Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

[PROHOEMIVM] His fere, quae in proximos quinque libros conlata sunt, ratio inveniendi atque inventa disponendi continetur, quam ut per omnis numeros penitus cognoscere ad summam scientiae necessarium est, ita incipientibus brevius ac simplicius tradi magis convenit. II. Aut enim difficultate institutionis tam numerosae atque perplexae deterreri solent, aut eo tempore quo praecipue alenda ingenia atque indulgentia quadam enutrienda sunt asperiorum tractatu rerum atteruntur, aut si haec sola didicerunt satis se ad eloquentiam instructos arbitrantur, aut quasi ad certas quasdam dicendi leges alligati conatum omnem reformidant. III.

[PROEM] In these for the most part, which have been gathered into the next five books, the method of invention and of disposing the things invented is contained; and though to know it thoroughly in all its particulars is necessary to the sum of the science, yet for beginners it is more fitting that it be taught more briefly and more simply. 2. For either they are wont to be deterred by the difficulty of an instruction so numerous and perplex, or at that time when talents ought especially to be nourished and fostered by a certain indulgence they are worn down by the treatment of rather harsher matters, or, if they have learned these things alone, they think themselves sufficiently equipped for eloquence, or, as if bound to certain fixed laws of speaking, they dread every attempt. 3.

Vnde existimant accidisse ut qui diligentissimi artium scriptores extiterint ab eloquentia longissime fuerint. Via tamen opus est incipientibus, sed ea plana et cum ad ingrediendum tum ad demonstrandum expedita. Eligat itaque peritus ille praeceptor ex omnibus optima et tradat ea demum in praesentia quae placet, remota refutandi cetera mora: sequentur enim discipuli quo duxeris.

Whence they think it has come to pass that those who have been the most diligent writers of the arts have been farthest from eloquence. Nevertheless, beginners have need of a way, but one plain and expeditious both for entering upon and for demonstrating. Therefore let that skilled preceptor choose from all the best things and hand down for the present only what pleases, the delay of refuting the rest being removed; for the disciples will follow where you have led.

Mox cum robore dicendi crescet etiam eruditio. IV. Idem primo solum iter credant esse in quod inducentur, mox illud cognituri etiam optimum. sunt autem neque obscura neque ad percipiendum difficilia, quae scriptores diversis opinionibus pertinaciter tuendis involverunt.

Mox, along with the vigor of speaking, erudition too will grow. 4. Let these same persons at first believe the only road to be that into which they are led, soon to know that that is indeed the best. but the things which writers have involved by pertinaciously maintaining diverse opinions are neither obscure nor difficult for perception.

V. Itaque in toto artis huiusce tractatu difficilius est iudicare quid doceas quam cum iudicaris docere, praecipueque in duabus his partibus perquam sunt pauca, circa quae si is qui instituitur non repugnaverit pronum ad cetera habiturus est cursum.

5. Therefore, in the whole treatise of this art it is more difficult to judge what you should teach than, when you have judged, to teach; and especially in these two parts there are exceedingly few matters, around which, if the one being instructed does not resist, he will have a ready course toward the rest.

VI. Nempe enim plurimum in hoc laboris exhausimus, ut ostenderemus rhetoricen bene dicendi scientiam et utilem et artem et virtutem esse: materiam eius res omnis de quibus dicendum esset: eas in tribus fere generibus, demonstrativo deliberativo iudicialique, reperiri: orationem porro omnem constare rebus et verbis: in rebus intuendam inventionem, in verbis elocutionem, in utraque conlocationem, quae memoria complecteretur? actio commendaret. VII.

6. Indeed, we have expended the greatest amount of labor on this, to show that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, both useful and an art and a virtue: its material is all the matters about which there must be speaking: these are found in almost three kinds, the demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial: furthermore, every speech consists of matters and words: in the matters one must consider invention, in the words elocution, in both arrangement, which memory would embrace? delivery would commend. 7.

Oratoris officium docendi movendi delectandi partibus contineri, ex quibus ad docendum expositio et argumentatio, ad movendum adfectus pertinerent, quos per omnem quidem causam sed maxime tamen in ingressu ac fine dominari. Nam delectationem, quamvis in utroque sit eorum, magis tamen proprias in elocutione partes habere. VIII.

The orator’s office is contained in the parts of teaching, moving, and delighting; of which, to teaching belong exposition and argumentation, to moving belong the affections, which prevail indeed through the whole cause, but most of all in the ingress and the end. For delectation, although it is present in each of the former two, yet has its more proper parts in elocution. 8.

Quaestiones alias infinitas, alias finitas, quae personis temporibus locis continerentur. In omni porro materia tria esse quaerenda, an sit, quid sit, quale sit. His adiciebamus demonstrativam laude ac vituperatione constare.

Questions, some infinite and others finite, which are contained by persons, times, and places. In every subject-matter, moreover, three things are to be inquired: whether it is, what it is, of what quality it is. To these we added that the demonstrative consists of praise and vituperation.

In ea quae ab ipso de quo diceremus, quae post eum acta essent, intuendum. Hoc opus tractatu honestorum utiliumque constare. IX. suasoriis accedere tertiam partem ex coniectura, possetne fieri et an esset futurum de quo deliberaretur.

In that, one must look to those things which were done by the person himself about whom we would speak, and to those which were done after him. This work consists in a treatment of things honorable and useful. 9. In suasoriae there is added a third part, from conjecture: whether it could be done, and whether that about which there is deliberation would be going to come to pass.

Hic praecipue diximus spectandum quis, apud quem, quid diceret. Iudicialium causarum alias in singulis, alias in pluribus controversiis consistere, et in quibusdam intentionem modo: depulsionem porro omnem infitiatione duplici, factumne et an hoc factum esset, praeterea defensione ac tralatione constare. X. Quaestionem aut ex scripto esse aut ex facto: facto de rerum fide proprietate qualitate, scripto de verborum vi aut voluntate, in quibus vis tum causarum, tum actionum inspici soleat, quae aut scripti et voluntatis aut ratiocinativa aut ambiguitatis aut legum contrariarum specie continentur.

Here we said especially that one must observe who, before whom, and what he was saying. Judicial causes sometimes consist in single, sometimes in multiple controversies, and in some in the intent alone (the claim); moreover, every rebuttal consists in a twofold denial—whether it was done, and whether this thing was done—besides in defense and in transference. 10. A question is either from writing or from fact: from fact, about the credibility, proprietorship, and quality of things; from writing, about the force of the words or the will, in which the force both of causes and of actions is wont to be inspected, which are contained either under the aspect of writing and will, or of ratiocination, or of ambiguity, or of contrary laws.

XI. In omni porro causa iudiciali quinque esse partes, quarum exordio conciliari audientem, narratione doceri, probatione proposita confirmari, refutatione contra dicta dissolvi, peroratione aut memoriam refici aut animos moveri. XII. His argumentandi et adficiendi locos et quibus generibus concitari placari resolvi iudices oporteret adiecimus.

11. Moreover, in every judicial cause there are five parts, by which: by the exordium the hearer is conciliated, by the narration he is taught, by the proof when proposed the case is confirmed, by refutation the things said on the other side are dissolved, by the peroration either memory is refreshed or minds are moved. 12. To these we added the topics (loci) of arguing and of affecting, and by what kinds the judges ought to be stirred, appeased, and resolved.

Accessit ratio divisionis. Credere modo qui discet velit, certa quaedam via est, et in qua multa o etiam sine doctrina praestare debeat per se ipsa natura, ut haec de quibus dixi non tam inventa a praeceptoribus quam cum fierent observata esse videantur.

A rationale of division has been added. Only let the one who is to learn be willing to believe: there is a certain path, and on it nature itself, by itself, ought to furnish many things even without doctrine, so that these things of which I have spoken seem not so much to have been invented by preceptors as to have been observed as they were being done.

XIII. Plus exigunt laboris et curae quae secuntur. Hinc enim iam elocutionis rationem tractabimus, partem operis, ut inter omnis oratores convenit, difficillimam.

13. The things that follow demand more labor and care. For from here we will now treat the rationale of elocution, the part of the work which, as is agreed among all orators, is most difficult.

Nam et M. Antonius, cuius supra mentionem habuimus, cum a se disertos visos esse multos ait, eloquentem neminem, diserto satis putat dicere quae oporteat, ornate autem dicere proprium esse eloquentis. XIV. Quae virtus si usque ad eum in nullo reperta est ac ne in ipso quidem aut L. Crasso, certum est et in his et in prioribus eam desideratam quia difficillima fuit.

For even M. Antonius, of whom we made mention above, while he says that many seemed to him to be well-spoken, but no one eloquent, holds that it is enough for the well-spoken man to say what ought to be said, whereas to say it ornately is the proper mark of the eloquent man. 14. Which virtue, if up to his time it was found in no one, not even in himself or in L. Crassus, it is certain that both in these men and in those before them it was lacking, because it was most difficult.

Et M. tullius inventionem quidem ac dispositionem prudentis hominis putat, eloquentiam oratoris, ideoque praecipue circa praecepta partis huius laboravit

And M. Tullius thinks invention and disposition to be the work of a prudent man, eloquence that of the orator; and therefore he especially labored over the precepts of this part.

XV. Quod eum merito fecisse etiam ipso rei de qua loquimur nomine palam declaratur. Eloqui enim [hoc] est omnia quae mente conceperis promere atque ad audientis perferre, sine quo supervacua sunt priora et similia gladio condito atque intra vaginam suam haerenti. XVI.

15. That he did this with merit is plainly declared even by the very name of the matter about which we speak. For to elocute [this] is to bring forth all that you have conceived in mind and to carry it through to the hearer, without which the prior things are superfluous and like a sword laid away and sticking within its own scabbard. 16.

Hoc itaque maxime docetur, hoc nullus nisi arte adsequi potest, hic studium plurimum adhibendum: hoc exercitatio petit, hoc imitatio, hic omnis aetas consumitur: hoc maxime orator oratore praestantior, hoc genera ipsa dicendi aliis alia potiora. XVII. Neque enim Asiani aut quocumque alio genere corrupti res non viderunt aut eas non conlocaverunt, neque quos aridos vocamus stulti aut in causis caeci fuerunt, sed his iudicium in eloquendo ac modus, illis vires defuerunt, ut appareat in hoc et vitium et virtutem esse dicendi.

Therefore this is taught most of all, this no one can attain except by art, here the greatest application of study is to be employed: this practice aims at, this imitation (does too), here a whole lifetime is consumed: by this chiefly one orator is more outstanding than another, by this the very kinds of speaking make some preferable to others. 17. For the Asianists, or those corrupted by any other style, did not fail to see the matters or to set them in order, nor were those whom we call “dry” foolish or blind in cases; but the former lacked judgment and measure in eloquendo, the latter lacked strength, so that it may appear that in this both the vice and the virtue of speaking reside.

XVIII. Non ideo tamen sola est agenda cura verborum. Occurram enim necesse est et velut in vestibulo protinus adprehensuris hanc confessionem meam resistam iis qui omissa rerum, qui nervi sunt in causis, diligentia quodam inani circa voces studio senescunt, idque faciunt gratia decoris, qui est in dicendo mea quidem opinione pulcherrimus, sed cum sequitur, non cum adfectatur.

18. Not for that reason, however, is care of words alone to be pursued. For I must anticipate and, as it were in the vestibule, at once resist those who, setting aside care for things—which are the nerves in causes—grow old in a certain empty zeal about words, and they do this for the sake of decor, which in speaking, in my opinion, is most beautiful when it follows, not when it is affected.

XIX. Corpora sana et integri sanguinis et exercitatione firmata ex isdem his speciem accipiunt ex quibus vires, namque et colorata et adstricta et lacertis expressa sunt: sed eadem si quis vulsa atque fucata muliebriter comat, foedissima sint ipso formae labore. XX. Et cultus concessus atque magnificus addit hominibus, ut Graeco versu testatum est, auctoritatem: at muliebris et luxuriosus non corpus exornat, sed detegit mentem.

19. Healthy bodies, of integral blood, and strengthened by exercise, take their appearance from these same things from which they take their forces; for they are both colored, and compact, and expressed by their muscles: but these same, if someone, having plucked and painted them, should groom them womanishly, become most foul by the very labor of form. 20. And attire, permitted and magnificent, adds to men, as is attested by a Greek verse, authority: but effeminate and luxurious [attire] does not adorn the body, but uncovers the mind.

Similiter illa translucida et versicolor quorundam elocutio res ipsas effeminat quae illo verborum habitu vestiuntur. curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse sollicitudinem. XXI.

Similarly that translucent and variegated elocution of certain people effeminates the things themselves which are clothed in that habit of words. therefore I wish the care of words to be a solicitude for things. 21.

Nam plerumque optima rebus cohaerent et cernuntur suo lumine: at nos quaerimus illa tamquam lateant semper seque subducant: ita numquam putamus circa id esse de quo dicendum est, sed ex aliis locis petimus et inventis vim adferimus. XXII. Maiore animo adgredienda eloquentia est, quae si toto corpore valet, unguis polire et capillum reponere non existimabit ad curam suam pertinere.

For, for the most part, the best things cohere to things and are discerned by their own light: but we seek them as though they always lie hidden and withdraw themselves: thus we never suppose that what must be said is right at the very matter, but we fetch it from other places and apply force to the things found. 22. Eloquence must be approached with a greater spirit, which, if it is strong in the whole body, will not think that to polish a nail and to set the hair pertain to its care.

Sed evenit plerumque ut in hac diligentia deterior etiam fiat oratio: XXIII. primum, quia sunt optima minime arcessita et simplicibus atque ab ipsa veritate profectis similia. Nam illa quae curam fatentur et ficta atque composita videri etiam volunt nec gratiam consecuntur et fidem amittunt, praeter id quod sensus obumbrant et velut laeto gramine sata strangulant.

But it very often happens that in this diligence the speech even becomes worse: 23. first, because the best things are least fetched and are akin to those that are simple and proceed from truth itself. For those things which avow care and even wish to appear feigned and composed neither attain favor and they lose faith, besides the fact that they overshadow the sense and, as it were, choke the plantings with luxuriant grass.

XXIV. Nam et quod recte dici potest circumimus amore verborum, et quod satis dictum est repetimus, et quod uno verbo patet pluribus oneramus, et pleraque significare melius putamus quam dicere. Quid quod nihil iam proprium placet dum parum creditur disertum quod et alius dixisset?

24. For we also circumvent what can be rightly said for love of words, and we repeat what has been said enough, and we burden with more words what is plain in a single word, and we think it better to signify most things than to say them. What of the fact that nothing proper now pleases, while that is scarcely believed eloquent which another also would have said?

XXV. A corruptissimo quoque poetarum figuras seu tralationes mutuamur, tum demum ingeniosi scilicet si ad intellegendos nos opus sit ingenio. Atqui satis aperte Cicero praeceperat in dicendo vitium vel maximum esse a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere.

25. We even borrow figures or translations from the most corrupt of the poets—then at last, forsooth, we are ingenious, if ingenuity is needed in order to understand us. And yet Cicero quite plainly instructed that in speaking it is a fault, indeed the greatest, to depart from the vulgar kind of oration and from the consuetude of common sense.

XXVI. Sed ille est durus atque ineruditus: nos melius, quibus sordet omne quod natura dictavit, qui non ornamenta quaerimus sed lenocinia, quasi vero sit ulla verborum nisi rei cohaerentium virtus: quae ut propria sint et dilucida et ornata et apte conlocentur si tota vita laborandum est, omnis studiorum fructus amissus est. XXVII.

26. But that fellow is hard and unlearned: we are better, to whom everything that nature dictated is sordid, we who seek not ornaments but panderings, as though indeed there were any virtue of words save as they cohere with the matter: and if, in order that they may be proper, lucid, and ornate, and be aptly collocated, one must labor a whole life, the entire fruit of studies is lost. 27.

Atqui plerosque videas haerentis circa singula et dum inveniunt et dum inventa ponderant ac dimetiuntur. Quod si idcirco fieret ut semper optimis uterentur, abominanda tamen haec infelicitas erat, quae et cursum dicendi refrenat et calorem cogitationis extinguit mora et diffidentia. XXVIII.

And yet you may see very many hanging about the particulars, both while they find them and while they weigh and measure what has been found. But even if this were done for the reason that they might always employ the best, nevertheless this infelicity was abominable, which both reins in the course of speaking and extinguishes the heat of thought by delay and diffidence. 28.

Miser enim et, ut sic dicam, pauper orator est qui nullum verbum aequo animo perdere potest. Sed ne perdet quidem qui rationem loquendi primum cognoverit, tum lectione multa et idonea copiosam sibi verborum supellectilem compararit, huic adhibuerit artem conlocandi, deinde haec omnia exercitatione plurima roborarit, ut semper in promptu sint et ante oculos: XXIX. namque ei qui id fecerit sic res cum suis nominibus occurrent.

For wretched and, so to speak, a poor orator is he who cannot bear with an even mind to lose any word. But neither will he lose who has first come to know the rationale of speaking, then by much and apt reading has acquired for himself a copious furnishing of words, has applied to this the art of collocation, and then has strengthened all these things by very abundant exercise, so that they are always at the ready and before his eyes: 29. for to him who has done that, things will thus occur together with their proper names.

Sed opus est studio praecedente et adquisita facultate et quasi reposita. Namque ista quaerendi iudicandi comparandi anxietas dum discimus adhibenda est, non dum dicimus. Alioqui sicut qui patrimonium non pararunt, sub diem quaerunt, ita in oratione +qui non satis laboravit+: XXX.

sin praeparata dicendi vis fuerit, erunt in officio, non ut requisita respondere sed ut semper sensibus inhaerere videantur atque eos ut umbra corpus sequi. XXXI. Sed in hac ipsa cura est aliquid satis: nam cum Latina significantia ornata, cum apte sunt conlocata, quid amplius laboremus?

But if the power of speaking has been prepared, they will be at their post, not to respond when required but to seem always to inhere in the thoughts and to follow them as a shadow [follows] the body. 31. But in this very care there is something sufficient: for when the Latin significations are adorned, when they are aptly collocated, why should we labor further?

Quibusdam tamen nullus est finis calumniandi se et cum singulis paene syllabis commorandi, qui etiam cum optima sunt reperta quaerunt aliquid quod sit magis antiquum remotum inopinatum, nec intellegunt iacere sensus in oratione in qua verba laudantur. XXXII. Sit igitur cura elocutionis quam maxima, dum sciamus tamen nihil verborum causa esse faciendum, cum verba ipsa rerum gratia sint reperta: quorum ea sunt maxime probabilia quae sensum animi nostri optime promunt, atque in animis iudicum quod nos volumus efficiunt.

Nevertheless, for certain people there is no end of calumniating themselves and of lingering over almost individual syllables, who even when the best things have been discovered seek something more antiquated, remote, unexpected, nor do they understand that the meanings lie prostrate in an oration in which words are praised. 32. Let the care of elocution, therefore, be as great as possible, while we nevertheless know that nothing should be done for the sake of words, since the words themselves were discovered for the sake of things: of which those are most acceptable that best bring forth the sense of our mind, and effect in the minds of the judges what we wish.

XXXIII. Ea debent praestare sine dubio et admirabilem et iucundam orationem, verum admirabilem non sic quo modo prodigia miramur, et iucundam non deformi voluptate sed cum laude ac dignitate coniuncta.

33. These things ought, without doubt, to provide a speech both admirable and jocund, yet admirable not in the way in which we marvel at prodigies, and jocund not with deformed pleasure but joined with laud and dignity.

[1] I. Igitur quam Graeci phrasin vocant, Latine dicimus elocutionem. Ea spectatur verbis aut singulis aut coniunctis. In singulis intuendum est ut sint Latina, perspicua, ornata, ad id quod efficere volumus accommodata: in coniunctis ut emendata, ut apte conlocata, ut figurata.

[1] 1. Therefore what the Greeks call phrasis, in Latin we say elocution. This is regarded in words, either single or conjoined. In single ones it must be considered that they be Latin, perspicuous, ornate, accommodated to that which we wish to effect: in conjoined ones, that they be emended, aptly collocated, figured.

II. Sed ea quae de ratione Latine atque emendate loquendi fuerunt dicenda in libro primo, cum de grammatice loqueremur, exsecuti sumus. Verum illic tantum ne vitiosa essent praecepimus: hic non alienum est admonere ut sint quam minime peregrina et externa. Multos enim, quibus loquendi ratio non desit, invenias quos curiose potius loqui dixeris quam Latine, quo modo et illa Attica anus Theophrastum, hominem alioqui disertissimum, adnotata unius adfectatione verbi hospitem dixit, nec alio se id deprendisse interrogata respondit quam quod nimium Attice loqueretur: III.

2. But those matters which had to be said about the method of speaking in Latin and correctly we have set forth in the first book, when we spoke about grammatica. Yet there we only instructed that they not be faulty; here it is not out of place to admonish that they be as little peregrine and external as possible. For you will find many, to whom the method of speaking is not lacking, whom you would say speak rather curiously (affectedly) than in Latin—just as that Attic old woman, having marked the affectation of a single word, called Theophrastus, a man otherwise most eloquent, a stranger, and when asked replied that she had detected this in no other way than that he spoke too Attically: 3.

et in Tito Livio, mirae facundiae viro, putat inesse Pollio Asinius quandam Patavinitatem. Quare, si fieri potest, et verba omnia et vox huius alumnum urbis oleant, ut oratio Romana plane videatur, non civitate donata.

And in Titus Livius, a man of wondrous facundity, Asinius Pollio thinks there is a certain Patavinity. Wherefore, if it can be done, let both all the words and the voice savor of an alumnus of this city, so that the oration may plainly seem Roman, not one granted citizenship.

[2] I. Perspicuitas in verbis praecipuam habet proprietatem, sed proprietas ipsa non simpliciter accipitur. Primus enim intellectus est sua cuiusque rei appellatio, qua non semper utemur. Nam et obscena vitabimus et sordida et humilia.

[2] 1. Perspicuity in words has propriety as a principal property, but propriety itself is not taken simply. For the first understanding is the appellation of each thing by its own name, which we shall not always use. For we shall avoid both the obscene and the sordid and the humble.

II. sunt autem humilia infra dignitatem rerum aut ordinis. In quo vitio cavendo non mediocriter errare quidam solent, qui omnia quae sunt in usu, etiam si causae necessitas postulet, reformidant: ut ille qui in actione Hibericas herbas se solo nequiquam intellegente dicebat, nisi inridens hanc vanitatem Cassius Severus spartum dicere eum vere indicasset. III.

2. but “humble” are things below the dignity of the matters or of the order. In avoiding this vice some are wont to err not moderately, who shrink from all things that are in common use, even if the necessity of the case should require it: as that man who in a pleading said “Iberian herbs,” with himself alone understanding, to no purpose, unless, mocking this vanity, Cassius Severus had truly indicated that he meant esparto. 3.

Nec video quare clarus orator duratos muria pisces nitidius esse crediderit quam ipsum id quod vitabat. In hac autem proprietatis specie, quae nominibus ipsis cuiusque rei utitur, nulla virtus est, at quod ei contrarium est vitium. Id apud nos inproprium, akyron apud Graecos vocatur, quale est "tantum sperare dolorem", aut, quod in oratione Dolabellae emendatum a Cicerone adnotavi, "mortem ferre", aut qualia nunc laudantur a quibusdam, quorum est "de cruce verba ceciderunt". IV. Non tamen quidquid non erit proprium protinus et inproprii vitio laborabit, quia primum omnium multa sunt et Graece et Latine non denominata.

Nor do I see why a famous orator believed that fish hardened in brine would be neater than the very thing he was avoiding. In this species of propriety, which uses the very names of each thing, there is no virtue; but what is contrary to it is a vice. That among us is called improper (inproprium), among the Greeks akyron, such as "to hope only for pain," or, which I noted as corrected by Cicero in Dolabella’s speech, "to bear death," or such as are now praised by certain people, whose [phrase is], "words fell from the cross." 4. Yet not everything that will not be proper will straightway labor under the fault of impropriety, because, first of all, many things are not denominated either in Greek or in Latin.

V. Nam et qui iaculum emittit iaculari dicitur, qui pilam aut sudem appellatione privatim sibi adsignata caret: et ut lapidare quid sit manifestum est, ita glebarum testarumque iactus non habet nomen. Vnde abusio, quae katachresis dicitur, necessaria. VI. Tralatio quoque, in qua vel maximus est orationis ornatus, verba non suis rebus accommodat.

V. For he who sends forth a javelin is said to jaculate, whereas he who [throws] a ball or a stake lacks an appellation specifically assigned to him: and just as what it is to stone is manifest, so the throwing of clods and potsherds has no name. Whence abusion, which is called katachresis, is necessary. VI. Transference too, in which there is even the greatest ornament of speech, accommodates words to things not their own.

Quare proprietas non ad nomen sed ad vim significandi refertur, nec auditu sed intellectu perpendenda est. VII. Secundo modo dicitur proprium inter plura quae sunt eiusdem nominis id unde cetera ducta sunt, ut vertex est contorta in se aqua vel quidquid aliud similiter vertitur, inde propter flexum capillorum pars summa capitis, ex hoc id quod in montibus eminentissimum.

Wherefore propriety is referred not to the name but to the force of signifying, and is to be weighed not by hearing but by intellect. 7. In the second mode, the “proper” is said, among several things that are of the same name, to be that whence the rest are derived; as vertex is water twisted upon itself or whatever else is similarly turned, thence, on account of the turn of the hairs, the highest part of the head, and from this, that which is most eminent on mountains.

Recte dixeris haec omnia vertices, proprie tamen unde initium est. VIII. Sic soleae et turdi pisces et cetera.

You would rightly call all these “vertices,” yet properly, that whence the beginning is. 8. Thus “soles” and “thrushes” are fishes, and the rest.

Tertius est huic diversus modus cum res communis pluribus in uno aliquo habet nomen eximium, ut carmen funebre proprie "nenia" et tabernaculum ducis "augurale". Item quod commune est et aliis nomen intellectu alicui rei peculiariter tribuitur, ut "urbem" Romam accipimus et "venales" novicios et "Corinthia" aera, cum sint urbes aliae quoque et venalia multa et tam aurum et argentum quam aes Corinthium. Sed ne in his quidem virtus oratoris inspicitur. IX. At illud iam non mediocriter probandum, quod Hoc etiam laudari modo solet ut proprie dictum, id est, quo nihil inveniri possit significantius, ut Cato dixit C. Caesarem ad evertendam rem publicam sobrium accessisse, ut Vergilius "deductum carmen", et Horatius "acrem tibiam" "Hannibalemque dirum". X. In quo modo illud quoque est a quibusdam traditum proprii genus ex adpositis (epitheta dicuntur), ut "dulcis musti" et "cum dentibus albis". De quo genere alio loco dicendum est.

Tertius est huic diversus modus cum res communis pluribus in uno aliquo habet nomen eximium, when a thing common to many has in some one case an exceptional name, as a funeral song is properly “nenia” and a general’s tent “augurale.” Likewise, what is common and to others, the name by understanding is assigned peculiarly to some one thing, as by “the city” we take Rome, and by “venales” the newly-bought slaves, and by “Corinthia” bronzes, although there are other cities too and many things for sale and both gold and silver as well as Corinthian bronze. But not even in these is the orator’s excellence inspected. 9. But that now is not moderately to be approved, that which also is wont to be praised as properly said, that is, than which nothing more significant can be found, as Cato said that Gaius Caesar approached to overturn the republic sober, as Vergil “deductum carmen,” and Horace “acrem tibiam” and “Hannibalemque dirum.” 10. In which mode there is also this handed down by some, a proper kind from adposita (they are called epithets), as “dulcis musti” and “cum dentibus albis.” About which kind it must be spoken in another place.

XI. Etiam quae bene tralata sunt, propria dici solent. Interim autem quae sunt in quoque praecipua proprii locum accipiunt, ut Fabius inter plures imperatorias virtutes cunctator est appellatus. Possunt videri verba quae plus significant quam elocuntur in parte ponenda perspicuitatis: intellectum enim adiuvant; ego tamen libentius emphasim retulerim ad ornatum orationis, quia non ut intellegatur efficit sed ut plus intellegatur.

11. Even those things which are well transferred are accustomed to be called “proper.” Meanwhile, however, the things which are foremost in each receive the place of the “proper,” as Fabius, among several imperatorial virtues, was called the Delayer. Words which signify more than they utter can seem to be placed under the part of perspicuity: for they help the understanding; I, however, would more willingly refer emphasis to the ornament of oration, because it does not bring it about that it be understood, but that it be understood more.

XII. At obscuritas fit verbis iam ab usu remotis, ut si commentarios quis pontificum et vetustissima foedera et exoletos scrutatus auctores id ipsum petat ex iis quae inde contraxerit, quod non intelleguntur. Hinc enim aliqui famam eruditionis adfectant, ut quaedam soli scire videantur.

12. But obscurity is produced by words now removed from use, as if someone, having ransacked the commentaries of the pontiffs and the most ancient treaties and obsolete authors, were to seek from those things which he has gathered from there this very outcome: that they are not understood. Hence, indeed, some aspire to the fame of erudition, so that they may seem to know certain things alone.

XIII. Fallunt etiam verba vel regionibus quibusdam magis familiaria vel artium propria, ut "atabulus" ventus et navis "stlataria" et +inmalocosanum+. Quae vel vitanda apud iudicem ignarum significationum earum vel interpretanda sunt, sicut in iis quae homonyma vocantur, ut "taurus" animal sit an mons an signum in caelo an nomen hominis an radix arboris nisi distinctum non intellegetur.

13. Words also deceive, whether more familiar to certain regions or proper to the arts, as “Atabulus” wind and “stlataria” ship and +inmalocosanum+. These are either to be avoided before a judge ignorant of their significations, or to be interpreted, just as in those which are called homonyms: for example, “taurus”—whether it be an animal, or a mountain, or a sign in the sky, or a man’s name, or the root of a tree—will not be understood unless it is distinguished.

XIV. Plus tamen est obscuritatis in contextu et continuatione sermonis, et plures modi. Quare nec sit tam longus ut eum prosequi non possit intentio, +nec transiectio intra modum hyperbato+ finis eius differatur.

14. Yet there is more obscurity in the context and continuation of discourse, and there are several modes. Wherefore let it not be so long that attention cannot pursue it, nor let a transposition, within the measure of hyperbaton, defer its end.

Quibus adhuc peior est mixtura verborum, qualis in illo versu: "saxa vocant Itali mediis quae in fluctibus aras". XV. Etiam interiectione, qua et oratores et historici frequenter utuntur ut medio sermone aliquem inserant sensum, impediri solet intellectus, nisi quod interponitur breve est. Nam Vergilius illo loco quo pullum equinum describit, cum dixisset "nec vanos horret strepitus", compluribus insertis alia figura quinto demum versu redit: "tum, si qua sonum procul arma dederunt, stare loco nescit". XVI. Vitanda in primis ambiguitas, non haec solum, de cuius genere supra dictum est, quae incertum intellectum facit, ut "Chremetem audivi percussisse Demean", sed illa quoque, quae etiam si turbare non potest sensum in idem tamen verborum vitium incidit, ut si quis dicat visum a se hominem librum scribentem.

Than these an even worse thing is a mixture of words, such as in that verse: "the Italians call altars the rocks which are in the midst of the waves." 15. Also by interjection, which both orators and historians frequently use so that they may insert some meaning in the middle of a discourse, understanding is wont to be impeded, unless what is interposed is brief. For Vergil, in that place where he describes an equine foal, when he had said "nor does he shudder at empty noises," with several insertions of another figure returns only in the fifth verse: "then, if any arms have given a sound far off, he does not know how to stand in place." 16. Ambiguity must be avoided first of all, not only this one, of whose kind it was said above, which makes the understanding uncertain, as "I heard that Chremes struck Demea," but also that which, even if it cannot disturb the sense, nevertheless falls into the same fault of words, as if someone should say "a man writing a book was seen by me."

Nam etiam si librum ab homine scribi patet, male tamen composuerit, feceritque ambiguum quantum in ipso fuit. XVII. Est etiam in quibusdam turba inanium verborum, qui, dum communem loquendi morem reformidant, ducti specie nitoris circumeunt omnia copiosa loquacitate, eo quod dicere nolunt ipsa: deinde illam seriem cum alia simili iungentes miscentesque ultra quam ullus spiritus durare possit extendunt.

For even if it is evident that a book is written by a man, nevertheless he has composed badly and has made it ambiguous, so far as it lay in himself. 17. There is also in certain persons a turmoil of inane words, who, while they dread the common mode of speaking, led by the appearance of polish, go around everything with copious loquacity, because they are unwilling to say the very things themselves: then, joining and mixing that series with another similar one, they stretch it beyond what any breath can endure.

XVIII. In hoc malum a quibusdam etiam laboratur: neque id novum vitium est, cum iam apud Titum Livium inveniam fuisse praeceptorem aliquem qui discipulos obscurare quae dicerent iuberet, Graeco verbo utens skotison. Vnde illa scilicet egregia laudatio: "tanto melior: ne ego quidem intellexi". XIX.

18. In this evil some also labor: nor is that a new vice, since already in Titus Livy I find that there was some preceptor who ordered his disciples to obscure what they said, using the Greek word skotison. Whence that, of course, excellent laudation: "so much the better: not even I understood." 19.

Alii brevitatem aemulati necessaria quoque orationi subtrahunt verba, et, velut satis sit scire ipsos quid dicere velint, quantum ad alios pertineat nihili putant: at ego vitiosum sermonem dixerim quem auditor suo ingenio intellegit. Quidam, emutatis in perversum dicendi figuris, idem vitium consecuntur. XX. Pessima vero sunt adianoeta, hoc est quae verbis aperta occultos sensus habent, ut cum dictus est caecus "secundum vitam stare", et qui suos artus morsu lacerasse fingitur in scholis "supra se cubasse". XXI.

Others, emulating brevity, even subtract from speech the words that are necessary, and, as though it were enough that they themselves know what they wish to say, they reckon as nothing how far it pertains to others: but I would call that a faulty discourse which the hearer understands by his own ingenuity. Certain men, with the figures of speaking changed into the perverse, achieve the same fault. 20. But the worst are the adianoeta, that is, those which, though open in words, have hidden meanings, as when a blind man is said “to stand according to life,” and the one who in the schools is feigned to have torn his own limbs by biting “to have lain above himself.” 21.

Ingeniosa haec et fortia et ex ancipiti diserta creduntur, pervasitque iam multos ista persuasio, ut id [iam] demum eleganter atque exquisite dictum putent quod interpretandum sit. Sed auditoribus etiam nonnullis grata sunt haec, quae cum intellexerunt acumine suo delectantur, et gaudent non quasi audierint sed quasi invenerint.

These are believed to be ingenious and strong and eloquent from a double sense, and that persuasion has already penetrated many, so that they think that [now] at last only that has been said elegantly and exquisitely which must be interpreted. But to some listeners these things are even pleasing, and when they have understood them they take delight in their own acumen, and rejoice not as though they had heard them but as though they had discovered them.

XXII. Nobis prima sit virtus perspicuitas, propria verba, rectus ordo, non in longum dilata conclusio, nihil neque desit neque superfluat: ita sermo et doctis probabilis et planus imperitis erit. Haec eloquendi observatio: nam rerum perspicuitas quo modo praestanda sit diximus in praeceptis narrationis.

22. For us, the first virtue should be perspicuity—proper words, a straight order, a conclusion not dilated into length, with nothing lacking and nothing superfluous: thus the discourse will be acceptable to the learned and plain to the unskilled. This is the observance of speaking; for how the perspicuity of things is to be provided we have said in the precepts of narration.

Similis autem ratio est in omnibus. XXIII. Nam si neque pauciora quam oportet neque plura neque inordinata aut indistincta dixerimus, erunt dilucida et neglegenter quoque audientibus aperta: quod et ipsum in consilio est habendum, non semper tam esse acrem iudicis intentionem ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intellegentiae suae lumen, sed multis eum frequenter cogitationibus avocari, nisi tam clara fuerint quae dicemus ut in animum eius oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiam si in eam non intendatur incurrat.

The rationale is similar in all things. 23. For if we have said neither fewer things than is fitting nor more, nor things disordered or indistinct, they will be lucid and open even to those hearing negligently: and this itself must be held in counsel—that the judge’s attention is not always so sharp as to sift an obscurity by himself and to bring into the darkness of the oration a certain light of his own intelligence—but that he is frequently called away by many thoughts, unless the things we say are so clear that the speech, like the sun into the eyes, rushes into his mind even if attention is not directed to it.

XXIV. Quare non ut intellegere possit sed ne omnino possit non intellegere curandum. Propter quod etiam repetimus saepe quae non satis percepisse eos qui cognoscunt putamus: "quae causa utique nostra, iudices, culpa dicta obscurius: ad planiora et communia magis verba descendimus", cum id ipsum optime fiat, quod nos aliquid non optime fecisse simulamus.

24. Wherefore the care must be, not that he can understand, but that he cannot at all fail to understand. On account of which we also often repeat the things which we think those who know have not sufficiently perceived: "for which reason, judges, assuredly by our fault things were spoken more obscurely: we descend to plainer and more common words," although that very thing is done most excellently, while we pretend that we have not done something most excellently.

[3] I. Venio nunc ad ornatum, in quo sine dubio plus quam in ceteris dicendi partibus sibi indulget orator. Nam emendate quidem ac lucide dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque ut vitiis carere quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris. II. inventio cum imperitis saepe communis, dispositio modicae doctrinae credi potest: si quae sunt artes altiores, plerumque occultantur ut artes sint; denique omnia haec ad utilitatem causarum solam referenda sunt.

[3] 1. I come now to ornament, in which without doubt the orator indulges himself more than in the other parts of speaking. For to those who speak correctly and lucidly the reward is slight, and you seem rather to be without vices than to have acquired any great virtue. 2. Invention is often common with the unskilled; disposition may be thought to belong to moderate learning; if there are any higher arts, they are for the most part concealed, in order that they may be arts; finally, all these must be referred to the utility of causes alone.

cultu vero atque ornatu se quoque commendat ipse qui dicit, et in ceteris iudicium doctorum, in hoc vero etiam popularem laudem petit, nec fortibus modo sed etiam fulgentibus armis proeliatur. III. An in causa C. Corneli Cicero consecutus esset docendo iudicem tantum et utiliter demum ac Latine perspicueque dicendo ut populus Romanus admirationem suam non adclamatione tantum sed etiam plausu confiteretur?

Indeed by cultivation and ornament the very speaker also commends himself, and in other matters he seeks the judgment of the learned, but in this he even seeks popular praise, and he fights not only with strong but also with shining arms. 3. Would Cicero, in the case of Gaius Cornelius, have achieved, by instructing only the judge and by speaking, to be sure, usefully and in Latin and clearly, that the Roman people confessed their admiration not by acclamation only but even by applause?

sublimitas profecto et magnificentia et nitor et auctoritas expressit illum fragorem. IV. Nec tam insolita laus esset prosecuta dicentem si usitata et ceteris similis fuisset oratio. Atque ego illos credo qui aderant nec sensisse quid facerent nec sponte iudicioque plausisse, sed velut mente captos et quo essent in loco ignaros erupisse in hunc voluptatis adfectum.

sublimity, to be sure, and magnificence and splendor and authority elicited that crash of applause. 4. Nor would so unusual a praise have attended the speaker if the speech had been customary and like the rest. And I believe that those who were present neither perceived what they were doing nor applauded of their own accord and judgment, but, as if seized in mind and unaware of where they were, burst forth into this impulse of delight.

V. Sed ne causae quidem parum conferet idem hic orationis ornatus. Nam qui libenter audiunt et magis attendunt et facilius credunt, plerumque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnumquam admiratione auferuntur. Nam et ferrum adfert oculis terroris aliquid, et fulmina ipsa non tam nos confunderent si vis eorum tantum, non etiam ipse fulgor timeretur.

5. But this same ornament of speech will not contribute too little even to the cause. For those who listen gladly both attend more and more easily give credence; for the most part they are captured by the very delectation, sometimes they are carried away by admiration. For iron too brings to the eyes something of terror, and the lightnings themselves would not so confound us if only their force, and not also the very glare, were feared.

VI. Recteque Cicero his ipsis ad Brutum verbis quadam in epistula scribit: "nam eloquentiam quae admirationem non habet nullam iudico". Eandem Aristoteles quoque petendam maxime putat.

6. And rightly Cicero writes in a certain letter to Brutus in these very words: "for I judge eloquence which does not have admiration to be none." Aristotle likewise deems that the same is to be sought most of all.

Sed hic ornatus (repetam enim) virilis et fortis et sanctus sit nec effeminatam levitatem et fuco ementitum colorem amet: sanguine et viribus niteat. VII. Hoc autem adeo verum est ut, cum in hac maxime parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia, etiam qui vitiis utuntur virtutum tamen iis nomen imponant.

But this ornamentation (for I shall repeat) should be manly and strong and sacred, and let it not love an effeminate levity and a color counterfeited with rouge: let it shine with blood and with strength. 7. And this is so true that, since in this very part vices are especially near to virtues, even those who make use of vices nevertheless impose upon them the name of virtues.

Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus: non hanc esse virtutem nego, sed illis eam non tribuo. VIII. An ego fundum cultiorem putem in quo mihi quis ostenderit lilia et violas et anemonas sponte surgentes quam ubi plena messis aut graves fructu vites erunt?

Wherefore let no one of the corrupt say that I am an enemy to those who speak in a cultivated manner: I do not deny that this is a virtue, but I do not ascribe it to them. 8. Shall I think a farm more cultivated in which someone has shown me lilies and violets and anemones spontaneously springing up than where there will be a full harvest or vines heavy with fruit?

sterilem platanum tonsasque myrtos quam maritam ulmum et uberes oleas praeoptaverim? Habeant illa divites licet: quid essent si aliud nihil haberent? IX. Nullusne ergo etiam frugiferis adhibendus est decor?

would I prefer the sterile plane-tree and the shorn myrtles to the married elm and the fertile olives? Let the rich have those, if you will: what would they be if they had nothing else? 9. Is no adornment, then, to be applied even to fruit-bearing things?

Quis negat? Nam et in ordinem certaque intervalla redigam meas arbores. Quid illo quincunce speciosius, qui in quamcumque partem spectaveris rectus est?

Who denies it? For I too will arrange my trees into order and at fixed intervals. What is more sightly than that quincunx, which, in whatever direction you look, is straight?

Sed protinus in id quoque prodest, ut terrae sucum aequaliter trahat. X. Fugientia in altum cacumina oleae ferro coercebo: in orbem se formosius fundet et protinus fructum ramis pluribus feret. Decentior equus cuius adstricta ilia, sed idem velocior.

But straightway this too is of profit, that it may draw the sap of the earth evenly. 10. I will coerce with iron the olive’s treetops fleeing aloft: it will spread itself more beautifully into a circle, and straightway will bear fruit on more numerous branches. A horse is more becoming whose flanks are tight, but the same is swifter.

pulcher aspectu sit athleta cuius lacertos exercitatio expressit, idem certamini paratior. XI. Numquam vera species ab utilitate dividitur.

Let the athlete be handsome in aspect, whose upper arms exercise has defined; the same is the more prepared for contest. 11. Never is true appearance divided from utility.

Sed hoc quidem discernere modici iudicii est: illud observatione dignius, quod hic ipse honestus ornatus materiae genere +decidit variatus+. Atque ut a prima divisione ordiar, non idem demonstrativis et deliberativis et iudicialibus causis conveniet. Namque illud genus ostentationi compositum solam petit audientium voluptatem, ideoque omnes dicendi artes aperit ornatumque orationis exponit, ut quod non insidietur nec ad victoriam sed ad solum finem laudis et gloriae tendat. XII.

But to discern this, indeed, is of moderate judgment: that is more worthy of observation, that this very honorable ornament +falls off, being varied+ by the kind of the subject-matter. And, to begin from the first division, the same style will not befit demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial causes. For that genus composed for ostentation seeks solely the pleasure of the audience, and therefore lays open all the arts of speaking and sets forth the ornament of oration, so that it may not lie in wait nor aim at victory, but tend to the sole end of praise and glory. 12.

Quare quidquid erit sententiis populare, verbis nitidum, figuris iucundum, tralationibus magnificum, compositione elaboratum, velut institor quidam eloquentiae intuendum et paene pertractandum dabit: nam eventus ad ipsum, non ad causam refertur. XIII. At ubi res agitur et vera dimicatio est, ultimus sit famae locus.

Wherefore, whatever shall be popular in maxims, polished in words, pleasant in figures, magnificent in translatiōns (metaphors), elaborated in composition, he will set out, like a certain peddler of eloquence, to be looked at and almost handled; for the outcome is referred to himself, not to the cause. 13. But where the matter is at issue and there is a true contest, let fame be in the last place.

Praeterea ne decet quidem, ubi maxima rerum momenta versantur, de verbis esse sollicitum. Neque hoc eo pertinet, ut in his nullus sit ornatus, sed uti pressior et severior et minus confessus, praecipue materiae accommodatus. XIV.

Moreover, it is not even decorous, when the greatest crises of affairs are in play, to be solicitous about words. Nor does this come to the point that in these there should be no ornament, but that it be more compressed, more severe, and less overt, especially accommodated to the subject-matter. 14.

Nam et in suadendo sublimius aliquid senatus, concitatius populus, et in iudiciis publicae capitalesque causae poscunt accuratius dicendi genus. At privatum consilium causasque paucorum, ut frequenter accidit, calculorum purus sermo et dissimilis curae magis decuerit. An non pudeat certam creditam perihodis postulare aut circa stillicidia adfici aut in mancipii redhibitione sudare?

For in advising, the senate demands something more sublime, the people something more impassioned; and in trials, public and capital causes require a more accurate kind of speaking. But a private council and the causes of a few, as frequently happens, are better suited by the pure speech of calculation and a care of a different sort. Or would it not be shameful to press suit for a fixed loan in periods, or to be affected over eaves-drippings, or to sweat in the redhibition of a slave?

Sed ad propositum.

But to the proposition.

XV. Et quoniam orationis tam ornatus quam perspicuitas aut in singulis verbis est aut in pluribus positus, quid separata, quid iuncta exigant consideremus. Quamquam enim rectissime traditum est perspicuitatem propriis, ornatum tralatis verbis magis egere, sciamus nihil ornatum esse quod sit inproprium. XVI.

15. And since both the ornament and the perspicuity of oration are placed either in single words or in more, let us consider what separated, what joined, require. For although it has been most rightly handed down that perspicuity needs proper words, ornament more the transferred words, let us know that nothing is ornamental which is improper. 16.

Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significent, quod synonymia vocatur, iam sunt aliis alia honestiora sublimiora nitidiora iucundiora vocaliora. Nam ut syllabae e litteris melius sonantibus clariores, ita verba e syllabis magis vocalia, et quo plus quodque spiritus habet, auditu pulchrius. Et quod facit syllabarum, idem verborum quoque inter se copulatio, ut aliud alii iunctum melius sonet.

But since the same things very frequently signify several things, which is called synonymy, now some are, compared to others, more honorable, more sublime, more polished, more pleasant, more vocal. For just as syllables are clearer when from letters that sound better, so words are more vocal from syllables; and the more breath each has, the more beautiful to the hearing. And what the coupling of syllables brings about, the coupling of words among themselves likewise does, so that one thing joined to another may sound better.

XVII. Diversus tamen usus: nam rebus atrocibus verba etiam ipso auditu aspera magis convenient. In universum quidem optima simplicium creduntur quae aut maxime exclamant aut sono sunt iucundissima.

17. Different, however, is the usage: for to atrocious matters words harsh even to the very hearing are more suitable. In general, indeed, the best of the simple are thought to be those which either ring out the most or are most pleasant in sound.

Et honesta quidem turpibus potiora semper nec sordidis umquam in oratione erudita locus. XVIII. Clara illa atque sublimia plerumque materiae modo discernenda sunt: quod alibi magnificum tumidum alibi, et quae humilia circa res magnas apta circa minores videntur.

And indeed honorable things are always preferable to base ones, nor is there ever a place for sordid things in erudite oration. 18. Those clear and sublime things are for the most part to be discerned according to the mode of the material: for what in one place is magnificent is in another tumid, and what seems humble in relation to great matters appears apt in relation to lesser ones.

Vt autem in oratione nitida notabile humilius verbum et velut macula, ita a sermone tenui sublime nitidumque discordat fitque corruptum quia in plano tumet. XIX. Quaedam non tam ratione quam sensu iudicantur, ut illud "caesa iungebant foedera porca" fecit elegans fictio nominis, quod si fuisset "porco" vile erat.

And just as in a polished oration a more lowly word is, as it were, a blemish, so from a slender discourse the sublime and polished is discordant, and it becomes corrupted because it swells on the level ground. 19. Certain things are judged not so much by reason as by sense, as in that “they were joining treaties with a slaughtered sow”: the elegant fashioning of the noun made it; but if it had been “porco” it was vile.

In quibusdam ratio manifesta est. Risimus, et merito, nuper poetam qui dixerat: "praetextam in cista mures rosere camilli". XX. At Vergili miramur illud "saepe exiguus mus"; nam epitheton "exiguus" aptum et proprium effecit ne plus exspectaremus, et casus singularis magis decuit, et clausula ipsa unius syllabae non usitata addidit gratiam. Imitatus est itaque utrumque Horatius: "nascetur ridiculus mus". XXI.

In some cases the rationale is manifest. We laughed, and with merit, recently at a poet who had said: "the praetexta in the chest the mice gnawed of the camillus." 20. But in Vergil we admire that "often a scant mouse"; for the epithet "scant" (exiguous) made it apt and proper so that we should not expect more, and the singular case was more fitting, and the clausula itself of one syllable, not usual, added grace. Horace therefore imitated both: "there will be born a ridiculous mouse." 21.

Nec augenda semper oratio, sed summittenda nonnumquam est. Vim rebus aliquando verborum ipsa humilitas adfert. An cum dicit in Pisonem Cicero "cum tibi tota cognatio serraco advehatur", incidisse videtur in sordidum nomen, non eo contemptum hominis quem destructum volebat auxisse?

Nor must the oration always be augmented, but it must sometimes be lowered. The very humility of words sometimes brings force to things. Or when Cicero says against Piso, “when your whole kindred is conveyed to you on a dray,” does he seem to have fallen into a sordid term, or did he not by that very thing increase the contempt of the man whom he wished to have destroyed?

XXII. Et alibi: "caput opponis cum eo coruscans". Vnde interim grati idiotismi [de quo], qualis est ille apud M. tullium: "pusio qui cum maiore sorore cubitabat" et "Flavius qui cornicum oculos confixit", et pro Milone illud "heus tu Rufio", et "Erucius Antoniaster". Id tamen in declamatoribus est notabilius, laudarique me puero solebat "da patri panem", et in eodem "etiam canem pascis". XXIII. Res quidem praecipue in scholis anceps et frequenter causa risus, nunc utique cum haec exercitatio procul a veritate seiuncta laboret incredibili verborum fastidio ac sibi magnam partem sermonis absciderit.

22. And elsewhere: "you set your head against him, flashing." Whence, in the meantime, agreeable idiotisms [about which], such as that one in M. tullium: "the little boy who used to lie with his elder sister," and "Flavius, who pierced the eyes of crows," and in For Milo that "hey, you, Rufio," and "Erucius, an Antony-aster." This, however, is more notable among declaimers, and in my boyhood there used to be praised "give bread to father," and in the same piece "you even feed the dog." 23. The matter indeed, especially in the schools, is two-edged and frequently a cause of laughter, especially now, since this exercise, severed far from truth, labors under an incredible fastidiousness of words and has cut off from itself a great part of discourse.

XXIV. cum sint autem verba propria ficta tralata, propriis dignitatem dat antiquitas. Namque et sanctiorem et magis admirabilem faciunt orationem, quibus non quilibet fuerit usurus, eoque ornamento acerrimi iudicii P. Vergilius unice est usus.

XXIV. But since words are proper, coined, [and] transferred, antiquity bestows dignity upon the proper. For they make the oration both more sacred and more admirable, words which not just anyone would have used; and with that ornament P. Vergilius, of the keenest judgment, used uniquely.

XXV. "Olli" enim et "quianam" et "moerus" et "pone" et "porricere" adspergunt illam, quae etiam in picturis est gravissima, vetustatis inimitabilem arti auctoritatem. Sed utendum modo nec ex ultimis tenebris repetenda.

25. For "olli" and "quianam" and "moerus" and "pone" and "porricere" sprinkle upon art that inimitable authority of antiquity, which is most weighty even in paintings. But it must be used with measure, and not fetched back from the farthest darkness.

Satis est vetus "quaeso": quid necesse est "quaiso" dicere? "Oppido", quamquam usi sunt paulum tempore nostro superiores, vereor ut iam nos ferat quisquam: certe "antegerio", cuius eadem significatio est, nemo nisi ambitiosus utetur. XXVI.

The old “quaeso” is sufficient: what need is there to say “quaiso”? “Oppido,” although our elders a little before our time used it, I fear that now no one will put up with us; certainly “antegerio,” which has the same signification, no one except an ambitious person will use. 26.

+Aerumnas+ quid opus est, tamquam parum sit si dicatur +quod horridum+? "Reor" tolerabile, "autumo" tragicum; "prolem" +dicendi versum ei+, "prosapiam" insulsum. Quid multa? totus prope mutatus est sermo.

+AERUMNAS+ what need is there, as though it were too little if +what is rough+ be said? "Reor" tolerable, "autumo" tragic; "prolem" +a turn of expression in his diction+, "prosapiam" insipid. Why many words? the whole speech has been almost changed.

XXVII. Quaedam tamen adhuc vetera vetustate ipsa gratius nitent, quaedam et necessario interim sumuntur, ut "nuncupare" et "fari": multa alia etiam audentius inseri possunt, sed ita demum si non appareat adfectatio, in quam mirifice Vergilius: XXVIII. "Corinthiorum amator iste verborum, Thucydides Britannus, Atticae febres, tau Gallicum, min et sphin +et male illisit+: ita omnia ista verba miscuit fratri". XXIX.

27. Certain things, however, still ancient, shine more pleasingly by antiquity itself; certain ones also are taken up of necessity meanwhile, such as "nuncupare" and "fari": many others too can be inserted more boldly, but only if affectation does not appear—a fault at which Vergilius wittily aimed: 28. "This lover of Corinthian words, a British Thucydides, Attic fevers, the Gallic tau, min and sphin +and he stuck them in badly+: thus he mixed all those words for his brother." 29.

Cimber hic fuit a quo fratrem necatum hoc Ciceronis dicto notatum est: "Germanum Cimber occidit". Nec minus noto Sallustius epigrammate incessitur: "et verba antiqui multum furate Catonis, Crispe, Iugurthinae conditor historiae". XXX. Odiosa cura: nam et cuilibet facilis et hoc pessima, quod eius studiosus non verba rebus aptabit, sed res extrinsecus arcesset quibus haec verba conveniant.

This was the Cimber by whom the brother’s killing was marked by this saying of Cicero: "Cimber killed his brother." Nor is Sallust less assailed by a well-known epigram: "and, Crispus, having much stolen the words of ancient Cato, founder of the Jugurthine history." 30. Odious care: for it is easy to anyone, and worst in this—that its devotee will not fit the words to the things, but will fetch in things from outside to which these words may be suitable.

Fingere, ut primo libro dixi, Graecis magis concessum est, qui sonis etiam quibusdam et adfectibus non dubitaverunt nomina aptare, non alia libertate quam qua illi primi homines rebus appellationes dederunt. XXXI. Nostri aut in iungendo aut in derivando paulum aliquid ausi vix in hoc satis recipiuntur.

To feign, as I said in the first book, has been more conceded to the Greeks, who did not hesitate to fit names even to certain sounds and affects, with no other liberty than that with which those first men gave appellations to things. 31. Our own, whether in joining or in deriving, having dared a little something, are scarcely in this matter received as sufficient.

Nam memini iuvenis admodum inter Pomponium ac Senecam etiam praefationibus esse tractatum an "gradus eliminat" in tragoedia dici oportuisset. At veteres ne "expectorat" quidem timuerunt, et sane eiusdem notae est "exanimat". XXXII. At in tractu et declinatione talia sunt qualia apud Ciceronem "beatitas" et "beatitudo": quae dura quidem sentit esse, verum tamen usu putat posse molliri.

For I remember, when quite a young man, that it was discussed even in prefaces between Pomponius and Seneca whether "gradus eliminat" ought to be said in tragedy. But the ancients did not fear even "expectorat," and surely "exanimat" is of the same stamp. 32. But in formation and inflection there are such as, with Cicero, "beatitas" and "beatitudo": which he does indeed feel to be harsh, yet nevertheless thinks can be softened by use.

Nec a verbis modo sed ab nominibus quoque derivata sunt quaedam, ut a Cicerone "sullaturit", Asinio "fimbriatum" et "figulatum". XXXIII. Multa ex Graeco formata nova, ac plurima a Sergio Plauto, quorum dura quaedam admodum videntur, ut [quae] "ens" et "essentia": quae cur tanto opere aspernemur nihil video, nisi quod iniqui iudices adversus nos sumus: ideoque paupertate sermonis laboramus. Quaedam tamen perdurant.

Not from verbs only but from nouns as well certain things have been derived, as from Cicero “sullaturit,” from Asinius “fimbriatum” and “figulatum.” 33. Many new things formed from Greek, and a very great many by Sergius Plautus, of which some seem quite harsh, such as [those which] “ens” and “essentia”: why we should so greatly spurn these I see no reason, except that we are unfair judges against ourselves; and therefore we suffer from poverty of speech. Certain ones, however, endure.

XXXIV. Nam et quae vetera nunc sunt fuerunt olim nova, et quaedam sunt in usu perquam recentia, ut Messala primus "reatum", "munerarium" Augustus primus dixerunt [reatum nemo ante Messalam, munerarium nemo ante Augustum dixerat]. "Piraticam" quoque ut "musicam" et "fabricam" dici adhuc dubitabant mei praeceptores, "favorem" et "urbanum" Cicero nova credit. Nam et in epistula ad Brutum "eum" inquit "amorem et eum, ut hoc verbo utar, favorem in consilium advocabo": XXXV.

34. For even the things which are old now were once new, and some are in use that are very recent indeed, as Messalla was the first to say "reatus," Augustus the first "munerarium" [no one before Messalla had said reatus, no one before Augustus had said munerarium]. My preceptors too still doubted whether "piratica" should be said as "musica" and "fabrica"; Cicero deems "favor" and "urbanum" new. For even in an epistle to Brutus he says: "that love and that—so that I may use this word—favor, I will call into council": 35.

et ad Appium Pulchrum: "te, hominem non solum sapientem verum etiam, ut nunc loquimur, urbanum". Idem putat a Terentio primum dictum esse "obsequium", [cincilius] a Sisenna "albenti caelo". "Cervicem" videtur Hortensius primus dixisse; nam veteres pluraliter appellabant. Audendum itaque: neque enim accedo Celso, qui ab oratore verba fingi vetat. XXXVI.

and to Appius Pulcher: "you, a man not only wise but also, as we now speak, urbane." The same man thinks that "obsequium" was first said by Terence, [cincilius] that "albenti caelo" by Sisenna. "Cervicem" Hortensius seems to have been the first to say; for the ancients used to call it in the plural. One must dare, therefore: for I do not accede to Celsus, who forbids words to be fashioned by the orator. 36.

Nam cum sint eorum alia, ut dicit Cicero, "nativa", id est, "quae significata sunt primo sensu", alia "reperta, quae ex his facta sunt": ut iam nobis ponere aliqua, quod illi rudes homines primique fecerunt, fas non sit, at derivare flectere coniungere, quod natis postea concessum est, quando desit licere? XXXVII. Sed si quid periculosius finxisse videbimur, quibusdam remediis praemuniendum est: "ut ita dicam", "si licet dicere", "quodam modo", "permittite mihi sic uti". Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius tralata erunt proderit, nihilque non tuto dici potest in quo non fari iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ipsa manifestum erit.

For since some of their words are, as Cicero says, "native," that is, "those which were signified in the first sense," and others "discovered, which have been made from these": though it may not now be right for us to posit some, which those rough and earliest men did, yet to derive, to inflect, to conjoin—what was granted to those born later—when is it not permissible? 37. But if we shall seem to have coined anything somewhat more perilous, we must be fortified with certain remedies: "so to speak," "if it be permitted to say," "in a certain manner," "allow me to use it thus." The same will also be useful in those things which shall have been transferred more freely, and nothing cannot be said safely, provided that our judgment in speaking is made manifest by the very solicitude.

Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praecipitur proepiplessein tei hyperbolei.

On this matter that Greek saying is most elegant, by which it is prescribed “to pre-rebuke the hyperbole.”

XXXVIII. Tralata probari nisi in contextu sermonis non possunt. Itaque de singulis verbis satis dictum, quae, ut alio loco ostendi, per se nullam virtutem habent.

38. Transferred expressions cannot be approved except in the context of discourse. And so enough has been said about single words, which, as I have shown in another place, have no virtue in themselves.

Sed ne inornata [quae] sunt quidem, nisi cum sunt infra rei de qua loquendum est dignitatem, excepto si obscena nudis nominibus enuntientur. XXXIX. Quod viderint qui non putant esse vitanda quia nec sit vox ulla natura turpis, et, si qua est rei deformitas, alia quoque appellatione quacumque ad intellectum eundem nihilo minus perveniat.

But not even the unadorned [things] are to be avoided, unless when they are below the dignity of the matter about which one must speak—except if obscenities are enunciated by naked names. 39. Let those consider this who do not think they must be shunned, since no voice is by nature base, and, if there is any deformity of the thing, by whatever other appellation it nonetheless arrives at the same understanding.

Ego Romani pudoris more contentus etiam respondendi talibus verecundiam silentio vindicabo.

I, content in the manner of Roman pudor, will also vindicate the modesty of replying to such things by silence.

XL. Iam hinc igitur ad rationem sermonis coniuncti transeamus. cuius ornatus in haec duo prima dividitur, quam concipiamus elocutionem, quo modo efferamus. Nam primum est ut liqueat augere quid velimus an minuere, concitate dicere an moderate, laete an severe, abundanter an presse, aspere an leniter, magnifice an subtiliter, graviter an urbane: tum quo tralationum genere, quibus figuris, qualibus sententiis, quo modo, qua postremo conlocatione id quod intendimus efficere possimus.

40. Now from here, therefore, let us pass to the rationale of connected speech. The ornament of which is divided first into these two: how we conceive the elocution, in what way we bring it forth. For first it is that it be clear whether we wish to augment or to diminish, to speak impetuously or moderately, brightly or severely, copiously or tersely, harshly or gently, magnificently or subtly, gravely or urbanely: then by what kind of translations (metaphors), by what figures, by what thoughts, in what manner, by what, finally, arrangement we may be able to effect that which we intend.

XLI. Ceterum dicturus quibus ornetur oratio, prius ea quae sunt huic laudi contraria attingam: nam prima virtus est vitio carere. XLII.

41. However, about to speak by what things the oration is adorned, I will first touch upon those things which are contrary to this praise: for the first virtue is to be free from vice. 42.

Igitur ante omnia ne speremus ornatam orationem fore quae probabilis non erit. Probabile autem Cicero id genus dicit quod non nimis est comptum: non quia comi expolirique non debeat (nam et haec ornatus pars est), sed quia vitium est ubique quod nimium est. XLIII.

Therefore, before all things, let us not hope for an adorned speech which will not be probable. Now Cicero calls that kind “probable” which is not too much bedecked: not because it ought not to be made comely and polished (for this too is a part of ornament), but because what is excessive is everywhere a vice. 43.

Itaque vult esse auctoritatem in verbis, sententias vel graves vel aptas opinionibus hominum ac moribus. His enim salvis licet adsumere ea quibus inlustrem fieri orationem putat, delecta tralata supralata, ad nomen adiuncta, duplicia et idem significantia atque ab ipsa actione atque imitatione rerum non abhorrentia.

Therefore he wants there to be authority in the words, and sentences either grave or apt to the opinions and morals of men. With these secure, it is permitted to assume those things by which he thinks the oration may be made illustrious: selected, transferred, heightened; joined to the noun; doublets and same-signifying (synonyms); and such as do not offend against delivery itself and the imitation of things.

XLIV. Sed quoniam vitia prius demonstrare adgressi sumus, ab hoc initium sit quod cacemphaton vocatur: XLV. sive mala consuetudine in obscenum intellectum sermo detortus est, ut "ductare exercitus" et "patrare bella" apud Sallustium dicta sancte et antique ridentibus, si dis placet (quam culpam non scribentium quidem iudico sed legentium, tamen vitandam, quatenus verba honesta moribus perdidimus et vincentibus etiam vitiis cedendum est), sive iunctura deformiter sonat, ut, si cum hominibus notis loqui nos dicimus, nisi hoc ipsum "hominibus" medium sit, in praefanda videmur incidere, quia ultima prioris [ultimae] syllabae littera, quae exprimi nisi labris coeuntibus non potest, aut intersistere nos indecentissime cogit aut [non] continuata cum insequente in naturam eius corrumpitur.

44. But since we have set out first to point out faults, let the beginning be from that which is called cacemphaton: 45. whether by bad custom speech is twisted into an obscene understanding, as “to lead about armies” and “to consummate wars,” said by Sallust in a sacred and ancient manner, yet provoking laughter, if it please the gods (which fault I judge to be not that of the writers, indeed, but of the readers—yet to be avoided, inasmuch as we have lost honorable words through our morals, and even to conquering vices one must yield), or the juncture sounds ill‑formed, as, if we say that we speak with well‑known men, unless this very word “with men” be placed in the middle, we seem to fall into the unmentionable, because the letter of the last syllable of the preceding [last], which cannot be expressed except with the lips coming together, either most indecently forces us to pause, or, [not] continued with what follows, is corrupted into its nature.

XLVI. Aliae quoque coniunctiones aliquid simile faciunt, quas persequi libenter est in eo vitio quod vitandum dicimus commorantis. Sed divisio quoque adfert eandem iniuriam pudori, ut si "intercapedinis" nominativo casu quis utatur.

46. Other conjunctions also produce something similar, which it is a pleasure for one lingering in that vice which we say must be avoided to pursue. But division likewise brings the same injury to modesty, as if someone were to use "intercapedinis" in the nominative case.

XLVII. Nec scripto modo id accidit, sed etiam sensu plerique obscene intellegere, nisi caveris, cupiunt (ut apud Ovidium "quaeque latent meliora putant") et ex verbis quae longissime ab obscenitate absunt occasionem turpitudinis rapere. Siquidem Celsus cacemphaton apud Vergilium putat: "incipiunt agitata tumescere": quod si recipias, nihil loqui tutum est.

47. Nor does this happen only in writing, but also in sense many desire to understand obscenely, unless you are careful (as in Ovid, "quaeque latent meliora putant") and to snatch from words which are farthest removed from obscenity an occasion for turpitude. Indeed, Celsus thinks there is a cacemphaton in Vergil: "incipiunt agitata tumescere": which, if you accept, nothing is safe to say.

XLVIII. Deformitati proximum est humilitatis vitium (tapeinosin vocant), qua rei magnitudo vel dignitas minuitur, ut "saxea est verruca in summo montis vertice": cui natura contrarium sed errore par est parvis dare excedentia modum nomina, nisi cum ex industria risus inde captatur. Itaque nec parricidam "nequam" dixeris hominem nec deditum forte meretrici "nefarium", quia alterum parum, alterum nimium est.

48. Next to deformity is the vice of humility/abasing (they call it tapeinosis), whereby the magnitude or dignity of a thing is diminished, as in "there is a stony wart on the summit of the mountain’s peak": to which, contrary by nature but equal through error, is to give to small things names that exceed due measure, unless when laughter is therefrom captured on purpose. And so you would not call a parricide a "good-for-nothing" man, nor one perhaps devoted to a harlot "nefarious," because the one is too little, the other too much.

XLIX. Proinde quaedam hebes sordida ieiuna tristis ingrata vilis oratio est. Quae vitia facillime fient manifesta contrariis virtutibus.

49. Accordingly, there is a certain oration that is dull, sordid, jejune, sad, ingrate, and vile. These vices will most easily be made manifest by the contrary virtues.

Nam primum acuto, secundum nitido, tertium copioso, deinceps hilari iucundo accurato diversum est.

For the first is different from acute, the second from nitid (polished), the third from copious; thereafter from hilar (cheerful), from jocund, from accurate.

L. Vitari debet et elleipsis, cum sermoni deest aliquid, quo minus plenus sit, quamquam id obscurae potius quam inornatae orationis est vitium. Sed hoc quoque, cum a prudentibus fit, schema dici solet, sicut tautologia, id est eiusdem verbi aut sermonis iteratio. LI.Haec enim, quamquam non magnopere a summis auctoribus vitata, interim vitium videri potest, in quod saepe incidit etiam Cicero securus tam parvae observationis, sicut hoc loco: "non solum igitur illud iudicium iudicii simile, iudices, non fuit". Interim mutato nomine epanalempsis dicitur, atque est et ipsum inter schemata, quorum exempla illo loco quaerenda quo virtutes erunt.

50. Ellipsis too ought to be avoided, when something is lacking to the discourse, whereby it is less full, although that is a fault of obscure rather than of unadorned oration. But this also, when done by the prudent, is wont to be called a schema, just as tautology, that is, a repetition of the same word or discourse. 51.These indeed, although not greatly shunned by the highest authors, can at times seem a fault, into which even Cicero often falls, unconcerned for so small an observation, as in this passage: "not only, then, was that judgment not like a judgment, judges, it was not." Sometimes, with the name changed, it is called epanalepsis, and it too is among the schemata, whose examples must be sought in that place where the virtues will be.

LII. Peior hac homoeideia; quae nulla varietatis gratia levat taedium atque est tota coloris unius, qua maxime deprehenditur carens arte oratio, eaque et in sententiis et in figuris et in compositione longe non animis solum sed etiam auribus est ingratissima. LIII.

52. Worse than this is homoeideia; which with no grace of variety relieves tedium and is wholly of a single color, whereby an oration lacking art is most detected; and this, both in sentences and in figures and in composition, is by far most displeasing not only to minds but even to ears. 53.

Vitanda macrologia, id est longior quam oportet sermo, ut apud T. Livium: "legati non impetrata pace retro domum, unde venerant, abierunt". Sed huic vicina periphrasis virtus habetur. Est et pleonasmos vitium, cum supervacuis verbis oratio oneratur: "ego oculis meis vidi" (sat est enim "vidi"). LIV. Emendavit hoc etiam urbane in Hirtio Cicero: cum is apud ipsum declamans filium a matre decem mensibus in utero latum esse dixisset, "quid?

Macrology is to be avoided, that is, a discourse longer than is fitting, as in T. Livy: "the envoys, peace not having been obtained, went back home, whence they had come." But a periphrasis adjacent to this is accounted a virtue. There is also the fault of pleonasm, when speech is laden with superfluous words: "I with my own eyes saw" (for "I saw" is enough). 54. Cicero also urbanely amended this in the case of Hirtius: when he, declaiming in his presence, had said that a son had been borne by his mother in the womb for ten months, "what?"

aliae" inquit "in perula solent ferre"? Nonnumquam tamen illud genus, cuius exemplum priore loco posui, adfirmationis gratia adhibetur: "vocemque his auribus hausi". LV. At vitium erit quotiens otiosum fuerit et supererit, non cum adicietur. Est etiam quae periergia vocatur, [cum] supervacua, ut sic dixerim, operositas, ut a diligenti curiosus et religione superstitio distat. Atque, ut semel finiam, verbum omne quod neque intellectum adiuvat neque ornatum vitiosum dici potest.

"do others," he says, "use to carry in a little pouch?" Sometimes, however, that kind, of which I set an example in the earlier place, is employed for the sake of affirmation: "and I drank in the voice with these ears." 55. But it will be a fault whenever it is idle and superfluous, not when it adds something. There is also what is called periergia, [when] a superfluous, so to speak, operosity, as a curious man differs from a diligent one and superstition from religion. And, to finish once for all, every word that aids neither the intellect nor the ornament can be called a fault.

LVI. Cacozelon, id est mala adfectatio, per omne dicendi genus peccat; nam et tumida et pusilla et praedulcia et abundantia et arcessita et exultantia sub idem nomen cadunt. Denique cacozelon vocatur quidquid est ultra virtutem, quotiens ingenium iudicio caret et specie boni fallitur, omnium in eloquentia vitiorum pessimum: nam cetera parum vitantur, hoc petitur.

56. Cacozelon, that is bad affectation, sins across every kind of speaking; for both tumid and puny and over-sweet and abundant and far-fetched and exultant fall under the same name. Finally, cacozelon is called whatever is beyond virtue, whenever ingenuity lacks judgment and is deceived by the semblance of the good—the worst of all vices in eloquence: for the rest are too little avoided, this one is pursued.

LVII. Est autem totum in elocutione. Nam rerum vitia sunt stultum commune contrarium supervacuum: corrupta oratio in verbis maxime inpropriis, redundantibus, compressione obscura, compositione fracta, vocum similium aut ambiguarum puerili captatione consistit.

57. Yet the whole lies in elocution. For the vices of subject-matter are the foolish, the common, the contrary, the superfluous: a corrupted oration consists in words especially improper and redundant, in obscurity through compression, in a broken composition, in a childish captation of similar or ambiguous words.

LVIII. Est autem omne cacozelon utique falsum, etiam si non omne falsum cacozelon: +et] dicitur aliter quam se natura habet et quam oportet et quam sat est. Totidem autem generibus corrumpitur oratio quot ornatur.

58. Now every cacozelon is assuredly false, even if not everything false is cacozelon; and it is said otherwise than its nature has itself, and than is fitting, and than is sufficient. Moreover, oration is corrupted by just as many kinds as it is adorned.

Sed de hac parte et in alio nobis opere plenius dictum est et in hoc saepe tractatur et adhuc spargetur omnibus locis. Loquentes enim de ornatu subinde quae sint vitanda similia virtutibus vitia dicemus.

But concerning this part, both in another work of ours it has been said more fully, and in this one it is often treated, and it will still be sprinkled in all places. For, speaking about ornament, we will from time to time say which vices, similar to virtues, are to be avoided.

LIX. sunt inornata et haec: quod male dispositum est, id anoiconometon, quod male figuratum, aschematiston, quod male conlocatum, id kakosyntheton vocant. Sed de dispositione diximus, de figuris et compositione dicemus.

59. There are unornate things also of this sort: what is badly disposed, they call anoiconometon; what is badly figured, aschematiston; what is badly collocated, kakosyntheton. But about disposition we have spoken; about figures and composition we shall speak.

Sardismos quoque appellatur quaedam mixta ex varia ratione linguarum oratio, ut si Atticis Dorica et Aeolica et Ionica confundas. LX. cui simile vitium est apud nos si quis sublimia humilibus, vetera novis, poetica vulgaribus misceat - id enim tale monstrum quale Horatius in prima parte libri de arte poetica fingit: "humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam iungere si velit" et cetera ex diversis naturis subiciat.

Sardismos also is called a certain oration mixed from a various manner of languages, as if you were to confound with Attic the Doric and Aeolic and Ionic. 60. A similar vice among us is if someone should mix lofty things with lowly, old with new, poetical with vulgar—the result is such a monster as Horace fashions in the first part of the book On the Art of Poetry: "if a painter should wish to join a horse’s neck to a human head," and should subjoin the rest from diverse natures.

LXI. Ornatum est quod perspicuo ac probabili plus est. Eius primi sunt gradus in eo quod velis +exprimendo+, tertius qui haec nitidiora faciat, quod proprie dixeris cultum.

61. Ornament is that which is more than the perspicuous and the probable. Its first degrees are in the +expressing+ of what you wish; the third, which makes these things more polished, you would properly call cultivation.

Itaque enargeian, cuius in praeceptis narrationis feci mentionem, quia plus est evidentia vel, ut alii dicunt, repraesentatio quam perspicuitas, et illud patet, hoc se quodam modo ostendit, inter ornamenta ponamus. LXII. Magna virtus res de quibus loquimur clare atque ut cerni videantur enuntiare.

Therefore let us place enargeia—of which I made mention in the precepts of narration—among the ornaments, because it is more an evidentness, or, as others say, a representation, than a perspicuity; and that lies open, this in a certain way shows itself. 62. Great virtue it is to enunciate the things about which we speak clearly and so that they seem to be seen.

Non enim satis efficit neque, ut debet, plene dominatur oratio si usque ad aures valet, atque ea sibi iudex de quibus cognoscit narrari credit, non exprimi et oculis mentis ostendi. LXIII. Sed quoniam pluribus modis accipi solet, non equidem in omnis eam particulas secabo, quarum ambitiose a quibusdam numerus augetur, sed maxime necessarias attingam.

For the oration does not accomplish enough, nor, as it ought, fully hold sway, if it prevails only up to the ears, and the judge believes that the matters of which he takes cognizance are being narrated to him, not expressed and shown to the eyes of the mind. 63. But since it is wont to be taken in several modes, I for my part will not cut it into all its little particles, whose number is ambitiously increased by some, but I will touch upon the most necessary.

Est igitur unum genus, quo tota rerum imago quodam modo verbis depingitur: "constitit in digitos extemplo arrectus uterque" et cetera, quae nobis illam pugilum congredientium faciem ita ostendunt ut non clarior futura fuerit spectantibus. LXIV. Plurimum in hoc genere sicut ceteris eminet Cicero: an quisquam tam procul a concipiendis imaginibus rerum abest ut non, cum illa in Verrem legit: "stetit soleatus praetor populi Romani cum pallio purpureo tunicaque talari muliercula nixus in litore", non solum ipsos intueri videatur et locum et habitum, sed quaedam etiam ex iis quae dicta non sunt sibi ipse adstruat?

There is, therefore, one kind by which the whole image of things is in a certain way painted with words: “at once each sprang erect onto his toes,” and the rest, which show us that visage of pugilists coming together in such a way that it would not have been clearer to the onlookers. 64. In this kind, as in the others, Cicero eminently stands out: or is anyone so far removed from conceiving images of things that he does not, when he reads those passages in Against Verres: “the praetor of the Roman people, sandal‑shod, with a purple pallium and a talar tunic, leaning on a little woman, stood on the shore,” seem not only to behold the persons themselves and the place and the attire, but even to add for himself certain details among those that have not been said?

LXV. Ego certe mihi cernere videor et vultum et oculos et deformes utriusque blanditias et eorum qui aderant tacitam aversationem ac timidam verecundiam. LXVI.

65. I surely seem to myself to discern both the face and the eyes and the misshapen blandishments of each, and the silent aversion and timid modesty of those who were present. 66.

Interim ex pluribus efficitur illa quam conamur exprimere facies, ut est apud eundem (namque ad omnium ornandi virtutum exemplum vel unus sufficit) in descriptione convivii luxuriosi: "Videbar videre alios intrantis, alios autem exeuntis, quosdam ex vino vacillantis, quosdam hesterna ex potatione oscitantis. humus erat inmunda, lutulenta vino, coronis languidulis et spinis cooperta piscium". LXVII. Quid plus videret qui intrasset?

Meanwhile, out of several there is effected that appearance which we are trying to express, as it is in that same author (for indeed, for an example of all the virtues of ornament, even a single one suffices) in the description of a luxurious banquet: "I seemed to see some entering, others, however, going out, certain ones staggering from wine, certain ones yawning from yesterday’s potation. the ground was unclean, muddy with wine, covered with drooping garlands and with fish spines". 67. What more would he see who had entered?

Sic et urbium captarum crescit miseratio. Sine dubio enim qui dicit expugnatam esse civitatem complectitur omnia quaecumque talis fortuna recipit, sed in adfectus minus penetrat brevis hic velut nuntius. LXVIII.

Thus too the compassion for captured cities increases. Without doubt, indeed, he who says that a city has been stormed comprehends all whatever such a fortune receives, but this brief, as it were, message penetrates less into the affections. 68.

At si aperias haec, quae verbo uno inclusa erant, apparebunt effusae per domus ac templa flammae et ruentium tectorum fragor et ex diversis clamoribus unus quidam sonus, aliorum fuga incerta, alii extremo complexu suorum cohaerentes et infantium feminarumque ploratus et male usque in illum diem servati fato senes: LXIX. tum illa profanorum sacrorumque direptio, efferentium praedas repetentiumque discursus, et acti ante suum quisque praedonem catenati, et conata retinere infantem suum mater, et sicubi maius lucrum est pugna inter victores. Licet enim haec omnia, ut dixi, complectatur "eversio", minus est tamen totum dicere quam omnia.

But if you open up these things which had been enclosed in one word, there will appear flames poured out through homes and temples, and the crash of roofs collapsing, and from diverse outcries a certain single sound; the uncertain flight of some, others clinging to their loved ones in a final embrace, and the wailing of infants and women, and old men ill preserved by fate even unto that day: 69. then that direption of profane and sacred things, the running to and fro of those carrying out spoils and of those seeking them back, and men driven in chains, each before his own plunderer, and a mother attempting to retain her infant, and, wherever the gain is greater, a fight among the victors. For although, as I said, “eversion” may embrace all these things, nevertheless it is less to say “the whole” than to say “all things.”

LXX. Consequemur autem ut manifesta sint si fuerint veri similia, et licebit etiam falso adfingere quidquid fieri solet. Contingit eadem claritas etiam ex accidentibus: "mihi frigidus horror membra quatit gelidusque coit formidine sanguis" et "trepidae matres pressere ad pectora natos". LXXI.

70. We shall, moreover, achieve that things be manifest if they are verisimilar, and it will even be permitted to feign falsely whatever is wont to occur. The same clarity arises also from accidents: "a frigid horror shakes my limbs, and my blood, gelid, congeals with dread," and "trembling mothers pressed their sons to their breasts." 71.

Atque huius summae iudicio quidem meo virtutis facillima est via: naturam intueamur, hanc sequamur. Omnis eloquentia circa opera vitae est, ad se refert quisque quae audit, et id facillime accipiunt animi quod agnoscunt.

And, as to this summit of virtue, in my judgment the most facile way is: let us contemplate nature, let us follow her. All eloquence is about the works of life; each person relates to himself the things he hears, and minds most easily receive that which they recognize.

LXXII. Praeclare vero ad inferendam rebus lucem repertae sunt similitudines: quarum aliae sunt quae probationis gratia inter argumenta ponuntur, aliae ad exprimendam rerum imaginem compositae, quod est huius loci proprium: "inde lupi ceu raptores atra in nebula" et "avi similis quae circum litora, circum piscosos scopulos humilis volat aequora iuxta". LXXIII. Quo in genere id est praecipue custodiendum, ne id quod similitudinis gratia adscivimus aut obscurum sit aut ignotum: debet enim quod inlustrandae alterius rei gratia adsumitur ipsum esse clarius eo quod inluminat.

72. Most excellently indeed similitudes have been discovered for bringing light to things: of which some are those that are placed among the arguments for the sake of probation, others are composed to express the image of things, which is proper to this place: "then, like wolves, marauders in a black mist," and "like a bird which around the shores, around the fish-rich crags, flies low close beside the waters." 73. In which kind this must be especially guarded against: that what we have adopted for the sake of similitude be not either obscure or unknown; for that which is assumed for the sake of illustrating another thing ought itself to be clearer than that which it illuminates.

Quare poetis quidem permittamus sane eius modi exempla: "qualis ubi hibernam Lyciam Xanthique fluenta deserit aut Delum maternam invisit Apollo": non idem oratorem decebit, ut occultis aperta demonstret. LXXIV. Sed illud quoque de quo in argumentis diximus similitudinis genus ornat orationem, facitque sublimem floridam iucundam mirabilem.

Wherefore let us indeed permit to poets examples of this kind: "such as when Apollo leaves wintry Lycia and the streams of Xanthus, or visits his mother Delos": it will not befit the orator to demonstrate things open by things hidden. 74. But that kind of similitude also, about which we spoke among the arguments, adorns the oration, and makes it sublime, florid, pleasant, marvelous.

LXXV. Nam quo quaeque longius petita est, hoc plus adfert novitatis atque inexspectata magis est. Illa vulgaria videri possunt et utilia tantum ad conciliandum fidem: "ut terram cultu, sic animum disciplinis meliorem uberioremque fieri", et "ut medici abalienata morbis membra praecidant, ita turpes ac perniciosos, etiam si nobis sanguine cohaereant, amputandos". Iam sublimius illud pro Archia: "saxa atque solitudines voci respondent, bestiae saepe inmanes cantu flectuntur atque consistunt" et cetera.

75. For the farther each example is fetched, the more it brings of novelty and the more it is unexpected. Those commonplace ones may seem useful only for conciliating credence: "as by cultivation the earth becomes better and more fruitful, so by disciplines the mind becomes better and more abundant," and "as physicians cut off limbs alienated by diseases, so the base and pernicious, even if they are joined to us by blood, are to be amputated." Now more sublime is that in the Pro Archia: "rocks and solitudes respond to a voice; beasts, often monstrous, are bent by song and come to a halt," and so forth.

LXXVI. Quod quidem genus a quibusdam declamatoria maxime licentia corruptum est: nam et falsis utuntur, nec illa iis quibus similia videri volunt adplicant. Quorum utrumque in his est, quae me iuvene ubique cantari solebant: "magnorum fluminum navigabiles fontes sunt", et "generosioris arboris statim planta cum fructu est". LXXVII.

76. This kind, indeed, has been corrupted by some with the utmost declamatory license: for they both make use of falsehoods, and they do not apply those things to the matters to which they wish them to seem similar. Both faults are present in those examples which, when I was a young man, used to be sung everywhere: "the sources of great rivers are navigable," and "the sapling of a more noble tree is at once a shoot with fruit." 77.

In omni autem parabole aut praecedit similitudo, res sequitur, aut praecedit res et similitudo sequitur. Sed interim libera et separata est, interim, quod longe optimum est, cum re cuius est imago conectitur, conlatione invicem respondente, quod facit redditio contraria, quae antapodosis dicitur. LXXVIII.

But in every parable either the similitude precedes and the thing follows, or the thing precedes and the similitude follows. But sometimes it is free and separate; sometimes, which is by far the best, it is connected with the thing of which it is the image, with the comparison answering in turn, which is effected by a contrary return, which is called antapodosis. 78.

Praecedit similitudo illa cuius modo feci mentionem: "inde lupi ceu raptores atra in nebula". Sequitur in primo Georgicon post longam de bellis civilibus atque externis conquestionem: "ut, cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae, addunt in spatia, et frustra retinacula tendens fertur equis auriga, neque audit currus habenas". Sed hae sunt sine antapodosi. LXXIX. Redditio autem illa rem utramque quam comparat velut subicit oculis et pariter ostendit.

The simile precedes, that one of which I just made mention: “then, like rapacious wolves in a black mist.” There follows in the first book of the Georgics, after a long lamentation about civil and foreign wars: “as, when from the starting-gates the four-horse chariots have poured themselves forth, they press on into the course, and the charioteer, stretching the reins in vain, is carried along by his horses, nor does the chariot heed the reins.” But these are without antapodosis. 79. The antapodosis, however, sets, as it were, before the eyes both of the things which it compares and shows them together.

cuius praeclara apud Vergilium multa reperio exempla, sed oratoriis potius utendum est. Dicit Cicero pro Murena: "ut aiunt in Graecis artificibus eos auloedos esse qui citharoedi fieri non potuerint: sic nos videmus, qui oratores evadere non potuerint, eos ad iuris studium devenire". LXXX. Illud pro eodem iam paene poetico spiritu, sed tamen cum sua redditione, quod est ad ornatum accommodatius: "nam ut tempestates saepe certo aliquo caeli signo commoventur, saepe inproviso nulla ex certa ratione obscura aliqua ex causa concitantur: sic in hac comitiorum tempestate populari, saepe intellegas quo signo commota sit, saepe ita obscura est ut sine causa excitata videatur". LXXXI.

of which I find many illustrious examples in Vergil, but it is rather to be used in oratorical matters. Cicero says in defense of Murena: "as they say among the Greek craftsmen, those are auloedi who have not been able to become citharoedi: so we see that those who have not been able to turn out orators come down to the study of law." 80. That passage on behalf of the same man, now with almost poetic spirit, yet with its own reddition, which is more suitable to ornament: "for as tempests are often set in motion by some definite sign of the sky, often unexpectedly, by no fixed reasoning, they are stirred by some obscure cause: so in this popular tempest of the comitia, you often understand by what sign it has been set in motion; often it is so obscure that it seems to have been aroused without a cause." 81.

sunt et illae breves: "vagi per silvas ritu ferarum", et illud Ciceronis in Clodium: "quo ex iudicio velut ex incendio nudus effugit". Quibus similia possunt cuicumque etiam ex cotidiano sermone succurrere. Huic subiacet virtus non solum aperte ponendi rem ante oculos, sed circumcise atque velociter. LXXXII.

there are also those brief ones: "wandering through the woods in the manner of wild beasts," and that saying of Cicero against Clodius: "from which trial he escaped naked, as if from a conflagration." Similar things can come to mind for anyone even from everyday speech. Underlying this lies the virtue not only of setting the matter openly before the eyes, but of doing so succinctly and swiftly. 82.

Ac merito laudatur brevitas integra. Sed ea minus praestat quotiens nihil dicit nisi quod necesse est (brachylogian vocant, quae reddetur inter schemata), est vero pulcherrima cum plura paucis complectimur, quale Sallusti est: "Mithridates corpore ingenti, perinde armatus". Hoc male imitantes sequitur obscuritas. LXXXIII.

And deservedly complete brevity is praised. But it is less effective whenever it says nothing except what is necessary (they call this brachylogy, which will be set forth among the schemata); yet it is most beautiful when we embrace more things in few words, such as Sallust’s: "Mithridates, of enormous body, armed to match." In badly imitating this, obscurity follows. 83.

Vicina praedictae, sed amplior virtus est emphasis, altiorem praebens intellectum quam quem verba per se ipsa declarant. Eius duae sunt species: altera quae plus significat quam dicit, altera quae etiam id quod non dicit. LXXXIV.

Neighboring to the aforesaid, yet a more ample virtue is emphasis, providing a higher understanding than that which the words by themselves declare. Its species are two: the one which signifies more than it says, the other which even signifies that which it does not say. 84.

Prior est et apud Homerum, cum Menelaus Graios in equum "descendisse" ait - nam verbo uno magnitudinem eius ostendit, et apud Vergilium: "demissum lapsi per funem": nam sic quoque est demonstrata altitudo. Idem Cyclopa cum iacuisse dixit "per antrum", prodigiosum illud corpus spatio loci mensus est. LXXXV.

The former is found also in Homer, when Menelaus says that the Greeks “descended” into the horse—for with a single word he showed its magnitude; and in Vergil: “having slipped down along the lowered rope”: for thus too the altitude is demonstrated. Likewise, when he said that the Cyclops had lain “throughout the cave,” he measured that prodigious body by the space of the place. 85.

Sequens positum in voce aut omnino suppressa aut etiam abscisa. supprimitur vox, ut fecit pro Ligario Cicero: "quod si in tanta fortuna bonitas tanta non esset quam tu per te, per te, inquam, optines: intellego quid loquar". Tacuit enim illud, quod nihilo minus accipimus, non deesse homines qui ad crudelitatem eum inpellant. Absciditur per aposiopesin, quae quoniam est figura reddetur suo loco.

The following is set in the voice, either wholly suppressed or even cut off. The voice is suppressed, as Cicero did in the Pro Ligarius: "But if, in so great a fortune, goodness were not so great as that which you, by yourself, by yourself, I say, hold: I understand what I am saying." For he kept silent that point which we nonetheless apprehend, that there are not lacking men who impel him to cruelty. It is cut off by aposiopesis, which, since it is a figure, will be rendered in its own place.

LXXXVI. Est in vulgaribus quoque verbis emphasis: "virum esse oportet", et "homo est ille", et "vivendum est": adeo similis est arti plerumque natura.

86. There is emphasis even in vulgar words: "one ought to be a man," and "he is a man," and "one must live": to such a degree is nature for the most part similar to art.

Non tamen satis eloquenti est ea de quibus dicat clare atque evidenter ostendere, sed sunt multi ac varii excolendae orationis modi. LXXXVII. Nam ipsa illa apheleia simplex et inadfectata habet quendam purum, qualis etiam in feminis amatur, ornatum, et sunt quaedam [velute] tenui diligentia circa proprietatem significationemque munditiae.

Not, however, is it enough for the eloquent man to show clearly and evidently the things about which he speaks, but there are many and various modes of cultivating the oration. 87. For that very apheleia, simple and unaffected, has a certain pure ornament—such as is loved even in women—and there are certain [as it were] refinements of slender diligence regarding the propriety and the signification of mundity.

Alia copia locuples, alia floribus laeta. LXXXVIII. Virium non unum genus: nam quidquid in suo genere satis effectum est, valet.

One abundance is wealthy, another luxuriant with flowers. 88. There is not one genus of strengths: for whatever in its own genus has been sufficiently effected, avails.

Praecipua tamen eius opera deinosis in exaggeranda indignitate et in ceteris altitudo quaedam, phantasia in concipiendis visionibus, exergasia in efficiendo velut opere proposito, cui adicitur epexergasia, repetitio probationis eiusdem et cumulus ex abundanti, energeia confinis his (est enim ab agendo ducta) et cuius propria sit virtus non esse quae dicuntur otiosa. LXXXIX. Est et amarum quiddam, quod fere in contumelia est positum, quale Cassi: "quid facies cum in bona tua invasero, hoc est, cum te docuero nescire maledicere"? et acre, ut illud Crassi: "ego te consulem putem, cum tu me non putes senatorem"? Sed vis oratoris omnis in augendo minuendoque consistit.

The chief, however, of his works are deinosis in exaggerating the indignity, and in the rest a certain loftiness; phantasia in conceiving visions; exergasia in carrying out, as it were, the proposed work, to which is added epexergasia, a repetition of the same proof and a heap out of abundance; energeia, bordering on these (for it is derived from acting), whose own virtue is that the things that are said are not idle. 89. There is also something bitter, which is for the most part set in insult, such as that of Cassius: "What will you do when I have made an inroad upon your goods, that is, when I have taught you not to know how to speak evil?" and something sharp, as that saying of Crassus: "Am I to think you a consul, when you do not think me a senator?" But the whole force of the orator consists in augmenting and diminishing.

Vtrique parti totidem modi, ex quibus praecipuos attingemus (reliqui similes erunt). sunt autem positi in rebus et verbis: sed quae sit rerum inventio ac ratio, tractavimus; XC. nunc quid elocutio attollat aut deprimat dicendum.

To either party, the same number of modes, of which we shall touch upon the principal ones (the rest will be similar). Moreover, they are placed in things and in words: but what the invention of things and the method is, we have treated; 90. now it must be said what elocution raises up or presses down.

[4] I. Prima est igitur amplificandi vel minuendi species in ipso rei nomine, ut cum eum qui sit caesus "occisum", eum qui sit improbus "latronem", contraque eum qui pulsavit "attigisse", qui vulneravit "laesisse" dicimus. Vtriusque pariter exemplum est pro M. Caelio: "si vidua libere, proterva petulanter, dives effuse, libidinosa meretricio more viveret, adulterum ego putarem si qui hanc paulo liberius salutasset"? II. Nam et inpudicam meretricem vocavit et eum cui longus cum illa fuerat usus liberius salutasse. Hoc genus increscit ac fit manifestius si ampliora verba cum ipsis nominibus pro quibus ea posituri sumus conferantur, ut Cicero in Verrem: "non enim furem sed ereptorem, non adulterum sed expugnatorem pudicitiae, non sacrilegum sed hostem sacrorum religionumque, non sicarium sed crudelissimum carnificem civium sociorumque in vestrum iudicium adduximus". III.

[4] 1. The first species, then, of amplifying or diminishing is in the very name of the thing, as when we call one who has been beaten “slain,” one who is depraved “a bandit,” and conversely we say of him who struck that he “touched,” of him who wounded that he “injured.” An example of either alike is in the speech for M. Caelius: “if a widow lived freely, a forward woman wantonly, a rich woman lavishly, a lustful woman in a meretricial manner, should I think a man an adulterer if someone had greeted her a little too freely?” 2. For he both called an immodest woman a meretrix, and said that the man who had had a long intimacy with her had “greeted her more freely.” This kind grows and becomes more manifest if ampler words are compared with the very names for which we are going to set them, as Cicero in the Verrine: “for we have brought into your judgment not a thief but a snatcher, not an adulterer but a stormer of chastity, not a sacrilegist but an enemy of sacred rites and religion, not an assassin but the most cruel executioner of citizens and allies.” 3.

Illo enim modo ut sit multum, hoc etiam plus ut sit efficitur. Quattuor tamen maxime generibus video constare amplificationem, incremento comparatione ratiocinatione congerie.

For by that method there is much; by this, even more is brought about. Yet I see amplification to consist chiefly of four kinds, increase comparison ratiocination accumulation.

Incrementum est potentissimum cum magna videntur etiam quae inferiora sunt. Id aut uno gradu fit aut pluribus, et pervenit non modo ad summum sed interim quodam modo supra summum. IV. Omnibus his sufficit vel unum Ciceronis exemplum: "facinus est vincire civem Romanum, scelus verberare, prope parricidium necare: quid dicam in crucem tollere"? Nam et si tantum verberatus esset uno gradu increverat, ponendo etiam id esse facinus quod erat inferius, et si tantum occisus esset per plures gradus ascenderat: V. cum vero dixerit "prope parricidium necare", supra quod nihil est, adiecit "quid dicam in crucem tollere"? Ita cum id quod maximum est occupasset necesse erat in eo quod ultra est verba deficere.

Increase is most powerful when even things that are inferior seem great. This is achieved either by one degree or by several, and it reaches not only to the highest point but sometimes, in a certain way, above the highest. 4. For all these, even a single example of Cicero suffices: "it is a crime to bind a Roman citizen, a wickedness to scourge, almost parricide to kill: what shall I say of lifting to the cross?" For even if he had only been scourged, it had increased by one degree, by positing that even that which was lower is a crime; and if he had only been slain, it had ascended by several degrees. 5. But when he said "to kill is almost parricide," beyond which there is nothing, he added "what shall I say of lifting to the cross?" Thus, when he had seized upon that which is the greatest, it was necessary that words fail for that which lies beyond.

VI. Fit et aliter supra summum adiectio, ut apud Vergilium de Lauso: "quo pulchrior alter non fuit, excepto Laurentis corpore turni". Summum est enim "quo pulchrior alter non fuit", huic deinde aliquid superpositum. VII. Tertius quoque est modus, ad quem non per gradus itur, et quod non est plus quam maximum, sed quo nihil maius est.

6. An addition above the maximum is also made otherwise, as in Vergil about Lausus: "than whom no other was more beautiful, except the body of Laurentine Turnus." For the maximum is "than whom no other was more beautiful," to which then something is superposed. 7. There is also a third mode, to which one does not go by steps, and which is not more than the maximum, but than which nothing is greater.

"Matrem tuam cecidisti: quid dicam amplius? Matrem tuam cecidisti". Nam et hoc augendi genus est, tantum aliquid efficere ut non possit augeri. VIII.

"You struck down your mother: what shall I say further? You struck down your mother." For this too is a kind of augmentation, to effect something so great that it cannot be augmented. 8.

Crescit oratio minus aperte, sed nescio an hoc ipso efficacius, cum citra distinctionem in contextu et cursu semper aliquid priore maius insequitur, ut de vomitu in Antonium Cicero: "in coetu vero populi Romani, negotium publicum gerens, magister equitum". Singula incrementum habent. Per se deforme vel non in coetu vomere, in coetu etiam, non populi, populi etiam, non Romani, vel si nullum negotium ageret vel si non publicum vel si non magister equitum. IX. Sed alius divideret haec et circa singulos gradus moraretur: hic in sublime etiam currit et ad summum non pervenit nisu, sed impetu.

The oration grows less openly, but I know not whether more efficacious for that very reason, since, without distinction, in the context and course something always follows greater than the prior, as in Cicero about the vomiting at Antony: “in the assembly indeed of the Roman people, conducting public business, the Master of the Horse.” Each item has its increment. Hideous in itself: either to vomit, or to vomit not even in an assembly; in an assembly too, not of the people; of the people too, not Roman; or if he were conducting no business, or not public business, or if he were not Master of the Horse. 9. But another would divide these and linger over the individual grades; this one runs even into the sublime and reaches the summit not by effort, but by impetus.

Verum ut haec amplificatio in superiora tendit, ita quae fit per comparationem incrementum ex minoribus petit. Augendo enim quod est infra necesse est extollat id quod superpositum est, ut idem atque in eodem loco: X. "si hoc tibi inter cenam et in illis inmanibus poculis tuis accidisset, quis non turpe duceret? In coetu vero populi Romani". Et in Catilinam: "servi mehercule mei si me isto pacto metuerent ut te metuunt omnes cives tui, domum meam relinquendam putarem". XI. Interim proposito velut simili exemplo efficiendum est ut sit maius id quod a nobis exaggerandum est, ut idem pro Cluentio, cum exposuisset Milesiam quandam a secundis heredibus pro abortu pecuniam accepisse: "quanto est" inquit "Oppianicus in eadem iniuria maiore supplicio dignus!

But as this amplification tends toward higher things, so the increase that is made through comparison seeks its increment from smaller things. For by augmenting what is beneath, it must extol that which is superposed, as the same man and in the same passage: 10. "if this had happened to you during dinner and amid those immense goblets of yours, who would not deem it shameful? But in the assembly of the Roman people." And in the Catilinarian: "By Hercules, if my slaves feared me in that fashion in which all your fellow citizens fear you, I would think my house must be abandoned." 11. Meanwhile, with a similar example set forth, it must be brought about that that which is to be exaggerated by us be greater, as the same man in For Cluentius, when he had set forth that a certain Milesian woman had received money from the secondary heirs for an abortion: "how much more is Oppianicus, in the same wrongdoing, worthy of a greater punishment!"

si quidem illa, cum suo corpori vim attulisset, se ipsa cruciavit, hic autem idem illud effecit per alieni corporis vim atque cruciatum". XII. Nec putet quisquam hoc, quamquam est simile illi ex argumentis loco quo maiora ex minoribus colliguntur, idem esse. Illic enim probatio petitur, hic amplificatio, sicut in Oppianico non id agitur hac comparatione, ut ille male fecerit, sed ut peius.

“for indeed that woman, when she had brought violence upon her own body, tortured herself; but this man effected that same thing through the violence and torment of another’s body.” 12. Nor let anyone think that this, although it is similar to that topic from arguments in which greater things are collected from lesser, is the same. For there proof is sought, here amplification, just as in Oppianicus it is not the point of this comparison that he did ill, but that he did worse.

Est tamen quamquam diversarum rerum quaedam vicinia: repetam itaque hic quoque idem quo sum illic usus exemplum, sed non in eundem usum. XIII. Nam hoc mihi ostendendum est, augendi gratia non tota modo totis sed etiam partes partibus comparari, sicut hoc loco: "an vero vir amplissimus P. Scipio pontifex maximus TI. Gracchum mediocriter labefactantem statum rei publicae privatus interfecit: Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendio vastare cupientem nos consules perferemus"? XIV.

There is, however, although of diverse things, a certain vicinity: I will therefore repeat here too the same example which I used there, but not for the same use. 13. For this must be shown by me: for the sake of amplification not only wholes are compared with wholes, but also parts with parts, as in this passage: "Or indeed did the most distinguished man P. Scipio, pontifex maximus, as a private citizen kill Tiberius Gracchus, who was moderately undermining the state of the republic; shall we, as consuls, endure Catiline, eager to devastate the orb of the earth with slaughter and conflagration?" 14.

Hic et Catilina Graccho et status rei publicae orbi terrarum et mediocris labefactatio caedi et incendiis et vastationi et privatus consulibus comparatur: quae si quis dilatare velit, plenos singula locos habent.

Here also Catiline is compared with Gracchus, the status of the commonwealth with the orb of the lands, and a moderate undermining with slaughter, conflagrations, and devastation, and a private man with consuls: which things, if anyone should wish to dilate them, each has its own full topic.

XV. Quas dixi per ratiocinationem fieri amplificationes viderimus an satis proprio verbo significaverim: nec sum in hoc sollicitus, dum res ipsa volentibus discere appareat; hoc sum tamen secutus, quod haec amplificatio alibi posita est, alibi valet: ut aliud crescat, aliud augetur, inde ad id quod extolli volumus ratione ducitur. XVI. Obiecturus Antonio Cicero merum et vomitum "tu" inquit "istis faucibus, istis lateribus, ista gladiatoria totius corporis firmitate". Quid fauces et latera ad ebrietatem?

15. The amplifications which I said are effected through ratiocination—let us see whether I have signified them by a sufficiently proper word; nor am I anxious in this matter, so long as the thing itself be apparent to those willing to learn; this, however, I have followed, that this amplification is set in one place, is effective in another: so that one thing grows, another is augmented, and from there by reasoning one is led to that which we wish to exalt. 16. Cicero, about to object to Antony unmixed wine and vomit, says, "you—with those throats, those flanks, that gladiatorial firmness of the whole body." What have throats and flanks to do with drunkenness?

Minime sunt otiosa: nam respicientes ad haec possumus aestimare quantum ille vini in Hippiae nuptiis exhauserit, quod ferre et coquere non posset illa corporis gladiatoria firmitate. Ergo, si ex alio colligitur aliud, nec inproprium nec inusitatum nomen est ratiocinationis, ut quod ex eadem causa inter status quoque habeamus. XVII.

By no means are they idle: for, looking back to these things, we can estimate how much wine that fellow drained at Hippia’s wedding, which he could not carry and digest with that gladiatorial firmness of body. Therefore, if one thing is collected from another, the name “ratiocination” is neither improper nor unusual, just as that which, from the same cause, we also have among the status. 17.

Sic et ex insequentibus amplificatio ducitur, si quidem tanta vis fuit vini erumpentis ut non casum adferret aut voluntatem sed necessitatem ubi minime deceret vomendi, et cibus non recens, ut accidere interim solet, redderetur, sed usque in posterum diem redundaret. XVIII. Idem hoc praestant quae antecesserunt: nam cum Aeolus a lunone rogatus "cavum conversa cuspide montem impulit in latus, et venti velut agmine facto ruunt", apparet quanta sit futura tempestas.

Thus too from the things that follow an amplification is drawn, since indeed so great was the force of the wine bursting forth that it brought not chance or will but necessity of vomiting where it was least becoming, and the food was returned not fresh, as now and then happens, but overflowed even into the next day. 18. The same thing is furnished by what has gone before: for when Aeolus, at Juno’s request, “with the point reversed smote the hollow mountain on its side, and the winds, as though a battle-line having been formed, rush forth,” it is apparent how great the coming tempest will be.

XIX. Quid? cum res atrocissimas quasque in summam ipsi extulimus invidiam elevamus consulto, quo graviora videantur quae secutura sunt, ut a Cicerone factum est cum illa diceret: "Levia sunt haec in hoc reo.

19. What? when we deliberately lighten the very most atrocious matters, which we ourselves have raised to the highest ill-will, so that the things to follow may seem more grave—just as was done by Cicero when he said those words: "These things are slight in this defendant."

Metum virgarum navarchus nobilis nobilissimae civitatis pretio redemit: humanum est; alius ne securi feriretur pecuniam dedit: usitatum est". XX. Nonne usus est ratione, qua colligerent audientes quantum illud esset quod inferebatur, cui comparata haec viderentur humana atque usitata? Sic quoque solet ex alio aliud augeri cum Hannibalis bellicis laudibus ampliatur virtus Scipionis, et fortitudinem Gallorum Germanorumque miramur quo sit maior C. Caesaris gloria. XXI.

“A noble navarch of a most noble city bought off the fear of the rods for a price: that is human; another gave money so as not to be struck by the axe: that is customary.” 20. Did he not use a line of reasoning by which the hearers might gather how great that thing was which was being brought forward, to which, by comparison, these would seem human and usual? Thus too one thing is wont to be increased from another, when the virtus of Scipio is amplified by the warlike praises of Hannibal, and we marvel at the fortitude of the Gauls and the Germans, in order that the glory of Gaius Caesar may be greater. 21.

Illud quoque est ex relatione ad aliquid quod non eius rei gratia dictum videtur amplificationis genus. Non putant indignum Troiani principes Graios Troianosque propter Helenae speciem tot mala tanto temporis spatio sustinere: quaenam igitur illa forma credenda est? Non enim hoc dicit Paris, qui rapuit, non aliquis iuvenis aut unus e vulgo, sed senes et prudentissimi et Priamo adsidentes.

That too is a genus of amplification from relation to something else, which seems to have been said not for the sake of that very matter. The Trojan princes do not think it unworthy that Greeks and Trojans should endure so many evils for so great a span of time on account of Helen’s form (beauty): what, then, must that form be believed to have been? For it is not Paris, who carried her off, that says this, nor some youth or one from the common crowd, but old men, most prudent, sitting beside Priam.

XXII. Verum et ipse rex decenni bello exhaustus, amissis tot liberis, imminente summo discrimine, cui faciem illam, ex qua tot lacrimarum origo fluxisset, invisam atque abominandam esse oportebat, et audit haec et eam filiam appellans iuxta se locat et excusat etiam sibi atque esse malorum causam negat. XXIII.

22. But even the king himself, exhausted by a ten-year war, with so many children lost, with the utmost crisis imminent— to whom that face, from which the origin of so many tears had flowed, ought to be hateful and abominable— both hears these things and, calling her “daughter,” places her beside him, and even excuses her to himself and denies that she is the cause of the evils. 23.

Nec mihi videtur in symposio Plato, cum Alcibiaden confitentem de se quid a Socrate pati voluerit narrat, ut illum culparet haec tradidisse, sed ut Socratis invictam continentiam ostenderet, quae corrumpi speciosissimi hominis tam obvia voluntate non posset. XXIV. Quin ex instrumento quoque heroum illorum magnitudo aestimanda nobis datur: huc pertinet clipeus Aiacis et pelias Achillis.

Nor does it seem to me that in the Symposium Plato, when he narrates Alcibiades confessing what he wished to undergo at the hands of Socrates, handed these things down in order to blame that man, but to show Socrates’ invincible continence, which could not be corrupted by the so ready a willingness of a most beautiful man. 24. Indeed, even from the equipment of those heroes their greatness is given us to be assessed: to this pertains the shield of Ajax and the Pelian spear of Achilles.

Qua virtute egregie est usus in Cyclope Vergilius. Nam quod illud corpus mente concipiam cuius "trunca manum pinus regit"? XXV. Quid?

By this virtue Vergil made most excellent use in the Cyclops. For what sort of body am I to conceive in my mind, of one whose "lopped pine guides his hand"? 25. What?

cum vix loricam duo "multiplicem conixi umeris" ferunt, quantus Demoleos qui indutus ea "cursu palantis Troas agebat"? Quid? M. Tullius de M. Antoni luxuria tantum fingere saltem potuisset quantum ostendit dicendo: "conchyliatis Cn. Pompei peristromatis servorum in cellis stratos lectos videres"? Conchyliata peristromata et Cn. Pompei terunt servi et in cellis: nihil dici potest ultra, et necesse est tamen infinito plus in domino cogitare. XXVI.

when scarcely do two, “straining with their shoulders, carry the many-plied cuirass,” how great was Demoleos, who, “clad in it, was driving the Trojans in rout at a run”? What? Could M. Tullius, about the luxury of M. Antonius, even have been able to feign at least as much as he showed by saying: “you would see beds spread with the purple-dyed coverlets of Cn. Pompeius in the cells of slaves”? Purple-dyed coverlets—and of Cn. Pompeius—are worn thin by slaves, and in cells: nothing can be said beyond this, and yet it is necessary to think infinitely more concerning the master. 26.

Est hoc simile illi quod emphasis dicitur: sed illa ex verbo, hoc ex re coniecturam facit, tantoque plus valet quanto res ipsa verbis est firmior.

This is similar to that which is called emphasis: but that makes a conjecture from the word, this one from the thing; and it prevails by so much the more, inasmuch as the thing itself is firmer than words.

Potest adscribi amplificationi congeries quoque verborum ac sententiarum idem significantium. Nam etiam si non per gradus ascendant, tamen velut acervo quodam adlevantur: XXVII. "Quid enim tuus ille, tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat?

A congeries too of words and of sentences signifying the same thing can be assigned to amplification. For even if they do not ascend by degrees, nevertheless they are, as it were, upraised by a certain heap: 27. "For what, then, was that drawn sword of yours, tubero, doing in the Pharsalic battle line?

cuius latus ille mucro petebat? Qui sensus erat armorum tuorum? Quae tua mens, oculi, manus, ardor animi?

Whose side was that sword-point seeking? What was the sense of your arms? What were your mind, your eyes, your hands, the ardor of your spirit?

Quid cupiebas? Quid optabas"? Simile est hoc figurae quam synathroismon vocant, sed illic plurium rerum est congeries, hic unius multiplicatio. Haec etiam crescere solet verbis omnibus altius atque altius insurgentibus: "aderat ianitor carceris, carnifex praetoris, mors terrorque sociorum et civium Romanorum, lictor Sextius". XXVIII.

What did you desire? What did you opt for"? This is similar to the figure which they call synathroismon, but there there is a congeries of several things, here a multiplication of one. This too is wont to grow, with all the words rising higher and higher: "there was present the doorkeeper of the prison, the executioner of the praetor, the death and terror of the allies and Roman citizens, the lictor Sextius". 28.

Eadem fere est ratio minuendi: nam totidem sunt ascendentibus quot descendentibus gradus. Ideoque uno ero exemplo contentus, eius loci quo Cicero de oratione Rulli haec dicit: "pauci tamen qui proxumi adstiterant nescio quid illum de lege agraria voluisse dicere suspicabantur". Quod si ad intellectum referas, minutio est, si ad obscuritatem, incrementum.

Almost the same is the rationale of diminishing: for there are just as many grades for those ascending as for those descending. And so I shall be content with one example, from that passage where Cicero says these things about the speech of Rullus: "a few, however, who had stood nearest suspected that he had wished to say I-know-not-what about the agrarian law." Which, if you refer it to understanding, is a diminution; if to obscurity, an increment.

XXIX. Scio posse videri quibusdam speciem amplificationis hyperbolen quoque: nam et haec in utramque partem valet; sed quia excedit hoc nomen, in tropos differenda est. Quos continuo subiungerem, nisi esset a ceteris separata ratio dicendi quae constat non propriis nec tralatis.

29. I know that to some the hyperbole too can seem a species of amplification: for this also avails in both directions; but because it exceeds this name, it must be deferred to the tropes. These I would immediately subjoin, were it not that there is a mode of speaking, set apart from the others, which consists neither of proper nor of transferred words.

Demus ergo breviter hoc desiderio iam paene publico, ne omittamus eum quem plerique praecipuum ac paene solum putant orationis ornatum.

Let us therefore briefly grant to this desire, now almost public, lest we omit that ornament of oration which most people consider the principal and nearly the sole one.

[5] I. Sententiam veteres quod animo sensissent vocaverunt. Id cum est apud oratores frequentissimum, tum etiam in usu cotidiano quasdam reliquias habet: nam et iuraturi "ex animi nostri sententia" et gratulantes "ex sententia" dicimus. Non raro tamen et sic locuti sunt, ut "sensa" sua dicerent.

[5] 1. The ancients called “sententia” what they had sensed in mind. While this is most frequent among orators, yet in quotidian use it also has certain relics: for when about to swear we say “ex animi nostri sententia,” and when congratulating, “ex sententia.” Not rarely, however, they also spoke thus, that they called their “sensa.”

Nam sensus corporis videbantur. II. Sed consuetudo iam tenuit ut mente concepta sensus vocaremus, lumina autem praecipueque in clausulis posita sententias; quae minus crebrae apud antiquos nostris temporibus modo carent. Ideoque mihi et de generibus earum et de usu arbitror pauca dicenda.

For “senses” were thought to belong to the body. 2. But usage has now prevailed that things conceived in the mind we call “senses,” while “lights,” and especially those set at sentence-endings (clausulae), we call “sentences”; which, less frequent among the ancients, in our times lack restraint. And therefore I think a few things must be said by me both about their kinds and about their use.

III. Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie, quamvis omnibus idem nomen sit, sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci gnomas appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis. Est autem haec vox universalis, quae etiam citra complexum causae possit esse laudabilis, interim ad rem tantum relata ut "nihil est tam populare quam bonitas": interim ad personam, quale est Afri Domiti: "princeps qui vult omnia scire necesse habet multa ignoscere". IV. Hanc quidam partem enthymematis, quidam initium aut clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt, et est aliquando, non tamen semper.

3. The most ancient are those which are properly, although the same name belongs to all, called sentences (maxims), which the Greeks call gnomai: and both names received their title from the fact that they are similar to counsels or decrees. Now this is a universal utterance, which can be laudable even outside the embrace of the cause, sometimes referred only to the matter, as "nothing is so popular as goodness": sometimes to the person, such as that of Domitius Afer: "a prince who wishes to know all things must forgive many things." 4. Some have said this is a part of the enthymeme, some the beginning or the clausula of the epicheireme, and it is so sometimes, yet not always.

Illud verius, esse eam aliquando simplicem, ut ea quae supra dixi, aliquando ratione subiecta: "nam in omni certamine qui opulentior est, etiam si accipit iniuriam, tamen quia plus potest facere videtur": nonnumquam duplicem: "obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit". V. sunt etiam qui decem genera fecerint, sed eo modo quo fieri vel plura possunt: per interrogationem, per comparationem, infitiationem, similitudinem, admirationem et cetera huius modi - per omnes enim figuras tractari potest. Illud notabile ex diversis: "mors misera non est, aditus ad mortem est miser". VI. Ac rectae quidem sunt tales: "tam deest avaro quod habet quam quod non habet". Sed maiorem vim accipiunt et mutatione figurae, ut "usque adeone mori miserum est"? (acrius hoc enim quam per se "mors misera non est"), et tralatione a communi ad proprium. Nam cum sit rectum "nocere facile est, prodesse difficile", vehementius apud Ovidium Medea dicit: "servare potui: perdere an possim rogas"? VII.

That is truer, that it is sometimes simple, like those which I said above, sometimes with a reason subjoined: "for in every contest he who is more opulent, even if he receives an injury, nevertheless, because he can do more, seems so": sometimes double: "obsequiousness begets friends, truth begets hatred." 5. There are also those who have made ten genera, but in such a way that more could be made: through interrogation, through comparison, infitiation (denial), similitude, admiration, and the rest of this kind—for it can be handled through all figures. That is notable from contrasts: "death is not miserable; the approach to death is miserable." 6. And indeed such as these are straightforward: "as much is lacking to the miser in what he has as in what he does not have." But they receive greater force also by a mutation of figure, as "to such an extent is it miserable to die?" (for this is sharper than "death is not miserable" by itself), and by a transference from the common to the proper. For whereas it is correct "to harm is easy, to benefit difficult," more vehemently in Ovid Medea says: "I was able to save: do you ask whether I can destroy?" 7.

Vertit ad personam Cicero: "nihil habet, Caesar, nec fortuna tua maius quam ut possis, nec natura melius quam ut velis servare quam plurimos". Ita quae erant rerum, propria fecit hominis. In hoc genere custodiendum est et id, quod ubique, ne crebrae sint, ne palam falsae (quales frequenter ab iis dicuntur qui haec catholica vocant et quidquid pro causa videtur quasi indubitatum pronuntiant) et ne passim et a quocumque dicantur. VIII.

Cicero turned it to the person: "There is nothing, Caesar, neither anything greater in your Fortune than that you can, nor anything better in your Nature than that you are willing, to preserve as many as possible." Thus what were things of matters, he made proper to the man. In this kind it must be guarded also, as everywhere, that they be not frequent, not openly false (such as are often said by those who call these catholic and pronounce whatever seems for the case as if undoubted), and that they not be said indiscriminately and by just anyone. 8.

Magis enim decet eos in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet. Quis enim ferat puerum aut adulescentulum aut etiam ignobilem si iudicet in dicendo et quodam modo praecipiat?

For it is more fitting for those in whom there is authority, that the weight of the matter be confirmed also by the person. For who would endure a boy or an adolescent or even an ignoble man, if he should judge in speaking and, in a certain manner, prescribe?

IX. Enthymema quoque est omne quod mente concepimus, proprie tamen dicitur quae est sententia ex contrariis, propterea quod eminere inter ceteras videtur, ut Homerus "poeta", "urbs" Roma. X. De hoc in argumentis satis dictum est. Non semper autem ad probationem adhibetur, sed aliquando ad ornatum: "quorum igitur inpunitas, Caesar, tuae clementiae laus est, eorum te ipsorum ad crudelitatem acuet oratio"? non quia sit ratio dissimilis, sed quia iam per alia ut id iniustum appareret effectum erat; XI. et addita in clausula est epiphonematis modo non tam probatio quam extrema quasi insultatio.

9. An enthymeme too is everything that we have conceived in mind; properly, however, it is said of that which is a sentence from contraries, because it seems to stand out among the rest, as Homer is “the poet,” Rome “the city.” 10. About this enough has been said under arguments. Yet it is not always employed for proof, but sometimes for ornament: “Those, therefore, whose impunity, Caesar, is the praise of your clemency, will their very speech spur you on to cruelty?” not because the reasoning is dissimilar, but because already through other means it had been brought about that this should appear unjust; 11. and added in the clausula in the manner of an epiphonema is not so much a proof as a kind of final, as it were, insult.

Est enim epiphonema rei narratae vel probatae summa adclamatio: "tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem!"; "facere enim probus adulescens periculose quam perpeti turpiter maluit". XII. Est et quod appellatur a novis noema, qua voce omnis intellectus accipi potest, sed hoc nomine donarunt ea quae non dicunt verum intellegi volunt, ut in eum quem saepius a ludo redemerat soror, agentem cum ea talionis quod ei pollicem dormienti recidisset: "eras dignus ut haberes integram manum": sic enim auditur "ut depugnares". XIII. Vocatur aliquid et clausula: quae si est quod conclusionem dicimus, et recta et quibusdam in partibus necessaria est: "quare prius de vestro facto fateamini necesse est quam Ligari culpam ullam reprehendatis". Sed nunc aliud volunt, ut omnis locus, omnis sensus in fine sermonis feriat aurem.

For an epiphonema is the sum acclamation of a thing narrated or proved: “so great a toil it was to found the Roman nation!”; “for a virtuous adolescent chose rather to do with peril than to suffer disgracefully.” 12. There is also what the “moderns” call noema, by which word every “intellect” can be taken, but with this name they have endowed those things which do not say it but wish the truth to be understood, as in the case of the man whom his sister had more than once ransomed from the gladiatorial school, she exacting talion from him because he had cut off her thumb while she slept: “you were worthy to have an intact hand”: for thus it is heard, “in order that you might fight it out.” 13. Something is also called a clausula: which, if it is what we call a conclusion, is both proper and in some parts necessary: “wherefore it is necessary that you first confess about your own deed before you censure any fault of Ligarius.” But now they intend something else, that every locus, every thought should strike the ear at the end of the discourse.

XIV. turpe autem ac prope nefas ducunt respirare ullo loco qui adclamationem non petierit. Inde minuti corruptique sensiculi et extra rem petiti: neque enim possunt tam multae bonae sententiae esse quam necesse est multae sint clausulae.

14. moreover they deem it disgraceful and almost a sacrilege to draw breath at any point that has not solicited an acclamation. Hence come the minute and corrupted little sense-units, fetched from outside the matter: for there cannot be as many good sentences as it is necessary that there be many cadences.

XV. Iam haec magis nova sententiarum genera: ex inopinato, ut dixit Vibius Crispus in eum qui, cum loricatus in foro ambularet, praetendebat id se metu facere: "quis tibi sic timere permisit"? Et insigniter Africanus apud Neronem de morte matris: "rogant te, Caesar, Galliae tuae ut felicitatem tuam fortiter feras". XVI. sunt et alio relata (ut Afer Domitius, cum Cloatillam defenderet, cui obiectum crimen quod virum qui inter rebellantis fuerat sepelisset, remiserat Claudius, in epilogo filios eius adloquens "matrem tamen" inquit "pueri sepelitote") et aliunde petita, id est in alium locum ex alio tralata: XVII. pro Spatale Crispus, quam qui heredem amator instituerat decessit cum haberet annos duodeviginti: "hominem divinum, qui sibi indulsit". XVIII.

15. Now these are more novel kinds of sententiae: from the unexpected, as Vibius Crispus said against the man who, while armored, was walking in the forum and pretended that he did it out of fear: "who permitted you to be afraid in that way?" And notably Africanus before Nero about the death of his mother: "your Gauls ask you, Caesar, to bear your felicity bravely." 16. There are also those referred to another (as Domitius Afer, when he was defending Cloatilla, against whom a charge had been brought that she had buried her husband who had been among the rebels; Claudius had remitted it; in the epilogue, addressing her sons, he says: "nevertheless, boys, bury your mother") and those sought from elsewhere, that is, translated into another place from another: 17. on behalf of Spatale, Crispus [said], whose lover, who had appointed her heir, died when he had nineteen years: "a divine man, who indulged himself." 18.

Facit quasdam sententias sola geminatio, qualis est Senecae in eo scripto quod Nero ad senatum misit occisa matre, cum se periclitatum videri vehet: "salvum me esse adhuc nec credo nec gaudeo". Melior cum ex contrariis valet: "habeo quem fugiam, quem sequar non habeo"; "quid quod miser, cum loqui non posset, tacere non poterat"? XIX. Ea vero fit pulcherrima cum aliqua comparatione clarescit. Trachalus contra Spatalen: "placet hoc ergo, leges, diligentissimae pudoris custodes, decimas uxoribus dari, quartas meretricibus"?

Some sententiae are made by mere gemination, such as Seneca’s in that writing which Nero sent to the senate when his mother had been killed, when, to seem endangered, he waxes vehement: "that I am safe as yet I neither believe nor rejoice." Better when it has force from contraries: "I have someone to flee; whom to follow I do not have"; "what of the fact that the wretch, when he could not speak, could not keep silent"? 19. And indeed it is made most beautiful when it shines forth by some comparison. Trachalus against Spatale: "Does this, then, please you, laws, most diligent custodians of modesty, that tenths be given to wives, quarters to prostitutes"?

Sed horum quidem generum et bonae dici possunt et malae: XX. Illae semper vitiosae aut a verbo: "patres conscripti: sic enim incipiendum est mihi, ut memineritis patrum". Peius adhuc, quo magis falsum est et longius petitum, contra eandem sororem gladiatoris cuius modo feci mentionem: "ad digitum pugnavi". XXI. Est etiam generis eiusdem, nescio an vitiosissimum, quotiens verborum ambiguitas cum rerum falsa quadam similitudine iungitur. Clarum actorem iuvenis audivi cum lecta in capite cuiusdam ossa sententiae gratia tenenda matri dedisset: "infelicissima femina, nondum extulisti filium et iam ossa legisti". XXII.

But of these kinds indeed both good can be said and bad: 20. Those are always vicious either from the word: “Conscript Fathers: for thus it must be begun by me, that you may remember fathers.” Worse still, the more it is false and more far-fetched, against that same sister of the gladiator of whom I made mention just now: “I fought to the finger.” 21. There is also of the same genus—whether the most vicious, I know not—whenever an ambiguity of words is joined with a certain false similitude of things. I, a young man, heard a famous advocate, when he had given to the mother bones gathered, borne on someone’s head, to be held for the sake of the sententia, saying: “Most ill-fated woman, you have not yet carried out your son, and already you have gathered his bones.” 22.

Ad hoc plerique minimis etiam inventiunculis gaudent, quae excussae risum habent, inventae facie ingenii blandiuntur. De eo qui naufragus et ante agrorum sterilitate vexatus in scholis fingitur se suspendisse: "quem neque terra recipit nec mare, pendeat". XXIII. huic simile in illo de quo supra dixi, cui pater sua membra laceranti venenum dedit: "qui haec edit, debet hoc bibere". Et in luxuriosum qui apocarteresin simulasse dicitur: "necte laqueum, habes quod faucibus tuis irascaris: sume venenum, decet luxuriosum bibendo mori". XXIV.

To this, moreover, very many take pleasure even in the smallest little inventions, which, when shaken out, have laughter, and, once discovered, flatter with a show of ingenuity. About the man who, a shipwrecked person and previously vexed by the sterility of his fields, is in the schools imagined to have hanged himself: "he whom neither land receives nor sea, let him hang." 23. similar to this is in that case I mentioned above, the one to whom a father gave poison as he was tearing his own limbs: "he who eats these things ought to drink this." And against the profligate who is said to have simulated apocarteresis: "tie a noose—you have something to be angry at your own gullet for; take poison—it befits a man of luxury to die by drinking." 24.

Alia vana, ut suadentis purpuratis ut Alexandrum Babylonis incendio sepeliant: "Alexandrum sepelio: hoc quisquam spectabit a tecto"? - quasi vero id sit in re tota indignissimum. Alia nimia, ut de Germanis dicentem quendam audivi: "caput nescio ubi impositum", et de viro forti: "bella umbone propellit". XXV. Sed finis non erit si singulas corruptorum persequar formas: illud potius quod est magis necessarium.

Other things are empty, as of one advising the purple-clad that they should bury Alexander by the burning of Babylon: "I bury Alexander: will anyone watch this from the roof"? - as though indeed that were the most unworthy thing in the whole affair. Other things are excessive, as I heard a certain man speaking about the Germans: "a head set I-know-not-where," and about a man of valor: "he repels wars with the umbo." 25. But there will be no end if I pursue each single form of the corruptions: rather, that which is more necessary.

Duae sunt diversae opiniones, aliorum sententias solas paene sectantium, aliorum omnino damnantium, quorum mihi neutrum admodum placet. XXVI. Densitas earum obstat invicem, ut in satis omnibus fructibusque arborum nihil ad iustam magnitudinem adolescere potest quod loco in quem crescat caret.

Two are the diverse opinions: of some who almost follow others’ judgments alone, and of others who utterly condemn them; of which neither pleases me very much. 26. Their density hinders mutually, so that in all sown fields and in the fruits of trees nothing can grow to just magnitude which lacks the place into which it may grow.

Nec pictura in qua nihil circumlitum est eminet, ideoque artifices, etiam cum plura in unam tabulam opera contulerunt, spatiis distingunt, ne umbrae in corpora cadant. XXVII. Facit res eadem concisam quoque orationem: subsistit enim omnis sententia, ideoque post eam utique aliud est initium.

Nor does a painting in which nothing is outlined stand out; and so artificers, even when they have brought several works together into one panel, distinguish them by spaces, lest shadows fall upon bodies. 27. The same consideration also makes the oration concise: for every sentence halts, and therefore after it there is assuredly another beginning.

Vnde soluta fere oratio et e singulis non membris sed frustis conlata structura caret, cum illa rutunda et undique circumcisa insistere invicem nequeant. XXVIII. Praeter hoc etiam color ipse dicendi quamlibet clarus multis tamen ac variis velut maculis conspergitur.

Whence the oration is almost unbound, and, put together out of single not members but fragments, lacks structure, since those rounded and on all sides cut pieces cannot stand upon one another. 28. Besides this, even the very color of speaking, however clear, is nevertheless, as it were, sprinkled with many and various spots.

Porro, ut adferunt lumen clavus et purpurae loco insertae, ita certe neminem deceat intertexta pluribus notis vestis. XXIX. Quare licet haec et nitere et aliquatenus extare videantur, tamen et lumina illa non flammae sed scintillis inter fumum emicantibus similia dixeris (quae ne apparent quidem ubi tota lucet oratio, ut in sole sidera ipsa desinunt cerni) et quae crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa nec admirationem consecuntur eminentium et planorum gratiam perdunt.

Moreover, just as the clavus and purple insets bring light, so surely it befits no one to wear a garment interwoven with too many marks. 29. Wherefore, although these things seem both to shine and to stand out to some degree, yet you would say that those lights are like not a flame but sparks flashing amid smoke (which do not even appear when the whole discourse shines, as in the sun the stars themselves cease to be seen); and those which, by frequent and small attempts, lift themselves up produce only unevenness and, as it were, cragginess, nor do they achieve the admiration of true eminences, and they lose the grace of the level parts.

XXX. Hoc quoque accedit, quod solas captanti sententias multas dicere necesse est leves frigidas ineptas: non enim potest esse delectus ubi numero laboratur. Itaque videas et divisionem pro sententia poni et argumentum, sit tantum in clausula et +male+ pronuntietur.

30. This also comes in addition: that one who is hunting after sentences must of necessity say many—light, cold, inept; for there can be no selection where one toils for sheer number. And so you may see even a division put in place of a sentence, and an argument too, provided only that it be in the clausula and be +poorly+ pronounced.

XXXI. "Occidisti uxorem ipse adulter; non ferrem te etiam si repudiasses" divisio est. "Vis scire venenum esse amatorium?

31. "You have killed your wife, you yourself an adulterer; I would not endure you even if you had repudiated her" is a division. "Do you wish to know that the poison is a love‑potion?

Viveret homo nisi illud bibisset" argumentum est. Nec multas plerique sententias dicunt, sed omnia tamquam sententias. XXXII.

"He would be alive if he had not drunk that" is an argument. Nor do most people say many sentences, but everything as if sentences. 32.

huic quibusdam contrarium studium, qui fugiunt ac reformidant omnem hanc in dicendo voluptatem, nihil probantes nisi planum et humile et sine conatu. Ita, dum timent ne aliquando cadant, semper iacent. Quod enim tantum in sententia bona crimen est?

To this, some have a contrary zeal, who flee and shrink from all this pleasure in speaking, approving nothing except what is plain and humble and without effort. Thus, while they fear lest they may ever fall, they always lie low. For what so great a crime is there in a good sentence?

Non causae prodest? non iudicem movet? non dicentem commendat?

Does it not benefit the cause? does it not move the judge? does it not commend the speaker?

XXXIII. "Sed est quoddam genus quo veteres non utebantur". Ad quam usque nos vocatis vetustatem? Nam si illam extremam, multa Demosthenes quae ante eum nemo.

33. "But there is a certain kind which the ancients did not use." Up to what point do you call "antiquity"? For if you mean that extreme antiquity, Demosthenes did many things which before him no one did.

Quo modo potest probare Ciceronem qui nihil putet ex Catone Gracchisque mutandum? Sed ante hos simplicior adhuc ratio loquendi fuit. XXXIV.

How can he approve Cicero who thinks that nothing ought to be changed from Cato and the Gracchi? But before these, the manner of speaking was still simpler. 34.

Ego vero haec lumina orationis velut oculos quosdam esse eloquentiae credo. Sed neque oculos esse toto corpore velim, ne cetera membra officium suum perdant, et, si necesse sit, veterem illum horrorem dicendi malim quam istam novam licentiam. Sed patet media quaedam via, sicut in cultu victuque accessit aliquis citra reprensionem nitor.

I indeed believe these lights of oratory to be, as it were, certain eyes of eloquence. But neither would I wish there to be eyes over the whole body, lest the other members lose their office; and, if it must be, I would prefer that ancient roughness of speaking to this new license. But a certain middle way lies open, just as in dress and in manner of living some polish has been added, short of reprehension.

Quare, sicut possumus, adiciamus virtutibus: prius tamen sit vitiis carere, ne, dum volumus esse meliores veteribus, simus tantum dissimiles.

Wherefore, as we are able, let us add to the virtues: yet let being free from vices come first, lest, while we wish to be better than the ancients, we be only dissimilar.

XXXV. Reddam nunc quam proximam esse dixeram partem de tropis, quos motus clarissimi nostrorum auctores vocant. Horum tradere praecepta et grammatici solent; sed a me, cum de illorum officio loquerer, dilata pars haec est, quia de ornatu orationis gravior videbatur locus et maiori operi reservandus.

35. I will now render the section which I said was next, about tropes, which the most illustrious of our authors call motions. The grammarians too are accustomed to hand down precepts of these; but by me, when I was speaking about their office, this part was deferred, because the topic concerning the ornament of oration seemed weightier and to be reserved for a greater work.

[6] I. Tropos est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio. Circa quem inexplicabilis et grammaticis inter ipsos et philosophis pugna est quae sint genera, quae species, qui numerus, quis cuique subiciatur. II. Nos, omissis quae nihil ad instruendum oratorem pertinent cavillationibus, necessarios maxime atque in usum receptos exsequemur, haec modo in his adnotasse contenti, quosdam gratia significationis, quosdam decoris adsumi, et esse alios in verbis propriis, alios in tralatis, vertique formas non verborum modo sed et sensuum et compositionis.

[6] 1. A trope is a mutation of a word or of discourse from its proper signification into another, with a certain virtue. Around this there is an inexplicable battle both among the grammarians themselves and with the philosophers—what the genera are, what the species, what the number, and what is subordinated to each. 2. We, omitting cavillations which pertain nothing to the training of the orator, will set forth those most necessary and received into use, content only to have noted this among them: that some are adopted for the sake of signification, some for decor; that some are in proper words, others in transferred ones; and that the forms are turned not only of words but also of senses and of composition.

III. Quare mihi videntur errasse qui non alios crediderunt tropos quam in quibus verbum pro verbo poneretur. Neque illud ignoro, in isdem fere qui significandi gratia adhibentur esse et ornatum, sed non idem accidet contra, eruntque quidam tantum ad speciem accommodati.

3. Therefore it seems to me that they have erred who believed there were no other tropes than those in which a word is put in place of a word. Nor am I unaware of this: that in nearly the same cases which are applied for the sake of signification there is also ornament; but the same will not happen conversely, and there will be some accommodated only to appearance.

IV. Incipiamus igitur ab eo qui cum frequentissimus est tum longe pulcherrimus, tralatione dico, quae metaphora Graece vocatur. Quae quidem cum ita est ab ipsa nobis concessa natura ut indocti quoque ac non sentientes ea frequenter utantur, tum ita iucunda atque nitida ut in oratione quamlibet clara proprio tamen lumine eluceat. V. Neque enim vulgaris esse neque humilis nec insuavis haec recte modo adscita potest.

4. Let us therefore begin with that figure which, while it is most frequent, is also by far the most beautiful—I mean transference, which in Greek is called metaphor. And this is so granted to us by Nature herself that even the unlearned and unperceiving use it frequently; and it is so pleasant and polished that in a speech however bright it nevertheless shines out with its own proper light. 5. For this, if only rightly admitted, can be neither common nor low nor unpleasing.

Copiam quoque sermonis auget permutando aut mutuando quae non habet, quodque est difficillimum, praestat ne ulli rei nomen deesse videatur. Transfertur ergo nomen aut verbum ex eo loco in quo proprium est in eum in quo aut proprium deest aut tralatum proprio melius est. VI. Id facimus aut quia necesse est aut quia significantius est aut, ut dixi, quia decentius.

It also augments the copiousness of discourse by exchanging or by borrowing what it does not have, and—what is most difficult—it provides that nothing seems to lack a name. Therefore a noun or a verb is transferred from that place in which it is proper into one in which either the proper word is lacking or the transferred is better than the proper. 6. We do this either because it is necessary, or because it is more significant, or, as I said, because it is more becoming.

Vbi nihil horum praestabit quod transferetur, inproprium erit. Necessitate rustici "gemmam" in vitibus (quid enim dicerent aliud?) et "sitire segetes" et "fructus laborare", necessitate nos "durum hominem" aut "asperum": non enim proprium erat quod daremus his adfectibus nomen. VII.

Where what is transferred will furnish none of these, it will be improper. By necessity rustics say “a gem on the vines” (for what else could they say?), and “the crops thirst,” and “the fruits labor”; by necessity we say “a hard man” or “a rough one”: for there was no proper term we could give to these affections. 7.

Iam "incensum ira" et "inflammatum cupiditate" et "lapsum errore" significandi gratia: nihil enim horum suis verbis quam his arcessitis magis proprium erit. Illa ad ornatum, "lumen orationis" et "generis claritatem" et "contionum procellas" et "eloquentiae fulmina", ut Cicero pro Milone Clodium "fontem gloriae eius" vocat et alio loco "segetem ac materiem". VIII. Quaedam etiam parum speciosa dictu per hanc explicantur: "hoc faciunt nimio ne luxu obtunsior usus sit genitali arvo et sulcos oblimet inertes". In totum autem metaphora brevior est similitudo, eoque distat quod illa comparatur rei quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur.

Now "incensed with anger" and "inflamed with desire" and "lapsed by error" for the sake of signifying: for none of these will be more proper by its own words than by these imported ones. Those for ornament, "the light of oration" and "the brightness of lineage" and "the storms of assemblies" and "the thunderbolts of eloquence," as Cicero in Pro Milone calls Clodius "the fountain of his glory" and elsewhere "the harvest and the material." 8. Certain things also, rather unseemly to say, are explained through this: "they do this so that, by excessive luxury, the use may not be more blunted for the genital field and may not mire the inert furrows." In sum, however, metaphor is a briefer simile, and it differs in this, that that one is compared to the thing we wish to express, while this one is said in place of the thing itself.

IX. Comparatio est cum dico fecisse quid hominem "ut leonem", tralatio cum dico de homine "leo est". huius vis omnis quadruplex maxime videtur: cum in rebus animalibus aliud pro alio ponitur, ut de agitatore "gubernator magna contorsit equum vi", aut [ut Livius Scipionem a Catone "adlatrari" solitum refert] inanima pro aliis generis eiusdem sumuntur, ut "classique inmittit habenas", aut pro rebus animalibus inanima: X. "ferron an fato moerus Argivom occidit"? aut contra: "sedet inscius alto accipiens sonitum saxi de vertice pastor". XI. Praecipueque ex his oritur mira sublimitas quae audaci et proxime periculum tralatione tolluntur, cum rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus, qualis est "pontem indignatus Araxes" et illa Ciceronis: XII. "Quid enim tuus ille, tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? cuius latus ille mucro petebat?

9. Comparison is when I say that a man has done something “as a lion,” transference when I say about a man “he is a lion.” The whole force of this seems especially fourfold: when in animate things one thing is put for another, as of a charioteer “the helmsman twisted the horse with great force,” or [as Livy relates that Scipio used to be “barked at” by Cato] lifeless things are taken for others of the same kind, as “he lets loose the reins to the fleet,” or lifeless things for animate ones: 10. “Was it iron or fate, Moerus, that slew the Argives?” or the contrary: “he sits unknowing on a height, the shepherd receiving the sound from the summit of a rock.” 11. And especially from these there arises a wondrous sublimity, which is achieved by bold and well-nigh perilous transference, when we give to things lacking sense a certain action and spirits, such as “the Araxes, indignant at a bridge,” and that of Cicero: 12. “For what, pray, was that sword of yours, Tubero, drawn in the Pharsalian battle-line, doing? Whose side was that blade seeking?”

Qui sensus erat armorum tuorum"? duplicatur interim haec virtus, ut apud Vergilium: "ferrumque armare veneno", nam et "veneno armare" et "ferrum armare" tralatio est. XIII. Secantur haec in pluris partis, ut a rationali ad rationale et idem de inrationalibus et haec invicem, quibus similis ratio est et a toto et a partibus.

"What was the intent of your arms?" Meanwhile this power is doubled, as in Vergil: "and to arm the iron with venom," for both "to arm with venom" and "to arm the iron" are tralation. 13. These are divided into several parts: from the rational to the rational, and the same concerning irrationals, and these in turn, for which the rationale is similar, both from the whole and from the parts.

Sed iam non pueris praecipimus, ut accepto genere species intellegere non possint.

But now we are not instructing boys, so that, with the genus received, they cannot understand the species.

XIV. Vt modicus autem atque oportunus eius usus inlustrat orationem, ita frequens et obscurat et taedio complet, continuus vero in allegorian et aenigmata exit. sunt etiam quaedam et humiles tralationes, ut id de quo modo dixi,"saxea est verruca", et sordidae.

14. But just as a modest and opportune use of it illuminates oration, so frequent use both obscures and fills it with tedium; continuous use, indeed, runs out into allegory and enigmas. There are also certain humble metaphors, as that which I just mentioned, "the wart is stony," and sordid ones.

XV. Non enim, si Cicero recte "sentinam rei publicae" dixit, foeditatem hominum significans, idcirco probem illud quoque veteris oratoris: "persecuisti rei publicae vomicas". Optimeque Cicero demonstrat cavendum ne sit deformis tralatio, qualis est (nam ipsis eius utar exemplis): "castratam morte Africani rem publicam", et "stercus curiae Glauciam": XVI. ne nimio maior aut, quod saepius accidit, minor, ne dissimilis. Quorum exempla nimium frequenter deprendet qui scierit haec vitia esse.

15. For indeed, if Cicero rightly said “the bilge of the commonwealth,” signifying the foulness of men, I do not on that account approve also this of the old orator: “you have pursued the abscesses of the commonwealth.” And Cicero most excellently shows that one must beware lest the tralation be misshapen, such as is (for I will use his very examples): “the commonwealth castrated by the death of Africanus,” and “Glaucia as the dung of the Curia”: 16. lest it be excessively greater or, as more often happens, smaller, lest it be dissimilar. He who has known these to be vices will all too frequently detect their examples.

Sed copia quoque modum egressa vitiosa est, praecipue in eadem specie. XVII. sunt et durae, id est a longinqua similitudine ductae, ut "capitis nives" et "Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspuit Alpes". In illo vero plurimum erroris, quod ea quae poetis, qui et omnia ad voluptatem referunt et plurima vertere etiam ipsa metri necessitate coguntur, permissa sunt convenire quidam etiam prorsae putant.

Sed abundance also, once it has passed the measure, is vicious, especially in the same species. 17. there are also harsh ones, that is, drawn from a long-distant similitude, as “the snows of the head” and “Jupiter bespatters the Alps with wintry hoary snow.” But in this there is very much error: that those things which are permitted to poets—who both refer everything to pleasure and are compelled by the very necessity of meter to turn many things—some think to be suitable even for prose.

XVIII. At ego in agendo nec "pastorem populi" auctore Homero dixerim nec volucres per a‰ra "nare", licet hoc Vergilius in apibus ac Daedalo speciosissime sit usus. Metaphora enim aut vacantem locum occupare debet aut, si in alienum venit, plus valere eo quod expellit.

18. But I, in pleading, would neither say “shepherd of the people,” on Homer’s authority, nor that birds “swim” through the air, although Vergil has used this most beautifully in the case of the bees and of Daedalus. For a metaphor ought either to occupy a vacant place, or, if it comes into an alien domain, to prevail more than that which it expels.

XIX. Quod [aliquando] paene iam magis de synecdoche dicam. Nam tralatio permovendis animis plerumque et signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est: haec variare sermonem potest, ut ex uno pluris intellegamus, parte totum, specie genus, praecedentibus sequentia, vel omnia haec contra, liberior poetis quam oratoribus.

XIX. Which [sometimes] I would now almost rather call synecdoche. For transference (metaphor) was devised chiefly for thoroughly moving minds, for marking things, and for setting them under the eyes: this can vary discourse, so that from one we understand more, from a part the whole, from a species the genus, from what precedes the things that follow, or all these the other way around—freer for poets than for orators.

XX. Nam prorsa, ut "mucronem" pro gladio et "tectum" pro domo recipiet, ita non "puppem" pro navi nec "abietem" pro tabellis, et rursus, ut pro gladio "ferrum", ita non pro equo "quadrupedem". Maxime autem in orando valebit numerorum illa libertas. Nam et Livius saepe sic dicit: "Romanus proelio victor", cum Romanos vicisse significat, et contra Cicero ad Brutum "populo" inquit "imposuimus et oratores visi sumus", cum de se tantum loqueretur. XXI.

20. For, in the direct kind, it will admit “point” for sword and “roof” for house, yet not “stern” for ship nor “fir” for writing-tablets; and again, just as “iron” for sword, so not “quadruped” for horse. But most of all, in pleading, that freedom of number will have force. For Livy too often says thus: “the Roman, victorious in battle,” when he signifies that the Romans have won; and conversely Cicero, to Brutus, says “we imposed upon the people and were seen as orators,” when he was speaking about himself alone. 21.

Quod genus non orationis modo ornatus sed etiam cotidiani sermonis usus recipit. Quidam synecdochen vocant et cum id in contextu sermonis quod tacetur accipimus: verbum enim ex verbis intellegi, quod inter vitia ellipsis vocatur: "Arcades ad portas ruere". Mihi hanc figuram esse magis placet, illic ergo reddetur. XXII.

This kind is received not only by the ornament of oratory but also by the usage of quotidian speech. Some call it synecdoche, even when in the context of discourse we accept what is tacit: namely, for a word to be understood from the words, which among faults is called ellipsis: "The Arcadians rush to the gates." It pleases me rather to consider this a figure; therefore it will be set forth there. 22.

Aliud etiam intellegitur ex alio: "aspice, aratra iugo referunt suspensa iuvenci", unde apparet noctem adpropinquare. Id nescio an oratori conveniat nisi in argumentando, cum rei signum est: sed hoc ab elocutionis ratione distat.

Another thing too is understood from another: "look, the steers carry back the ploughs hanging from the yoke," whence it appears that night is drawing near. I do not know whether this suits the orator except in argumentation, when it is a sign of the matter; but this stands apart from the rationale of elocution.

XXIII. Nec procul ab hoc genere discedit metonymia, quae est nominis pro nomine positio, [cuius vis est pro eo quod dicitur causam propter quam dicitur ponere] sed, ut ait Cicero, hypallagen rhetores dicunt. Haec inventas ab inventore et subiectas res ab optinentibus significat, ut "Cererem corruptam undis", et "receptus terra Neptunus classes aquilonibus arcet". XXIV.

23. Nor does metonymy depart far from this kind, which is the placing of a name for a name, [whose force is to put, in place of what is said, the cause on account of which it is said]; but, as Cicero says, the rhetoricians call it hypallage. This signifies things found by the finder and things subjected by the holders, as “Ceres spoiled by the waves,” and “Neptune, received by the land, keeps the fleets from the north winds.” 24.

Quod fit retrorsum durius. Refert autem in quantum hic tropos oratorem sequatur. Nam ut "Vulcanum" pro igne vulgo audimus et "vario Marte pugnatum" eruditus est sermo et "Venerem" quam coitum dixisse magis decet, ita "Liberum et Cererem" pro vino et pane licentius quam ut fori severitas ferat.

Which, if done in reverse, is harsher. It matters, moreover, to what extent this trope follows the orator. For just as we commonly hear “Vulcan” for fire, and “it was fought with varying Mars” is an erudite locution, and it is more fitting to have said “Venus” than coitus, so “Liber and Ceres” for wine and bread is more licentious than the severity of the forum would bear.

Sicut ex eo quod continet id quod continetur: usus recipit "bene moratas urbes" et "poculum epotum" et "saeculum felix", at id quod contra est raro audeat nisi poeta: XXV. "iam proximus ardet Vcalegon". Nisi forte hoc potius est a possessore quod possidetur, ut "hominem devorari", cuius patrimonium consumatur: quo modo fiunt innumerabiles species. XXVI.

Just as from that which contains to that which is contained: usage admits “well-moraled cities,” and “a cup drunk up,” and “a happy age”; but the contrary is rarely dared unless by a poet: 25. “now Ucalegon close by is burning.” Unless perhaps this is rather from the possessor to that which is possessed, as “a man to be devoured,” whose patrimony is consumed: in which way innumerable species arise. 26.

huius enim sunt generis cum "ab Hannibale" caesa [et apud tragicos aegialeo] apud Cannas sexaginta milia dicimus, et carmina Vergili "Vergilium", "venisse" commeatus qui adferantur, "sacrilegium" deprehensum, non sacrilegum, "armorum" scientiam habere, non artis. XXVII. Illud quoque et poetis et oratoribus frequens, quo id quod efficit ex eo quod efficitur ostendimus.

for these belong to this kind, when we say that "by Hannibal" [et apud tragicos aegialeo] at Cannae sixty thousand were cut down, and we call the songs of Vergil "Vergil", "to have come" for the supplies that are being brought, "a sacrilege" detected, not a sacrilegious person, to have "knowledge of arms", not of art. 27. That too is frequent both with poets and with orators, whereby we show that which effects from that which is effected.

Nam et carminum auctores "pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas", et pallentesque habitant morbi tristisque senectus", et orator "praecipitem iram", "hilarem adulescentiam", "segne otium" dicet. XXVIII. Est etiam huic tropo quaedam cum synecdoche vicinia; nam cum dico "vultus hominis" pro vultu, dico pluraliter quod singulare est: sed non id ago, ut unum ex multis intellegatur (nam id est manifestum), sed nomen inmuto: et cum aurata tecta "aurea", pusillum ab ea discedo, quia non est pars auratura.

For both the authors of poems say "pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas", and "pallentesque habitant morbi tristisque senectus", and an orator will say "praecipitem iram", "hilarem adulescentiam", "segne otium". 28. There is also to this trope a certain vicinity with synecdoche; for when I say "vultus hominis" in place of vultu, I speak in the plural what is singular: but I do not aim that one out of many be understood (for that is manifest), but I change the name: and when aurata tecta "aurea", I depart a little from it, because gilding is not a part.

Quae singula persequi minutioris est curae etiam non oratorem instruentibus.

To pursue these things one by one is a matter of more minute concern even for those who are not training an orator.

XXIX. Antonomasia, quae aliquid pro nomine ponit, poetis utroque modo frequentissima, et per epitheton, quod detracto eo cui adponitur valet pro nomine ("Tydides", "Pelides"), et ex iis quae in quoque sunt praecipua: "divum pater atque hominum rex". [Et ex factis quibus persona signatur: "thalamo quae fixa reliquit impius".] XXX. Oratoribus etiamsi rarus eius rei nonnullus tamen usus est.

29. Antonomasia, which puts something in place of a name, is most frequent with poets in both ways: both by the epithet, which, with the one to whom it is attached removed, serves as a name ("Tydides", "Pelides"), and from those things which in each are principal: "the father of gods and king of men". [And from deeds by which a person is designated: "whom the impious man left fastened in the bridal chamber".] 30. For orators, even if rare, there is nonetheless some use of this thing.

Nam ut "Tydiden" et "Peliden" non dixerint, ita dixerint "impium" et "parricidam": "eversorem" quoque "Carthaginis et Numantiae" pro Scipione et "Romanae eloquentiae principem" pro Cicerone posuisse non dubitent. Ipse certe usus est hac libertate: "non multa peccas, inquit ille fortissimo viro senior magister": neutrum enim nomen est positum et utrumque intellegitur.

For just as they did not say "Tydides" and "Pelides," so they did say "the impious one" and "parricide": nor do they hesitate to have put "the overthrower of Carthage and Numantia" for Scipio, and "the chief of Roman eloquence" for Cicero. He himself certainly used this liberty: "you do not sin much," says that elder master to the most brave man; for neither name is set down and both are understood.

XXXI. Onomatopoeia quidem, id est fictio nominis, Graecis inter maximas habita virtutes, nobis vix permittitur. Et sunt plurima ita posita ab iis qui sermonem primi fecerunt, aptantes adfectibus vocem: nam "mugitus" et "sibilus" et "murmur" inde venerunt.

31. Onomatopoeia indeed, that is the fiction of a name, held among the greatest virtues by the Greeks, is scarcely permitted to us. And there are very many things thus set by those who first fashioned discourse, fitting the voice to affections: for "mugitus" and "sibilus" and "murmur" came from there.

XXXII. Deinde, tamquam consumpta sint omnia, nihil generare audemus ipsi, cum multa cotidie ab antiquis ficta moriantur. Vix illa, quae pepoiemena vocant, quae ex vocibus in usum receptis quocumque modo declinantur nobis permittimus, qualia sunt [ut] "sullaturit" et "proscripturit"; atque "laureati postes" pro illo "lauru coronati" ex eadem fictione sunt, sed hoc feliciter evaluit.

32. Then, as though all things were exhausted, we ourselves dare to generate nothing, although many things daily, coined by the ancients, die. We scarcely permit to ourselves those which they call pepoiemena, which are inflected in whatever way from words received into use, such as [ut] "sullaturit" and "proscripturit"; and "laureled doorposts" instead of that "crowned with laurel" are from the same fiction, but this has happily prevailed.

XXXIII. +Adoinoia etvio eo+ ferimus in Graecis, Ovidius +ocoeludit+ "vinoeo bonoeo". Dure etiam iungere arquitenentem et dividere septentriones videmur.

XXXIII. We do permit +Adoinoia etvio eo+ among the Greeks; Ovid +ocoeludit+ “vinoeo bonoeo.” We seem harsh even to join “bow-holder” (arquitenentem) and to divide “Septentrions” (septentriones).

XXXIV. Eo magis necessaria catachresis, quam recte dicimus abusionem, quae non habentibus nomen suum accommodat quod in proximo est, sic: "equum +ogra putant+ aedificant", XXXV. et apud tragicos "Aegialeo parentat pater". Mille sunt haec: "acetabula" quidquid habent et "pyxides" cuiuscumque materiae sunt et "parricida" matris quoque aut fratris interfector.

34. All the more necessary is catachresis, which we rightly call abusion, which, for things not having their own name, accommodates what is nearest at hand, thus: "they build a horse +ogra putant+," 35. and among the tragic poets "the father performs obsequies for Aegialeus." There are a thousand such: "acetabula" for whatever they hold, and "pyxides" of whatever material they are, and "parricida" also the slayer of a mother or of a brother.

Discernendumque est ab hoc totum tralationis istud genus, quod abusio est ubi nomen defuit, tralatio ubi aliud fuit. Nam poetae solent abusive etiam in iis rebus quibus nomina sua sunt vicinis potius uti, quod rarum in prorsa est. XXXVI.

And this whole kind of transference must be distinguished from that: abuse is where a name was lacking, transference where another existed. For poets are accustomed, abusively, even in those things which have their own names, to use rather neighboring ones, which is rare in prose. 36.

Illa quoque quidam catachresis volunt esse, cum pro temeritate "virtus" aut pro luxuria "liberalitas" dicitur. A quibus equidem dissentio: namque in his non verbum pro verbo ponitur, sed res pro re. Neque enim quisquam putat [et] "luxuriam" et "liberalitatem" idem significare, verum id quod fit alius luxuriam esse dicit, alius liberalitatem, quamvis neutri dubium sit haec esse diversa.

Some also want those to be catachresis, when “virtue” is said for temerity or “liberality” for luxury. From whom I, for my part, dissent: for in these cases not word for word is set, but thing for thing. Nor indeed does anyone think [and] “luxury” and “liberality” to signify the same, but as to what is done, one says it is luxury, another liberality, although to neither is it doubtful that these are diverse.

XXXVII. Superest ex his quae aliter significant metalempsis, id est transumptio, quae ex alio +tropo+ in alium velut viam praestat, * et rarissimus et improbissimus, Graecis tamen frequentior, qui Centaurum, qui Chiron est, Hessona et insulas oxeias thoas dicunt. Nos quis ferat si Verrem "suem" aut Aelium Catum "doctum" nominemus?

37. There remains among those which signify otherwise metalepsis, that is transumption, which, from one +trope+ into another, as it were, furnishes a road, * and it is both very rare and most improper, yet more frequent among the Greeks, who call the Centaur, who is Chiron, "Hessona" and the islands "oxeias thoas." Who would put up with us if we should name Verres "swine" or Aelius Catus "learned"?

XXXVIII. Est enim haec in metalempsi natura, ut inter id quod transfertur et id quo transfertur sit medius quidam gradus, nihil ipse significans sed praebens transitum: quem tropum magis adfectamus ut habere videamur quam ullo in loco desideramus. Nam id eius frequentissimum exemplum est: "cano canto", et "canto dico", ita "cano dico": interest medium illud "canto". XXXIX.

38. For this is the nature in metalepsis, that between that which is transferred and that to which it is transferred there is a certain intermediate step, itself signifying nothing but affording a passage: a trope which we are more eager to affect so that we may seem to possess it than we desire it in any particular place. For this is its most frequent example: "I sing I chant", and "I chant I say", thus "I sing I say": the middle "I chant" intervenes. 39.

Nec diutius in eo morandum: +innisi+ usus admodum video, +nihil+, ut dixi, in comoedis.

Nor must we linger on it longer: +innisi+ I see the usage to be very scant, +nothing+, as I said, in the comedians.

XL. Cetera iam non significandi gratia, sed ad ornandam +non+ augendam orationem adsumuntur. Ornat enim epitheton, quod recte dicimus adpositum, a nonnullis sequens dicitur. Eo poetae et frequentius et liberius utuntur.

40. The rest now are assumed not for the sake of signifying, but for adorning, not for augmenting the oration. For the epithet, which we rightly call adpositum, is by some called sequens. This the poets use both more frequently and more freely.

Namque illis satis est convenire id verbo cui adponitur: itaque et "dentes albos" et "umida vina" in his non reprehendemus; apud oratorem, nisi aliquid efficitur, redundat: tum autem efficitur si sine illo id quod dicitur minus est, qualia sunt: "o scelus abominandum, o deformem libidinem". XLI. Exornatur autem res tota maxime tralationibus: "cupiditas effrenata" et "insanae substructiones". Et solet fieri aliis adiunctis [epitheton] tropis, ut apud Vergilium "turpis egestas" et "tristis senectus". Verumtamen talis est ratio huiusce virtutis ut sine adpositis nuda sit et velut incompta oratio, oneretur tamen multis. XLII.

For to them it is enough to harmonize with the word to which it is adposed: and so we shall not find fault in their case with “white teeth” and “moist wines”; with an orator, unless something is effected, it is redundant: then, however, it is effective if without it that which is said is less, such as: “O abominable crime, O deformed lust.” 41. The whole matter, moreover, is most adorned by translations (metaphors): “unbridled cupidity” and “insane substructions.” And it is wont to be done with other tropes joined to the [epitheton], as in Vergil “foul poverty” and “sad old age.” Nevertheless, such is the rationale of this virtue that without appositions speech is naked and as it were unadorned, yet is burdened by many. 42.

Nam fit longa et impedita +uti questionibus+ eam iungas similem agmini totidem lixas habenti quot milites, cui et numerus est duplex nec duplum virium. Quamquam non singula modo, sed etiam plura verba adponi solent, ut "coniugio Anchisa Veneris dignate superbo". XLIII. Sed hoc quocumque modo: duo vero uni adposita ne versum quidem decuerint.

For it becomes long and impeded, +as with interrogations+, if you join to it something like a battle-line having as many sutlers as soldiers, which thus has a number that is double and yet not double in strength. Although not single words only, but even several words are wont to be added, as “coniugio Anchisa Veneris dignate superbo”. 43. But this be as it may: two, however, when attached to one, would not even have suited a verse.

sunt autem quibus non videatur hic omnino tropos quia nihil vertat, nec est semper, sed cum id quod est adpositum, si a proprio diviseris, per se significat et facit antonomasian. Nam si dicas "ille qui Numantiam et Carthaginem evertit", antonomasia est, si adieceris "Scipio" adpositum: +non potest ergo esse iunctum+. XLIV. Allegoria, quam inversionem interpretantur, aut aliud verbis, aliud sensu ostendit, aut etiam interim contrarium.

sunt autem quibus non videatur hic omnino trope because it turns nothing, nor is it always [so], but only when that which is apposed, if you separate it from the proper name, signifies by itself and produces antonomasia. For if you say “he who overthrew Numantia and Carthage,” it is an antonomasia, if you add “Scipio” as the appositive: +therefore it cannot be conjoined+. 44. Allegory, which they interpret as inversion, either shows one thing by the words and another by the sense, or even sometimes the contrary.

Prius fit genus plerumque continuat,is tralationibus, ut "O navis, referent in mare te novi fluctus: o quid agis? Fortiter occupa portum", totusque ille Horati locus, quo navem pro re publica, fluctus et tempestates pro bellis civilibus, portum pro pace atque concordia dicit. XLV.

The former kind arises for the most part from continuous translations (metaphors), as: "O ship, the new waves will carry you back into the sea: O what are you doing? Boldly seize the port," and that whole passage of Horace, in which he calls the ship the republic, the waves and tempests the civil wars, the port peace and concord. 45.

Tale Lucreti "avia Pieridum peragro loca", et Vergili "sed nos inmensum spatiis confecimus aequor, et iam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla". XLVI. Sine tralatione vero in Bucolicis: "certe equidem audieram, qua se subducere colles incipiunt mollique iugum demittere clivo, usque ad aquam et veteris iam fracta cacumina fagi, omnia carminibus vestrum servasse Menalcan". XLVII. Hoc enim loco praeter nomen cetera propriis decisa sunt verbis, verum non pastor Menalcas sed Vergilius est intellegendus.

Such is Lucretius’s “I traverse the pathless places of the Pierides,” and Vergil’s “but we have completed the immense level expanse by stages, and now it is time to loosen the horses’ smoking necks.” 46. Without translatio indeed in the Bucolics: “surely indeed I had heard, where the hills begin to withdraw themselves and to let down the ridge with a soft slope, all the way to the water and the already-broken summits of the old beech, that your Menalcas had preserved all things by his songs.” 47. For in this passage, apart from the name, the rest are expressed with proper words; but it is not the shepherd Menalcas, rather Vergil, who is to be understood.

Habet usum talis allegoriae frequenter oratio, sed raro totius, plerumque apertis permixta est. Tota apud Ciceronem talis est: "hoc miror, hoc queror, quemquam hominem ita pessumdare alterum velle ut etiam navem perforet in qua ipse naviget". XLVIII. Illud commixtum frequentissimum: "equidem ceteras tempestates et procellas in illis dumtaxat fluctibus contionum semper Miloni putavi esse subeundas". Nisi adiecisset "dumtaxat contionum", esset allegoria: nunc eam miscuit.

Speech has frequent use of such allegory, but rarely of the whole; for the most part it is intermixed with plain things. An entire one such in Cicero is: "this I marvel at, this I complain of, that any man should wish so to ruin another that he even perforates the ship in which he himself is sailing." 48. That very frequent commixed kind: "indeed I thought that all the other tempests and storms had to be undergone by Milo in those waves only of assemblies." Unless he had added "only of assemblies," it would be an allegory: now he has mixed it.

Quo in genere et species ex arcessitis verbis venit et intellectus ex propriis. XLIX. Illud vero longe speciosissimum genus orationis in quo trium permixta est gratia, similitudinis allegoriae tralationis: "Quod fretum, quem euripum tot motus, tantas, tam varias habere creditis agitationes commutationes fluctus, quantas perturbationes et quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum?

In which kind both the appearance comes from fetched words and the understanding from proper ones. 49. But that is by far the most splendid kind of speech in which the grace of three is commixed—of similitude, allegory, and metaphor: "What strait, what Euripus do you believe to have so many motions, so great, so various agitations, commutations, waves, as many perturbations and as many surges as the method of the comitia has?"

Dies intermissus unus aut nox interposita saepe [et] perturbat omnia et totam opinionem parva nonnumquam commutat aura rumoris". L. Nam id quoque in primis est custodiendum, ut, quo ex genere coeperis tralationis, hoc desinas. Multi autem, cum initium tempestatem sumpserunt, incendio aut ruina finiunt, quae est inconsequentia rerum foedissima. LI. Ceterum allegoria parvis quoque ingeniis et cotidiano sermoni frequentissime servit.

A single day intermitted or a night interposed often [and] throws everything into disturbance, and a small breeze of rumor sometimes changes the whole opinion". 50. For this too must be guarded among the first things: that, in the kind of translation (metaphor) with which you have begun, with this you should end. Many, however, when they have taken a tempest as the beginning, finish with a conflagration or a ruin, which is the most foul inconsequence of things. 51. Moreover, allegory most frequently serves even lesser wits and everyday speech.

Nam illa in agendis causis iam detrita "pedem conferre" et "iugulum petere" et "sanguinem mittere" inde sunt, nec offendunt tamen: est enim grata in eloquendo novitas et emutatio, et magis inopinata delectant. Ideoque iam in his amisimus modum et gratiam rei nimia captatione consumpsimus. LII.

For those expressions, already worn thin in conducting cases—“to come to close quarters,” “to aim at the throat,” and “to let blood”—come from that source, and yet they do not offend: for novelty and mutation in speaking are pleasing, and things more unexpected give more delight. And for that reason we have already in these lost measure and the grace of the thing, and by excessive courting we have consumed it. 52.

Est in exemplis allegoria, si non praedicta ratione ponantur. Nam ut "Dionysium Corinthi esse", quo Graeci omnes utuntur, ita plurima similia dici possunt. Sed allegoria quae est obscurior "aenigma" dicitur, vitium meo quidem iudicio si quidem dicere dilucide virtus, quo tamen et poetae utuntur: "dic quibus in terris, et eris mihi magnus Apollo, tris pateat caeli spatium non amplius ulnas"? et oratores nonnumquam, ut Caelius "quadrantariam Clytaemestram" et "in triclinio coam, in cubiculo nolam". LIII.

There is allegory in examples, if they are not set forth according to the aforesaid method. For as “that Dionysius is at Corinth,” which all the Greeks use, so very many similar things can be said. But an allegory which is more obscure is called an “enigma,” a fault in my judgment, if indeed to speak clearly is a virtue; yet poets make use of it too: “tell in what lands—and you will be to me a great Apollo—the space of the sky extends no more than three ells”? and orators sometimes, as Caelius [says], “a quarter-piece Clytemnestra” and “in the dining room Coan [silk], in the bedroom a bell.” 53.

Namque et nunc quidem solvuntur et tum erant notiora cum dicerentur: aenigmata sunt tamen; non et cetera, si quis interpretetur, intellegas?

For indeed even now they are solved, and then they were more well-known when they were spoken: nevertheless they are enigmas; do you not also understand the rest, if someone interprets them?

LIV. In eo vero genere quo contraria ostenduntur ironia est (inlusionem vocant): quae aut pronuntiatione intellegitur aut persona aut rei natura; nam si qua earum verbis dissentit, apparet diversam esse orationi voluntatem. LV. Quamquam in plurimis id tropis accidit, ut intersit +quid de quoquo+ dicatur, quia quod dicitur alibi verum est.

54. In that kind indeed in which contraries are shown there is irony (they call it mocking): which is understood either by delivery, or by the persona, or by the nature of the thing; for if any of these disagrees with the words, it appears that the intention is different from the speech. 55. Although in very many tropes this happens, namely that it matters +what is said about each respective thing+, because what is said is true elsewhere.

Et laudis autem simulatione detrahere et vituperationis laudare concessum est: "quod C. Verres, praetor urbanus, homo sanctus et diligens, subsortitionem eius in codice non haberet". Et contra: "oratores visi sumus et populo imposuimus". LVI. Aliquando cum inrisu quodam contraria dicuntur iis quae intellegi volunt, quale est in Clodium: "integritas tua te purgavit, mihi crede, pudor eripuit, vita ante acta servavit". LVII. Praeter haec usus est allegoriae ut tristia dicamus melioribus verbis urbanitatis gratia aut quaedam contrariis significemus * +aliut textum sp+ "exta cocta numerabimus". Haec si quis ignorat quibus Graeci nominibus appellent, sarkasmon, asteismon, antiphrasin, paroimian dici sciat.

And furthermore it is permitted both to detract under a simulation of praise and to praise under the guise of vituperation: "that C. Verres, the urban praetor, a holy and diligent man, did not have the subsortition of it in the record‑book." And conversely: "we seemed orators and we imposed upon the people." 56. Sometimes, with a certain derision, things contrary to what is meant to be understood are said, as in the case of Clodius: "your integrity has cleared you, believe me; shame has rescued you; your life lived before has saved you." 57. Besides these, there is a use of allegory, that we may say sad things with better words for the sake of urbanity, or signify certain things by contraries * +aliut textum sp+ "we will count boiled entrails." If anyone does not know by what names the Greeks call these, let him know they are called sarkasmon, asteismon, antiphrasin, paroimian.

LVIII. sunt etiam qui haec non species allegoriae sed ipsa tropos dicant, acri quidem ratione, quod illa obscurior sit, in his omnibus aperte appareat quid velimus. cui accedit hoc quoque, quod genus, cum dividatur in species, nihil habet proprium, ut arbor pinus et olea et cupressus, et ipsius per se nulla proprietas, allegoria vero habet aliquid proprium.

58. There are also those who call these not species of allegory but the tropes themselves, with acute reasoning indeed: because the former is more obscure, whereas in all these it is openly apparent what we intend. To which there is added also this, that a genus, when divided into species, has nothing proper of its own—just as “tree,” namely pine and olive and cypress—and of itself no property; allegory, however, has something proper.

Quod quo modo fieri potest nisi ipsa species est? Sed utentium nihil refert. LIX.

How can that be done in any way unless it is itself a species? But as for users, it makes no difference. 59.

Adicitur his mycterismos, dissimulatus quidem sed non latens derisus.

Added to these is mycterismos, a dissimulated yet not latent derision.

Pluribus autem verbis cum id quod uno aut paucioribus certe dici potest explicatur, periphrasin vocant, circumitum quendam eloquendi, qui nonnumquam necessitatem habet, quotiens dictu deformia operit, ut Sallustius "ad requisita naturae", interim ornatum petit solum, qui est apud poetas frequentissimus: LX. "tempus erat quo prima quies mortalibus aegris incipit et dono divum gratissima serpit", et apud oratores non rarus, semper tamen adstrictior. LXI. Quidquid enim significari brevius potest et cum ornatu latius ostenditur periphrasis est, cui nomen Latine datum est non sane aptum orationis virtuti circumlocutio.

But when that which can certainly be said with one or with fewer words is explained with more words, they call it periphrasis, a certain circuit of speaking, which sometimes has a necessity, whenever it veils things unsightly to say, as Sallust “to the requisites of nature,” at times seeks ornament alone, which is most frequent among poets: 60. “it was the time when the first repose for ailing mortals begins and, by the gift of the gods, most welcome, creeps,” and among orators it is not rare, yet always more constrained. 61. For whatever can be signified more briefly and is shown more broadly with ornament is periphrasis, to which a name has been given in Latin not truly apt to the virtue of speech, “circumlocution.”

Verum hoc ut cum decorem habet periphrasis, ita cum in vitium incidit perissologia dicitur: obstat enim quidquid non adiuvat.

But this—just as periphrasis has decorum—so, when it falls into a fault, is called perissology: for whatever does not aid obstructs.

LXII. Hyperbaton quoque, id est verbi transgressionem, quoniam frequenter ratio compositionis et decor poscit, non inmerito inter virtutes habemus. Sit enim frequentissime aspera et dura et dissoluta et hians oratio si ad necessitatem ordinis sui verba redigantur, et ut quodque oritur ita proximis, etiam si vinciri non potest, alligetur.

62. Hyperbaton also, that is, a transgression of word-order, since frequently the rationale of composition and decor demands it, we not undeservedly have among the virtues. For very often speech would be rough and hard and loose and gaping if the words were reduced to the necessity of their own order, and so that, as each thing arises, it be bound to what is next, even if it cannot be shackled.

LXIII. Differenda igitur quaedam et praesumenda, atque ut in structuris lapidum inpolitorum loco quo convenit quodque ponendum. Non enim recidere ea nec polire possumus quo coagmentata se magis iungant, sed utendum iis qualia sunt, eligendaeque sedes.

63. Therefore certain things must be deferred and certain things anticipated, and, as in structures of unpolished stones, each thing must be set in the place where it is fitting. For we cannot cut them down nor polish them so that, when joined together, they may bind themselves more closely; rather we must use them as they are, and the seats must be chosen.

LXIV. Nec aliud potest sermonem facere numerosum quam oportuna ordinis permutatio, neque alio ceris Platonis inventa sunt quattuor illa verba, quibus in illo pulcherrimo operum in Piraeum se descendisse significat, plurimis modis scripta quam ut quo ordine quodque maxime faceret experiretur. LXV.

64. Nor can anything else make discourse numerose than a well-timed permutation of order, nor were those four words of Plato found on his wax tablets—by which in that most beautiful of works he signifies that he descended to the Piraeus—written in very many ways except so that he might test in what order each would do the most. 65.

Verum id cum in duobus verbis fit, anastrophe dicitur, reversio quaedam, qualia sunt vulgo "mecum", "secum", apud oratores et historicos "quibus de rebus". At cum decoris gratia traicitur longius verbum, proprie hyperbati tenet nomen: "animadverti, iudices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse partis". Nam "in duas partis divisam esse" rectum erat, sed durum et incomptum. LXVI. Poetae quidem etiam verborum divisione faciunt transgressionem: "Hyperboreo septem subiecta trioni," quod oratio nequaquam recipiet.

But when this is done in two words, it is called anastrophe, a kind of reversal, such as the common “with me,” “with himself,” and among orators and historians “about which matters.” But when, for the sake of decor, a word is carried farther across, it properly bears the name hyperbaton: “I noticed, judges, that the whole oration of the accuser had been divided into two parts.” For “to have been divided into two parts” was the regular form, but harsh and unpolished. 66. Poets indeed even make a transgression by division of words: “set beneath the Hyperborean Septentrion,” which prose by no means will admit.

At id quidem proprie dici tropos possit, quia componendus est e duobus intellectus: alioqui, ubi nihil ex significatione mutatum est et structura sola variatur, figura potius verborum dici potest, sicut multi existimarunt. LXVII. Longis autem hyperbatis et confusis quae vitia accidunt, suo loco diximus.

But that indeed might properly be called tropes, because the sense has to be composed from the two; otherwise, where nothing is changed in signification and only the structure is varied, it can rather be called a figure of words, as many have thought. 67. Moreover, about the faults that occur with long and confused hyperbata, we have spoken in their proper place.

Hyperbolen audacioris ornatus summo loco posui. Est haec decens veri superiectio: virtus eius ex diverso par, augendi atque minuendi. LXVIII.

I have placed hyperbole, an ornament of more audacious style, in the highest rank. This is a decorous superposition upon the truth: its virtue, equal on the opposite side, is for augmenting and for diminishing. 68.

Fit pluribus modis; aut enim plus facto dicimus: "vomens frustis esculentis gremium suum et totum tribunal implevit", et "geminique minantur in caelum scopuli", aut res per similitudinem attollimus: "credas innare revulsas Cycladas", aut per comparationem, ut "fulminis ocior alis", aut signis quasi quibusdam: LXIX. "illa vel intactae segetis per summa volaret gramina nec teneras cursu laesisset aristas", vel tralatione, ut ipsum illud "volaret". LXX. Crescit interim hyperbole alia insuper addita, ut Cicero in Antonium dicit: "Quae Charybdis tam vorax?

It is done in several modes; for either we say more than the fact: "vomiting morsels of food he filled his lap and the whole tribunal," and "the twin crags threaten into heaven," or we uplift the thing by similitude: "you would believe the torn‑away Cyclades to be floating," or by comparison, as "swifter than the wings of lightning," or by certain, as it were, signs: 69. "she would even fly over the topmost grasses of an untouched cornfield and would not have injured the tender ears by her running," or by transference, as that very "would fly." 70. Meanwhile the hyperbole grows with another thing added on top, as Cicero says against Antony: "What Charybdis is so voracious?

Charybdin dico? Quae si fuit, fuit animal unum: Oceanus, medius fidius, vix videtur tot res, tam dissipatas, tam distantibus in locis positas tam cito absorbere potuisse". LXXI. Exquisitam vero figuram huius rei deprendisse apud principem lyricorum Pindarum videor in libro quem inscripsit Hymnus.

Do I say Charybdis? Which, if it existed, was a single animal: the Ocean, by my good faith, scarcely seems to have been able to swallow up so many things, so scattered, placed in places so far apart, so quickly". 71. I seem, in truth, to have found an exquisite figure of this matter with Pindar, the prince of the lyric poets, in the book which he entitled Hymn.

Is namque Herculis impetum adversus Meropas, qui in insula Coo dicuntur habitasse, non igni nec ventis nec mari sed fulmini dicit similem fuisse, ut illa minora, hoc par esset. LXXII. Quod imitatus Cicero illa composuit in Verrem: "Versabatur in Sicilia longo intervallo alter non Dionysius ille nec Phalaris (tulit enim illa quondam insula multos et crudelis tyrannos), sed quoddam novum monstrum ex vetere illa inmanitate quae in isdem versata locis dicitur.

For he says that the impetus of Hercules against the Meropes, who are said to have dwelt on the island of Cos, was like not fire nor winds nor the sea, but lightning—so that those would be lesser, this a peer. 72. Which Cicero, imitating it, composed thus against Verres: "There was active in Sicily after a long interval another—not that Dionysius nor Phalaris (for that island once bore many and cruel tyrants), but a certain new monster out of that old savagery which is said to have moved about in the same places."

Non enim Charybdin tam infestam neque Scyllam navibus quam istum in eodem freto fuisse arbitror". LXXIII. Nec pauciora sunt genera minuendi: "vix ossibus haerent". Et quod Cicero [est] in quodam ioculari libello: "fundum +Vetto+ vocat quem possit mittere funda: ni tamen exciderit qua cava funda patet". Sed huius quoque rei servetur mensura quaedam. Quamvis enim est omnis hyperbole ultra fidem, non tamen esse debet ultra modum, nec alia via magis in cacozelian itur.

"For I do not think Charybdis nor Scylla so hostile to ships as that man was in the same strait." 73. Nor are the kinds of diminishing fewer: "they scarcely cling to their bones." And what [is] Cicero’s in a certain jocular little book: "he calls +Vetto+ a sinker, whom he can send with a sling; unless, however, it should slip out where the hollow sling gapes." But let a certain measure be observed in this matter too. For although every hyperbole is beyond belief, yet it ought not to be beyond measure, nor is there any road by which one goes more into cacozelia.

LXXIV. Piget referre plurima hinc orta vitia, cum praesertim minime sint ignota et obscura. Monere satis est mentiri hyperbolen, nec ita ut mendacio facere velit.

74. It irks to recount the very many faults arisen hence, since especially they are by no means unknown or obscure. It is enough to admonish that hyperbole lies, yet not in such a way as to wish to do so by a lie.

Quo magis intuendum est quo usque deceat extollere quod nobis non creditur. pervenit haec res frequentissime ad risum: qui si captatus est, urbanitatis, sin aliter, stultitiae nomen adsequitur. LXXV.

All the more must we consider how far it is fitting to exalt what is not believed of us. this practice very frequently issues in laughter: which, if it is caught, attains the name of urbanity; otherwise, it attains the name of stupidity. 75.

Est autem in usu vulgo quoque et inter ineruditos et apud rusticos, videlicet quia natura est omnibus augendi res vel minuendi cupiditas insita nec quisquam vero contentus est: sed ignoscitur, quia non adfirmamus. LXXVI. tum est hyperbole virtus cum res ipsa de qua loquendum est naturalem modum excessit: conceditur enim amplius dicere, quia dici quantum est non potest, meliusque ultra quam citra stat oratio.

It is, moreover, in use commonly as well, both among the unlearned and among rustics, evidently because there is inborn in all a cupiditas of augmenting things or of diminishing, nor indeed is anyone content; but it is pardoned, because we do not affirm. 76. then hyperbole is a virtue when the very thing about which one must speak has exceeded its natural measure: for it is conceded to say more, because it cannot be said as much as it is, and the oration stands better beyond than on this side.

Sed de hoc satis, quia eundem locum plenius in eo libro quo causas corruptae eloquentiae reddebamus tractavimus.

But enough about this, since we have treated the same subject more fully in that book in which we were setting forth the causes of corrupted eloquence.