Augustine: DE CIVITATE DEI

[I] Ciuitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione prouidentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum diuina excellens auctoritate subiecit. Ibi quippe scriptum est: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, ciuitas Dei; et in alio psalmo legitur: Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis in ciuitate Dei nostri, in monte sancto eius, dilatans exultationes uniuersae terrae f et paulo post in eodem psalmo: Sicut audiuimus, ita et uidimus, in ciuitate domini uirtutum, in ciuitate Dei nostri; Deus fundauit eam in aeternum; item in alio: Fluminis impetus laetificat ciuitatem Dei, sanctificauit tabernaculum suum Altissimus; Deus in medio eius non commouebitur. His atque huius modi testimoniis, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, didicimus esse quandam ciuitatem Dei, cuius ciues esse concupiuimus illo amore, quem nobis illius conditor inspirauit.

[1] We speak of the City of God, whose witness is that Scripture which, not by fortuitous motions of minds, but plainly by the highest disposition of Providence, has subjected to itself, by divine excelling authority, all kinds of human ingenia over all the letters of all nations. There indeed it is written: “Glorious things are said of you, City of God;” and in another psalm it is read: “Great is the Lord and exceedingly laudable in the city of our God, on his holy mountain, enlarging the exultations of the whole earth f” and a little after in the same psalm: “As we have heard, so also have we seen, in the city of the Lord of hosts, in the city of our God; God has founded her forever;” likewise in another: “The river’s impetus gladdens the City of God; the Most High has sanctified his tabernacle; God is in her midst, she shall not be moved.” By these and testimonies of this sort, all of which to commemorate would be too long, we have learned that there is a certain City of God, whose citizens we have desired to be with that love which its Founder inspired in us.

Huic conditori sanctae ciuitatis ciues terrenae ciuitatis deos suos praeferunt ignorantes eum esse Deum deorum, non deorum falsorum, hoc est impiorum et superborum, qui eius incommutabili omnibusque communi luce priuati et ob hoc ad quandam egenam potestatem redacti suas quodam modo priuatas potentias consectantur honoresque diuinos a deceptis subditis quaerunt; sed deorum piorum atque sanctorum, qui potius se ipsos uni subdere quam multos sibi, potiusque Deum colere quam pro Deo coli delectantur. Sed huius sanctae ciuitatis inimicis decem superioribus libris, quantum potuimus, domino et rege nostro adiuuante respondimus. Nunc uero quid a me iam expectetur agnoscens meique non inmemor debiti de duarum ciuitatum, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodam modo diximus inuicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum ualuero, disputare eius ipsius domini et regis nostri ubique opitulatione fretus adgrediar, primumque dicam, quem ad modum exordia duarum istarum ciuitatum in angelorum diuersitate praecesserint.

To this Founder of the holy city the citizens of the earthly city prefer their own gods, not knowing Him to be the God of gods—not of false gods, that is, of the impious and proud, who, deprived of His immutable and common-to-all light and therefore reduced to a certain beggarly power, pursue in a certain manner their private potencies and seek divine honors from deceived subjects—but of pious and holy gods, who take delight rather to subject themselves to One than to have many subject to themselves, and rather to worship God than to be worshiped instead of God. But to the enemies of this holy city we have replied, as far as we could, in the ten preceding books, with our Lord and King helping. Now indeed, recognizing what is already expected of me and not unmindful of my debt, concerning the two cities, namely the earthly and the heavenly, which in this meantime age we have said to be in a certain way perplexed and mutually commingled, about their origin and course and proper ends, as I shall be able, relying everywhere on the aid of that same Lord and King of ours, I will set about to discourse; and first I will say in what manner the beginnings of these two cities were prefigured in the diversity of the angels.

[II] Magnum est et admodum rarum uniuersam creaturam corpoream et incorpoream consideratam compertamque mutabilem intentione mentis excedere atque ad incommutabilem Dei substantiam peruenire et illic discere ex ipso, quod cunctam naturam, quae non est quod ipse, non fecit nisi ipse. Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut inter sonantem et audientem aeria spatia uerberentur, neque per eius modi spiritalem, quae corporum similitudinibus figuratur, sicut in somnis uel quo alio tali modo (nam et sic uelut corporis auribus loquitur, quia uelut per corpus loquitur et uelut interposito corporalium locorum interuallo; multum enim similia sunt talia uisa corporibus); sed loquitur ipsa ueritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine ceteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior.

[2] It is a great and very rare thing to go beyond, by an intention of mind, the entire creature, corporeal and incorporeal, when it has been considered and found mutable, and to arrive at the unchangeable substance of God, and there to learn from himself that all nature which is not what he is was made by none but himself. For thus God speaks with man not through any corporeal creature, rattling in bodily ears, so that the airy spaces are struck between the sounding and the hearing, nor through a spiritual one of that sort which is shaped by likenesses of bodies, as in dreams or by any other such mode (for even thus he speaks, as it were, to the ears of the body, because he speaks as it were through a body and as it were with an interval of bodily places interposed; for such visions are very like to bodies); but he speaks by truth itself, if there be anyone fit to hear with the mind, not with the body. For he so speaks to that part of man which, in man, is better than the other things of which man consists, and than which God himself alone is better.

Cum enim homo rectissime intellegatur uel, si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei: profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intellegentia naturaliter inest, uitiis quibusdam tenebrosis et ueteribus inualida est, non solum ad inhaerendum fruendo, uerum etiam ad perferendum incommutabile lumen, donec de die in diem renouata atque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax, fide primum fuerat inbuenda atque purganda. In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad ueritatem, ipsa ueritas, Deus Dei filius, homine adsumpto, non Deo consumpto, eandem constituit et fundauit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum.

Since indeed man is most rightly understood, or, if this cannot be, at least believed, to have been made to the image of God, surely by that part of himself he is nearer to the higher God, by which he surpasses his lower parts, which he has even in common with cattle. But because the mind itself, in which reason and intelligence are naturally inherent, is enfeebled by certain dark and ancient vices, it is not only unequal to adhering in enjoyment, but even to bearing the incommutable light, until, renewed and healed from day to day, it becomes capable of so great a blessedness; therefore it had first to be imbued with faith and purged. And so that it might walk more confidently toward the truth, the Truth itself, God the Son of God, with man assumed, not God consumed, established and founded that same faith, so that there might be for man a way to the God of man through the God-man.

Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo, per hoc et uia. Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit uia media est, spes est perueniendi; si autem desit aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit?

This is indeed the mediator of God and of men, the man Christ Jesus. By this he is mediator—in that he is man—by this also he is the way. For if between him who is tending and that to which he tends there is a middle way, there is hope of arriving; but if it be lacking, or if it be unknown by which one must go, what profit is it to know whither one must go?

Sola est autem aduersus omnes errores uia munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo; quo itur Deus, qua itur homo.

But the only most fortified way against all errors is that the very same One be God and man; to whom one goes is God, by which way one goes is man.

[III] Hic prius per prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per apostolos, quantum satis esse iudicauit, locutus etiam scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de his rebus, quas ignorare non expedit nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus. Nam si ea sciri possunt testibus nobis, quae remota non sunt a sensibus nostris siue interioribus siue etiam exterioribus (unde et praesentia nuncupantur, quod ita ea dicimus esse prae sensibus, sicut prae oculis quae praesto sunt oculis): profecto ea, quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostro testimonio scire non possumus, de his alios testes requirimus eisque credimus, a quorum sensibus remota esse uel fuisse non credimus. Sicut ergo de uisibilibus, quae non uidimus, eis credimus, qui uiderunt, atque ita de ceteris, quae ad suum quemque sensum corporis pertinent: ita de his, quae animo ac mente sentiuntur (quia et ipse rectissime dicitur sensus, unde et sententia uocabulum accepit), hoc est de inuisibilibus quae a nostro sensu interiore remota sunt, his nos oportet credere, qui haec in illo incorporeo lumine disposita didicerunt uel manentia contuentur.

[3] He, first through the prophets, then through himself, afterwards through the apostles, spoke as much as he judged to be sufficient, and also established a writing which is called canonical, of most outstanding authority, to which we give faith concerning those matters which it is not expedient to be ignorant of and for the knowing of which we are not competent by ourselves. For if those things can be known for us by witnesses which are not removed from our senses, whether interior or even exterior (whence they are also called “present,” because we say that they are before the senses, just as “before the eyes” are those things which are at hand to the eyes): assuredly those things which are removed from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, concerning these we seek other witnesses and believe them—those from whose senses we do not believe them to be or to have been removed. Thus, therefore, concerning visibles which we have not seen, we believe those who have seen, and so concerning the rest which pertain to each one’s proper sense of the body: so too concerning those things which are sensed by the soul and the mind (for that is most rightly called “sense,” whence also “sentence” [i.e., opinion] has received its vocable), that is, concerning invisibles which are removed from our interior sense, we ought to believe those who have learned these things as disposed in that incorporeal light or behold them abiding.

[IV] Visibilium omnium maximus mundus est, inuisibilium omnium maximus Deus est. Sed mundum esse conspicimus, Deum esse credimus. Quod autem Deus fecerit mundum, nulli tutius credimus quam ipsi Deo.

[IV] Of all visible things the greatest is the world; of all invisible things the greatest is God. But that the world is, we behold; that God is, we believe. As for the fact that God made the world, we more safely believe no one than God himself.

Vbi eum audiuimus? Nusquam interim nos melius quam in scripturis sanctis, ubi dixit propheta eius: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Numquidnam ibi fuit iste propheta, quando fecit Deus caelum et terram?

Where have we heard him? Nowhere meanwhile better than in the sacred Scriptures, where his prophet said: "In the beginning God made heaven and earth." Surely that prophet was not there when God made heaven and earth?

Non; sed ibi fuit sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quae in animas sanctas etiam se transfert, amicos Dei et prophetas constituit eisque opera sua sine strepitu intus enarrat. Loquuntur eis quoque angeli Dei, qui semper uident faciem Patris uoluntatemque eius quibus oportet adnuntiant. Ex his unus erat iste propheta, qui dixit et scripsit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram.

No; but the Wisdom of God was there, through whom all things were made, who also transfers herself into holy souls, makes them friends of God and prophets, and to them inwardly, without din, recounts his works. The angels of God also speak to them, who always see the face of the Father and announce his will to those to whom it is fitting to announce it. Of these one was that prophet, who said and wrote: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.”

Qui tam idoneus testis est, per quem Deo credendum sit, ut eodem spiritu Dei, quo haec sibi reuelata cognouit, etiam ipsam fidem nostram futuram tanto ante praedixerit.

He is such an apt witness, through whom God is to be believed, that by the same Spirit of God by which he recognized these things as revealed to him, he even predicted, so long beforehand, the very coming of our faith.

Sed quid placuit aeterno Deo tunc facere caelum et terram, quae antea non fecisset? Qui hoc dicunt, si mundum aeternum sine ullo initio et ideo nec a Deo factum uideri uolunt, nimis auersi sunt a ueritate et letali morbo impietatis insaniunt. Exceptis enim propheticis uocibus mundus ipse ordinatissima sua mutabilitate et mobilitate et uisibilium omnium pulcherrima specie quodam modo tacitus et factum se esse et non nisi a Deo ineffabiliter atque inuisibiliter magno et ineffabiliter atque inuisibiliter pulchro fieri se potuisse proclamat.

But why did it please the eternal God then to make heaven and earth, which previously he had not made? Those who say this, if they wish the world to seem eternal without any beginning and therefore not made by God, are too averse from truth and rave with the lethal malady of impiety. For even with the prophetic voices set aside, the world itself, by its most-ordered mutability and mobility and by the most beautiful appearance of all visible things, in a certain way silent, proclaims both that it has been made and that it could have been made only by God—ineffably and invisibly great, and ineffably and invisibly beautiful.

Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis uolunt habere, sed suae creationis initium, ut modo quodam uix intellegibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi Deum uidentur uelut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi uenisse credatur in mentem, quod numquam ante uenisset, facere mundum, et accidisse illi uoluntatem nouam, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis; sed non uideo quo modo eis possit in ceteris rebus ratio ista subsistere maximeque in anima, quam si Deo coaeternam esse contenderint, unde illi acciderit noua miseria, quae numquam antea per aeternum, nullo modo poterunt explicare. Si enim alternasse semper eius miseriam et beatitudinem dixerint, necesse est dicant etiam semper alternaturam; unde illa eos sequetur absurditas, ut etiam cum beata dicitur in hoc utique non sit beata, si futuram suam miseriam et turpitudinem praeuidet; si autem non praeuidet nec se turpem ac miseram fore, sed beatam semper existimat. falsa opinione sit beata; quo dici stultius nihil potest.

But those who confess that it was indeed made by God, yet do not want it to have a beginning of time, but a beginning of its creation, so that, in a manner scarcely intelligible, it has always been made, do indeed say something by which they seem to themselves, as it were, to defend God from fortuitous temerity, lest it be believed that there suddenly came into his mind—to make the world—a thought which had never before come, and that a new will befell him, whereas in no respect is he at all mutable; but I do not see how that rationale can stand for them in other matters, and especially in the soul, which, if they contend to be coeternal with God, they will in no way be able to explain whence there befell to it a new misery which never before, through eternity, had been. For if they say that its misery and beatitude have always alternated, it is necessary that they say it will also always be alternating; whence that absurdity will follow them, that even when it is called blessed, herein it is assuredly not blessed, if it foresees its future misery and turpitude; but if it does not foresee that it will be base and wretched, but supposes itself always to be blessed, it is blessed by a false opinion; than which nothing more foolish can be said.

Si autem semper quidem per saecula retro infinita cum beatitudine alternasse animae miseriam putant, sed nunc iam de cetero, cum fuerit liberata, ad miseriam non esse redituram, nihilo minus conuincuntur numquam eam fuisse uere beatam, sed deinceps esse incipere noua quadam nec fallaci beatitudine. ac per hoc fatebuntur accidere illi aliquid noui, et hoc magnum atque praeclarum, quod numquam retro per aeternitatem accidisset. Cuius nouitatis causam si Deum negabunt in aeterno habuisse consilio, simul eum negabunt beatitudinis eius auctorem, quod nefandae impietatis est; si autem dicent etiam ipsum nouo consilio excogitasse, ut de cetero sit anima in aeternum beata, quo modo eum alienum ab ea, quae illis quoque displicet, mutabilitate monstrabunt?

But if they think that indeed through infinite ages past the soul’s misery has alternated with beatitude, yet now at last hereafter, once it has been liberated, it is not to return to misery, nonetheless they are convicted that it was never truly blessed, but that henceforward it begins to be, by a certain new and non-fallacious beatitude. And through this they will admit that something new befalls it—and this a great and preeminent thing—which never before, back through eternity, had befallen. If they deny that God had the cause of this novelty in an eternal counsel, at the same time they will deny him the author of its beatitude, which is a crime of unspeakable impiety; but if they say that he himself also devised by a new counsel that henceforth the soul be blessed unto eternity, how will they show him to be alien from that mutability which is displeasing even to them?

Porro si ex tempore creatam, sed nullo ulterius tempore perituram, tamquam numerum, habere initium, sed non habere finem fatentur, et ideo semel expertam miserias, si ab eis fuerit liberata, numquam miseram postea futuram: non utique dubitabunt hoc fieri manente incommutabilitate consilii Dei, Sic ergo credant et mundum ex tempore fieri potuisse, nec tamen ideo Deum in eo faciendo aeternum consilium uoluntatemque mutasse.

Moreover, if they admit it to have been created from time, yet to perish at no further time—like a number, to have a beginning but not to have an end—and therefore, once having experienced miseries, if it shall have been freed from them, never thereafter to be miserable: they will surely not doubt that this occurs with the unchangeability of the counsel of God remaining. Thus, then, let them believe also that the world could have been made from time, and yet not therefore that God, in making it, changed his eternal counsel and will.

[V] Deinde uidendum est, isti, qui Deum conditorem mundi esse consentiunt et tamen quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. Ita enim quaeritur, cur potius tunc et non antea factus sit, quem ad modum quaeri potest, cur hic potius ubi est et non alibi. Nam si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus eis non uidetur Deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, in quibus si quisquam dicat non potuisse uacare Omnipotentem, nonne consequens erit, ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur (ea tantum differentia, quod eos ille fortuitis motibus atomorum gigni asserit et resolui, isti autem opere Dei factos dicturi sunt), si eum per interminabilem inmensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium uacare noluerint, nec eosdem mundos, quod etiam de isto sentiunt, ulla causa posse dissolui?

[5] Then it must be considered what those who agree that God is the creator of the world, and yet ask what we answer about the world’s time, themselves answer about the world’s place. For just as it is asked why it was made then rather than earlier, so it can be asked why it is here where it is rather than elsewhere. For if they conceive infinite stretches of time before the world, in which it does not seem to them that God could have ceased from work, let them similarly conceive outside the world infinite expanses of places; and if anyone says that the Omnipotent could not be idle in them, will it not follow that they are forced to dream, with Epicurus, of innumerable worlds (with only this difference, that he asserts them to be generated and dissolved by the fortuitous motions of atoms, whereas they will say they were made by the work of God), if they are unwilling that Him to be idle through the interminable immensity of places lying open on every side outside the world, and not admit that these same worlds, as they also think about this one, could be dissolved by any cause?

Cum his enim agimus, qui et Deum incorporeum et omnium naturarum, quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; alios autem nimis indignum est ad istam disputationem religionis admittere, maxime quod apud eos, qui multis diis sacrorum obsequium deferendum putant, isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate atque auctoritate uicerunt, non ob aliud, nisi quia longo quidem interuallo, uerum tamen reliquis propinquiores sunt ueritati. An forte substantiam Dei, quam nec includunt nec determinant nec distendunt loco, sed eam, sicut de Deo sentire dignum est, fatentur incorporea praesentia ubique totam, a tantis locorum extra mundum spatiis absentem esse dicturi sunt, et uno tantum atque in comparatione illius infinitatis tam exiguo loco, in quo mundus est, occupatam? Non opinor eos in haec uaniloquia progressuros.

For we are dealing with those who agree with us that God is incorporeal and the creator of all natures which are not what he himself is; but it is far too unworthy to admit others to this disputation of religion—especially since among those who think that the observance of sacred rites is to be rendered to many gods, these have surpassed the other philosophers in nobility and authority, for no other reason than that, though by a long interval, yet they are nearer than the rest to the truth. Or are they perhaps going to say that the substance of God—which they neither enclose nor determine nor distend by place, but confess, as it is worthy to think about God, to be everywhere whole by incorporeal presence—is absent from such vast expanses of places outside the world, and occupied only in the one place, so small in comparison with that infinity, in which the world is? I do not suppose they will advance into these vain babblings.

Cum igitur unum mundum ingenti quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco suo determinatum et operante Deo factum esse dicant: quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis, cur in eis ab opere Deus cesset, hoc sibi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus, cur in eis ab opere Deus cessauerit. Et sicut non est consequens, ut fortuito potius quam ratione diuina Deus non alio, sed isto in quo est loco mundum constituerit, cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamuis eandem diuinam rationem, qua id factum est nulla possit humana conprehendere: ita non est consequens, ut Deo aliquid existimemus accidisse fortuitum, quod illo potius quam anteriore tempore condidit mundum, cum aequaliter anteriora tempora per infinitum retro spatium praeterissent nec fuisset aliqua differentia, unde tempus tempori eligendo praeponeretur. Quod si dicunt inanes esse hominum cogitationes, quibus infinita imaginantur loca, cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum: respondetur eis isto modo inaniter homines cogitare praeterita tempora uacationis Dei, cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum.

Since, therefore, they say that there is one world with a huge corporeal mass, yet finite and determined by its own place, and made by the working of God: what they answer about the infinite places outside the world—why in them God should cease from work—let them answer this for themselves about the infinite times before the world—why in them God ceased from work. And just as it does not follow that, by fortune rather than by divine reason, God constituted the world not in some other place but in this place in which it is—since, with infinite spaces equally lying open everywhere, this could be chosen with no more excellent merit, although that same divine reason by which it was done no human mind can comprehend—so it does not follow that we should think anything fortuitous befell God, in that he founded the world at that time rather than at an earlier time, since earlier times alike had passed through an infinite backward expanse, nor was there any difference whereby, by choosing, one time should be preferred to another. But if they say that the thoughts of men are empty, by which they imagine infinite places, since there is no place outside the world, it is answered to them that in like manner men think inanely of past times of God’s cessation, since there is no time before the world.

[VI] Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est: quis non uideat, quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret, cuius motionis et mutationis cum aliud atque aliud, quae simul esse non possunt, cedit atque succedit, in breuioribus uel productioribus morarum interuallis tempus sequeretur? Cum igitur Deus, in cuius aeternitate nulla est omnino mutatio, creator sit temporum et ordinator: quo modo dicatur post temporum spatia mundum creasse non uideo, nisi dicatur ante mundum iam aliquam fuisse creaturam, cuius motibus tempora currerent. Porro si litterae sacrae maximeque ueraces ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum caelum et terram, ut nihil antea fecisse intellegatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante cetera cuncta quae fecit: procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore.

[6] If indeed eternity and time are rightly discerned—since time is not without some mobile mutability, whereas in eternity there is no mutation—who does not see that times would not have existed, unless a creature were made that would change something by some motion, the yielding and succeeding of which motion and mutation—since one thing and then another, which cannot be simultaneously, gives way and follows—would be accompanied by time in shorter or more protracted intervals of delay? Since therefore God, in whose eternity there is altogether no mutation, is the creator and ordainer of times, I do not see how it can be said that he created the world after spans of time, unless it be said that before the world there had already been some creature by whose motions times would run. Moreover, if the sacred writings—most truthful—thus say that in the beginning God made heaven and earth, so that it is understood that he had made nothing before (for this rather would be said to have been made “in the beginning,” if he had made anything before all the other things that he made), then without doubt the world was not made in time, but with time.

Quod enim fit in tempore, et post aliquod fit et ante aliquod tempus; post id quod praeteritum est, ante id quod futurum est; nullum autem posset esse praeteritum, quia nulla erat creatura, cuius mutabilibus motibus ageretur. Cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in eius conditione factus est mutabilis motus, sicut uidetur se habere etiam ordo ille primorum sex uel septem dierum, in quibus et mane et uespera nominantur, donec omnia, quae his diebus Deus fecit, sexto perficiantur die septimoque in magno mysterio Dei uacatio commendatur. Qui dies cuius modi sint, aut perdifficile nobis aut etiam inpossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.

For whatever is made in time is made both after some time and before some time—after that which is past, before that which is to come; but there could be no past, because there was no creature by whose mutable motions it would be carried on. Yet the world was made with time, if in its constitution a mutable motion was made, as that order of the first six or seven days also seems to stand, in which both morning and evening are named, until all the things which God made in these days are brought to completion on the sixth day, and on the seventh, in a great mystery of God, a rest is commended. What sort of days these are, it is either very difficult for us or even impossible to conceive, how much more to speak.

[VII] Videmus quippe istos dies notos non habere uesperam nisi de solis occasu nec mane nisi de solis exortu; illorum autem priores tres dies sine sole peracti sunt, qui die quarto factus refertur. Et primitus quidem lux uerbo Dei facta atque inter ipsam et tenebras Deus separasse narratur et eandem lucem uocasse diem, tenebras autem noctem; sed qualis illa sit lux et quo alternante motu qualemque uesperam et mane fecerit, remotum est a sensibus nostris, nec ita ut est intellegi a nobis potest, quod tamen sine ulla haesitatione credendum est. Aut enim aliqua lux corporea est, siue in superioribus mundi partibus longe a conspectibus nostris siue unde sol postmodum accensus est; aut lucis nomine significata est sancta ciuitas in sanctis angelis et spiritibus beatis, de qua dicit apostolus: Quae sursum est Hierusalem, mater nostra aeterna in caelis; ait quippe et alio loco: Omnes enim uos filii lucis estis et filii diei; non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum; si tamen et uesperam diei huius et mane aliquatenus congruenter intellegere ualeamus.

[7] We see, to be sure, that these days known to us have no evening except from the sun’s setting, nor morning except from the sun’s rising; but the first three days of those were accomplished without the sun, which is reported to have been made on the fourth day. And at the first, indeed, light was made by the Word of God, and God is narrated to have separated between it and the darkness, and to have called the same light day, but the darkness night; but what sort that light is, and by what alternating motion he made what sort of evening and morning, is removed from our senses, nor can it be understood by us as it is—yet it must be believed without any hesitation. For either it is some corporeal light, whether in the higher parts of the world far from our sight, or from which the sun was afterwards kindled; or by the name of light is signified the holy city in the holy angels and blessed spirits, about which the apostle says: The Jerusalem which is above, our mother, eternal in the heavens; for he also says in another place: For you all are sons of light and sons of day; we are not of night nor of darkness; if, however, we are able in some measure fittingly to understand the evening and the morning of this day as well.

Quoniam scientia creaturae in comparatione scientiae Creatoris quodam modo uesperascit, itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum et ipsa refertur ad laudem dilectionemque Creatoris; nec in noctem uergitur, ubi non Creator creaturae dilectione relinquitur. Denique scriptura cum illos dies dinumeraret ex ordine, nusquam interposuit uocabulum noctis. Non enim ait alicubi: Facta est nox; sed: Facta est uespera et factum est mane dies unus.

Since the knowledge of the creature, in comparison with the knowledge of the Creator, in a certain manner grows toward evening, and likewise it grows light and becomes morning when it too is referred to the praise and love of the Creator; nor does it incline into night, where the Creator is not abandoned through love of the creature. Finally, when Scripture was enumerating those days in order, it nowhere interposed the vocable of “night.” For it does not say anywhere: “Night was made”; but: “Evening was made, and morning was made, one day.”

Ita dies secundus et ceteri. Cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in Dei sapientia cognoscitur, uelut in arte qua facta est. Ideo uespera quam nox congruentius dici potest; quae tamen, ut dixi, cum ad laudandum et amandum refertur Creatorem, recurrit in mane.

Thus the second day and the rest. For the cognition of the creature in itself is, so to speak, paler than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made. Therefore “evening,” rather than “night,” can more fittingly be said; which, however, as I said, when it is referred to the praising and loving of the Creator, runs back into morning.

Et hoc cum facit in cognitione sui ipsius, dies unus est; cum in cognitione firmamenti, quod inter aquas inferiores et superiores caelum appellatum est, dies secundus; cum in cognitione terrae ac maris omniumque gignentium, quae radicibus continuata sunt terrae, dies tertius; cum in cognitione luminarium maioris et minoris omniumque siderum, dies quartus; cum in cognitione omnium ex aquis animalium natatilium atque uolatilium, dies quintus; cum in cognitione omnium animalium terrenorum atque ipsius hominis, dies sextus.

And when it does this in the cognition of itself, it is day one; when in the cognition of the firmament, which between the lower and the upper waters was called heaven, day two; when in the cognition of the earth and the sea and of all things that sprout, which are connected to the earth by roots, day three; when in the cognition of the greater and the lesser luminary and of all the stars, day four; when in the cognition of all animals from the waters, the swimming and the flying, day five; when in the cognition of all terrestrial animals and of man himself, day six.

[VIII] Cum uero in die septimo requiescit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis et sanctificat eum, nequaquam est accipiendum pueriliter, tamquam Deus laborauerit operando, qui dixit et facta sunt uerbo intellegibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. Sed requies Dei requiem significat eorum qui requiescunt in Deo, sicut laetitia domus laetitiam significat eorum, qui laetantur in domo, etiamsi non eos domus ipsa, sed alia res aliqua laetos facit. Quanto magis, si eadem domus pulchritudine sua faciat laetos habitatores, ut non solum eo loquendi modo laeta dicatur, quo significamus per id quod continet id quod continetur (sicut "theatra plaudunt, prata mugiunt", cum in illis homines plaudunt, in his boues mugiunt); sed etiam illo, quo significatur per efficientem id quod efficitur; sicut laeta epistula dicitur, significans eorum laetitiam, quos legentes efficit laetos.

[8] But when on the seventh day God rests from all his works and sanctifies it, it is by no means to be taken childishly, as though God had labored by working—He who said, and they were made, by an intelligible and sempiternal word, not a sonorous and temporal one. But the rest of God signifies the rest of those who rest in God, just as the joy of a house signifies the joy of those who rejoice in the house, even if it is not the house itself, but some other thing, that makes them joyful. How much more, if that same house by its own beauty makes its inhabitants joyful, so that it is called joyful not only in that mode of speaking by which we signify through that which contains that which is contained (as “theaters applaud, meadows moo,” when in the former human beings applaud, in the latter oxen moo); but also in that mode by which that which is effected is signified through the efficient; as a “joyful letter” is said, signifying the joy of those whom, as readers, it makes joyful.

Conuenientissime itaque, cum Deum requieuisse prophetica narrat auctoritas, significatur requies eorum, qui in illo requiescunt et quos facit ipse requiescere; hoc etiam hominibus, quibus loquitur et propter quos utique conscripta est, promittente prophetia, quod etiam ipsi post bona opera, quae in eis et per eos operatur Deus, si ad illum prius in ista uita per fidem quodam modo accesserint, in illo habebunt requiem sempiternam. Hoc enim et sabbati uacatione ex praecepto legis in uetere Dei populo figuratum est, unde suo loco diligentius arbitror disserendum.

Most fittingly, therefore, when the prophetic authority relates that God rested, it is signified to be the rest of those who rest in Him and whom He Himself makes to rest; with prophecy also promising this to the human beings to whom it speaks and for whom it was of course written, that they too, after good works which God works in them and through them, if first in this life they shall have in some manner approached to Him through faith, will have sempiternal rest in Him. For this, too, was prefigured by the vacation of the sabbath by the precept of the law in the old people of God, whence, in its own place, I think it should be discussed more diligently.

[IX] Nunc, quoniam de sanctae ciuitatis exortu dicere institui et prius quod ad sanctos angelos adtinet dicendum putaui, quae huius ciuitatis et magna pars est et eo beatior, quod numquam peregrinata, quae hinc diuina testimonia suppetant, quantum satis uidebitur, Deo largiente explicare curabo. Vbi de mundi constitutione sacrae litterae loquuntur, non euidenter dicitur, utrum uel quo ordine creati sint angeli; sed si praetermissi non sunt, uel caeli nomine, ubi dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, uel potius lucis huius, de qua loquor, significati sunt. Non autem esse praetermissos hinc existimo, quod scriptum est, requieuisse Deum in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis quae fecit, cum liber ipse ita sit exorsus: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; ut ante caelum et terram nihil aliud fecisse uideatur.

[9] Now, since I have undertaken to speak about the rise of the holy city, and thought that I ought first to speak about the holy angels—which are both a great part of this city and the more blessed in that they have never been pilgrims—I will try to set forth, as much as will seem sufficient, God granting, what divine testimonies are at hand about this. Where the sacred writings speak about the constitution of the world, it is not said clearly whether, or in what order, the angels were created; but, if they have not been passed over, they are signified either under the name “heaven,” where it is said: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” or rather by this “light” of which I am speaking. Yet I do not think they have been passed over, from this: that it is written that God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made, whereas the book itself began thus: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” so that he seems to have made nothing else before heaven and earth.

Cum ergo a caelo et terra coeperit, atque ipsa terra, quam primitus fecit, sicut scriptura consequenter eloquitur, inuisibilis et incomposita nondumque luce facta utique tenebrae fuerint super abyssum, id est super quandam terrae et aquae indistinctam confusionem (ubi enim lux non est, tenebrae sint necesse est), deinde omnia creando disposita sint, quae per sex dies consummata narrantur: quo modo angeli praetermitterentur, tamquam non essent in operibus Dei, a quibus in die septimo requieuit? Opus autem Dei esse angelos hic quidem etsi non praetermissum, non tamen euidenter expressum est; sed alibi hoc sancta scriptura clarissima uoce testatur. Nam et in hymno trium in camino uirorum cum praedictum esset: Benedicite omnia opera Domini Dominum, in executione eorundem operum etiam angeli nominati sunt; et in psalmo canitur: Laudate Dominum de caelis, laudate eum in excelsis; laudate eum omnes angeli eius, laudate eum omnes uirtutes eius; laudate eum sol et luna, laudate eum omnes stellae et lumen; laudate eum caeli caelorum, et aquae, quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen Domini; quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt.

Since therefore he began from heaven and earth, and the earth itself, which he first made, as Scripture subsequently declares, was invisible and uncomposed, and with light not yet made there were assuredly darknesses upon the abyss, that is, upon a certain indistinct confusion of earth and water (for where light is not, it is necessary that there be darkness), then by creating all things were disposed, which are related to have been consummated through six days: how would the angels have been passed over, as though they were not among the works of God, from which on the seventh day he rested? But that the angels are a work of God, here indeed, although not omitted, is not, however, clearly expressed; yet elsewhere Holy Scripture bears witness to this with a most clear voice. For both in the hymn of the three men in the furnace, when it had been said beforehand: “Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord,” in the execution of those same works even the angels are named; and in a psalm it is sung: “Praise the Lord from the heavens, praise him in the heights; praise him, all his angels, praise him, all his virtues; praise him, sun and moon, praise him, all stars and light; praise him, heavens of heavens, and waters which are above the heavens, let them praise the name of the Lord; for he himself said, and they were made.”

ipse mandauit, et creata sunt. Etiam hic apertissime a Deo factos esse angelos diuinitus dictum est, cum eis inter cetera caelestia commemoratis infertur ad omnia: Ipse dixit, et facta sunt. Quis porro audebit opinari post omnia ista, quae sex diebus enumerata sunt, angelos factos?

He himself commanded, and they were created. Here too it has been said most openly by divine authority that the angels were made by God, since, after they along with the other celestial things have been commemorated, there is subjoined, as to all: He himself said, and they were made. Who, moreover, will dare to opine that the angels were made after all those things which were enumerated in six days?

Sed etsi quisquam ita desipit, redarguit istam uanitatem illa scriptura paris auctoritatis, ubi Deus dicit: Quando facta sunt sidera, laudauerunt me uoce magna omnes angeli mei. Iam ergo erant angeli, quando facta sunt sidera. Facta sunt autem quarto die.

But even if anyone is so senseless, that scripture of equal authority redargues that vanity, where God says: When the stars were made, all my angels praised me with a great voice. Therefore the angels already were, when the stars were made. Now the stars were made on the fourth day.

Numquidnam ergo die tertio factos esse dicemus? Absit. In promptu est enim, quid illo die factum sit.

Shall we then say that they were made on the third day? Far be it. For it is plain what was done on that day.

Ab aquis utique terra discreta est et distinctas sui generis species duo ista elementa sumpserunt et produxit terra quidquid ei radicitus inhaeret. Numquidnam secundo? Ne hoc quidem.

From the waters, to be sure, the earth was separated, and the two elements took distinct species of their own kind, and the earth produced whatever adheres to it by root. Shall we say on the second [day]? Not even this.

Tunc enim firmamentum factum est inter aquas superiores et inferiores caelumque appellatum est; in quo firmamento quarto die facta sunt sidera. Nimirum ergo si ad istorum dierum opera Dei pertinent angeli, ipsi sunt illa lux, quae diei nomen accepit, cuius unitas ut commendaretur, non est dictus dies primus, sed dies unus. Nec alius est dies secundus aut tertius aut ceteri; sed idem ipse unus ad inplendum senarium uel septenarium numerum repetitus est propter septenariam cognitionem; senariam scilicet operum, quae fecit Deus, et septimam quietis Dei.

For then the firmament was made between the superior and inferior waters and was called heaven; and in that firmament on the fourth day the stars were made. Therefore indeed, if the angels pertain to the works of God of those days, they themselves are that light, which received the name of day, whose unity, in order that it might be commended, it was not called the first day, but day one. Nor is the second day or the third or the others another; but the very same one, repeated to fulfill the senary or septenary number on account of septenary cognition; namely, the senary of the works which God made, and the seventh of the rest of God.

Cum enim dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, si recte in hac luce creatio intellegitur angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei filium; ut ea luce inluminati, qua creati, fierent lux et uocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est uerbum Dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. Lumen quippe uerum, quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum, hoc inluminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo; a quo si auertitur angelus, fit inmundus; sicut sunt omnes, qui uocantur inmundi spiritus, nec iam lux in Domino, sed in se ipsis tenebrae, priuati participatione lucis aeternae. Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.

For when God said, Let there be light, and there was light, if in this light the creation of the angels is rightly understood, assuredly they were made participants of the eternal light, which is the very immutable wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, whom we call the only-begotten Son of God; so that, illumined by that light by which they were created, they might become light and be called day by participation in the immutable light and day, which is the word of God, through whom both they and all things were made. For the true light, which illumines every man coming into this world, this also illumines every pure angel, that he may be light not in himself, but in God; from whom if the angel is turned away, he becomes unclean; as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and no longer light in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, deprived of participation in the eternal light. For evil has no nature; but the loss of good has received the name “evil.”

[X] Est itaque bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita.

[10] Therefore the Good alone is simple, and on this account alone incommutable, which is God. From this Good all good things have been created, but not simple, and on this account mutable. Created indeed, I say, that is, made, not begotten.

Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc.cum spiritu suo unus Deus est; qui spiritus Patris et Filii Spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione huius nominis in sacris litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est nec Filius; sed "alius" dixi, non "aliud", quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas.

For what is begotten from the simple good is likewise simple, and it is what that is of which it is begotten; these two we call the Father and the Son; and these two, with their own Spirit, are one God; which Spirit of the Father and of the Son is called the Holy Spirit in the sacred letters by a certain proper notion of this name. Yet he is other than the Father and the Son, because he is neither the Father nor the Son; but I said “another” (alius), not “another thing” (aliud), because this too is alike a simple and alike an incommutable good, and coeternal. And this Trinity is one God; nor therefore not simple, because it is a Trinity.

Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus aut solus Filius aut solus Spiritus sanctus, aut uero sola est ista nominis trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putauerunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relatiue quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius <, et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater&lg. In quo ergo ad semet ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet; sicut ad se ipsum dicitur uiuus habendo utique uitam, et eadem uita ipse est.

For neither do we on this account call this nature of the good simple, because the Father alone is in it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, or truly that this is a trinity of name alone without the subsistence of persons, as the Sabellian heretics thought; but it is therefore called simple, because what it has, this it is, except that relatively each person is said with respect to another. For assuredly the Father has the Son, yet he himself is not the Son <, and the Son has the Father, yet he himself is not the Father&lg. In that, therefore, in which he is said with respect to himself, not to another, this is what he has; just as with respect to himself he is called living, of course by having life, and the same life he himself is.

Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod uel possit amittere; uel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut uas aliquem liquorem aut corpus colorem aut aer lucem siue feruorem aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet; nam neque uas liquor est nec corpus color nec aer lux siue feruor neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est quod etiam priuari possunt rebus, quas habent, et in alios habitus uel qualitates uerti atque mutari, ut et uas euacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur et aer tenebrescat siue frigescat et anima desipiat.

Therefore for this reason the nature is called simple: that it not have something which it could either lose, or be one thing as the haver and another as that which it has; as a vessel [has] a certain liquid, or a body [has] a color, or air [has] light or heat, or the soul [has] wisdom. For none of these is that which it has; for neither is the vessel liquid nor the body color nor air light or heat nor the soul wisdom. Hence it is that they also can be deprived of the things which they have, and be turned and changed into other states or qualities: so that the vessel is emptied of the moisture with which it is full, and the body is discolored, and the air grows dark or grows cold, and the soul becomes foolish.

Sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. Nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est nec alibi maior, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera; corpus uero ipsum maius est in toto quam in parte; et cum alia pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam quae minor. Aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est, alia incorruptio, quae ubique eius tota est, quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam ceteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est.

But even if there be an incorruptible body, such as is promised to the saints in the resurrection, it does indeed have the inamissible quality of incorruption itself; yet, with the bodily substance remaining, it is not the same thing as incorruption itself. For that [incorruption] is also whole through each several part of the body, and is not greater in one place and smaller in another; for no part is more incorrupt than another. But the body itself is greater in the whole than in a part; and when one part in it is larger and another smaller, that which is larger is not more incorrupt than that which is smaller. Therefore the body is one thing—which is not everywhere all of itself—another the incorruption, which is everywhere all of it, because every part of an incorruptible body, even though unequal to the rest, is equally uncorrupted.

Neque enim uerbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptibilior manus quam digitus. Ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. Ac per hoc quamuis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit, aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas eius, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur.

Nor, for example, because a finger is smaller than the whole hand, is the hand therefore more incorruptible than the finger. Thus, although the hand and the finger are unequal, nevertheless the incorruptibility of the hand and of the finger is equal. And therefore, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, yet one thing is the substance, by which it is called a body, another its quality, by which it is denominated incorruptible.

Et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua inluminatur.

And therefore even so it is not the same as that which it has. The soul itself too, even if it be always wise, as it will be when it is freed forever, yet will be wise by participation in immutable wisdom, which is not what it itself is. For neither, if the air, suffused with light, is never forsaken by it, is it therefore not one thing itself and the light by which it is illuminated another.

Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima, quod putauerunt quidam qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quandam similitudinem, ut non inconuenienter dicatur sic inluminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei, sicut inluminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus (nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumque corporalium tenebrae quam aer carens luce), ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce priuatam.

Nor would I say this thus, as if the soul were air, which certain people supposed who could not conceive an incorporeal nature. But these things, in relation to those, even amid great disparity, have a certain similitude, so that it may not inaptly be said that the incorporeal soul is illuminated by the incorporeal light of the simple wisdom of God, just as the body of air is illuminated by corporeal light; and just as the air grows dark when deserted by that light (for the so‑called darknesses of places of whatever corporeal kind are nothing other than air lacking light), so the soul grows dark when deprived of the light of wisdom.

Secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter uereque diuina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione uel diuina uel sapientia uel beata sunt. Ceterum dictus est in scripturis sanctis Spiritus sapientiae multiplex, eo quod multa in sese habeat; sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thensauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam uisibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt.

According to this, therefore, those things are called simple, which are primarily and truly divine, because in them quality is not one thing and substance another, nor are they divine or wise or blessed by the participation of others. Moreover, in the holy Scriptures the Spirit of wisdom is called manifold, because it has many things in itself; but the things it has, these it also is, and, as to all of them, it is one. For there are not many wisdoms, but one Wisdom, in which there are certain treasuries of intelligible things, in a way infinite and, to it, finite, in which are all the invisible and incommutable reasons of things—even of visible and mutable things—which were made through it.

Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest; porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae nouerat. Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen uerum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset.

Since God did not make anything being ignorant, which cannot rightly be said even of any human artificer; moreover, if knowing he made all things, he assuredly made those which he knew. From this there occurs to the mind something wondrous, yet true: that this world could not be known to us unless it existed; but to God, unless it were known, it could not exist.

[XI] Quae cum ita sint, nullo modo quidem secundum spatium aliquod temporis prius erant spiritus illi tenebrae, quos angelos dicimus; sed simul ut facti sunt, lux facti sunt; non tamen tantum ita creati, ut quoquo modo essent et quoquo modo uiuerent; sed etiam inluminati, ut sapienter beateque uiuerent. Ab hac inluminatione auersi quidam angeli non obtinuerunt excellentiam sapientis beataeque uitae, quae procul dubio non nisi aeterna est aeternitatisque suae certa atque secura; sed rationalem uitam licet insipientem sic habent, ut eam non possint amittere, nec si uelint. Quatenus autem, antequam peccassent, illius sapientiae fuerint participes, definire quis potest?

[11] Since these things are thus, in no way, according to any span of time, were those spirits—whom we call angels—previously darkness; but the moment they were made, they were made light; yet they were not only so created as to exist in whatever manner and to live in whatever manner, but also illuminated, in order that they might live wisely and blessedly. Turned away from this illumination, certain angels did not obtain the excellence of the wise and blessed life, which without doubt is none other than eternal and, of its own eternity, sure and secure; yet they have a rational life, albeit insipient, in such a way that they cannot lose it, not even if they should wish. But to what extent, before they had sinned, they were participants in that wisdom, who can define?

In eius tamen participatione aequales fuisse istos illis, qui propterea uere pleneque beati sunt, quoniam nequaquam de suae beatitudinis aeternitate falluntur, quo modo dicturi sumus? quando quidem si aequales in ea fuissent, etiam isti in eius aeternitate mansissent pariter beati, quia pariter certi. Neque enim sicut uita, quamdiucumque fuerit, ita aeterna uita ueraciter dici poterit, si finem habitura sit; si quidem uita tantummodo uiuendo, aeterna uero finem non habendo nominata est.

In its participation, however, that these were equal to those who for that reason are truly and fully blessed, because they are by no means deceived about the eternity of their beatitude—how shall we say this? For if they had been equal in it, these too would have remained equally blessed in its eternity, because equally certain. For neither, like life, however long it may be, can eternal life be truthfully said to be such if it is going to have an end; since indeed life is named only from living, but eternal [life] from not having an end.

Quapropter quamuis non, quidquid aeternum, continuo beatum sit (dicitur enim etiam poenalis ignis aeternus): tamen si uere perfecteque beata uita non nisi aeterna est, non erat talis istorum, quandoque desitura et propterea non aeterna, siue id scirent, siue nescientes aliud putarent; quia scientes timor, nescientes error beatos esse utique non sinebat. Si autem hoc ita nesciebant, ut falsis incertisue non fiderent, sed utrum sempiternum an quandoque finem habiturum esset bonum suum, in neutram partem firma adsensione ferrentur: ipsa de tanta felicitate cunctatio eam beatae uitae plenitudinem, quam in sanctis angelis esse credimus, non habebat. Neque enim beatae uitae uocabulum ita contrahimus ad quasdam significationis angustias, ut solum Deum dicamus beatum; qui tamen uere ita beatus est, ut maior beatitudo esse non possit, in cuius comparatione, quod angeli beati sunt summa quadam sua beatitudine, quanta esse in angelis potest, quid aut quantum est?

Wherefore, although not everything that is eternal is straightway blessed (for even the penal fire is called eternal), nevertheless, if a truly and perfectly blessed life is only an eternal one, theirs was not such, being destined at some time to cease and therefore not eternal, whether they knew this, or, not knowing it, supposed otherwise; for if they knew it, fear, if they did not know it, error, assuredly did not allow them to be blessed. But if they were ignorant of it in such a way that they did not put trust in false or uncertain things, but, as to whether their good was sempiternal or would at some time have an end, were borne by firm assent into neither alternative, that very hesitation, amid so great felicity, did not have that plenitude of blessed life which we believe to be in the holy angels. For neither do we contract the name of blessed life into such straits of signification as to say that only God is blessed; who yet is truly so blessed that a greater beatitude cannot be, in comparison with whom—grant that the angels are blessed with a certain highest blessedness of their own, as great as can be in angels—what is it, or how great?

[XII] Nec ipsos tantum, quod adtinet ad rationalem uel intellectualem creaturam, beatos nuncupandos putamus. Quis enim primos illos homines in paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum, quamuis sua beatitudo quam diuturna uel utrum aeterna esset incertos (esset autem aeterna, nisi peccassent), cum hodie non inpudenter beatos uocemus, quos uidemus iuste ac pie cum spe futurae inmortalitatis hanc uitam ducere sine crimine uastante conscientiam, facile inpetrantes peccatis huius infirmitatis diuinam misericordiam. Qui licet de suae perseuerantiae praemio certi sint, de ipsa tamen perseuerantia sua reperiuntur incerti.

[12] Nor do we think that they alone, so far as pertains to the rational or intellectual creature, are to be called blessed. For who would dare deny that those first humans in Paradise were blessed before sin, although they were uncertain how long-lasting their beatitude was, or whether it was eternal (and it would have been eternal, unless they had sinned), since today we do not immodestly call blessed those whom we see leading this life justly and piously with the hope of future immortality, without any crime laying waste to the conscience, easily obtaining the divine mercy for the sins of this infirmity. Although they are certain of the reward of their perseverance, yet about the perseverance itself they are found uncertain.

Quis enim hominum se in actione prouectuque iustitiae perseueraturum usque in finem sciat, nisi aliqua reuelatione ab illo fiat certus, qui de hac re iusto latentique iudicio non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit? Quantum itaque pertinet ad delectationem praesentis boni, beatior erat primus homo in paradiso, quam quilibet iustus in hac infirmitate mortali; quantum autem ad spem futuri, beatior quilibet in quibuslibet cruciatibus corporis, cui non opinione, sed certa ueritate manifestum est, sine fine se habiturum omni molestia carentem societatem angelorum in participatione summi Dei, quam erat ille homo sui casus incertus in magna illa felicitate paradisi.

For who among men knows that he will persevere unto the end in the action and progress of justice, unless by some revelation he be made certain by Him who, concerning this matter, by a just and latent judgment instructs not all, yet deceives no one? Insofar, therefore, as pertains to the delectation of present good, the first man in Paradise was more blessed than any just man in this mortal infirmity; but as regards the hope of what is to come, more blessed is anyone whatsoever even in whatever torments of the body, to whom it is manifest not by opinion but by sure truth that he will have, without end, the society of the angels, lacking all molestation, in the participation of the Most High God, than was that man—uncertain of his own fall—in that great felicity of Paradise.

[XIII] Quocirca cuiuis iam non difficulter occurrit utroque coniuncto effici beatitudinem, quam recto proposito intellectualis natura desiderat, hoc est, ut et bono incommutabili, quod Deus est, sine ulla molestia perfruatur et in eo se in aeternum esse mansurum nec ulla dubitatione cunctetur nec ullo errore fallatur. Hanc habere angelos lucis pia fide credimus; hanc nec antequam caderent habuisse angelos peccatores, qui sua prauitate illa luce priuati sunt, consequenti ratione colligimus; habuisse tamen aliquam, etsi non praesciam, beatitudinem, si uitam egerunt ante peccatum, profecto credendi sunt. Aut si durum uidetur, quando facti sunt angeli, alios credere ita factos ut non acciperent praescientiam uel perseuerantiae uel casus sui, alios autem ita ut ueritate certissima aeternitatem suae beatitudinis nossent, sed aequalis felicitatis omnes ab initio creati sunt, et ita fuerunt, donec isti, qui nunc mali sunt, ab illo bonitatis lumine sua uoluntate cecidissent: procul dubio multo est durius nunc putare angelos sanctos aeternae suae beatitudinis incertos, et ipsos de semet ipsis ignorare, quod nos de illis per scripturas sanctas nosse potuimus.

[13] Wherefore it now occurs to anyone, not with difficulty, that by the conjunction of both there is effected the beatitude which the intellectual nature, with right purpose, desires, that is, that it both enjoy, without any trouble, the incommutable Good, which God is, and that it will remain in him forever, and that it neither hesitate with any doubt nor be deceived by any error. This we piously believe the angels of light to have; that the sinful angels did not have this even before they fell, who by their own depravity were deprived of that light, we gather by consequent reasoning; yet that they did have some beatitude, though not prescient, if they lived before sin, they are assuredly to be believed. Or if it seems harsh, when the angels were made, to believe that some were so made as not to receive prescience either of their perseverance or of their fall, but others so as to know with most certain truth the eternity of their beatitude—yet all were created from the beginning in equal felicity, and were so, until those who are now evil fell by their own will from that light of goodness—without doubt it is much harder now to think that the holy angels are uncertain of their eternal beatitude, and that they themselves are ignorant about their own selves of that which we have been able to know about them through the sacred Scriptures.

Quis enim catholicus Christianus ignorat nullum nouum" diabolum ex bonis angelis ulterius futurum, sicut nec istum in societatem bonorum angelorum ulterius rediturum? Veritas quippe in euangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit, quod erunt aequales angelis Dei; quibus etiam promittitur, quod ibunt in uitam aeternam. Porro autem si nos certi sumus numquam nos ex illa inmortali felicitate casuros, illi uero certi non sunt: iam potiores, non aequales eis erimus.

For what catholic Christian is ignorant that no new devil will hereafter be from the good angels, just as neither will that one return any further into the society of the good angels? For Truth in the Gospel promises to the holy and faithful that they will be equal to the angels of God; to whom also it is promised that they will go into eternal life. Moreover, if we are certain that we shall never fall from that immortal felicity, but they are not certain: already we shall be superior, not equal, to them.

Sed quia nequaquam Veritas fallit et aequales eis erimus, profecto etiam ipsi certi sunt suae felicitatis aeternae. Cuius illi alii quia certi non fuerunt (non enim erat eorum aeterna felicitas cuius certi essent, quae finem fuerat habitura), restat, ut aut inpares fuerint, aut, si pares fuerunt, post istorum ruinam illis certa scientia suae sempiternae felicitatis accesserit. Nisi forte quis dicat id, quod Dominus ait de diabolo in euangelio: Ille homicida erat ab initio et in ueritate non stetit, sic esse accipiendum, ut non solum homicida fuerit ab initio, id est initio humani generis, ex quo utique homo factus est, quem decipiendo posset occidere, uerum etiam ab initio suae conditionis in ueritate non steterit et ideo numquam beatus cum sanctis angelis fuerit, suo recusans esse subditus creatori et sua per superbiam uelut priuata potestate laetatus, ac per hoc falsus et fallax, quia nec quisquam potestatem Omnipotentis euadit, et qui per piam subiectionem noluit tenere quod uere est, adfectat per superbam elationem simulare quod non est, ut sic intellegatur etiam quod beatus Iohannes apostolus ait: Ab initio diabolus peccat, hoc est, ex quo creatus est, iustitiam recusauit, quam nisi pia Deoque subdita uoluntas habere non posset.

But since Truth by no means deceives and we shall be equal to them, assuredly they too are certain of their eternal felicity. Of which those others were not certain (for it was not an eternal felicity of which they could be certain, since it was going to have an end), it remains that either they were unequal, or, if they were equal, after the ruin of those ones there accrued to them a sure knowledge of their sempiternal felicity. Unless perhaps someone should say that what the Lord says about the devil in the gospel: He was a murderer from the beginning and did not stand in the truth, is to be taken thus, that he was not only a murderer from the beginning—that is, from the beginning of the human race, from which, of course, a man was made whom he could kill by deceiving—but also that from the beginning of his own condition he did not stand in the truth and therefore was never blessed with the holy angels, refusing to be subject to his Creator and rejoicing through pride in his own, as it were, private power; and through this he is false and fallacious, because no one escapes the power of the Omnipotent, and he who by pious subjection was unwilling to hold to what truly is, aspires through proud elation to simulate what is not, so that thus there may also be understood what blessed John the apostle says: From the beginning the devil sins—that is, from the time he was created he refused justice, which could not be had except by a pious will subject to God.

Huic sententiae quisquis adquiescit, non cum illis haereticis sapit, id est Manichaeis, et si quae aliae pestes ita sentiunt, quod suam quandam propriam tamquam ex aduerso quodam principio diabolus habeat naturam mali; qui tanta uanitate desipiunt, ut, cum uerba ista euangelica in auctoritate nobiscum habeant, non adtendant non dixisse Dominum: A ueritate alienus fuit; sed: In ueritate non stetit, ubi a ueritate lapsum intellegi uoluit, in qua utique si stetisset, eius particeps factus beatus cum sanctis angelis permaneret. [XIV] Subiecit autem indicium, quasi quaesissemus, unde ostendatur, quod in ueritate non steterit, atque ait: Quia non est ueritas in eo. Esset autem in eo, si.in illa stetisset. Locutione autem dictum est minus usitata.

Whoever acquiesces in this opinion does not think with those heretics, that is, the Manichaeans, and if there are any other pestilences that so think, namely that the devil has a certain proper nature of evil as though from some contrary principle; who are so besotted with vanity that, although they have these evangelical words with us in authority, they do not attend to the fact that the Lord did not say: “He was alien from the truth,” but: “He did not stand in the truth,” wherein he wished a lapse from the truth to be understood— in which, assuredly, if he had stood, made a participant of it, he would have remained blessed with the holy angels. [14] Moreover, he subjoined an indication, as if we had asked whence it is shown that he did not stand in the truth, and said: “Because there is not truth in him.” But it would be in him, if he had stood in it. The expression, however, was said in a less usual locution.

Sic enim uidetur sonare: In ueritate non stetit, quia ueritas non est in eo, tamquam ea sit causa, ut in ueritate non steterit, quod in eo ueritas non sit; cum potius ea sit causa, ut in eo ueritas non sit, quod in ueritate non stetit. Ista locutio est et in psalmo: Ego clamaui, quoniam exaudisti me Deus; cum dicendum fuisse uideatur: Exaudisti me Deus, quoniam clamaui. Sed cum dixisset: "Ego clamaui", tamquam ab eo quaereretur, unde se clamasse monstraret, ab effectu exauditionis Dei clamoris sui ostendit affectum; tamquam diceret: "Hinc ostendo clamasse me, quoniam exaudisti me."

For it seems to sound thus: "He did not stand in the truth, because the truth is not in him," as though this were the cause that he did not stand in the truth, that the truth is not in him; whereas rather this is the cause that the truth is not in him, that he did not stand in the truth. This locution is also in the Psalm: "I cried out, because you have hearkened to me, O God"; whereas it would seem it ought to have been said: "You have hearkened to me, O God, because I cried out." But when he had said: "I cried out," as though it were asked of him whence he would show that he had cried out, he showed the affect of his cry by the effect of God's hearkening; as though he were saying: "From this I show that I cried out, because you have hearkened to me."

[XV] Illud etiam, quod ait de diabolo Iohannes: Ab initio diabolus peccat, non intellegunt, si natura talis est, nullo modo esse peccatum. Sed quid respondetur propheticis testimoniis, siue quod ait Esaias sub figurata persona principis Babyloniae diabolum notans: Quo modo cecidit Lucifer, qui mane oriebatur. siue quod Hiezechiel: In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es? Vbi intellegitur fuisse aliquando sine peccato.

[15] Also that which John says about the devil: From the beginning the devil sins, they do not understand, that, if his nature is such, it is in no way sin. But what is answered to the prophetic testimonies, whether what Isaiah says, under the figurative persona of the prince of Babylon noting the devil: How has Lucifer fallen, who used to rise in the morning; or what Ezekiel says: In the delights of the paradise of God you were, you were adorned with every precious stone? Where it is understood that he was at some time without sin.

Nam expressius ei paulo post dicitur: Ambulasti in diebus tuis sine uitio. Quae si aliter conuenientius intellegi nequeunt, oportet etiam illud, quod dictum est: In ueritate non stetit, sic accipiamus, quod in ueritate fuerit, sed non permanserit; et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio, ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est, sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum. Nec illud, quod scriptum est in libro Iob, cum de diabolo sermo esset: Hoc est initium figmenti Domini, quod fecit ad inludendum ab angelis suis (cui consonare uidetur et psalmus, ubi legitur: Draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei), sic intellegendum est, ut existimemus talem ab initio creatum, cui ab angelis inluderetur, sed in hac poena post peccatum ordinatum.

For more expressly it is said to him a little after: “You walked in your days without fault.” If these cannot be more fittingly understood otherwise, we must also take that which was said, “He did not stand in the truth,” thus, that he was in the truth but did not remain; and that, “the devil sins from the beginning,” is not to be thought of as from the beginning from which he was created, but from the beginning of the sin, which began to be sin from his own superbia. Nor is that which is written in the book of Job, when the discourse was about the devil: “This is the beginning of the Lord’s figment, which he made to be mocked by his angels” (to which the psalm also seems consonant, where it is read: “This dragon, whom you fashioned to mock him”), to be understood in such a way that we should suppose such a one created from the beginning to be mocked by the angels, but that he was ordained to this punishment after sin.

Initium ergo eius figmentum est Domini; non enim est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non ille constituit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil rerum inueniri uel cogitari potest; quanto magis angelica creatura, quae omnia cetera, quae Deus condidit, naturae dignitate praecedit!

Therefore the beginning of his formation is the Lord’s; for there is no nature, even among the farthest and lowest little beasts, which he did not constitute, from whom is every mode, every species, every order, without which nothing among things can be found or even conceived; how much more the angelic creature, which outstrips all the rest that God has founded in the dignity of nature!

[XVI] In his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo facta sunt, praeponuntur uiuentia non uiuentibus, sicut ea, quae habent uim gignendi uel etiam appetendi, his, quae isto motu carent; et in his, quae uiuunt, praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia; et in his, quae sentiunt, praeponuntur intellegentia non intellegentibus, sicut homines pecoribus; et in his, quae intellegunt, praeponuntur inmortalia mortalibus, sicut angeli hominibus. Sed ista praeponuntur naturae ordine; est autem alius atque alius pro suo cuiusque usu aestimationis modus, quo fit, ut quaedam sensu carentia quibusdam sentientibus praeponamus, in tantum, ut si potestas esset ea prorsus de natura rerum auferre uellemus, siue quem in ea locum habeant ignorantes, siue etiamsi sciamus nostris ea commodis postponentes. Quis enim non domui suae panem habere quam mures, nummos quam pulices malit?

[16] For among those things which in any way are and are not what God is by whom they were made, living things are set before non-living, just as those which have the power of generating or even of appetiting are before those which lack that motion; and among those which live, things that feel are set before things that do not feel, as animals are before trees; and among those which feel, intelligent beings are set before the non-intelligent, as men are before cattle; and among those which understand, immortals are set before mortals, as angels are before men. But these are set before by the order of nature; yet there is another and another mode of estimation according to each one’s utility, whereby it comes about that we prefer certain things lacking sense to certain things that feel, to such an extent that, if there were the power, we would wish to remove them utterly from the nature of things—whether not knowing what place they have in it, or even if we do know, preferring them to our own conveniences. For who would not rather have bread than mice in his house, coins than fleas?

Sed quid mirum, cum in ipsorum etiam hominum aestimatione, quorum certe natura tantae est dignitatis, plerumque carius comparetur equus quam seruus, gemma quam famula? Ita libertate iudicandi plurimum distat ratio considerantis a necessitate indigentis seu uoluptate cupientis, cum ista quid per se ipsum in rerum gradibus pendat, necessitas autem quid propter quid expetat cogitat, et ista quid uerum luci mentis appareat, uoluptas uero quid iucundum corporis sensibus blandiatur spectat. Sed tantum ualet in naturis rationalibus quoddam ueluti pondus uoluntatis et amoris, ut, cum ordine naturae angeli hominibus, tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur.

But what wonder, when even in the estimation of human beings themselves—whose nature is assuredly of such dignity—a horse is very often bought more dearly than a male slave, a gem than a maidservant? Thus, with freedom of judging, the reason of the one considering differs very much from the necessity of the one in need or the pleasure of the one desiring: for the former considers what a thing, in and of itself, weighs in the gradations of things; necessity, however, considers what it seeks for the sake of what; and the former what of the true appears to the light of the mind, whereas pleasure looks to what of the pleasant flatters the senses of the body. Yet so much avails in rational natures a certain, as it were, weight of will and love, that, although by the order of nature angels are preferred to human beings, nevertheless by the law of justice good human beings are preferred to evil angels.

[XVII] Propter naturam igitur, non propter malitiam diaboli, dictum recte intellegimus: Hoc est initium figmenti Domini. Quia sine dubio, ubi est uitium malitiae, natura non uitiata praecessit. Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae.

[17] Therefore on account of nature, not on account of the devil’s malice, we rightly understand the saying: This is the beginning of the Lord’s formation. For without doubt, where there is the vice of malice, an unvitiated nature has gone before. But vice is so against nature that it can do nothing except harm nature.

Non itaque esset uitium recedere a Deo, nisi naturae, cuius id uitium est, potius competeret esse cum Deo. Quapropter etiam uoluntas mala grande testimonium est naturae bonae. Sed Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus creator est, ita malarum uoluntatum iustissimus ordinator; ut, cum illae male utuntur naturis bonis, ipse bene utatur etiam uoluntatibus malis.

Therefore there would not be a vice of receding from God, unless it more properly befitted the nature, whose vice it is, to be with God. Wherefore even an evil will is a great testimony of a good nature. But God, just as he is the best creator of good natures, so is he the most just ordainer of evil wills; so that, when they use good natures badly, he himself uses well even evil wills.

Itaque fecit, ut diabolus institutione illius bonus, uoluntate sua malus, in inferioribus ordinatus inluderetur ab angelis eius, id est, ut prosint temptationes eius sanctis, quibus eas obesse desiderat. Et quoniam Deus, cum eum conderet, futurae malignitatis eius non erat utique ignarus et.praeuidebat quae bona de malo eius esset ipse facturus: propterea psalmus ait: Draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei, ut in eo ipso quod eum finxit, licet per suam bonitatem bonum, iam per suam praescientiam praeparasse intellegatur quo modo illo uteretur et malo.

Accordingly he brought it about that the devil—by his institution good, by his own will evil—being ordered among the lower things, should be made sport of by his (God’s) angels; that is, that his temptations should profit the saints, whom he desires those temptations to harm. And since God, when he was creating him, was of course not ignorant of his future malignity, and fore‑saw what goods he himself would make out of his evil: therefore the psalm says, This dragon, whom you fashioned to make sport with him; so that in this very thing that he fashioned him—though by his own goodness good—he may already be understood, by his own prescience, to have prepared how he would also make use of him even in his evil.

[XVIII] Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico angelorum, sed uel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret atque ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae appellantur in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae Latine ut appellentur opposita, uel, quod expressius dicitur, contraposita, non est apud nos huius uocabuli consuetudo, cum tamen eisdem ornamentis locutionis etiam sermo Latinus utatur, immo linguae omnium gentium. His antithetis et Paulus apostolus in secunda ad Corinthios epistula illum locum suauiter explicat, ubi dicit: Per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra: per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam; ut seductores et ueraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur.

[18] For God would not create anyone— I do not say of the angels, but even of men—whom he had foreknown would be evil, unless he likewise knew to what good uses he would accommodate them, and thus would honor the order of the ages, like a most beautiful song, even with certain, as it were, antitheses. For antitheta, as they are called, are most fitting among the ornaments of elocution; to call them in Latin opposita, or, which is more express, contraposita, is not a usage current among us, although the Latin speech also employs the same ornaments of diction—indeed, the tongues of all nations do. With these antitheses the apostle Paul also sweetly explicates that passage in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, where he says: Through the arms of righteousness on the right and on the left: through glory and ignobility, through infamy and good fame; as seducers and veracious, as those who are unknown and known.

quasi morientes, et ecce uiuimus, ut coherciti et non mortificati; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes, sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes, tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes. Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt: ita quadam n on uerborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in libro ecclesiastico isto modo: Contra malum bonum est et contra mortem uita; sic contra pium peccator.

as if dying, and behold we live; as chastised and not put to death; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as needy, yet enriching many; as having nothing and possessing all things. Just as therefore these contraries, set against contraries, render a beauty of discourse: so by a certain, not of words, but of things, eloquence, the beauty of the age is composed by the opposition of contraries. Most plainly this is set down in the Ecclesiastic book in this way: Against evil is good and against death life; so against the pious the sinner.

Et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi, bina bina, unum contra unum.

And thus look upon all the works of the Most High, two by two, one against one.

[XIX] Quamuis itaque diuini sermonis obscuritas etiam ad hoc sit utilis, quod plures sententias ueritatis parit et in lucem notitiae producit, dum alius eum sic, alius sic intellegit (ita tamen ut, quod in obscuro loco intellegitur, uel adtestatione rerum manifestarum uel aliis locis minime dubiis asseratur; siue, cum multa tractantur, ad id quoque perueniatur, quod sensit ille qui scripsit, siue id lateat, sed ex occasione tractandae profundae obscuritatis alia quaedam uera dicantur): non mihi uidetur ab operibus Dei absurda sententia, si, cum lux prima illa facta est, angeli creati intelleguntur, inter sanctos angelos et inmundos fuisse discretum, ubi dictum est: Et diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et uocauit Deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit noctem. Solus quippe ille ista discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam priusquam caderent praescire casuros et priuatos lumine ueritatis in tenebrosa superbia remansuros. Nam inter istum nobis notissimum diem et noctem, id est inter hanc lucem et has tenebras, uulgatissima sensibus nostris luminaria caeli ut diuiderent imperauit: Fiant, inquit, luminaria in firmamento caeli, ut luceant super terram et diuidant inter diem et noctem; et paulo post: Et fecit, inquit, Deus duo luminaria magna, luminare maius in principia diei, et luminare minus in principia noctis, et stellas; et posuit illa Deus in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et praeesse diei et nocti et diuidere inter lucem et tenebras.

[19] Although therefore the obscurity of the divine discourse is also useful for this, that it begets more sentences of truth and brings them into the light of knowledge, while one person understands it thus, another thus (provided, however, that what is understood in an obscure place be asserted either by the attestation of manifest things or by other scarcely doubtful places; or, when many things are handled, there be reached also that which he who wrote sensed, whether that lie hidden, yet on the occasion of treating the deep obscurity certain other true things be spoken): it does not seem to me an absurd opinion from the works of God, if, when that first light was made, the angels are understood to have been created, that there was a separation between the holy angels and the unclean where it was said: And God divided between the light and the darkness; and God called the light day and the darkness he called night. For he alone could discern these things, who could also, before they fell, foreknow those about to fall, and, deprived of the light of truth, to remain in tenebrous pride. For between this day and night most well known to us, that is between this light and these darknesses, he commanded the most widespread to our senses luminaries of heaven, that they should divide: Let there be, he says, luminaries in the firmament of heaven, that they may shine upon the earth and divide between day and night; and a little after: And God, he says, made two great luminaries, the greater luminary for the rule of the day, and the lesser luminary for the rule of the night, and the stars; and God set them in the firmament of heaven to shine upon the earth and to preside over the day and the night and to divide between the light and the darkness.

Inter illam uero lucem, quae sancta societas angelorum est inlustratione ueritatis intellegibiliter fulgens, et ei contrarias tenebras, id est malorum angelorum auersorum a luce iustitiae taeterrimas mentes, ipse diuidere potuit, cui etiam futurum non naturae, sed uoluntatis malum occultum aut incertum esse non potuit.

Between that light, which is the holy society of angels, intelligibly shining with the illumination of truth, and the darkness contrary to it, that is, the most foul minds of evil angels averse from the light of justice, he himself was able to divide—he for whom even the future evil, not of nature but of will, could not be hidden or uncertain.

[XX] Denique nec illud est praetereundum silentio, quod, ubi dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, continuo subiunctum est; Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est f non postea quam separauit inter lucem et tenebras et uocauit lucem diem et tenebras noctem, ne simul cum luce etiam talibus tenebris testimonium placiti sui perhibuisse uideretur. Nam ubi tenebrae inculpabiles sunt, inter quas et lucem istam his oculis conspicuam luminaria caeli diuidunt, non ante, sed post infertur: Et uidit Deus quia bonum est. Posuit illa, inquit, in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et pracesse diei et nocti et separare inter lucem et tenebras.

[20] Finally, neither must this be passed over in silence: that where God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light, it is straightway subjoined, “And God saw the light, that it was good,” f not after He had separated between light and darkness and had called the light day and the darkness night, lest He might seem to have borne the testimony of His good-pleasure to such darknesses together with the light. For where the darknesses are blameless, between which and this light visible to these eyes the luminaries of heaven divide, “And God saw that it was good” is brought in not before, but after. “He placed them,” he says, “in the firmament of heaven to shine upon the earth and to preside over the day and the night and to separate between the light and the darkness.”

Et uidit Deus quia bonum est. Vtrumque placuit, quia utrumque sine peccato est. Vbi autem dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux.

And God saw that it was good. Both were pleasing, because both are without sin. But when God said: Let there be light, and light was made.

Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est; et postmodum infertur: Et separauit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et uocauit Deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit noctem: non hoc loco additum est: Et uidit Deus quia bonum est, ne utrumque appellaretur bonum, cum esset horum alterum malum, uitio proprio, non natura. Et ideo sola ibi lux placuit Conditori: tenebrae autem angelicae, etsi fuerant ordinandae, non tamen fuerant adprobandae.

And God saw the light, that it is good; and afterward it is brought in: And God separated between the light and the darkness; and God called the light day and the darkness he called night: in this place there is not added: And God saw that it is good, lest both be called good, since of these the other was evil, by its own vice, not by nature. And therefore there alone the light pleased the Founder; but the angelic darkness, although it was to be ordered, nevertheless was not to be approved.

[XXI] Quid est enim aliud intellegendum in eo, quod per omnia dicitur: Vidit Deus quia bonum est, nisi operis adprobatio secundum artem facti, quae sapientia Dei est? Deus autem usque adeo non, cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. Dum ergo uidet quia bonum est, quod, nisi uidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret: docet bonum esse, non discit.

[21] For what else is to be understood in this, which is said throughout: God saw that it was good, except an approval of the work according to the art of its making, which is the wisdom of God? But God to such a degree did not, when it was made, then learn the good, that none of those things would be made, if it had been unknown to him. Therefore, while he sees that it is good—which, unless he had seen before it was made, assuredly would not be made—he teaches that it is good, he does not learn.

Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi uniuersitate perfecta. Vbi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis nouitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere uoluit artifici suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia uarietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non enim more nostro ille uel quod futurum est prospicit, uel quod praesens est aspicit, uel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diuerso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter uidet; ita ut illa quidem, quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint et praesentia iam sint et praeterita iam non sint, ipse uero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia conprehendat; nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore; nec aliter nunc et aliter antea et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita eius quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis uidelicet et praeteriti uel futuri, uarietate mutatur, apud quem non est inmutatio nec momenti obumbratio.

And indeed Plato dared to say more, namely that God was elated with joy when the universe was perfected. Wherein he himself was not so far foolish as to suppose that God became more blessed by the novelty of His work; but he wished thus to show that what had pleased, in the Art, to be made, when now made pleased the Artificer; not that in any way the knowledge of God is varied, as if the things which are not yet, or which already are, or which have been, should make something different in it; for He does not, after our manner, either look forward to what will be, or look upon what is present, or look back upon what is past; but in some other mode far, high, and widely diverse from the custom of our thoughts. For He, not by a change of thought from this to that, but altogether immutably sees; so that those things which come to be temporally are such that the future are not yet, the present already are, and the past already are not, yet He comprehends all these with a stable and sempiternal presence; nor one way with the eyes, another with the mind (for He does not consist of soul and body); nor one way now, another before, another after; since not as our knowledge, so His also is changed by the variety of the three times—of the present, the past, and the future—seeing that with Him there is no mutation nor shadowing of a moment.

Neque enim eius intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae nouit; quoniam tempora ita nouit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quem ad modum temporalia mouet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. Ibi ergo uidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse uidit ut faceret; nec quia factum uidit scientiam duplicauit uel ex aliqua parte auxit, tamquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod uideret, qui tam perfecte non operare-, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex eius operibus adderetur. Quapropter, si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, fecit Deus lucem; si autem non solum quis fecerit, uerum etiam per quid fecerit, satis esset ita enuntiari: Et dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum Deum, sed etiam per Verbum lucem fecisse nossemus.

For neither does his intention pass from cogitation to cogitation, in whose incorporeal contemplation all the things he knows are present at once; since he knows times in such a way by no temporal notions of his own, just as he moves temporal things by no temporal motions of his own. There, therefore, he saw that what he made is good, where he saw it to be good in order to make it; nor did he, because he saw it made, duplicate his knowledge or augment it in any part, as though he had been of lesser knowledge before he should do what he would see, he who would not operate so perfectly except by so perfect a knowledge, to which nothing from his works would be added. Wherefore, if it were only to be insinuated to us who made the light, it would suffice to say, God made the light; but if not only who made it, but also by what he made it, it would be enough to enunciate thus: And God said: Let there be light, and light was made; so that we might know that not only God, but also through the Word, made the light.

Quia uero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: Dixit Deus, inquit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et uidit Deus lucem quia bona est. Si ergo quaerimus, quis fecerit: Deus est, si per quid fecerit: Dixit: Fiat, et facta est; si quare fecerit: Quia bona est.

Since, moreover, three things about creation had to be intimated to us as most to be known—who made it, through what he made it, why he made it: he says: God said: Let there be light, and light came to be. And God saw the light, because it is good. If therefore we ask, who made it: it is God; if through what he made it: He said: Let it be, and it came to be; if why he made it: Because it is good.

Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei uerbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent; siue ista legerit, siue ab his qui legerant forte cognouerit; siue acerrimo ingenio inuisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, siue ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.

Neither is any author more excellent than God, nor any art more efficacious than the Word of God, nor any cause better than that good should be created by the good God. This cause also Plato says is the most just for the founding of the world: that by the good God good works should be made; whether he read these things, or perhaps learned them from those who had read, or with a most acute genius beheld the invisible things of God, understood through the things that have been made, or himself learned from those who had beheld these things.

[XXII] Hanc tamen causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei, hanc, inquam, causam tam iustam atque idoneam, quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controuersias quaerentium mundi originem terminat, quidam haeretici non uiderunt, quia egenam carnis huius fragilemque mortalitate.m iam de iusto supplicio uenientem, dum ei non conueniunt, plurima offendunt, sicut ignis aut frigus aut fera bestia aut qquid eius modi; nec adtendunt, quam uel in suis locis naturisque uigeant pulchroque ordine disponantur, quantumque uniuersitati rerum pro suis portionibus decoris tamquam in communem rem publicam conferant uel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter atque scienter utamur, commoditatis adtribuant, ita ut uenena ipsa, quae per inconuenientiam perniciosa sunt, conuenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta uertantur; quamque a contrario etiam haec, quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, inmoderato et inopportuno usu noxia sentiantur. Vnde nos admonet diuina prouidentia non res insipienter uituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium uel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quaedam, quae uix potuimus inuenire; quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio aut humilitatis exercitatio est aut elationis adtritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum nomenque hoc non sit nisi priuationis boni. Sed a terrenis usque ad caelestia et a uisibilibus usque ad inuisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora, ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia; Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in paruis; quae parua non sua granditate (nam nulla est), sed artificis sapientia metienda sunt; sicut in specie uisibilis hominis, si unum radatur supercilium, quam propemodum nihil corpori, et quam multum detrahitur pulchritudini, quoniam non mole constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione membrorum!

[22] Yet this cause—namely, the goodness of God for the creating of good things—this, I say, cause so just and so apt, which, when diligently considered and piously pondered, terminates all controversies of those who seek the origin of the world, certain heretics did not see, because the needy and fragile mortality of this flesh, now coming from just punishment, while many things do not agree with it, takes offense at very many things, such as fire or cold or a wild beast or whatever of that kind; nor do they attend to how, in their own places and natures, they flourish and are arranged in a fair order, and how much they contribute to the commonwealth of the universe, each for its share of adornment, and also, to us ourselves, if we use them congruently and knowingly, they bestow convenience—so that poisons themselves, which through incongruity are pernicious, when applied congruently are turned into salubrious medicaments; and how, conversely, even those things with which they take delight, such as food and drink and this light, are felt to be harmful by immoderate and untimely use. Whence divine providence admonishes us not to vituperate things foolishly, but to inquire diligently the utility of things, and where our wit or weakness fails, so to believe that utility hidden, just as there were certain things which we could scarcely discover; for even the very concealment of usefulness is either an exercise of humility or an attrition of elation; since no nature at all is an evil, and this name is nothing but of a privation of good. But from earthly things up to the heavenly, and from visibles up to invisibles, there are some goods better than others—unequal to this end, that all things might exist; but God is so great an Artificer in great things that he is not lesser in small things; and these small things are to be measured not by their own grandeur (for it is none), but by the craftsman’s wisdom; just as in the visible appearance of a man, if a single eyebrow be shaved away, how almost nothing to the body, and how much is taken from beauty, since it consists not in bulk, but in the parity and proportion of the members!

Nec sane multum mirandum est, quod hi, qui nonnullam malam putant esse naturam suo quodam contrario exortam propagatamque principio, nolunt accipere istam causam creationis rerum, ut bonus Deus conderet bona, credentes eum potius ad haec mundana molimina rebellantis aduersum se mali repellendi extrema necessitate perductum suamque naturam bonam malo cohercendo superandoque miscuisse, quam turpissime pollutam et crudelissime captiuatam et oppressam labore magno uix mundet ac liberet; non tamen totam, sed quod eius non potuerit ab illa inquinatione purgari, tegmen ac uinculum futurum hostis uicti et inclusi. Sic autem Manichaei non desiperent uel potius insanirent, si Dei naturam, sicuti est, incommutabilem atque omnino incorruptibilem crederent, cui nocere nulla res possit; animam uero, quae uoluntate mutari in deterius et peccato corrumpi potuit atque ita incommutabilis ueritatis luce priuari, non Dei partem nec eius naturae, quae Dei est, sed ab illo conditam longe inparem Conditori Christiana sanitate sentirent.

Nor indeed is it much to be wondered at, that those who think there is some evil nature arisen and propagated from its own contrary principle are unwilling to accept that cause of the creation of things, namely that a good God should found good things; believing rather that he was driven, to these mundane machinations, by the extreme necessity of repelling an evil rebelling against himself, and that he mixed his own good nature in the act of restraining and overcoming the evil—a nature which, being most shamefully polluted and most cruelly taken captive and oppressed, he scarcely cleanses and frees with great toil; not, however, the whole of it, but that part of it which could not be purged from that defilement would be the covering and bond of the enemy conquered and shut in. Yet the Manichaeans would not be senseless—or rather insane—if they believed God’s nature, as it is, to be immutable and altogether incorruptible, to which no thing can do harm; but the soul, which by its will could be changed for the worse and corrupted by sin and thus be deprived of the light of immutable Truth, they would, with Christian soundness, regard not as a part of God nor of that nature which is God’s, but as created by him, far unequal to the Creator.

[XXIII] Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam, qui unum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium, ullamque naturam, quae non est quod Deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse, noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ac simpliciter credere, ut Deus bonus conderet bona et essent post Deum quae non essent quod est Deus, bona tamen, quae non faceret nisi bonus Deus; sed animas dicunt, non quidem partes Dei, sed factas a Deo, peccasse a Conditore recedendo et diuersis progressibus pro diuersitate peccatorum a caelis usque ad terras diuersa corpora quasi uincula meruisse, et hunc esse mundum eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderentur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. Hinc Origenes iure culpatur. In libris enim quos appellat *peri\ *a)rxw=n, id est de principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit.

[23] But it is much more to be wondered at, that even certain men who, along with us, believe that there is one principle of all things, and that no nature which is not what God is can exist unless from that Creator, nevertheless were unwilling to believe well and simply this cause of fabricating the world, so good and simple: that a good God would found good things, and that there would be, after God, things which are not what God is—yet good things—which a good God alone would make. Rather, they say that souls—indeed not parts of God, but made by God—sinned by withdrawing from the Creator, and by diverse progressions, according to the diversity of sins, merited diverse bodies, as it were chains, from the heavens down to the earth; and that this is the world, and that this was the cause for making the world: not that good things might be created, but that evils might be restrained. Hence Origen is justly blamed. For in the books which he calls *peri\ *a)rxw=n, that is, On Principles, he felt this, he wrote this.

Vbi plus quam dici potest miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum non adtendisse, primum quam hoc esset contrarium scripturae huius tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera Dei subiungens: Et uidit Deus, quia bonum est, completisque omnibus inferens: Et uidit Deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi uoluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono Deo. Vbi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt impleta peccatis, cum bonorum longe maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem seruet; nec mala uoluntas, quia naturae ordinem seruare noluit, ideo iusti Dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco suo posito, ita uniuersitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamuis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet.

Where I marvel more than can be said that a man so learned and exercised in ecclesiastical literature did not attend, first, how this was contrary to the intention of Scripture of such great authority—which, subjoining through all the works of God: And God saw that it is good, and, when all things were completed, adding: And God saw all things that he made, and behold, very good—willed no other cause of making the world to be understood, except that good things be made by a good God. Where, if no one had sinned, the world would have been adorned and filled only with good natures; and because there is sin, not for that reason are all things filled with sins, since the number of good things is by far greater in the celestial realms, preserving the order of their nature; nor has the evil will, because it was unwilling to preserve the order of nature, therefore escaped the laws of the just God who ordains all things well; since, just as a picture, with black color placed in its proper place, so the universe of things, if anyone can behold it, even with sinners, is beautiful, although, considered by themselves, their own deformity disgraces them.

Deinde uidere debuit Origenes et quicumque ista sapiunt, si haec opinio uera esset, mundum ideo factum, ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tamquam ergastula, quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leuiora quae minus, inferiora uero et grauiora quae amplius peccauerunt, daemones, quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora, quibus inferius et grauius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam bonos habere debuisse. Nunc uero, ut intellegeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon, homo autem, et nunc licet malus longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae, et certe ante peccatum, tamen luteum corpus accepit. Quid autem stultius dici potest, quam istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis uel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum, sed hoc potius euenisse, quia una anima sic peccauerat, ut tali corpore mereretur includi?

Then Origen ought to have seen, and whoever savors these notions, that if this opinion were true, the world was therefore made in order that souls, according to the merits of their sins, might receive bodies as ergastula, in which they would be penally enclosed—the higher and lighter for those who sinned less, but the lower indeed and heavier for those who sinned more—so that the demons, than whom nothing is worse, ought to have had earthly bodies, than which nothing is lower and heavier, rather than even good men. But as it is, in order that we might understand that the merits of souls are not to be weighed by the qualities of bodies, the worst demon is aerial, whereas man—even now, though evil, of far lesser and milder malice, and certainly before sin—nevertheless received a clayey body. But what can be said more foolishly than that this sun, so that in one world there might be one, was not provided by the artificer God for the decorum of beauty or even for the health of bodily things, but that this rather happened because one soul had so sinned that it deserved to be enclosed in such a body?

ac per hoc si contigisset, ut non una, sed duae; immo non duae, sed decem uel centum similiter aequaliterque peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus? Quod ut non fieret, non opificis prouisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est, sed contigit.potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis, ut sola corpus tale mereretur. Non plane animarum, de quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed eorum ipsorum, qui talia sapiunt multum longe a ueritate, [et] merito est cohercenda progressio.

and therefore, if it had happened that not one, but two—nay, not two, but ten or a hundred—had sinned similarly and equally, would this world have a hundred suns? In order that this not happen, it was not provided by the Artificer’s marvelous provision for the health and beauty of corporeal things, but it happened.rather through so great a progression of one soul sinning, that it alone deserved such a body. Clearly not the progression of souls, about which they know not what they are saying, but the progression of those very men who are wise in such things very far from the truth, [and] is deservedly to be coerced.

Haec ergo tria, quae superius commendaui, cum in unaquaque creatura requirantur, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit, ut respondeatur "Deus, per Verbum, quia bona est", utrum altitudine mystica nobis ipsa trinitas intimetur, hoc est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, an aliquid occurrat, quod hoc loco scripturarum id accipiendum esse prohibeat, multi sermonis est quaestio, nec omnia uno uolumine ut explicemus urgendum est.

Therefore these three, which I commended above, since in each creature there are to be inquired—who made it, through what he made it, why he made it—so that the answer be “God, through the Word, because it is good,” whether by a mystical height the Trinity itself is intimated to us, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, or whether something occurs which would prohibit this from being taken in this place of the Scriptures, is a question for much discourse, nor must we be pressed to explain all things in one volume.

[XXIV] Credimus et tenemus et fideliter praedicamus, quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, unus unum, aeternus coaeternum, summe bonus aequaliter bonum; et quod Spiritus sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus et ipse consubstantialis et coaeternus ambobus; atque hoc totum et trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum et unus Deus propter inseparabilem diuinitatem, sicut unus Omnipotens propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam; ita tamen, ut etiam cum de singulis quaeritur unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum uero de omnibus simul, non tres dii uel tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se uoluit praedicari. Vtrum autem boni Patris et boni Filii Spiritus sanctus, quia communis ambobus est, recte bonitas dici possit amborum, non audeo temerariam praecipitare sententiam; uerum tamen amborum eum dicere sanctitatem facilius ausus fuero, non amborum quasi qualitatem, sed ipsum quoque substantiam et tertiam in trinitate personam. Ad hoc enim me probabilius ducit, quod, cum sit et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus, proprie tamen ipse uocatur Spiritus sanctus tamquam sanctitas substantialis et consubstantialis amborum.

[24] We believe and hold and faithfully proclaim, that the Father has begotten the Word, that is, Wisdom, through whom all things were made, the Only-begotten Son—one begetting one, the eternal [begetting] the coeternal, the supremely good [begetting] the equally good; and that the Holy Spirit is at once the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, he himself consubstantial and coeternal with both; and that this whole is both a Trinity on account of the property of the persons, and one God on account of the inseparable divinity, just as one Omnipotent on account of the inseparable omnipotence; yet in such wise that, even when inquiry is made about each singly, each of them is to be answered to be both God and omnipotent; but when about all together, not three gods or three omnipotents, but one God omnipotent; so great there is in the Three an inseparable unity, which willed thus to be proclaimed. Whether, however, the Holy Spirit of the good Father and of the good Son—since he is common to both—can rightly be called the goodness of both, I do not dare to precipitate a rash judgment; yet I would more readily dare to call him the holiness of both, not the quality of both, as it were, but himself also substance and the third person in the Trinity. For to this I am more probably led, that, although the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father holy and the Son holy, yet he himself is properly called the Holy Spirit, as though the substantial and consubstantial holiness of both.

Sed si nihil est aliud bonitas diuina quam sanctitas, profecto et illa diligentia rationis est, non praesumptionis audacia, ut in operibus Dei secreto quodam loquendi modo, quo nostra exerceatur intentio, eadem nobis insinuata intellegatur trinitas, unamquamque creaturam quis fecerit, per quid fecerit, propter quid fecerit. Pater quippe intellegitur Verbi, qui dixit ut fiat; quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est; in eo uero quod dicitur: Vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est; quod ideo postea quam factum est dicitur, ut res, quae facta est, congruere bonitati, propter quam facta est, indicetur. Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intellegitur, uniuersa nobis trinitas in suis operibus intimatur.

But if divine goodness is nothing else than sanctity, assuredly it is the diligence of reason, not the audacity of presumption, that in the works of God, by a certain secret mode of speaking whereby our intention is exercised, the same Trinity be insinuated to us as understood: in each creature, who made it, through what he made it, for what he made it. For the Father of the Word is understood, who said that it be made; but what, when he was speaking, was made, was without doubt made through the Word; and in that which is said, “God saw that it is good,” it is sufficiently signified that God, by no necessity, by no indigence of any utility of his own, but by sole goodness, made what was made—that is, because it is good; which is therefore said after it has been made, in order that the thing which has been made be indicated to agree with the goodness for the sake of which it has been made. Which goodness, if the Holy Spirit is rightly understood, the whole Trinity is intimated to us in its works.

Inde est ciuitatis sanctae, quae in sanctis angelis sursum est, et origo et informatio et beatitudo. Nam si quaeratur unde sit: Deus eam condidit; si unde sit sapiens: a Deo inluminatur; si unde sit felix: Deo fruitur; subsistens modificatur, contemplans inlustratur, inhaerens iucundatur; est, uidet, amat; in aeternitate Dei uiget, in ueritate Dei lucet, in bonitate Dei gaudet.

Thence come the origin, the formation, and the beatitude of the holy City, which is on high in the holy angels. For if it be asked whence it is: God founded it; if whence it is wise: it is illuminated by God; if whence it is happy: it enjoys God; subsisting, it is set in measure; contemplating, it is illumined; adhering, it is gladdened; it is, it sees, it loves; in the eternity of God it flourishes, in the truth of God it shines, in the goodness of God it rejoices.

[XXV] Quantum intellegi datur, hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripertitam esse uoluerunt, immo tripertitam esse animaduertere potuerunt (neque enim ipsi instituerunt ut ita esset, sed ita esse potius inuenerunt), cuius una pars appellaretur physica, altera logica, tertia ethica (quarum nomina Latina iam multorum litteris frequentata sunt, ut naturalis, rationalis moralisque uocarentur; quas etiam in octauo libro breuiter strinximus); non quo sit consequens, ut isti in his tribus aliquid secundum Deum de trinitate cogitauerint, quamuis Plato primus istam distributionem repperisse et commendasse dicatur, cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus uisus est neque intellegentiae dator neque amoris, quo bene beateque uiuitur, inspirator. Sed certe cum et de natura rerum et de ratione indagandae ueritatis et de boni fine, ad quem cuncta quae agimus referre debemus, diuersi diuersa sentiant: in his tamen tribus magnis et generalibus quaestionibus omnis eorum uersatur intentio. Ita cum in unaquaque earum quid quisque sectetur multiplex discrepantia sit opinionum, esse tamen aliquam naturae causam, scientiae formam, uitae summam nemo cunctatur.

[25] Insofar as it is given to be understood, from this the philosophers wished the discipline of wisdom to be tripartite—nay rather, they were able to observe it to be tripartite (for they themselves did not institute that it should be so, but rather found that it is so)—one part of which would be called physica, another logica, a third ethica (whose Latin names have by now been made frequent in the writings of many, so that they are called naturalis, rationalis, and moralis; which also in the eighth book we have briefly skimmed); not that it follows that those men, in these three, thought anything about the Trinity according to God, although Plato is said first to have discovered and commended that distribution, for whom none seemed to be the author of all natures except God, nor the giver of intelligence, nor the inspirer of the love by which one lives well and blessedly. But certainly, since on the nature of things, and on the reason for investigating truth, and on the end of the good, to which we ought to refer all the things we do, different people think different things, yet in these three great and general questions all their attention is occupied. Thus, although in each of them, as to what each person pursues, there is a manifold discrepancy of opinions, nevertheless that there is some cause of nature, some form of science, some sum of life, no one hesitates.

Tria etiam sunt, quae in unoquoque homine artifice spectantur, ut aliquid efficiat: natura, doctrina, usus; natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus fructu diiudicandus est. Nec ignoro, quod proprie fructus fruentis, usus utentis sit, atque hoc interesse uideatur, quod ea re frui dicimur, quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsa delectat; uti uero ea re, quam propter aliud quaerimus (unde temporalibus magis utendum est, quam fruendum, ut frui mereamur aeternis; non sicut peruersi, qui frui uolunt nummo, uti autem Deo; quoniam non nummum propter Deum inpendunt, sed Deum propter nummum colunt); uerum tamen eo loquendi modo, quem pius obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur et usibus fruimur; nam et fructus iam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes temporaliter utimur. Hoc itaque more usum dixerim in his tribus, quae in homine spectanda commonui, quae sunt natura, doctrina, usus.

There are also three things which are observed in each man as an artificer, so that he may effect something: nature, doctrine, use; nature is to be judged by ingenium, doctrine by science (knowledge), use by fruit. Nor am I unaware that properly fruit belongs to the enjoying person, use to the using person, and that this seems to differ thus: we are said to enjoy that thing which, not to be referred to something else, delights us by itself; but to use that thing which we seek on account of something else (whence temporal things are rather to be used than enjoyed, that we may merit to enjoy eternal things; not like the perverse, who wish to enjoy the coin, but to use God; since they do not expend the coin for God’s sake, but worship God for the coin’s sake); yet nevertheless, in that mode of speaking which pious custom has obtained, we both use fruits and enjoy uses; for even the fruits are now properly spoken of as of the fields, which indeed we all use temporally. Therefore, by this usage I would call “use” among those three which I have admonished are to be observed in a man, which are nature, doctrine, use.

Ex his propter obtinendam beatam uitam tripertita, ut dixi, a philosophis inuenta est disciplina, naturalis propter naturam, rationalis propter doctrinam, moralis propter usum. Si ergo natura nostra esset a nobis, profecto et nostram nos genuissemus sapientiam nec eam doctrina, id est aliunde discendo, percipere curaremus; et noster amor a nobis profectus et ad nos relatus et ad beate uiuendum sufficeret nec bono alio quo frueremur ullo indigeret; nunc uero quia natura nostra, ut esset, Deum habet auctorem, procul dubio ut uera sapiamus ipsum debemus habere doctorem, ipsum etiam ut beati simus suauitatis intimae largitorem.

From these, for the obtaining of the blessed life, as I said, a three-part discipline was discovered by the philosophers: the natural on account of nature, the rational on account of doctrine, the moral on account of use. Therefore, if our nature were from us, assuredly we ourselves would have begotten our wisdom, nor would we care to receive it by doctrine, that is, by learning from elsewhere; and our love, having proceeded from us and referred back to us, would suffice for living blessedly and would need no other good to enjoy; but as it is, since our nature, in order that it might exist, has God as its author, without doubt that we may truly be wise we ought to have Him as teacher, and, that we may be blessed, Himself also as the bestower of inmost sweetness.

[XXVI] Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo ualde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo breuius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse nouimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas ueri similis turbat.

[26] And we indeed in ourselves, although not an equal, nay, very far and remote, nor coeternal and, to say the whole more briefly, not of the same substance as God is, yet than which to God nothing in the things made by Him is by nature nearer, we recognize the image of God, that is, of that supreme Trinity, still to be perfected by reformation, that it may also be by likeness very near. For we both are, and we know that we are, and we love that being and knowing. But in these three which I have mentioned, no falsity verisimilar to the truth disturbs us.

Non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, uelut colores uidendo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas cogitatione uersamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur; sed sine ulla phantasiarum uel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his ueris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum.

For we do not touch these, as we do those things which are outside, by any sense of the body—just as we perceive colors by seeing, sounds by hearing, odors by smelling, tastes by tasting, and hard and soft by handling—of which sensibles also we turn in thought images very similar to them, now no longer corporeal, we hold them in memory, and through these we are stirred into desires of those; but without any delusory imagination of phantasies or phantasms, it is most certain to me that I am, and that I know this and love it. In these truths I do not fear the arguments of the Academics who say: What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am.

Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quiargo sum si fallor, quo modo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me noui esse, non fallor.

For he who is not, certainly cannot be deceived; and through this, I am, if I am deceived. What then? Since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived about my being, when it is certain that I am, if I am deceived? Because, therefore, I would exist as one who would be deceived, even if I were deceived, beyond doubt I am not deceived in this, that I know myself to be.

Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me noui nosse, non fallar. Sicut enim noui esse me, ita noui etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque amorem quiddam tertium nec inparis aestimationis eis quas noui rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar; quamquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare uerum esset.

It is consequent, moreover, that also in this—namely, that I know that I know—I am not deceived. For just as I know that I am, so I know this very thing as well, that I know. And when I love those two, I adjoin also the same love as a certain third thing, not of unequal estimation, to the things which I know. For I am not deceived that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; although even if those things were false, it would be true that I love what is false.

Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum uero et illa uera atque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor uerus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non esse beatus uelit.

For how would I be rightly reproved and rightly restrained from the love of false things, if it were false that I love those things? But since those things are true and certain, who would doubt that, when they are loved, the love itself is true and certain? Furthermore, just as there is no one who would not wish to be, so there is no one who would not wish to be blessed.

Quo modo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?

For how, indeed, can he be blessed, if he is nothing?

[XXVII] Ita uero ui quadam naturali ipsum esse iucundum est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire et, cum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de rebus, sed miseriam suam potius auferri uelint. Illis etiam, qui et sibi miserrimi apparent et plane sunt et non solum a sapientibus, quoniam stulti, uerum et ab his, qui se beatos putant, miseri iudicantur, quia pauperes atque mendici sunt, si quis inmortalitatem daret, qua nec ipsa miseria moreretur, proposito sibi quod, si in eadem miseria semper esse nollent, nulli et nusquam essent futuri, sed omni modo perituri, profecto exultarent laetitia et sic semper eligerent esse quam omnino non esse. Huius rei testis est notissimus sensus illorum.

[27] Thus indeed, by a certain natural force, being itself is pleasant, such that even those who are wretched do not wish to perish, and, when they feel themselves to be wretched, they wish not that they themselves be removed from things, but rather that their misery be taken away. Even those who both appear to themselves most miserable and plainly are, and who are judged miserable not only by the wise, since they are foolish, but also by those who think themselves happy, because they are poor and beggars—if someone were to grant them immortality, in which not even that misery itself would die, with this set before them, that, if they were unwilling to be always in the same misery, they would be going to be no one and nowhere, but in every way would perish—assuredly they would exult with joy and thus would always choose to be rather than not to be at all. Of this matter their very well-known sense is witness.

Vnde enim mori metuunt et malunt in illa aerumna uiuere, quam eam morte finire, nisi quia satis apparet quam refugiat natura non esse? Atque ideo cum se nouerint esse morituros, pro magno beneficio sibi hanc inpendi misericordiam desiderant, ut aliquanto productius in eadem miseria uiuant tardiusque moriantur. Procul dubio ergo indicant, inmortalitatem, saltem talem quae non habeat finem mendicitatis, quanta gratulatione susciperent.

For whence is it that they fear to die and prefer to live in that hardship rather than finish it by death, unless because it is quite apparent how nature shrinks from not being? And therefore, when they have come to know that they are going to die, they desire as a great beneficium that this mercy be expended upon them: that they may live somewhat more protractedly in the same misery and die more slowly. Without doubt, therefore, they indicate with how great gratulation they would welcome immortality, at least such as would have no end to beggary.

Quid? animalia omnia etiam inrationalia, quibus datum non est ista cogitare, ab inmensis draconibus usque ad exiguos uermiculos nonne se esse uelle atque ob hoc interitum fugere omnibus quibus possunt motibus indicant? Quid?

What? Do not all animals, even the irrational ones, to whom it has not been given to think these things, from immense dragons down to exiguous little worms, indicate by all the motions they can that they wish to be and, on this account, flee destruction? What?

arbusta omnesque frutices, quibus nullus est sensus ad uitandam manifesta motione perniciem, nonne ut in auras tutum cacuminis germen emittant, aliud terrae radicis adfigunt, quo alimentum trahant atque ita suum quodam modo esse conseruent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est uita, ita tamen uel exiliunt in superna uel in ima descendunt uel librantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam, ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant.

the arboreta and all shrubs, which have no sense to avoid perdition by manifest motion, do they not, in order to send into the airs a safe shoot of the top, affix another to the earth as a root, by which they may draw aliment and thus conserve, in a certain way, their own being? Bodies themselves, finally, which have neither sense nor even any, at least, seminal life, yet either leap up into the upper regions or descend into the lower, or are balanced in the middle, so that they may guard their essence where, according to nature, they can be.

Iam uero nosse quantum ametur quamque falli nolit humana natura, uel hinc intellegi potest, quod lamentari quisque sana mente mauult quam laetari in amentia. Quae uis magna atque mirabilis mortalibus praeter homini animantibus nulla est, licet eorum quibusdam ad istam lucem contuendam multo quam nobis sit acrior sensus oculorum; sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo radiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus.

Now indeed how much knowing is loved, and how human nature does not wish to be deceived, can be understood even from this: that anyone of sound mind prefers to lament rather than to rejoice in amentia. This great and marvelous power is in mortals; among animate beings other than man, there is none, although some of them have a sense of the eyes much keener than ours for beholding that light; but they cannot come into contact with that incorporeal light, by which our mind is in a certain manner irradiated, so that we may judge rightly concerning all these things. For in so far as we grasp it, to that extent we can do this.

Verum tamen inest in sensibus inrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo; cetera autem rerum corporalium, non quia sentiunt, sed quia sentiuntur, sensibilia nuncupata sunt. Quorum in arbustis hoc simile est sensibus, quod aluntur et gignunt. Verum tamen et haec et omnia corporalia latentes in natura causas habent; sed formas suas, quibus mundi huius uisibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent, ut pro eo, quod nosse non possunt, quasi innotescere uelle uideantur.

Yet nevertheless there is in the senses of irrational animals, if not knowledge in any way, at least a certain similitude of knowledge; but the other things among corporeal realities, not because they sense, but because they are sensed, have been called sensibles. Of which, in the arbusta, this is like to senses: that they are nourished and they beget. Yet nevertheless both these and all corporeals have causes latent in nature; but they offer their own forms, by which the structure of this visible world is beautiful, to be sensed by the senses, so that, in place of the fact that they cannot know, they seem as if to wish to become known.

Sed nos ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus, iusta per intellegibilem speciem, iniusta per eius priuationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupulae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit.

But we grasp these things by the sense of the body in such a way that we do not judge about them by the sense of the body. For we have another sense of the inner man far more excellent than that, by which we perceive the just and the unjust—the just by an intelligible form, the unjust by its privation. To the office of this sense there comes no acuity of the pupil, no aperture of the ear, no spiracles of the nostrils, no taste of the throat, nor any corporeal touch.

Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum.

There I am certain that I both am and know this, and I love these things, and I am similarly certain that I love.

[XXVIII] Sed de duobus illis, essentia scilicet et notitia, quantum amentur in nobis, et quem ad modum etiam in ceteris rebus, quae infra sunt, eorum reperiatur, etsi differens, quaedam tamen similitudo, quantum suscepti huius operis ratio uisa est postulare, satis diximus; de amore autem, quo amantur, utrum et ipse amor ametur, non dictum est. Amatur autem; et hinc probamus, quod in hominibus, qui rectius amantur, ipse magis amatur. Neque enim uir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit.

[28] But concerning those two, namely essence and knowledge, how much they are loved in us, and in what manner, even in the other things which are below, there is found, although different, yet a certain similitude of them, we have said enough, as much as the rationale of this undertaken work seemed to demand; but about the love by which they are loved, whether love itself also is loved, it has not been said. But it is loved; and from this we prove that in human beings, who are more rightly loved, love itself is more loved. For a good man is not deservedly called one who knows what the good is, but one who loves it.

Cur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quidquid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo amatur et quod amandum non est, et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut illo proficiente quo bene uiuimus iste deficiat quo male uiuimus, donec ad perfectum sanetur et in bonum commutetur omne quod uiuimus.

Why, then, do we not also feel in our very selves that we love love itself, by which we love whatever good we love? For there is also a love by which even what ought not to be loved is loved; and the person who loves that love by which what ought to be loved is loved, hates in himself this love. For both can be in one human being; and this is good for a human being: that as that love advances by which we live well, this one fail by which we live ill, until all that we live be healed to perfection and be converted into good.

Si enim pecora essemus, carnalem uitam et quod secundum sensum eius est amaremus idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum et secundum hoc, cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, uerum tamen id quasi adpetere uideremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides aut fluctus aut uentus aut flamma uel quid huius modi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque uita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis adpetitus.

For if we were cattle, we would love carnal life and what is in accordance with its sense, and that would be our sufficient good; and according to this, when it was well with us, we would seek nothing else. Likewise, if we were trees, we could indeed love nothing with sentient motion, yet we would seem as it were to appetite that by which we would be more fertile and more abundantly fruitful. If we were stones or waves or wind or flame or anything of this sort, indeed without any sense or life, yet there would not be lacking to us, as it were, a certain appetency of our proper places and order.

Nam uelut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, siue deorsum grauitate siue sursum leuitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est uera aeternitas, aeterna ueritas, aeterna et uera caritas, estque ipse aeterna et uera et cara trinitas neque confusa neque separata: in his quidem rebus, quae infra nos sunt, quoniam et ipsa nec aliquo modo essent nec aliqua specie continerentur nec aliquem ordinem uel adpeterent uel tenerent, nisi ab illo facta essent, qui summe est, qui summe sapiens est, qui summe bonus est, tamquam per omnia, quae fecit mirabili stabilitate, currentes quasi quaedam eius alibi magis, alibi minus inpressa uestigia colligamus; In nobis autem ipsis eius imaginem contuentes tamquam minor ille euang icus filius ad nosmet ipsos reuersi surgamus et ad illum redeamus, a quo peccando recesseramus.

For just as the loves of bodies are like the moments of weights, whether they strive downward by gravity or upward by lightness, so a body by its weight, as a mind by its love, is borne whithersoever it is borne. Since therefore we are human beings created to the image of our Creator, whose is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true charity, and who himself is the eternal and true and dear Trinity, neither confused nor separated: in those things indeed which are beneath us—since they too neither would in any way exist, nor be contained in any form, nor seek or hold any order, unless they had been made by him who supremely is, who is supremely wise, who is supremely good—running, as it were, through all the things which he made with wondrous stability, let us gather, as it were, certain vestiges of him, impressed more in some places, less in others; but in ourselves, contemplating his image, like that younger evangelical son, let us, having returned to our very selves, arise and return to him from whom by sinning we had withdrawn.

Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem. Nunc autem tria ista nostra quamuis certa teneamus nec aliis ea credamus testibus, sed nos ipsi praesentia sentiamus atque interiore ueracissimo cernamus aspectu, tamen, quamdiu futura uel utrum numquam defutura et quo si male, quo autem si bene agantur peruentura sint, quoniam per nos ipsos nosse non possumus, alios hinc testes uel quaerimus uel habemus; de quorum fide cur nulla debeat esse dubitatio, non est iste, sed posterior erit diligentius disserendi locus. In hoc autem libro de ciuitate Dei, quae non peregrinatur in huius uitae mortalitate, sed inmortalis semper in caelis est, id est de angelis sanctis Deo cohaerentibus, qui nec fuerunt umquam nec futuri sunt desertores, inter quos et illos, qui aeternam lucem deserentes tenebrae facti sunt, Deum primitus diuisisse iam diximus, illo adiuuante quod coepimus ut possumus explicemus.

There our being will not have death, there our knowing will not have error, there our loving will not have offense. Now, however, though we hold these three of ours as certain and do not entrust them to other witnesses, but we ourselves feel them as present and discern them with the most truthful inner gaze, nevertheless, so long as the question concerns their future—whether they are never to fail, and to what they will come if they are conducted ill, and to what if well—since we cannot know this by ourselves, we either seek or have other witnesses on this point; why there ought to be no doubt about their credibility is not the place for discussion here, but will be a later place for discussing more diligently. But in this book about the City of God, which does not peregrinate in the mortality of this life, but is immortal always in the heavens—that is, about the holy angels cohering to God, who have never been nor will be deserters—between whom and those who, deserting the eternal light, have been made darkness, we have already said that God in the beginning made a division; with Him aiding, let us, as we are able, unfold what we have begun.

[XXIX] Illi quippe angeli sancti non per uerba sonantia Deum discunt, sed per ipsam praesentiam inmutabilis ueritatis, hoc est Verbum eius unigenitum, et ipsum Verbum et Patrem et eorum Spiritum sanctum, eamque esse inseparabilem trinitatem singulasque in ea personas esse substantiam, et tamen omnes non tres deos esse, sed unum Deum, ita nouerunt, ut eis magis ista, quam nos ipsi nobis cogniti simus. Ipsam quoque creaturam melius ibi, hoc est in sapientia Dei, tamquam in arte, qua facta est, quam in ea ipsa sciunt; ac per hoc et se ipsos ibi melius quam in se ipsis, uerum tamen et in se ipsis. Facti sunt enim et aliud sunt quam ille qui fecit.

[29] For those holy angels do not learn God through sounding words, but through the very presence of immutable Truth, that is, His Only‑begotten Word; and both this Word and the Father and their Holy Spirit they know to be an inseparable Trinity, and that the single persons in it are substance, and yet that all are not three gods, but one God, they know in such wise that these things are more known to them than we are to ourselves. They also know the creature itself better there, that is, in the Wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made, than in the creature itself; and thereby they also know themselves there better than in themselves, yet truly also in themselves. For they have been made, and are other than He who made them.

Ibi ergo tamquam in diurna cognitione, in se ipsis autem tamquam in uespertina, sicut iam supra diximus. Multum enim differt, utrum in ea ratione cognoscatur aliquid, secundum quam factum est, an in se ipso; sicut aliter scitur rectitudo linearum seu veritas figurarum, cum intellecta conspicitur, aliter cum in puluere scribitur; et aliter iustitia in ueritate incommutabili, aliter in anima iusti. Sic deinde cetera, sicut firmamentum inter aquas superiores et inferiores, quod caelum uocatum est; sicut deorsum aquarum congeries terraeque nudatio et herbarum institutio atque lignorum; sicut solis ac lunae stellarumque conditio; sicut ex aquis animalium, uolucrum scilicet atque piscium beluarumque natantium; sicut quorumque in terra gradientium atque repentium et ipsius hominis, qui cunctis in terra rebus excelleret.

There therefore, as it were, in diurnal cognition; but in themselves, as it were, in vespertine, as we have already said. For it makes much difference whether a thing is known in that reason according to which it was made, or in itself; just as the rectitude of lines or the truth of figures is known one way when, being understood, it is beheld, another when it is written in the dust; and justice one way in unchangeable truth, another in the soul of the just. Thus then the rest: such as the firmament between the upper and lower waters, which was called heaven; such as the heap of the waters below and the laying bare of the land and the establishment of herbs and of trees; such as the formation of the sun and the moon and the stars; such as from the waters the animals, namely birds and fishes and swimming beasts; such as whatever things on the earth are walking and creeping, and man himself, who would excel all things on the earth.

Omnia haec aliter in Verbo Dei cognoscuntur ab angelis, ubi habent causas rationesque suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in se ipsis; illa clariore, hac obscuriore cognitione, uelut artis atque operum; quae tamen opera cum ad ipsius Creatoris laudem uenerationemque referuntur, tamquam mane lucescit in mentibus contemplantium.

All these things are known by the angels in the Word of God in one way—where they have their causes and reasons, that is, according to which they were made, remaining incommutably—and in another way in themselves: the former with a clearer, the latter with a more obscure cognition, as of art and of works; which works, however, when they are referred to the praise and veneration of the Creator himself, it is as though morning grows bright in the minds of those contemplating.

[XXX] Haec autem propter senarii numeri perfectionem eodem die sexiens repetito sex diebus perfecta narrantur, non quia Deo fuerit necessaria mora temporum, quasi qui non potuerit creare omnia simul, quae deinceps congruis motibus peragerent tempora; sed quia per senarium numerum est operum significata perfectio. Numerus quippe senarius primus completur suis partibus, id est sexta sui parte et tertia et dimidia, quae sunt unum et duo et tria, quae in summam ducta sex fiunt. Partes autem in hac consideratione numerorum illae intellegendae sunt, quae quotae sint dici potest; sicut dimidia, tertia, quarta et deinceps ab aliquo numero denominatae.

[30] These things, however, because of the perfection of the senary number, are reported as completed in six days, the same day repeated six times, not because a delay of times was necessary for God, as though he could not create all things at once, which thereafter by congruent motions would carry out the times; but because through the senary number the perfection of works is signified. For the senary number is the first to be completed by its parts, that is, by its sixth part and its third and its half, which are one and two and three, which, brought into a sum, make six. But the parts, in this consideration of numbers, are to be understood as those of which it can be said in what-th fraction they are; as a half, a third, a fourth, and so on, denominated from some number.

Neque enim exempli gratia quia in nouenario numero quattuor pars aliqua eius est, ideo dici potest quota eius sit; unum autem potest, nam nona eius est; et tria potest, nam tertia eius est. Coniunctae uero istae duae partes eius, nona scilicet atque tertia, id est unum et tria, longe sunt a tota summa eius, quod est nouem. Itemque in denario quaternarius est aliqua pars eius; sed quota sit dici non potest; unum autem potest; nam decima pars eius est.

Nor, for example, because in the novenary number four is some part of it, can it therefore be said what-th part it is; but one can, for it is its ninth; and three can, for it is its third. But those two parts of it joined together, the ninth namely and the third, that is, one and three, are far from its whole sum, which is nine. Likewise in the denary the quaternary is some part of it; but it cannot be said what-th it is; but one can, for it is its tenth part.

Habet et quintam, quod sunt duo; habet et dimidiam, quod sunt quinque. Sed hae tres partes eius, decima et quinta et dimidia, id est unum et duo et quinque, simul ductae non complent decem; sunt enim octo. Duodenarii uero numeri partes in summam ductae transeunt eum; habet enim duodecimam, quod est unum; habet sextam, quae sunt duo; habet quartam, quae sunt tria; habet tertiam, quae sunt quattuor; habet et dimidiam, quae sunt sex; unum autem et duo et tria et quattuor et sex non duodecim, sed amplius, id est sedecim, fiunt.

It has also the fifth, which is two; it has also the half, which is five. But these three parts of it—the tenth and the fifth and the half, that is, one and two and five—when brought together do not complete ten; for they are eight. But the parts of the duodenary number, when led into a sum, pass beyond it; for it has the twelfth, which is one; it has the sixth, which is two; it has the fourth, which is three; it has the third, which is four; it has also the half, which is six; and one and two and three and four and six make not twelve, but more, that is, sixteen.

Hoc breuiter commemorandum putaui ad commendandam senarii numeri perfectionem, qui primus, ut dixi, partibus suis in summam redactis ipse perficitur; in quo perfecit Deus opera sua. Vnde ratio numeri contemnenda non est, quae in multis sanctarum scripturarum locis quam magni aestimanda sit elucet diligenter intuentibus. Nec frustra in laudibus Dei dictum est: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.

I thought this should be briefly commemorated to commend the perfection of the senary number (the number six), which first, as I said, when its parts are reduced into the sum, is itself perfected; in which God perfected His works. Whence the rationale of number is not to be despised, which, in many places of the Holy Scriptures, shines forth to those who look diligently, as to how greatly it is to be esteemed. Nor was it said in the praises of God in vain: You have disposed all things in measure and number and weight.

[XXXI] In septimo autem die, id est eodem die septiens repetito, qui numerus etiam ipse alia ratione perfectus est, Dei requies commendatur, in qua primum sanctificatio sonat. Ita Deus noluit istum diem in ullis suis operibus sanctificare, sed in requie sua, quae non habet uesperam; neque enim ulla creatura est, ut etiam ipsa aliter in Dei Verbo, aliter in se cognita faciat aliam uelut diurnam, aliam uelut uespertinam notitiam. De septenarii porro numeri perfectione dici quidem plura possunt; sed et liber iste iam prolixus est, et uereor ne occasione comperta scientiolam nostram leuiter magis quam utiliter iactare uelle uideamur.

[31] But on the seventh day, that is, on the same day repeated seven times, which number also itself is perfected by another reckoning, the rest of God is commended, in which sanctification first sounds forth. Thus God willed not to sanctify this day in any of his works, but in his rest, which has no evening; for there is no creature such that even it, being known one way in the Word of God and another in itself, makes one knowledge as it were diurnal, another as it were vespertine. Moreover, many things indeed can be said about the perfection of the septenary number; but both this book is already prolix, and I fear lest, the opportunity having been found, we seem to wish to flaunt our little smattering of science more lightly than usefully.

Habenda est itaque ratio moderationis atque grauitatis, ne forte, cum de numero multum loquimur, mensuram et pondus neglegere iudicemur. Hoc itaque satis sit admonere, quod totus inpar primus numerus ternarius est, totus par quaternarius; ex quibus duobus septenarius constat. Ideo pro uniuerso saepe ponitur, sicuti est: Septiens cadet iustus, et resurget; id est: Quotienscumque ceciderit, non peribit; quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intellegi uoluit; et: Septiens in die laudabo te; quod alibi alio modo dictum est: Semper laus eius in ore meo; et multa huius modi in diuinis auctoritatibus reperiuntur, in quibus septenarius numerus, ut dixi, pro cuiusque rei uniuersitate poni solet.

Therefore account must be taken of moderation and gravity, lest perhaps, while we speak much about number, we be judged to neglect measure and weight. Let it suffice, then, to admonish this: that the first wholly odd number is the ternary, the wholly even the quaternary; from these two the septenary is constituted. For this reason it is often put for the universal, as in: “Seven times shall the just fall, and he shall rise again;” that is: “As often as he shall have fallen, he will not perish;” which he willed to be understood not of iniquities, but of tribulations leading to humility; and: “Seven times in the day I will praise you;” which elsewhere is said in another way: “His praise shall be always in my mouth;” and many things of this sort are found in the divine authorities, in which the septenary number, as I said, is wont to be set for the universality of any given thing.

Propter hoc eodem saepe numero significatur Spiritus sanctus, de quo Dominus ait: Docebit uos omnem ueritatem. Ibi requies Dei, qua requiescitur in Deo. In toto quippe, id est in plena perfectione, requies; in parte autem labor.

Because of this, by this same number the Holy Spirit is often signified, of whom the Lord says: He will teach you all truth. There is the rest of God, in which one rests in God. In the whole, that is, in full perfection, rest; but in part, labor.

Ideo laboramus, quamdiu ex parte scimus, sed cum uenerit quod perfectum est, quod ex parte est euacuabitur. Hinc est quod etiam scripturas istas cum labore rimamur. Sancti uero angeli quorum societati et congregationi in hac peregrinatione laboriosissima suspiramus, sicut habent permanendi aeternitatem, ita cognoscendi facilitatem et requiescendi felicitatem.

Therefore we labor, so long as we know in part; but when that which is perfect shall have come, what is in part will be evacuated. Hence it is that we also examine these scriptures with labor. But the holy angels, whose fellowship and congregation we sigh for in this most toilsome pilgrimage, just as they have the eternity of abiding, so also the facility of knowing and the felicity of resting.

Sine difficultate quippe nos adiuuant, quoniam spiritalibus motibus puris et liberis non laborant.

Indeed they aid us without difficulty, since in spiritual motions, pure and free, they do not labor.

[XXXII] Ne quis autem contendat et dicat non sanctos angelos esse significatos in eo quod scriptum est: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, sed quamlibet lucem tunc primum factam esse corpoream aut opinetur aut doceat; angelos autem prius esse factos non tantum ante firmamentum, quod inter aquas et aquas factum appellatum est caelum, sed ante illud de quo dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; atque illud, quod dictum est: In principio, non ita dictum tamquam primum hoc factum sit, cum ante fecerit angelos, sed quia omnia in sapientia fecit, quod est Verbum eius et ipsum scriptura principium nominauit (sicut ipse in euangelio Iudaeis quaerentibus quis esset respondit se esse principium): non e contrario referam contentionem, maxime quia hoc me delectat plurimum, quod etiam in summo exordio sancti libri geneseos trinitas commendatur. Cum enim ita dicitur: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, ut Pater fecisse intellegatur in Filio, sicut adtestatur psalmus, ubi legitur: Quam magnificata sunt opera tua Domine! omnia in sapientia fecisti: conuenientissime paulo post commemoratur etiam Spiritus sanctus.

[32] Lest anyone, however, contend and say that it is not the holy angels who are signified in that which is written: “Let there be light, and there was light,” but that some bodily light whatsoever was then first made—either suppose this or teach it; and that the angels were made earlier, not only before the firmament, which, made between the waters and the waters, was called heaven, but before that of which it was said: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”; and that what was said, “In the beginning,” was not so said as though this were made first, since He had made the angels before, but because He made all things in Wisdom, which is His Word, and Scripture itself has named “Beginning” (just as He Himself in the Gospel, when the Jews were asking who He was, answered that He is the Beginning): I will not, conversely, carry on a contention—especially because this delights me very much, that even in the very beginning of the holy book of Genesis the Trinity is commended. For when it is thus said: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” so that the Father is understood to have made in the Son, as the Psalm attests, where it is read: “How magnified are Your works, O Lord! You have made all things in Wisdom,” most fittingly a little later the Holy Spirit also is commemorated.

Cum enim dictum esset, qualem terram Deus primitus fecerit, uel quam molem materiamue futurae constructionis mundi caeli et terrae nomine nuncupauerit subiciendo et addendo: Terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita et tenebrae erant super abyssum: mox ut trinitatis commemoratio compleretur: Et spiritus, inquit, Dei superferebatur super aquam. Proinde ut uolet quisque accipiat, quod ita profundum est, ut ad exercitationem legentium a fidei regula non abhorrentes plures possit generare sententias, dum tamen angelos sanctos in sublimibus sedibus non quidem Deo coaeternos, sed tamen de sua sempiterna et uera felicitate securos et certos esse nemo ambigat. Ad quorum societatem pertinere paruulos suos Dominus docens non solum illud ait: Erunt aequales angelis Dei; uerum ipsi quoque angeli qua contemplatione fruantur ostendit, ubi ait: Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex pusillis istis, dico enim uobis, quia angeli eorum in caelis semper uident faciem Patris mei, qui in caelis est.

Since indeed it had been said what kind of earth God originally made, or what mass or material of the future construction of the world he designated by the name of “heaven and earth,” by subjoining and adding: “But the earth was invisible and uncomposed, and darkness was upon the abyss”; soon, in order that the commemoration of the Trinity might be completed: “And,” he says, “the Spirit of God was borne over the water.” Accordingly, let each receive it as he will, a matter so profound that, for the exercise of readers not deviating from the rule of faith, it can generate several interpretations, provided nevertheless that no one doubt that the holy angels in the sublime seats— not indeed coeternal with God, yet secure and assured of their own everlasting and true felicity— are such. Teaching that his little ones belong to whose fellowship, the Lord not only says this: “They shall be equal to the angels of God”; but he also shows what contemplation the angels themselves enjoy, where he says: “See that you do not despise one of these little ones, for I tell you that their angels in the heavens always see the face of my Father who is in the heavens.”

[XXXIII] Peccasse autem quosdam angelos et in huius mundi ima detrusos, qui eis uelut carcer est, usque ad futuram in die iudicii ultimam damnationem apostolus Petrus apertissime ostendit dicens, quod Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercerit, sed carceribus caliginis inferi retrudens tradiderit in iudicio puniendos reseruari. Inter hos ergo et illos Deum uel praescientia uel opere diuisisse quis dubitet? illosque lucem merito appellari quis contradicat?

[33] But that certain angels have sinned and have been thrust down into the depths of this world, which is for them as a prison, until the future, on the day of judgment, final damnation, the apostle Peter most openly shows, saying that God did not spare the sinning angels, but, thrusting them back into the dungeons of the gloom of the infernal, delivered them to be reserved for punishment at the judgment. Between these, then, and those, that God has divided either by foreknowledge or by deed, who would doubt? and that those are deservedly called light, who would contradict?

quando quidem nos adhuc in fide uiuentes et eorum aequalitatem adhuc sperantes, utique nondum tenentes iam lux dicti ab apostolo sumus: Fuistis enim, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino. Istos uero desertores tenebras aptissime nuncupari profecto aduertunt, qui peiores esse hominibus infidelibus siue intellegunt siue credunt. Quapropter, etsi alia lux in isto huius libri loco intellegenda est, ubi legimus: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, et aliae tenebrae significatae sunt in eo quod scriptum est: Diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras: nos tamen has duas angelicas societates, unam fruentem Deo, alteram tumentem typho; unam cui dicitur: Adorate eum omnes angeli eius, aliam cuius princeps dicit: Haec omnia tibi dabo, si prostratus adoraueris me; unam Dei sancto amore flagrantem, alteram propriae celsitudinis inmundo amore fumantem; et quoniam, sicut scriptum est, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam, illam in caelis caelorum habitantem, istam inde deiectam in hoc infimo aerio caelo tumultuantem; illam luminosa pietate tranquillam, istam tenebrosis cupiditatibus turbulentam; illam Dei nutu clementer subuenientem, iuste ulciscentem, istam suo fastu subdendi et nocendi libidine exaestuantem; illam, ut quantum uult consulat, Dei bonitati ministram, istam, ne quantum uult noceat, Dei potestate frenatam; illam huic inludentem, ut nolens prosit persecutionibus suis, hanc illi inuidentem, cum peregrinos colligit suos, — nos ergo has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares atque contrarias, unam et natura bonam et uoluntate rectam, aliam uero natura bonam, sed uoluntate peruersam, aliis manifestioribus diuinarum scripturarum testimoniis declaratas quod etiam in hoc libro, cui nomen est genesis, lucis tenebrarumque uocabulis significatas existimauimus, etiamsi aliud hoc loco sensit forte qui scripsit, non est inutiliter obscuritas huius pertractata sententiae, quia, etsi uoluntatem auctoris libri huius indagare nequiuimus, a regula tamen fidei, quae per alias eiusdem auctoritatis sacras litteras satis fidelibus nota est, non abhorruimus.

since indeed we, still living in the faith and still hoping for equality with them, surely not yet holding it, have already been called light by the apostle: For you were once darkness, he says, but now light in the Lord. But that those deserters are most aptly named darkness is surely noticed by those who either understand or believe that they are worse than unbelieving men. Wherefore, even if another light is to be understood in that place of this book where we read: God said, Let there be light, and there was light, and other darknesses are signified in that which is written: God divided between the light and the darkness: we, nevertheless, these two angelic societies—one enjoying God, the other swelling with typho; one to whom it is said: Worship him, all his angels, the other whose prince says: All these things I will give you, if, prostrate, you will worship me; one blazing with holy love of God, the other smoking with the unclean love of its own celsitude; and since, as it is written, God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble, the former dwelling in the heavens of heavens, the latter cast down from there, making tumult in this lowest airy heaven; the former tranquil with luminous piety, the latter turbulent with tenebrous cupidities; the former, at God’s nod, mercifully coming to help, justly avenging, the latter boiling over with the lust of subduing and harming by its own fastus; the former, a minister to God’s goodness, so that it may aid as much as it wills, the latter, curbed by God’s power, lest it harm as much as it wills; the former mocking this one, so that, unwilling, it may benefit by its persecutions, this one envying that one, when it gathers its own pilgrims,—we therefore have judged these two angelic societies, unlike and contrary to each other, the one good by nature and upright by will, but the other good by nature yet perverse by will, declared by other, more manifest testimonies of the divine Scriptures, to be signified also in this book, which is named Genesis, by the terms light and darkness; and even if the one who wrote perhaps sensed something else in this place, the obscurity of this sentence has not been handled uselessly, because, even if we have been unable to track out the will of the author of this book, yet we have not diverged from the rule of faith, which through other sacred letters of the same authority is sufficiently well known to the faithful.

Etsi enim corporalia hic commemorata sunt opera Dei, habent procul dubio nonnullam similitudinem spiritalium, secundum quam dicit apostolus: Omnes enim uos filii lucis estis et filii diei, non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum. Si autem hoc sensit etiam ille qui scripsit, ad perfectiorem disputationis finem nostra peruenit intentio, ut homo Dei tam eximiae diuinaeque sapientiae, immo per eum Spiritus Dei in commemorandis operibus Dei, quae omnia sexto die dicit esse perfecta, nullo modo angelos praetermisisse credatur, siue in principio, quia primo fecit, siue, quod conuenientius intellegitur, in principio, quia in Verbo unigenito fecit, scriptum sit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; quibus nominibus uniuersalis est significata creatura, uel spiritalis et corporalis, quod est credibilius, uel magnae duae mundi partes, quibus omnia quae creata sunt continentur, ut primitus eam totam proponeret ac deinde partes eius secundum mysticum dierum numerum exsequeretur.

Although the works of God commemorated here are corporeal, they have, without doubt, some likeness to the spiritual, according to which the apostle says: For you all are sons of light and sons of day; we are not of night nor of darkness. But if he who wrote also sensed this, our intention reaches a more perfect end of the disputation: that the man of God of such outstanding and divine wisdom—nay rather, through him the Spirit of God—in recounting the works of God, which he says all to have been perfected on the sixth day, is in no way to be believed to have passed over the angels, whether in the beginning, in that he made them first, or, what is more fittingly understood, in the Beginning, in that he made in the Only-begotten Word, as it is written: In the beginning God made heaven and earth; by which names the universal creation is signified—either the spiritual and the corporeal (which is more credible), or the two great parts of the world, within which all things that have been created are contained—so that first he might set it forth as a whole and thereafter carry out its parts according to the mystical number of the days.

[XXXIV] Quamquam nonnulli putauerint aquarum nomine significatos quodam modo populos angelorum et hoc esse quod dictum est: Fiat firmamentum inter aquam et aquam, ut supra firmamentum angeli intellegantur, infra uero uel aquae istae uisibiles uel malorum angelorum multitudo uel omnium hominum gentes. Quod si ita est, non illic apparet ubi facti sint angeli, sed ubi discreti; quamuis et aquas, quod peruersissimae atque impiae uanitatis est, negent quidam factas a Deo, quoniam nusquam scriptum est: Dixit Deus: Fiant aquae. Quod possunt simili uanitate etiam de terra dicere; nusquam enim legitur: Dixit Deus: Fiat terra.

[34] Although some have thought that by the name of “waters” the peoples of angels are in some manner signified, and that this is what is said: Let there be a firmament between water and water, so that above the firmament angels are understood, but below either these visible waters or the multitude of evil angels or the nations of all men. But if it is so, it does not there appear where the angels were made, but where they were separated; although some, which is of most perverse and impious vanity, deny that the waters were made by God, since nowhere is it written: God said: Let there be waters. Which they can, by similar vanity, say also about the earth; for nowhere is it read: God said: Let there be earth.

Sed, inquiunt, scriptum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Illic ergo et aqua intellegenda est; uno enim nomine utrumque conprehensum est. Nam ipsius est mare, sicut in psalmo legitur, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam terram manus eius finxerunt.

But, they say, it is written: In the beginning God made heaven and earth. Therefore water too is to be understood there; for by one name both have been comprehended. For the sea is his, as in the psalm it is read, and he himself made it, and the dry land his hands fashioned.

Sed hi, qui in nomine aquarum, quae super caelos sunt, angelos intellegi uolunt, ponderibus elementorum mouentur et ideo non putant aquarum fluuidam grauemque naturam in superioribus mundi locis potuisse constitui; qui secundum rationes suas, si ipsi hominem facere possent, non ei pituitam, quod Graece phlegma dicitur et tamquam in elementis corporis nostri aquarum uicem obtinet, in capite ponerent. Ibi enim sedes est phlegmatis, secundum Dei opus utique aptissime, secundum istorum autem coniecturam tam absurde, ut, si hoc nesciremus et in hoc libro similiter scriptum esset, quod Deus umorem fluuidum et frigidum ac per hoc grauem in superiore omnibus ceteris humani corporis parte posuerit, isti trutinatores elementorum nequaquam crederent, et si auctoritati eiusdem scripturae subditi essent, aliquid aliud ex hoc intellegendum esse censerent. Sed quoniam, si diligenter singula scrutemur atque tractemus, quae in illo diuino libro de constitutione mundi scripta sunt, et multa dicenda et a proposito instituti operis longe digrediendum est, iamque de duabus istis diuersis inter se atque contrariis societatibus angelorum, in quibus sunt quaedam exordia duarum etiam in rebus humanis ciuitatum, de quibus deinceps dicere institui, quantum satis esse uisum est, disputauimus: hunc quoque librum aliquando claudamus.

But those who want angels to be understood under the name of the waters that are above the heavens are moved by the weights of the elements and therefore do not think that the fluid and heavy nature of waters could have been established in the upper regions of the world; who, according to their own reasonings, if they themselves could make a human, would not place in the head the phlegm, which in Greek is called phlegma and, as it were, holds the place of the waters among the elements of our body. For there is the seat of the phlegm, according to the work of God assuredly most fittingly, but according to their conjecture so absurdly that, if we did not know this and it were written in like manner in this book that God had placed a fluid and cold and therefore heavy humor in the part of the human body higher than all the rest, these balancers of the elements would by no means believe it; and if they were subject to the authority of that same Scripture, they would judge that something else must be understood from this. But since, if we diligently scrutinize and handle one by one the things that are written in that divine book about the constitution of the world, both many things must be said and we must digress far from the aim of the instituted work; and now concerning those two societies of angels diverse and contrary to each other, in which are certain beginnings of two cities even in human affairs—about which I have set myself to speak next—we have discussed as much as seemed sufficient: let us now close this book as well.