Alcuin: Disputatio de Rhetorica

Qui rogo civiles cupiat cognoscere mores,
     Haec praecepta legat, quae liber iste tenet.
Scripserat haec inter curas rex Karulus aulae
     Albinusque simul: hic dedit, ille probat.
Unum opus amborum, dispar sed causa duorum:
     Ille pater mundi, hic habitator inops.

Whoever, I ask, desires to know civil mores,
     let him read these precepts which this book contains.
King Charles had written these among the cares of the court,
     and Albinus as well: this one presented, that one approves.
One work of both, but the cause of the two is different:
     that one the father of the world, this one a needy inhabitant.

Neu temnas modico lector pro corpore librum:
Corpore praemodico mel tibi portat apis.

Do not disdain, reader, a book for its modest body:
With a very small body the bee carries honey for you.

KARLUS REX ET ALBINUS MAGISTER.

KING CHARLES AND MASTER ALBINUS.

[1] Quia te, venerande magister Albine, Deus adduxit et reduxit, quaeso ut liceat mihi te de rhetoricae rationis praeceptis parumper interrogare; nam te olim memini dixisse, totam eius artis vim in civilibus versari quaestionibus. Sed ut optime nosti propter occupationes regni et curas palatii in huiuscemodi quaestionibus assidue nos versari solere, et ridiculum videtur eius artis nescisse praecepta, cuius cotidie occupatione involvi necesse est. Verum ex quo mihi paucis tuis responsionibus ianuas rhetoricae artis vel dialecticae subtilitatis claustra partim aperuisti, valde mihi in eas rationes fecisti intentum, maxime quia me in cellaria arithmeticae disciplinae pridie sagaciter induxisti vel astrologiae splendore inluminasti.

[1] Because God has led you forth and brought you back, venerable master Albinus, I ask that it be permitted me to question you a little about the precepts of rhetorical reason; for I remember that you once said that the whole force of that art is engaged in civil questions. But, as you know most excellently, on account of the occupations of the kingdom and the cares of the palace we are accustomed to be constantly engaged in questions of this sort, and it seems ridiculous not to know the precepts of that art whose occupation it is necessary to be involved in every day. Yet since by your few responses you have partly opened to me the doors of the rhetorical art and the bars of dialectical subtlety, you have made me very intent upon those disciplines—especially because yesterday you shrewdly led me into the cellars of the discipline of arithmetic and illuminated me with the splendor of astrology.

A. Deus te, domine mi rex Karle, omni sapientiae lumine inluminavit et scientiae claritate ornavit, ut non solum magistrorum ingenia prompte subsequi, sed etiam in multis velociter praecurrere possis, et licet flammivomo tuae sapientiae lumini scintilla ingenioli mei nil addere possit, tamen ne me aliqui inoboedientem notent, tuis promptulus respondeo interrogationibus, et utinam tam sagaciter quam oboedienter.

A. God has illuminated you, my lord King Charles, with every light of wisdom and has adorned you with the clarity of knowledge, so that you can not only promptly follow the wits of masters, but even in many things swiftly run ahead; and although the flame-vomiting light of your wisdom can receive nothing added by the scintilla of my little ingenuity, nevertheless, lest some mark me as disobedient, I, right prompt, answer your interrogations—and would that as sagaciously as obediently.

[2]K. Primum mihi, magister, huius artis vel studii initium pande. A. Pandam penes auctoritatem veterum. Nam fuit, ut fertur, quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum more vagabantur, nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant.

[2]K. First, teacher, lay open to me the beginning of this art or study. A. I will lay it open on the authority of the ancients. For there was, as it is said, a certain time, when in the fields men wandered everywhere after the manner of beasts, and they administered not anything by the reason of the mind, but most things by the powers of the body.

Nondum divinae religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur, sed caeca et temeraria dominatrix cupiditas ad se explendam corporis viribus abutebatur. Quo tempore quidam, magnus videlicet vir et sapiens, cognovit quae materia et quanta ad maximas res oportunitas animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo eam meliorem reddere: qui dispersos homines in agris et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam conpulit in unum locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam primo propter insolentiam reclamantes, deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et inmanibus mites reddidit ac mansuetos. Ac mihi quidem videtur, domine mi rex, hoc nec tacita nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse, ut homines a consuetudine subito converteret et ad diversas rationes vitae traduceret.

As yet the rule of divine religion, nor the measure of human office, was being cultivated, but blind and rash mistress Desire, to satisfy herself, was misusing the strengths of the body. At which time a certain man—great indeed and wise—recognized what material and how great an opportunitas for the greatest matters there was inherent in the minds of men, if someone could draw it out and, by prescribing, make it better: he, by a certain ratio, compelled scattered men, wandering in the fields and hidden in woodland roofs, into one place and gathered them together, and leading them into each and every thing useful and honest, at first, because of unfamiliarity, protesting, then, because of ratio and oratio, listening more eagerly, he made them from wild and monstrous into mild and tame. And it seems to me, my lord king, that this could not have been brought to completion by a sapientia either silent or needy of speaking, so as suddenly to turn men from custom and to lead them over to diverse rationes of life.

[3]K. Unde dicta est rhetorica? A. Apo tou retoreuein, id est copia locutionis. K. Ad quem finem spectat?

[3]K. Whence is rhetoric so called? A. Apo tou retoreuein, that is, copiousness of locution. K. To what end does it aim?

A. Ad bene dicendi scientiam. K. In quibus versatur rebus? A. In civilibus, id est doctis quaestionibus, quae naturali animi ingenio concipi possunt.

A. To the science of speaking well. K. In what matters is it engaged? A. In civil matters, that is, in learned questions, which can be conceived by the natural genius of the mind.

Nam sicut naturale est omnibus se tueri et alium ferire, etiam si armis et exercitatione non didicerint, ita naturale fere est omnibus alios accusare et se ipsos purgare, etiam si exercitatione non didicerint. Sed utilius et promptius utuntur oratione, qui disciplinis instruuntur et usu exercentur; nam omnibus naturale est loqui, at tamen multum excellit alios qui per grammaticam loquitur. K. Bene dicis, magister, etiam omnis vita nostra disciplinis proficit et usu valet, quapropter huius rhetoricae disciplinae regulas pande nobis: iam cotidiana occupationum necessitas cogit nos exerceri in illis: et primum quot sint illius artis partes dic.

For just as it is natural for all to protect themselves and to strike another, even if they have not learned by arms and training, so it is almost natural for all to accuse others and to purge themselves, even if they have not learned by training. But those who are instructed by disciplines and exercised by use employ speech more usefully and more readily; for it is natural for all to speak, yet he who speaks through grammar far excels others. K. You speak well, master; indeed our whole life makes progress by disciplines and avails by use; wherefore lay open to us the rules of this discipline of rhetoric: now the daily necessity of occupations compels us to be exercised in those: and first say how many parts there are of that art.

[4]A. Artis rhetoricae partes quinque sunt: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut verisimilium, quae causam probabilem reddant: dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem distributio: elocutio est idoneorum verborum ad inventionem accommodatio: memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio: pronuntiatio est ex rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis moderatio. Primum est enim invenire quod dicas, dein quod inveneris disponere, tum quod disposueris verbis explicare, quarto quod inveneris et disposueris et oratione vestieris memoria conprehendere, ultimum ac summum quod memoria conprehenderis pronuntiare.

[4]A. The parts of the rhetorical art are five: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, pronuntiation. Invention is the excogitation of things true or verisimilar, which render the cause probable: disposition is the distribution of the things found into an order: elocution is the accommodation of suitable words to the invention: memory is the firm perception by the mind of the things and words relative to the invention: pronuntiation is the regulation of voice and body in keeping with the dignity of the things and the words. For first it is to find what you will say, then to dispose what you have found, then to unfold in words what you have disposed, fourth to grasp in memory what you have found and disposed and clothed with speech, last and highest to pronounce what you have grasped in memory.

[5]K. Si rhetorica in causis et quaestionibus civilibus versatur, necesse est, ut mihi videtur, causas ipsas certa habere genera, quae voluissem scire exemplisque mihi monstrari. A. Ars rhetorica in tribus versatur generibus, id est demonstrativo, deliberativo et iudiciali. Demonstrativum genus, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem vel vituperationem, ut in Genesi de Abel et Cain legitur: Respexit dominus ad Abel et ad munera eius, ad Cain autem et munera eius non respexit.

[5]K. If rhetoric is engaged in civil causes and questions, it is necessary, as it seems to me, that the causes themselves have certain genera, which I would have wished to know and to be shown to me by examples. A. The rhetorical art is engaged in three genera, that is, the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial. The demonstrative genus, which is assigned to the praise or vituperation of some definite person, as is read in Genesis about Abel and Cain: The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his offerings, but upon Cain and his offerings he did not look.

Deliberativum est in suasione et dissuasione, ut in Regum legitur, quomodo Achitophel suasit David citius perdere, et quomodo Chusai dissuasit consilium eius, ut regem salvaret. Iudiciale est, in quo est accusatio et defensio, ut in actibus legimus Apostolorum, quomodo Iudaei cum Tertullo quodam oratore Paulum accusabant apud Felicem praesidem, et quomodo Paulus se defendebat apud eundem praesidem. Nam in iudiciis saepius quid aequum sit quaeritur, in demonstratione quid honestum sit intellegitur, in deliberatione quid honestum et utile sit consideratur.

The deliberative is in suasion and dissuasion, as in Kings it is read how Achitophel advised to destroy David more quickly, and how Chusai dissuaded his counsel, in order to save the king. The judicial is that in which there is accusation and defense, as in the Acts of the Apostles we read how the Jews, with a certain orator Tertullus, were accusing Paul before Felix the governor, and how Paul was defending himself before the same governor. For in judgments more often what is equitable is sought; in demonstration what is honorable is understood; in deliberation what is honorable and useful is considered.

[6]K. Quot habet causa circumstantias? A. Plenaria causa septem habet circumstantias, personam, factum, tempus, locum, modum, occasionem, facultatem. In persona quaeritur quis fecerit, in facto quid fecerit, in tempore quaudo fecerit, in loco ubi factum sit, in modo quomodo fieri potuisset, in occasione cur facere voluisset, in facultate, si ei subpeditaret potestas faciendi; per has enim et confirmari potest causa et infirmari.

[6]Q. How many circumstances does a case have? A. A plenary case has seven circumstances: person, deed, time, place, manner, occasion, faculty. In the person is inquired who did it; in the deed, what he did; in the time, when he did it; in the place, where it was done; in the manner, how it could have been done; in the occasion, why he would have wished to do it; in the faculty, whether the power of doing were at his disposal; for through these a case can both be confirmed and weakened.

Frustra enim quaeris in controversiis quid factum sit, si persona facientis deerit: et iterum personam frustra ostendis, si factum non aderit personae. Item tali in tempore vel tali in loco talis res fieri non potuit, item non eo modo fieri potuit, ut asseris, nec ideo facere voluit, nec talis homo talem habuit potestatem, ut hoc facere potuisset.

For in vain you inquire in controversies what the fact was, if the person of the doer is lacking: and again you display the person in vain, if the fact is not present to the person. Likewise, at such a time or in such a place such a thing could not have been done; likewise, it could not have been done in the mode you assert, nor therefore did he wish to do it, nor did such a man have such a power that he could have done this.

[7]K. Loci controversiarum quot sunt? A. Loci controversiarum, quos rhetores status causarum appellant, id est, ubi quaestio consistit et primum non convenerit inter partes, sunt rationales aut legales. K. Quot sunt rationales?

[7]K. How many loci of controversies are there? A. The loci of controversies, which the rhetors call the statuses of causes, that is, where the question consists and where at first there has not been agreement between the parties, are rational or legal. K. How many are the rational ones?

A. Quattuor, id est facti aut nominis aut qualitatis aut translationis. K. Singulorum exempla profer. A. Prima est facti ipsius controversia, ut est: "fecisti, non feci"; et haec prima controversia, quae in facto constat, dicitur coniecturalis constitutio, quia coniecturis exploranda res est, si fecisset an non.

A. Four, that is, of fact or of name or of quality or of translation. K. Bring forth examples of each. A. The first is the controversy of the fact itself, as is: "you did it, I did not do it"; and this first controversy, which consists in the fact, is called the conjectural constitution, because the matter is to be explored by conjectures, whether he did it or not.

Aut cum de facto convenit inter litigatores, tum saepe nominis controversiam introducunt, quia accusator augere crimen ex nomine nititur et defensor minuere: ut si quis sacrum ex privato subripuerit, utrum fur sit nominandus an sacrilegus. Defensor vult furem esse, quia fur quadruplum solvat, accusator sacrilegum, quia sacrilegus capite plectitur: et haec constitutio definitiva dicitur, quia quid sit fur et quid sacrilegus definiendum ratione et videndum, in cuius definitionem cadat qui sacrum de privato loco subripuit. Si vero inter accusatorem et defensorem convenit de facto et de nomine facti, tum quaerenda est aestimatio facti, id est quale sit factum, iustum an iniustum, utile an inutile: et haec constitutio generalis dicitur, cuius exemplum est: Quidam dux Romanus cum obsideretur ab inimicis nec ullo modo evadere potuisset, pactus est cum hostibus ut arma daret; armis vero datis salvum eduxit exercitum: accusatur a quibusdam reus esse maiestatis.

Or when there is agreement about the fact between the litigants, then they often introduce a controversy of the name, because the accuser strives to augment the crime from the name and the defender to lessen it: as if someone should filch a sacred thing from a private place, whether he ought to be named a thief or a sacrilegist. The defender wants him to be a thief, because a thief pays fourfold; the accuser (wants him) a sacrilegist, because a sacrilegist is punished with death: and this is called the definitive constitution, because what a thief is and what a sacrilegist is must be defined by reason and it must be seen into whose definition he falls who stole a sacred thing from a private place. But if between the accuser and the defender there is agreement about the fact and about the name of the act, then the appraisal of the act must be sought, that is, of what sort the deed is, just or unjust, useful or useless: and this is called the general constitution, the example of which is: A certain Roman leader, when he was being besieged by enemies and could in no way escape, made a pact with the foes to hand over arms; but when the arms had been handed over, he led the army out safe: he is accused by some of being guilty of treason.

Hic de facto et de facti nomine convenit inter ambas partes, sed quale sit factum quaeritur hoc modo, utrum satius esset amittere milites an ad hanc conditionem turpissimam venire: cuius constitutionis plures sunt partes, de quibus post dicemus. In quarta constitutione, quam translativam nominamus, quaeritur, an facere rem debeat qui fecit, aut eo tempore, vel eo modo, vel in eo loco, aut cum illis cum quibus fecit: ut si Orestes accusetur Clytaemnestram matrem suam occidisse: non iuste filium occidisse matrem, licet illa occidisset Agamemnonem patrem suum regem Graecorum. Hic quaeri debet per translationem, si iuste fecisset an non.

Here about the fact and about the name of the fact it is agreed between both parties, but of what quality the deed is is asked in this way, whether it would have been better to lose the soldiers or to come to this most disgraceful condition: of which constitution there are several parts, about which we shall speak afterward. In the fourth constitution, which we name translative, it is asked whether he who did the thing ought to have done it, or at that time, or in that manner, or in that place, or with those with whom he did it: as if Orestes were accused of having slain Clytemnestra his mother: that the son did not justly slay the mother, although she had slain Agamemnon his father, king of the Greeks. Here it ought to be asked by translation, whether he did justly or not.

[8]K. Statu causae invento quomodo tunc status ipse considerandus est? A. Constitutione causae reperta statim placet considerare, utrum quaestio causae simplex sit an iuncta. Simplex est, quae unam in se continet quaestionem, hoc modo: Corinthiis bellum indicamus an non?

[8]K. With the status of the case discovered, how then is the status itself to be considered? A. With the constitution of the case found, it is straightway fitting to consider whether the question of the case is simple or conjoined. It is simple, which contains one question in itself, in this way: Do we declare war upon the Corinthians or not?

Coniuncta est quaestio, quae ex pluribus quaestionibus constat, hoc pacto: utrum Carthago diruatur, an Carthaginiensibus reddatur, an eo colonia deducatur.

A conjoined question is that which consists of several questions, in this fashion: whether Carthage be razed, or be returned to the Carthaginians, or a colony be established there.

[9]K. Sed legales nunc constitutiones exemplis confirma. A. Considerandum est, sicut iam dixi, in ratione an in scripto sit controversia. Nam scripti controversia est ea, quae ex scripta lege nascitur, hoc modo: Lex: "qui in adversa tempestate navem reliquerint, omnia amittant, et eorum sint onera et navis qui remanserint in ea". Duo quidam cum in alto navigarent, cum alterius navis et alterius onus esset, naufragum quendam natantem misericordia moti sustulerunt in navem.

[9]Q. But now confirm the legal constitutions with examples. A. It must be considered, just as I have already said, whether the controversy is in reason or in writing. For a controversy of writing is that which arises from a written law, in this way: Law: "those who in an adverse tempest shall have abandoned the ship, let them forfeit everything, and let the cargo and the ship belong to those who shall have remained in it." Two men, while they were sailing on the deep—when the ship was one man’s and the cargo another’s—moved by mercy, took up into the ship a certain shipwrecked man who was swimming.

Postea [cum] aliquanto plus ipsos quoque tempestas vehementius iactare coepit, usque adeo, ut dominus navis, cum idem gubernator esset, in scapham confugeret, quae religata navi cohaerebat (et inde quantum potuit navi opitulabatur), ille autem, cuius merces erant, in gladium ibidem in navi occumberet; naufragus vero ad gubernacula accessit, navem regebat. Sedata tempestate navis in portum pervehitur. Ille, qui in gladium incubuerat, leviter saucius ex vulnere recreatus est.

Afterwards, when the storm began to toss them also somewhat more vehemently, to such a degree that the master of the ship, since he was the same man as the helmsman, took refuge into the skiff, which, tied to the ship, was clinging to it (and from there he aided the ship as much as he could), but the man whose merchandise it was, on the spot there on the ship fell upon his sword; the shipwrecked man, however, went to the helm and was steering the ship. The storm having been calmed, the ship is carried into port. He who had thrown himself upon the sword, being lightly wounded from the wound, was restored.

Navem cum onere horum trium iuxta scriptam legem quisque suam dixit. Et hic ex scripto quaestio nascitur, cuius sit navis, definitionibus adhibitis, quid sit relinquere navem et quid sit remanere in navi. Item ambiguitas saepe in scripta lege facit quaestionem, hoc modo: Meretrix coronam ne habeat; si habeat, publicetur.

Each claimed the ship together with the cargo of these three as his own, according to the written law. And here from the writing a question arises—whose is the ship?—with definitions applied, what it is to relinquish the ship and what it is to remain in the ship. Likewise, ambiguity often makes a question in a written law, in this way: “Let a prostitute not have a crown; if she have it, let it be made public.”

Hic ambiguitas in scripto est, an meretrix vel corona publicanda sit. Ex contrariis quoque saepe legibus nascitur quaestio, dum de una re alia lex aliter cavet, aliter et altera. Lex: "qui tyrannum occiderit, rem quam volet praemii loco a magistratu roget, et accipiet". Altera: "tyranno occiso quinque quoque eius proximos cognatione magistratus occidito". Alexandrum, qui in Thessalia tyrannidem occupaverat, Thebe uxor sua noctu occidit.

Here there is ambiguity in the writing, whether the prostitute or the crown is to be confiscated. Also from contrary laws a question often arises, while concerning one matter one law provides otherwise, and the other otherwise. Law: "whoever shall have killed a tyrant, let him ask from the magistrate the thing which he will wish as a reward, and he will receive it". The other: "with the tyrant killed, let the magistrate also kill five of his nearest by kinship". Thebe, his wife, killed Alexander, who had seized the tyranny in Thessaly, by night.

Haec filium suum, quem ex tyranno habebat, sibi in praemii loco deposcit. Sunt qui ex lege occidi puerum dicant oportere: sunt qui dicant oportere reddi matri praemii loco. Res in iudicio est.

She demands as her reward her own son, whom she had by the tyrant. There are those who say, by the law, the boy ought to be killed; there are those who say he ought to be returned to the mother as a reward. The matter is in court.

Et hic considerandum est, quae lex ad maiorem utilitatem pertineat, et quae prius esset scripta, et quos quaeque habuisset legislatores. Ex scripto et sententia controversia consistit, cum alter verbis ipsis quae scripta sunt utitur, alter ad id, quod scriptorem sensisse dicet, omnem adiungit dictionem, ut: lex aperire noctu portas vetat. Quidam aperit et amicos in oppidum accipit, ne ab hostibus opprimerentur, si foris mansissent.

And here it is to be considered which law pertains to the greater utility, and which had been written earlier, and what legislators each had had. The controversy consists in the written text and in the sense, when the one employs the very words which have been written, the other adds his whole wording to that which he will say the writer intended, as: the law forbids opening the gates by night. A certain man opens them and admits friends into the town, lest they be overwhelmed by enemies if they had remained outside.

Accusator solam intendit litteram, defensor sententiam: scriptorem legis pro inimicis claudi, non pro amicis iussisse portas oppidi. Fiunt per ratiocinationem vel definitionem legis quaestiones, dum alia ratione alter scriptum interpretari nititur, alia alter, vel si diverso modo scriptoris sententiam conantur definire; et eiusmodi, ut dixi, ex scripto fiunt quaestiones.

The accuser fixes upon the letter alone, the defender upon the meaning: that the writer of the law ordered the gates of the town to be shut against enemies, not against friends. Questions arise by ratiocination or by definition of the law, while the one strives to interpret the writing by one line of reasoning, the other by another, or if they try to define the writer’s intention in a different manner; and questions of this sort, as I said, arise from the written text.

[10]K. Perspecto controversiae loco secundum quod dixisti, an in ratione sit vel in scripto, quo tunc animus ferendus est? A. Videndum est quae quaestio, quae ratio, quae iudicatio et quod firmamentum causae sit. K. De his singulis dic.

[10]K. With the place of the controversy surveyed, according to what you have said—whether it lies in reason or in the writing—whither then should the mind be directed? A. It must be considered what the question is, what the reasoning is, what the judgment is, and what the support of the case is. K. Speak about each of these individually.

A. Quaestio est constitutio, in qua causae disceptatio constat, hoc modo: "non iure fecisti, iure feci": ratio est, qua utitur reus, quare iure fecisset, ut Orestes si accusaretur matricidii, non habet defensionem, nisi hoc dicat: iure feci; illa enim patrem meum occiderat: iudicatio est ex ratione deducta summa huiusmodi: rectumne fuerit ab Oreste matrem occidi, cum illa Orestis patrem occiderit. Firmamentum est firmissima argumentatio defensoris, ut si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum, in se ipsum, in regnum et in omne genus suum, ut ab ea poenas liberi sui potissimum expetere debuissent.

A. The question is the constitutio, in which the disputation of the cause consists, in this manner: “you did not act by right; I acted by right.” The ratio is that which the defendant uses, whereby he would have acted by right, as if Orestes were being accused of matricide; he has no defense unless he says this: I acted by right; for she had killed my father. The judication is the sum deduced from the ratio of this sort: whether it was right that the mother be slain by Orestes, since she had slain the father of Orestes. The firmament is the most firm argumentation of the defender, as if Orestes should wish to say that such was his mother’s disposition toward his father, toward himself, toward the kingdom, and toward his whole lineage, that from her his children ought most of all to exact penalties.

[11]K. De generali constitutione prius dixisti, quod plures partes haberet: illas rogo ut pandas mihi, magister, exemplisque confirmes per singulas, me tacente et probante. A. Faciam; illa enim controversia, quae quaerit quale illud factum sit, quod reo obicitur, constitutio generalis vocatur, et habet partes duas, iuridicialem et negotialem. Negotialis est, in qua quid iuris sit ex civili more et aequitate consideratur, cui diligentiae praesunt iudices, et habet in se inplicatam controversiam civilis iuris, hoc modo: Quidam dum filium non habuit, pupillum sibi fecit heredem.

[11]K. Concerning the general constitution you said before that it had several parts: those I ask that you unfold for me, master, and confirm with examples for each, I being silent and approving. A. I will do it; for that controversy which asks of what sort that deed is which is objected to the defendant is called the general constitution, and it has two parts, the juridical and the negotiary. The negotiary is that in which what the law is is considered from civil custom and equity, a diligence over which the judges preside, and it has within itself an implicated controversy of civil law, in this way: A certain man, while he did not have a son, made a ward his heir.

Sed pupillus ante mortuus est, quam hereditas in eius venisset potestatem. Fit controversia a secundis heredibus patris: nostra est possessio. Intentio est propinquorum pupilli: "nostra est pecunia, de qua testatus non est propinquus noster": depulsio est: "immo nostra, qui heredes testamento patris sumus": quaestio est, utrorum sit: ratio: "pupillo enim pater testamentum scripsit, quare quae eius sunt, nostra fiant necesse est": infirmatio rationis: "immo pater sibi scripsit secundum heredem, non pupillo: quare testamento illius vestra esse non potest hereditas": iudicatio: possitne quisquam de filii pupilli re testari; an heredes secundi ipsius patris familias, non filii quoque eius pupilli heredes sint.

But the ward died before the inheritance had come into his power. A controversy arises on the part of the father’s second heirs: possession is ours. The intention is that of the ward’s kinsmen: "the money is ours, about which our kinsman did not make a testament": the rebuttal is: "nay rather, it is ours, we who are heirs by our father’s testament": the question is, whose it is: the reason: "for the father wrote a testament for the ward, wherefore the things that are his must needs become ours": the infirmation of the reason: "nay rather, the father wrote a second heir for himself, not for the ward; wherefore by his testament the inheritance cannot be yours": the judication: whether anyone can make a testament concerning the property of a ward-son; whether the second heirs are heirs of the paterfamilias himself, and not also heirs of his son, the ward.

[12] Iuridicialis est, in qua aequi et iniqui et praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur. Huius partes sunt duae, absoluta et adsumptiva: absoluta, quae in se continet iuris et iniuriae quaestionem, hoc modo. Cum Thebani Lacedaemonios bello superavissent et fere mos esset Grais, cum inter se bellum gessissent, ut ii qui vicissent tropheum aliquod in finibus statuerent, victoriae modo in praesentiam declarandae causa, non ut in perpetuum belli memoria maneret, aeneum statuerunt tropheum.

[12] The juridical is that in which the rationale of the just and the unjust and of reward or punishment is sought. Its parts are two, the absolute and the assumptive: the absolute, which contains in itself the question of right and injury, in this way. When the Thebans had overcome the Lacedaemonians in war, and it was almost a custom among the Greeks, when they had waged war among themselves, that those who had won should set up some trophy on the borders, for the sake of declaring the victory for the present, not that the memory of the war should remain in perpetuity, they set up a bronze trophy.

Accusantur apud commune Graeciae concilium. Intentio est "non oportuit": depulsio est "oportuit": quaestio est "oportueritne": ratio est: "eam enim ex bello gloriam virtute peperimus: ut eius aeterna insignia posteris nostris relinquerentur, statuimus tropheum": infirmatio est: "at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Grais statuere non oportet": iudicatio est: cum summae virtutis celebrandae causa Grai de Grais aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum statuerunt, recte an non fecerint? Adsumptiva est, cum ipsum factum probari non potest, sed aliquo foris adsumpto argumento defenditur.

They are accused before the common council of Greece. The intention is “it was not fitting”; the defense is “it was fitting”; the question is “whether it was fitting”; the reason is: “for we have begotten that glory from war by virtue: so that its eternal insignia might be left to our posterity, we set up a trophy”; the refutation is: “but yet it is not fitting for Greeks to set up against Greeks an eternal monument of enmities”; the adjudication is: when, for the sake of celebrating the highest virtue, the Greeks set up against Greeks an eternal monument of enmities, whether they did rightly or not? The assumptive is, when the deed itself cannot be approved, but is defended by some argument assumed from outside.

Cuius partes sunt quattuor, conparatio, relatio criminis, remotio criminis, concessio.

Whose parts are four: comparison, relation of the crime, removal of the crime, concession.

[13] Conparatio est, cum aliud aliquod factum rectum aut utile contenditur, quod ut fieret, illud quod arguitur dicitur esse commissum, ut in illo exemplo, quod paulo ante posuimus. Cum dux Romanus ab hostibus obsideretur, nec ullo pacto evadere potuit nisi pacaret ut hostibus arma daret: armis datis milites conservavit, sed post accusatur maiestatis. Intentio est "non oportuit arma relinquere": depulsio est oportuit: quaestio est "oportueritne": ratio est: "milites enim omnes perissent, si hoc non fecissem": infirmatio est "non ideo fecisti". Ex quibus iudicatio est, perissentne, et ideone fecisset.

[13] Comparison is, when some other deed is contended to be right or useful, which, in order that it might be done, that which is charged is said to have been committed, as in that example which we set down a little before. When a Roman commander was besieged by the enemy, and could by no means escape unless he should make peace so as to give arms to the enemy: the arms having been given, he preserved the soldiers, but afterwards he is accused of maiestas (treason). The intention is "it was not proper to relinquish the arms": the defense is "it was proper": the question is "whether it was proper": the rationale is: "for all the soldiers would have perished, if I had not done this": the refutation is "you did not do it for that reason." From which the judgment is, whether they would have perished, and whether he did it for that reason.

Conparatio, an melius esset ad hanc turpissimam conditionem venire, vel milites perire. Relatio criminis est, cum reus id quod arguitur confessus alterius se inductum peccato iure fecisse demonstrat. Ea est huiusmodi.

Comparison: whether it would be better to come to this most disgraceful condition, or for the soldiers to perish. Relatio criminis is, when the defendant, having confessed that which is alleged, shows that he did it by right, having been induced by another’s fault. It is of such a kind.

Horatius occisis tribus Curiatiis et duobus amissis fratribus domum se victor recepit. Is animadvertit sororem suam de fratrum morte non laborantem, sponsi autem nomen appellantem identidem Curiati cum gemitu et lamentatione. Indigne passus virginem occidit; accusatur.

Horatius, the three Curiatii having been slain and his two brothers lost, returned home a victor. He observed his sister not troubled at the death of her brothers, but again and again calling the name of her fiancé, Curiatius, with groaning and lamentation. Taking it with indignation, he slew the virgin; he is accused.

Intentio est: "iniuria sororem occidisti": depulsio "iure occidi": quaestio est "iurene occiderit": ratio est: "illa enim hostium mortem lugebat, fratrum neglegebat, me et populum Romanum vicisse moleste ferebat": infirmatio est: "tamen a fratre indamnatam sororem necari non oportuit". Ex quo iudicatio fit: cum Horatia fratrum mortem neglegeret, hostium lugeret, fratris et publicae rei victoria non gauderet, oportueritne eam a fratre indamnatam occidi?

The claim is: "you killed your sister wrongfully"; the defense: "I killed by right"; the question is "whether he killed by right"; the rationale is: "for she was mourning the death of the enemies, was neglecting her brothers, and was bearing it ill that I and the Roman people had won"; the refutation is: "nevertheless it was not proper that a sister uncondemned be put to death by her brother." From which an issue for judgment arises: since Horatia was neglecting the death of her brothers, was mourning the enemies, was not rejoicing at her brother’s and the commonwealth’s victory, ought she to have been killed uncondemned by her brother?

[14] Remotio criminis est, cum eius intentio facti, quod ab adversario infertur, in alium aut in aliud crimen demovetur. Id fit bipertito; nam tum causa, tum res ipsa removetur; causae remotionis hoc nobis exemplo sit: Rhodii quosdam legarunt Athenas: legatis quaestores sumptum, quem oportebat dari, non dederant: legati profecti non sunt, accusantur. Intentio "proficisci oportuit": depulsio est "non oportuit": quaestio est "oportueritne": ratio est: "sumptus enim, qui de publico dari solet, his ab quaestore non est datus": infirmatio est: "vos tamen id, quod publici vobis erat negotii datum, conficere oportebat": iudicatio est: "cum his, qui legati erant, sumptus qui debebatur ex publico non daretur, oportueritne eos conficere nilominus legationem.

[14] Remotion of the charge is, when the intentio of the act which is brought by the adversary is shifted onto another person or into another charge. This is done in a twofold way; for now the cause, now the very thing itself is removed. Let this be our example of remotion of the cause: the Rhodians commissioned certain men as legates to Athens; the quaestors did not give the legates the expense which it was proper to be given; the legates did not set out; they are accused. The intentio is “it was proper to set out”; the depulsio is “it was not proper”; the quaestio is “whether it was proper”; the ratio is: “for the expense, which is accustomed to be given from the public funds, was not given to these by the quaestor”; the infirmatio is: “nevertheless, you ought to have completed that business which, being public, had been assigned to you”; the iudicatio is: “when to those who were legates the expense that was owed from the public funds was not given, ought they nevertheless to have completed the legation.”

Ipsius autem rei fit remotio, cum id, quod datur crimini, negat neque ad se neque ad officium suum reus pertinuisse, nec si quod in eo sit delictum, sibi adtribui oportere. Id causae genus est huiusmodi: In eo foedere, quod factum est quondam cum Samnitibus, quidam adulescens nobilis porcum sustinuit iussu imperatoris, foedere autem ab senatu improbato et imperatore Samnitibus dedito, quidam in senatu eum quoque dicit, qui porcum tenuerit, dedi oportere. Intentio est, dedi oportere: depulsio est "non oportet": quaestio est "oporteatne": ratio "non enim meum fuit officium nec mea potestas, cum id aetatis non habui et privatus essem, et summa cum auctoritate et potestate imperator mandavit, qui videret ut satis honestum foedus feriretur". Infirmatio est: "At enim, quoniam particeps tu factus es in turpissimo foedere summae relegionis, dedi te convenit". Iudicatio est: cum is, qui potestatis nil habuerit, iussu imperatoris in foedere et in tanta religione interfuerit, dedendus sit hostibus necne.

But there is a removal of the matter itself, when the defendant denies that that which is imputed as a crime pertained either to himself or to his duty, nor, if there is any fault in it, ought it to be attributed to himself. This kind of cause is of this sort: In that treaty which once was made with the Samnites, a certain noble youth held up a pig by order of the general; but when the treaty was disapproved by the senate and the general was surrendered to the Samnites, someone in the senate says that he too, who held the pig, ought to be given up. The intention is: that he ought to be surrendered; the defense is: “it ought not”; the question is: “whether it ought”; the reason: “for it was not my duty nor within my power, since I did not have the requisite age and I was a private person, and the general, with highest authority and power, commanded, who saw to it that a sufficiently honorable treaty be struck.” The infirmation is: “But indeed, since you were made a participant in a most disgraceful treaty of the highest religious obligation, it is proper that you be surrendered.” The judgment-issue is: whether, when one who had no power took part by order of the general in the treaty and in so great a matter of religion, he should be surrendered to the enemy or not.

Hoc genus causae cum superiore differt, quod in illo concedit se reus oportuisse facere id quod fieri dicat accusator oportuisse, sed alicui rei aut homini eam causam attribuit, quae voluntati suae fuerit inpedimento: in hoc autem non accusare alterum nec culpam in alium transferre debet, sed monstrare eam rem nihil ad se nec ad suam potestatem neque ad officium suum pertinuisse aut pertinere.

This genus of cause differs from the preceding, in that in that one the defendant concedes that he ought to have done what the accuser says ought to have been done, but attributes the cause to some thing or to some person which was an impediment to his will; whereas in this one he ought neither to accuse another nor transfer blame onto another, but to show that that matter had nothing to do with him nor with his power nor with his office, whether it had pertained or pertains.

[15] Concessio est, per quam non factum ipsum probatur ab reo, sed ut ignoscatur id petitur: cuius partes sunt duae, purgatio et deprecatio. Purgatio est, per quam eius qui accusatur non factum ipsum, sed voluntas defenditur: ea habet partes tres, inprudentiam, casum, necessitudinem. Inprudentia est, cum scisse aliquid is, qui arguitur, negatur, ut: Apud quosdam lex erat, ne quis Dianae vitulum immolaret: nautae quidam cum adversa tempestate in alto iactarentur, voverunt, si eo portu, quem conspiciebant, potiti essent, ei deo, qui ibi esset, se vitulum immolaturos.

[15] Concession is that by which the deed itself is not proved by the defendant, but it is sought that pardon be granted for it: its parts are two, purgation and deprecation. Purgation is that by which, of him who is accused, not the deed itself but the intention is defended: it has three parts, imprudence, chance, necessity. Imprudence is, when it is denied that the one who is arraigned knew something, as: Among certain people there was a law that no one should immolate a calf to Diana: certain sailors, when in an adverse storm they were being tossed on the deep, vowed that, if they should gain that port which they were beholding, they would immolate a calf to that god who was there.

Casu erat in eo portu fanum Dianae eius, cui vitulum immolare non licebat. Inprudentes legis cum exissent, vitulum immolaverunt; accusantur. Intentio est: "vitulum immolastis ei deo, cui non licebat": depulsio est in concessione deposita: ratio est "nescivi non licere": infirmatio est: "tamen, quoniam fecisti quod non licebat ex lege, supplicio dignus es". Iudicatio est: cum id fecerit, quod non oportuerit, et id non oportere nescierit, sitne supplicio dignus?

By chance there was in that port a fane of Diana, of the sort to whom it was not permitted to immolate a calf. Unaware of the law, when they had put in, they immolated a calf; they are accused. The intentio is: "you immolated a calf to that god to whom it was not permitted"; the depulsio is placed under concessio: the ratio is "I did not know it was not permitted"; the infirmatio is: "nevertheless, since you did what was not permitted by the law, you are worthy of punishment." The iudicatio is: when someone has done what ought not to have been done, and did not know that it ought not to be done, is he worthy of punishment?

Casus autem infertur in concessionem, cum demonstratur aliqua fortunae vis voluntati obstitisse, ut in hac re: Cum Lacedaemoniis lex esset, ut hostias nisi ad sacrificium quoddam redemptor praebuisset, capitale esset, hostias is qui redemerat, cum sacrificii dies instaret, in urbem ex agro coepit agere, cum subito magnis commotus tempestatibus fluvius Eurotas, is qui praeter Lacedaemoniam fluit, ita magnus et vehemens factus est, ut eo traduci victimae nullo modo possent. Redemptor suae voluntatis ostendendae causa hostias constituit omnes in litore, ut qui trans flumen essent videre possent. Cum omnes studio eius subitam fluminis magnitudinem scirent fuisse inpedimento, tamen eum quidam capitis arcesserunt.

Moreover, “Accident” is brought under Concession, when it is demonstrated that some force of Fortune has stood in opposition to the will, as in this case: When among the Lacedaemonians there was a law that it was a capital offense unless a contractor had provided the victims for a certain sacrifice, the man who had contracted for the victims, as the day of the sacrifice was drawing near, began to drive them into the city from the fields; when suddenly, the river Eurotas, which flows past Lacedaemonia, stirred by great storms, became so great and vehement that the victims could in no way be conveyed across it. The contractor, for the sake of showing his own will, set all the victims on the shore, so that those who were across the river might be able to see. Although all knew that the sudden greatness of the river had been an impediment to his zeal, nevertheless certain men prosecuted him on a capital charge.

Intentio est: "hostiae, quas debuisti, ad sacrificium praesto non fuerunt": depulsio concessio: ratio "flumen enim subito accrevit et ea re traduci non potuerunt": infirmatio "tamen quoniam, quod lex iubet, factum non est, supplicio dignus es": iudicatio est: cum in ea re contra legem redemptor aliquid fecerit, qua in re studio eius subita fluminis obstiterit magnitudo, supplicio dignusne sit. Necessitudo autem infertur, cum vi quadam reus id quod fecerit fecisse defenditur, hoc modo. Lex est apud Rhodios, ut, si qua rostrata navis in portu deprehensa sit, publicetur.

The intention is: "the victims, which you owed, were not present for the sacrifice": the rebuttal is a concession: the rationale "for the river suddenly swelled and for that reason they could not be conveyed across": the refutation "nevertheless, since, what the law orders, was not done, you are worthy of punishment": the issue for judgment is: since in this matter the contractor did something against the law, and in this matter the sudden magnitude of the river stood in the way of his zeal, whether he is worthy of punishment. But necessity is introduced, when by a certain force the defendant is defended as having done what he did, in this manner. There is a law among the Rhodians, that, if any rostrate ship should be caught in the harbor, it is to be made public property.

Cum magna in alto tempestas esset, vis ventorum invitis nautis in Rhodiorum portum navem coegit; quaestor navem populi vocat; navis dominus negat oportere publicari. Intentio est: "rostrata navis in portu deprehensa est": depulsio concessio: ratio "vi et necessitate sumus in portum coacti": infirmatio est: "navem ex lege tamen populi esse oportet". Iudicatio est: cum rostratam navem in portu deprehensam lex publicaverit, cumque haec navis invitis nautis vi tempestatis in portum coniecta sit, oporteatne eam publicari? Deprecatio est, cum et peccasse et consulto peccasse reus se confitetur, et tamen ut ignoscatur postulat, quod genus perraro potest accidere, in quo non defensio facti, sed ignoscendi postulatio continetur.

When there was a great tempest on the deep, the force of the winds, with the sailors unwilling, drove the ship into the port of the Rhodians; the quaestor calls the ship the People’s; the owner of the ship denies that it ought to be made public. The intention is: “a rostrate ship was apprehended in the port”; the repulse is concession; the rationale: “by force and necessity we were compelled into the port”; the infirmation is: “nevertheless, by the law, the ship ought to belong to the People.” The judgment is: since the law has made a rostrate ship caught in the port public, and since this ship was flung into the port by the force of the storm with the sailors unwilling, ought it to be made public? Deprecation is, when the defendant confesses both that he has sinned and that he has sinned deliberately, and yet petitions that pardon be granted, a kind which can very rarely occur, in which is contained not a defense of the act, but a petition for forgiveness.

Hoc genus vix in iudicio probari potest, ideo quod concesso peccato difficile est ab eo, qui peccatorum vindex esse debet, ut ignoscat impetrare.

This kind can scarcely be proved in judgment, for the reason that, the sin having been conceded, it is difficult to obtain from him who ought to be the avenger of sins that he grant pardon.

[16] Ecce habes de locis quaestionum et de statu causarum et de partibus institutionum, quae omnia cotidiano usu natura pandente agnoscis.K. Agnoscam, si naturarum conditor me adiuvaverit, et tamen habeo quod adhuc a te quaeram. A. Quaere quod placeat, pergam quo me ducis.

[16] Behold, you have about the places of questions and about the status of causes and about the parts of institutions, all of which you recognize by daily use, nature laying them open.K. I shall acknowledge them, if the Founder of natures shall aid me, and yet I have something which I would still ask of you. A. Ask what pleases; I will proceed where you lead me.

K. Quot personae solent in iudiciis esse? A. Quattuor: accusator causae, defensor causae, testes, iudex. K. Quo quisque utitur officio?

K. How many persons are accustomed to be at trials? A. Four: the accuser of the cause, the defender of the cause, the witnesses, the judge. K. What office does each exercise?

A. Iudex aequitate, testes veritate, accusator intentione ad amplificandam causam, defensor extenuatione ad minuendam causam, nisi forte in laude vel praemii petitione sit causa posita: tunc converso ordine accusatoni extenuatione et defensori amplificatione utendum est.

A. The judge with equity, the witnesses with verity, the accuser with intention toward amplifying the cause, the defender with extenuation toward diminishing the cause, unless perhaps the cause is set in praise or in a petition for a reward: then, with the order reversed, the accuser must use extenuation and the defender amplification.

[17]K. Quot modis fit amplificatio vel extenuatio causae? A. Duobus: ex inpulsione vel ratiocinatione. Inpulsio est, quae sine cogitatione per quandam affectionem animi facere aliquid hortatur, ut amor, iracundia, aegritudo, vinolentia, et omnino omnia, in quibus animus ita videtur affectus fuisse, ut rem perspicere cum consilio et cura non potuerit, et id quod fecit impetu quodam animi potius quam cogitatione fecerit.

[17]K. In how many ways is amplification or extenuation of a cause done? A. In two: from impulse or ratiocination. Impulse is that which, without cogitation, through a certain affection of the mind urges one to do something, as love, irascibility, affliction, vinolence (drunkenness), and generally all things in which the mind seems to have been so affected that it could not perceive the matter with counsel and care, and did what it did by a certain impetus of the mind rather than by cogitation.

Ratiocinatio est diligens et considerata faciendi aliquid aut non faciendi excogitatio. Ea dicetur interfuisse tum, cum faciendi aliquid aut non faciendi certa de causa vitasse aut secutus esse animus videbitur, si amicitiae quid causa factum dicitur, si inimici ulciscendi, si metus, si gloriae, si pecuniae, denique ut omnia generatim amplectamur, alicuius retinendi, augendi adipiscendive commodi, aut contra reiciundi, diminuendi devitandive incommodi causa.

Ratiocination is a diligent and considered excogitation of doing something or not doing. It will be said to have been involved then, when the mind will seem to have avoided or pursued the doing or not doing of something for a definite reason—if something is said to have been done for the sake of friendship, or for avenging an enemy, or from fear, or for glory, or for money; finally, so that we may embrace everything in general, for the sake of retaining, increasing, or acquiring some advantage, or on the contrary for the sake of rejecting, diminishing, or avoiding some disadvantage.

[18]K. Qualiter accusator vel defensor inpulsione seu ratiocinatione uti debet? A. Ergo accusator, cum inpulsione aliquid factum esse dicet, illum impetum et quandam commotionem animi affectionemque verbis et sententiis amplificare debebit et ostendere, quanta vis sit amoris, quanta animi perturbatio ex iracundia fiat aut ex aliqua causa earum, qua inpulsum aliquem id fecisse dicet, ut non mirum videatur, si quod ad facinus tali perturbatione commotus animus accesserit, et exemplis confirmare ante actis, qui simili inpulsu aliquid simile commiserunt. Cum autem non inpulsione, verum ratiocinatione aliquem commisisse quid dicet, quid commodi sit secutus aut quid incommodi fugerit, demonstrabit et id augebit quam maxime, ut: si gloriae causa, quantam gloriam consecuturam existimarit; item si dominationis, si pecuniae, si amicitiae, si inimicitiarum, et omnino quicquid erit, quod causae prodesse dicet, id summe augere debebit.

[18]Q. In what manner ought the accuser or the defender to use impulsion or ratiocination? A. Therefore when the accuser will say that something was done by impulsion, he ought to amplify that impulse and a certain commotion of the mind and affection by words and sentences, and to show how great the force of love is, how great a perturbation of mind comes from anger, or from some cause of those by which he will say someone was impelled to have done it, so that it may not seem a marvel if a mind stirred by such perturbation has approached to a crime; and to confirm it by examples previously enacted, of those who by a similar impulse have committed something similar. But when he will say that someone committed something not by impulsion but by ratiocination, he will demonstrate what advantage he pursued or what disadvantage he shunned, and will magnify that as much as possible, as: if for the sake of glory, how much glory he supposed would be attained; likewise if for domination, if for money, if for friendship, if for enmities, and, in a word, whatever there will be which he will say profits the cause, he ought to maximize that to the utmost.

Defensor autem ex contrario primum inpulsionem aut nullam fuisse dicet, aut si fuisse concedet, extenuabit et parvulam quandam fuisse demonstrabit, aut non ex ea solere huiusmodi facta nasci docebit. Ratiocinationis autem suspiciones infirmabit, si aut commodum nullum fuisse aut parvum aut aliis maius esse, aut nihilo sibi maius quam aliis: aut incommodum sibi maius quam commodum dicet, ut nequaquam fuerit illius commodi, quod expetitum dicatur, magnitudo aut cum eo incommodo, quod acciderit, aut cum illo periculo, quod subeatur, conparandum. Qui omnes loci similiter in incommodi quoque vitatione tractabuntur.

The defender, however, on the contrary, will first say that the impulsion was either none, or, if he concedes it existed, he will attenuate it and show it was rather small, or he will demonstrate that deeds of this kind are not wont to be born from it. He will weaken the suspicions of ratiocination, if either the advantage was none or small, or was greater for others, or no greater for himself than for others; or he will say that the disadvantage to himself was greater than the advantage, so that by no means was the magnitude of that advantage, which is said to have been sought, to be compared either with that disadvantage which has occurred, or with that danger which is undergone. And all these topics will likewise be handled in the avoidance of disadvantage as well.

[19]K. Quia personas causarum dixisti, dic, obsecro, loca singularum. A. Dicam, licet hoc non tantum ad artis praecepta pertineat, quantum ad officii decorem. Iudex in tribunali, causa in medio ante eum ad laudem vel ad poenam posita, ut forte patriae defensio vel proditio: accusator ad sinistram causae et defensor ad dextram, testes retro.

[19]Q. Since you have spoken of the persons of the cases, tell me, I beseech, the places of each. A. I will tell, although this pertains not so much to the precepts of the art as to the decorum of duty. The judge on the tribunal, the case in the middle before him, set for praise or for penalty, as for instance defense of the fatherland or betrayal: the accuser to the left of the case and the defender to the right, the witnesses behind.

K. An insignia sua singulae ex illis habent? A. Habent. Iudex sceptro aequitatis armandus est, accusator pugione malitiae, defensor clypeo pietatis, testes tuba veritatis.

K. Do each of them have their own insignia? A. They do. The judge must be armed with the sceptre of equity, the accuser with the dagger of malice, the defender with the shield of piety, the witnesses with the trumpet of truth.

K. Etiam his omnibus causae adiacentibus circumstantiis repertis, quid tunc quaerendum est, magister? A. Quid nisi singulae totius causae partes? K. Quae vel quot illae sint, audire desidero.

K. Even with all the circumstances adjacent to the case discovered, what then must be sought, master? A. What, if not the individual parts of the whole case? K. Which, or how many, those are, I desire to hear.

A. Sex enim sunt partes, per quas ab oratore ordinanda est oratio causae: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, conclusio.

A. For there are six parts, by which the orator is to order the oration of a case: exordium, narration, partition, confirmation, reprehension, conclusion.

[20]K. Quid est exordium? A. Oratio animum auditoris idonee conparans ad reliquam dictionem. K. Quomodo hoc efficitur?

[20]K. What is the exordium? A. An oration suitably preparing the mind of the auditor for the remaining discourse. K. How is this effected?

A. Primo ut benivolum, attentum, docilem efficias auditorem. K. Ut mihi videtur, hoc summe curandum est, ut benivolus, attentus, docilis efficiatur auditor: sed quonam modo hoc idem effici possit, velim scire. A. Quattuor ex locis benivolentia conparatur, ab nostra, ab adversariorum, ab iudicum persona, a causa.

A. First, that you make the hearer benevolent, attentive, docile. K. As it seems to me, this must be most carefully attended to, that the hearer be made benevolent, attentive, docile; but in what way this same thing can be effected, I would like to know. A. Benevolence is procured from four loci: from our own, from the adversaries’, from the judges’ person, from the cause.

Ab nostra, si de nostris factis et officiis sine arrogantia dicemus, si crimina inlata et aliquas minus honestas suspiciones iniectas diluemus, si quae incommoda acciderint aut quae instent difficultates proferemus, si prece et obsecratione humili ac supplici utemur. Ab adversariorum autem, si eos aut in odium aut in invidiam aut in contemptum adducemus. In odium ducentur, si quod eorum spurce, superbe, crudeliter, malitiose factum proferetur: in invidiam, si vis eorum, potentia, divitiae, cognatio, pecuniae proferentur, atque eorum usus arrogans et intolerabilis, ut his rebus magis videantur quam causae suae confidere: in contemptum adducentur, si eorum inertia, neglegentia, ignavia, desidiosum studium et luxuriosum otium proferetur.

From our side, if we speak of our deeds and duties without arrogance; if we shall dilute the charges brought and certain rather less honorable suspicions cast upon us; if we bring forward whatever inconveniences have happened or what difficulties press; if we employ request and entreaty, humble and suppliant. From the adversaries’, however, if we lead them either into hatred or into envy or into contempt. They will be led into hatred, if anything of theirs done foully, haughtily, cruelly, maliciously is brought forward; into envy, if their force, power, riches, kinship, monies are brought forward, and their arrogant and intolerable use of these, so that by these things they seem to trust rather than in their own cause; they will be brought into contempt, if their inertia, negligence, ignavia, sluggish application, and luxurious leisure are brought forward.

Ab auditorum persona benivolentia captabitur, si res ab iis fortiter, sapienter, mansuete gestae proferentur, ut nequaquam assentatio nimia significetur, si de iis quam honesta existimatio quantaque eorum iudicii et auctoritatis expectatio sit ostenditur: a rebus, si nostram causam laudando extollemus, aliorum causam per contemptum deprimemus. Attentos autem faciemus, si demonstrabimus ea, quae dicturi erimus, magna, nova, incredibilia esse, aut ad omnes aut ad eos qui audiant aut ad aliquos inlustres homines aut ad deos immortales aut ad summam rei publicae pertinere, et si pollicebimur nos brevi nostram causam demonstraturos, atque exponemus iudicationem aut iudicationes, si plures erunt. Dociles auditores faciemus, si aperte ac breviter summam causae exponemus, hoc est, in quo consistat controversia.

From the person of the auditors, benevolence will be courted if deeds done by them bravely, wisely, and gently are brought forward, so that by no means is excessive adulation signified; if it is shown what honorable estimation of them there is and how great an expectation of their judgment and authority; from the matters, if by praising we exalt our case and by contempt we depress the case of others. We will make them attentive, moreover, if we demonstrate that the things we are going to say are great, new, incredible, and pertain either to all, or to those who are listening, or to some illustrious men, or to the immortal gods, or to the highest interest of the commonwealth; and if we promise that we will in brief demonstrate our case, and set forth the judication or judications, if there will be several. We will make the auditors docile if we openly and briefly set forth the sum of the case, that is, wherein the controversy consists.

Sed qui bene exordiri volet, primo necesse est ut suae causae genus diligenter agnoscat.

But whoever will wish to begin well must first diligently recognize the genus of his cause.

[21]K. Quot sunt causarum genera? A. Quinque: honestum, admirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. Honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra favet auditoris animus: admirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum qui audituri sunt: humile, quod neglegitur ab auditore et non magnopere attendendum videtur: anceps, in quo aut iudicatio dubia est, aut causa et honestatis et turpitudinis particeps, ut benivolentiam pariat et offensionem: obscurum, in quo aut tardi auditores sunt aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa est implicata.

[21]Q. How many kinds of causes are there? A. Five: honorable, admirable, humble, two-edged, obscure. The honorable kind of cause is that to which the hearer’s mind at once, without our speech, shows favor; the admirable, that by which the mind of those who are going to hear is alienated; the humble, which is neglected by the hearer and seems not much to need attending to; the two-edged, in which either the iudication is doubtful, or the cause is a participant both in honesty and in turpitude, so that it breeds both benevolence and offense; the obscure, in which either the hearers are slow, or the cause is entangled with matters more difficult to come to know.

K. An semper perspicue exordiri debet orator? A. Aliquando perspicue, aliquando per circuitionem. Perspicua oratio est, cui mox animus auditoris favet, ut in honesto genere causae est: illa vero, quae per circuitionem fit, clam subit animum auditoris, ut in humili, ancipiti vel obscuro causae genere faciendum est.

K. Must the orator always begin perspicuously? A. Sometimes perspicuously, sometimes by circumlocution. A perspicuous discourse is one to which the hearer’s mind soon shows favor, as in the honorable genus of cause; but that which is done by circumlocution steals in secretly to the auditor’s mind, as must be done in the humble, ambivalent, or obscure genus of cause.

Sed hoc sciendum est, quod exordium sententiarum et gravitatis plurimum debet habere et omnino omnia quae ad dignitatem pertinent, ostentationis vero et concinnitudinis minimum, propterea quod ex his suspicio quaedam artificiosae diligentiae nascitur, quae maxime orationi fidem et oratori adimit auctoritatem.

But this must be known: that the exordium ought to have very much of sentences and gravity, and altogether all things that pertain to dignity, but of ostentation and concinnity the least, because from these there arises a certain suspicion of artful diligence, which most of all removes credibility from the speech and takes away authority from the orator.

[22]K. Ecce habeo quo modo exordiri debeat causa, nunc narrationis textum expone. A. Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio, quae tria debet habere, id est ut brevis, ut aperta, ut probabilis sit. Brevis erit, si unde necesse est, inde initium sumat, et non ab ultimo repetetur, et si cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur; nam saepe satis est quid factum sit dicere, ut ne narres quemadmodum sit factum: et si non longius quam opus est in narrando procedetur, et si nullam in rem aliam transiet oratio, et si ita dicetur, ut nonnumquam ex eo quod dictum sit, id quod non sit dictum intellegatur, et si non modo id quod obest, verum etiam id quod nec obest nec adiuvat praeteribitur: et non minus rerum non necessariarum quam verborum multitudine supersedendum est.

[22]K. Behold, I have how a cause ought to be begun; now expose the texture of the narration. A. Narration is an exposition of things done or as though done, which ought to have three things, that is, that it be brief, that it be clear, that it be probable. It will be brief, if it takes its beginning from where it is necessary, and is not repeated back from the end; and if, when it will suffice to have stated the sum of a matter, its parts are not stated; for often it is enough to say what was done, so that you need not narrate how it was done; and if one does not proceed in narrating farther than is needful; and if the speech passes over into no other matter; and if it is so spoken that sometimes from what has been said, that which has not been said is understood; and if not only that which harms, but even that which neither harms nor helps, is passed over: and one must refrain no less from a multitude of unnecessary things than from a multitude of words.

Aperta autem narratio poterit esse, si ut quidque primum gestum erit, ita primum exponetur, et rerum ac temporum ordo servabitur, ut ita narrentur res, ut gestae erunt aut ut potuisse geri videbantur. Hic erit considerandum, ne quid perturbate, ne quid contorte dicatur, ne quam in aliam rem transeatur. Probabilis erit narratio, si in ea videbuntur inesse quae solent apparere in veritate, si personarum dignitates servabuntur, si causae factorum exstabunt, si fuisse facilitates faciundi videbuntur, si tempus idoneum, si spatii satis, si locus oportunus ad eandem rem, qua de re narrabitur, fuisse ostendetur, si res et ad eorum qui agent naturam et ad vulgi rumorem et ad eorum qui audient opinionem accommodabitur.

An open narration, however, will be able to be, if, as whatever was first done, so it is first expounded, and the order of things and of times will be preserved, so that things are narrated as they were done or as they seemed to have been able to be done. Here it will have to be considered that nothing be said in a perturbed way, nothing contortedly, and that one not pass into any other matter. The narration will be probable if in it there will seem to be present the things that are wont to appear in truth, if the dignities of the persons are preserved, if the causes of the deeds stand forth, if facilities of doing will be seen to have existed, if the time is suitable, if there is space enough, if the place is shown to have been opportune for that same matter about which it will be narrated, if the matter is accommodated both to the nature of those who act and to the rumor of the crowd and to the opinion of those who will hear.

[23]K. Ordo deposcit ut de partitione dicas. A. Dicam. Partitio est rerum ad causam ipsam pertinentium divisio, quae recte habita perspicuam et inlustrem totam orationem efficit.

[23]K. Order demands that you speak on partition. A. I will speak. Partition is the division of matters pertaining to the cause itself, which, rightly conducted, renders the whole oration perspicuous and illustrious.

Quae duas habet partes: una pars est, quae quid cum adversariis conveniat et quid in controversia relinquatur ostendit, ex qua certum quiddam destinatur auditori, in quo animum debeat habere occupatum: altera est, in qua rerum earum, de quibus erimus dicturi, breviter expositio ponitur distributa, ex qua conficitur, ut certas animo res teneat auditor; nam et haec pars habere debet brevitatem, absolutionem, paucitatem. Brevitas est, cum nisi necessarium nullum assumitur verbum: absolutio est, per quam omnia quae incidunt in causam genera, de quibus dicendum est, amplectimur in partitione: paucitas est, quae eas res tantum ponit in partitione, quae necessarie sunt dicendae iterum, et ne plura quam satis est demonstraturos nos dicamus, hoc modo: "ostendam adversarios quod arguamus et potuisse facere et voluisse et fecisse", cum fecisse satis est ostendere.

which has two parts: one part is that which shows what is agreed with the adversaries and what is left in controversy, from which a certain something is assigned to the auditor, on which he ought to have his mind occupied; the other is that in which a brief exposition is set forth, distributed, of those things about which we shall speak, from which it is brought about that the auditor holds definite things in mind; for this part too ought to have brevity, absolution, paucity. Brevity is, when no word is taken up unless it is necessary: absolution is that by which we embrace in the partition all the genera that fall into the cause, about which there must be speaking: paucity is that which sets in the partition only those things which must necessarily be said again, and so that we may not say that we will show more things than is enough, in this way: "I will show, as to the adversaries, that that which we charge they both could have done and wished to do and did," when it is enough to show that they did it.

[24]K. Nunc ad confirmnationis praecepta te verte, magister, quae maxime omnibus reor necessaria, ut suam quisque sciat confirmare causam, et licet hoc voluntarie faciat, tamen non satis digne nisi praeceptis et usu agi potest. A. Ita est, domine mi rex, ut dicis. Nam omnes argumentationes ad confirmationum tendunt rationes: sed tam grandis est argumentorum silva, ut vix sub brevitate huius dialogi nostri aliquid aperiri possit.

[24]K. Now turn yourself to the precepts of confirmation, master, which I reckon most necessary for all, that each may know how to confirm his own cause; and although he may do this voluntarily, nevertheless it cannot be carried on sufficiently worthily unless by precepts and by practice. A. So it is, my lord king, as you say. For all argumentations tend toward the reasons of confirmations; but so great is the forest of arguments that scarcely anything can be laid open within the brevity of this our dialogue.

K. Tamen stringe paucis plura; nam saepe una clave multae thesaurorum gazae aperiuntur. A. Faciam prout possum. Confirmatio est argumentatio, qua tuae causae fidem et auctoritatem conparas, quae duobus modis fit, id est ex personis aut ex negotiis.

K. Yet compress many things into a few; for often by one key many treasuries’ hoards are opened. A. I will do as I can. Confirmation is an argumentation, by which you acquire for your cause credence and authority, which is done in two ways, that is, from persons or from affairs.

Et personis quidem has res adtributas putamus, nomen, naturam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes; nam ex his singulis argumenta possunt fieri, prout se commoditas causae affert.

And to persons indeed we think these things are attributed: name, nature, way of life, fortune, habit, affection/disposition, studies/pursuits, counsels, deeds, accidents, speeches; for from each of these arguments can be made, as the convenience of the case affords.

[25]K. Etsi brevitati studeas, tamen haec plenius desidero. A. Ex nomine fit argumentum hoc modo, ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Callidum vocari, quod sit temerario et repentino consilio, ut sacrae scripturae quoque utamur exemplo. Nam Esau de fratre suo Jacob dicit: recte vocatur nomen eius Jacob, id est subplantator: en altera vice subplantavit me. In natura sexus, natio, patria, cognatio, aetas consideratur: in sexu vir an mulier: in natione Graecus an barbarus: in patria Atheniensis an Romanus: in cognatione, quibus maioribus, quibus consanguineis sit: in aetate puer an adulescens, natu grandior an senex.

[25]K. Although you strive for brevity, yet I desire these more fully. A. From the name an argument is made in this way, as if we should say that someone is therefore called “Callidus” (i.e., “Cunning”) because he is of rash and sudden counsel; let us also use an example from sacred scripture. For Esau says of his brother Jacob: rightly is his name called Jacob, that is “supplanter”: behold, a second time he has supplanted me. In nature are considered sex, nation, fatherland, cognation, age: in sex, man or woman: in nation, Greek or barbarian: in fatherland, Athenian or Roman: in cognation, of what ancestors, of what consanguines he is: in age, a boy or a youth, an elder or an old man.

Item saepe ex commodis vel incommodis naturae coniectura sumenda est hoc modo: valens an inbecillis, longus an brevis, formosus an deformis, velox an tardus, acutus an hebes, memor an obliviosus, dolosus an simplex. Et ex victu multae trahuntur suspiciones, cum quemadmodum et apud quos et a quibus educatus sit et eruditus quaeritur, et quibuscum vivat et qua ratione vitae et quo more domestico vivat. Et ex fortuna saepe argumentatio nascitur, cum servus an liber, pecuniosus an pauper, nobilis an ignobilis, felix an infelix, privatus an in potestate sit aut fuerit aut futurus sit consideratur, aut denique aliquid eorum quaeritur, quae fortunae esse adtributa intelleguntur.

Likewise often from the advantages or disadvantages of nature a conjecture must be taken in this way: whether strong or weak, tall or short, well-formed or deformed, swift or slow, sharp or dull, mindful or oblivious, crafty or simple. And from the manner of living many suspicions are drawn, when it is asked how and among whom and by whom he has been brought up and instructed, and with whom he lives and by what plan of life and by what domestic custom he lives. And from fortune often an argumentation arises, when it is considered whether slave or free, moneyed or poor, noble or ignoble, fortunate or unfortunate, a private man or in power he is or was or will be, or finally something of those things is inquired which are understood to be attributed to fortune.

Habitus autem in aliqua perfecta et constanti animi aut corporis absolutione consistit, quo in genere est virtus, scientia et quae contraria sunt: res ipsa et causa posita docebit, ecquid hic quoque locus suspicionis ostendat. Nam affectionis quidem ratio perspicuam solet prae se gerere coniecturam, ut amor, iracundia, molestia, propterea quod et ipsorum vis intellegitur, et quae res harum aliquam rem consequantur faciles cognitu sunt. Studium autem quoniam est assidua et vehemens aliqua ad rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, facile ex eo ducitur argumentatio, prout res ipsa in causa desiderabit.

But habit consists in some perfect and constant completion of mind or body—in which category are virtue, science (knowledge), and their contraries; the matter itself and the case as set forth will teach whether this locus too shows a ground of suspicion. For the rationale of affection is wont to carry a perspicuous conjecture on its face—love, irascibility, vexation—because both the force of these is understood, and the things which are consequent upon them in any matter are easy to know. But zeal (study), since it is an assiduous and vehement occupation applied to some matter with great pleasure, easily yields an argument from itself, just as the matter itself in the case shall require.

Item ex consilio sumitur aliquid suspicionis; nam consilium est aliquid faciundi non faciundive excogitata ratio. Facta autem et casus et orationes tribus ex temporibus considerabuntur: quid fecerit aut quid ipsi acciderit aut quid dixerit, et quid faciat, quid ipsi accidat, quid dicat, aut quid facturus, quid ipsi casurum sit, qua sit usurus oratione. Ex quibus facile erit videndum, quid afferant ad confirmandam coniecturam suspicionis.

Likewise, something of suspicion is taken from counsel; for counsel is a thought‑out rationale of doing or of not doing something. Deeds, moreover, and contingencies and speeches will be considered from three times: what he has done, or what has happened to him, or what he has said; and what he does, what happens to him, what he says; or what he is going to do, what is going to befall him, what speech he will be going to employ. From these it will be easy to see what they bring toward confirming the conjecture of suspicion.

[26]K. Sunt haec loca accusatori seu defensori communia? A. Fiunt secundum utriusque causae commodum. K. Quo modo?

[26]K. Are these topics common to the accuser or the defender? A. They become so according to the advantage of each party’s case. K. How so?

A. Nam accusator eius vitam ante actam, quem arguit, vel protervam eius naturam seu studia malitiosa vel mores inprobos vel facta cruenta improbare debebit et ostendere, si potuerit, si in quo pari ante peccato convictus sit, et quam turpis aut cupidus aut petulans aut cruentus esset, ut mirandum non sit talem hominem ad tale facinus proruisse. Quantum enim de honestate et auctoritate eius qui arguitur detractum erit, tantum erit de facultate totius eius defensionis inminutum. Si nullo ante acto peccato reus infamari poterit, hortandi sunt iudices, non veterem famam hominis, sed novum facinus esse iudicandum.

A. For the accuser must discredit the prior life of the one whom he arraigns, or his brash nature, or malicious pursuits, or depraved morals, or bloody deeds, and show, if he can, whether he was previously convicted of any like offense, and how base or greedy or petulant or bloodstained he was, so that it be no wonder that such a man rushed to such a crime. For by as much as there is detracted from the honor and authority of the one who is accused, by so much will the capacity of his whole defense be diminished. If the defendant can be discredited by no offense previously committed, the judges must be exhorted that it is not the man’s old reputation, but the new crime, that must be judged.

Nam ante celatum esse qualis esset, nunc autem manifestum esse: quare hanc rem ex superiori vita non debere considerari, sed superiorem vitam ex hac turpitudine improbari. K. Si haec omnia accusator reo ingerit, quis locus defensionis relinquitur ei? A. Relinquitur defensionis idoneus locus; saepe enim uno protegente scuto multa nocentis repelluntur spicula. Defensor primo, si potuerit, debebit eius vitam honestissimam, fidelissimam demonstrare, aut in rem publicam aut in parentes, cognatos, amicos, et eius bene gesta fideliter ac fortiter si quae sunt proferenda; et miserum esse tam insignia bona tam parvo reatu obscurari.

For previously it was concealed what sort he was, but now it is manifest: wherefore this matter ought not to be considered from the former life, but the former life to be disapproved from this turpitude. K. If the accuser hurls all these things upon the defendant, what place of defense is left to him? A. A suitable place for defense is left; for often, with one shield protecting, many darts of the harmful are repelled. The defender first, if he can, ought to demonstrate his life as most honorable, most faithful, either toward the Republic or toward his parents, kinsmen, friends, and, if there are any, his well-performed deeds faithfully and bravely to be brought forward; and that it is pitiable that such distinguished goods be obscured by so small a charge.

Nec hoc ipsum aliqua cupiditate vel malitia seu infidelitate perpetrasse, sed casu et ignorantia aut alterius suggestione fecisse, nullumque patriae profectibus vel pietati parentum vel dignitati morum studere velle, si quolibet parvo vel levi reatu priora bona adnullenda sunt. Et hoc optimis viris esse perniciosum, ut malitiosus quilibet bonos insimulare audeat. Sin autem in ante acta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt, has eum aut inprudentiae necessitudine aut adulescentiae persuasione perpetrasse, aut aliquorum invidia fictas aut falsa opinione inlatas esse dicendum erit.

Nor did he perpetrate this very thing from any cupidity or malice or infidelity, but did it by chance and ignorance or at another’s suggestion; and that no one would wish to be zealous for the progress of the fatherland, or for piety toward parents, or for the dignity of morals, if for any small or light charge prior good deeds are to be annulled. And that this is pernicious to the best men, namely that any malicious person dares to accuse the good. But if, however, in the life previously lived there are some disgraces, it will have to be said that he perpetrated these either under the constraint of imprudence or by the persuasion of adolescence, or that they were fabricated by the envy of certain persons or brought in by a false opinion.

Si vero nullo modo vitae turpitudo aut infamia leniri potest oratione, negare oportebit de vita eius et de moribus quaerere, sed de uno crimine, de quo arguatur, quare ante actis omissis illud quod instat agi oportere.

But if in truth the turpitude or infamy of the life can in no way be mitigated by oration, it will be necessary to deny that inquiry should be made about his life and morals, but about the single charge of which he is accused, and why, the prior acts being omitted, that which is at hand ought to be pleaded.

[27]K. Dixisti quod alia argumenta a personis, alia a negotiis; haec enim a personis sunt, quae modo dixisti: sed superest ut a negotiis dicas, et primum quid negotium nomines dicito. A. Negotium est ipsum factum, in quo inter accusatorem et defensorem controversia est. Cum vero ex negotiis argumenta sumenda erunt, tria consideranda sunt: primo, quid sit ante rem, quid in re, quid post rem, ut in facto cauponis ante rem fuit, quod in itinere illi duo familiariter ibant, quod simul diverterent in hospitium et simul cenarent: in re nox, somnium, occisio: post rem, quod solus ierit, quod socium reliquerit, quod cruentum gladium habuerit.

[27]K. You said that some arguments are from persons, others from matters; for these are from persons, which you have just said: but it remains that you speak from matters, and first say what you call a “matter.” A. A matter is the very deed, in which the controversy is between the accuser and the defender. But when arguments must be taken from matters, three things are to be considered: first, what is before the affair, what in the affair, what after the affair; as, in the deed of the innkeeper, before the affair there was this: that those two were traveling on the journey in familiar fashion, that they turned aside together into a hostelry and dined together; in the affair: the night, the dream, the slaying; after the affair: that he went alone, that he left his companion, that he had a blood-stained sword.

Est quoque quartum, quod ad negotium pertinet, id est, quae lex sit eius rei vel qui sint auctores eius vel quo id nomine quod factum est appellari debeat. Ante enim rem causa facti consideranda est, id est, an spe lucri vel causa inimicitiarum vel metus vel amici occiderit hominem; nam frustra hominem occidere velle incredibile est. Omnino in gestione rei locus, tempus, occasio, modus, facultas considerari solet, id est, in quo loco vel in quo tempore vel per quem modum vel qua occasione aut facultate occiderit hominem, quaerendum est.

There is also a fourth point, which pertains to the matter, that is, what the law of that affair is, or who are its authors, or by what name that which was done ought to be appellated. For before the thing, the cause of the deed must be considered, that is, whether he killed the man by hope of gain, or by reason of enmities, or through fear, or for a friend; for it is incredible to wish to kill a man without cause. In general, in the gestion of the matter, place, time, occasion, mode, and faculty are wont to be considered, that is, it must be inquired in what place or at what time or by what mode or on what occasion or with what faculty (means) he killed the man.

Post gestam rem considerabuntur signa quaedam gestae rei, ut cruor caedis signum est et fuga reatus saepe signum solet esse.

After the deed has been carried out, certain signs of the deed done will be considered, as the gore of a slaying is a sign, and flight is often wont to be a sign of guilt.

[28]K. Commemorasti locos argumentorum et confirmationum, sed ipsa argumentatio, ut reor, nequaquam uniformis esse potest. A. Non uniformis, sed omnis argumentatio, quae ex his locis quos commemoravimus conficitur, aut probabilis aut necessaria debet esse. Necessaria sunt quae aliter fieri non possunt, ut "si peperit, concubuit cum viro". Haec vero per conplexionem seu per enumerationem vel simplicem conclusionem fiunt: per conplexionemn, in qua utrum concesseris reprehenditur ad hunc modum: "si inprobus est, cur tueris?

[28]K. You have recalled the places of arguments and confirmations, but the argumentation itself, as I think, can by no means be uniform. A. Not uniform; rather, every argumentation which is put together from those places we mentioned ought to be either probable or necessary. Necessary are those which cannot be otherwise, as “if she has given birth, she has had intercourse with a man.” These, indeed, are made through complexio or through enumeration or a simple conclusion: through complexio, in which whichever you have conceded is censured in this way: “if he is wicked, why do you defend him?”

si probus, cur accusas?" Per enumerationem, in qua pluribus rebus inductis una necessario confirmatur, hoc pacto: "necesse aut inimicitiarum causa ab hoc esse hunc occisum aut metus aut spei aut alicuius amici causa, et si horum nihil est, relinquitur ab hoc non esse occisum; nam frustra homo occidi non potest". Per simiplicem conclusionem hoc modo: "si vos me istuc eo tempore dicitis fecisse, ego eo tempore trans mare fui; ideo id quod vos dicitis, non modo non feci, sed ne potui quidem facere. K. Haec, ut intellego, omnino necessaria sunt, sed et, ut video, diligenter videndum, ne quo pacto hoc genus argumentationis refelli possit. A. Est, ut intellegis.

"if he is upright, why do you accuse?" Through enumeration, in which, with several matters introduced, one is necessarily confirmed, in this fashion: "it is necessary either that this man was killed by this person on account of enmities, or on account of fear, or hope, or on account of some friend; and if none of these is the case, it remains that he was not killed by this person; for a man cannot be killed without motive". Through a simple conclusion in this way: "if you say that I did that at that time, I at that time was across the sea; therefore that which you say I not only did not do, but I was not even able to do. K. These, as I understand, are altogether necessary, but also, as I see, it must be carefully considered lest in some way this kind of argumentation can be refuted. A. So it is, as you understand.

[29]K. Haec argumenta quae dixisti necessaria sunt: iam probabilia quoque dic. A. Probabilia sunt, quae fere fieri solent, ut "si mater est, diligit filium: si avarus est, neglegit ius iurandum". K. Num probabilia semper vera sunt? A. Alia vera in opinione, alia in similitudine: in opinione, ut "inferna esse sub terra": similitudo in contrariis et in paribus spectatur.

[29]K. These arguments which you said are necessary: now speak also of the probable. A. The probable are those which for the most part are wont to happen, as “if she is a mother, she loves her son; if he is avaricious, he neglects the oath.” K. Are the probable always true? A. Some are true in opinion, others in similitude: in opinion, as “that the infernal realms are under the earth”; similitude is observed in contraries and in equals (peers).

K. Quomodo in contrariis et in paribus? A. In contrariis hoc modo: "nam si his, qui inprudenter laeserunt, ignosci convenit, illis, qui necessario profuerunt, haberi gratiam non oportet". Ex pari sic: "nam ut locus sine portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse". K. An omnis argumentatio ex his tantum locis confirmatur, ornatur et consideratur? A. Sunt quoque argumentationes, quae per inductionem vel ratiocinationem tractantur, sed hae magis ad philosophos pertinent.

K. How in contraries and in equals? A. In contraries in this way: "for if it is fitting to pardon those who have injured unwittingly, it is not proper that thanks be had for those who have benefited of necessity." From an equal thus: "for as a place without a harbor cannot be safe for ships, so a mind without faith cannot be stable for friends." K. Is all argumentation confirmed, adorned, and considered from these places only? A. There are also argumentations which are handled through induction or ratiocination, but these pertain more to philosophers.

K. Dic tamen de illis.

K. Yet speak about those.

[30]A. Inductio est oratio, quae per certas res quaedam incerta probat et nolentem ducit in assensionem. K. Hoc mirum videtur, si facere potest, ut nolens consentiat. A. Audies et forte exemplo credis.

[30]A. Induction is a discourse that, through certain things, proves some uncertain things and leads the unwilling into assent. K. This seems marvelous, if it can make it so that one unwilling consents. A. You will hear, and perhaps you will believe by an example.

Nam philosophus quidam cum Xenophonte quodam et eius uxore iniit disputationem, et primum cum uxore sermonem instituit. "Dic mihi, quaeso, Xenophontis uxor, si vicina tua melius habeat aurum, quam tu habes, utrum illudne an tuum malis? Illud, inquit.

For a certain philosopher entered into a disputation with a certain Xenophon and his wife, and first he instituted a conversation with the wife. "Tell me, I pray, Xenophon’s wife, if your neighbor should have gold better than what you have, would you prefer that or yours?" "That," she said.

Quid si vestem et ceterum ornatum muliebrem pretii maioris habeat, quam tu habes, tuumne an illius malis? Respondit, illius vero. Age, inquit, quid si virum meliorem habeat, quam tu habes, utrumne tuum virum malis an illius?" Hic mulier erubuit.

"What if she has clothing and the rest of female adornment of greater price than you have—would you prefer yours or hers?" She replied, "Hers, indeed." "Come now," says he, "what if she has a better husband than you have—would you prefer your husband or hers?" At this the woman blushed.

Philosophus autem sermonem cum Xenophonte instituit. "Quaeso, inquit, Xenophon, si vicinus tuus equum meliorem habeat, quam tuus est, tuumne equum malis an illius? Illius, inquit.

The philosopher, moreover, instituted a conversation with Xenophon. "I beg, he said, Xenophon, if your neighbor should have a better horse than yours, do you prefer your horse or his?" "His," he said.

Quid, si fundum meliorem habeat, quam tu habes, utrum tandem fundum habere malis? Illum, inquit, meliorem scilicet. Quid, si uxorem meliorem habeat, quam tu habes, utram malis?" Atque hic Xenophon quoque ipse tacuit.

"What if he were to have a better estate than you have, which estate would you prefer to have?" "That one," he said, "the better, of course." "What if he were to have a better wife than you have, which would you prefer?" And at this point Xenophon himself too fell silent.

Post philosophus: "Quoniam uterque vestrum, inquit, id mihi solum non respondit, quod ego solum audire volueram, egomet dicam quid uterque cogitet. Nam et tu, mulier, optimum virum vis habere, et tu, Xenophon, uxorem lectissimam maxime vis. Quare, nisi hoc perfeceritis, ut neque vir melior neque femina lectior in terris sit, profecto semper id, quod optimum putabitis esse, maxime requiretis, ut et tu maritus sis quam optimae, et haec quam optimo viro nupta sit". Hic rebus non dubiis dubia probavit propter similitudinem inductionis.

Afterwards the philosopher: "Since each of you," he said, "failed to answer me only that which I alone had wished to hear, I myself will say what each is thinking. For both you, woman, wish to have the optimum husband, and you, Xenophon, most of all wish to have a most select wife. Wherefore, unless you shall have achieved this—that neither a better man nor a more choice woman exist on earth—you will assuredly always most seek that which you will reckon to be the optimum, so that both you may be the husband of the best possible woman, and this woman be wed to the best possible man." Here he proved doubtful things by means of not-doubtful things because of the similarity of the induction.

Quod si quis separatim quaereret, forte non concederetur. K. Iste philosophus non fuit evangelicus. A. Non fuit evangelicus, sed rhetoricus.

But if someone were to ask separately, perhaps it would not be conceded. K. That philosopher was not evangelical. A. He was not evangelical, but rhetorical.

K. Cur credimus ei? A. Ille secutus est suam artem. K. Quid ad haec? sequamur et nos nostram?

K. Why do we believe him? A. He followed his own art. K. What about this? Shall we also follow our own art?

A. Sequere quae velis, sequar te sequentem. K. Qualis debet esse illa inductio? A. Similis semper ei rei, cuius causa inducitur.

A. Follow what you will; I will follow you following. K. Of what sort ought that induction to be? A. Always similar to the thing for whose sake it is introduced.

K. An lucida vel obscura? A. Videndum est diligenti cura, ut non intellegat adversarius, quo spectent illae primae inductiones et ad quem finem sint perventurae; nam qui videt, aut tacendo aut negando non sinit longius ire interrogationem. K. Si negat?

K. Lucid or obscure? A. One must see to it with diligent care, that the adversary not understand toward what those first inductions aim and to what end they are going to arrive; for he who sees, either by keeping silent or by denying, does not allow the interrogation to go further. K. If he denies?

A. Ostendenda est similitudo earum, quae ante concessae sunt. K. Si tacet? A. Iam elicienda est responsio aut, quia taciturnitas imitatur confessionem, concludenda est argumentatio, sicut in concessis.

A. The similitude of those things which were previously conceded must be shown. K. If he is silent? A. A response must now be elicited, or, since taciturnity imitates confession, the argumentation must be concluded, just as in the conceded matters.

[31]K. Quomodo per ratiocinationem confirmanda est argumentatio? A. Illa enim fit propositione, adprobatione vel adsumptione et conclusione. K. Planiora haec exemplo quolibet fac.

[31]K. How is argumentation to be confirmed through ratiocination? A. For it is made by a proposition, approbation or assumption, and a conclusion. K. Make these things clearer with any example.

A. Propositio est, ut: "melius accurantur quae consilio geruntur quam quae sine consilio administrantur". Adprobatio est: "domus ea, quae ratione et consilio regitur, omnibus rebus est instructior quam ea, quae sine ratione et consilio administratur". Adsumptio est: "Nil autem omnium melius quam omnis mundus administratur". Hic altera probatio inducitur: "nam signorum ortus et occasus et annuae frugum, temporum et dierum mutationes satis mirabili ordine et certa vicissitudine disponuntur, quae signa sunt magno consilio mundum regi". Tum spectata conclusio proferenda est hoc modo: "quodsi melius geruntur ea, quae consilio quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nil autem omnium rerum melius administratur quam totus mundus, consilio igitur mundus administratur". Hoc argumentum adversus eos valet, qui dicunt mundum casu agi, non consilio regi. K. Quid stultius est, quam hoc putari? A. Stultus stulta aestimat, cui tamen iuxta Salomonem respondendum est, ne sibi sapiens videatur.

A. The proposition is, as follows: "those things which are conducted with counsel are better attended to than those which are administered without counsel". The approbation is: "that house which is ruled by reason and counsel is better furnished with all things than that which is administered without reason and counsel". The assumption is: "But nothing among all things is better administered than the whole world is administered". Here a second proof is introduced: "for the risings and settings of the constellations, and the yearly changes of crops, seasons, and days are arranged with quite marvelous order and with a fixed vicissitude, which are signs that the world is ruled by great counsel". Then the tried conclusion is to be brought forward in this way: "and if those things which are managed with counsel are conducted better than those which are administered without counsel, but nothing of all things is administered better than the whole world, therefore the world is administered with counsel". This argument prevails against those who say that the world is driven by chance, not ruled by counsel. K. What is more foolish than that this should be thought? A. A fool esteems foolish things, to whom nevertheless, according to Solomon, one must respond, lest he seem wise to himself.

[32]K. Recolo te, magister, inter orationis partes reprehensionem nominasse, sed tantam confirmationum seriem audivi, ut vix videatur reprehensori aliquis locus relictus, quo possit infirmare confirmatam his argumentis causam. A. Relinquitur ei locus infirmandi, sed non nos de ea debemus laborare: paene omnis causa in se ipsa habet loca confirmandi et loca reprehendendi. K. Suspensus sum tamen, quid de ea velis dicere.

[32]K. I recall, master, that you named reprehension among the parts of oration, but I have heard such a series of confirmations that scarcely any place seems left to the refuter, by which he could weaken the case confirmed by these arguments. A. A place for weakening is left to him, but we ought not to labor over it: almost every case has within itself places for confirming and places for reprehending. K. I am in suspense, however, what you wish to say about it.

A. Dicam, et breviter dicam. Reprehensio est, per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio aut infirmatur aut tollitur. Haec autem isdem ex locis sumitur, quibus et confirmatio, quia omnis res paene unde confirmari potest, inde et infirmari potest; quod sic evenit, si aut falsum est unde conponitur confirmatio, hoc modo: "non potest sapiens esse, qui pecuniam neglexerit" Ìü¦ multi sapientes pecuniam neglexerunt: Ìü¦ aut commune, quod nihilo minus ab adversariis potest dici hoc modo: "idcirco, iudices, quia veram causam habebam, breviter peroravi": aut leve est: "si in mentem non venisset, non commisisset": aut remotum et longius incipit quam satis est: "Si Scipio Tiberio Graccho filiam suam Corneliam non dedisset, haec seditio a filiis eorum in populo non accidisset: quare Scipioni hoc malum deputandum est". Aut offensum est, id est quod eorum qui audiunt laedit voluntatem, ut si forte ante avarum accuses pecuniae amorem: aut adversarium, id est quod tuae causae officit, ut si, cum milites tuos hortari debeas, copias hostium et fortitudinem laudes.

A. I will speak, and I will speak briefly. Refutation is that by which, by arguing, the opponents’ confirmation is either weakened or taken away. Moreover, this is taken from the same loci as confirmation, because almost every matter from which it can be confirmed, from there it can also be weakened; this happens thus, if either what the confirmation is composed from is false, in this way: "he cannot be wise who has neglected money" Ìü¦ "many wise men have neglected money": Ìü¦ or it is common, which no less can be said by the adversaries, in this way: "therefore, judges, because I had a true cause, I perorated briefly": or it is slight: "if it had not come into his mind, he would not have committed it": or it begins too remote and farther back than is sufficient: "If Scipio had not given his daughter Cornelia to Tiberius Gracchus, this sedition would not have happened among the people through their sons: wherefore this evil is to be imputed to Scipio." Or it is offensive, that is, what wounds the good will of those who hear, as if perchance you accuse love of money in the presence of a miser: or it is adversarial, that is, what hinders your cause, as if, when you ought to exhort your soldiers, you praise the forces and bravery of the enemy.

Item conplexio reprehenditur, si converti potest hoc modo: "nam si veretur, non est accusandus, quia probus est: si vero non veretur, scit se innocentem esse, et ideo non est accusandus". Hic vereri eum sive non vereri dicas, hoc putat concedendum, ut neges accusandum esse: quod conversione sic reprehenditur: "immo accusandus est, si veretur, testatus se innocentem non esse: si vero non veretur, probus non est ac ideo accusandus est." Item enumeratio reprehenditur, si praeteritur quiddam in enumeratione, hoc modo: "quia habes equum istum, aut emisti eum aut hereditate tibi evenit aut munere datus est tibi aut, si horum nihil est, subripueris eum necesse est". Quod hoc modo reprehenditur, si dici potest ex hostibus esse captum. His et aliis multis modis reprehendi possunt argumentationes, qui summo studio cavendi sunt oratori magis quam mihi propter brevitatem explanandi.

Likewise a complexio is reprehended, if it can be converted in this way: "for if he is afraid, he is not to be accused, because he is upright; but if he is not afraid, he knows himself to be innocent, and therefore he is not to be accused." Here, whether you say that he fears or does not fear, it deems this to be conceded, that you deny he is to be accused; which is reprehended by a conversion thus: "nay rather, he is to be accused, if he fears, having attested that he is not innocent; but if he does not fear, he is not upright and therefore is to be accused." Likewise an enumeration is reprehended, if something is passed over in the enumeration, as follows: "because you have that horse, either you bought it, or it came to you by inheritance, or it was given to you as a gift, or, if none of these, you must have filched it." Which is reprehended in this way, if it can be said that it was taken as a capture from enemies. By these and many other modes argumentations can be reprehended, which are to be avoided with the utmost zeal by the orator rather than to be explained by me on account of brevity.

[33]K. Restat conclusio sola, quam sex partium orationis posuisti extremam, de qua ordo postulat ut dicas. A. Conclusio est exitus et determinatio totius causae. K. Quot habet partes?

[33]K. The conclusion alone remains, which you set as the last of the six parts of an oration, about which order demands that you speak. A. The conclusion is the exit and determination of the whole cause. K. How many parts does it have?

A. Tres: enumerationem, indignationem, conquestionem. K. Enumeratio conclusionis quae est? A. Enumeratio conclusionis est, per quam res dispersae in unum locum coguntur et reminiscendi causa unum sub aspectum simul subiciuntur, hoc modo: "quidnam amplius desideratis, o iudices, cum vobis hoc et hoc dixi, hoc et hoc vobis planum feci?" K. Quid efficit indignatio?

A. Three: enumeration, indignation, lamentation (conquestion). K. What is the enumeration of the conclusion? A. The enumeration of the conclusion is that by which scattered matters are gathered into one place and, for the sake of recalling, are at once set under a single view, in this way: "what more do you desire, O judges, since I have said this and this to you, I have made this and this clear to you?" K. What does indignation bring about?

A. Odium in adversarium vel offensionem in eius causam. K. Hoc maxime velim scire, quomodo id effici possit. A. Eius praecepta plurima sint talia, si demonstramus illam rem, quam adversarius defendit, diis inmortalibus, sapientissimis hominibus, senatui, populo indignam videri; item si demonstramus adversarii alia facta crudelia, iniusta, avara, inhonesta, contumacia; item si transactam eius vitam moresque inprobamus; item quid mali sit, futurum, si non puniatur; item voluntario maleficio vel inconsueto veniam non debere dari; item si superbiam vel arrogantiam eius ostendimus; item ut de se ipse iudex cogitet vel de suis caris, si quid tale eis accidisset: item multos alacres exspectare, quid statuatur de hac re, ut ex eo quod hiuc concessum sit, sibi quoque tali de re quid liceat intellegere possint.

A. Hatred against the adversary or offense against his cause. K. This most of all I would wish to know: how that can be effected. A. Its precepts are very many, such as these: if we demonstrate that the thing which the adversary defends seems unworthy to the immortal gods, to the wisest men, to the senate, to the people; likewise if we demonstrate other deeds of the adversary to be cruel, unjust, avaricious, dishonest, contumacious; likewise if we disapprove his past life and morals; likewise what evil will be in the future, if he is not punished; likewise that pardon ought not to be given for a voluntary or an unusual malefice; likewise if we show his pride or arrogance; likewise that the judge think about himself or about his dear ones, if anything such had happened to them; likewise that many, eager, are awaiting what shall be decided about this matter, so that from what shall have been conceded here, they also may be able to understand what is permitted to them concerning such a matter.

Item indignamur taetrum, crudele, nefarium, tyranicum scelus non ulcisci, quod remotum sit ab omni lege et aequitate, tale factum non vindicari. Item in eos, qui neque laedere alium nec se defendere potuerunt, crudeliter facta dicemus, ut in pueros, mulieres, senes, infirmos; item in peregrinos, in hospites, in vicinos, in amicos atrocia gesta. Item ut iudex videat, si ipse interfuerit ac praesens viderit.

Likewise we are indignant that a foul, cruel, nefarious, tyrannical crime is not avenged, that, being removed from all law and equity, such an act is not vindicated. Likewise we shall call deeds cruelly done against those who could neither harm another nor defend themselves—such as against boys, women, old men, the infirm; likewise atrocious deeds done against foreigners, guests, neighbors, friends. Likewise, let it be as if the judge were to see it, had he himself been present and seen it.

Item si ostendi potest ab eo factum, a quo minime oportuerit, et a quo, si aluis fecerit, prohiberi conveniret. His et aliis plurimis modis, prout se causa, locus et tempus et persona affert, indignationem aut offensionem in adversariis concitare debes.

Likewise, if it can be shown that it was done by one by whom it least ought to have been done, and by one who, had another done it, it would be fitting that he forbid it. By these and very many other modes, as the case, place, time, and person bring it, you ought to stir up indignation or offense against the adversaries.

[34]K. Bene intellego de eiusmodi oratione posse animos audientium ad indignationem instigari. A. Nam, ut dixi, ex his argumentationibus, quae ex personis aut ex negotiis veniunt, amplificationes et indignationes nasci possunt. K. Possunt, ut certum teneo: sed quid sit conquestio et quid efficiat et quomodo sit perficienda edicito.

[34]K. I well understand that by a speech of this sort the minds of the hearers can be instigated to indignation. A. For, as I said, from those argumentations which come from persons or from affairs, amplifications and indignations can be born. K. They can, as I hold for certain: but what a lamentation (conquestio) is and what it effects and how it should be brought to completion, declare.

A. Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans. In hac primum animum auditoris mitem et misericordem conficere oportet, quae multis modis fit, ut quae commoda perdiderit et in quibus incommodis sit, ut in morte filii amor, spes, solacium, educatio, item quanta bona fecisset ei, qui tanta mala fecisset sibi; item quam turpes res et inliberales adversarius profert; item quam miserum vobis videretur, o iudices, si adfuissetis; item, dum bona speravi, venerunt mihi mala. Item infirmitatis infelicitas conqueritur, item disiunctio amici, parentis, filii, fratris, uxoris et suavium personarum; item quod male tractetur ab eis, a quibus non conveniat, amicis, servis; item quam misericors essem in illum.

A. Complaint is a speech that captures the compassion of the hearers. In this, first one ought to fashion the hearer’s mind as mild and merciful, which is done in many ways: such as, what advantages he has lost and in what disadvantages he is; as, in the death of a son, love, hope, solace, upbringing; likewise, how many good things he had done to him who had done him such great evils; likewise, what base and illiberal things the adversary brings forward; likewise, how pitiable it would have seemed to you, O judges, if you had been present; likewise, while I hoped for good things, evils came to me. Likewise, the unhappiness of infirmity makes complaint; likewise, separation from a friend, parent, son, brother, wife, and beloved persons; likewise, that he is ill-treated by those by whom it is not fitting, by friends, by slaves; likewise, how merciful I would be toward him.

Nam gravitas sermonis et auctoritas plus proficit saepe ad misericordiam quam humilitas et obsecratio. Sed nunc habes de prima et maxima parte rhetoricae artis, id est inventione: iam transeamus ad alias partes.

For the gravity of speech and authority often makes more progress toward mercy than humility and obsecration. But now you have the first and greatest part of the rhetorical art, that is, invention: now let us pass on to the other parts.

[35]K. Transeamus, sed primum dic, quid sit sophistica locutio? A. Si me alius quis de scola palatii tui interrogasset, forsan ostendissem ei. K. Cur alteri et non mihi? an invides me scire?

[35]K. Let us proceed, but first say, what is sophistic locution? A. If someone else from the school of your palace had interrogated me, perhaps I would have shown it to him. K. Why to another and not to me? Or do you begrudge my knowing?

A. Non invideo, sed parco et honoro. K. Non video honorem mihi esse, dum interrogata negas. A. Licet mihi interrogare te? K. Cur non?

A. I do not envy, but I spare and honor. K. I do not see an honor for me, while you refuse what is asked. A. Is it permitted me to question you? K. Why not?

nam interrogare sapienter est docere: et si alter sit qui interrogat, alter qui docet, ex uno tamen, hoc est sapientiae fonte, utrisque sensus procedit. A. Etiam procedit, et si alter est qui interrogat, alter qui respondet: tunc tu quidem non es idem qui interrogas, quod ego qui respondeo. K. Nequaquam idem.

for to ask wisely is to teach: and even if one is the one who asks, another the one who teaches, yet from one, that is, from the fount of wisdom, the understanding proceeds to both. A. It does indeed proceed, even if one is the one who asks, another the one who responds: then you indeed are not the same—you who ask—as I who answer. K. By no means the same.

A. Quid tu? K. Ego homo. A. Vides quomodo potes me concludere. K. Quomodo?

A. What about you? K. I am a man. A. You see how you can conclude against me. K. How?

A. Si dicis, si non idem ego et tu, et ego homo, consequens est ut et tu homo non sis. K. Consequens. A. Sed quot syllabas habet homo?

A. If you say, if I and you are not the same, and I am a man, it follows that you also are not a man. K. It follows. A. But how many syllables does “homo” have?

K. Duas. A. Numquid tu duae syllabae es? K. Nequaquam, sed quorsum ista? A. Ut sophisticam intellegas versutiam et videas quomodo concludi potes.

K. Two. A. Are you two syllables? K. By no means, but to what end are these things? A. So that you may understand sophistic cunning and see how you can be concluded.

K. Video et intellego ex prioribus concessis, dum concessi, ut et ego homo essem, et homo duae syllabae sunt, concludi me posse, ut ego hae duae syllabae sim. Et miror, quam latenter induxisti me prius ut concluderem te, quod homo non esses, post et me ipsum, quod duae syllabae essem.

K. I see and I understand from the prior concessions, while I conceded, that since I conceded both that I too was a man, and that “homo” has two syllables, it can be concluded about me that I am these two syllables. And I marvel how covertly you induced me earlier to conclude you were not a man, and afterward even myself, that I was two syllables.

[36] Memini te, magister, post inventionem posuisse dispositionem, in qua praecepisti inventas res oratorem ordinate distribuere. Si haec quoque aliqua habeat praecepta, pande mihi.A. Non multa per se habet haec pars ad se solam pertinentia praecepta, quae non inveniantur in inventionis praeceptis vel elocutionis.

[36] I remember, master, that after Invention you set forth Disposition, in which you instructed that the orator should distribute the things found in an orderly way. If this too has any precepts, unfold them to me.A. This part does not have many precepts belonging to itself alone, which are not found in the precepts of Invention or of Elocution.

Nam et haec rebus et verbis maxime prodest et ornamentum fidemque argumentationibus praestat et laudem orationi tribuit, cum omnia enim non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque iudicio dispensanda et conponenda sunt, prout praesens ratio utilitatis aut decoris aut necessitatis exegerit. Sed quod ad verborum dispositionem pertinet, satis plene docetur, cum de elocutione tractatur: de rerum vero dispositione per singula membra orationis in inventionis praeceptis traditum est.

For this too is most useful to matters and to words, and it furnishes ornament and credibility to argumentations and grants praise to the oration; for all things must be apportioned and composed not only with order, but also with a certain measure and judgment, according as the present ratio of utility or decorum or necessity shall have required. But as to what pertains to the disposition of words, it is taught quite fully when elocution is treated; while the disposition of matters has been handed down in the precepts of invention through the several members of the oration.

[37]K. Iam nunc nos ordo disputationis ad elocutionis deduxit inquisitionem, quae magnam causae adfert venustatem et rhetori dignitatem: nec te ab huius tam facile excusas responsis, quam in dispositionis te praeceptis eruisti. A. Non me excuso, sed tuas, domine mi rex, licet tardo pede, non tamen tarda voluntate sequar interrogationes. K. Primo qualis esse debeat elocutio aperi.

[37]K. Now the order of disputation has already led us down to an inquiry of elocution, which brings great comeliness to the cause and dignity to the rhetor: nor will you excuse yourself from this with answers as easily as you extricated yourself in the precepts of disposition. A. I do not excuse myself, but I will follow your questions, my lord king, though with a slow foot, yet not with a slow will. K. First, lay open of what sort elocution ought to be.

A. Facunda debet esse et aperta. K. Quomodo aperta? A. Aperta erit, si uteris significantibus et propriis verbis et usitatis sine ambiguo, non nimis procul ductis translationibus nec interposito hyperbato.

A. It ought to be eloquent and clear. K. How clear? A. It will be clear, if you use significant and proper words, and those in common use, without ambiguity, not with translations (metaphors) drawn too far afield, nor with hyperbaton interposed.

K. Quomodo facunda? A. Facunda erit, si grammaticae regulas servat et auctoritate veterum fulcitur. K. Qualiter ad auctoritatem priscorum potest oratio nostra pervenire?

K. How eloquent? A. It will be eloquent, if it observes the rules of grammar and is buttressed by the authority of the ancients. K. In what manner can our oration arrive at the authority of the ancients?

A. Legendi sunt auctorum libri eorumque bene dicta memoriae mandanda: quorum sermone adsueti facti qui erunt, ne cupientes quidem poterunt loqui nisi ornate. Neque tamen utendum erit verbis priscis, quibus iam consuetudo nostra non utitur, nisi raro ornandi causa et parce, sed tamen usitatis plus ornatur eloquentia. K. An magis ornatur in singulis verbis vel in coniunctione verborum eloquentia?

A. The books of the authors must be read, and their well-spoken sayings must be committed to memory: those who shall have been made accustomed to their discourse will not be able, not even if they desire it, to speak except ornately. Nor, however, should ancient words be used, which our custom no longer employs, except rarely for the sake of ornament and sparingly; yet nevertheless eloquence is more adorned by customary words. K. Is eloquence more adorned in the single words or in the conjunction of words?

A. Utrumque; nam et in singulis verbis et in coniunctione verborum decus orationis constat. K. Si in utrisque constat, de utrisque dic. A. In singulis verbis duo sunt, quae orationem inlustrant, aut si sit proprium verbum aut translatum.

A. Both; for the ornament of oration consists both in individual words and in the conjunction of words. K. If it consists in both, speak about both. A. In individual words there are two things that illumine oration: either a proper word or a translated (transferred) one.

In propriis illa laus est, ut abiecta et inconsueta fugiamus, electis et inlustribus utamur, in quibus plenum quiddam et consonans inesse videatur, in quo consuetudo etiam bene loquendi valet plurimum. In translatis late patet ornatus, quem genuit necessitas, inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem delectatio et iocunditas celebravit. Nam ut vestis frigoris repellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi coepta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem, sic verbis translatio instituta est inopiae causa, deinde frequentata est delectationis et ornatus.

In proper words that praise is this: that we shun abject and unaccustomed ones, and we use chosen and illustrious ones, in which something full and consonant seems to be present, wherein the custom of speaking well also prevails most. In transferred expressions ornament lies wide open, which necessity begot, compelled by lack and straits; afterward delight and agreeableness celebrated it. For just as clothing was first discovered for the sake of repelling cold, later it began to be applied also to the ornament and dignity of the body, so transference in words was instituted for the sake of need, then was frequented for delight and ornament.

Nam gemmare vites, luxuriare messem, fluctuare segetes etiam rustici dicunt; quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio potest, id translato inlustratur. Ea tamen transferri oportet quae clariorem faciunt rem, ut est horrescit mare et fervet aestu pelagus. Nonnumquam etiam brevitas translatione conficitur, ut telum manu fugit; inprudentia enim teli missi propriis verbis exprimi brevius non posset, et quoniam summa haec laus est verbi translati, ut sensum aperiat.

For even rustics say “the vines gem,” “the harvest luxuriates,” “the crops fluctuate”; for what can scarcely be declared by a proper word is illustrated by a transferred one. Yet those things ought to be transferred which make the matter clearer, as in “the sea bristles” and “the deep seethes with heat.” Sometimes also brevity is effected by translation, as “the weapon fled from the hand”; for the inadvertence of the missile having been sent could not be expressed more briefly by proper words, and since this is the highest praise of the transferred word, that it open the sense.

K. An undecumque licet ducere translationes? A. Nequaquam, sed tantum de honestis rebus. Nam summopere fugienda est omnis turpitudo earum rerum, ad quas eorum animos qui audiunt trahet similitudo, ut dictum est "morte Africani castratam rem publicam" et "stercus curiae": in utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis.

Q. Is it permitted to draw translations (metaphors) from anywhere whatsoever? A. By no means, but only from honorable things. For every baseness is to be most especially shunned in those matters to which the likeness will drag the minds of the hearers, as when it has been said “by the death of Africanus the commonwealth was castrated” and “the dung of the Curia”: in each the conception of the likeness is deformed.

Item non sit maior translatio, quam res postulet, ut "tempestas litis", aut contra minor, ut "aer tonat, ceu dormiens stertit". Est quoque pulchra translatio per metonymiam, cum res per auctorem rei significatur, ut pro bello Martem et pro frugibus Cererem: aut cum virtutes et vitia pro ipsis, in quibus sunt, appellamus, ut "in quam domum luxuries inrupit et avaritia penetravit". Est et synechdochica translatio pulchra, cum ex parte totum aut ex toto partem significamus, ut pro tota domu tecta dicamus aut pro undis mare.

Likewise let the translation not be greater than the matter demands, as “a tempest of a lawsuit,” nor, on the contrary, smaller, as “the air thunders, as a sleeper snores.” There is also a beautiful translation by metonymy, when a thing is signified by the author of the thing, as Mars for war and Ceres for grain; or when we name virtues and vices for the persons themselves in whom they are, as “into what house luxury has burst and avarice has penetrated.” There is also a beautiful synecdochic translation, when from a part we signify the whole, or from the whole a part, as when for the entire house we say roofs, or for the waves the sea.

[38]K. Qualis oportet verborum esse coniunctio? A. Decens et conposita et conpacta, ut ne sit hiulca vocalibus, ut "placida aura adest": nec aspera consonantibus, ut multum ille luget: nec ab ultima syllaba prioris verbi sequens verbum incipiat, ut prima mater: ne prima cum ultima efficiat obscenitatem, ut numerum numquam intellexi. Cavendum quoque est ne inania verba non rei agendae, sed structurae tantummodo implendae causa proferantur, et, ut ad summum veniamus, sicut reliquarum rerum fundamentum est sapientia, ita et in eloquentia quoque; ut enim in vita, ita et in oratione nil clarius est quam omnia sapienter fieri.

[38]Q. Of what sort ought the conjunction of words to be? A. Decent and composed and compact, so that it be not gaping with vowels, as "placida aura adest": nor rough with consonants, as multum ille luget: nor should the following word begin from the last syllable of the prior word, as prima mater: lest the first together with the last produce obscenity, as "numerum numquam intellexi." One must also beware lest empty words be brought forth not for the thing to be done, but only for the sake of filling the structure; and, to come to the summit, just as the foundation of the remaining things is wisdom, so also in eloquence; for, as in life, so also in speech, nothing is clearer than that everything be done wisely.

Quapropter oratori summopere praevidendum est, quid sibi deceat et suae conveniat causae, non in sententiis solum, sed etiam in verbis; non enim omnis fortuna, non omnis honos, non omnis auctoritas, non omnis aetas, nec vero locus aut tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum, semperque in omni parte orationis, ut vitae, quid deceat considerandum.

Wherefore the orator must with the utmost care foresee what befits himself and what is congruent to his own cause, not in sentences only, but also in words; for not every fortune, not every honor, not every authority, not every age, nor indeed every place or time or auditor, is to be handled by the same kind either of words or of sentences; and always, in every part of an oration, as in life, what is decent must be considered.

[39]K. Quid dicis de nobilissima, ut reor, rhetoricae parte, memoria? A. Quid aliud nisi quod Marcus Tullius dicit? quod thesaurus est omnium rerum memoria, quae nisi custos cogitatis inventisque rebus et verbis adhibeatur, intellegimus omnia, etiamsi praeclara fuerint, in oratore peritura.

[39]K. What do you say about the most noble, as I think, part of rhetoric, memory? A. What else except what Marcus Tullius says? that memory is the thesaurus of all things; which, unless it be applied as a guardian to the cogitated and invented things and words, we understand that all things, even if ever so illustrious, are destined to perish in the orator.

K. Suntne aliqua eius praecepta, quomodo vel illa optinenda sit vel augenda? A. Non habemus eius alia praecepta, nisi ediscendi exercitationem et scribendi usum et cogitandi studium et ebrietate cavenda, quae omnibus bonis studiis maxime nocet, quae non solum corpori aufert sanitatem, sed etiam menti adimit integritatem. K. Sufficiunt haec praecepta, si quis idoneus est ad haec inplenda; nam ut video tam ardua sunt sensu quam rara verbis.

K. Are there any precepts of it, how either it should be secured or increased? A. We have no other precepts of it, except the exercise of learning by heart, the use of writing, the zeal for thinking, and the avoidance of drunkenness, which most harms all good studies, which not only takes away health from the body, but also deprives the mind of its integrity. K. These precepts suffice, if someone is fit to fulfill them; for, as I see, they are as arduous in sense as they are rare in words.

A. Etiam ardua et utilia.

A. Also arduous and useful.

[40]K. Sed ordo meae interrogationis postulat, ut tua responsio ad pronuntiationem procedat, quam quintam partem artis rhetoricae esse in principio nostrae disputationis memini te dixisse, magister. A. Pronuntiatio est verborum dignitas vocis sensibus accommodatio et corporis moderatio. Haec enim in tantum excellit, ut etiam secundum sententiam maximi Tullii indocta oratio laudem tamen consequatur, si optime proferatur, et quamvis expolita, si indecenter pronuntietur, contemptum inrisionemque mereatur, nisi forte tibi, domine mi rex, aliter videatur.

[40]K. But the order of my questioning requires that your response proceed to pronunciation, which I remember you said at the beginning of our disputation was the fifth part of the rhetorical art, master. A. Pronunciation is the dignity of the words, the accommodation of the voice to the sense, and the moderation of the body. For this excels so greatly that, even according to the judgment of the most great Tullius, an unlearned speech nevertheless obtains praise if it is brought forth very well; and however polished, if it is delivered indecently, it deserves contempt and derision—unless perhaps, my lord king, it seems otherwise to you.

K. Mihi nequaquam aliter, sed huius quoque partis praecepta sequenda vel vitia cavenda velim ut dicas. A. Primo exerceri debet vocis et spiritus moderatio et corporis et linguae motus, quae non tam artis sunt quam laboris. Vitia quoque si quae sunt oris, diligenti cura sunt emendanda: ne verba sint inflata vel anhelata vel in faucibus frendentia nec oris inanitate resonantia, non aspera frendentibus dentibus, non hiantibus labris prolata, sed pressim et aequabiliter et leniter et clare pronuntiata, ut suis quaeque litterae sonis enuntientur, et unumquodque verbum legitimo accentu decoretur, nec immoderato clamore vociferetur, vel ostentationis causa frangatur oratio, verum pro locis, rebus, personis, causis et temporibus dispensanda est.

K. For me by no means otherwise; but I would like you to say that in this part too the precepts are to be followed and the vices to be avoided. A. First, the moderation of the voice and breath ought to be exercised, and the movement of the body and of the tongue, which are not so much a matter of art as of labor. The faults too, if there are any, of the mouth, must be corrected with diligent care: lest the words be inflated or gasped, or gnashing in the throat, nor resounding with the emptiness of the mouth, not rough with teeth gnashing, not brought forth with gaping lips, but pronounced compactly and evenly and gently and clearly, so that each letter may be enunciated with its proper sounds, and each word be adorned with its legitimate accent, nor let one vociferate with immoderate clamor, or for the sake of ostentation let the oration be broken; rather it must be dispensed according to places, matters, persons, causes, and times.

Nam alia simplicitate narranda sunt, alia auctoritate suadenda, alia cum indignatione depromenda, alia miseratione flectenda, ut semper vox et oratio suae causae conveniat. Haec te praecepta ad pronuntiationis laudem deducunt, et tibi honestatem et tuae causae fidem efficient.

For some things must be narrated with simplicity, others urged with authority, others brought forth with indignation, others bent with commiseration, so that the voice and the speech may always suit its cause. These precepts lead you to the praise of delivery, and will effect for you honor and credence for your cause.

[41]K. Quid est quod paulo ante corporis moderationem dixisti esse servandam? A. Dixi, quia necessarie observandum est, ut recta sit facies, ne labra detorqueantur, ne inmodicus hiatus rictus distendat, ne supinus vultus, ne deiecti in terram oculi, ne inclinata cervix, neque elata aut depressa supercilia. Infinitum enim in his quoque rebus momentum est, quia nihil potest placere, quod non decet et, ut ait Marcus Tullius, caput artis est decere quod facis.

[41]K. What is it that a little before you said must be kept as moderation of the body? A. I said that it must necessarily be observed, that the face be straight, lest the lips be twisted, lest an immoderate gape distend the jaws, lest the countenance be upturned, nor the eyes cast down to the ground, nor the neck inclined, nor the eyebrows raised or depressed. For the importance is infinite even in these matters, since nothing can please which is not seemly; and, as Marcus Tullius says, the chief of the art is that what you do be decorous.

Labra lambere vel mordere deforme est, cum etiam in efficiendis verbis modicus esse debeat eorum motus; ore enim magis quam labris loquendum est.

To lick or to bite the lips is deformed, since even in the effecting of words their movement ought to be moderate; for one ought to speak more with the mouth than with the lips.

[42]K. Haec, venerande magister, iocunda esse et honesta fateor mihique multum placabilia: sed, ut video et intellego, iugem exercitationem et cotidianum usum postulant, et ad plenam consummationem nisi continua meditatione et instanti exercitatione non possunt pervenire, sine qua nullam disciplinam inlustrem esse puto. A. Ita est, domine mi rex, ut dicis; nam exercitatio ingenium et naturam saepe vincit, et usus omnium magistrorum praecepta superabit. Quamobrem inventio et dispositio et elocutio et memoria et pronuntiatio usu acri et exercitatione intentissima convalescant; naturae enim vicem paene obtinet consuetudo.

[42]K. These things, venerable master, I confess to be pleasant and honorable and very pleasing to me: but, as I see and understand, they demand continual exercise and quotidian use, and they cannot arrive at full consummation except by continuous meditation and assiduous exercise, without which I think no discipline to be illustrious. A. So it is, my lord king, as you say; for exercise often conquers talent and nature, and practice will surpass the precepts of all teachers. Wherefore let invention and disposition and elocution and memory and pronunciation grow strong by vigorous use and most intent exercise; for habit almost obtains the place of nature.

Nam in arte qualibet exercitata consuetudo confidentiam constantiamque procreat, sine qua nil ars proficit. Quid enim timidis arma? Amet laudem iuvenis, magnumque esse sciat multis tacentibus solum audiri; nam licet ipsa vitium sit ambitio, frequenter tamen causa virtutum est.

For in any art, a practiced habit begets confidence and constancy, without which art profits nothing. For what are arms to the timid? Let the youth love praise, and let him know it to be something great to be the only one heard while many are silent; for although ambition itself is a vice, yet frequently it is the cause of virtues.

Discat ab adulescentia non reformidare ante multos loqui, ut eum nec metus frangat nec ultra modum reverentia retardet, ut, dum omnibus oratoris sit opibus instructus, animi quoque praestantia et oris fiducia illi non desit.

Let him learn from adolescence not to dread speaking before many, so that neither fear may shatter him nor reverence beyond measure may delay him, so that, while he is equipped with all the resources of an orator, excellence of spirit and confidence of the mouth also may not be lacking to him.

[43]K. Quapropter, ut mihi videtur, illis sermocinandi ratio, qui causis civilibus et negotiis saecularibus interesse aestimandi sunt, mox a pueritia multo studio habenda est vocis quoque et verborum exercitatio, ut ab ineunte aetate adsuescat vocis fiducia et verborum copia et decenti corporis motu, ut sine formidine faciat in publicis quaestionibus, quod cum consuetudine gessit in privatis. A. Vere intellegis et optime prosequeris. Nam ut in castris miles, sic in domo orator debet erudiri, ut quod solus exercuerat, inter multos facere non formidet.

[43]K. Wherefore, as it seems to me, for those who are to be considered to take part in civil causes and secular business affairs, the method of discoursing should, soon from boyhood, be cultivated with much zeal, and likewise an exercise of the voice and of words, so that from his earliest age he may grow accustomed to confidence of voice, abundance of words, and a becoming movement of the body, so that without dread he may do in public trials what by practice he has carried on in private. A. Truly you understand and you set it forth most excellently. For as a soldier in the camp, so an orator in the home ought to be trained, so that what he had practiced alone, he may not fear to do among many.

K. Iam quoque necesse esse video, ut domesticus usus cavere incipiat, quod publicus conventus detrahere possit. Nec enim inhonestis verbis inter suos uti debet qui honestis inter alienos loqui desiderat, cum in omni parte vitae honestas pernecessaria est, maxime in sermonibus, quia fere cuiusque mores sermo probat, nisi tibi, magister, aliud videatur. A. Mihi vero de hac re nil aliud videri potest, ac ideo consuetudinaria sermocinatione verba sint lecta, honesta, lucida, simplicia, plano ore, vultu quieto, facie conposita, sine inmoderato cachinno, clamore nullo prolata.

K. Now too I see it to be necessary that domestic usage begin to beware of what a public convocation can detract. For he ought not to use dishonorable words among his own who desires to speak honorable ones among outsiders, since in every part of life honorableness is most necessary, especially in discourses, because speech for the most part proves each one’s character, unless to you, master, it seems otherwise. A. Indeed, nothing else can seem to me about this matter; and therefore in customary conversation the words should be selected, honorable, lucid, simple, with plain delivery, with a quiet countenance, a composed face, without immoderate guffaw, brought forth with no clamor.

Nam bonus modus est in loquendo, tamquam in ambulando, clementer ire, sine saltu, sine mora, quatenus omnia medii moderaminis temperantia fulgeant, quae est una de quattuor virtutibus, de quibus ceterae quasi radicibus procedant virtutes, in quibus animae est nobilitas, vitae dignitas, morum honestas, laus disciplinae. K. Intellego philosophicum illud proverbium non solum moribus, sed etiam verbis esse necessarium. A. Quodnam?

For there is a good measure in speaking, as in walking, to go gently, without a leap, without delay, inasmuch as all things may shine with the temperance of the moderation of the mean, which is one of the four virtues, from which the other virtues proceed, as it were, from roots, in which there is the soul’s nobility, life’s dignity, the honesty of morals, the praise of discipline. K. I understand that philosophical proverb to be necessary not only for morals, but also for words. A. Which one?

K. Ne quid nimis. A. Est et vere est in omni re necessarium, quia quidquid modum excedit, in vitio est. Ideo virtutes in medio sunt positae, de quibus tuae venerandae auctoritati plura dicere potuissem, si non disputatio nostra ad finem festinaret, et si non superfluum videretur tecum de virtutibus agere, quem virtutum non tantum scientia, sed etiam ornat efficientia.

K. Nothing in excess. A. It is, and truly it is necessary in every matter, because whatever exceeds the measure is in vice. Therefore the virtues are placed in the middle, about which I could have said more to your venerable authority, if our disputation were not hastening to its end, and if it did not seem superfluous to deal with you about the virtues, whom not only the science of the virtues, but also their efficiency adorns.

[44]K. Non tamen te, magister, prius dimittam calamum responsionis claudere, quam mihi nomina et partes quattuor virtutum exponas, quas radices aliarum esse virtutum dixisti. Paulo ante inter nos constitit, sermocinationis exercitationem esse necessariam: in quo melius est habendum sermonis studium quam in virtutum excellentia, quae utrumque et scribentibus et legentibus multum prodesse valet? A. Prodest, ut dicis, domine mi rex, sed inter utrumque coartor; nam succinta brevitas pauca postulat et res ardua plura desiderat.

[44]K. Not yet, however, will I, master, allow you to close the pen of your reply before you set forth to me the names and the parts of the four virtues, which you said are the roots of the other virtues. A little before it was agreed between us that the exercise of conversing is necessary: and in what is zeal for discourse better to be employed than in the excellence of the virtues, which is able to profit greatly both writers and readers? A. It profits, as you say, my lord king, but I am constrained between the two; for succinct brevity demands few things, and the arduous matter desires more.

K. Tempera te in utrumque, ne aut prolixitas fastidium aut brevitas ignorantiam generet. A. Primo sciendum est, quod quaedam res tam clarae et tam nobiles sunt, ut non propter aliud emolumentum expetendae sint, sed propter suam solummodo dignitatem amandae sunt et exsequendae. K. Has ipsas res magnopere velim cognoscere.

K. Temper yourself in both, lest either prolixity produce distaste or brevity produce ignorance. A. First it must be known that certain things are so clear and so noble that they are not to be sought for any other emolument, but are to be loved and pursued on account of their own dignity alone. K. These very things I would greatly wish to know.

A. Hae sunt: virtus, scientia, veritas, amor bonus. K. Numquid non has christiana relegio adprime laudat? A. Laudat et colit.

A. These are: virtue, science, truth, good love. K. Does not the Christian religion especially praise these? A. It praises and cultivates them.

K. Quid philosophis cum his? A. Has intellexerunt in natura humana et summo studio coluerunt. K. Quid tunc distat inter philosophum talem et christianos?

K. What have philosophers to do with these? A. They understood these in human nature and cultivated them with the highest zeal. K. What, then, is the difference between such a philosopher and Christians?

A. Fides et baptismus. K. Prosequere tamen philosophicas definitiones de virtutibus et primum dic, quae sit ipsa virtus. A. Virtus est animi habitus, naturae decus, vitae ratio, morum nobilitas.

A. Faith and baptism. K. Nevertheless pursue the philosophical definitions concerning the virtues, and first say what virtue itself is. A. Virtue is a habitus of the mind, the adornment of nature, the reason of life, the nobility of morals.

K. Quot habet partes? A. Quattuor: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam.

K. How many parts does it have? A. Four: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance.

[44]K. Quae est prudentia? A. Rerum et naturarum scientia. K. Quot habet partes?

[44]K. What is prudence? A. The science of things and of natures. K. How many parts does it have?

A. Tres: memoriam, intellegentiam, providentiam. K. Harum quoque definitiones dicito. A. Memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt: intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt: providentia, per quam futurum aliquid praevidetur ante quam fiat.

A. Three: memory, intelligence, providence. K. State the definitions of these as well. A. Memory is that by which the mind recalls those things which have been; intelligence, by which it clearly perceives those things which are; providence, by which something future is foreseen before it comes to be.

K. Iustitiae rationem expone. A. Iustitia est habitus animi unicuique rei propriam tribuens dignitatem: in hac divinitatis cultus et humanitatis iura et aequitas totius vitae conservatur. K. Eius quoque partes pande.

K. Expound the account of justice. A. Justice is a habit of mind, assigning to each thing its proper dignity: in this the worship of divinity and the rights of humanity and the equity of the whole of life are preserved. K. Unfold its parts as well.

A. Partim illa est ex naturae iure, partim ex consuetudinis usu. K. Quomodo ex naturae iure? A. Quia partes illius quaedam naturae vis inserit, ut relegionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem.

A. Partly it is from the law of nature, partly from the usage of custom. K. How from the law of nature? A. Because the force of nature implants certain parts of it, such as religion, piety, gratitude, vindication, observance, truth.

K. De his singulis lucidius aperi. A. Relegio est, quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam ceremoniamque affert: pietas, per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benivolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus: gratia, in qua amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria et remunerandi voluntas continetur: vindicatio, per quam vis aut iniuria et omnino omne quod offuturum est defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur: observantia, per quam homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes cultu quodam et honore dignantur: veritas, per quam ea quae sunt aut ante fuerunt aut futura sunt dicuntur. K. Quomodo ex consuetudinis usu iustitia servatur?

K. Open these singly more lucidly. A. Religion is that which brings concern and ceremony for some superior nature, which they call divine; piety, through which to those joined by blood and to the fatherland service and diligent cultivation are rendered with good will; gratitude, in which the memory of friendships and services of another, and the will to remunerate, are contained; vindication, through which force or injury, and in general everything that will be harmful, is driven off by defending or avenging; observance, through which men antecedent in some dignity are deemed worthy with a certain reverence and honor; truth, through which the things that are, or were before, or will be, are spoken. K. How is justice preserved by the usage of custom?

A. Ex pacto, pari, iudicato et lege. K. Plus quaero et de his quoque. A. Pactum est, quod inter aliquos convenit: par in omnes aequabile est: iudicatum, quod alicuius magni viri aut aliquorum sententiis constitutum est: lex est omni populo scriptum ius, quid cavere vel quid observare debeat.

A. From pact, parity, judgment, and law. K. I inquire further, and about these as well. A. A pact is that which is agreed between certain persons: parity is what is equitable toward all: a judgment is what has been established by the judgments of some great man or of certain persons: law is the written ius for the whole people, what it ought to guard against or what it ought to observe.

[45]K. Nunc fortitudinem cum suis partibus ut depromas flagito. A. Fortitudo est magno animo periculorum et laborum perpessio: eius partes sunt magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia. K. Harum rationes patefac.

[45]K. Now I insist that you bring forth fortitude with its parts. A. Fortitude is the endurance of dangers and labors with a great spirit: its parts are magnificence, confidence, patience, perseverance. K. Lay open the reasons for these.

A. Magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio: fidentia est, per quam magnis et honestis in rebus multum animus in se fiduciae certa cum spe conlocavit: patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum aut difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio: perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. K. Restat tibi de temperantia dicere, a qua orta est nobis de virtutibus inquisitio, cuius proprietatem et partium illius audire expecto. A. Temperantia est rationabilis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio: eius partes sunt continentia, clementia, modestia.

A. Magnificence is the cogitation and administration of great and lofty things, with a certain ample and splendid setting-forth of spirit: confidence is that by which, in great and honorable matters, the mind has placed much trust in itself with sure hope: patience is, for the sake of honesty or utility, the voluntary and long-lasting endurance of arduous or difficult things: perseverance is a stable and perpetual abiding in a well-considered reason. K. It remains for you to speak about temperance, from which our inquiry about the virtues took its rise, whose property and the parts of it I expect to hear. A. Temperance is a rational, firm, and moderate dominion over libido and over the other not-straight impulses of the mind: its parts are continence, clemency, modesty.

Continentia est, per quam omnis mala cupiditas magna consilii gubernatione regitur et deprimitur: clementia est, per quam iniuriae et odia miti animo retinentur: modestia est, per quam totius vitae modus seu animi seu in corporis motibus ubique honesti cura servatur.

Continence is that by which every evil cupidity is ruled and pressed down by the great governance of counsel: clemency is that by which injuries and hatreds are restrained with a mild spirit: modesty is that by which the measure of the whole life—whether of the mind or in the movements of the body—is everywhere kept by a care for what is honorable.

[46]K. Honor eximius est coram hominibus haec servanti et laus apud deum. Sed miror nos christianos, si illi philosophi has virtutes ob illarum tantum dignitatem vel laudem vitae servaverunt, cur nos ab his in multis devio errore declinamus, cum haec nunc in fide et caritate observantibus aeternae gloriae ab ipsa veritate, Christo Iesu, praemia pollicentur. A. Plus miserandi quam mirandi sumus, quia plurimi ex nostris sunt, quos nec terror poenarum nec gloria praemiorum ad virtutum dignitatem revocat.

[46]K. Exceptional honor is before men for one who keeps these things, and praise with God. But I marvel at us Christians, if those philosophers preserved these virtues merely on account of their dignity or the commendation of life, why we in many ways decline from them by a devious error, since these now, to those observing them in faith and charity, promise rewards of eternal glory from Truth itself, Christ Jesus. A. We are more to be pitied than to be marveled at, because there are very many of our people whom neither the terror of punishments nor the glory of rewards calls back to the dignity of the virtues.

K. Agnosco et sine lacrimis non dico multos esse tales, attamen rogo, ut quam breviter possis edisseras, quomodo hae excellentes virtutes in nostra relegione christiana intellegendae atque observandae sint. A. Nonne tibi videtur sapientia esse, qua Deus secundum modulum humanae mentis intellegitur et timetur et futurum eius creditur iudicium? K. Intellego et assentio nihil hac sapientia excellentius, et in Iob recolo scriptum: ecce hominis sapientia pietas, et quid pietas, nisi dei cultus?

K. I acknowledge, and I do not say without tears that many are such; nevertheless I ask that, as briefly as you can, you expound how these excellent virtues in our Christian religion are to be understood and observed. A. Does it not seem to you to be wisdom, by which God is understood according to the measure of the human mind and is feared, and His future judgment is believed? K. I understand and assent that nothing is more excellent than this wisdom, and in Job I recall it written: behold, the wisdom of man is piety—and what is piety, if not the worship (cult) of God?

qui Graece dicitur theosebeia. A. Bene intellegis et vere, sed quid tibi iustitia videtur esse nisi caritas Dei eiusque mandatorum observatio? K. Et hoc agnosco, nihil hac iustitia iustius, immo nullam aliam esse nisi istam. A. Numquid non fortitudinem esse cernis, qua hostis antiquus vincitur et adversa mundi tolerantur?

which in Greek is called theosebeia. A. You understand well and truly; but what does justice seem to you to be, except the charity of God and the observance of his mandates? K. This too I acknowledge: nothing is more just than this justice—indeed, that there is no other except this. A. Do you not discern that fortitude is that by which the ancient enemy is conquered and the adversities of the world are borne?

K. Cerno equidem nec aliquid hac victoria laudabilius aestimo. A. An temperantia non est, quae libidinem refrenat, avaritiam reprimit, omnes animi inpetus sedat et temperat? K. Est et vere est et valde necessaria omni homini, sed adhuc quaero: ad quem finem harum observatio virtutum spectat?

K. I indeed discern it, and I esteem nothing more laudable than this victory. A. Or is it not temperance, which reins in lust, restrains avarice, and soothes and tempers all the mind’s impulses? K. It is, and truly it is, and very necessary to every man, but I still ask: to what end does the observance of these virtues look?

A. Ut diligatur Deus et proximus, an aliud aestimas? K. Nil equidem aliud, sed quam breve auditu est, tam factu difficile et arduum. A. Quid facilius est quam amare species pulchras, dulces sapores, sonos suaves, odores flagrantes, tactus iocundos, honores et felicitates saeculi?

A. That God and neighbor be loved—do you esteem anything else? K. Indeed, nothing else; but as brief it is to hear, so difficult and arduous it is to do. A. What is easier than to love fair forms, sweet savors, suave sounds, fragrant odors, jocund touches, the honors and felicities of the age?

Haecine amare facile est animae, quae velut volatilis umbra recedunt, et Deum non amare, qui est aeterna pulchritudo, aeterna dulcedo, aeterna suavitas, aeterna flagrantia, aeterna iocunditas, perpetuus honor, indeficiens felicitas? maxime cum divinae scripturae nil aliud nobiscum agant, nisi ut diligamus Deum et dominum nostrum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente, et proximum nostrum tamquam nosmet ipsos. Nam promissum habemus ab illo, qui fallere ignorat.

Is it so easy for the soul to love these things, which recede like a winged shadow, and not to love God, who is eternal pulchritude, eternal sweetness, eternal suavity, eternal fragrance, eternal jocundity, perpetual honor, unfailing felicity? especially since the divine Scriptures do nothing else with us except that we should love God and our lord with all the heart and with all the soul and with all the mind, and our neighbor as our very selves. For we have a promise from Him who knows not how to deceive.

Iugum, inquit, meum suave est et onus meum leve. Laboriosior est enim huius mundi amor quam Christi; quod enim in illo anima quaerit, non invenit, id est felicitatem et aeternitatem, quoniam haec infima pulchritudo transit et recedit, vel amantem deserit vel ab amante deseritur: teneat igitur anima ordinem suum. K. Quis est ordo animae?

"My yoke," he says, "is sweet, and my burden light." For the love of this world is more laborious than that of Christ; for what the soul seeks in it, it does not find—that is, felicity and eternity—since this lowest beauty passes and withdraws, either it deserts the lover or is deserted by the lover: therefore let the soul hold its own order. K. What is the order of the soul?

A. Ut diligat quod superius est, id est Deum, et regat quod inferius est, id est corpus, et socias animas dilectione nutriat et foveat; his enim sacrificiis purgata atque exonerata anima ab hac laboriosa vita et aerumnosa revolabit ad quietem et intrabit in gaudium domini sui. K. Magnum quendam virum et vere beatum praedicas, o magister. A. Magnum te faciat Deus et vere beatum, domine mi rex, et in hac virtutum quadriga, de qua paulo ante egimus, ad caelestis regni arcem geminis dilectionis pennis saeculum hoc nequam transvolare concedat.

A. That it love what is higher, that is, God, and rule what is lower, that is, the body, and that it nourish and foster allied souls by dilection; for by these sacrifices the soul, purged and unburdened from this toilsome and hardship‑laden life, will fly back to rest and will enter into the joy of its Lord. K. You proclaim a certain great man and truly blessed, O master. A. May God make you great and truly blessed, my lord king, and may he grant that, in this quadriga of virtues, of which we spoke a little before, on the twin wings of dilection, you may fly across this wicked age to the citadel of the heavenly kingdom.

K. Fiat, fiat gratia divina donante. A. Sermo iste noster, qui de volubili civilium quaestionum ingenio initium habuit, hunc aeternae stabilitatis habeat finem, ne aliquis nos incassum tantum disputandi itineris peregisse contendat. K. Quis est qui nos frustra sermocinari audeat dicere, si aut honestarum est saeculi scrutator curiosus artium aut excellentium scrutator virtutum?

K. Let it be, let it be, with divine grace granting. A. Let this our discourse, which had its beginning from the voluble ingenuity of civil questions, have this end of eternal stability, lest anyone should contend that we have traversed so great a journey of disputation in vain. K. Who is there who would dare to say that we are discoursing to no purpose, if he is either a curious scrutineer of the honorable arts of the age or a scrutineer of excellent virtues?

Nam me, ut fateor, ad has inquisitiones scientiae amor adduxit, et tibi gratiam habeo quod inquisita non negasti, ac ideo hanc tuarum responsionum benivolentiam probo et studiosis profuturam esse arbitror, si modo macula livoris legentem non corrumpit.

For, as I confess, love of science led me to these inquiries, and I have gratitude to you because you did not deny what was inquired; and therefore I approve this benevolence of your responses and judge it will be profitable to the studious, if only the stain of envy does not corrupt the reader.