senate was being held in the city and Pompeius was away, seemed to be sent from Pompeius’s very mouth. Someone had stated a gentler sententia, as at first M. Marcellus, having entered upon this discourse, that it ought not to be referred to the senate about this matter before levies had been held through all Italy and armies conscripted, by whose protection the senate might dare safely and freely to decree what it wished; as M. Calidius, who was of the opinion that Pompeius should set out into his own provinces, lest there be any cause of arms: that Caesar feared, with two legions snatched from him, lest Pompeius should seem to reserve and retain them at the city to his danger; as M. Rufus, who followed the sententia of Calidius with almost only a few things changed. All these, seized upon with reproach by the consul L. Lentulus, were harried.
Lentulus utterly denied that he would pronounce Calidius’s opinion. Marcellus, terror‑struck by insults, departed from his own opinion. Thus, by the consul’s cries, by the terror of the army at hand, by the threats of Pompey’s friends, most, driven, unwilling and constrained, follow Scipio’s opinion: that before a fixed day Caesar should disband his army; if he does not do so, he would appear to be acting against the Republic.
M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the plebs, interposed their veto. It was immediately referred concerning the intercession of the tribunes. Grave opinions were spoken; in proportion as each spoke most bitterly and most cruelly, so he was the more highly extolled by Caesar’s enemies.
[3] Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur. Laudat promptos Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus legionibus, quae sunt traditae a Caesare, arcessuntur.
[3] With the senate dismissed toward evening, all who are of that order are summoned by Pompey. Pompey praises the prompt and confirms them for the future; he chastises the more sluggish and incites them. Many from all sides, from Pompey’s veteran armies, are called out by the hope of rewards and ranks, and many from the two legions that were handed over by Caesar are summoned.
The city and the comitium itself are filled with tribunes, centurions, and evocati (recalled veterans). All the friends of the consuls, the intimates of Pompey, and those who were carrying long-standing enmities with Caesar are driven into the Senate; by their voices and their concourse the weaker are terrified, the doubtful are confirmed, and for very many the power of decreeing freely is snatched away. L. Piso the censor promises that he will go to Caesar, likewise L. Roscius the praetor, to inform him about these matters: they ask six days’ time for bringing that matter to completion.
[4] Omnibus his resistitur, omnibusque oratio consulis, Scipionis, Catonis opponitur. Catonem veteres inimicitiae Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae. Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur, seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperii redeat.
[4] All these are resisted, and to them all the speech of the consul, of Scipio, of Cato is opposed. Cato is incited by Caesar’s old enmities and the pain of a repulse; Lentulus is moved by the magnitude of his debt and by the hope of an army and of provinces and by the largesses to be had by appealing to kings, and he boasts among his own that he will be a second Sulla, to whom the supreme command may return.
Scipio is impelled by the same hope of a province and of armies, which he thinks he will share with Pompey by reason of kinship, together with fear of trials, and flattery and ostentation of himself and of the potent men who then were most prevailing in the state and in the courts. Pompey himself, incited by Caesar’s enemies, and because he wished that no one be made equal to himself in dignity, had wholly turned himself away from his friendship and had returned into favor with their common enemies, most of whom he himself had fastened upon Caesar at that time of affinity; at the same time, moved by the ill-fame of the two legions, which he had diverted from their journey to Asia and Syria to his own power and domination, he was eager to have the matter brought to arms.
[5] His de causis aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate. Nec docendi Caesaris propinquis eius spatium datur, nec tribunis plebis sui periculi deprecandi neque etiam extremi iuris intercessione retinendi, quod L. Sulla reliquerat, facultas tribuitur, sed de sua salute septimo die cogitare coguntur, quod illi turbulentissimi superioribus temporibus tribuni plebis octavo denique mense suarum actionum respicere ac timere consuerant. Decurritur ad illud extremum atque ultimum senatus consultum, quo nisi paene in ipso urbis incendio atque in desperatione omnium salutis sceleratorum audacia numquam ante descensum est: dent operam consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, quique pro consulibus sint ad urbem, ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat.
[5] For these causes all things are conducted rapidly and in turmoil. Nor is time granted to Caesar’s kinsmen for instructing him, nor is a faculty granted to the tribunes of the plebs for deprecating their own danger, nor even for restraining it by the intercession of their extreme right, which L. Sulla had left remaining; but they are forced to think about their own safety on the seventh day, whereas those most turbulent tribunes of the plebs in earlier times were accustomed only in the eighth month at last to look back upon and fear the consequences of their actions. Resort is made to that extreme and ultimate senatorial decree, to which it had never before been descended except almost in the very conflagration of the city and in despair of the safety of all, through the audacity of the wicked: let the consuls, the praetors, the tribunes of the plebs, and those who are acting as proconsuls near the city, give their efforts that the republic suffer no detriment.
These things are written out in a senatorial decree on January 7. And so in the first 5 days, from the day on which Lentulus entered upon the consulship, with the two comitial days excepted, the harshest and most bitter decrees are passed both concerning Caesar’s command (imperium) and concerning the most distinguished men, the tribunes of the plebs. The tribunes of the plebs immediately flee from the city and betake themselves to Caesar.
[6] Proximis diebus habetur extra urbem senatus. Pompeius eadem illa, quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit; legiones habere sese paratas X; praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites neque eis posse persuaderi, uti eum defendant aut sequantur. Statim de reliquis rebus ad senatum refertur: tota Italia delectus habeatur; Faustus Sulla propere in Mauretaniam mittatur; pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur.
[6] In the next days a session of the senate is held outside the city. Pompey prosecutes those same measures which he had displayed through Scipio; he highly commends the senate’s virtue and constancy; he sets forth his forces; that he has 10 legions prepared; moreover that it has been learned and ascertained by him that the soldiers are of an alien mind toward Caesar, nor can they be persuaded to defend him or to follow him. Immediately reference is made to the senate about the remaining matters: that a levy be held through all Italy; that Faustus Sulla be sent quickly into Mauretania; that money be given to Pompey from the treasury.
Nor do they wait, as had happened in prior years, for their imperium to be brought before the people and to go out paludati with vows pronounced. The consuls—something which had never happened before that time—set out from the city, and, as private persons, have lictors in the city and on the Capitol, against all precedents of antiquity. Throughout all Italy levies are held, arms are requisitioned; monies are exacted from the municipalities, and are taken from the shrines: all divine and human laws are commingled.
[7] Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta.
[7] When these things were learned, Caesar addresses the soldiers in assembly. He commemorates the injuries of all times from his enemies against himself; he complains that Pompey has been led away and depraved by them through envy and the detraction of his praise, whose honor and dignity he himself has always favored and been a helper. He complains that a new precedent has been introduced in the commonwealth: that the tribunician intercession should be branded by arms and suppressed, which in former years had been restored by arms.
Sulla, though he stripped the tribunician power of all things, nevertheless left a free intercession. Pompey, who seems to have restored what had been lost, has even taken away the gifts which they previously had. Whenever it has been decreed that the magistrates should take care that the republic suffer no detriment (by which phrase and by which decree of the senate the Roman people was called to arms), this has been done in the case of pernicious laws, in tribunician violence, in a secession of the people with temples and more elevated places occupied: and he shows that these examples of an earlier age were expiated by the downfalls of Saturninus and the Gracchi; of which things at that time nothing was done, not even thought.
no law had been promulgated, no proceedings with the people had been begun, no secession had taken place. He exhorts them—he, under whose leadership for 9 years they had managed the republic most successfully and had fought many favorable battles, and had pacified all Gaul and Germany—to defend his estimation and dignity from his enemies. The soldiers of the 13th legion, which was present—for he had summoned this one at the beginning of the tumult, the rest had not yet assembled—shout together that they are prepared to defend their own commander and the tribunes of the plebs against injustices.
[8] Cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebis, qui ad eum profugerant, convenit; reliquas legiones ex hibernis evocat et subsequi iubet. Eo L. Caesar adulescens venit, cuius pater Caesaris erat legatus. Is reliquo sermone confecto, cuius rei causa venerat, habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in suam contumeliam vertat.
[8] Having learned the will of the soldiers, he proceeds to Ariminum with that legion, and there he meets the tribunes of the plebs who had fled to him; he summons the remaining legions from their winter quarters and orders them to follow. There to that place came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was Caesar’s legate. After completing the rest of the conversation for which he had come, he shows that he has from Pompey for him mandates of private duty: that Pompey wishes himself to be cleared to Caesar, lest he turn the things which he has done for the sake of the commonwealth into contumely against himself.
He had always held the advantages of the Republic to be preferable to private necessities and bonds. Caesar also, in proportion to his dignity, ought to dismiss both his zeal and his iracundity for the Republic, and not be so gravely enraged at his enemies that, while he hopes to harm them, he harms the Republic. He adds a few remarks of the same kind, conjoined with an excuse on Pompey’s behalf.
[9] Quae res etsi nihil ad levandas iniurias pertinere videbantur, tamen idoneos nactus homines, per quos ea, quae vellet, ad eum perferrentur, petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. Sibi semper primam rei publicae fuisse dignitatem vitaque potiorem. Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset.
[9] Although these measures seemed to pertain nothing to alleviating the injuries, nevertheless, having found suitable men through whom those things which he wished might be conveyed to him, he asks from both, since they had delivered Pompey’s mandates to him, that they not think it burdensome to convey his own demands to him as well, if with little labor they can remove great controversies and free all Italy from fear. That for himself the dignity of the commonwealth had always been first and preferable to life. That he had grieved because the benefaction of the Roman people was being extorted from him with contumely by his enemies, and, his six‑month command being snatched away, he was being dragged back into the city, although the people had ordered at the most recent elections that account be taken of him in his absence.
Nevertheless, this loss of his own honor he bore with equanimity for the sake of the Republic; though he sent letters to the Senate, that all should disband from their armies, not even that did he obtain. Throughout all Italy levies are being held, the 2 legions, which were led away from him under the pretense of a Parthian war, are being retained, the state is under arms. To what, pray, do all these things pertain except to his own destruction?
But yet he declared himself prepared to descend to everything and to endure all things for the sake of the Republic. Let Pompey set out into his own provinces, let they themselves disband their armies, let all in Italy withdraw from arms, let fear be removed from the state, let free elections and the whole Republic be entrusted to the Senate and the Roman People. That these things may the more easily and under fixed conditions be done and be sanctioned by oath, either let he himself come nearer or allow him to approach: it will come about that through conferences all controversies are composed.
[10] Acceptis mandatis Roscius cum L. Caesare Capuam pervenit ibique consules Pompeiumque invenit; postulata Caesaris renuntiat. Illi deliberata re respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt; quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. Interea, quoad fides esset data Caesarem facturum, quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules Pompeiumque delectus.
[10] Having received the mandates, Roscius with L. Caesar arrived at Capua and there found the consuls and Pompey; he reports back Caesar’s demands. They, the matter having been deliberated, reply and send back to him written mandates by their hand; the sum of which was this: that Caesar should return into Gaul, depart from Ariminum, and dismiss his armies; if he should do these things, Pompey would go into the Spains. Meanwhile, until a pledge had been given that Caesar would do what he was promising, the consuls and Pompey would not discontinue the levies.
[11] Erat iniqua condicio postulare, ut Caesar Arimino excederet atque in provinciam reverteretur, ipsum et provincias et legiones alienas tenere; exercitum Caesaris velle dimitti, delectus habere; polliceri se in provinciam iturum neque, ante quem diem iturus sit, definire, ut, si peracto consulatu Caesaris [non] profectus esset, nulla tamen mendacii religione obstrictus videretur; tempus vero colloquio non dare neque accessurum polliceri magnam pacis desperationem afferebat. Itaque ab Arimino M. Antonium cum cohortibus V Arretium mittit; ipse Arimini cum duabus subsistit ibique delectum habere instituit; Pisaurum, Fanum, Anconam singulis cohortibus occupat.
[11] It was an unjust condition to demand that Caesar depart from Ariminum and return into his province, while he himself held both the provinces and others’ legions; to wish Caesar’s army to be disbanded, while he held levies; to promise that he would go into his province and yet not define before what day he would go, so that, if upon the completion of Caesar’s consulship he had [not] set out, he might nevertheless seem bound by no scruple of falsehood; and in truth to give no time for a conference and to promise that he would not come brought great desperation of peace. And so from Ariminum he sends M. Antonius with 5 cohorts to Arretium; he himself halts at Ariminum with two and there begins to hold a levy; Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona he occupies with single cohorts.
[12] Interea certior factus Iguvium Thermum praetorem cohortibus V tenere, oppidum munire, omniumque esse Iguvinorum optimam erga se voluntatem, Curionem cum tribus cohortibus, quas Pisauri et Arimini habebat, mittit. Cuius adventu cognito diffisus municipii voluntati Thermus cohortes ex urbe reducit et profugit. Milites in itinere ab eo discedunt ac domum revertuntur.
[12] Meanwhile, having been informed that Thermus the praetor was holding Iguvium with 5 cohorts, was fortifying the town, and that the goodwill of all the Iguvinians toward himself was most favorable, he sends Curio with 3 cohorts, which he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. When his arrival was learned, distrustful of the municipality’s goodwill, Thermus withdraws the cohorts from the city and flees. The soldiers, on the march, depart from him and return home.
Curio, with the utmost good will of all, took back Iguvium. These things having been learned, and trusting in the good will of the municipalities, Caesar leads down from the garrisons the cohorts of the 13th legion and sets out for Auximum; which town Attius was holding with cohorts brought in, and he was holding a levy throughout all Picenum, with senators sent round.
[13] Adventu Caesaris cognito decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui. Quorum oratione permotus Varus praesidium, quod introduxerat, ex oppido educit ac profugit. Hunc ex primo ordine pauci Caesaris consecuti milites consistere coegerunt.
[13] When the arrival of Caesar was learned, the decurions of Auximum assemble in great numbers to Attius Varus; they show that the matter is not within their discretion; that neither they nor the rest of their fellow townsmen can allow Gaius Caesar, a commander who has well deserved of the republic, with such great deeds accomplished, to be kept away from the town and its walls; accordingly let him have regard for posterity and for his own peril. Moved by their speech, Varus leads the garrison which he had brought in out of the town and flees. Him a few of Caesar’s soldiers from the foremost rank, having pursued, compelled to halt.
With battle joined, Varus is deserted by his own; a portion of the soldiers depart home; the rest make their way to Caesar, and together with them, having been caught, L. Pupius, centurion of the first pilus, is brought in, who had previously held this same rank in the army of Cn. Pompey. But Caesar highly commends the Attian soldiers, dismisses Pupius, gives thanks to the Auximates, and promises that he will be mindful of their deed.
[14] Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis tantus repente terror invasit, ut cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatus consulto proferendam, protinus aperto sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius equites falso nuntiabantur. Hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt.
[14] When these matters were reported at Rome, so great a terror suddenly seized them that, when the consul Lentulus had come to open the treasury and to bring out money for Pompey by senatorial decree, straightway, the more sacred treasury having been opened, he fled from the city. For Caesar was now at any moment said—falsely—to be approaching, and his horsemen to be at hand. His colleague Marcellus and most of the magistrates followed him.
Gnaeus Pompeius, having set out from the city the day before that day, was making a march toward the legions which, received from Caesar, he had disposed in Apulia for the sake of winter-quarters. The levies around the city are intermitted; it seems to all that nothing on this side of Capua is safe. At Capua first they take their stand and gather, and they resolve to hold a levy of the colonists who had been settled at Capua by the Julian law; and the gladiators whom Caesar had there in the training-school, brought to the forum, Lentulus heartens with the hope of liberty, and he assigns horses to them and ordered them to follow him; whom afterward, warned by his own men, because that measure was reprehended in the judgment of all, he distributed among the households of the Campanian circuits for the purpose of guard.
[15] Auximo Caesar progressus omnem agrum Picenum percurrit. Cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant. Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat, ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur.
[15] From Auximum, Caesar having advanced, he runs through the whole Picene territory. All the prefectures of those regions receive him with most willing minds and aid his army in every respect. Even at Cingulum, a town which Labienus had established and had built at his own expense, envoys come to him and promise that they will most eagerly do whatever he may command.
That town Lentulus Spinther was holding with 10 cohorts; who, when Caesar’s advent was learned, fled from the town and, having tried to lead the cohorts away with him, is deserted by a great part of the soldiers. Left behind on the way with a few, he falls in with Vibullius Rufus, sent by Pompey into the Picene land for the purpose of confirming the men. Having been made more certain by him about what was being done in Picenum, Vibullius receives the soldiers from him and dismisses the man himself.
Likewise from the neighboring regions he musters as many cohorts as he can from the Pompeian levies; among these, at Camerinum he intercepts Lucilius Hirrus as he flees, with six cohorts, which he had had there in garrison; with these collected he makes 12. With these he reaches Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium by forced marches and announces that Caesar is present with two legions. Domitius on his own had assembled at Alba about 20 cohorts, from the Marsi and the Paeligni, from neighboring regions.
[16] Recepto Firmo expulsoque Lentulo Caesar conquiri milites, qui ab eo discesserant, delectumque institui iubet; ipse unum diem ibi rei frumentariae causa moratus Corfinium contendit. Eo cum venisset, cohortes V praemissae a Domitio ex oppido pontem fluminis interrumpebant, qui erat ab oppido milia passuum circiter III. Ibi cum antecursoribus Caesaris proelio commisso celeriter Domitiani a ponte repulsi se in oppidum receperunt.
[16] With Firmum recovered and Lentulus expelled, Caesar orders that the soldiers who had departed from him be sought out, and that a levy be instituted; he himself, having tarried there one day for the sake of the grain-supply, hastened to Corfinium. When he had come there, 5 cohorts sent ahead by Domitius from the town were breaking the bridge of the river, which was about 3 miles from the town. There, battle having been joined with Caesar’s advance-guard, Domitius’s men were quickly repulsed from the bridge and withdrew into the town.
[17] Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit, qui petant atque orent, ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. Quod nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum. Interim suos cohortatus tormenta in muris disponit certasque cuique partes ad custodiam urbis attribuit; militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque.
[17] With the situation learned, Domitius sends into Apulia to Pompey men experienced in the regions, with a great reward set forth, with letters, to seek and beg that he come to his aid: that Caesar can easily be cut off by the two armies and by the narrowness of the terrain and be kept from grain. If he does not do this, he says that he and more than 30 cohorts and a great number of senators and Roman equites will come into danger. Meanwhile, after exhorting his men, he deploys the artillery on the walls and assigns fixed sectors to each for the guarding of the city; in an assembly he promises the soldiers fields from his own estates, four iugera to each individual, and in a proportional share to the centurions and the evocati.
[18] Interim Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, quod oppidum a Corfinio VII milium intervallo abest, cupere ea facere, quae vellet, sed a Q. Lucretio senatore et Attio Peligno prohiberi, qui id oppidum VII cohortium praesidio tenebant. Mittit eo M. Antonium cum legionis XIII cohortibus V. Sulmonenses simul atque signa nostra viderunt, portas aperuerunt universique, et oppidani et milites, obviam gratulantes Antonio exierunt. Lucretius et Attius de muro se deiecerunt.
[18] Meanwhile it is reported to Caesar that the Sulmonenses, a town which is distant from Corfinium by an interval of 7 miles, desire to do what he would wish, but are being prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius the Pelignian, who were holding that town with a garrison of 7 cohorts. He sends there Marcus Antonius with 5 cohorts of the 13th legion. The Sulmonenses, as soon as they saw our standards, opened the gates, and all together—both the townsfolk and the soldiers—went out to meet Antony with congratulations. Lucretius and Attius hurled themselves down from the wall.
In the first days Caesar set himself to fortify the camp with great works and to bring in grain from the neighboring municipalities and to await the remaining forces. In that three-day span the 8th legion came to him, and 22 cohorts from the new levies of Gaul, and about 300 cavalry from the king of Noricum. With their arrival he pitches a second camp on the other side of the town; over this camp he placed Curio.
[19] Litteris perlectis Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum hortaturque eos, ne animo deficiant quaeque usui ad defendendum oppidum sint parent. Ipse arcano cum paucis familiaribus suis colloquitur consiliumque fugae capere constituit. Cum vultus Domiti cum oratione non consentiret, atque omnia trepidantius timidiusque ageret, quam superioribus diebus consuesset, multumque cum suis consiliandi causa secreto praeter consuetudinem colloqueretur, concilia conventusque hominum fugeret, res diutius tegi dissimularique non potuit.
[19] The letters having been read through, Domitius, dissembling, announces in council that Pompey will come quickly for succor, and he exhorts them not to lose spirit and to prepare the things that will be of use for defending the town. He himself in secret confers with a few of his intimates and resolves to adopt a plan of flight. Since Domitius’s expression did not agree with his speech, and he did everything more in trepidation and more timidly than he had been accustomed in the preceding days, and, beyond his wont, he conversed much in private with his own men for the sake of deliberation, while he shunned councils and gatherings of men, the matter could no longer be covered up and dissimulated.
For Pompey had written back: that he would not lead the matter into utmost peril, and that Domitius had not, by his counsel or will, betaken himself into the town of Corfinium; therefore, if there were any opportunity, he should come to him with all his forces. In order that this might not be able to be done, it was being effected by the siege and the circumvallation of the town.
[20] Divulgato Domiti consilio milites, qui erant Corfinii, prima vesperi secessionem faciunt atque ita inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare, opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere: debere se suae salutis rationem habere. Ab his primo Marsi dissentire incipiunt eamque oppidi partem, quae munitissima videretur, occupant, tantaque inter eos dissensio exsistit, ut manum conserere atque armis dimicare conentur; post paulo tamen internuntiis ultro citroque missis quae ignorabant, de L. Domiti fuga, cognoscunt. Itaque omnes uno consilio Domitium productum in publicum circumsistunt et custodiunt legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestati tradere.
[20] With Domitius’s plan made public, the soldiers who were at Corfinium make a secession at early evening and thus among themselves, through the military tribunes, the centurions, and the most honorable men of their order, confer as follows: that they are being besieged by Caesar, that the works and fortifications are nearly completed; that their leader Domitius, in whose hope and trust they had remained, having cast everything aside, is adopting a plan of flight; that they ought to have regard for their own safety. From these first the Marsi begin to dissent and seize that part of the town which seemed the most fortified, and such dissension arises among them that they attempt to join battle and fight with arms; after a little while, however, with inter-nuncios sent to and fro, they learn what they did not know—about the flight of L. Domitius. And so, all with one counsel, they surround Domitius, brought out into public, and keep guard, and they send legates from their own number to Caesar: that they are prepared to open the gates, to do whatever he shall have ordered, and to hand over L. Domitius alive into his power.
[21] Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, etsi magni interesse arbitrabatur quam primum oppido potiri cohortesque ad se in castra traducere, ne qua aut largitionibus aut animi confirmatione aut falsis nuntiis commutatio fieret voluntatis, quod saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus intercederent, tamen veritus, ne militum introitu et nocturni temporis licentia oppidum diriperetur, eos, qui venerant, collaudat atque in oppidum dimittit, portas murosque adservari iubet. Ipse eis operibus, quae facere instituerat, milites disponit non certis spatiis intermissis, ut erat superiorum dierum consuetudo, sed perpetuis vigiliis stationibusque, ut contingant inter se atque omnem munitionem expleant; tribunos militum et praefectos circummittit atque hortatur, non solum ab eruptionibus caveant, sed etiam singulorum hominum occultos exitus adservent. Neque vero tam remisso ac languido animo quisquam omnium fuit, qui ea nocte conquieverit.
[21] With these things learned, Caesar, although he judged it to be of great importance to get possession of the town as soon as possible and to bring the cohorts over to himself into the camp, lest any change of will be made either by largesses or by confirmation of spirit or by false reports—since often in war great chances intervene in small moments—nevertheless, fearing lest the town be plundered by the entrance of the soldiers and the license of the night-time, commends those who had come and sends them back into the town, and orders the gates and walls to be guarded. He himself posts the soldiers upon those works which he had set himself to make, not with fixed spaces left between, as was the custom of the previous days, but with perpetual watches and stations, so that they are contiguous with one another and fill out the whole fortification; he sends around the tribunes of the soldiers and the prefects and exhorts them not only to beware of sallies, but also to guard the hidden exits of individual men. Nor indeed was there anyone of all so remiss and languid in spirit as to have taken rest that night.
[22] Quarta vigilia circiter Lentulus Spinther de muro cum vigiliis custodibusque nostris colloquitur; velle, si sibi fiat potestas, Caesarem convenire. Facta potestate ex oppido mittitur, neque ab eo prius Domitiani milites discedunt, quam in conspectum Caesaris deducatur. Cum eo de salute sua agit, orat atque obsecrat, ut sibi parcat, veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus.
[22] At about the fourth watch Lentulus Spinther speaks from the wall with our sentries and guards; that he wishes, if permission be granted to him, to meet Caesar. Permission granted, he is sent out from the town, nor do Domitius’s soldiers leave him before he is led into Caesar’s sight. With him he pleads concerning his own safety; he begs and beseeches that he spare him, and he recalls the old friendship and sets forth Caesar’s benefactions toward him; which were very great: that through him he had been admitted into the college of pontiffs, that he had held the province Hispania after his praetorship, that in the petition for the consulship he had been supported.
Caesar interrupts his speech: that he had not gone out from the province for the sake of malefice, but in order to defend himself from the contumelies of enemies, to restore the tribunes of the plebs, expelled from the state in that matter, to their dignity, to vindicate himself and the Roman People, oppressed by the faction of a few, into liberty. Strengthened by whose speech, Lentulus asks that it be permitted to return into the town: that, since he has obtained what concerns his own safety, it will be also to the rest a solace for their own hope; that some are so terrified that they are compelled to take harsher counsel concerning their life. Permission having been granted, he departs.
[23] Caesar, ubi luxit, omnes senatores senatorumque liberos, tribunos militum equitesque Romanos ad se produci iubet. Erant quinquaginta; ordinis senatorii L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Caecilius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus quaestor, L. Rubrius; praeterea filius Domiti aliique complures adulescentes et magnus numerus equitum Romanorum et decurionum, quos ex municipiis Domitius evocaverat.
[23] Caesar, when it grew light, orders all the senators and the sons of senators, the military tribunes and the Roman equites to be brought before him. They were fifty: of the senatorial order L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Caecilius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus, quaestor, L. Rubrius; besides the son of Domitius and several other adolescents, and a great number of Roman equites and decurions, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipia.
He forbids that all these, when brought out, be subjected to the soldiers’ insults and revilings; he speaks a few words among them, [he complains] that gratitude has not been returned to him by their side in return for his very great benefactions toward them; he dismisses all unharmed. The HS 60, which Domitius had brought in and had deposited in the public treasury, having been carried to him by the 4 magistrates of the Corfinians, he returns to Domitius, lest he seem to have been more continent in the matter of men’s lives than in money, although it was agreed that that money was public and had been given by Pompey for stipend. He orders Domitius’s soldiers to speak the sacrament (military oath) in his presence and on that day moves camp and completes a regular march, having tarried altogether 7 days at Corfinium, and through the borders of the Marrucini, the Frentani, and the Larinates he comes into Apulia.
[24] Pompeius his rebus cognitis, quae erant ad Corfinium gestae, Luceria proficiscitur Canusium atque inde Brundisium. Copias undique omnes ex novis dilectibus ad se cogi iubet; servos, pastores armat atque eis equos attribuit; ex his circiter CCC equites conficit. L. Manlius praetor Alba cum cohortibus sex profugit, Rutilius Lupus praetor Tarracina cum tribus; quae procul equitatum Caesaris conspicatae, cui praeerat Vibius Curius, relicto praetore signa ad Curium transferunt atque ad eum transeunt.
[24] Pompey, these matters known, which had been done at Corfinium, sets out from Luceria to Canusium and thence to Brundisium. He orders all forces from everywhere, from the new levies, to be gathered to himself; he arms slaves and shepherds and assigns horses to them; from these he fashions about 300 cavalry. L. Manlius, praetor at Alba, fled with six cohorts, Rutilius Lupus, praetor at Tarracina, with three; which, having caught sight from afar of Caesar’s cavalry, which Vibius Curius commanded, abandoning their praetor transfer their standards to Curius and pass over to him.
Likewise on the remaining routes, some cohorts fall in with Caesar’s column, others run into the cavalry. Brought back to him, having been apprehended on the road, is Numerius Magius of Cremona, chief of engineers of Gnaeus Pompey. Him Caesar sends back to Pompey with mandates: since up to that time there had not been an opportunity for colloquy, and since he himself was going to come to Brundisium, it was in the interest of the commonwealth and of the common safety that he hold a conference with Pompey; nor indeed is the same progress achieved at a long distance of journey, when conditions are carried through others, as if all the conditions are debated face-to-face.
[25] His datis mandatis Brundisium cum legionibus VI pervenit, veteranis III et reliquis, quas ex novo dilectu confecerat atque in itinere compleverat; Domitianas enim cohortes protinus a Corfinio in Siciliam miserat. Reperit consules Dyrrachium profectos cum magna parte exercitus, Pompeium remanere Brundisii cum cohortibus viginti; neque certum inveniri poterat, obtinendine Brundisii causa ibi remansisset, quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare ex ultimis Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex utraque parte bellum administrare posset, an inopia navium ibi restitisset, veritusque ne ille Italiam dimittendam non existimaret, exitus administrationesque Brundisini portus impedire instituit. Quorum operum haec erat ratio.
[25] With these mandates given he arrived at Brundisium with 6 legions, 3 veteran and the rest, which he had completed from a new levy and had filled up on the march; for he had at once sent the Domitian cohorts from Corfinium into Sicily. He found the consuls set out to Dyrrachium with a great part of the army, Pompey remaining at Brundisium with 20 cohorts; and it could not be determined for certain whether he had remained there for the purpose of holding Brundisium, so that he might more easily have the whole Adriatic Sea from the farthest parts of Italy and the regions of Greece in his power and be able to administer the war from both sides, or whether he had halted there for lack of ships; and, fearing that the other would not consider Italy to be relinquished, he began to obstruct the exits and the operations of the Brundisian harbor. The plan of these works was as follows.
Where the narrows of the port were narrowest, he was throwing up a mole and an embankment from both sides of the shore, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having advanced farther, when the embankment could not be kept together in deeper water, he would place double rafts, each 30 feet every way, opposite the line of the mole. These he secured with 4 anchors from the 4 corners, lest they be moved by the waves.
When these were completed and set in place, he was then joining other rafts in succession of equal size. He covered these with earth and an earthwork, lest approach and incursion for defending be impeded. From the front and on either side he protected them with hurdles and mantelets; on every fourth of them he raised towers of two stories, in order the more conveniently to defend against the onrush of ships and against fires.
[26] Contra haec Pompeius naves magnas onerarias, quas in portu Brundisino deprehenderat, adornabat. Ibi turres cum ternis tabulatis erigebat easque multis tormentis et omni genere telorum completas ad opera Caesaris adpellebat, ut rates perrumperet atque opera disturbaret. Sic cotidie utrimque eminus fundis, sagittis reliquisque telis pugnabatur.
[26] In answer to these things, Pompey was equipping large cargo-ships, which he had seized in the port of Brundisium. There he was erecting towers with three stories, and these, filled with many engines and every kind of missile, he was bringing alongside to Caesar’s works, in order to break through the rafts and to disturb the works. Thus daily on both sides they fought at long range with slings, arrows, and the remaining missiles.
And Caesar managed these things in such a way that he did not think the conditions of peace should be dismissed; and although he marveled greatly that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with instructions, was not sent back to him, and although that matter, often attempted, was slowing his impetus and counsels, nevertheless he thought that in all respects one must persevere in it. Therefore he sends Caninius Rebilus, a legate, a familiar friend and close associate of Scribonius Libo, to him for the sake of a colloquy; he instructs him to exhort Libo about conciliating peace; above all, he demands that he himself confer with Pompey; he shows that he is greatly confident that, if power has been granted for this matter, it will come about that there will be a withdrawal from arms on equitable conditions. A great part of the praise and reputation for this affair will come to Libo, if, with him as author and agent, there is a departure from arms.
Libo, having departed from a colloquy with Caninius, sets out to Pompey. A little later he reports that, because the consuls are absent, it is not possible for anything to be transacted concerning a composition without them. Thus, since the matter had been tried more than once in vain, Caesar judges that at length it must be dismissed and that he must proceed with war.
[27] Prope dimidia parte operis a Caesare effecta diebusque in ea re consumptis VIIII, naves a consulibus Dyrrachio remissae, quae priorem partem exercitus eo deportaverant, Brundisium revertuntur. Pompeius sive operibus Caesaris permotus sive etiam quod ab initio Italia excedere constituerat, adventu navium profectionem parare incipit et, quo facilius impetum Caesaris tardaret, ne sub ipsa profectione milites oppidum irrumperent, portas obstruit, vicos plateasque inaedificat, fossas transversas viis praeducit atque ibi sudes stipitesque praeacutos defigit. Haec levibus cratibus terraque inaequat; aditus autem atque itinera duo, quae extra murum ad portum ferebant, maximis defixis trabibus atque eis praeacutis praesepit.
[27] With nearly half the work accomplished by Caesar and 9 days consumed in that matter, the ships that had been sent back from Dyrrachium by the consuls, which had carried the earlier part of the army there, return to Brundisium. Pompey, whether moved by Caesar’s works or also because from the beginning he had determined to withdraw from Italy, at the arrival of the ships begins to prepare the departure; and, in order the more easily to retard Caesar’s onset, lest at the very moment of departure the soldiers should burst into the town, he blocks the gates, builds up the lanes and broad streets, leads transverse ditches across the roads, and there fixes stakes and sharpened posts. He levels these with light wattled hurdles and earth; moreover, he fences off the two approaches and routes which led outside the wall to the harbor with very large beams driven in and sharpened.
With these things prepared, he orders the soldiers to embark upon the ships in silence, and he stations, at wide intervals, along the wall and the towers men lightly equipped, drawn from the evocati, the archers, and the slingers. He determined to recall these by a fixed signal, when all the soldiers had embarked on the ships, and for them he leaves, in an unencumbered place, swift actuaria vessels.
[28] Brundisini Pompeianorum militum iniuriis atque ipsius Pompei contumeliis permoti Caesaris rebus favebant. Itaque cognita Pompei profectione concursantibus illis atque in ea re occupatis vulgo ex tectis significabant. Per quos re cognita Caesar scalas parari militesque armari iubet, ne quam rei gerendae facultatem dimittat.
[28] The Brundisians, moved by the injuries of Pompey’s soldiers and by the contumelies of Pompey himself, were favoring Caesar’s affairs. And so, when Pompey’s departure was learned, while they were running to and fro and occupied in that business, they were commonly making signals from the rooftops. Through whom, the matter ascertained, Caesar orders ladders to be prepared and the soldiers to be armed, lest he let slip any opportunity of conducting the affair.
Pompey, toward night, set sail. Those who had been stationed on the wall for the sake of guard, at the signal which had been agreed upon, are recalled and run down by known routes to the ships. The soldiers, ladders having been set, climb the walls, but, warned by the Brundisians to beware the blind rampart and the ditches, they halt and, led around by them by a long route, reach the port, and two ships with soldiers, which had stuck fast to Caesar’s moles (breakwaters), they overtake with skiffs and punts, and, once overtaken, they take them in tow.
[29] Caesar etsi ad spem conficiendi negotii maxime probabat coactis navibus mare transire et Pompeium sequi, priusquam ille sese transmarinis auxiliis confirmaret, tamen eius rei moram temporisque longinquitatem timebat, quod omnibus coactis navibus Pompeius praesentem facultatem insequendi sui ademerat. Relinquebatur, ut ex longinquioribus regionibus Galliae Picenique et a freto naves essent exspectandae. Id propter anni tempus longum atque impeditum videbatur.
[29] Caesar, although for the hope of completing the business he most approved, with the ships gathered, to cross the sea and to follow Pompey, before that man should confirm himself with transmarine auxiliaries, nevertheless he feared the delay of that matter and the long prolongation of time, because, with all the ships having been collected, Pompey had taken away the present faculty of pursuing him. It remained that ships must be awaited from the more remote regions of Gaul and of Picenum and from the strait. This seemed long and impeded on account of the season of the year.
[30] Itaque in praesentia Pompei sequendi rationem omittit, in Hispaniam proficisci constituit: duumviris municipiorum omnium imperat, ut naves conquirant Brundisiumque deducendas curent. Mittit in Sardiniam cum legione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus duabus; eundem, cum Siciliam recepisset, protinus in Africam traducere exercitum iubet. Sardiniam obtinebat M. Cotta, Siciliam M. Cato; Africam sorte Tubero obtinere debebat.
[30] And so for the present he abandons the plan of pursuing Pompey, and resolves to set out into Spain: he commands the duumvirs of all the municipalities to gather ships and to see to their being brought down to Brundisium. He sends to Sardinia, with one legion, the legate Valerius; to Sicily, Curio as propraetor with two legions; and he orders this same man, when he shall have recovered Sicily, to transfer the army straightway into Africa. Sardinia was held by M. Cotta, Sicily by M. Cato; Africa, by lot, ought to be held by Tubero.
The Caralitans, as soon as they heard that Valerius was being sent to them, before he had even set out from Italy, of their own accord cast Cotta out of the town. He, thoroughly terrified, because he understood that the whole province was consenting, fled from Sardinia into Africa. Cato in Sicily was refitting old long ships and was ordering new ones upon the communities.
He was doing these things with great zeal. In Lucania and among the Bruttii he was holding levies of Roman citizens through his legates; he was exacting from the communities of Sicily a fixed number of horsemen and foot-soldiers. With these matters almost completed, upon learning of Curio’s arrival, he complains in an assembly that he has been cast aside and betrayed by Cn. Pompeius, who, with all things most unprepared, had undertaken an unnecessary war and, when asked by him and the rest in the senate, had affirmed that everything for himself was apt and prepared for war.
[31] Nacti vacuas ab imperiis Sardiniam Valerius, Curio Siciliam, cum exercitibus eo perveniunt. Tubero cum in Africam venisset, invenit in provincia cum imperio Attium Varum; qui ad Auximum, ut supra demonstravimus, amissis cohortibus protinus ex fuga in Africam pervenerat atque eam sua sponte vacuam occupaverat delectuque habito duas legiones effecerat, hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae nactus aditus ad ea conanda, quod paucis ante annis ex praetura eam provinciam obtinuerat. Hic venientem Uticam navibus Tuberonem portu atque oppido prohibet neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur, sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit.
[31] Sardinia, being vacant of imperia, fell to Valerius; Sicily to Curio; with their armies they arrive there. When Tubero had come into Africa, he found Attius Varus in the province with imperium; who, at Auximum, as we have shown above, his cohorts having been lost, had straightway, in flight, reached Africa and had of his own accord occupied it as empty, and, a levy having been held, had made up two legions, having, through knowledge of men and places and through the use (experience) of that province, obtained access to attempt such things, because a few years before, after his praetorship, he had held that province. This man keeps Tubero, coming by ships to Utica, out of the port and the town, nor does he allow his son, affected in health, to be set ashore on land, but, the anchors having been weighed, compels him to withdraw from that place.
[32] His rebus confectis Caesar, ut reliquum tempus a labore intermitteretur, milites in proxima municipia deducit; ipse ad urbem proficiscitur. Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum, quod omnibus civibus pateret.
[32] With these matters completed, Caesar, so that the remaining time might be intermitted from labor, leads the soldiers into the nearest municipal towns; he himself sets out for the city. The senate having been convened, he commemorates the injuries of his enemies. He shows that he had sought no extraordinary honor, but, having awaited the lawful time of the consulship, had been content with that which was open to all citizens.
It was carried by 10 tribunes of the plebs, his enemies speaking in contradiction, while Cato, indeed, resisted most sharply and, by his former custom of speaking, drew out the days by delay, that consideration of him, though absent, be had—Pompey himself being consul; who, if he had disapproved, why had he allowed it to be carried? If he had approved, why had he forbidden himself to make use of the people’s beneficium? He puts forward his patience, since he had of his own accord demanded the dismissal of the armies, in which he himself was going to make a jettison of dignity and honor.
He sets forth the acerbity of the enemies, who refused in his case what they demanded from another, and preferred that all things be thoroughly commixed rather than to lay down command and their armies. He proclaims the injustice in the snatching away of the legions, the cruelty and insolence in circumscribing the tribunes of the plebs; he recalls the conditions proposed by himself, and the colloquies sought and denied. For which matters he exhorts and requests that they take up the commonwealth and administer it together with him.
But if they flee out of fear, he would not be a burden to them and would administer the commonwealth by himself. That legates ought to be sent to Pompey about a composition, nor did he dread what Pompey had said a little before in the senate: that to those to whom legates were sent, authority was attributed, and the fear of those who sent was signified. These things seem of a tenuous and infirm spirit.
[33] Probat rem senatus de mittendis legatis: sed, qui mitterentur, non reperiebantur, maximeque timoris causa pro se quisque id munus legationis recusabat. Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent. Sic triduum disputationibus excusationibusque extrahitur.
[33] The senate approves the measure about sending envoys; but those who were to be sent were not found, and, chiefly by reason of fear, each man for his own part refused that duty of the legation. For Pompey, departing from the city, had said in the senate that he would hold in the same position those who had remained at Rome and those who had been in Caesar’s camp. Thus three days are drawn out with disputations and excuses.
L. Metellus also is put forward, a tribune of the plebs, by Caesar’s enemies, to delay this matter and to impede the remaining affairs, whatever he should undertake to do. When his plan was known, Caesar, with several days consumed in vain, lest he lose the remaining time, with those things left unfinished which he had intended to do, sets out from the city and arrives in Further Gaul.
[34] Quo cum venisset, cognoscit missum a Pompeio Vibullium Rufum, quem paucis ante diebus Corfinio captum ipse dimiserat; profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis septem, quas Igilii et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis, libertis, colonis suis compleverat; praemissos etiam legatos Massilienses domum, nobiles adulescentes, quos ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent. Quibus mandatis acceptis Massilienses portas Caesari clauserant; Albicos, barbaros homines, qui in eorum fide antiquitus erant montesque supra Massiliam incolebant, ad se vocaverant; frumentum ex finitimis regionibus atque ex omnibus castellis in urbem convexerant; armorum officinas in urbe instituerant; muros portas classem reficiebant.
[34] When he had come there, he learns that Vibullius Rufus had been sent by Pompey, whom a few days earlier, captured at Corfinium, he himself had released; that Domitius likewise had set out to occupy Massilia with seven swift-sailing ships, which, gathered from private persons at Igilium and at Cosa, he had filled with his slaves, freedmen, and colonists; that the Massiliote envoys too had been sent on ahead home, noble youths, whom, when departing from the city, Pompey had exhorted not to let Caesar’s new good offices expel from them the memory of his former benefactions. With these mandates received, the Massiliots had closed the gates to Caesar; they had summoned to themselves the Albici, barbarian men, who of old were in their faith and inhabited the mountains above Massilia; they had conveyed grain from the neighboring regions and from all the forts into the city; they had established workshops of arms in the city; they were refitting the walls, the gates, the fleet.
[35] Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos; cum his agit, ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur: debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua, quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur, commemorat. Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiorem habeat causam.
[35] Caesar summons to himself from Massilia the fifteen foremost men; with them he deals, lest the beginning of waging war arise from the Massiliots: that they ought to follow the authority of all Italy rather than obey the will of one man. He recounts the remaining points, which he judged to pertain to healing their minds. The envoys carry home his oration and, by authority, report these things to Caesar: that they understand the Roman people to be divided into two parties; and that it is neither within their own judgment nor within their powers to discern which party has the more just cause.
That the chiefs of those parties were Gnaeus Pompeius and Gaius Caesar, patrons of the city; of whom the one had publicly granted to them the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii, the other had assigned the Salyi, conquered in war, and had increased the tax revenues. Wherefore, to equal benefactions they too ought to render equal goodwill, and to aid neither of them against the other nor to receive either into the city or the harbors.
[36] Haec dum inter eos aguntur, Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab eis receptus urbi praeficitur; summa ei belli administrandi permittitur. Eius imperio classem quoquo versus dimittunt; onerarias naves, quas ubique possunt, deprehendunt atque in portum deducunt, parum clavis aut materia atque armamentis instructis ad reliquas armandas reficiendasque utuntur; frumenti quod inventum est, in publicum conferunt; reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, si accidat, reservant. Quibus iniuriis permotus Caesar legiones tres Massiliam adducit; turres vineasque ad oppugnationem urbis agere, naves longas Arelate numero XII facere instituit.
[36] While these things are being transacted among them, Domitius reached Massilia by ships and, received by them, is put in charge of the city; the highest authority for administering the war is entrusted to him. At his command they send out the fleet in every direction; cargo ships, wherever they can, they seize and lead into the harbor, and, though furnished too little with nails or timber and tackle, they use them for arming and refitting the rest; whatever grain was found, they bring into the public stock; the remaining wares and supplies they reserve for a siege of the city, if it should occur. Stirred by these injuries, Caesar brings three legions to Massilia; he begins to drive up towers and vineae for the assault of the city, and to have long ships to the number 12 made at Arelate.
[37] Dum haec parat atque administrat, C. Fabium legatum cum legionibus III, quas Narbone circumque ea loca hiemandi causa disposuerat, in Hispaniam praemittit celeriterque saltus Pyrenaeos occupari iubet, qui eo tempore ab L. Afranio legato praesidiis tenebantur. Reliquas legiones, quae longius hiemabant, subsequi iubet. Fabius, ut erat imperatum, adhibita celeritate praesidium ex saltu deiecit magnisque itineribus ad exercitum Afrani contendit.
[37] While he prepares and administers these things, he sends ahead C. Fabius, legate, with 3 legions, which he had stationed at Narbo and around those places for the sake of wintering, into Spain, and he orders the Pyrenean passes to be occupied with celerity, which at that time were held by garrisons under L. Afranius, the legate. He orders the remaining legions, which were wintering farther away, to follow after. Fabius, as it had been commanded, celerity having been applied, dislodged the garrison from the pass and by forced marches hastened to the army of Afranius.
[38] Adventu L.Vibulli Rufi, quem a Pompeio missum in Hispaniam demonstratum est, Afranius et Petreius et Varro, legati Pompei, quorum unus Hispaniam citeriorem tribus legionibus, alter ulteriorem a saltu Castulonensi ad Anam duabus legionibus, tertius ab Ana Vettonum agrum Lusitaniamque pari numero legionum optinebat, officia inter se partiuntur, uti Petreius ex Lusitania per Vettones cum omnibus copiis ad Afranium proficiscatur, Varro cum eis, quas habebat, legionibus omnem ulteriorem Hispaniam tueatur. His rebus constitutis equites auxiliaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae, Cantabris barbarisque omnibus, qui ad Oceanum pertinent, ab Afranio imperantur. Quibus coactis celeriter Petreius per Vettones ad Afranium pervenit, constituuntque communi consilio bellum ad Ilerdam propter ipsius opportunitatem gerere.
[38] Upon the advent of L. Vibullius Rufus, who was shown to have been sent by Pompey into Spain, Afranius and Petreius and Varro, Pompey’s legates—of whom one held Hither Spain with three legions, another the Farther from the Castulonian pass to the Anas with two legions, the third from the Anas the land of the Vettones and Lusitania with an equal number of legions—partition the duties among themselves, to wit, that Petreius set out from Lusitania through the Vettones with all forces to Afranius, and that Varro, with the legions which he had, protect all Farther Spain. These matters having been settled, cavalry and auxiliaries are imposed: upon all Lusitania by Petreius, upon Celtiberia, the Cantabrians, and all the barbarians who pertain to the Ocean, by Afranius. These having been gathered, Petreius swiftly reaches Afranius through the Vettones, and by common counsel they determine to wage war at Ilerda on account of its very opportuneness.
[39] Erant, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones Afranii tres, Petreii duae, praeterea scutatae citerioris provinciae et caetratae ulterioris Hispaniae cohortes circiter LXXX equitumque utriusque provinciae circiter V milia. Caesar legiones in Hispaniam praemiserat VI, auxilia peditum V milia, equitum III milia, quae omnibus superioribus bellis habuerat, et parem ex Gallia numerum, quam ipse pacaverat, nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato, huc optimi generis hominum ex Aquitanis montanisque, qui Galliam provinciam attingunt addiderat. Audierat Pompeium per Mauretaniam cum legionibus iter in Hispaniam facere confestimque esse venturum.
[39] There were, as has been shown above, 3 legions of Afranius, 2 of Petreius, and, besides, about 80 cohorts—shield-bearing from the Hither province and target-shielded from Further Spain—and about 5 thousand cavalry from both provinces. Caesar had sent ahead into Spain 6 legions, 5 thousand infantry auxiliaries, 3 thousand cavalry, which he had had in all the earlier wars, and an equal number from Gaul, which he himself had pacified, having summoned by name from all the communities each man who was most noble and most stalwart; to these he had added men of the best stock from the Aquitani and the mountaineers who border the Province of Gaul. He had heard that Pompey was making a march through Mauretania with the legions into Spain and would come at once.
[40] Fabius finitimarum civitatum animos litteris nuntiisque temptabat. In Sicori flumine pontes effecerat duos distantes inter se milia passuum IIII. His pontibus pabulatum mittebat, quod ea quae citra flumen fuerant, superioribus diebus consumpserat.
[40] Fabius was testing the spirits of the neighboring cities by letters and messengers. On the river Sicoris he had made two bridges, distant from each other 4 miles. By these bridges he was sending out to forage, because the things which had been on this side of the river he had consumed in the preceding days.
Almost the same, and for the same reason, the commanders of the Pompeian army were doing, and they were frequently contending with them in equestrian battles. To this spot, when, by daily custom, two Fabian legions, having come together as a guard for the foragers, had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and the baggage-train and all the cavalry were following, suddenly by the force of the winds and the greatness of the water the bridge was interrupted and the remaining multitude of the cavalry was cut off. This being learned by Petreius and Afranius from the embankment and the wickerworks which were being borne along by the river, Afranius, by his own bridge, which he had connected to the town and the camp, swiftly ferried across 4 legions and all the cavalry, and met the two Fabian legions.
With his advent announced, Lucius Plancus, who was in command of the legions, compelled by a necessary matter seizes higher ground and sets a diverse battle-line in two parts, lest he be circumvened by the cavalry. Thus, having engaged with an unequal number, he sustains great onsets of the legions and the cavalry. With the battle joined by the horse, the standards of two legions are seen from afar by both sides, which Gaius Fabius had sent by the farther bridge as aid to our men, having suspected that what happened would occur: that the leaders of the adversaries would use the opportunity and the beneficium of Fortune to overwhelm our men.
[41] Eo biduo Caesar cum equitibus DCCCC, quos sibi praesidio reliquerat, in castra pervenit. Pons, qui fuerat tempestate interruptus, paene erat refectus; hunc noctu perfici iussit. Ipse cognita locorum natura ponti castrisque praesidio sex cohortes reliquit atque omnia impedimenta et postero die omnibus copiis triplici instructa acie ad Ilerdam proficiscitur et sub castris Afranii constitit et ibi paulisper sub armis moratus facit aequo loco pugnandi potestatem.
[41] In that two-day period Caesar reached the camp with 900 cavalry, whom he had left as a protection for himself. The bridge, which had been interrupted by a tempest, was almost refashioned; he ordered this to be completed by night. He himself, the nature of the places having been learned, left six cohorts as a guard for the bridge and the camp, and all the impedimenta; and on the next day, with all his forces, a triple battle-line drawn up, he sets out to Ilerda and took position under Afranius’s camp, and there, having lingered a little under arms, he grants the power of fighting on equal ground.
With the opportunity given, Afranius leads out his forces and positions them on the middle of the hill below the camp. Caesar, when he learned that it depended on Afranius that a battle not be fought, decided to make a camp from the very lowest foothills of the mountain, leaving about 400 paces between; and, lest in doing the work the soldiers be terrified by a sudden incursion of the enemy and be hindered from the work, he forbade them to be fortified with a rampart, because it had to project and be seen from afar, but ordered a ditch of 15 feet to be made from the front, facing the enemy. The first and second battle-lines remained under arms, as had been established from the beginning; behind these the work was being done out of sight by the 3rd line.
[42] Postero die omnem exercitum intra fossam continet et, quod longius erat agger petendus, in praesentia similem rationem operis instituit singulaque latera castrorum singulis attribuit legionibus munienda fossasque ad eandem magnitudinem perfici iubet; reliquas legiones in armis expeditas contra hostem constituit. Afranius Petreiusque terrendi causa atque operis impediendi copias suas ad infimas montis radices producunt et proelio lacessunt, neque idcirco Caesar opus intermittit confisus praesidio legionum trium et munitione fossae. Illi non diu commorati nec longius ab infimo colle progressi copias in castra reducunt.
[42] On the next day he keeps the whole army within the ditch, and, since the material for the rampart had to be fetched farther, for the present he establishes a similar plan of the work and assigns each side of the camp to individual legions to be fortified, and orders the ditches to be completed to the same magnitude; he stations the remaining legions armed and unencumbered against the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, for the sake of terrifying and of impeding the work, lead their troops out to the lowest roots of the mountain and challenge to battle; yet for that reason Caesar does not interrupt the work, trusting in the guard of three legions and in the munition of the ditch. They, not lingering long nor advancing farther from the foot of the hill, lead their forces back into camp.
[43] Erat inter oppidum Ilerdam et proximum collem, ubi castra Petreius atque Afranius habebant, planities circiter passuum CCC, atque in hoc fere medio spatio tumulus erat paulo editior; quem si occupavisset Caesar et communisset, ab oppido et ponte et commeatu omni, quem in oppidum contulerant, se interclusurum adversarios confidebat. Hoc sperans legiones III ex castris educit acieque in locis idoneis instructa unius legionis antesignanos procurrere atque eum tumulum occupare iubet. Qua re cognita celeriter quae in statione pro castris erant Afranii cohortes breviore itinere ad eundem occupandum locum mittuntur.
[43] Between the town of Ilerda and the nearest hill, where Petreius and Afranius had their camp, there was a plain of about 300 paces, and in about the middle of this space there was a mound a little higher; which, if Caesar should seize and fortify, he trusted that he would cut off his adversaries from the town and the bridge and from all the supply which they had brought together into the town. Hoping this, he leads 3 legions out from the camp, and with his battle line drawn up in suitable places he orders the antesignani of one legion to run forward and seize that mound. When this was learned, the cohorts of Afranius which were on station in front of the camp are sent by a shorter route to seize the same place.
[44] Genus erat pugnae militum illorum, ut magno impetu primo procurrerent, audacter locum caperent, ordines suos non magnopere servarent, rari dispersique pugnarent; si premerentur, pedem referre et loco excedere non turpe existimarent cum Lusitanis reliquisque barbaris barbaro genere quodam pugnae assuefacti; quod fere fit, quibus quisque in locis miles inveteraverit, ut multum earum regionum consuetudine moveatur. Haec tum ratio nostros perturbavit insuetos huius generis pugnae: circumiri enim sese ab aperto latere procurrentibus singulis arbitrabantur; ipsi autem suos ordines servare neque ab signis discedere neque sine gravi causa eum locum, quem ceperant, dimitti censuerant oportere. Itaque perturbatis antesignanis legio, quae in eo cornu constiterat, locum non tenuit atque in proximum collem sese recepit.
[44] The manner of combat of those soldiers was this: that at the first they ran forward with great impetus, boldly seized a position, did not greatly keep their ranks, and fought scattered and in open order; if they were pressed, they thought it not disgraceful to step back and leave their ground, being habituated with the Lusitanians and the other barbarians to a certain barbarian kind of fighting; which generally happens, in whatever regions a soldier has become inveterate, that he is much influenced by the custom of those places. This method then disordered our men, unaccustomed to this kind of combat: for they supposed that they were being outflanked on the open side by individuals running out; but they themselves had judged that they ought to keep their own ranks, not depart from the standards, nor let go the place which they had taken without grave cause. And so, when the vanguard (antesignani) was thrown into confusion, the legion which had taken its stand on that wing did not hold the position and withdrew to the nearest hill.
[45] Caesar paene omni acie perterrita, quod praeter opinionem consuetudinemque acciderat, cohortatus suos legionem nonam subsidio ducit; hostem insolenter atque acriter nostros insequentem supprimit rursusque terga vertere seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro consistere cogit. Sed nonae legionis milites elati studio, dum sarcire acceptum detrimentum volunt, temere insecuti longius fugientes in locum iniquum progrediuntur et sub montem, in quo erat oppidum positum Ilerda, succedunt. Hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant.
[45] Caesar, with almost the whole battle line terrified, because it had happened contrary to expectation and custom, after exhorting his men leads the Ninth Legion in for support; he suppresses the enemy, insolently and sharply pursuing our men, and compels them again to turn their backs and to betake themselves to the town Ilerda and to take a stand under the wall. But the soldiers of the Ninth Legion, carried away by zeal, while they wish to repair the detriment incurred, rashly pursuing those fleeing too far, advance into an unfavorable place and move up under the hill on which the town Ilerda was situated. From here, when they wanted to withdraw, those men, from the higher ground, were pressing our men again.
The place was precipitous, sheer on each side, and extended only so much in breadth that three deployed cohorts could fill it, so that neither could reserves be sent up from the flanks nor could the cavalry be of use to those laboring. From the town, however, a sloping ground with a slight gradient trended for a length of about 400 paces. By this way there was a retreat for our men, because, incited by zeal, they had advanced more unadvisedly to that point; in this place the fighting was carried on, and it was unfavorable both on account of the narrowness and because they had taken their stand right under the very roots of the mountain, so that no missile was hurled at them in vain.
TNevertheless they strove by virtue and patience and sustained all wounds. Their forces were being augmented, and from the camp cohorts were frequently sent through the town, so that the fresh might succeed the weary. Caesar was compelled to do this same thing, that, cohorts having been sent in to the same place, he might receive the fatigued.
[46] Hoc cum esset modo pugnatum continenter horis quinque nostrique gravius a multitudine premerentur, consumptis omnibus telis gladiis destrictis impetum adversus montem in cohortes faciunt, paucisque deiectis reliquos sese convertere cogunt. Submotis sub murum cohortibus ac nonnullam partem propter terrorem in oppidum compulsis facilis est nostris receptus datus. Equitatus autem noster ab utroque latere, etsi deiectis atque inferioribus locis constiterat, tamen summa in iugum virtute conititur atque inter duas acies perequitans commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat.
[46] When fighting had been carried on in this manner continuously for five hours and our men were pressed more heavily by the multitude, with all missiles spent and swords drawn they make a charge uphill against the cohorts, and, a few having been cast down, they force the rest to turn about. The cohorts having been driven back under the wall, and no small part driven into the town because of terror, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. But our cavalry on both flanks, although it had taken its stand after being driven down and in lower places, nevertheless with utmost valor strains up to the ridge, and, riding between the two battle lines, gives our men a more convenient and safer retreat.
Thus the fighting was waged with a varied struggle. Our men in the first engagement about 70 fell, among them Q. Fulginius from the first hastatus of the 14th Legion, who, on account of outstanding valor, had from the lower orders attained to that position; more than 600 are wounded. Of Afranius’s men, T. Caecilius, centurion of the primus pilus, is killed, and besides him 4 centurions, and more than 200 soldiers.
[47] Sed haec eius diei praefertur opinio, ut se utrique superiores discessisse existimarent: Afraniani, quod, cum esse omnium iudicio inferiores viderentur, comminus tam diu stetissent et nostrorum impetum sustinuissent et initio locum tumulumque tenuissent, quae causa pugnandi fuerat, et nostros primo congressu terga vertere coegissent; nostri autem, quod iniquo loco atque impari congressi numero quinque horis proelium sustinuissent, quod montem gladiis destrictis ascendissent, quod ex loco superiore terga vertere adversarios coegissent atque in oppidum compulissent. Illi eum tumulum, pro quo pugnatum est, magnis operibus munierunt praesidiumque ibi posuerunt.
[47] But this opinion of that day is put forward, that both sides thought themselves to have departed as superiors: the Afranians, because, although they seemed inferior by the judgment of all, they had stood at close quarters so long and had sustained the onrush of our men and at the beginning had held the position and the knoll—which had been the cause of fighting—and had compelled our men at the first encounter to turn their backs; our men, however, because, having engaged on disadvantageous ground and with unequal numbers, they had sustained the battle for five hours, because they had climbed the mountain with swords drawn, because from the higher ground they had forced the adversaries to turn their backs and had driven them into the town. They fortified that knoll, for the sake of which the fight was waged, with great works and placed a garrison there.
[48] Accidit etiam repentinum incommodum biduo, quo haec gesta sunt. Tanta enim tempestas cooritur, ut numquam illis locis maiores aquas fuisse constaret. Tum autem ex omnibus montibus nives proluit ac summas ripas fluminis superavit pontesque ambo, quos C. Fabius fecerat, uno die interrupit.
[48] A sudden incommodity also befell within the two-day span in which these things were done. For so great a tempest arose that it was agreed that never in those places had there been greater waters. Then, moreover, from all the mountains it washed down the snows and overpassed the highest banks of the river, and it broke both bridges, which C. Fabius had made, in a single day.
This matter brought great difficulties to Caesar’s army. For the camp, as has been shown above, since it was between two rivers, the Sicoris and the Cinga, at a space of 30 miles, neither of these could be crossed, and of necessity all were contained in these straits. Neither could the communities that had come into Caesar’s friendship bring up grain, nor could those who had advanced farther to forage, cut off by the rivers, return, nor could the very great convoys of supplies, which were coming from Italy and Gaul, arrive in the camp.
It was, moreover, a most difficult time, when neither was there grain in the winter-quarters nor were the crops far from maturity; and the communities had been emptied out, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the grain to Ilerda before Caesar’s arrival, and whatever of a remainder there had been, Caesar had consumed in the previous days; the herds, which could have been a second succor against scarcity, the neighboring communities had removed farther away on account of the war. Those who had advanced for the sake of foraging fodder or grain, these the light-armed Lusitanians and the cetrati—targeteers skilled in those regions—of Hither Spain kept pursuing; for whom it was easy to swim across the river, because it is the custom of all of them not to go to the army without water-skins.
[49] At exercitus Afranii omnium rerum abundabat copia. Multum erat frumentum provisum et convectum superioribus temporibus, multum ex omni provincia comportabatur; magna copia pabuli suppetebat. Harum omnium rerum facultates sine ullo periculo pons Ilerdae praebebat et loca trans flumen integra, quo omnino Caesar adire non poterat.
[49] But Afranius’s army abounded in a supply of all things. Much grain had been provided and conveyed in earlier times, much was being carried in from the whole province; a great supply of fodder was at hand. The resources for all these things were furnished without any danger by the bridge at Ilerda and by the places across the river left intact, whither Caesar could not come at all.
[50] Hae permanserunt aquae dies complures. Conatus est Caesar reficere pontes; sed nec magnitudo fluminis permittebat, neque ad ripam dispositae cohortes adversariorum perfici patiebantur. Quod illis prohibere erat facile cum ipsius fluminis natura atque aquae magnitudine, tum quod ex totis ripis in unum atque angustum locum tela iaciebantur; atque erat difficile eodem tempore rapidissimo flumine opera perficere et tela vitare.
[50] These waters remained for several days. Caesar attempted to refashion the bridges; but neither did the magnitude of the river permit it, nor did the cohorts of the adversaries disposed at the bank allow completion. For it was easy for them to prohibit this both by the nature of the river itself and the magnitude of the water, and moreover because from all the banks missiles were being hurled into a single and narrow place; and it was difficult at the same time, with a most rapid river, to complete the works and to avoid the missiles.
[51] Nuntiatur Afranio magnos commeatus, qui iter habebant ad Caesarem, ad flumen constitisse. Venerant eo sagittarii ex Rutenis, equites ex Gallia cum multis carris magnisque impedimentis, ut fert Gallica consuetudo. Erant praeterea cuiusque generis hominum milia circiter VI cum servis liberisque; sed nullus ordo, nullum imperium certum, cum suo quisque consilio uteretur atque omnes sine timore iter facerent usi superiorum temporum atque itinerum licentia.
[51] It is reported to Afranius that large convoys of supplies, who were making a march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Ruteni had come there, cavalry from Gaul with many wagons and a great baggage-train, as the Gallic custom bears. There were, besides, about 6 thousand people of every sort, with slaves and freeborn; but there was no order, no fixed command, since each used his own counsel, and all made the journey without fear, having made use of the license of earlier times and marches.
There were several honorable adolescents, sons of senators and of the equestrian order; there were legations of the communities; there were legates of Caesar. All these the rivers were confining. To crush these, with all the cavalry and with 3 legions, Afranius sets out by night and attacks the unwary, having first sent the cavalry ahead.
Quickly, however, the Gallic horsemen get themselves unencumbered and commit battle. They, so long as the matter could be carried on in an equal contest, few sustained a great number of the enemy; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, with a few lost, they betook themselves to the nearest mountains. This juncture of the fight brought great momentum for safety to our men; for, having gotten a span of space, they withdrew into the higher places.
[52] His tamen omnibus annona crevit; quae fere res non solum inopia praesentis, sed etiam futuri temporis timore ingravescere consuevit. Iamque ad denarios L in singulos modios annona pervenerat, et militum vires inopia frumenti deminuerat, atque incommoda in dies augebantur; et ita paucis diebus magna erat facta rerum commutatio ac se fortuna inclinaverat, ut nostri magna inopia necessariarum rerum conflictarentur, illi omnibus abundarent rebus superioresque haberentur. Caesar eis civitatibus, quae ad eius amicitiam accesserant, quod minor erat frumenti copia, pecus imperabat; calones ad longinquiores civitates dimittebat; ipse praesentem inopiam quibus poterat subsidiis tutabatur.
[52] Yet with all these things, the price of grain grew; a matter which is accustomed to become more burdensome not only from the scarcity of the present, but also from fear of the future time. And now the price of grain had reached 50 denarii for each modius, and the soldiers’ strength had been diminished by want of grain, and the inconveniences were increasing by the day; and so in a few days a great change of affairs had come to pass and fortune had inclined, with the result that our men were struggling with a great lack of necessary things, while they abounded in all things and were held to be superior. Caesar ordered livestock from those communities which had entered into his friendship, because the supply of grain was smaller; he sent the camp-servants to the more distant communities; he himself was guarding against the present scarcity by whatever aids he could.
[53] Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant; multa rumor affingebat, ut paene bellum confectum videretur. Quibus litteris nuntiisque Romam perlatis magni domum concursus ad Afranium magnaeque gratulationes fiebant; multi ex Italia ad Cn. Pompeium proficiscebantur, alii, ut principes talem nuntium attulisse, alii ne eventum belli exspectasse aut ex omnibus novissimi venisse viderentur.
[53] These things Afranius and Petreius and their friends were writing out to their own at Rome, even fuller and more abundant; rumor was adding many embellishments, so that the war seemed almost finished. When these letters and messengers had been brought to Rome, there was a great throng to Afranius’s house and great congratulations were being offered; many from Italy were setting out to Cn. Pompey, some so as to appear the first to have brought such a report, others lest they seem to have waited for the outcome of the war or to have come last of all.
[54] Cum in his angustiis res esset, atque omnes viae ab Afranianis militibus equitibusque obsiderentur, nec pontes perfici possent, imperat militibus Caesar, ut naves faciant, cuius generis eum superioribus annis usus Britanniae docuerat. Carinae ac prima statumina ex levi materia fiebant; reliquum corpus navium viminibus contextum coriis integebatur. Has perfectas carris iunctis devehit noctu milia passuum a castris XXII militesque his navibus flumen transportat continentemque ripae collem improviso occupat.
[54] When affairs were in these narrows, and all the roads were blockaded by Afranius’s soldiers and horsemen, nor could the bridges be brought to completion, Caesar orders the soldiers to make ships, a kind whose kind the experience of Britain in earlier years had taught him. The keels and the first stanchions were made from light material; the remaining body of the ships, woven with withes, was covered with hides. These, once completed, he conveys with carts yoked, by night, 22 miles from the camp, and with these ships he transports the soldiers across the river and, by surprise, occupies a hill contiguous with the bank.
He quickly, before he is perceived by the adversaries, fortifies this. To this place he later ferries a legion and on both sides sets up a bridge, and in two days he completes it. Thus he safely receives back to himself the supplies and those who had gone forth for the sake of grain, and he begins to expedite the grain-supply.
[55] Eodem die equitum magnam partem flumen traiecit. Qui inopinantes pabulatores et sine ullo dissipatos timore aggressi magnum numerum iumentorum atque hominum intercipiunt cohortibusque cetratis subsidio missis scienter in duas partes sese distribuunt, alii ut praedae praesidio sint, alii ut venientibus resistant atque eos propellant, unamque cohortem, quae temere ante ceteras extra aciem procurrerat, seclusam ab reliquis circumveniunt atque interficiunt incolumesque cum magna praeda eodem ponte in castra revertuntur.
[55] On the same day he ferried across a great part of the cavalry. These, having attacked the foragers unexpecting and scattered without any fear, intercept a great number of pack-animals and men; and with cetrate cohorts sent as relief, they knowingly distribute themselves into two parts—some to be a guard for the booty, others to withstand those coming and to drive them back—and they surround and kill one cohort which, having rashly run forward before the rest outside the line of battle, had been cut off from the others; and unharmed, with great booty, they return to the camp by the same bridge.
[56] Dum haec ad Ilerdam geruntur, Massilienses usi L. Domitii consilio naves longas expediunt numero XVII, quarum erant XI tectae. Multa huc minora navigia addunt, ut ipsa multitudine nostra classis terreatur. Magnum numerum sagittariorum, magnum Albicorum, de quibus supra demonstratum est, imponunt atque hos praemiis pollicitationibusque incitant.
[56] While these things are being transacted at Ilerda, the Massiliots, using the counsel of L. Domitius, fit out long ships to the number of 17, of which 11 were covered. They add many smaller vessels besides, so that by the very multitude our fleet might be terrified. They put on board a great number of archers, a great number of Albici, about whom it has been shown above, and they incite these by rewards and promises.
Domitius requisitioned certain ships for himself and filled these with the colonists and shepherds whom he had brought with him. Thus, with the fleet equipped in all respects, they proceeded with great confidence toward our ships, which were commanded by D. Brutus. These were holding stations at the island which lies opposite Massilia.
[57] Erat multo inferior numero navium Brutus; sed electos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros, antesignanos, centuriones, Caesar ei classi attribuerat, qui sibi id muneris depoposcerant. Hi manus ferreas atque harpagones paraverant magnoque numero pilorum, tragularum reliquorumque telorum se instruxerant. Ita cognito hostium adventu suas naves ex portu educunt, cum Massiliensibus confligunt.
[57] Brutus was much inferior in the number of ships; but Caesar had assigned to that fleet the bravest men chosen from all the legions, front‑rankers (antesignani) and centurions, who had demanded that duty for themselves. These had prepared iron hands and grapnels, and had equipped themselves with a great number of pila, tragulae, and the remaining missiles. Thus, when the arrival of the enemy was known, they lead their ships out of the harbor and engage with the Massilians.
On both sides it was fought most bravely and most fiercely; nor did the Albici yield much to our men in valor, rough mountaineers, trained in arms; and these, only just departed from the Massilians, kept their recent promise in mind, and the shepherds of Domitius, stirred by the hope of liberty, under their master’s eyes were striving to prove their service.
[58] Ipsi Massilienses et celeritate navium et scientia gubernatorum confisi nostros eludebant impetusque eorum excipiebant et, quoad licebat latiore uti spatio, producta longius acie circumvenire nostros aut pluribus navibus adoriri singulas aut remos transcurrentes detergere, si possent, contendebant; cum propius erat necessario ventum, ab scientia gubernatorum atque artificiis ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant. Nostri cum minus exercitatis remigibus minusque peritis gubernatoribus utebantur, qui repente ex onerariis navibus erant producti neque dum etiam vocabulis armamentorum cognitis, tum etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impediebantur; factae enim subito ex humida materia non eundem usum celeritatis habebant. Itaque, dum locus comminus pugnandi daretur, aequo animo singulas binis navibus obiciebant atque iniecta manu ferrea et retenta utraque nave diversi pugnabant atque in hostium naves transcendebant et magno numero Albicorum et pastorum interfecto partem navium deprimunt, nonnullas cum hominibus capiunt, reliquas in portum compellunt.
[58] The Massiliotes themselves, relying both on the speed of their ships and the science of their helmsmen, were evading our attacks and receiving their charges, and, so long as it was permitted to make use of a broader space, with their line drawn out farther they strove either to encircle our men, or to assail single ships with several, or, running their oars across, to sweep them clean, if they could; when it was necessarily come to closer quarters, they fled from the science of the helmsmen and their artifices to the valor of the mountaineers. Our men, since they were employing less-trained rowers and less-experienced helmsmen—who had suddenly been brought out of cargo ships and had not yet even learned the names of the fittings—and were then also hindered by the slowness and heaviness of the ships (for, made suddenly from green timber, they did not have the same use of speed), therefore, whenever a place for fighting at close quarters was given, with even spirit they would oppose single ships to two, and, when an iron hand had been thrown in and both ships held fast, those stationed apart fought, and they boarded the enemies’ ships; and, after a great number of Albici and shepherds had been slain, they sink part of the ships, they seize some with their men, and they drive the rest into the harbor.
[59] Hoc primum Caesari ad Ilerdam nuntiatur; simul perfecto ponte celeriter fortuna mutatur. Illi perterriti virtute equitum minus libere, minus audacter vagabantur, alias non longo a castris progressi spatio, ut celerem receptum haberent, angustius pabulabantur, alias longiore circuitu custodias stationesque equitum vitabant, aut aliquo accepto detrimento aut procul equitatu viso ex medio itinere proiectis sarcinis fugiebant. Postremo et plures intermittere dies et praeter consuetudinem omnium noctu constituerant pabulari.
[59] This is first announced to Caesar at Ilerda; at the same time, with the bridge completed, fortune quickly is changed. They, terrified by the valor of the cavalry, wandered less freely and less boldly; at times, having advanced not far from the camp, so that they might have a swift retreat, they foraged more narrowly; at other times, by a longer circuit they avoided the cavalry’s guards and stations; or, after some loss received, or when the cavalry was seen from afar, they fled from the middle of the road, having thrown down their packs. Finally, they had resolved both to let several days pass between and, contrary to the custom of all, to forage by night.
[60] Interim Oscenses et Calagurritani, qui erant Oscensibus contributi, mittunt ad eum legatos seseque imperata facturos pollicentur. Hos Tarraconenses et Iacetani et Ausetani et paucis post diebus Illurgavonenses, qui flumen Hiberum attingunt, insequuntur. Petit ab his omnibus, ut se frumento iuvent.
[60] Meanwhile the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who had been attached to the Oscenses, send legates to him and promise that they will do what is commanded. These are followed in turn by the Tarraconenses and the Iacetani and the Ausetani, and a few days later by the Illurgavonenses, who touch the river Hiberus. He petitions from all of these that they aid him with grain.
With the bridge completed, with five great cities adjoined to friendship, the grain affair expedited, and the rumors extinguished about the auxiliaries of the legions which were said to be coming with Pompey through Mauretania, many more long-distant cities defect from Afranius and follow Caesar’s friendship.
[61] Quibus rebus perterritis animis adversariorum Caesar, ne semper magno circuitu per pontem equitatus esset mittendus, nactus idoneum locum fossas pedum XXX in latitudinem complures facere instituit, quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret vadumque in eo flumine efficeret. His paene effectis magnum in timorem Afranius Petreiusque perveniunt, ne omnino frumento pabuloque intercluderentur, quod multum Caesar equitatu valebat. Itaque constituunt illis locis excedere et in Celtiberiam bellum transferre.
[61] With the minds of the adversaries terrified by these things, Caesar, in order that his cavalry not always have to be sent by a great detour over the bridge, having found a suitable place, set about making several ditches 30 feet in breadth, by which he might divert some part of the Sicoris and produce a ford in that river. With these almost accomplished, Afranius and Petreius come into great fear, lest they be entirely cut off from grain and forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. Therefore they resolve to depart from those places and to transfer the war into Celtiberia.
This counsel was also supported by this consideration: of the two contrary classes, the cities which in the former war had stood with Sertorius, conquered, feared the name and command of the absent Pompey; those which had remained in friendship, affected by great benefactions, cherished him; but the name of Caesar was more obscure among the barbarians. Here they expected great cavalry forces and great auxiliaries and were thinking to draw out the war in their own locales into the winter. This plan having been entered upon, they order ships to be collected along the whole river Hiberus (Ebro) and to be brought to Octogesa.
[62] Qua re per exploratores cognita summo labore militum Caesar continuato diem noctemque opere in flumine avertendo huc iam rem deduxerat, ut equites, etsi difficulter atque aegre fiebat, possent tamen atque auderent flumen transire, pedites vero tantummodo umeris ac summo pectore exstarent et cum altitudine aquae tum etiam rapiditate fluminis ad transeundum impedirentur. Sed tamen eodem fere tempore pons in Hibero prope effectus nuntiabatur, et in Sicori vadum reperiebatur.
[62] With this matter learned through the scouts, Caesar, by the utmost labor of the soldiers, with the work continued day and night in diverting the river, had already brought the affair to this point: that the horsemen, although it came about with difficulty and distress, nevertheless could and would dare to cross the river, whereas the foot-soldiers would stand out only with their shoulders and the top of the chest, and were impeded in crossing both by the height of the water and also by the rapidity of the river. But yet at nearly the same time it was announced that the bridge on the Hiberus was almost completed, and in the Sicoris a ford was found.
[63] Iam vero eo magis illi maturandum iter existimabant. Itaque duabus auxiliaribus cohortibus Ilerdae praesidio relictis omnibus copiis Sicorim transeunt et cum duabus legionibus, quas superioribus diebus traduxerant, castra coniungunt. Relinquebatur Caesari nihil, nisi uti equitatu agmen adversariorum male haberet et carperet.
[63] By now, indeed, they judged all the more that the march must be hastened. And so, with two auxiliary cohorts left at Ilerda as a garrison, they cross the Sicoris with all their forces and join camp with the two legions which they had led across in the previous days. Nothing remained to Caesar, except to use the cavalry to ill-handle and to harry the column of the adversaries.
For the bridge itself involved a great detour, so that by a much shorter route they could reach the Hiberus. The cavalry sent by him cross the river, and, when at about the third watch Petreius and Afranius had moved camp, they suddenly show themselves to the rearmost column and, with a great multitude poured around, begin to delay and to impede the march.
[64] Prima luce ex superioribus locis, quae Caesaris castris erant coniuncta, cernebatur equitatus nostri proelio novissimos illorum premi vehementer ac nonnumquam sustineri extremum agmen atque interrumpi, alias inferri signa et universarum cohortium impetu nostros propelli, dein rursus conversos insequi. Totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum non necessario longius duci; centuriones tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus. Quorum studio et vocibus excitatus Caesar, etsi timebat tantae magnitudini fluminis exercitum obicere, conandum tamen atque experiendum iudicat.
[64] At first light, from the higher ground that was joined to Caesar’s camp, it was seen that our cavalry in battle were pressing hard upon their rearmost, and that sometimes the tail of the column was being held up and broken, at other times the standards were borne forward and, by the onrush of all the cohorts together, our men were driven back, then again, turned about, they pursued. In the whole camp indeed the soldiers were running around and grieving that the enemy was being let slip from their hands, that the war was being drawn out longer than necessary; they approached the centurions and tribunes of the soldiers and besought that through them Caesar might be made the more certain not to spare their toil nor their danger; that they were ready, that they were able and dared to cross the river at those places where the cavalry had been brought across. Aroused by their zeal and shouts, Caesar—although he feared to expose the army to a river of such magnitude—judges nevertheless that it must be attempted and put to the test.
Therefore he orders the weaker soldiers to be selected out of all the centuries, who seemed unable to sustain it either in spirit or in strength. These he leaves in the camp with one legion as a garrison; he leads out the remaining legions unencumbered and, with a great number of pack-animals stationed in the river both upstream and downstream, he leads the army across. A few of these soldiers, swept away by the force of the river, are caught up and assisted by the cavalry; yet no one perishes.
With the army brought across unscathed, he arrays the forces and begins to lead a triple battle line. And so great was the zeal among the soldiers that, with a detour of six miles added to the march and a great delay interposed at the ford of the river, they overtook those who had set out at the third watch before the 9th hour of the day.
[65] Quos ubi Afranius procul visos cum Petreio conspexit, nova re perterritus locis superioribus constitit aciemque instruit. Caesar in campis exercitum reficit, ne defessum proelio obiciat; rursus conantes progredi insequitur et moratur. Illi necessario maturius, quam constituerant, castra ponunt.
[65] When Afranius, together with Petreius, caught sight of them seen from afar, thoroughly alarmed by the new development, he halted on the higher ground and drew up his battle line. Caesar on the plains refits the army, lest he expose the weary to battle; again he pursues and delays them as they attempt to advance. They of necessity pitch camp earlier than they had appointed.
For mountains were close by, and, at a distance of 5 miles, difficult and narrow routes were encountered. They wished to have entered these mountains, so that they might escape Caesar’s cavalry and, with garrisons placed in the narrows, block the army from the route, while they themselves, without peril and fear, would lead their forces across the Hiberus. This had to be attempted by them and effected by every method; but, exhausted by the battle of the whole day and by the toil of the march, they postponed the matter to the following day.
[66] Media circiter nocte eis, qui aquandi causa longius a castris processerant, ab equitibus correptis fit ab his certior Caesar duces adversariorum silentio copias castris educere. Quo cognito signum dari iubet et vasa militari more conclamari. Illi exaudito clamore veriti, ne noctu impediti sub onere confligere cogerentur aut ne ab equitatu Caesaris in angustius tenerentur, iter supprimunt copiasque in castris continent.
[66] About the middle of the night, when some who had gone farther from the camp for the purpose of watering were seized by the cavalry, Caesar is by them made more certain that the leaders of the adversaries were, in silence, leading their forces out of the camp. Learning this, he orders the signal to be given and the kits to be called out according to military custom. They, when the clamor was heard, fearing lest by night, hampered under a burden, they be forced to clash, or lest they be held in narrower straits by Caesar’s cavalry, halt the march and keep their forces in the camp.
[67] Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus profectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri.
[67] It is discussed in council by Petreius and Afranius, and the time of departure is sought. The majority judged that they should make the march by night: that it would be possible to come to the narrows before it was noticed. Others, because the night before there had been a shout raised in Caesar’s camp, took it as an argument that it was not possible to go out secretly.
That Caesar’s cavalry should be surrounded by night and all places and routes blockaded; and that nocturnal battles must be avoided, because a thoroughly frightened soldier in civil dissension is wont to consult fear rather than religion. But daylight of itself brings much modesty before the eyes of all, and much also is brought by the presence of the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions; by which factors soldiers are wont to be coerced and kept to their duty. Wherefore by every method a break-through must be made by day: even if some loss be incurred, nevertheless with the main body of the army safe the place which they seek can be seized.
[68] Caesar exploratis regionibus albente caelo omnes copias castris educit magnoque circuitu nullo certo itinere exercitum ducit. Nam quae itinera ad Hiberum atque Octogesam pertinebant castris hostium oppositis tenebantur. Ipsi erant transcendendae valles maximae ac difficillimae; saxa multis locis praerupta iter impediebant, ut arma per manus necessario traderentur, militesque inermes sublevatique alii ab aliis magnam partem itineris conficerent.
[68] Caesar, the regions having been explored, with the sky whitening, leads all the forces out of camp and, by a great circuit with no fixed itinerary, leads the army. For the routes which pertained to the Hiberus and to Octogesa were held by the enemy’s camps posted opposite. They themselves had to cross very large and most difficult valleys; in many places sheer rocks impeded the way, so that arms had of necessity to be passed along hand-to-hand, and the soldiers, unarmed and hoisted up, some by others, accomplished a great part of the journey.
[69] Ac primo Afraniani milites visendi causa laeti ex castris procurrebant contumeliosisque vocibus prosequebantur nostros: necessarii victus inopia coactos fugere atque ad Ilerdam reverti. Erat enim iter a proposito diversum, contrariamque in partem iri videbatur. Duces vero eorum consilium suum laudibus efferebant, quod se castris tenuissent; multumque eorum opinionem adiuvabat, quod sine iumentis impedimentisque ad iter profectos videbant, ut non posse inopiam diutius sustinere confiderent.
[69] And at first Afranius’s soldiers, glad for the sake of viewing, ran out from the camp and pursued our men with contumelious cries: that, compelled by want of necessary victuals, they were fleeing and returning to Ilerda. For the route was divergent from the purpose, and it seemed they were going into the contrary direction. But their leaders were exalting their own counsel with praises, because they had kept to the camp; and much was bolstering their opinion, that they saw them set out for the march without juments and impediments (baggage), so that they were confident they could not sustain the scarcity any longer.
But when they saw the column being gradually twisted back to the right, and now noticed that the foremost were surpassing the region of the camp, there was no one so slow or shunning of labor as not to think that they must at once go out from the camp and go to meet them. The cry is raised to arms, and all the forces, a few cohorts having been left for guard, march out and by a straight route press on to the Hiberus (Ebro).
[70] Erat in celeritate omne positum certamen, utri prius angustias montesque occuparent; sed exercitum Caesaris viarum difficultates tardabant, Afranii copias equitatus Caesaris insequens morabatur. Res tamen ab Afranianis huc erat necessario deducta, ut, si priores montes, quos petebant, attigissent, ipsi periculum vitarent, impedimenta totius exercitus cohortesque in castris relictas servare non possent; quibus interclusis exercitu Caesaris auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat. Confecit prior iter Caesar atque ex magnis rupibus nactus planitiem in hac contra hostem aciem instruit.
[70] The whole contest was placed in celerity, as to which of the two would first occupy the narrows and the mountains; but the difficulties of the roads were delaying Caesar’s army, while Caesar’s cavalry, pursuing, was delaying Afranius’s forces. The situation, however, was of necessity brought by Afranius’s men to this point: that, if they first reached the mountains which they were seeking, they themselves would avoid danger, but they could not preserve the impediments (baggage-train) of the whole army and the cohorts left in the camp; and with these intercluded by Caesar’s army, aid could by no method be brought. Caesar completed the march first, and, having come out from great crags and found a plain, on this he arrays his battle-line against the enemy.
Afranius, when his rearmost column was being pressed by the cavalry and he saw the enemy before him, having found a certain hill halted there. From that place he sends 4 cohorts of cetrati onto the mountain which was the loftiest in the sight of all. He orders them, urged to great speed, to seize this, with this plan: that he himself should with all his forces contend thither also and, the route having been changed, along the ridges should reach Octogesa.
When the targeteers (cetrati) were making for this by an oblique route, Caesar’s cavalry, having caught sight of them, made an attack upon the cohorts; nor were the targeteers able to withstand the force of the horsemen for even the least portion of time, and, surrounded by them, they were all slain in the sight of both armies.
[71] Erat occasio bene gerendae rei. Neque vero id Caesarem fugiebat, tanto sub oculis accepto detrimento perterritum exercitum sustinere non posse, praesertim circumdatum undique equitatu, cum in loco aequo atque aperto confligeretur; idque ex omnibus partibus ab eo flagitabatur. Concurrebant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos.
[71] There was an occasion for the affair to be well conducted. Nor indeed did this escape Caesar, that, with so great a loss received under their very eyes, the thoroughly terrified army could not sustain itself, especially being encompassed on all sides by cavalry, since the engagement would be on level and open ground; and this was being demanded of him from all quarters. The legates, the centurions, and the tribunes of the soldiers were running together: that he should not hesitate to commit the battle; that the minds of all the soldiers were most ready.
Afranius’s men, on the contrary, had sent out signs of their own fear in many respects: that they had not come to the aid of their own, that they did not depart from the hill, that they scarcely sustained the charges of the cavalry, and, with the standards gathered into one place, being crowded together they kept neither ranks nor standards. And that, if he feared the inequality of the ground, nevertheless the opportunity of fighting would be given in some place, since assuredly Afranius would have to withdraw from there and could not remain without water.
[72] Caesar in eam spem venerat, se sine pugna et sine vulnere suorum rem conficere posse, quod re frumentaria adversarios interclusisset. Cur etiam secundo proelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites?
[72] Caesar had come into that hope, that he could finish the matter without combat and without a wound to his own men, because, in the matter of grain-supply, he had cut off the adversaries. Why, even in a successful battle, should he lose some of his own? why should he allow soldiers who had deserved very well of him to be wounded?
This counsel of Caesar was not approved by very many: the soldiers indeed were openly speaking among themselves that, since such an occasion of victory was being let go, even if Caesar should wish it, they would not fight. He persists in his own opinion and withdraws a little from that place, to lessen fear in the adversaries. Petreius and Afranius, with the opportunity offered, betake themselves back to the camp.
[73] Postero die duces adversariorum perturbati, quod omnem rei frumentariae fluminisque Hiberi spem dimiserant, de reliquis rebus consultabant. Erat unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti vellent; alterum, si Tarraconem peterent. Haec consiliantibus eis nuntiantur aquatores ab equitatu premi nostro.
[73] On the next day the leaders of the adversaries, perturbed because they had dismissed all hope of the grain-supply and of the river Hiberus, deliberated about the remaining matters. There was one route, if they should wish to return to Ilerda; another, if they should make for Tarraco. While they were taking counsel on these things, it is reported that the water-carriers are being pressed by our cavalry.
With this matter known, they arrange frequent stations of cavalry and of the alary cohorts, and they insert legionary cohorts between, and they begin to lead a rampart from the camp to the water, so that within the fortification they might be able to draw water both without fear and without stations. Petreius and Afranius divide this work between themselves, and they themselves, for the sake of completing the work, advance farther.
[74] Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirit atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde de imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur.
[74] Upon their departure, the soldiers, having gotten free faculty of colloquies, come forth in crowds, and each man searches out and calls over whomever he had in the camp as an acquaintance or a fellow townsman (municipal). First they give thanks to all, because, when they were panic-stricken the day before, they had spared them: by their beneficence, they say, they live. Then they inquire about the commander’s good faith, whether it would be right to commit themselves to him; and they complain that they did not do this from the beginning and that they have borne arms against intimates and kinsmen.
Provoked by these speeches, they seek a pledge from the commander regarding the lives of Petreius and Afranius, lest they seem to have conceived any crime against them or to have betrayed their own. These assurances having been given, they affirm that they will at once transfer the standards, and they send to Caesar envoys about peace—centurions of the first ranks. Meanwhile some bring their comrades into the camp for the purpose of inviting them, others are led away from their own, to such a degree that one camp now seemed to have been made out of two; and many tribunes of soldiers and centurions come to Caesar and commend themselves to him.
The same thing is done by the leading men of Spain, whom they had summoned and were holding with them in the camp in the place of hostages. These were seeking their acquaintances and guest-friends, through whom each of them might have an avenue of commendation to Caesar. Afranius’s son also, a young man, was treating with Caesar through the legate Sulpicius concerning the safety of himself and his father.
All things were full of joy and gratulation, both of those who seemed to have avoided such great dangers and of those who seemed to have accomplished such great things without a wound; and Caesar, in the judgment of all, was bearing great fruit of his former lenity, and his counsel was approved by all.
[75] Quibus rebus nuntiatis Afranius ab instituto opere discedit seque in castra recipit, sic paratus, ut videbatur, ut, quicumque accidisset casus, hunc quieto et aequo animo ferret. Petreius vero non deserit sese. Armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuerat, improviso ad vallum advolat, colloquia militum interrumpit, nostros repellit a castris, quos deprendit interficit.
[75] When these matters had been announced, Afranius departs from the work undertaken and withdraws himself into the camp, so prepared, as it seemed, that, whatever accident had happened, he would bear it with a quiet and level mind. But Petreius does not desert himself. He arms his household; with this and the praetorian cohort of targeteers and a few barbarian horsemen, with his beneficiaries, whom he had been accustomed to have for the sake of his own guard, he unexpectedly rushes to the rampart, interrupts the soldiers’ colloquies, drives our men back from the camp, and those whom he catches he kills.
The rest gather together among themselves, and, terrified by the sudden peril, they wrap their left hands in their cloaks and draw their swords, and thus they defend themselves from the cetrati and the horsemen, relying on the nearness of the camp; and they withdraw into the camp and are defended by those cohorts which were on station at the gates.
[76] Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium, imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. Fit celeriter concursus in praetorium. Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos.
[76] With these things completed, weeping, Petreius goes around the maniples and addresses the soldiers, beseeching that they hand over neither himself nor Pompey, their imperator, to the adversaries for punishment. There is a quick rush into the praetorium. He demands that all swear that they will neither desert nor betray the army and the leaders, nor will they, separately for themselves apart from the rest, adopt a plan.
The commander himself swears to these words; he compels Afranius to the same oath; the military tribunes and the centurions follow; the soldiers, produced by centuries, swear the same. They issue an edict that whoever has a soldier of Caesar in his possession is to bring him out: those produced they openly kill in the praetorium. But most they, who had received them, conceal, and by night send them out through the rampart.
[77] Caesar, qui milites adversariorum in castra per tempus colloquii venerant, summa diligentia conquiri et remitti iubet. Sed ex numero tribunorum militum centurionumque nonnulli sua voluntate apud eum remanserunt. Quos ille postea magno in honore habuit; centuriones in priores ordines, equites Romanos in tribunicium restituit honorem.
[77] Caesar orders that the soldiers of the adversaries who had come into the camp for the time of the colloquy be sought out with the utmost diligence and sent back. But from the number of the military tribunes and centurions several, of their own accord, remained with him. These he afterward held in great honor; he restored the centurions to the prior ranks, and the Roman knights to tribunic honor.
[78] Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur aegre. Frumenti copiam legionarii nonnullam habebant, quod dierum XXII ab Ilerda frumentum iussi erant efferre, cetrati auxiliaresque nullam, quorum erant et facultates ad parandum exiguae et corpora insueta ad onera portanda. Itaque magnus eorum cotidie numerus ad Caesarem perfugiebat.
[78] Afranius’s men were hard pressed for foddering, and they drew water with difficulty. The legionaries had some supply of grain, because they had been ordered to carry out grain for 22 days from Ilerda; the targeteers and the auxiliaries had none, for both their resources for procuring were scant and their bodies unaccustomed to bearing burdens. And so a great number of them every day fled for refuge to Caesar.
[79] Genus erat hoc pugnae. Expeditae cohortes novissimum agmen claudebant pluresque in locis campestribus subsistebant. Si mons erat ascendendus, facile ipsa loci natura periculum repellebat, quod ex locis superioribus, qui antecesserant, suos ascendentes protegebant; cum vallis aut locus declivis suberat, neque ei, qui antecesserant, morantibus opem ferre poterant, equites vero ex loco superiore in aversos tela coniciebant, tum magno erat in periculo res.
[79] This was the kind of battle. Unencumbered cohorts closed the rear-guard, and many would halt in level places. If a mountain had to be ascended, the very nature of the place easily repelled the danger, because from higher positions those who had gone ahead protected their own as they were climbing; but when a valley or a sloping place lay below, those who had gone ahead could not bring aid to those delaying, while the horsemen from higher ground were hurling missiles into the backs of the men turned away—then the situation was in great peril.
It remained that, when they had approached places of such a kind, they should order the standards of the legions to halt and with great impetus should drive back the cavalry; this force having been removed, suddenly, incited at a run, they should all together let themselves down into the valleys and, having thus crossed, should again take their stand on the higher ground. For they were so far from the auxiliaries of their own horsemen, of whom they had a great number, that they were receiving them, terrified by earlier battles, into the middle of the column and were moreover protecting them; and none of them was permitted to step out from the line of march without being intercepted by Caesar’s cavalry.
[80] Tali dum pugnatur modo, lente atque paulatim proceditur, crebroque, ut sint auxilio suis, subsistunt; ut tum accidit. Milia enim progressi IIII vehementiusque peragitati ab equitatu montem excelsum capiunt ibique una fronte contra hostem castra muniunt neque iumentis onera deponunt. Ubi Caesaris castra posita tabernaculaque constituta et dimissos equites pabulandi causa animum adverterunt, sese subito proripiunt hora circiter sexta eiusdem diei et spem nacti morae discessu nostrorum equitum iter facere incipiunt.
[80] While it is fought in such a mode, they proceed slowly and little by little, and frequently, in order to be of aid to their own, they halt; as then happened. For having advanced 4 miles and having been more vehemently harassed by the cavalry, they seize a lofty mountain, and there with a single front against the enemy they fortify a camp, nor do they lay down the burdens from the pack-animals. When they noticed that Caesar’s camp had been pitched and the tents set up, and that the horsemen had been sent out for the sake of foraging, they suddenly rush out at about the sixth hour of the same day, and, having found hope of a delay by the departure of our cavalry, they begin to make their march.
Wherefore, this having been noticed, Caesar, with the legions refreshed, follows up, leaving a few cohorts as a guard for the baggage; at hour 10 he orders the foragers and the horsemen to be recalled to follow. The cavalry quickly returns to the quotidian duty of the march. It is fought fiercely at the rearmost column, to such a degree that they almost turn their backs, and several soldiers, even some centurions, are slain.
[81] Tum vero neque ad explorandum idoneum locum castris neque ad progrediendum data facultate consistunt necessario et procul ab aqua et natura iniquo loco castra ponunt. Sed isdem de causis Caesar, quae supra sunt demonstratae, proelio non lacessit et eo die tabernacula statui passus non est, quo paratiores essent ad insequendum omnes, sive noctu sive interdiu erumperent. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum tota nocte munitiones proferunt castraque castris convertunt.
[81] Then indeed, with neither opportunity given to reconnoiter a suitable place for a camp nor to advance, they halt of necessity and pitch their camp far from water and on ground disadvantageous by nature. But for the same reasons which have been shown above, Caesar does not provoke a battle, and on that day he did not allow the tents to be set up, so that all might be more prepared for pursuing, whether they should break out by night or by day. They, having noticed the defect of their camp, extend their fortifications throughout the whole night and turn their camp toward Caesar’s camp.
This same thing on the following day from first light they do, and they consume the whole day in this matter. But by as much as they had advanced in the work and had extended the camp, by so much they were farther away from water, and to the present evil remedies were being given by other evils. On the first night, for the sake of getting water, no one goes out from the camp; on the next day, with a guard left in the camp, they lead out the entire forces to the water; no one is sent out to forage.
By these torments Caesar preferred that they be ill-handled and to undergo a necessary surrender rather than to decide it by battle. He nevertheless tries to surround them with rampart and fosse, so as to delay their sudden eruptions as much as possible; to which course he thought they would of necessity descend. They, both driven by lack of fodder and, in order to be the more expeditious, order all the pack-animals to be killed.
[82] In his operibus consiliisque biduum consumitur; tertio die magna iam pars operis Caesaris processerat. Illi impediendae reliquae munitionis causa hora circiter VIIII signo dato legiones educunt aciemque sub castris instruunt. Caesar ab opere legiones revocat, equitatum omnem convenire iubet, aciem instruit; contra opinionem enim militum famamque omnium videri proelium defugisse magnum detrimentum afferebat.
[82] In these works and counsels a two-day period is consumed; on the third day a great part of Caesar’s work had now progressed. They, for the sake of impeding the remaining munition, at about the 9th hour, the signal having been given, lead out their legions and array a battle line beneath the camp. Caesar recalls the legions from the work, orders all the cavalry to assemble, arrays his battle line; for to seem to have shunned battle, contrary to the expectation of the soldiers and the repute of all, was bringing a great detriment.
But by these same causes, which were known, he was moved not to wish to contend, and this all the more because, by the brevity of the space, even with the adversaries cast into flight, he could not much aid the sum of victory. For the camps were not more than two thousand feet apart; of this, two parts were occupied by the two battle-lines; the third was vacant, left for the incursion and onset of the soldiers. If battle were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the defeated a swift retreat recovered from flight.
[83] Acies erat Afraniana duplex legionum V; tertium in subsidiis locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; Caesaris triplex; sed primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex V legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuiusque legionis subsequebantur; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat. Tali instructa acie tenere uterque propositum videbatur: Caesar, ne nisi coactus proelium committeret; ille, ut opera Caesaris impediret. Producitur tamen res, aciesque ad solis occasum continentur; inde utrique in castra discedunt.
[83] The Afranian line of battle was double, of 5 legions; the alary (auxiliary) cohorts held the third place in the reserves; Caesar’s was triple; but the first line was held by four cohorts from the 5 legions, these were followed by three supporting cohorts, and again others just as many of each legion followed in turn; the archers and slingers were contained in the middle of the line, the cavalry girded the flanks. With the line thus arranged, each seemed to maintain his purpose: Caesar, not to engage in battle unless compelled; the other, to impede Caesar’s works. Nevertheless the matter is prolonged, and the lines are kept until sunset; then both withdraw into their camps.
On the next day Caesar prepares to complete the fortifications that had been instituted; they to try the ford of the river Sicoris, to see whether they could cross. This matter having been observed, Caesar ferries across the Germans of light armature and a part of the cavalry, and he arranges frequent guards along the banks.
[84] Tandem omnibus rebus obsessi, quartum iam diem sine pabulo retentis iumentis, aquae, lignorum, frumenti inopia colloquium petunt et id, si fieri possit, semoto a militibus loco. Ubi id a Caesare negatum et, palam si colloqui vellent, concessum est, datur obsidis loco Caesari filius Afranii. Venitur in eum locum, quem Caesar delegit.
[84] At length, hard-pressed in every respect, with the draft animals kept back now the fourth day without fodder, and with a lack of water, firewood, and grain, they ask for a parley—and that, if it can be done, in a place removed from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar, and it was granted if they wished to confer openly, Afranius’s son is given to Caesar in the place of a hostage. They come to that place which Caesar chose.
With both armies listening, Afranius speaks: that neither they themselves nor the soldiers should be blamed, for they wished to conserve their faith toward their Imperator Gnaeus Pompeius. But that they have now satisfied duty and have borne punishment enough, having endured a lack of all things; now indeed, almost like wild beasts, walled around, they are barred from water, barred from ingress, and can bear neither pain in body nor ignominy in spirit. Therefore they confess themselves conquered; they pray and beseech, if any place for mercy is left, that he need not proceed to the ultimate punishment.
[85] Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: se, qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, confligere noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservarit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia constitisse: ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque colloquii neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse.
[85] To these things Caesar replied: to none of all men have these parts either of querimony or of commiseration less befitted. For all the rest have performed their office: himself, who would not engage in conflict even on a good condition, and on equal place and time, in order that all things might be as entire as possible for peace; his army, which, even after injury had been received and after some of their own had been slain by those whom they had had in their power, nevertheless preserved and sheltered them; finally, the soldiers of that army, who of themselves treated about conciliating peace, in which matter they judged that regard must be had for the lives of all their own. Thus the parts of all orders stood in mercy: the leaders themselves abhorred from peace; they observed the rights neither of colloquy nor of armistice, and most cruelly slew men unskilled and deceived under a parley.
That, therefore, has happened to them which is wont to happen through men’s excessive pertinacity and arrogance: that they fall back upon and most greedily seek the very thing which a little before they had contemned. Nor does he now make his demand by reason of their abasement, nor by some opportunity of the moment, by which his own resources might be augmented; but that he wishes those armies, which for many years they have maintained against him, to be disbanded. For neither were six legions for any other cause sent into Spain, and a seventh levied there, nor were so many and so great fleets made ready, nor commanders skilled in the military art sent as reinforcements.
None of these things were provided for the pacifying of the Spains, nothing for the use of the province, which, because of the long duration of peace, has desired no aid. All these measures have long since been prepared against himself: that commands of a new kind are being established over him, such that the same man may, at the gates, preside over the urban affairs and, being absent, hold for so many years two most warlike provinces; that, as regards himself, the rights of the magistrates are being altered, so that not from the praetorship and the consulship, as always, but through a few approved and chosen men are they sent into the provinces; that, as regards himself, even the plea of age avails nothing, since those proven in earlier wars are summoned to hold armies; that, in his case alone, what has always been granted to all generals is not being observed, namely, that when affairs have been carried on successfully, they return home either with some honor or at least without disgrace and disband their army. All which things, however, both he has borne patiently and will bear; nor is he now aiming at this—that he himself keep the army taken away from them, which nevertheless would not be difficult for him—but rather that they not have that by which they could use against him.
[86] Id vero militibus fuit pergratum et iucundum, ut ex ipsa significatione cognosci potuit, ut, qui aliquid iusti incommodi exspectavissent, ultro praemium missionis ferrent. Nam cum de loco et tempore eius rei controversia inferretur, et voce et manibus universi ex vallo, ubi constiterant, significare coeperunt, ut statim dimitterentur, neque omni interposita fide firmum esse posse, si in aliud tempus differretur. Paucis cum esset in utramque partem verbis disputatum, res huc deducitur, ut ei, qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania, statim, reliqui ad Varum flumen dimittantur; ne quid eis noceatur, neu quis invitus sacramentum dicere cogatur, a Caesare cavetur.
[86] This indeed was most gratifying and pleasant to the soldiers, as could be known from the very signification itself, that they, who had expected some just inconvenience, should unbidden receive the reward of discharge. For when a controversy was raised about the place and time of this matter, both with voice and with hands all together, from the rampart where they had taken their stand, they began to signal that they should be dismissed immediately, and that not even with every pledge of faith interposed could it be made firm, if it were deferred to another time. When a few words had been argued on either side, the matter is brought to this: that those who have a domicile or possession in Hispania be dismissed at once, the rest at the river Var; it is provided by Caesar that nothing be done to harm them, and that no one be compelled to speak the sacramentum unwillingly.
[87] Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur; militibus aequa facta aestimatione pecuniam pro his rebus dissolvit. Quascumque postea controversias inter se milites habuerunt, sua sponte ad Caesarem in ius adierunt.
[87] Caesar from that time, until the river Varus be reached, pledges that he will give grain. He adds also that whatever each of them lost in war, which are in the possession of his own soldiers, be restored to those who lost them; to the soldiers he disbursed money for these items, a fair estimation having been made. Whatever controversies the soldiers thereafter had among themselves, of their own accord they went to Caesar to law.
When Petreius and Afranius were being pressed by the legions for the stipend, with a sedition nearly having arisen, and they said that the day for it had not yet come, it was demanded that Caesar take cognizance, and with what he decided both sides were content. With about a third part of the army discharged in that two‑day period, he ordered his two legions to precede and the rest to follow in subsequence, so that they should make camp not at a great interval between themselves; and he put Q. Fufius Calenus, legate, in charge of this business. Under this prescript of his, the march was made from Spain to the river Varus, and there the remaining part of the army was discharged.