Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Nunc de sapientia nobis est disserendum, non illa dei quae procul dubio deus est (nam sapientia dei filius eius unigenitus dicitur), sed loquemur de hominis sapientia, uera tamen quae secundum deum est et uerus ac praecipuus cultus eius est, quae uno nomine *theosebeia graece appellatur. Quod nomen nostri sicut iam commemorauimus uolentes et ipsi uno nomine interpretari 'pietatem' dixerunt, cum pietas apud graecos *eusebeia usitatius nuncupetur, *theosebeia uero quia uno uerbo perfecte non potest, melius interpretatur duobus ut dicatur potius 'dei cultus.'

[1 1] Now it is for us to discourse about wisdom, not that of God which without doubt is God (for the Wisdom of God is called His Only-Begotten Son), but we shall speak of human wisdom, true nevertheless, which is according to God and is His true and principal cult, which by a single name is called in Greek *theosebeia. Which name our people, as we have already mentioned, wishing themselves also to interpret by one name, called ‘piety,’ although ‘piety’ among the Greeks is more commonly named *eusebeia, whereas *theosebeia, because it cannot be perfectly rendered by one word, is better interpreted by two, so that it be said rather ‘the worship of God.’

Hanc esse hominis sapientiam, quod et in duodecimo huius operis uolumine iam posuimus, scripturae sanctae auctoritate monstratur in libro serui dei Iob ubi legitur dei sapientiam dixisse homini: Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis scientia (siue etiam ut nonnulli de graeco *epistemen interpretati sunt, disciplina, quae utique a discendo nomen accepit, unde et scientia dici potest; ad hoc enim quaeque res discitur ut sciatur, quamuis alia notione in his quae pro peccatis suis mala quisque patitur ut corrigatur dici soleat disciplina. Vnde illud est in epistula ad hebraeos: Quis enim est filius cui non det disciplinam pater eius?, et illud euidentius in eadem: Omnis uero disciplina ad tempus non gaudii uidetur esse sed tristitiae; postea uero fructum pacificum his qui per eam certaunt reddet iustitiae). Deus ergo ipse summa sapientia; cultus autem dei sapientia est hominis de qua nunc loquimur. Nam sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud deum.

Hominis wisdom to be this, as we also set down already in the twelfth volume of this work, is shown by the authority of the holy Scriptures in the book of the servant of God Job, where it is read that the wisdom of God said to man: “Behold, piety is wisdom; but to abstain from evils is knowledge” (or also, as some have interpreted from the Greek *episteme*, “discipline,” which indeed has received its name from learning, whence it can also be called “knowledge”; for to this end each thing is learned, that it may be known, although in another notion, in those things which each person suffers as evils for his sins that he may be corrected, it is wont to be called “discipline.” Whence is that in the Epistle to the Hebrews: “For what son is there whose father does not give him discipline?”, and that more clearly in the same: “Now all discipline for the time seems not to be of joy but of sadness; afterward, however, it will render the peaceful fruit of righteousness to those who strive through it”). God, therefore, is himself the highest wisdom; but the cult of God is the wisdom of man of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is folly with God.

Secundum hanc itaque sapientiam quae dei cultus est ait sancta scriptura: Multitudo sapientium sanitas est orbis terrarum.

According to this wisdom, therefore, which is the cult of God, holy Scripture says: A multitude of the wise is the health of the world.

[2] Sed si de sapientia disputare sapientium est, quid agemus? Numquidnam profiteri audebimus sapientiam ne sit nostra de illa impudens disputatio? Nonne terrebimur exemplo Pythagorae qui cum ausus non fuisset sapientem profiteri, philosophum potius, id est amatorem sapientiae, se esse respondit, a quo id nomen exortum ita deinceps posteris placuit ut quantalibet de rebus ad sapientiam pertinentibus doctrina quisque uel sibi uel aliis uideretur excellere non nisi philosophus uocaretur?

[2] But if to dispute about wisdom is the part of the wise, what shall we do? Shall we perhaps dare to profess wisdom, lest our disputation about it be impudent? Shall we not be terrified by the example of Pythagoras, who, since he did not dare to profess himself wise, answered rather that he was a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom; from whom that name, having thus arisen, thereafter so pleased posterity that, however much anyone might seem, by his doctrine in matters pertaining to wisdom, to excel either to himself or to others, he was called nothing but philosopher?

An ideo sapientem profiteri talium hominum nullus audebat quia sine ullo peccato putabant esse sapientem? Hoc autem nostra scriptura non dicit quae dicit: Argue sapientem, et amabit te; profecto enim iudicat habere peccatum quem censet arguendum. Sed ego nec sic quidem sapientem me audeo profiteri.

Was it for this reason that none of such men dared to profess a sapient, because they thought the wise man to be without any sin? But our Scripture does not say this, which says: “Reprove the wise man, and he will love you;” for assuredly it judges that he has sin whom it deems ought to be reproved. But I, not even thus, dare to profess myself wise.

Satis est mihi quod etiam ipsi negare non possunt, esse etiam philosophi, id est amatoris sapientiae, de sapientia disputare. Non enim hoc illi facere destiterunt qui se amatores sapientiae potius quam sapientes esse professi sunt.

It is enough for me that even they themselves cannot deny that it is also for the philosopher, that is, the lover of wisdom, to dispute about wisdom. For those who have professed themselves lovers of wisdom rather than wise men have not ceased to do this.

[3] Disputantes autem de sapientia definierunt eam dicentes: Sapientia est rerum humanarum diuinarumque scientia. Vnde ego quoque in libro superiore utrarumque rerum cognitionem, id est diuinarum atque humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse non tacui. Verum secundum hanc distinctionem qua dixit apostolus: Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, ista definitio diuidenda est ut rerum diuinarum scientia sapientia proprie nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat, de qua uolumine tertio decimo disputaui, non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis ubi plurimum superuacaneae uanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est huic scientiae tribuens, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima quae ad ueram beatitudinem ducit gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur.

[3] Those, however, disputing about wisdom defined it by saying: Wisdom is the science of human and divine things. Whence I too in the preceding book did not keep silent that the cognition of both kinds of things, that is, of divine and of human, can be called both wisdom and science. But according to this distinction in which the apostle said: To one is given a word of wisdom, to another a word of science, this definition must be divided, so that the science of divine things is properly entitled wisdom, while of human things it properly obtains the name of science—about which I disputed in volume 13—not, of course, attributing to this science whatever can be known by a human in human affairs, wherein there is very much superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity, but only that by which the most healthful faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened.

Qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamuis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam uitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare uocabulo scientiam uidetur apostolus. De qua prius cum loquerer ipsam praecipue fidem commendare curaui, a temporalibus aeterna breuiter ante distinguens atque ibi de temporalibus disserens, aeterna uero in hunc librum differens, etiam de rebus aeternis fidem temporalem quidem et temporaliter in credentium cordibus habitare, necessariam tamen propter adipiscenda ipsa aeterna esse monstraui.

By which science very many of the faithful do not prevail, although they prevail very much in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for the attaining of the blessed life, which is not except eternal, but another to know how this very thing both succors the pious and is defended against the impious, which the apostle seems to call by its proper appellation “science.” Of which, when I spoke before, I took care especially to commend faith itself, briefly distinguishing beforehand the eternal things from the temporal, and there discoursing about the temporal, but deferring the eternal to this book, and I showed that even concerning eternal things faith is indeed temporal and dwells temporally in the hearts of believers, yet is necessary for the obtaining of those very eternal things.

Fidem quoque de temporalibus rebus quas pro nobis aeternus fecit et passus est in homine quem temporaliter gessit atque ad aeterna peruexit ad eandem aeternorum adeptionem prodesse disserui, uirtutesque ipsas quibus in hac temporali mortalitate prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste uiuitur, nisi ad eandem licet temporalem fidem quae tamen ad aeterna perducit referantur, ueras non esse uirtutes.

I have also argued that the faith concerning temporal things which the Eternal did and suffered for us in the man whom he temporally assumed and conveyed to the eternal, is profitable for that same acquisition of eternal things; and that the very virtues by which, in this temporal mortality, one lives prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly are not true virtues unless they are referred to that same, albeit temporal, faith which nevertheless leads to the eternal.

[II 4] Quapropter, quoniam sicut scriptum est: Quamdiu sumus in corpore peregrinamur a domino; per fidem enim ambulamus non per speciem, profecto quamdiu iustus ex fide uiuit, quamuis secundum interiorem hominem uiuat, licet per eandem temporalem fidem ad ueritatem nitatur et tendat aeternam, tamen in eiusdem fidei temporalis retentione, contemplatione, dilectione nondum talis est trinitas ut dei iam imago dicenda sit ne in rebus temporalibus constituta uideatur quae constituenda est in aeternis. Mens quippe humana cum fidem suam uidet qua credit quod non uidet non aliquid sempiternum uidet. Non enim semper hoc erit, quod utique non erit quando ista peregrinatione finita qua peregrinamur a domino ut per fidem ambulare necesse sit species illa succedet per quam uidebimus facie ad faciem, sicut modo non uidentes, tamen quia credimus, uidere merebimur atque ad speciem nos per fidem perductos esse gaudebimus.

[2 4] Wherefore, since, as it is written: As long as we are in the body we sojourn away from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight, assuredly, as long as the just man lives from faith, although he lives according to the inner man, although by that same temporal faith he strives and tends toward the eternal truth, nevertheless, in the retention, contemplation, and dilection of that same temporal faith, there is not yet such a triad as to be called already the image of God, lest it seem to be constituted in temporal things which must be constituted in eternal things. For the human mind, when it sees its faith by which it believes what it does not see, does not see anything sempiternal. For this will not always be; indeed it will not be when, this peregrination being finished in which we are away from the Lord so that it is necessary to walk by faith, that appearance will succeed by which we shall see face to face—just as now, not seeing, yet because we believe we shall merit to see, and we shall rejoice that by faith we have been brought through to sight.

Neque enim iam fides erit qua credantur quae non uidentur, sed species qua uideantur quae credebantur. Tunc ergo etsi uitae huius mortalis transactae meminerimus et credidisse nos aliquando quae non uidebamus memoriter recoluerimus, in praeteritis atque transactis deputabitur fides ista non in praesentibus rebus semperque manentibus, ac per hoc etiam trinitas ista quae nunc in eiusdem fidei praesentis ac manentis memoria, contuitu, dilectione consistit tunc transacta et praeterita reperietur esse, non permanens. Ex quo colligitur ut si iam imago dei est ista trinitas, etiam ipsa non in eis quae semper sunt sed in rebus sit habenda transeuntibus.

For neither will there any longer be faith by which things not seen are believed, but sight by which the things that were believed are seen. Then, therefore, even if we remember the transacted course of this mortal life and recollect from memory that we once believed things we did not see, this faith will be accounted among past and transacted things, not among present things and those ever-abiding; and through this, too, that trinity which now consists in the memory, contemplation, and dilection of that same present and abiding faith will then be found to be transacted and past, not remaining. Whence it is gathered that, if already this trinity is the image of God, even it itself must be held to be not in the things which always are, but in passing things.

[III] Absit autem ut cum animae natura sit immortalis nec ab initio quo creata est umquam deinceps esse desitat, id quo nihil melius habet non cum eius immortalitate perduret. Quid uero melius in eius natura creatum est quam quod ad sui creatoris imaginem facta est? Non igitur in fidei retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, quae non erit semper, sed in eo quod semper erit inuenienda est quam dici oporteat imaginem dei.

[3] Far be it, however, that, since the soul’s nature is immortal and from the beginning when it was created it has never thereafter ceased to be, that than which it has nothing better should not endure together with its immortality. What, indeed, has been created better in its nature than that it was made to the image of its Creator? Therefore not in the retention of faith, contemplation, and dilection, which will not be forever, but in that which will be forever is that to be found which ought to be called the image of God.

[5] An adhuc utrum ita se res habeat aliquanto diligentius atque abstrusius perscrutabimur? Dici enim potest non perire istam trinitatem etiam cum fides ipsa transierit quia sicut nunc eam et memoria tenemus et cogitatione cernimus et uoluntate diligimus, ita etiam tunc cum eam nos habuisse memoria tenebimus et recolemus et hoc utrumque tertia uoluntate iungemus, eadem trinitas permanebit (quoniam si nullum in nobis quasi uestigium transiens reliquerit, profecto nec in memoria nostra eius aliquid habebimus quo recurramus eam praeteritam recordantes atque id utrumque intentione tertia copulantes, et quod erat scilicet in memoria non inde cogitantibus nobis et quod inde cogitatione formatur).

[5] Shall we investigate somewhat more diligently and abstrusely whether the matter still stands thus? For it can be said that that trinity does not perish even when faith itself has passed over, because just as now we both hold it by memory and discern it by cogitation and love it by will, so also then, when by memory we shall hold that we have had it and shall recollect it, and shall join both this by a third thing, the will, the same trinity will remain (for if it were to leave behind in us no, as it were, vestige in passing, assuredly neither shall we have in our memory anything of it to which we may recur, remembering it as past and coupling both by a third intention—both that which, namely, was in the memory when we are not thinking from it, and that which from it is formed by cogitation).

Sed qui hoc dicit non discernit aliam nunc esse trinitatem quando praesentem fidem tenemus, uidemus, amamus in nobis; aliam tunc futuram quando non ipsam sed eius uelut imaginarium uestigium in memoria reconditum recordatione contuebimur, et duo haec id est quod erat in memoria retinentis et quod inde imprimitur in acie recordantis, tertia uoluntate iungemus. Quod ut possit intellegi, sumamus exemplum de corporalibus rebus de quibus in libro undecimo satis locuti sumus, nempe ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendentes uel ab exterioribus ad interiora ingredientes primam reperimus trinitatem in corpore quod uidetur et acie uidentis quae cum uidet inde formatur et in uoluntatis intentione quae utrumque coniungit. Huic trinitati similem constituamus cum fides quae nunc inest nobis tamquam corpus illud in loco ita in nostra memoria constituta est, de quia informatur cogitatio recordantis sicut ex illo corpore acies intuentis, quibus duobus ut trinitas impleatur adnumeratur tertia uoluntas quae fidem in memoria constitutam et quandam eius effigiem in contuitu recordationis impressam conectit et iungit sicut in illa corporalis trinitate uisionis formam corporis quod uidetur et conformationem quae fit in cernentis aspectu coniungit intentio uoluntatis.

But the one who says this does not discern that one Trinity is now, when we hold, see, love the present faith within us; another will then be, when we shall behold not it itself but, as it were, its imaginary vestige laid up in memory, by recollection; and these two—namely, what was in the memory of the retainer and what from there is imprinted upon the gaze of the rememberer—we shall join by a third, the will. In order that this may be understood, let us take an example from corporal things, about which in the eleventh book we have spoken enough: namely, as we ascend from lower to higher or enter from outer to inner, we find a first Trinity in the body that is seen, and in the gaze of the seer, which, when it sees, is formed from it, and in the intention of the will which conjoins both. Let us constitute a similar Trinity to this, when the faith which now is in us—just as that body is in a place—is thus set in our memory; from which the thought of the one recollecting is informed, just as from that body the gaze of the one looking is; to which two, that the Trinity may be completed, a third is added, the will, which links and joins the faith established in memory and a certain effigy of it impressed in the contemplative regard of recollection, just as in that corporal Trinity the intention of the will conjoins the form of the body that is seen and the conformation that is made in the beholder’s aspect.

Faciamus ergo corpus illud quod cernebatur interisse dilapsum nec eius remansisse aliquid in ullo loco ad quod uidendum recurrat aspectus. Numquid quia imago rei corporalis iam transactae atque praeteritae remanet in memoria unde informetur cogitantis obtutus atque id utrumque tertia uoluntate iungatur, eadem trinitas esse dicenda est quae fuerat quando species in loco positi corporis uidebatur? Non utique, sed prorsus alia.

Let us then suppose that that body which was being perceived has perished, having fallen to pieces, and that nothing of it has remained in any place to which the gaze might return to see it. Because the image of a corporeal thing now transacted and past remains in the memory, from which the gaze of the one thinking is informed, and these two are joined by a third—the will—is this to be said to be the same trinity that existed when the appearance of a body set in a place was being seen? Not at all, but altogether another.

Nam praeter quod illa erat extrinsecus, haec intrinsecus, illam profecto faciebat species praesentis corporis, hanc imago praeteriti. Sic et in hac re de qua nunc agimus et propter quam putauimus adhibendum illud exemplum, fides quae nunc in animo nostro est uelut illud corpus in loco dum tenetur, aspicitur, amatur quandam efficit trinitatem; sed non ipsa erit quando fides haec in animo sicut corpus illud in loco iam non erit. Quae uero tunc erit quando eam recordabimur in nobis fuisse, non esse, alia profecto erit.

For besides that the former was extrinsically, the latter intrinsically, assuredly the former was made by the appearance of the present body, the latter by the image of what is past. So also in this matter which we are now handling, and on account of which we thought that example should be adduced: the faith which is now in our mind, like that body in a place while it is held, is looked upon, is loved, produces a certain trinity; but it will not itself be, when this faith will no longer be in the mind, just as that body will no longer be in a place. But that which will then be, when we shall remember it to have been in us, not to be, will assuredly be another.

Hanc enim quae nunc est facit res ipsa praesens et animo credentis affixa, at illam quae tunc erit faciet rei praeteritate imaginatio in recordantis memoria derelicta.

For this one which now is is effected by the thing itself, present and affixed to the mind of the believer; but that one which then will be will be effected by the thing’s pastness, an imagination left behind in the memory of the one recalling.

[6] Nec illa igitur trinitas quae nunc non est imago dei erit, nec ista imago dei est quae tunc non erit, sed ea est inuenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali siue intellectuali, imago creatoris quae immortaliter immortalitati eius est insita.

[6] Therefore neither will that trinity which now is not be the image of God, nor is this the image of God which then will not be; but that is to be found in the soul of man, that is, the rational or intellectual, the image of the Creator which is immortally inlaid into His immortality.

[IV] Nam sicut ipsa immortalitas animae secundum quendam modum dicitur (habet quippe et anima mortem suam cum uita beata caret quae uere animae uita dicenda est, sed immortalis ideo nuncupatur quoniam qualicumque uita etiam cum miserrima est numquam desinit uiuere), ita quamuis ratio uel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc paruus, nunc magnus appareat, numquam nisi rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana; ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, siue ita obsoleta sit haec imago ut pene nulla sit siue obscura atque deformis siue clara et pulchra sit, semper est. Denique deformitatem dignitatis eius miserans diuina scriptura: Quamquam, inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur; thesaurizat et nescit cui congregabit ea. Non itaque uanitatem imagini dei tribueret nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec tantum ualere illam deformitatem ut auferat quod imago est satis ostendit dicendo: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo.

[4] For just as the very immortality of the soul is said in a certain manner (for the soul indeed has its death when it lacks the blessed life, which truly ought to be called the life of the soul; yet it is called immortal because, with whatever sort of life, even when it is most wretched, it never ceases to live), so, although reason or intellect now in it appears drowsed, now small, now great, the human soul is never anything except rational and intellectual; and therefore, if in this respect it was made to the image of God, namely, that by using reason and intellect it can understand and behold God, then from the beginning when this so great and wondrous nature began to be, whether this image be so obsolete as to be almost none, or be obscure and deformed, or be bright and beautiful, it always is. Finally, the divine Scripture, pitying the deformity of its dignity: “Although,” it says, “man walks in the image, nevertheless he is vainly disturbed; he treasures up and does not know for whom he will gather them.” Therefore it would not ascribe vanity to the image of God unless it saw that it had been made deformed. Nor does it judge that that deformity so prevails as to take away what is an image; it sufficiently shows this by saying: “Although man walks in the image.”

Quapropter ex utraque parte ueraciter pronuntiari potest ista sententia, ut quemadmodum dictum est: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur, ita dicatur: 'Quamquam uane conturbatur homo, tamen in imagine ambulat.' Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen uitiari potuit quia summa non est; et quamquam uitiari potuerit quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae capax est et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.

Wherefore on both sides this sentence can be truthfully pronounced, that just as it has been said: Although man walks in the image, nevertheless he is vainly disturbed, so let it be said: 'Although man is vainly disturbed, nevertheless he walks in the image.' For although it is a great nature, nevertheless it could be vitiated because it is not the supreme; and although it could be vitiated because it is not the supreme, nevertheless, because it is capable of the supreme nature and can be a participant in it, it is a great nature.

Quaeramus igitur in hac imagine dei quandam sui generis trinitatem adiuuante ipso qui nos fecit ad imaginem suam. Non enim aliter possumus haec salubriter uestigare et secundum sapientiam quae ab illo est aliquid inuenire, sed ea quae in superioribus libris et maxime in decimo de anima humana uel mente diximus si lectoris uel memoria teneantur atque recolantur uel diligentia in eisdem locis in quibus conscripta sunt recenseantur, non hic desiderabit prolixiorem de rei tantae inquisitione sermonem.

Let us therefore seek in this image of God a certain trinity of its own kind, with his aid who made us in his image. For we are not otherwise able to investigate these things salubriously and to find anything according to the wisdom which is from him; but if the things which in the preceding books, and most of all in the tenth, concerning the human soul or mind, we have said are held and recalled by the reader’s memory, or are reviewed with diligence in those same places in which they have been written, he will not here desire a more prolix discourse about the inquiry into so great a matter.

[7] Inter cetera ergo in libro decimo diximus hominis mentem nosse semetipsam. Nihil enim tam nouit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi. Et alia quantum satis uisum est adhibuimus documenta quibus hoc certissime probaretur.

[7] Among the rest, then, in the tenth book we said that the mind of man knows itself. For the mind knows nothing so well as that which is present to itself, nor is anything more present to the mind than itself to itself. And we adduced other documents, as much as seemed sufficient, by which this might be most certainly proved.

[V] Quid itaque dicendum est de infantis mente ita adhuc paruuli et in tam magna demersi rerum ignorantia ut illius mentis tenebras mens hominis quae aliquid nouit exhorreat? An etiam ipsa se nosse credenda est, sed intenta nimis in eas res quas per corporis sensus tanto maiore quanto nouiore coepit delectatione sentire, non ignorare se potest sed cogitare se non potest? Quanta porro intentione in ista quae foris sunt sensibilia feratur uel hinc solum conici potest quod lucis huius hauriendae sic auida est ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi iacet infans, in ea parte ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri nec ceruix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non remouetur aspectus ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri nouerimus eam formam tenentibus oculis quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit.

[5] What, then, is to be said about the mind of an infant, thus still very small and submerged in so great an ignorance of things that the human mind, which knows something, shudders at the darkness of that mind? Or is even it to be believed to know itself, but, being too intent upon those things which through the senses of the body it has begun to feel with a delectation the greater the newer it is, it cannot be ignorant of itself, but it cannot cogitate upon itself? With how great an intention it is borne toward those sensibles which are outside can even from this alone be conjectured: that it is so avid to imbibe this light that, if someone less cautious, or unaware of what might happen from it, should set a night-light where the infant lies, on that side to which the eyes of the one lying can be turned back and the neck cannot be bent, its gaze is not removed from there, so that we have known some even to become strabismic from this, their eyes retaining that form which habit has in a certain manner fixed in the tender and soft eyes.

Ita et in alios corporis sensus quantum sinit illa aetas intentione se quasi coartant animae paruulorum ut quidquid per carnem offendit aut allicit hoc solum abhorreant uehementer aut appetant; sua uero interiora non cogitent nec possint admoneri ut hoc faciant quia nondum admonentis signa nouerunt ubi praecipuum locum uerba obtinent quae sicut alia prorsus nesciunt. Quod autem aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare iam in eodem uolumine ostendimus.

Thus too into the other senses of the body, in so far as that age allows, the souls of little ones, as it were, constrain themselves by attention, so that whatever through the flesh offends or allures, this alone they vehemently abhor or desire; but their own interiors they do not think upon, nor can they be admonished to do this, because as yet they do not know the signs of one admonishing, wherein words obtain the chief place, which, like other things, they absolutely do not know. But that it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think upon oneself, we have already shown in the same volume.

[8] Sed hanc aetatem omittamus quae nec interrogari potest quid in se agatur et nos ipsi eius ualde obliti sumus. Hinc tantum certos nos esse suffecerit quod cum homo de animi sui natura cogitare potuerit atque inuenire quod uerum est, alibi non inueniet quam penes se ipsum. Inueniet autem non quod nesciebat sed unde non cogitabat.

[8] But let us omit this age, which can neither be interrogated as to what is going on within it, and which we ourselves have very much forgotten. Let it suffice from this point only that we are certain of this: when a man is able to cogitate about the nature of his mind and to find what is true, he will not find it elsewhere than with himself. Moreover, he will find not what he did not know, but that about which he was not cogitating.

Quid enim scimus si quod est in nostra mente nescimus cum omnia quae scimus non nisi mente scire possimus?

For what do we know, if we do not know what is in our mind, since all the things that we know we can know only by the mind?

[VI] Tanta est tamen cogitationis uis ut nec ipsa mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat nisi quando se cogitat, ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est nisi unde cogitatur ut nec ipsa mens qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur aliter possit esse in conspectu suo nisi se ipsam cogitando. Quomodo autem quando se non cogitat in conspectu suo non sit cum sine se ipsa numquam esse possit quasi aliud sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, inuenire non possum. Hoc quippe de oculo corporis non absurde dicitur.

[6] Yet so great is the force of cogitation that not even the mind itself, in a certain manner, sets itself in its own sight unless when it cogitates itself; and through this, thus nothing is in the sight of the mind except what is being cogitated, so that not even the mind itself, by which whatever is cogitated is cogitated, can be in its own sight otherwise than by cogitating itself. But how it is that, when it does not cogitate itself, it is not in its own sight—since without itself it can never be—as though it were one thing and its sight another, I cannot find. For this, indeed, is not absurdly said of the eye of the body.

Ipse quippe oculus loco suo est fixus in corpore; aspectus autem eius in ea quae extra sunt tenditur et usque in sidera extenditur. Nec est oculus in conspectu suo quandoquidem non conspicit se ipsum nisi speculo obiecto unde iam locuti sumus. Quod non fit utique quando se mens in suo conspectu sui cogitatione constituit.

For indeed the eye itself is fixed in its place in the body; but its gaze is stretched toward the things that are outside and is extended even to the stars. Nor is the eye in its own sight, since it does not behold itself except when a mirror is set before it, about which we have already spoken. Which assuredly does not happen when the mind sets itself, by thought, in its own sight.

Numquid ergo alia sua parte aliam suam partem uidet cum se conspicit cogitando sicut aliis membris nostris qui sunt oculi alia nostra membra conspicimus quae in nostro possunt esse conspectu? Quid dici absurdius uel sentiri potest? Vnde igitur aufertur mens nisi a se ipsa, et ubi ponitur in conspectu suo nisi ante se ipsam?

Does it then see one part of itself by another part of itself when it beholds itself by thinking, just as by other members of ours, which are the eyes, we behold other members of ours that can be in our sight? What can be said or felt more absurd? Whence, then, is the mind removed, if not from itself, and where is it placed in its own sight, if not before itself?

Non ergo ibi erit ubi erat quando in conspectu suo non erat quia hic posita, inde sublata est? Sed si conspicienda migrauit, conspectura ubi manebit? An quasi geminatur ut et illic sit et hic, id est et ubi conspicere et ubi conspici possit, ut in se sit conspiciens ante se conspicua?

Will it then not be there where it was when it was not in its own sight, because, being set here, it has been taken away from there? But if, in order to be beheld, it has migrated, where will it remain to behold? Or is it as if doubled, so that it may be both there and here, that is, both where it can behold and where it can be beheld, so that it is in itself as beholding, and before itself as to-be-beheld?

Nihil horum nobis ueritas consulta respondet quoniam quando isto modo cogitamus non nisi corporum fictas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paucis certissimum est mentibus a quibus potest de hac re ueritas consuli.

Truth, when consulted, responds to none of these, since when we think in this mode we think nothing except feigned images of bodies—a thing which it is most certain to a few minds, by whom truth can be consulted on this matter, that the mind is not a body.

Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam quando se cogitat non quasi per loci spatium sed incorporea conuersione reuocetur. Cum uero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen nouerit se tanquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui. Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritus ea quae nouit eius memoria continentur, nec est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis eius nisi unde cogitat; cetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita quae memoria nuncupatur.

Accordingly it remains that something pertaining to its nature is its own sight, and that into it, when it thinks itself, it is recalled not as if through the space of place but by an incorporeal conversion. But when it does not think itself, indeed it is not in its own sight nor is its gaze formed upon it; yet it knows itself, as though it itself were to itself the memory of itself. Just as in the case of one skilled in many disciplines, the things he knows are contained by his memory, and from there nothing is in the sight of his mind except that about which he is thinking; the rest are stowed away in a certain arcane knowledge which is called memory.

Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus in memoria poneremus, ipsam uero conformationem tamquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur, at illud quo utrumque coniungitur amorem seu uoluntatem. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intellegit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. Res quippe incorporea intellecta conspicitur, et intellegendo cognoscitur.

Therefore we commended the trinity thus: that we would place in memory that from which the gaze of the thinker is formed, but the very conformation as an image which is imprinted from it, and that by which both are conjoined, love or will. The mind, therefore, when by thought it beholds itself, understands itself and recognizes itself: it begets, therefore, this understanding and its own cognition. For an incorporeal thing, once understood, is beheld, and by understanding it is known.

Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens quando cogitando intellectam se conspicit tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit, sed ita sibi nota erat quemadmodum notae sunt res quae memoria continentur etiamsi non cogitentur (quoniam dicimus hominem nosse litteras etiam cum de aliis rebus, non de litteris cogitat). Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur quae nihil est aliud quam uoluntas fruendum aliquid appetens uel tenens. Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuandam mentis putauimus trinitatem, memoria, intellegentia, uoluntate.

Nor indeed does the mind beget that knowledge of itself, when by thinking it beholds itself as understood, as though it had been previously unknown to itself; rather, it was known to itself in the way in which things are known that are contained in memory even if they are not being thought (since we say that a man knows his letters even when he is thinking about other things, not about letters). But these two, the begetting and the begotten, are coupled by a third dilection, which is nothing else than the will desiring or holding something to be enjoyed. And therefore by those three names also we judged that the trinity of the mind should be insinuated: memory, intelligence, will.

[9] Sed quoniam mentem semper sui meminisse semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare, quamuis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est, circa eiusdem libri decimi finem diximus, quaerendum est quonam modo ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus, notitia uero cuiusque rei quae inest menti etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere. Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria ut et sui meminisset et se intellegeret et amaret, sed meminerat sui tantum, et postea cum cogitare se coepit tunc se intellexit atque dilexit.

[9] But since we said toward the end of that same Book Ten that the mind always remembers itself and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think itself as discrete from those things which are not what it itself is, it must be inquired in what way intellect pertains to cogitation, whereas the notion of any thing which is in the mind even when it is not being cogitated is to be said to pertain to memory alone. For if this is so, it did not have these three—that it both remembered itself and understood itself and loved itself—but it remembered itself only; and afterwards, when it began to cogitate itself, then it understood and loved itself.

[VII] Quapropter diligentius illud consideremus exemplum quod adhibuimus ubi ostenderetur aliud esse rem quamque non nosse, aliud non cogitare, fierique posse ut nouerit homo aliquid quod non cogitat quando aliunde, non inde cogitat. Duarum ergo uel plurium disciplinarum peritus quando unam cogitat, aliam uel alias etiam si non cogitat nouit tamen. Sed numquid recte possumus dicere: 'Iste musicus nouit quidem musicam sed nunc eam non intellegit quia non eam cogitat; intellegit autem nunc geometricam, hanc enim nunc cogitat'? Absurda est quantum apparet ista sententia.

[7] Wherefore let us consider more diligently that example which we employed, where it was being shown that it is one thing not to know each thing, another not to think; and that it can come about that a man knows something which he is not thinking, when he is thinking from elsewhere, not from there. Therefore a man expert in two or more disciplines, when he is thinking one, nevertheless knows the other or others even if he is not thinking them. But can we rightly say: 'This musician does indeed know music, but he does not now understand it because he is not thinking it; he does, however, now understand geometric, for this he is now thinking'? Absurd, so far as appears, is this statement.

Quid etiam illa si dicamus: 'Iste musicus nouit quidem musicam sed nunc eam non amat quando non eam cogitat; amat autem nunc geometrica quoniam nunc ipsam cogitat'? Nonne similiter absurda est? Rectissime uero dicimus: 'Iste quem perspicis de geometrica disputantem etiam perfectus est musicus. Nam et meminit eius disciplinae et intellegit et diligit eam, sed quamuis eam nouerit et amet, nunc illam non cogitat quoniam geometricam de qua disputat cogitat.'

What about this too, if we say: 'This musician indeed knows music, but now he does not love it when he is not thinking of it; he loves, however, geometry now, since now he is thinking of it itself'? Is it not similarly absurd? But most rightly we say: 'This man whom you perceive disputing about geometry is also a perfect musician. For he both remembers that discipline and understands and loves it, but although he knows and loves it, now he is not thinking of that one, since he is thinking of the geometry about which he is disputing.'

Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerum quasdam notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium atque in conspectu mentis uelut apertius constitui quando cogitantur; tunc enim se ipsa mens et meminisse et intellegere et amare inuenit etiam unde non cogitabat quando aliunde cogitabat. Sed unde diu non cogitauerimus et unde cogitare nisi commoniti non ualemus, id nos nescio quo eodemque miro modo si potest dici scire nescimus. Denique recte ab eo qui commemorat ei quem commemorat dicitur: 'Scis hoc sed scire te nescis; commemorabo et inuenies te scientem quod te nescire putaueras.' Id agunt et litterae quae de his rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione ueras esse inuenit lector, non quas ueras esse credit ei qui scripsit sicut legitur historia, sed quas ueras esse etiam ipse inuenit siue apud se siue in ipsa mentis duce ueritate.

Hence we are admonished that there are for us, in the hidden recess of the mind, certain notions of certain things, and that these then, in a certain way, proceed into the open and are, as it were, set more plainly in the sight of the mind when they are being thought; for then the mind itself finds itself both remembering and understanding and loving even that which it was not thinking of when it was thinking of something else. But those things which we have not thought of for a long time, and which we are not able to think of unless we are prompted, this we do not know-that-we-know, in some I-know-not-what and likewise wondrous way, if it can be called knowing. Finally, it is rightly said by the one who reminds to the one whom he reminds: 'You know this but you do not know that you know; I will remind, and you will find yourself knowing what you had supposed you did not know.' This also is what the writings do that have been composed about these matters—things which the reader, with reason as guide, finds to be true, not things which he believes to be true on the credit of the one who wrote, as history is read, but things which he too himself finds to be true, whether within himself or in truth itself, the guide of the mind.

Qui uero nec admonitus ualet ista contueri magna caecitate cordis tenebris ignorantiae demersus est altius, et mirabiliore diuina ope indiget ut possit ad ueram sapientiam peruenire.

He, however, who is not able, even when admonished, to behold these things, has been sunk deeper by the great blindness of heart and the darkness of ignorance, and requires more wondrous divine aid, so that he may be able to arrive at true wisdom.

[10] Propter hoc itaque uolui de cogitatione adhibere qualecumque documentum quo posset ostendi quomodo ex his quae memoria continentur recordantis acies informetur et tale aliquid gignatur ubi homo cogitat quale in illo erat ubi ante cogitationem meminerat, quia facilius dinoscitur quod tempore accedit et ubi parens prolem spatio temporis antecedit. Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit et interiorem uoluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul sunt et simul semper fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt siue cogitarentur siue non cogitarentur, uidebitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere. Sed quia ibi uerbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiore uerbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intellegentia, uoluntate.

[10] On account of this, therefore, I wished to apply from cogitation some sort of proof by which it might be shown how, from those things which are contained in memory, the keen edge of the one recalling is informed, and something of such a kind is begotten in that sphere where a human being cogitates, like what there was in that sphere where, before cogitation, he had remembered; because that which comes with time, and where the parent precedes the offspring by a span of time, is more easily discerned. For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and the inner intelligence by which it understands itself, and the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are together and have always been together from the time they began to be, whether they were being cogitated or were not being cogitated, the image of that Trinity will indeed seem also to pertain to memory alone. But because there a word cannot exist without cogitation (for we cogitate everything that we say, even with that inner word which pertains to the language of no nation), in those three rather is this image recognized, namely, memory, intelligence, will.

Hanc autem nunc dico intellegentiam qua intellegimus cogitantes, id est quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant sed non cogitabantur cogitatio nostra formatur, et eam uoluntatem siue amorem uel dilectionem quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est. Hinc factum est ut etiam per exteriora sensibilia quae per oculos carnis uidentur legentium ducerem tarditatem, in undecimo scilicet libro, atque inde cum eis ingrederer ad hominis interioris eam potentiam qua ratiocinatur de temporalibus rebus differens illam principaliter dominantem qua contemplatur aeterna. Atque id duobus uoluminibus egi, duodecimo utrumque discernens quorum unum est superius, alterum inferius quod superiori esse subditum debet; tertio decimo autem de munere inferioris quo humanarum rerum scientia salubris continetur ut in hac temporali uita id agamus quo consequamur aeternam quanta potui ueritate ac breuitate disserui, quandoquidem rem tam multiplicem atque copiosam, multorum atque magnorum disputationibus multis magnisque celebratam uno strictim uolumine inclusi, ostendens etiam in ipsa trinitatem sed nondum quae dei sit imago dicenda.

I now mean by understanding that by which we understand while cogitating, that is, when, those things having been found which were at the disposal of memory but were not being cogitated, our cogitation is formed; and I mean that will or love or dilection which joins this progeny and its parent, and is in a certain manner common to both. Hence it came about that even through external sensibles which are seen through the eyes of the flesh I would lead the tardity of readers—in the 11th book, namely—and from there with them I would enter to that power of the inner man by which he reasons about temporal things, distinguishing that primarily ruling one by which he contemplates eternal things. And I did this in two volumes, in the 12th distinguishing the two, of which the one is higher, the other lower, which ought to be subject to the higher; but in the 13th, concerning the office of the lower, whereby a healthful knowledge of human affairs is contained so that in this temporal life we may do that by which we may attain the eternal, I discoursed with as much truth and brevity as I could, since I enclosed a matter so multiple and copious, celebrated by many and great disputations of many and great men, in one compressed volume, showing a trinity in it as well, but not yet one which ought to be called the image of God.

[VIII 11] Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiamus imaginem dei. Quamuis enim mens humana non sit eius naturae cuius est deus, imago tamen naturae illius qua natura melior nulla est ibi quaerenda et inuenienda est in nobis quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps dei et in ea reperienda est imago eius.

[8 11] Now indeed we have already come to that discussion in which we have undertaken to consider the principal of the human mind, by which it knows God or can know him, so that in it we may find the image of God. For although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, nevertheless the image of that nature than which no nature is better is to be sought there, and is to be found in us in that in which our nature too has nothing better. But first the mind must be considered in itself before it is a partaker of God, and in it his image is to be found.

Diximus enim eam etsi amissa dei participatione obsoletam atque deformem dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest, quod tam magnum bonum nisi per hoc quod imago eius est non potest.

For we have said that even if, the participation of God having been lost, it is obsolete and deformed, yet the image of God remains. By that very fact indeed it is his image, whereby it is capable of him and can be a participant of him; for so great a good it cannot attain except through this, that it is his image.

Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem deum sed iam imaginem dei. Non forinsecus accepit memoria quod teneret, nec foris inuenit quod aspiceret intellectus sicut corporis oculus, nec ista duo uelut formam corporis et eam quae inde facta est in acie contuentis uoluntas foris iunxit. Nec imaginem rei quae foris uisa est quodam modo raptam et in memoria reconditam cogitatio cum ad eam conuerteretur inuenit, et inde informatus est recordantis obtutus iungente utrumque tertia uoluntate, sicut in eis ostendebamus trinitatibus fieri quae in rebus corporalibus reperiebantur uel ex corporibus per sensum corporis introrsus quodam modo trahebantur, de quibus omnibus in libro undecimo disseruimus.

Behold, therefore, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself. If we discern this, we discern a Trinity, not yet indeed God but already the image of God. Memory did not receive from without what it should hold, nor did the intellect find outside what it might look upon like the eye of the body, nor did the will from without join these two together, as it does the form of a body and that which from it is made in the line of sight of the beholder. Nor did thought, when it turned to it, find the image of a thing which was seen from without—after being in a certain manner snatched and stored away in memory—and from there the gaze of the rememberer was informed, a third will joining both; just as we were showing to happen in those trinities which were found in corporeal things, or were in a certain way drawn inward from bodies through the sense of the body, about all of which we have discoursed in Book 11.

Nec sicut fiebat uel apparebat quando de illa scientia disserebamus iam in hominis interioris opibus constituta, quae distinguenda fuit a sapientia, unde quae sciuntur uelut aduenticia sunt in animo, siue cognitione historica inlata ut sunt facta et dicta quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt uel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, siue in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis sicut fides quam plurimum in libro tertio decimo commendauimus, sicut uirtutes quibus si uerae sunt in hac mortalitate ideo bene uiuitur ut beate in illa quae diuinitus promittitur immortalitate uiuatur.

Nor as it was being done or appeared when we were discoursing about that science already established among the resources of the inner man, which had to be distinguished from wisdom, whence the things that are known are, as it were, adventitious in the mind, whether brought in by historical cognition, as are the deeds and words which are accomplished in time and pass away, or are set in the nature of things in their own places and regions; or, in the man himself, there arise things which were not, either through others teaching or through one’s own cogitations, such as the faith which we very greatly commended in Book 13, and such as the virtues, by which, if they are true, in this mortality one therefore lives well, in order that one may live blessedly in that immortality which is divinely promised.

Haec atque huiusmodi habent in tempore ordinem suum, in quo nobis trinitas memoriae, uisionis et amoris facilius apparebat. Nam quaedam eorum praeueniunt cognitionem discentium; sunt enim cognoscibilia et antequam cognoscantur suique cognitionem in discentibus gignant. Sunt autem uel in locis suis uel quae tempore praeterierunt, quamuis quae praeterierunt non ipsa sint sed eorum quaedam signa praeteritorum quibus uisis uel auditis cognoscantur fuisse atque transisse.

These and things of this sort have their order in time, in which the trinity of memory, vision, and love appeared to us more easily. For certain of them anticipate the cognition of learners; for they are knowable and, even before they are known, beget in learners a cognition of themselves. But they are either in their own places, or are things that have passed by in time, although the things that have passed are not the things themselves, but certain signs of things past, by the seeing or hearing of which they are known to have been and to have passed away.

Quae signa uel in locis sita sunt sicut monumenta mortuorum et quaecumque similia, uel in litteris fide dignis sicut est omnis grauis et approbandae auctoritatis historia, uel in animis eorum qui ea iam nouerunt (eis quippe iam nota, et aliis utique sunt noscibilia quorum scientiam praeuenerunt et qui ea nosse illis quibus nota sunt docentibus possunt). Quae omnia et quando discuntur quandam faciunt trinitatem specie sua quae noscibilis fuit etiam antequam nosceretur eique adiuncta cognitione discentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur ac tertia uoluntate quae utrumque coniungit. Et cum cognita fuerint, alia trinitas dum recoluntur fit iam interius in ipso animo ex his imaginibus quae cum discerentur sunt impressae in memoria et informatione cogitationis ad ea conuerso recordantis aspectu et ex uoluntate quae tertia duo ista coniungit.

Which signs either are situated in places, like monuments of the dead and whatever similar things, or in writings worthy of faith, as is every history of grave and approvable authority, or in the minds of those who already knew them (for to them they are already known, and to others assuredly they are knowable, whose knowledge they have anticipated, and who can get to know them by those to whom they are known teaching). All of which, also when they are learned, make a certain trinity by their own species, which was knowable even before it was known, and to it is adjoined the cognition of the learner, which then begins to be when it is learned, and a third, the will, which conjoins both. And when they have been known, another trinity, while they are recollected, is made now inwardly in the mind itself, from those images which, when they were being learned, were imprinted in the memory, and from the information of thought, with the gaze of the one recalling turned toward them, and from the will which as the third conjoins those two.

Ea uero quae oriuntur in animo ubi non fuerunt sicut fides et cetera huiusmodi, etsi aduenticia uidentur cum doctrina inseruntur, non tamen foris posita uel foris peracta sunt sicut illa quae creduntur, sed intus omnino in ipso animo esse coeperunt. Fides enim non est quod creditur, sed qua creditur, et illud creditur, illa conspicitur. Tamen quia esse coepit in animo qui iam erat animus antequam in illo ista esse coepisset, aduenticium quiddam uidetur et in praeteritis habebitur quando succedente specie iam esse destiterit, aliamque nunc trinitatem facit per suam praesentiam, retenta, conspecta, dilecta; aliam tunc faciet per quoddam sui uestigium quod in memoria praeteriens dereliquerit sicut iam supra dictum est.

Those things, however, which arise in the mind where they were not—such as faith and other things of this kind—although they seem adventitious when they are inserted by doctrine, nevertheless are not set outside or accomplished outside like those things which are believed, but have begun to be entirely within, in the mind itself. For faith is not that which is believed, but that by which one believes; and the former is believed, the latter is beheld. Yet because it began to be in a mind which already was a mind before these things had begun to be in it, it seems something adventitious, and will be accounted among past things when, a succeeding form coming on, it has now ceased to be; and now it makes one trinity by its presence—retained, beheld, loved; then it will make another by a certain vestige of itself which, as has already been said above, it will have left behind in memory as it passed.

[IX 12] Vtrum autem etiam tunc uirtutes quibus in hac mortalitate bene uiuitur quia et ipsae incipiunt esse in animo qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat, desinant esse cum ad aeterna perduxerint nonnulla quaestio est. Quibusdam enim uisum est desituras, et de tribus quidem, prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia cum hoc dicitur non nihil dici uidetur. Iustitia uero immortalis est et magis tunc perficietur in nobis quam esse cessabit.

[9 12] Whether, moreover, even then the virtues by which one lives well in this mortality—since they themselves begin to exist in the mind which, although it was previously without them, was nevertheless a mind—cease to be when they have led to the eternal, is a certain question. For to some it has seemed that they will fail; and as to three, indeed—prudence, fortitude, temperance—when this is said, it seems that something (not nothing) is being said. But justice is immortal, and will then be perfected in us rather than cease to be.

De omnibus tamen quattuor magnus auctor eloquentiae Tullius in Hortensio dialogo disputans: Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac uita migrauerimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aeuum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent; aut ipsis etiam uirtutibus? Nec enim fortitudine egeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo; nec iustitia, cum esset nihil quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines; nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. Vna igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est uita laudanda.

Concerning all four, however, the great author of eloquence Tullius, disputing in the dialogue Hortensius: “If for us,” he says, “when we have migrated from this life, it were permitted to spend an immortal age in the islands of the blessed, as the fables relate, what need would there be of eloquence, since no judgments would be held; or even of the virtues themselves? For we would have no need of fortitude, with no task set forth nor toil nor danger; nor of justice, since there would be nothing of another’s to be sought after; nor of temperance, to rule lusts which would not exist; nor indeed would we need prudence, with no selection proposed of goods and evils. By one thing, therefore, we would be blessed: by the cognition of nature and by science, by which alone even the life of the gods is to be praised.”

Ex quo intellegi potest, cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc uoluntatis.

From which it can be understood that the other things are of necessity, this one thing of will.

Ita ille tantus orator cum philosophiam praedicaret recolens ea quae a philosophis acceperat et praeclare ac suauiter explicans in hac tantum uita quam uidemus aerumnis et erroribus plenam omnes quattuor necessarias dixit esse uirtutes, nullam uero earum cum ex hac uita emigrabimus si liceat ibi uiuere ubi uiuitur beate, sed bonos animos sola beatos esse cognitione et scientia, hoc est contemplatione naturae in qua nihil est melius et amabilius ea natura quae creauit omnes ceteras instituitque naturas. Cui regenti esse subditum si iustitiae est, immortalis est omnino iustitia nec in illa esse beatitudine desinet sed talis ac tanta erit ut perfectior et maior esse non possit.

Thus that so great an orator, when he was proclaiming philosophy, recollecting the things which he had received from the philosophers and explaining them excellently and suavely, said that in this life alone which we see, full of hardships and errors, all four virtues are necessary, but that none of them would be, when we shall emigrate from this life, if it be permitted to live there where one lives blessedly; rather, that good souls are blessed by cognition and science alone, that is, by the contemplation of nature, in which nothing is better and more lovable than that nature which created and instituted all the other natures. If being subject to the One who rules is of justice, justice is altogether immortal, nor will it cease to be in that beatitude, but it will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater.

Fortassis et aliae tres uirtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnatione libidinum erunt in illa felicitate ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum deo praeponere uel aequare, fortitudinis ei firmissime cohaerere, temperantiae nullo defectu noxio delectari. Nunc autem quod agit iustitia in subueniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecauendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectationibus prauis non ibi erit ubi nihil omnino mali erit. Ac per hoc ista uirtutum opera quae huic mortali uitae sunt necessaria sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt in praeteritis habebuntur, et aliam nunc faciunt trinitatem, cum ea praesentia tenemus, aspicimus, amamus; aliam tunc factura sunt cum ea non esse sed fuisse per quaedam eorum uestigia quae praetereundo in memoria derelinquent reperiemus, quia et tunc trinitas erit cum illud qualecumque uestigium et memoriter retinebitur et agnoscetur ueraciter et hoc utrumque tertia uoluntate iungetur.

Perhaps the other three virtues also—prudence now without any peril of error, fortitude without the annoyance of evils to be borne, temperance without the repugnance of libidines—will be in that felicity, so that it be for prudence to put no good before God or to equal him, for fortitude to cohere to him most firmly, for temperance to be delighted with no noxious defect. Now, however, what justice does in succoring the wretched, what prudence in precluding insidious plots, what fortitude in enduring molestations, what temperance in coercing perverse delectations, will not be there where there will be nothing of evil at all. And therefore these works of the virtues, which are necessary for this mortal life, will be held among things past, like faith, to which they are to be referred; and now they make one trinity, since we hold them present, we look upon, we love; they will make another then, when they will not be, but will have been; through certain traces of them which, in passing by, they will leave behind in memory, we shall find them, for then too there will be a trinity, when that trace, of whatever sort, both will be retained in memory and will be truly recognized, and both will be joined by a third, the will.

[X 13] In omnibus istarum quas commemorauimus temporalium rerum scientia quaedam cognoscibilia cognitionem interpositione temporis antecedunt sicut sunt ea sensibilia quae iam erant in rebus antequam cognoscerentur uel ea omnia quae per historiam cognoscuntur; quaedam uero simul esse incipiunt uelut si aliquid uisibile quod omnino non erat ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit, aut si aliquid sonet ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. Verumtamen siue tempore praecedentia siue simul esse incipientia cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignuntur. Cognitione uero facta cum ea quae cognouimus posita in memoria recordatione reuisuntur, quis non uideat priorem esse tempore in memoria retentionem quam in recordatione uisionem et huius utriusque terita uoluntate iunctionem?

[10 13] In all the knowledge of those temporal things which we have commemorated, certain cognoscibles precede cognition by the interposition of time, as are those sensibles which already were in things before they were known, or all those things which are known through history; others, however, begin to be together with cognition, as if some visible thing which was in no way before our eyes should arise, it certainly does not precede our cognition; or if something should sound where a hearer is present, both the sound and its hearing indeed begin to be together and together cease. Nevertheless, whether preceding in time or beginning to be together, the cognoscibles beget cognition; they are not begotten by cognition. But when cognition has been made, when those things which we have known, placed in memory, are revisited by recordation, who does not see that in time the retention in memory is prior to the vision in recordation, and the junction of both by a third thing, the will?

Porro autem in mente non sic est; neque enim aduenticia sibi ipsa est quasi ad se ipsam quae iam erat uenerit aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat, aut non aliunde uenerit sed in se ipsa quae iam erat nata sit ea ipsa quae non erat sicut in mente quae iam erat oritur fides quae non erat, aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam uelut in memoria sua constitutam uidet quasi non ibi fuerit antequam se ipsam cognosceret, cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, numquam sui meminisse, numquam se intellegere, numquam se amare destiterit sicut iam ostendimus. Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione conuertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et uerbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, uoluntate utrumque iungente.

But moreover in the mind it is not so; for it is not adventitious to itself, as though to itself, which already existed, there had come from elsewhere that same self which had not existed, or as though it had not come from elsewhere but in itself, which already existed, there had been born that very thing which had not existed, as in the mind which already was there arises faith which was not; nor, after cognition of itself, does it, by recollecting, see itself as though constituted in its own memory, as if it had not been there before it knew itself, since indeed from the time it began to be, it has never ceased to remember itself, never to understand itself, never to love itself, as we have already shown. And therefore, when it is turned to itself by thought, a trinity comes to be in which now even the Word can be understood. For it is formed from the thought itself, the will joining both.

Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus.

There, then, the image which we seek is rather to be recognized.

[XI 14] Sed dicet aliquis: 'Non est ista memoria qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur quae sibi semper est praesens; memoria enim praeteritorum est non praesentium.' Nam quidam cum de uirtutibus agerent in quibus est etiam Tullius in tria ista prudentiam diuiserunt, memoriam, intellegentiam, prouidentiam, memoriam scilicet praeteritis, intellegentiam praesentibus, prouidentiam rebus tribuentes futuris quam non habent certam nisi praescii futurorum, quod non est munus hominum nisi detur desuper, ut prophetis. Vnde scriptura sapientiae de hominibus agens: Cogitationes, inquit, mortalium timidae, et incertae prouidentiae nostrae.

[11 14] But someone will say: 'This is not that memory by which the mind is asserted to remember itself, which is always present to itself; for memory is of things past, not of things present.' For certain men, when they were dealing with the virtues—among whom is also Tullius—divided prudence into these three: memory, intelligence, providence; assigning memory to past things, intelligence to present things, providence to future things—which they do not have as certain unless they are fore-knowers of things to come, which is not a gift of human beings unless it be given from above, as to prophets. Whence the Scripture of Wisdom, speaking about human beings: 'The thoughts,' it says, 'of mortals are timid, and our providence is uncertain.'

Memoria uero de praeteritis et intellegentia de praesentibus certa est (sed praesentibus utique incorporalibus rebus, nam corporales corporalium praesentes sunt aspectibus oculorum). Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium attendat quemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris ubi maioris curae fuit uerborum integritas quam ueritas rerum:

Memory, indeed, is certain of past things, and understanding of present things (but, with respect to present things, to be sure, in the case of incorporeal realities; for corporeal things are present to the sight of bodily eyes). But let him who says that memory is not of present things consider how it has been said even in the secular literature itself, where the integrity of words was a greater concern than the truth of things:

nec talia passus Vlixes, Oblitusue sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. Vergilius enim cum sui non oblitum diceret Vlixem, quid aliud intellegi uoluit nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum sibi ergo praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset nisi et ad res praesentes memoria pertineret.

nor had Ulysses suffered such things, nor had the Ithacan been forgetful of himself in so great a crisis. For when Vergil said that Ulysses was not forgetful of himself, what else did he wish to be understood except that he remembered himself? Therefore, since he was present to himself, in no way would he have remembered himself unless memory also pertained to present things.

Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur qua fit ut ualeant recoli et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens memoria sine absurditate dicenda est qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intellegi et utrumque sui amore coniungi.

Wherefore, just as in past things that is called memory by which it comes about that they are able to be recollected and recalled, so, in a present matter, what the mind is to itself is, without absurdity, to be called memory, by which it is at hand to itself, so that by its own cogitation it can be understood, and for both to be conjoined by love of itself.

[XII 15] Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit seque intellegit ac diligit, stulta est.

[12 15] This trinity of the mind, therefore, is not for this reason the image of God: because the mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember and understand and love Him by whom it was made. When it does this, it itself becomes wise. If, however, it does not do this, even when it remembers itself and understands and loves itself, it is foolish.

Meminerit itaque dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligat. Quod ut breuius dicam, colat deum non factum cuius ab eo capax facta est et cuius esse particeps potest; propter quod scriptum est: Ecce dei cultus est sapientia, et non sua luce sed summae illius lucis participatione sapiens erit, atque ubi aeterna, ibi beata regnabit. Sic enim dicitur ista hominis sapientia ut etiam dei sit.

Let her therefore remember her God, in whose image she was made, and let her understand and love him. To say it more briefly, let her worship the unmade God, of whom, by him, she has been made capable, and of whose being she can be a participant; on account of which it is written: Behold, the worship of God is wisdom; and she will be wise not by her own light but by participation in that highest light, and where what is eternal is, there she will reign blessed. For thus is this wisdom of man spoken of, so that it may be God’s as well.

Tunc enim uera est; nam si humana est, uana est. Verum non ita dei qua sapiens est deus; neque enim participatione sui sapiens est sicut mens participatione dei. Sed quemadmodum dicitur etiam iustitia dei non solum illa qua ipse iustus est sed quam dat homini cum iustificat impium, quam commendans apostolus ait de quibusdam: Ignorantes enim dei iustitiam et suam iustitiam uolentes constituere iustitiae dei non sunt subiecti, sic enim dici etiam de quibusdam potest: 'Ignorantes dei sapientiam et suam uolentes constituere sapientiae dei non sunt subiecti.'

Then indeed it is true; for if it is human, it is vain. But not God’s in such a way as that by which God is wise; for He is not wise by participation in Himself, as the mind is wise by participation in God. But just as the justice of God is said not only of that by which He Himself is just, but also of that which He gives to a human when He justifies the impious, which, commending, the Apostle says about certain persons: For, being ignorant of the justice of God and wishing to establish their own justice, they were not subject to the justice of God, so likewise it can be said also about certain persons: 'Ignorant of the wisdom of God and wishing to establish their own, they are not subject to the wisdom of God.'

[16] Est igitur natura non facta quae fecit omnes ceteras magnas paruasque naturas eis quas fecit sine dubitatione praestantior, ac per hoc hac etiam de qua loquimur rationali et intellectuali quae hominis mens est ad eius qui eam fecit imaginem facta. Illa autem ceteris natura praestantior deus est, et quidem non longe positus ab unoquoque nostrum sicut apostolus dicit adiungens: In illo enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus. Quod si secundum corpus diceret, etiam de isto corporeo mundo posset intellegi.

[16] There is therefore an unmade nature which made all the other natures, great and small, more excellent without doubt than those which it made, and through this also than that rational and intellectual nature of which we are speaking, which is the mind of man, made to the image of him who made it. But that nature more excellent than the rest is God, and indeed not placed far from each one of us, as the apostle says adding: In him indeed we live and move and are. Which, if he were saying according to the body, could also be understood of this corporeal world.

Nam et in illo secundum corpus uiuimus et mouemur et sumus. Vnde secundum mentem quae facta est ad eius imaginem debet hoc accipi excellentiore quodam eodemque non uisibili sed intellegibili modo. Nam quid non est in ipso de quo diuine scriptum est: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia?

For even in that, according to the body, we live and move and are. Whence, according to the mind which has been made to his image, this ought to be taken in a more excellent and likewise not visible but intelligible mode. For what is there that is not in him, of whom it is written divinely: For from him and through him and in him are all things?

Proinde si in ipso sunt omnia, in quo tandem possunt uiuere quae uiuunt et moueri quae mouentur nisi in quo sunt? Non tamen omnes cum illo sunt eo modo quo ei dictum est: Ego semper tecum, nec ipse cum omnibus eo modo quo dicimus: 'Dominus uobiscum.' Magna itaque hominis miseria est cum illo non esse sine quo non potest esse. In quo enim est procul dubio sine illo non est, et tamen si eius non meminit eumque non intellegit neque diligit, cum illo non est.

Accordingly, if all things are in him, in whom then can those live that live, and be moved that are moved, except in him in whom they are? Yet not all are with him in the manner in which it was said to him: “I am always with you,” nor is he with all in the manner in which we say: “The Lord be with you.” Great, therefore, is the misery of man: not to be with him without whom he cannot be. For he who is in him, without a doubt, is not without him; and yet, if he does not remember him, and does not understand him, nor love him, he is not with him.

Quod autem quisque penitus obliuiscitur nec commoneri eius utique potest.

However, what each person utterly forgets cannot, assuredly, be reminded to him.

[XIII 17] De uisibilibus rebus ad hanc rem sumamus exemplum. Dicit tibi quispiam quem non recognoscis: 'Nosti me,' et ut commoneat dicit ubi, quando, quomodo tibi innotuerit. Omnibusque adhibitis signis quibus in memoriam reuoceris si non recognoscis, ita iam oblitus es ut omnis illa notitia penitus deleta sit animo, nihilque aliud restet nisi aut credas ei qui tibi hoc dicit quod aliquando eum noueras, aut ne hoc quidem si fide dignus tibi esse qui loquitur non uidetur.

[13 17] From visible things let us take an example for this matter. Someone whom you do not recognize says to you: 'You know me,' and, to remind you, he tells where, when, and how he became known to you. And with all the signs applied by which you might be called back into memory, if you do not recognize, you have now so forgotten that all that acquaintance has been utterly erased from the mind, and nothing else remains except either that you believe the one who says this to you—that at some time you had known him—or not even this, if the one who speaks does not seem to you to be worthy of faith.

Si autem reminisceris, profecto redis in memoriam tuam et in ea inuenis quod non fuerat penitus obliuione deletum.

But if you reminisce, surely you return into your memory, and in it you find what had not been utterly erased by oblivion.

Redeamus ad illud propter quod adhibuimus humanae conuersationis exemplum. Inter cetera psalmus nonus: Conuertantur, inquit, peccatores in infernum, omnes gentes quae obliuiscuntur deum. Porro autem uicesimus primus: Commemorabuntur, inquit, et conuertentur ad dominum uniuersi fines terrae.

Redeamus ad illud propter quod adhibuimus humanae conversationis exemplum. Among other things, Psalm 9: “Let sinners be converted into hell, all the nations that forget God.” But furthermore, the 21st: “They shall be remembered, and the ends of the whole earth shall be converted to the Lord.”

Non igitur sic erant oblitae istae gentes deum ut eius nec commemoratae recordarentur. Obliuiscendo autem deum tamquam obliuiscendo uitam suam conuersae ferant in mortem, hoc est in infernum. Commemoratae uero conuertuntur ad dominum tamquam reuiuiscentes reminiscendo uitam cuius eas habebat obliuio.

Therefore those peoples had not so forgotten God that, even when commemorated, they would not recollect him. But by forgetting God, as by forgetting their own life, being turned they are borne into death, that is, into hell. Yet when commemorated they are converted to the Lord, as if reviving, by calling to mind the life from which oblivion had held them.

Item legitur in nonagesimo tertio: Intellegite nunc qui insipientes estis in populo, et stulti aliquando sapite. Qui plantauit aurem non audiet?, et cetera. Eis enim dictum est qui deum non intellegendo de illo uana dixerunt.

Likewise it is read in the ninety-third: “Understand now, you who are insipient among the people, and you fools, at length be wise. He who planted the ear, will he not hear?”, and so on. For it was said to those who, by not understanding God, spoke vain things about him.

[XIV 18] De dilectione autem dei plura reperiuntur in diuinis eloquiis testimonia. Ibi enim et illa duo consequenter intelleguntur quia nemo diligit cuius non meminit et quod penitus nescit. Vnde illud est notissimum praecipuumque praeceptum: Diliges dominum deum tuum.

[14 18] Moreover, concerning the dilection of God, more testimonies are found in the divine oracles. For there also those two things are consequently understood: that no one loves one whom he does not remember, and what he utterly does not know. Whence that most well-known and principal precept: You shall love the Lord your God.

Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intellegat, numquam se non diligat. Sed quoniam qui odit aliquem nocere illi studet, non immerito et mens hominis quando sibi nocet odisse se dicitur. Nesciens enim sibi uult male dum non putat sibi obesse quod uult, sed tamen male sibi uult quando id uult quod obsit sibi, unde illud scriptum est: Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam.

Thus therefore the human mind is constituted, that it never fails to remember itself, never fails to understand itself, never fails to love itself. But since he who hates someone strives to harm him, with good reason also the mind of man, when it harms itself, is said to hate itself. For not knowing, it wills ill to itself while it does not suppose that what it wills harms it; yet it wills ill to itself when it wills that which is harmful to itself, whence that which is written: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.

Qui ergo se diligere nouit deum diligit; qui uero non diligit deum etiam si se diligit, quod ei naturaliter inditum est, tamen non inconuenienter odisse se dicitur cum id agit quod sibi aduersatur et se ipsum tamquam suus inimicus insequitur. Qui profecto est error horrendus ut cum sibi omnes prodesse uelint, multi non faciant nisi quod eis perniciosissimum sit. Similem morbum mutorum animalium cum poeta describeret: Dii, inquit, meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum!

Therefore he who knows how to love himself loves God; but he who does not love God, even if he loves himself—which has been naturally implanted in him—nevertheless is not inaptly said to hate himself when he does what is adverse to himself and pursues himself as though his own enemy. This indeed is a horrendous error, that while all wish to benefit themselves, many do nothing except what is most pernicious to them. When the poet was describing a similar malady of mute animals: “Gods,” he says, “better things for the pious, and that error for enemies!”

Discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. Cum morbus ille corporis fuerit, cur dixit errorem nisi quia omne animal cum sibi natura conciliatum sit ut se custodiat quantum potest, talis ille erat morbus ut ea quorum salutem appetebant sua membra laniarent?

They were lacerating torn-apart limbs with bare teeth. Although that was a disease of the body, why did he call it an error, except because every animal, since it is by nature reconciled to itself so that it may guard itself as much as it can, such was that disease that they were tearing with their own teeth their own limbs—the very things whose safety they were seeking?

Cum autem deum diligit mens et sicut dictum est consequenter eius meminit eumque intellegit, recte illi de proximo suo praecipitur ut eum sicut se diligat. Iam enim se non peruerse sed recte diligit cum deum diligit cuius participatione imago illa non solum est, uerum etiam ex uetustate renouatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate beatificatur. Quamuis enim se ita diligat ut si alterutrum proponatur, malit omnia quae infra se diligit perdere quam perire, tamen superiorem deserendo ad quem solum posset custodire fortitudinem suam eoque frui lumine suo, cui canitur in psalmo: Fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam, et in alio: Accedite ad eum et inluminamini, sic infirma et tenebrosa facta est ut a se quoque ipsa in ea quae non sunt quod ipsa et quibus superior est ipsa infelicius laberetur per amores quos non ualet uincere et errores a quibus non uidet qua redire.

But when the mind loves God and, as has been said, consequently remembers him and understands him, it is rightly enjoined upon it concerning its neighbor that it love him as itself. For now it loves itself not perversely but rightly, when it loves God, by whose participation that image not only exists, but is also renewed from antiquity, reformed from deformity, beatified from infelicity. For although it so loves itself that, if an either-or be proposed, it would prefer to lose all the things it loves beneath itself rather than to perish, yet by deserting its superior, with whom alone it could keep its fortitude and enjoy his light—of whom it is sung in the psalm: “My fortitude I will keep for you,” and in another: “Draw near to him and be illumined”—it has thus been made weak and dark, so that even from itself it slips the more unhappily into those things which are not what it itself is and over which it is superior, through loves which it is not able to conquer and errors from which it does not see by what way to return.

Vnde iam deo miserante poenitens clamat in psalmis: Deseruit me fortitudo mea et lumen oculorum meorum non est mecum.

Whence now, with God showing mercy, the penitent cries out in the Psalms: My fortitude has deserted me, and the light of my eyes is not with me.

[19] Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatis et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum et amorem sui. Propter quod merito dici potuit quod supra commemoraui: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur. Thesaurizat et nescit cui congregabit ea. Cur enim thesaurizat nisi quia fortitudo eius deseruit eum per quam deum habens rei nullius indigeret?

[19] Nevertheless, in these so great evils of weakness and error he could not lose the natural memory, intellect, and love of himself. On account of which it could deservedly be said what I recalled above: Although in the image man walks, nevertheless he is vainly disturbed. He treasures up, and does not know for whom he will gather them. For why does he treasure up, unless because his fortitude has deserted him, by which, having God, he would be in need of nothing?

Et cur nescit cui congregabit ea nisi quia lumen oculorum eius non est cum eo? Et ideo non uidet quod ueritas ait: Stulte, hac nocte animam tuam repetunt abs te. Haec quae praeparasti cuius erunt? Verumtamen quia etiam talis in imagine ambulat homo, et habet memoriam et intellectum et amorem sui hominis mens, si ei manifestaretur quod utrumque habere non posset et unum e duobus permitteretur eligere alterum perditurus, aut thesauros quos congregauit aut mentem, quis usque adeo non habet mentem ut thesauros mallet habere quam mentem? Thesauri enim possunt mentem plerumque subuertere, et mens quae thesauris non subuertitur sine ullis thesauris facilius et expeditius potest uiuere.

And why does he not know for whom he will gather them, unless because the light of his eyes is not with him? And therefore he does not see what Truth says: 'Fool, this night your soul is required from you. The things which you have prepared, whose will they be?' Nevertheless, because even such a man walks in the image, and the human mind has memory and intellect and love of itself, if it were made manifest to him that he could not have both, and one of the two were permitted to be chosen with the other to be lost—either the treasures which he has amassed or the mind—who is so utterly without mind as to prefer to have the treasures rather than the mind? For treasures can for the most part subvert the mind, and the mind which is not subverted by treasures can, without any treasures, more easily and more expeditiously live.

Quis uero ullos thesauros nisi per mentem poterit possidere? Si enim puer infans quamuis ditissimus natus, cum sit dominus omnium quae iure sunt eius, nihil possidet mente sopita, quonam tandem modo quisquam quidquam mente possidebit amissa? Sed de thesauris quid loquor quod eius quilibet hominum si talis optio proponatur mauult carere quam mente cum eos nemo praeponat, nemo comparet luminibus corporis quibus non aurum rarus quisque homo sed omnis homo possidet caelum?

Who indeed will be able to possess any treasures except through the mind? For if an infant boy, although born very wealthy, since he is lord of all the things that are his by right, possesses nothing with his mind asleep, in what way, pray, will anyone possess anything with the mind lost? But why do I speak of treasures, seeing that any human being, if such a choice be proposed, prefers to be without them rather than without mind—since no one sets them before, no one compares them to the lights of the body, by which not gold—which only a rare man possesses—but every man possesses the sky?

Per lumina enim corporis quisque possidet quidquid libenter uidet. Quis ergo si tenere utrumque non possit et alterutrum cogatur amittere, non thesauros quam oculos malit? Et tamen si ab eo simili conditione quaeratur utrum oculos malit amittere an mentem, quis mente non uideat eum oculos malle quam mentem?

For by the lights of the body each person possesses whatever he gladly sees. Who, then, if he could not hold both and were compelled to lose one or the other, would prefer treasures to eyes? And yet, if he were asked under a like condition whether he would rather lose his eyes or his mind, who would not see with the mind that he prefers the eyes rather than the mind?

Mens quippe sine oculis carnis humana est; oculi autem carnis sine mente belluini sunt. Quis porro non hominem se malit esse etiam carne caecum quam belluam uidentem?

For the mind indeed, without the eyes of the flesh, is human; but the eyes of the flesh without the mind are bestial. Who, moreover, would not prefer to be a man, even blind in the flesh, rather than a beast seeing?

[20] Haec dixi ut etiam tardiores quamuis breuiter commonerentur a me in quorum oculos uel aures hae litterae uenerint quantum mens diligat se ipsam etiam infirma et errans male diligendo atque sectando quae sunt infra ipsam. Diligere porro se ipsam non posset si se omnino nesciret, id est si sui non meminisset nec se intellegeret. Qua in se imagine dei tam potens est ut ei cuius imago est ualeat inhaerere.

[20] I have said these things so that even the slower, albeit briefly, may be admonished by me—into whose eyes or ears these letters have come—how much the mind loves itself even when infirm and erring, by loving badly and by following the things that are beneath itself. Moreover, it could not love itself if it were altogether ignorant of itself, that is, if it did not remember itself nor understand itself. By that image of God in itself it is so powerful that it is able to adhere to Him whose image it is.

Sic enim ordinata est naturarum ordine non locorum ut supra illam non sit nisi ille. Denique cum illi penitus adhaeserit, unus erit spiritus, cui rei attestatur apostolus dicens: Qui autem adhaeret domino unus spiritus est, accedente quidem ista ad participationem naturae, ueritatis et beatitudinis illius non tamen crescente illo in natura, ueritate et beatitudine sua. In illa itaque natura cum feliciter adhaeserit immutabile uidebit omne quod uiderit.

For thus it is ordered by the order of natures, not of places, that above it there is none except Him. Finally, when it has adhered to Him utterly, there will be one spirit, to which fact the Apostle attests, saying: “But he who adheres to the Lord is one spirit,” this one indeed acceding to a participation of His nature, verity, and beatitude, yet not with Him increasing in His own nature, verity, and beatitude. In that nature, therefore, when it has happily adhered, it will see immutably whatever it shall see.

Tunc sicut ei diuina scriptura promittit satiabitur in bonis desiderium eius, bonis immutabilibus, ipsa trinitate deo suo cuius imago est, et ne uspiam deinceps uioletur erit in abscondito uultus eius tanta ubertate eius impleta ut eam numquam peccare delectet.

Then, just as divine Scripture promises to it, its desire will be satisfied with goods, immutable goods, with the Trinity itself, its God, whose image it is; and lest it be violated anywhere henceforth, it will be in the hidden place of his face, filled with such abundance of him that it will never take delight in sinning.

Se ipsam uero nunc quando uidet non aliquid immutabile uidet. [XV 21] Quod ideo certe non dubitat quoniam misera est et beata esse desiderat, nec ob aliud fieri sperat hoc posse nisi quia est mutabilis. Nam si mutabilis non esset, sicut ex beata misera sic ex misera beata esse non posset.

As for itself, however, when it now sees itself, it does not see something immutable. [XV 21] This it certainly does not doubt, since it is miserable and desires to be blessed; nor does it hope that this can come to pass for any other reason except because it is mutable. For if it were not mutable, just as it could not be wretched from being blessed, so neither could it be blessed from being wretched.

Et quid eam fecisset miseram sub omnipotente et bono domino nisi peccatum suum et iustitia domini sui? Et quid eam faciet beatam nisi meritum suum et praemium domini sui? Sed et meritum eius gratia est illius cuius praemium erit beatitudo eius.

And what would have made her wretched under an omnipotent and good lord, if not her own sin and the justice of her lord? And what will make her blessed, if not her own merit and the reward of her lord? But even her merit is the grace of him whose reward will be her beatitude.

Iustitiam quippe sibi dare non potest quam perditam non habet. Hanc enim cum homo conderetur accepit et peccando utique perdidit. Accipit ergo iustitiam propter quam beatitudinem accipere mereatur.

Indeed, he cannot give justice to himself, which, being lost, he does not have. For he received this when man was created, and by sinning he assuredly lost it. Therefore he accepts justice, on account of which he may merit to receive beatitude.

Vnde uaraciter ei dicitur ab apostolo quasi de suo bono superbire incipienti: Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis?

Whence truly it is said to him by the Apostle, as to one beginning to be proud of his own good: What indeed do you have that you have not received? But if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?

Quando autem bene recordatur domini sui spiritu eius accepto, sentit omnino quia hoc discit intimo magisterio, non nisi eius gratuito effectu posset se surgere, nonnisi suo uoluntario defectu cadere potuisse. Non sane reminiscitur beatitudinis suae. Fuit quippe illa et non est, eiusque ista penitus oblita est, ideoque nec commemorari potest.

When, however, she well remembers her Lord, having received his Spirit, she perceives altogether that she learns this by an intimate magistery: that she could not rise except by his gratuitous effect, and could not have fallen except by her own voluntary defect. Indeed she does not call to mind her beatitude. For that was and is not, and of it this one has been utterly forgetful, and therefore it cannot even be recalled.

Credit autem de illa fide dignis litteris dei sui per eius prophetas conscriptis narrantibus de felicitate paradisi atque illud primum et bonum hominis et malum historica traditione indicantibus. Domini autem dei sui reminiscitur. Ille quippe semper est, nec fuit et non est, nec est et non fuit, sed sicut numquam non erit ita numquam non erat.

Moreover, she believes on the basis of those writings of her God, worthy of faith, composed through his prophets, which narrate of the felicity of Paradise and, by historical tradition, indicate that primal both good of man and evil. But she remembers her Lord God. For he always is, nor was and is not, nor is and was not; but just as he will never not be, so he never was not.

Et ubique totus est, propter quod ista in illo et uiuit et mouetur et est, et ideo eius reminisci potest.

And he is everywhere entire, on account of which this in him both lives and moves and is, and therefore can remember him.

Non quia hoc recordatur quod eum nouerat in Adam aut alibi alicubi ante huius corporis uitam aut cum primum facta est ut insereretur huic corpori; nihil enim horum omnino reminiscitur; quidquid horum est obliuione deletum est. Sed commemoratur ut conuertatur ad dominum, tamquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo auerteretur quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus.

Not because it remembers this, that it had known Him in Adam or elsewhere anywhere before the life of this body, or when it was first made to be inserted into this body; for it remembers absolutely none of these things; whatever of these there is has been blotted out by oblivion. But it is brought to remembrance in order that it may be converted to the Lord, as to that light by which, even when it was turned away from Him, it was in some way touched. For hence it is that even the impious think about eternity, and many things they rightly reprehend and rightly laud in the morals of men.

Quibus ea tandem regulis iudicant nisi in quibus uident quemadmodum quisque uiuere debeat etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo uiuant? Vbi eas uident? Neque enim in sua natura, cum procul dubio mente ista uideantur, eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has uero regulas immutabiles uideat quisquis in eis et hoc uidere potuerit; nec in habitu suae mentis cum illae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes uero eorum esse constet iniustas.

By what rules, then, do they at last judge, if not by those in which they see how each person ought to live, even if they themselves do not live in the same way? Where do they see them? For neither in their own nature, since beyond doubt these things are seen by the mind, and it is agreed that their minds are mutable, while whoever has been able also to see this therein sees these rules to be immutable; nor in the habit of their own mind, since those rules are of justice, whereas their minds are acknowledged to be unjust.

Vbinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit iustum et iniustus agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Vbi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae ueritas dicitur unde omnis lex iusta describitur et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam non migrando sed tamquam imprimendo transfertur, sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit et anulum non relinquit? Qui uero non operatur et tamen uidet quid operandum sit, ipse est qui ab illa luce auertitur, a qua tamen tangitur.

Where then are those rules written, where he recognizes what is just and unjust, where he perceives that what he himself does not have is to be had? Where then are they written, unless in the book of that light which is called Truth, whence every just law is transcribed, and into the heart of the man who works justice it is transferred, not by migrating but as if by imprinting, just as an image passes from a ring into wax and does not leave the ring? But he who does not work and yet sees what ought to be done, he it is who is turned away from that light, by which nevertheless he is touched.

Qui autem nec uidet quemadmodum sit uiuendum excusabilius quidem peccat quia non est transgressor legis incognitae, sed etiam ipse splendore aliquotiens ubique praesentis ueritatis attingitur quando admonitus confitetur.

But he who does not even see how one ought to live sins more excusably indeed, because he is not a transgressor of an unknown law; yet even he himself is at times touched by the splendor of the verity present everywhere, when, being admonished, he confesses.

[XVI 22] Qui uero commemorati conuertuntur ad dominum ab ea deformitate qua per cupiditates saeculares conformabantur huic saeculo reformantur ex illo audientes apostolum dicentem: Nolite conformari huic saeculo sed reformamini in nouitate mentis uestrae, ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari a quo formata est; non enim reformare se ipsam potest sicut potuit deformare. Dicit etiam alibi: Renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem qui secundum deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate ueritatis. Quod ait, secundum deum creatum, hoc alio loco dicitur, ad imaginem dei.

[16 22] But those who, being recalled, are converted to the Lord from that deformity by which through secular cupidities they were being conformed to this age are re-formed from that One, hearing the Apostle saying: Do not be conformed to this age, but be re-formed in the newness of your mind, so that that image may begin to be re-formed by Him by whom it was formed; for it cannot re-form itself as it could deform itself. He also says elsewhere: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God has been created in righteousness and holiness of truth. What he says, according to God created, this in another place is said, according to the image of God.

Sed peccando iustitiam et sanctitatem ueritatis amisit, propter quod haec imago deformis et decolor facta est; hanc recipit cum reformatur atque renouatur.

But by sinning he lost the justice and the sanctity of truth, on account of which this image was made deformed and discolored; he receives it back when he is re-formed and renewed.

Quod autem ait, spiritu mentis uestrae, non ibi duas res intellegi uoluit quasi aliud sit mens, aliud spiritus mentis, sed quia omnis mens spiritus est, non autem omnis spiritus mens est. Est enim spiritus et deus qui renouari non potest quia nec ueterescere potest. Dicitur etiam spiritus in homine qui mens non sit, ad quem pertinent imaginationes similes corporum, de quo dicit ad corinthios ubi dicit: Si autem orauero lingua, spiritus meus orat; mens autem mea infructuosa est.

But when he says, by the spirit of your mind, he did not will two things to be understood there, as though mind were one thing, and spirit of the mind another, but because every mind is spirit, yet not every spirit is mind. For God is also Spirit, who cannot be renewed because neither can he grow old. “Spirit” is also said in a human being which is not mind, to which belong imaginations like to bodies, about which he says to the Corinthians, where he says: If, however, I should pray in a tongue, my spirit prays; but my mind is unfruitful.

Hoc enim ait quando id quod dicitur non intellegitur quia nec dici potest nisi corporalium uocum imagines sonum oris in spiritus cogitatione praeueniant. Dicitur et hominis anima spiritus, unde est in euangelio: Et inclinato capite tradidit spiritum, quo significata est mors corporis anima exeunte. Dicitur spiritus etiam pecoris, quod in ecclesiaste libro Salomonis apertissime scriptum est ubi ait: Quis scit spiritus filiorum hominis si ascendet ipse sursum et spiritus pecoris si descendet ipse deorsum in terram?

For he says this when that which is said is not understood, because it cannot even be spoken unless the images of bodily voices anticipate the sound of the mouth in the thought of the spirit. The soul of a human is also called spirit, whence it is in the Gospel: And, having inclined his head, he gave up the spirit, by which the death of the body was signified as the soul went out. Spirit is also said of a beast, which is written most openly in the book of Ecclesiastes of Solomon, where he says: Who knows the spirit of the sons of man, whether it ascends upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it descends downward into the earth?

Scriptum est etiam in genesi ubi dicit diluuio mortuam uniuersam carnem quae habebat in se spiritum uitae. Dicitur spiritus etiam uentus, res apertissime corporalis, unde illud est in psalmis: Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis. Quia ergo tot modis dicitur spiritus, spiritum mentis dicere uoluit eum spiritum quae mens uocatur.

It is also written in Genesis where it says that by the deluge all flesh died which had in itself the spirit of life. Spirit is also said of wind, a most manifestly corporeal thing, whence that in the Psalms: fire, hail, snow, ice, the wind of the tempest. Therefore, since spirit is said in so many ways, by “the spirit of the mind” he wished to designate that spirit which is called “mind.”

Sicut ait etiam idem apostolus: In exspoliatione corporis carnis. Non duas utique res intellegi uoluit quasi aliud sit caro, aliud corpus carnis, sed quia corpus multarum rerum nomen est quarum nulla caro est (nam multa sunt excepta carne corpora caelestia et corpora terrestria), corpus carnis dixit, corpus quae caro est. Sic itaque spiritum mentis eum spiritum quae mens est.

As the same apostle also says: In the stripping-off of the body of flesh. He certainly did not wish two things to be understood, as though flesh were one thing and the body of flesh another; but because “body” is the name of many things of which none is flesh (for there are many bodies apart from flesh—celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies), he said “body of flesh,” the body which is flesh. Thus, therefore, “spirit of mind” is that spirit which is mind.

Alibi quoque apertius etiam imaginem nominauit, scilicet aliis uerbis idipsum praecipiens: Exspoliantes uos, inquit, ueterem hominem cum actibus eius induite nouum hominem qui renouatur in agnitione dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum. Quod ergo ibi legitur: Induite nouum hominem qui secundum deum creatus est, hoc isto loco: Induite nouum hominem qui renouatur secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum. Ibi autem ait, secundum deum; hic uero, secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum.

Elsewhere also, more openly, he even named the image, namely prescribing the very same thing in other words: “Stripping off from yourselves,” he says, “the old man with his acts, put on the new man, who is renewed in the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him.” What therefore is read there: “Put on the new man who has been created according to God,” this, in this place: “Put on the new man who is renewed according to the image of him who created him.” There, however, he says, “according to God”; here, rather, “according to the image of him who created him.”

Pro eo uero quod ibi posuit, in iustitia et sanctitate ueritatis, hoc posuit hic, in agnitione dei. Fit ergo ista renouatio reformatioque mentis secundum deum uel secundum imaginem dei. Sed ideo dicitur secundum deum ne secundum aliam creaturam fieri putetur; ideo autem secundum imaginem dei ut in ea re intellegatur fieri haec renouatio ubi est imago dei, id est in mente, quemadmodum dicimus secundum corpus mortuum, non secundum spiritum, eum qui de corpore fidelis et iustus abscedit.

But in place of what he set down there, “in justice and sanctity of truth,” he has set down here, “in recognition of God.” Therefore this renovation and reformation of the mind is made according to God or according to the image of God. But it is said “according to God” lest it be thought to be made according to some other creature; and “according to the image of God” so that it may be understood that this renovation is effected in that thing where the image of God is, that is, in the mind, just as we say “dead according to the body, not according to the spirit,” of one who departs from the body faithful and just.

Quid enim dicimus 'secundum corpus mortuum' nisi corpore uel in corpore, non anima uel in anima mortuum? Aut si dicamus: 'Secundum corpus est pulcher,' aut: 'Secundum corpus fortis, non secundum animum,'; quid est aliud quam, 'Corpore non animo pulcher aut fortis est'? Et innumerabiliter ita loquimur. Non itaque sic intellegamus secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum quasi alia sit imago secundum quam renouatur, non ipsa qua renouatur.

What, indeed, do we mean by 'dead according to the body' except dead in body or with respect to the body, not dead in soul or with respect to the soul? Or if we say: 'According to the body he is beautiful,' or: 'According to the body strong, not according to the mind,'; what is it other than, 'In body, not in mind, he is beautiful or strong'? And we speak thus innumerably often. Let us not, therefore, understand 'according to the image of him who created him' as though there were another image according to which he is renewed, not the very one by which he is renewed.

[XVII 23] Sane ista renouatio non momento uno fit ipsius conuersionis sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renouatio remissione omnium peccatorum; neque enim uel unum quantulumcumque remanet quod non remittatur. Sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate quae febribus facta est reualescere, itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud uulnus quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare. Ita prima curatio est causam remouere languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renouatione huius imaginis.

[17 23] Surely that renovation is not effected in a single moment of the conversion itself, as in a single moment there is brought about in baptism that renovation by the remission of all sins; for not even a single thing, however small, remains that is not remitted. But just as it is one thing to be free from fevers, another to grow strong again from the infirmity that was brought about by the fevers, and likewise one thing to remove from the body an embedded weapon, another to heal by a subsequent treatment the wound that was made by it. Thus the first cure is to remove the cause of the languor—which is done through the forgiveness of all sins; the second is to heal the languor itself—which is done little by little by making progress in the renovation of this image.

Quae duo demonstrantur in psalmo ubi legitur: Qui propitus fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis, quod fit in baptismo; deinde sequitur: Qui sanat omnes languores tuos, quod fit cotidianis accessibus cum haec imago renouatur. De qua re apostolus apertissime locutus est dicens: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renouatur de die in diem. Renouatur autem in agnitione dei, hoc est in iustitia et sanctitate ueritatis, sicut sese habent apostolica testimonia quae paulo ante memoraui.

Those two are shown in the psalm where it reads: 'Who is propitious to all your iniquities,' which takes place in baptism; then it follows: 'Who heals all your infirmities,' which takes place by daily advances as this image is renewed. About which matter the apostle spoke most plainly, saying: 'And even if our outer man is being corrupted, yet the inner is renewed from day to day.' Now it is renewed in the recognition of God, that is, in justice and sanctity of truth, as the apostolic testimonies which I a little before recalled have it.

In agnitione igitur dei iustitiaque et sanctitate ueritatis qui de die in diem proficiendo renouatur transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a uisibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere illisque se caritate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit quantum diuinitus adiuuatur Dei quippe sententia est: Sine me nihil potestis facere. In quo prouectu et accessu tenentem mediatoris fidem cum dies uitae huius ultimus quemque compererit, perducendus ad deum quem coluit et ab eo perficiendus excipietur ab angelis sanctis, incorruptibile corpus in fine saeculi non ad poenam sed ad gloriam recepturus.

Therefore, in the recognition of God and the justice and sanctity of truth, he who by making progress from day to day is renewed transfers love from temporal things to eternal, from visibles to intelligibles, from carnal to spiritual things, and he diligently applies himself to bridle and diminish desire for the former and to bind himself to the latter by charity. Moreover, he does only so much as he is divinely helped—for God’s sentence is: “Without me you can do nothing.” In which advance and approach, when the last day of this life shall have found each one holding the faith of the Mediator, he will be received by the holy angels, to be led through to the God whom he worshiped and to be perfected by him, destined to receive an incorruptible body at the end of the age, not for punishment but for glory.

In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit dei similitudo quando dei perfecta erit uisio. De qua dicit apostolus Paulus: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Item dicit: Nos autem reuelata facie gloriam domini speculantes in eandem imaginem transformamur de gloria in gloriam tamquam a domini spiritu; hoc est quod fit de die in diem bene proficientibus.

In this image, indeed, the likeness of God will then be perfected when the vision of God will be perfect. Of which the Apostle Paul says: “We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face.” Likewise he says: “But we, with unveiled face, contemplating the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord”; this is what happens from day to day for those making good progress.

[24] Apostolus autem Iohannes: Dilectissimi, inquit, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus. Scimus quia cum apparuerit similes ei erimus quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est.

[24] But the Apostle John: Beloved, he says, now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall have appeared we shall be similar to him, because we shall see him just as he is.

Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem quando eius plenam perceperit uisionem, [XVIII] quamquam possit hoc a Iohanne apostolo etiam de immortalitate corporis dictum uideri. Et in hac quippe similes erimus deo sed tantummodo filio quia solus in trinitate corpus accepit in quo mortuus resurrexit atque id ad superna peruexit. Nam dicitur etiam ista imago filii dei in qua sicut ille immortale corpus habebimus conformes facti in hac parte non patris imaginis aut spiritus sancti sed tantummodo filii quia de hoc solo legitur et fide sanissima accipitur: Verbum caro factum est.

From this it appears that then, in this image of God, his full similitude is made when it has perceived his full vision, [18] although this can seem to have been said by the Apostle John also about the immortality of the body. And in this indeed we shall be similar to God, but only to the Son, because he alone in the Trinity received a body, in which he died, rose again, and conveyed it to the heights above. For this too is called the image of the Son of God, in which, just as he, we shall have an immortal body, having been made conform in this respect not to the image of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Son, because concerning this one alone it is read and is received by most sound faith: The Word was made flesh.

Propter quod apostolus: Quos ante, inquit, praesciuit et praedestinauit conformes imaginis filii sui ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Primogenitus utique a mortuis secundum eundem apostolum; qua morte seminata est caro eius in contumelia, resurrexit in gloria. Secundum hanc imaginem filii cui per immortalitatem conformamur in corpore etiam illud agimus quod item dicit idem apostolus: Sicut portauimus imaginem terreni portemus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est, ut scilicet qui secundum Adam mortales fuimus secundum Christum immortales nos futuros esse fide uera et spe certa firmaque teneamus.

On account of which the Apostle: “Those whom,” he says, “He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brothers.” Firstborn indeed from the dead, according to the same Apostle; by which death His flesh was sown in dishonor, He rose in glory. According to this image of the Son, to which we are conformed in the body through immortality, we also do that which the same Apostle likewise says: “As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of Him who is from heaven,” so that we who were mortals according to Adam may hold with true faith and with certain and firm hope that, according to Christ, we shall be immortals.

Sic enim nunc eandem imaginem portare possumus, nondum in uisione sed in fide, nondum in re sed in spe. De corporis quippe resurrectione tunc loquebatur apostolus cum haec diceret.

For thus even now we can bear the same image, not yet in vision but in faith, not yet in reality but in hope. For the apostle was then speaking about the resurrection of the body when he said these things.

[XIX 25] At uero illa imago de qua dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, quia non dictum est, ad 'meam' uel 'tuam,' ad imaginem trinitatis factum hominem credimus, et quanta potuimus inuestigatione comprehendimus. Et ideo secundum hanc potius et illud intellegendum est quod ait apostolus Iohannes: Similes ei erimus quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est, quia et de illo dixit de quo dixerat: Filii dei sumus. Et immortalitas carnis illo perficietur momento resurrectionis de quo ait apostolus Paulus: In ictu oculi, in nouissima tuba et mortui resurgent incorrupti et nos immutabimur.

[19 25] But indeed that image of which it is said: Let us make man to our image and likeness—because it was not said ‘to my’ or ‘to your’—we believe man was made to the image of the Trinity, and we have grasped it by as much investigation as we could. And therefore, according to this, that too is rather to be understood which the Apostle John says: We shall be like him because we shall see him as he is, because he also said this about those about whom he had said: We are sons of God. And the immortality of the flesh will be perfected in that moment of the resurrection of which the Apostle Paul says: In the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, and the dead will rise incorruptible and we shall be changed.

In ipso namque ictu oculi ante iudicium resurget in uirtute, in incorruptione, in gloria corpus spiritale quod nunc seminatur in infirmitate, corruptione, contumelia corpus animale. Imago uero quae renouatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione dei non exterius sed interius de die in diem, ipsa perficietur uisione quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem, nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate. Propter cuius perfectionem dictum intellegendum est: Similes ei erimus quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est.

For in that very twinkling of an eye, before the judgment, there will rise in power, in incorruption, in glory the spiritual body, whereas what is now sown in weakness, in corruption, in contumely is the animal body. But the image which is renewed in the spirit of the mind in the recognition of God, not outwardly but inwardly, day by day—this same will be perfected by the vision which then will be, after the judgment, face to face; now, however, it advances through a mirror, in an enigma. On account of the perfection of this the saying is to be understood: We shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.

Hoc enim donum tunc nobis dabitur cum dictum fuerit: Venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete paratum uobis regnum. Tunc quippe tolletur impius ut non uideat claritatem domini quando ibunt sinistri in supplicium aeternum euntibus dextris in uitam aeternam. Hanc est autem, sicut ait ueritas, uita aeterna ut cognoscant te, inquit, unum uerum deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum.

For this gift will then be given to us, when it shall have been said: “Come, you blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you.” Then indeed the impious one will be taken away so that he may not see the brightness of the Lord, when those on the left go into eternal punishment, as those on the right go into eternal life. Now this is, however, as Truth says, eternal life: “that they may know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.”

[26] Hanc contemplatiuam sapientiam, quam proprie puto in litteris sanctis ab scientia distinctam sapientiam nuncupari dumtaxat hominis, quae quidem illi non est nisi ab illo cuius participatione uere sapiens fieri mens rationalis et intellectualis potest, Cicero commendans in fine dialogi Hortensii: Quae nobis, inquit, dies noctesque considerantibus acuentibusque intellegentiam quae est mentis acies cauentibusque ne quando illa hebescat, id est in philosophia uiuentibus, magna spes est, aut si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, iucundum nobis perfunctis muneribus humanis occasum neque molestam exstinctionem et quasi quietem uitae fore; aut si ut antiquis philosophis hisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit aeternos animos ac diuinos habemus sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in suo cursu, id est in ratione et inuestigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicauerint hominum uitiis et erroribus, hoc his faciliorem ascensum et reditum in caelum fore. Deinde addens hanc ipsam clausulam repetendoque sermonem finiens: Quapropter, inquit, ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille uolumus cum in his artibus uixerimus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est.

[26] This contemplative wisdom, which I think is properly called in the sacred letters a wisdom distinct from science, belonging only to the human being— which indeed he does not have except from Him by whose participation the rational and intellectual mind can become truly wise—Cicero commending at the end of the dialogue Hortensius: “For us,” he says, “as we day and night consider and sharpen the intelligence, which is the edge of the mind, and take care lest it ever grow dull—that is, as we live in philosophy—there is great hope, either that, if what we perceive and savor is mortal and caducous, for us, once we have discharged human duties, there will be a pleasant setting and not a troublesome extinction, and, as it were, a rest of life; or, if, as it pleased the ancient philosophers, and these the greatest and by far the most illustrious, we have souls eternal and divine, thus must it be thought: the more these have always been in their own course, that is, in reason and in the desire of investigating, and the less they have mingled and entangled themselves with the vices and errors of men, by so much the easier for them will be the ascent and return into heaven.” Then adding this very closing and finishing the discourse by repeating it: “Wherefore,” he says, “that the speech may at last be terminated, if either we wish to be extinguished tranquilly when we shall have lived in these arts, or if from this house into another by no means a little better we wish to migrate without delay, in these studies all our effort and care must be placed.”

Hic miror hominem tanti ingenii perfunctis muneribus humanis hominibus in philosophia uiuentibus quae contemplatione ueritatis beatos facit iucundum promittere occasum si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, quasi hoc moriatur et intercidat quod non diligebamus uel potius quod atrociter oderamus ut iucundus nobis sit eius occasus. Verum hoc non didicerat a philosophis quos magnis laudibus praedicat, sed ex illa noua academia ubi ei dubitare etiam de rebus manifestissimis placuit ista sententia redolebat. A philosophis autem sicut ipse confitetur, maximis longeque clarissimis, aeternos esse animos acceperat.

I here marvel that a man of such great ingenium, with human duties performed, promises to men living in philosophy—which by the contemplation of truth makes them blessed—a pleasant setting if that which we feel and we are wise by is mortal and caducous, as though that dies and is cut off which we were not loving, or rather which we were atrociously hating, so that its setting should be pleasant to us. In truth he had not learned this from the philosophers whom he proclaims with great praises, but this sententia savored of that New Academy, where it pleased him to doubt even about the most manifest things. From the philosophers, however—as he himself confesses, the greatest and by far the most illustrious—he had received that souls are eternal.

Aeterni quippe animi non inconuenienter hac exhortatione excitantur ut in suo cursu reperiantur cum uenerit uitae huius extremum, id est in ratione et inuestigandi cupiditate, minusque se admisceant atque implicent hominum uitiis et erroribus ut eis facilior sit regressus ad deum. Sed iste cursus qui constituitur in amore atque inuestigatione ueritatis non sufficit miseris, id est omnibus cum ista sola ratione mortalibus sine fide mediatoris, quod in libris superioribus huius operis, maxime in quarto et tertio decimo quantum potui demonstrare curaui.

Eternal souls indeed are not inappropriately stirred by this exhortation, so that they may be found in their own course when the end of this life has come, that is, in reason and in the desire for investigating, and that they may less mix and entangle themselves in the vices and errors of men, so that their return to God may be easier. But this course, which is constituted in the love and investigation of truth, does not suffice for the wretched—that is, for all mortals with this reason alone, without the faith of the mediator—which, in the earlier books of this work, especially in the 4th and the 13th, I have taken care to demonstrate as far as I could.