Bacon: NOVUM ORGANUM

Pars autem instituti nostri est, ut omnia, quantum fieri potest aperte et perspicue proponantur. Nuditas enim animi, ut olim corporis, innocentiae et simplicitatis comes est. Pateat itaque primo ordo operis atque ratio ejus.

It is, moreover, a part of our plan that everything, as far as can be done, be set forth openly and perspicuously. For the nudity of the mind, as once of the body, is the companion of innocence and simplicity. Therefore let the order of the work and its rationale be made plain first.

Partes operis a nobis constituuntur sex.

The parts of the work are constituted by us as six.

Prima pars exhibet scientiae ejus sive doctrinae in cujus possessione humanum genus hactenus versatur, Summam, sive descriptionem universalem. Visum enim est nobis etiam in iis quae recepta sunt nonnullam facere moram: eo nimirum consilio, ut facilius et veteribus perfectio et novis aditus detur. Pari enim fere studio ferimur et ad vetera excolenda et ad ulteriora assequenda.

The First Part presents the Sum, or universal description, of that science or doctrine in the possession of which the human race has hitherto been conversant. For it has seemed to us to make some pause even upon those things that are received; with this design, namely, that both to the old perfection may more easily be given and to the new an approach afforded. For with almost equal zeal we are carried both to cultivate the old and to attain the ulterior.

Pertinet etiam hoc ad faciendam fidem: juxta illud, Non accipit indoctus verba scientiae, nisi prius ea dixeris quae versantur in corde ejus. Itaque scientiarum atque artium receptarum oras legere, necnon utilia quaedam in illas importare, tanquam in transitu, non negligemus.

This also pertains to producing credence: according to that saying, “The unlearned does not receive the words of knowledge, unless first you shall have said those things which are turning in his heart.” Therefore to coast along the shores of the received sciences and arts, and likewise to import certain useful things into them, as it were in transit, we shall not neglect.

Partitiones tamen Scientiarum adhibemus eas, quae non tantum jam inventa et nota, sed hactenus omissa et debita, complectantur. Etenim inveniuntur in globo intellectuali, quemadmodum in terrestri, et culta pariter et deserta. Itaque nil mirum videri debet, si a divisionibus usitatis quandoque recedamus.

Nevertheless, we employ those Partitions of the Sciences which embrace not only what has already been discovered and known, but also what has hitherto been omitted and is due. For in the intellectual globe, just as in the terrestrial, there are found both cultivated and desert alike. Therefore nothing should seem a marvel, if we sometimes depart from the customary divisions.

Adjectio enim, dum totum variat, etiam partes earumque sectiones necessario variat: receptae autem divisiones receptae summae scientiarum, qualis nunc est, tantum competunt.

For an addition, while it varies the whole, also necessarily varies the parts and their sections; but the received divisions suit only the received sum of the sciences, such as it now is.

Circa ea vero quae ceu omissa notabimus, ita nos geremus, ut non leves tantum titulos et argumenta concisa eorum quae desiderantur proponamus. Nam siquid inter omissa retulerimus (modo sit dignioris subjecti) cujus ratio paulo videatur obscurior adeo ut merito suspicari possimus homines non facile intellecturos quid nobis velimus aut quale sit illud opus quod animo et cogitatione complectimur, perpetuo nobis curae erit aut praecepta hujusmodi operis conficiendi aut etiam partem operis ipsius jam a nobis confectam ad exemplum totius subjungere; ut in singulis aut opera aut consilio juvemus. Etenim etiam as nostram existimationem, non solum aliorum utilitatem, pertinere putavimus, ne quis arbitretur levem aliquam de istiusmodi rebus notionem mentem nostram perstrinxisse, atque esse illa quae desideramus ac prensamus tanquam votis similia.

Concerning those things which we shall mark as, so to speak, omitted, we will conduct ourselves thus: we will not merely propose light titles and concise arguments of the things desiderated. For if we shall have included among the omissions anything (provided it be of a more dignified subject) whose rationale seems a little more obscure, so that we may with reason suspect men will not easily understand what we would, or of what sort that opus is which we comprehend in mind and cogitation, it shall be our perpetual care either to subjoin precepts for composing an opus of this kind, or even a part of the opus itself already by us composed, as a sample of the whole; so that in each case we may aid either by work or by counsel. For we have judged that it pertains also to our own estimation, not only to the utility of others, lest anyone suppose that some slight notion concerning matters of this sort has but grazed our mind, and that the things which we desiderate and grasp are like mere wishes.

Ea vero talia sunt, quorum et penes homines (nisi sibi ipsi desint) potestas plane sit, et nos apud nosmet rationem quandam certam et explicatam habeamus. Neque enim regiones metiri animo, ut augures, auspiciorum cause: sed intrare, ut duces, promerendi studio, suscepimus.

These indeed are such things, the power of which plainly lies with men (unless they fail themselves), and we for our part have with ourselves a certain sure and explicit method. For we have undertaken not to measure regions in the mind, like augurs, for the sake of auspices: but to enter them, like leaders, with a zeal to earn merit.

Atque haec prima operis pars est.

And this is the first part of the work.

Porro praetervecti artes veteres, intellectum humanum ad trajiciendum instruemus. Destinatur itaque parti secundae, doctrina de meliore et perfectiore usu rationis in rerum inquisitione, et de auxiliis veris intellectus: ut per hoc (quantum conditio humanitatis ac mortalitatis patitur) exaltetur intellectus, et facultate amplificetur ad naturae ardua et obscura superanda. Atque est ea quam adducimus ars (quam Interpretationem Naturae appellare consuevimus) ex genere logicae; licet plurimum, atque adeo immensum quiddam, intersit.

Moreover, having passed beyond the old arts, we shall equip the human intellect for making the crossing. Accordingly, to the second part there is assigned a doctrine concerning the better and more perfect use of reason in the inquiry into things, and concerning the true aids of the intellect: so that by this (so far as the condition of humanity and mortality allows) the intellect may be exalted, and its faculty amplified for overcoming the arduous and the obscure of nature. And the art which we adduce (which we are accustomed to call the Interpretation of Nature) is of the genus of logic; although there is a very great—indeed an immense—difference between them.

Nam et ipsa illa logica vulgaris auxilia et praesidia intellectui moliri ac parare profitetur: et in hoc uno consentiunt. Differt autem plane a vulgari rebus praecipue tribus: viz. ipso fine, ordine demonstrandi, et inquirendi initiis.

For even that common logic itself professes to contrive and to prepare aids and safeguards for the intellect; and in this one point they agree. But it plainly differs from the vulgar chiefly in three matters: viz., in the end itself, in the order of demonstrating, and in the beginnings of inquiry.

Nam huic nostrae scientiae finis proponitur, ut inveniantur non argumenta sed artes, nec principiis consentanea sed ipsa principia, nec rationes probabiles sed designationes et indicationes Operum. Itaque ex intentione diversa diversus sequitur effectus. Illic enim adversarius disputatione vincitur et constringitur; hic natura, opere.

For to this our science an end is proposed: that there be discovered not arguments but arts, not things consonant with principles but the very principles themselves, and not probable reasons but the designations and indications of Works. Therefore, from a different intention a different effect follows. There, indeed, the adversary is vanquished and constrained by disputation; here, nature, by work.

Atque cum hujusmodi fine conveniunt demonstrationum ipsarum natura et ordo. In logica enim vulgari opera fere universa circa Syllogismum consumitur. De Inductione vero Dialectici vix serio cogitasse videntur; levi mentione eam transmittentes, et ad disputandi formulas properantes.

And with an end of this kind the nature and order of the demonstrations themselves agree. For in vulgar Logic almost the whole labor is consumed about the Syllogism. As for Induction, the Dialecticians seem scarcely to have thought seriously; passing it over with a light mention, and hastening to the formulas of disputation.

At nos demonstrationem per syllogismum rejicimus, quod confusius agat, et naturam emittat e manibus. Tametsi enim nemini dubium esse possit quin, quae in medio termino conveniunt, ea et inter se conveniant (quod est mathematicae cujusdam certitudinis): nihilominus hoc subest fraudis, quod syllogismus ex propositionibus constet, propistiones ex verbis, verba autem notionum tesserae et signa sint. Itaque si notiones ipsae mentis (quae verborum quasi anima sunt, et totius hujusmodi structurae ac fabricae basis) male ac temere a rebus abstractae, et vagae, nec satis definitae et circumscriptae, denique multis modis vitiosae fuerint, omnia ruunt.

But we reject demonstration through syllogism, because it proceeds more confusedly and lets nature slip out of the hands. For although it can be doubtful to no one that things which agree in the middle term also agree with one another (which is a kind of mathematical certainty), nonetheless there lies under this a fraud: that the syllogism consists of propositions, the propositions of words, while words are the tokens and signs of notions. Therefore, if the notions themselves of the mind (which are, as it were, the soul of words, and the basis of this whole structure and fabric) have been ill and rashly abstracted from things, and are vague, and not sufficiently defined and circumscribed, finally vitiated in many ways, everything collapses.

Rejicimus igitur syllogismum; neque id solum quoad principia (ad quae nec illi eam adhibent) sed etiam quoad propositiones medias, quas educit sane atque parturit utcunque syllogismus, sed operum steriles et a practica remotas et plane quoad partem activam scientiarum incompetentes. Quamvis igitur relinquamus syllogismo et hujusmodi demonstrationibus famosis ac jactatis jurisdictionem in artes populares et opinabiles (nil enim in hac parte movemus), tamen ad naturam rerum Inductione per omnia, et tam ad minores propositiones quam ad majores, utimur. Inductionem enim censemus eam esse demonstrandi formam, quae sensum tuetur et naturam premit et operibus imminet ac fere immiscetur.

We therefore reject the syllogism; and not only as regards first principles (to which they themselves do not apply it), but also as regards the middle propositions, which the syllogism indeed elicits and in some wise brings to birth, yet are sterile of works and removed from practice, and plainly incompetent for the active part of the sciences. Although therefore we leave to the syllogism and to such famous and vaunted demonstrations jurisdiction over the popular and opinative arts (for in this part we set nothing in motion), nevertheless in dealing with the nature of things we employ Induction in all respects, and for minor propositions as well as for major. For we deem Induction to be that form of demonstrating which safeguards sense and presses upon nature, and which impends over works and almost commingles with them.

Itaque ordo quoque demonstrandi plane invertitur. Adhuc enim res ita geri consuevit; ut a sensu et particularibus primo loco ad maxime generalia advoletur, tanquam ad polos fixos circa quos disputationes vertantur; ab illis caetera per media deriventur: via certe compendiaria, sed praecipiti, et ad naturam impervia, ad disputationes vero proclivi et accommodata. At secundum nos, axiomata continenter et gradatim excitantur, ut nonnisi postremo loco ad generalissima veniatur: ea vero generalissima evadunt non notionalia, sed bene terminata, et talia quae natura ut revera sibi notiora agnoscat, quaeque rebus haereant in medullis.

Therefore the order of demonstrating is plainly inverted as well. For up to now the matter has been wont to be managed thus: that from sense and particulars, in the first place, there is a flight up to the most general, as to fixed poles around which disputations turn; from those the rest are derived through intermediates: a path indeed compendious, but headlong, and impervious to nature, yet easy and accommodated to disputations. But according to us, axioms are raised continuously and by degrees, so that one comes to the most general only in the last place: and those most general turn out not notional, but well delimited, and such as nature recognizes as truly better known to itself, and which cling to things in their very marrow.

At in forma ipsa quoque inductionis, et judicio quod per eam fit, opus longe maximum movemus. Ea enim de qua dialectici loquuntur, quae procedit per enumerationem simplicem, puerile quiddam est, et precario concludit, et periculo ab instantia contradictoria exponitur, et consueta tantum intuetur, nec exitum reperit.

But in the very form also of induction, and in the judgment which is effected through it, we set in motion a work by far the greatest. For that induction of which the dialecticians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is something puerile, and concludes precariously, and is exposed to danger from a contradictory instance, and looks only at what is customary, nor does it find an exit.

Atqui opus est ad scientias inductionis forma tali, quae experientiam solvat et separet, et per exclusiones ac rejectiones debitas necessario concludat. Quod si judicium illud vulgatum dialecticorum tam operosum fuerit, et tanta ingenia exercuerit; quanto magis laborandum est in hoc altero, quod non tantum ex mentis penetralibus, sed etiam ex naturae visceribus extrahitur?

And yet there is need, for the sciences, of an induction of such a form as shall dissolve and separate experience, and by due exclusions and rejections conclude by necessity. But if that commonplace judgment of the dialecticians has been so laborious, and has exercised intellects so great; how much more must labor be spent on this other, which is extracted not only from the inmost penetralia of the mind, but also from the very viscera of nature?

Neque tamen hic finis. Nam fundamenta quoque scientiarum fortius deprimimus et solidamus, atque initia inquirendi altius sumimus, quam adhuc homines fecerunt: ea subjiciendo examini, quae logica vulgaris tanquam fide aliena recipit. Etenim dialectici principia scientiarum a scientiis singulis tanquam mutuo sumunt: rursus, notiones mentis primas venerantur: postremo, informationibus immediatis sensus bene dispositi acquiescunt.

Nor, however, is this the end. For we also press down and consolidate the foundations of the sciences more strongly, and we take the beginnings of inquiry higher than men have hitherto done: by subjecting to examination those things which vulgar logic receives as if on another’s credit. For the dialecticians take the principles of the sciences from the several sciences as if by a loan: in turn, they venerate the prime notions of the mind: finally, they acquiesce in the immediate informations of a well-disposed sense.

At nos logicam veram singulas scientiarum provincias majore cum imperio quam penes ipsarum principia sit debere ingredi decrevimus, atque illa ipsa principia putativa ad rationes reddendas compellere quousque plane constent. Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectus; nihil est eoroum quae intellectus sibi permissus congessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum, nisi novo judicio se stiterit et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit. Quinetiam sensus ipsius informationes multis modis excutimus.

But we have decreed that true logic ought to enter the several provinces of the sciences with a greater authority than that which resides in their own principles, and to compel those very putative principles to render reasons until they are plainly established. As for the first notions of the intellect, nothing of what the intellect, left to itself, has heaped together is for us anything but suspect, nor in any way ratified, unless it has stood a new judgment and been pronounced according to that. Moreover, we sift in many ways the informations (reports) of sense itself.

Sensus enim fallunt utique, sed et errores suos indicant: verum errores praesto, indicia eorum longe petita sunt.

For the senses assuredly do deceive, but they also indicate their own errors: yet though the errors are at hand, their indicia are far‑fetched.

Duplex autem est sensus culpa: aut enim destituit nos aut decipit. Nam primo, plurimae sunt res quae sensum etiam recte dispositum nec ullo modo impeditum effugiunt; aut subtilitate totius corporis, aut partium minutiis, aut loci distantia, aut tarditate atque etiam velocitate motus, aut familiaritate objecti, aut alias ob causas. Neque rursus, ubi sensus rem tenet, prehensiones ejus admodum firmae sunt.

Moreover, the fault of sense is twofold: for it either deserts us or deceives. For, in the first place, very many things escape sense even when it is rightly disposed and in no way impeded; either by the subtlety of the whole body, or by the minuteness of the parts, or by the distance of the place, or by the slowness and even the speed of motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or on account of other causes. Nor, in turn, when sense holds the thing, are its apprehensions very firm.

Nam testimonium et informatio sensus semper est ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi: atque magno prorsus errore asseritur, sensum esse mensuram rerum.

For the testimony and the information of sense are always from the analogy of man, not from the analogy of the universe: and with a very great and downright error it is asserted that sense is the measure of things.

Itaque ut his occurratur, nos multo et fido ministerio auxilia sensui undique conquisivimus et contraximus, ut destitutionibus substitutiones, variationibus rectificationes suppeditentur. Neque id molimur tam instrumentis quam experimentis. Etenim experimentorum longe major est subtilitas quam sensus ipsius, licet instrumentis exquisitis adjuti; (de iis loquimur experimentis, quae ad intentionem ejus quod quaeritur perite et secundum artem excogitata et apposita sunt). Itaque perceptioni sensus immediatae ac propriae non multum tribuimus: sed eo rem deducimus, ut sensus tantum de experimento, experimentum de re judicet.

Therefore, that these may be countered, we by much and faithful ministry have sought out and gathered from everywhere aids to sense, so that for desertions there may be substitutions, for variations rectifications may be supplied. Nor do we attempt this so much by instruments as by experiments. For the subtlety of experiments is far greater than that of sense itself, though aided by exquisite instruments; (we speak of those experiments which, to the intention of that which is sought, have been skillfully and according to art devised and applied). Therefore to the immediate and proper perception of sense we do not ascribe much: but we bring the matter to this, that sense judge only concerning the experiment, the experiment concerning the thing.

Quare existimamus nos sensus (a quo omnia in naturalibus petenda sunt, nisi forte libeat insanire) antistites religiosos, et oraculorum ejus non imperitos interpretes, nos praestitisse: ut alii professione quadam, nos re ipsa, sensum tueri ac colere videamus. Atque hujusmodi sunt ea quae ad lumen ipsum naturae ejusque accensionem et immissionem paramus: quae per se sufficere possent, si intellectus humanus aequus et instar tabulae abrasae esset. Sed cum mentes hominum miris modis adeo obsessae sint ut ad veros rerum radios excipiendos sincera et polita area prorsus desit, necessitas quaedam incumbit ut etiam huic rei remedium quaerendum esse putemus.

Wherefore we judge that we have shown ourselves the religious wardens of sense (from which all things in natural matters are to be sought, unless perhaps it should please one to be insane), and not unskilled interpreters of its oracles: so that while others by a certain profession, we in the very deed may be seen to guard and to cultivate sense. And such are the things which we prepare for the very light of nature and for its kindling and its admission: which by themselves could suffice, if the human intellect were equitable and like a tablet scraped clean. But since the minds of men are in such wondrous ways so beset that a sincere and polished surface is altogether lacking for receiving the true rays of things, a certain necessity presses upon us, that we should think a remedy must be sought even for this matter.

Idola autem a quibus occupatur mens, vel Adscititia sunt vel Innata. Adscititia vero immigrarunt in mentes hominum, vel ex philosophorum placitis et sectis vel ex perversis legibus demonstrationum. At Innata inhaerent naturae ipsius intellectus, qui ad errorem longe proclivior esse deprehenditur quam sensus.

But the idols by which the mind is occupied are either Adscititious or Innate. The Adscititious, in truth, have immigrated into the minds of men either from the tenets and sects of philosophers or from the perverse laws of demonstrations. But the Innate adhere to the very nature of the intellect, which is discovered to be far more prone to error than the senses.

Utcunque enim homines sibi placeant et in admirationem mentis humanae ac fere adorationem ruant, illud certissimum est: sicut speculum inaequale rerum radios ex figura et sectione propria immutat, ita et mentem, cum a rebus per sensum patitur, in notionibus suis expediendis et comminiscendis haud optima fide rerum naturae suam naturam inserere et immiscere.

However much men may be pleased with themselves and rush into admiration of the human mind, indeed almost to adoration, this is most certain: just as an unequal mirror alters the rays of things by its own figure and section, so too the mind, when it is acted upon by things through sense, in the disentangling and devising of its notions, with by no means the best fidelity, inserts and intermingles its own nature into the nature of things.

Atque priora illa duo Idolorum genera aegre, postrema vero haec nullo modo, evelli possunt. Id tantum relinquitur, ut indicentur, atque ut vis ista mentis insidiatrix notetur et convincatur; ne forte a destructione veterum novi subinde errorum surculi ex ipsa mala complexione mentis pullulent, eoque res recidat, ut errores non extinguantur se permutentur; verum e contra ut illud tandem in aeternum ratum et fixum sit, intellectum nisi per inductionem ejusque formam legitimam judicare non posse. Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectus ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur: redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humanae nativae.

And those former two kinds of Idols can scarcely be uprooted, but these latter by no means can be. Only this remains: that they be indicated, and that this insidious force of the mind be noted and convicted; lest perhaps from the destruction of the old, new little shoots of errors should from time to time sprout out of the very bad complexion of the mind, and the matter relapse to this, that errors are not extinguished but are exchanged; but on the contrary, that this at last be ratified and fixed forever, that the intellect cannot judge except through induction and its legitimate form. Therefore this doctrine concerning the expurgation of the intellect, that it may itself be apt for truth, is accomplished by three refutations: the refutation of the philosophies, the refutation of the demonstrations, and the refutation of native human reason.

His vero explicatis, ac postquam demum patuerit quid rerum natura, quid mentis natura ferat, existimamus nos thalamum Mentis et Universi, pronuba divina bonitate, stravisse et ornasse. Epithalamii autem votum sit, ut ex eo connubio auxilia humana et stirps inventorum quae necessitates ac miserias hominum aliqua ex parte doment et subigant, suscipiatur. Haec vero est operis pars secunda.

With these things explained, and after at last it has become evident what the nature of things and what the nature of the Mind yield, we judge that we have strown and adorned the bridal-chamber of Mind and Universe, divine Bounty being the pronuba. But let the epithalamium’s wish be that from that marriage there be engendered human aids and a stock of inventions which may in some part tame and subdue the necessities and miseries of men. This, indeed, is the second part of the work.

At vias non solum monstrare et munire, sed inire quoque consilium est. Itaque tertia pars operis complectitur Phaenomena Universi; hoc est, omnigenam experientiam, atque historiam naturalem ejus generis quae possit esse ad condendam philosophiam fundamentalis. Neque enim excellens aliqua demonstrandi via sive naturam interpretandi forma, ut mentem ab errore et lapsu defendere ac sustinere, ita ei materiam ad sciendum praebere et subministrare possit.

But the plan is not only to show and to pave the roads, but also to enter upon them. Therefore the third part of the work embraces the Phenomena of the Universe; that is, omnigenous experience, and a natural history of such a kind as can be fundamental for founding philosophy. For no excellent way of demonstrating, or form of interpreting nature, can, even as it defends and sustains the mind from error and lapse, likewise furnish and supply to it the material for knowing.

Verum iis quibus non conjicere et hariolari, sed invenire et scire propositum est, quique non simiolas et fabulas mundorum comminisci, sed hujus ipsius veri mundi naturam introspicere et velut dissecare in animo habent, omnia a rebus ipsis petenda sunt. Neque huic labori et inquisitioni ac mundanae perambulationi, ulla ingenii aut meditationis aut argumentationis substitutio aut compensatio sufficere potest; non si omnia omnium ingenia coierint. Itaque aut hoc prorsus habendum, aut negotium in perpetuum deserendum.

But for those whose aim is not to conjecture and to soothsay, but to discover and to know, and who have in mind not to contrive mimicries and fables of worlds, but to look into the nature of this very true world and, as it were, to dissect it, everything must be sought from the things themselves. Nor can any substitution or compensation of ingenuity or meditation or argumentation suffice for this labor and inquiry and perambulation of the world; not even if all the wits of all men should come together. Therefore either this must absolutely be embraced, or the undertaking must be abandoned forever.

Ad hunc vero usque diem ita cum hominibus actum est, ut minime mirum sit si natura sui copiam non faciat.

Down to this very day it has gone with men in such a way that it is by no means a wonder if nature does not make herself forthcoming.

Nam primo, sensus ipsius informatio, et deserens et fallens: observatio, indiligens et inaequalis et tanquam fortuita; traditio, vana et ex rumore; practica, operi intenta et servilis; vis experimentalis, caeca, stupida, vaga, et praerupta; denique historia naturalis, levis et inops, vitiosissimam materiam intellectui ad philosophiam et scientias congesserunt.

For, in the first place, the very information of the senses is both deserting and deceiving: observation, careless and unequal and, as it were, fortuitous; tradition, vain and from rumor; practice, intent upon work and servile; the experimental force, blind, stupid, wandering, and precipitous; finally, natural history, slight and needy, have heaped up for the intellect the most vicious material for philosophy and the sciences.

Deinde, praepostera argumentandi subtilitas et ventilatio serum rebus plane desperatis tentatur remedium, nec negotium ullo modo restituit aut errores separat. Itaque nulla spes majoris augmenti ac progressus sita est, nisi in restauratione quadam scientiarum.

Then, the preposterous subtlety of arguing and the late ventilation are attempted as a remedy for affairs plainly desperate, nor does it in any way restore the business or separate the errors. Therefore no hope of greater augmentation and progress is placed, except in a certain restoration of the sciences.

Hujus autem exordia omnino a naturali historia sumenda sunt, eaque ipsa novi cujusdam generis et apparatus. Frustra enim fuerit speculum expolire, si desint imagines; et plane materia idonea praeparanda est intellectui, non solum praesidia fida comparanda. Differt vero rursus historia nostra (quemadmodum logica nostra) ab ea quae habetur, multis rebus: fine sive officio, ipsa mole et congerie, dein subtilitate, etiam delectu et constitutione in ordine ad ea quae sequuntur.

But the beginnings of this must altogether be taken from natural history, and that itself of a certain new kind and apparatus. For it would be in vain to polish a mirror, if images are lacking; and plainly apt material must be prepared for the intellect, not only faithful aids to be procured. But again our history (just as our logic) differs from that which is current, in many respects: in the end or office, in the very mass and congeries, then in subtlety, and also in the selection and constitution with reference to the things that follow.

Primo enim eam proponimus historiam naturalem, quae non tam aut rerum varietate delectet aut praesenti experimentorum fructu juvet, quam lucem inventioni causarum affundat, et philosophiae enutricandae primam mammam praebeat. Licet enim opera atque activam scientiarum partem praecipue sequamur, tamen messis tempus expectamus, nec muscum et segetem herbidam demetere conamur. Satis enim scimus, axiomata recte inventa tota agmina operum secum trahere, atque opera non sparsim sed confertim exhibere.

For first we propound that natural history which not so much either delights with the variety of things or helps with the present fruit of experiments, as sheds light upon the invention of causes, and proffers the first teat for the nurturing of philosophy. For although we chiefly pursue works and the active part of the sciences, nevertheless we await the season of harvest, nor do we attempt to reap moss and a grassy (unripe) crop. For we know well that axioms rightly invented draw after them whole battalions of works, and exhibit works not scattered but in close array.

Intempestivum autem illum et puerilem affectum, ut pignora aliqua novorum operum propere captentur, prorsus damnamus et amovemus, ceu pomum Atalantae quod cursum retardat. Atque Historiae nostrae Naturalis officium tale est.

But we utterly condemn and remove that untimely and puerile impulse, namely, to snatch hastily at certain pledges of new works, like the apple of Atalanta which retards the course. And such is the office of our Natural History.

Quoad congeriem vero, conficimus historiam non solum naturae liberae ac solutae (cum scilicet illa sponte fluit et opus suum peragit), qualis est historia coelestium, meteororum, terrae et maris, mineralium, plantarum, animalium; sed multo magnis naturae constrictae et vexatae; nempe, cum per artem et ministerium humanum de statu suo detruditur, atque premitur et fingitur. Itaque omnia artium mechanicarum, omnia operativae partis liberalium, omnia practicarum complurium quae in artem propriam non coaluerunt, experimenta (quantum inquirere licuit et quantum ad finem nostrum faciunt) perscribimus. Quin etiam (ut quod res est eloquamur) fastum hominum et speciosa nil morati, multo plus et operae et praesidii in hac parte quam in illa altera ponimus; quandoquidem natura rerum magis se prodit per vexationes artis quam in libertate propria.

As to the collection indeed, we compile a history not only of nature free and unbound (when, namely, it flows of its own accord and accomplishes its work), such as is the history of celestial things, of meteors, of earth and sea, of minerals, of plants, of animals; but much more of nature constrained and vexed; to wit, when by art and human ministry it is thrust down from its state, and is pressed and shaped. Therefore we set down in full the experiments of all the mechanical arts, of the operative part of the liberal [arts], and of many practical disciplines which have not coalesced into their own proper art (so far as it has been permitted to inquire and so far as they conduce to our end). Nay even (to speak what the case is), not at all regarding the pride of men and what is specious, we place much more both of labor and of provision in this part than in that other; since the nature of things reveals itself more through the vexations of art than in its own liberty.

Neque Corporum tantum historiam exhibemus; sed diligentiae insuper nostrae esse putavimus, etiam Virtutum ipsarum (illarum dicimus quae tanquam cardinales in natura censeri possint, et in quibus naturae primordia plane constituuntur, utpote materiae primis passionibus ac desideriis, viz. Denso, Raro, Calido, Frigido, Consistenti, Fluido, Gravi, Levi, aliisque haud paucis) historiam seorsum comparare.

Nor do we exhibit the history of Bodies only; but we have further thought it to belong to our diligence, even to compile separately the history of the Virtues themselves (we mean those which can be reckoned as, so to speak, cardinal in nature, and in which the primordia of nature are plainly constituted, as being the first passions and desires of matter, viz. Dense, Rare, Hot, Cold, Consistent, Fluid, Heavy, Light, and not a few others).

Enimvero ut de subtilitate dicamus, plane conquirimus genus experimentorum longe subtilius et simplicius quam sunt ea quae occurrunt. Complura enim a tenebris educimus et eruimus, quae nulli in mentem venisset investigare, nisi qui certo et constanti tramite ad inventionem causarum pergeret; cum in se nullius magnopere sint usus; ut liquido appareat, ea non propter se quaesita esse; sed ita prorsus se habeant illa ad res et opera quemadmodum literae alphabeti se habeant ad orationem et verba; quae licet per se inutiles eaedem tamen omnis sermonis elementa sunt.

Indeed, to speak about subtlety, we plainly seek out a kind of experiments far more subtle and more simple than those which occur. For we educe and bring forth many things out of darkness, which would have come into no one’s mind to investigate, unless one were proceeding by a sure and constant track to the invention of causes; since in themselves they are of no great use; so that it may clearly appear that they were not sought for their own sake, but that they stand related to things and works exactly as the letters of the alphabet stand related to speech and words; which, although useless by themselves, are nevertheless the elements of all discourse.

In delectu autem narrationum et experimentorum melius hominibus cavisse nos arbitramur, quam qui adhuc in historia naturali versati sunt. Nam omnia fide oculata aut saltem perspecta, et summa quadam cum severitate, recipimus; ita ut nil referatur auctum miraculi causa, sed quae narramus a fabulis et vanitate casta et intemerata sint. Quinetiam et recepta quaeque ac jactata mendacia (quae mirabili quodam neglectu per saecula multa obtinuerunt et inveterata sunt) nominatim proscribimus et notamus; ne scientiis amplius molesta sint.

In the selection, moreover, of narrations and experiments we think that we have guarded men better than those who up to now have been engaged in natural history. For we receive everything on ocular faith, or at least as having been inspected, and with a certain utmost severity; so that nothing is reported augmented for the sake of a miracle, but what we narrate is chaste and inviolate from fables and vanity. Nay further, even the received and vaunted falsehoods (which by a certain wondrous neglect have prevailed through many ages and become inveterate) we proscribe and mark by name; lest they be any longer troublesome to the sciences.

Quod enim prudenter animadvertit quidam, fabulas et superstitiones et nugas quas nutriculae pueris instillant, mentes eorum etiam serio depravare: ita eadem nos movit ratio ut solliciti atque etiam anxii simus ne ab initio, cum veluti infantiam philosophiae sub historia naturali tractemus et curemus, illa alicui vanitati assuescat. At in omni experimento novo et paulo subtiliore, licet (ut nobis videtur) certo ac probato, modum tamen experimenti quo usi sumus aperte subjungimus; ut, postquam patefactum sit quomodo singula nobis constiterint, videant homines quid erroris subesse et adhaerere possit, atque ad probationes magis fidas et magis exquistas (si quae sint) expergiscantur: denique ubique monita et scrupulos et cautiones aspergimus, religione quadam et tanquam exorcismo omnia phantasmata ejicientes ac cohibentes.

For, as a certain person prudently observed, the fables and superstitions and trifles which nursemaids instill into boys do deprave even their minds in earnest: thus the same reasoning moved us to be solicitous and even anxious lest from the beginning, when we treat and tend, as it were, the infancy of philosophy under natural history, it become accustomed to some vanity. But in every new and somewhat subtler experiment, although (as it seems to us) sure and approved, we nevertheless openly subjoin the method of the experiment which we employed; so that, after it has been laid open how the several particulars were established for us, men may see what error may underlie and adhere, and may be stirred to probations more faithful and more exquisite (if there be any): finally, everywhere we sprinkle warnings and scruples and cautions, by a kind of religion and, as by an exorcism, casting out and restraining all phantasms.

Postremo, cum nobis exploratum sit quantopere experientia et historia aciem mentis humanae disgreget, et quam difficile sit (praesertim animis vel teneris vel praeoccupatis) a principio cum natura consuescere, adjungimus saepius observationes nostras, tanquam primas quasdam conversiones et inclinationes ac veluti aspectus historiae ad philosophiam; ut et pignoris loco hominibus sint eos in historiae fluctibus perpetuo non detentos iri, utque cum ad opus intellectus deveniatur omnia sint magis in procinctu. Atque per hujusmodi (qualem describimus) Historiam Naturalem, aditum quendam fieri posse ad naturam tutum et commodum, atque materiam intellectui praeberi probam et praeparatam, censemus.

Finally, since it has been ascertained by us how greatly experience and history disperse the acumen of the human mind, and how difficult it is (especially for minds either tender or preoccupied) from the beginning to become conversant with nature, we often subjoin our observations as certain first conversions and inclinations, and as it were aspects of history toward philosophy; so that they may be, in the place of a pledge, to men that they will not be detained perpetually in the billows of history, and that, when one comes to the work of the intellect, all things may be more in readiness. And we judge that through a Natural History of this kind (such as we describe), a certain access to nature can be made safe and commodious, and that matter may be presented to the intellect proven and prepared.

Postquam vero et intellectum fidissimis auxiliis se praesidiis stipavimus, et justum divinorum operum exercitum severissimo delectu comparavimus; nil amplius superesse videtur, nisi ut philosophiam ipsam aggrediamur. Attamen in re tam ardua et suspensa, sunt quaedam quae necessario videntur interponenda; partim docendi gratia, partim in usum praesentem.

But after indeed we have surrounded and fortified the intellect with the most trustworthy aids and protections, and have assembled a proper army of the works of God by a most rigorous selection, nothing further seems to remain, except that we should address philosophy itself. Yet in a matter so arduous and suspended, there are certain things which seem necessarily to be interposed; partly for the sake of teaching, partly for present use.

Horum primum est, ut exempla proponantur inquirendi et inveniendi secundum nostram rationem ac viam, in aliquibus subjectis repraesentata: sumendo ea potissimum subjecta quae et inter ea quae quaeruntur sunt nobilissima et inter se maxime diversa; ut in unoquoque genere exemplum non desit. Neque de iis exemplis loquimur quae singulis praeceptis ac regulis illustrandi gratia adjiciuntur (hoc enim in secunda parte operis abunde praestitimus); sed plane typos intelligimus et plasmata, quae universum mentis processum atque inveniendi continuatam fabricam et ordinem, in certis subjectis, iisque variis et insignibus, tanquam sub oculos ponant. Etenim nobis in mentem venit, in mathematicis, astante machina, sequi demonstrationem facilem et perspicuam; contra absque hac commoditate, omnia videri involuta et, quam revera sunt, subtiliora.

The first of these is that examples of inquiring and inventing, according to our method and way, be proposed, represented in some subjects: choosing especially those subjects which both among the things sought are the most noble and among themselves the most diverse; so that in each genus an example be not lacking. Nor do we speak of those examples which are added to individual precepts and rules for the sake of illustrating (for this in the second part of the work we have abundantly provided); but we mean plainly types and plasmata, which may, in certain subjects—and those various and notable—set, as it were, before the eyes the whole process of the mind and the continued fabric and order of finding. For it has come into our mind that in mathematics, with the machine standing by, the demonstration follows easy and perspicuous; whereas, without this convenience, all things appear involved and more subtle than they really are.

Itaque hujusmodi exemplis quartam partem nostri operis attribuimus: quae revera nil aliud est, quam secundae partis applicatio particularis et explicata.

Therefore to examples of this kind we have assigned the fourth part of our work: which in truth is nothing else than a particular and explicit application of the second part.

At quinta pars ad tempus tantum, donec reliqua perficiantur, adhibetur; et tanquam foenus redditur, usque dum sors haberi possit. Neque enim finem nostrum ita petimus occaecati, ut quae occurrunt in via utilia negligamus. Quamobrem quintam partem operis ex iis conficimus quae a nobis aut inventa aut probata aut addita sunt; neque id tamen ex rationibus atque praescriptis interpretandi, sed ex eodem intellectus usu quem alii in inquirendo et inveniendo adhibere consueverunt.

But the fifth part is employed for a time only, until the rest shall be perfected; and, as it were, interest is paid, until the principal can be had. For we do not pursue our end so benighted, as to neglect the useful things which occur on the way. Wherefore we make up the fifth part of the work from those things which have by us either been invented, or approved, or added; and not, however, from the rationales and prescriptions of interpreting, but from the same use of the intellect which others have been accustomed to employ in inquiring and in finding.

Etenim cum, ex perpetua nostra cum natura consuetudine, majora de meditationibus nostris quam pro ingenii viribus speramus; tum poterunt ista veluti tabernaculorum in via positorum vice fungi, ut mens ad certiora contendens in iis paulisper acquiescat. Attamen testamur interim, nos illis ipsis, quod ex vera interpretandi forma non sint inventa aut probata, teneri minime velle. Istam vero judicii suspensionem non est quod exhorreat quispiam, in doctrina quae non simpliciter nil sciri posse, sed nil nisi certo ordine et certa via sciri posse, asserit; atque interea tamen certos certitudinis gradus ad usum et levamen constituit, donec mens in causarum explicatione consistat.

For indeed, from our perpetual familiarity with nature, we are wont to hope for greater things from our meditations than the powers of our genius warrant; then these can serve, as it were, in the stead of tents pitched by the way, so that the mind, striving toward surer things, may for a little while rest in them. Nevertheless we meanwhile testify that we by those very things do by no means wish to be held bound, since they have not been discovered or approved by the true form of interpreting. Nor should anyone shudder at this suspension of judgment, within a doctrine which asserts not simply that nothing can be known, but that nothing can be known save in a certain order and by a certain way; and, in the meantime, it establishes fixed grades of certitude for use and alleviation, until the mind takes its stand in the explication of causes.

Neque enim illae ipsae scholae philosophorum qui Acatalepsiam simpliciter tenuerunt inferiores fuere istis quae pronuntiandi licentiam usurparunt. Illae tamen sensui et intellectui auxilia non paraverunt, quod nos fecimus, sed fidem et authoritatem plane sustulerunt; quod longe alia res est, et fere opposita.

For neither were those very schools of philosophers who simply held Acatalepsy inferior to those which usurped the license of pronouncing. They, however, did not prepare aids for sense and for intellect—which we have done—but plainly removed faith and authority; which is a thing far different, and almost opposed.

Sexta tandem pars operis nostri (cui reliquae inserviunt ac ministrant) eam demum recludit et proponit philosophiam, quae ex hujusmodi (qualem ante docuimus et paravimus) inquisitione legitima et casta et severa educitur et constituitur. Hanc vero postremam partem perficere et ad exitum perducere, res est et supra vires et ultra spes nostras collocata. Nos ei initia (ut speramus) non contemnenda, exitum generis humani fortuna dabit, qualem forte homines in hoc rerum et animorum statu haud facile animo capere aut metiri queant.

The sixth part of our work at last (to which the rest serve and minister) unlocks and sets forth the philosophy which is elicited and constituted from an inquiry of this sort (such as we have previously taught and prepared), legitimate and chaste and severe. But to perfect this last part and bring it to an issue is a matter placed beyond our powers and beyond our hopes. We give to it beginnings (as we hope) not to be despised; the fortune of the human race will give the outcome—of such a kind as perhaps men, in this state of things and of minds, can hardly conceive or measure in their thought.

Neque enim agitur solum foelicitas contemplativa, sed vere res humanae et fortunae, atque omnis operum potentia. Homo enim naturae minister et interpres tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de naturae ordine, opere vel mente, observaverit: nec amplius scit, aut potest. Neque enim ullae vires causarum catenam solvere aut perfringere possint; neque natura aliter quam parendo vincitur.

Nor indeed is contemplative felicity alone at issue, but truly human affairs and fortunes, and the whole potency of works. For man, the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands only so much as he has observed of nature’s order, work, or mind: nor does he know more, or can he do more. For no forces can dissolve or break the chain of causes; nor is nature conquered otherwise than by obeying.

Itaque intentiones geminae illae, humanae scilicet Scientiae et Potentiae, vere in idem coincidunt; et frustratio operum maxime fit ex ignoratione causarum.

Therefore those twin intentions, namely of human Science and Power, truly coincide in the same; and the frustration of works arises chiefly from ignorance of causes.

Atque in eo sunt omnia, siquis oculos mentis a rebus ipsis nunquam dejiciens, earum imagines plane ut sunt excipiat. Neque enim hoc siverit Deus, ut phantasiae nostrae somnium pro exemplari mundi edamus: sed potius benigne faveat, ut apocalypsim ac veram visionem vestigiorum et sigillorum creatoris super creaturas scribamus.

And in this are all things, if anyone, never casting down the eyes of the mind from the things themselves, would receive their images plainly as they are. For God would not allow this, that we should put forth the dream of our phantasy as the exemplar of the world: but rather may he graciously favor, that we may write an apocalypse and a true vision of the vestiges and seals of the Creator upon the creatures.

Itaque Tu Pater, qui lucem visibilem primitias creaturae dedisti, et lucem intellectualem ad fastigium operum tuorum in faciem hominis inspirasti; opus hoc, quod a tua bonitate profectum tuam gloriam repetit, tuere et rege. Tu postquam conversus es ad spectandum opera quae fecerunt manus tuae, vidisti quod omnia essent bona valde; et requievisti. At homo conversus ad opera quae fecerunt manus suae, vidit quod omnia essent vanitas et vexatio spiritus; nec ullo modo requievit.

Therefore Thou, Father, who gavest visible light, the firstfruits of creation, and didst inspire intellectual light to the pinnacle of Thy works into the face of man; protect and rule this work, which, proceeding from Thy goodness, returns to Thy glory. Thou, after Thou hadst turned to behold the works which Thy hands had made, sawest that all were very good; and Thou didst rest. But man, turned to the works which his own hands had made, saw that all was vanity and vexation of spirit; nor in any way did he rest.

Quare si in operibus tuis sudabimus, facies nos visionis tuae et sabbati tui participes. Supplices petimus, ut haec mens nobis constet; utque novis eleemosynis, per manus nostras et aliorum quibus eandem mentem largieris, familiam humanam dotatam velis.

Wherefore, if we sweat in your works, you will make us participants of your vision and of your sabbath. We suppliantly beseech that this mind may stand firm for us; and that, by new alms, through our hands and through the hands of others to whom you will have bestowed the same mind, you may be pleased that the human family be endowed.