Augustine: DE CIVITATE DEI

[I] Nunc intentiore nobis opus est animo multo quam erat in superiorum solutione quaestionum et explicatione librorum. De theologia quippe, quam naturalem uocant, non cum quibuslibet hominibus (non enim fabulosa est uel ciuilis, hoc est uel theatrica uel urbana; quarum altera iactitat deorum crimina, altera indicat deorum desideria criminosiora ac per hoc malignorum potius daemonum quam deorum), sed cum philosophis est habenda conlatio; quorum ipsum nomen si Latine interpretemur, amorem sapientiae profitetur. Porro si sapientia Deus est, per quem facta sunt omnia, sicut diuina auctoritas ueritasque monstrauit, uerus philosophus est amator Dei.

[1] Now we have need of a mind much more intent than it was in the solving of the foregoing questions and the explication of the books. For concerning the theology which they call natural, a discussion is to be held not with just any men (for it is not fabulous or civil, that is, either theatrical or urban; of which the former trumpets the crimes of the gods, the latter points out the desires of the gods that are more criminal—and through this shows rather the desires of malign demons than of gods), but with philosophers; whose very name, if we interpret it in Latin, professes a love of wisdom. Moreover, if Wisdom is God, through whom all things were made, as divine authority and truth have shown, the true philosopher is a lover of God.

Sed quia res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, non est in omnibus, qui hoc nomine gloriantur (neque enim continuo uerae sapientiae sunt amatores, quicumque appellantur philosophi): profecto ex omnibus, quorum sententias litteris nosse potuimus, eligendi sunt cum quibus non indigne quaestio ista tractetur. Neque enim hoc opere omnes omnium philosophorum uanas opiniones refutare suscepi, sed eas tantum, quae ad theologian pertinent, quo uerbo Graeco significari intellegimus de diuinitate rationem siue sermonem; nec eas omnium, sed eorum tantum, qui cum et esse diuinitatem et humana curare consentiant, non tamen sufficere unius incommutabilis Dei cultum ad uitam adipiscendam etiam post mortem beatam, sed multos ab illo sane uno conditos atque institutos ob eam causam colendos putant. Hi iam etiam Varronis opinionem ueritatis propinquitate transcendunt; si quidem ille totam theologian naturalem usque ad mundum istum uel animam eius extendere potuit, isti uero supra omnem animae naturam confitentur Deum, qui non solum mundum istum uisibilem, qui saepe caeli et terrae nomine nuncupatur, sed etiam omnem omnino animam fecerit, et qui rationalem et intellectualem, cuius generis anima humana est, participatione sui luminis incommutabilis et incorporei beatam facit.

But because the reality itself, of which this is the name, is not in all who glory in this name (for they are not forthwith lovers of true wisdom, whoever are called philosophers), assuredly, out of all whose opinions we have been able to know from writings, those must be chosen with whom this question may be handled not unworthily. For in this work I have not undertaken to refute the vain opinions of all philosophers, but only those which pertain to theology, by which Greek word we understand to be signified a reason or discourse concerning divinity; and not those of all, but only of those who, while they agree both that there is divinity and that it cares for human affairs, nevertheless think that the cult of the one unchangeable God does not suffice for attaining even after death a blessed life, but that many—though indeed created and appointed by that One—are on that account to be worshiped. These already also surpass Varro’s opinion by a closeness to truth; for indeed he could extend the whole natural theology as far as this world or its soul, whereas these confess God as above every nature of soul, who made not only this visible world, which is often called by the name of heaven and earth, but also absolutely every soul, and who makes the rational and intellectual—of which kind the human soul is—blessed by participation in his unchangeable and incorporeal light.

Hos philosophos Platonicos appellatos a Platone doctore uocabulo deriuato nullus, qui haec uel tenuiter audiuit, ignorat. De hoc igitur Platone, quae necessaria praesenti quaestioni existimo, breuiter adtingam, prius illos commemorans, qui eum in eodem genere litterarum tempore praecesserunt.

That these philosophers are appellated Platonics, from Plato the teacher, by a derived appellation, no one who has even slightly heard of these matters is ignorant. Therefore, concerning this Plato, I will briefly touch on what I deem necessary to the present question, first commemorating those who in the same genre of literature preceded him in time.

[II] Quantum enim adtinet ad litteras Graecas, quae lingua inter ceteras gentium clarior habetur, duo philosophorum genera traduntur: unum Italicum ex ea parte Italiae, quae quondam magna Graecia nuncupata est; alterum Ionicum in eis terris, ubi et nunc Graecia nominatur. Italicum genus auctorem habuit Pythagoram Samium, a quo etiam ferunt ipsum philosophiae nomen exortum. Nam cum antea sapientes appellarentur, qui modo quodam laudabilis uitae aliis; praestare uidebantur, iste interrogatus, quid profiteretur, philosophum se esse respondit, id est studiosum uel amatorem sapientiae; quoniam sapientem profiteri arrogantissimum uidebatur.

[2] For, in so far as it pertains to Greek letters, whose language is held more renowned among the nations, two genera of philosophers are handed down: one Italic, from that part of Italy which was once appellated Magna Graecia; the other Ionic, in those lands which even now are called Greece. The Italic genus had as its auctor Pythagoras the Samian, from whom they even report that the very name of philosophy arose. For whereas previously those were called wise men who by a certain mode of laudable life seemed to excel others; this man, when asked what he professed, replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a devotee or lover of wisdom; since to profess oneself wise seemed most arrogant.

Ionici uero generis princeps fuit Thales, Milesius, unus illorum septem, qui sunt appellati sapientes. Sed illi sex uitae genere distinguebantur et quibusdam praeceptis ad bene uiuendum accommodatis; iste autem Thales, ut successores etiam propagaret, rerum naturam scrutatus suasque disputationes litteris mandans eminuit maximeque admirabilis extitit, quod astrologiae numeris conprehensis defectus solis et lunae etiam praedicere potuit. Aquam tamen putauit rerum esse principium et hinc omnia elementa mundi ipsumque mundum et quae in eo gignuntur existere.

Of the Ionic kind the chief was Thales, the Milesian, one of those seven who are called wise men. But those six were distinguished by mode of life and by certain precepts accommodated to living well; whereas this Thales, in order also to propagate successors, by scrutinizing the nature of things and committing his disputations to letters, was eminent, and he proved most admirable in that, with the numbers of astrology comprehended, he was even able to predict eclipses of the sun and of the moon. He nevertheless thought water to be the principle of things, and that from this all the elements of the world, and the world itself, and the things that are generated in it, exist.

Nihil autem huic operi, quod mundo considerato tam mirabile aspicimus, ex diuina mente praeposuit. Huic successit Anaximander, eius auditor, mutauitque de rerum natura opinionem. Non enim ex una re, sicut Thales ex umore, sed ex suis propriis principiis quasque res nasci putauit.

But over this work—which, with the world taken into consideration, we behold as so marvelous—he set nothing from a divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his auditor (hearer), and he changed the opinion concerning the nature of things. For he thought that not from one thing, as Thales [held] from moisture, but that each thing arises from its own proper principles.

Quae rerum principia singularum esse credidit infinita, et innumerabiles mundos gignere et quaecumque in eis oriuntur; eosque mundos modo dissolui, modo iterum gigni existimauit, quanta quisque aetate sua manere potuerit; nec ipse aliquid diuinae menti in his rerum operibus tribuens. Iste Anaximenen discipulum et successorem reliquit, qui omnes rerum causas aeri infinito dedit, nec deos negauit aut tacuit; non tamen ab ipsis aerem factum, sed ipsos ex aere ortos credidit. Anaxagoras uero eius auditor harum rerum omnium, quas uidemus, effectorem diuinum animum sensit et dixit ex infinita materia, quae constaret similibus inter se particulis rerum omnium; quibus suis et propriis singula fieri, sed animo faciente diuino.

He believed the beginnings of each several thing to be infinite, and to beget innumerable worlds and whatever arise in them; and he thought those worlds now to be dissolved, now again to be generated, for as great a span as each could remain in its own age; nor did he himself attribute anything to a divine mind in these works of things. This man left Anaximenes as disciple and successor, who assigned all the causes of things to infinite air, and neither denied the gods nor was silent about them; yet he believed not that the air was made by them, but that they themselves arose from air. Anaxagoras, however, his auditor, perceived and said that a divine mind was the maker of all these things which we see, from infinite matter, which consisted of particles similar among themselves of all things; by whose own proper particles each thing is made, but with the divine mind doing the making.

Diogenes quoque Anaximenis alter auditor, aerem quidem dixit rerum esse materiam, de qua omnia fierent; sed eum esse compotem diuinae rationis, sine qua nihil ex eo fieri posset. Anaxagorae successit auditor eius Archelaus. Etiam ipse de particulis inter se similibus, quibus singula quaeque fierent, ita putauit constare omnia, ut inesse etiam mentem diceret, quae corpora aeterna, id est illas particulas, coniungendo et dissipando ageret omnia.

Diogenes too, another auditor of Anaximenes, indeed said that air was the material of things, from which all things are made; but that it was participant in divine reason, without which nothing could be made from it. To Anaxagoras there succeeded his auditor Archelaus. He likewise thought about the particles similar among themselves, by which each several thing is made, that all things thus consist, so that he also said that Mind was present, which, by conjoining and dissipating the eternal bodies—that is, those particles—accomplished all things.

Socrates huius discipulus fuisse perhibetur, magister Platonis, propter quem breuiter cuncta ista recolui.

Socrates is reported to have been his disciple, the teacher of Plato, on account of whom I have briefly recollected all these things.

[III] Socrates ergo, primus uniuersam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur, cum ante illum omnes magis physicis, id est naturalibus, rebus perscrutandis operam maximam inpenderent. Non mihi autem uidetur posse ad liquidum colligi, utrum Socrates, ut hoc faceret, taedio rerum obscurarum et incertarum ad aliquid apertum et certum reperiendum animum intenderit, quod esset beatae uitae necessarium, propter quam unam omnium philosophorum inuigilasse ac laborasse uidetur industria, an uero, sicut de illo quidam beneuolentius suspicantur, nolebat inmundos terrenis cupiditatibus animos se extendere in diuina conari. Quando quidem ab eis causas rerum uidebat inquiri, quas primas atque summas non nisi in unius ac summi Dei uoluntate esse credebat; unde non eas putabat nisi mundata mente posse conprehendi; et ideo purgandae bonis moribus uitae censebat instandum, ut deprimentibus libidinibus exoneratus animus naturali uigore in aeterna se adtolleret naturamque incorporei et incommutabilis luminis, ubi causae omnium factarum naturarum stabiliter uiuunt, intellegentiae puritate conspiceret.

[III] Socrates, therefore, is remembered as the first to have bent the whole of philosophy toward the correcting and composing of morals, whereas before him all expended their greatest effort on physics, that is, natural things, to be investigated. Yet it does not seem to me possible to determine to the clear whether Socrates, in order to do this, directed his mind, out of tedium of obscure and uncertain matters, to find something open and certain, which would be necessary for the blessed life, for the sake of which alone the industry of all philosophers seems to have kept vigil and labored; or truly, as some more benevolently suspect about him, he did not wish souls, unclean with earthly cupidities, to extend themselves in attempting the divine. Since indeed he saw that by them the causes of things were being inquired into, which first and highest he believed to be only in the will of the one and highest God; whence he thought that they could not be comprehended except by a cleansed mind; and therefore he judged that one must insist upon a life to be purged by good morals, so that the mind, relieved from the pressing-down lusts, by natural vigor might lift itself to the eternal and, with the purity of intelligence, might behold the nature of the incorporeal and incommutable light, where the causes of all fashioned natures live stably.

Constat eum tamen inperitorum stultitiam scire se aliquid opinantium etiam in ipsis moralibus quaestionibus, quo totum animum intendisse uidebatur, uel confessa ignorantia sua uel dissimulata scientia lepore mirabili disserendi et acutissima urbanitate agitasse atque uersasse. Vnde et concitatis inimicitiis calumniosa criminatione damnatus morte multatus est. Sed eum postea illa ipsa, quae publice damnauerat, Atheniensium ciuitas publice luxit, in duos accusatores eius usque adeo populi indignatione conuersa, ut unus eorum oppressus ui multitudinis interiret, exilio autem uoluntario atque perpetuo poenam similem alter euaderet.

It is agreed, however, that he agitated and handled even the moral questions—on which he seemed to have fixed his whole mind—either by his confessed ignorance or by his knowledge dissembled, with a marvelous charm of discoursing and a most acute urbanity. Whence also, hostilities having been aroused, he was condemned and punished with death by a calumnious crimination. But afterwards that very city of the Athenians which had publicly condemned him publicly lamented him, the indignation of the people having been turned upon his two accusers to such a degree that one of them, crushed by the force of the multitude, perished, while the other escaped with a like penalty by voluntary and perpetual exile.

Tam praeclara igitur uitae mortisque fama Socrates reliquit plurimos suae philosophiae sectatores, quorum certatim studium fuit in quaestionum moralium disceptatione uersari, ubi agitur de summo bono, quo fieri homo beatus potest. Quod in Socratis disputationibus, dum omnia mouet asserit destruit, quoniam non euidenter apparuit: quod cuique placuit inde sumpserunt et ubi cuique uisum est constituerunt finem boni. Finis autem boni appellatur, quo quisque cum peruenerit beatus est.

Therefore, with so illustrious a fame of life and of death, Socrates left behind very many followers of his philosophy, whose eager zeal was to engage in the disputation of moral questions, where the matter at issue is the highest good, by which a man can be made blessed. Because in the disputations of Socrates—since, while he sets everything in motion, he asserts and demolishes—it did not appear evident; from this each took what pleased him, and where it seemed good to each he established the end of the good. Now the end of the good is called that point on attaining which each person is blessed.

Sic autem diuersas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt, ut (quod uix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent uoluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam uirtutem, sicut Antisthenes. Sic alii atque alii aliud atque aliud opinati sunt, quos commemorare longum est.

Thus, moreover, the Socratics had among themselves diverse opinions about that end, such that (which is scarcely credible that the followers of one master could have done) some said the highest good was pleasure, like Aristippus; others said virtue, like Antisthenes. Thus various others opined one thing and another, whom it would be lengthy to commemorate.

[IV] Sed inter discipulos Socratis, non quidem inmerito, excellentissima gloria claruit, qua omnino ceteros obscuraret, Plato. Qui cum esset Atheniensis honesto apud suos loco natus et ingenio mirabili longe suos condiscipulos anteiret, parum tamen putans perficiendae philosophiae sufficere se ipsum ac Socraticam disciplinam, quam longe ac late potuit peregrinatus est, quaquauersum eum alicuius nobilitatae scientiae percipiendae fama rapiebat. Itaque et in Aegypto didicit quaecumque magna illic habebantur atque docebantur, et inde in eas Italiae partes ueniens, ubi Pythagoreorum fama celebrabatur, quidquid Italicae philosophiae tunc florebat, auditis eminentioribus in ea doctoribus facillime conprehendit.

[4] But among the disciples of Socrates, not indeed undeservedly, Plato shone with most excellent glory, by which he utterly overshadowed the rest. Since he was an Athenian, born among his own in an honorable station, and by marvelous ingenium far outstripped his fellow-disciples, yet, thinking that he himself and the Socratic discipline were insufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he traveled far and wide, wherever the fame for acquiring some nobilitated science swept him away. And so in Egypt he learned whatever great things were there held and taught; and from there, coming into those parts of Italy where the fame of the Pythagoreans was celebrated, he most easily comprehended whatever of Italic philosophy was then flourishing, after hearing the more eminent teachers in it.

Et quia magistrum Socratem singulariter diligebat, eum loquentem faciens fere in omnibus sermonibus suis etiam illa, quae uel ab aliis didicerat, uel ipse quanta potuerat intellegentia uiderat, cum illius lepore et moralibus disputationibus temperauit. Itaque cum studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione uersetur, unde una pars eius actiua, altera contemplatiua dici potest (quarum actiua ad agendam uitam, id est ad mores instituendos pertinet, contemplatiua autem ad conspiciendas naturae causas et sincerissimam ueritatem): Socrates in actiua excelluisse memoratur; Pythagoras uero magis contemplatiuae, quibus potuit intellegentiae uiribus, institisse. Proinde Plato utrumque iungendo philosophiam perfecisse laudatur, quam in tres partes distribuit: unam moralem, quae maxime in actione uersatur; alteram naturalem, quae contemplationi deputata est; tertiam rationalem, qua uerum disterminatur a falso.

And because he singularly cherished his teacher Socrates, making him speak in nearly all his discourses, he tempered even those things which either he had learned from others or himself had seen by as much intelligence as he could, with that man’s charm and with moral disputations. And so, since the pursuit of wisdom is engaged in action and contemplation, whence one part of it can be called active, the other contemplative (of which the active pertains to conducting life, that is, to the instituting of morals, but the contemplative to beholding the causes of nature and the most unalloyed truth): Socrates is reported to have excelled in the active; Pythagoras, however, to have applied himself more to the contemplative, by the powers of understanding that he could. Accordingly Plato, by joining both, is praised to have perfected philosophy, which he distributed into three parts: one moral, which is engaged chiefly in action; another natural, which is deputed to contemplation; a third rational, by which the true is distinguished from the false.

Quae licet utrique, id est actioni et contemplationi, sit necessaria, maxime tamen contemplatio perspectionem sibi uindicat ueritatis. Ideo haec tripertitio non est contraria illi distinctioni, qua intellegitur omne studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione consistere. Quid autem in his uel de his singulis partibus Plato senserit, id est, ubi finem omnium actionum, ubi causam omnium naturarum, ubi lumen omnium rationum esse cognouerit uel crediderit, disserendo explicare et longum esse arbitror et temere adfirmandum esse non arbitror.

Although this is necessary for both, that is, for action and for contemplation, yet contemplation most of all claims for itself the perception of truth. Therefore this tripartition is not contrary to that distinction by which it is understood that the whole pursuit of wisdom consists in action and contemplation. But what Plato thought in or about these individual parts—namely, where he recognized or believed the end of all actions to be, where the cause of all natures, where the light of all reasons—I judge both that to unfold by disquisition would be long, and that it ought not to be rashly affirmed.

Cum enim magistri sui Socratis, quem facit in suis uoluminibus disputantem, notissimum morem dissimulandae scientiae uel opinionis suae seruare adfectat, quia et illi ipse mos placuit, factum est ut etiam ipsius Platonis de rebus magnis sententiae non facile perspici possint. Ex his tamen, quae apud eum leguntur, siue quae dixit, siue quae ab aliis dicta esse narrauit atque conscripsit, quae sibi placita uiderentur, quaedam commemorari et operi huic inseri oportet a nobis, uel ubi suffragatur religioni uerae, quam fides nostra suscepit ac defendit, uel ubi ei uidetur esse contrarius, quantum ad istam de uno Deo et pluribus pertinet quaestionem, propter uitam, quae post mortem futura est, ueraciter beatam. Fortassis enim qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius atque ueracius intellexisse ac secuti esse fama celebriore laudantur, aliquid tale de Deo sentiunt, ut in illo inueniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intellegendi et ordo uiuendi; quorum trium unum ad naturalem, alterum ad rationalem, tertium ad moralem partem intellegitur pertinere.

For since he affects to observe the very well-known custom of his teacher Socrates—whom he makes disputing in his own volumes—of dissimulating his own scientia or opinion (because that custom pleased that man himself), it has come about that even Plato’s own sententiae about great matters cannot easily be seen through. Yet from those things which are read in him, whether the things he himself said, or the things he narrated as said by others and consigned to writing, which seemed pleasing to himself, certain points ought to be recalled by us and inserted into this work, either where he gives suffrage to the true religion which our faith has undertaken and defends, or where he seems to be contrary to it, so far as it pertains to that question about one God and many, on account of the life which after death will be truly blessed. For perhaps those who, with more celebrated fame, are praised for having far and rightly preferred Plato to the other philosophers of the nations, and for having understood more acutely and more veraciously and followed him, hold some such view about God, that in Him is found both the cause of subsisting, and the ratio of understanding, and the order of living; of which three, the one is understood to pertain to the natural part, the second to the rational, the third to the moral.

Si enim homo ita creatus est, ut per id, quod in eo praecellit, adtingat illud, quod cuncta praecellit, id est unum uerum optimum Deum, sine quo nulla natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit, nullus usus expedit: ipse quaeratur, ubi nobis serta sunt omnia; ipse cernatur, ubi nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi nobis recta sunt omnia.

For if man was so created that through that which in him excels he may attain that which excels all things, that is, the one true, best God, without whom no nature subsists, no doctrine instructs, no use profits: let He Himself be sought, where for us all things are certain; let He Himself be discerned, where for us all things are certain; let He Himself be loved, where for us all things are right.

[V] Si ergo Plato Dei huius imitatorem cognitorem amatorem dixit esse sapientem, cuius participatione sit beatus, quid opus est excutere ceteros? Nulli nobis quam isti propius accesserunt. Cedat eis igitur non solum theologia illa fabulosa deorum criminibus oblectans animos impiorum, nec solum etiam illa ciuilis, ubi inpuri daemones terrestribus gaudiis deditos populos deorum nomine seducentes humanos errores tamquam suos diuinos honores habere uoluerunt, ad spectandos suorum criminum ludos cultores suos tamquam ad suum cultum studiis inmundissimis excitantes et sibi delectabiliores ludos de ipsis spectatoribus exhibentes (ubi si qua uelut honesta geruntur in templis, coniuncta sibi theatrorum obscenitate turpantur, et quaecumque turpia geruntur in theatris, comparata sibi templorum foeditate laudantur), et ea, quae Varro ex his sacris quasi ad caelum et terram rerumque mortalium semina et actus interpretatus est (quia nec ipsa illis ritibus significantur, quae ipse insinuare conatur, et ideo ueritas conantem non sequitur; et si ipsa essent, tamen animae rationali ea, quae infra illam naturae ordine constituta sunt, pro deo suo colenda non essent, nec sibi debuit praeferre tamquam deos eas res, quibus ipsam praetulit uerus Deus), et ea, quae Numa Pompilius re uera ad sacra eius modi pertinentia secum sepeliendo curauit abscondi et aratro eruta senatus iussit incendi.

[5] Therefore, if Plato said that the wise man is an imitator, knower, lover of this God, by whose participation he is blessed, what need is there to shake out the others? None have come nearer to us than these. Let there yield to them, then, not only that fabulous theology which, by the crimes of the gods, delights the minds of the impious, nor yet also that civil theology, where unclean daemons, seducing peoples devoted to terrestrial joys under the name of gods, have wished to have human errors as though their own divine honors, rousing their worshipers, as it were to their own cult, by the most unclean pursuits to watch the shows of their crimes, and exhibiting for themselves more delectable plays out of the very spectators (where if any things as if honorable are done in the temples, they are defiled by the obscenity of the theaters joined to them; and whatever shameful things are done in the theaters, by comparison with the foulness of the temples are praised), and those things which Varro interpreted from these rites as if to heaven and earth and to the seeds and acts of mortal things (since neither are those very things signified by those rites which he tries to insinuate, and therefore truth does not follow the one attempting; and if they themselves were so, nevertheless the rational soul ought not to worship, as its god, those things which are set beneath it by the order of nature, nor ought it to have preferred, as gods, those things to which the true God has preferred it), and those things which Numa Pompilius really took care to have hidden by burying with himself, and which, when ploughed up, the senate ordered to be burned.

(In eo genere sunt etiam illa, ut aliquid de Numa mitius suspicemur, quae Alexander Macedo scribit ad matrem sibi a magno antistite sacrorum Aegyptiorum quodam Leone patefacta, ubi non Picus et Faunus et Aeneas et Romulus uel etiam Hercules et Aesculapius et Liber Semela natus et Tyndaridae fratres et si quos alios ex mortalibus pro diis habent, sed ipsi etiam maiorum gentium dii, quos Cicero in Tusculanis tacitis nominibus uidetur adtingere, Iuppiter, Iuno, Saturnus, Vulcanus, Vesta et alii plurimi, quos Varro conatur ad mundi partes siue elementa transferre, homines fuisse produntur. Timens enim et ille quasi reuelata mysteria petens admonet Alexandrum, ut, cum ea matri conscripta insinuauerit, flammis iubeat concremari.) Non solum ergo ista, quae duae theologiae, fabulosa continet et ciuilis, Platonicis philosophis cedant, qui uerum Deum et rerum auctorem et ueritatis inlustratorem et beatitudinis largitorem esse dixerunt; sed alii quoque philosophi, qui corporalia naturae principia corpori deditis mentibus opinati sunt, cedant his tantis et tanti Dei cognitoribus uiris, ut Thales in umore, Anaximenes in aere, Stoici in igne, Epicurus in atomis, hoc est minutissimis corpusculis, quae nec diuidi nec sentiri queunt, et quicumque alii, quorum enumeratione inmorari non est necesse, siue simplicia siue coniuncta corpora, siue uita carentia siue uiuentia, sed tamen corpora, causam principiumque rerum esse dixerunt. Nam quidam eorum a rebus non uiuis res uiuas fieri posse crediderunt, sicut Epicurei; quidam uero a uiuente quidem et uiuentia et non uiuentia, sed tamen a corpore corpora.

(In that genus are also those things—so that we may suspect something more mildly about Numa—which Alexander the Macedonian writes were laid open to him for his mother by a certain great high-priest of the Egyptian rites, one Leon, where not Picus and Faunus and Aeneas and Romulus, or even Hercules and Aesculapius and Liber born of Semele and the Tyndarid brothers, and any others whom they hold from mortals as gods, but even the gods of the greater nations themselves, whom Cicero in the Tusculans seems to touch upon with names kept silent—Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and very many others, whom Varro tries to transfer to the parts of the world or the elements—are reported to have been men. For that man too, fearing, and as though betraying mysteries once revealed, warns Alexander that, when he has conveyed these things in writing to his mother, he should order them to be burned by flames.) Not only, therefore, should those things which the two theologies, the fabulous and the civil, contain yield to the Platonic philosophers—who said that the true God is the author of things and the illuminator of truth and the bestower of beatitude—but also other philosophers, who have opined corporeal principles of nature with minds devoted to body, should yield to these so great knowers of so great a God: as Thales in moisture, Anaximenes in air, the Stoics in fire, Epicurus in atoms, that is, most minute little bodies which can be neither divided nor sensed, and whatever others, whose enumeration it is not necessary to dwell upon, who said that bodies, whether simple or composite, whether lacking life or living—yet nevertheless bodies—are the cause and principle of things. For some of them believed that from non-living things living things can be made, as the Epicureans; but some indeed, from a living [source], both things living and non-living—yet nevertheless bodies from a body.

Nam Stoici ignem, id est corpus unum ex his quattuor elementis, quibus uisibilis mundus hic constat, et uiuentem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem atque omnium, quae in eo sunt, eumque omnino ignem deum esse putauerunt. Hi et ceteri similes eorum id solum cogitare potuerunt, quod cum eis corda eorum obstricta carnis sensibus fabulata sunt. In se quippe habebant quod non uidebant, et apud se imaginabantur quod foris uiderant, etiam quando non uidebant, sed tantummodo cogitabant.

For the Stoics thought fire—that is, a body, one of those four elements by which this visible world consists—to be both living and sapient and the fabricator of the world itself and of all things that are in it, and this fire altogether to be god. These and others like them were able to think only that which their hearts, bound by the senses of the flesh, had spun as fable to them. For they had within themselves what they did not see, and they imagined with themselves what they had seen outside, even when they were not seeing, but only thinking.

Hoc autem in conspectu talis cogitationis iam non est corpus, sed similitudo corporis; illud autem, unde uidetur in animo haec similitudo corporis, nec corpus est nec similitudo corporis; et unde uidetur atque utrum pulchra an deformis sit iudicatur, profecto est melius quam ipsa quae iudicatur. Haec mens hominis et rationalis animae natura est, quae utique corpus non est, si iam illa corporis similitudo, cum in animo cogitantis aspicitur atque iudicatur, nec ipsa corpus est. Non est ergo nec terra nec aqua, nec aer nec ignis, quibus quattuor corporibus, quae dicuntur quattuor elementa, mundum corporeum uidemus esse compactum.

But this, in the sight of such cogitation, is now not a body, but a similitude of a body; but that whence this similitude of a body is seen in the mind is neither a body nor a similitude of a body; and that whence it is seen and by which it is judged whether it is beautiful or deformed is assuredly better than the very thing that is judged. This is the mind of man and the nature of the rational soul, which surely is not a body, if already that likeness of a body, when in the mind of the thinker it is beheld and judged, is not itself a body. Therefore it is neither earth nor water, nor air nor fire, by which four bodies, which are called the four elements, we see the corporeal world to be compacted.

Porro si noster animus corpus non est, quo modo Deus creator animi corpus est? Cedant ergo et isti, ut dictum est, Platonicis; cedant et illi, quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, uerum tamen eiusdem naturae, cuius ille est, animos nostros esse putauerunt; ita non eos mouit tanta mutabilitas animae, quam Dei naturae tribuere nefas est. Sed dicunt: Corpore mutatur animae natura, nam per se ipsa incommutabilis est.

Furthermore, if our mind is not a body, how is God, the creator of the mind, a body? Let these, then, as has been said, yield to the Platonists; and let those also yield who were indeed ashamed to say that God is a body, yet nevertheless thought that our souls are of the same nature as He is; thus so great a mutability of the soul did not move them—something it is nefas to ascribe to the nature of God. But they say: The nature of the soul is changed by the body, for by itself it is incommutable.

Poterant isti dicere: Corpore aliquo uulneratur caro, nam per se ipsa inuulnerabilis est. Prorsus quod mutari non potest, nulla re potest, ac per hoc quod corpore mutari potest, aliqua re potest et ideo incommutabile recte dici non potest.

They could say: “Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable.” Absolutely, that which cannot be changed can be affected by nothing; and hence that which can be changed by a body can be affected by some thing, and therefore cannot rightly be called immutable.

[VI] Viderunt ergo isti philosophi, quos ceteris non inmerito fama atque gloria praelatos uidemus, nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt quaerentes Deum. Viderunt, quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum, et ideo animam omnem mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt quaerentes summum Deum. Deinde uiderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua est, quidquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui uere est, quia incommutabiliter est, ac per hoc siue uniuersi mundi corpus figuras qualitates ordinatumque motum et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram et quaecumque corpora in eis sunt, siue omnem uitam, uel quae nutrit et continet, qualis est in arboribus, uel quae et hoc habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus, uel quae et haec habet et intellegit, qualis est in hominibus, uel quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget, sed tantum continet sentit intellegit, qualis est in angelis, nisi ab illo esse non posse, qui simpliciter est; quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud uiuere, quasi possit esse non uiuens; nec aliud illi est uiuere, aliud intellegere, quasi possit uiuere non intellegens; nec aliud illi est intellegere, aliud beatum esse, quasi possit intellegere non beatus; sed quod est illi uiuere, intellegere, beatum esse, hoc est illi esse.

[6] Therefore those philosophers, whom we see not undeservedly preferred before the others by fame and glory, saw that no body is God, and for that reason they transcended all bodies seeking God. They saw that whatever is mutable is not the highest God, and therefore they transcended every soul and all spirits that are mutable, seeking the highest God. Then they saw that every form in any mutable thing, by which it is whatever it is, in whatever manner and of whatever kind of nature it is, cannot be except from Him who truly is, because He is in an incommutable way; and consequently, whether it be the body of the whole universe—its figures, qualities, ordered motion, and the elements disposed from heaven down to earth—and whatever bodies are in them, or all life, whether that which nourishes and contains, as in trees, or that which both has this and senses, as in cattle, or that which has these too and understands, as in human beings, or that which does not need nutritory support but only contains, senses, understands, as in angels, cannot be except from Him who simply is; because for Him to be is not one thing and to live another, as if He could be not living; nor is to live one thing and to understand another, as if He could live not understanding; nor is to understand one thing and to be blessed another, as if He could understand not blessed; but what it is for Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, this is for Him to be.

Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse. Considerauerunt enim, quidquid est, uel corpus es s e uel uitam, meliusque aliquid uitam esse quam corpus, speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intellegibilem uitae. Proinde intellegibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt.

On account of this incommutability and simplicity they understood that he had made all those things, and that he himself could have been made by no one. For they considered that whatever is is either body or life, and that life is something better than body, and that the species/form of body is sensible, but that of life intelligible. Accordingly, they preferred the intelligible species/form to the sensible.

Sensibilia dicimus, quae uisu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt; intellegibilia, quae conspectu mentis intellegi. Nulla est enim pulchritudo corporalis siue in statu corporis, sicut est figura, siue in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua non animus iudicet. Quod profecto non posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec species, sine tumore molis, sine strepitu uocis, sine spatio uel loci uel temporis.

We call sensible things those which can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body; intelligible things, those which are understood by the mind’s gaze. For there is no bodily beauty—whether in the body’s state at rest, as is figure, or in motion, as is a chant—about which the mind does not judge. And indeed it could not do so, unless this species (form) were in it in a better way: without the swelling of bulk, without the din of a voice, without the span either of place or of time.

Sed ibi quoque nisi mutabilis esset, non alius alio melius de specie sensibili iudicaret; melius ingeniosior quam tardior, melius peritior quam inperitior, melius exercitatior quam minus exercitatus, et idem ipse unus, cum proficit, melius utique postea quam prius. Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. Vnde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt non esse in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilis esse conuincitur.

But there too, unless it were mutable, no one would judge better than another about the sensible species; the more ingenious better than the slower, the more skilled better than the unskilled, the more exercised better than the less exercised, and the very same single person, when he advances, certainly better afterwards than before. But whatever receives more and less is without doubt mutable. Whence ingenious and learned men, and men exercised in these things, easily gathered that the first species is not in those matters where it is proved to be mutable.

Cum igitur in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent, si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: uiderunt esse aliquid ubi prima esset incommutabilis et ideo nec comparabilis; atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset et ex quo facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, manifestauit eis ipse, cum ab eis inuisibilia eius per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspecta sunt; sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas; a quo etiam uisibilia et temporalia cuncta creata sunt. Haec de illa parte, quam physicam, id est naturalem, nuncupant, dicta sint.

Since therefore, in their sight, both body and soul were more and less beautiful, but if they could be devoid of every species, they would be altogether nothing: they saw that there is Something where the primary species is incommutable and therefore not comparable; and they most rightly believed that there is there the principium of things, which had not been made and from which all things had been made. Thus that which is known of God he himself manifested to them, when his invisibles, through the things that have been made, were by them understood and beheld; his sempiternal power also and divinity; by whom likewise all visible and temporal things were created. Let these things have been said about that part which they call “physical,” that is, “natural.”

[VII] Quod autem adtinet ad doctrinam, ubi uersatur pars altera, quae ab eis logica, id est rationalis, uocatur: absit ut his comparandi uideantur, qui posuerunt iudicium ueritatis in sensibus corporis eorumque infidis et fallacibus regulis omnia, quae discuntur, metienda esse censuerunt, ut Epicurei et quicumque alii tales, ut etiam ipsi Stoici, qui cum uehementer amauerint sollertiam disputandi, quam dialecticam nominant, a corporis sensibus eam ducendam putarunt, hinc asseuerantes animum concipere notiones, quas appellant *e)nnoi/as, earum rerum scilicet quas definiendo explicant; hinc propagari atque conecti totam discendi docendique rationem. Vbi ego multum mirari soleo, cum pulchros dicant non esse nisi sapientes, quibus sensibus corporis istam pulchritudinem uiderint, qualibus oculis carnis formam sapientiae decusque conspexerint. Hi uero, quos merito ceteris anteponimus, discreuerunt ea, quae mente conspiciuntur, ab his, quae sensibus adtinguntur, nec sensibus adimentes quod possunt, nec eis dantes ultra quam possunt.

[VII] But as it pertains to doctrine, where the other part is engaged, which by them is called logic, that is, rational: far be it that they seem fit to be compared with those who placed the judgment of truth in the senses of the body and decreed that all things which are learned must be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules, like the Epicureans and whatever others of that sort, even the Stoics themselves, who, although they vehemently loved the cleverness of disputation, which they name dialectic, thought it must be derived from the senses of the body, hence asserting that the mind conceives notions, which they call *e)nnoi/as, namely of those things which they explain by defining; hence that the whole method of learning and teaching is propagated and connected. Where I am wont to marvel much, when they say that none are beautiful except the wise, by what bodily senses they have seen that beauty, with what eyes of flesh they have beheld the form and adornment of wisdom. But these men, whom we rightly set before the rest, distinguished the things that are beheld by the mind from those that are reached by the senses, neither taking away from the senses what they can do, nor giving to them beyond what they can.

Lumen autem mentium esse dixerunt ad discenda omnia eundem ipsum Deum, a quo facta sunt omnia.

Moreover, they said that the light of minds for learning all things is that very same God, by whom all things were made.

[VIII] Reliqua est pars moralis, quam Graeco uocabulo dicunt ethicam, ubi quaeritur de summo bono, quo referentes omnia quae agimus, et quod non propter aliud, sed propter se ipsum adpetentes idque adipiscentes nihil, quo beati simus, ulterius requiramus. Ideo quippe et finis est dictus, quia propter hunc cetera uolumus, ipsum autem non nisi propter ipsum. Hoc ergo beatificum bonum alii a corpore, alii ab animo, alii ab utroque homini esse dixerunt.

[VIII] The moral part remains, which by a Greek vocable they call ethic, wherein inquiry is made about the highest good, to which referring all the things we do, and which desiring not on account of another but for its own sake, and, attaining it, we seek nothing further by which we may be blessed. For this reason indeed it is also called the end, because on account of this we will the rest, but it itself only for itself. This therefore beatific good some have said to belong to man from the body, others from the soul, others from both.

Videbant quippe ipsum hominem constare ex animo et corpore et ideo ab alterutro istorum duorum aut ab utroque bene sibi esse posse credebant, finali quodam bono, quo beati essent, quo cuncta quae agebant referrent atque id quo referendum esset non ultra quaererent. Vnde illi, qui dicuntur addidisse tertium genus bonorum, quod appellatur extrinsecus, sicuti est honor gloria pecunia et si quid huius modi, non sic addiderunt, ut finale esset, id est propter se ipsum adpetendum, sed propter aliud; bonumque esse hoc genus bonis, malum autem malis. Ita bonum hominis qui uel ab animo uel a corpore uel ab utroque expetiuerunt, nihil aliud quam ab homine expetendum esse putauerunt; sed qui id adpetiuerunt a corpore, a parte hominis deteriore; qui uero ab animo, a parte meliore; qui autem ab utroque, a toto homine.

For they saw that the human being itself consists of soul and body, and therefore they believed that their well-being could come from either of these two or from both, by some final good, whereby they would be beatified, to which they would refer all the things they did, and they would not seek beyond that to which things ought to be referred. Whence those who are said to have added a third genus of goods, which is called extrinsic—such as honor, glory, money, and anything of this sort—did not add it as something final, that is, to be sought for its own sake, but for the sake of something else; and that this genus is good for the good, but evil for the evil. Thus those who sought the good of man either from the soul or from the body or from both thought it should be sought from nothing other than from man; but those who sought it from the body, from the worse part of the human being; those from the soul, from the better part; while those from both, from the whole human being.

Siue ergo a parte qualibet siue a toto, non nisi ab homine. Nec istae differentiae, quoniam tres sunt, ideo tres, sed multas dissensiones philosophorum sectasque fecerunt, quia et de bono corporis et de bono animi et de bono utriusque diuersi diuersa opinati sunt. Cedant igitur omnes illis philosophis, qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem fruentem corpore uel fruentem animo, sed fruentem Deo; non sicut corpore uel se ipso animus aut sicut amico amicus, sed sicut luce oculus, si aliquid ab his ad illa similitudinis adferendum est, quod quale sit, si Deus ipse adiuuerit, alio loco, quantum per nos fieri poterit, apparebit.

Whether therefore from any part whatsoever or from the whole, yet from none but from the human being. And these differences, since they are three, did not on that account make three, but produced many dissensions of philosophers and sects, because concerning the good of the body and the good of the soul (mind) and the good of both, different people have opined different things. Let all then yield to those philosophers, who did not say that the blessed man is a man enjoying his body or enjoying his soul, but enjoying God; not as the soul enjoys the body or itself, nor as a friend [enjoys] a friend, but as the eye [enjoys] light—if any likeness is to be brought from these to those—which, of what sort it is, if God himself shall aid, in another place, so far as can be done by us, will appear.

Nunc satis sit commemorare Platonem determinasse finem boni esse secundum uirtutem uiuere et ei soli euenire posse, qui notitiam Dei habeat et imitationem nec esse aliam ob causam beatum; ideoque non dubitat hoc esse philosophari, amare Deum, cuius natura sit incorporalis. Vnde utique colligitur tunc fore beatum studiosum sapientiae (id enim est philosophus), cum frui Deo coeperit. Quamuis enim non continuo beatus sit, qui eo fruitur quod amat (multi enim amando ea, quae amanda non sunt, miseri sunt et miseriores cum fruuntur): nemo tamen beatus est, qui eo quod amat non fruitur.

Now let it suffice to commemorate that Plato determined the end of the good to be to live according to virtue, and that it can eventuate only for him who has knowledge of God and imitation, and that there is no other cause of being blessed; and therefore he does not doubt that to philosophize is this: to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it is surely gathered that then the devotee of wisdom (for that is a philosopher) will be blessed, when he begins to enjoy God. For although he is not immediately blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many, by loving things that are not to be loved, are wretched, and more wretched when they enjoy them), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves.

Nam et ipsi, qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos putant amando, sed fruendo. Quisquis ergo fruitur eo, quod amat, uerumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserrimus negat? Ipsum autem uerum ac summum bonum Plato dicit Deum, unde uult esse philosophum amatorem Dei, ut, quoniam philosophia ad beatam uitam tendit, fruens Deo sit beatus qui Deum amauerit.

For even those who love things not to be loved do not reckon themselves blessed by loving, but by enjoying. Whoever therefore enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good—who denies him to be blessed, except the most miserable? But Plato says that the very true and highest good is God; whence he wills the philosopher to be a lover of God, so that, since philosophy tends toward the blessed life, the one who has loved God, enjoying God, may be blessed.

[IX] Quicumque igitur philosophi de Deo summo et uero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creatarum sit effector et lumen cognoscendarum et bonum agendarum, quod ab illo nobis sit et principium naturae et ueritas doctrinae et felicitas uitae, siue Platonici accommodatius nuncupentur, siue quodlibet aliud sectae suae nomen inponant; siue tantummodo Ionici generis, qui in eis praecipui fuerunt, ista senserint, sicut idem Plato et qui eum bene intellexerunt; siue etiam Italici, propter Pythagoram et Pythagoreos et si qui forte alii eiusdem sententiae indidem fuerunt; siue aliarum quoque gentium qui sapientes uel philosophi habiti sunt, Atlantici Libyes, Aegyptii, Indi, Persae, Chaldaei, Scythae, Galli, Hispani, aliqui reperiuntur, qui hoc uiderint ac docuerint: eos omnes ceteris anteponimus eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur.

[9] Whoever, therefore, of the philosophers have thought these things about the highest and true God—that he is both the maker of created things and the light of things to be known and the good of things to be done; that from him there is for us both the principle of nature and the truth of doctrine and the felicity of life—whether they be more fittingly named Platonists, or impose whatever other name of their sect; whether only those of the Ionic stock, who were preeminent among them, held these views, as that same Plato and those who understood him well; or also the Italic, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and if perhaps any others of the same opinion were from the same region; or even of other nations as well who have been held wise or philosophers—Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldaeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards—if any are found who have seen and taught this: all these we set before the others, and we acknowledge them to be nearer to us.

[X] Quamuis enim homo Christianus litteris tantum ecclesiasticis eruditus Platonicorum forte nomen ignoret, nec utrum duo genera philosophorum extiterint in Graeca lingua, Ionicorum et Italicorum, sciat: non tamen ita surdus est in rebus humanis, ut nesciat philosophos uel studium sapientiae uel ipsam sapientiam profiteri. Cauet eos tamen, qui secundum elementa huius mundi philosophantur, non secundum Deum, a quo ipse factus est mundus. Admonetur enim praecepto apostolico fideliterque audit quod dictum est: Cauete ne quis uos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum elementa mundi.

[10] For although a Christian man educated only in ecclesiastical letters may perhaps be ignorant of the name of the Platonists, and may not know whether two kinds of philosophers existed in the Greek tongue, the Ionian and the Italian, yet he is not so deaf in human affairs as not to know that philosophers profess either the pursuit of wisdom or wisdom itself. He nevertheless is on his guard against those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according to God, by whom the world itself was made. For he is admonished by the apostolic precept and faithfully hears what has been said: Beware lest anyone deceive you through philosophy and empty seduction according to the elements of the world.

Deinde ne omnes tales esse arbitretur, audit ab eodem apostolo dici de quibusdam: Quia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestauit. Inuisibila enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas, et ubi Atheniensibus loquens, cum rem magnam de Deo dixisset et quae a paucis possit intellegi, quod in illo uiuimus et mouemur et sumus, adiecit et ait: Sicut et uestri quidam dixerunt. Nouit sane etiam ipsos, in quibus errant, cauere; ubi enim dictum est, quod per ea, quae facta sunt, Deus illis manifestauit intellectu conspicienda inuisibilia sua: ibi etiam dictum est non illos ipsum Deum recte coluisse, quia et aliis rebus, quibus non oportebat, diuinos honores illi uni tantum debitos detulerunt: Quoniam cognoscentes Deum non sicut Deum glorificauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum.

Then, lest he suppose all such men to be of this sort, he hears it said by the same Apostle concerning certain persons: That what is known of God is manifest in them; for God has manifested it to them. For his invisibles from the constitution of the world, being understood through the things that have been made, are beheld, his sempiternal virtue also and divinity; and when speaking to the Athenians, after he had said a great matter about God, and one which can be understood by few, namely that in him we live and move and are, he added and said: As even some of yours have said. He certainly also knows how to beware of those very men in the points wherein they err; for where it was said that through the things which have been made God manifested to them his invisibles to be beheld by the intellect, there it was also said that they did not rightly worship God himself, because they also rendered to other things, to which it was not fitting, divine honors owed to that One alone: Because, knowing God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but they became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened.

Dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium; ubi et Romanos et Graecos et Aegyptios, qui de sapientiae nomine gloriati sunt, fecit intellegi. Sed de hoc cum istis post modum disputabimus. In quo autem nobis consentiunt de uno Deo huius uniuersitatis auctore, qui non solum super omnia corpora est incorporeus, uerum etiam super omnes animas incorruptibilis, principium nostrum, lumen nostrum, bonum nostrum, in hoc eos ceteris anteponimus.

For, saying themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man and of birds and quadrupeds and serpents; wherein he also caused it to be understood that Romans and Greeks and Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom, are included. But about this we shall dispute with these men afterward. Yet in that wherein they agree with us about the one God, the author of this universe, who is not only over all bodies incorporeal, but also over all souls incorruptible—our principle, our light, our good—in this we set them before the others.

Nec, si litteras eorum Christianus ignorans uerbis, quae non didicit, in disputatione non utitur, ut uel naturalem Latine uel physicam Graece appellet eam partem, in qua de naturae inquisitione tractatur, et rationalem siue logicam, in qua quaeritur quonam modo ueritas percipi possit, et moralem uel ethicam, in qua de moribus agitur bonorumque finibus adpetendis malorumque uitandis, ideo nescit ab uno uero Deo atque optimo et naturam nobis esse, qua facti ad eius imaginem sumus, et doctrinam, qua eum nosque nouerimus, et gratiam, qua illi cohaerendo beati simus. Haec itaque causa est cur istos ceteris praeferamus, quia, cum alii philosophi ingenia sua studiaque contriuerint in requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi atque uiuendi, isti Deo cognito reppererunt ubi esset et causa constitutae uniuersitatis et lux percipiendae ueritatis et fons bibendae felicitatis. Siue ergo isti Platonici siue quicumque alii quarumlibet gentium philosophi de Deo ista sentiunt, nobiscum sentiunt.

Nor, if a Christian, being ignorant of their letters, does not in disputation use words which he has not learned—so as to call, in Latin, “natural,” or in Greek, “physic,” that part in which the inquiry of nature is handled; and “rational” or “logic,” that in which it is asked by what mode truth can be perceived; and “moral” or “ethic,” that in which conduct is treated, and the ends of goods to be pursued and of evils to be avoided—does he for that reason not know from the one true and best God both that there is for us a nature, by which we were made to his image, and a doctrine, by which we may know him and ourselves, and a grace, by cleaving to which we may be blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these men to the others: because, whereas other philosophers wore down their talents and studies on seeking the causes of things, and what might be the mode of learning and of living, these, with God known, discovered where there was both the cause of the constituted universe, and the light for perceiving truth, and the fount for drinking felicity. Therefore whether these be Platonists, or whatever other philosophers of whatever nations think these things about God, they think with us.

Sed ideo cum Platonicis magis agere placuit hanc causam, quia eorum sunt litterae notiores. Nam et Graeci, quorum lingua in gentibus praeminet, eas magna praedicatione celebrarunt, et Latini permoti earum uel excellentia uel gloria, ipsas libentius didicerunt atque in nostrum eloquium transferendo nobiliores clarioresque fecerunt.

But for this reason it has pleased us to deal this case rather with the Platonics, because their letters are more well-known. For both the Greeks, whose tongue is preeminent among the nations, celebrated them with great proclamation, and the Latins, moved by their excellence or glory, more willingly learned them, and by transferring them into our eloquence made them more noble and more illustrious.

[XI] Mirantur autem quidam nobis in Christi gratia sociati, cum audiunt uel legunt Platonem de Deo ista sensisse, quae multum congruere ueritati nostrae religionis agnoscunt. Vnde nonnulli putauerunt eum, quando perrexit in Aegyptum, Hieremiam audisse prophetam uel scripturas propheticas in eadem peregrinatione legisse; quorum quidem opinionem in quibusdam libris meis posui. Sed diligenter supputata temporum ratio, quae chronica historia continetur, Platonem indicat a tempore, quo prophetauit Hieremias, centum ferme annos postea natum fuisse; qui cum octoginta et unum uixisset, ab anno mortis eius usque ad id tempus, quo Ptolomaeus rex Aegypti scripturas propheticas gentis Hebraeorum de Iudaea poposcit et per septuaginta uiros Hebraeos, qui etiam Graecam linguam nouerant, interpretandas habendasque curauit, anni reperiuntur ferme sexaginta.

[11] Some, moreover, who are associated with us in the grace of Christ, marvel when they hear or read that Plato held these things about God, which they acknowledge to be highly congruent with the truth of our religion. Whence some have supposed that, when he proceeded into Egypt, he heard the prophet Jeremiah, or read the prophetic Scriptures on that same journey; the opinion of whom I have indeed set down in some of my books. But a carefully computed reckoning of the times, which is contained in chronicle history, indicates that Plato was born almost one hundred years after the time when Jeremiah prophesied; and, though he lived eighty-one years, from the year of his death down to that time when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, asked for the prophetic Scriptures of the Hebrew nation from Judaea and took care to have them interpreted by seventy Hebrew men, who also knew the Greek language, there are found to be nearly sixty years.

Quapropter in illa peregrinatione sua Plato nec Hieremiam uidere potuit tanto ante defunctum, nec easdem scripturas legere, quae nondum fuerant in Graecam linguam translatae, qua ille pollebat; nisi forte, quia fuit acerrimi studii, sicut Aegyptias, ita et istas per interpretem didicit, non ut scribendo transferret (quod Ptolomaeus pro ingenti beneficio, qui a regia potestate etiam timeri poterat, meruisse perhibetur), sed ut conloquendo quid continerent, quantum capere posset, addisceret. Hoc ut existimetur, illa suadere uidentur indicia, quod liber geneseos sic incipit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae <erant> super abyssum, et spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam; in Timaeo autem Plato, quem librum de mundi constitutione conscripsit, Deum dicit in illo opere terram primo ignemque iunxisse.

Wherefore, on that peregrination of his, Plato could neither see Jeremiah, who had died so long before, nor read those same Scriptures, which had not yet been translated into the Greek tongue, in which he excelled; unless perhaps, because he was of the keenest studium, just as he learned the Egyptian ones, so also he learned these through an interpreter—not in order to transfer them by writing (which Ptolemy is reported to have earned as an immense beneficium, he who by royal power could even be feared), but so that by conversing he might learn what they contained, so far as he could grasp. That this may be thought, these indices seem to persuade: that the book of Genesis thus begins: In the beginning God made heaven and earth. But the earth was invisible and uncomposed, and darkness <were> upon the abyss, and the Spirit of God was being borne over the water; but in the Timaeus, however, Plato—whose book he composed on the constitution of the world—says that in that work God joined earth first and fire.

Manifestum est autem, quod igni tribuat caeli locum: habet ergo haec sententia quandam illius similitudinem, qua dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Deinde ille duo media, quibus interpositis sibimet haec extrema copularentur, aquam dicit et aerem; unde putatur sic intellexisse quod scriptum est: spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam. Parum quippe adtendens quo more soleat illa scriptura appellare spiritum Dei, quoniam et aer spiritus dicitur, quattuor opinatus elementa loco illo commemorata uideri potest.

It is manifest, moreover, that he assigns to fire the place of the heaven: therefore this opinion has a certain likeness to that where it is said: "In the beginning God made heaven and earth." Then he says that the two intermediates, by whose interposition these extremes might be coupled to each other, are water and air; whence he is thought thus to have understood what is written: "the Spirit of God was borne over the water." Paying too little heed to the manner in which that Scripture is wont to name the Spirit of God, since air also is called spirit, he can seem to have supposed that the four elements were commemorated in that place.

Deinde quod Plato dicit amatorem Dei esse philosophum, nihil sic illis sacris litteris flagrat; et maxime illud (quod et me plurimum adducit, ut paene assentiar Platonem illorum librorum expertem non fuisse), quod, cum ad sanctum Moysen ita uerba Dei per angelum perferantur, ut quaerenti quod sit nomen eius, qui eum pergere praecipiebat ad populum Hebraeum ex Aegypto liberandum, respondeatur: Ego sum qui sum, et dices filiis Israel; Qui est, misit me ad uos, tamquam in eius comparatione, qui uere est quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt non sint, uehementer hoc Plato tenuit et diligentissime commendauit. Et nescio utrum hoc uspiam reperiatur in libris eorum, qui ante Platonem fuerunt, nisi ubi dictum est: Ego sum qui sum, et dices eis: Qui est, misit me ad uos.

Then, as to Plato’s saying that the philosopher is a lover of God, nothing in those sacred letters flames thus; and especially this (which also leads me very much to the point that I almost assent that Plato was not unacquainted with those books): that, when to holy Moses the words of God are conveyed through an angel in such wise that, to his asking what is the name of Him who was commanding him to go to the Hebrew people to be freed from Egypt, the answer is given: “I am who I am, and you shall say to the sons of Israel; He Who Is has sent me to you,” as though by comparison with Him who truly is—because He is immutable—those things which have been made mutable are not; this Plato vehemently maintained and most diligently commended. And I do not know whether this is found anywhere in the books of those who were before Plato, except where it is said: “I am who I am, and you shall say to them: He Who Is has sent me to you.”

[XII] Sed undecumque ille ista didicerit, siue praecedentibus eum ueterum libris siue potius, quo modo dicit apostolus, quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestauit; inuisibilia enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas: nunc non inmerito me Platonicos philosophos elegisse cum quibus agam, quod in ista quaestione, quam modo suscepimus, agitur de naturali theologia, utrum propter felicitatem, quae post mortem futura est, uni Deo an pluribus sacra facere oporteat, satis, ut existimo, exposui. Ideo quippe hos potissimum elegi. quoniam de uno Deo qui fecit caelum et terram, quanto melius senserunt, tanto ceteris gloriosiores et inlustriores habentur, in tantum aliis praelati iudicio posterorum, ut, cum Aristoteles Platonis discipulus, uir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem impar, sed multos facile superans, cum sectam Peripateticam condidisset, quod deambulans disputare consueuerat, plurimosque discipulos praeclara fama excellens uiuo adhuc praeceptore in suam haeresim congregasset, post mortem uero Platonis Speusippus, sororis eius filius, et Xenocrates, dilectus eius discipulus, in scholam eius, quae Academia uocabatur, eidem successissent atque ob hoc et ipsi et eorum successores Academici appellarentur, recentiores tamen philosophi nobilissimi, quibus Plato sectandus placuit, noluerint se dici Peripateticos aut Academicos, sed Platonicos.

[12] But from whatever source he learned these things, whether from the books of the ancients that preceded him or rather, as the Apostle says, because what is known of God is manifest in them; for God has made it manifest to them; for his invisible things, from the constitution of the world, are seen—being understood through the things that have been made—his eternal power also and divinity: now I have not without merit shown sufficiently, as I think, that I chose the Platonic philosophers with whom I should deal, because in this question which we have now undertaken there is a treatment of natural theology—whether, on account of the felicity which will be after death, it is proper to perform sacred rites to the one God or to many. For this reason indeed I chose these men especially, since concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, the better they perceived, by so much the more glorious and illustrious than the rest they are held, preferred to others by the judgment of posterity to such a degree that, when Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of excellent genius and in eloquence indeed unequal to Plato yet easily surpassing many, had founded the Peripatetic sect—because he was accustomed to dispute while walking—and, excelling in renowned fame, had gathered very many disciples into his sect while his teacher was still alive, but after the death of Plato Speusippus, his sister’s son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, had succeeded him in his school, which was called the Academy, and on this account both they and their successors were called Academics, yet the more recent and most noble philosophers, for whom it seemed good that Plato be followed, did not wish to be called Peripatetics or Academics, but Platonists.

Ex quibus sunt ualde nobilitati Graeci Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius; in utraque autem lingua, id est et Graeca et Latina, Apuleius Afer extitit Platonicus nobilis. Sed hi omnes et ceteri eius modi et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putauerunt.

Among whom are highly renowned Greeks: Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry; and in both tongues, that is, both Greek and Latin, Apuleius the African stood forth as a noble Platonist. But all these, and others of that kind, and Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed to very many gods.

[XIII] Quamquam ergo a nobis et in aliis multis rebus magnisque dissentiant, in hoc tamen, quod modo posui, quia neque parua res est et inde nunc quaestio est, primum ab eis quaero, quibus diis istum cultum exhibendum arbitrentur, utrum bonis an malis an et bonis et malis. Sed habemus sententiam Platonis dicentis omnes deos bonos esse nec esse omnino ullum deorum malum. Consequens est igitur, ut bonis haec exhibenda intellegantur; tunc enim diis exhibentur, quoniam nec dii erunt, si boni non erunt.

[13] Although therefore they dissent from us also in many other matters and great ones, yet in this, which I have just put forward—because it is no small matter and the question now turns on it—I first ask of them to which gods they think this cult ought to be exhibited: whether to good ones or to evil ones, or to both good and evil. But we have the sententia of Plato, saying that all gods are good and that there is absolutely no god evil. It is consequent, therefore, that these things be understood to be rendered to the good; for then they are rendered to gods, since they will not even be gods if they will not be good.

Hoc si ita est, (nam de diis quid aliud decet credere?) illa profecto uacuatur opinio, qua nonnulli putant deos malos sacris placandos esse, ne laedant, bonos autem, ut adiuuent, inuocandos. Mali enim nulli sunt dii; bonis porro debitus, ut dicunt, honor sacrorum est deferendus. Qui sunt ergo illi, qui ludos scaenicos amant eosque diuinis rebus adiungi et suis honoribus flagitant exhiberi?

If this is so, (for what else is it fitting to believe about the gods?) that opinion is surely made void, whereby certain men think that evil gods must be placated with sacred rites, lest they harm, but good ones must be invoked, that they may aid. For no gods are evil; and to the good, moreover, the due, as they say, honor of the sacred rites is to be rendered. Who, then, are those who love the scenic games and demand that they be joined to divine matters and be exhibited for their own honors?

quorum uis non eos indicat nullos, sed iste affectus nimirum indicat malos. Quid enim de ludis scaenicis Plato senserit, notum est, cum poetas ipsos, quod tam indigna deorum maiestate atque bonitate carmina composuerint, censet ciuitate pellendos. Qui sunt igitur isti dii, qui de scaenicis ludis cum ipso Platone contendunt?

whose force does not indicate them to be none, but this affect surely indicates them to be evil. For what Plato felt about the scenic games is known, since he judges the poets themselves, because they have composed poems so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the gods, to be expelled from the city. Who, then, are those gods who contend about the scenic games with Plato himself?

Ille quippe non patitur deos falsis criminibus infamari; isti eisdem criminibus suos honores celebrari iubent. Denique isti cum eosdem ludos instaurari praeciperent, poscentes turpia etiam maligna gesserunt, Tito Latinio auferentes filium et inmittentes morbum, quod eorum abnuisset imperium, eumque morbum retrabentes, cum iussa complesset; iste autem illos nec tam malos timendos putat, sed suae sententiae robur constantissime retinens , omnes poetarum sacrilegas nugas, quibus illi inmunditiae societate oblectantur, a populo bene instituto remouere non dubitat. Hunc autem Platonem, quod iam in secundo libro commemoraui, inter semideos Labeo ponit.

That man, indeed, does not allow the gods to be defamed by false crimes; these command that their honors be celebrated by the same crimes. Finally, when these prescribed that the same games be restored, demanding shameful things, they also perpetrated malignant deeds—taking from Titus Latinius his son and sending in a disease, because he had refused their command, and drawing back that disease when he had completed the orders; but this man thinks that those are not to be feared as being so evil, and, most steadfastly retaining the strength of his opinion , does not hesitate to remove from a well-instituted people all the sacrilegious trifles of the poets, with the fellowship of uncleanness by which those are delighted. But this Plato, as I have already mentioned in the second book, Labeo places among the demigods.

Qui Labeo numina mala uictimis cruentis atque huius modi supplicationibus placari existimat, bona uero ludis et talibus quasi ad laetitiam pertinentibus rebus. Quid est ergo quod semideus Plato non semideis, sed deis, et hoc bonis, illa oblectamenta, quia iudicat turpia, tam constanter audet auferre? Qui sane dii refellunt sententiam Labeonis; nam, se in Latinio non lasciuos tantum atque ludibundos, sed etiam saeuos terribilesque monstrarunt.

As for Labeo, he holds that the evil numina are appeased by bloody victims and supplications of this sort, but the good by games and such things as pertain to gladness. What, then, is the reason that the demigod Plato so steadfastly dares to take away those amusements not from demigods, but from gods—and these good ones—because he judges them shameful? These gods indeed refute Labeo’s opinion; for, in the case of Latinius, they showed themselves not only lascivious and sportive, but also savage and terrible.

Exponant ergo nobis ista Platonici, qui omnes deos secundum auctoris sui sententiam bonos et honestos et uirtutibus sapientium socios esse arbitrantur aliterque de ullo deorum sentiri nefas habent. Exponimus, inquiunt. Adtente igitur audiamus.

Let the Platonists, then, expound these things to us—who reckon all the gods, according to the opinion of their author, to be good and honorable and associates of the virtues of the wise, and hold it impious that anything otherwise be thought concerning any of the gods. “We expound,” they say. Let us, then, listen attentively.

[XIV] Omnium, inquiunt, animalium, in quibus est anima rationalis, tripertita diuisio est, in deos, homines, daemones. Dii excelsissimum locum tenent, homines infimum, daemones medium. Nam deorum sedes in caelo est, hominum in terra, in aere daemonum.

[14] Of all animals, they say, in which there is a rational anima, there is a tripartite division: into gods, humans, daemons. The gods hold the most exalted place, humans the lowest, daemons the middle. For the seat of the gods is in heaven, of humans on earth, of daemons in the air.

Sicut eis diuersa dignitas est locorum, ita etiam naturarum. Proinde dii sunt hominibus daemonibusque potiores; homines uero infra deos et daemones constituti sunt, ut elementorum ordine, sic differentia meritorum. Daemones igitur medii, quem ad modum diis, quibus inferius habitant, postponendi, ita hominibus, quibus superius, praeferendi sunt.

Just as for them there is a diverse dignity of places, so also of natures. Accordingly the gods are superior to humans and daemons; but humans are constituted beneath the gods and the daemons, as by the order of the elements, so by a difference of merits. Therefore the daemons, being in the middle, are, in the manner that they must be postponed to the gods beneath whom they dwell, thus to be preferred to humans above whom they are.

Habent enim cum diis communem inmortalitatem corporum, animorum autem cum hominibus passiones. Quapropter non est mirum, inquiunt, si etiam ludorum obscenitatibus et poetarum figmentis delectantur, quando quidem humanis capiuntur affectibus, a quibus dii longe absunt et modis omnihus alieni sunt. Ex quo colligitur, Platonem poetica detestando et prohibendo figmenta non deos, qui omnes boni et excelsi sunt, priuasse ludorum scaenicorum uoluptate, sed daemones.

For they have with the gods a common immortality of bodies, but passions of souls with human beings. Wherefore it is not a wonder, they say, if they are also delighted by the obscenities of the games and the poets’ figments, since indeed they are seized by human affections, from which the gods are far absent and in every way alien. Whence it is gathered that Plato, by detesting poetry and forbidding figments, deprived not the gods, who are all good and exalted, of the pleasure of the scenic games, but the daemons.

Haec si ita sunt (quae licet apud alios quoque reperiantur, Apuleius tamen Platonicus Madaurensis de hac re sola unum scripsit librum, cuius esse titulum uoluit "de deo Socratis", ubi disserit et exponit, ex quo genere numinum Socrates habebat adiunctum et amicitia quadam conciliatum, a quo perbibetur solitus admoneri, ut desisteret ab agendo, quando id quod agere uolebat, non prospere fuerat euenturum; dicit enim apertissime et copiosissime asserit non illum deum fuisse, sed daemonem, diligenti disputatione pertractans istam Platonis de deorum sublimitate et hominum humilitate et daemonum medietate sententiam) -- haec ergo si ita sunt, quonam modo ausus est Plato, etiamsi non diis, quos ab omni humana contagione semouit, certe ipsis daemonibus poetas urbe pellendo auferre theatricas uoluptates, nisi quia hoc pacto admonuit animum humanum, quamuis adhuc in his moribundis membris positum, pro splendore honestatis impura daemonum iussa contemnere eorumque inmunditiam detestari? Nam si Plato haec honestissime arguit et prohibuit, profecto daemones turpissime poposcerunt atque iusserunt. Aut ergo fallitur Apuleius et non ex isto genere numinum habuit amicum Socrates aut contraria inter se sentit Plato modo daemones honorando, modo eorum delicias a ciuitate bene morata remouendo, aut non est Socrati amicitia daemonis gratulanda, de qua usque adeo et ipse Apuleius erubuit, ut de deo Socratis praenotaret librum, quem secundum suam disputationem, qua deos a daemonibus tam diligenter copioseque discernit, non appellare de deo, sed de daemone Socratis debuit.

If these things are so (which, although they may be found also among others, yet Apuleius the Platonist of Madaura wrote one book on this matter alone, which he wished to have the title "On the god of Socrates," where he discusses and sets forth from what kind of divinities Socrates had one adjoined and, by a certain friendship, conciliated, by whom he is reported to have been accustomed to be admonished to desist from acting whenever that which he wished to do would not have turned out prosperously; for he says quite openly and asserts most copiously that that one was not a god, but a daemon, handling with diligent disputation that opinion of Plato about the sublimity of the gods, the humility of men, and the mediety of daemons) -- if, therefore, these things are so, in what way did Plato dare, even if not from the gods, whom he removed from all human contagion, yet from the daemons themselves, by expelling poets from the city, to take away theatrical pleasures, unless it was because by this method he admonished the human mind, although still set in these dying limbs, for the splendor of honesty to contemn the impure commands of daemons and to detest their uncleanness? For if Plato most honorably argues and prohibits these things, surely the daemons most disgracefully demanded and commanded them. Either, then, Apuleius is mistaken, and Socrates did not have as a friend one from that kind of divinities, or Plato holds opinions contrary to one another, now honoring daemons, now removing their delights from a well-moraled city, or the friendship of a daemon is not to be congratulated for Socrates, about which even Apuleius himself blushed to such a degree that he prefixed to the book the title On the god of Socrates, which, according to his own disputation, in which he so diligently and copiously distinguishes gods from daemons, he ought to have called not On the god, but On the daemon of Socrates.

Maluit autem hoc in ipsa disputatione quam in titulo libri ponere. Ita enim per sanam doctrinam, quae humanis rebus inluxit, omnes uel paene omnes daemonum nomen exhorrent, ut, quisquis ante disputationem Apulei, qua daemonum dignitas commendatur, titulum libri de daemone Socratis legeret, nequaquam illum hominem sanum fuisse sentiret. Quid autem etiam ipse Apuleius quod in daemonibus laudaret inuenit praeter subtilitatem et firmitatem corporum et habitationis altiorem locum?

However, he preferred to put this in the disputation itself rather than in the title of the book. For thus, through sound doctrine, which has shone upon human affairs, all, or almost all, shrink from the name of daemons, such that whoever, before Apuleius’s disputation in which the dignity of the daemons is commended, should read the title of the book “On the Daemon of Socrates,” would by no means judge that man to have been sane. But what, moreover, did Apuleius himself find to praise in the daemons, besides the subtlety and firmness of their bodies and the higher place of their habitation?

Nam de moribus eorum, cum de omnibus generaliter loqueretur, non solum nihil boni dixit, sed etiam plurimum mali. Denique lecto illo libro prorsus nemo miratur eos etiam scaenicam turpitudinem in rebus diuinis habere uoluisse, et cum deos se putari uelint, deorum criminibus oblectari potuisse, et quidquid in eorum sacris obscena sollemnitate seu turpi crudelitate uel ridetur uel horretur, eorum affectibus conuenire.

For regarding their morals, when he was speaking generally about all of them, he not only said nothing good, but even very much evil. Finally, after that book is read, absolutely no one is surprised that they even wished to have theatrical turpitude in divine matters, and that, though they want themselves to be thought gods, they could take delight in the crimes of the gods; and that whatever in their sacred rites, by obscene solemnity or by shameful cruelty, is either laughed at or shuddered at, fits their affections.

[XV] Quam ob rem absit ut ista considerans animus ueraciter religiosus et uero Deo subditus ideo arbitretur daemones se ipso esse meliores, quod habeant corpora meliora. Alioquin multas sibi et bestias praelaturus est, quae nos et acrimonia sensuum et motu facillimo atque celerrimo et ualentia uirium et annosissima firmitate corporum uincunt. Quis hominum uidendo aequabitur aquilis et uulturibus?

[15] Wherefore, let it be far away that a mind truly religious and subject to the true God, considering these things, should therefore judge the demons to be better than itself, because they have better bodies. Otherwise, he will even prefer many beasts to himself, which surpass us both in the acrimony (acuity) of the senses and in a most easy and most swift motion and in the vigor of strength and in the most long-lived durability of bodies. Who among men will be equal to eagles and vultures in seeing?

quis odorando canibus? quis uelocitate leporibus, ceruis, omnibus auibus? quis multum ualendo leonibus et elephantis?

who will equal dogs in smelling? who in velocity hares, stags, all birds? who in great strength lions and elephants?

quis diu uiuendo serpentibus, qui etiam deposita tunica senectutem deponere atque in iuuentam redire perhibentur? Sed sicut his omnibus ratiocinando et intellegendo meliores sumus, ita etiam daemonibus bene atque honeste uiuendo meliores esse debemus. Ob hoc enim et prouidentia diuina eis, quibus nos constat esse potiores, data sunt quaedam potiora corporum munera, ut illud, quo eis praeponimur, etiam isto modo nobis commendaretur multo maiore cura excolendum esse quam corpus, ipsamque excellentiam corporalem, quam daemones habere nossemus, prae bonitate uitae, qua illis anteponimur, contemnere disceremus, habituri et nos inmortalitatem corporum, non quam suppliciorum aeternitas torqueat, sed quam puritas praecedat animorum.

who in long living equals the serpents, who even are reported, with their tunic laid aside, to lay aside old age and return into youth? But just as than all these we are better by ratiocinating and understanding, so also than the daemons we ought to be better by living well and honorably. For on this account even by divine providence to those, than whom it is evident that we are superior, certain superior endowments of bodies have been given, so that that by which we are set before them would also in this way be commended to us as needing to be cultivated with much greater care than the body; and that we might learn to contemn the very corporal excellence which we would know the daemons to have, in comparison with the goodness of life, by which we are set before them, we too being destined to have immortality of bodies—not that which the eternity of punishments torments, but that which the purity of souls goes before.

Iam uero de loci altitudine, quod daemones in aere, nos autem habitamus in terra, ita permoueri, ut hinc eos nobis esse praeponendos existimemus, omnino ridiculum est. Hoc enim pacto nobis et omnia uolatilia praeponimus. At enim uolatilia cum uolando fatigantur uel reficiendum alimentis corpus habent, terram repetunt uel ad requiem uel ad pastum, quod daemones, inquiunt, non faciunt.

Now indeed, as to the altitude of place—because the demons are in the air, whereas we inhabit the earth—to be so moved as to think that from this they ought to be set before us is altogether ridiculous. For by this reasoning we would also set all winged creatures before us. But indeed winged creatures, when they are wearied by flying or have a body needing to be refreshed by aliment, return to the earth either for rest or for feeding, which, they say, the demons do not do.

Numquid ergo placet eis, ut uolatilia nobis, daemones autem etiam uolatilibus antecellant? Quod si dementissimum est opinari, nihil est quod de habitatione superioris elementi dignos esse daemones existimemus, quibus nos religionis affectu subdere debeamus. Sicut enim fieri potuit, ut aeriae uolucres terrestribus nobis non solum non praeferantur, uerum etiam subiciantur propter rationalis animae, quae in nobis est, dignitatem: ita fieri potuit, ut daemones, quamuis magis aerii sint, terrestribus nobis non ideo meliores sint, quia est aer quam terra superior; sed ideo eis homines praeferendi sint, quoniam spei piorum hominum nequaquam illorum desperatio comparanda est.

So then does it please them that the winged creatures be set before us, but that the demons even excel the winged? If it is the most demented thing to suppose this, there is no reason why we should think the demons worthy, on account of their habitation of a superior element, to whom we ought to subject ourselves by religious affection. For just as it could come to pass that aerial birds are not only not preferred to us terrestrials, but are even subjected, on account of the dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so it could come to pass that the demons, although more aerial, are not therefore better than us earth-dwellers, because air is superior to earth; but for that very reason men are to be preferred to them, since the hope of pious men is by no means comparable with their desperation.

Nam et illa ratio Platonis, qua elementa quattuor proportione contexit atque ordinat, ita duobus extremis, igni mobilissimo et terrae inmobili, media duo, aerem et aquam, interserens, ut, quanto est aer aquis et aere ignis, tanto et aquae superiores sint terris, satis nos admonet animalium merita non pro elementorum gradibus aestimare. Et ipse quippe Apuleius cum ceteris terrestre animal hominem dicit, qui tamen longe praeponitur animalibus aquatilibus, cum ipsas aquas terris praeponat Plato: ut intellegamus non eundem ordinem tenendum, cum agitur de meritis animarum, qui uidetur esse ordo in gradibus corporum; sed fieri posse, ut inferius corpus anima melior inhabitet deteriorque superius.

For that rationale of Plato too, by which he interweaves and orders the four elements in proportion—thus inserting the two middle ones, air and water, between the two extremes, fire most mobile and earth immobile—so that, just as much as air stands above waters and fire above air, by that same measure the waters also are superior to the lands, sufficiently admonishes us not to appraise the merits of animals according to the grades of the elements. And Apuleius himself, for his part, with the others calls man a terrestrial animal, who nevertheless is far preferred to aquatic animals, although Plato sets the waters themselves before the lands: so that we may understand that the same order is not to be maintained, when it is a question of the merits of souls, as seems to be the order in the grades of bodies; but that it can come to be that a better soul inhabits a lower body, and a worse a higher.

[XVI] De moribus ergo daemonum cum idem Platonicus loqueretur, dixit eos eisdem quibus homines animi perturbationibus agitari, inritari iniuriis, obsequiis donisque placari, gaudere honoribus, diuersis sacrorum ritibus oblectari et in eis si quid neglectum fuerit commoueri. Inter cetera etiam dicit ad eos pertinere diuinationes augurum, aruspicum, uatum atque somniorum; ab his quoque esse miracula magorum. Breuiter autem eos definiens ait daemones esse genere animalia, animo horum uero quinque tria priora illis esse quae nobis, quartum proprium, quintum eos cum diis habere commune.

[16] On the morals, then, of demons, when that same Platonist was speaking, he said that they are agitated by the same perturbations of mind as men, are irritated by injuries, are appeased by services and gifts, rejoice in honors, are delighted by diverse sacred rites, and are stirred if anything in them shall have been neglected. Among other things he also says that to them pertain the divinations of augurs, haruspices, prophets, and of dreams; from them too are the miracles of the magi. Briefly defining them, moreover, he says that demons are, by genus, animals; as to the soul, of these five the first three are to them what they are to us, the fourth is proper to them, the fifth they have in common with the gods.

Sed uideo trium superiorum, quae nobiscum habent, duo etiam cum diis habere. Animalia quippe esse dicit et deos, suaque cuique elementa distribuens in terrestribus animalibus nos posuit cum ceteris, quae in terra uiuunt et sentiunt, in aquatilibus pisces et alia natatilia, in aeriis daemones, in aetheriis deos. Ac per hoc quod daemones genere sunt animalia, non solum eis cum hominibus, uerum etiam cum diis pecoribusque commune est; quod mente rationalia, cum diis et hominibus; quod tempore aeterna, cum diis solis; quod animo passiua, cum hominibus solis; quod corpore aeria, ipsi sunt soli.

But I see that of the three prior things, which they have with us, they have two also with the gods. For he says that even the gods are animals; and distributing to each their own elements, he placed us among terrestrial animals with the others which live and perceive on the earth, fishes and other swimmers among aquatic beings, daemons among aerial, gods among aetherial. And therefore, in that daemons are animals by kind, it is common to them not only with human beings, but also with gods and with cattle; in that they are rational in mind, with gods and humans; in that they are eternal in time, with the gods alone; in that they are passible in soul, with humans alone; in that they are aerial in body, they themselves are alone.

Proinde quod genere sunt animalia, non est magnum, quia hoc sunt et pecora; quod mente rationalia, non est supra nos, quia sumus et nos; quod tempore aeterna, quid boni est, si non beata? Melior est enim temporalis felicitas quam misera aeternitas. Quod animo passiua, quo modo supra nos est, quando et nos hoc sumus, nec ita esset, nisi miseri essemus?

Accordingly, that by kind they are animals is no great matter, because cattle also are this; that they are rational in mind is not above us, because we too are; that they are eternal in respect of time—what good is it, if not blessed? For temporal felicity is better than miserable eternity. That they are passible in soul—how is it above us, since we also are this, nor would it be so, unless we were wretched?

Quod corpore aeria, quanti aestimandum est, cum omni corpori praeferatur animae qualiscumque natura, et ideo religionis cultus, qui debetur ex animo, nequaquam debeatur ei rei, quae inferior est animo? Porro si inter illa, quae daemonum esse dicit, adnumeraret uirtutem, sapientiam, felicitatem et haec eos diceret habere cum diis aeterna atque commuma, profecto aliquid diceret exoptandum magnique pendendum; nec sic eos tamen propter haec tamquam Deum colerec deberemus, sed potius ipsum, a quo haec illos accepisse nossemus. Quanto minus nunc honore diuino aeria digna sunt animalia, ad hoc rationalia ut misera esse possint, ad hoc passiua ut misera sint, ad hoc aeterna ut miseriam finire non possint!

As for their being aerial in body, how much is that to be esteemed, when the nature of soul, of whatever kind, is preferred to any body, and therefore the cult of religion, which is owed from the soul, is by no means owed to that thing which is inferior to the soul? Furthermore, if among those things which he says belong to the demons he were to reckon virtue, wisdom, felicity, and were to say that they have these with the gods, eternal and common, surely he would be saying something to be desired and to be valued highly; nor even so on account of these ought we to worship them as God, but rather Him, from whom we would know that they have received these. How much less now are animals aerial worthy of divine honor—rational to this end, that they can be wretched; passible to this end, that they are wretched; eternal to this end, that they cannot end their misery!

[XVII] Quapropter, ut omittam cetera et hoc solum pertractem, quod nobiscum daemones dixit habere commune, id est animi passiones, si omnia quattuor elementa suis animalibus plena sunt, inmortalibus ignis et aer, mortalibus aqua et terra, quaero cur animi daemonum passionum turbelis et tempestatibus agitentur. Perturbatio est enim, quae Graece *Pathos dicitur; unde illa uoluit uocare animo passiua, quia uerbum de uerbo *Pathos passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem. Cur ergo sunt ista in animis daemonum, quae in pecoribus non sunt?

[17] Wherefore, to omit the rest and to handle this alone, which he said the demons have in common with us, that is, the passions of the mind, if all four elements are filled with their own animals—immortal ones in fire and air, mortal ones in water and earth—I ask why the minds of the demons are driven by the turmoils and tempests of passions. For a perturbation is what in Greek is called *Pathos; whence he wished to call them things “passive” to the mind, because, word for word, *Pathos would be rendered “passion,” a movement of the mind against reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of demons, which are not in beasts?

Quoniam si quid in pecore simile apparet, non est perturbatio, quia non est contra rationem, qua pecora carent. In hominibus autem ut sint istae perturbationes, facit hoc stultitia uel miseria; nondum enim sumus in illa perfectione sapientiae beati, quae nobis ab hac mortalitate liberatis in fine promittitur.Deos uero ideo dicunt istas perturbationes non perpeti , quia non solum aeterni, uerum etiam beati sunt. Easdem quippe animas rationales etiam ipsos habere perhibent, sed ab omni labe ac peste purissimas.Quam ob rem si propterea dii non perturbantur, quod animalia sunt beata, non misera, et propterea pecora non perturbantur, quod animalia sunt, quae nec beata possunt esse nec misera: restat ut daemones sicut homines ideo perturbentur, quod animalia sunt non beata, sed misera.

Since if anything similar appears in beasts, it is not a perturbation, because it is not against reason, which beasts lack. But in human beings, that these perturbations exist, folly or misery causes this; for we are not yet blessed in that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at the end, once we are freed from this mortality.Gods, however, they say for this reason do not undergo these perturbations , because they are not only eternal, but also blessed. For they assert that they themselves also have rational souls, the same, but most pure from every stain and plague.Quite wherefore, if for that reason the gods are not perturbed, because they are animals that are blessed, not wretched, and for that reason beasts are not perturbed, because they are animals that can be neither blessed nor wretched, it remains that demons, like men, are for this reason perturbed, because they are animals not blessed, but wretched.

[XVIII] Qua igitur insipientia uel potius amentia per aliquam religionem daemonibus subdimur, cum per ueram religionem ab ea uitiositate, in qua illis sumus similes, liberemur? Cum enim daemones, quod et iste Apuleius, quamuis eis plurimum parcat et diuinis honoribus dignos censeat, tamen cogitur confiteri, ira instigentur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ne ira instigemur, sed ei potius resistamus. Cum daemones donis inuitentur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ne cuiquam donorum acceptione faueamus.

[18] By what insipience, or rather amentia, are we subjected to demons through some religion, when through the true religion we are freed from that vitiosity in which we are like them? For when the demons—as even that Apuleius, although he greatly indulges them and deems them worthy of divine honors, is nevertheless compelled to confess—are instigated by anger, true religion enjoins us not to be instigated by anger, but rather to resist it. When demons are enticed by gifts, true religion enjoins us not to favor anyone by the acceptance of gifts.

Cum daemones honoribus mulceantur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ut talibus nullo modo moueamur. Cum daemones quorundam hominum osores, quorundam amatores sint, non prudenti tranquilloque iudicio, sed animo ut appellat ipse passiuo, nobis uera religio praecipit, ut nostros etiam diligamus inimicos. Postremo omnem motum cordis et salum mentis omnesque turbelas et tempestates animi, quibus daemones aestuare atque fluctuare asserit, nos uera religio deponere iubet.

When the demons are soothed by honors, true religion enjoins us that by such things we be in no way moved. When the demons are haters of certain men and lovers of certain others, not by a prudent and tranquil judgment, but by a spirit, as he himself calls it, passive, true religion enjoins us that we love even our enemies. Finally, every motion of the heart and the swell of the mind, and all the turbulences and tempests of the soul, in which he asserts the demons to seethe and to fluctuate, true religion bids us to lay down.

Quae igitur causa est nisi stultitia errorque miserabilis, ut ei te facias uenerando humilem, cui te cupias uiuendo dissimilem; et religione colas, quem imitari nolis, cum religionis summa sit imitari quem colis?

What cause, then, is there except stupidity and a miserable error, that you make yourself humble by venerating him to whom you desire, in your manner of living, to be dissimilar; and that you worship by religion him whom you are unwilling to imitate, since the sum of religion is to imitate him whom you worship?

[XIX] Frustra igitur eis Apuleius, et quicumque ita sentiunt, hunc detulit honorem, sic eos in aere medios inter aetherium caelum terramque constituens, ut, quoniam nullus deus miscetur homini, quod Platonem dixisse perhibent, isti ad deos perferant preces hominum et inde ad homines inpetrata quae poscunt. Indignum enim putauerunt qui ista crediderunt misceri homines diis et deos hominibus; dignum autem misceri daemones et diis et hominibus, hinc petita qui allegent, inde concessa qui apportent; ut uidelicet homo castus et ab artium magicarum sceleribus alienus eos patronos adhibeat, per quos illum dii exaudiant, qui haec amant, quae ille non amando fit dignior, quem facilius et libentius exaudire debeant. Amant quippe illi scaenicas turpitudines, quas non amat pudicitia; amant in maleficiis magorum mille nocendi artes, quas non amat innocentia.

[19] In vain, therefore, did Apuleius—and whoever thinks thus—confer this honor upon them, thus setting them in the air midway between the ethereal heaven and the earth, so that, since no god is mingled with man (which they report Plato to have said), these may carry to the gods the prayers of men, and from there bring to men the things obtained which they ask. For those who believed these things thought it unworthy that men be mingled with gods and gods with men; but worthy that daemons be mingled both with gods and with men—to fetch from here the things sought and to bring from there the things granted—so that, to wit, a chaste man and alien from the crimes of the magical arts might employ them as patrons, through whom the gods may give heed to him—gods who love these things which, by not loving, he becomes more worthy—that they ought more easily and more willingly to hear. For they love theatrical turpitudes, which modesty does not love; they love, in the malefices of magicians, a thousand arts of harming, which innocence does not love.

Ergo et pudicitia et innocentia si quid ab diis inpetrare uoluerit, non poterit suis meritis nisi suis interuenientibus inimicis. Non est quod iste poetica figmenta et theatrica ludibria iustificare conetur. Habemus contra ista magistrum eorum et tantae apud eos auctoritatis Platonem, si pudor humanus ita de se male meretur, ut non solum diligat turpia, uerum etiam diuinitati existimet grata.

Therefore both pudicity and innocence, if they should wish to impetrate anything from the gods, will not be able by their own merits unless their own enemies intervene. There is no reason that this man should try to justify poetic figments and theatrical mockeries. We have against these their teacher, and of such authority among them, Plato—if human pudor so ill deserves of itself as not only to love shameful things, but even to deem them pleasing to divinity.

[XIX] Porro aduersus magicas artes, de quibus quosdam nimis infelices et nimis impios etiam gloriari libet, nonne ipsam publicam lucem testem citabo? Cur enim tam grauiter ista plectuntur seueritate legum, si opera sunt numinum colendorum? An forte istas leges Christiani instituerunt, quibus artes magicae puniuntur?

[19] Moreover, against the magical arts—about which certain people, far too unfortunate and far too impious, even like to glory—shall I not summon the very public light as witness? For why are these things punished so gravely by the severity of the laws, if they are the works of numina to be worshiped? Or perhaps Christians instituted those laws by which the magical arts are punished?

Secundum quem alium sensum, nisi quod haec maleficia generi humano perniciosa esse non dubium est, ait poeta clarissimus:

In what other sense, except that it is not doubtful that these malefices are pernicious to the human race, says the most illustrious poet:

Testor, cara, deos et te, germana, tuumque

I call to witness, dear, the gods and you, sister, and your own

Dulce caput, magicas inuitam accingier artes? Illud etiam, quod alio loco de his artibus dicit:

Sweet head, to be girded—unwilling—into magical arts? That also, which in another place he says about these arts:

Atque satas alio uidi traducere messes, eo quod hac pestifera scelerataque doctrina fructus alieni in alias terras transferri perhibentur, nonne in duodecim tabulis, id est Romanorum antiquissimis legibus, Cicero commemorat esse conscriptum et ei, qui hoc fecerit, supplicium constitutum? Postremo Apuleius ipse numquid apud Christianos iudices de magicis artibus accusatus est? Quas utique sibi obiectas si diuinas et pias esse nouerat et diuinarum potestatum operibus congruas, non solum eas confiteri debuit, sed etiam profiteri, leges culpans potius, quibus haec prohiberentur et damnanda putarentur, quae haberi miranda et ueneranda oporteret.

And I have seen sown harvests translated elsewhere, because by this pestiferous and wicked doctrine the fruits belonging to another are said to be transferred into other lands; does not Cicero recount that it is written in the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient laws of the Romans, and that punishment was appointed for him who should do this? Finally, was Apuleius himself by any chance accused before Christian judges concerning magical arts? Which, assuredly, if, when they were objected to him, he knew to be divine and pious and congruent with the works of divine powers, he ought not only to have confessed but even to have professed them, blaming rather the laws by which these things were prohibited and thought damnable, which ought to be held wondrous and venerable.

Ita enim uel sententiam suam persuaderet iudicibus, uel, si illi secundum iniquas leges saperent eumque talia praedicantem atque laudantem morte multarent, digna animae illius daemones dona rependerent, pro quorum diuinis operibus praedicandis humanam uitam sibi adimi non timeret; sicut martyres nostri, cum eis pro crimine obiceretur Christiana religio, qua nouerant se fieri saluos et gloriosissimos in aeternum, non eam negando temporales poenas euadere delegerunt, sed potius confitendo profitendo praedicando et pro hac omnia fideliter fortiterque tolerando et cum pia securitate moriendo leges, quibus prohibebatur, erubescere compulerunt mutarique fecerunt. Huius autem philosophi Platonici copiosissima et disertissima extat oratio, qua crimen artium magicarum a se alienum esse defendit seque aliter non uult innocentem uideri nisi ea negando, quae non possunt ab innocente committi. At omnia miracula magorum, quos recte sentit esse damnandos, doctrinis fiunt et operibus daemonum, quos uiderit cur censeat honorandos, eos necessarios asserens perferendis ad deos precibus nostris, quorum debemus opera deuitare, si ad Deum uerum preces nostras uolumus peruenire.

For thus either he would persuade the judges of his sententia, or, if they judged according to iniquitous laws and punished him with death as one proclaiming and lauding such things, the daemons would repay gifts worthy of that soul, on account of the proclaiming of whose divine works he would not fear to have his human life taken from him; just as our martyrs, when the Christian religion was objected to them as a crime—by which they knew themselves to be made safe and most glorious forever—did not choose to evade temporal penalties by denying it, but rather by confessing, professing, proclaiming, and for this faithfully and bravely enduring all things, and dying with pious security, they compelled the laws, by which it was prohibited, to blush and they caused them to be changed. But of this Platonic philosopher there exists a most copious and most eloquent oration, in which he defends that the charge of magical arts is alien from himself, and he is unwilling to seem innocent otherwise than by denying those things which cannot be committed by an innocent man. Yet all the miracles of the magi—whom he rightly judges to be condemned—are done by the doctrines and operations of daemons; let him see why he deems them worthy of honor, asserting them to be necessary for carrying our prayers to the gods—whose works we ought to avoid, if we wish our prayers to arrive at the true God.

Deinde quaero, quales preces hominum diis bonis per daemones allegari putat, magicas an licitas? Si magicas, nolunt tales; si licitas, nolunt per tales. Si autem peccator paenitens preces fundit, maxime si aliquid magicum admisit: itane tandem illis intercedentibus accipit ueniam, quibus inpellentibus aut fauentibus se cecidisse plangit in culpam?

Then I ask, of what sort he thinks the prayers of men are to be conveyed to the good gods through demons—magical or licit? If magical, they do not want such; if licit, they do not want them through such. But if a penitent sinner pours forth prayers, especially if he has admitted something magical: is it then, with those interceding, that he receives pardon—from those at whose impelling or favoring he laments that he has fallen into fault?

an et ipsi daemones, ut possint paenitentibus mereri indulgentiam, priores agunt, quod eos deceperint, paenitentiam? Hoc nemo umquam de daemonibus dixit, quia, si ita esset, nequaquam sibi auderent diuinos honores expetere, qui paenitendo desiderarent ad gratiam ueniae pertinere. Ibi enim est detestanda superbia, hic humilitas miseranda.

Or do the demons themselves, in order that they may be able to merit indulgence for penitents, first do penance for having deceived them? No one has ever said this of demons; for if it were so, they would by no means dare to seek divine honors for themselves—those who by repenting would desire to pertain to the grace of pardon. There, indeed, is pride to be detested; here, humility to be pitied.

[XX] At enim urgens causa et artissima cogit daemones medios inter deos et homines agere, ut ab hominibus adferant desiderata, et a diis referant inpetrata. Quaenam tandem ista causa est et quanta necessitas? Quia nullus, inquiunt, Deus miscetur homini.

[20] But indeed a pressing and most strait cause compels the demons to act in the middle between gods and men, so that from human beings they may bring the desiderata, and from the gods they may bring back the things impetrated. What then is that cause, and how great a necessity? Because, they say, no God is mingled with man.

Praeclara igitur sanctitas Dei, qui non miscetur homini supplicanti, et miscetur daemoni arroganti; non miscetur homini paenitenti, et miscetur daemoni decipienti; non miscetur homini confugienti ad diuinitatem, et miscetur daemoni fingenti diuinitatem; non miscetur homini petenti indulgentiam, et miscetur daemoni suadenti nequitiam; non miscetur homini per philosophicos libros poetas de bene instituta ciuitate pellenti, et miscetur daemoni a principibus et pontificibus ciuitatis per scaenicos ludos poetarum ludibria requirenti; non miscetur homini deorum crimina fingere prohibenti, et miscetur daemoni se falsis deorum criminibus oblectanti; non miscetur homini magorum scelera iustis legibus punienti, et miscetur daemoni magicas artes docenti et implenti; non miscetur homini imitationem daemonis fugienti, et miscetur daemoni deceptionem hominis aucupanti.

Therefore, most illustrious is the sanctity of God, who does not mix himself with a supplicating man, and does mix himself with an arrogant daemon; does not mix himself with a penitent man, and does mix himself with a deceiving daemon; does not mix himself with a man fleeing for refuge to divinity, and does mix himself with a daemon feigning divinity; does not mix himself with a man asking for indulgence, and does mix himself with a daemon persuading wickedness; does not mix himself with a man who, by philosophical books, expels poets from a well-instituted city, and does mix himself with a daemon who, by the princes and pontiffs of the city, demands in scenic shows the mockeries of the poets; does not mix himself with a man forbidding the forging of crimes of the gods, and does mix himself with a daemon taking delight in the false crimes of the gods; does not mix himself with a man punishing by just laws the crimes of magicians, and does mix himself with a daemon teaching and accomplishing magical arts; does not mix himself with a man fleeing the imitation of the daemon, and does mix himself with a daemon lying in wait to ensnare the man by deception.

[XXI] Sed nimirum tantae huius absurditatis et indignitatis est magna necessitas, quod scilicet deos aetherios humana curantes quid terrestres homines agerent utique lateret, nisi daemones aerii nuntiarent; quoniam aether longe a terra est alteque suspensus, aer uero aetheri terraeque contiguus. O mirabilem sapientiam! Quid aliud de diis isti sentiunt, quos omnes optimos uolunt, nisi eos et humana curare, ne cultu uideantur indigni, et propter elementorum distantiam humana nescire, ut credantur daemones necessarii et ob hoc etiam ipsi putentur colendi, per quos dii possint et quid in rebus humanis agatur addiscere et ubi oportet hominibus subuenire?

[21] But, to be sure, there is a great necessity for this so great absurdity and indignity, namely that it would assuredly be hidden from the aetherial gods, though caring for human things, what terrestrial men were doing, unless the aerial daemons announced it; since the aether is far from the earth and loftily suspended, while the air is contiguous both to the aether and to the earth. O marvelous wisdom! What else do these people think about the gods, whom they wish all to be best, except this: that they both care for human things, lest they seem unworthy of cult, and, on account of the distance of the elements, are ignorant of human things, so that the daemons may be believed necessary and on this account they themselves also be thought worthy to be worshiped, through whom the gods might both learn what is being done in human affairs and where it is fitting to come to the aid of human beings?

Hoc si ita est, diis istis bonis magis notus est daemon per corpus uicinum quam homo per animum bonum. O multum dolenda necessitas, an potius inridenda uel detestanda uanitas, ne sit uana diuinitas! Si enim animo ab obstaculo corporis libero animum nostrum uidere dii possunt, non ad hoc indigent daemonibus nuntiis; si autem animorum indicia corporalia, qualia sunt locutio uultus motus, per corpus suum aetherii dii sentiunt et inde colligunt quid etiam daemones nuntient, possunt et mendaciis daemonum decipi.

If this is so, to those so-called good gods the daemon is more well-known through the neighboring body than the man through the good mind. O a necessity much to be lamented, or rather a vanity to be laughed at or detested, lest divinity be vain! For if by a mind freed from the obstacle of body the gods can see our mind, they do not need daemons as messengers for this; but if the bodily signs of souls—such as speech, countenance, movements—the aetherial gods perceive through their own body and from that gather what even the daemons report, they also can be deceived by the lies of daemons.

Porro si deorum diuinitas a daemonibus non potest falli, eadem diuinitate quod agimus non potest ignorari. Vellem autem mihi isti dicerent, utrum diis daemones nuntiauerint de criminibus deorum poetica Platoni displicere figmenta et sibi ea placere celauerint, an utrumque occultauerint deosque esse maluerint totius rei huius Ignaros, an utrumque indicauerint, et religiosam erga deos Platonis prudentiam et in deos iniuriosam libidinem suam, an sententiam quidem Platonis, qua noluit deos per impiam licentiam poetarum falsis criminibus infamari, ignotam diis esse uoluerint, suam uero nequit iam, qua ludos scaenicos amant, quibus illa deorum dedecora celebrantur, prodere non erubuerunt uel timuerint. Horum quattuor, quae interrogando proposui, quodlibet eligant et in quolibet eorum quantum mali de diis bonis opinentur adtendant.Si enim primum elegerint, confessuri sunt non licuisse diis bonis habitare cum bono Platone, quando eorum iniurias prohibebat, et habitasse cum daemonibus malis, quando eorum iniuriis exultabant, cum dii boni hominem bonum longe a se positum non nisi per malos daemones nossent, quos uicinos nosse non possent.

Moreover, if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by daemons, by that same divinity it cannot be ignorant of what we do. I would, however, wish that those men would tell me whether the daemons announced to the gods that the poetic figments about the crimes of the gods displeased Plato, and concealed that these pleased themselves; or whether they concealed both, and preferred the gods to be ignorant of this whole affair; or whether they indicated both, both Plato’s religious prudence toward the gods and their own injurious lust against the gods; or whether they wished Plato’s opinion to be unknown to the gods—by which he did not wish the gods to be defamed by the impious license of the poets with false crimes—yet were not ashamed or afraid to betray their own nequity, whereby they love the scenic games, in which those disgraces of the gods are celebrated. Of these four things which I have proposed by questioning, let them choose whichever they please, and in any one of them let them observe how much evil they opine concerning the good gods. For if they choose the first, they will be confessing that it was not permitted for the good gods to dwell with the good Plato when he was prohibiting their injuries, and that they dwelt with evil daemons when they were exulting in their injuries, since the good gods would not know the good man set far from them except through evil daemons, whom, though neighbors, they could not know.

Si autem secundum elegerint et utrumque occultatum a daemonibus dixerint, ut dii omnino nescirent et Platonis religiosissimam legem et daemonum sacrilegam delectationem: quid in rebus humanis per internuntios daemones dii nosse utiliter possunt, quando illa nesciunt, quae in honorem bonorum deorum religione bonorum hominum contra libidinem malorum daemonum decernuntur? Si uero tertium elegerint et non solum sententiam Platonis deorum iniurias prohibentem, sed etiam daemonum nequitiam deorum iniurias exultantem per eosdem daemones nuntios diis innotuisse responderint:hoc nuntiare est an insultare?et dii utrumque sic audiunt, sic utrumque cognoscunt, ut non solum malignos daemones deorum dignitati et Platonis religioni contraria cupientes atque facientes a suo accessu non arceant, uerum etiam per illos malos propinquos Platoni bono longinquo dona transmittant? sic enim eos elementorum quasi catenata series conligauit, ut illis, a quibus criminantur, coniungi possint, huic, a quo defenduntur, non possint, utrumque scientes, sed aeris et terrae transmutare pondera non ualentes.Iam, quod reliquum est, si quartum elegerint, peius est ceteris.

But if they shall have chosen the second and shall have said that both were concealed by the daemons, so that the gods altogether were ignorant both of Plato’s most religious law and of the daemons’ sacrilegious delectation: what in human affairs can the gods usefully know through inter-nuncios, the daemons, when they do not know those things which, in honor of the good gods, are decreed by the religion of good men against the lust of evil daemons? If truly they shall have chosen the third and shall have answered that not only Plato’s opinion forbidding injuries against the gods, but also the iniquity of the daemons exulting in injuries against the gods, became known to the gods through those same daemons as messengers:is this to announce or to insult?and do the gods so hear both, so know both, that not only do they not ward off from their approach the malign daemons who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods and to Plato’s religion, but even through those evil near ones transmit gifts to the good Plato, far away? For thus a certain chain-linked series of the elements has bound them, so that they can be conjoined to those by whom they are accused, but cannot be conjoined to this one by whom they are defended, knowing both, but not being able to transmute the weights of air and earth.Now, as to what remains, if they shall have chosen the fourth, it is worse than the rest.

Quis enim ferat, si poetarum de diis inmortalibus criminosa figmenta et theatrorum indigna ludibria suamque in his omnibus ardentissimam cupiditatem et suauissimam uoluptatem diis daemones nuntiauerunt, et quod Plato philosophica grauitate de optima re publica haec omnia cen uit remouenda tacuerunt; ut iam dii boni per tales nuntios nosse cogantur mala pessimorum, nec aliena, sed eorundem nuntiorum, atque his contraria non sinantur nosse bona philosophorum, cum illa sint in iniuriam, ista in honorem ipsorum deorum?

Who, indeed, could bear it, if the demons have announced to the gods the criminal fictions of the poets about the immortal gods and the unworthy mockeries of the theaters, and their own most burning cupidity and most sweet pleasure in all these things, and have kept silent about the fact that Plato, with philosophical gravity, in his work on the best republic judged that all these things should be removed; so that now the good gods are forced through such messengers to know the evils of the worst—not those of others, but of these very same messengers—and are not allowed to know the goods of the philosophers, contrary to these, since those are to the injury, these to the honor of the gods themselves?

[XXII] Quia igitur nihil istorum quattuor eligendum est, ne in quolibet eorum de diis tam male sentiatur, restat, ut nullo modo credendum sit, quod Apuleius persuadere nititur et quicumque alii sunt eiusdem sententiae philosophi, ita esse medios daemones inter deos et homines tamquam internuntios et interpretes, qui hinc ferant petitiones nostras, inde referant deorum suppetias; sed esse spiritus nocendi cupidissimos, a iustitia penitus alienos, superbia tumidos, inuidentia, liuidos, fallacia callidos, qui in hoc quidem aere habitant, quia de caeli superioris sublimitate deiecti merito inregressibilis transgressionis in hoc sibi congruo uelut carcere praedamnati sunt; nec tamen, quia supra terras et aquas aeri locus est, ideo et ipsi sunt meritis superiores hominibus, qui eos non terreno corpore, sed electo in auxilium Deo uero pia mente facillime superant. Sed multis plane participatione uerae religionis indignis tamquam captis subditisque domi-, nantur, quorum maximae parti mirabilibus et fallacibus signis siue factorum siue praedictorum deos se esse persuaserunt. Quibusdam uero uitia eorum aliquanto adtentius et diligentius intuentibus non potuerunt persuadere quod dii sint, atque inter deos et homines internuntios ac beneficiorum inpetratores se esse finxerunt; si tamen non istum saltem honorem homines eis deferendum putarunt, qui illos nec deos esse credebant, quia malos uidebant, deos autem omnes bonos uolebant, nec audebant tamen omnino indignos dicere honore diuino, maxime ne offenderent populos, a quibus eis cernebant inueterata superstitione per tot sacra et templa seruiri.

[22] Since, therefore, none of those four is to be chosen, lest in any one of them one think so badly of the gods, it remains that in no way is it to be believed, what Apuleius strives to persuade, and whatever other philosophers there are of the same opinion, that there are middle demons between gods and men as though internuncios and interpreters, who from here carry our petitions and from there bring back the succors of the gods; but rather that they are spirits most desirous of harming, utterly alien from justice, swollen with pride, livid with envy, crafty in deceit, who indeed dwell in this air, because, cast down from the loftiness of the higher heaven, by the desert of a transgression not to be re-entered, they have been pre‑condemned to this, as it were, prison congruent to them; nor yet, because the place of the air is above lands and waters, are they therefore in merits superior to men, who most easily overcome them, not by a terrestrial body, but by the true God chosen for help, with a pious mind. But over many plainly unworthy of participation in the true religion they lord it as over captured and subjected persons, the greater part of whom they have persuaded, by marvelous and fallacious signs whether of deeds done or of predictions, that they are gods. Yet to some who look somewhat more attentively and diligently upon their vices they could not persuade that they are gods, and they have feigned themselves to be internuncios between gods and men and impetrators of benefits; if, however, men did not think that even this honor at least ought to be paid to them—men who did not believe them to be gods, because they saw them to be evil, but wished all gods to be good—neither did they dare to declare them altogether unworthy of divine honor, especially lest they offend the peoples, by whom they saw that, through so many sacred rites and temples, service was rendered to them by inveterate superstition.

[XXIII] Nam diuersa de illis Hermes Aegyptius, quem Trismegiston uocant, sensit et scripsit. Apuleius enim deos quidem illos negat; sed cum dicit ita inter deos et homines quadam medietate uersari, ut hominibus apud ipsos deos necessarii uideantur, cultum eorum a supernorum deorum religione non separat. Ille autem Aegyptius alios deos esse dicit a summo Deo factos, alios ab hominibus.

[23] For Hermes the Egyptian, whom they call Trismegistus, felt and wrote differently about them. For Apuleius indeed denies that they are gods; but when he says that they are engaged between gods and men by a certain mediacy, so that to men they seem necessary with the gods themselves, he does not separate their cult from the religion of the supernal gods. But that Egyptian says that there are some gods made by the Highest God, others by men.

Hoc qui audit, sicut a me positum est, putat dici de simulacris, quia opera sunt manuum hominum; at ille uisibilia et contrectabilia simulacra uelut corpora deorum esse asserit; inesse autem his quosdam spiritus inuitatos, qui ualeant aliquid siue ad nocendum siue ad desideria nonnulla complenda eorum, a quibus eis diuini honores et cultus obsequia deferuntur. Hos ergo spiritus inuisibiles per artem quandam uisibilibus rebus corporalis materiae copulare, ut sint quasi animata corpora illis spiritibus dicata et subdita simulacra, hoc esse dicit deos facere eamque magnam et mirabilem deos faciendi accepisse homines potestatem. Huius Aegyptii uerba, sicut in nostram linguam interpretata sunt, ponam.

One who hears this, as I have set it down, thinks it is said of simulacra, because they are works of human hands; but he asserts that the visible and tangible simulacra are as it were the bodies of the gods; moreover, that certain spirits, summoned, are present in these, who are able to do something either for harming or for the fulfilling of certain desires of those by whom divine honors and the services of cult are rendered to them. To couple, therefore, these invisible spirits by a certain art to visible things of corporeal matter, so that the simulacra may be, as it were, animated bodies dedicated and subjected to those spirits—this, he says, is to make gods, and that mankind has received this great and marvelous power of making gods. I will set down the words of this Egyptian, as they have been translated into our language.

"Et quoniam de cognatione, inquit, et consortio hominum deorumque nobis indicitur sermo, potestatem hominis, o Asclepi, uimque cognosce. Dominus, inquit, et Pater uel quod est summum Deus ut effector est deorum caelestium, ita homo fictor est deorum, qui in templis sunt humana proximitate contenti." Et paulo post: "Ita humanitas, inquit, semper memor naturae et originis suae in illa diuinitatis imitatione perseuerat, ut, sicuti Pater ac Dominus, ut sui similes essent, deos fecit aernos, ita humanitas deos suos ex sui uultus similitudine figuraret." Hic cum Asclepius, ad quem maxime loquebatur, ei respondisset atque dixisset: "Statuas dicis, o Trismegiste?" tum ille: "Statuas, inquit, o Asclepi, uides quatenus tu ipse diffidas; statuas animatas sensu et spiritu plenas tantaque facientes et talia, statuas futurorum praescias eaque sorte uate somniis multisque aliis rebus praedicentes, inbecillitates hominibus facientes easque curantes, tristitiam laetitiamque pro meritis. An ignoras, o Asclepi, quod Aegyptus imago s it caeli, aut, quod est uerius, translatio aut descensio omnium quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo.

"And since about the kinship, he says, and fellowship of men and gods a discourse is enjoined upon us, recognize the power of man, O Asclepius, and his force. The Lord, he says, and the Father, or what is highest, God—as he is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the fashioner of gods, who in the temples are content with human proximity." And a little after: "Thus humanity, he says, always mindful of its nature and origin, perseveres in that imitation of divinity, so that, just as the Father and Lord, in order that they might be like himself, made the gods eternal, so humanity might fashion its own gods from the likeness of its own visage." Here when Asclepius, to whom he was chiefly speaking, had answered and said: "You mean statues, O Trismegistus?" then he: "Statues, he says, O Asclepius—see how far you yourself distrust—statues animated, full of sense and spirit, and accomplishing such great things and such as these: statues foreknowing things to come and foretelling them by lot, by prophet, by dreams, and by many other means; causing infirmities for men and curing them; sadness and joy according to deserts. Do you not know, O Asclepius, that Egypt is an image of heaven, or, what is truer, a translation or descent of all things which are governed and exercised in heaven."

Ac si dicendum est uerius, terra nostra mundi totius est templum. Et tamen quoniam praescire cuncta prudentem decet, istud uos ignorare fas non est: Futurum tempus est, cum appareat Aegyptios incassum pia mente diuinitatem sedula religione seruasse."

And if it must be said more truly, our land is the temple of the whole world. And yet, since it befits the prudent to foreknow all things, it is not right for you to be ignorant of this: There will be a time when it will appear that the Egyptians have, in vain, with a pious mind, served the Divinity with assiduous religion."

Deinde multis uerbis Hermes hunc locum exequitur, in quo uidetur hoc tempus praedicere, quo Christiana religio, quanto est ueracior atque sanctior, tanto uehementius et liberius cuncta fallacia figmenta subuertit, ut gratia uerissimi Saluatoris liberet hominem ab eis diis, quos facit homo, et ei Deo subdat, a quo factus est homo. Sed Hermes cum ista praedicit, uelut amicus eisdem ludificationibus daemonum loquitur, nec Christianum nomen euidenter exprimit, sed tamquam ea tollerentur atque delerentur, quorum obseruatione caelestis similitudo custodiretur in Aegypto, ita haec futura deplorans luctuosa quodam modo praedicatione testatur. Erat enim de his, de quibus dicit apostolus, quod cognoscentes Deum non sicut Deum glorificauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorrupti Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et cetera, quae commemorare longum est.

Then with many words Hermes pursues this passage, in which he seems to foretell this time, wherein the Christian religion, by as much as it is more veracious and more holy, by so much the more vehemently and more freely subverts all fallacious figments, so that by the grace of the most true Savior it may free the human being from those gods whom man makes, and subject him to that God by whom man was made. But when Hermes foretells these things, he speaks as though a friend to those same ludifications of demons, nor does he evidently express the Christian name; rather, as though those things were being taken away and blotted out, by the observance of which a celestial similitude used to be kept in Egypt, thus, bewailing these future things, he bears witness with a certain mournful preaching. For he was of those of whom the Apostle says that, knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God nor give thanks, but became vain in their cogitations, and their foolish heart was darkened; for, saying that they were wise, they were made fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and the rest, which it is long to recount.

Multa quippe talia dicit de uno uero Deo fabricatore mundi, qualia ueritas habet; et nescio quo modo illa obscuratione cordis ad ista delabitur, ut diis, quos confitetur ab hominibus fieri, semper uelit homines subdi et haec futuro tempore plangat auferri quasi quicquam sit infelicius homine, cui sua figmenta dominantur; cum sit facilius, ut tamquam deos colendo, quos fecit, nec ipse sit homo, quam ut per eius cultum dii possint esse, quos fecit homo. Citius enim fit, ut homo in honore positus pecoribus non intellegens comparetur, quam ut operi Dei ad eius imaginem facto, id est ipsi homini, opus hominis praeferatur. Quapropter merito homo deficit ab illo qui eum fecit, cum sibi praeficit ipse quod fecit.

Indeed he says many such things about the one true God, the fabricator of the world, such as truth holds; and I know not how, by that obscuration of heart, he slips down to this: that he always wishes men to be subjected to gods whom he confesses are made by men, and he laments that these are to be taken away in the future, as if anything were more unhappy than a man whose own figments lord it over him; since it is easier that, by worshipping as gods those whom he made, he himself should not even be a man, than that by his worship those whom a man made could be gods. For more quickly does it come to pass that a man set in honor, not understanding, is compared to cattle, than that the work of man be preferred to the work of God made according to His image—that is, to man himself. Wherefore, deservedly, man falls away from Him who made him, when he puts before himself that which he himself made.

Haec uana deceptoria, perniciosa sacrilega Hermes Aegyptius, quia tempus, quo auferrentur, uenturum sciebat, dolebat; sed tam inpudenter dolebat, quam inprudenter sciebat. Non enim haec ei reuelauerat sanctus Spiritus, sicut prophetis sanctis, qui haec praeuidentes cum exultatione dicebant: Si faciet homo deos, et ecce ipsi non sunt dii ( et alio loco: Erit in illo die, dicit Dominus, exterminabo nomina simulacrorum a terra, et non iam erit eorum memoria, proprie uero de Aegypto, quod ad hanc rem adtinet, ita sanctus Esaias prophetat: Et mouebuntur manufacta Aegypti a facie eius, et cor eorum uincetur in eis, et cetera huius modi. Ex quo genere et illi erant, qui uenturum quod sciebant uenisse gaudebant; qualis Symeon, qualis Anna, qui mox natum Iesum; qualis Elisabeth, quae etiam conceptum in Spiritu agnouit; qualis Petrus reuelante Patre dicens: Tu es Christus, filius Dei uiui.

These vain, delusive, pernicious, sacrilegious things the Egyptian Hermes, because he knew the time would come when they would be taken away, lamented; but he lamented as shamelessly as he knew imprudently. For the Holy Spirit had not revealed these things to him, as to the holy prophets, who, foreseeing these things, with exultation used to say: If a man makes gods, and behold they themselves are not gods ( and in another place: It shall be in that day, says the Lord, I will exterminate the names of the idols from the land, and their memory shall be no more; but properly concerning Egypt, as pertains to this matter, thus does holy Isaiah prophesy: And the hand-made things of Egypt will be moved at his face, and their heart will be overcome within them, and other things of this sort. Of which kind also were those who rejoiced that what they knew would come had come; such as Simeon, such as Anna, who when Jesus was newly born; such as Elizabeth, who even in the Spirit recognized him conceived; such as Peter, with the Father revealing, saying: You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.

Huic autem Aegyptio illi spiritus indicauerant futura tempora perditionis suae, qui etiam praesenti in carne Domino trementes dixerunt: Quid uenisti ante tempus perdere nos? siue quia subitum illis fuit, quod futurum quidem, sed tardius opinabantur, siue quia perditionem suam hanc ipsam dicebant, qua fiebat, ut cogniti spernerentur, et hoc erat ante tempus, id est ante tempus iudicii, quo aeterna damnatione puniendi sunt cum omnibus etiam hominibus, qui eorum societate detinentur, sicut religio loquitur, quae nec fallit nec fallitur, non sicut iste quasi omni uento doctrinae hinc atque inde perflatus et falsis uera permiscens dolet quasi perituram religionem, quem postea confitetur errorem.

But to this Egyptian those spirits had indicated the future times of their perdition, who also, trembling before the Lord present in the flesh, said: Why have you come before the time to destroy us? whether because it was sudden to them—what indeed was going to happen, but they supposed would be later—or because they called this very thing their perdition, whereby it came to pass that, once known, they were scorned; and this was before the time, that is, before the time of judgment, in which they are to be punished with eternal damnation together with all the men as well who are held fast in their fellowship, as religion speaks, which neither deceives nor is deceived; not as this man, as if blown hither and thither by every wind of doctrine and mixing true things with false, laments as though religion were going to perish—an error which he afterwards confesses.

[XXIV] Post multa enim ad hoc ipsum redit, ut iterum dicat de diis, quos homines fecerunt, ita loquens: "Sed iam de talibus sint satis dicta talia. Iterum, inquit, ad hominem rationemque redeamus, ex quo diuino dono homo animal dictum est rationale. Minus enim miranda etsi miranda sunt, quae de homine dicta sunt.

[24] For after many things he returns to this very point, that he may again speak about the gods whom men made, speaking thus: "But now let such things of such a kind have been said enough about such matters. Again, he says, let us return to man and to reason, from which by divine gift man has been called a rational animal. For the things that have been said about man are less to be marveled at, though they are to be marveled at."

Omnium enim mirabilium uicit admirationem, quod homo diuinam potuit inuenire naturam eamque efficere. Quoniam ergo proaui nostri multum errabant circa deorum rationem increduli et non animaduertentes ad cultum religionemque diuinam, inuenerunt artem, qua efficerent deos. Cui inuentae adiunxerunt uirtutem de mundi natura conuenientem, eamque miscentes, quoniam animas facere non poterant, euocantes animas daemonum uel angelorum eas indiderunt imaginibus sanctis diuinisque mysteriis, per quas idola et bene faciendi et male uires habere potuissent.

For of all marvels, this outstripped admiration: that man was able to discover the divine nature and to effect it. Since therefore our forefathers were much erring concerning the rationale of the gods, unbelieving and not attending to divine worship and religion, they found an art by which they might make gods. To this invention they added a power, congruent from the nature of the world; and mixing it, since they could not make souls, by calling forth the souls of demons or of angels they inserted them into images with sacred and divine mysteries, through which the idols might have powers both of doing good and of doing ill.

w Nescio utrum sic confiterentur ipsi daemones adiurati, quo modo iste confessus est. "Quoniam, inquit, proaui nostri multum errabant circa deorum rationem increduli et non animaduertentes ad cultum religionemque diuinam, inuenerunt artem qua efficerent deos." Numquidnam saltem mediocriter eos dixit errasse, ut hanc artem inuenirent faciendi deos, aut contentus fuit dicere: Errabant, nisi adderet et diceret: Multum errabant? Iste ergo multus error et incredulitas non animaduertentium ad cultum religionemque diuinam inuenit artem, qua efficeret deos.

w I do not know whether the daemons themselves, when adjured, would confess thus, in the way this man confessed. “Since,” he says, “our forefathers were greatly erring concerning the rationale of the gods, unbelieving and not noticing the worship and divine religion, they found an art by which they might make gods.” Did he by any chance at least say that they erred moderately, so that they might discover this art of making gods, or was he content to say, “They were in error,” unless he added and said, “They were much in error”? Therefore this great error and incredulity of those not attending to the worship and divine religion found the art by which it would make gods.

Et tamen quod multus error et incredulitas et a cultu ac religione diuina auersio animi inuenit, ut homo arte faceret deos, hoc dolet uir sapiens tamquam religionem diuinam uenturo certo tempore auferri. Vide si non et ui diuina maiorum suorum errorem praeteritum prodere, et ui diabolica poenam daemonum futuram dolere compellitur. Si enim proaui eorum multum errando circa deorum rationem incredulitate et auersione animi a cultu ac religione diuina inuenerunt artem, qua efficerent deos: quid mirum, si, haec ars detestanda quidquid fecit auersa a religione diuina, aufertur religione diuina, cum ueritas emendat errorem, fides redarguit incredulitatem, conuersio corrigit auersionem?

And yet what a great error and incredulity and an aversion of mind from divine cult and religion discovered—that a man by art should make gods—this the wise man laments, as though the divine religion were to be taken away at a certain time to come. See whether he is not compelled both by divine force to betray the past error of his ancestors, and by diabolic force to grieve the future punishment of the daemons. For if their forefathers, by erring much around the reasoning about the gods, through incredulity and an aversion of mind from divine cult and religion, found an art by which they would make gods, what wonder if this detestable art—whatever it made, turned away from divine religion—is taken away by divine religion, when truth emends error, faith refutes incredulity, and conversion corrects aversion?

Si enim tacitis causis dixisset proauos suos inuenisse artem, qua facerent deos: nostrum fuit utique, si quid rectum piumque saperemus, adtendere et uidere nequaquam illos ad hanc artem peruenturos fuisse, qua homo deos facit, si a ueritate non aberrarent, si ea, quae Deo digna sunt, crederent, si animum aduerterent ad cultum religionemque diuinam; et tamen si causas artis huius nos diceremus multum errorem hominum et incredulitatem et animi errantis atque infidelis a diuina religione auersionem, utcumque ferenda esset inpudentia resistentium ueritati. Cum uero idem ipse, qui potestatem huius artis super omnia cetera miratur in homine, qua illi deos facere concessum est, et dolet uenturum esse tempus, quo haec omnia deorum figmenta ab hominibus instituta etiam legibus iubeantur auferri, confitetur tamen atque exprimit causas, quare ad ista peruentum sit, dicens proauos suos multo errore et incredulitate et animum non aduertendo ad cultum religionemque diuinam inuenisse hanc artem, qua facerent deos: nos quid oportet dicere, uel potius quid agere nisi quantas possumus gratias Domino Deo nostro, qui haec contrariis causis, quam instituta sunt, abstulit? Nam quod instituit multitudo erroris, abstulit uia ueritatis; quod instituit incredulitas, abstulit fides; quod instituit a cultu diuinae religionis auersio, abstulit ad unum uerum Deum sanctumque conuersio; nec in sola Aegypto, quam solam in isto plangit daemonum spiritus, sed in omni terra, quae cantat Domino canticum nouum, sicut uere sacrae et uere propheticae litterae praenuntiarunt, ubi scriptum est: Cantate Domino canticum nouum, cantate Domino omnis terra.

If, with the causes kept silent, he had said that his forefathers found an art by which they might make gods, it would surely have been ours—if we savored anything right and pious—to attend and see that by no means would they have come to this art, by which a man makes gods, if they had not strayed from truth, if they believed things worthy of God, if they had turned their mind to the cult and divine religion; and yet, if we were the ones to state the causes of this art—great error of men and incredulity and the aversion of an erring and faithless mind from divine religion—the shamelessness of those resisting the truth would somehow have had to be borne. But since this very same man, who marvels above all the rest at the power of this art in man, by which it has been conceded to them to make gods, and grieves that a time is going to come when all these figments of gods instituted by men are even by laws ordered to be removed, nevertheless confesses and sets forth the causes whereby it came to these things, saying that their forefathers, through much error and incredulity and by not turning the mind to the cult and divine religion, found this art by which they would make gods: what ought we to say, or rather what to do, except render as many thanks as we can to the Lord our God, who has removed these things by causes contrary to those by which they were instituted? For what the multitude of error instituted, the way of truth removed; what incredulity instituted, faith removed; what aversion from the cult of divine religion instituted, conversion to the one true and holy God removed; and not in Egypt alone, which alone in this the spirit of demons laments, but in all the earth, which sings to the Lord a new song, just as the truly sacred and truly prophetic letters foretold, where it is written: Sing to the Lord a new song, sing to the Lord, all the earth.

Titulus quippe psalmi huius est: Quando domus aedificabatur post captiuitatem. Aedificatur enim domus Domino ciuitas Dei, quae est sancta ecclesia, in omni terra post eam captiuitatem, qua illos homines, de quibus credentibus in Deum tamquam lapidibus uiuis domus aedificatur, captos daemonia possidebant. Neque enim, quia deos homo faciebat, ideo non ab eis possidebatur ipse qui fecerat, quando in eorum societatem colendo traducebatur; societatem dico, non idolorum stolidorum, sed uersutorum daemoniorum.

For the title of this psalm is: When the house was being built after the captivity. For the house to the Lord is being built, the City of God, which is the holy Church, in all the earth after that captivity, in which those men—of whom, believing in God, as living stones the house is built—were held captive and possessed by the demons. Nor, indeed, because a man was making gods, was he therefore not possessed by those whom he had made, when by worshiping he was transferred into their fellowship; I say fellowship, not of the stolid idols, but of the wily demons.

Nam quid sunt idola, nisi quod eadem scriptura dicit: Oculos habent, et non uidebunt, et quidquid tale de materiis licet affabre effigiatis, tamen uita sensuque carentibus dicendum fuit? Sed inmundi spiritus eisdem simulacris arte illa nefaria conligati cultorum suorum animas in suam societatem redigendo miserabiliter captiuauerant. Vnde dicit apostolus: Scimus quia nihil est idolum; sed quae immolant gentes, daemoniis immolant, et non Deo ; nolo uos socios fieri daemoniorum.

For what are idols, if not what the same Scripture says: “They have eyes, and they will not see,” and whatever is of the sort, although skillfully fashioned from materials, yet had to be said to be lacking life and sensation? But unclean spirits, bound to those same simulacra by that nefarious art, had miserably taken captive the souls of their worshipers by reducing them into their fellowship. Whence the Apostle says: We know that an idol is nothing; but the things which the nations sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, and not to God; I do not wish you to become partners of demons.

Post hanc ergo captiuitatem, qua homines a malignis daemonibus tenebantur, Dei domus aedificatur in omni terra; unde titulum ille psalmus accepit, ubi dicitur: Cantate Domino canticum nouum, cantate Domino omnis terra. Cantate Domino, benedicite nomen eius, bene nuntiate diem ex die salutare eius. Adnuntiate in gentibus gloriam eius, in omnibus populis mirabilia eius; quoniam magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis, terribilis est super omnes deos.

After this captivity, by which humans were held by malignant demons, the house of God is being built in all the earth; whence that psalm took its title, where it is said: Sing to the Lord a new song, sing to the Lord, all the earth. Sing to the Lord, bless his name, proclaim good tidings day by day of his salvation. Announce among the nations his glory, among all the peoples his marvels; for great is the Lord and exceedingly laudable, he is terrible above all gods.

Quia omnes dii gentium daemonia, dominus autem caecos fecit.

For all the gods of the nations are demons, but the lord made the blind.

Qui ergo doluit uenturum fuisse tempus, quo auferretur cultus idolorum et in eos, qui colerent, dominatio daemoniorum, malo spiritu instigatus semper uolebat istam captiuitatem manere, qua transacta psalmus canit aedificari domum in omni terra. Praenuntiabat illa Hermes dolendo; praenuntiabat haec propheta gaudendo. Et quia Spiritus uictor est, qui haec per sanctos prophetas canebat, etiam Hermes ipse ea, quae nolebat et dolebat auferri, non a prudentibus et fidelibus et religiosis, sed ab errantibus et incredulis et a cultu diuinae religionis auersis esse instituta miris modis coactus est confiteri.

Who therefore grieved that the time was going to come when the cult of idols would be taken away and, over those who worshipped, the domination of demons, being instigated by an evil spirit, always wanted that captivity to remain, after which the psalm sings that a house is built in all the earth. Those things Hermes foretold with grief; these things the prophet foretold with joy. And because the Spirit is victor, who through the holy prophets was singing these things, even Hermes himself was compelled in wondrous ways to confess that the things which he did not want and was pained to be removed had been instituted not by the prudent and faithful and religious, but by the erring and incredulous and those averse from the cult of divine religion.

Qui quamuis eos appellet deos, tamen cum dicit a talibus hominibus factos, quales esse utique non debemus, uelit nolit, ostendit colendos non esse ab eis, qui tales non sunt, quales fuerunt a quibus facti sunt, hoc est a prudentibus, fidelibus, religiosis; simul etiam demonstrans ipsos homines, qui eos fecerunt, sibimet inportasse, ut eos haberent deos, qui non erant dii. Verum est quippe illud propheticum: Si faciet homo deos, et ecce ipsi non sunt dii. Deos ergo tales, talium deos, arte factos a talibus, [cum appellasset Hermes,] id est idolis daemones per artem nescio quam cupiditatum suarum uinculis inligatos cum appellaret factos ab hominibus deos, non tamen eis dedit, quod Platonicus Apuleius (unde iam satis diximus et quam sit inconueniens absurdumque monstrauimus), ut ipsi essent interpretes et intercessores inter deos, quos fecit Deus, et homines, quos idem fecit Deus; hinc adferentes uota, inde munera referentes.

He, although he calls them gods, yet when he says that they were made by such men as we certainly ought not to be, willing or unwilling, shows that they are not to be worshiped by those who are not such as those by whom they were made, that is, by the prudent, the faithful, the religious; at the same time also demonstrating that the very men who made them imported for themselves, so that they might have as gods those who were not gods. True indeed is that prophetic word: If a man shall make gods, behold, they themselves are not gods. Therefore such gods, the gods of such men, made by art by such men, [when Hermes had called them,] that is, idols—demons bound by the chains of their desires by some I-know-not-what art—when he called them gods made by men, yet he did not grant to them what the Platonist Apuleius (about which we have already said enough and have shown how unfitting and absurd it is) granted: that they themselves should be interpreters and intercessors between the gods whom God made and the men whom the same God made; bringing vows from here, carrying back gifts from there.

Nimis enim stultum est credere deos, quos fecerunt homines, plus ualere apud deos, quos fecit Deus, quam ualent ipsi homines, quos idem ipse fecit Deus. Daemon quippe simulacro arte impia conligatus ab homine factus est deus, sed tali homini, non omni homini. Qualis est ergo iste deus, quem non faceret homo nisi errans et incredulus et auersus a uero Deo?

For it is exceedingly foolish to believe that the gods whom men have made prevail more with the gods whom God made than do the men themselves, whom that same God made. For a daemon, bound to a simulacrum by impious art, has been made a god by a man, but for such a man, not for every man. What sort of god, then, is this, whom a man would not have made except while erring and unbelieving and turned away from the true God?

Porro si daemones, qui coluntur in templis, per artem nescio quam imaginibus inditi, hoc est uisibilibus simulacris, ab eis hominibus, qui hac arte fecerunt deos, cum aberrarent auersique essent a cultu et religione diuina, non sunt internuntii nec interpretes inter homines et deos, et propter suos pessimos ac turpissimos mores, et quod homines, quamuis errantes et increduli et auersi a cultu ac religione diuina, tamen eis sine dubio meliores sunt, quos deos ipsi arte fecerunt: restat, ut, quod possunt, tamquam daemones possint, uel quasi beneficia praestando magis nocentes, quia magis decipientes, uel aperte malefaciendo (nec tamen quodlibet horum, nisi quando permittuntur alta et secreta Dei prouidentia), non autem tamquam medii inter homines et deos per amicitiam deorum multum apud homines ualeant. Hi enim diis bonis, quos sanctos angelos nos uocamus rationalesque creaturas sanctae caelestis habitationis siue sedes siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates, amici esse omnino non possunt, a quibus tam longe absunt animi affectione, quam longe absunt a uirtutibus uitia et a bonitate malitia.

Moreover, if the daemons who are worshipped in temples—by some I‑know‑not‑what art being inserted into images, that is, into visible simulacra—by those men who by this art made gods, while they were straying and turned away from divine cult and religion, are not go‑betweens nor interpreters between humans and gods, both because of their worst and most shameful morals, and because humans—although erring and unbelieving and turned away from divine cult and religion—are nevertheless without doubt better than they, the very ones whom they by art made into gods: it remains that they, as daemons, can do what they can, either by bestowing quasi‑benefits yet being the more harmful because the more deceiving, or by openly doing malefice (and yet none of this, except when they are permitted by the high and secret Providence of God), but not as if, being middle between humans and gods, they might have great influence among humans through friendship with the gods. For these cannot at all be friends to the good gods—whom we call holy angels and rational creatures of the holy heavenly habitation, whether Thrones or Dominations or Principalities or Powers—from whom they are as far removed in the affection of the mind as vices are far from virtues and malice from goodness.

[XXV] Nullo modo igitur per daemonum quasi medietatem ambiendum est ad beneuolentiam seu beneficentiam deorum uel potius angelorum bonorum, sed per bonae uoluntatis similitudinem, qua cum illis sumus et cum illis uiuimus et cum illis Deum quem colunt colimus, etsi eos carnalibus oculis uidere non possumus; in quantum autem dissimilitudine uoluntatis et fragilitate infirmitatis miseri sumus, in tantum ab eis longe sumus uitae merito, non corporis loco. Non enim quia in terra condicione carnis habitamus, sed si inmunditia cordis terrena sapimus, non eis iungimur. Cum uero sanamur, ut quales ipsi sunt simus: fide illis interim propinquamus, si ab illo nos fieri beatos, a quo et ipsi facti sunt, etiam ipsis fauentibus credimus.

[25] In no way, therefore, is the benevolence or beneficence of the gods—or rather of the good angels—to be courted through the demons’ as-it-were mediacy, but through a similitude of good will, by which we are with them and live with them and with them worship God whom they worship, even if we cannot see them with carnal eyes; and inasmuch as by a dissimilitude of will and by the fragility of infirmity we are wretched, by so much are we far from them by the desert (merit) of life, not by bodily place. For it is not because we dwell on earth by the condition of flesh, but if by uncleanness of heart we savor earthly things, that we are not joined to them. But when we are healed, that we may be such as they are: by faith meanwhile we draw near to them, if we believe—also with they themselves favoring—that we are made blessed by Him by whom they too were made.

[XXVI] Sane aduertendum est, quo modo iste Aegyptius, cum doleret tempus esse uenturum, quo illa auferrentur ex Aegypto, quae fatetur a multum errantibus et incredulis et a cultu diuinae religionis auersis esse instituta, ait inter cetera: m Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum atque templorum, sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima"; quasi uero, si illa non auferrentur, non essent homines morituri, aut alibi essent mortui ponendi quam in terra; et utique, quanto plus uolueretur temporis et dierum, tanto maior esset numerus sepulcrorum propter maiorem numerum mortuorum. Sed hoc uidetur dolere, quod memoriae martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent, ut uidelicet, qui haec legunt animo a nobis auerso atque peruerso, putent a paganis cultos fuisse deos in templis, a nobis autem coli mortuos in sepulcris. Tanta enim homines impii caecitate in montes quodam modo offendunt resque oculos suos ferientes nolunt uidere, ut non adtendant in omnibus litteris paganorum aut non inueniri aut uix inueniri deos, qui non homines fuerint mortuisque diuini honores delati sint.

[26] Truly it must be adverted to how that Egyptian, when he was grieving that a time would come when those things would be taken away from Egypt which he confesses were instituted by those much erring and incredulous and averse from the cult and religion of the divine, said among other things: m "Then this land, the most holy seat of shrines and temples, will be a sepulcher and most full of the dead"; as though, if those things were not removed, men would not be going to die, or the dead would have to be placed elsewhere than in the earth; and assuredly, the more the course of time and days would roll on, the greater would be the number of sepulchers on account of the greater number of the dead. But this he seems to lament: that the memorials of our martyrs would succeed to their temples and shrines, so that, namely, those who read these things with a mind averse and perverse toward us may think that by the pagans gods were worshiped in temples, but by us the dead are worshiped in sepulchers. For men so impious, in such blindness, in a certain way stumble against mountains and do not wish to see the things striking their eyes, so that they do not attend, in all the letters of the pagans, that either there are not found, or are scarcely found, gods who were not men, and to whom, when dead, divine honors have been bestowed.

Omitto, quod Varro dicit omnes ab eis mortuos existimari manes deos et probat per ea sacra, quae omnibus fere mortuis exhibentur, ubi et ludos commemorat funebres, tamquam hoc sit maximum diuinitatis indicium, quod non soleant ludi nisi numinibus celebrari.

I pass over what Varro says, that all the dead are by them considered Manes-gods, and he proves it by those sacra which are rendered to almost all the dead, where he also commemorates funereal games, as though this were the greatest indication of divinity, that games are not wont to be celebrated except for numina.

Hermes ipse, de quo nunc agitur, in eodem ipso libro, ubi quasi futura praenuntiando deplorans ait: "Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum atque templorum, sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima", deos Aegypti homines mortuos esse testatur. Cum enim dixisset proauos suos multum errantes circa deorum rationem, incredulos et non animaduertentes ad cultum religionemque diuinam, inuenisse artem, qua efficerent deos: "Cui inuentae, inquit, adiunxerunt uirtutem de mundi natura conuenientem eamque miscentes, quoniam animas facere non poterant, euocantes animas daemonum uel angelorum eas indiderunt imaginibus sanctis diuinisque mysteriis, per quas idola et bene faciendi et male uires habere potuissent." Deinde sequitur tamquam hoc exemplis probaturus et dicit: "Auus enim tuus, o Asclepi, medicinae primus Inuentor, cui templum consecratum est in monte Libyae circa litus crocodilorum, in quo eius iacet mundanus homo, id est corpus; reliquus enim, uel potius totus, si est homo totus in sensu uitae, melior remeauit in caelum, omnia etiam nunc hominibus adiumenta praestans infirmis numine nunc suo, quae solebat medicinae arte praebere." Ecce dixit mortuum coli pro deo in eo loco, ubi habebat sepulcrum, falsus ac fallens, quod remeauit in caelum. Adiungens deinde aliud: "Hermes, inquit, cuius auitum mihi nomen est, nonne in sibi cognomine patria consistens omnes morales undique uenientes adiuuat atque conseruat?" Hic enim Hermes maior, id est Mercurius, quem dicit auum suum fuisse, in Hermopoli, hoc est in sui nominis ciuitate, esse perhibetur.

Hermes himself, of whom the discussion is now, in that very book where, as if by foretelling the future, lamenting he says: "Then this land, the most holy seat of shrines and temples, will be a place of tombs and most full of the dead," bears witness that the gods of Egypt are dead men. For when he had said that his forefathers, erring much concerning the account of the gods, unbelieving and not attending to the cult and divine religion, had found an art by which they would make gods: "To which invention," he says, "they added a power suited from the nature of the world, and, mixing it, since they could not make souls, summoning the souls of daemons or angels, they inserted them into holy images with divine mysteries, through which the idols might have powers both of doing good and of doing ill." Then he continues, as if about to prove this by examples, and says: "For your grandfather, O Asclepius, the first Inventor of medicine, to whom a temple has been consecrated on a mountain of Libya near the shore of the crocodiles, in which his worldly man lies, that is, the body; for the rest, or rather the whole, if a man is whole in the sense of life, the better part returned to heaven, even now affording to men, to the weak, helps by his numen now, which he was accustomed to provide by the art of medicine." Behold, he said that a dead man is worshiped as a god in that place where he had his tomb, false and deceiving in saying that he returned to heaven. Then adding another point: "Hermes," he says, "whose ancestral name is mine, does he not, residing in his namesake fatherland, help and preserve all mortals coming from every side?" For this greater Hermes, that is, Mercury, whom he says was his grandfather, is held to be in Hermopolis, that is, in the city of his own name.

Ecce duos deos dicit homines fuisse, Aesculapium et Mercurium. Sed de Aesculapio et Graeci et Latini hoc idem sentiunt; Mercurium autem multi non putant fuisse mortalem, quem tamen iste auum suum fuisse testatur. At enim alius est ille, alius iste, quamuis eodem nomine nuncupentur.

Behold, he says that two gods were men, Asclepius and Mercury. But concerning Asclepius both Greeks and Latins think this same; but as for Mercury, many do not think he was mortal, whom nevertheless this man attests to have been his grandfather. But indeed that one is one person, this one another, although they are called by the same name.

Non multum pugno, alius ille sit, alius iste; uerum et iste, sicut Aesculapius, ex homine deus secundum testimonium tanti apud suos uiri, huius Trismegisti, nepotis sui.

I do not contend much: let that one be another, and this one another; but even this one, like Aesculapius, became a god from a man, according to the testimony of so great a man among his own people—this Trismegistus, his grandson.

Adhuc addit et dicit: "lsin uero Osiris quam multa bona praestare propitiam, quantis obesse scimus iratam!" Deinde ut ostenderet ex hoc genere esse deos, quos illa arte homines faciunt (unde dat intellegi daemones se opinari ex hominum mortuorum animis extitisse, quos per artem, quam inuenerunt homines multum errantes, increduli et inreligiosi, ait inditos simulacris, quia hi, qui tales deos faciebant, animas facere non utique poterant), cum de Iside dixisset, quod commemoraui, "quantis obesse scimus iratam", secutus adiunxit: "Terrenis etenim diis atque mundanis facile est irasci, utpote qui sint ab hominibus ex utraque natura facti atque compositi." "Ex utraque natura" dicit ex anima et corpore, ut pro anima sit daemon, pro corpore simulacrum. "Vnde contigit, inquit, ab Aegyptiis haec sancta animalia nuncupari colique per singulas ciuitates eorum animas, quorum sunt consecratae uiuentes, ita ut eorum legibus incolantur et eorum nominibus nuncupentur." Vbi est illa uelut querela luctuosa, quod terra Aegypti, sanctissima sedes delubrorum atque templorum, sepulcrorum futura esset mortuorumque plenissima? Nempe spiritus fallax, cuius instinctu Hermes ista dicebat, per eum ipsum coactus est confiteri iam tunc illam terram sepulcrorum et mortuorum, quos pro diis colebant, fuisse plenissimam.

He furthermore adds and says: “But as for Isis and Osiris, how many good things the propitious one bestows, by how great things we know the irate one to harm!” Then, in order to show that the gods are of this genus, whom by that art men make (whence it is given to be understood that he thinks daemons arose from the souls of dead men, which, through the art that men—greatly erring, incredulous and irreligious—discovered, he says were inserted into simulacra, since those who made such gods most certainly could not make souls), after he had said about Isis what I have recalled, “by how great things we know the irate one to harm,” he went on and added: “For to terrestrial and mundane gods it is easy to be angry, inasmuch as they are made and composed by men from both natures.” By “from both natures” he means from soul and body, so that for the soul there is the daemon, for the body the simulacrum. “Whence it has come about,” he says, “that by the Egyptians these holy animals are so named, and that in their several cities the souls of those men are worshiped, to whom they were consecrated while living, so that by their laws they are inhabited and by their names they are named.” Where is that, as it were, mournful complaint, that the land of Egypt, the most holy seat of shrines and temples, would be a land of sepulchers and most full of the dead? Surely the deceitful spirit, at whose instigation Hermes said these things, was compelled through that very man to confess that even then that land was most full of sepulchers and of dead men whom they were worshiping as gods.

Sed dolor daemonum per eum loquebatur, qui suas futuras poenas apud sanctorum martyrum memorias inminere maerebant. In multis enim talibus locis torquentur et confitentur et de possessis hominum corporibus eiciuntur.

But the grief of the demons was speaking through him, who were lamenting that their future punishments were impending at the memorials of the holy martyrs. For in many such places they are tormented and confess and are cast out from the possessed bodies of human beings.

[XXVII] Nec tamen nos eisdem martyribus templa, sacerdotia, sacra et sacrificia constituimus, quoniam non ipsi, sed Deus eorum nobis est Deus. Honoramus sane memorias eorum tamquam sanctorum hominum Dei, qui usque ad mortem corporum suorum pro ueritate certarunt, ut innotesceret uera religio falsis fictisque conuictis; quod etiam si qui antea sentiebant, timendo reprimebant. Quis autem audiuit aliquando fidelium stantem sacerdotem ad altare, etiam super sanctum corpus martyris ad Dei honorem cultumque constructum, dicere in precibus: Offero tibi sacrificium Petre uel Paule uel Cypriane, cum apud eorum memorias offeratur Deo, qui eos et homines et martyres fecit et sanctis suis angelis caelesti honore sociauit, ut ea celebritate et Deo uero de illorum uictoriis gratias agamus et nos ad imitationem talium coronarum atque palmarum eodem inuocato in auxilium ex illorum memoriae renouatione adhortemur?

[27] Nor yet do we establish for the same martyrs temples, priesthoods, sacred rites, and sacrifices, since not they, but their God, is our God. We do indeed honor their memorials as of holy men of God, who contended even to the death of their bodies for the truth, that true religion might become well-known, the false and fictitious having been convicted; which even if some had previously felt, they repressed through fear. But who ever heard a priest of the faithful standing at the altar—even above the holy body of a martyr constructed for the honor and worship of God—say in his prayers: “I offer to you a sacrifice, Peter or Paul or Cyprian,” when at their memorial shrines it is offered to God, who made them both men and martyrs and associated them with his holy angels in heavenly honor, so that by that solemnity we may give thanks to the true God for their victories, and we may be exhorted to the imitation of such crowns and palms, with the same One invoked for help, from the renewal of the memory of them?

Quaecumque igitur adhibentur religiosorum obsequia in martyrum locis, ornamenta sunt memoriarum, non sacra uel sacrificia mortuorum tamquam deorum. Quicumque etiam epulas suas eo deferunt (quod quidem a Christianis melioribus non fit, et in plerisque terrarum nulla talis est consuetudo) -- tamen quicumque id faciunt, quas cum apposuerint, orant et auferunt, ut uescantur uel ex eis etiam indigentibus largiantur, sanctificari sibi eas uolunt per merita martyrum in nomine domini martyrum. Non autem esse ista sacrificia martyrum nouit, qui nouit unum, quod etiam illic offertur, sacrificium Christianorum.

Therefore, whatever services of the religious are employed in the places of the martyrs are ornaments of the memorials, not sacred rites or sacrifices of the dead as though of gods. Whoever also brings his banquets there (which indeed is not done by better Christians, and in most lands no such custom exists) -- yet whoever do this, when they have set them out, they pray and remove them, that they may eat, or also bestow from them upon the needy; they wish them to be sanctified for themselves through the merits of the martyrs in the name of the Lord of the martyrs. But he knows that these are not sacrifices of the martyrs, who knows the one sacrifice of the Christians, which also is offered there.

Nos itaque martyres nostros nec diuinis honoribus nec humanis criminibus colimus, sicut colunt illi deos suos, nec sacrificia illis offerimus, nec eorum probra in eorum sacra conuertimus. Nam de Iside, uxore Osiris, Aegyptia dea, et de parentibus eorum, qui omnes reges fuisse scribuntur (quibus parentibus suis illa cum sacrificaret, inuenit hordei segetem atque inde spicas marito regi et eius consiliario Mercurio demonstrauit, unde eandem et Cererem uolunt), quae et quanta mala non a poetis, sed mysticis eorum litteris memoriae mandata sint, sicut Leone sacerdote prodente ad Olympiadem matrem scribit Alexander, legant qui uolunt uel possunt, et recolant qui legerunt, et uideant quibus hominibus mortuis uel de quibus eorum factis tamquam diis sacra fuerint instituta. Absit ut eos, quamuis deos habeant, sanctis martyribus nostris, quos tamen deos non habemus, ulla ex parte audeant comparare.

Nos therefore do not honor our martyrs either with divine honors or with human crimes, as those men honor their own gods, nor do we offer sacrifices to them, nor do we convert their disgraces into their sacred rites. For concerning Isis, the wife of Osiris, an Egyptian goddess, and concerning their parents, who are all written to have been kings (to whose own parents, when she was sacrificing, she found a barley crop and from there showed the ears to her husband the king and to his counselor Mercury, whence they also wish her to be the same as Ceres), what and how great evils have been consigned to memory not by poets, but by their mystical writings, as Alexander writes to Olympias his mother, with the priest Leo disclosing—let those who wish or are able read, and let those who have read recall, and let them see for which dead human beings, or from which of their deeds, sacred rites were instituted as if for gods. Far be it that they, although they have them as gods, should dare to compare them in any respect to our holy martyrs, whom nevertheless we do not have as gods.

Sic enim non constituimus sacerdotes nec offerimus sacrificia martyribus nostris, quia incongruum indebitum inlicitum est atque uni Deo tantummodo debitum, ut nec criminibus suis nec ludis eos turpissimis oblectemus, ubi uel flagitia isti celebrant deorum suorum, si, cum homines essent, talia commiserunt, uel conficta delectamenta daemonum noxiorum, si homines non fuerunt. Ex isto genere daemonum Socrates non haberet deum, si haberet deum; sed fortasse homini ab illa arte faciendi deos alieno et innocenti illi inportauerint talem deum, qui eadem arte excellere uoluerunt. Quid ergo plura?

Thus indeed we neither constitute priests nor offer sacrifices to our martyrs, because it is incongruous, undue, illicit, and owed to the one God only; nor do we amuse them either with their crimes or with most disgraceful games, where those people celebrate either the outrages of their own gods—if, when they were men, they committed such things—or fabricated delectations of noxious daemons, if they were not men. From this genus of daemons Socrates would not have had a god, if he had had a god; but perhaps those who wished to excel in that same art imported such a god to that man, who was a stranger to the craft of making gods and innocent. Why, then, say more?

Non esse spiritus istos colendos propter uitam beatam, quae post mortem futura est, nullus uel mediocriter prudens ambigit. Sed fortasse dicturi sunt deos quidem esse omnes bonos, daemones autem alios malos, alios bonos, et eos, per quos ad uitam in aeternum beatam perueniamus, colendos esse censebunt, quos bonos opinantur. Quod quale sit iam in uolumine sequenti uidendum est.

That these spirits are not to be worshiped for the sake of the blessed life, which will be after death, no one even moderately prudent doubts. But perhaps they will say that the gods indeed are all good, whereas the daemons are some bad, others good, and they will judge those to be worshiped—through whom we may attain to a life blessed forever—whom they consider good. What sort of thing this is must now be seen in the following volume.