Gaius: Commentarius Secundus

1. Superiore commentario de iure personarum exposuimus; modo uideamus de rebus: quae uel in nostro patrimonio sunt uel extra nostrum patrimonium habentur.

1. In the previous commentary we expounded concerning the law of persons; now let us see about things: which either are in our patrimony or are held outside our patrimony.

2. Summa itaque rerum diuisio in duos articulos diducitur: nam aliae sunt diuini iuris, aliae humani.

2. Therefore the principal division of things is drawn into two articles: for some are of divine law, others of human.

3. Diuini iuris sunt ueluti res sacrae et religiosae.

3. Belonging to divine law are, as it were, sacred and religious things.

4. Sacrae sunt, quae diis superis consecratae sunt; religiosae, quae diis Manibus relictae sunt.

4. Sacred are those which have been consecrated to the gods above; religious are those which have been left to the divine Manes.

5. Sed sacrum quidem hoc solum existimatur, quod ex auctoritate populi Romani consecratum est, ueluti lege de ea re lata aut senatus consulto facto.

5. But indeed sacred is considered only that which has been consecrated by the authority of the Roman people, for instance, when a law on that matter has been passed or a senatorial decree has been made.

6. Religiosum uero nostra uoluntate facimus mortuum inferentes in locum nostrum, si modo eius mortui funus ad nos pertineat.

6. But we make a thing religious by our own will, by bringing a dead person into our place, provided only that the funeral of that dead person pertains to us.

7. Sed in prouinciali solo placet plerisque solum religiosum non fieri, quia in eo solo dominium populi Romani est uel Caesaris, nos autem possessionem tantum et usumfructum habere uidemur; utique tamen, etiamsi non sit religiosum, pro religioso habetur: item quod in prouinciis non ex auctoritate populi Romani consecratum est, proprie sacrum non est, tamen pro sacro habetur.

7. But on provincial soil it pleases most (i.e., most hold) that the ground does not become religious, because in that soil the dominium is that of the Roman People or of the Caesar, while we seem to have only possession and usufruct; nevertheless, at any rate, even if it is not religious, it is regarded as religious: likewise, what in the provinces has not been consecrated by the authority of the Roman People is not properly sacred, yet it is regarded as sacred.

8. Sanctae quoque res, uelut muri et portae, quodam modo diuini iuris sunt.

8. Sacred things also, such as walls and gates, are in a certain way of divine law.

9. Quod autem diuini iuris est, id nullius in bonis est: id uero, quod humani iuris est, plerumque alicuius in bonis est; potest autem et nullius in bonis esse: nam res hereditariae, antequam aliquis heres existat, nullius in bonis sunt [. . . . . vv. fere 8 . . . . . . . ]ue domino.

9. But what is of divine law is in no one’s patrimony; whereas what is of human law is for the most part in someone’s patrimony; however, it can also be in no one’s patrimony: for hereditary things, before any heir exists, are in no one’s patrimony [. . . . . vv. fere 8 . . . . . . . ]ue domino.

10. Hae autem res, quae humani iuris sunt, aut pu-blicae sunt aut priuatae.

10. These things, however, which are of human law, are either public or private.

11. Quae publicae sunt, nullius uidentur in bonis esse; ipsius enim uniuersitatis esse creduntur. priuatae sunt, quae singulorum hominum sunt.

11. Things which are public are seen to be in no one’s estate; for they are believed to belong to the community itself. Private are those which are of individual persons.

12. Quaedam praeterea res corporales sunt, quaedam incorporales.

12. Certain things moreover are corporeal, certain incorporeal.

13. Corporales hae sunt, quae tangi possunt, uelut fundus, homo, uestis, aurum, argentum et denique aliae res innumerabiles.

13. Corporeal are these, which can be touched, for example: a fundus (estate), a human being, a garment, gold, silver, and finally other things innumerable.

14. Incorporales sunt, quae tangi non possunt, qualia sunt ea, quae in iure consistunt, sicut hereditas, ususfructus, obligationes quoquo modo contractae. nec ad rem pertinet, quod in hereditate res corporales continentur, et fructus, qui ex fundo percipiuntur, corporales sunt, et id, quod ex aliqua obligatione nobis debetur, plerumque corporale est, ueluti fundus, homo, pecunia: nam ipsum ius successionis et ipsum ius utendi fruendi et ipsum ius obligationis incorporale est. eodem numero sunt iura praediorum urbanorum et rusticorum.

14. Incorporeal are those which cannot be touched, such as those which consist in law, like inheritance, usufruct, obligations contracted in whatever manner. Nor is it to the point that in an inheritance corporeal things are contained, and that the fruits which are taken from an estate are corporeal, and that what is owed to us from some obligation is for the most part corporeal, for example an estate, a person, money: for the right itself of succession and the very right of using and enjoying, and the very right of obligation, is incorporeal. In the same category are the predial rights of urban and rustic estates.

[. . . . . vv. 2 1/4 . . . . . . . ] non extollendi, ne luminibus uicini officiatur: item fluminum et stillicidiorum idem ius ut [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ]

[. . . . . vv. 2 1/4 . . . . . . . ] not to be raised, lest the lights/windows of the neighbor be obstructed: likewise of rivers/streams and of eave-drippings the same right that [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ]

14a. Res praeterea aut mancipi sunt aut nec mancipi. [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] seruitutes praediorum urbanorum nec mancipi sunt.

14a. Furthermore, things are either mancipi or not mancipi. [. . . . . vv. 5 . . . . . . . ] the servitudes of urban praedia are not mancipi.

item stipendiaria praedia et tributaria nec mancipi sunt.

likewise stipendiary estates and tributary estates are not mancipi.

15. Sed quod diximus ea animalia, quae domari solent, mancipi esse, n[. . . . . vv. 1 3/4 . . . . . . . ] statim ut nata sunt, mancipi esse putant; Nerua uero et Proculus et ceteri diuersae scholae auctores non aliter ea mancipi esse putant quam si domita sunt; et si propter nimiam feritatem domari non possunt, tunc uideri mancipi esse incipere, cum ad eam aetatem peruenerint, in qua domari solent.

15. But as we have said that those animals which are wont to be tamed are mancipi, n[. . . . . vv. 1 3/4 . . . . . . . ] think that immediately, as soon as they are born, they are mancipi; but Nerva and Proculus and the other authors of the opposite school do not think them to be mancipi otherwise than if they have been tamed; and if, on account of excessive wildness, they cannot be tamed, then they are considered to begin to be mancipi when they have reached that age at which they are wont to be tamed.

16. At ferae bestiae nec mancipi sunt, uelut ursi, leones, item ea animalia, quae ferarum bestiarum numero sunt, uelut elefanti et cameli, et ideo ad rem non pertinet, quod haec animalia etiam collo dorsoue domari solent; nam ne notitia quidem eorum animalium illo tempore fuit, quo constituebatur quasdam res mancipi esse, quasdam nec mancipi.

16. But wild beasts are not mancipi, for example bears, lions; likewise those animals which are in the number of wild beasts, for example elephants and camels; and therefore it is not to the point that these animals too are accustomed to be tamed by neck or back; for not even a knowledge of those animals existed at that time when it was being established that certain things were mancipi and certain not mancipi.

17. Sed item fere omnia, quae incorporalia sunt, nec mancipi sunt, exceptis seruitutibus praediorum rusticorum; nam eas mancipi esse constat, quamuis sint ex numero rerum incorporalium.

17. But likewise almost all things which are incorporeal are not mancipi, with the exception of the servitudes of rural estates; for it is established that those are mancipi, although they belong to the class of incorporeal things.

18. Magna autem differentia est inter mancipi res et nec mancipi.

18. But there is a great difference between mancipi things and not-mancipi.

19. Nam res nec mancipi ipsa traditione pleno iure alterius fiunt, si modo corporales sunt et ob id recipiunt traditionem.

19. For things not mancipi become another’s by the very tradition, with full right, provided only that they are corporeal and on that account receive tradition.

20. Itaque si tibi uestem uel aurum uel argentum tradidero siue ex uenditionis causa siue ex donationis siue quauis alia ex causa, statim tua fit ea res, si modo ego eius dominus sim.

20. And so, if I have handed over to you a garment or gold or silver, whether on account of vendition (sale) or of donation, or from any other cause whatsoever, that thing at once becomes yours, provided only that I am its owner.

21. In eadem causa sunt prouincialia praedia, quorum alia stipendiaria, alia tributaria uocamus: stipendiaria sunt ea, quae in his prouinciis sunt, quae propriae populi Romani esse intelleguntur; tributaria sunt ea, quae in his prouinciis sunt, quae propriae Caesaris esse creduntur.

21. Provincial estates are in the same condition, of which some we call stipendiary, others tributary: stipendiary are those which are in those provinces that are understood to belong properly to the Roman People; tributary are those which are in those provinces that are believed to belong properly to Caesar.

22. Mancipi uero res sunt, quae per mancipationem ad alium transferuntur; unde etiam mancipi res sunt dictae. quod autem ualet mancipatio, idem ualet et in iure cessio.

22. But mancipi things are those which are transferred to another through mancipation; whence they are also called mancipi things. And whatever mancipation avails for, the same avails also in an in iure cession.

23. Et mancipatio quidem quemadmodum fiat, superiore commentario tradidimus.

23. And indeed how mancipation is effected, we have set forth in the preceding commentary.

24. In iure cessio autem hoc modo fit: apud magistratum populi Romani uelut praetorem urbanum [aut praesides prouinciae] is, cui res in iure ceditur, rem tenens ita dicit: HVNC EGO HOMINEM EX IVRE QVIRITIVM MEVM ESSE AIO; deinde postquam hic uindicauerit, praetor interrogat eum, qui cedit, an contra uindicet; quo negante aut tacente tunc ei, qui uindicauerit, eam rem addicit; idque legis actio uocatur. hoc fieri potest etiam in prouinciis apud praesides earum.

24. But in iure cession is done in this way: before a magistrate of the Roman people, as it were the urban praetor [or the governors of the provinces], the one to whom the thing is ceded in court, holding the thing, says thus: I DECLARE THIS MAN TO BE MINE BY QUIRITARY RIGHT; then, after he has claimed it, the praetor asks the one who cedes whether he counter-claims; when he denies it or is silent, then he adjudges that thing to the one who has claimed; and this is called a legis action. This can also be done in the provinces before their governors.

25. Plerumque tamen et fere semper mancipationibus utimur: quod enim ipsi per nos praesentibus amicis agere possumus, hoc non interest nec necesse cum maiore difficultate apud praetorem aut apud praesidem prouinciae agere.

25. For the most part, however, and almost always we make use of mancipations: for what we ourselves can transact on our own with friends present, there is no point, nor is it necessary, to transact with greater difficulty before the praetor or before the provincial governor.

26. Quod si neque mancipata neque in iure cessa sit res mancipi [. . . . . vv. 8 . . . . . . . ] 27. Praeterea admonendi sumus, quod ueteres dicebant soli Italici nexum esse, prouincialis soli nexum non esse, hanc habere significationem: solum Italicum mancipi esse, prouinciale nec mancipi esse. aliter enim ueteri lingua actus uocatur, et quod illis nexus, idem nobis est mancipatio.

26. But if a res mancipi has been neither mancipated nor ceded in iure [. . . . . vv. 8 . . . . . . . ] 27. Moreover, we must be reminded that what the ancients used to say—that Italian soil has nexum, and provincial soil does not have nexum—has this meaning: Italian soil is res mancipi, provincial soil is nec mancipi. For in the older tongue the act is called otherwise, and what to them was nexum is the same as mancipatio for us.

28. Res incorporales traditionem non recipere manifestum est.

28. It is manifest that incorporeal things do not admit of tradition (delivery).

29. Sed iura praediorum urbanorum in iure cedi tantum possunt; rusticorum uero etiam mancipari possunt.

29. But the praedial rights of urban praedia can only be ceded in iure; those of rural praedia can also be mancipated.

30. Ususfructus in iure cessionem tantum recipit: nam dominus proprietatis alii usumfructum in iure cedere potest, ut ille usumfructum habeat et ipse nudam proprietatem retineat. ipse usufructuarius in iure cedendo domino proprietatis usumfructum efficit, ut a se discedat et conuertatur in proprietatem; alii uero in iure cedendo nihilo minus ius suum retinet: creditur enim ea cessione nihil agi.

30. Usufruct receives cession in law only: for the owner of the proprietorship can cede the usufruct in law to another, so that that person may have the usufruct and he himself may retain the naked proprietorship. The usufructuary himself, by ceding the usufruct in law to the owner of the proprietorship, brings it about that it departs from himself and is converted into proprietorship; but by ceding in law to someone else he nonetheless retains his right: for it is believed that by that cession nothing is done.

31. Sed haec scilicet in Italicis praediis ita sunt, quia et ipsa praedia mancipationem et in iure cessionem recipiunt. alioquin in prouincialibus praediis siue quis usumfructum siue ius eundi agendi aquamue ducendi uel altius tollendi aedes aut non tollendi, ne luminibus uicini officiatur, ceteraque similia iura constituere uelit, pactionibus et stipulationibus id efficere potest; quia ne ipsa quidem praedia mancipationem aut in iure cessionem recipiunt.

31. But these matters, namely, are thus in Italian estates, because the estates themselves admit mancipation and in iure cession. Otherwise, in provincial estates, if someone should wish to establish either a usufruct or a right of going, of driving, and of leading water, or of raising buildings higher or of not raising them, lest the neighbor’s lights be obstructed, and other similar rights, he can effect it by pactions and stipulations; because not even the estates themselves admit mancipation or in iure cession.

32. Sed cum ususfructus et hominum et ceterorum animalium constitui possit, intellegere debemus horum usumfructum etiam in prouinciis per in iure cessionem constitui posse.

32. But since a usufruct of persons and of other animals can be constituted, we ought to understand that the usufruct of these can also be constituted in the provinces by in iure cession.

33. Quod autem diximus usumfructum in iure cessionem tantum recipere, non est temere dictum, quamuis etiam per mancipationem constitui possit eo, quod in mancipanda proprietate detrahi potest; non enim ipse ususfructus mancipatur, sed cum in mancipanda proprietate deducatur, eo fit, ut apud alium ususfructus, apud alium proprietas sit.

33. But what we said, that a usufruct admits only of in iure cession, is not said rashly, although it can also be constituted through mancipation by the fact that, in the mancipating of the proprietorship, it can be taken off; for the usufruct itself is not mancipated, but when, in the mancipation of the proprietorship, it is deducted, it thus comes about that the usufruct is with one person and the proprietorship with another.

34. Hereditas quoque in iure cessionem tantum recipit.

34. An inheritance likewise admits only in iure cession.

35. Nam si is, ad quem ab intestato legitimo iure pertinet hereditas, in iure eam alii ante aditionem cedat, id est antequam heres extiterit, proinde fit heres is, cui in iure cesserit, ac si ipse per legem ad hereditatem uocatus esset: post obligationem uero si cesserit, nihilo minus ipse heres permanet et ob id creditoribus tenebitur, debita uero pereunt, eoque modo debitores hereditarii lucrum faciunt; corpora uero eius hereditatis proinde transeunt ad eum, cui cessa est hereditas, ac si ei singula in iure cessa fuissent.

35. For if the person to whom, ab intestate and by legitimate right, the inheritance pertains should in iure cede it to another before adition, that is, before he has become heir, then the one to whom he has ceded it in iure becomes heir just as if he himself had been called to the inheritance by law: after obligation, however, if he should cede, nonetheless he himself remains heir and on that account will be held to the creditors, but the debts perish, and in that way the hereditary debtors make a gain; the corporeal things of that inheritance, however, pass to the one to whom the inheritance has been ceded, just as if the individual items had been in iure ceded to him.

36. Testamento autem scriptus heres ante aditam quidem hereditatem in iure cedendo eam alii nihil agit; postea uero quam adierit si cedat, ea accidunt, quae proxime diximus de eo, ad quem ab intestato legitimo iure pertinet hereditas, si post obligationem in iure cedat.

36. But an heir written in a testament, before the inheritance has been entered upon, by ceding it in court to another effects nothing; but afterwards, when he has entered upon it, if he cedes, the same things happen which we have just said about the one to whom the inheritance pertains ab intestato by legitimate right, if after obligation he cedes it in court.

37. Idem et de necessariis heredibus diuersae scholae auctores existimant, quod nihil uidetur interesse, utrum aliquis adeundo hereditatem fiat heres an inuitus existat. quod quale sit, suo loco apparebit: sed nostri praeceptores putant nihil agere necessarium heredem, cum in iure cedat hereditatem.

37. The same, too, do the authors of the different school think, because it seems to make no difference whether someone becomes heir by entering upon the inheritance or stands as heir unwillingly. What kind of case that is will appear in its own place; but our preceptors think that a necessary heir does nothing by in iure ceding the inheritance.

38. Obligationes quoquo modo contractae nihil eorum recipiunt: nam quod mihi ab aliquo debetur, id si uelim tibi deberi, nullo eorum modo, quibus res corporales ad alium transferuntur, id efficere possum; sed opus est, ut iubente me tu ab eo stipuleris; quae res efficit, ut a me liberetur et incipiat tibi teneri. quae dicitur nouatio obligationis.

38. Obligations, in whatever way contracted, admit none of these: for that which is owed to me by someone, if I wish it to be owed to you, I cannot effect this by any of those methods by which corporeal things are transferred to another; rather, it is necessary that, at my bidding, you stipulate from him; this brings it about that he is released from me and begins to be bound to you. This is called a novation of the obligation.

39. Sine hac uero nouatione non poteris tuo nomine agere, sed debes ex persona mea quasi cognitor aut procurator meus experiri.

39. Without this novation, however, you will not be able to sue in your own name, but you must proceed from my persona, as if my cognitor or procurator.

40. Sequitur, ut admoneamus apud peregrinos quidem unum esse dominium; nam aut dominus quisque est aut dominus non intellegitur. quo iure etiam populus Romanus olim utebatur: aut enim ex iure Quiritium unusquisque dominus erat aut non intellegebatur dominus. sed postea diuisionem accepit dominium, ut alius possit esse ex iure Quiritium dominus, alius in bonis habere.

40. It follows that we should remind that among foreigners dominion is indeed one; for each person is either an owner or is not understood to be an owner. By which law the Roman People also once used: for either each person was an owner by Quiritary right, or was not understood to be an owner. But afterwards dominion received a division, so that one person can be an owner by Quiritary right, another have it in his goods (in bonis).

41. Nam si tibi rem mancipi neque mancipauero neque in iure cessero, sed tantum tradidero, in bonis quidem tuis ea res efficitur, ex iure Quiritium uero mea permanebit, donec tu eam possidendo usucapias: semel enim impleta usucapione proinde pleno iure incipit, id est et in bonis et ex iure Quiritium tua res esse, ac si ea mancipata uel in iure cessa esset.

41. For if I have neither mancipated to you nor ceded in court (in iure), but have only delivered it, the thing is indeed made “in your goods” (bonitary ownership), yet in Quiritary right it will remain mine, until you acquire it by usucapion through possession; for once usucapion has been completed, it begins to be yours with full right, that is, both “in your goods” and by Quiritary right, just as if it had been mancipated or ceded in court.

42. Vsucapio autem mobilium quidem rerum anno completur, fundi uero et aedium biennio; et ita lege XII tabularum cautum est.

42. Usucapion of movable things is completed in a year, but of a farm and of buildings in a biennium; and thus it has been provided by the law of the 12 Tables.

43. Ceterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis conpetit, quae non a domino nobis traditae fuerint, siue mancipi sint eae res siue nec mancipi, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus, cum crederemus eum, qui traderet, dominum esse.

43. Moreover, usucapion also accrues to us for those things which have not been delivered to us by the owner, whether those things be mancipi or not mancipi, provided that we have received them in good faith, when we believed the one who delivered to be the owner.

44. Quod ideo receptum uidetur, ne rerum dominia diutius in incerto essent, cum sufficeret domino ad inquirendam rem suam anni aut biennii spatium, quod tempus ad usucapionem possessori tributum est.

44. This seems to have been adopted for this reason: lest the dominions of things remain longer in uncertainty, since a year’s or a two-year span sufficed for the owner to investigate his property, which time has been granted to the possessor for usucapion.

45. Sed aliquando etiamsi maxime quis bona fide alienam rem possideat, non tamen illi usucapio procedit, uelut si quis rem furtiuam aut ui possessam possideat; nam furtiuam lex XII tabularum usucapi prohibet, ui possessam lex Iulia et Plautia.

45. But sometimes, even if someone in the highest degree possesses another’s property in good faith, nevertheless usucaption does not proceed for him, for instance if someone possesses a thing stolen or possessed by force; for the Law of the 12 Tables forbids usucaption of a stolen thing, and the Julian and Plautian Law (forbids usucaption) of one possessed by force.

46. Item prouincialia praedia usucapionem non recipiunt.

46. Likewise provincial estates do not admit usucapion.

47. Item olim mulieris, quae in agnatorum tutela erat, res mancipi usucapi non poterant, praeterquam si ab ipsa tutore auctore traditae essent: id ita lege XII tabularum cautum erat.

47. Likewise, formerly the res mancipi of a woman who was in the tutelage of her agnates could not be acquired by usucapion, except if they had been conveyed by herself with the tutor authorizing; this was thus provided by the Law of the 12 Tables.

48. Item liberos homines et res sacras et religiosas usucapi non posse manifestum est.

48. Likewise it is manifest that free persons and sacred and religious things cannot be acquired by usucapion.

49. Quod ergo uulgo dicitur furtiuarum rerum et ui possessarum usucapionem per legem XII tabularum prohibitam esse, non eo pertinet, ut ne ipse fur quiue per uim possidet, usucapere possit (nam huic alia ratione usucapio non competit, quia scilicet mala fide possidet), sed nec ullus alius, quamquam ab eo bona fide emerit, usucapiendi ius habeat.

49. Therefore, what is commonly said—that the usucaption of stolen things and of things possessed by force was prohibited by the Law of the 12 Tables—does not have this import, namely, that the thief himself or one who possesses by force cannot acquire by usucaption (for to him usucaption does not apply on another ground, since, to wit, he possesses in bad faith), but rather that no one else, although he has bought from him in good faith, has the right of usucaption.

50. Vnde in rebus mobilibus non facile procedit, ut bonae fidei possessori usucapio competat, quia qui alienam rem uendidit et tradidit, furtum committit; idemque accidit etiam, si ex alia causa tradatur. sed tamen hoc aliquando aliter se habet; nam si heres rem defuncto commodatam aut locatam uel apud eum depositam existimans eam esse hereditariam, uendiderit aut donauerit, furtum non committit; item si is, ad quem ancillae ususfructus pertinet, partum etiam suum esse credens uendiderit aut donauerit, furtum non committit; furtum enim sine affectu furandi non committitur. aliis quoque modis accidere potest, ut quis sine uitio furti rem alienam ad aliquem transferat et efficiat, ut a possessore usucapiatur.

50. Whence, in movable things it does not easily proceed that usucapion belongs to a possessor in good faith, because he who has sold and delivered another’s thing commits theft; and the same happens even if it be delivered on another ground. But yet this sometimes stands otherwise; for if an heir, thinking a thing which had been loaned for use, or leased, or deposited with the deceased to be hereditary (in the estate), has sold or donated it, he does not commit theft; likewise, if he to whom the usufruct of a maidservant pertains, believing the offspring also to be his own, has sold or donated it, he does not commit theft; for theft is not committed without the intent to steal. It can also happen in other ways that someone, without the vice of theft, transfers another’s thing to someone, and brings it about that it is acquired by usucapion by the possessor.

51. Fundi quoque alieni potest aliquis sine ui possessionem nancisci, quae uel ex neglegentia domini uacet, uel quia dominus sine successore decesserit uel longo tempore afuerit: quam si ad alium bona fide accipientem transtulerit, poterit usucapere possessor; et quamuis ipse, qui uacantem possessionem nactus est, intellegat alienum esse fundum, tamen nihil hoc bonae fidei possessori ad usucapionem nocet, cum inprobata sit eorum sententia, qui putauerint furtiuum fundum fieri posse.

51. Someone can also obtain without force the possession of another’s estate, which either stands vacant through the negligence of the owner, or because the owner has died without a successor or has been absent for a long time: and if he transfers it to another who receives in good faith, the possessor will be able to acquire by usucapion; and although the very person who got the vacant possession understands the estate to be another’s, nevertheless this in no way harms the good‑faith possessor for usucapion, since the opinion of those who have thought that a fundus can be stolen has been disapproved.

52. Rursus ex contrario accidit, ut qui sciat alienam rem se possidere, usucapiat, uelut si rem hereditariam, cuius possessionem heres nondum nactus est, aliquis possederit; nam ei concessum est usucapere, si modo ea res est, quae recipit usucapionem. quae species possessionis et usucapionis pro herede uocatur.

52. Conversely it happens that one who knows he is possessing another’s thing acquires it by usucapion, as, for instance, if someone has possessed a hereditary thing, the possession of which the heir has not yet obtained; for it is granted to him to usucapt, provided only that the thing is one which admits usucapion. This species of possession and of usucapion is called pro herede.

53. Et in tantum haec usucapio concessa est, ut et res, quae solo continentur, anno usucapiantur.

53. And to such an extent has this usucaption been granted, that even things which are contained by the soil may be acquired by usucaption in one year.

54. Quare autem hoc casu etiam soli rerum annua constituta sit usucapio, illa ratio est, quod olim rerum hereditariarum possessione ipsae hereditates usucapi credebantur, scilicet anno: lex enim XII tabularum soli quidem res biennio usucapi iussit, ceteras uero anno: ergo hereditas in ceteris rebus uidebatur esse, quia soli non est [quia neque corporalis est]; et quamuis postea creditum sit ipsas hereditates usucapi non posse, tamen in omnibus rebus hereditariis, etiam quae solo tenentur, annua usucapio remansit.

54. And why in this case even for things of the soil an annual usucapion has been established, the rationale is this: formerly, by the possession of hereditary things, the inheritances themselves were believed to be usucaptible, namely in a year; for the law of the 12 Tables ordered that things of the soil be usucapted in a biennium (two years), but the others in a year; therefore an inheritance seemed to be among the other things, because it is not of the soil [because neither is it corporeal]; and although later it was believed that inheritances themselves cannot be usucapted, nevertheless in all hereditary things, even those which are held by the soil, an annual usucapion remained.

55. Quare autem omnino tam inproba possessio et usucapio concessa sit, illa ratio est, quod uoluerunt ueteres maturius hereditates adiri, ut essent, qui sacra facerent, quorum illis temporibus summa obseruatio fuit, ut et creditores haberent, a quo suum consequerentur.

55. Why, moreover, such an improper possession and usucapion was conceded at all, the reason is this: that the ancients wished inheritances to be entered upon more promptly, so that there might be those who would perform the sacra (family rites), the observance of which in those times was of the highest importance, and so that creditors too might have someone from whom they could recover what was theirs.

56. Haec autem species possessionis et usucapionis etiam lucratiua uocatur: nam sciens quisque rem alienam lucrifacit.

56. This kind of possession and usucapion is also called lucrative: for whoever knowingly makes gain from another’s property.

57. Sed hoc tempore iam non est lucratiua: nam ex auctoritate diui Hadriani senatus consultum factum est, ut tales usucapiones reuocarentur; et ideo potest heres ab eo, qui rem usucepit, hereditatem petendo proinde eam rem consequi, atque si usucapta non esset.

57. But at this time it is no longer lucrative: for by the authority of the deified Hadrian a senatus consultum was made, that such usucapions be revoked; and therefore an heir can, by seeking the inheritance, obtain that thing from him who has acquired it by usucapion, just as if it had not been acquired by usucapion.

58. Suo et necessario tamen herede extante nihil ipso iure pro herede usucapi potest.

58. However, with an own and necessary heir existing, nothing can by the law itself be usucapted as heir.

59. Adhuc etiam ex aliis causis sciens quisque rem alienam usucapit: nam qui rem alicui fiduciae causa mancipio dederit uel in iure cesserit, si eandem ipse possederit, potest usucapere, anno scilicet, si mobilis sit, biennio, soli si sit. quae species usucapionis dicitur usureceptio, quia id, quod aliquando habuimus, recipimus per usucapionem.

59. Further, also from other causes, anyone knowingly usucapts another’s thing: for he who has given a thing to someone by mancipation for a cause of fiducia (trust), or has ceded it in iure, if he himself has possessed the same, can usucapt—namely, in one year if it is movable, in two years if it is land (soil). This species of usucapion is called usureception (usureceptio), because that which we once had we receive back through usucapion.

60. Sed cum fiducia contrahitur aut cum creditore pignoris iure aut cum amico, quo tutius nostrae res apud eum essent, si quidem cum amico contracta sit fiducia, sane omni modo conpetit usus receptio; si uero cum creditore, soluta quidem pecunia omni modo conpetit, nondum uero soluta ita demum competit, si neque conduxerit eam rem a creditore debitor neque precario rogauerit, ut eam rem possidere liceret; quo casu lucratiua usus capio conpetit.

60. But when fiducia is contracted either with a creditor by the law of pledge or with a friend, in order that our goods might be safer with him, if indeed the fiducia has been contracted with a friend, plainly in every way usureception lies; but if with a creditor, once the money has been paid it lies in every way, whereas if it has not yet been paid, then only does it lie if the debtor has neither leased that thing from the creditor nor asked on sufferance (precariously) to be allowed to possess that thing; in which case a lucrative usucapion lies.

61. Item si rem obligatam sibi populus uendiderit eamque dominus possederit, concessa est usus receptio: sed et hoc casu praedium biennio usurecipitur: et hoc est, quod uolgo dicitur ex praediatura possessionem usurecipi: nam qui mercatur a populo, praediator appellatur.

61. Likewise, if the People has sold a thing obligated to itself, and the owner has possessed it, usureception is granted: but in this case too an estate is usureceived in two years; and this is what is commonly said, that possession is usureceived from the praediatura: for he who buys from the People is called a praediator.

62. Accidit aliquando, ut qui dominus sit, alienandae rei potestatem non habeat, et qui dominus non sit, alienare possit

62. It happens sometimes that he who is owner does not have the power of alienating the thing, and that he who is not owner can alienate

63. Nam dotale praedium maritus inuita muliere per legem Iuliam prohibetur alienare, quamuis ipsius sit uel mancipatum ei dotis causa uel in iure cessum uel usucaptum. quod quidem ius utrum ad Italica tantum praedia an etiam ad prouincialia pertineat, dubitatur.

63. For the husband is prohibited by the Julian law to alienate a dotal estate with the wife unwilling, although it is his—whether mancipated to him for the sake of the dowry, or in iure ceded, or usucapted. It is, however, a matter of doubt whether this right pertains only to Italian estates or also to provincial ones.

64. Ex diuerso agnatus furiosi curator rem furiosi alienare potest ex lege XII tabularum; item procurator [. . . . . versus dimidius legi nequit . . . . . . . ] est; item creditor pignus ex pactione, quamuis eius ea res non sit. sed hoc forsitan ideo uideatur fieri, quod uoluntate debitoris intellegitur pignus alienari, qui olim pactus est, ut liceret creditori pignus uendere, si pecunia non soluatur. 65. Ergo ex his, quae diximus, adparet quaedam naturali iure alienari, qualia sunt ea, quae traditione alienantur, quaedam ciuili; nam mancipationis et in iure cessionis et usucapionis ius proprium est ciuium Romanorum.

64. Conversely, the agnate, as curator of an insane person, can alienate the insane person’s property by the law of the 12 Tables; likewise a procurator [. . . . . versus dimidius legi nequit . . . . . . . ] is; likewise a creditor can alienate a pledge by pact, although that thing is not his. But this perhaps seems to happen for this reason, that by the will of the debtor the pledge is understood to be alienated, since he once bargained that it should be permitted to the creditor to sell the pledge, if the money is not paid. 65. Therefore from these things which we have said, it appears that certain things are alienated by natural law—such as those which are alienated by traditio (delivery)—and certain things by civil law; for the right of mancipation and in iure cession and usucapion is proper to Roman citizens.

66. Nec tamen ea tantum, quae traditione nostra fiunt, naturali nobis ratione adquiruntur, sed etiam quae occupando ideo adepti erimus, quia antea nullius essent, qualia sunt omnia, quae terra mari caelo capiuntur.

66. Nor, however, are only those things which become ours by tradition (delivery) acquired by us by natural reason, but also those which by occupying we shall for that reason have obtained, because previously they were no one’s, such as all things that are taken on land, at sea, and in the sky.

67. Itaque si feram bestiam aut uolucrem aut piscem ceperimus, simul atque captum fuerit hoc animal, statim nostrum fit, et eo usque nostrum esse intellegitur, donec nostra custodia coerceatur; cum uero custodiam nostram euaserit et in naturalem se libertatem receperit, rursus occupantis fit, quia nostrum esse desinit: naturalem autem libertatem recipere uidetur, cum aut oculos nostros euaserit, aut licet in conspectu sit nostro, difficilis tamen eius persecutio sit.

67. And so, if we have taken a wild beast or a bird or a fish, as soon as this animal shall have been captured, immediately it becomes ours, and it is understood to be ours up to the point that it is restrained by our custody; but when it has escaped our custody and has withdrawn itself into natural liberty, it again becomes the property of the occupant, because it ceases to be ours: moreover, it is seen to recover natural liberty when it has either escaped our eyes, or, although it is in our sight, nevertheless its pursuit is difficult.

68. In iis autem animalibus, quae ex consuetudine abire et redire solent, ueluti columbis et apibus, item ceruis, qui in siluas ire et redire solent, talem habemus regulam traditam, ut si reuertendi animum habere desierint, etiam nostra esse desinant et fiant occupantium: reuertendi autem animum uidentur desinere habere, cum reuertendi consuetudinem deseruerint.

68. In those animals, however, which by custom are wont to go away and to return, as with doves and bees, likewise with deer, who are accustomed to go into the woods and to return, we have a rule handed down of this sort: that if they have ceased to have the intention of returning, they likewise cease to be ours and become the property of the occupiers; and they seem to have ceased to have the intention of returning when they have abandoned the custom of returning.

69. Ea quoque, quae ex hostibus capiuntur, naturali ratione nostra fiunt.

69. Those things also which are captured from enemies become ours by natural reason.

70. Sed et id, quod per alluuionem nobis adicitur, eodem iure nostrum fit: per alluuionem autem id uidetur adici, quod ita paulatim flumen agro nostro adicit, ut aestimare non possimus, quantum quoquo momento temporis adiciatur: hoc est, quod uolgo dicitur per adluuionem id adici uideri, quod ita paulatim adicitur, ut oculos nostros fallat.

70. But also that which is added to us by alluvion becomes ours by the same law: by alluvion, moreover, that is seen to be added which the river thus gradually adds to our field, so that we are not able to estimate how much is added at each and every moment of time: this is what is commonly said, that by alluvion that is seen to be added which is thus added little by little, so as to deceive our eyes.

71. Itaque si flumen partem aliquam ex tuo praedio resciderit et ad meum praedium pertulerit, haec pars tua manet.

71. And so, if a river has cut off some part from your estate and has carried it to my estate, this part remains yours.

72. At si in medio flumine insula nata sit, haec eorum omnium communis est, qui ab utraque parte fluminis prope ripam praedia possident; si uero non sit in medio flumine, ad eos pertinet, qui ab ea parte, quae proxuma est, iuxta ripam praedia habent.

72. But if an island should be born in the middle of the river, it is common to all those who possess estates (praedia) near the bank on both sides of the river; but if indeed it is not in the middle of the river, it pertains to those who have estates next to the bank on that side which is nearest (proximate).

73. Praeterea id, quod in solo nostro ab aliquo aedificatum est, quamuis ille suo nomine aedificauerit, iure naturali nostrum fit, quia superficies solo cedit.

73. Moreover, that which has been constructed on our soil by someone, although he may have built it in his own name, by natural law becomes ours, because the superficies yields to the soil.

74. Multoque magis id accidit et in planta, quam quis in solo nostro posuerit, si modo radicibus terram complexa fuerit.

74. And much more does this occur also in the case of a plant which someone has set in our soil, provided that it has embraced the earth with its roots.

75. Idem contingit et in frumento, quod in solo nostro ab aliquo satum fuerit.

75. The same happens also in grain which has been sown in our soil by someone.

76. Sed si ab eo petamus fundum uel aedificium et inpensas in aedificium uel in seminaria uel in sementem factas ei soluere nolimus, poterit nos per exceptionem doli mali repellere, utique si bonae fidei possessor fuerit.

76. But if we demand from him the estate or the building and are unwilling to pay him the expenses incurred on the building or on the nurseries or on the sowing, he will be able to repel us by the exceptio doli mali, especially if he was a possessor in good faith.

77. Eadem ratione probatum est, quod in cartulis siue membranis meis aliquis scripserit, licet aureis litteris, meum esse, quia litterae cartulis siue membranis cedunt: itaque si ego eos libros easue membranas petam nec inpensam scripturae soluam, per exceptionem doli mali summoueri potero.

77. By the same reasoning it has been established that whatever someone has written on my papers or parchments, even in golden letters, is mine, because the letters yield to the papers or parchments: and so, if I demand those books or those parchments and do not pay the expense of the writing, I can be repelled by the exception of dolus malus.

78. Sed si in tabula mea aliquis pinxerit ueluti imaginem, contra probatur: magis enim dicitur tabulam picturae cedere. cuius diuersitatis uix idonea ratio redditur: certe secundum hanc regulam si me possidente petas imaginem tuam esse nec soluas pretium tabulae, poteris per exceptionem doli mali summoueri; at si tu possideas, consequens est, ut utilis mihi actio aduersum te dari debeat; quo casu nisi soluam inpensam picturae, poteris me per exceptionem doli mali repellere, utique si bonae fidei possessor fueris. illud palam est, quod siue tu subripueris tabulam siue alius, conpetit mihi furti actio.

78. But if someone has painted, as it were, an image on my panel, the contrary is held: for it is rather said that the panel yields to the painting. Of which diversity scarcely an adequate reason is rendered: certainly, according to this rule, if, while I am in possession, you seek, claiming that the image is yours, and do not pay the price of the panel, you can be removed by the exception of dolus malus; but if you possess, it follows that a useful action ought to be given to me against you; in which case, unless I pay the expense of the painting, you will be able to repel me by the exception of dolus malus, especially if you are a possessor in good faith. It is plain that, whether you have filched the panel or another, an action of theft accrues to me.

79. In aliis quoque speciebus naturalis ratio requiritur: proinde si ex uuis aut oliuis aut spicis meis uinum aut oleum aut frumentum feceris, quaeritur, utrum meum sit id uinum aut oleum aut frumentum an tuum. item si ex auro aut argento meo uas aliquod feceris uel ex tabulis meis nauem aut armarium aut subsellium fabricaueris, item si ex lana mea uestimentum feceris uel si ex uino et melle meo mulsum feceris siue ex medicamentis meis emplastrum aut collyrium feceris, quaeritur, utrum tuum sit id, quod ex meo effeceris, an meum. quidam materiam et substantiam spectandam esse putant, id est, ut cuius materia sit, illius et res, quae facta sit, uideatur esse, idque maxime placuit Sabino et Cassio; alii uero eius rem esse putant, qui fecerit, idque maxime diuersae scholae auctoribus uisum est: sed eum quoque, cuius materia et substantia fuerit, furti aduersus eum, qui subripuerit, habere actionem; nec minus aduersus eundem condictionem ei competere, quia extinctae res, licet uindicari non possint, condici tamen furibus et quibusdam aliis possessoribus possunt.

79. In other kinds as well natural reason is inquired: accordingly, if from my grapes or olives or ears you shall have made wine or oil or grain, the question is raised whether that wine or oil or grain is mine or yours. Likewise, if from my gold or silver you shall have made some vessel, or from my boards you shall have fashioned a ship or a cabinet (armoire) or a subsellium (bench), likewise if from my wool you shall have made a garment, or if from my wine and honey you shall have made mulsum, or from my medicaments you shall have made an emplaster or a collyrium, the question is raised whether that which you have effected out of what is mine is yours or mine. Some think that the material and substance are to be regarded, that is, that the thing which has been made is to be seen as belonging to the person whose material it is, and this especially pleased Sabinus and Cassius; but others think that the thing belongs to the one who made it, and this especially seemed right to the authorities of the opposite school: yet that he also whose material and substance it was has an action of theft against the one who has filched it; and no less a condiction lies for him against that same person, because extinguished things, although they cannot be vindicated, can nevertheless be the subject of a condiction against thieves and certain other possessors.

[De pupillis an aliquid a se alienare possunt.]

[On wards, whether they can alienate anything by themselves.]

80. Nunc admonendi sumus neque feminam neque pupillum sine tutoris auctoritate rem mancipi alienare posse; nec mancipi uero feminam quidem posse, pupillum non posse.

80. Now we must be reminded that neither a woman nor a ward can alienate a res mancipi without the authority of a tutor; but as to a res nec mancipi, a woman indeed can, a ward cannot.

81. Ideoque si quando mulier mutuam pecuniam alicui sine tutoris auctoritate dederit, quia facit eam accipientis, cum scilicet pecunia res nec mancipi sit, contrahit obligationem.

81. And therefore, if ever a woman, without the authority of her guardian, shall have given a loan of money to someone, because she makes it the recipient’s (since, namely, money is a res nec mancipi), she contracts an obligation.

82. At si pupillus idem fecerit, quia non facit accipientis sine tutoris auctoritate pecuniam, nullam contrahit obligationem: unde pupillus uindicare quidem nummos suos potest, sicubi extent, id est eos petere, [. . . . . vv. 5 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

82. But if a pupil has done the same, because without the tutor’s authority he does not make the money the recipient’s, he contracts no obligation: whence the pupil can indeed vindicate his own coins, wherever they exist, that is, to claim them, [. . . . . vv. 5 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

83. Et ex contrario omnes res tam mancipi quam nec mancipi mulieribus et pupillis sine tutoris auctoritate solui possunt, quoniam meliorem condicionem suam facere eis etiam sine tutoris auctoritate concessum est.

83. And conversely, all things, both res mancipi and res nec mancipi, can be paid out to women and wards without the tutor’s authority, since it is conceded to them even without the tutor’s authority to make their condition better.

84. Itaque si debitor pecuniam pupillo soluat, facit quidem pecuniam pupilli, sed ipse non liberatur, quia nullam obligationem pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate dissoluere potest, quia nullius rei alienatio ei sine tutoris auctoritate concessa est; sed tamen si ex ea pecunia locupletior factus sit et adhuc petat, per exceptionem doli mali summoueri potest.

84. And so, if a debtor pays money to a ward, he indeed makes the money the ward’s, but he himself is not released, because a ward can dissolve no obligation without the authority of a tutor, since no alienation of any thing has been granted to him without the authority of a tutor; but nevertheless, if by that money he has been made more wealthy and still demands it, he can be repelled by the exception of malicious fraud.

85. Mulieri uero etiam sine tutoris auctoritate recte solui potest: nam qui soluit, liberatur obligatione, quia res nec mancipi, ut proxume diximus, a se dimittere mulieres etiam sine tutoris auctoritate possunt: quamquam hoc ita est, si accipiat pecuniam; at si non accipiat, sed habere se dicat et per acceptilationem uelit debitorem sine tutoris auctoritate liberare, non potest.

85. But to a woman, too, payment can rightly be made even without the authority of a tutor: for he who pays is freed from the obligation, since things not mancipi, as we said just before, women can dispose of from themselves even without the authority of a tutor; although this is so, if she receives the money; but if she does not receive it, but says that she has it and wishes to release the debtor by acceptilation without the authority of a tutor, she cannot.

86. Adquiritur autem nobis non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed etiam per eos, quos in potestate manu mancipioue habemus; item per eos seruos, in quibus usumfructum habemus; item per homines liberos et seruos alienos, quos bona fide possidemus: de quibus singulis diligenter dispiciamus.

86. Moreover, acquisition is made for us not only by our own selves, but also by those whom we have under potestas, manus, or mancipium; likewise by those slaves in whom we have a usufruct; likewise by free persons and by others’ slaves whom we possess in good faith: each of which let us examine carefully.

87. Igitur quod liberi nostri, quos in potestate habemus, item quod serui nostri mancipio accipiunt uel ex traditione nanciscuntur siue quid stipulentur uel ex aliqualibet causa adquirunt, id nobis adquiritur: ipse enim, qui in potestate nostra est, nihil suum habere potest; et ideo si heres institutus sit, nisi nostro iussu hereditatem adire non potest; et si iubentibus nobis adierit, hereditas nobis adquiritur, proinde atque si nos ipsi heredes instituti essemus; et conuenienter scilicet legatum per eos nobis adquiritur.

87. Therefore, what our children whom we have in our power, likewise what our slaves, receive by mancipation or obtain by delivery (tradition), or whatever they stipulate, or acquire from any cause whatsoever, is acquired for us: for he who is in our power can have nothing of his own; and therefore, if he has been appointed heir, he cannot enter upon the inheritance unless by our order; and if, at our bidding, he has entered, the inheritance is acquired for us, just as if we ourselves had been appointed heirs; and accordingly, of course, a legacy is acquired for us through them.

88. Dum tamen sciamus: si alterius in bonis sit seruus, alterius ex iure Quiritium, ex omnibus causis ei soli per eum adquiritur, cuius in bonis est.

88. Only let us understand this: if a slave is in the goods of one person, and of another by Quiritary right, then, from all causes, he acquires solely for the one in whose goods he is.

89. Non solum autem proprietas per eos, quos in potestate habemus, adquiritur nobis, sed etiam possessio; cuius enim rei possessionem adepti fuerint, id nos possidere uidemur; unde etiam per eos usucapio procedit.

89. Not only, moreover, is property acquired for us through those whom we have in our power, but possession as well; for whatever thing’s possession they have obtained, we are deemed to possess that; whence also usucapion proceeds through them.

90. Per eas uero personas, quas in manu mancipioue habemus, proprietas quidem adquiritur nobis ex omnibus causis sicut per eos, qui in potestate nostra sunt; an autem possessio adquiratur, quaeri solet, quia ipsas non possidemus.

90. Through those persons, however, whom we have in manus or in mancipium, proprietorship is indeed acquired for us from all causes, just as through those who are in our power; but whether possession is acquired is usually asked, because we do not possess them themselves.

91. De his autem seruis, in quibus tantum usumfructum habemus, ita placuit, ut quidquid ex re nostra uel ex operis suis adquirunt, id nobis adquiratur; quod uero extra eas causas, id ad dominum proprietatis pertineat: itaque si iste seruus heres institutus sit legatumue quid ei aut donatum fuerit, non mihi, sed domino proprietatis adquiritur.

91. But concerning those slaves in whom we have only a usufruct, it has been decided thus: whatever they acquire from our property or from their own works is acquired for us; but whatever is outside those causes pertains to the owner of the property; and so, if this slave has been instituted heir, or if any legacy to him or gift has been made, it is acquired not for me, but for the owner of the property.

92. Idem placet de eo, qui a nobis bona fide possidetur, siue liber sit siue alienus seruus: quod enim placuit de usufructuario, idem probatur etiam de bonae fidei possessore: itaque quod extra duas istas causas adquiritur, id uel ad ipsum pertinet, si liber est, uel ad dominum, si seruus est.

92. The same is held concerning him who is possessed by us in good faith, whether he be free or another’s slave: for what has been settled about the usufructuary is likewise approved about the bona fide possessor; and so what is acquired outside those two causes pertains either to the person himself, if he is free, or to the owner, if he is a slave.

93. Sed bonae fidei possessor cum usucepit seruum, quia eo modo dominus fit, ex omni causa per eum sibi adquirere potest. usufructuarius uero usucapere non potest; primum quia non possidet, sed habet ius utendi fruendi; deinde quia scit alienum seruum esse.

93. But a good-faith possessor, when he has acquired a slave by usucapion, since in that way he becomes owner, can through him acquire for himself from every cause. The usufructuary, however, cannot acquire by usucapion; first, because he does not possess, but has the right of using and enjoying; then, because he knows the slave is another’s.

94. De illo quaeritur: an per eum seruum, in quo usumfructum habemus, possidere aliquam rem et usucapere possumus, quia ipsum non possidemus? per eum uero, quem bona fide possidemus, sine dubio et possidere et usucapere possumus. loquimur autem in utriusque persona secundum definitionem, quam proxume exposuimus; id est, si quid ex re nostra uel ex operis suis adquirant, id nobis adquiritur.

94. The question is asked about this: whether through that slave, in whom we have a usufruct, we can possess some thing and acquire by usucapion, because we do not possess him? Through him, however, whom we possess in good faith, without doubt we can both possess and acquire by usucapion. We speak, moreover, as to each of them according to the definition which we most recently expounded; that is, if they acquire anything from our property or from their own works, that is acquired for us.

95. Ex his apparet per liberos homines, quos neque iuri nostro subiectos habemus neque bona fide possidemus, item per alienos seruos, in quibus neque usumfructum habemus neque iustam possessionem, nulla ex causa nobis adquiri posse. et hoc est, quod uulgo dicitur per extraneam personam nobis adquiri non posse; tantum de possessione quaeritur, an per liberam personam nobis adquiratur.

95. From these things it appears that through free persons, whom we have neither subject to our right nor possess in bona fide, likewise through others’ slaves, with respect to whom we have neither usufruct nor just possession, nothing can on any ground be acquired for us. And this is what is commonly said: that through an extraneous person nothing can be acquired for us; only as to possession is it asked whether through a free person it is acquired for us.

96. In summa sciendum est his, qui in potestate manu mancipioue sunt, nihil in iure cedi posse; cum enim istarum personarum nihil suum esse possit, conueniens est scilicet, ut nihil suum esse in iure uindicare possint.

96. In sum it must be known that to those who are in potestas, in manus, or in mancipium, nothing can be ceded by in iure cessio; for since nothing can be “their own” for persons of that sort, it is fitting, of course, that they cannot in iure vindicate anything as their own.

97. Hactenus tantisper admonuisse sufficit, quemadmodum singulae res nobis adquirantur: nam legatorum ius, quo et ipso singulas res adquirimus, opportunius alio loco referemus. uideamus itaque nunc, quibus modis per uniuersitatem res nobis adquirantur.

97. Thus far, for the present, it suffices to have indicated how individual things are acquired for us: for the law of legacies, by which likewise we acquire individual things, we will more opportunely set forth in another place. Let us therefore now see by what modes things are acquired for us through universality.

98. Si cui heredes facti sumus siue cuius bonorum possessionem petierimus siue cuius bona emerimus siue quem adoptauerimus siue quam in manum ut uxorem receperimus, eius res ad nos transeunt.

98. If we have been made heirs to someone, or have petitioned for the possession of whose goods, or have bought whose goods, or have adopted someone, or have received a woman into our hand as a wife, that person’s things pass over to us.

99. Ac prius de hereditatibus dispiciamus, quarum duplex condicio est: nam uel ex testamento uel ab intestato ad nos pertinent.

99. And first let us examine inheritances, of which there is a twofold condition: for they pertain to us either from a testament or from intestacy.

100. Et prius est, ut de his dispiciamus, quae nobis ex testamento obueniunt.

100. And first, let us examine those things which accrue to us from a testament.

101. Testamentorum autem genera initio duo fuerunt: nam aut calatis comitiis testamentum faciebant, quae comitia bis in anno testamentis faciendis destinata erant, aut in procinctu, id est, cum belli causa arma sumebant: procinctus est enim expeditus et armatus exercitus. alterum itaque in pace et in otio faciebant, alterum in proelium exituri.

101. However, the kinds of testaments at the beginning were two: for they either made a testament at the calata comitia, which assemblies were twice in the year appointed for making testaments, or in procinctus, that is, when for the cause of war they took up arms: for procinctus is an unencumbered and armed army. Accordingly, the one they made in peace and in leisure, the other when about to go out into battle.

102. Accessit deinde tertium genus testamenti, quod per aes et libram agitur: qui enim neque calatis comitiis neque in procinctu testamentum fecerat, is, si subita morte urguebatur, amico familiam suam, id est patrimonium suum, mancipio dabat eumque rogabat, quid cuique post mortem suam dari uellet. quod testamentum dicitur per aes et libram, scilicet quia per mancipationem peragitur. 103. Sed illa quidem duo genera testamentorum in desuetudinem abierunt; hoc uero solum, quod per aes et libram fit, in usu retentum est.

102. Then a third kind of testament was added, which is transacted through bronze and balance: for he who had made no testament either in the calate assemblies or in the battle-line, if he was pressed by sudden death, would give by mancipation his familia, that is, his patrimony, to a friend, and would ask him what he would wish to be given to each person after his own death. Which testament is called through bronze and balance, clearly because it is accomplished through mancipation. 103. But those two kinds of testaments have indeed fallen into disuse; this one, however, alone, which is made through bronze and balance, has been retained in use.

sane nunc aliter ordinatur, quam olim solebat; namque olim familiae emptor, id est, qui a testatore familiam accipiebat mancipio, heredis locum optinebat, et ob id ei mandabat testator, quid cuique post mortem suam dari uellet; nunc uero alius heres testamento instituitur, a quo etiam legata relinquuntur, alius dicis gratia propter ueteris iuris imitationem familiae emptor adhibetur.

indeed now it is arranged otherwise than it used to be; for formerly the purchaser of the family—that is, the one who received the family from the testator by mancipation—held the place of an heir, and on that account the testator gave him a mandate as to what he wished to be given to each person after his own death; but now one person is instituted as heir by the testament, by whom also legacies are left, while another, the purchaser of the family, is employed for form’s sake, on account of an imitation of the ancient law.

104. Eaque res ita agitur: qui facit testamentum, adhibitis, sicut in ceteris mancipationibus, V testibus ciuibus Romanis puberibus et libripende, postquam tabulas testamenti scripserit, mancipat alicui dicis gratia familiam suam; in qua re his uerbis familiae emptor utitur: FAMILIAM PECVNIAMQVE TVAM ENDO MANDATELA TVA CVSTODELAQVE MEA ESSE AIO, EAQVE, QVO TV IVRE TESTAMENTVM FACERE POSSIS SECVNDVM LEGE PVBLICAM, HOC AERE, et ut quidam adiciunt, AENEAQVE LIBRA, ESTO MIHI EMPTA; deinde aere percutit libram idque aes dat testatori uelut pretii loco; deinde testator tabulas testamenti manu tenens ita dicit: HAEC ITA VT IN HIS TABVLIS CERISQVE SCRIPTA SVNT, ITA DO ITA LEGO ITA TESTOR, ITAQVE VOS, QVIRITES, TESTIMONIVM MIHI PERHIBETOTE; et hoc dicitur nuncupatio: nuncupare est enim palam nominare, et sane quae testator specialiter in tabulis testamenti scripserit, ea uidetur generali sermone nominare atque confirmare.

104. And the matter is carried out thus: he who makes a testament, with, as in the other mancipations, 5 Roman citizens of full age as witnesses and a scale-holder (libripens) in attendance, after he has written the testamentary tablets, mancipates to someone, for the sake of the form of words, his familia, that is, his patrimony; in which act the purchaser of the familia uses these words: YOUR FAMILIA AND PECUNIA I SAY TO BE UNDER MY MANDATE AND CUSTODY, AND, IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY BY RIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE A TESTAMENT ACCORDING TO THE PUBLIC LAW, WITH THIS BRONZE, and, as some add, WITH A BRONZE SCALE, LET IT BE BOUGHT BY ME; then he strikes the scale with the bronze and gives that bronze to the testator as in the place of a price; then the testator, holding the testamentary tablets in his hand, thus says: THESE THINGS, AS THEY ARE WRITTEN IN THESE TABLETS AND WAX, SO I GIVE, SO I BEQUEATH, SO I TESTIFY, AND SO YOU, CITIZENS, BEAR WITNESS FOR ME; and this is called a nuncupation: for to nuncupate is to name openly, and indeed the things which the testator has specifically written in the testamentary tablets, he is understood to name and confirm by a general speech.

105. In testibus autem non debet is esse, qui in potestate est aut familiae emptoris aut ipsius testatoris, quia propter ueteris iuris imitationem totum hoc negotium, quod agitur testamenti ordinandi gratia, creditur inter familiae emptorem agi et testatorem; quippe olim, ut proxime diximus, is, qui familiam testatoris mancipio accipiebat, heredis loco erat; itaque reprobatum est in ea re domesticum testimonium.

105. As to the witnesses, however, he ought not to be one who is under the power either of the purchaser of the family or of the testator himself, because, on account of the imitation of the ancient law, this whole transaction, which is conducted for the sake of ordering a testament, is believed to be transacted between the purchaser of the family and the testator; for indeed formerly, as we said just above, he who received the testator’s familia by mancipation was in the place of an heir; and so in this matter domestic testimony has been disapproved.

106. Unde et si is, qui in potestate patris est, familiae emptor adhibitus sit, pater eius testis esse non potest; ac ne is quidem, qui in eadem potestate est, uelut frater eius. sed et si filius familias ex castrensi peculio post missionem faciat testamentum, nec pater eius recte testis adhibetur nec is, qui in potestate patris est.

106. Whence also, if he who is under a father’s power is employed as the family-buyer, his father cannot be a witness; nor even he who is in the same power, for instance his brother. But also, if a son of the family (filius familias), from his castrense peculium, makes a testament after discharge, neither is his father rightly employed as a witness nor he who is in the father’s power.

107. De libripende eadem, quae et de testibus, dicta esse intellegemus: nam et is testium numero est.

107. About the libripens we shall understand that the same things that have been said about the witnesses have been said: for he too is in the number of the witnesses.

108. Is uero, qui in potestate heredis aut legatarii est, cuiusue heres ipse aut legatarius in potestate est, quique in eiusdem potestate est, adeo testis et libripens adhiberi potest, ut ipse quoque heres aut legatarius iure adhibeantur. sed tamen quod ad heredem pertinet quique in eius potestate est cuiusue is in potestate erit, minime hoc iure uti debemus. [De testamentis militum.]

108. But he who is in the power of the heir or the legatee, or in whose power the heir himself or the legatee is, and he who is in that same person’s power, can be brought in as witness and libripens to such an extent that the heir or the legatee themselves also may lawfully be brought in. But nevertheless, so far as concerns the heir and the one who is in his power, or in whose power he will be, we ought by no means to use this law. [On the testaments of soldiers.]

109. Sed haec diligens obseruatio in ordinandis testamentis militibus propter nimiam inperitiam constitutionibus principum remissa est: nam quamuis neque legitimum numerum testium adhibuerint neque uendiderint familiam neque nuncupauerint testamentum, recte nihilo minus testantur.

109. But this diligent observance in arranging soldiers’ testaments has been remitted by the constitutions of the emperors on account of excessive inexperience: for although they have neither employed the lawful number of witnesses nor sold the familia nor nuncupated the testament, nevertheless they none the less make a valid testament.

110. Praeterea permissum est iis et peregrinos et Latinos instituere heredes uel iis legare; cum alioquin peregrini quidem ratione ciuili prohibeantur capere hereditatem legataque, Latini uero per legem Iuniam.

110. Moreover, it has been permitted to them also to institute as heirs both Peregrines and Latins, or to bequeath to them; whereas otherwise Peregrines are prohibited by the civil law from taking an inheritance and legacies, and Latins by the Junian law.

111. Caelibes quoque, qui lege Iulia hereditates legataque capere uetantur, item orbi, id est qui liberos non habent, quos lex [. . . . . fol. deperd., vv. 21 exceptis frustulis paucis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

111. Celibates also, who by the Julian law are forbidden to take inheritances and legacies, likewise the childless, that is, those who do not have children, whom the law [. . . . . fol. deperd., vv. 21 exceptis frustulis paucis legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

112. [. . . .] ex auctoritate diui Hadriani senatus consultum factum est, quo permissum est ********s feminis etiam sine coemptione testamentum facere, si modo non minores essent annorum XII; scilicet ut quae tutela liberatae non essent, tutore auctore testari deberent.

112. [. . . .] by the authority of the deified Hadrian a senatus consultum was made, by which it was permitted to ********s women even without coemptio to make a testament, provided only that they were not under 12 years of age; namely, that those who had not been freed from tutela ought to make a will with their tutor as auctor.

113. Videntur ergo melioris condicionis esse feminae quam masculi; nam masculus minor annorum XIIII testamentum facere non potest, etiamsi tutore auctore testamentum facere uelit, femina uero potest; facta enim XII annorum testamenti faciundi ius nanciscitur.

113. Therefore females seem to be of better condition than males; for a male under 14 years cannot make a testament, even if, with a tutor authorizing, he should wish to make a testament, but a female can; for, upon becoming 12 years old, she acquires the right of making a testament.

114. Igitur si quaeramus, an ualeat testamentum, inprimis aduertere debemus, an is, qui id fecerit, habuerit testamenti factionem: deinde si habuerit, requiremus, an secundum iuris ciuilis regulam testatus sit, exceptis militibus, quibus propter nimiam inperitiam, ut diximus, quomodo uelint uel quomodo possint, permittitur testamentum facere.

114. Therefore, if we inquire whether a testament is valid, first of all we ought to advert to whether the one who made it had testamentary capacity; then, if he had, we shall inquire whether he has made his will according to the rule of the civil law, soldiers being excepted, to whom, on account of excessive inexperience, as we have said, it is permitted to make a testament in whatever way they will or in whatever way they can.

115. Non tamen, ut iure ciuili ualeat testamentum, sufficit ea obseruatio, quam supra exposuimus de familiae uenditione et de testibus et de nuncupatione.

115. Not, however, that a testament may be valid by the civil law, does that observance suffice which we set forth above concerning the sale of the family, and concerning the witnesses, and the nuncupation.

116. Sed ante omnia requirendum est, an institutio heredis sollemni more facta sit; nam aliter facta institutione nihil proficit familiam testatoris ita uenire testesque ita adhibere et ita nuncupare testamentum, ut supra diximus.

116. But before all, it must be inquired whether the institution of an heir has been made in the solemn manner; for if the institution has been made otherwise, it avails nothing for the testator’s familia to be thus sold and for witnesses to be thus adhibited and for the testament to be thus nuncupated, as we said above.

117. Sollemnis autem institutio haec est: TITIVS HERES ESTO; sed et illa iam conprobata uidetur: TITIVM HEREDEM ESSE IVBEO; at illa non est conprobata: TITIVM HEREDEM ESSE VOLO; sed et illae a plerisque inprobatae sunt: TITIVM HEREDEM INSTITVTO, item: HEREDEM FACIO.

117. However the solemn institution is this: LET TITIUS BE HEIR; but also that one now seems approved: I ORDER THAT TITIUS BE HEIR; but that one is not approved: I WANT TITIUS TO BE HEIR; but also those are disapproved by most: I INSTITUTE TITIUS AS HEIR, likewise: I MAKE HEIR.

118. Obseruandum praeterea est, ut si mulier, quae in tutela est, faciat testamentum, tutore auctore facere debeat: alioquin inutiliter iure ciuili testabitur.

118. It must further be observed that, if a woman who is in tutelage makes a testament, she ought to make it with her tutor authorizing; otherwise, by the civil law she will make a testament ineffectually.

119. Praetor tamen, si septem signis testium signatum sit testamentum, scriptis heredibus secundum tabulas testamenti bonorum possessionem pollicetur, et si nemo sit, ad quem ab intestato iure legitimo pertineat hereditas, uelut frater eodem patre natus aut patruus aut fratris filius, ita poterunt scripti heredes retinere hereditatem: nam idem iuris est et si alia ex causa testamentum non ualeat, uelut quod familia non uenierit aut nuncupationis uerba testator locutus non sit.

119. Nevertheless the Praetor, if the testament has been sealed with the seven seals of witnesses, promises to the written-in heirs possession of the goods according to the testamentary tablets; and if there is no one to whom by the legitimate law of intestacy the inheritance pertains, such as a brother born of the same father, or a paternal uncle, or a brother’s son, thus the written-in heirs will be able to retain the inheritance: for the same law holds also if for some other cause the testament is not valid, for example because the familia has not been sold, or the testator has not spoken the words of nuncupation.

120. Sed uideamus, an etiam si frater aut patruus extent, potiores scriptis heredibus habeantur; rescripto enim imperatoris Antonini significatur eos, qui secundum tabulas testamenti non iure factas bonorum possessionem petierint, posse aduersus eos, qui ab intestato uindicant hereditatem, defendere se per exceptionem doli mali.

120. But let us see whether, even if a brother or a paternal uncle exist, those written as heirs are to be held preferable; for by a rescript of Emperor Antoninus it is signified that those who have sought possession of the goods according to testamentary tablets not lawfully made can, against those who claim the inheritance from intestacy, defend themselves by the exception of fraud.

121. Quod sane quidem ad masculorum testamenta pertinere certum est; item ad feminarum, quae ideo non utiliter testatae sunt, quod uerbi gratia familiam non uendiderint aut nuncupationis uerba locutae non sint: an autem et ad ea testamenta feminarum, quae sine tutoris auctoritate fecerint, haec constitutio pertineat, uidebimus.

121. That indeed is certain to pertain to the testaments of males; likewise to those of women, who for that reason have not testated effectually, because, for example, they have not sold the familia or have not spoken the words of nuncupation: but whether this constitution also pertains to those testaments of women which they have made without the authority of a tutor, we shall see.

122. Loquimur autem de his scilicet feminis, quae non in legitima parentium aut patronorum tutela sunt, sed [de his] quae alterius generis tutores habent, qui etiam inuiti coguntur auctores fieri. alioquin parentem et patronum sine auctoritate eius facto testamento non summoueri palam est.

122. We are speaking, moreover, of those women, namely, who are not in the legitimate tutelage of parents or patrons, but [of those] who have tutors of another kind, who even unwilling are compelled to become authorizers. Otherwise, it is clear that a parent and a patron are not removed by a testament made without his authority.

123. Item qui filium in potestate habet, curare debet, ut eum uel heredem instituat uel nominatim exheredet; alioquin si eum silentio praeterierit, inutiliter testabitur: adeo quidem, ut nostri praeceptores existiment, etiam si uiuo patre filius defunctus sit, neminem heredem ex eo testamento existere posse, scilicet quia statim ab initio non constiterit institutio; sed diuersae scholae auctores, si quidem filius mortis patris tempore uiuat, sane impedimento eum esse scriptis heredibus et illum ab intestato heredem fieri confitentur; si uero ante mortem patris interceptus sit, posse ex testamento hereditatem adiri putant, nullo iam filio impedimento; quia scilicet existimant non statim ab initio inutiliter fieri testamentum filio praeterito.

123. Likewise, he who has a son in his power ought to take care either to institute him as heir or to exheredate him by name; otherwise, if he passes him over in silence, he will make a will ineffectually: indeed to such a degree that our preceptors hold that, even if the son has died while the father was alive, no one can become heir from that testament, namely because the institution was not valid from the very beginning; but the authors of a different school confess that, if indeed the son is alive at the time of the father’s death, he is clearly an impediment to the written heirs and that he becomes heir from intestacy (ab intestato); if, however, he has been taken off before the father’s death, they think the inheritance can be entered upon from the testament, the son now being no impediment; since, namely, they reckon that a testament with a son passed over is not rendered useless from the very beginning.

124. Ceteras uero liberorum personas si praeterierit testator, ualet testamentum: sed praeteritae istae personae scriptis heredibus in partem adcrescunt, si sui heredes sint, in uirilem, si extranei, in dimidiam: id est, si quis tres uerbi gratia filios heredes instituerit et filiam praeterierit, filia adcrescendo pro quarta parte fit heres et ea ratione id consequitur, quod ab intestato patre mortuo habitura esset; at si extraneos ille heredes instituerit et filiam praeterierit, filia adcrescendo ex dimidia parte fit heres. quae de filia diximus, eadem et de nepote deque omnibus ceteris liberorum personis seu masculini seu feminini sexus dicta intellegemus.

124. But if the testator has passed over the other persons of his children, the testament is valid: but these persons thus passed over accrete to the written heirs—if they are sui heirs, in a virile share; if outsiders (extranei), in a half. That is: if someone, for example, has instituted three sons as heirs and has passed over a daughter, the daughter, by accretion, becomes heir for a fourth part, and in that way obtains what she would have had from her father dying intestate; but if he has instituted outsiders as heirs and has passed over a daughter, the daughter, by accretion, becomes heir from a half. What we have said about a daughter we shall understand to have been said likewise about a grandson and about all the other persons of children, whether of the male or the female sex.

125. Quid ergo est? licet hae secundum ea, quae diximus, scriptis heredibus dimidiam partem modo detrahant, tamen praetor eis contra tabulas bonorum possessionem promittit, qua ratione extranei heredes a tota hereditate repelluntur et efficiuntur sine re heredes.

125. What then? although these persons, according to what we have said, only subtract a half share from the written heirs, nevertheless the praetor promises to them a possession of the goods against the tablets, by which arrangement the extraneous heirs are repelled from the whole inheritance and are made heirs without the thing.

126. Et hoc iure utebamur, quasi nihil inter feminas et masculos interesset; sed nuper imperator Antoninus significauit rescripto suas non plus nancisci feminas per bonorum possessionem, quam quod iure adcrescendi consequerentur. quod in emancipatarum quoque personis obseruandum est, ut nimirum hae quoque, quod adcrescendi iure habiturae essent, si in potestate fuissent, id ipsum etiam per bonorum possessionem habeant.

126. And we were using this law, as though nothing differed between females and males; but recently the emperor Antoninus signified by his rescript that women do not obtain more through bonorum possessio than what they would acquire by the right of accretion. This is to be observed also in the case of emancipated women, namely that these too, that which by the right of accretion they would have had, if they had been under potestas, have that very thing also through bonorum possessio.

127. Sed si quidem filius a patre exheredetur, nominatim exheredari debet; alioquin non prodest eum exheredari. nominatim autem exheredari uidetur, siue ita exheredetur: TITIVS FILIVS MEVS EXHERES ESTO, siue ita: FILIVS MEVS EXHERES ESTO, non adiecto proprio nomine.

127. But if indeed a son is disinherited by his father, he must be disinherited by name; otherwise it does not profit to disinherit him. And he is considered to be disinherited by name whether he is disinherited thus: TITIVS, MY SON, SHALL BE DISINHERITED, or thus: MY SON SHALL BE DISINHERITED, without his proper name being added.

128. Ceterae uero liberorum personae uel feminini sexus uel masculini satis inter ceteros exheredantur, id est his uerbis: CETERI OMNES EXHEREDES SVNTO, quae uerba statim post institutionem heredum adici solent. sed hoc ita est iure ciuili.

128. But the other persons of the children, whether of the feminine sex or of the masculine, are sufficiently disinherited among the others, that is, by these words: LET ALL THE OTHERS BE DISINHERITED, which words are wont to be added immediately after the institution of heirs. But this is so by civil law.

129. Nam praetor omnes uirilis sexus liberorum personas, id est nepotes quoque et pronepotes [. . . . . 2 1/3 versus legi nequeunt . . . . . . . ]

129. For the praetor [provides that] all persons of the male sex among the children, that is, grandsons also and great-grandsons [. . . . . 2 1/3 lines cannot be read . . . . . . . ]

130. Postumi quoque liberi nominatim uel heredes institui debent uel exheredari.

130. Posthumous children too ought either to be instituted as heirs by name or to be disinherited.

131. Et in eo par omnium condicio est, quod et in filio postumo et in quolibet ex ceteris liberis siue feminini sexus siue masculini praeterito ualet quidem testamentum, sed postea adgnatione postumi siue postumae rumpitur, et ea ratione totum infirmatur. ideoque si mulier, ex qua postumus aut postuma sperabatur, abortum fecerit, nihil impedimento est scriptis heredibus ad hereditatem adeundam.

131. And in this the condition of all is equal, that both in the case of a posthumous son and in the case of any of the other children, whether of the female sex or the male, if passed over, the testament does indeed stand; but afterwards, by the agnation of the posthumous child, whether male or female, it is broken, and in that way the whole is invalidated. And therefore, if the woman from whom a posthumous son or daughter was expected has had a miscarriage, nothing is a hindrance to the written heirs in entering upon the inheritance.

132. Sed feminini quidem sexus personae uel nominatim uel inter ceteros exheredari solent, dum tamen, si inter ceteros exheredentur, aliquid eis legetur, ne uideantur per obliuionem praeteritae esse: masculini uero sexus liberorum personas placuit non aliter recte exheredari, nisi nominatim exheredentur, hoc scilicet modo QVICVMQVE MIHI FILIVS GENITVS FVERIT EXHERES ESTO. [. . . . . vv. 9 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

132. But persons of the feminine sex are accustomed to be disinherited either by name or among the others, provided, however, that if they are disinherited among the others, something is bequeathed to them, lest they seem to have been passed over through oblivion: but as to the persons of children of the masculine sex, it has been decided that they are not rightly disinherited otherwise, unless they are disinherited by name, namely in this manner WHOEVER SON SHALL HAVE BEEN BORN TO ME, LET HIM BE DISINHERITED. [. . . . . vv. 9 1/2 . . . . . . . ]

133. Postumorum autem loco sunt et hi, qui in sui heredis locum succedendo quasi adgnascendo fiunt parentibus sui heredes: ut ecce si filium et ex eo nepotem neptemue in potestate habeam, quia filius gradu praecedit, is solus iura sui heredis habet, quamuis nepos quoque et neptis ex eo in eadem potestate sint; sed si filius meus me uiuo moriatur aut qualibet alia ratione exeat de potestate mea, incipit nepos neptisue in eius locum succedere, et eo modo iura suorum heredum quasi adgnatione nanciscuntur.

133. In the place of posthumous children are also those who, by succeeding into the place of a sui-heir, become, as it were by agnation, sui-heirs to their parents: as, for example, if I have a son and from him a grandson or granddaughter in my power, because the son precedes by degree, he alone has the rights of a sui-heir, although the grandson also and the granddaughter from him are in the same power; but if my son dies while I am alive, or goes out of my power by any other ground whatsoever, the grandson or granddaughter begins to succeed into his place, and in that way they acquire the rights of sui-heirs, as it were by agnation.

134. Ne ergo eo modo rumpatur mihi testamentum, sicut ipsum filium uel heredem instituere uel exheredare debeo, ne non iure faciam testamentum, ita et nepotem neptemue ex eo necesse est mihi uel heredem instituere uel exheredare, ne forte, me uiuo filio mortuo, succedendo in locum eius nepos neptisue quasi adgnatione rumpat testamentum: idque lege Iunia Vellaea prouisum est, in qua simul exheredationis modus notatur, ut uirilis sexus nominatim, feminini uel nominatim uel inter ceteros exheredentur, dum tamen iis, qui inter ceteros exheredantur, aliquid legetur.

134. Therefore, lest my testament be broken in that way, just as I ought either to institute the son himself as heir or to exheredate him, lest I make a testament not according to law, so also it is necessary for me either to institute as heir or to exheredate the grandson or granddaughter from him, lest perhaps, with me alive and the son dead, the grandson or granddaughter, by succeeding into his place, should break the testament as if by agnation: and this has been provided by the Junia Vellaea Law, in which at the same time the mode of exheredation is noted, namely, that those of the male sex are exheredated by name, those of the female either by name or among the others, provided, however, that to those who are exheredated among the others something is bequeathed.

135. Emancipatos liberos iure ciuili neque heredes instituere neque exheredare necesse est, quia non sunt sui heredes: sed praetor omnes tam feminini quam masculini sexus, si heredes non instituantur, exheredari iubet, uirilis sexus nominatim, feminini uel nominatim uel inter ceteros: quod si neque heredes instituti fuerint neque ita, ut supra diximus, exheredati, praetor promittit eis contra tabulas bonorum possessionem.

135. Emancipated children, by civil law, there is no need either to institute as heirs or to disinherit, because they are not sui heirs; but the praetor orders all, both of the feminine and of the masculine sex, if they are not instituted as heirs, to be disinherited—the masculine sex by name, the feminine either by name or among the others: but if they have neither been instituted as heirs nor disinherited in the way we said above, the praetor promises to them possession of the estate against the tablets.

135a In potestate patris non sunt, qui cum eo ciuitate Romana donati sunt nec in accipienda ciuitate Romana pater petiit statim a principe, ut eos in potestate haberet, aut si petiit, non impetrauit; nam qui in potestatem patris ab imperatore rediguntur, nihil differunt ab his, qui ita nati sunt.

135a They are not in the father’s power who, together with him, have been endowed with Roman citizenship, and at the time of receiving Roman citizenship the father did not at once request from the princeps that he hold them in his power, or, if he did request it, he did not obtain it; for those who are brought into the father’s power by the emperor differ in nothing from those who were born so.

136. Adoptiui filii, quamdiu manent in adoptione, naturalium loco sunt; emancipati uero a patre adoptiuo neque iure ciuili neque quod ad edictum praetoris pertinet inter liberos numerantur.

136. Adoptive sons, so long as they remain in adoption, are in the place of natural sons; but those emancipated by an adoptive father are numbered among the children neither by civil law nor, so far as pertains to the edict of the praetor.

137. Qua ratione accidit, ut ex diuerso, quod ad naturalem parentem pertinet, quamdiu quidem sint in adoptiua familia, extraneorum numero habeantur; si uero emancipati fuerint ab adoptiuo patre, tunc incipiant in ea causa esse, qua futuri essent, si ab ipso naturali patre emancipati fuissent.

137. By this reasoning it happens that, conversely, with respect to the natural parent, so long as they are indeed in the adoptive family, they are counted among outsiders; but if they have been emancipated by the adoptive father, then they begin to be in that condition in which they would be, if they had been emancipated by the natural father himself.

138. Si quis post factum testamentum adoptauerit sibi filium aut per populum eum, qui sui iuris est, aut per praetorem eum, qui in potestate parentis fuerit, omni modo testamentum eius rumpitur quasi agnatione sui heredis.

138. If anyone, after a testament has been made, should adopt a son for himself, either through the people one who is sui iuris, or through the praetor one who has been in the power of a parent, in every way his testament is broken, as if by the agnation of a suus-heir.

139. Idem iuris est, si cui post factum testamentum uxor in manum conueniat, uel quae in manu fuit, nubat: nam eo modo filiae loco esse incipit et quasi sua.

139. The same law obtains, if, after a testament has been made, a wife comes into manus to someone, or if a woman who was in manus should marry: for in that way she begins to be in the place of a daughter and, as it were, one of his own.

140. Nec prodest, siue haec siue ille, qui adoptatus est, in eo testamento sit institutus institutaue: nam de exheredatione eius superuacuum uidetur quaerere, cum testamenti faciundi tempore suorum heredum numero non fuerint.

140. Nor does it profit, whether she or he, who has been adopted, be instituted heir in that testament: for it seems superfluous to inquire about their exheredation, since at the time of making the testament they were not in the number of their sui heirs.

141 Filius quoque, qui ex prima secundaue mancipatione manumittitur, quia reuertitur in potestatem patriam, rumpit ante factum testamentum; nec prodest, si in eo testamento heres institutus uel exheredatus fuerit.

141 A son also, who is manumitted from the first or second mancipation, because he returns into paternal power, breaks a testament previously made; nor does it avail, if in that testament he had been instituted heir or disinherited.

142. Simile ius olim fuit in eius persona, cuius nomine ex senatus consulto erroris causa probatur, quia forte ex peregrina uel Latina, quae per errorem quasi ciuis Romana uxor ducta esset, natus esset: nam siue heres institutus esset a parente siue exheredatus, siue uiuo patre causa probata siue post mortem eius, omni modo quasi adgnatione rumpebat testamentum.

142. A similar right formerly obtained in the case of the person on whose behalf, by a senatus consultum, a cause-of-error is approved, because perchance he had been born from a peregrina or a Latina who, through error, had been taken as a wife as though a Roman-citizen; for whether he had been instituted heir by his parent or disinherited, whether the cause was approved while his father was alive or after his death, in every way he used to rupture the testament, as it were by an agnation.

143. Nunc uero ex nouo senatus consulto, quod auctore diuo Hadriano factum est, si quidem uiuo patre causa probatur, aeque ut olim omni modo rumpit testamentum; si uero post mortem patris, praeteritus quidem rumpit testamentum, si uero heres in eo scriptus est uel exheredatus, non rumpit testamentum, ne scilicet diligenter facta testamenta rescinderentur eo tempore, quo renouari non possent.

143. Now indeed, by a new senatorial decree, which was made with the divine Hadrian as author, if indeed the case is approved with the father alive, equally as formerly he in every way breaks the testament; but if after the father’s death, one omitted does indeed break the testament, whereas if he is written in it as heir or is disinherited, he does not break the testament, so that, to wit, testaments diligently made might not be rescinded at a time when they could not be renewed.

144. Posteriore quoque testamento, quod iure factum est, superius rumpitur; nec interest, an extiterit aliquis ex eo heres an non extiterit: hoc enim solum spectatur, an existere potuerit: ideoque si quis ex posteriore testamento, quod iure factum est, aut noluerit heres esse aut uiuo testatore aut post mortem eius, antequam hereditatem adiret, decesserit aut per cretionem exclusus fuerit aut condicione, sub qua heres institutus est, defectus sit aut propter caelibatum ex lege Iulia summotus fuerit ab hereditate, [quibus casibus pater familias intestatus moritur: nam] et prius testamentum non ualet ruptum a posteriore, et posterius aeque nullas uires habet, cum ex eo nemo heres extiterit.

144. By a later testament, too, which has been made according to law, the earlier is broken; nor does it matter whether someone has emerged from it as heir or has not emerged: for this alone is regarded, whether he could have emerged. And so, if someone from the later testament, which has been made according to law, either was unwilling to be heir, or, while the testator was alive or after his death, before he entered upon the inheritance, died, or was excluded by cretion, or failed the condition under which he was instituted as heir, or on account of celibacy under the Julian law was removed from the inheritance, [in which cases the paterfamilias dies intestate: for] both the prior testament does not avail, having been broken by the later, and the later likewise has no force, since from it no one has emerged as heir.

145. Alio quoque modo testamenta iure facta infirmantur, uelut cum is, qui fecerit testamentum, kapite deminutus sit; quod quibus modis accidat, primo commentario relatum est.

145. Testaments also lawfully made are invalidated in another way, as when the one who has made the testament has been reduced in legal status (capitis deminutio); the ways in which this happens have been related in the first commentary.

146. Hoc autem casu inrita fieri testamenta dicemus, cum alioquin et quae rumpuntur, inrita fiant, et quae statim ab initio non iure fiunt, inrita sint; sed et ea, quae iure facta sunt et postea propter capitis deminutionem inrita fiunt, possunt nihilo minus rupta dici. sed quia sane commodius erat singulas causas singulis appellationibus distingui, ideo quaedam non iure fieri dicuntur, quaedam iure facta rumpi uel inrita fieri.

146. In this case, however, we shall say that wills become void, although otherwise both those which are broken do become void, and those which from the very beginning are not made according to law are void; but also those which have been made according to law and afterwards, on account of capitis deminution, become void can nonetheless be called broken. But since it was indeed more convenient that individual causes be distinguished by individual appellations, therefore some are said to be made not according to law, and some, though made according to law, to be broken or to become void.

147. Non tamen per omnia inutilia sunt ea testamenta, quae uel ab initio non iure facta sunt uel iure facta postea inrita facta aut rupta sunt. nam si septem testium signis signata sint testamenta, potest scriptus heres secundum tabulas bonorum possessionem petere, si modo defunctus testator et ciuis Romanus et suae potestatis mortis tempore fuerit. nam si ideo inritum factum sit testamentum, quod puta ciuitatem uel etiam libertatem testator amisit aut quia in adoptionem se dedit et mortis tempore in adoptiui patris potestate fuit, non potest scriptus heres secundum tabulas bonorum possessionem petere.

147. Nevertheless, those testaments are not in every respect ineffectual which either from the beginning were not made according to law, or, though made according to law, were afterwards made invalid or were broken. For if the testaments have been sealed with the seals of seven witnesses, the instituted heir can petition for possession of the estate according to the tablets, provided only that the deceased testator was both a Roman citizen and under his own power at the time of death. For if the testament has been made invalid for this reason, namely, because, for instance, the testator lost citizenship or even freedom, or because he gave himself into adoption and at the time of death was in the power of his adoptive father, the instituted heir cannot petition for possession of the estate according to the tablets.

148. Qui autem secundum tabulas testamenti, quae aut statim ab initio non iure factae sunt aut iure factae postea ruptae uel inritae erunt, bonorum possessionem accipiunt, si modo possunt hereditatem optinere, habebunt bonorum possessionem cum re; si uero ab his auocari hereditas potest, habebunt bonorum possessionem sine re.

148. But those who, according to the testamentary tablets which either were not lawful straightway from the beginning or, though lawfully made, will afterwards have been broken or invalidated, receive possession of the goods, if only they can obtain the inheritance, will have possession of the goods with the thing; but if the inheritance can be called away from them, they will have possession of the goods without the thing.

149. Nam si quis heres iure ciuili institutus sit uel ex primo uel ex posteriore testamento uel ab intestato iure legitimo heres sit, is potest ab iis hereditatem auocare; si uero nemo sit alius iure ciuili heres, ipsi retinere hereditatem possunt, nec ullum ius aduersus eos habent cognati, qui legitimo iure deficiuntur.

149. For if anyone has been instituted heir by civil law either from the first or from the later testament, or is heir ab intestate by legitimate right, he can call back the inheritance from them; but if no one else is heir by civil law, they themselves can retain the inheritance, and the cognates, who fail by the legitimate law, have no right against them.

149a. Aliquando tamen, sicut supra quoque notauimus, etiam legitimis quoque heredibus potiores scripti habentur, ueluti si ideo non iure factum sit testamentum, quod familia non uenierit aut nuncupationis uerba testator locutus non sit; **** si adgnati petant hereditatem [. . . . ]

149a. Sometimes, however, just as we have noted above as well, those written are held preferable even to the legitimate heirs, for example if for this reason the testament has not been made according to law, that the familia has not been “sold,” or the testator has not spoken the words of nuncupation; **** if the agnates seek the inheritance [. . . . ]

150. [. . . . . vv. 3 1/2 . . . . . . . ] ea lege bona caduca fiunt et ad populum deferri iubentur, si defuncto nemo heres uel bonorum possessor sit.

150. [. . . . . vv. 3 1/2 . . . . . . . ] by that law the goods become caducary and are ordered to be brought to the people, if, the deceased having died, there is no heir or possessor of the goods.

151. Potest, ut iure facta testamenta contraria uoluntate infirmentur. apparet autem non posse ex eo solo infirmari testamentum, quod postea testator id noluerit ualere, usque adeo, ut si linum eius inciderit, nihilo minus iure ciuili ualeat. quin etiam si deleuerit quoque aut combusserit tabulas testamenti, non ideo minus desinent ualere, quae ibi fuerunt scripta, licet eorum probatio difficilis sit.

151. It is possible that testaments made according to law be infirmed by a contrary volition. However, it appears that a testament cannot be infirmed from this alone, that afterwards the testator did not wish it to have force, to such a degree that, even if he should cut its cord, nonetheless by civil law it holds good. Nay even, if he should also erase or burn the testamentary tablets, the things which were written there will not for that cease to be valid, although their proof is difficult.

151a. Quid ergo est? si quis ab intestato bonorum possessionem petierit et is, qui ex eo testamento heres est, petat hereditatem, [. . . . . vv. 2 1/4 . . . . . . . ], perueniat hereditas: et hoc ita rescripto imperatoris Antonini significatur.

151a. What, then, is it? If someone has petitioned for possession of the goods ab intestato and he who is heir from that testament seeks the inheritance, [. . . . . vv. 2 1/4 . . . . . . . ], let the inheritance accrue: and this is thus signified by a rescript of Emperor Antoninus.

152. Heredes autem aut necessarii dicuntur aut sui et necessarii aut extranei.

152. Heirs, moreover, are called either necessary, or sui and necessary, or extraneous.

153. Necessarius heres est seruus cum libertate heres institutus, ideo sic appellatus, quia siue uelit siue nolit, omni modo post mortem testatoris protinus liber et heres est.

153. A necessary heir is a slave appointed as heir together with liberty, so called for this reason, because whether he wills it or not, in any case after the death of the testator he is immediately free and heir.

154. Unde qui facultates suas suspectas habet, solet seruum suum primo aut secundo uel etiam ulteriore gradu liberum et heredem instituere, ut si creditoribus satis non fiat, potius huius heredis quam ipsius testatoris bona ueneant, id est, ut ignominia, quae accidit ex uenditione bonorum, hunc potius heredem quam ipsum testatorem contingat; quamquam apud Fufidium Sabino placeat eximendum eum esse ignominia, quia non suo uitio, sed necessitate iuris bonorum uenditionem pateretur; sed alio iure utimur.

154. Whence he who has his faculties suspect is accustomed to institute his slave free and heir in the first or second, or even in a further degree, so that, if satisfaction is not made to the creditors, the goods of this heir rather than of the testator himself may be sold—that is, that the ignominy which befalls from a sale of goods may touch this heir rather than the testator himself; although, as reported by Fufidius, it pleases Sabinus that he be exempted from ignominy, because he would undergo the sale of goods not by his own fault, but by the necessity of law; but we use another law.

155. Pro hoc tamen incommodo illud ei commodum praestatur, ut ea, quae post mortem patroni sibi adquisierit, siue ante bonorum uenditionem siue postea, ipsi reseruentur; et quamuis pro portione bona uenierint, iterum ex hereditaria causa bona eius non uenient, nisi si quid ei ex hereditaria causa fuerit adquisitum, uelut si ex eo, quod Latinus adquisierit, locupletior factus sit; cum ceterorum hominum, quorum bona uenierint pro portione, si quid postea adquirant, etiam saepius eorum bona uenire soleant.

155. For this disadvantage, however, that advantage is afforded to him, that the things which after the death of the patron he shall have acquired for himself, whether before the sale of the goods or afterwards, are reserved to himself; and although the goods have been sold in part (pro portion), again his goods will not come to sale on account of the hereditary cause, unless something has been acquired for him from the hereditary cause, for example, if by that which a Latin has acquired he has been made more wealthy; whereas in the case of other men whose goods have been sold in part, if they afterwards acquire anything, their goods are wont to come to sale again, even repeatedly.

156. Sui autem et necessarii heredes sunt uelut filius filiaue, nepos neptisue ex filio et deinceps ceteri, qui modo in potestate morientis fuerunt: sed uti nepos neptisue suus heres sit, non sufficit eum in potestate aui mortis tempore fuisse, sed opus est, ut pater quoque eius uiuo patre suo desierit suus heres esse aut morte interceptus aut qualibet ratione liberatus potestate; tum enim nepos neptisue in locum sui patris succedunt.

156. Sui and necessary heirs are, for example, a son or daughter, a grandson or granddaughter through a son, and thereafter the others, provided only that they were in the power of the one dying: but in order that a grandson or granddaughter be a suus heir, it does not suffice that he was in the power of the grandfather at the time of death, but it is necessary that his father too, while his own father was still alive, has ceased to be a suus heir, either overtaken by death or released from power by any manner; for then the grandson or granddaughter succeed into the place of their own father.

157. Sed sui quidem heredes ideo appellantur, quia domestici heredes sunt et uiuo quoque parente quodam modo domini existimantur; unde etiam si quis intestatus mortuus sit, prima causa est in successione liberorum. necessarii uero ideo dicuntur, quia omni modo, siue uelint siue nolint, tam ab intestato quam ex testamento heredes fiunt.

157. But “sui” heirs are so called because they are domestic heirs and are deemed in a certain manner owners even with the parent still living; whence also, if anyone has died intestate, the first place in succession belongs to the children. necessarii, however, are so called because in every way, whether they wish or do not wish, they become heirs both from intestacy and from a testament.

158. Sed his praetor permittit abstinere se ab hereditate, ut potius parentis bona ueneant.

158. But to these the praetor permits to abstain from the inheritance, so that rather the parent’s goods may be sold.

159. Idem iuris est et in uxoris persona, quae in manu est, quia filiae loco est, et in nuru, quae in manu filii est, quia neptis loco est.

159. The same law holds also in the case of a wife who is in manus, because she is in the place of a daughter, and in the case of a daughter-in-law who is in the manus of a son, because she is in the place of a granddaughter.

160. Quin etiam similiter abstinendi potestatem facit praetor etiam ei, qui in causa [id est mancipato] mancipii est, si cum libertate heres institutus sit, cum necessarius, non etiam suus heres sit, tamquam seruus.

160. Nay more, the praetor likewise grants the power of abstaining even to him who is in the condition of mancipium [that is, mancipated], if he has been instituted heir together with liberty, since he is a necessary heir, not also a "suus" heir, like a slave.

161. Ceteri, qui testatoris iuri subiecti non sunt, extranei heredes appellantur: itaque liberi quoque nostri, qui in potestate nostra non sunt, heredes a nobis instituti sicut extranei uidentur; qua de causa et qui a matre heredes instituuntur, eodem numero sunt, quia feminae liberos in potestate non habent. serui quoque, qui cum libertate heredes instituti sunt et postea a domino manumissi, eodem numero habentur.

161. The rest, who are not subject to the testator’s authority, are called external heirs: and so our children too, who are not in our power, when instituted as heirs by us, appear as if external; for which cause those who are instituted as heirs by their mother are in the same category, because women do not have children in their power. Slaves also, who were instituted as heirs together with freedom and afterwards manumitted by their master, are held in the same category.

162. Extraneis autem heredibus deliberandi potestas data est de adeunda hereditate uel non adeunda.

162. But to extraneous heirs the power of deliberating has been granted as to entering upon the inheritance or not entering upon it.

163. Sed siue is, cui abstinendi potestas est, inmiscuerit se bonis hereditariis, siue is, cui de adeunda deliberare licet, adierit, postea relinquendae hereditatis facultatem non habet, nisi si minor sit annorum XXV: nam huius aetatis hominibus, sicut in ceteris omnibus causis deceptis, ita etiam si temere damnosam hereditatem susceperint, praetor succurrit. scio quidem diuum Hadrianum etiam maiori XXV annorum ueniam dedisse, cum post aditam hereditatem grande aes alienum, quod aditae hereditatis tempore latebat, apparuisset.

163. But whether he to whom there is the power of abstaining has mixed himself into the hereditary goods, or he to whom it is permitted to deliberate about entering has entered, thereafter he does not have the faculty of relinquishing the inheritance, unless he is under 25 years: for to persons of this age, just as in all other cases when deceived, so also if they have rashly undertaken a ruinous inheritance, the praetor brings succor. I know indeed that the deified Hadrian even granted indulgence to one older than 25 years, when, after the inheritance had been entered upon, a great debt, which at the time of the inheritance’s being entered lay hidden, had come to light.

164. Extraneis heredibus solet cretio dari, id est finis deliberandi, ut intra certum tempus uel adeant hereditatem uel, si non adeant, temporis fine summoueantur: ideo autem cretio appellata est, quia cernere est quasi decernere et constituere.

164. To foreign heirs a cretio is usually given, that is, a term of deliberation, so that within a fixed time they either enter upon the inheritance or, if they do not enter, they are removed at the end of the time: and it is called cretio for this reason, because to cernere is as it were to decree and to constitute.

165. Cum ergo ita scriptum sit: HERES TITIVS ESTO, adicere debemus: CERNITOQVE IN CENTVM DIEBVS PROXVMIS, QVIBVS SCIES POTERISQVE. QVOD NI ITA CREVERIS, EXHERES ESTO.

165. Therefore, since it is written thus: LET TITUS BE HEIR, we must add: AND MAKE CRETION WITHIN THE NEXT 100 DAYS, IN WHICH YOU SHALL KNOW AND BE ABLE. BUT IF YOU SHALL NOT THUS MAKE CRETION, BE DISINHERITED.

166. Et qui ita heres institutus est, si uelit heres esse, debebit intra diem cretionis cernere, id est haec uerba dicere: QVOD ME PVBLIVS MEVIVS TESTAMENTO SVO HEREDEM INSTITVIT, EAM HEREDITATEM ADEO CERNOQVE. quod si ita non creuerit, finito tempore cretionis excluditur; nec quicquam proficit, si pro herede gerat, id est, si rebus hereditariis tamquam heres utatur.

166. And he who has been instituted heir in this way, if he wishes to be heir, must within the day of cretio “cern,” that is, speak these words: BECAUSE PUBLIUS MEVIUS HAS APPOINTED ME HEIR BY HIS TESTAMENT, THAT INHERITANCE I ACCEPT AND I CERN IT. But if he has not so cerned, when the time of cretio is finished he is excluded; nor does it profit anything if he acts as heir, that is, if he uses the hereditary things as though he were heir.

167. At is, qui sine cretione heres institutus sit aut qui ab intestato legitimo iure ad hereditatem uocatur, potest aut cernendo aut pro herede gerendo uel etiam nuda uoluntate suscipiendae hereditatis heres fieri: eique liberum est, quocumque tempore uoluerit, adire hereditatem; sed solet praetor postulantibus hereditariis creditoribus tempus constituere, intra quod, si uelit, adeat hereditatem, si minus, ut liceat creditoribus bona defuncti uendere.

167. But he who has been instituted heir without a cretio, or who is called to the inheritance ab intestato by legitimate right, can become heir either by cernendo or by acting pro herede, or even by the bare will to undertake the inheritance: and it is free to him, at whatever time he wishes, to enter upon the inheritance; but the praetor is wont, upon petition of the hereditary creditors, to fix a time, within which, if he wishes, he may enter upon the inheritance, if not, that it be permitted to the creditors to sell the goods of the deceased.

168. Sicut autem qui cum cretione heres institutus est, nisi creuerit hereditatem, non fit heres, ita non aliter excluditur, quam si non creuerit intra id tempus, quo cretio finita sit; itaque licet ante diem cretionis constituerit hereditatem non adire, tamen paenitentia actus superante die cretionis cernendo heres esse potest.

168. Just as one who has been instituted heir with cretion does not become heir unless he has made cretion upon the inheritance, so he is not otherwise excluded than if he has not made cretion within the time at which the cretion is concluded; and thus, although before the day of cretion he may have determined not to enter upon the inheritance, nevertheless, repenting of the act, while the day of cretion still remains, by making cretion he can be heir.

169. At is, qui sine cretione heres institutus est quiue ab intestato per legem uocatur, sicut uoluntate nuda heres fit, ita et contraria destinatione statim ab hereditate repellitur.

169. But he who has been instituted heir without a cretio, or who is called ab intestato by law to the inheritance, just as by naked will he becomes heir, so also by a contrary determination he is immediately repelled from the inheritance.

170. Omnis autem cretio certo tempore constringitur. in quam rem tolerabile tempus uisum est centum dierum: potest tamen nihilo minus iure ciuili aut longius aut breuius tempus dari; longius tamen interdum praetor coartat.

170. But every cretion is bound by a fixed time. In this matter a tolerable period has been deemed to be 100 days; nevertheless, by the civil law a longer or a shorter time can no less be granted; however, the praetor sometimes constricts the longer.

171. Et quamuis omnis cretio certis diebus constringatur, tamen alia cretio uulgaris uocatur, alia certorum dierum: uulgaris illa, quam supra exposuimus, id est, in qua adiciuntur haec uerba: QVIBVS SCIET POTERITQVE: certorum dierum, in qua detractis his uerbis cetera scribuntur.

171. And although every cretion is constrained to fixed days, nevertheless one cretion is called vulgar, another of certain days: the vulgar is that which we have set forth above, that is, in which these words are added: QVIBVS SCIET POTERITQVE; the cretion of certain days is that in which, these words having been removed, the rest is written.

172. Quarum cretionum magna differentia est: nam uulgari cretione data nulli dies conputantur, nisi quibus scierit quisque se heredem esse institutum et possit cernere; certorum uero dierum cretione data etiam nescienti se heredem institutum esse numerantur dies continui; item ei quoque, qui aliqua ex causa cernere prohibetur, et eo amplius ei, qui sub condicione heres institutus est, tempus numeratur; unde melius et aptius est uulgari cretione uti.

172. Of which cretions there is a great difference: for, when a common cretion has been given, no days are computed except those on which each person has known that he has been instituted heir and is able to make the election; but when a cretion of fixed days has been given, even for one not knowing that he has been instituted heir continuous days are counted; likewise, time is counted also for him who is prohibited from making the election for some reason, and, what is more, for him who has been instituted heir under a condition; whence it is better and more apt to use the common cretion.

173. Continua haec cretio uocatur, quia continui dies numerantur; sed quia tamen dura est haec cretio, altera magis in usu habetur; unde etiam uulgaris dicta est. [De substitutionibus.]

173. This cretion is called continuous, because continuous days are counted; but because nevertheless this cretion is strict, the other is more in use; whence it is also called vulgar. [On substitutions.]

174. Interdum duos pluresue gradus heredum facimus, hoc modo: L. TITIVS HERES ESTO CERNITOQVE IN DIEBVS CENTVM PROXIMIS, QVIBVS SCIES POTERISQVE. QVOD NI ITA CREVERIS, EXHERES ESTO. TVM MEVIVS HERES ESTO CERNITOQVE IN DIEBVS CENTVM et reliqua; et deinceps in quantum uelimus, substituere possumus.

174. Sometimes we make two or more degrees of heirs, in this way: L. TITIUS, BE HEIR, AND MAKE CRETION WITHIN THE NEXT ONE HUNDRED DAYS, IN WHICH YOU SHALL KNOW AND BE ABLE. IF YOU DO NOT THUS MAKE CRETION, BE DISINHERITED. THEN MEVIUS, BE HEIR, AND MAKE CRETION WITHIN ONE HUNDRED DAYS and the rest; and thereafter we can substitute to whatever extent we wish.

175. Et licet nobis uel unum in unius locum substituere pluresue, et contra in plurium locum uel unum uel plures substituere.

175. And it is permitted to us to substitute either one in the place of one or several, and conversely to substitute in the place of several either one or several.

176. Primo itaque gradu scriptus heres hereditatem cernendo fit heres, et substitutus excluditur; non cernendo summouetur, etiamsi pro herede gerat, et in locum eius substitutus succedit; et deinceps si plures gradus sint, in singulis simili ratione idem contingit.

176. Therefore at the first degree the heir written (instituted) becomes heir by cretion of the inheritance, and the substitute is excluded; by not making cretion he is removed, even if he acts as heir, and in his place the substitute succeeds; and thereafter, if there are several degrees, in each the same happens by a similar rationale.

177. Sed si cretio sine exheredatione sit data, id est in haec uerba: SI NON CREVERIS, TVM PVBLIVS MEVIVS HERES ESTO, illud diuersum inuenitur, quod si prior omissa cretione pro herede gerat, substitutum in partem admittit, et fiunt ambo aequis partibus heredes; quod si neque cernat neque pro herede gerat, tum sane in uniuersum summouetur, et substitutus in totam hereditatem succedit.

177. But if cretion is given without disinheritance, that is, in these words: IF YOU DO NOT MAKE CRETION, THEN PUBLIUS MEVIUS SHALL BE HEIR, a different outcome is found: namely, if the prior, with cretion omitted, acts as heir, he admits the substitute into a share, and both become heirs in equal parts; but if he neither makes cretion nor acts as heir, then indeed he is removed altogether, and the substitute succeeds to the whole inheritance.

178. Sed Sabino quidem placuit, quamdiu cernere et eo modo heres fieri possit prior, etiamsi pro herede gesserit, non tamen admitti substitutum; cum uero cretio finita sit, tum pro herede gerentem admittere substitutum: aliis uero placuit etiam superante cretione posse eum pro herede gerendo in partem substitutum admittere et amplius ad cretionem reuerti non posse.

178. But it pleased Sabinus that, so long as the prior is able to cern (and thereby become heir), even if he has acted as heir, nevertheless the substitute is not to be admitted; but when the cretio has ended, then to admit the substitute to the one acting as heir. Others, however, held that even while the cretio is still prevailing he can, by acting as heir, admit the substitute into a share, and that thereafter he cannot revert to the cretio.

179. Liberis nostris inpuberibus, quos in potestate habemus, non solum ita, ut supra diximus, substituere possumus, id est, ut si heredes non extiterint, alius nobis heres sit; sed eo amplius ut, etiamsi heredes nobis extiterint et adhuc inpuberes mortui fuerint, sit iis aliquis heres, uelut hoc modo: TITIVS FILIVS MEVS MIHI HERES ESTO. SI FILIVS MEVS MIHI HERES NON ERIT, SIVE HERES MIHI ERIT ET IS PRIVS MORIATVR QVAM IN SVAM TVTELAM VENERIT, TVNC SEIVS HERES ESTO.

179. For our underage children, whom we have in our power, we can substitute not only in the way we said above, that is, that if they do not turn out to be heirs, another shall be our heir; but further, that even if they do turn out to be our heirs and die still underage, there shall be some heir for them, for example in this way: TITIUS, MY SON, BE MY HEIR. IF MY SON WILL NOT BE MY HEIR, OR IF HE WILL BE MY HEIR AND HE DIE BEFORE HE HAS COME INTO HIS OWN TUTELAGE, THEN SEIUS, BE HEIR.

180. Quo casu si quidem non extiterit heres filius, substitutus patris fit heres; si uero heres extiterit filius et ante pubertatem decesserit, ipsi filio fit heres substitutus. quam ob rem duo quodam modo sunt testamenta, aliud patris, aliud filii, tamquam si ipse filius sibi heredem instituisset; aut certe unum est testamentum duarum hereditatum.

180. In which case, if indeed the son has not become heir, the substitute becomes the father’s heir; but if the son has become heir and has died before puberty, the substitute becomes heir to the son himself. Wherefore, in a certain way there are two testaments, one of the father, the other of the son, as if the son himself had appointed an heir for himself; or at any rate there is one testament of two inheritances.

181. Ceterum ne post obitum parentis periculo insidiarum subiectus uideretur pupillus, in usu est uulgarem quidem substitutionem palam facere, id est eo loco, quo pupillum heredem instituimus; nam uulgaris substitutio ita uocat ad hereditatem substitutum, si omnino pupillus heres non extiterit; quod accidit, cum uiuo parente moritur, quo casu nullum substituti maleficium suspicari possumus, cum scilicet uiuo testatore omnia, quae in testamento scripta sint, ignorentur: illam autem substitutionem, per quam, etiamsi heres extiterit pupillus et intra pubertatem decesserit, substitutum uocamus, separatim in inferioribus tabulis scribimus easque tabulas proprio lino propriaque cera consignamus et in prioribus tabulis cauemus, ne inferiores tabulae uiuo filio et adhuc inpubere aperiantur. sed longe tutius est utrumque genus substitutionis separatim in inferioribus tabulis consignari, quia si ita consignatae uel separatae fuerint substitutiones, ut diximus, ex priore potest intellegi in altera quoque idem esse substitutus.

181. Moreover, lest the pupil should seem to be subjected to the peril of ambushes after the death of the parent, it is the practice to make the common substitution openly, that is, in the very place where we institute the pupil as heir; for the common substitution calls the substitute to the inheritance if the pupil has not become heir at all; which happens when he dies with the parent still living, in which case we can suspect no maleficence of the substitute, since, of course, while the testator lives, all the things written in the testament are unknown. But that substitution by which we summon the substitute even if the pupil has become heir and has died before puberty, we write separately on lower tablets, and we seal those tablets with their own linen and their own wax, and in the prior tablets we provide that the lower tablets are not opened while the son is alive and still under age. But it is far safer that each kind of substitution be sealed separately on the lower tablets, because if the substitutions have been so sealed or separated, as we have said, from the former it can be understood that the same person is substituted also in the other.

182. Non solum autem heredibus institutis inpuberibus liberis ita substituere possumus, ut si ante pubertatem mortui fuerint, sit is heres, quem nos uoluerimus, sed etiam exheredatis: itaque eo casu si quid pupillo ex hereditatibus legatisue aut donationibus propinquorum adquisitum fuerit, id omne ad substitutum pertinet.

182. Not only, moreover, can we thus substitute for underage children who have been instituted as heirs, so that, if they have died before puberty, he be heir whom we have wished, but also for those disinherited: and so in that case, if anything has been acquired for the pupil from inheritances or legacies or from donations of relatives, all of it pertains to the substitute.

183. Quaecumque diximus de substitutione inpuberum liberorum uel heredum institutorum uel exheredatorum, eadem etiam de postumis intellegemus.

183. Whatever we have said about the substitution of underage children, whether instituted as heirs or disinherited, we will understand the same also concerning posthumous children.

184. Extraneo uero heredi instituto ita substituere non possumus, ut si heres extiterit et intra aliquod tempus decesserit, alius ei heres sit; sed hoc solum nobis permissum est, ut eum per fideicommissum obligemus, ut hereditatem nostram totam uel ex parte restituat; quod ius quale sit, suo loco trademus.

184. But for a stranger instituted as heir we cannot substitute in such a way that, if he has become heir and has died within some time, another should be his heir; but this alone is permitted to us: that we oblige him by a fideicommissum to restore our inheritance, in whole or in part; what sort of right this is, we will set forth in its proper place.

185. Sicut autem liberi homines, ita et serui tam nostri quam alieni heredes scribi possunt.

185. Just as free men, so also slaves, both ours and others’, can be written as heirs.

186. Sed noster seruus simul et liber et heres esse iuberi debet, id est hoc modo: STICHVS SERVVS MEVS LIBER HERESQVE ESTO, uel: HERES LIBERQVE ESTO.

186. But our slave must be ordered to be at once both free and heir, that is in this way: STICHUS, MY SLAVE, LET HIM BE FREE AND HEIR, or: LET HIM BE HEIR AND FREE.

187. Nam si sine libertate heres institutus sit, etiamsi postea manumissus fuerit a domino, heres esse non potest, quia institutio in persona eius non constitit; ideoque licet alienatus sit, non potest iussu domini noui cernere hereditatem.

187. For if an heir has been instituted without liberty, even if afterwards he has been manumitted by his master, he cannot be an heir, because the institution did not consist in his person; and therefore, although he has been alienated, he cannot, by the order of the new master, enter upon the inheritance.

188. Cum libertate uero heres institutus si quidem in eadem causa durauerit, fit ex testamento liber et inde necessarius heres: si uero ab ipso testatore manumissus fuerit, suo arbitrio hereditatem adire potest; quod si alienatus sit, iussu noui domini adire hereditatem debet, qua ratione per eum dominus fit heres: nam ipse neque heres neque liber esse potest.

188. But an heir instituted with liberty, if indeed he has remained in the same condition, becomes by the testament free and thereby a necessary heir: but if he has been manumitted by the testator himself, he can enter upon the inheritance at his own discretion; but if he has been alienated, he ought to enter the inheritance by the order of the new master, in which way through him the master becomes heir: for he himself can be neither heir nor free.

189. Alienus quoque seruus heres institutus, si in eadem causa durauerit, iussu domini hereditatem adire debet; si uero alienatus ab eo fuerit aut uiuo testatore aut post mortem eius, antequam cernat, debet iussu noui domini cernere: si uero manumissus est, suo arbitrio adire hereditatem potest.

189. Likewise a slave belonging to another, appointed heir, if he has persisted in the same condition, must enter upon the inheritance by order of his master; but if he has been alienated by him either while the testator is alive or after his death, before he declares acceptance, he ought to declare acceptance by order of the new master: but if he has been manumitted, he can enter upon the inheritance at his own discretion.

190. Si autem seruus alienus heres institutus est uulgari cretione data, ita intelle-gitur dies cretionis cedere, si ipse seruus scierit se heredem institutum esse nec ullum impedimentum sit, quo minus certiorem dominum faceret, ut illius iussu cernere possit.

190. If, however, a slave belonging to another has been instituted heir with the ordinary cretion having been given, the day of cretion is understood to begin to run, provided the slave himself knew that he had been instituted heir and there is no impediment preventing him from informing his master, so that by that one’s order he may be able to make cretion.

191. Post haec uideamus de legatis. quae pars iuris extra propositam quidem materiam uidetur: nam loquimur de his iuris figuris, quibus per uniuersitatem res nobis adquiruntur: sed cum omni modo de testamentis deque heredibus, qui testamento instituuntur, locuti simus, non sine causa sequenti loco poterit haec iuris materia tractari. [De legatis.]

191. After these things, let us see about legacies. Which part of law seems indeed outside the proposed subject-matter: for we are speaking about those figures of law by which things are acquired to us in universality: but since in every way we have spoken about testaments and about heirs who are instituted by a testament, not without cause in the following place this matter of law can be treated. [On legacies.]

192. Legatorum itaque genera sunt quattuor: aut enim per uindicationem legamus aut per damnationem aut sinendi modo aut per praeceptionem.

192. Therefore, the kinds of legacies are four: for either we bequeath by vindication, or by damnation, or by the mode of allowing, or by praeception.

193. Per uindicationem hoc modo legamus: TITIO uerbi gratia HOMINEM STICHVM DO LEGO; sed et si alterum uerbum positum sit, ueluti DO aut LEGO, aeque per uindicationem legatum est: item, ut magis uisum est, et si ita legatum fuerit: SVMITO uel ita: SIBI HABETO uel ita: CAPITO, aeque per uindicationem legatum est.

193. We bequeath by vindication in this way: TO TITIUS, for example, I GIVE I BEQUEATH THE SLAVE STICHUS; but even if one or the other word has been set down, as, for instance, I GIVE or I BEQUEATH, the legacy is equally by vindication: likewise, as has seemed the better view, even if it has been bequeathed thus: TAKE, or thus: HAVE FOR HIMSELF, or thus: TAKE, it is equally a legacy by vindication.

194. Ideo autem per uindicationem legatum appellatur, quia post aditam hereditatem statim ex iure Quiritium res legatarii fit; et si eam rem legatarius uel ab herede uel ab alio quocumque, qui eam possidet, petat, uindicare debet, id est intendere suam rem ex iure Quiritium esse.

194. And it is called a legacy by vindication for this reason, because after the inheritance has been entered upon, the thing at once becomes the legatee’s by the right of the Quirites; and if the legatee should claim that thing either from the heir or from any other whatsoever who possesses it, he must vindicate it, that is, assert that the thing is his by the right of the Quirites.

195. In eo solo dissentiunt prudentes, quod Sabinus quidem et Cassius ceterique nostri praeceptores, quod ita legatum sit, statim post aditam hereditatem putant fieri legatarii, etiamsi ignoret sibi legatum esse, sed postea quam scierit et spreuerit legatum, proinde esse atque si legatum non esset; Nerua uero et Proculus ceterique illius scholae auctores non aliter putant rem legatarii fieri, quam si uoluerit eam ad se pertinere: sed hodie ex diui Pii Antonini constitutione hoc magis iure uti uidemur, quod Proculo placuit; nam cum legatus fuisset Latinus per uindicationem coloniae, 'Deliberent', inquit, 'decuriones, an ad se uelint pertinere, proinde ac si uni legatus esset'.

195. In this one point the jurists disagree, that Sabinus indeed and Cassius and our other preceptors, when a legacy has been thus made, think it becomes the legatee’s immediately after the inheritance has been entered upon, even if he is unaware that a legacy is to him; but after he has learned and has spurned the legacy, it is the same as if there were no legacy: but Nerva and Proculus and the other authors of that school think that the thing becomes the legatee’s only if he has wished it to pertain to himself: yet today, by a constitution of the deified Pius Antoninus, we seem to use rather that law which pleased Proculus; for when a Latinus had been bequeathed by vindication to a colony, “Let the decurions deliberate,” he said, “whether they wish it to pertain to themselves, just as if it had been bequeathed to one person.”

196. Eae autem solae res per uindicationem legantur recte, quae ex iure Quiritium ipsius testatoris sunt; sed eas quidem res, quae pondere, numero, mensura constant, placuit sufficere, si mortis tempore sint ex iure Quiritium testatoris, ueluti uinum, oleum, frumentum, pecuniam numeratam; ceteras res uero placuit utroque tempore testatoris ex iure Quiritium esse debere, id est, et quo faceret testamentum, et quo moreretur; alioquin inutile est legatum.

196. Only those things are properly bequeathed by vindication which are by Quiritary right of the testator himself; but as to those things which consist by weight, number, or measure, it has been held sufficient if at the time of death they are by Quiritary right of the testator, for example wine, oil, grain, counted money; whereas the other things, it has been held, ought to be by Quiritary right at both times of the testator, that is, both when he should make the testament and when he should die; otherwise the legacy is ineffectual.

197. Sed sane hoc ita est iure ciuili. postea uero auctore Nerone Caesare senatus consultum factum est, quo cautum est, ut si eam rem quisque legauerit, quae eius numquam fuerit, proinde utile sit legatum, atque si optimo iure relictum esset. optumum autem ius est per damnationem legati, quo genere etiam aliena res legari potest, sicut inferius apparebit.

197. But indeed this is so by civil law. Thereafter, however, with Nero Caesar as instigator, a senatorial decree was passed, by which it was provided that, if anyone should bequeath a thing which had never been his, the legacy would be just as valid as if it had been left under the best right. Now the best right is by a legacy per damnationem, by which kind even another’s property can be bequeathed, as will appear below.

198. Sed si quis rem suam legauerit, deinde post testamentum factum eam alienauerit, plerique putant non solum iure ciuili inutile esse legatum, sed nec ex senatus consulto confirmari. quod ideo dictum est, quia et si per damnationem aliquis rem suam legauerit eamque postea alienauerit, plerique putant, licet ipso iure debeatur legatum, tamen legatarium petentem posse per exceptionem doli mali repelli, quasi contra uoluntatem defuncti petat.

198. But if someone has bequeathed his own thing, and then after the testament has been made has alienated it, most think that the legacy is not only useless by the civil law, but is not confirmed even by the senatorial decree. This has been said for the reason that even if someone has bequeathed his own thing by way of condemnation and afterwards alienated it, most think that, although the legacy is owed by the law itself, nevertheless the legatee, when seeking it, can be repelled by an exception of dolus malus, as if he were demanding contrary to the will of the deceased.

199. Illud constat, si duobus pluribusue per uindicationem eadem res legata sit, siue coniunctim siue disiunctim, et omnes ueniant ad legatum, partes ad singulos pertinere et deficientis portionem collegatario adcrescere. coniunctim autem ita legatur: TITIO ET SEIO HOMINEM STICHVM DO LEGO; disiunctim ita: LVCIO TITIO HOMINEM STICHVM DO LEGO. SEIO EVNDEM HOMINEM DO LEGO.

199. It is established that, if to two or more the same thing has been bequeathed by vindication, whether conjointly or disjointly, and they all come to the legacy, the shares pertain to each individually, and the portion of one who fails accrues to the co-legatee. Conjointly it is thus bequeathed: TO TITUS AND TO SEIUS I GIVE AND BEQUEATH THE SLAVE STICHUS; disjointly thus: TO LUCIUS TITIUS I GIVE AND BEQUEATH THE SLAVE STICHUS. TO SEIUS I GIVE AND BEQUEATH THE SAME SLAVE.

200. Illud quaeritur, quod sub condicione per uindicationem legatum est, pendente condicione cuius esset: nostri praeceptores heredis esse putant exemplo statuliberi, id est eius serui, qui testamento sub aliqua condicione liber esse iussus est, quem constat interea heredis seruum esse; sed diuersae scholae auctores putant nullius interim eam rem esse; quod multo magis dicunt de eo, quod sine condicione pure legatum est, antequam legatarius admittat legatum.

200. This is inquired: that which has been bequeathed by vindication under a condition—while the condition is pending, whose it is. Our teachers think it is the heir’s, by the example of the statuliber, that is, of that slave who by the testament has been ordered to be free under some condition, whom it is agreed is meanwhile the heir’s slave; but the authors of the opposite school think that thing is meanwhile no one’s; which they say much more of that which has been bequeathed purely without condition, before the legatee admits the legacy.

201. Per damnationem hoc modo legamus: HERES MEVS STICHVM SERVVM MEVM DARE DAMNAS ESTO; sed et si DATO scriptum fuerit, per damnationem legatum est.

201. We bequeath by condemnation in this way: LET MY HEIR BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO GIVE MY SLAVE STICHUS; but even if LET HIM GIVE has been written, it is bequeathed by condemnation.

202. Eoque genere legati etiam aliena res legari potest, ita ut heres rem redimere et praestare aut aestimationem eius dare debeat.

202. And by this kind of legacy even another’s thing can be bequeathed, such that the heir must redeem and furnish the thing, or give its valuation.

203. Ea quoque res, quae in rerum natura non est, si modo futura est, per damnationem legari potest, uelut fructus, qui in illo fundo nati erunt, aut quod ex illa ancilla natum erit.

203. That thing also which is not in the nature of things, provided it is going to exist, can be bequeathed by condemnation, for example the fruits which will have been born on that farm, or what will have been born from that maidservant.

204. Quod autem ita legatum est, post aditam hereditatem, etiamsi pure legatum est, non, ut per uindicationem legatum, continuo legatario adquiritur, sed nihilo minus heredis est: et ideo legatarius in personam agere debet, id est intendere heredem sibi dare oportere, et tum heres rem, si mancipi sit, mancipio dare aut in iure cedere possessionemque tradere debet; si nec mancipi sit, sufficit, si tradiderit. nam si mancipi rem tantum tradiderit nec mancipauerit, usucapione demum pleno iure fit legatarii. completur autem usucapio, sicut alio quoque loco diximus, mobilium quidem rerum anno, earum uero, quae solo teneantur, biennio.

204. But that which is thus bequeathed, after the inheritance has been entered upon, even if it is bequeathed purely, is not, as in a legacy by vindication, acquired at once by the legatee, but nevertheless remains the heir’s: and therefore the legatee must sue in personam, that is, assert that the heir ought to give it to him; and then the heir, if the thing be res mancipi, must give it by mancipation or cede it in iure and deliver possession; if it be res nec mancipi, it is sufficient if he has delivered it. For if he has only delivered a res mancipi and has not mancipated it, it becomes the legatee’s by full right only through usucapion. And usucapion is completed, as we have said elsewhere, in the case of movable things in one year, but of those which are held by land, in two years.

205. Est et illa differentia huius et per uindicationem legati, quod si eadem res duobus pluribusue per damnationem legata sit, si quidem coniunctim, plane singulis partes debentur, sicut in per uindicationem legato diximus; si uero disiunctim, singulis solida debetur; ita fit, ut scilicet heres alteri rem, alteri aestimationem eius praestare debeat; et in coniunctis deficientis portio non ad collegatarium pertinet, sed in hereditate remanet.

205. There is also this difference between this legacy and a legacy by vindication, that if the same thing has been bequeathed to two or more by damnation, then, if jointly, clearly parts are owed to each individual, just as we said in the legacy by vindication; but if separately, the whole is owed to each; thus it comes about that, of course, the heir must furnish to one the thing, to another its valuation; and in joint cases the share of one who fails does not pertain to the co-legatee, but remains in the inheritance.

206. Quod autem diximus deficientis portionem in per damnationem quidem legato in hereditate retineri, in per uindicationem uero collegatario accrescere, admonendi sumus ante legem Papiam hoc iure ciuili ita fuisse; post legem uero Papiam deficientis portio caduca fit et ad eos pertinet, qui in eo testamento liberos habent.

206. But as to what we have said, that the portion of one failing, in a legacy per damnationem indeed is retained in the inheritance, but in a legacy per uindicationem it accrues to the co-legatee, we must be reminded that before the Papian law this was so by civil law; but after the Papian law the portion of the defaulter becomes caducous and pertains to those who have children in that testament.

207. Et quamuis prima causa sit in caducis uindicandis heredum liberos habentium, deinde si heredes liberos non habeant, legatariorum liberos habentium, tamen ipsa lege Papia significatur, ut collegatarius coniunctus, si liberos habeat, potior sit heredibus, etiamsi liberos habebunt.

207. And although the first claim in vindicating caducary items belongs to heirs who have children, and then, if the heirs do not have children, to legatees who have children, nevertheless by the Lex Papia itself it is signified that a conjoined co-legatee, if he has children, is preferable to the heirs, even if they will have children.

208. Sed plerisque placuit, quantum ad hoc ius, quod lege Papia coniunctis constituitur, nihil interesse, utrum per uindicationem an per damnationem legatum sit.

208. But it has seemed good to most that, so far as concerns this right which is established by the Lex Papia for the conjoined, it makes no difference whether the legacy is by vindication or by damnation.

209. Sinendi modo ita legamus: HERES MEVS DAMNAS ESTO SINERE LVCIVM TITIVM HOMINEM STICHVM SVMERE SIBIQVE HABERE.

209. In the mode of allowing, let us bequeath thus: LET MY HEIR BE OBLIGATED TO ALLOW LUCIUS TITIUS TO TAKE THE SLAVE STICHUS AND TO HAVE HIM FOR HIMSELF.

210. Quod genus legati plus quidem habet quam per uindicationem legatum, minus autem quam per damnationem: nam eo modo non solum suam rem testator utiliter legare potest, sed etiam heredis sui, cum alioquin per uindicationem nisi suam rem legare non potest, per damnationem autem cuiuslibet extranei rem legare potest.

210. This kind of legacy indeed has more than a legacy by vindication, but less than one by damnation: for in that mode the testator can validly bequeath not only his own thing, but also that of his heir, whereas otherwise by vindication he can bequeath nothing except his own thing; by damnation, however, he can bequeath the thing of any outsider.

211. Sed si quidem mortis testatoris tempore res uel ipsius testatoris sit uel heredis, plane utile legatum est, etiamsi testamenti faciendi tempore neutrius fuerit.

211. But if indeed at the time of the testator’s death the thing is either the testator’s own or the heir’s, plainly the legacy is valid, even if at the time of making the testament it had been neither’s.

212. Quod si post mortem testatoris ea res heredis esse coeperit, quaeritur, an utile sit legatum: et plerique putant inutile esse. quid ergo est? licet aliquis eam rem legauerit, quae neque eius umquam fuerit neque postea heredis eius umquam esse coeperit, ex senatus consulto Neroniano proinde uidetur, ac si per damnationem relicta esset.

212. But if after the testator’s death that thing should begin to belong to the heir, the question is asked whether the legacy is effective: and most think it is ineffective. What then is the case? Although someone may have bequeathed a thing which was never his, nor thereafter ever began to be his heir’s, by the Neronian senatus consultum it is regarded just as if it had been left by way of damnation.

213. Sicut autem per damnationem legata res non statim post aditam hereditatem legatarii efficitur, sed manet heredis eo usque, donec is tradendo uel mancipando uel in iure cedendo legatarii eam fecerit, ita et in sinendi modo legato iuris est; et ideo huius quoque legati nomine in personam actio est QVIDQVID HEREDEM EX TESTAMENTO DARE FACERE OPORTET.

213. Just as, however, a thing bequeathed by damnation does not immediately after the inheritance has been entered upon become the legatee’s, but remains the heir’s until he, by delivering or by mancipating or by cession in court, shall have made it the legatee’s, so too the law is in a legacy by the mode of allowing (sinendi modo); and therefore under the name of this legacy also there is an action in personam, WHATEVER THE HEIR OUGHT TO GIVE OR DO BY THE TESTAMENT.

214. Sunt tamen, qui putant ex hoc legato non uideri obligatum heredem, ut mancipet aut in iure cedat aut tradat, sed sufficere, ut legatarium rem sumere patiatur; quia nihil ultra ei testator imperauit, quam ut sinat, id est patiatur, legatarium rem sibi habere.

214. There are, however, those who think that from this legacy the heir does not seem to be obligated to mancipate or to cede in court or to deliver, but that it is sufficient that he allow the legatee to take the thing; because the testator imposed nothing further on him than that he should let, that is, permit, the legatee to have the thing for himself.

215. Maior illa dissensio in hoc legato interuenit, si eandem rem duobus pluribusue disiunctim legasti; quidam putant utrisque solidam deberi, sicut per damnationem: nonnulli occupantis esse meliorem condicionem aestimant, quia, cum eo genere legati damnetur heres patientiam praestare, ut legatarius rem habeat, sequitur, ut si priori patientiam praestiterit et is rem sumpserit, securus sit aduersus eum, qui postea legatum petierit, quia neque habet rem, ut patiatur eam ab eo sumi, neque dolo malo fecit, quo minus eam rem haberet.

215. A greater dissension has arisen in this legacy, if you have bequeathed the same thing to two or more disjunctively; some think that the whole is owed to each, as by condemnation: several estimate the condition of the one who occupies to be better, because, since in that kind of legacy the heir is condemned to furnish patience, that the legatee may have the thing, it follows that, if he has afforded patience to the earlier claimant and he has taken the thing, he is secure against him who afterwards shall claim the legacy, because he neither has the thing, so as to allow it to be taken by him, nor has he acted by dolus malus so as to hinder his having that thing.

216. Per praeceptionem hoc modo legamus: LVCIVS TITIVS HOMINEM STICHVM PRAECIPITO.

216. By preception (pre-taking) we bequeath in this way: LUCIUS TITIUS, TAKE BY PRECEPTION THE SLAVE STICHUS.

217. Sed nostri quidem praeceptores nulli alii eo modo legari posse putant nisi ei, qui aliqua ex parte heres scriptus esset. praecipere enim esse praecipuum sumere; quod tantum in eius persona procedit, qui aliqua ex parte heres institutus est, quod is extra portionem hereditatis praecipuum legatum habiturus sit.

217. But indeed our preceptors think that by that mode it can be bequeathed to no one else except to him who has been written as heir in some part. For to preempt is to take a preeminent (praecipuum) thing; which operates only in the case of the person who has been instituted heir as to some part, because he will have a preeminent legacy outside the portion of the inheritance.

218. Ideoque si extraneo legatum fuerit, inutile est legatum, adeo ut Sabinus existimauerit ne quidem ex senatus consulto Neroniano posse conualescere: 'nam eo', inquit, 'senatus consulto ea tantum confirmantur, quae uerborum uitio iure ciuili non ualent, non quae propter ipsam personam legatarii non deberentur'. sed Iuliano et Sexto placuit etiam hoc casu ex senatus consulto confirmari legatum; nam ex uerbis etiam hoc casu accidere, ut iure ciuili inutile sit legatum, inde manifestum esse, quod eidem aliis uerbis recte legaretur, uelut per uindicationem, per damnationem, sinendi modo; tunc autem uitio personae legatum non ualere, cum ei legatum sit, cui nullo modo legari possit uelut peregrino, cum quo testamenti factio non sit. quo plane casu senatus consulto locus non est.

218. And so, if a bequest has been made to an outsider, the bequest is ineffectual, to such a degree that Sabinus thought it could not even be strengthened by the Neronian senatorial decree: “for by that,” he says, “senatorial decree only those things are confirmed which, by a defect of wording, do not avail by civil law, not those which would not be owed on account of the very person of the legatee.” But it pleased Julian and Sextus that even in this case the bequest be confirmed by the senatorial decree; for from the words it also happens in this case that by civil law the bequest is ineffectual—this is clear from the fact that to the same person it could rightly be bequeathed by other words, as by vindication, by damnation, by the mode of permitting; whereas then a bequest does not avail by a defect of the person, when it is to one to whom it can in no way be bequeathed, as to a foreigner, with whom there is no testamentary capacity. In which manifest case there is no place for the senatorial decree.

219. Item nostri praeceptores, quod ita legatum est, nulla alia ratione putant posse consequi eum, cui ita fuerit legatum, quam iudicio familiae erciscundae, quod inter heredes de hereditate erciscunda, id est diuidunda, accipi solet: officio enim iudicis id contineri, ut ei, quod per praeceptionem legatum est, adiudicetur.

219. Likewise our preceptors think that what has been bequeathed in this manner can be obtained by the person to whom it has been so bequeathed by no other method than by the iudicium familiae erciscundae, which is accustomed to be employed among heirs for the inheritance to be partitioned—that is, divided; for it is contained in the duty of the judge that what has been bequeathed by praeception (pre-taking) be adjudicated to him.

220. Unde intellegimus nihil aliud secundum nostrorum praeceptorum opinionem per praeceptionem legari posse, nisi quod testatoris sit. nulla enim alia res quam hereditaria deducitur in hoc iudicium. itaque si non suam rem eo modo testator legauerit, iure quidem ciuili inutile erit legatum, sed ex senatus consulto confirmabitur.

220. Whence we understand that, according to the opinion of our preceptors, nothing else can be bequeathed by praeception except that which belongs to the testator. For no other thing than what is hereditary is brought into this iudicium. And so, if the testator has in that way bequeathed a thing not his own, the legacy will indeed be ineffectual under the civil law, but it will be confirmed by the senatus consultum.

aliquo tamen casu etiam alienam rem per praeceptionem legari posse fatentur: ueluti si quis eam rem legauerit, quam creditori fiduciae causa mancipio dederit; nam officio iudicis coheredes cogi posse existimant soluta pecunia luere eam rem, ut possit praecipere is, cui ita legatum sit.

Yet they admit that in some circumstance even another’s thing can be bequeathed by praeception: for instance, if someone has bequeathed a thing which he has given to a creditor by mancipatio for the cause of fiducia; for they think that by the office of the judge the coheirs can be compelled, with the money paid, to redeem that thing, so that the one to whom it has been thus bequeathed may pre-take it.

221. Sed diuersae scholae auctores putant etiam extraneo per praeceptionem legari posse, proinde ac si ita scribatur: TITIVS HOMINEM STICHVM CAPITO, superuacuo adiecta PRAE syllaba; ideoque per uindicationem eam rem legatam uideri: quae sententia dicitur diui Hadriani constitutione confirmata esse.

221. But the authors of the opposite school think that even to an outsider it can be bequeathed by preception, just as if it were written: "Titius, take the slave Stichus," the PRAE syllable having been added superfluously; and therefore the thing is seen as bequeathed by vindication: which opinion is said to have been confirmed by a constitution of the deified Hadrian.

222. Secundum hanc igitur opinionem, si ea res ex iure Quiritium defuncti fuerit, potest a legatario uindicari, siue is unus ex heredibus sit siue extraneus; quod si in bonis tantum testatoris fuerit, extraneo quidem ex senatus consulto utile erit legatum, heredi uero familiae herciscundae iudicis officio praestabitur; quod si nullo iure fuerit testatoris, tam heredi quam extraneo ex senatus consulto utile erit.

222. According to this opinion, therefore, if that thing was of Quiritary right in the deceased, it can be vindicated by the legatee, whether he is one of the heirs or an outsider; but if it was only in the testator’s goods, for an outsider the legacy will be effective by a senatorial decree, while for an heir it will be provided through the office of the judge for partition of the family property; but if it was in no right of the testator, for both the heir and the outsider it will be effective by a senatorial decree.

223. Siue tamen heredibus secundum nostrorum opinionem siue etiam extraneis secundum illorum opinionem duobus pluribusue eadem res coniunctim aut disiunctim legata fuerit, singuli partes habere debent. [Ad legem Falcidiam.]

223. Whether, however, to the heirs according to our opinion, or also to outsiders according to theirs, if the same thing has been bequeathed to two or more, jointly or severally, each ought to have shares. [On the Falcidian Law.]

224. Sed olim quidem licebat totum patrimonium legatis atque libertatibus erogare nec quicquam heredi relinquere praeterquam inane nomen heredis; idque lex XII tabularum permittere uidebatur, qua cauetur, ut quod quisque de re sua testatus esset, id ratum haberetur, his uerbis: "VTI LEGASSIT SVAE REI, ITA IVS ESTO". qua de causa, qui scripti heredes erant, ab hereditate se abstinebant, et idcirco plerique intestati moriebantur.

224. But formerly indeed it was permitted to expend the whole patrimony on legacies and manumissions and to leave nothing to the heir except the empty name of “heir”; and the Law of the 12 Tables seemed to permit this, wherein it is provided that whatever each person had testified by will concerning his own property should be held valid, in these words: “AS HE SHALL HAVE LEGATED OF HIS OWN PROPERTY, SO LET THERE BE LAW.” For which cause, those who had been written as heirs kept away from the inheritance, and therefore very many died intestate.

225. Itaque lata est lex Furia, qua exceptis personis quibusdam ceteris plus mille assibus legatorum nomine mortisue causa capere permissum non est. sed [et] haec lex non perfecit, quod uoluit: qui enim uerbi gratia quinque milium aeris patrimonium habebat, poterat quinque hominibus singulis millenos asses legando totum patrimonium erogare.

225. And so the Furian law was passed, by which, certain persons excepted, it is not permitted for the rest to take more than one thousand asses under the name of legacies or causa mortis. but [also] this law did not bring to perfection what it intended: for one who, for example, had a patrimony of 5,000 asses could, by bequeathing to five persons one thousand asses each, disburse the whole patrimony.

226. Ideo postea lata est lex Voconia, qua cautum est, ne cui plus legatorum nomine mortisue causa capere liceret, quam heredes caperent. ex qua lege plane quidem aliquid utique heredes habere uidebantur; sed tamen fere uitium simile nascebatur. nam in multas legatariorum personas distributo patrimonio poterat testator adeo heredi minimum relinquere, ut non expediret heredi huius lucri gratia totius hereditatis onera sustinere.

226. Therefore afterward the Voconian law was passed, by which it was provided that it should not be permitted for anyone, under the name of legacies or by reason of death, to take more than the heirs take. From which law the heirs clearly did seem at any rate to have something; but nevertheless a nearly similar defect arose. For, with the patrimony distributed among many persons of legatees, the testator could leave so little to the heir that it would not be expedient for the heir, for the sake of this lucre, to bear the burdens of the whole inheritance.

227. Lata est itaque lex Falcidia, qua cautum est, ne plus ei legare liceat quam dodrantem: itaque necesse est, ut heres quartam partem hereditatis habeat: et hoc nunc iure utimur.

227. Therefore the Lex Falcidia was passed, by which it was provided that it is not permitted to bequeath more than a dodrans (three-quarters); accordingly it is necessary that the heir have a fourth part of the inheritance: and we now use this law.

228. In libertatibus quoque dandis nimiam licentiam conpescuit lex Fufia Caninia, sicut in primo conmentario rettulimus. [De inutiliter relictis legatis.]

228. In the granting of liberties as well the Lex Fufia Caninia checked excessive license, just as we related in the first commentary. [On legacies bequeathed ineffectually.]

229. Ante heredis institutionem inutiliter legatur, scilicet quia testamenta uim ex institutione heredis accipiunt, et ob id uelut caput et fundamentum intellegitur totius testamenti heredis institutio.

229. Before the institution of the heir, a legacy is ineffectually bequeathed, namely because testaments receive their force from the institution of the heir, and on that account the institution of the heir is understood as, as it were, the head and foundation of the whole testament.

230. Pari ratione nec libertas ante heredis institutionem dari potest.

230. By the same reasoning, neither can liberty be granted before the institution of the heir.

231. Nostri praeceptores nec tutores eo loco dari posse existimant: sed Labeo et Proculus tutorem posse dari, quod nihil ex hereditate erogatur tutoris datione.

231. Our preceptors think that tutors cannot be given in that place; but Labeo and Proculus hold that a tutor can be given, because nothing is disbursed from the inheritance by the giving of a tutor.

232. Post mortem quoque heredis inutiliter legatur, id est hoc modo: CVM HERES MEVS MORTVVS ERIT, DO LEGO, aut DATO. ita autem recte legatur: CVM HERES MEVS MORIETVR, quia non post mortem heredis relinquitur, sed ultimo uitae eius tempore. rursum ita non potest legari: PRIDIE QVAM HERES MEVS MORIETVR; quod non pretiosa ratione receptum uidetur.

232. Also, a legacy is invalidly bequeathed “after the heir’s death,” that is in this way: WHEN MY HEIR HAS DIED, I GIVE AND BEQUEATH, or LET IT BE GIVEN. But thus it is rightly bequeathed: WHEN MY HEIR WILL DIE, because it is not left after the heir’s death, but at the ultimate time of his life. Again, it cannot be bequeathed thus: ON THE DAY BEFORE MY HEIR WILL DIE; which does not seem to have been received with a weighty rationale.

233. Eadem et de libertatibus dicta intellegemus.

233. We will understand that the same things have been said also concerning manumissions.

234. Tutor uero an post mortem heredis dari possit, quaerentibus eadem forsitan poterit esse quaestio, quae de eo agitatur, qui ante heredum institutionem datur. [De poenae causa relictis legatis.]

234. But as to a tutor, whether he can be appointed after the heir’s death, for those inquiring perhaps the same question can be raised as is debated concerning one who is appointed before the institution of the heirs. [On legacies left by way of penalty.]

235. Poenae quoque nomine inutiliter legatur. poenae autem nomine legari uidetur, quod coercendi heredis causa relinquitur, quo magis heres aliquid faciat aut non faciat, uelut quod ita legatur: SI HERES MEVS FILIAM SVAM TITIO IN MATRIMONIVM COLLOCAVERIT, X MILIA SEIO DATO, uel ita: SI FILIAM TITIO IN MATRIMONIVM NON COLLOCAVERIS, X MILIA TITIO DATO; sed et si heredem, si uerbi gratia intra biennium monumentum sibi non fecerit, X milia Titio dari iusserit testator, poenae nomine legatum est. et denique ex ipsa definitione multas similes species cir-cumspicere possumus.

235. A legacy is also ineffectual when made under the name of a penalty. Moreover, a legacy is deemed to be made by way of penalty when it is left for the purpose of coercing the heir, so that the heir may the more do or not do something, for example when it is left thus: IF MY HEIR SHALL HAVE PLACED HIS DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE WITH TITIUS, GIVE 10,000 TO SEIUS, or thus: IF YOU SHALL NOT HAVE PLACED THE DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE WITH TITIUS, GIVE 10,000 TO TITIUS; and also if the testator has ordered that, if the heir—for example—shall not have made a monument for himself within two years, 10,000 be given to Titius, the legacy is by way of penalty. And finally, from the very definition we can survey many similar species.

236. Nec libertas quidem poenae nomine dari potest, quamuis de ea re fuerit quaesitum. De tutore uero nihil possumus quaerere, quia non potest datione tutoris heres conpelli quidquam facere aut non facere. ideoque_datur poenae nomine tutor datus fuerit, magis sub condicione quam poenae nomine datus uidebitur.

236. Not even liberty can be given under the name of a penalty, although the question has been raised about that matter. But concerning a tutor, indeed, we can ask nothing, because by the dation (appointment) of a tutor the heir cannot be compelled to do or not to do anything. and therefore_if a tutor has been given under the name of a penalty, he will seem to have been given rather under a condition than under the name of a penalty.

238. Incertae personae legatum inutiliter relinquitur. incerta autem uidetur persona, quam per incertam opinionem animo suo testator subicit, uelut cum ita legatum sit: QVI PRIMVS AD FVNVS MEVM VENERIT, EI HERES MEVS X MILIA DATO; idem iuris est, si generaliter omnibus legauerit: QVICVMQVE AD FVNVS MEVM VENERIT; in eadem causa est, quod ita relinquitur: QVICVMQVE FILIO MEO IN MATRIMONIVM FILIAM SVAM CONLOCAVERIT, EI HERES MEVS X MILIA DATO; illud quoque [in eadem causa est], quod ita relinquitur: QVI POST TESTAMENTVM SCRIPTVM PRIMI CONSVLES DESIGNATI ERVNT, aeque incertis personis legari uidetur; et denique aliae multae huiusmodi species sunt. sub certa uero demonstratione incertae personae recte legatur, uelut: EX COGNATIS MEIS, QVI PRIMVS AD FVNVS MEVM VENERIT, EI X MILIA HERES MEVS DATO.

238. A legacy to an uncertain person is ineffectually left. And a person seems “uncertain” whom the testator sets before his mind by an uncertain supposition, as when the legacy is thus: WHOEVER FIRST SHALL COME TO MY FUNERAL, TO HIM LET MY HEIR GIVE 10,000; the same law holds if he has bequeathed generally to all: WHOEVER SHALL COME TO MY FUNERAL; in the same case is what is left thus: WHOEVER SHALL GIVE HIS DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE TO MY SON, TO HIM LET MY HEIR GIVE 10,000; that also [is in the same case], which is left thus: THOSE WHO, AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN WRITTEN, SHALL FIRST BE DESIGNATED CONSULS—likewise it seems to be bequeathed to uncertain persons; and finally there are many other species of this sort. But under a definite designation a legacy may rightly be made to uncertain persons, as: OF MY KINSMEN, WHOEVER FIRST SHALL COME TO MY FUNERAL, TO HIM LET MY HEIR GIVE 10,000.

239. Libertas quoque non uidetur incertae personae dari posse, quia lex Fufia Caninia iubet nominatim seruos liberari.

239. Liberty likewise does not seem able to be given to an uncertain person, because the Lex Fufia Caninia commands that slaves be freed by name.

240. Tutor quoque certus dari debet.

240. A specific tutor (guardian) must also be appointed.

241. Postumo quoque alieno inutiliter legatur. est autem alienus postumus, qui natus inter suos heredes testatori futurus non est: ideoque ex emancipato quoque filio conceptus nepos extraneus postumus est; item qui in utero est eius, quae iure ciuili non intellegitur uxor, extraneus postumus patris intellegitur.

241. Likewise, a legacy is ineffectually bequeathed to an alien posthumous. Now an alien posthumous is one who, when born, will not be among the testator’s own heirs: and therefore a grandson conceived from a son who has been emancipated is an alien posthumous as an outsider; likewise, he who is in the womb of a woman who is not understood by civil law to be a wife is considered an alien posthumous of the father.

242. Ac ne heres quidem potest institui postumus alienus: est enim incerta persona.

242. And not even an alien posthumous (child) can be instituted heir: for it is an uncertain person.

243. Cetera uero, quae supra diximus, ad legata proprie pertinent; quamquam non inmerito quibusdam placeat poenae nomine heredem institui non posse. nihil enim interest, utrum legatum dare iubeatur heres, si fecerit aliquid aut non fecerit, an coheres ei adiciatur, quia tam coheredis adiectione quam legati datione compellitur, ut aliquid contra propositum suum faciat aut non faciat.

243. But the rest, which we said above, properly pertain to legacies; although, not without reason, it pleases some that an heir cannot be instituted by way of a penalty. For it makes no difference whether the heir is ordered to give a legacy if he has done something or has not done it, or whether a coheir is added to him, since by the addition of a coheir as much as by the giving of a legacy he is compelled to do something, or not to do something, against his purpose.

244. An ei, qui in potestate sit eius, quem heredem instituimus, recte legemus, quaeritur. Seruius recte legari putat, sed euanescere legatum, si quo tempore dies legatorum cedere solet, adhuc in potestate sit; ideoque siue pure legatum sit et uiuo testatore in potestate heredis esse desierit, siue sub condicione et ante condicionem id acciderit, deberi legatum. Sabinus et Cassius sub condicione recte legari, pure non recte putant; licet enim uiuo testatore possit desinere in potestate heredis esse, ideo tamen inutile legatum intellegi oportere, quia quod nullas uires habiturum foret, si statim post testamentum factum decessisset testator, hoc ideo ualere, quia uitam longius traxerit, absurdum esset.

244. It is asked whether we may properly bequeath by legacy to one who is in the power of him whom we have instituted heir. Servius thinks it is rightly legated, but that the legacy vanishes if, at the time when the day for legacies is wont to accrue, he is still in the power; and therefore, whether the legacy has been left purely (i.e., unconditionally) and, while the testator is alive, he has ceased to be in the power of the heir, or under a condition and that has happened before the condition, the legacy is owed. Sabinus and Cassius think it is rightly legated under a condition, not rightly purely; for although while the testator is alive he may cease to be in the power of the heir, nevertheless the legacy ought to be understood as ineffectual, because that which would have had no force if the testator had died immediately after the testament was made, for this to be valid because he has drawn out his life longer, would be absurd.

sed diuersae scholae auctores nec sub condicione recte legari, quia quos in potestate habemus, eis non magis sub condicione quam pure debere possumus.

but the authors of the opposing school [maintain] that it is not rightly legated even under a condition, because those whom we have in power, to them we can no more owe under a condition than purely.

245. Ex diuerso constat ab eo, qui in potestate tua est, herede instituto recte tibi legari; sed si tu per eum heres extiteris, euanescere legatum, quia ipse tibi legatum debere non possis; si uero filius emancipatus aut seruus manumissus erit uel in alium translatus, et ipse heres extiterit aut alium fecerit, deberi legatum.

245. Conversely, it is established that, with the one who is in your power instituted as heir, it is rightly legated to you; but if you should become heir through him, the legacy evaporates, because you cannot yourself owe a legacy to yourself; if, however, the son has been emancipated or the slave manumitted or transferred to another, and he himself has become heir or has made another, the legacy is owed.

246. Nunc transeamus ad fideicommissa.

246. Now let us pass to fideicommissa.

247. Et prius de hereditatibus uideamus.

247. And first, let us see about inheritances.

248. Inprimis igitur sciendum est opus esse, ut aliquis heres recto iure instituatur eiusque fidei committatur, ut eam hereditatem alii restituat; alioquin inutile est testamentum, in quo nemo recto iure heres instituitur.

248. In the first place, therefore, it must be known that it is necessary that some heir be instituted by right in due form, and that to his good faith it be committed, that he restore that inheritance to another; otherwise the testament is useless, in which no heir is instituted by right in due form.

249. Verba autem utilia fideicommissorum haec [recte] maxime in usu esse uidentur: PETO, ROGO, VOLO, FIDEI COMMITTO, quae proinde firma singula sunt, atque si omnia in unum congesta sint.

249. But the words useful for fideicommissa that seem especially to be most in use are these [rightly]: I REQUEST, I ASK, I WILL, I COMMIT TO YOUR GOOD FAITH, which accordingly are each firm singly, just as if all were heaped together into one.

250. Cum igitur scripserimus: LVCIVS TITIVS HERES ESTO, possumus adicere: ROGO TE, LVCI TITI, PETOQVE A TE, VT CVM PRIMVM POSSIS HEREDITATEM MEAM ADIRE, GAIO SEIO REDDAS RESTITVAS. Possumus autem et de parte restituenda rogare; et liberum est uel sub condicione uel pure relinquere fideicommissa uel ex die certa.

250. Therefore, when we have written: “Let Lucius Titius be heir,” we can add: “I ask you, Lucius Titius, and I also request from you, that as soon as you can enter upon my inheritance, you hand over and restore it to Gaius Seius.” Moreover, we can also ask for a part to be restored; and it is permitted to leave fideicommissa either under a condition or purely (i.e., unconditionally), or from a fixed day.

251. Restituta autem hereditate is, qui restituit, nihilo minus heres permanet; is uero, qui recipit hereditatem, aliquando heredis loco est, aliquando legatarii.

251. Once the inheritance has been restored, the one who restores it nonetheless remains heir; but the one who receives the inheritance is sometimes in the place of an heir, sometimes of a legatee.

252. Olim autem nec heredis loco erat nec legatarii, sed potius emptoris. tunc enim in usu erat ei, cui restituebatur hereditas, nummo uno eam hereditatem dicis causa uenire; et quae stipulationes inter uenditorem hereditatis et emptorem interponi solent, eaedem interponebantur inter heredem et eum, cui restituebatur hereditas, id est hoc modo: heres quidem stipulabatur ab eo, cui restituebatur hereditas, ut quidquid hereditario nomine condemnatus fuisset siue quid alias bona fide dedisset, eo nomine indemnis esset, et omnino si quis cum eo hereditario nomine ageret, ut recte defenderetur; ille uero, qui recipiebat hereditatem, inuicem stipulabatur, ut si quid ex hereditate ad heredem peruenisset, id sibi restitueretur, ut etiam pateretur eum hereditarias actiones procuratorio aut cognitorio nomine exequi.

252. Formerly, however, he was neither in the position of an heir nor of a legatee, but rather of a purchaser. For then it was the practice that, for the sake of form, the inheritance which was being restored to him should be sold for a single coin; and the stipulations which are accustomed to be interposed between the vendor of an inheritance and the buyer were likewise interposed between the heir and him to whom the inheritance was being restored, that is, in this way: the heir indeed would stipulate from him to whom the inheritance was being restored, that whatever he had been condemned in under the hereditary title, or whatever else he had in good faith paid, he should be held harmless on that account, and, in general, that if anyone should bring an action against him under the hereditary title, he should be properly defended; but the one who received the inheritance, in turn, would stipulate that if anything from the inheritance had come to the heir, it should be restored to himself, and that he would also allow him to prosecute hereditary actions in a procuratorial or cognitorial capacity.

253. Sed posterioribus temporibus Trebellio Maximo et Annaeo Seneca consulibus senatus consultum factum est, quo cautum est, ut si cui hereditas ex fideicommissi causa restituta sit, actiones, quae iure ciuili heredi et in heredem conpeterent, ei et in eum darentur, cui ex fideicommisso restituta esset hereditas; per quod senatus consultum desierunt illae cautiones in usu haberi. praetor enim utiles actiones ei et in eum, qui recepit hereditatem, quasi heredi et in heredem dare coepit, eaeque in edicto proponuntur.

253. But in later times, when Trebellius Maximus and Annaeus Seneca were consuls, a senatorial decree was made, by which it was provided that, if to anyone an inheritance had been restored by reason of a fideicommiss, the actions which by civil law would belong to the heir and lie against the heir should be granted to him and against him to whom the inheritance had been restored from the fideicommiss; through which senatorial decree those stipulations ceased to be in use. For the praetor began to grant useful (utiles) actions to and against him who received the inheritance, as though to the heir and against the heir, and these are set forth in the edict.

254. Sed rursus quia heredes scripti, cum aut totam hereditatem aut paene totam plerumque restituere rogabantur, adire hereditatem ob nullum aut minimum lucrum recusabant atque ob id extinguebantur fideicommissa, postea Pegaso et Pusione consulibus senatus censuit, ut ei, qui rogatus esset hereditatem restituere, proinde liceret quartam partem retinere, atque e lege Falcidia in legatis retinendi ius conceditur: ex singulis quoque rebus, quae per fideicommissum relincuntur, eadem retentio permissa est. per quod senatus consultum ipse heres onera hereditaria sustinet; ille autem, qui ex fideicommisso reliquam partem hereditatis recipit, legatarii partiarii loco est, id est eius legatarii, cui pars bonorum legatur; quae species legati partitio uocatur, quia cum herede legatarius partitur hereditatem. unde effectum est, ut quae solent stipulationes inter heredem et partiarium legatarium interponi, eaedem interponantur inter eum, qui ex fideicommissi causa recipit hereditatem, et heredem, id est, ut et lucrum et damnum hereditarium pro rata parte inter eos commune sit.

254. But again, because the instituted heirs, when they were usually asked to restore either the whole inheritance or almost the whole, refused to enter upon the inheritance on account of no or the least profit, and on that account fideicommissa were extinguished, afterwards, under the consuls Pegasus and Pusio, the senate decreed that it should likewise be permitted to him who had been asked to restore the inheritance to retain a fourth part, and that, as by the Falcidian law in legacies, a right of retaining is granted: from individual items also which are left by fideicommissum, the same retention is permitted. By which senatorial decree the heir himself sustains the hereditary burdens; but he who from the fideicommissum receives the remaining part of the inheritance is in the position of a partiary legatee, that is, of that legatee to whom a share of the goods is bequeathed; which species of legacy is called a partition, because the legatee partitions the inheritance with the heir. Whence it has resulted that the stipulations which are wont to be interposed between the heir and the partiary legatee are interposed likewise between him who, by reason of fideicommissum, receives the inheritance and the heir, that is, that both profit and hereditary loss be common between them pro rata parte.

255. Ergo si quidem non plus quam dodrantem hereditatis scriptus heres rogatus sit restituere, tum ex Trebelliano senatus consulto restituitur hereditas, et in utrumque actiones hereditariae pro rata parte dantur, in heredem quidem iure ciuili, in eum uero, qui recipit hereditatem, ex senatus consulto Trebelliano; quamquam heres etiam pro ea parte, quam restituit, heres permanet eique et in eum solidae actiones competunt; sed non ulterius oneratur, nec ulterius illi dantur actiones, quam apud eum commodum hereditatis remanet.

255. Therefore, if indeed the instituted heir is asked to restore not more than three quarters of the inheritance, then under the Trebellian senatorial decree the inheritance is restored, and hereditary actions are given to each in proportion: against the heir indeed by civil law, and against the one who receives the inheritance, by the Trebellian senatorial decree; although the heir even for that part which he restores remains heir, and actions in solidum both lie to him and against him; but he is not burdened further, nor are actions granted to him further, than the benefit of the inheritance remains with him.

256. At si quis plus quam dodrantem uel etiam totam hereditatem restituere rogatus sit, locus est Pegasiano senatus consulto.

256. But if someone has been asked to restore more than three quarters, or even the whole inheritance, the Pegasian senatorial decree applies.

257. Sed is, qui semel adierit hereditatem, si modo sua uoluntate adierit, siue retinuerit quartam partem siue noluerit retinere, ipse uniuersa onera hereditaria sustinet; sed quarta quidem retenta quasi partis et pro parte stipulationes interponi debent tamquam inter partiarium legatarium et heredem; si uero totam hereditatem restituerit, ad exemplum emptae et uenditae hereditatis stipulationes interponendae sunt.

257. But he who has once entered upon the inheritance, provided only that he has entered by his own will, whether he has retained the fourth part or has been unwilling to retain it, he himself sustains all the hereditary burdens; but, with the fourth retained, stipulations ought to be interposed as of a part and pro parte, as between a partiary legatee and the heir; but if he has restored the whole inheritance, stipulations must be interposed on the model of an inheritance bought and sold.

258. Sed si recuset scriptus heres adire hereditatem ob id, quod dicat eam sibi suspectam esse quasi damnosam, cauetur Pegasiano senatus consulto, ut desiderante eo, cui restituere rogatus est, iussu praetoris adeat et restituat, proindeque ei et in eum, qui receperit, actiones dentur, ac iuris esset ex senatus consulto Trebelliano. quo casu nullis stipulationibus opus est, quia simul et huic, qui restituit, securitas datur, et actiones hereditariae ei et in eum transferuntur, qui receperit hereditatem.

258. But if the instituted heir refuses to enter upon the inheritance on the ground that he says it is suspect to him as being ruinous, it is provided by the Pegasian senatorial decree that, at the desire of him to whom he has been asked to restore it, by order of the praetor he shall enter and restore; and accordingly actions are granted to him and against the one who shall have received, just as would be the law under the Trebellian senatorial decree. In which case no stipulations are needed, because at the same time both security is given to the one who restores, and the hereditary actions are transferred to and against the one who has received the inheritance.

259. Nihil autem interest, utrum aliquis ex asse heres institutus aut totam hereditatem aut pro parte restituere rogetur, an ex parte heres institutus aut totam eam partem aut partis partem restituere rogetur. nam et hoc casu de quarta parte eius partis ratio ex Pegasiano senatus consulto haberi solet.

259. There is no difference whether someone appointed heir for the whole (ex asse) is asked to restore either the entire inheritance or a share, or someone appointed heir for a share is asked to restore either that whole share or a share of the share. For in this case too, with respect to the fourth part of that share, account is regularly taken by the Pegasian senatorial decree.

260. Potest autem quisque etiam res singulas per fideicommissum relinquere, uelut fundum, hominem, uestem, argentum, pecuniam, et uel ipsum heredem rogare, ut alicui restituat, uel legatarium, quamuis a legatario legari non possit.

260. Moreover, anyone can also leave individual things by fideicommissum, such as an estate, a person, a garment, silver, money, and may ask either the heir himself to restore it to someone, or a legatee, although a legacy cannot be bequeathed by a legatee.

261. Item potest non solum propria testatoris res per fideicommissum relinqui, sed etiam heredis aut legatarii aut cuiuslibet alterius. itaque et legatarius non solum de ea re rogari potest, ut eam alicui restituat, quae ei legata sit, sed etiam de alia, siue ipsius legatarii siue aliena sit. [sed] hoc solum obseruandum est, ne plus quisquam rogetur aliis restituere, quam ipse ex testamento ceperit; nam quod amplius est, inutiliter relinquitur.

261. Likewise, not only the testator’s own property can be left by fideicommiss, but also that of the heir or the legatee or of any other person. And so a legatee can be asked not only about that thing which has been bequeathed to him, that he restore it to someone, but also about another thing, whether it be the legatee’s own or someone else’s. [But] this only is to be observed: that no one be asked to restore to others more than he himself has taken under the testament; for what is beyond that is left without effect.

262. Cum autem aliena res per fideicommissum relinquitur, necesse est ei, qui rogatus est, aut ipsam redimere et praestare aut aestimationem eius soluere, sicut iuris est, si per damnationem aliena res legata sit. sunt tamen, qui putant, si rem per fideicommissum relictam dominus non uendat, extingui fideicommissum; sed aliam esse causam per damnationem legati.

262. But when another’s property is left by fideicommiss, it is necessary for the one who has been asked either to redeem the thing itself and furnish it, or to pay its estimation, just as is the law if an alien thing has been bequeathed by damnation. There are, however, those who think that, if the owner does not sell the thing left by fideicommiss, the fideicommiss is extinguished; but that the case is otherwise in a legacy by damnation.

263. Libertas quoque seruo per fideicommissum dari potest, ut uel heres rogetur manumittere uel legatarius.

263. Liberty too can be given to a slave by fideicommissum, so that either the heir is requested to manumit or the legatee.

264. Nec interest, utrum de suo proprio seruo testator roget an de eo, qui ipsius heredis aut legatarii uel etiam extranei sit.

264. Nor does it matter whether the testator asks concerning his own slave or concerning one who belongs to the heir or the legatee or even to an outsider.

265. Itaque et alienus seruus redimi et manumitti debet. quod si dominus eum non uendat, sane extinguitur fideicommissa libertas, quia hoc casu pretii computatio nulla interuenit.

265. And so even another’s slave ought to be bought and manumitted. But if the owner does not sell him, indeed the fideicommissary liberty is extinguished, because in this case no computation of the price intervenes.

266. Qui autem ex fideicommisso manumittitur, non testatoris fit libertus, etiamsi testatoris seruus fuerit, sed eius, qui manumittit.

266. But he who is manumitted out of a fideicommissum does not become the testator’s freedman, even if he was the testator’s slave, but the freedman of the one who manumits.

267. At qui directo testamento liber esse iubetur, uelut hoc modo: STICHVS SERVVS MEVS LIBER ESTO, uel hoc: STICHVM SERVVM MEVM LIBERVM ESSE IVBEO, is ipsius testatoris fit libertus. nec alius ullus directo ex testamento libertatem habere potest, quam qui utroque tempore testatoris ex iure Quiritium fuerit, et quo faceret testamentum et quo moreretur.

267. But he who is ordered to be free by a direct testament, for example in this way: “LET STICHUS, MY SLAVE, BE FREE,” or thus: “I ORDER STICHUS, MY SLAVE, TO BE FREE,” becomes the freedman of the testator himself. Nor can anyone else at all have freedom directly from a testament, except the one who at both times was the testator’s under Quiritary right, both when he made the testament and when he died.

268. Multum autem differunt ea, quae per fideicommissum relincuntur, ab his, quae directo iure legantur.

268. Moreover, those things which are left by fideicommissum differ greatly from those which are legated by direct law.

269. Nam ecce per fideicommissum [. . . . . . . . ] heredis relinqui potest: cum alioquin legatum [. . . . . . . . ] inutile sit.

269. For behold, through a fideicommissum [. . . . . . . . ] of the heir can be left; since otherwise a legacy [. . . . . . . . ] would be useless.

270. Item intestatus moriturus potest ab eo, ad quem bona eius pertinent, fideicommissum alicui relinquere; cum alioquin ab eo legari non possit.

270. Likewise, a person about to die intestate can leave by fideicommissum to someone, from the one to whom his goods pertain; since otherwise a legacy cannot be bequeathed from him.

270a. Item legatum codicillis relictum non aliter ualet, quam si a testatore confirmati fuerint, id est, nisi in testamento cauerit [. . . . . . . . . . ] testator, ut quidquid in codicillis scripserit, id ratum sit; fideicommissum uero etiam non confirmatis codicillis relinqui potest. 271. Item a legatario legari non potest, sed fideicommissum relinqui potest.

270a. Likewise a legacy left in codicils is not otherwise valid than if they have been confirmed by the testator, that is, unless in the testament the testator has provided [. . . . . . . . . . ] that whatever he has written in the codicils be ratified; but a fideicommiss can be left even with the codicils not confirmed. 271. Likewise, by a legatee a legacy cannot be bequeathed, but a fideicommiss can be left.

quin etiam ab eo quoque, cui per fideicommissum relinquimus, rursus alii per fideicommissum relinquere possumus.

Moreover, we can even arrange that the person to whom we leave something through a fideicommissum leaves it in turn through a fideicommissum to another.

272. Item seruo alieno directo libertas dari non potest, sed per fideicommissum potest.

272. Likewise, liberty cannot be given directly to another’s slave, but through a fideicommissum it can.

273. Item codicillis nemo heres institui potest neque exheredari, quamuis testamento confirmati sint; at is, qui testamento heres institutus est, potest codicillis rogari, ut eam hereditatem alii totam uel ex parte restituat, quamuis testamento codicilli confirmati non sint.

273. Likewise, by codicils no one can be instituted heir nor disinherited, although they have been confirmed by a testament; but he who has been instituted heir by a testament can be asked by codicils to restore that inheritance to another, in whole or in part, although the codicils have not been confirmed by a testament.

274. Item mulier, quae ab eo, qui centum milia aeris census est, per legem Voconiam heres institui non potest, tamen fideicommisso relictam sibi hereditatem capere potest.

274. Likewise, a woman, who, by one who is assessed at 100,000 asses, cannot be instituted heir through the Lex Voconia, nevertheless can take an inheritance left to her by fideicommissum.

275. Latini quoque, qui hereditates legataque directo iure lege Iunia capere prohibentur, ex fideicommisso capere possunt.

275. The Latins too, who are prohibited by the Lex Junia from taking inheritances and legacies by direct right, can take from a fideicommissum.

276. Item cum senatus consulto prohibitum sit proprium seruum minorem annis XXX liberum et heredem instituere, plerisque placet posse nos iubere liberum esse, cum annorum XXX erit, et rogare, ut tunc illi restituatur hereditas.

276. Likewise, since by a senatorial decree it is prohibited to institute one’s own slave who is under 30 years of age as free and as heir, it pleases most that we may command that he be free when he will be 30 years old, and request that then the inheritance be restored to him.

277. Item quamuis non possimus post mortem eius, qui nobis heres extiterit, alium in locum eius heredem instituere, tamen possumus eum rogare, ut, cum morietur, alii eam hereditatem totam uel ex parte restituat; et quia post mortem quoque heredis fideicommissum dari potest, idem efficere possumus et si ita scripserimus: CVM TITIVS HERES MEVS MORTVVS ERIT, VOLO HEREDITATEM MEAM AD PVBLIVM MAEVIVM PERTINERE. utroque autem modo, tam hoc quam illo, Titius heredem suum obligatum relinquit de fideicommisso restituendo.

277. Likewise, although we cannot, after the death of him who has become our heir, institute another in his place as heir, nevertheless we can ask him that, when he shall die, he restore that inheritance to another, either in whole or in part; and because a fideicommissum can be given even after the heir’s death, we can achieve the same even if we have written thus: WHEN TITIUS, MY HEIR, HAS DIED, I WISH MY INHERITANCE TO PERTAIN TO PUBLIUS MAEVIUS. But in either way, both by this and by that, Titius leaves his own heir bound with respect to restoring the fideicommissum.

278. Praeterea legata per formulam petimus; fideicommissa uero Romae quidem apud consulem uel apud eum praetorem, qui praecipue de fideicommissis ius dicit, persequimur, in prouinciis uero apud praesidem prouinciae.

278. Moreover, we claim legacies by formula; but fideicommissa at Rome we pursue before the consul, or before that praetor who principally adjudicates matters of fideicommissa; in the provinces, however, before the praeses of the province.

279. Item de fideicommissis semper in urbe ius dicitur, de legatis uero, cum res aguntur.

279. Likewise, in matters of fideicommissa, judgment is always pronounced in the city; but in matters of legacies, judgment is pronounced when proceedings are being conducted.

280. Item fideicommissorum usurae et fructus debentur, si modo moram solutionis fecerit, qui fideicommissum debebit; legatorum uero usurae non debentur, idque rescripto diui Hadriani significatur. scio tamen Iuliano placuisse in eo legato, quod sinendi modo relinquitur, idem iuris esse, quod in fideicommissis; quam sententiam et his temporibus magis optinere uideo.

280. Likewise, interest and fruits of fideicommissa are owed, provided that he who owes the fideicommissum has caused delay in performance; but interest on legacies is not owed, and this is signified by a rescript of the deified Hadrian. I know, however, that it pleased Julian that, in that legacy which is left by the mode of permitting (sinendi modo), the same law should apply as in fideicommissa; which opinion I see to prevail even more in these times.

281. Item legata Graece scripta non ualent; fideicommissa uero ualent.

281. Likewise legacies written in Greek are not valid; but fideicommissa are valid.

282. Item si legatum per damnationem relictum heres infitietur, in duplum cum eo agitur; fideicommissi uero nomine semper in simplum persecutio est.

282. Likewise, if a legacy left by condemnation the heir denies, suit is brought against him for double; but under a fideicommissum the pursuit is always for the simple.

283. Item quod quisque ex fideicommisso plus debito per errorem soluerit, repetere potest; at id, quod ex causa falsa per damnationem legati plus debito solutum sit, repeti non potest. idem scilicet iuris est de eo legato, quod non debitum uel ex hac uel ex illa causa per errorem solutum fuerit.

283. Likewise, what anyone has paid from a fideicommissum, more than is due, through error, he can recover; but that which, on a false ground, under a legacy by damnation, has been paid more than is due cannot be recovered. The same, namely, is the law concerning that legacy which, not owed, has been paid through error for this or that cause.

284. Erant etiam aliae differentiae, quae nunc non sunt.

284. There were also other differences, which now are not.

285. Ut ecce peregrini poterant fideicommissa capere, et fere haec fuit origo fideicommissorum. sed postea id prohibitum est, et nunc ex oratione diui Hadriani senatus consultum factum est, ut ea fideicommissa fisco uindicarentur.

285. For instance, peregrines (foreigners) could take fideicommissa, and almost this was the origin of fideicommissa. But afterwards that was prohibited, and now from the oration of the deified Hadrian a senatus consultum was made, that those fideicommissa be vindicated to the fisc (imperial treasury).

286. Caelibes quoque, qui per legem Iuliam hereditates legataque capere prohibentur, olim fideicommissa uidebantur capere posse.

286. Celibates also, who by the Julian law are prohibited from taking inheritances and legacies, formerly were thought to be able to take fideicommissa.

286a. Item orbi, qui per legem Papiam ob id, quod liberos non habent, dimidias partes hereditatum legatorumque perdunt, olim solida fideicommissa uidebantur capere posse. sed postea senatus consulto Pegasiano proinde fideicommissa quoque ac legata hereditatesque capere posse prohibiti sunt; eaque translata sunt ad eos, qui in eo testamento liberos habent, aut si nulli liberos habebunt, ad populum, sicuti iuris est in legatis et in hereditatibus, quae eadem aut simili ex causa caduca fiunt.

286a. Likewise the childless, who by the Papian law, on account of not having children, lose the half portions of inheritances and legacies, formerly seemed able to take entire fideicommissa. But afterwards, by the Pegasian senatus consultum, they were forbidden to take fideicommissa also, as well as legacies and inheritances; and these were transferred to those who in that testament have children, or, if none will have children, to the people, just as is the law in the case of legacies and inheritances, which become caduca from the same or a similar cause.

287. Item olim incertae personae uel postumo alieno per fideicommissum relinqui poterat, quamuis neque heres institui neque legari ei posset. sed senatus consulto, quod auctore diuo Hadriano factum est, idem in fideicommissis, quod in legatis hereditatibusque constitutum est.

287. Likewise, formerly it was possible to leave something by fideicommissum to an uncertain person or to another’s posthumous child, although he could neither be instituted heir nor have a legacy bequeathed to him. But by a senatorial decree, which was made under the authority of the deified Hadrian, the same has been established in fideicommissa as is constituted for legacies and inheritances.

288. Item poenae nomine iam non dubitatur nec per fideicommissum quidem relinqui posse.

288. Likewise, it is now not doubted that a bequest by way of a penalty cannot be left, not even by fideicommissum.

289. Sed quamuis in multis iuris partibus longe latior causa sit fideicommissorum quam eorum, quae directo relincuntur, in quibusdam tantundem ualeant, tamen tutor non aliter testamento dari potest quam directo, ueluti hoc modo: LIBERIS MEIS TITIVS TVTOR ESTO, uel ita: LIBERIS MEIS TITIVM TVTOREM DO; per fideicommissum uero dari non potest.

289. But although in many parts of the law the cause of fideicommissa is far broader than that of those things which are left directly, and in some matters they have equal force, nevertheless a guardian cannot be given by a testament otherwise than directly, for example in this way: FOR MY CHILDREN, LET TITUS BE GUARDIAN, or thus: FOR MY CHILDREN I GIVE TITUS AS GUARDIAN; but he cannot be given through a fideicommissum.