Cicero: ORATORIA

[1] Si, quantum in agro locisque desertis audacia potest, tantum in foro atque in iudiciis impudentia valeret, non minus nunc in causa cederet A. Caecina Sex. Aebuti impudentiae, quam tum in vi facienda cessit audaciae. Verum et illud considerati hominis esse putavit, qua de re iure disceptari oporteret, armis non contendere, et hoc constantis, quicum vi et armis certare noluisset, eum iure iudicioque superare.

[1] If shamelessness had as much force in the forum and in the courts as audacity can have in the field and in deserted places, A. Caecina would now in the case yield no less to the impudence of Sex. Aebutius than then he yielded to audacity in the perpetration of violence. But he also judged this to be the part of a considerate man: not to contend with arms about a matter that ought to be debated by law; and this to be the part of a constant man: that the one with whom he had been unwilling to strive by force and arms, he should overcome by law and by judgment.

[2] Ac mihi quidem cum audax praecipue fuisse videtur Aebutius in convocandis hominibus et armandis, tum impudens in iudicio, non solum quod in iudicium venire ausus est—nam id quidem tametsi improbe fit in aperta re, tamen malitia est iam usitatum—sed quod non dubitavit id ipsum quod arguitur confiteri; nisi forte hoc rationis habuit, quoniam, si facta vis esset moribus, superior in possessione retinenda non fuisset, quia contra ius moremque facta sit, A. Caecinam cum amicis metu perterritum profugisse; nunc quoque in iudicio si causa more institutoque omnium defendatur, nos inferiores in agendo non futuros; sin a consuetudine recedatur, se, quo impudentius egerit, hoc superiorem discessurum. Quasi vero aut idem possit in iudicio improbitas quod in vi confidentia, aut nos non eo libentius tum audaciae cesserimus quo nunc impudentiae facilius obsisteremus.

[2] And to me indeed Aebutius seems, while audacious especially in convoking and arming men, then impudent in court, not only because he dared to come into court—for that indeed, although it is done improperly in an open matter, nevertheless through malice has now become customary—but because he did not hesitate to confess that very thing which is charged; unless perhaps he had this rationale: since, if the violence had been done according to the mores, he would not have been superior in retaining possession—because it was done against law and custom—A. Caecina, with his friends, panic‑stricken by fear, fled; now too in court, if the case be defended according to the custom and institution of all, we shall not be inferior in pleading; but if there be a recession from custom, he, the more impudently he shall have acted, by so much will come off the superior. As if indeed wickedness could accomplish the same in court that confidence does in violence, or as if we had not then the more willingly yielded to audacity in order that we might now more easily resist impudence.

[3] Itaque longe alia ratione, recuperatores, ad agendam causam hac actione venio atque initio veneram. Tum enim nostrae causae spes erat posita in defensione mea, nunc in confessione adversarii, tum in nostris, nunc vero in illorum testibus; de quibus ego antea laborabam ne, si improbi essent, falsi aliquid dicerent, si probi existimarentur, quod dixissent probarent; nunc sum animo aequissimo. Si enim sunt viri boni, me adiuvant, cum id iurati dicunt quod ego iniuratus insimulo; sin autem minus idonei, me non laedunt, cum eis sive creditur, hoc ipsum quod nos arguimus, sive fides non habetur, de adversarii testium fide derogatur.

[3] And so, Recuperators, I come to plead the case in this action on a plan far different from that on which I came at the outset. Then, indeed, the hope of our case was placed in my defense, now in the adversary’s confession; then in our witnesses, now truly in theirs. About whom I previously was anxious that, if they were wicked, they might say something false, and if they were deemed upright, they might prove what they had said; now I am of a very equable mind. For if they are good men, they aid me, when under oath they say that which I, not under oath, allege; but if they are less fit, they do not harm me, since either they are believed, and then this very point which we allege is , or no credit is afforded, and a deduction is made from the credit of the adversary’s witnesses.

[4] Verum tamen cum illorum actionem causae considero, non video quid impudentius dici possit, cum autem vestram in iudicando dubitationem, vereor ne id quod videntur impudenter fecisse astute et callide fecerint. Nam, si negassent vim hominibus armatis esse factam, facile honestissimis testibus in re perspicua tenerentur; sin confessi essent et id quod nullo tempore iure fieri potest tum ab se iure factum esse defenderent, sperarunt, id quod adsecuti sunt, se iniecturos vobis causam deliberandi et iudicandi iustam moram ac religionem. Simul illud quod indignissimum est futurum arbitrati sunt, ut in hac causa non de improbitate Sex.

[4] Yet nevertheless, when I consider their conduct of the case, I do not see what could be said more impudent; but when I consider your hesitation in judging, I fear lest that which they seem to have done impudently they have done shrewdly and craftily. For if they had denied that violence had been done by armed men, they would easily be held fast by most honorable witnesses in a matter that is perspicuous; but if they had confessed and had defended that that which at no time can be done by right was then done by them by right, they hoped—what they attained—that they would impose upon you a ground for deliberating and judging, a just delay and a scruple of religion. At the same time they supposed that this, which is most unworthy, would come about: that in this case the question would be not about the depravity of Sextus.

Aebuti, sed de iure civili iudicium fieri videretur.

of Aebutius, but that a judgment would seem to be made about the civil law.

[5] Qua in re, si mihi esset unius A. Caecinae causa agenda, profiterer satis idoneum esse me defensorem, propterea quod fidem meam diligentiamque praestarem; quae cum sunt in actore causae, nihil est in re praesertim aperta ac simplici quod excellens ingenium requiratur. Sed cum de eo mihi iure dicendum sit, quod pertineat ad omnis, quodque constitutum sit a maioribus, conservatum usque ad hoc tempus, quo sublato non solum pars aliqua iuris deminuta, sed etiam vis ea quae iuri maxime est adversaria iudicio confirmata esse videatur, video summi ingeni causam esse, non ut id demonstretur quod ante oculos est sed ne, si quis vobis error in tanta re sit obiectus, omnes potius me arbitrentur causae quam vos religioni vestrae defuisse.

[5] In this matter, if I had to plead the case of A. Caecina alone, I would profess myself a sufficiently fit defender, because I would furnish my good faith and diligence; and when these are present in the pleader of the cause, there is nothing in the matter, especially being open and simple, that requires outstanding genius. But since I must speak on that law which pertains to all, and which has been constituted by our ancestors and preserved down to this time—whose removal would seem not only to diminish some part of the law, but even to have the force that is most adversarial to law confirmed by a judgment—I see it to be a cause for the highest talent, not to demonstrate what is before our eyes, but lest, if any error be thrown before you in so great a matter, all may rather think that I failed the cause than that you failed your religion.

[6] Quamquam ego mihi sic persuadeo, recuperatores, non vos tam propter iuris obscuram dubiamque rationem bis iam de eadem causa dubitasse quam, quod videtur ad summam illius existimationem hoc iudicium pertinere, moram ad condemnandum quaesisse simul et illi spatium ad sese conligendum dedisse. Quod quoniam iam in consuetudinem venit et id viri boni vestri similes in iudicando faciunt, reprehendendum fortasse minus, querendum vero magis etiam videtur, ideo quod omnia iudicia aut distrahendarum controversiarum aut puniendorum maleficiorum causa reperta sunt, quorum alterum levius est, propterea quod et minus laedit et persaepe disceptatore domestico diiudicatur, alterum est vehementissimum, quod et ad graviores res pertinet et non honorariam operam amici, sed severitatem iudicis ac vim requirit.

[6] Although I thus persuade myself, Recuperators, that you have not twice now doubted about the same case so much on account of the obscure and doubtful reasoning of law as, because this judgment seems to pertain to the sum of that man’s estimation, you have sought a delay for condemning and at the same time have given him space to gather himself. Since this has now come into custom and men of good character like you do this in judging, it seems perhaps less to be reprehended, but rather even more to be complained of, for this reason: that all judgments were devised either for the sake of distracting (unraveling) controversies or of punishing malefactions, of which the former is lighter, because it both harms less and very often is decided by a domestic arbitrator, the other is most vehement, because it pertains to graver matters and requires not the honorary service of a friend, but the severity of a judge and force.

[7] Quod est gravius, et cuius rei causa maxime iudicia constituta sunt, id iam mala consuetudine dissolutum est. Nam ut quaeque res est turpissima, sic maxime et maturissime vindicanda est, at eadem, quia existimationis periculum est, tardissime iudicatur. Qui igitur convenit, quae causa fuerit ad constituendum iudicium, eandem moram esse ad iudicandum?

[7] That which is more grave, and for the sake of which judgments were chiefly established, has now been dissolved by evil custom. For just as any matter is most disgraceful, so it ought to be punished most and most promptly; but the same, because there is a danger to reputation, is judged most slowly. How, then, does it make sense that the very cause which existed for establishing a judgment should be the same cause for delaying judgment?

Si quis quod spopondit, qua in re verbo se uno obligavit, id non facit, maturo iudicio sine ulla religione iudicis condemnatur; qui per tutelam aut societatem aut rem mandatam aut fiduciae rationem fraudavit quempiam, in eo quo delictum maius est, eo poena est tardior?

If anyone does not do what he has promised, in which matter he bound himself by a single word, he is condemned by a prompt judgment without any scruple on the judge’s part; he who through guardianship or partnership or an entrusted matter or a fiduciary arrangement has defrauded someone—in that case where the delict is greater, is the penalty slower?

[8] 'Est enim turpe iudicium.' Ex facto quidem turpi. Videte igitur quam inique accidat, quia res indigna sit, ideo turpem existimationem sequi; quia turpis existimatio sequatur, ideo rem indignam non vindicari. Ac si qui mihi hoc iudex recuperatorve dicat: 'potuisti enim leviore actione confligere, potuisti ad tuum ius faciliore et commodiore iudicio pervenire; qua re aut muta actionem aut noli mihi instare ut iudicem tamen,' is aut timidior videatur quam fortem, aut cupidior quam sapientem iudicem esse aequum est, si aut mihi praescribat quem ad modum meum ius persequar, aut ipse id quod ad se delatum sit non audeat iudicare.

[8] 'For the judgment is disgraceful.' From a disgraceful deed, to be sure. See then how unjustly it happens, that because the matter is unworthy, therefore a disgraceful estimation follows; because a disgraceful estimation follows, therefore the unworthy matter is not redressed. And if any judge or recuperator should say this to me: 'for you could have contended by a lighter action, you could have reached your right by an easier and more commodious judgment; therefore either change your action or do not press me to act as judge nonetheless,' it is fair that such a one appear either more timid than brave, or more covetous than wise as a judge, if either he prescribes to me in what way I am to pursue my right, or he himself does not dare to judge that which has been referred to him.

Etenim si praetor is qui iudicia dat numquam petitori praestituit qua actione illum uti velit, videte quam iniquum sit constituta iam re iudicem quid agi potuerit aut quid possit, non quid actum sit quaerere.

For indeed, if the praetor, who grants judgments, never prescribes to the petitioner by what action he wishes him to proceed, see how inequitable it is that, the matter already constituted, the judge should inquire what could have been or what can be done, not what has been done.

[9] Verum tamen nimiae vestrae benignitati pareremus, si alia ratione ius nostrum recuperare possemus. Nunc vero quis est qui aut vim hominibus armatis factam relinqui putet oportere aut eius rei leviorem actionem nobis aliquam demonstrare possit? Ex quo genere peccati, ut illi clamitant, vel iniuriarum vel capitis iudicia constituta sunt, in eo potestis atrocitatem nostram reprehendere, cum videatis nihil aliud actum nisi possessionem per interdictum esse repetitam?

[9] Yet indeed we would defer to your excessive benignity, if we could recuperate our right by another method. But as it is, who is there who either thinks that force done by armed men ought to be left alone, or can point out to us some lighter action for that matter? From this kind of offense, as they keep clamoring, trials either for injuries or for capital charges have been established; is it in this that you can reprehend our severity, when you see that nothing else has been done except that possession has been sought back by interdict?

Verum, sive vos existimationis illius periculum sive iuris dubitatio tardiores fecit adhuc ad iudicandum, alterius rei causam vosmet ipsi iam vobis saepius prolato iudicio sustulistis, alterius ego vobis hodierno die causam profecto auferam, ne diutius de controversia nostra ac de communi iure dubitetis.

However, whether the peril to that reputation or a doubt of law has made you slower thus far to judge, the cause of one matter you yourselves have already removed for yourselves by the judgment more than once brought forward, and the cause of the other I will assuredly remove for you today, so that you may no longer doubt about our controversy and about the common right.

[10] Et si forte videbor altius initium rei demonstrandae petisse quam me ratio iuris eius de quo iudicium est et natura causae coegerit, quaeso ut ignoscatis. Non enim minus laborat A. Caecina ne summo iure egisse quam ne certum ius non obtinuisse videatur.

[10] And if by chance I shall seem to have sought a higher starting point for demonstrating the matter than the rationale of the law concerning that about which the judgment is and the nature of the cause has compelled me, I ask that you pardon it. For A. Caecina is no less anxious that he not seem to have acted by the strictest law than that he not seem to have failed to obtain a definite right.

M. Fulcinius fuit, recuperatores, e municipio Tarquiniensi; qui et domi suae cum primis honestus existimatus est et Romae argentariam non ignobilem fecit. Is habuit in matrimonio Caesenniam, eodem e municipio summo loco natam et probatissimam feminam, sicut et vivus ipse multis rebus ostendit et in morte sua testamento declaravit.

M. Fulcinius was, recuperators, from the municipium of Tarquinii; who both at his own home was esteemed among the foremost for honor, and at Rome carried on a banking business not ignoble. He had in marriage Caesennia, from the same municipium, born of the highest rank and a woman most approved, as both he himself while alive showed by many deeds and at his death declared by his testament.

[11] Huic Caesenniae fundum in agro Tarquiniensi vendidit temporibus illis difficillimis solutionis; cum uteretur uxoris dote numerata, quo mulieri res esset cautior, curavit ut in eo fundo dos conlocaretur. Aliquanto post iam argentaria dissoluta Fulcinius huic fundo uxoris continentia quaedam praedia atque adiuncta mercatur. Moritur Fulcinius—multa enim, quae sunt in re, quia remota sunt a causa, praetermittam—testamento facit heredem quem habebat e Caesennia filium; usum et fructum omnium bonorum suorum Caesenniae legat ut frueretur una cum filio.

[11] To this Caesennia he sold a farm in the Tarquinian territory at those most difficult times for payment; and as he was making use of his wife’s dowry, paid in cash, in order that the woman’s property might be the safer, he took care that the dowry be placed on that farm. Some while after, with the banking business now dissolved, Fulcinius purchases to this farm certain tracts of land contiguous and adjoining, belonging to his wife. Fulcinius dies—I will pass over many things which are in the matter, because they are removed from the cause—by his testament he makes heir the son whom he had from Caesennia; he bequeaths to Caesennia the usufruct of all his goods, that she might enjoy it together with her son.

[12] Magnus honos viri iucundus mulieri fuisset, si diuturnum esse licuisset; frueretur enim bonis cum eo quem suis bonis heredem esse cupiebat et ex quo maximum fructum ipsa capiebat. Sed hunc fructum mature fortuna ademit. Nam brevi tempore M. Fulcinius adulescens mortuus est; heredem P. Caesennium fecit; uxori grande pondus argenti matrique partem maiorem bonorum legavit.

[12] A great honor of the man would have been pleasant to the woman, if it had been permitted to be long‑lasting; for she would enjoy the goods with him whom she desired to be the heir of her own goods, and from whom she herself was taking the greatest fruit. But Fortune took away this fruit early. For in a short time M. Fulcinius, a young man, died; he made P. Caesennius his heir; to his wife he bequeathed a great weight of silver, and to his mother the greater part of the goods.

Itaque in partem mulieres vocatae sunt.

Therefore the women were called to a share.

[13] Cum esset haec auctio hereditaria constituta, Aebutius iste, qui iam diu Caesenniae viduitate ac solitudine aleretur ac se in eius familiaritatem insinuasset, hac ratione ut cum aliquo suo compendio negotia mulieris, si qua acciderent, controversiasque susciperet, versabatur eo quoque tempore in his rationibus auctionis et partitionis atque etiam se ipse inferebat et intro dabat et in eam opinionem Caesenniam adducebat ut mulier imperita nihil putaret agi callide posse, ubi non adesset Aebutius.

[13] When this hereditary auction had been set up, that Aebutius—who for a long time had been sustained by Caesennia’s widowhood and solitude and had insinuated himself into her familiarity—on this plan, namely that, with some profit of his own, he would take up the woman’s affairs, if any should arise, and her controversies, was busied also at that time in these accounts of the auction and the partition, and he was even thrusting himself in and letting himself inside, and he was bringing Caesennia to this opinion: that an inexpert woman should think that nothing could be transacted shrewdly where Aebutius was not present.

[14] Quam personam iam ex cotidiana vita cognostis, recuperatores, mulierum adsentatoris, cognitoris viduarum, defensoris nimium litigiosi, contriti ad Regiam, inepti ac stulti inter viros, inter mulieres periti iuris et callidi, hanc personam imponite Aebutio. Is enim Caesenniae fuit Aebutius—ne forte quaeratis, num propinquus?—nihil alienius—amicus a patre aut a viro traditus? —nihil minus—quis igitur?

[14] The persona which you already recognize from everyday life, recuperators—the flatterer of women, the legal agent of widows, the defender far too litigious, worn-smooth at the Regia, inept and foolish among men, among women skilled in law and crafty—this persona fasten upon Aebutius. For such to Caesennia was Aebutius—lest perchance you ask, was he a kinsman?—nothing more alien— a friend handed down by her father or by her husband? —nothing less—who then?

ille, ille quem supra deformavi, voluntarius amicus mulieris non necessitudine aliqua, sed ficto officio simulataque sedulitate coniunctus magis opportuna opera non numquam quam aliquando fideli.

that man, that man whom above I have deformed, a voluntary friend of the woman, not by any necessity, but conjoined by a feigned duty and simulated assiduity, offering service sometimes more opportune than ever faithful.

[15] Cum esset, ut dicere institueram, constituta auctio Romae, suadebant amici cognatique Caesenniae, id quod ipsi quoque mulieri veniebat in mentem, quoniam potestas esset emendi fundum illum Fulcinianum, qui fundo eius antiquo continens esset, nullam esse rationem amittere eius modi occasionem, cum ei praesertim pecunia ex partitione deberetur; nusquam posse eam melius conlocari. Itaque hoc mulier facere constituit; mandat ut fundum sibi emat,—cui tandem? —cui putatis?

[15] Since the auction had been established at Rome, as I had begun to say, the friends and cognates of Caesennia were persuading—what also was coming into the woman’s own mind—that, since there was the power of buying that Fulcinian farm, which was contiguous to her ancient farm, there was no rationale for letting slip an opportunity of that kind, especially as money was owed to her from the partition; nowhere could it be better invested. And so the woman resolved to do this; she gives a mandate that the farm be bought for her,—to whom, pray?—to whom do you suppose?

an non in mentem vobis venit omnibus illius hoc munus esse ad omnia mulieris negotia parati, sine quo nihil satis caute, nihil satis callide posset agi?

or does it not come into your minds, all of you, that this is the office of that man, ready for all the woman’s business, without whom nothing could be transacted with sufficient caution, nothing with sufficient craft?

[16] Recte attenditis. Aebutio negotium datur. Adest ad tabulam, licetur Aebutius; deterrentur emptores multi partim gratia Caesenniae, partim etiam pretio.

[16] You observe correctly. The business is given to Aebutius. He is present at the table; Aebutius bids; many buyers are deterred, partly by the favor of Caesennia, partly also by the price.

Fundus addicitur Aebutio; pecuniam argentario promittit Aebutius; quo testimonio nunc vir optimus utitur sibi emptum esse. Quasi vero aut nos ei negemus addictum aut tum quisquam fuerit qui dubitaret quin emeretur Caesenniae, cum id plerique scirent, omnes fere audissent, <qui non audisset,> is coniectura adsequi posset, cum pecunia Caesenniae ex illa hereditate deberetur, eam porro in praediis conlocari maxime expediret, essent autem praedia quae mulieri maxime convenirent, ea venirent, liceretur is quem Caesenniae dare operam nemo miraretur, sibi emere nemo posset suspicari.

The farm is adjudged to Aebutius; Aebutius promises the money to the banker; on this testimony the most excellent man now relies, that it was bought for himself. As though, forsooth, either we denied that it was adjudged to him, or that at that time there was anyone who would doubt that it was being purchased for Caesennia, since most knew it, almost all had heard it, <who had not heard,> he could gather it by conjecture, since money was owed to Caesennia out of that inheritance, and moreover it was most expedient that it be invested in estates, and there were estates which would most suit the woman, these were coming up for sale, the bidder was one whom no one would wonder to see devoting his efforts to Caesennia, and no one could suspect that he was buying for himself.

[17] Hac emptione facta pecunia solvitur a Caesennia; cuius rei putat iste rationem reddi non posse quod ipse tabulas averterit; se autem habere argentarii tabulas in quibus sibi expensa pecunia lata sit acceptaque relata. Quasi id aliter fieri oportuerit. Cum omnia ita facta essent, quem ad modum nos defendimus, Caesennia fundum possedit locavitque; neque ita multo post A. Caecinae nupsit.

[17] With this purchase effected, the money is paid by Caesennia; and that fellow thinks that no account of this matter can be rendered because he himself has removed the tablets; but that he has the banker’s ledgers in which money expended for himself has been carried to the debit and money received to the credit. As if it ought to have been done otherwise. Since everything was done thus, in the manner which we maintain, Caesennia possessed the estate and leased it; and not very long after she married A. Caecina.

Vt in pauca conferam, testamento facto mulier moritur; facit heredem ex deunce et semuncia Caecinam, ex duabus sextulis M. Fulcinium, libertum superioris viri, Aebutio sextulam aspergit. Hanc sextulam illa mercedem isti esse voluit adsiduitatis et molestiae si quam ceperat. Iste autem hac sextula se ansam retinere omnium controversiarum putat.

To gather it into a few words, with the testament made the woman dies; she makes Caecina heir for a deunce and a semuncia, for two sextulae M. Fulcinius, the freedman of her former husband, and she sprinkles Aebutius with a sextula. She wished this sextula to be that man’s meed of assiduity and of molestation, if any he had incurred. But that fellow thinks that with this sextula he holds a handle for all controversies.

[18] Iam principio ausus est dicere non posse heredem esse Caesenniae Caecinam, quod is deteriore iure esset quam ceteri cives propter incommodum Volaterranorum calamitatemque civilem. Itaque homo timidus imperitusque, qui neque animi neque consili satis haberet, non putavit esse tanti hereditatem ut de civitate in dubium veniret; concessit, credo, Aebutio, quantum vellet de Caesenniae bonis ut haberet. Immo, ut viro forti ac sapienti dignum fuit, ita calumniam stultitiamque eius obtrivit ac contudit.

[18] Already at the outset he dared to say that Caecina could not be the heir of Caesennia, because he was in an inferior legal condition to the other citizens on account of the disadvantage and the civil calamity of the Volaterrans. Therefore, a timid and unskilled man, who had enough neither of spirit nor of counsel, did not think the inheritance worth so much that his citizenship should come into question; he yielded, I suppose, to Aebutius, that he might have as much as he wished of Caesennia’s goods. On the contrary, as was worthy of a brave and wise man, he ground down and crushed his calumny and stupidity.

[19] In possessione bonorum cum esset, et cum iste sextulam suam nimium exaggeraret, nomine heredis arbitrum familiae herciscundae postulavit. Atque illis paucis diebus, postea quam videt nihil se ab A. Caecina posse litium terrore abradere, homini Romae in foro denuntiat fundum illum de quo ante dixi, cuius istum emptorem demonstravi fuisse mandatu Caesenniae, suum esse seseque sibi emisse. Quid ais?

[19] When he was in possession of the estate, and when that fellow was excessively inflating his sixth-part, in the name of the heir he demanded an arbiter for the partition of the family estate. And in those few days, after he sees that he can scrape off nothing from A. Caecina by the terror of lawsuits, he gives formal notice to the man at Rome in the Forum that that farm, about which I spoke before, of which I showed that that man was the purchaser by the mandate of Caesennia, was his, and that he had bought it for himself. What do you say?

istius ille fundus est quem sine ulla controversia quadriennium, hoc est ex quo tempore fundus veniit, quoad vixit, possedit Caesennia? 'Vsus enim,' inquit, 'eius fundi et fructus testamento viri fuerat Caesenniae.'

Is that farm of his the one which Caesennia possessed without any controversy for 4 years—that is, from the time the farm was sold—so long as she lived? “For the use,” he says, “of that farm and its fruits had, by her husband’s testament, belonged to Caesennia.”

[20] Cum hoc novae litis genus tam malitiose intenderet, placuit Caecinae de amicorum sententia constituere, quo die in rem praesentem veniretur et de fundo Caecina moribus deduceretur. Conloquuntur; dies ex utriusque commodo sumitur. Caecina cum amicis ad diem venit in castellum Axiam, a quo loco fundus is de quo agitur non longe abest.

[20] When he was pressing this new kind of suit so maliciously, it pleased Caecina, on the opinion of friends, to determine a day on which there should be a coming into the thing in presence and, according to custom, Caecina should be led off from the estate. They confer; a day is taken according to the convenience of both. Caecina with friends comes on the day into the fortress Axia, from which place that farm about which the case is being litigated is not far distant.

Ibi certior fit a pluribus homines permultos liberos atque servos coegisse et armasse Aebutium. Cum id partim mirarentur, partim non crederent, ecce ipse Aebutius in castellum venit; denuntiat Caecinae se armatos habere; abiturum eum non esse, si accessisset. Caecinae placuit et amicis, quoad videretur salvo capite fieri posse, experiri tamen.

There he is informed by several that Aebutius had assembled and armed a very great number of men, free and slave. While they partly marveled at this, partly did not believe it, behold, Aebutius himself comes into the stronghold; he gives notice to Caecina that he has men under arms; that he would not depart, if he approached. It pleased Caecina and his friends, so far as it seemed that it could be done with the head safe, to make the attempt nevertheless.

[21] De castello descendunt, in fundum proficiscuntur. Videtur temere commissum, verum, ut opinor, hoc fuit causae: tam temere istum re commissurum quam verbis minitabatur nemo putavit. Atque iste ad omnis introitus qua adiri poterat non modo in eum fundum de quo erat controversia, sed etiam in illum proximum de quo nihil ambigebatur armatos homines opponit.

[21] They descend from the fort, they set out to the estate. It seems rashly undertaken; but, as I suppose, this was the cause: no one thought that he would commit himself in deed as rashly as he was menacing in words. And that fellow posts armed men at all the entrances by which it could be approached, not only on the estate about which there was a controversy, but also on the proximate one about which there was no ambiguity.

Itaque primo cum in antiquum fundum ingredi vellet, quod ea proxime accedi poterat, frequentes armati obstiterunt.

And so at first, when he wished to enter the former estate, since by that way it could be most directly approached, numerous armed men stood in his way.

[22] Quo loco depulsus Caecina tamen qua potuit ad eum fundum profectus in quo ex conventu vim fieri oportebat; eius autem fundi extremam partem oleae derecto ordine definiunt. Ad eas cum accederetur, iste cum omnibus copiis praesto fuit servumque suum nomine Antiochum ad se vocavit et voce clara imperavit ut eum qui illum olearum ordinem intrasset occideret. Homo mea sententia prudentissimus Caecina tamen in hac re plus mihi animi quam consili videtur habuisse.

[22] Driven back from that place, Caecina nevertheless, as he could, set out to that estate on which, by agreement, force ought to be applied; but the far edge of that estate is defined by olives in a straight row. When they were approaching these, that man was on hand with all his forces and called to him his slave named Antiochus, and with a loud voice ordered that whoever had entered that row of olives be killed. Caecina, a man in my judgment most prudent, nevertheless seems to me in this matter to have had more spirit than counsel.

Nam cum et armatorum multitudinem videret et eam vocem Aebuti quam commemoravi audisset, tamen accessit propius et iam ingrediens intra finem eius loci quem oleae terminabant impetum armati Antiochi ceterorumque tela atque incursum refugit. Eodem tempore se in fugam conferunt amici advocatique eius metu perterriti, quem ad modum illorum testem dicere audistis.

For when he both saw the multitude of armed men and had heard that utterance of Aebutius which I have commemorated, nevertheless he approached nearer; and now, as he was entering within the boundary of that place which the olive-trees defined, he fled from the assault of the armed Antiochus and from the weapons and incursion of the rest. At the same time his friends and his advocates, terrified by fear, betook themselves to flight, in the manner in which you have heard their witness say.

[23] His rebus ita gestis P. Dolabella praetor interdixit, ut est consuetudo, de vi hominibvs armatis sine ulla exceptione, tantum ut unde deiecisset restitueret. Restituisse se dixit.

[23] With these matters thus transacted, Publius Dolabella, praetor, as is the custom, issued an interdict on force by armed men without any exception, only that he should restore to the place from which he had cast him out. He said that he had restored.

Hac de> sponsione vobis iudicandum est.

On this> sponsion you must judge.

Maxime fuit optandum Caecinae, recuperatores, ut controversiae nihil haberet, secundo loco ut ne cum tam improbo homine, tertio ut cum tam stulto haberet. Etenim non minus nos stultitia illius sublevat quam laedit improbitas. Improbus fuit, quod homines coegit, armavit, coactis armatisque vim fecit.

Most of all it was to be wished by Caecina, recuperators, that he should have nothing of controversy; in second place, that he should not have to do with so wicked a man; in third, that he should have to do with one so stupid. For indeed that man’s stupidity relieves us no less than his improbity harms us. He was wicked, in that he compelled men, armed them, and, with men gathered and armed, committed violence.

Laesit in eo Caecinam, sublevat ibidem; nam in eas ipsas res quas improbissime fecit testimonia sumpsit et eis in causa testimoniis utitur.

He injured Caecina in that point, he relieves him there as well; for upon those very matters which he did most improperly he has taken testimonies, and he uses those testimonies in the case.

[24] Itaque mihi certum est, recuperatores, ante quam ad meam defensionem meosque testis venio, illius uti confessione et testimoniis; qui confitetur atque ita libenter confitetur ut non solum fateri sed etiam profiteri videatur, recuperatores: 'convocavi homines, coegi, armavi, terrore mortis ac periculo capitis ne accederes obstiti; ferro,' inquit, 'ferro'—et hoc dicit in iudicio—'te reieci atque proterrui.' Quid? testes quid aiunt? P. Vetilius, propinquus Aebuti, se Aebutio cum armatis servis venisse advocatum.

[24] And so it is fixed for me, recuperatores, before I come to my own defense and my own witnesses, to use that man’s confession and testimonies; he confesses, and so gladly does he confess that he seems not only to confess but even to profess, recuperatores: ‘I called together men, I compelled them, I armed them, I with the terror of death and the peril to your head stood in the way that you should not approach; with iron,’ he says, ‘with iron’—and he says this in court—‘I hurled you back and drove you off.’ What then? What do the witnesses say? P. Vetilius, a kinsman of Aebutius, [says] that he came to Aebutius as an advocate with armed slaves.

Quid praeterea? Fuisse compluris armatos. Quid aliud?

What, furthermore? That there were a number of armed men. What else?

Minatum esse Aebutium Caecinae. Quid ego de hoc teste dicam nisi hoc, recuperatores, ut ne idcirco minus ei credatis quod homo minus idoneus habetur, sed ideo credatis quod ex illa parte id dicit quod illi causae maxime sit alienum?

That Aebutius threatened Caecina. What am I to say about this witness except this, recuperatores, that you should not on that account believe him the less because the man is held less suitable, but for that very reason believe him, because from that side he says that which is most alien to that cause?

[25] A. Terentius, alter testis, non modo Aebutium sed etiam se pessimi facinoris arguit. In Aebutium hoc dicit, armatos homines fuisse, de se autem hoc praedicat, Antiocho, Aebuti servo, se imperasse ut in Caecinam advenientem cum ferro invaderet. Quid loquar amplius de hoc homine?

[25] A. Terentius, the other witness, not only accuses Aebutius but even himself of a most wicked deed. Against Aebutius he says this, that there were armed men; but about himself he proclaims this, that he ordered Antiochus, Aebutius’s slave, to attack Caecina as he was arriving with steel. What more shall I say about this man?

In quem ego hoc dicere, cum rogarer a Caecina, numquam volui, ne arguere illum rei capitalis viderer, de eo dubito nunc quo modo aut loquar aut taceam, cum ipse hoc de se iuratus praedicet.

Against whom I, when I was asked by Caecina, never wished to say this, lest I should seem to accuse him of a capital matter, about him I now hesitate how either I should speak or be silent, since he himself under oath proclaims this about himself.

[26] Deinde L. Caelius non solum Aebutium cum armatis dixit fuisse compluribus verum etiam cum advocatis perpaucis eo venisse Caecinam. De hoc ego teste detraham? cui aeque ac meo testi ut credatis postulo.

[26] Then L. Caelius said not only that Aebutius was there with numerous armed men, but also that Caecina came there with very few advocates. Shall I detract from this witness? I request that you believe him as much as my own witness.

P. Memmius secutus est qui suum non parvum beneficium commemoravit in amicos Caecinae, quibus sese viam per fratris sui fundum dedisse dixit qua effugere possent, cum essent omnes metu perterriti. Huic ego testi gratias agam, quod et in re misericordem se praebuerit et in testimonio religiosum.

P. Memmius followed, who commemorated his not small beneficium toward Caecina’s friends, to whom he said that he had granted a way through his brother’s estate by which they might escape, since all were thoroughly terrified by fear. To this witness I shall give thanks, because he showed himself both compassionate in the matter and religious (scrupulous) in his testimony.

[27] A. Atilius et eius filius L. Atilius et armatos ibi fuisse et se suos servos adduxisse dixerunt; etiam hoc amplius: cum Aebutius Caecinae malum minaretur, ibi tum Caecinam postulasse ut moribus deductio fieret. Hoc idem P. Rutilius dixit, et eo libentius dixit ut aliquando in iudicio eius testimonio creditum putaretur. Duo praeterea testes nihil de vi, sed de re ipsa atque emptione fundi dixerunt; P. Caesennius, auctor fundi, non tam auctoritate gravi quam corpore, et argentarius Sex.

[27] A. Atilius and his son L. Atilius said that both armed men had been there and that they had brought their own slaves; even this more besides: when Aebutius was threatening harm to Caecina, then and there Caecina demanded that a deductio be made according to custom. This same thing P. Rutilius said, and he said it the more gladly so that at some time in a trial credence might be thought to have been given to his testimony. Two witnesses besides said nothing about violence, but about the matter itself and the purchase of the estate: P. Caesennius, the auctor of the estate, not so much weighty in authority as in body, and the banker Sex.

Clodius cui cognomen est Phormio, nec minus niger nec minus confidens quam ille Terentianus est Phormio, nihil de vi dixerunt, nihil praeterea quod ad vestrum iudicium pertineret.

Clodius, whose cognomen is Phormio—no less black and no less confident (i.e., impudent) than that Terentian Phormio—said nothing about force, nothing besides what pertained to your judgment.

[28] Decimo vero loco testis exspectatus et ad extremum reservatus dixit, senator populi Romani, splendor ordinis, decus atque ornamentum iudiciorum, exemplar antiquae religionis, Fidiculanius Falcula; qui cum ita vehemens acerque venisset ut non modo Caecinam periurio suo laederet sed etiam mihi videretur irasci, ita eum placidum mollemque reddidi, ut non auderet, sicut meministis, iterum dicere quot milia fundus suus abesset ab urbe. Nam cum dixisset minus iccc, populus cum risu adclamavit ipsa esse. Meminerant enim omnes quantum in Albiano iudicio accepisset.

[28] But in the tenth place the expected witness, reserved to the end, spoke—a senator of the Roman people, the splendor of the order, the honor and ornament of the courts, an exemplar of ancient religion—Fidiculanius Falcula; who, when he had come in so vehement and sharp a fashion that he not only injured Caecina by his perjury but even seemed to me to be angry, I made him so placid and compliant that he did not dare, as you remember, to say again how many miles his farm was distant from the city. For when he had said “less than 1,300,” the crowd, with laughter, shouted that that was the very figure. For all remembered how much he had received in the Albiana trial.

[29] In eum quid dicam nisi id quod negare non possit, venisse in consilium publicae quaestionis, cum eius consili iudex non esset, et in eo consilio, cum causam non audisset et potestas esset ampliandi, dixisse sibi liquere; cum de incognita re iudicare voluisset, maluisse condemnare quam absolvere; cum, si uno minus damnarent, condemnari reus non posset, non ad cognoscendam causam sed ad explendam damnationem praesto fuisse? Vtrum gravius aliquid in quempiam dici potest quam ad hominem condemnandum quem numquam vidisset neque audisset adductum esse pretio? an certius quicquam obici potest quam quod is cui obicitur ne nutu quidem infirmare conatur?

[29] What shall I say against him except that which he cannot deny: that he came into the council of a public criminal court, though he was not a judge of that council; and that in that council, when he had not heard the case and there was the power of ampliation, he said that the matter was clear to him; that, when he wished to judge about an unknown matter, he preferred to condemn rather than to absolve; that, since if they were short by a single vote for condemnation the defendant could not be condemned, he was present not to learn the case but to fill up the condemnation? Whether anything more grievous can be said against anyone than that a man was brought, for a price, to condemn one whom he had never seen nor heard? Or can anything more certain be alleged than a charge which the very man charged does not try to weaken, not even with a nod?

[30] Verum tamen is testis, —ut facile intellegeretis eum non adfuisse animo, cum causa ab illis ageretur testesque dicerent, sed tantisper de aliquo reo cogitasse—cum omnes ante eum dixissent testes armatos cum Aebutio fuisse compluris, solus dixit non fuisse. Visus est mihi primo veterator intellegere praeclare quid causae obstaret, et tantum modo errare, quod omnis testis infirmaret qui ante eum dixissent: cum subito, ecce idem qui solet, duos solos servos armatos fuisse dixit. Quid huic tu homini facias?

[30] Nevertheless, that witness—so that you might easily understand that he had not been present in mind when the case was being conducted by those men and the witnesses were speaking, but meanwhile had been thinking about some defendant or other—when all before him had said that several armed men had been with Aebutius, he alone said there had not been. He seemed to me at first a veteran trickster to perceive excellently what stood in the way of the case, and only to err in this, that he weakened the testimony of all who had spoken before him: when suddenly—look!—as is his habit, he said that only two armed slaves had been. What are you to do with this fellow?

nonne concedas interdum ut excusatione summae stultitiae summae improbitatis odium deprecetur?

Will you not sometimes concede that, by a plea of supreme stupidity, he may avert the odium of supreme improbity?

[31] Vtrum, recuperatores, his testibus non credidistis, cum quid liqueret non habuistis? at controversia non erat quin verum dicerent. An in coacta multitudine, in armis, in telis, in praesenti metu mortis perspicuoque periculo caedis dubium vobis fuit inesse vis aliqua videretur necne?

[31] Whether, recuperators, did you not believe these witnesses, when you had no certainty what was clear? But there was no controversy that they were speaking the truth. Or, in a compelled multitude, amid arms, amid weapons, in the present fear of death and the manifest peril of slaughter, was it a matter of doubt to you whether some force seemed to be present or not?

Quibus igitur in rebus vis intellegi potest, si in his non intellegetur? An vero illa defensio vobis praeclara visa est: 'Non deieci, sed obstiti; non enim sum passus in fundum ingredi, sed armatos homines opposui, ut intellegeres, si in fundo pedem posuisses, statim tibi esse pereundum?' Quid ais? is qui armis proterritus, fugatus, pulsus est, non videtur esse deiectus?

In what matters, then, can force be understood, if it will not be understood in these? Or did that defense seem brilliant to you: 'I did not eject, but I stood in the way; for I did not allow him to enter the estate, but I opposed armed men, so that you might understand that, if you had set foot on the estate, you must perish at once?' What do you say? Does he who has been terrified by arms, put to flight, driven off, not seem to have been ejected?

[32] Posterius de verbo videbimus; nunc rem ipsam ponamus quam illi non negant et eius rei ius actionemque quaeramus.

[32] Later we shall see about the word; now let us set down the thing itself, which they do not deny, and let us inquire into the law and the action of that matter.

Est haec res posita quae ab adversario non negatur, Caecinam, cum ad constitutam diem tempusque venisset ut vis ac deductio moribus fieret, pulsum prohibitumque esse vi coactis hominibus et armatis. Cum hoc constet, ego, homo imperitus iuris, ignarus negotiorum ac litium, hanc puto me habere actionem, ut per interdictum meum ius teneam atque iniuriam tuam persequar. Fac in hoc errare me nec ullo modo posse per hoc interdictum id adsequi quod velim; te uti in hac re magistro volo.

This matter is established, which is not denied by the adversary: that Caecina, when the appointed day and time had come for the force and the leading-in to be carried out according to custom, was driven off and prevented by force, with men gathered and armed. Since this is settled, I, a man untaught in law, ignorant of business and lawsuits, think that I have this action, that by an interdict I may hold my right and pursue your injury. Suppose that herein I am mistaken, and that in no way can I through this interdict attain what I wish; I want to use you as a teacher in this matter.

[33] Quaero sitne aliqua huius rei actio an nulla. Convocari homines propter possessionis controversiam non oportet, armari multitudinem iuris retinendi causa non convenit; nec iuri quicquam tam inimicum quam vis nec aequitati quicquam tam infestum est quam convocati homines et armati. Quod cum ita sit resque eius modi sit ut in primis a magistratibus animadvertenda videatur, iterum quaero sitne eius rei aliqua actio an nulla.

[33] I ask whether there is any action for this matter or none. Men ought not to be called together on account of a controversy over possession; it is not fitting that a multitude be armed for the sake of retaining a right; nor is anything so inimical to law as force, nor anything so hostile to equity as men convened and armed. Since this is so, and since the matter is of such a sort that it seems especially to be noted and punished by the magistrates, again I ask whether there is any action for this matter or none.

Nullam esse dices? Audire cupio, qui in pace et otio, cum manum fecerit, copias pararit, multitudinem hominum coegerit, armarit, instruxerit, homines inermos qui ad constitutum experiendi iuris gratia venissent armis, viris, terrore periculoque mortis reppulerit, fugarit, averterit, hoc dicat:

You will say there is none? I am eager to hear the man who, in peace and leisure, after he has formed a band, has prepared forces, has gathered a multitude of men, has armed and arrayed them, has repulsed, put to flight, and turned away unarmed men who had come at the appointed time for the sake of trying their right, by arms, by men, and by the terror and peril of death, say this:

[34] 'Feci equidem quae dicis omnia, et ea sunt et turbulenta et temeraria et periculosa. Quid ergo est? impune feci; nam quid agas mecum ex iure civili ac praetorio non habes.' Itane vero?

[34] 'I did indeed all the things you say, and they are both turbulent and temerarious and perilous. What then? I did it with impunity; for you have nothing with which to proceed against me under the civil and the praetorian law.' Is it so, indeed?

recuperatores, hoc vos audietis et apud vos dici patiemini saepius? Cum maiores nostri tanta diligentia prudentiaque fuerint ut omnia omnium non modo tantarum rerum sed etiam tenuissimarum iura statuerint persecutique sint, hoc genus unum vel maximum praetermitterent, ut, si qui me exire domo mea coegisset armis, haberem actionem, si qui introire prohibuisset, non haberem? Nondum de Caecinae causa disputo, nondum de iure possessionis nostrae loquor; tantum de tua defensione, C. Piso, quaero.

recuperators, will you hear this and will you suffer it to be said before you more often? Since our ancestors were of such great diligence and prudence that they established and pursued the rights of all things, not only of such great matters but even of the most slight, would they have passed over this one kind—or rather the greatest—namely, that if someone had forced me out of my own house by arms, I would have an action, but if someone had prohibited me from entering, I would not have one? I am not yet disputing about Caecina’s case, I am not yet speaking about the right of our possession; I only ask about your defense, Gaius Piso.

[35] Quoniam ita dicis et ita constituis, si Caecina, cum in fundo esset, inde deiectus esset, tum per hoc interdictum eum restitui oportuisse; nunc vero deiectum nullo modo esse inde ubi non fuerit; hoc interdicto nihil nos adsecutos esse: quaero, si te hodie domum tuam redeuntem coacti homines et armati non modo limine tectoque aedium tuarum sed primo aditu vestibuloque prohibuerint, quid acturus sis. Monet amicus meus te, L. Calpurnius, ut idem dicas quod ipse antea dixit, iniuriarum. Quid ad causam possessionis, quid ad restituendum eum quem oportet restitui, quid denique ad ius civile, aut ad praetoris notionem atque animadversionem?

[35] Since you thus say and thus lay it down—that if Caecina, when he was on the estate, had been cast out from there, then by this interdict he ought to have been restored; but now that he was in no way cast out from a place where he was not; that by this interdict we have achieved nothing—I ask: if today, as you are returning to your home, men banded together and armed should prevent you not only from the threshold and roof of your house but from the very first approach and vestibule, what action will you take? My friend L. Calpurnius advises you to say the same thing which he himself said before, the action of injuries. What has that to do with the case of possession, what with restoring him whom it is proper to restore, what, finally, with the civil law, or with the praetor’s cognizance and animadversion?

Ages iniuriarum. Plus tibi ego largiar; non solum egeris verum etiam condemnaris licet; num quid magis possidebis? actio enim iniuriarum non ius possessionis adsequitur sed dolorem imminutae libertatis iudicio poenaque mitigat.

You will bring an action for injuries. I grant you more: not only may you have brought suit, but even let there be a condemnation; will you possess any the more? For the action for injuries does not attain the right of possession, but mitigates the pain of diminished liberty by judgment and penalty.

[36] Praetor interea, Piso, tanta de re tacebit? quem ad modum te restituat in aedis tuas non habebit? Qui dies totos aut vim fieri vetat aut restitui factam iubet, qui de fossis, de cloacis, de minimis aquarum itinerumque controversiis interdicit, is repente obmutescet, in atrocissima re quid faciat non habebit?

[36] Meanwhile, Piso, will the praetor be silent on so great a matter? will he not have the means by which to restore you into your house? He who all day long either forbids force to be done or orders that what has been done be restored, who issues interdicts about ditches, about sewers, about the very smallest controversies of waters and of ways, will he suddenly fall mute, will he not have what to do in the most atrocious matter?

et C. Pisoni domo tectisque suis prohibito, <prohibito> inquam, per homines coactos et armatos, praetor quem ad modum more et exemplo opitulari possit non habebit? Quid enim dicet, aut quid tu tam insigni accepta iniuria postulabis? 'Vnde vi prohibitus?' Sic nemo umquam interdixit; novum est, non dico inusitatum, verum omnino inauditum.

and with Gaius Piso prohibited from his home and his own roofs—prohibited, I say, <prohibito>—by men collected and armed, will the praetor have no way to give aid according to custom and precedent? For what will he say, or what will you demand after so signal a wrong has been received? ‘From where were you prohibited by force?’ No one has ever issued an interdict thus; it is new, I do not say unaccustomed, but altogether unheard-of.

'Vnde deiectus?' Quid proficies, cum illi hoc respondebunt tibi quod tu nunc mihi, armatis se tibi obstitisse ne in aedis accederes; deici porro nullo modo potuisse qui non accesserit?

'Whence cast down?' What will you profit, when they will respond to you this which you now to me: that, with armed men, they obstructed you so that you might not approach into your house; furthermore, that one who has not approached could in no way have been cast out?

[37] 'Deicior ego,' inquis, 'si quis meorum deicitur omnino.' Iam bene agis; a verbis enim recedis et aequitate uteris. Nam verba quidem ipsa si sequi volumus, quo modo tu deiceris, cum servus tuus deicitur? Verum ita est uti dicis; te deiectum debeo intellegere, etiam si tactus non fueris.

[37] 'I am ejected,' you say, 'if any of my people is ejected at all.' Now you are doing well; for you recede from the words and employ equity. For if we wish to follow the words themselves, how are you ejected, when your slave is ejected? But it is as you say; I ought to understand you as ejected, even if you have not been touched.

Nonne? Age nunc, si ne tuorum quidem quisquam loco motus erit atque omnes in aedibus adservati ac retenti, tu solus prohibitus et a tuis aedibus vi atque armis proterritus, utrum hanc actionem habebis qua nos usi sumus, an aliam quampiam, an omnino nullam? Nullam esse actionem dicere in re tam insigni tamque atroci neque prudentiae neque auctoritatis tuae est; alia si quae forte est quae nos fugerit, dic quae sit; cupio discere.

Is it not so? Come now, if not even any one of your people will have been moved from his place and all are kept under watch and restrained within the house, while you alone are barred and driven in terror from your own house by force and by arms, will you have this action which we have employed, or some other, or none at all? To say that there is no action in a matter so signal and so atrocious is consistent neither with your prudence nor with your authority; if there is some other which perchance has escaped us, tell what it is; I am eager to learn.

[38] Haec si est qua nos usi sumus te iudice vincamus necesse est. Non enim vereor ne hoc dicas, in eadem causa eodem interdicto te oportere restitui, Caecinam non oportere. Etenim cui non perspicuum est ad incertum revocari bona, fortunas, possessiones omnium, si ulla ex parte sententia huius interdicti deminuta aut infirmata sit, si auctoritate virorum talium vis armatorum hominum iudicio approbata videatur, in quo iudicio non de armis dubitatum sed de verbis quaesitum esse dicatur?

[38] If this is the one which we have used, it is necessary that we prevail, you as judge. For I do not fear that you will say this—that in the same cause by the same interdict you ought to be restored, but Caecina ought not. For who does not see that the goods, fortunes, and possessions of all are called back to uncertainty, if in any part the sentence of this interdict is diminished or weakened; if, by the authority of such men, the violence of armed men seems to be approved by a judicial decision, in which decision it is said that there was no doubt about arms but that the inquiry was about words?

Isne apud vos obtinebit causam suam qui se ita defenderit: 'reieci ego te armatis hominibus, non deieci,' ut tantum facinus non in aequitate defensionis, sed in una littera latuisse videatur?

Will he obtain his case before you who has defended himself thus: 'I drove you back with armed men, I did not throw you down,' so that so great a crime seems to have lain hidden not in the equity of the defense, but in a single letter?

[39] Huiusce rei vos statuetis nullam esse actionem, nullum experiendi ius constitutum, qui obstiterit armatis hominibus, qui multitudine coacta non introitu, sed omnino aditu quempiam prohibuerit? Quid ergo? hoc quam habet vim, ut distare aliquid aut ex aliqua parte differre videatur, utrum, pedem cum intulero atque in possessione vestigium fecero, tum expellar ac deiciar, an eadem vi et isdem armis mihi ante occurratur, ne non modo intrare verum aspicere aut aspirare possim?

[39] Will you determine that for this matter there is no action, no right of proceeding constituted, for one who has stood in the way with armed men, who, with a multitude gathered, has forbidden someone not an entrance only, but altogether an access? What then? What force has this, that it should seem to differ in anything or in any part—whether, when I have put in my foot and made a footprint in the possession, then I am expelled and cast down, or that with the same force and the same arms men anticipate me beforehand, so that I am able not only not to enter but not even to look or to draw breath?

Quid hoc ab illo differt, ut ille cogatur restituere qui ingressum expulerit, ille qui ingredientem reppulerit non cogatur?

How does this differ from that: that he be compelled to restore who has expelled one who had entered, while he who has repelled one entering is not compelled?

[40] Videte, per deos immortalis! quod ius nobis, quam condicionem vobismet ipsis, quam denique civitati legem constituere velitis. Huiusce generis una est actio per hoc interdictum quo nos usi sumus constituta; ea si nihil valet aut si ad hanc rem non pertinet, quid neglegentius aut quid stultius maioribus nostris dici potest, qui aut tantae rei praetermiserint actionem aut eam constituerint quae nequaquam satis verbis causam et rationem iuris amplecteretur?

[40] See, by the immortal gods! what right for us, what condition for your very selves, what law, finally, you wish to constitute for the state. Of this kind there is a single action constituted through that interdict which we have employed; if that avails nothing, or if it does not pertain to this matter, what more negligent or more foolish can be said of our ancestors, who either passed over an action for so great a matter, or constituted one which by no means, in its words, embraced the cause and the rationale of right?

Hoc est periculosum, dissolvi hoc interdictum, est captiosum omnibus rem ullam constitui eius modi quae, cum armis gesta sit, rescindi iure non possit; verum tamen illud est turpissimum, tantae stultitiae prudentissimos homines condemnari, ut vos iudicetis huius rei ius atque actionem in mentem maioribus nostris non venisse.

This is perilous, that this interdict be dissolved; it is captious for all that any matter of such a kind be constituted which, since it has been carried out with arms, cannot be rescinded by law; but yet that is most disgraceful, that the most prudent men be condemned of such stupidity, namely, that you judge that the right and the action of this matter did not come into the mind of our ancestors.

[41] 'Queramur,' inquit, 'licet; tamen hoc interdicto Aebutius non tenetur.' Quid ita? 'Quod vis Caecinae facta non est.' Dici in hac causa potest, ubi arma fuerint, ubi coacta hominum multitudo, ubi instructi et certis locis cum ferro homines conlocati, ubi minae, pericula terroresque mortis, ibi vim non fuisse? 'Nemo,' inquit, 'occisus est neque saucius .' Quid ais?

[41] 'Let us complain,' he says, 'granted; nevertheless Aebutius is not held by this interdict.' Why so? 'Because violence to Caecina was not done.' Can it be said in this case that, where there were arms, where a gathered multitude of men, where men, with iron, were arrayed and stationed in fixed places, where menaces, perils, and terrors of death—there, there was no violence? 'No one,' he says, 'was slain nor wounded .' What do you say?

cum de possessionis controversia et de privatorum hominum contentione iuris loquamur, tu vim negabis factam, si caedes et occisio facta non erit? At exercitus maximos saepe pulsos et fugatos esse dico terrore ipso impetuque hostium sine cuiusquam non modo morte verum etiam volnere.

when we are speaking about a controversy of possession and about the contention in law of private men, will you deny that force has been done if slaughter and killing have not occurred? But I say that very great armies have often been driven back and routed by the very terror and impetus of the enemy, without anyone’s not only death but even wound.

[42] Etenim, recuperatores, non ea sola vis est quae ad corpus nostrum vitamque pervenit, sed etiam multo maior ea quae periculo mortis iniecto formidine animum perterritum loco saepe et certo de statu demovet. Itaque saucii saepe homines cum corpore debilitantur, animo tamen non cedunt neque eum relinquunt locum quem statuerunt defendere; at alii pelluntur integri; ut non dubium sit quin maior adhibita vis ei sit cuius animus sit perterritus quam illi cuius corpus volneratum sit.

[42] For indeed, Recuperators, not only is that force which reaches our body and life to be called violence, but there is also a much greater one which, the peril of death injected, by fear often drives the panic‑stricken mind from its place and from a definite position. And so wounded men are often debilitated in body, yet they do not yield in spirit nor relinquish that place which they resolved to defend; but others are driven off unharmed; so that it is not doubtful that greater force has been applied to him whose mind has been thoroughly terrified than to him whose body has been wounded.

[43] Quod si vi pulsos dicimus exercitus esse eos qui metu ac tenui saepe suspicione periculi fugerunt, et si non solum impulsu scutorum neque conflictu corporum neque ictu comminus neque coniectione telorum, sed saepe clamore ipso militum aut instructione aspectuque signorum magnas copias pulsas esse et vidimus et audivimus, quae vis in bello appellatur, ea in otio non appellabitur? et, quod vehemens in re militari putatur, id leve in iure civili iudicabitur? et, quod exercitus armatos movet, id advocationem togatorum non videbitur movisse?

[43] Now if we say that armies are driven back by force when they have fled through fear and often a slight suspicion of danger, and if we have both seen and heard that great troops have been routed not only by the impulse of shields, nor the conflict of bodies, nor a blow at close quarters, nor the hurling of missiles, but often by the very clamor of the soldiers, or by the array and the sight of the standards—will that force which is so called in war not be so called in peace? And that which is reckoned vehement in the military sphere, will that be judged light in the civil law? And what moves armed armies, will that not seem to have moved the advocation of the toga-clad?

et volnus corporis magis istam vim quam terror animi declarabit? et sauciatio quaeretur, cum fugam factam esse constabit?

and will a wound of the body declare that force rather than the terror of the mind? and will a wounding be inquired into, when it will be evident that a flight has been made?

[44] Tuus enim testis hoc dixit, metu perterritis nostris advocatis locum se qua effugerent demonstrasse. Qui non modo ut fugerent sed etiam ipsius fugae tutam viam quaesiverunt, his vis adhibita non videbitur? Quid igitur fugiebant?

[44] For your witness said this: that, with our advocates panic-stricken by fear, he had pointed out a place by which they might escape. Will violence not be seen to have been applied to those who not only sought to flee but even sought out a safe way for the flight itself? What, then, were they fleeing?

Propter metum. Quid metuebant? Vim videlicet.

Because of fear. What were they fearing? Violence, viz.

Potestis igitur principia negare, cum extrema conceditis? Fugisse perterritos confitemini; causam fugae dicitis eandem quam omnes intellegimus, arma, multitudinem hominum, incursionem atque impetum armatorum; haec ubi conceduntur esse facta, ibi vis facta negabitur?

Can you therefore deny the principles, when you concede the conclusions? You admit that, terrified, they fled; you say the cause of the flight is the same which we all understand—arms, a multitude of men, an incursion and the onrush of armed men; when these things are conceded to have been done, will it be denied that force was done there?

[45] At vero hoc quidem iam vetus est et maiorum exemplo multis in rebus usitatum, cum ad vim faciendam veniretur, si quos armatos quamvis procul conspexissent, ut statim testificati discederent, optime sponsionem facere possent, ni adversvs edictvm praetoris vis facta esset. Itane vero? scire esse armatos satis est ut vim factam probes; in manus eorum incidere non est satis?

[45] But indeed this is by now old and, by the example of the ancestors, customary in many matters: when there was a coming to commit force, if they had caught sight of any armed men, though from afar, that they, having at once attested, should withdraw, since they could very well make a sponsio, if violence had been done contrary to the praetor’s edict. Is it so, then? To know that there are armed men is enough for you to prove that violence was done; to fall into their hands is not enough?

aspectus armatorum ad vim probandam valebit; incursus et impetus non valebit? qui abierit, facilius sibi vim factam probabit quam qui effugerit?

The sight of armed men will avail for proving violence; will an incursion and an impetus not avail? Will he who has departed more easily prove that violence was done to him than he who has escaped?

[46] At ego hoc dico, si, ut primum in castello Caecinae dixit Aebutius se homines coegisse et armasse neque eum, si illo accessisset, abiturum, statim Caecina discessisset, dubitare vos non debuisse quin Caecinae facta vis esset; si vero simul ac procul conspexit armatos recessisset eo minus dubitaretis. Omnis enim vis est quae periculo aut decedere nos alicunde cogit aut prohibet accedere. Quod si aliter statuetis, videte ne hoc vos statuatis, qui vivus discesserit, ei vim non esse factam, ne hoc omnibus in possessionum controversiis praescribatis, ut confligendum sibi et armis decertandum putent, ne, quem ad modum in bello poena ignavis ab imperatoribus constituitur, sic in iudiciis deterior causa sit eorum qui fugerint quam qui ad extremum usque contenderint.

[46] But I say this: if, when first in Caecina’s fort, Aebutius said that he had gathered and armed men and that he, if he had approached that place, would not depart, and immediately Caecina had withdrawn, you ought not to have doubted that violence had been done to Caecina; but if, the moment he saw armed men from afar, he had retired, so much the less would you have doubted. For every violence is that which by danger either compels us to depart from somewhere or prohibits us from approaching. But if you decide otherwise, take care that you are not laying this down—that for him who has gone away alive no violence has been done—lest you prescribe this for all controversies of possession, that they think they must clash and decide the issue with arms; lest, just as in war a penalty is appointed by generals for the cowardly, so in the courts the case be worse of those who have fled than of those who have contended to the very end.

[47] Cum de iure et legitimis hominum controversiis loquimur et in his rebus vim nominamus, pertenuis vis intellegi debet. Vidi armatos quamvis paucos; magna vis est. Decessi unius hominis telo proterritus; deiectus detrususque sum.

[47] When we speak of law and the legitimate controversies of men, and in these matters name “force,” a very slight force ought to be understood. I saw armed men, though few; that is great force. I withdrew, frightened off by the weapon of a single man; I was cast down and thrust out.

Hoc si ita statuetis, non modo non erit cur depugnare quisquam posthac possessionis causa velit, sed ne illud quidem cur repugnare. Sin autem vim sine caede, sine volneratione, sine sanguine nullam intellegetis, statuetis homines possessionis cupidiores quam vitae esse oportere.

If you thus determine this, not only will there be no reason why anyone hereafter should wish to fight it out for the sake of possession, but not even why he should resist. But if, however, you will understand there to be no violence without slaughter, without wounding, without blood, you will be decreeing that men ought to be more desirous of possession than of life.

[48] Age vero, de vi te ipsum habebo iudicem, Aebuti. Responde, si tibi videtur. In fundum Caecina utrum tandem noluit, an non potuit accedere?

[48] Come now, as to violence, I will have you yourself as judge, Aebuti. Respond, if it seems good to you. Onto Caecina’s estate, did he then not wish to go, or was he not able to go?

Cum te obstitisse et reppulisse dicis, certe hunc voluisse concedis. Potes igitur dicere non ei vim fuisse impedimento cui, cum cuperet eoque consilio venisset, per homines coactos licitum non sit accedere? Si enim id quod maxime voluit nullo modo potuit, vis profecto quaedam obstiterit necesse est; aut tu dic quam ob rem, cum vellet accedere, non accesserit.

Since you say that you obstructed and repelled him, you certainly concede that he wished to do this. Can you then say that force was not an impediment to him, to whom, when he desired it and had come with that design, it was not permitted to approach by means of men who had been mustered? For if what he most wished he could in no way do, some kind of force must necessarily have stood in the way; or else you tell why, when he wished to approach, he did not approach.

[49] Iam vim factam negare non potes; deiectus quem ad modum sit, qui non accesserit, id quaeritur. Demoveri enim et depelli de loco necesse est eum qui deiciatur. Id autem accidere ei qui potest qui omnino in eo loco unde se deiectum esse dicit numquam fuit?

[49] Now you cannot deny that force was done; the question is how one was cast out (dejected), who did not approach. For he who is dejected must of necessity be removed and driven from a place. But how can that befall him who was never at all in that place from which he says he was cast out?

Quid? si fuisset et ex eo loco metu permotus fugisset, cum armatos vidisset, diceresne esse deiectum? Opinor.

What? If he had been there, and from that place, moved by fear, had fled when he had seen armed men, would you say that he had been driven out? I suppose so.

Ain tu? qui tam diligenter et tam callide verbis controversias non aequitate diiudicas, et iura non utilitate communi sed litteris exprimis, poterisne dicere deiectum esse eum qui tactus non erit? Quid? detrusum dicesne?

Really, you? You—who so diligently and so cleverly decide controversies by words, not by equity, and draw out the law not by the common utility but by the letter—will you be able to say that he has been cast down who will not have been touched? What? will you say “detruded”?

nam eo verbo antea praetores in hoc interdicto uti solebant. Quid ais? potestne detrudi quisquam qui non attingitur?

for previously the praetors were accustomed to use that word in this interdict. What say you? can anyone be thrust down (detruded) who is not touched?

nonne, si verbum sequi volumus, hoc intellegamus necesse est, eum detrudi cui manus adferantur? Necesse est, inquam, si ad verbum rem volumus adiungere, neminem statui detrusum qui non adhibita vi manu demotus et actus praeceps intellegatur.

Is it not necessary, if we wish to follow the word, that we understand this: that he is “thrust down” to whom hands are applied? It is necessary, I say, if we wish to join the matter to the word, that no one be held “thrust down” who is not understood, with force and hand applied, to have been removed and driven headlong.

[50] Deiectus vero qui potest esse quisquam nisi in inferiorem locum de superiore motus? Potest pulsus, fugatus, eiectus denique; illud vero nullo modo potest, non modo qui tactus non sit sed ne in aequo quidem et plano loco. Quid ergo?

[50] But who, indeed, can be cast down unless moved from a higher place into a lower? He can be repelled, put to flight, or, finally, ejected; but that, however, is in no way possible—not only for one who has not been touched, but not even on level and flat ground. What then?

hoc interdictum putamus eorum esse causa compositum qui se praecipitatos ex locis superioribus dicerent—eos enim vere possumus dicere esse deiectos—an, cum voluntas et consilium et sententia interdicti intellegatur, impudentiam summam aut stultitiam singularem putabimus in verborum errore versari, rem et causam et utilitatem communem non relinquere solum sed etiam prodere?

Do we think that this interdict was composed for the sake of those who would say they were precipitated from higher places—for we can truly say that they are cast down—or, since the will and the counsel and the meaning of the interdict is understood, shall we deem it extreme impudence or singular stupidity to be entangled in an error of words, not only to relinquish the matter and the cause and the common utility but even to betray it?

[51] An hoc dubium est quin neque verborum tanta copia sit non modo in nostra lingua, quae dicitur esse inops, sed ne in alia quidem ulla, res ut omnes suis certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur, neque vero quicquam opus sit verbis, cum ea res cuius causa verba quaesita sint intellegatur? Quae lex, quod senatus consultum, quod magistratus edictum, quod foedus aut pactio, quod, ut ad privatas res redeam, testamentum, quae iudicia aut stipulationes aut pacti et conventi formula non infirmari ac convelli potest, si ad verba rem deflectere velimus, consilium autem eorum qui scripserunt et rationem et auctoritatem relinquamus?

[51] Or is this doubtful, that there is not such a great abundance of words, not only in our language, which is said to be needy, but not in any other either, that all things should be named by their sure and proper vocables, and indeed that there is no need of words when the thing for the sake of which words were sought is understood? What law, what senatorial decree, what magistrate’s edict, what treaty or paction, what—so that I may return to private affairs—testament, what judgments or stipulations or the formula of pact and covenant cannot be weakened and torn apart, if we are willing to deflect the matter to the words, but leave behind the intent of those who wrote and the rationale and the authority?

[52] Sermo hercule familiaris et cotidianus non cohaerebit, si verba inter nos aucupabimur; denique imperium domesticum nullum erit, si servolis hoc nostris concesserimus ut ad verba nobis oboediant, non ad id quod ex verbis intellegi possit obtemperent. Exemplis nunc uti videlicet mihi necesse est harum rerum omnium; non occurrit uni cuique vestrum aliud alii in omni genere exemplum quod testimonio sit non ex verbis aptum pendere ius; sed verba servire hominum consiliis et auctoritatibus.

[52] By Hercules, familiar and quotidian speech will not cohere, if we go bird‑catching for words among ourselves; and finally there will be no domestic imperium, if we shall have granted this to our little slaves, that they obey the words, and not obtemper to that which can be understood from the words. Evidently I must now use examples of all these matters; does not some example occur to each one of you, different to different men, in every kind, to bear witness that right ought not to hang upon words, but that words should serve the counsels and authorities of men.

[53] Ornate et copiose L. Crassus, homo longe eloquentissimus, paulo ante quam nos in forum venimus, iudicio cvirali hanc sententiam defendit et facile, cum contra eum prudentissimus homo, Q. Mucius, diceret, probavit omnibus, M'. Curium, qui heres institutus esset ita: 'mortvo postvmo filio,' cum filius non modo non mortuus sed ne natus quidem esset, heredem esse oportere. Quid? verbis hoc satis erat cautum?

[53] Lucius Crassus, a man by far the most eloquent, a little before we came into the forum, defended this opinion in the centumviral court and easily, although a most prudent man, Quintus Mucius, was speaking against him, proved to everyone that Manius Curius, who had been instituted heir in this way: “with the posthumous son dead,” although the son was not only not dead but not even born, ought to be heir. What? was this sufficiently provided for by the words?

Minime. Quae res igitur valuit? Voluntas, quae si tacitis nobis intellegi posset, verbis omnino non uteremur; quia non potest, verba reperta sunt, non quae impedirent sed quae indicarent voluntatem.

Not at all. What, then, prevailed? The will, which, if it could be understood with us silent, we would not use words at all; because it cannot, words were discovered—not to impede but to indicate the will.

[54] Lex usum et auctoritatem fundi iubet esse biennium; at utimur eodem iure in aedibus, quae in lege non appellantur. Si via sit immunita, iubet qua velit agere iumentum; potest hoc ex ipsis verbis intellegi, licere, si via sit in Bruttiis immunita, agere si velit iumentum per M. Scauri Tusculanum. Actio est in auctorem praesentem his verbis: 'qvandoqve te in ivre conspicio.' Hac actione Appius ille Caecus uti non posset, si ita in iure homines verba consectarentur ut rem cuius causa verba sunt non considerarent.

[54] The law orders the use and authority of a farm to be for a biennium; yet we employ the same right in buildings, which are not named in the law. If a road be unmaintained, it orders that he may drive his beast of burden wherever he wishes; from the very words one could understand it to be permitted, if a road in Bruttium be unmaintained, to drive, if he should wish, a beast of burden through M. Scaurus’s Tusculan estate. There is an action against the warrantor being present with these words: “whensoever I behold you in court.” By this action that Appius the Blind could not make use, if men in court were to pursue the words in such a way that they did not consider the thing for the sake of which the words exist.

Testamento si recitatus heres esset pupillus Cornelius isque iam annos xx haberet, vobis interpretibus amitteret hereditatem.

If in the testament the recited heir were the ward Cornelius, and he already had 20 years, with you as interpreters he would lose the inheritance.

[55] Veniunt in mentem mihi permulta, vobis plura, certo scio. Verum ne nimium multa complectamur atque ab eo quod propositum est longius aberret oratio, hoc ipsum interdictum quo de agitur consideremus; intellegetis enim in eo ipso, si in verbis ius constituamus, omnem utilitatem nos huius interdicti, dum versuti et callidi velimus esse, amissuros. 'Vnde tv avt familia avt procvrator tvvs.' Si me vilicus tuus solus deiecisset, non familia deiecisset, ut opinor, sed aliquis de familia.

[55] Very many things come to my mind; more to yours, I know for certain. But lest we embrace too many matters and the speech stray farther from what has been proposed, let us consider this very interdict about which the matter is being conducted; for you will understand in this very thing that, if we constitute the law in the words, we shall, while we wish to be wily and crafty, lose all the utility of this interdict. 'Vnde tv avt familia avt procvrator tvvs.' If your bailiff alone had cast me out, it would not have been the household that had cast me out, I suppose, but someone of the household.

Recte igitur diceres te restituisse? Quippe; quid enim facilius est quam probare eis qui modo Latine sciant, in uno servolo familiae nomen non valere? Si vero ne habeas quidem servum praeter eum qui me deiecerit, clames videlicet: 'Si habeo familiam, a familia mea fateor te esse deiectum.' Neque enim dubium est quin, si ad rem iudicandam verbo ducimur, non re, familiam intellegamus quae constet ex servis pluribus; quin unus homo familia non sit; verbum certe hoc non modo postulat, sed etiam cogit,

So then would you say you had restored? Indeed; for what is easier than to prove to those who merely know Latin that in the case of a single little slave the name “family” does not have force? But if you do not even have a slave besides the one who has ejected me, you would, of course, shout: ‘If I have a family, I admit that you were cast out by my family.’ For there is no doubt that, if we are led in judging the matter by the word, not by the thing, we understand “family” as one that consists of several slaves; indeed, a single man is not a family; this word surely not only demands this, but even compels it,

[56] at vero ratio iuris interdictique vis et praetorum voluntas et hominum prudentium consilium et auctoritas respuit hanc defensionem et pro nihilo putat. Quid ergo? isti homines Latine non loquuntur? Immo vero tantum loquuntur quantum est satis ad intellegendam voluntatem, cum sibi hoc proposuerint ut, sive me tu deieceris sive tuorum quispiam sive servorum sive amicorum, servos non numero distinguant sed appellent uno familiae nomine;

[56] but in truth the reason of law and the force of the interdict and the will of the praetors and the counsel and authority of prudent men rejects this defense and counts it as nothing. What then? Do those men not speak Latin? Nay rather they speak just so much as is sufficient for understanding the intention, since they have proposed this to themselves: that, whether you yourself have cast me down or someone of yours, whether of slaves or of friends, they do not distinguish the slaves by number but call them by the single name of the family;

[57] de liberis autem quisquis est, procuratoris nomine appelletur; non quo omnes sint aut appellentur procuratores qui negoti nostri aliquid gerant, sed in hac re cognita sententia interdicti verba subtiliter exquiri omnia noluerunt. Non enim alia causa est aequitatis in uno servo et in pluribus, non alia ratio iuris in hoc genere dumtaxat, utrum me tuus procurator deiecerit, is qui legitime procurator dicitur, omnium rerum eius qui in Italia non sit absitve rei publicae causa quasi quidam paene dominus, hoc est alieni iuris vicarius, an tuus colonus aut vicinus aut cliens aut libertus aut quivis qui illam vim deiectionemque tuo rogatu aut tuo nomine fecerit.

[57] but as for free persons, whoever he may be, let him be called by the name of procurator; not that all are or are called procurators who conduct any part of our business, but in this matter, with the sense of the interdict understood, they did not wish all the words to be minutely sifted. For there is not one ground of equity for a single slave and another for several, nor a different reason of law in this kind, at least, whether your procurator—he who is legitimately called procurator, of all the affairs of one who is not in Italy or is absent for the sake of the commonwealth, as a sort of almost master, that is, a vicarius of another’s right—or your tenant-farmer, or neighbor, or client, or freedman, or anyone who carried out that force and ejection at your request or in your name, has ejected me.

[58] Qua re, si ad eum restituendum qui vi deiectus est eandem vim habet aequitatis ratio, ea intellecta certe nihil ad rem pertinet quae verborum vis sit ac nominum. Tam restitues si tuus me libertus deiecerit nulli tuo praepositus negotio, quam si procurator deiecerit; non quo omnes sint procuratores qui aliquid nostri negoti gerunt, sed quod in hac re quaeri nihil attinet. Tam restitues si unus servolus, quam si familia fecerit universa; non quo idem sit servolus unus quod familia, verum quia non quibus verbis quidque dicatur quaeritur, sed quae res agatur.

[58] Wherefore, if for restoring him who has been ejected by force the same force of equity holds, then, that being understood, certainly it is nothing to the matter what the force of words and of names is. You will restore just as much if your freedman, appointed over no business of yours, has ejected me, as if a procurator had ejected me; not that all are procurators who manage any of our business, but because in this matter it is of no concern to inquire. You will restore just as much if a single little slave did it as if the whole household did it; not that one little slave is the same thing as a household, but because the question is not by what words each thing is said, but what thing is being done.

Etiam, ut longius a verbo recedamus, ab aequitate ne tantulum quidem, si tuus servus nullus fuerit et omnes alieni ac mercennarii, tamen ei ipsi tuae familiae genere et nomine continebuntur.

Even, that we may withdraw farther from the word, not even a whit from equity: if you should have no slave of your own and all be others’ and mercenary hirelings, nevertheless those very men will be contained within the genus and the name of your family.

[59] Perge porro hoc idem interdictum sequi. 'hominibvs coactis.' Neminem coegeris, ipsi convenerint sua sponte; certe cogit is qui congregat homines et convocat; coacti sunt ei qui ab aliquo sunt unum in locum congregati. Si non modo convocati non sunt, sed ne convenerunt quidem, sed ei modo fuerunt qui etiam antea non vis ut fieret, verum colendi aut pascendi causa esse in agro consuerant, defendes homines coactos non fuisse, et verbo quidem superabis me ipso iudice, re autem ne consistes quidem ullo iudice.

[59] Go on further to pursue this same interdict. 'with men compelled.' You will have compelled no one; they have come together of their own accord; certainly he compels who congregates men and convokes them; those are compelled who by someone are congregated into one place. If not only have they not been convoked, but not even have they come together, but only those were present who even before—not because you wish it to be done, but had been accustomed to be in the field for the sake of cultivating or pasturing—you will defend that men were not compelled; and by the word indeed you will overcome (I myself as judge), but in reality you will not even stand your ground before any judge.

Vim enim multitudinis restitui voluerunt, non solum convocatae multitudinis; sed, quia plerumque ubi multitudine opus est homines cogi solent, ideo de coactis compositum interdictum est; quod etiam si verbo differre videbitur, re tamen erit unum et omnibus in causis idem valebit, in quibus perspicitur una atque eadem causa aequitatis. 'armatisve.'

For they wished the force of the multitude to be restored, not only of a convoked multitude; but, because for the most part, where there is need of a multitude, men are wont to be compelled, therefore the interdict was framed concerning the compelled; which, even if it will seem to differ in wording, yet in reality will be one and will have the same force in all causes in which one and the same cause of equity is perceived. 'or armed.'

[60] Quid dicemus? armatos, si Latine loqui volumus, quos appellare vere possumus? Opinor eos qui scutis telisque parati ornatique sunt.

[60] What shall we say? armed men, if we wish to speak Latin, whom can we truly call so? I think those who are prepared and arrayed with shields and weapons.

Quid igitur? si glebis aut saxis aut fustibus aliquem de fundo praecipitem egeris iussusque sis, quem hominibus armatis deieceris, restituere, restituisse te dices? Verba si valent, si causae non ratione sed vocibus ponderantur, me auctore dicito.

What then? If with clods or stones or cudgels you have driven someone headlong from an estate, and you are ordered to restore the one whom you cast down by armed men, will you say that you have restored him? If words prevail, if cases are weighed not by reason but by voices, say so on my authority.

Vinces profecto non fuisse armatos eos qui saxa iacerent quae de terra ipsi tollerent, non esse arma caespites neque glebas; non fuisse armatos eos qui praetereuntes ramum defringerent arboris; arma esse suis nominibus alia ad tegendum, alia ad nocendum; quae qui non habuerint, eos inermos fuisse vinces.

You will surely prevail that those who throw stones which they themselves lift from the earth were not armed, that sods nor clods (glebes) are not arms; that those who, as they pass by, break off a branch of a tree were not armed; that arms, in their proper names, are some for covering (defense), others for harming (offense); and that those who have not had these were unarmed—you will prevail.

[61] Verum si quod erit armorum iudicium, tum ista dicito; iuris iudicium cum erit et aequitatis, cave in ista tam frigida, tam ieiuna calumnia delitiscas. Non enim reperies quemquam iudicem aut recuperatorem qui, tamquam si arma militis inspicienda sint, ita probet armatum; sed perinde valebit quasi armatissimi fuerint, si reperientur ita parati fuisse ut vim vitae aut corpori potuerint adferre.

[61] But if there will be any judgment of arms, then say those things; when there will be a judgment of law and of equity, beware lest you hide yourself in a calumny so cold, so jejune. For you will not find any judge or recuperator who, as if the arms of a soldier had to be inspected, thus proves a man to be armed; but it will avail to the same effect as if they had been most fully armed, if they are found to have been so prepared that they could bring force to life or body.

[62] Atque ut magis intellegas quam verba nihil valeant, si tu solus aut quivis unus cum scuto et gladio impetum in me fecisset atque ego ita deiectus essem, auderesne dicere interdictum esse de hominibus armatis, hic autem hominem armatum unum fuisse? Non, opinor, tam impudens esses. Atqui vide ne multo nunc sis impudentior.

[62] And that you may understand more how words avail nothing, if you alone or any single person with shield and sword had made an attack upon me and I had thus been cast down, would you dare to say that the interdict is concerning armed men, but that here, however, there was one armed man? No, I suppose, you would not be so impudent. And yet take care you are not much more impudent now.

Nam tum quidem omnis mortalis implorare posses, quod homines in tuo negotio Latine obliviscerentur, quod inermi armati iudicarentur, quod, cum interdictum esset de pluribus, commissa res esset ab uno, unus homo plures esse homines iudicaretur.

For then indeed you could appeal to all mortals, that men in your affair were forgetting their Latin, that an unarmed man was adjudged to be armed, that, although the interdict was about several, the act had been committed by one, that one man was judged to be several men.

[63] Verum in his causis non verba veniunt in iudicium, sed ea res cuius causa verba haec in interdictum coniecta sunt. Vim quae ad caput ac vitam pertineret restitui sine ulla exceptione voluerunt. Ea fit plerumque per homines coactos armatosque; si alio consilio, eodem periculo facta sit, eodem iure esse voluerunt.

[63] But in these causes it is not words that come into judgment, but the matter for whose sake these words have been cast into the interdict. They willed that violence which pertained to head and life be restored without any exception. This for the most part is done by men coerced and armed; if it has been done by a different counsel, with the same peril, they willed it to be under the same law.

Non enim maior est iniuria si tua familia quam si tuus vilicus, non si tui servi quam si alieni ac mercennarii, non si tuus procurator quam si vicinus aut libertus tuus, non si coactis hominibus quam si voluntariis aut etiam adsiduis ac domesticis, non si armatis quam si inermibus qui vim armatorum haberent ad nocendum, non si pluribus quam si uno armato. Quibus enim rebus plerumque vis fit eius modi, eae res appellantur in interdicto. Si per alias res eadem facta vis est, ea tametsi verbis interdicti non concluditur, sententia tamen iuris atque auctoritate retinetur.

For it is not a greater injury if it was your household than if it was your bailiff (vilicus), not if your slaves than if others’ and hired men (mercenaries), not if your procurator than if your neighbor or your freedman, not if by men compelled than if by volunteers or even by assiduous and domestic attendants, not if by armed men than if by unarmed who had the force of armed men for doing harm, not if by several than if by one armed man. For the things by which force of this sort is for the most part done, those things are named in the interdict. If by other means the same force has been done, although it is not encompassed by the words of the interdict, nevertheless it is retained by the sense of the law and by its authority.

[64] Venio nunc ad illud tuum: 'non deieci; non enim sivi accedere.' Puto te ipsum, Piso, perspicere quanto ista sit angustior iniquiorque defensio quam si illa uterere: 'non fuerunt armati, cum fustibus et cum saxis fuerunt.' Si me hercule mihi, non copioso homini ad dicendum, optio detur, utrum malim defendere non esse deiectum eum cui vi et armis ingredienti sit occursum, an armatos non fuisse eos qui sine scutis sineque ferro fuerint, omnino ad probandum utramque rem videam infirmam nugatoriamque esse, ad dicendum autem in altera videar mihi aliquid reperire posse, non fuisse armatos eos qui neque ferri quicquam neque scutum ullum habuerint; hic vero haeream, si mihi defendendum sit eum qui pulsus fugatusque sit non esse deiectum.

[64] I come now to that of yours: 'I did not eject; for I did not allow him to approach.' I think you yourself, Piso, perceive how much narrower and more inequitable that defense is than if you were to use this: 'they were not armed; they had clubs and stones.' If, by Hercules, a choice were given to me—no copious man in speaking—whether I would rather defend that he has not been ejected, he who, as he was entering, was met with force and arms, or that those were not armed who were without shields and without iron, altogether, for proving, I see each point to be infirm and nugatory; but for speaking, in the latter I seem to myself to be able to find something, namely that those were not armed who had neither any iron nor any shield; here indeed I should stick fast, if I had to defend that he who has been beaten back and put to flight has not been ejected.

[65] Atque illud in tota defensione tua mihi maxime mirum videbatur, te dicere iuris consultorum auctoritati obtemperari non oportere. Quod ego tametsi non nunc primum neque in hac causa solum audio, tamen admodum mirabar abs te quam ob rem diceretur. Nam ceteri tum ad istam orationem decurrunt cum se in causa putant habere aequum et bonum quod defendant; si contra verbis et litteris et, ut dici solet, summo iure contenditur, solent eius modi iniquitati aequi et boni nomen dignitatemque opponere.

[65] And this in your whole defense seemed to me most marvelous above all, that you say the authority of the jurisconsults ought not to be obeyed. Although I have not heard this now for the first time nor in this case alone, nevertheless I wondered greatly that it should be said by you, and for what reason. For others then run to that kind of oration when they think they have in the case the equitable and the good to defend; if, on the contrary, the contest is about words and letters and, as it is said, the utmost strictness of law, they are accustomed to oppose to an iniquity of that sort the name and dignity of equity and the good.

Tum illud quod dicitur, 'sive nive,' inrident, tum aucupia verborum et litterarum tendiculas in invidiam vocant, tum vociferantur ex aequo et bono, non ex callido versutoque iure rem iudicari oportere; scriptum sequi calumniatoris esse bonique iudicis voluntatem scriptoris auctoritatemque defendere.

Then they mock that which is said, “or with snow”; then they call into ill-will the fowling for words and the little traps of letters; then they vociferate that the matter ought to be judged from equity and good, not from crafty and wily law; that to follow what is written is the part of a calumniator, but of a good judge to defend the intention of the author and his authority.

[66] In ista vero causa cum tu sis is qui te verbo litteraque defendas, cum tuae sint hae partes: 'unde deiectus es? an inde quo prohibitus es accedere? reiectus es, non deiectus,' cum tua sit haec oratio: 'fateor me homines coegisse, fateor armasse, fateor tibi mortem esse minitatum, fateor hoc interdicto praetoris vindicari, si voluntas et aequitas valeat; sed ego invenio in interdicto verbum unum ubi delitiscam: non deieci te ex eo loco quem in locum prohibui ne venires'—in ista defensione accusas eos qui consuluntur, quod aequitatis censeant rationem, non verbi haberi oportere?

[66] In this very case, since you are the one who defends yourself by word and by letter, since these are your lines: 'From where have you been ejected? Or from that place to which you were forbidden to approach? You were rejected, not ejected,' since this is your speech: 'I confess that I have compelled men, I confess that I have armed men, I confess that I have threatened you with death, I confess that this is vindicated by the praetor’s interdict, if will and equity should prevail; but I find in the interdict one word where I may hide myself: I did not eject you from that place to which I forbade you to come'—in that defense do you accuse those who are consulted, because they judge that consideration of equity ought to be had, not of the word?

[67] Et hoc loco Scaevolam dixisti causam apud cviros non tenuisse; quem ego antea commemoravi, cum idem faceret quod tu nunc—tametsi ille in aliqua causa faciebat, tu in nulla facis—tamen probasse nemini quod defendebat, quia verbis oppugnare aequitatem videbatur. Cum id miror, te hoc in hac re alieno tempore et contra quam ista causa postulasset defendisse, tum illud volgo in iudiciis et non numquam ab ingeniosis hominibus defendi mihi mirum videri solet, nec iuris consultis concedi nec ius civile in causis semper valere oportere.

[67] And at this point you said that Scaevola did not sustain the case before the centumviral court; whom I previously mentioned, when he was doing the same as you now—although he was doing it in some case, while you do it in none—yet he persuaded no one of what he was defending, because he seemed to assail equity with words. While I marvel at this, that you in this matter have defended it at an untimely moment and contrary to what this cause would have required, so too this other point is wont to seem strange to me: that it is commonly in the courts, and sometimes by ingenious men, maintained that neither should deference be granted to the jurisconsults nor should the civil law be allowed always to prevail in cases.

[68] Nam hoc qui disputant, si id dicunt non recte aliquid statuere eos qui consulantur, non hoc debent dicere iuris consultis, sed hominibus stultis obtemperari non oportere; sin illos recte respondere concedunt et aliter iudicari dicunt oportere, male iudicari oportere dicunt; neque enim fieri potest ut aliud iudicari de iure, aliud responderi oporteat, nec ut quisquam iuris numeretur peritus qui id statuat esse ius quod non oporteat iudicari. 'At est aliquando contra iudicatum.'

[68] For those who dispute this: if they say that those who are consulted set down something not rightly, they ought not to say this of the jurisconsults, but that it is not fitting to obey foolish men; but if they concede that those answer rightly and say that it ought to be adjudged otherwise, they are saying that it ought to be judged badly; for it cannot come to pass that one thing ought to be judged concerning the law, and another to be answered, nor that anyone be counted an expert in law who should establish that to be law which ought not to be judged. 'But sometimes there has been a judgment to the contrary.'

[69] Primum utrum recte, an perperam? Si recte, id fuit ius quod iudicatum est; sin aliter, non dubium est utrum iudices an iuris consulti vituperandi sint. Deinde, si de iure vario quippiam iudicatum est, potius contra iuris consultos statuunt, si aliter pronuntiatum est ac Mucio placuit, quam ex eorum auctoritate, si, ut Manilius statuebat, sic est iudicatum.

[69] First, was it rightly or wrongly? If rightly, that was the law which was adjudged; but if otherwise, there is no doubt whether the judges or the jurisconsults are to be blamed. Then, if something has been adjudged on a point of variable law, do they rather decide against the jurisconsults, if it has been pronounced otherwise than as Mucius approved, than decide by their authority, if, as Manilius was laying down, so it has been judged?

Etenim ipse Crassus non ita causam apud cviros egit ut contra iuris consultos diceret, sed ut hoc doceret, illud quod Scaevola defendebat, non esse iuris, et in eam rem non solum rationes adferret, sed etiam Q. Mucio, socero suo, multisque peritissimis hominibus auctoribus uteretur.

For indeed Crassus himself did not so plead the case before the men as to speak against the jurisconsults, but to show this: that that which Scaevola was defending was not law; and for that point he not only brought forward reasons, but also employed as authorities Q. Mucius, his father-in-law, and many most expert men.

[70] Nam qui ius civile contemnendum putat, is vincula revellit non modo iudiciorum sed etiam utilitatis vitaeque communis; qui autem interpretes iuris vituperat, si imperitos iuris esse dicit, de hominibus, non de iure civili detrahit; sin peritis non putat esse obtemperandum, non homines laedit, sed leges ac iura labefactat; quod vobis venire in mentem profecto necesse est, nihil esse in civitate tam diligenter quam ius civile retinendum. Etenim hoc sublato nihil est qua re exploratum cuiquam possit esse quid suum aut quid alienum sit, nihil est quod aequabile inter omnis atque unum omnibus esse possit.

[70] For he who thinks the civil law ought to be contemned tears loose the bonds not only of the courts but also of utility and of common life; but he who vituperates the interpreters of the law—if he says they are unskilled in law—detracts from men, not from the civil law; but if he thinks the skilled are not to be obeyed, he does not wound men, but undermines the laws and rights; which must surely come into your mind: that there is nothing in the commonwealth that must be retained more diligently than the civil law. For with this removed, there is nothing by which it can be ascertained by anyone what is one’s own or what is another’s; there is nothing that can be equitable among all and one and the same for all.

[71] Itaque in ceteris controversiis atque iudiciis cum quaeritur aliquid factum necne sit, verum an falsum proferatur, et fictus testis subornari solet et interponi falsae tabulae, non numquam honesto ac probabili nomine bono viro iudici error obici, improbo facultas dari ut, cum sciens perperam iudicarit, testem tamen aut tabulas secutus esse videatur; in iure nihil est eius modi, recuperatores, non tabulae falsae, non testis improbus, denique nimia ista quae dominatur in civitate potentia in hoc solo genere quiescit; quid agat, quo modo adgrediatur iudicem, qua denique digitum proferat, non habet.

[71] And so, in other controversies and judgments, when it is asked whether something was done or not, whether the true or the false is produced, both a fictitious witness is wont to be suborned and false records to be interposed; sometimes, too, under an honorable and probable name, an error is thrown before the judge, a good man, and to the unscrupulous there is given the faculty that, although he has knowingly judged wrongly, he may nevertheless seem to have followed a witness or the records; in law there is nothing of this sort, recuperators: not false records, not a wicked witness; finally, that excessive potentia which dominates in the state rests in this sole kind; what it should do, how it should address the judge, where, finally, it should point a finger, it does not have.

[72] Illud enim potest dici iudici ab aliquo non tam verecundo homine quam gratioso: 'iudica hoc factum esse aut numquam esse factum; crede huic testi, has comproba tabulas'; hoc non potest: 'statue cui filius agnatus sit, eius testamentum non esse ruptum; iudica quod mulier sine tutore auctore promiserit, deberi.' Non est aditus ad huiusce modi res neque potentiae cuiusquam neque gratiae; denique, quo maius hoc sanctiusque videatur, ne pretio quidem corrumpi iudex in eius modi causa potest.

[72] For this can be said to a judge by someone not so modest as ingratiating: 'judge that this was done or that it was never done; trust this witness, approve these tablets'; this cannot: 'determine that for whom a son is an agnate, his testament is not ruptured; judge that what a woman has promised without a guardian as authorizer is owed.' There is no access in matters of this kind either for anyone’s power or for favor; finally, in order that this may seem the greater and more sacrosanct, not even by a price can a judge be corrupted in a case of this kind.

[73] Iste vester testis qui ausus est dicere fecisse videri eum de quo ne cuius rei argueretur quidem scire potuit, is ipse numquam auderet iudicare deberi viro dotem quam mulier nullo auctore dixisset.

[73] That witness of yours, who dared to say that the man seemed to have done it when he could not even have known of what matter he was being accused, that very man would never dare to adjudge that a dowry is owed to a man which a woman had declared with no guardian as auctor.

O rem praeclaram vobisque ob hoc retinendam, recuperatores! Quod enim est ius civile? Quod neque inflecti gratia neque perfringi potentia neque adulterari pecunia possit; quod si non modo oppressum sed etiam desertum aut neglegentius adservatum erit, nihil est quod quisquam sese habere certum aut a patre accepturum aut relicturum liberis arbitretur.

O splendid thing, and on this account to be kept by you, recuperators! For what is the civil law? That which can neither be bent by favor nor broken through by power nor adulterated by money; which, if it shall be not only oppressed but even abandoned or more negligently kept, there is nothing which anyone may think that he either has as certain or will receive from his father or will leave to his children.

[74] Quid enim refert aedis aut fundum relictum a patre aut aliqua ratione habere bene partum, si incertum est, quae nunc tua iure mancipi sint, ea possisne retinere, si parum est communitum ius civile ac publica lege contra alicuius gratiam teneri non potest? quid, inquam, prodest fundum habere, si, quae diligentissime descripta a maioribus iura finium, possessionum, aquarum itinerumque sunt, haec perturbari aliqua ratione commutarique possunt? Mihi credite, maior hereditas uni cuique nostrum venit in isdem bonis a iure et a legibus quam ab eis a quibus illa ipsa nobis relicta sunt.

[74] For what does it matter to have a house or a farm left by your father, or to possess by some title something well gotten, if it is uncertain whether you can retain those things which are now yours by the ius mancipi, if the civil law is too little fortified and cannot be held by public statute against someone’s favor? what, I say, is the use of having an estate, if the rights of boundaries, possessions, waters, and ways, which have been most diligently delineated by our ancestors, can be disturbed and in some manner commuted and changed? Believe me, a greater inheritance comes to each one of us in these same goods from Right and from the laws than from those by whom those very things were bequeathed to us.

Nam ut perveniat ad me fundus testamento alicuius fieri potest; ut retineam quod meum factum sit sine iure civili fieri non potest. Fundus a patre relinqui potest, at usucapio fundi, hoc est finis sollicitudinis ac periculi litium, non a patre relinquitur, sed a legibus; aquae ductus, haustus, iter, actus a patre, sed rata auctoritas harum rerum omnium ab iure civili sumitur.

For that an estate may come to me can be brought about by someone’s testament; that I may retain what has been made mine cannot be brought about without the civil law. An estate can be left by a father, but the usucaption of an estate, that is, the end of anxiety and the peril of lawsuits, is not left by a father, but by the laws; a water-conduit, a drawing (of water), a path, a driving-way may be from a father, but the ratified authority of all these things is taken from the civil law.

[75] Quapropter non minus diligenter ea quae a maioribus accepistis, publica patrimonia iuris quam privatae rei vestrae retinere debetis, non solum quod haec iure civili saepta sunt verum etiam quod patrimonium unius incommodo dimittetur, ius amitti non potest sine magno incommodo civitatis.

[75] Wherefore you ought to retain, no less diligently than your private property, those things which you have received from your ancestors—the public patrimonies of law—not only because these are hedged about by the civil law, but also because, whereas the patrimony of a single person will be let go with the inconvenience of one, the law cannot be lost without great inconvenience to the state.

In hac ipsa causa, recuperatores, si hoc nos non obtinemus, vi armatis hominibus deiectum esse eum quem vi armatis hominibus pulsum fugatumque esse constat, Caecina rem non amittet, quam ipsam animo forti, si tempus ita ferret, amitteret, in possessionem in praesentia non restituetur, nihil amplius;

In this very case, Recuperators, if we do not obtain this point—that he was ejected by force by armed men, he whom it is established was driven and put to flight by force by armed men—Caecina will not lose the thing, which very thing he would lose with a stout spirit, if the time so required; he will not be restored into possession for the present, nothing more;

[76] populi Romani causa, civitatis ius, bona, fortunae possessionesque omnium in dubium incertumque revocantur. Vestra auctoritate hoc constituetur, hoc praescribetur: quicum tu posthac de possessione contendes, eum si ingressum modo in praedium deieceris, restituas oportebit; sin autem ingredienti cum armata multitudine obvius fueris et ita venientem reppuleris, fugaris, averteris, non restitues. Iuris si haec vox est, esse vim non in caede solum sed etiam in animo, libidinis, nisi cruor appareat, vim non esse factam; iuris, deiectum esse qui prohibitus sit, libidinis, nisi ex eo loco ubi vestigium impresserit deici neminem posse;

[76] the cause of the Roman people, the right of the commonwealth, the goods, fortunes, and possessions of all are called back into doubt and uncertainty. By your authority this will be established, this will be prescribed: with whomever you hereafter contend about possession, if you shall have ejected him when he had only entered upon the estate, you will have to restore; but if, to one entering, you shall have gone to meet with an armed multitude and thus, as he comes, have repelled him, put him to flight, and turned him away, you will not restore. If this is the voice of law, that violence is not in slaughter only but also in the intention; of wantonness, that unless gore appear, no violence has been done; of law, that he is held to have been ejected who has been prohibited; of caprice, that no one can be ejected unless from that very place where he has pressed a footprint;

[77] iuris, rem et sententiam et aequitatem plurimum valere oportere, libidinis, verbo ac littera ius omne intorqueri: vos statuite, recuperatores, utrae voces vobis honestiores et utiliores esse videantur.

[77] of law, that the matter and the sentence and equity ought to prevail most; of lust, that by word and letter the whole law be twisted: you decide, recuperators, which words seem to you more honorable and more useful.

Hoc loco percommode accidit quod non adest is qui paulo ante adfuit et adesse nobis frequenter in hac causa solet, vir ornatissimus, C. Aquilius; nam ipso praesente de virtute eius et prudentia timidius dicerem, quod et ipse pudore quodam adficeretur ex sua laude et me similis ratio pudoris a praesentis laude tardaret; cuius auctoritati dictum est ab illa causa concedi nimium non oportere. <Non> vereor de tali viro ne plus dicam quam vos aut sentiatis aut apud vos commemorari velitis.

At this point it has happened very conveniently that he is not present who a little before was present and is accustomed frequently to be present with us in this case, a most distinguished man, C. Aquilius; for with him himself present I would speak more timidly about his virtue and prudence, because both he himself would be affected with a certain modesty by his own praise and a similar consideration of modesty would slow me from the praise of one present; on whose authority it has been said from that case that it is not proper to concede too much. <Not> do I fear, concerning such a man, lest I say more than you either feel or are willing to have commemorated among you.

[78] Quapropter hoc dicam, numquam eius auctoritatem nimium valere cuius prudentiam populus Romanus in cavendo, non in decipiendo perspexerit, qui iuris civilis rationem numquam ab aequitate seiunxerit, qui tot annos ingenium, laborem, fidem suam populo Romano promptam eitamque praebuerit; qui ita iustus est et bonus vir ut natura, non disciplina, consultus esse videatur, ita peritus ac prudens ut ex iure civili non scientia solum quaedam verum etiam bonitas nata videatur, cuius tantum est ingenium, ita probata fides ut quicquid inde haurias purum te liquidumque haurire sentias.

[78] Wherefore I will say this: that the authority of one whose prudence the Roman people has discerned in guarding against, not in deceiving, can never have too much weight; who has never severed the reason of civil law from equity; who for so many years has offered to the Roman people his talent, his labor, his trustworthiness, prompt and ready; who is so just and a good man that he seems a jurist by nature, not by discipline; so experienced and prudent that from civil law not only a certain science but even goodness seems to have been born; whose genius is so great, whose faith so proven, that whatever you draw from there you feel you are drawing pure and limpid.

[79] Qua re permagnam initis a nobis gratiam, cum eum auctorem defensionis nostrae esse dicitis. Illud autem miror, quem vos aliquid contra me sentire dicatis, cur eum auctorem vos pro me appelletis, nostrum nominetis. Verum tamen quid ait vester iste auctor?

[79] Wherefore you enter very great gratitude from us, since you say that he is the author of our defense. But this I marvel at: that the very man whom you say to think something against me—why do you call him an author on my behalf, name him as ours? Yet, however, what does that author of yours say?

'Qvibvs qvidqve verbis actvm pronvntiatvmqve sit.' Conveni ego ex isto genere consultorum non neminem, ut opinor, istum ipsum quo vos auctore rem istam agere et defensionem causae constituere vos dicitis. Qui cum istam disputationem mecum ingressus esset, non posse probari quemquam esse deiectum nisi ex eo loco in quo fuisset, rem et sententiam interdicti mecum facere fatebatur, verbo me excludi dicebat, a verbo autem posse recedi non arbitrabatur.

'By what words each thing has been done and pronounced.' I met, from that class of consultants, someone—indeed, as I think, that very man by whose authority you say you are conducting this matter and establishing the defense of the case. When he had entered upon that disputation with me, he admitted that it could not be proved that anyone had been cast down unless from the place in which he had been; he acknowledged that the matter and the meaning of the interdict were with me, but said that I was excluded by the wording, and he did not think it possible to depart from the wording.

[80] Cum exemplis uterer multis ex omni memoria antiquitatis a verbo et ab scripto plurimis saepe in rebus ius et aequi bonique rationem esse seiunctam, semperque id valuisse plurimum quod in se auctoritatis habuisset aequitatisque plurimum, consolatus est me et ostendit in hac ipsa causa nihil esse quod laborarem; nam verba ipsa sponsionis facere mecum, si vellem diligenter attendere. 'Quonam,' inquam, 'modo?' 'Quia certe,' inquit, 'deiectus est Caecina vi hominibus armatis aliquo ex loco; si non ex eo loco quem in locum venire voluit, at ex eo certe unde fugit.' 'Quid tum?' 'Praetor,' inquit, 'interdixit ut, unde deiectus esset, eo restitueretur, hoc est, quicumque is locus esset unde deiectus esset. Aebutius autem qui fatetur aliquo ex loco deiectum esse Caecinam, is quoniam se restituisse dixit, necesse est male fecerit sponsionem.'

[80] When I was employing many examples out of the whole memory of antiquity that in very many matters the law and the rationale of equity and the good have often been separated from the word and from the writing, and that always that has prevailed most which in itself had had the most authority and the most equity, he consoled me and showed that in this very cause there was nothing for me to toil over; for the very words of the sponsion, if I were willing to attend carefully, were working with me. 'In what,' said I, 'manner?' 'Because certainly,' he said, 'Caecina was cast out by force by armed men from some place; if not from that place into which he wished to come, yet certainly from that place from which he fled.' 'What then?' 'The praetor,' he said, 'issued an interdict that, from where he had been cast out, to there he be restored,—that is, whatever place it might be from which he had been cast out. But Aebutius, who admits that Caecina was cast out from some place, since he said that he restored him, must necessarily have made the sponsion badly.'

[81] Quid est, Piso? placet tibi nos pugnare verbis? placet causam iuris et aequitatis et non nostrae possessionis, sed omnino possessionum omnium constituere in verbo?

[81] What is it, Piso? does it please you that we fight with words? does it please you to establish the cause of law and equity, and not of our possession, but indeed of the possessions of all, upon a word?

Ego quid mihi videretur, quid a maioribus factitatum, quid horum auctoritate quibus iudicandum est dignum esset, ostendi; id verum, id aequum, id utile omnibus esse spectari, quo consilio et qua sententia, non quibus quidque verbis esset actum. Tu me ad verbum vocas; non ante veniam quam recusaro. Nego oportere, nego obtineri posse, nego ullam rem esse quae aut comprehendi satis aut caveri aut excipi possit, si aut praeterito aliquo verbo aut ambigue posito re et sententia cognita non id quod intellegitur, sed id quod dicitur valebit.

I have shown what seemed to me, what was practiced by our maiores, what by the authority of those by whom it is to be judged would be worthy; that it is true, equitable, useful for all that regard be had to the plan and the judgment, not to the particular words by which each thing has been transacted. You summon me ad verbum; I will not come before I have refused. I deny that it ought, I deny that it can be maintained, I deny that there is any matter which can either be sufficiently comprehended or guarded against or excepted, if, with the thing and the sententia known, through either some word omitted or ambiguously placed, not that which is understood but that which is uttered shall prevail.

[82] Quoniam satis recusavi, venio iam quo vocas. Quaero abs te simne deiectus, non de Fulciniano fundo; neque enim praetor, 'si ex eo fundo essem deiectus,' ita me restitui iussit, sed 'eo unde deiectus essem.' Sum ex proximo vicini fundo deiectus, qua adibam ad istum fundum, sum de via, sum certe alicunde, sive de privato sive de publico; eo restitui sum iussus. Restituisse te dixti; nego me ex decreto praetoris restitutum esse.

[82] Since I have refused enough, I now come where you summon. I ask of you whether I was ejected—not from the Fulcinian estate; for the praetor did not so order me to be restored, “if I had been ejected from that estate,” but “to that place whence I had been ejected.” I was ejected from the adjoining neighbor’s estate, by which I was approaching that estate; I am from the road, I am certainly from somewhere, whether from private or from public; to that place I was ordered to be restored. You said that you restored; I deny that I have been restored in accordance with the praetor’s decree.

Quid ad haec dicimus? Aut tuo, quem ad modum dicitur, gladio aut nostro defensio tua conficiatur necesse est.

What do we say to these things? Either by your sword, as it is said, or by ours, it is necessary that your defense be finished off.

[83] Si ad interdicti sententiam confugis et, de quo fundo actum sit tum cum Aebutius restituere iubebatur, id quaerendum esse dicis neque aequitatem rei verbi laqueo capi putas oportere, in meis castris praesidiisque versaris; mea, mea est ista defensio, ego hoc vociferor, ego omnis homines deosque testor, cum maiores vim armatam nulla iuris defensione texerint, non vestigium eius qui deiectus sit, sed factum illius qui deiecerit, in iudicium venire; deiectum esse qui fugatus sit, vim esse factam cui periculum mortis sit iniectum.

[83] If you take refuge in the sense of the interdict and say that what must be inquired is, about which estate the action was when Aebutius was being ordered to restore, and you think the equity of the matter ought not to be caught by the snare of a word, you are moving within my camps and garrisons; mine, mine is that defense—I shout this aloud, I call all men and gods to witness—that, since our elders have covered armed force with no defense of law, it is not the vestige of him who has been ejected, but the deed of him who has ejected, that comes into judgment; that he is ejected who has been routed, that violence has been done to him upon whom the peril of death has been cast.

[84] Sin hunc locum fugis et reformidas et me ex hoc, ut ita dicam, campo aequitatis ad istas verborum angustias et ad omnis litterarum angulos revocas, in eis ipsis intercludere insidiis quas mihi conaris opponere. 'Non deieci, sed reieci.' Peracutum hoc tibi videtur, hic est mucro defensionis tuae; in eum ipsum causa tua incurrat necesse est. Ego enim tibi refero: si non sum ex eo loco deiectus quo prohibitus sum accedere, at ex eo sum deiectus quo accessi, unde fugi.

[84] But if you flee and dread this position, and call me back from this, so to speak, field of equity to those narrow straits of words and to every corner of letters, you are shut in by those very ambushes which you try to set against me. ‘I did not deject, but reject.’ This seems to you very sharp; this is the point of your defense; your case must needs run onto that very point. For I retort to you: if I was not cast down from that place which I was forbidden to approach, yet I was cast down from that place which I did approach, whence I fled.

Si praetor non distinxit locum quo me restitui iuberet, et restitui iussit, non sum ex decreto restitutus.

If the praetor did not distinguish the place to which he would order me to be restored, and yet ordered me to be restored, I have not been restored in accordance with the decree.

[85] Velim, recuperatores, hoc totum si vobis versutius quam mea consuetudo defendendi fert videbitur, sic existimetis; primum alium, non me excogitasse, deinde huius rationis non modo non inventorem, sed ne probatorem quidem esse me, idque me non ad meam defensionem attulisse, sed illorum defensioni rettulisse; me posse pro meo iure dicere neque in hac re quam ego protuli quaeri oportere quibus verbis praetor interdixerit, sed de quo loco sit actum cum interdixit, neque in vi armatorum spectari oportere in quo loco sit facta vis, verum sitne facta; te vero nullo modo posse defendere in qua re tu velis verba spectari oportere, in qua re nolis non oportere.

[85] I would wish, recuperators, if this whole thing shall seem to you more wily than my custom of defending allows, that you think thus: first, that someone else, not I, devised it; next, that of this ratio I am not only not the inventor, but not even the approver; and that I did not bring this forward for my own defense, but referred it to their defense. That I can, by my right, say that in this matter which I have put forward it ought not to be inquired with what words the praetor interdicted, but about what locus the matter was dealt with when he interdicted; and that in the interdict “by the force of armed men” it ought not to be regarded in what place the force was done, but whether it was done. But that you, indeed, can in no way defend that in whatever matter you wish the words ought to be regarded, and in whatever matter you do not wish, they ought not.

[86] Verum tamen ecquid mihi respondetur ad illud quod ego iam antea dixi, non solum re et sententia sed verbis quoque hoc interdictum ita esse compositum ut nihil commutandum videretur? Attendite, quaeso, diligenter, recuperatores; est enim vestri ingeni non meam, sed maiorum prudentiam cognoscere; non enim id sum dicturus quod ego invenerim, sed quod illos non fugerit. Cum de vi interdicitur, duo genera causarum esse intellegebant ad quae interdictum pertineret, unum, si qui ex eo loco ubi fuisset se deiectum diceret, alterum, si qui ab eo loco quo veniret; et horum utrumque neque praeterea quicquam potest accidere, recuperatores.

[86] But still, is anything answered to me regarding what I said already before, that not only in the matter and in the meaning but also in the words this interdict was so composed that nothing seemed to need changing? Attend, I pray, carefully, recuperators; for it belongs to your talent to recognize not my prudence, but that of the ancestors; for I am not going to say what I myself discovered, but what did not escape them. When there is an interdict about force, they understood there to be two kinds of cases to which the interdict pertained: one, if someone said he had been cast down from the place where he had been; the other, if someone said he had been kept away from that place to which he was coming; and of these two, and beyond them nothing else, can occur, recuperators.

[87] Id adeo sic considerate. Si qui meam familiam de meo fundo deiecerit, ; si qui mihi praesto fuerit cum armatis hominibus extra meum fundum et me introire prohibuerit, non ex eo, sed ab eo loco me deiecerit. Ad haec duo genera rerum unum verbum quod satis declararet utrasque res invenerunt, ut, sive ex fundo sive a fundo deiectus essem, uno atque eodem interdicto restituerer 'vnde tv.' Hoc verbum 'vnde' utrumque declarat, et ex quo loco et a quo loco.

[87] Consider this, then, in this way. If someone has cast out my household from my estate, ; if someone has been posted against me with armed men outside my estate and has forbidden me to enter, he has cast me down not from out of that place, but from that place. For these two genera of matters they found one word which would sufficiently declare both things, so that, whether I had been cast out from the estate or away from the estate, I might be restored by one and the same interdict, 'vnde tv.' This word 'vnde' declares both, both from out of which place and from which place.

Vnde deiectus est Cinna? Ex urbe. Vnde Telesinus?

Whence was Cinna ejected? From the city. Whence Telesinus?

Ab urbe. Vnde deiecti Galli? A Capitolio.

From the city. Whence were the Gauls cast down? From the Capitol.

Vnde qui cum Graccho fuerunt? Ex Capitolio.

Whence were those who were with Gracchus? From the Capitol.

[88] Videtis igitur hoc uno verbo 'vnde' significari res duas, et ex quo et a quo. Cum autem eo restitui iubet, ita iubet ut, si Galli a maioribus nostris postularent ut eo restituerentur unde deiecti essent, et aliqua vi hoc adsequi possent, non, opinor, eos in cuniculum qua adgressi erant sed in Capitolium restitui oporteret. Hoc enim intellegitur: vnde deiecisti, sive ex quo loco sive a quo loco, eo restitvas.

[88] You see therefore that by this one word 'vnde' two things are signified, both 'ex quo' and 'a quo'. And when by it he orders one to be restored thither, he so orders that, if the Gauls were to demand from our ancestors that they be restored there whence they had been cast down, and could by some force achieve this, they ought, I think, to be restored not into the tunnel by which they had advanced, but onto the Capitol. For this is understood: whence you have cast down, whether out of what place or from what place, thither you shall restore.

Hoc iam simplex est, in eum locum restituas: sive ex hoc loco deiecisti, restitue in hunc locum, sive ab hoc loco, restitue in eum locum, non ex quo, sed a quo deiectus est. Vt si qui ex alto cum ad patriam accessisset, tempestate subito reiectus optaret ut, cum a patria deiectus esset, eo restitueretur, hoc, opinor, optaret ut a quo loco depulsus esset, in eum se fortuna restitueret, non in salum, sed in ipsam urbem quam petebat, sic quoniam verborum vim necessario similitudine rerum aucupamur, qui postulat ut a quo loco deiectus est, hoc est unde deiectus est, eo restituatur, hoc postulat ut in eum ipsum locum restituatur.

This now is simple: restore into that place: whether you cast him down out of this place, restore into this place; or from this place, restore into that place—not out of which (ex quo), but from which (a quo) he was cast down. As if someone, when he had approached his fatherland from the deep, were suddenly driven back by a storm, he would wish that, since he had been driven away from his fatherland, he be restored there; this, I suppose, he would wish—that to the place from which he had been repelled, Fortune would restore him, not into the open sea, but into the very city which he was seeking. Thus, since we necessarily hunt the force of words by the similitude of things, he who demands that he be restored to the place from which he was cast down, that is unde he was cast down, demands that he be restored into that very place.

[89] Cum verba nos eo ducunt, tum res ipsa hoc sentire atque intellegere cogit. Etenim, Piso,—redeo nunc ad illa principia defensionis meae—si quis te ex aedibus tuis vi hominibus armatis deiecerit, quid ages? Opinor, hoc interdicto quo nos usi sumus persequere.

[89] While the words lead us to this, so too does the thing itself compel us to feel and to understand it. Indeed, Piso,—I now return to those first principles of my defense—if someone were to cast you out of your house by force with armed men, what will you do? I suppose you will pursue it by this interdict which we have employed.

Quid? si qui iam de foro redeuntem armatis hominibus domum tuam te introire prohibuerit, quid ages? Vtere eodem interdicto.

What then? If someone, as you are already returning from the forum, with armed men should forbid you to enter your own house, what will you do? Use the same interdict.

Cum igitur praetor interdixerit, unde deiectus es, ut eo restituaris, tu hoc idem quod ego dico et quod perspicuum est interpretabere, cum illud verbum 'vnde' in utramque rem valeat, eoque tu restitui sis iussus, tam te in aedis tuas restitui oportere, si e vestibulo, quam si ex interiore aedium parte deiectus sis.

Accordingly, when the praetor has issued an interdict, “from where you were ejected,” that you be restored to that place, you will interpret this same point which I state and which is perspicuous: since that word “unde” has force for either case, and since you have been ordered to be restored there, it is proper that you be restored into your house just as much if you were ejected from the vestibule as if from the inner part of the house.

[90] Vt vero iam, recuperatores, nulla dubitatio sit, sive rem sive verba spectare voltis, quin secundum nos iudicetis, exoritur hic iam obrutis rebus omnibus et perditis illa defensio, eum deici posse qui tum possideat; qui non possideat, nullo modo posse; itaque, si ego sim a tuis aedibus deiectus, restitui non oportere, si ipse sis, oportere. Numera quam multa in ista defensione falsa sint, Piso. Ac primum illud attende, te iam ex illa ratione esse depulsum, quod negabas quemquam deici posse nisi inde ubi tum esset; iam posse concedis; eum qui non possideat negas deici posse.

[90] But now, Recuperators, so that there be no doubt—whether you wish to regard the matter or the words—that you should judge in our favor, there now emerges here, with all their affairs buried and ruined, that defense: that he can be ejected who at that time possesses; he who does not possess can in no way be ejected; and so, if I should be ejected from your house, I ought not to be restored; if you yourself should be, you ought to be. Count how many things in that defense are false, Piso. And first mark this: that you have already been driven off from that line of reasoning, because you were denying that anyone could be ejected except from the very place where he then was; now you concede that it can be done; you deny that one who does not possess can be ejected.

[91] Cur ergo aut in illud cotidianum interdictum 'vnde ille me vi deiecit' additur 'cvm ego possiderem,' si deici nemo potest qui non possidet, aut in hoc interdictum de hominibvs armatis non additur, si oportet quaeri possederit necne? Negas deici, nisi qui possideat. Ostendo, si sine armatis coactisve hominibus deiectus quispiam sit, eum qui fateatur se deiecisse vincere sponsionem, si ostendat eum non possedisse.

[91] Why, therefore, either in that everyday interdict “whence that man ejected me by force” is “when I was in possession” added, if no one can be ejected who is not in possession; or is it not added in this interdict about armed men, if it ought to be asked whether he was in possession or not? You deny that anyone is ejected, unless he is in possession. I show that, if someone has been ejected without armed or assembled men, he who admits that he ejected him wins the sponsion, if he shows that the other had not been in possession.

Negas deici, nisi qui possideat. Ostendo ex hoc interdicto de armatis hominibvs, qui possit ostendere non possedisse eum qui deiectus sit, condemnari tamen sponsionis necesse esse, si fateatur esse deiectum.

You deny that one can be ejected, unless he possess. I show from this interdict concerning armed men that one who can show that the person who was ejected was not in possession must nevertheless be condemned in the sponsio, if he admits that an ejection occurred.

[92] Dupliciter homines deiciuntur, aut sine coactis armatisve hominibus aut per eius modi rationem atque vim. Ad duas dissimilis res duo diiuncta interdicta sunt. In illa vi cotidiana non satis est posse docere se deiectum, nisi ostendere potest, cum possideret, tum deiectum.

[92] In a twofold manner men are ejected, either without men gathered or armed, or by a method and force of that kind. For the two unlike matters two separate interdicts are set forth. In that quotidian force it is not enough to be able to show oneself ejected, unless he can show that, while he was possessing, then he was ejected.

Ne id quidem satis est, nisi docet ita se possedisse <ut> nec vi nec clam nec precario possederit. Itaque is qui se restituisse dixit magna voce saepe confiteri solet se vi deiecisse, verum illud addit: 'non possidebat' vel etiam, cum hoc ipsum concessit, vincit tamen sponsionem, si planum facit ab se illum aut vi aut clam aut precario possedisse.

Not even this is enough, unless he shows that he possessed in such a way that he had not possessed either by force (vi) or secretly (clam) or on sufferance/by precarium (precario). And so the one who has said that he restored is often wont to confess in a loud voice that he cast him out by force, but he adds this: “he was not in possession”; or even when he grants this very point, he nevertheless wins the sponsion, if he makes it clear that the other had possessed as against him either by force (vi) or secretly (clam) or on sufferance/by precarium (precario).

[93] Videtisne quot defensionibus eum qui sine armis ac multitudine vim fecerit uti posse maiores voluerint? Hunc vero qui ab iure, officio, bonis moribus ad ferrum, ad arma, ad caedem confugerit, nudum in causa destitutum videtis, ut, qui armatus de possessione contendisset, inermis plane de sponsione certaret. Ecquid igitur interest, Piso, inter haec interdicta?

[93] Do you see how many defenses our elders wished the man to be able to employ who has used force without arms and a multitude? But this man who has fled from law, duty, and good morals to the sword, to arms, to slaughter—you see him left naked in his case, so that, he who had contended about possession armed should contend plainly unarmed about the wager (sponsion). Is there, then, any difference, Piso, between these interdicts?

ecquid interest utrum in hoc sit additum 'cvm A. Caecina possideret' necne? Ecquid te ratio iuris, ecquid interdictorum dissimilitudo, ecquid auctoritas maiorum commovet? Si esset additum, de eo quaeri oporteret; additum non est, tamen oportebit?

Does it make any difference whether this has been added, ‘when A. Caecina was in possession,’ or not? Does the ratio of law move you at all, does the dissimilarity of interdicts, does the authority of the ancestors? If it had been added, it ought to be inquired into on that point; it has not been added—nevertheless, ought it to be?

[94] Atque ego in hoc Caecinam non defendo; possedit enim Caecina, recuperatores; et id, tametsi extra causam est, percurram tamen brevi ut non minus hominem ipsum quam ius commune defensum velitis. Caesenniam possedisse propter usum fructum non negas. Qui colonus habuit conductum de Caesennia fundum, cum idem ex eadem conductione fuerit in fundo, dubium est quin, si Caesennia tum possidebat, cum erat colonus in fundo, post eius mortem heres eodem iure possederit?

[94] And in this I do not defend Caecina; for Caecina did possess, O recuperators; and that point, although it lies outside the case, I will nevertheless run through briefly, so that you may wish to see not less the man himself than the common law defended. You do not deny that Caesennia possessed on account of the usufruct. The colonus (tenant) who had the estate leased from Caesennia—since that same man was on the estate by the same contract of lease—is it doubtful that, if Caesennia was then in possession when the colonus was on the estate, after her death the heir possessed by the same right?

Deinde ipse Caecina cum circuiret praedia, venit in istum fundum, rationes a colono accepit.

Then Caecina himself, while making the rounds of the estates, came into that farm and received the accounts from the tenant farmer.

[95] Sunt in eam rem testimonia. Postea cur tu, Aebuti, de isto potius fundo quam de alio, si quem habes, Caecinae denuntiabas, si Caecina non possidebat? Ipse porro Caecina cur se moribus deduci volebat idque tibi de amicorum et de Aquili sententia responderat.

[95] There are testimonies for that matter. Afterwards, why did you, Aebutius, denounce to Caecina about that estate rather than about another, if you have any, if Caecina was not possessing? Moreover, why did Caecina himself wish to be led in according to custom, and had replied this to you by the opinion of his friends and of Aquilius?

At enim Sulla legem tulit. Vt nihil de illo tempore, nihil de calamitate rei publicae querar, hoc tibi respondeo, ascripsisse eundem Sullam in eadem lege: 'si qvid ivs non esset rogarier, eivs ea lege nihilvm rogatvm.' Quid est quod ius non sit, quod populus iubere aut vetare non possit? Vt ne longius abeam, declarat ista ascriptio esse aliquid; nam, nisi esset, hoc in omnibus legibus non ascriberetur.

But indeed Sulla promulgated a law. So that I may make no complaint about that time, no complaint about the calamity of the republic, this I answer to you: that the same Sulla wrote into the same law: ‘if anything were not lawful to be proposed, then, by that law, nothing has been proposed.’ What is there that is not right, which the people cannot order or forbid? Not to go farther afield, that ascription declares that there is something; for, if there were not, this would not be ascribed in all laws.

[96] Sed quaero te, putesne, si populus iusserit me tuum aut te meum servum esse, id iussum ratum atque firmum futurum. Perspicis hoc nihil esse et fateris; qua in re primum illud concedis, non quicquid populus iusserit, ratum esse oportere; deinde nihil rationis adfers quam ob rem, si libertas adimi nullo modo possit, civitas possit. Nam et eodem modo de utraque re traditum nobis est, et, si semel civitas adimi potest, retineri libertas non potest.

[96] But I ask you, do you think that, if the people were to order me to be your slave or you to be my slave, that order would be valid and firm? You see that this is nothing and you admit it; wherein you concede first that not whatever the people has ordered ought to be deemed valid; then you adduce no reasoning why, if liberty can in no way be taken away, citizenship can. For concerning both matters it has been handed down to us in the same way, and, if once citizenship can be taken away, liberty cannot be retained.

Qui enim potest iure Quiritium liber esse is qui in numero Quiritium non est?

For how can he be free by Quiritary right who is not in the number of the Quirites?

[97] Atque ego hanc adulescentulus causam cum agerem contra hominem disertissimum nostrae civitatis, Cottam, probavi. Cum Arretinae mulieris libertatem defenderem et Cotta xviris religionem iniecisset non posse nostrum sacramentum iustum iudicari, quod Arretinis adempta civitas esset, et ego vehementius contendissem civitatem adimi non posse, xviri prima actione non iudicaverunt; postea re quaesita et deliberata sacramentum nostrum iustum iudicaverunt. Atque hoc et contra dicente Cotta et Sulla vivo iudicatum est.

[97] And I, when a very young man, argued this case against the most eloquent man of our state, G. Cotta, and I prevailed. When I was defending the freedom of an Arretine woman, and Cotta had cast a religious scruple upon the decemvirs, that our sacramentum (wager) could not be judged just because citizenship had been taken away from the Arretines, and I had contended more vehemently that citizenship could not be taken away, the decemvirs did not render judgment at the first hearing; afterwards, the matter having been examined and deliberated, they judged our sacramentum to be just. And this was adjudged both with Cotta speaking against it and with Sulla still alive.

Iam vero in ceteris rebus ut omnes qui in eadem causa sunt et lege agant et suum ius persequantur, et omni iure civili sine cuiusquam aut magistratus aut iudicis aut periti hominis aut imperiti dubitatione utantur, quid ego commemorem? Dubium esse nemini vestrum certo <scio>.

Now indeed, in the rest of matters, that all who are in the same cause both proceed by law and pursue their own right, and use all civil law without the doubt of anyone, whether magistrate or judge or a skilled man or an unskilled, what should I mention? That it is doubtful to none of you, certainly <I know>.

[98] Quaeri hoc solere me non praeterit—ut ex me ea quae tibi in mentem non veniunt audias—quem ad modum, si civitas adimi non possit, in colonias Latinas saepe nostri cives profecti sint. Aut sua voluntate aut legis multa profecti sunt; quam multam si sufferre voluissent, manere in civitate potuissent. Quid?

[98] It does not pass me by that this is wont to be asked—that you may hear from me those things which do not come into your mind—how, if citizenship cannot be taken away, our citizens have often set out to Latin colonies. Either of their own will or by the mulct of the law they set out; which mulct, if they had wished to bear, they could have remained in the citizenship. What?

quem pater patratus dedidit aut suus pater populusve vendidit, quo is iure amittit civitatem? Vt religione civitas solvatur civis Romanus deditur; qui cum est acceptus, est eorum quibus est deditus; si non accipiunt, <ut> Mancinum Numantini, retinet integram causam et ius civitatis. Si pater vendidit eum quem in suam potestatem susceperat, ex potestate dimittit.

He whom a pater patratus has surrendered, or whom his own father or the People have sold—by what law does he lose citizenship? In order that by religion the commonwealth be absolved, a Roman citizen is surrendered (in deditio); when he is accepted, he is theirs to whom he has been surrendered; if they do not accept him, as the Numantines [did not accept] Mancinus, he retains his case entire and the right of citizenship. If a father has sold one whom he had taken into his own power, he releases him from that power.

[99] Iam populus cum eum vendit qui miles factus non est, non adimit ei libertatem, sed iudicat non esse eum liberum qui, ut liber sit, adire periculum noluit; cum autem incensum vendit, hoc iudicat, cum ei qui in servitute iusta fuerunt censu liberentur, eum qui, cum liber esset, censeri noluerit, ipsum sibi libertatem abiudicavisse. Quod si maxime hisce rebus adimi libertas aut civitas potest, non intellegunt qui haec commemorant, si per has rationes maiores adimi posse voluerunt, alio modo noluisse?

[99] Now when the people sell one who has not become a soldier, they do not take away his liberty, but judge that he is not a free man who, in order that he be free, was unwilling to approach the peril; but when they sell an incensus, they judge this: since those who have been in lawful servitude are freed by the census, he who, though he was free, was unwilling to be registered, has himself disadjudged his own liberty. But if most of all by these things liberty or citizenship can be taken away, do those who recount these not understand that, if by these rationales the ancestors wished it to be able to be taken away, they were unwilling it to be so in any other way?

[100] Nam ut haec ex iure civili proferunt, sic adferant velim quibus lege aut rogatione civitas aut libertas erepta sit. Nam quod ad exsilium attinet, perspicue intellegi potest quale sit. Exsilium enim non supplicium est, sed perfugium portusque supplici.

[100] For as they bring these points forward from the civil law, so I would like them to produce by what law or by what rogation citizenship or liberty has been taken away. For as to exile, it can be clearly understood what sort it is. Exile is not a punishment, but a refuge and a harbor for the one under punishment.

Nam quia volunt poenam aliquam subterfugere aut calamitatem, eo solum vertunt, hoc est sedem ac locum mutant. Itaque nulla in lege nostra reperietur, <ut> apud ceteras civitates, maleficium ullum exsilio esse multatum; sed cum homines vincula, neces ignominiasque vitant, quae sunt legibus constitutae, confugiunt quasi ad aram in exsilium. Qui si in civitate legis vim subire vellent, non prius civitatem quam vitam amitterent; quia nolunt, non adimitur eis civitas, sed ab eis relinquitur atque deponitur.

For, because they wish to evade some punishment or calamity, they turn to that ground alone—that is, they change their seat and place. And so in our law there will be found, <ut> among other communities, no malefaction that has been mulcted by exile; but when men avoid chains, executions, and ignominies which are constituted by the laws, they take refuge, as to an altar, in exile. If they were willing in the state to undergo the force of the law, they would lose life before citizenship; because they are unwilling, citizenship is not taken from them, but is by them relinquished and laid down.

Nam, cum ex nostro iure duarum civitatum nemo esse possit, tum amittitur haec civitas denique, cum is qui profugit receptus est in exsilium, hoc est in aliam civitatem.

For, since by our law no one can belong to two commonwealths, then this citizenship is finally lost when he who has fled is received into exile, that is, into another commonwealth.

[101] Non me praeterit, recuperatores, tametsi de hoc iure permulta praetereo, tamen me longius esse prolapsum quam ratio vestri iudici postularit. Verum id feci, non quo vos hanc in hac causa defensionem desiderare arbitrarer, sed ut omnes intellegerent nec ademptam cuiquam civitatem esse neque adimi posse. Hoc cum eos scire volui quibus Sulla voluit iniuriam facere, tum omnis ceteros novos veteresque civis.

[101] It does not escape me, recuperators, although I am passing over very many points about this law, that nevertheless I have slipped farther than the nature of your judgment required. But I did this, not because I thought you desired this defense in this case, but so that all might understand that citizenship has neither been taken away from anyone nor can be taken away. This I wished those to know upon whom Sulla wished to inflict an injury, and likewise all the rest, both new and old citizens.

Neque enim ratio adferri potest cur, si cuiquam novo civi potuerit adimi civitas, non omnibus patriciis, omnibus antiquissimis civibus possit.

Nor indeed can a reason be adduced why, if citizenship could be taken from any new citizen, it could not be taken from all the patricians, from all the most ancient citizens.

[102] Nam ad hanc quidem causam nihil hoc pertinuisse primum ex eo intellegi potest quod vos de re iudicare non debetis; deinde quod Sulla ipse ita tulit de civitate ut non sustulerit horum nexa atque hereditates. Iubet enim eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses; quos quis ignorat duodecim coloniarum fuisse et a civibus Romanis hereditates capere potuisse? Quod si adimi civitas A. Caecinae lege potuisset, magis illam rationem tamen omnes boni quaereremus, quem ad modum spectatissimum pudentissimumque hominem, summo consilio, summa virtute, summa auctoritate domestica praeditum, levatum iniuria civem retinere possemus, quam uti nunc, cum de iure civitatis nihil potuerit deperdere, quisquam exsistat nisi tui, Sexte, similis et stultitia et impudentia qui huic civitatem ademptam esse dicat.

[102] For indeed, that this had nothing to do with this case can first be understood from the fact that you ought not to judge about matter; next, from the fact that Sulla himself thus enacted concerning citizenship that he did not remove these men’s nexa and inheritances. For he orders them to be under the same law as the Ariminenses were; and who is unaware that they belonged to the twelve colonies and could take inheritances from Roman citizens? But if the citizenship of A. Caecina could have been taken away by statute, nevertheless we all good men would rather be seeking that course—by what method we might retain as a citizen a man most distinguished and most modest, endowed with the highest prudence, the highest virtue, the highest domestic authority, with the injury lifted—than, as now, when he could lose nothing of the right of citizenship, that anyone should arise, except someone like you, Sextus, alike in stupidity and shamelessness, to say that citizenship has been taken away from this man.

[103] Qui quoniam, recuperatores, suum ius non deseruit neque quicquam illius audaciae petulantiaeque concessit, de reliquo iam communem causam populique ius in vestra fide ac religione deponit. Is homo est, ita se probatum vobis vestrique similibus semper voluit ut id non minus in hac causa laborarit ne inique contendere aliquid quam ne dissolute relinquere videretur, nec minus vereretur ne contemnere Aebutium quam ne ab eo contemptus esse existimaretur.

[103] Since he, recuperators, has not deserted his own right nor conceded anything to that man’s audacity and petulance, as to the rest he now entrusts the common cause and the right of the people to your good faith and scrupulousness. He is such a man, and has always wished himself to stand approved to you and to those like you, that in this case he has striven no less not to contend for anything iniquitously than not to seem to relinquish it remissly, and he would fear no less to contemn Aebutius than to be thought to have been contemned by him.

[104] Quapropter, si quid extra iudicium est quod homini tribuendum sit, habetis hominem singulari pudore, virtute cognita et spectata fide, amplissimo totius Etruriae nomine, in utraque fortuna cognitum multis signis et virtutis et humanitatis. Si quid in contraria parte in homine offendendum est, habetis eum, ut nihil dicam amplius, qui se homines coegisse fateatur. Sin hominibus remotis de causa quaeritis, cum iudicium de vi sit, is qui arguitur vim se hominibus armatis fecisse fateatur, verbo se, non aequitate, defendere conetur, id quoque ei verbum ipsum ereptum esse videatis, auctoritatem sapientissimorum hominum facere nobiscum, in iudicium non venire utrum A. Caecina possederit necne, tamen doceri possedisse; multo etiam minus quaeri A. Caecinae fundus sit necne, me tamen id ipsum docuisse, fundum esse Caecinae: cum haec ita sint, statuite quid vos tempora rei publicae de armatis hominibus, quid illius confessio de vi, quid nostra decisio de aequitate, quid ratio interdicti de iure admoneat ut iudicetis.

[104] Wherefore, if there is anything outside the judgment that ought to be attributed to a man, you have a man of singular modesty, of virtue known and of tested faith, of the most ample name in all Etruria, proved in both fortunes by many tokens both of virtue and of humanity. If there is anything to be taken offense at in the man on the opposite side, you have him who—even to say nothing further—confesses that he compelled men. But if, the persons being set aside, you inquire into the cause, since the judgment is about force, the one accused admits that he committed force with armed men, he tries to defend himself by a word, not by equity, and you see that even that very word has been wrested from him; the authority of the wisest men is with us; it does not come into the judgment whether A. Caecina possessed or not, yet it has been shown that he did possess; much less is it asked whether the farm is A. Caecina’s or not, yet I have shown that very thing, that the farm is Caecina’s: since these things are so, determine what the times of the commonwealth admonish you concerning armed men, what his confession concerning violence, what our decision concerning equity, what the rationale of the interdict concerning law, should remind you so that you judge.