Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] Animadverti, Brute, saepe Catonem, avunculum tuum, cum in senatu sententiam diceret, locos graves ex philosophia tractare abhorrentes ab hoc usu forensi et publico, sed dicendo consequi tamen, ut illa etiam populo probabilia viderentur.

[1] I have observed, Brutus, that Cato, your uncle, often, when he was delivering his opinion in the senate, would handle grave topics from philosophy—topics abhorrent to this forensic and public use—yet by his speaking he nevertheless achieved that even those matters seemed probable to the people.

[2] Quod eo maius est illi quam aut tibi aut nobis, quia nos ea philosophia plus utimur, quae peperit dicendi copiam, et in qua dicuntur ea, quae non multum discrepent ab opinione populari, Cato autem, perfectus mea sententia Stoicus, et ea sentit, quae non sane probantur in volgus, et in ea est haeresi, quae nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum, minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis, quod proposuit, efficit.

[2] Which on that account is greater for him than either for you or for us, because we make more use of that philosophy which has begotten a copiousness of speaking, and in which things are said that do not differ much from popular opinion; but Cato, in my judgment a perfect Stoic, both holds views which are not really approved among the common crowd, and is in that “heresy” (sect) which follows no flower of oration nor dilates the argument, but with minute little interrogatives, as if with points, effects what he has proposed.

[3] Sed nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile, nihil tam horridum, tam incultum, quod non splendescat oratione et tamquam excolatur. Quod cum ita putarem, feci etiam audacius quam ille ipse, de quo loquor. Cato enim dumtaxat de magnitudine animi, de continentia, de morte, de omni laude virtutis, de dis inmortalibus, de caritate patriae Stoice solet oratoriis ornamentis adhibitis dicere, ego tibi illa ipsa, quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant, ludens conieci in communes locos.

[3] But nothing is so incredible that it does not become probable by speaking; nothing so horrid, so uncultivated, that it does not shine with oration and, as it were, be cultivated. Since I supposed this to be so, I acted even more audaciously than that very man of whom I speak. For Cato, at least, is accustomed, Stoically, with oratorical ornaments applied, to speak about greatness of spirit, about continence, about death, about every praise of virtue, about the immortal gods, about love of the fatherland; but I, for you, those very things which the Stoics scarcely approve even in the gymnasia and in leisure, in sport I cast into the commonplaces.

[4] Quae quia sunt admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium [ab ipsis etiam parãdoja appellantur], temptare volui possentne proferri in lucem [id est in forum], et ita dici, ut probarentur, an alia quaedam esset erudita, alia popularis oratio, eoque hos locos scripsi libentius, quod mihi ista parãdoja quae appellant maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima.

[4] Since these are admirable and contrary to the opinion of all [by the very men themselves they are also called paradoxes], I wished to try whether they could be brought into the light [that is, into the forum], and to be spoken in such a way that they might be approved, or whether there were one kind of erudite discourse and another popular; and for that reason I wrote these topics the more willingly, because those paradoxes, as they call them, seem to me to be most Socratic and by far the truest.

[5] Accipies igitur hoc parvum opusculum lucubratum his iam contractioribus noctibus, quoniam illud maiorum vigiliarum munus in tuo nomine apparuit, et degustabis genus exercitationum earum, quibus uti consuevi, cum ea, quae dicuntur in scholis yetik«w, ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus. Hoc tamen opus in acceptum ut referas, nihil postulo; non enim est tale, ut in arce poni possit quasi illa Minerva Phidiae, sed tamen ut ex eadem officina exisse appareat.

[5] You will therefore receive this small opusculum, lamp-labored in these now more contracted nights, since that gift of greater vigils has appeared under your name; and you will take a taste of the kind of exercises which I am wont to use, when I transfer those things which are said in the schools “rhetically” to this our oratorical kind of speaking. Yet as for this work, I demand nothing that you enter it to the credit; for it is not of such a sort that it could be set upon the citadel, as that Minerva of Phidias, but yet so that it may appear to have come forth from the same workshop.

ÜOti mÒnon tÚ kalÚn égayÒn.

That only the beautiful is good.

[6] Vereor, ne cui vestrum ex Socraticorum hominum disputationibus, non ex meo sensu deprompta haec videatur oratio, dicam, quod sentio, tamen, et dicam brevius, quam res tanta dici potest. Numquam hercule ego neque pecunias istorum neque tecta magnifica neque opes neque imperia neque eas, quibus maxume astricti sunt, voluptates in bonis rebus aut expetendis esse duxi, quippe cum viderem rebus his circumfluentis ea tamen desiderare maxime, quibus abundarent. Neque enim umquam expletur nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis, neque solum ea qui habent libidine augendi cruciantur, sed etiam amittendi metu.

[6] I fear, lest to some of you this speech may seem drawn from the disputations of Socratic men, not from my own sense; I will say what I feel, nevertheless, and I will say it more briefly than so great a matter can be said. Never, by Hercules, have I judged either their moneys, nor magnificent roofs, nor riches, nor commands, nor those pleasures to which they are most bound, to be among good things or things to be sought, since I saw that, though overflowing with these things, they nevertheless most desire those very things with which they abound. For the thirst of cupidity is never filled nor satisfied, and not only are those who have them tormented by the lust of augmenting, but also by the fear of losing.

[7] In quo equidem continentissimorum hominum, maiorum nostrorum, saepe requiro prudentiam, qui haec inbecilla et commutabilia [pecuniae membra] verbo bona putaverunt appellanda, cum re ac factis longe aliter iudicavissent. Potestne bonum cuiquam malo esse, aut potest quisquam in abundantia bonorum ipse esse non bonus? Atqui ista omnia talia videmus, ut et inprobi habeant et absint probis.

[7] In this matter indeed I often miss the prudence of the most continent men, our ancestors, who thought that these feeble and changeable [limbs of wealth] ought by a word to be called goods, although in reality and by deeds they judged far otherwise. Can a good be an evil to anyone, or can anyone amid an abundance of goods himself be not good? And yet we see all those things to be such that both the depraved have them and they are absent from the upright.

[8] Quam ob rem licet inrideat, si qui vult, plus apud me tamen vera ratio valebit quam vulgi opinio; neque ego umquam bona perdidisse dicam, si quis pecus aut supellectilem amiserit, nec non saepe laudabo sapientem illum, Biantem, ut opinor, qui numeratur in septem; cuius quom patriam Prienam cepisset hostis ceterique ita fugerent, ut multa de suis rebus asportarent, cum esset admonitus a quodam, ut idem ipse faceret, 'Ego vero', inquit, 'facio; nam omnia mecum porto mea.'

[8] Wherefore, let him mock, if anyone wishes; yet true reason will prevail more with me than the opinion of the vulgus; nor will I ever say that a man has lost his goods, if someone has lost cattle or furnishings; and I will often praise that wise man, Bias, as I suppose, who is counted among the Seven; when an enemy had taken his fatherland, Priene, and the rest were fleeing in such a way as to carry off many of their belongings, when he was admonished by a certain person to do the same, “I indeed,” he said, “am doing so; for I carry all my things with me.”

[9] Ille haec ludibria fortunae ne sua quidem putavit, quae nos appellamus etiam bona. Quid est igitur, quaeret aliquis, bonum? Si, quod recte fit et honeste et cum virtute, id bene fieri vere dicitur, quod rectum et honestum et cum virtute est, id solum opinor bonum.

[9] He did not reckon these mockeries of Fortune to be his own even, which we even call “goods.” What then, someone will ask, is the good? If that which is done rightly and honorably and with virtue is truly said to be done well, that which is right and honorable and with virtue—that alone, I opine, is good.

[10] Sed haec videri possunt odiosiora, cum lentius disputantur; vita atque factis inlustrata sunt summorum virorum haec, quae verbis subtilius, quam satis est, disputari videntur. Quaero enim a vobis, num ullam cogitationem habuisse videantur ii, qui hanc rem publicam tam praeclare fundatam nobis reliquerunt, aut argenti ad avaritiam aut amoenitatum ad delectationem aut supellectilis ad delicias aut epularum ad voluptates.

[10] But these things can seem more odious when they are debated more slowly; these points, which seem to be disputed in words more subtly than is sufficient, have been illustrated by the life and deeds of the highest men. For I ask of you whether those who have left to us this commonwealth so splendidly founded seem to have had any thought for silver toward avarice, or for amenities toward delectation, or for household furnishings toward delights, or for banquets toward pleasures.

[11] Ponite ante oculos unum quemque veterum. Voltis a Romulo? voltis post liberam civitatem ab iis ipsis, qui liberaverunt?

[11] Set before your eyes each one of the ancients. Do you want [an example] from Romulus? Do you want one from after the commonwealth was free, from those very men who liberated it?

Quibus tandem gradibus Romulus escendit in caelum? iisne, quae isti bona appellant, an rebus gestis atque virtutibus? Quid?

By what steps, then, did Romulus climb into heaven? By those things which those men call goods, or by deeds accomplished and virtues? What?

a Numa Pompilio minusne gratas dis inmortalibus capudines ac fictiles urnulas fuisse quam felicatas Saliorum pateras arbitramur? Omitto reliquos; sunt enim omnes pares inter se praeter Superbum.

From Numa Pompilius, do we judge that little cups and fictile little urns were less pleasing to the immortal gods than the consecrated paterae of the Salii? I omit the rest; for they are all equal among themselves except the Proud.

[12] Brutum si qui roget, quid egerit in patria liberanda, si quis item reliquos eiusdem consilii socios, quid spectaverint, quid secuti sint, num quis existat, cui voluptas, cui divitiae, cui denique praeter officium fortis et magni viri quicquam aliud propositum fuisse videatur? Quae res ad necem Porsennae C. Mucium inpulit sine ulla spe salutis suae? quae vis Coclitem contra omnes hostium copias tenuit in ponte solum?

[12] If someone should ask Brutus what he did in liberating the fatherland, and likewise if someone should ask the remaining associates of the same counsel what they aimed at, what they followed, would anyone exist to whom it would seem that pleasure, that riches, that finally anything other than the duty of a brave and great man had been proposed as an aim? What thing impelled Gaius Mucius toward the death of Porsenna without any hope of his own safety? what force held Cocles alone on the bridge against all the forces of the enemies?

quae patrem Decium, quae filium devota vita inmisit in armatas hostium copias? quid continentia C. Fabrici, quid tenuitas victus M'. Curi sequebatur? quid?

what drove the father Decius, what the son, with a devoted life, into the armed ranks of the enemy? what did the continence of Gaius Fabricius, what the meagerness of fare of Manius Curius, aim at? what?

duo propugnacula belli Punici, Cn. et P. Scipiones, qui Carthaginiensium adventum corporibus suis intercludendum putaverunt, quid? Africanus maior, <quid? minor,> quid?

the two bulwarks of the Punic War, the Scipios, Gnaeus and Publius, who thought that the advance of the Carthaginians ought to be blocked by their own bodies, what? Africanus the elder, <what? the younger,> what?

inter horum aetates interiectus Cato, quid? innumerabiles alii (nam domesticis exemplis abundamus) cogitassene quicquam in vita sibi esse expetendum, nisi quod laudabile esset et praeclarum, videntur?

Cato, interposed between the ages of these men, what? innumerable others (for we abound in domestic examples)—do they seem to have cogitated that anything in life was to be desired for themselves, except what was laudable and preeminent?

[13] Veniant igitur isti inrisores huius orationis ac sententiae et iam vel ipsi iudicent, utrum se horum alicuius, qui marmoreis tectis ebore et auro fulgentibus, qui signis, qui tabulis, qui caelato auro et argento, qui Corinthiis operibus abundant, an C. Fabrici, qui nihil habuit eorum, nihil habere voluit, similes malint.

[13] Let the deriders of this oration and sentiment come, then, and now let them even themselves judge whether they would prefer to be like any of those who abound in houses with marble roofs, gleaming with ivory and gold, who in statues, who in panels, who in chased gold and silver, who in Corinthian works, or like C. Fabricius, who had none of those things and wished to have nothing.

[14] Atque haec quidem, quae modo huc, modo illuc transferuntur, facile adduci solent ut in bonis rebus esse negent, illud arte tenent accurateque defendunt, voluptatem esse summum bonum; quae quidem mihi vox pecudum videtur esse, non hominum. Tu, cum tibi sive deus sive mater, ut ita dicam, rerum omnium natura dederit animum, quo nihil est praestantius neque divinius, sic te ipse abicies atque prosternes, ut nihil inter te atque inter quadripedem aliquam putes interesse? Quicquam bonum est, quod non eum, qui id possidet, meliorem facit?

[14] And these things indeed, which are shifted now here, now there, are readily induced to deny that they are among good things; but this they hold with art and scrupulously defend: that pleasure is the highest good—a voice which seems to me to be of cattle, not of human beings. You—when either god or the mother, so to speak, the nature of all things has given you a mind, than which nothing is more preeminent nor more divine—will you so cast yourself away and prostrate yourself, that you think there is no difference between you and some quadruped? Is anything good which does not make him who possesses it better?

[15] Ut enim est quisque maxime boni particeps, ita est laudabilis maxime; neque est ullum bonum, de quo non is, qui id habeat, honeste possit gloriari. Quid autem est horum in voluptate? melioremne efficit aut laudabiliorem virum?

[15] For as each person is a participant in the good in the highest degree, so he is in the highest degree laudable; nor is there any good of which the one who has it cannot honorably glory. But what of these is in pleasure? does it make a man better or more laudable?

an quisquam in potiendis voluptatibus gloriando se et praedicatione ecfert? Atqui si voluptas, quae plurimorum patrociniis defenditur, in rebus bonis habenda non est, eaque quo est maior, eo magis mentem ex sua sede et statu demovet, profecto nihil est aliud bene et beate vivere nisi honeste et recte vivere.

Does anyone, in the obtaining of pleasures, exalt himself by glorying and by proclamation? And yet, if pleasure, which is defended by the patronages of very many, is not to be held among good things, and the greater it is, by so much the more it dislodges the mind from its own seat and state, assuredly there is nothing else to live well and blessedly except to live honorably and rightly.

ÜOti aÈtãrkhw ¾ éretØ prÚw eÈdaimon¤an.

That virtue is self-sufficient for eudaimonia.

[16] Nec vero ego M. Regulum aerumnosum nec infelicem nec miserum umquam putavi. Non enim magnitudo animi cruciabatur eius a Poenis, non gravitas, non fides, non constantia, non ulla virtus, non denique animus ipse, qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque comitatu, cum corpus eius caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit. C. vero Marium vidimus, qui mihi secundis rebus unus ex fortunatis hominibus, adversis unus ex summis viris videbatur, quo beatius esse mortali nihil potest.

[16] Nor indeed have I ever thought Marcus Regulus a man of hardship, nor unfortunate, nor miserable. For his magnanimity was not tormented by the Punics, nor his gravity, nor his fidelity, nor his constancy, nor any virtue, nor finally his very spirit itself, which, with the protection of so many virtues and with so great a retinue, though his body was captured, certainly he himself could not be captured. And we have indeed seen Gaius Marius, who to me in prosperous circumstances seemed one of the fortunate men, in adverse circumstances one of the greatest men, than which nothing can be more blessed for a mortal.

[17] Nescis, insane, nescis, quantas vires virtus habeat; nomen tantum virtutis usurpas, quid ipsa valeat, ignoras. Nemo potest non beatissimus esse, qui est totus aptus ex sese, quique in se uno sua ponit omnia. Cui spes omnis et ratio et cogitatio pendet ex fortuna, huic nihil potest esse certi, nihil, quod exploratum habeat permansurum sibi unum diem.

[17] You do not know, madman, you do not know how great powers virtue has; you usurp only the name of virtue, you are ignorant what it itself avails. No one can fail to be most blessed who is wholly apt from himself, and who places all his things in himself alone. For whom all hope and reason and cogitation depend on fortune, for such a man nothing can be certain, nothing which he may have ascertained will remain to him for a single day.

Eum tu hominem terreto, si quem eris nanctus, istis mortis aut exilii minis. Mihi vero quicquid acciderit in tam ingrata civitate, ne recusanti quidem evenerit, non modo [non] repugnanti. Quid enim ego laboravi aut quid egi, aut in quo evigilarunt curae et cogitationes meae, siquidem nihil peperi tale, nihil consecutus sum, ut eo statu essem, quem neque fortunae temeritas neque inimicorum labefactaret iniuria?

You, then, frighten a man—if you shall have found any—by those threats of death or exile. As for me, whatever shall have happened in so ungrateful a commonwealth will have befallen me not even refusing, not to mention [not] resisting. For what have I labored, or what have I done, or over what have my cares and cogitations kept vigil, if indeed I have brought forth nothing of such a sort, have achieved nothing, that I should be in that state which neither the temerity of Fortune nor the injury of enemies would undermine?

[18] Mortemne mihi minitaris, ut omnino ab hominibus, an exilium, ut ab inprobis demigrandum sit? Mors terribilis iis, quorum cum vita omnia extinguuntur, non iis, quorum laus emori non potest, exilium autem illis, quibus quasi circumscriptus est habitandi locus, non iis, qui omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt. Te miseriae, te aerumnae premunt omnes, qui te beatum, qui te florentem putas, tuae lubidines torquent, tu dies noctesque cruciaris, cui nec sat est, quod est, et id ipsum ne non diuturnum sit futurum, times, te conscientiae stimulant maleficiorum tuorum, te metus exanimant iudiciorum atque legum, quocumque adspexisti, ut furiae sic tuae tibi occurrunt iniuriae, quae te suspirare libere non sinunt.

[18] Do you threaten me with death, so that I be altogether removed from humankind, or with exile, so that one must migrate away from the wicked? Death is terrible to those for whom, together with life, all things are extinguished, not to those whose praise cannot die; exile, however, to those for whom the place of dwelling is, as it were, circumscribed, not to those who reckon the whole orb of lands to be one city. You—miseries, hardships press you on every side, you who think yourself blessed, who think yourself flourishing; your lusts torment you; you are racked day and night, for whom what is is not enough, and you fear that even that will not be of long duration; the conscience of your misdeeds goads you; the fears of judgments and laws make you breathless; wherever you have looked, like Furies your injustices run up to meet you, which do not allow you to breathe freely.

[19] Quam ob rem, ut inprobo et stulto et inerti nemini bene esse potest, sic bonus vir et sapiens et fortis miser esse nemo potest. Nec vero, quoius virtus moresque laudandi sunt, eius non laudanda vita est, neque porro fugienda vita est, quae laudanda est; esset autem fugienda, si esset misera. Quam ob rem, quicquid est laudabile, idem et beatum et florens et expetendum videri decet.

[19] Wherefore, just as no one who is wicked and stupid and inert can be well, so no good and wise and brave man can be miserable. Nor indeed, for one whose virtue and morals are to be praised, is his life not to be praised; nor, moreover, is a life to be fled which is to be praised; but it would have to be fled, if it were wretched. Wherefore, whatever is laudable ought to seem the same—both blessed and flourishing and to be sought.

ÜOti ýsa tå èmartÆmata kaÐ tå katory‰mata.

that the sins and the right actions are equal.

[20] Parva, inquit, est res. At magna culpa; nec enim peccata rerum eventis, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt. In quo peccatur, id potest aliud alio maius esse aut minus, ipsum quidem illud peccare, quoquo verteris, unum est.

[20] “It is a small matter,” he says. But a great fault; for sins are to be measured not by the events of things, but by the vices of men. In that wherein one sins, that can be greater or lesser, one than another; but the very act of sinning itself, whichever way you turn it, is one.

Auri navem evertat gubernator an paleae, in re aliquantum, in gubernatoris inscitia nihil interest. Lapsa est lubido in muliere ignota, dolor ad pauciores pertinet, quam si petulans fuisset in aliqua generosa ac nobili virgine; peccavit vero nihilo minus, siquidem est peccare tamquam transire lineas; quod cum feceris, culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam transeundi culpam nihil pertinet. Peccare certe licet nemini.

Whether the governor (helmsman) overturns the ship laden with gold or with chaff, in the matter there is some difference, but in the governor’s ignorance there is none. Lust has fallen upon an unknown woman; the pain pertains to fewer than if he had been petulant toward some well-born and noble maiden; yet he sinned nonetheless, since to sin is as it were to cross boundary-lines; and when you have done that, a fault has been committed; how far you go on, once you have crossed, contributes nothing to augmenting the culpability of the crossing. To sin, assuredly, is permitted to no one.

Quod autem non licet, id hoc uno tenetur, si arguitur non licere. Id si nec maius nec minus umquam fieri potest, quoniam in eo est peccatum, si non licuit, quod semper unum et idem est, quae ex eo peccata nascantur, aequalia sint oportet.

But that which is not permitted is held by this one thing: if it is argued to be not permitted. And if that can never become greater or lesser, since the sin lies in this—namely, that it was not permitted—which is always one and the same, the sins which are born from it ought to be equal.

[21] Quodsi virtutes sunt pares inter se, paria esse etiam vitia necesse est. Atqui pares esse virtutes, nec bono viro meliorem nec temperante temperantiorem nec forti fortiorem nec sapiente sapientiorem posse fieri facillume potest perspici. An virum bonum dices, qui depositum nullo teste, cum lucrari inpune posset auri pondo decem, reddiderit, si idem in decem milibus pondo auri non idem fecerit?

[21] But if the virtues are equal among themselves, it is necessary that the vices also be equal. And indeed that the virtues are equal—that it is not possible for there to come to be a man better than a good man, nor more temperate than a temperate man, nor more stout (braver) than a brave man, nor more sapient than a sapient man—can be most easily perceived. Will you call him a good man, who, a deposit with no witness, when he could gain with impunity ten pounds of gold, has returned it, if the same man in ten thousand pounds of gold would not have done the same?

aut temperantem, qui se in aliqua libidine continuerit, in aliqua effuderit?

or a temperate man, who has restrained himself in some libido, has poured himself out in another?

[22] Una virtus est consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia; nihil huc addi potest, quo magis virtus sit, nihil demi, ut virtutis nomen relinquatur. Etenim si bene facta recte facta sunt et nihil recto rectius, certe ne bono quidem melius quicquam inveniri potest. Sequitur igitur, ut etiam vitia sint paria, siquidem pravitates animi recte vitia dicuntur.

[22] There is one virtue, agreeing with reason and with perpetual constancy; nothing can be added to it whereby it would be more virtue, nothing taken away, such that the name of virtue remains. For indeed, if good deeds are deeds done rightly, and nothing is more right than the right, surely nothing better than the good can be found. It follows, therefore, that the vices also are equal, since depravities of the mind are rightly called vices.

Atqui, quoniam pares virtutes sunt, recte facta, quando a virtutibus proficiscuntur, paria esse debent, itemque peccata, quoniam ex vitiis manant, sint aequalia necesse est.

And yet, since the virtues are equal, right deeds, since they proceed from virtues, ought to be equal; and likewise sins, since they emanate from vices, must be equal.

[23] 'A philosophis', inquit, 'ista sumis.' Metuebam, ne 'a lenonibus' diceres. 'Socrates disputabat isto modo.' Bene hercule narras; nam istum doctum et sapientem virum fuisse memoriae traditum est. Sed tamen quaero ex te, quoniam verbis inter nos contendimus, non pugnis: utrum nobis est quaerendum, quid baioli atque operarii an quid homines doctissimi senserint?

[23] 'From philosophers,' he says, 'you take those things.' I was afraid you might say 'from pimps.' 'Socrates used to dispute in that manner.' Well, by Hercules, you tell it well; for that man is handed down to memory as a learned and wise man. But still I ask you, since we contend with words between us, not with fists: are we to inquire what porters and workmen have thought, or what most learned men have held?

praesertim cum hac sententia non modo verior, sed ne utilior quidem hominum vitae reperiri ulla possit. Quae vis est enim, quae magis arceat homines ab improbitate omni, quam si senserint nullum in delictis esse discrimen? aeque peccare se, si privatis ac si magistratibus manus adferant?

especially since, with this sentiment, not only a truer one, but not even any more useful for the life of men could be found. For what force is there, indeed, that would more keep men away from every improbity than if they have perceived that there is no discrimination in delicts—equally to sin, if they lay hands on private persons and if on magistrates?

quamcumque in domum stuprum intulerint, eandem esse labem lubidinis?

that, into whatever house they have brought sexual outrage, there is the same stain of libido?

[24] 'Nihilne igitur interest' (nam hoc dicet aliquis), 'patrem quis necet anne servum?' Nuda ista si ponas, iudicari, qualia sint, non facile possint. Patrem vita privare si per se scelus est, Saguntini, qui parentes suos liberos emori quam servos vivere maluerunt, parricidae fuerunt. Ergo et parenti non numquam adimi vita sine scelere potest et servo saepe sine iniuria non potest.

[24] 'Is there then no difference' (for someone will say this), 'whether someone kills a father or a slave?' If you set those things forth bare, they cannot easily be judged of what sort they are. If to deprive a father of life is in itself a crime, then the Saguntines, who preferred that their parents should die free rather than live as slaves, were parricides. Therefore both from a parent life can sometimes be taken away without crime, and from a slave it often cannot be without injustice.

Causa igitur haec, non natura distinguit; quae quoniam utro accessit, id fit propensius, si utroque adiuncta est, paria fiant necesse est.

Therefore it is this cause, not nature, that distinguishes; and since it has come to either side, that becomes more inclined; if it has been joined to both, it is necessary that they become equal.

[25] Illud tamen interest, quod in servo necando, si id fit iniuria, semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa peccantur; violatur is, qui procreavit, is, qui aluit, is, qui erudivit, is, qui in sede ac domo atque in re publica conlocavit; multitudine peccatorum praestat eoque poena maiore dignus est. Sed nos in vita, non quae cuique peccato poena sit, sed quantum cuique liceat, spectare debemus; quicquid non oportet, scelus esse, quicquid non licet, nefas putare debemus. Etiamne in minimis rebus?

[25] Yet this makes a difference: that in killing a slave, if that is done unjustly, one sins once; in violating a father’s life, many sins are committed; he is violated who procreated, who nourished, who educated, who placed one in position and home and in the republic; by the multitude of sins it excels, and for that reason is worthy of a greater penalty. But we in life ought to regard not what punishment is for each sin, but how far each one is permitted; we ought to think whatever is not fitting to be a crime, and whatever is not permitted to be nefarious. Even in the least matters?

Etiam, siquidem rerum modum figere non possumus, animorum modum tenere possumus.

Yes, since indeed we cannot fix the measure of things, we can keep the measure of our spirits.

[26] Histrio si paulum se movit extra numerum, aut si versus pronuntiatus est syllaba una brevior aut longior, exsibilatur, exploditur; in vita tu, quae omni gestu moderatior, omni versu aptior esse debet, in syllaba te peccasse dices? Poetam non audio in nugis; in vitae societate audiam civem digitis peccata dimetientem sua? Si vis, sane sint breviora, leviora qui possunt videri?

[26] If the actor moves himself a little outside the measure, or if a verse is pronounced with one syllable shorter or longer, he is hissed at, driven off the stage; in life, which ought to be more moderated in every gesture, more apt to every verse, will you say that you have sinned in a syllable? I do not listen to the poet in trifles; in the society of life shall I listen to a citizen measuring out his sins on his fingers? If you wish, by all means let those be briefer, lighter which can seem so.

cum, quicquid peccetur, perturbatione peccetur rationis atque ordinis, perturbata autem semel ratione et ordine nihil possit addi, quo magis peccari posse videatur.

since, whatever is sinned, is sinned by a perturbation of reason and order; and once reason and order have been perturbed, nothing can be added whereby it might seem possible to sin more.

ÜOti pçw êfrvn ma¤netai.

that somehow the fool raves.

[27] Ego vero te non stultum, ut saepe, non inprobum, ut semper, sed dementem . . . . . . . . rebus ad victum necessariis esse invictus potest. Sapientis animus magnitudine consilii, tolerantia rerum humanarum, contemptione fortunae, virtutibus denique omnibus ut moenibus saeptus vincetur et expugnabitur, qui ne civitate quidem pelli potest? Quae est enim civitas?

[27] But I, for my part, deem you not foolish, as often, not wicked, as always, but demented . . . . . . . . it is possible to be unconquered in the things necessary for sustenance. Will the mind of a wise man, enclosed by greatness of counsel, by tolerance of human affairs, by contempt of fortune, and, finally, by all virtues as by walls, be conquered and stormed—he who cannot even be expelled from his commonwealth? For what, indeed, is the commonwealth?

omnisne conventus etiam ferorum et immanium? omnisne etiam fugitivorum ac latronum congregata unum in locum multitudo? Certe negabis.

Is every convocation even of the feral and the monstrous? Is every multitude of fugitives and bandits congregated into one place? Surely you will deny it.

Non igitur erat illa tum civitas, cum leges in ea nihil valebant, cum iudicia iacebant, cum mos patrius occiderat, cum ferro pulsis magistratibus senatus nomen in re publica non erat; praedonum ille concursus et te duce latrocinium in foro constitutum et reliquiae coniurationis a Catilinae furiis ad tuum scelus furoremque conversae, non civitas erat.

Therefore, that was not then a commonwealth, when the laws had no force in it, when the courts lay prostrate, when the ancestral custom had perished, when, the magistrates struck down by the sword, the name of the Senate had no place in the commonwealth; that concourse of brigands and the latrociny established in the Forum with you as leader, and the remnants of the conspiracy turned from Catiline’s furies to your crime and frenzy, was not a commonwealth.

[28] Itaque pulsus ego civitate non sum, quae nulla erat, accersitus in civitatem sum, cum esset in re publica consul, qui tum nullus fuerat, esset senatus, qui tum occiderat, esset consensus populi liber, esset iuris et aequitatis, quae vincla sunt civitatis, repetita memoria. Ac vide, quam ista tui latrocinii tela contempserim. Iactam et inmissam a te nefariam in me iniuriam semper duxi, pervenisse ad me numquam putavi, nisi forte, cum parietes disturbabas aut cum tectis sceleratas faces inferebas, meorum aliquid ruere aut deflagrare arbitrabare.

[28] Therefore I was not driven out from a commonwealth, which did not exist; I was summoned back into a commonwealth, when in the republic there was a consul, who before then had been none; there was a senate, which at that time had perished; there was a free consensus of the people; the memory of law and equity, which are the bonds of the commonwealth, was renewed. And see how I have despised those missiles of your brigandage. The impious injury cast and launched by you against me I have always regarded as such; I never thought it had reached me—unless, perhaps, when you were tearing down walls or when you were bringing criminal torches against roofs, you supposed that something of mine was collapsing or burning to ashes.

[29] Nihil neque meum est neque quoiusquam, quod auferri, quod eripi, quod amitti potest. Si mihi eripuisses divinam animi mei conscientiam meis curis, vigiliis, consiliis stare te invitissimo rem publicam, si huius aeterni beneficii inmortalem memoriam delevisses, multo etiam magis, si illam mentem, unde haec consilia manarunt, mihi eripuisses, tum ego accepisse me confiterer iniuriam. Sed si haec nec fecisti nec facere potuisti, reditum mihi gloriosum iniuria tua dedit, non exitum calamitosum.

[29] Nothing is either mine or anyone’s that can be carried off, that can be snatched away, that can be lost. If you had torn from me the divine conscience of my mind—the awareness that by my cares, vigils, and counsels the republic stands, you being most unwilling—if you had effaced the immortal memory of this eternal benefaction, and much more, if you had snatched from me that mind from which these counsels flowed, then I would confess that I had received an injury. But if you have neither done these things nor been able to do them, your injury has given me a glorious return, not a calamitous departure.

Ergo ego semper civis, et tum maxime, cum meam salutem senatus exteris nationibus <ut> civis optumi commendabat, tu ne nunc quidem, nisi forte idem hostis esse et civis potest. An tu civem ab hoste natura ac loco, non animo factisque distinguis?

Therefore I am always a citizen, and then most especially, when the senate was commending my safety to foreign nations as that of a most excellent citizen; you, not even now—unless perhaps the same person can be both enemy and citizen. Or do you distinguish a citizen from an enemy by nature and place, not by mind and deeds?

[30] Caedem in foro fecisti, armatis latronibus templa tenuisti, privatorum domos, aedes sacras incendisti. Cur hostis Spartacus, si tu civis? Potes autem esse tu civis, propter quem aliquando civitas non fuit?

[30] You committed a slaughter in the forum, you held the temples with armed bandits, you set fire to the homes of private persons and to consecrated shrines. Why was Spartacus an enemy, if you are a citizen? But can you be a citizen, because of whom at one time the commonwealth did not exist?

et me tuo nomine appellas, cum omnes meo discessu exulasse rem publicam putent? Numquamne, homo amentissime, te circumspicies, numquam, nec quid facias, considerabis, nec quid loquare? Nescis exilium scelerum esse poenam, meum illud iter ob praeclarissimas res a me gestas esse susceptum?

and you address me by your own name, when all think that by my departure the Republic has gone into exile? Will you never, most demented man, look around yourself—never consider what you do, nor what you say? Do you not know that exile is the penalty of crimes, and that that journey of mine was undertaken on account of the most illustrious exploits performed by me?

[31] Omnes scelerati atque impii, quorum tu te ducem esse profiteris, quos leges exilio adfici volunt, exules sunt, etiamsi solum non mutarunt. An, cum omnes te leges exulem esse iubeant . . . . ~appellet inimicus, qui cum telo fuerit? Ante senatum tua sica deprehensa est.

[31] All the criminal and impious, of whom you profess yourself to be the leader, whom the laws wish to be afflicted with exile, are exiles, even if they have not changed the soil. Or, since all the laws order you to be an exile . . . . ~should he be called an enemy, who has been with a weapon? Before the Senate your dagger was detected.

Qui hominem occiderit? Plurimos occidisti. Qui incendium fecerit?

Who has killed a man? You have killed very many. Who has committed arson?

Aedis Nympharum manu tua deflagravit. Qui templa occupaverit? In foro castra posuisti.

The Temple of the Nymphs was burned down by your hand. Who has seized temples? You have pitched a camp in the Forum.

[32] Sed quid ego communes leges profero, quibus omnibus es exul? Familiarissimus tuus de te privilegium tulit, ut, si in opertum Bonae Deae accessisses, exulares. At te id fecisse etiam gloriari soles.

[32] But why do I bring forward the common laws, by all of which you are an exile? Your most intimate carried a privilegium concerning you, that, if you had entered the veiled rites of the Bona Dea, you should be an exile. But you even are wont to boast that you did this.

Quo modo igitur tot legibus eiectus in exilium nomen exulis non perhorrescis? 'Romae sum', inquit. Et quidem in operto fuisti.

How, then, cast out into exile by so many laws, do you not shudder at the name of “exile”? “I am at Rome,” he says. And indeed you were in the covered place.

Non igitur, ubi quisque erit, eius loci ius tenebit, si ibi eum legibus esse non oportebit.

Therefore, it is not the case that, wherever anyone may be, he will hold the right of that place, if by the laws it is not proper for him to be there.

ÜOti mÒnow ž sofÚw §leÊyerow kaÐ pçw

That the wise man alone is free, and how

afrwn douloj.

the fool is a slave.

[33] Laudetur vero hic imperator aut etiam appelletur aut hoc nomine dignus putetur! Quo modo aut cui tandem hic libero imperabit, qui non potest cupiditatibus suis imperare? Refrenet primum libidines, spernat voluptates, iracundiam teneat, coerceat avaritiam, ceteras animi labes repellat, tum incipiat aliis imperare, cum ipse improbissimis dominis, dedecori ac turpitudini, parere desierit; dum quidem his oboediet, non modo imperator, sed liber habendus omnino non erit.

[33] Let this “emperor” indeed be praised, or even be called such, or be thought worthy of this name! How, or over whom, will this man at last rule as over a free man, who cannot rule his own desires? Let him first bridle his lusts, spurn pleasures, hold his anger in check, coerce avarice, drive back the other stains of the mind; then let him begin to rule others, when he has ceased to obey the most shameless masters—disgrace and turpitude; so long as he obeys these, he must be accounted not only no emperor, but not even free at all.

Praeclare enim est hoc usurpatum a doctissimis (quorum ego auctoritate non uterer, si mihi apud aliquos agrestes haec habenda esset oratio; cum vero apud prudentissimos loquar, quibus haec inaudita non sint, cur ego simulem me, si quid in his studiis operae posuerim, perdidisse?) dictum est igitur ab eruditissimis viris nisi sapientem liberum esse neminem.

For splendidly has this been employed by the most learned (whose authority I would not use, if this oration had to be delivered by me among certain rustics; but since I speak among the most prudent, to whom these things are not unheard-of, why should I pretend that, if I have put any effort into these studies, I have lost it?) therefore it has been said by the most erudite men that no one is free except the wise man.

[34] Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi, ut velis. Quis igitur vivit, ut volt, nisi qui recte vivit?

[34] What, then, is liberty? The power of living as you will. Who, then, lives as he wills, except the one who lives rightly?

qui gaudet officio, cui vivendi via considerata atque provisa est, qui ne legibus quidem propter metum paret, sed eas sequitur et colit, quia id salutare esse maxime iudicat, qui nihil dicit, nihil facit, nihil cogitat denique nisi libenter ac libere, cuius omnia consilia resque omnes, quas gerit, ab ipso proficiscuntur eodemque referuntur, nec est ulla res, quae plus apud eum polleat quam ipsius voluntas atque iudicium; cui quidem etiam, quae vim habere maximam dicitur, Fortuna ipsa cedit, si, ut sapiens poeta dixit, 'suis ea cuique fingitur moribus.' Soli igitur hoc contingit sapienti, ut nihil faciat invitus, nihil dolens, nihil coactus.

who rejoices in duty, for whom the way of living has been considered and foreseen, who does not obey even the laws on account of fear, but follows and cultivates them, because he judges that to be most salutary, who says nothing, does nothing, finally thinks nothing except willingly and freely, whose counsels all and all the things which he manages proceed from himself and are referred back to the same, nor is there any thing which has more power with him than his own will and judgment; to whom indeed even Fortune herself, which is said to have the greatest force, yields, if, as a wise poet said, “for each it is fashioned by his own mores.” Therefore this befalls the wise man alone, that he does nothing unwillingly, nothing grieving, nothing compelled.

[35] Quod etsi ita esse pluribus verbis disserendum est, illud tamen et breve et confitendum est, nisi qui ita sit adfectus, esse liberum neminem. Igitur omnes improbi servi. Nec hoc tam re est quam dictu inopinatum atque mirabile.

[35] Which, although that it is so must be discussed with more words, nevertheless this is both brief and to be confessed: unless someone be so affected, no one is free. Therefore all the wicked are slaves. Nor is this so unexpected and marvelous in reality as in the saying.

Non enim ita dicunt eos esse servos, ut mancipia, quae sunt dominorum facta nexo aut aliquo iure civili, sed, si servitus sit, sicut est, oboedientia fracti animi et abiecti et arbitrio carentis suo, quis neget omnes leves, omnes cupidos, omnes denique improbos esse servos?

For they do not say that they are slaves in the way that chattels are—the mancipia, which are made the property of masters by bond or by some civil law—but, if slavery is, as it is, the obedience of a broken and abject mind and one lacking its own judgment, who will deny that all the light-minded, all the covetous, all, in fine, the wicked are slaves?

[36] An ille mihi liber, cui mulier imperat, cui leges imponit, praescribit, iubet, vetat, quod videtur? qui nihil imperanti negare potest, nihil recusare audet? Poscit, dandum est; vocat, veniendum est; eicit, abeundum; minatur, extimescendum.

[36] Is that man free for me, to whom a woman commands, upon whom she imposes laws, prescribes, orders, forbids, as she sees fit? who can deny nothing to the one commanding, dares to refuse nothing? She demands, it must be given; she calls, one must come; she drives out, one must depart; she threatens, one must stand in dread.

Ego vero istum non modo servum, sed nequissimum servum, etiamsi in amplissima familia natus sit, appellandum puto. Atque in pari stultitia sunt, quos signa, quos tabulae, quos caelatum argentum, quos Corinthia opera, quos aedificia magnifica nimio opere delectant. 'At sumus', inquit, 'principes civitatis.' Vos vero ne conservorum quidem vestrorum principes estis.

I, for my part, think that man must be called not only a slave, but a most worthless slave, even if he has been born in a most ample family. And in equal stupidity are those whom statues, paintings, engraved silver, Corinthian works, and magnificent edifices with excessive workmanship delight. ‘But we are,’ he says, ‘princes of the state.’ You indeed are not even princes of your fellow-slaves.

[37] Sed ut in magna familia sunt alii lautiores, ut sibi videntur, servi, sed tamen servi, ut atrienses, at qui tractant ista, qui tergent, qui ungunt, qui verrunt, qui spargunt, non honestissimum locum servitutis tenent, sic in civitate, qui se istarum rerum cupiditatibus dediderunt, ipsius servitutis locum paene infimum obtinent. 'Magna', inquit, 'bella gessi, magnis imperiis et provinciis praefui.' Gere igitur animum laude dignum. Aetionis tabula te stupidum detinet aut signum aliquod Polycleti.

[37] But just as in a great household there are other slaves more sumptuous, as they seem to themselves—slaves nonetheless, like atrienses—while those who handle those things, who wipe, who anoint, who sweep, who sprinkle, do not hold the most honorable place of servitude; so in the state, those who have surrendered themselves to the cupidities of those things occupy almost the lowest place of servitude itself. 'Great', he says, 'wars I have waged; I have been set over great commands and provinces.' Therefore bear a spirit worthy of praise. A painting of Aetion holds you stupefied, or some statue of Polycleitus.

Mitto, unde sustuleris, quo modo habeas; intuentem te, admirantem, clamores tollentem cum video, servum esse ineptiarum omnium iudico.

I pass over whence you have picked it up, how you have it; when I see you gazing, admiring, raising clamors, I judge you to be a slave to every ineptitude.

[38] 'Nonne igitur sunt illa festiva?' Sunt (nam nos quoque oculos eruditos habemus); sed, obsecro te, ita venusta habeantur ista, non ut vincla virorum sint, sed ut oblectamenta puerorum. Quid enim censes? si L. Mummius aliquem istorum videret matellionem Corinthium cupidissime tractantem, cum ipse totam Corinthum contempsisset, utrum illum civem excellentem an atriensem diligentem putaret?

[38] 'Are those things not festive, then?' They are (for we too have erudite eyes); but, I beseech you, let those things be held as charming, not as chains of men, but as oblectations of boys. What, indeed, do you suppose? If Lucius Mummius saw one of those fellows handling a Corinthian chamber-pot most eagerly, when he himself had despised all Corinth, would he think him an excellent citizen or a diligent atriensis?

Revivescat M'. Curius aut eorum aliquis, quorum in villa ac domo nihil splendidum, nihil ornatum fuit praeter ipsos, et videat aliquem summis populi beneficiis usum barbatulos mullos exceptantem de piscina et pertractantem et murenarum copia gloriantem, nonne hunc hominem ita servum iudicet, ut ne in familia quidem dignum maiore aliquo negotio putet?

Let Manius Curius come back to life, or one of those men in whose villa and house there was nothing splendid, nothing ornate except themselves, and let him see someone who has enjoyed the highest benefactions of the people catching bearded mullets from his fishpond and handling them, and glorying in an abundance of moray eels—would he not judge this man to be such a slave that he would not even think him, in his household, worthy of any greater business?

[39] An eorum servitus dubia est, qui cupiditate peculii nullam condicionem recusant durissimae servitutis? Hereditatis spes quid iniquitatis in serviendo non suscipit? quem nutum locupletis orbi senis non observat?

[39] Or is the servitude of those in doubt, who, from cupidity for a peculium, refuse no condition of the most severe slavery? What iniquity, in serving, does the hope of an inheritance not undertake? What nod of a wealthy, childless old man do they not observe?

loquitur ad voluntatem; quicquid denunciatum est, facit, adsectatur, adsidet, muneratur. Quid horum est liberi? quid denique servi non inertis?

he speaks according to another’s will; whatever has been announced, he does; he attends as a follower, he sits beside, he bestows gifts. Which of these is free? what, in fine, is there that is not of a slave—and not an idle one?

[40] Quid? iam illa cupiditas, quae videtur esse liberalior, honoris, imperii, provinciarum, quam dura est domina, quam imperiosa, quam vehemens! Cethego, homini non probatissimo, servire coegit eos, qui sibi esse amplissimi videbantur, munera mittere, noctu venire domum ad eum, precari, denique supplicare.

[40] What? That desire, which seems to be more liberal—of honor, of command, of provinces—how hard a mistress it is, how imperious, how vehement! It compelled those who seemed to themselves to be most eminent to serve Cethegus, a man by no means of the highest probity: to send gifts, to come to his house by night, to entreat, and finally to supplicate.

Quae servitus est, si haec libertas existimari potest? Quid? cum cupiditatis dominatus excessit et alius est dominus exortus ex conscientia peccatorum, timor, quam est illa misera, quam dura servitus!

What a servitude is this, if this can be esteemed liberty? What then? When the dominion of desire has exceeded its bounds and another master has arisen from the conscience of sins—fear—how wretched that is, how harsh a servitude!

Adulescentibus paulo loquacioribus est serviendum, omnes, qui aliquid scire videntur, tamquam domini timentur. Iudex vero quantum habet dominatum! quo timore nocentes adficit!

People must serve adolescents who are a little more loquacious; all who seem to know something are feared as though masters. The judge, indeed—how much dominion he has! With what fear he afflicts the guilty!

An non est omnis metus servitus?

Or is not every fear servitude?

[41] Quid valet igitur illa eloquentissimi viri, L. Crassi, copiosa magis quam sapiens oratio: 'Eripite nos ex servitute'? Quae est ista servitus tam claro homini tamque nobili? Omnis animi debilitati et humilis et fracti timiditas servitus est. 'Nolite sinere nos cuiquam servire.' In libertatem vindicari volt?

[41] What, then, is the worth of that speech of the most eloquent man, L. Crassus, more copious than wise: 'Snatch us from servitude'? What is that servitude for so renowned and so noble a man? Every timidity of a debilitated, lowly, and broken spirit is servitude. 'Do not allow us to serve anyone.' Does he wish to be vindicated into liberty?

Minime; quid enim adiungit? 'Nisi vobis universis.' Dominum mutare, non liber esse volt. 'Quibus et possumus et debemus.' Nos vero, siquidem animo excelso et alto et virtutibus exaggerato sumus, nec debemus nec possumus; tu posse te dicito, quoniam quidem potes, debere ne dixeris, quoniam nihil quisquam debet, nisi quod est turpe non reddere.

By no means; for what does he add? 'Unless to you all.' He wishes to change a master, not to be free. 'Those whom we both can and ought [to serve].' We, however, if we are of an exalted and lofty spirit and heaped up with virtues, neither ought nor are able; you, say that you are able, since indeed you are able; do not say that you ought, since no one owes anything except what it is disgraceful not to repay.

Sed haec hactenus. Ille videat, quo modo imperator esse possit, cum eum ne liberum quidem esse ratio et veritas ipsa convincat.

But enough of this for now. Let him see how he can be emperor, when reason and truth themselves prove that he is not even free.

ÜOti mÒnow ž sofÚw ploÊsiow.

That the wise man alone is wealthy.

[42] Quae est ista in commemoranda pecunia tua tam insolens ostentatio? solusne tu dives? pro di immortales!

[42] What is this so insolent ostentation in mentioning your money? Are you alone rich? O immortal gods!

egone me audisse aliquid et didicisse non gaudeam? Solusne dives? Quid, si ne dives quidem?

Am I not to rejoice that I have heard something and learned it? Are you alone rich? What, if you are not even rich?

quid, si pauper etiam? Quem enim intellegimus divitem aut hoc verbum in quo homine ponimus? Opinor in eo, quoi tanta possessio sit, ut ad liberaliter vivendum facile contentus sit, qui nihil quaerat, nihil appetat, nihil optet amplius.

What, if even a pauper? For whom, indeed, do we understand as rich, or upon what person do we place this word? I opine: in him in whom there is such possession that, for living liberally, he is easily content—who seeks nothing, has an appetite for nothing, opts for nothing further.

[43] Animus oportet tuus se iudicet divitem, non hominum sermo neque possessiones tuae. Nihil sibi deesse putat, nihil curat amplius, satiatus est aut contentus etiam pecunia; concedo, dives est. Sin autem propter aviditatem pecuniae nullum quaestum turpem putas, cum isti ordini ne honestus quidem possit esse ullus, si cotidie fraudas, decipis, poscis, pacisceris, aufers, eripis, si socios spolias, aerarium expilas, si testamenta amicorum expectas quidem atque ipse supponis, haec utrum abundantis an egentis signa sunt?

[43] Your mind must judge itself wealthy, not the talk of men nor your possessions. It thinks nothing is lacking to itself, cares for nothing further, is satiated or content even with money; I concede it, he is rich. But if, on account of the avidity for money, you reckon no profit disgraceful—when within that order not even an honorable one can exist—if day by day you defraud, deceive, exact, bargain, take away, snatch; if you despoil partners, plunder the treasury; if you do not even wait for the wills of friends and yourself substitute them—are these the signs of one abounding or of one in need?

[44] Animus hominis dives, non arca, appellari solet. Quamvis illa sit plena, dum te inanem videbo, divitem non putabo. Etenim ex eo, quantum cuique satis est, metiuntur homines divitiarum modum.

[44] It is the mind of a person that is rich, not the strongbox, which is what is usually so called. Although that be full, so long as I see you empty, I will not reckon you rich. For indeed men measure the measure of wealth by this: how much is enough for each.

Filiam quis habet, pecunia est opus; duas, maiore; pluris, maiore etiam; si, ut aiunt ~Danaum quinquaginta sint filiae, tot dotes magnam quaerunt pecuniam. Quantum enim cuique opus est, ad id accommodatur, ut ante dixi, divitiarum modus. Qui igitur non filias plures, sed innumerabiles cupiditates habet, quae brevi tempore maximas copias exhaurire possint, hunc quo modo ego appellabo divitem, cum ipse egere se sentiat?

Whoever has a daughter, there is need of money; two, of a greater amount; more, of greater still; if, as they say, ~there be fifty daughters of the Danaans~, so many dowries require great money. For the measure of riches is accommodated, as I said before, to how much each one has need. Therefore he who has, not several daughters, but innumerable cupidities, which can exhaust the greatest stores in a short time—how shall I call this man rich, when he himself feels that he is in need?

[45] Multi ex te audierunt, cum diceres neminem esse divitem, nisi qui exercitum alere posset suis fructibus, quod populus Romanus tantis vectigalibus iam pridem vix potest. Ergo hoc proposito numquam eris dives ante, quam tibi ex tuis possessionibus tantum reficietur, ut eo tueri sex legiones et magna equitum ac peditum auxilia possis. Iam fateris igitur non esse te divitem, cui tantum desit, ut expleas id, quod exoptas.

[45] Many have heard from you, when you said that no one is wealthy, unless he could sustain an army on his own fruits, which the Roman People with such great revenues has for a long time scarcely been able to do. Therefore, with this standard set forth, you will never be rich before so much is furnished to you from your own possessions that with it you can keep six legions and great auxiliaries of cavalry and infantry in defense. Already, therefore, you confess that you are not rich, since so much is lacking to you that you might fulfill what you desire.

Itaque istam paupertatem vel potius egestatem ac mendicitatem tuam numquam obscure tulisti.

And so that poverty—or rather your indigence and mendicity—you have never borne obscurely.

[46] Nam ut iis, qui honeste rem quaerunt mercaturis faciendis, operis dandis, publicis sumendis, intellegimus opus esse quaesito, sic, qui videt domi tuae pariter accusatorum atque indicum consociatos greges, qui nocentes et pecuniosos reos eodem te actore corruptelam iudicii molientes, qui tuas mercedum pactiones in patrociniis, ~intercidas pecuniarum in coitionibus candidatorum, dimissiones libertorum ad defaenerandas diripiendasque provincias, qui expulsiones vicinorum, qui latrocinia in agris, qui cum servis, cum libertis, cum clientibus societates, qui possessiones vacuas, qui proscriptiones locupletium, qui caedes municipiorum, qui illam Sullani temporis messem recordetur, qui testamenta subiecta, tot qui sublatos homines, qui denique omnia venalia, edictum decretum, alienam suam sententiam, forum domum, vocem silentium: quis hunc non putet confiteri sibi quaesito opus esse? Cui quaesito autem opus sit, quis umquam hunc vere dixerit divitem?

[46] For just as we understand that those who honorably pursue property by carrying on mercantile ventures, by giving out works, by taking public contracts, have need of capital, so he who sees in your house banded-together flocks alike of accusers and informers; who sees guilty and moneyed defendants, with you as the same agent, engineering the corruption of the judgment; who sees your fee-pactions in patronages, ~skimmings of monies in the coalitions of candidates, the dispatching of freedmen to usury-farm and to plunder the provinces; who sees the expulsions of neighbors, brigandages in the fields, partnerships with slaves, with freedmen, with clients; who sees vacant possessions, proscriptions of the wealthy, slaughters of municipalities; who recalls that harvest of Sulla’s time; who sees substituted testaments, so many men removed; who, finally, sees everything venal—an edict, a decree, another man’s and his own opinion, the forum and the home, the voice and silence—who would not think this man confesses that he has need of capital? But one to whom capital is a necessity—who has ever truly called that man rich?

[47] Etenim divitiarum est fructus in copia, copiam autem declarat satietas rerum atque abundantia; quam tu quoniam numquam adsequere, numquam omnino es dives futurus. Meam autem quoniam pecuniam contemnis, et recte (est enim ad volgi opinionem mediocris, ad tuam nulla, ad meam modica), de me silebo, de re loquar.

[47] For indeed the fruit of wealth is in plenty, and plenty is declared by satiety of things and abundance; which, since you never attain, you will never be rich at all. But since you despise my money, and rightly (for by the opinion of the crowd it is mediocre; by yours, none; by my own, modest), I will be silent about myself; I will speak about the matter.

[48] Si censenda nobis sit atque aestimanda res, utrum tandem pluris aestimemus pecuniam Pyrrhi, quam Fabricio dabat, an continentiam Fabrici, qui illam pecuniam repudiabat? utrum aurum Samnitum an responsum M'. Curi? hereditatem L. Pauli an liberalitatem Africani, qui eius hereditatis Q. Maximo fratri partem suam concessit?

[48] If we must reckon and appraise the matter, which, then, shall we value more highly: the money of Pyrrhus, which he was giving to Fabricius, or the continence of Fabricius, who repudiated that money? the gold of the Samnites, or the response of Manius Curius? the inheritance of Lucius Paulus, or the liberality of Africanus, who conceded to his brother Quintus Maximus his own share of that inheritance?

Haec profecto, quae sunt summarum virtutum pluris aestimanda sunt quam illa, quae sunt pecuniae. Quis igitur, siquidem, ut quisque, quod plurimi sit, possideat, ita divitissimus habendus sit, dubitet, quin in virtute divitiae sint? quoniam nulla possessio, nulla vis auri et argenti pluris quam virtus aestimanda est.

These things assuredly, which are of the highest virtues, are to be valued more than those which are of money. Who then, since—if indeed the richest man is to be accounted the one who possesses what is of the highest price—would doubt that riches are in virtue? since no possession, no amount of gold and silver, is to be esteemed more than virtue.

[49] O di immortales! non intellegunt homines, quam magnum vectigal sit parsimonia. Venio enim iam ad sumptuosos, relinquo istum quaestuosum.

[49] O immortal gods! men do not understand how great a revenue parsimony is. For I now come to the sumptuous (the extravagant); I leave aside that gainful fellow.

Capit ille ex suis praediis sescena sestertia, ego centena ex meis; illi aurata tecta in villis et sola marmorea facienti et signa, tabulas, supellectilem et vestem infinite concupiscenti non modo ad sumptum ille est fructus, sed etiam ad faenus exiguus. Ex meo tenui vectigali detractis sumptibus cupiditatis aliquid etiam redundabit. Uter igitur est divitior, cui deest an cui superat?

He draws from his estates six hundred sestertia, I one hundred from mine; for that man, building gilded roofs in his villas and marble floors, and craving without limit statues, panels, furnishings, and clothing, that yield goes not only to expenditure but even a bit into interest. From my slender revenue, with expenses deducted, something will even overflow for cupidity. Which, then, is richer: he to whom there is a lack, or he to whom there is a surplus?

qui eget an qui abundat? cuius possessio quo est maior, eo plus requirit ad se tuendam, an quae suis se viribus sustinet?

who is needy or who abounds? whose possession, the greater it is, the more it requires to be maintained, or that which sustains itself by its own forces?

[50] Sed quid ego de me loquor, qui morum ac temporum vitio aliquantum etiam ipse fortasse in huius saeculi errore verser? M'. Manilius patrum nostrorum memoria, ne semper Curios et Luscinos loquamur, pauper tandem fuit? habuit enim aediculas in Carinis et fundum in Labicano; nos igitur divitiores, qui plura habemus?

[50] But why do I speak about myself, I who by the vice of mores and of the times perhaps even I myself to some extent am involved in the error of this age? Manius Manilius, within the memory of our fathers—so that we not always talk of the Curii and the Luscinuses—was he, after all, poor? for he had small dwellings in the Carinae and an estate on the Labican Way; are we therefore richer, we who have more?

Utinam quidem! sed non aestimatione census, verum victu atque cultu terminatur pecuniae modus.

Would that indeed! but the limit of money is determined not by an estimation of the census, but by victuals and attire.

[51] Non esse cupidum pecunia est, non esse emacem vectigal est; contentum vero suis rebus esse maximae sunt certissimaeque divitiae. Etenim si isti callidi rerum aestimatores prata et areas quasdam magno aestimant, quod ei generi possessionum minime quasi noceri potest, quanti est aestimanda virtus, quae nec eripi nec subripi potest neque naufragio neque incendio amittitur nec tempestatum nec temporum perturbatione mutatur! qua praediti qui sunt, soli sunt divites;

[51] Not to be covetous is wealth, not to be a buyer is revenue; but to be content with one’s own things is the greatest and most certain riches. For if those shrewd appraisers of things value meadows and certain plots highly, because that kind of possessions can, as it were, be least harmed, how highly must virtue be valued, which can neither be snatched away nor surreptitiously filched, nor is it lost by shipwreck or by fire, nor is it changed by the perturbation of tempests or of times! Those who are endowed with it, they alone are rich;

[52] soli enim possident res et fructuosas et sempiternas solique, quod est proprium divitiarum, contenti sunt rebus suis, satis esse putant, quod est, nihil adpetunt, nulla re egent, nihil sibi deesse sentiunt, nihil requirunt; inprobi autem et avari, quoniam incertas atque in casu positas possessiones habent et plus semper adpetunt, nec eorum quisquam adhuc inventus est, quoi, quod haberet, esset satis, non modo non copiosi ac divites, sed etiam inopes ac pauperes existimandi sunt.

[52] for they alone possess things both fruitful and sempiternal, and they alone, which is proper to riches, are content with their own things; they think that what is, is enough, they desire nothing, they are in need of nothing, they perceive nothing to be lacking to themselves, they require nothing; but the wicked and the avaricious, since they have possessions uncertain and placed at the mercy of chance and always seek more, nor has any one of them yet been found for whom what he had was enough, are to be considered not only not well-supplied and rich, but even needy and paupers.