Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. In primâ, causae exponuntur propter quas de rebus omnibus, praesertim materialibus, possumus dubitare; quandiu scilicet non habemus alia scientiarum fundamenta, quàm ea quae antehac habuimus. Etsi autem istius tantae dubitationis utilitas primâ fronte non appareat, est tamen in eo maxima quòd ab omnibus praejudiciis nos liberet, viamque facillimam sternat ad mentem a sensibus abducendam; ac denique efficiat, ut de iis, quae posteà vera esse comperiemus, non amplius dubitare possimus.

1. In the first, the causes are expounded on account of which concerning all things, especially material ones, we can doubt; so long, namely, as we do not have other foundations of the sciences than those which we previously had. Although the utility of so great a doubt does not appear at first sight, yet it is greatest in this: that it frees us from all prejudices, and paves the easiest way for withdrawing the mind from the senses; and finally it effects, that concerning those things which we shall afterwards ascertain to be true, we shall no longer be able to doubt.

2. In secundâ, mens quae, propriâ libertate utens, supponit ea omnia non existere de quorum existentiâ vel minimum potest dubitare, animadvertit fieri non posse quin ipsa interim existat. Quod etiam summae est utilitatis, quoniam hoc pacto facile distinguit quaenam ad se, hoc est, ad naturam intellectualem, & quaenam ad corpus pertineant. Sed quia forte nonnulli rationes de animae immortalitate illo in loco expectabunt, eos hîc monendos

2. In the second, the mind which, using its own liberty, supposes all those things not to exist of whose existence it can doubt even the least, observes that it cannot happen but that it itself meanwhile exists. Which also is of the highest utility, since in this way it easily distinguishes what things pertain to itself, that is, to the intellectual nature, & what things pertain to the body. But because perhaps some will expect reasons concerning the immortality of the soul in that place, they must here be warned

[13] puto me conatum esse nihil scribere quod non accurate demonstrarem; ideoque non alium ordinem sequi potuisse, quàm illum qui est apud Geometras usitatus, ut nempe omnia praemitterem ex quibus quaesita propositio dependet, antequam de ipsâ quidquam concluderem. Primum autem & praecipuum quod praerequiritur ad cognoscendam animae immortalitatem, esse ut quàm maxime perspicuum de eâ conceptum, & ab omni conceptu corporis plane distinctum, formemus; quod ibi factum est. Praeterea verò requiri etiam ut sciamus ea omnia quae clare & distincte intelligimus, eo ipso modo quo illa intelligimus, esse vera: quod ante quartam Meditationem probari non potuit; & habendum esse distinctum naturae corporeae conceptum, qui partim in ipsâ secunda, partim etiam in quintâ & sextâ formatur; atque ex his debere concludi ea omnia quae clare & distincte concipiuntur ut substantiae diversae, sicuti concipiuntur mens & corpus, esse revera substantias realiter a se mutuò distinctas; hocque in sextâ concludi.

[13] I think I have attempted to write nothing which I did not
demonstrate accurately; and therefore I could follow no other order than
that which is customary among Geometers, namely that I should preface everything from which
the sought proposition depends, before I concluded anything about it itself. The first and chief thing which is pre‑required for coming to know the soul’s
immortality is that we form a concept of it as perspicuous as possible,
and plainly distinct from every concept of body; which was done there.
Moreover, it is also required that we know that all those things which we clearly
and distinctly understand are true in that very way in which we understand them:
which could not be proved before the Fourth Meditation; and that a distinct
concept of corporeal nature must be had, which is formed partly in the Second itself, and partly also
in the Fifth and Sixth; and from these there ought to be concluded
that all things which are clearly and distinctly conceived as diverse substances,
just as mind and body are conceived, are in truth substances really
distinct from one another; and this is concluded in the Sixth.

Idemque etiam in ipsâ confirmari ex eo quòd nullum corpus nisi divisibile intelligamus, contrà autem nullam mentem nisi indivisibilem: neque enim possumus ullius mentis mediam partem concipere, ut possumus cujuslibet quantamvis exigui corporis; adeo ut eorum naturae non modo diversae, sed etiam quodammodo contrariae agnoscantur. Non autem ulteriùs eâ de re in hoc scripto me egisse; tum quia haec sufficiunt ad ostendendum ex corporis corruptione mentis interitum non sequi, atque sic ad alterius vitae spem mortalibus faciendam; tum etiam quia praemissae, ex quibus ipsa mentis immortalitas concludi potest, ex totius Physicae explicatione dependent: primo

The same is also confirmed in that very Meditation from the fact that we understand no body except as divisible, but on the contrary no mind except as indivisible: for we cannot conceive a middle part of any mind, as we can of any body, however small; to such a degree that their natures are acknowledged not only as diverse, but even in a certain way as contrary. Nor have I treated that matter further in this writing; both because these things suffice to show that from the corruption of the body the perishing of the mind does not follow, and thus to afford mortals the hope of another life; and also because the premises from which the immortality of the mind itself can be concluded depend upon the explication of the whole Physics: first

[14] ut sciatur omnes omnino substantias, sive res quae a Deo creari debent ut existant, ex naturâ suâ esse incorruptibiles, nec posse unquam desinere esse, nisi ab eodem Deo concursum suum iis denegante ad nihilum reducantur; ac deinde ut advertatur corpus quidem in genere sumptum esse substantiam, ideoque nunquam etiam perire. Sed corpus humanum, quatenus a reliquis differt corporibus, non nisi ex certâ membrorum configuratione aliisque ejusmodi accidentibus esse conflatum; mentem verò humanam non ita ex ullis accidentibus constare, sed puram esse substantiam: etsi enim omnia ejus accidentia mutentur, ut quòd alias res intelligat, alias velit, alias sentiat, &c, non idcirco ipsa mens alia evadit; humanum autem corpus aliud fit ex hoc solo quòd figura quarumdam ejus partium mutetur: ex quibus sequitur corpus quidem perfacile interire, mentem autem ex naturâ suâ esse immortalem.

[14] that it be known that absolutely all substances, or things which must be created by God in order to exist, are by their nature incorruptible, and can never cease to be, unless by the same God, by denying to them his concurrence, they are reduced to nothing; and then that it be noticed that body indeed, taken in general, is a substance, and therefore never perishes either. But the human body, insofar as it differs from other bodies, is compounded only from a certain configuration of members and other accidents of that sort; whereas the human mind does not thus consist of any accidents, but is a pure substance: for even if all its accidents are changed, so that at one time it understands other things, at another it wills other things, at another it senses other things, &c, not on that account does the mind itself become another thing; but the human body becomes another thing from this alone, that the figure of certain of its parts is changed: from which it follows that body indeed very easily perishes, but the mind by its nature is immortal.

3. In tertiâ Meditatione, meum praecipuum argumentum ad probandum Dei existentiam satis fusè, ut mihi videtur, explicui. Verumtamen, quia, ut Lectorum animos quàm maxime a sensibus abducerem, nullis ibi comparationibus a rebus corporeis petitis volui uti, multae fortasse obscuritates remanserunt, sed quae, ut spero, postea in responsionibus ad objectiones plane tollentur; ut, inter caeteras, quomodo idea entis summe perfecti, quae in nobis es t. tantum habeat realitatis objectivae, ut non possit non esse a causâ summe perfectâ, quod ibi illustratur comparatione machinae valde perfectae, cujus idea est in mente alicujus artificis; ut enim artificium objectivum hujus ideae debet habere aliquam causam, nempe scientiam hujus artificis, vel alicujus alterius a quo illam accepit, ita

3. In the Third Meditation, my chief argument for proving the existence of God I have explained sufficiently at length, as it seems to me. Nevertheless, because, in order to draw the minds of the Readers as far as possible away from the senses, I wished to employ no comparisons borrowed from corporeal things, many obscurities perhaps have remained, but which, as I hope, will afterwards be completely removed in the Replies to the objections; as, among others, how the idea of a supremely perfect being, which is in us, has so much objective reality that it cannot but be from a supremely perfect cause; which there is illustrated by a comparison of a very perfect machine, the idea of which is in the mind of some craftsman; for as the objective workmanship of this idea ought to have some cause, namely the knowledge of this craftsman, or of some other from whom he received it, so

[15] idea Dei, quae in nobis est, non potest non habere Deum ipsum pro causâ.

[15] the idea of God, which is in us, cannot but have God himself as its cause.

4. In quartâ, probatur ea omnia quae clare er distincte percipimus, esse vera, simulque in quo ratio falsitatis consistat explicatur: quae necessariò sciri debent tam ad praecedentia firmanda, quàm ad reliqua intelligenda. (Sed ibi interim est advertendum nullo modo agi de peccato, vel errore qui committitur in persecutione boni & mali, sed de eo tantùm qui contingit in dijudicatione veri & falsi. Nec ea spectari quae ad fidem pertinent, vel ad vitam agendam, sed tantùm speculativas & solius luminis naturalis ope cognitas veritates.)

4. In the fourth, it is proved that all things which we perceive clearly and distinctly are true, and at the same time it is explicated wherein the rationale of falsity consists: which must necessarily be known both for confirming the preceding and for understanding the remaining. (But there in the meantime it is to be noted that it is in no way a matter of sin, or of the error which is committed in the pursuit of good & evil, but only of that which happens in the discrimination of the true & the false. Nor are those things regarded which pertain to faith, or to the conducting of life, but only speculative truths and those known by the aid of the natural light alone.)

5. In quintâ, praeterquam quòd natura corporea in genere sumpta explicatur, novâ etiam ratione Dei existentia demonstratur: sed in quâ rursus nonnullae fortè occurrent difficultates, quae postea in responsione ad objectiones resolventur: ac denique ostenditur quo pacto verum sit, ipsarum Geometricarum demonstrationum certitudinem a cognitione Dei pendere.

5. In the fifth, besides that the corporeal nature, taken in general, is explained, by a new rationale the existence of God is also demonstrated: but in which again some difficulties may perhaps occur, which will afterward be resolved in the response to the objections: and finally it is shown in what manner it is true that the certainty of the geometrical demonstrations themselves depends upon the knowledge of God.

6. In sextâ denique, intellectio ab imaginatione secernitur; distinctionum signa describuntur; mentem realiter a corpore distingui probatur; eandem nihilominus tam arctè illi esse conjunctam, ut unum quid cum ipsâ componat, ostenditur; omnes errores qui a sensibus oriri solent recensentur; modi quibus vitari possint exponuntur; & denique rationes omnes ex quibus rerum materialium existentia possit concludi, afferuntur: non quòd eas valde utiles esse putarim ad probandum id ipsum quod

6. In the sixth, finally, intellection is separated from imagination; the marks of distinctions are described; it is proved that the mind is really distinguished from the body; nevertheless the same is shown to be so closely conjoined to it that it composes one thing with it; all the errors which are wont to arise from the senses are recounted; the modes by which they can be avoided are set forth; & finally the reasons all from which the existence of material things can be concluded are adduced: not because I would think them to be very useful for proving that very thing which

[16] probant, nempe revera esse aliquem mundum, & homines habere corpora, & similia, de quibus nemo unquam sanae mentis seriò dubitavit; sed quia, illas considerando, agnoscitur non esse tam firmas nec tam perspicuas quàm sunt eae, per quas in mentis nostrae & Dei cognitionem devenimus; adeo ut hae sint omnium certissimae & evidentissimae quae ab humano ingenio sciri possint. Cujus unius rei probationem in his Meditationibus mihi pro scopo proposui. Nec idcirco hîc recenseo varias illas quaestiones de quibus etiam in ipsis ex occasione tractatur.

[16] they prove, namely, that there truly is some world, and that human beings have bodies, and the like, about which no one ever of sound mind has seriously doubted; but because, by considering them, it is recognized that they are not so firm nor so perspicuous as are those by which we come into the cognition of our mind and of God; to such a degree that these are, of all, the most certain and most evident that can be known by human ingenuity. The proof of this one thing I have set before myself as the scope in these Meditations. Nor on that account do I here review those various questions about which also in them, on occasion, there is treatment.