Erasmus•Institutio Principis Christiani
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I. | De Natiuitate et educatione Principis Christiani. |
II. | De adulatione uitanda Principi |
III. | Artes pacis |
IV. | De uectigalibus et exactionibus |
V. | De beneficentia Principis |
VI. | De legibus condendis aut emendandis |
VII. | De magistratibus et officiis |
VIII. | De foederibus |
IX. | De Principum Affinitatibus |
X. | De Principum occupationibus in pace. |
XI. | De bello suscipiendo |
1. | On the Nativity and education of the Christian Prince. |
2. | On adulation to be avoided by the Prince |
3. | Arts of peace |
4. | On taxes and exactions |
5. | On the beneficence of the Prince |
6. | On laws to be established or amended |
7. | On magistrates and offices |
8. | On treaties |
9. | On the Affinities of Princes |
10. | On the occupations of Princes in peace. |
11. | On undertaking war |
Caput primum: De Natiuitate et educatione Principis Christiani.
Chapter one: On the Nativity and education of the Christian Prince.
[1,1] Ubi receptum est suffragiis adscisci Principem, illic non perinde spectandae sunt maiorum imagines, siue species corporis, aut proceritas (quod a Barbaris nonnullis olim ineptissime factitatum legimus) atque indoles animi mansueta placidaque: sedatum, ac minime praeceps ingenium, nec ita concitatum, ut periculum sit, ne accedente fortunae licentia, erumpat in Tyrannidem, et admonentem aut consulentem non ferat: nec rursus ita lentum, ut cuiuslibet arbitrio quouis duci sese patiatur. Spectandus et rerum usus, et aetas nec ita grauis, ut iam obnoxia sit delirationi: nec ita uirens, ut affectibus abripiatur. Fortassis et ualetudinis habenda nonnulla ratio, ne subinde nouus Princeps sit adhibendus, idque non citra Reipublicae dispendium.
[1,1] Where it is received by suffrages to admit a Prince, there not so much are the ancestral images to be inspected, nor the appearance of the body, or tall stature (which we read was once most ineptly practiced by certain Barbarians), as the gentle and placid disposition of mind: a settled, and by no means headlong temperament, nor so excited that there is danger lest, with the license of fortune added, he burst forth into Tyranny, and not bear one who admonishes or counsels; nor in turn so sluggish, that at the will of anyone whatsoever he allows himself to be led. One must also consider the experience of affairs, and an age neither so advanced, that it be already liable to delirium: nor so green, that he be snatched away by affections. Perhaps some account of health also is to be had, lest ever and anon a new Prince have to be brought in—and that not without detriment to the Republic.
[1,2] In nauigatione non ei committitur clauus, qui natalibus aut opibus aut forma caeteris antecellit, sed qui peritia gubernandi, qui uigilantia, qui fide superat: Ita regnum ei potissimum est committendum, qui Regiis dotibus anteit reliquos: nempe, sapientia, iustitia, animi moderatione, prouidentia, studio commodi publici.
[1,2] In navigation the helm is not entrusted to him who surpasses the rest in birth
or in wealth or in form, but to him who surpasses in the expertise
of steering, who in vigilance, who in fidelity: Thus a kingdom is
most especially to be entrusted to him who goes before the others in royal endowments:
namely, in wisdom, justice, moderation of mind,
providence, zeal for the public good.
[1,4] Quod unum oportet spectare Principem in administrando, id unum oportet spectare populum in Principe deligendo, nimirum, publicam commoditatem, procul ablegatis priuatis affectibus. Quo minus integrum est mutare quem delegeris, hoc circumspectius est deligendus, ne diutissime nos cruciet unius horae temeritas.
[1,4] That one thing which it behooves the Prince to regard in administering,
that one thing it behooves the People to regard in choosing a Prince,
to wit, the public convenience, private affections being sent far away.
The less it is feasible to change him whom you have chosen,
by so much the more circumspectly must he be chosen, lest the rashness of a single hour
torment us for a very long time.
[1,5] Caeterum ubi nascatur Princeps, non eligitur: quod et olim apud Barbaras aliquot nationes fieri solitum, testatur Aristoteles, et nostris temporibus ubique fere receptum est: ibi praecipua boni Principis spes a recta pendet institutione, quam hoc diligentiorem etiam adhiberi conueniet, ut quod suffragiorum iuri detractum est, id educandi studio pensetur. Proinde statim, et ab ipsis (ut aiunt) incunabulis uacuum adhuc et rude futuri Principis pectus salutaribus opinionibus erit occupandum. Ac protinus in puerilis animi nouale iacienda honesti semina, quae paullatim aetate et usu rerum suppullulent ac maturescant, et semel infixa in omnem usque uitam inhaereant.
[1,5] Moreover, where a Prince is born, he is not chosen: and that
this was once the custom among several barbarian nations, Aristotle
attests, and in our times it is almost everywhere received: there the chief hope of a good Prince hangs upon right institution,
which it will be fitting to apply all the more diligently, so that what
has been detracted from the right of suffrages may be compensated by the zeal of educating. Accordingly at once, and from the very (as they say) swaddling-clothes, the as yet empty
and raw breast of the future Prince must be occupied with salutary
opinions. And forthwith into the fallow of the boyish mind
the seeds of honesty are to be cast, which little by little with age and
with the use of things may sprout up and ripen, and once fixed
may adhere through the whole of life.
[1,6] Ubi potestas non est deligendi Principem, ibi pari diligentia deligendus erit is, qui futurum instituat Principem. Ut nascatur probae indolis Princeps, id uotis optandum a Superis: porro ne bene natus degeneret, sut ut parum bene natus, educatione reddatur melior, id partim in nobis situm est. Mos erat olim de Republica bene meritis statuas, arcus ac titulos honoris gratia ponere.
[1,6] Where there is no power of choosing the Prince, there with equal diligence must he be chosen who will instruct the future Prince. That a Prince of upright natural disposition be born is a thing to be desired by vows from the gods above: further, that one well-born not degenerate, and that one born less well be rendered better by education, this lies partly in us. It was once the custom to set up statues, arches, and titles for the sake of honor for those who had well deserved of the Republic.
Therefore this must be diligently undertaken, not only thus far, that in the meantime he be restrained from disgraceful things, but also that he be imbued with certain specific precepts of virtues.
If with such solicitude parents not altogether foolish educate a boy destined for the succession of a single small field: with what zeal and care ought he to be educated who is being instituted not for one house, but for so many peoples, so many cities,
indeed who is being set up for the world, about to be, to the great advantage of all, a good man, or, to the great destruction of all, an evil man? Magnificent and very illustrious, to bear the imperium well.
But no
less outstanding is it to bring it about that a worse man not succeed: nay, this even is the
preeminent duty of a good Prince, to give effort that there cannot be
an evil Prince. So rule, as if you were striving in this,
that no one like you could succeed: and yet meanwhile your children
preparing for the future imperium, as though you were doing this, that one
better than yourself may succeed you. No fairer commendation of an excellent Prince than
if he should leave to the Republic such a man, in comparison with whom he himself
may seem rather little good: nor could his glory be more truly illustrated
than thus, by being overshadowed.
[1,8] Bonus ac sapiens Princeps, ita curet educandos liberos, ut illud semper meminerit, se patriae genitos, patriae educare, non suis affectibus. Priuatum parentis affectum semper ublica uincat utilitas. Quantumuis multas erigat statuas, quantumuis operosas tollat substructiones, non aliud pulcrius uirtutum suarum monumentum potest relinquere Princeps, quam filium haudquaquam degenerem, qui patrem optimum, optimis factis repraesentet.
[1,8] A good and wise Prince should so take care for educating his children, that he always remember this: that he was begotten for the fatherland, to educate for the fatherland, not for his own affections. The public utility should always conquer the private affection of a parent. However many statues he may set up, however many elaborate substructions he may raise, no other fairer monument of his virtues can a Prince leave, than a son by no means degenerate, who may represent his best father by most excellent deeds.
He does not die,
who has left a living image of himself. Let him therefore choose for this
duty, out of the whole number of his own, or even enroll from wherever,
men of integrity, incorrupt, grave, with long use of affairs, not only taught by
precepts, by whom both age may conciliate reverence, and the sincerity of life
authority, and the comity and pleasantness of manners love and benevolence—
lest the tender spirit, offended by the harshness of those instructing, begin to
hate virtue before to know it; or again, corrupted by the immoderate indulgence
of the shaper, he degenerate to where he ought not.
[1,10] Eiusmodi debet esse futuri Principis institutor, ut (quemadmodum eleganter a Seneca dictum est) et obiurgare norit citra contumeliam, et laudare citra adulationem quem ille simul et reuereatur ob uitae seueritatem, et amet ob morum iucunditatem. Principum nonnulli magna cura dispiciunt, quibus equum insignem, aut auem, aut canem curandum tradant: nihil autem referre putant, cui filium formandum committant, quem saepenumero talibus credunt praeceptoribus, qualibus nemo plebeius paulo cordatior, suos liberos uelit concredere. At quid retulerat filium genuisse imperio, nisi eumdem cures educandum imperio?
[1,10] Such ought to be the instructor of the future Prince, that
(as it has been elegantly said by Seneca) he both know how to objurgate
without contumely, and to praise without adulation—one whom he at once both reveres
for severity of life, and loves for the pleasantness of his manners. Certain princes with great care
look out for those to whom they will hand over a distinguished horse, or a bird, or a dog
to be tended; yet they think it matters nothing to whom they commit a son to be formed,
whom very often they entrust to such preceptors as no plebeian a little more sound of judgment
would wish to entrust his own children. But what would it have availed to have begotten a son
for rule, unless you likewise take care that the same be educated for rule?
Ne nutricibus quidem quibuslibet est committendus imperio natus, sed integris et ad id ipsum praemonitis et edoctis: nec collusoribus quibusuis admiscendus, sed bonae uerecundaeque indolis pueris, ac liberaliter sancteque habitis et institutis. Lasciuorum iuuenum, ebriosorum, turpiloquorum, in primis autem adulatorum turba procul ab huius auribus atque oculis erit arcenda, dum nondum praeceptis confirmatus animus. Cum pleraque mortalium ingenia uergant in malum, ad haec porro nullum tam feliciter natum ingenium, quod peruersa educatione non corrumpatur: quid nisi magnum malum exspectes ab eo Principe, qui quocumque natus ingenio (neque enim imagines, ut regnum, ita mentem quoque praestant) statim ab ipsis incunabulis, stultissimis inficitur opinionibus, enutritur inter stultas mulierculas, adolescit inter lasciuas puellas, inter collusores perditos, inter abiectissimos assentatores, inter scurras et mimos, inter combibones et aleatores, ac uoluptatum architectos iuxta stultos ac nequam: inter quos nihil audit, nihil discit, nihil imbibit, nisi uoluptates, delicias, fastum, arrogantiam, auaritiam, iracundiam, tyrannidem: atque ab bac schola mox adhibetur ad regni gubernacula.
Nor ought a child born to rule be committed to just any nurses, but to women of integrity and expressly fore-warned and taught for that very task: nor ought he to be mingled with just any playmates, but with boys of good and modest disposition, and honorably and piously kept and instructed. A crowd of wanton youths, drunkards, foul-speakers, but especially flatterers, must be kept far from this one’s ears and eyes, while his spirit is not yet confirmed by precepts. Since the greater part of mortals’ dispositions incline toward evil, and, moreover, there is no nature so happily born that is not corrupted by a perverse education: what, save a great evil, would you expect from that Prince who, of whatever disposition he is born (for ancestral images do not, as they bestow a kingdom, so also furnish a mind), straightway from his very swaddling-clothes is dyed with most foolish opinions, is brought up among silly little women, grows up among wanton girls, among depraved playfellows, among the most abject sycophants, among buffoons and mimes, among boon-companions and gamblers, and the architects of pleasures, equally foolish and wicked: among whom he hears nothing, learns nothing, imbibes nothing, save pleasures, delights, pomp, arrogance, avarice, irascibility, tyranny: and from this school is soon applied to the helm of the kingdom.
[1,11] Quaeso quid exerceant adulti nisi Tyrannidem, qui pueri nihil etiam luserunt nisi Tyrannidem? Ut omnes boni sint, uix etiam optari potest: at non difficile est ex tot hominum millibus unum atque alterum deligere, qui probitate sapientiaque, praecellat, per quos compendio plurimi reddantur boni. Princeps adolescens diu suspectam habeat suam ipsius aetatem, partim ob rerum imperitiam, partira ob immoderatos animi impetus: caueatque ne quid magnae rei tentet, nisi prudentium uirorum consilio, praecipue seniorum, inter quos assidue uersari debet, ut iuuentutis impotentia, maiorum reuerentia temperetur.
[1,11] Pray, what do adults practice except Tyranny, who as boys played at nothing except Tyranny? That all be good can hardly even be wished: but it is not difficult out of so many thousands of men to select one and another who, in probity and sapience, excels, through whom by a compendium very many may be rendered good. A young Prince should for a long time hold his own age suspect, partly on account of inexperience of affairs, partly on account of the immoderate impulses of spirit: and let him beware lest he attempt anything of great moment, except by the counsel of prudent men, especially of elders, among whom he ought to be assiduously conversant, so that the unbridledness of youth may be tempered by reverence for his betters.
[1,12] Quisquis instituendi Principis suscepit prouinciam, illud etiam atque etiam secum cogitet, sese rem haudquaquam uulgarem agere, sed omnium ut longe maximam, ita longe periculosissimam. Et in primis animum adferat eo munere dignum: neque spectet quantum Sacerdotiorum illinc possit auferre, sed qua ratione possit patriae, suas spes ipsius credenti fidei, salutarem Principem reddere. Cogita moderator, quantum tuae debeas patriae, quae tibi felicitatis suae summam concredidit.
[1,12] Whoever has undertaken the province of instructing a Prince should think with himself again and again that he is dealing with a matter by no means common, but, of all, as by far the greatest, so by far the most perilous. And first of all let him bring a spirit worthy of that office: let him not look to how many sacerdotal offices he might carry off from thence, but by what method he may render to the fatherland, which entrusts its own hopes to his faith, a health-bringing Prince. Consider, moderator, how much you owe to your fatherland, which has entrusted to you the sum of its felicity.
In you
it lies, whether to provide for her, in evils, a certain saving numen,
or to send in a fated pest and plague. First,
therefore let him, to whom the Republic1 has given its boy into
his lap, shrewdly take note toward what he even then already inclines. Since this too at that age can be detected by certain marks,
whether he is more prone to irascibility
or arrogance, whether to ambition or thirst for fame, whether
to libido or to dice, or a zeal for money, whether to
vindictiveness or to war, whether to lack of self-restraint or to Tyranny.
Deinde qua senserit illum procliuem ad uitium, ea primum muniat animum illius salubribus decretis ac praeceptis accommodis, coneturque sequax adhuc ingenium, in diuersum habitum trahere. Rursum qua deprehenderit naturam ad honesta procliuem, aut certe ad eiusmodi uitia, quae facile detorquentur ad uirtutem, quod genus sunt fortassis ambitio et profusio, hac magis instet, et naturae commoditatem cultu adiuuet. Neque satis est, huiusmodi decreta tradere, quae uel a turpibus auocent, uel inuitent ad honesta, infigenda sunt, infulcienda sunt, inculcanda sunt, et alia atque alia forma renouanda memoriae, nunc sententia, nunc fabella, nunc simili, nunc exemplo, nunc apophthegmate, nunc prouerbio, insculpenda annulis, appingenda tabulis, adscribenda stemmatis, et si quid aliud est, quo aetas ea delectatur, ut undique sint obuia, etiam aliud agenti.
Then, in whatever respect he has perceived him prone to vice, let him
first fortify that one’s mind with salutary decrees and suitable precepts,
and strive to draw the as‑yet‑pliant disposition into
a contrary habit. Again, where he has discovered the nature
inclined to honorable things, or at least to those sorts of vices
which are easily twisted aside toward virtue, of which kind perhaps
are ambition and profusion, on this let him press the more, and
assist nature’s aptitude by cultivation. Nor is it enough to hand down
decrees of this kind, which either call away from base things, or invite to
honorable ones: they must be stamped in, underpropped, inculcated,
and renewed for the memory in one form and another, now by a maxim,
now by a little fable, now by a simile, now by an example, now
by an apophthegm, now by a proverb, to be engraved on rings,
painted on panels, inscribed on family trees, and, if there is anything else
with which that age is delighted, so that they may be met on every side, even
while one is doing something else.
Vehemently do the examples of celebrated men inflame generous spirits,
but by much the most it matters with what opinions they are imbued.
For from these fountains the whole regimen of life proceeds.
But if we shall have found a raw boy, then it will be necessary to strive
that at once he imbibe the most straight and most healthful ones,
and, as it were with certain pharmaceutics, he be fortified in advance
against the poisons of vulgar opinions.
But if it shall befall that he is somewhat infected with plebeian opinions, then the first care ought to be
that he be gradually freed from them, with salutary ones to be inserted in place of the wrenched-out pestiferous ones. For just as, in Seneca, Ariston says, “It is in vain to prescribe to an insane man how he ought to speak,
how to proceed, how to comport himself in public, how in private, unless first you have expelled the black bile”: so
you would admonish in vain about the method of conducting the Principate, unless first you free the mind from those most false, yet most received,
opinions of the crowd.
[1,13] Nec est quod resiliat aut diffidat institutor, si forte ferocius aut intractabilius ingenium fuerit nactus. Cum enim nulla sit tam effera, tam immanis bellua, quae non mansuescat cura domitoris et industria: cur existimet ullum hominis ingenium tam agreste, tamque deploratum, quod diligenti non mitescat instituione?
[1,13] Nor is there reason that the instructor should recoil or lose confidence, if by chance he has encountered a more ferocious or more intractable temperament. Since indeed there is no beast so savage, so monstrous, which does not become tame by the care of the tamer and his industry: why should he suppose any human temperament so rustic, and so deplorable, that it would not grow mild by diligent instruction?
[1,14] Rursum non est quod cessandum putet, si felicius ingenium contigerit. Etenim quo melior est soli natura, hoc magis corrumpitur, et inutilibus herbis ac fruticibus occupatur, ni uigilet agricola. Itidem ingenium hominis, quo felicius, quo generosius et erectius, hoc pluribus ac tetrioribus obducitur uitiis, ni salubribus praeceptis excolatur.
[1,14] Again, let him not think there is any reason for delaying, if a more felicitous nature should have fallen to his lot. For the better the nature of the soil, the more it is corrupted, and is occupied by useless herbs and shrubs, unless the farmer keep watch. Likewise the nature of a man, the more felicitous, the more generous and erect, the more it is overlaid with more and fouler vices, unless it be cultivated by salutary precepts.
[1,15] Ea littora solemus diligentissime communire, quae uehementissimam fluctuum uim excipiunt. Sunt autem innumerae res, quae possint Principum animos a recto dimouere, fortunae magnitudo, rerum affluentia, luxus deliciae: libertas, qua quidquid libet libet: exempla magnorum, sed stultorum Principum: ipsi rerum humanarum aestus ac procellae: super omnia uero adulatio, fidei ac libertatis fuco personata. Quo diligentius erit optimis decretis, laudatorum Principum exemplis, aduersus haec praemuniendus.
[1,15] We are accustomed most diligently to fortify those shores which receive the most vehement force of the waves. There are, however, innumerable things which can divert the minds of Princes from the straight course—greatness of fortune, affluence of resources, luxury, delights; liberty, whereby whatever one likes, one is at liberty to do; the examples of great—but foolish—Princes; the very surges and tempests of human affairs; and, above all, adulation, masked with the cosmetic of fidelity and liberty. Therefore, all the more must he be fortified in advance against these by the best decrees and by the examples of lauded Princes.
Just as he is not worthy of only one punishment, who infects a public fountain, whence all drink, with poison: so he is most noxious, who has infected the Prince’s mind with depraved opinions, which soon redound to the ruin of so many men. If he is punished with death who has vitiated the Prince’s coin, how much more worthy is he of that punishment, who has corrupted the Prince’s nature?
[1,16] Mature suum negotium aggrediatur institutor, ut teneris adhuc sensibus, semina uirtutum instillet: dum procul abest ab omnibus uitiis animus, et in quemuis sequax habitum fingentis obtemperat digitis. Est sua et sapientiae infantia, quemadmodum et pietati. Semper idem, sed alias aliter agendum.
[1,16] Let the instructor maturely set about his own business, so that, while the senses are still tender, he may instill the seeds of virtues: while the mind is far away from all vices, and, pliant into any habit whatsoever, obeys the fingers of the fashioner. Sapience too has its infancy, just as piety does. Always the same thing, but at other times it must be done otherwise.
Even then, to the very little child, let him insinuate by agreeable little tales, festive apologues, charming parables, those things which later, when more grown, he will be about to teach in earnest. When the little boy has gladly heard the Aesopic apologue about the lion saved in turn by a mouse’s beneficence, about the dove kept unharmed by the ant’s effort: when he has smiled enough, then the teacher will add that that little tale pertains to a Prince—that he should by no means despise anyone, but should strive by benefactions to attach to himself the spirits of even the lowest plebeians; because no one is so feeble that he cannot, when the occasion arises, as a friend do good, and as an enemy do harm—and this even to the most powerful. When he has laughed enough at the eagle, the queen of birds, almost utterly destroyed by a most wretched insect, a scarab, let him add this by way of that example: that not even for the most powerful Prince is an enemy, however humble, either to be provoked or to be neglected.
[1,17] Ubi Phaetontis fabulam cura uoluptate didicerit, admoneat hanc esse Principis imaginem, qui dura aetatis calore praeceps, sed nulla adiutus sapientia, rerum habenas capessit, suo pariter et orbis malo subuertit omnia. Ubi Cyclopis ab Ulysse exoculati denarrata erit fabula, addat ei Polyphemo simillimum Principem, qui uiribus quidem polleat, careat autem sapientia.
[1,17] When he has learned the fable of Phaethon with care and with delight, let him admonish that this is the image of a Prince, who, headlong in the heat of a harsh age, but aided by no wisdom, seizes the reins of affairs, and overturns everything to the harm of himself and of the world alike. When the fable of the Cyclops blinded by Ulysses has been recounted, let him add that a Prince is most like Polyphemus, who indeed excels in strengths, but lacks wisdom.
[1,18] Quis non libenter auscultet apura et formicarum politiam? Haec ubi illecebra descenderit in animum puerilem, tum eliciat institutor, quod ad Principis pertineat eruditionem, uelut illud, quod Rex numquam procul auolat, alis quam pro corporis portione minoribus, quod solus aculeo careat: admonens hoc esse boni Principis, semper intra regni terminos uersari, et peculiarem huius laudem esse clementiam: atque ad eumdem modum faciat et in caeteris: Neque enim est huius instituti exempla persequi, sed rationem ac uiam indicare.
[1,18] Who does not gladly listen to the bees and the polity of ants? When this allure has descended into the puerile mind, then let the instructor elicit what pertains to the erudition of a Prince, as, for instance, this: that the King never flies far away, with wings smaller than in proportion to the body; that he alone lacks a sting: admonishing that this is the mark of a good Prince, to be always engaged within the borders of his realm, and that his peculiar praise is clemency: and in the same manner let him do also in the rest. For it is not of this institute to pursue examples, but to indicate the rationale and the way.
[1,19] Si qua uidebuntur acerbiora, ea formator orationis iucunditate leniat atque edulcet. Laudet apud alios, sed honestis ac ueris titulis: obiurget priuatim, sed ita ut seueritatem admonitionis aliqua leniat suauitate, praesertim si iam fuerit adultior.
[1,19] If any things seem more acerb, let the instructor soften and sweeten them by the jocundity of oration. Let him praise before others, but with honest and true titles; let him objurgate in private, yet so as to mitigate the severity of the admonition with some suavity, especially if he has already become more grown.
[1,20] Illud ante omnia ac penitus infigendum animo Principis, ut de Christo quam optime sentie, huius dogmata commode collecta protinus combibat, idque ex ipsis statim fontibus, unde non solum purius hauriuntur, uerum etiam efficacius. Hoc illi persuadeatur, quod ille docuit ad neminem magis pertinere, quam ad Principem.
[1,20] That, before all things and to be deeply implanted in the mind of the Prince,
that he think as excellently as possible concerning Christ, that he immediately imbibe this one’s dogmas, aptly collected,
and that from the very fountains at once, whence they are drawn not only more purely, but also more efficaciously.
Let this be persuaded to him: that what He taught pertains to no one more than to the Prince.
[1,21] Magna pars multitudinis falsis ducitur opinionibus, nec secus atque hi, qui in specu Platonico uincti desident, inanes rerum umbras pro ueris rebus admirantur. At boni Principis partes sunt, nihil horum mirari, quae uulgus hominum magni facit, sed omnia ueris malis, ac ueris boni metiri: nihil autem esse uere malum, nisi quod cum turpitudine coniunctum sit: nihil uere bonum, nisi quod cum honestate copulatum. Statim igitur hoc agat moderator, ut uirtutem ceu rem omnium pulcerrimam ac felicissimam, ac praecipue Principe dignam, amet ac suspiciat.
[1,21] A great part of the multitude is led by false opinions, not otherwise than those who, bound, sit in the Platonic cave, admiring empty shadows of things in place of true things. But it is the part of a good Prince to marvel at none of those things that the common crowd of men esteems highly, but to measure all things by true evils and true goods: that nothing is truly evil except what is conjoined with turpitude; nothing truly good except what is coupled with honorableness. Therefore at once let the ruler aim at this: to love and to look up to virtue as the most beautiful and most felicitous thing of all, and especially worthy of a Prince.
[1,22] Ne consuescat puer ille regno destinatus, suspicere diuitias, ut rem eximiam, per fas ac nefas expetendam: discat istos non esse ueros honores, qui uulgo uocentur. Verum honorem decus esse, quod uirtutem et recte facta suapte sponte consequatur, et tanto consequatur illustrius, quanto minus fuerit affectatum.
[1,22] Let that boy destined for rule not become accustomed to look up to riches,
as something exceptional, to be sought by right and wrong: let him learn
that those are not true honors which are called so by the vulgar. True
honor is a glory which follows virtue and right deeds of its own
accord, and it follows the more illustriously, the less it has been affectedly sought.
[1,23] Voluptates istas plebeias, adeo non esse dignas Principe, et Christiano Principe, ut uix hominem deceant. Ostendatur aliud esse uoluptatis genus, quod sincerum ac perpetuum in omnem usque uitam homini duret. Audiat nobilitatem, imagines, ceras, stemmata, et totam illam caduceatorum pompam, qua procerum uulgus muliebriter intumescit, nomina esse inania: nisi quidquid est hoc nominis, ab honesto fuerit profectum.
[1,23] Those plebeian pleasures are so far from being worthy of a Prince, and of a Christian Prince, that they scarcely befit a man. Let it be shown that there is another kind of pleasure, which, sincere and perpetual, endures for a man through his whole life. Let him hear that nobility, ancestral images, wax masks, pedigrees, and that whole pomp of caduceus-bearers, by which the vulgar herd of the nobles swells womanishly, are empty names: unless whatever there is of this name has proceeded from what is honorable.
Nor does the Prince perish, who dies in a business of this kind. Finally, whatever the vulgar crowd either embraces as pleasant, or looks up to as splendid,
or follows as useful, is to be measured only by the rule of the honorable. Conversely, whatever the crowd either shudders at as bitter,
or disdains as lowly, or flees as damaging, are not otherwise to be fled from, unless they have been conjoined with disgrace.
Let these be fastened in the mind of the future Prince; let these, as most sacred laws and unmovable, be engraved upon the tender little breast. Under these titles let him hear many praised, let him hear others variously reprehended, so that even then he may become accustomed from the best things to hope for true praise, and from truly base things to detest ignominy.
[1,25] At hic protinus reclamabit ex aulicis istis nugonibus quispiam, quauis muliere tum stultior, tum corruption: Tu Philosophum nobis formas, non Principem. Imo Principem fingo, cum tu pro Principe uappam malis tuf similem. Ni Philosophus fueris, Princeps esse non potes, Tyrannus potes.
[1,25] But here at once someone from those aulic triflers will protest,
someone, than any woman whatsoever both more foolish and more corrupt: You
are shaping for us a Philosopher, not a Prince. Nay rather, I fashion a Prince,
while you prefer, in place of a Prince, a vapid good‑for‑nothing like yourself. Unless
you are a Philosopher, you cannot be a Prince; a Tyrant you can be.
There is nothing better than a good Prince; a Tyrant is a beast of such a sort,
that there is no other portent under the sun, nor one equally noxious,
nor more odious to all. Do not think it said rashly by Plato, and praised by the most lauded men,
that only then will the Republic be blessed, if either Princes philosophize,
or Philosophers take up the Principate. Moreover, a Philosopher
is not one who is skilled in Dialectic or Physics, but one who,
with the false simulacra of things despised, with an unbroken breast,
both perceives and pursues true goods.
[1,26] Quid stultius quam his artibus metiri Principem, si belle saltitet, si dextre ludat aleam, si gnauiter potitet, si fastu turgeat, si regaliter expilet populum, si caetera faciat, quae nos pudet referre,' cum quosdam haud pudeat facere? Quantopere Principem uulgus studet abesse a cultu uictuque plebeio, tantopere uerus Princeps debet abesse a sordidis opinionibus ac studiis uulgi: imo solum hoc sordidum, uile, seque indignum ducat, cum plebecula sentire, cui numquam optima placuerunt.
[1,26] What is more foolish than to measure a Prince by these arts: if he dances nicely, if he plays dice deftly, if he drinks hard, if he swells with haughtiness, if he royally despoils the people, if he does the other things which it shames us to report, while it shames certain men not at all to do them? In proportion as the vulgar crowd is eager that a Prince be far removed from plebeian dress and diet, in the same proportion a true Prince ought to be far removed from the sordid opinions and studies of the crowd: nay, let him count this alone sordid, vile, and unworthy of himself—to be of one mind with the plebeian rabble, to whom the best things have never been pleasing.
[1,27] Cogita, quaeso, quam sit absurdum gemmis, auro, purpura, satellitio, reliquisque corporis ornamentis, cerfs et imaginibus, planeque bonis non tuis, omneis tanto interuallo superare, ueris animi bonis multis e media fece plebis inferiorem conspici. Princeps qui gemmas, aurum, purpuram, ac reliquam fortunae pompam ciuibus suis ostentat, quaeso, quid aliud quam suos id suspicere mirarique docet, unde omnium ferme maleficiorum sentina nascitur, quae Principum legibus puniuntur? In aliis frugalitas aut mundicies uel inopiae tribui potest, uel parsimoniae, si quis iniquius interpretetur.
[1,27] Consider, I pray, how absurd it is, in gems, gold, purple,
a bodyguard retinue, and the remaining ornaments of the body, with waxes and
images, and plainly with goods not yours, to surpass all by so great an interval,
and yet to be seen inferior in the true goods of the mind to many from the very dregs of the plebs.
A Prince who displays gems, gold, purple,
and the remaining pomp of Fortune to his citizens,
I ask, what else does he teach his own to look up to and to marvel at,
whence the bilge-sump of almost all malefactions is born, which
are punished by the laws of Princes? In others, frugality or neatness
can be attributed either to poverty, or to parsimony, if someone
interpret more unfairly.
But the same things in a Prince can be nothing other than a demonstration of temperance, when he uses with moderation those resources of which, as much as he pleases, so much is at his command.
How does it agree that the same man should incite vices who punishes what has been committed?
And is it not most disgraceful if someone allows to himself the very things which he forbids to be done by others?
If you wish to show yourself an excellent Prince, see that no one surpasses you in your own goods—in wisdom, greatness of spirit, temperance, integrity.
But if it shall seem good to you to contend with other Princes, do not think yourself the more superior for having taken from them some part of their dominion, or for having routed their forces: but rather if you are more incorrupt than they are, less avaricious, less arrogant than they, less irascible, less headlong than they.
Supreme nobility befits a Prince—granted; but since there are three kinds of nobility, one which is born from virtue and right deeds, the next which proceeds from the cognition of the most honorable disciplines, the third which is valued by portraits of lineage and the stemmata of forefathers, or by wealth: consider how unfitting it is for a Prince to swell with the lowest kind of nobility, which is so lowest that it is none at all unless it too has proceeded from virtue; and to neglect that highest kind, which is so highest that it alone can be held by the best right.
If you are eager to seem illustrious,
do not display images sculpted or adumbrated with colors; in
which, if there is anything of true praise, it is owed to the painter, whose
ingenuity and industry they argue. Rather, express monuments of virtue
by your morals. If the rest be lacking, even the ornaments
of your Highness can themselves admonish you of duty.
What does ardent purple signify, if not the highest love toward the Republic? What does the scepter signify, if not a mind tenacious
of justice, and by no avocations deflecting from the right? However, if someone be very far removed from these things, for him
these symbols are not ornaments, but reproaches of vices.
If torcs, if a scepter, if purple, if a bodyguard make a king, what, pray, forbids that tragedians, who come forth onto the stage adorned with the same, be held as kings? Do you wish to know what separates a Prince from an actor? namely, a spirit worthy of a Prince—that is, fatherly toward the Republic.
[1,28] Quo turpius est, hoc magis erit cauendum, ne talis sit Princeps, quales olim fuisse permultos legimus, et utinam hodie nullos uidere sit: quibus si Regium detraxeris ornatum, et aduentitiis nudatos bonis, ad suam cutem redegeris, iam nihil relinquas, praeter egregium aleatorem, inuictum potorem, acrem expugnatorem pudicitiae, uaferrimum impostorem, insatiabilem expilatorem, periuriis, sacrilegiis, perfidiis, omnique facinorum genere coopertum hominem.
[1,28] The more disgraceful it is, the more must it be guarded against, lest the Prince be such as we read that very many once were, and would that today there were none to be seen: from whom, if you were to strip off the royal ornament, and, stripped of adventitious goods, reduce them to their own skin, you would now leave nothing except an egregious dice-player, an unconquered drinker, a fierce stormer of chastity, a most crafty impostor, insatiable pillager, a man covered with perjuries, sacrileges, perf idies, and every kind of crimes.
[1,29] Quoties uenit in menteur te Principem esse, pariter succurrat et illud, te Christianum esse Principem: ut intelligas te a laudatis quoque Ethnicorum Principibus tantum oportere abesse, quantum abest ab Ethnico Christianus. Neque uero putes securam ac delicatam Christiani professionem, nisi forte leue putas sacramentum, quod aeque cum omnibus in baptismo iurasti, semel omnibus renunciare quae Satanae placent, et Christo displicent. Displicent autem quaecumque ab Euangelicis decretis abhorrent.
[1,29] As often as it comes into your mind that you are a Prince, let this equally occur, that you are a Christian Prince: so that you may understand that you ought to be as far removed even from the lauded Princes of the Ethnics, as a Christian is removed from an Ethnic. Nor indeed should you suppose the profession of a Christian to be secure and delicate, unless perhaps you deem light the sacrament, which you swore equally with all in baptism, once for all to renounce all the things which please Satan and displease Christ. Moreover, those things displease which are at variance with the Evangelical decrees.
The sacraments
of Christ are common to you with others, and you do not wish the doctrine
to be common? You swore to Christ’s words, and into
the mores of Julius or of Alexander the Great do you digress? The reward for you
you demand to be common, and you think that his decrees pertain nothing to you?
[1,30] At rursum ne putaris Christum situm esse in cerimoniis, hoc est, in praeceptis dumtaxat utcumque seruatis et Ecclesiae constitutionibus. Christianus est, non qui lotus est, non qui unctus, non qui sacris adest, sed qui Christum intimis complectitur affectibus, ac piis factis exprimit. Caue ne quando sic tecum cogites, cur ista mihi canuntur?
[1,30] But again, do not think that Christ is situated in ceremonies, that is, only in precepts however kept, and in the constitutions of the Church. A Christian is not he who is washed, not he who is anointed, not he who is present at the sacred rites, but he who embraces Christ with inmost affections, and expresses him by pious deeds. Beware lest you ever thus think with yourself, why are these things being sung to me?
[1,31] Si iudicas infame crimen, et cui nullum supplicium par inueniri possit, ab Imperatore desciscere, qui semel in illius uerba iurarit: cur ipse tibi ignoscis, lusum ac iocum existimans, quoties edicta Christi negligis, in cuius uerba iuratum est in baptismo, cui nomen dedisti, cuius Sacramentis adactus es, et auctoratus? Si haec serio fiunt, cur pro ludo ducimus? sin ludus est, cur Christi titulo gloriamur?
[1,31] If you judge it an infamous crime, and one for which no equal punishment can be found, for one who has once sworn into his words to defect from the Emperor: why do you pardon yourself, reckoning it sport and a joke, whenever you neglect the edicts of Christ, into whose words an oath was sworn in baptism, to whom you gave your name, by whose Sacraments you have been constrained and enlisted? If these things are done in earnest, why do we reckon them a game? but if it is a game, why do we glory in the title of Christ?
[1,32] Ne putaris te Christum satis tibi demeriturum, si classem miseris in Turcas, si sacellum aut monasteriolum exstruxeris. Non alio officio potes magis tibi conciliare Deum, quam si populo salutarem praestes Principem. Caue, ne te fallant adulantium uoces, qui ita dictitant, huiusmodi praecepta non ad Principes, sed ad Ecclesiasticos, quos uocant, pertinere.
[1,32] Do not think you will have merited Christ enough for yourself, if you send a fleet
against the Turks, if you build a little chapel or a small monastery. By no other duty can you more conciliate God to yourself, than if
you provide the people with a salutary Prince. Beware, lest the voices of flatterers deceive you,
who keep saying thus, that precepts of this kind
do not pertain to Princes, but to the Ecclesiastics, as they call them.
The Prince is not a Priest, I grant, and therefore he does not consecrate
the body of Christ: he is not a Bishop, and hence he does not
preach among the people about the mysteries of Christ, nor does he administer the
Sacraments. He has not professed the institute of Saint
Benedict, and on that account he does not wear a cowl. But what is greater than all
these: he is a Christian.
Not of Francis, but
of Christ himself the institute he has professed; from this he received the white
garment. His care ought to contend with that of the other Christians, if
with the others he hopes for such great rewards. Either your cross must for you also
be taken up, or Christ will not acknowledge you.
What then
is my cross, you will say? I will say: that you follow what is right though hard,
that, though hard, you do injury to no one, you despoil no one, you sell no
magistracy, you are corrupted by no gift: assuredly, your fisc will have less.
Contemn the detriment of the fisc, provided that you make a profit for justice.
To this: while by every method you strive to care for the Commonwealth, you lead an anxious life, you defraud your lifetime and your genius of pleasures, you macerate yourself with vigils and labors. Neglect this, and solace yourself with the conscience of rectitude. Likewise, while you prefer to bear an injury rather than to avenge it with great detriment to the Commonwealth, perhaps somewhat is deducted from your authority: bear it, reckoning this an abundantly great profit, that you have injured fewer.
Private affections solicit your mind, of such a kind as anger stirred by contumelies, or a wife’s love, or an enemy’s hatred, or shame, so that you do what is abhorrent to the right, and what is not for the use of the Republic: let regard for the honorable prevail, let public utility prevail over the private motions of the mind. Finally, you cannot guard the kingdom, unless with justice violated, unless with a great shedding of human blood, unless with an enormous loss to religion: lay it down rather and yield to the time. You cannot succor the affairs of your own, unless at the peril of your life: set the public safety before life.
But while you do these things, which are truly of a Christian Prince,
there will perhaps be those who call you stupid, and too little a Prince.
Make firm your mind, that you choose to be a just man rather than an unjust Prince.
You see, I suppose, how not even to the highest Kings is their own cross lacking,
if they are willing to follow what is fitting, the right, everywhere.
[1,33] In aliis nonnihil conceditur adolescentiae, aliquid donatur senectuti: error illi, huic otium et cessatio. At qui Principis munus suscepit, quandoquidem omnium agit negotium, nec adolescentem esse licet, nec senem: propterea quod non nisi magno plurimorum malo errat, nec sine grauissima pernicie cessat in officio.
[1,33] In others something is conceded to adolescence, something is granted
to senectitude: to the former, error; to the latter, otium and cessation. But he who has undertaken the office
of a Prince, since he conducts the business of all, is permitted to be neither an adolescent nor an old man:
for this reason, that he does not err except with great harm to very many, nor is he idle in his office without most grievous
perdition.
[1,34] Miseram prudentiam dixere ueteres, quae rerum experimentis comparatur, propterea quod hanc suo quisque malo consequitur. Hanc igitur oportet quam longissime abesse a Principe: quae ut serius, ita non sine immensis totius populi malis contingit.
[1,34] The ancients called wretched the prudence which is acquired by the experiments of things,
because each person attains this by his own misfortune.
Therefore this ought to be as far as possible absent from the
Prince: which, though later, yet does not occur without the immense ills of the whole
people.
[1,35] Si recte dixit Africanus, indignam uiro sapiente uocem esse, non putaram: quanto magis indigna uidebitur Principe: quae cura ipsi magno, tum nimio constat Reipublicae? Semel fortasse temere susceptum bellum a iuuene belli imperito, durat in annum uigesimum. Quantum hinc malorum omnium mare?
[1,35] If Africanus spoke rightly, that the utterance “I had not thought” is unworthy of a wise man,
how much more unworthy will it seem in a Prince:
since such a care costs himself greatly, and the Republic excessively? Once perhaps a war rashly undertaken by a youth unskilled in war,
lasts into the twentieth year. What a sea of all evils
comes from this?
[1,37] Ne tibi putes licere quidquid libuerit, quod stultae mulierculae et adulatores solent Principibus occinere uerum ita temet ipsum instituas, ut non libeat nisi quod licet, imo nec hoc tibi licere credas, quod licet priuatis. Quod in aliis error est, in Principe flagitium est.
[1,37] Do not think that whatever you please is licit to you, which foolish little women and adulators are wont to sing to Princes
but rather so school your very self that you take pleasure only in what is licit,
nay, do not even believe this to be licit for you which is licit for private persons. What
in others is an error, in a Prince is a flagitious disgrace.
[1,38] Quo tibi plus licet per alios, hoc minus ipse tibi permittas oportet, et hoc in te ipsum sis seuerior, quo magis indulgent omnes, ipse tibi sis censor acerrimus, etiam cum applauserint omnes. Tua in conspicuo uita est, latere non potes: aut magno omnium bono, bonus sis necesse est, aut magna omnium pernicie malus. Quo plus honorum tibi defertur ab omnibus, hoc impensius operam da, ne deferantur indigno.
[1,38] The more is permitted to you through others, the less you yourself ought to permit yourself, and in this be the more severe toward yourself, the more all are indulgent; be yourself your own most keen censor, even when all have applauded. Your life is in conspicuous view, you cannot lie hidden: either, to the great good of all, it is necessary that you be good, or, to the great ruin of all, evil. The more honors are conferred upon you by all, the more earnestly take pains that they not be conferred upon one unworthy.
[1,39] Ut nihil est in rebus humanis sapiente bonoque Monarcha magis salutare, ita e diuerso, stulto maloque nihil potest exsistere pestilentius. Nullius pestilentiae neque citius corripit, neque latius serpit contagium, quam mali Principis. Contra non alia breuior aut efficacior ad corrigendos populi mores uia, quam Principis incorrupta uita.
[1,39] As nothing in human affairs is more salutary than a wise and good monarch,
so, conversely, nothing can prove more pestilential than a foolish and bad one.
The contagion of no pestilence seizes more swiftly, nor spreads more widely, than that of a bad prince.
Conversely, there is no shorter or more efficacious way to correct the people’s morals than the incorrupt life of the prince.
The populace imitates nothing more willingly than what it has seen done by its own Prince.
Under a dice-player, dice are played everywhere; under a warlike man, all are for war; under a carouser, they melt away in luxury; under a libidinous one, they pander; under a cruel one, they inform and calumniate. Unroll the histories of the ancients, you will find the mores of the age always to have been of such a sort as was the life of the Prince.
No
comet, no fatal force so affects the affairs of mortals as the life
of the Prince seizes and transforms the manners and minds of the citizens. Very much to this have moment the studies and morals
of Priests and Bishops, I confess, but much more those of Princes:
for men more quickly calumniate them, if by chance they should be bad,
than they imitate them if they are good. Just as
Monks do not much incite to the imitation of themselves, if they are pious,
because they seem only to accomplish that which they profess.
[1,40] Princeps salutaris, ut erudite dictum est a Plutarcho, uiuum quoddam est Dei simulacrum, qui simul et optimus est et potentissimus, cui bonitas hoc praestat, ut omnibus prodesse uelit, potentia, ut quibus uelit, possit quoque. E diuerso malus ac pestilens Princeps, mali Daemonis imaginem repraesentat, cui multum adsit potentiae cura summa malitia coniunctum. Quidquid habet uirium, id omne consumit ad calamitatem humani generis.
[1,40] The health-giving Prince, as it has been eruditely said by Plutarch,
is a certain living simulacrum of God, who at once is both best
and most powerful, to whom goodness grants this: that he should wish
to profit all; and power, that those whom he wishes, he also can. On the other hand the evil and pestilent Prince represents the image of an evil Daemon,
in whom there is much concern for power, conjoined with utmost
malice. Whatever strength he has, all of it he consumes
toward the calamity of the human race.
[1,41] At tu qui Christianus etiam es Princeps, cura audis aut legis te Dei simulacrum esse, te Dei uicarium esse, caue ne quid hinc intumescas animo: quin potius ea res te magis sollicitum reddat, ut respondeas archetypo tuo, pulcerrimo quidam illi, sed quod adsequi sit difficillimum, non adsequi turpissimum.
[1,41] But you, who are a Prince and a Christian as well, when you hear with care or
read that you are a simulacrum of God, that you are the vicar of God, beware lest
you swell in spirit on this account: nay rather, let this make you the more solicitous,
that you may answer to your archetype, to that most beautiful One indeed, but which
to attain is most difficult, not to attain most disgraceful.
[1,43] Nam potentia sine bonitate mera Tyrannis est: sine sapientia, pernicies, non regnum. Primum igitur des operam, ut quandoquidem potentiam fortuna dedit, quam maximam sapientiae uim tibi compares, ut unus omnium optime quid expetendum, quidue fugiendum sit, perspicias, deinde ut quam maxime prodesse studeas omnibus, nam id est bonitatis. Potestas autem ad hoc potissimum tibi seruie, ut quantum cupis prodesse, tantumdem et possis, imo plus uelis quam possis.
[1,43] For power without goodness is mere Tyranny: without wisdom,
ruin, not a reign. Therefore first apply yourself, since Fortune has given
you power, to procure for yourself the utmost power of wisdom, so that you,
above all, may see most clearly what is to be sought and what is to be shunned;
then that you strive to profit all as much as possible, for that is of goodness.
And let your power serve you chiefly for this: that as much as you desire to
benefit, so much also you may be able—nay, will more than you can.
[1,44] Deus amatur a bonis omnibus, non timetur nisi a malis, hoc dumtaxat genere timoris, quo quis timet, ne sibi noceatur: Ita bonus Princeps nulli debet esse formidabilis, nisi sontibus ac scelerosis: at ita rursus, ut his quoque spes ueniae reliqua fiat, si modo fuerint sanabiles: ex aduerso, Cacodaemon amatur a nemine, formidatur ab omnibus, praecipue bonis: nam malis cum illo conuertit: Ita Tyrannus optimis quibusque maxime est inuisus, et nullus est ab hoc minus alienus, quam qui pessimus est.
[1,44] God is loved by all good people, is not feared except by the wicked,
only with this kind of fear, by which one fears lest harm be done to himself:
Thus a good Princeps ought to be formidable to no one, except to the guilty and the criminal:
but so again, that for these too a remaining hope of pardon be left, if only they shall be curable: on the other hand,
the Cacodaemon is loved by no one, is dreaded by all, especially by the good: for with the wicked he makes common cause:
thus the Tyrant is most hateful to all who are best, and none is less alien from him than he who is most wicked.
[1,45] Perspexisse uidetur haec diuus ille Dionysius, qui treis fecit hierarchias, ut quod Deus est inter Coelitum ordines, id Episcopus sit in Ecclesia, id Princeps in Republica. Illo nihil melius, et ab eo uelut a fonte manat in alios, quidquid boni possidet. Vehementer igitur absurdum uideatur, si ab eo maxima Reipublicae malorum pars oriatur, ubi fontem bonorum oportebat esse.
[1,45] That divine Dionysius seems to have perceived these things, who made three hierarchies, so that what God is among the orders of the Celestials, that the Bishop may be in the Church, that the Prince in the Commonwealth. That one is surpassed by nothing, and from him, as from a fountain, there emanates into others whatever good the Commonwealth possesses. It would therefore seem exceedingly absurd, if from him the greatest part of the Commonwealth’s evils should arise, where the fountain of goods ought to have been.
[1,46] Populus suapte natura tumultuatur, magistratus facile corrumpit aut auaritia aut ambitio. Una superest ueluti sacra ancora, incorruptus Principis animus: quod si is quoque stultis opinionibus, prauisque affectibus uitiatus est, quae tandem potest esse Reipublicae spes?
[1,46] The People by its own nature is tumultuous, either avarice or ambition easily corrupts the magistrates. One thing remains, as it were, a sacred anchor, the incorrupt mind of the Prince: but if he too is vitiated by foolish opinions and depraved affections, what, at last, can be the hope of the Republic?
[1,47] Deus cum sit in omnia beneficus, ipse nec eget ullius officio, nec requirit beneficium: Ita uere magni Principis est, ut aeterni Principis imaginem referentis, uel gratis bene mereride omnibus, nullo uel emolumenti uel gloriae respectu. Deus ut pulcerrimum sui simulacrum in coelo constituit solem, ita inter homines euidentem ac uiuam sui collocauit imaginem, Regem: At sole nihil communius, ac caeteris item corporibus coelestibus lucem suam impertit: ita Princeps publicis usibus maxime debet esse expositus, et natiuum sapientiae lumen habere domi, ut etiam si quid caecutiant caeteri, numquam tamen ille hallucinetur.
[1,47] Since God is beneficent toward all, he himself neither needs anyone’s service, nor requires a benefaction: thus it truly belongs to a great Prince, as one bearing the image of the eternal Prince, to merit well of all even gratis, with regard had to neither emolument nor glory. As God set the sun in heaven as the most beautiful simulacrum of himself, so among men he has placed a manifest and living image of himself, the King: but nothing is more common than the sun, and it imparts its light likewise to the other celestial bodies: so the Prince ought to be most of all exposed to public uses, and to have a native light of wisdom at home, so that even if the rest are somewhat groping in blindness, yet he never errs.
[1,48] Deus cum nullis tangatur affectibus, tamen optime mundum administrat iudicio. Ad huius exemplum Princeps in omnibus quae gerit, exclusis animi motibus, rationem et animi iudicium debet adhibere. Deo nihil sublimius, ita Principem oportet ab humilibus uulgi curis, ac sordidis affectibus quam longissime semotum esse.
[1,48] God, although he is touched by no passions, nevertheless most excellently administers the world by judgment. According to this exemplar the Prince, in all the things he carries on, with the motions of the mind excluded, ought to apply reason and the mind’s judgment. Nothing is more sublime than God; thus it is proper that the Prince be as far as possible removed from the low cares of the vulgar, and from sordid passions.
[1,49] Ut Deum omnia moderantem, nemo tamen cernit, sed sentit, idque beneficio adiutus: ita patria non sentie Principis uires, nisi cum illius sapientia bonitateque subleuatur. Contra Tyranni nusquam sentiuntur nisi omnium malo. Sol cum altissime prouectus est in Zodiaco, tum tardissimi motus est: ita quo fortuna te subuexerit altius, hoc oportet animo leniori minusque feroci esse.
[1,49] As no one, though, discerns God moderating all things, but senses Him, and that aided by beneficence: so the fatherland will not sense the Prince’s forces, unless it is uplifted by his wisdom and goodness.
By contrast, Tyrants are sensed nowhere except to the harm of all.
When the Sun has been borne most high in the Zodiac, then it is of the slowest motion: thus the higher fortune has upborne you, by so much it behooves you to be of a gentler and less ferocious spirit.
[1,53] Quam absurdum sit, cum apud Ethnicos fuisse constet, qui maluerunt sibi necem consciscere, quam cum humani sanguinis iactura tueri imperium, quique Reipublicae commoditatem anteposuerint suae uitae, Christianum Principem tanta Reipublicae pernicie, uoluptatibus aut affectibus uitiosis consulere? Cum Principatum suscipis, ne cogita quantum accipias honoris, sed quantum oneris ac sollicitudinis, neque censum ac uectigalium modum expende, sed curam, nec arbitreris tibi praedam obtigisse, sed administrationem.
[1,53] How absurd it is, since among the Gentiles it is established, that there have been those who preferred to resolve upon death for themselves, rather than with the loss of human blood to defend their dominion, and who have put the Commonwealth’s advantage before their own life, that a Christian Prince, to the Commonwealth’s so great ruin, should cater to pleasures or vicious affections? When you take up the Principate, do not think how much of honor you receive, but how much of burden and solicitude, nor weigh the revenue and the measure of taxes, but the care, nor suppose that booty has fallen to you, but an administration.
Nullus imperio gerendo censeur idoneus, auctore Platone, nisi qui coactus et inuitus suscipit imperium. Quisquis enim affectat Principis munus, is aut stultus sit necesse est, qui non intelligat quam sollicita, quamque periculosa res sit, recte fungi Regis officio: aut adeo uir malus, ut in animo habeat sibi gerere imperium, non Reipublicae: aut adeo socors, ut non expendat onus quod suscipit. Oportet autem hunc qui sit idoneus regno, simul et diligentem esse, et bonum, et sapientem.
No one is judged suitable for exercising command, on the authority of Plato, except one who takes up power compelled and unwilling. For whoever aspires to the office of Prince must needs be either a fool, who does not understand how anxious and how perilous a matter it is to discharge rightly the duty of a King; or so evil a man that he has in mind to wield power for himself, not for the Republic; or so slothful that he does not weigh the burden which he takes upon himself. But it is fitting that he who is suitable for kingship be at once diligent, good, and wise.
[1,54] Quo ditionem suscipis ampliorem, caue ne hoc tibi uideare fortunatior: sed memineris te hoc plus curarum ac sollicitudinum in humeros recipere, ut minus iam indulgendum sit otio, minus dandum uoluptatibus. Ii demum Principis titulo digni sunt, non qui Rempublicam sibi, sed se Reipublicae disant. Etenim qui sibi gerit imperium, et omnia suis metitur commodis, is non refert quibus ornetur titulis, serte re Tyrannus est, non Princeps.
[1,54] In that you take up a wider dominion, beware lest you seem to yourself on that account more fortunate: but remember that by this you are taking more cares and solicitudes onto your shoulders, so that now less is to be indulged to leisure, less to be given to pleasures. Those at last are worthy of the title of Prince, not who dedicate the Republic to themselves, but who dedicate themselves to the Republic. For he who conducts the rule for himself, and measures all things by his own advantages, it makes no difference with what titles he is adorned, he is surely in reality a Tyrant, not a Prince.
But as there is no appellation more beautiful than Prince, so there is none more hateful, and more execrated by the sense of all, than Tyrant.
This is the difference between a Prince and a Tyrant, as between a propitious father and a harsh master.
The former desires even to expend his life for his children;
the latter looks to nothing else than his own emolument, or
humors his own spirit, he does not consult the interests of his own people.
[1,55] Id ut compendio dicam, hac nota Principem a Tyranno distinguit in Politicis Aristoteles, quod hic suis studet commodis, ille Reipublicae. Princeps quacumque de re deliberans, illud semper in animo spectat, num expediat uniuersis ciuibus: Tyrannus illud considerat, an sibi conducat. Princeps etiam suum agens negotium, tamen potissimum suorum spectat utilitatem.
[1,55] To say it in brief, by this mark Aristotle in the Politics distinguishes the Prince from the Tyrant: that the Tyrant strives after his own advantages, the Prince after the Republic’s. A Prince, deliberating about whatever matter, always has this in mind, whether it be expedient for all the citizens; the Tyrant considers that, whether it be conducive to himself. A Prince, even when transacting his own business, yet most of all looks to the utility of his own people.
By contrast, the Tyrant, if ever he earns well of the citizens, yet refers this very thing to his own private utility.
Those who care for their own only insofar as it is expedient for their own commodities, hold their citizens in no other place than the common run of men do horses and asses.
For they too care for these, but they measure all their care by their own uses, not by those creatures’ uses.
[1,56] Curabit igitur qui Principem instituit, nominum etiam ipsorum odium instillare futuro Principi, tyrannidis ac dominii: frequenter exsecrans humano generi detestata uocabula, Phalaridis, Mezentii, Dionysii Syracusani, Neronis, Caligulae, Domitii, qui Deus ac Dominus dici uoluerit.
[1,56] He who instructs a Prince will therefore take care to instill even
a hatred of the very names into the future Prince, of tyranny and
dominion: frequently execrating before the human race the detested
appellations—Phalaris, Mezentius, Dionysius the Syracusan, Nero,
Caligula, Domitian, who wished to be called God and Lord.
[1,57] Contra si qua sunt exempla bonorum Principum, qui uehementer absint ab imagine Tyranni, ea cura fauore et laude crebro studeat proponere. Deinde utriusque uelut imaginem quamdam depingat, et quoad poterit, oculis animoque repraesentet, Regis ac Tyranni: ut ad illam magis inflammetur, ab bac uehementius abhorreat.
[1,57] On the contrary, if there are any examples of good Princes who are vehemently far removed from the image of a Tyrant, let him, with care, favor, and praise, frequently strive to set them forth. Then let him paint, as it were, a certain image of each, and, as far as he shall be able, represent to the eyes and to the mind the King and the Tyrant: so that toward that one he may be more inflamed, and from this one he may more vehemently abhor.
[1,58] Deliniet igitur coeleste quoddam animal, Numini quam homini similius, omnibus uirtutum numeris absolutum, omnium bono natum, imo datum a Superis subleuandis rebus mortalium, quod omnibus prospiciat, omnibus consulat: cui nihil sit antiquius, nihil dulcius Republica, cui plus quam paternus sit in omneis animus, cui singulorum uita carior sit quam sua: quod nocteis ac dies nihil aliud agat nitaturque, quam ut optime sit omnibus: apud quem praemia parata sint bonis omnibus, malis uenia, si modo sese ad frugem meliorem referant: quod adeo gratis cupiat de ciuibus suis bene mereri, ut si necesse sit, non dubitet suo periculo illorum incolumitati consulere: quod patriae commodum, suum ducat esse lucrum: quod semper uigilet, quo caeteris liceat altum dormire: quod sibi nullum relinquat otium, quo patriae liceat in otio uitam agere: quod se iugibus curis discruciet, quo ciuibus suppetat tranquillitas: a cuius unius uirtute publica pendeat felicitas: et hanc admoneat esse ueri Principis imaginem. Ex aduerso subiiciat oculis, immanem quamdam ac tetram belluam e dracone, lupo, leone, uipera, urso, similibusque conflatam portentis, undique sexcentis armatam oculis, undique dentatam, undique metuendam, aduncis unguibus, uentre insatiabili, humanis saginatam uisceribus, humano sanguine temulentam, quae peruigil omnium fortunis uitaeque immineat, infensam omnibus, sed praecipue bonis, fatale quoddam totius orbis malum, quam exsecrentur et oderint uniuersi, qui bene uelint Reipublicae: quae nec ferri possit ob immanitatem, nec tolli sine magna urbis ruina, ob praesidiis et opibus armatam malitiam. Et hanc esse Tyranni imaginem, aut si quid hac quoque fingi possit odiosius.
[1,58] He will delineate, then, a certain celestial creature, more similar to the Numen than to man, complete in every number of virtues, born for the good of all—nay rather, given by the Supernals for the uplifting of mortal affairs—which looks out for all, takes counsel for all: for whom nothing is more of first importance, nothing sweeter, than the Republic; whose spirit toward all is more than paternal; to whom the life of each individual is dearer than his own: which by nights and days does and strives for nothing else than that it may be best for all: with whom rewards are prepared for all the good, pardon for the bad, if only they refer themselves to a better amendment: which so freely longs to deserve well of its citizens that, if need be, it does not hesitate at its own peril to provide for their safety: which counts the fatherland’s advantage as its own profit: which always keeps watch, so that it may be permitted to the rest to sleep deep: which leaves no leisure to itself, so that it may be permitted to the fatherland to pass life in leisure: which racks itself with continual cares, so that tranquility may be in supply to the citizens: on whose single virtue the public happiness depends: and let him remind that this is the image of the true Prince. On the contrary, let him set before the eyes a certain monstrous and grim beast, fused from a dragon, a wolf, a lion, a viper, a bear, and similar portents, armed on all sides with six hundred eyes, toothed on all sides, everywhere to be feared, with hooked claws, with an insatiable belly, fattened on human entrails, drunk with human blood, which, ever-wakeful, hangs over the fortunes and life of all, hostile to all, but especially to the good—a certain fated evil of the whole world—which all who wish the Republic well execrate and hate: which can neither be borne on account of its monstrosity, nor removed without great ruin of the city, because its malice is armed with garrisons and resources. And that this is the image of the Tyrant, or, if anything even more hateful than this can be imagined.
[1,59] Tyranno propositum est sequi quidquid animo collibuit, Regi contra, quod rectum sit et honestum. Tyranni praemium diuitiae, Regis honos, qui uirtutem consequitur. Tyrannus administrat metu, dolo, ac malis artibus, Rex sapientia, integritate, beneficentia.
[1,59] The tyrant’s purpose is to follow whatever his mind has fancied, the king’s, by contrast, to pursue what is right and honorable. The tyrant’s prize
is riches, the king’s is honor, which follows virtue. The tyrant administers by fear, by deceit, and by evil arts, the king by wisdom, integrity, beneficence.
The tyrant wields power for himself
the King for the Commonwealth. The tyrant, with a barbarian bodyguard
and hired brigands, protects his own safety: the King
deems himself sufficiently safe by his beneficence toward the citizens, and by the citizens’ benevolence toward himself.
To the tyrant, whoever among the citizens excel in virtue, prudence, or authority,
are suspect and hated: but
these the King most of all embraces as helpers and friends.
The Tyrant either delights in the stupid, upon whom he may impose; or in the scelerate, whom he may abuse for the defense of his Tyranny; or in adulators, from whom he may hear what he gladly does. By contrast, to the King each wisest man is most pleasing, by whose counsel he can be aided: the better a man is, the more he values him, because to this man’s good faith he can safely entrust himself; and he loves free-spoken friends, by whose consuetude he is rendered better. Both Kings and Tyrants have many hands, many eyes, but far different members.
The Tyrant aims at this: that the wealth of the citizens be transferred to a few—and those the worst—and, with the forces of his own people attenuated, he buttresses his own power; the King counts this as most in his fisc: that which is in the citizens’ cash. The Tyrant aims at this: that he have all men subject to himself by laws or by delations. The King takes delight in the liberty of the citizens.
The tyrant strives to be feared,
the king to be loved. The tyrant holds nothing as equally suspect as
the concord of good citizens and of commonwealths, in which good princes especially
rejoice. The tyrant rejoices to sow factions and dissensions among citizens,
and the enmities that have arisen by chance he carefully nourishes and promotes,
and he abuses these things for the fortification of his tyranny.
But this is the king’s chief concern: to nourish the concord of the citizens, and, if any dissension shall have arisen, immediately to compose the matter between them—surely, as one who understands this to be the most grievous pestilence of commonwealths. A tyrant, if he perceives the Commonwealth to be flourishing, with pretexts discovered, or even by letting in enemies, excites war, so that on this occasion he may attenuate the forces of his own. By contrast, the king does and endures all things, in order to render the public peace perpetual, understanding that from war, at one stroke, all the Commonwealth’s evils proceed.
[1,60] Huiusmodi plurimae sunt Tyranni uel notae uel artes, quas Aristoteles in libris Politicis fusius exsequitur. Verum harum omnium summam in tria contrahit. Primum, ait, Tyranno studium esse, ne uelint, aut ausint ciues aduersus Tyrannidem insurgere.
[1,60] Of this sort very many are the Tyrant’s marks or arts,
which Aristotle more fully sets forth in the books of the Politics. But
he contracts the sum of all these into three. First, he says,
that a Tyrant’s study is that the citizens may not be willing, or may not dare, to rise up against
Tyranny.
The next, that they do not confide among themselves. The third, that they can contrive nothing in the way of novelties. He accomplishes the first, while by every method he works that the citizens may have as little spirit as possible and as little wisdom, while he holds them servilely, and either bound to sordid offices, or made liable to delations, or effeminated by pleasures.
He knows, indeed, that generous and erect spirits bear Tyranny indignantly. He effects the second,
while he acts so that the citizens disagree among themselves with mutual hatreds, and
one informs against another, he himself meanwhile the more powerful by their misfortune. He attains the third, while the wealth and the authority of his own, and
especially of good men, he in every way attenuates: for this reason,
that no sane man may wish to attack,
what he despairs can be accomplished.
[1,61] Ab his omnibus studiis Princeps quam longissime absit oportet, imo prorsus g-ek g-diametrou, quod dici solet, dissideat, praesertim Princeps Christianus. Etenim si talem pinxit Aristoteles, primum Ethnicus, deinde Philosophus, inter illos quoque non perinde sanctus ac doctus, quanto magis id praestare oportet eum, qui Christi fungatur uice?
[1,61] From all these pursuits the Prince ought to be as far away as possible, nay rather to be altogether, as it is wont to be said, diametrically at odds, especially a Christian Prince. For if Aristotle portrayed such a one—first a Gentile, then a Philosopher, among them too not so much holy as learned—how much more ought he to exhibit this who performs the office in Christ’s stead?
[1,62] Quin ex ipsis mutis animantibus Regis ac Tyranni simulacrum colligere licet. Apum Regi amplissimum cubile est, sed id in medio, ueluti tutissimo Regi loco. Atque ipse quidem onere uacat, uerum exactor est alienorum operum.
[1,62] Indeed, from the mute living creatures themselves it is permitted to gather the simulacrum of a King and a Tyrant. For the King of the bees has the amplest couch, but it is in the middle, as in the safest place for a king. And he himself indeed is free from burden, but is an exactor of others’ works.
With this lost, the whole swarm dissolves. Furthermore, the King has a remarkable form, unlike the rest, both in magnitude and in splendor.
But by this mark, as Seneca says, he is most especially distinguished from the others: that, whereas among the bees there is very much irascibility, to such a degree that they leave their stings in the wound, he alone, the King, lacks a sting.
Nature was unwilling that he be savage, nor that he seek vengeance that would cost greatly; she stripped off his missile, and left his anger unarmed. This is a massive exemplar for great Kings. Now if you seek the image of a Tyrant, think of a lion, a bear, a wolf, or an eagle, which live by laceration and prey: and since they understand themselves to be obnoxious to the hatreds of all, to be assailed by the ambushes of all, they keep to precipitous places, or hide themselves in caves and solitudes—except that the Tyrant surpasses even the savagery of these.
Quin etiam in litteris diuinis Deus Tyranni simulacrum depinxit his uerbis: Hoc erit ius Regis, qui imperaturus est uobis: Filios uestros tollet, et ponet in curribus suis, facietque sibi equites et praecursores quadrigarum suarum: ut constitue sibi Tribunos et Centuriones, et aratores agrorum suorum, et messores segetum, et fabros armorum et curruum suorum. Filias quoque uestras faciet sibi unguentarias et focarias et panificas. Agros quoque uestros et uineas, et oliueta optima tollet, et dabit seruis suis.
Nay rather, even in the divine letters God depicted the simulacrum of the Tyrant with these words: This will be the right of the King who is going to rule over you: He will take your sons, and he will set them on his chariots, and he will make for himself horsemen and forerunners of his chariots: and he will appoint for himself Tribunes and Centurions, and plowmen of his fields, and reapers of his crops, and smiths of his arms and chariots. Your daughters also he will make for himself perfumers and cooks and bakers. Your fields too and your vineyards, and the best olive-yards he will take, and he will give them to his servants.
But also your grain-fields
and the revenues of your vineyards he will tithe, to give to his eunuchs
and his servants. Your slaves also and your handmaids, and your choicest youths,
and your donkeys he will carry off, and he will set them to his work. Your flocks
also he will tithe, and you yourselves will be slaves to him.
And since nothing is more salutary than a good King, why had God, angered, ordered this image to be set forth to the people, namely, that he might deter them from petitioning for a King.
Accordingly he called the Royal right a Tyrannical right. Otherwise Samuel himself had truly borne the Kingly role, administering the commonwealth of the people for so many years holily and incorruptly.
But
they, not understanding their felicity, after the custom of the nations were
demanding a King, one who would play the King with haughtiness, with
violence. And yet in this image what a small portion of the evils is there,
which within our memory we have beheld in some even Christian Princes,
to the great harm of the whole orb? Receive now the image of the good
Prince, which God himself in the book of Deuteronomy described in this
manner: And when the King shall have been established, he will not
multiply horses for himself, nor will he lead the people back into Egypt,
lifted up by the number of his cavalry.
He shall not have very many wives,
who might allure his spirit, nor immense weights of silver and gold.
But after he has sat upon the throne of his kingdom, he shall write
for himself the Deuteronomy of this law in a volume, receiving an
exemplar from the priests of the Levitical tribe: and he shall have it with him
all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God,
and to keep his words and his ceremonies, which are prescribed in the law.
Nor let his heart be lifted up into pride above his brothers, nor let him turn aside
to the right hand or to the left, that he and his sons may reign for a long time over Israel.
If
the Hebrew King is ordered to learn the law by heart, which handed down figures and shadows of righteousness only, how much more does it befit
that the Christian Prince hold and follow the dogmas of the Gospel? If He does not wish the Jewish King to be exalted above his people,
calling them brothers, not slaves, how much less ought a Christian to do the same toward Christians, whom Christ himself also,
the Monarch of all Princes, calls brothers?
[1,63] Audi iam quomodo Tyrannum descripserit Ezechiel: Principes, inquit, in medio eius, quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem. Plato Principes Reipublicae custodes appellat, ut hoc sint patriae, quod canes gregi: quod si canes uertantur in lupos, quid praeterea sperandum est gregi? Idem alio in loco, crudelem ac rapacem Principum leonem appellat, et alibi minatur pastoribus, qui pascerent semet ipsos, neque gregis ullam haberent curam, Principes sentiens, qui sibi gerunt imperium.
[1,63] Hear now how Ezekiel described the Tyrant:
The princes, he says, in its midst, like wolves snatching prey,
for the pouring out of blood. Plato calls the princes the custodians of the Republic,
that they may be to the fatherland what dogs are
to the flock: but if the dogs are turned into wolves, what, moreover,
is to be hoped for the flock? The same man elsewhere calls the lion of princes cruel and rapacious,
and elsewhere he threatens the shepherds,
who would feed themselves and would have no care at all for the flock,
meaning the princes, who bear rule for themselves.
And again elsewhere: When the impious shall have taken the Principate,
the people will groan as if led down under servitude. And again elsewhere
When the impious have risen up, men will be hidden. What of the fact that
with Isaiah, when the Lord, offended by the people’s crimes,
threatens, saying, And I will give boys as their Princes, and
effeminate men will rule over them.
[1,64] Sed quid nos ista persequimur? cum ipse Christus unicus Princeps ac Dominus omnium, clarissime discreuerit Christianum Principem ab Ethnico? Principes, inquit, gentium dominantur eis, et qui potestatem habent, exercent in eos: inter uos autem non erit sic.
[1,64] But why are we pursuing these things? since Christ himself, the sole Prince and Lord of all, has most clearly distinguished the Christian Prince from the Ethnic. “Princes,” he says, “of the nations lord it over them, and those who have power exercise power over them; but among you it will not be so.”
If it is of ethnic Princes to domineer, then there is not, therefore, a dominion of Christians. But what is that which he says, It will not be so among you, unless that it is fitting not to be done in the same way among Christians, among whom
the administration of the Principate is not imperium; and the kingdom
is beneficence, not tyranny. Nor indeed let the Prince thus flatter himself,
“These things pertain to the Bishops, not to me.”
Nay rather they pertain to you, if only you are a Christian: if you are a Christian
not, they pertain nothing to you.
Do not at once suppose permitted,
whatever the common crowd of Princes does. By the rule of what is honest,
exact yourself; from this, estimate yourself. And if there shall be no one whom you
may conquer, contend with yourself; since that is the most beautiful contest
of all, and truly worthy of an Unconquered Prince,
if he strives every day to turn out better than himself.
If the name of a Tyrant—or rather the pursuit—is foul, it will become by no whit more honest,
if it is common with many. Since indeed in the things themselves the force of the honest is set,
not in the number of men. It has been gravely written by Seneca: in the same place where we put
robbers and pirates, kings are to be placed, having the mind of robbers and pirates.
[1,65] Refert in libris Politicis Aristoteles, in nonnullis Oligarchiis hunc fuisse morem, ut inituri magistratum, conceptis uerbis iurarent in hunc modum: Plebem odio prosequar, et pro uirili adnitar, ut illi sit male. At Princeps initurus magistratus, longe diuersa iurat suis. Et tamen audimus quosdam tales esse erga populum, quasi iuxta morem illum Barbaricum iurassent, se populi rebus modis omnibus hostes fore.
[1,65] Aristotle reports in the Political books that in some Oligarchies
this was the custom: that those about to enter the magistracy, in set
words should swear in this manner: I will pursue the Plebs with hatred,
and to the best of my ability I will strive that it may go ill with them. But the Princeps, about to enter
office, swears things far different to his own. And yet we hear
that certain men are such toward the people, as if according to that
Barbaric custom they had sworn that they would be, in the people’s affairs and in every way,
enemies.
[1,66] Plane tyrannidem sapit, quoties tum optime est Principi, quoties populo est pessime, et alterius felicitas ex alterius crescit calamitate. Perinde quasi paterfamilias id agat, ut suorum malis ipse ditior reddatur ac potentior. Qui sibi Principis titulum uolet asserere, et inuisum Tyranni nomen cupiet effugere, non terroribus ac minis, sed benefactis id sibi uindicet oportet.
[1,66] It plainly savors of tyranny, whenever it is best for the Prince,
whenever it is worst for the people, and the felicity of the one grows from the calamity of the other. Just as if a paterfamilias should do this, that by the evils of his own he himself be rendered richer and more potent. He who will wish to assert to himself the title of Prince, and will desire to escape the odious name of Tyrant, ought to vindicate this for himself not by terrors and menaces, but by benefactions.
For it makes no difference whether by flatterers or by the oppressed one is called a Prince, called father of the fatherland, if in reality he is a Tyrant. And even if his own age most highly adulates him, yet posterity will not assent. You see of the once-formidable Kings, whom no one while they lived dared to offend even with a nod, with how much hatred posterity celebrates their malefactions, with what freedom even the very names are detested.
[1,68] Quod quidem intellexisse uidentur et uetustissimi Poetae, qui Iouem, cui totius mundi et Deorum, ut illi loquuntur, omnium tribuunt imperium, subinde notant his uerbis, g-patehr g-androhn g-te g-theohn g-te, id est, Pater hominumque Deumque. Et nos sic a Christo praeceptore docti, Deum omnium haud dubie Principem, Patris uocabulo compellamus.
[1,68] This indeed the most ancient Poets seem to have understood, who to Jove, to whom they ascribe the imperium of the whole world and, as they speak, of all the gods, they repeatedly mark with these words, g-patehr g-androhn g-te g-theohn g-te, that is, Father of men and of gods. And we too, thus taught by Christ the Preceptor, God of all, without doubt the Prince, we address by the appellation of Father.
[1,69] Quid autem foedius aut exsecrabilius illa compellatione, quam apud Homerum Achilles, opinor, iacit in Principem sibi gerentemimperium, non populo, g-dehmoboros g-basileus. Nihil enim reperit iratus ille, quod probrosius diceret in eum, quem imperio iudicabat indignum, nisi quod populum deuoraret. At idem Homerus, si quem Regem honoris gratia nominat, g-poimena g-laohn solet appellare, hoc est, populi pastorem.
[1,69] What, moreover, is more foul or more execrable than that compellation,
which in Homer Achilles, I suppose, hurls at a Prince bearing imperium for himself, not for the people,
g-dehmoboros g-basileus. For that angry man found nothing that he could say more opprobrious against him whom
he judged unworthy of command, except that he devoured the people. But the same Homer, if he names any King by way of honor,
is wont to call him g-poimena g-laohn, that is, a shepherd of the people.
But there is the greatest difference between a shepherd and a plunderer. With what face, then, do they claim for themselves the title of Prince, who choose a few—and those the most criminal—from their own number, by whom, with pretexts cleverly devised and ever and anon renewed titles, they drain both the strength and the wealth of the people, and sweep them into their own fisc, whether what they have mercilessly extorted they squander wickedly on pleasures, or expend cruelly on wars: and the more one can play the consummate trickster in these matters, the more highly they value him, just as if the Prince were the enemy of the people, not their father, so that he seems especially to consult the Prince’s interests who most obstructs the people’s advantages. Just as the paterfamilias thinks his own goods to have increased by whatever gain has befallen any of his household, so he who is truly endowed with the spirit of a Prince thinks that whatever citizens possess anywhere is, as it were, in his own fisc, since he holds them bound and devoted to himself by such affection, that they shrink from nothing—nay, would expend life itself for their Prince, not money only.
[1,70] Operae pretium fuerit audire, quibus epithetis Iulius Pollux Commodo Caesari, cuius pueritiam instituerat, Regem signarit ac Tyrannum. Etenim cum Regem statim Diis subiecisset, ueluti proximum ac simillimum, g-peri g-basileohn, inquit, g-lege g-epainohn, g-patehr, g-ehpios, g-praos, g-hehmeros, g-pronoehtikos, g-epieikehs, g-philanthrohpos, g-megalophrohn, g-eleutheros, g-chrehmatohn g-kreittohn, g-exoh g-pathohn, g-heautou g-kratohn, g-archohn g-hehdonohn, g-logismoh g-chrohmenos, g-oxus, g-agchinous, g-perieskemmenos, g-euboulos, g-dikaios, g-sohphrohn, g-theohn g-epimelehtehs, g-anthrohpohn g-kehdehmohn, g-stasimos, g-bebaios, g-anexapathehtos, g-megalognohmohn, g-ischurognohmohn, g-energos, g-telesiourgos, g-phrontistehs g-tohn g-archomenohn, g-sohtehr, g-procheiros g-eis g-euergesian, g-bradus g-eis g-timohrian, g-asphalehs, g-aplanehs, g-akribesteros g-pros g-to g-dikaion g-tsugou, g-euprosodos, g-euprosehgoros, g-euenteuktos, g-meilichios, g-prosehnehs, g-epimelehtehs g-tohn g-hupehkoohn, g-philostratiohtehs, g-polemikos g-men, g-ou g-philopolemos g-de, g-eirehnikos, g-eirehnopoios, g-eirehnophulax, g-paideutikos, g-archehgos, g-kai g- archikos, g-nomothetikos, g-eupoiein g-pephukohs, g-theoeidehs. g-polla -g-de g-estin g-ha g-logoh g-tis g-an g-eipein g-echoi, g-kai g-ouk g-onomati.
[1,70] It would be worth the effort to hear with which epithets Julius Pollux, to Commodus Caesar, whose boyhood he had instructed, has designated the King and the Tyrant. For indeed, when he had straightway set the King beneath the gods, as next to and most similar to them, about kings, he says, read words of praise: father, gentle, mild, civilized, provident, equitable, philanthropic, magnanimous, free, stronger than wealth, beyond passions, master of himself, ruler of pleasures, using reasoning, acute, quick-witted, well-appointed, of good counsel, just, temperate, caretaker of divine things, guardian of men, steady, firm, not-to-be-deceived, great-minded, strong-minded, energetic, effectual, a caretaker of subjects, savior, ready to benefaction, slow to punishment, secure, unerring, more exact with respect to the balance of justice, approachable, easy to address, easy to meet, mild, gracious, a caretaker of those who obey, a friend of the soldiery, warlike indeed, yet not war-loving, peaceable, peacemaking, a guardian of peace, educative, a leader, and rulerly, law-giving, by nature apt to do good, godlike. And there are many things which one could express in a discourse, and not by a mere name.
Ea tametsi Latinus sermo commode non possit reddere, ob Graecae linguae proprietatem, tamen in hoc certe uertemus quo queant intelligi. Regem laudato his titulis. Pater, mitis, placidus, lenis, prouidus, aequus, humanus, ma gnanimus, liber, pecuniae contemptor, haud obnoxius affectibus, sibi ipsi imperans, dominans uoluptatibus, ratione utens, acri iudicio, perspicax, circumspectus, ualens consilio, iustus, sobrius, numinum curam agens, hominum negotia curans, stabilis, firmus, infallibilis, magna cogitans, auctoritate praeditus, industrius, confector negotiorum, sollicitus pro his quibus imperat, seruator, promptus ad beneficentiam, lentus ad uindictam, certus, constans, inflexibilis, propensior ad iustitiam, semperque attentus ad id quod de Principe dictum est, librae in morem, facilis aditu, comis in congressu, commodus alloqui uolentibus, blandus, expositus, curam agens suo parentium imperio, amans militum suorum, qui strenue quidem bellum gerat, sed qui bellum non affectet, pacis amans, pacis conciliator, pacis tenax, appositus ad emendandos populi mores, qui ducem agere norit, ac Principem, qui leges salutares sciat condere, natus ad bene merendum, diuina specie.
Although Latin speech cannot suitably render these, on account of the propriety of the Greek language, nevertheless we will turn them at least thus, so that they may be able to be understood. Praise a King with these titles. Father, mild, placid, gentle, provident, equitable, humane, magnanimous,
free, a despiser of money, not subject to passions, ruling himself, mastering pleasures, using reason, with acute judgment,
perspicacious, circumspect, strong in counsel, just,
sober, taking care for the gods, caring for the affairs of men,
stable, firm, infallible, thinking great things, endowed with authority,
industrious, an accomplisher of business, solicitous for those over whom he rules, preserver, ready for beneficence,
slow to vengeance, sure, constant, inflexible, more inclined toward justice,
and always attentive to that which has been said about the Prince, after the manner of a balance, easy of access, courteous in meeting,
accommodating to those wishing to speak, bland, open,
exercising care with a parental rule, loving his soldiers,
one who indeed wages war strenuously, but who does not desire war,
a lover of peace, a conciliator of peace, a keeper of peace, apt to amend the morals of the people,
one who knows how to act the leader and the Prince,
one who knows how to establish salutary laws, born for well-deserving,
of divine aspect.
There are, moreover, many things that can be said by oration, yet cannot be explicated by single vocables. Thus far we have expressed Pollux’s sentiment. Now, if a pagan moderator has fashioned such a Prince in a pagan manner, how much holier a simulacrum is it fitting to set forth for the Christian Prince.
[1,71] Nunc quibus coloribus Tyrannum expresserit attende. g-psegohn g-an g-ereis, g-turannikos, g-ohmos, g-thehriohdehs, g-biaios, g-pleonektikos, g-philochrehmatos, g-kai g-to g-tou g-Platohnos, g-erasichrehmatos, g-arpax, g-kai g-to g-tou g-Homehrou, dehmoboros, g-huperoptehs, g-huperehphanos, g-dusprositos, g-dusprosodos, g-gusprosehgoros, g-dusenteuktos, g-dusorgehtos, g-dusthumos, g-emplehktos, g-tarachohdehs, g-hehdonohn g-hehttohn, g-akratehs, g-akratohr, g-alogistos, g-misanthrohpos, g-adikos, g-aboulos, g-anisos, g-anosios, g-vou g-kenos, g-eukolos, g-eumetabolos, g-euexapathetos g-hradios, g-anehmeros, g-epithumiais g-endidous, g-akolastos, g-hubristhes, g-polemopoios, g-barus, g-epachtehs, g-akathektos, g-aphorehtos.
[1,71] Now attend to the colors with which he has portrayed the Tyrant. blameworthy, unmanly, tyrannical, cruel, bestial, violent, greedy-for-more, money-loving, and, that of Plato, money-loving, rapacious, and, that of Homer, people-devouring, disdainful, over-proud, hard to approach, hard of access, hard to address, hard to meet with, hard to appease, ill-tempered, impetuous, turbulent, a slave to pleasures, akratic, intemperate, irrational, misanthropic, unjust, without counsel, unequal, unholy, empty of counsel, easy, easily changeable, easily deceived, ready, inhuman, yielding to desires, unchaste, insolent, war-making, heavy, troublesome, unrestrainable, intolerable.
Quorum uerborum haec ferme sententia est: Malum Principem uituperabis ad hunc modum. Tyrannicus, crudelis, efferus, uiolentus, occupatoralieni, auidus pecuniarum: et quod uerbum est, apud Platonem, pecuniarum cupiens, rapax: et quod dixit Homerus, populi deuorator, superbus, elatus,difficilis aditu, incommodus ad conueniendum, durus ad congressum, incomis ad colloquium, male iracundus, irritabilis, terribilis, turbulentus, uoluptatum seruus, intemperans, immoderatus, inconsideratus, inhumanus, iniustus, inconsultus, iniquus, impius, mente carens, leuis, inconstans, et qui facile decipiatur, male facilis, immitis, affectibus deditus, incorrigibilis, contumeliosus, bellorum auctor, grauis, molestus, incoercibilis, intolerabilis. Cum Deus longissime absit a natura Tyranni, uerisimillimum est, illi nihil inuisius esse pestilente Rege: et cum nulla bellua nocentior sit Tyranno, consentapeum est, nihil inuisius esse mortalibus omnibus, quam malum Principem.
Of which words this is roughly the sense: You will vituperate an Evil Prince in this manner. Tyrannical, cruel, savage, violent, a seizer of another’s property, greedy of moneys: and what the term is with Plato, money-desiring; rapacious: and what Homer said, a devourer of the people; proud, exalted, difficult of access, inconvenient for meeting, hard for an encounter, ungracious for conversation, ill-temperedly irascible, irritable, terrible, turbulent, a slave of pleasures, intemperate, immoderate, inconsiderate, inhuman, unjust, ill-advised, inequitable, impious, lacking mind, light, inconstant, and one who is easily deceived, ill-easy, unmitigated, given over to passions, incorrigible, contumelious, an author of wars, heavy, troublesome, uncoercible, intolerable. Since God is farthest removed from the nature of a Tyrant, it is most probable that nothing is more hateful to Him than a pestilential King: and since no beast is more harmful than a Tyrant, it is consonant that nothing is more hateful to all mortals than an Evil Prince.
Who, moreover, would even wish to live, to the gods above and to men alike
odious and execrated? Accordingly Octavius Augustus, when he had perceived
that his head was being targeted by frequent conjurations, and that when some had been crushed
others immediately succeeded, declared that living was not of such worth
as to safeguard his own safety, being hateful to all, by the blood of so many citizens.
[1,72] Proinde regnum, quod uirtute administratur ac beneuolentia, non solum quietius est ac iucundius, uerum etiam diuturnius ac stabilius: id quod ex Veterum Annalibus facile poteris cognoscere. Nulla tyrannis tam munita fuit, quae diu constiterit. At quoties Reipublicae status in tyrannidem degenerauit, toties in exitium properasse compertum est.
[1,72] Accordingly a kingship, which is administered by virtue and benevolence,
is not only quieter and more pleasant, but also
more durable and more stable: a thing which from the Annals of the Ancients
you will easily be able to learn. No tyranny has been so fortified
as to have stood for long. But whenever the condition of the Republic has degenerated into tyranny,
so often it has been found to have hastened into ruin.
[1,74] Primitus Reges non ob aliud constituti sunt, populi consensu, quam ob eximiam uirtutem, quam heroicam uocant, uelut diuinae proximam, et humana maiorem. Originis igitur suae Principes meminerint oportet, illud intelligentes, se ne Principes quidem esse, si eo caruerint, quod primum Principes fecit.
[1,74] At first Kings were established, by the consent of the people, for no other reason than outstanding Virtue, which they call heroic, as it were next to divine, and greater than human. Therefore Princes ought to remember their origin, understanding this, that they are not even Princes, if they lack that which first made Princes.
[1,75] Cum multae sint formae Rerumpublicarum Philosophorum omnium ferme consensus est, saluberrimam esse Monarchiam, nimirum, ad exemplar Dei, ut rerum summa penes unum sit, uerum ita, si is ad imaginem item Dei, sapientia bonitateque caeteris omnibus antecellat, et nullius indigens, nihil aliud studeat, quam prodesse Reipublicae. Quod si secus fuerit, pessimus Reipublicae status sit oportet, ut qui pugnet cum eo qui est optimus. Si Princeps contingat omnibus absolutus uirtutibus, optanda sit pura ac simplex Monarchia, uerum quando id haud scio an umquam contingat, quin potius magnum et exoptandum, si detur mediocris, ut nunc sunt res hominum, praestiterit Monarchiam Aristocratiae et Democratiae admixtam temperari diluique, ne quando in tyrannidem erumpat, sed quemadmodum elementa uicissim sese librant, ita simili moderamine consistat Respublica.
[1,75] Since there are many forms of Commonwealths, the consensus of almost all philosophers is that Monarchy is most healthful, namely, after the exemplar of God, that the sum of affairs be in the hands of one; yet thus, if he, in the image likewise of God, surpass all others in wisdom and goodness, and, needing no one, study nothing else than to profit the Republic. But if it be otherwise, the condition of the Republic must be the worst, as that which fights with that which is best. If a Prince should occur, absolute in all virtues, a pure and simple Monarchy would be to be desired; but since I scarcely know whether that ever occurs, rather it is great and much to be desired, if a mediocre one be granted, as the affairs of men now are, that Monarchy be tempered and diluted by an admixture of Aristocracy and Democracy, lest at some time it burst forth into tyranny; but, just as the elements in turn balance themselves, so let the Republic consist by a similar moderation.
[1,76] Cum multa sint dominandi genera, hominis in belluas, heri in seruos, patris in liberos, mariti in uxorem, Regiam dominationem omnium excellentissimam iudicat Aristoteles, eamque maxime diuinam appellat, quod ea res quiddam homine maius habere uideatur. Quod si diuinum est agere Regem, profecto Tyrannum agere, nihil aliud sit oportet, quod eius uicem agere, qui Deo dissimillimus est. Seruus seruo praestantior, ut habet prouerbium, ut dominus domino potior, quod alia sit ars alia praeclarior, alia functio alia melior.
[1,76] Since there are many kinds of dominion, of a man over beasts,
of a master over slaves, of a father over children, of a husband over a wife, Aristotle judges Royal
domination to be the most excellent of all, and calls it most divine, because that thing seems to have something
greater than man. And if it is divine to act the King, then to act the Tyrant must be nothing else
than to play the part of him who is most dissimilar to God. A slave is superior to a slave, as the proverb has it, just as a master
is preferable to a master, because one art is more illustrious than another, one
function another better.
[1,78] Ut oculi est uidere, aurium audire, narium olfacere, ita Principis est populi rebus consulere. At non potest alia re consulere, quam sapientia: ea si careat Princeps, non magis consulet Reipublicae, quam oculus uidebit excaecatus.
[1,78] As it is the function of the eyes to see, of the ears to hear, of the nostrils to smell, so it is the Princeps’s to take counsel for the people’s affairs. But he cannot take counsel by any other thing than wisdom: if the Princeps lack that, he will no more provide for the Republic than an eye will see when blinded.
[1,79] Xenophon in Oeconomico libello scribit, diuinum potius quam humanum, imperare liberis ac uolentibus: sordidum enim, imperare mutis animantibus, aut coactis mancipiis: at homo diuinum est animal, ac bis liberum, primum natura, deinde legibus: ideoque summae uirtutis est, ac plane diuinae, Regem sic temperare imperium, ut beneficium sentiat populus, seruitutem non sentiat. Caue solum eos tuos esse putes, quorum opera in popinis, in uenatu, in domesticis uteris ministeriis, cum saepenumero nulli minus sint tui, sed uniuersos ciues ex aequo tuos esse ducito. Quorum si quis omnino delectus sit, eum tibi proximum et coniunctissimum habeto, qui uir sit optimus, qui patriae, qui Reipublicae amantissimus.
[1,79] Xenophon, in the little book Oeconomicus, writes that it is rather divine than human, to command the free and willing: it is sordid indeed, to command mute living beings, or coerced bond-slaves: but man is a divine animal, and twice free, first by nature, then by laws: and therefore it is of the highest virtue, and plainly divine, for a King so to temper his rule, that the people may feel a benefaction and not feel servitude. Beware of thinking those only to be yours whose service you use in taverns, in the hunt, in domestic ministries, since very often none are less yours; but take all citizens equally to be yours. Of whom, if anyone at all be chosen, hold him nearest and most conjoined to you, who is the best man, who of his fatherland, who of the Commonwealth is most loving.
When you visit the cities of your own, do not
thus think with yourself, I am lord of so great affairs; these
all are at my discretion; in regard to these it is permitted me whatever I please. But if, what is worthy of a good Prince, you will wish to think,
think after this fashion: These have been entrusted to my faith;
there must therefore be vigilance, that I may render them better than I received. When you have beheld the innumerable multitude of your people, beware
of thinking thus, I have so many slaves: but so many thousands of human beings
depend upon my solicitude; to me alone they have entrusted themselves and their own things
to be guarded; they look to me as to a parent: so many thousands
I can profit, if I shall have shown myself a good Prince;
I can do very great harm, if a bad one.
[1,80] Quod si haec quoque uocabula te delectant, at illud memineris, facito, quod ab Ethnicis quoque Philosophis et perspectum et proditum est, non alius modi esse imperium Princcpps in populum, quam quale est animi in corpus. Dominatur animus corpori, quod magis sapiat quam corpus, sed dominatur magno corporis commodo potius quam suo: et animum regnare in corpore, felicitas est corporis. Quod cor est in corpore animantis, id est Princeps in Republica.
[1,80] But if these terms too delight you, then remember this, see to it: that which has been both inspected and handed down even by Ethnic Philosophers, that the imperium of the Prince over the people is of no other mode than that of the mind over the body. The mind dominates the body, because it is more sapient than the body, but it dominates to the great advantage of the body rather than its own: and for the mind to reign in the body is the body’s felicity. What the heart is in the body of a living creature, that is the Prince in the Republic.
If the heart is sincere, since it is the fount of blood and of the spirits,
it imparts life to the whole body; but if it has been vitiated,
it brings destruction to all the members. But just as that part in
the body of a living creature is accustomed to be corrupted last of all, and in
it they think the last relics of life to remain; so the Prince ought,
if any disease has seized the people, to be as untainted as possible from every
plague of stupidity. As in a human being that which is more preeminent rules—namely, the mind;
again, in the mind the part which is best presides—namely, reason; and
that which rules in the universe is the best of all—namely, God:
thus whoever in the Commonwealth, as in a great body, has occupied the parts of command,
it is fitting that he surpass the others in goodness, wisdom, and vigilance.
And by as much as the magistrates excel the plebs, by so much the Prince ought to precede
the magistrates.
If anything evil is in the mind, it proceeds from the contagion of the body, which is subject to passions (affections); but whatever good the body has, that wells up from the mind, as from a fountain. And just as it would be preposterous and against nature if evils were to emanate from the mind into the body, and the body’s goods were to be corrupted by a vice of the mind, so it would be exceedingly absurd if wars, seditions, corrupt morals, crooked laws, corrupt magistrates, and other plagues of the Republic of that kind were to arise from the Princes themselves, whose wisdom ought to have composed the disturbances that had arisen from the folly of the plebs.
But very often we see commonwealths well constituted and flourishing by the industry of the people, overthrown by the fault of Princes. How un-Christian it is to take pleasure in the title of lord, which not a few alien from Christ have shunned; and what they desired to be because of ambition, they were unwilling to be called because of envy. And will a Christian Prince think it right for himself to be the same, to be called “Magnificent”?
Octavius Augustus, although he had seized the imperium by crime,
regarded being called Lord as a matter of contumely;
and this appellation, brought forward by a mime, before
the whole people, he refused both by his countenance and by his voice, as though by that word
Tyranny were being cast in his teeth. And this modesty of a pagan man
will a Christian Prince not imitate? If you are lord
of all your own, it is necessary that they be slaves to you.
[1,81] Cum natura genuerit omneis homines liberos, et praeter naturam inducta sit seruitus, quod Ethnicorum etiam leges fatentur, cogita quam non conueniat, Christianum in Christianos usurpare dominium, quos nec leges seruos esse uoluerunt, et Christus ab omni seruitute redemit. Siquidem Paulus Onesimum seruum natum, a Baptismo fratrem prioris heri Philemonis appellat. Quam absurdum est eos pro seruis habere, quos Christus eodem redemtos sanguine, in communem adseruit libertatem, quos iisdem tecum alit Sacramentis, quos ad eamdem immortalitatis uocauit haereditatem: et iis seruitutis iugum inducere, qui communem tecum habent dominum, ac Principem Iesum Christum?
[1,81] Since nature has begotten all men free, and servitude has been introduced contrary to nature—which even the laws of the Ethnics confess—consider how unfitting it is for a Christian to usurp dominion over Christians, whom not even the laws willed to be slaves, and whom Christ has redeemed from every servitude. For indeed Paul calls Onesimus, slave-born, by Baptism the brother of his former master Philemon. How absurd it is to hold as slaves those whom Christ, redeemed by the same blood, has brought into common liberty, whom he nourishes with the same Sacraments with you, whom he has called to the same inheritance of immortality: and to impose upon them the yoke of servitude, who have with you a common Lord and Prince, Jesus Christ?
[1,82] Cum Christianorum unus sit Dominus, cur qui huius gerunt uices, abs quouis malunt administrandi formam petere, quam ab hoc, qui solus est totus imitandus? Ab aliis decerpere licet, si quid forte uirtutis admixtum habent. At in hoc absolutum est omnis uirtutis ac sapientiae exemplar.
[1,82] Since there is one Lord of the Christians, why do those who bear his vicariate prefer to seek the form of administering from anyone whatsoever, rather than from him, who alone is entirely to be imitated? From others it is permitted to cull, if perchance they have anything of virtue admixed. But in this one there is the perfect exemplar of all virtue and wisdom.
This indeed seems stupidity, but to the infidels; to us—if we are truly faithful—it is the power of God and the wisdom of God. Now I would not have you think thus with yourself: “But that is to serve, not to reign.” Nay rather, this is the most beautiful kind of reigning, unless perhaps you suppose God to serve, who administers this world gratis, whose beneficence all things experience, while no reward returns to him; unless the soul seems to serve, which, though it does not need the body, with such zeal consults its interests; unless the eye is to be thought to serve the other members, because it looks out for all.
He therefore consults for your majesty’s interest, who protects the citizens’ liberty and dignity. God himself, in order not to rule over the coerced, gave to both angels and to men free will, so that he might render his rule more splendid and august. And does anyone seem great to himself under this very name, because he rules citizens driven by fear, like cattle?
[1,84] Ne te fugiat, quidquid in Euangelicis aut Apostolicis litteris de tolerandis dominis, de parendo Praefectis, de honorandis Regibus, de pendendo tributo dictum est, id ad Ethnicos Principes esse referendum, quod ea tempestate nondum essent Principes ulli Christiani. Tolerari iubet impios magistratus, ne quid perturbetur ordo ciuitatis, modo suo fungantur officio, modo ne imperent impia. Honorem exigit Ethnicus Princeps, Paulus honorem iubet dependi: uectigal exigit, uult solui uectigal: tributum exigit, iubet dari tributum.
[1,84] Let it not escape you, that whatever in the Evangelical or Apostolic letters has been said about tolerating masters, about obeying Prefects, about honoring Kings, about paying tribute, is to be referred to Ethnic Princes, because at that time there were not yet any Christian Princes. He bids that impious magistrates be tolerated, lest the order of the city be disturbed, provided they discharge their own office, provided they do not command impious things. An Ethnic Prince demands honor; Paul bids that honor be paid out: he exacts a customs-duty, he wills the customs-duty to be paid; he exacts a tribute, he bids that tribute be given.
[1,85] Idem in Euangelio cum insidiose rogaretur, num gens ut tum putabatur, Deo dicata, censum deberet Caesari: nomisma iubet exhiberi, exhibitum non agnoscit, et uelut ignarus, cuius sit imago et inscriptio sciscitatur; cum responsum esset, Caesaris esse, malitiose tentantibus ambigue respondit, Date Caesari quae sunt Caesaris, quae Dei sunt Deo: simul eludens insidiosam quaestionem, et per occasionem ad Dei pietatem inuitans, cui debemus omnia. Perinde quasi dixisset: Caesari, quem ignoro, quid debeatis, uos uideritis. Illud potius spectate, quid debeatis Deo, cuius negotium ago, non Caesaris.
[1,85] Likewise in the Gospel, when he was insidiously asked whether the nation, as then it was thought, dedicated to God, ought to owe the census‑tax to Caesar: he bids a coin be exhibited; the exhibited coin he does not recognize, and, as if unknowing, he inquires whose image and inscription it is; when it was answered that it is Caesar’s, he replied ambiguously to those maliciously tempting him, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s: at the same time eluding the insidious question, and on the occasion inviting to piety toward God, to whom we owe all things. Just as if he had said: As for Caesar—whom I do not know—what you owe, you yourselves will see to it. Look rather to this, what you owe to God, whose business I transact, not Caesar’s.
[1,86] Ne uero inter haec cuiquam obrepat huiusmodi cogitatio; Quid igitur Principi suum ius adimis, et plus tribuis Ethnico quam Christiano ? Imo Principi Christiano suum ius uindico. Ius est Ethnico Principi, suos metu premere, ad seruiles operas adigere, exigere possessionibus, expilare bonis, denique martyres facere, ius est Ethnici Principis. Num idem uis esse Christiano?
[1,86] Let not, however, amid these things such a thought creep upon anyone; Why then do you take away from the Prince his own right, and grant more to the Ethnic than to the Christian ? Nay rather, I vindicate for the Christian Prince his own right. It is a right of the Ethnic Prince to press his own with fear, to drive to servile labors, to exact from estates, to plunder goods, and finally to make martyrs—this is a right of the Ethnic Prince. Do you wish the same to be for the Christian?
Or will his right seem diminished, if these things are less allowed to him? His own right does not perish for him who bears the imperium in a Christian manner, but he possesses it otherwise, and indeed both much more preeminent and safer. That this is so, it will be permitted to collect from these arguments.
First, those whom you press with servitude are not yours, for consensus
indeed makes a Prince. But those at last are truly yours, who
obey you of their own accord and willingly. Next, when you possess men driven by fear,
you do not even half-possess them: you gain possession of bodies,
their minds are alien from you.
However, when Christian charity conciliates the people and the Princeps, there all things are yours, whenever the matter requires.
For a good Princeps does not demand, unless when the utility of the fatherland urgently demands it.
Conversely, where there is dominion, not benevolence, however much is exacted, surely the Princeps has less than when he has everything.
No one obtains more than he who commands nothing, but merits it. Moreover, the honor that is exhibited to a Tyrant is not even honor, but either adulation or simulation; nor is it obedience, but servitude; nor is the splendor he ostents true, but haughtiness; nor power, but force. All of which, under their true names, are possessed by him who acts the Christian Prince. To no one is more honor deferred than to him who does not exact honor; men obey no one more willingly than him who does not require obedience; upon no one do they more gladly pour out their wealth than upon him to whom they know what is entrusted will return, with interest, to the public utility.
When you exact a tax from your people as though a due, first see to it that you examine your very self, whether you have paid them the tribute of your office. Aristotle denies that the rationale of dominion is situated in possessing, but rather in this: that you make use of servants. And yet much less is the Principate set in titles and images, in exacting the census, but in taking counsel.
[1,87] Cum Respublica corpus quoddam sit ex uariis membris compactum, in quorum numero sit et Princeps ipse, licet eximium, ea moderatione conueniet uti, ut omnibus bene sit, non ut attenuatis caeteris unum aut alterum uegetum ac saginatum euadat. Quod si Princeps Reipublicae malis gaudet et alitur, neque pars est Reipublicae neque Princeps, sed praedo.
[1,87] Since the Republic is a certain body compacted from various members
among whose number is the Prince himself as well, albeit
eminent, it will be fitting to use such moderation, that it may be well
for all, not that, the rest attenuated, one or another should emerge vigorous
and fattened. But if the Prince of the Republic rejoices in evils
and is nourished by them, he is neither a part of the Republic nor a Prince,
but a robber.
[1,88] Prodidit Aristoteles seruum uiuam esse domini portionem, si modo is uerus sit dominus. Est autem et amicitia parti cum toto, et utilitas utrique ex altero. Id si uerum est inter herum et mancipium de lapide (ut aiunt) emptum, quanto magis inter plebem Christianam et Principem Christianum?
[1,88] Aristotle has handed down that the slave is a living portion of the master, provided only that he be a true master. Moreover, there is both friendship of the part with the whole, and utility to each from the other. If that is true between a master and a mancipium bought “from the stone” (as they say), how much more between the Christian plebs and the Christian Prince?
The Prince who thinks of nothing else, does nothing else,
except to extort as much money as possible from the citizens,
to ensnare by laws the greatest amount of coin that he can,
to sell magistracies and offices for as much as possible—I ask,
is he to be called a Prince, or a merchant, or, to speak more truly,
a robber?
[1,89] Croesus cum uideret, urbe capta, Cyri milites magno tumultu discursantes, rogabat, quidnam facerent. Cui respondenti, facere eos, quod uictor exercitus solet, diripere bona ciuium: quid, inquit, audio? An non haec iam tua sunt, qui me uicisti?
[1,89] When Croesus saw, the city having been taken, the soldiers of Cyrus running about in great tumult, he was asking what they were doing. To one responding that they were doing what a victorious army is wont to do—to plunder the goods of the citizens—“What,” said he, “do I hear? Are not these things now yours, you who have conquered me?”
Why then are those men plundering your possessions? Warned by this utterance, Cyrus restrained the soldiery from pillage. The same should always be set before the Prince’s mind; These things which are extorted are mine; Those who are despoiled and worn down are mine, whatever I sin against these, I sin against myself.
Manage your empire in such a way that you can easily render an account of what has been carried on; and if no one is going to exact it, so much the more ought you to exact it of yourself. For it will come to pass, and that shortly, that there is One who will demand an account from you, before whom it will have profited you nothing to have been a Prince, except that you will have a judge so much the more rigid as the greater power was entrusted to you. Though you be the sole Monarch of the whole world, this exactor you will neither be able to deceive, nor to escape, nor to terrify, nor to corrupt.
After you have once dedicated yourself to the Commonwealth, it is no longer free for you to live in your own manner: the persona which you have undertaken you ought to sustain and to safeguard. No one goes to the Olympic contest unless he has first weighed with himself what the law of that contest demands. Nor does he complain that the sun, or the dust, or the sweat, or if there is anything else of this kind, is troublesome to him: since all these things are conjoined with the very rationale of the game.
One must labor, that it may be permitted to others to be at leisure. The highest integrity of morals must be rendered, since in others a mediocre innocence may suffice. The mind must be stripped of all private affections; and for one conducting public business, nothing is to be thought of except the public.
But if that is not permitted, at least relegate the function of this kind to someone of such a sort, the sort you yourself ought to have shown yourself to be. Among the Greeks, a certain wise man said most sapiently that the things which are preeminent are the same as being difficult. Therefore one ought to remember that to be a good Prince is indeed by much the most beautiful thing of all, but the same is by far the most difficult of all.
Nor let anything move you, if in these times you see some Princes living in such a way that it is more difficult to play the part of an average paterfamilias than of a Prince of that sort: nor let it seem at all rashly said in the old proverb, that either a King, or a fool, had to be born. Since therefore the rest of mortals learn, with study applied beforehand, the art which they are preparing to profess, with how much greater care ought a Prince to learn beforehand the reasoned method of administering? And indeed the other arts consist chiefly of four things, nature, precepts, examples, and use.
But it can happen that a natural disposition is either so stupid, or so ferocious and violent, that in forming it one takes pains in vain.
Nero’s nature was too corrupt for that most saintly preceptor Seneca to be able to keep him from turning out a most pestilential Prince. The precepts must at once, as we have said, be instilled—and such as are worthy of a true Prince, and certain;
and for this cause Plato wished Dialectic to be touched late by the Guardians, because this discipline argues on either side, and makes opinions about the honorable, or the dishonorable, less firm.
The exemplar of administering ought chiefly to be sought from God himself, and from Christ who is both Man and God, from whose dogmas the precepts too ought chiefly to be taken. Practice, which is the final part, is not so safe in a Prince; for it is no great matter if one who strives to be a good citharist should break several lyres. But it would be grievous for the Republic to be afflicted while the Prince learns to administer the Republic.
Let him indeed, therefore, get accustomed already
from boyhood onward; but that he may judge the better, being instructed by decrees,
to sit in on consultations, to be present at judgments, to attend the creating of
magistrates, to hear the Petitions of Kings; but let him determine nothing
unless it has been approved by the judgment of many, until age
and the use of affairs has prepared a surer judgment. If Homer spoke truly,
that it is not the Prince’s part to sleep an entire night, to whom so many
thousands of men, to whom so great a mass of businesses have been entrusted,
if Virgil, not without judgment, fashions his Aeneas thus,
whence, I ask, should the Prince have leisure to beguile whole days—nay,
to waste the greatest part of life—on dice, dances, hunts,
buffoons, and trifles even more trifling than these? The Commonwealth is subverted
by factions, is afflicted by wars, all things are full of brigandages,
by immoderate plunderings the plebs is driven to hunger and
the halter.
The lowly are oppressed by iniquitous magnates:
corrupt Magistrates do not what is law, but what they please,
they do, and amid these things, as though at leisure, then the Prince plays at dice? Is it fitting that he who sits at the helm be somnolent, and in
such great perils of affairs does the Prince snore? No sea ever has
tempests so grave as every realm
unceasingly.
Therefore the Prince must always keep vigil, lest he err—for he never commits a fault except with the ruin of very many. The magnitude of the ship, or the prices of the merchandise, or the number of passengers,
does not make a good shipmaster more elated, but more attentive. Thus a good King, the more people he commands, by so much the more vigilant he ought to be,
not more insolent.
If you consider how great a province you sustain, there will never be lacking something to do. If you have become accustomed to be delighted by public commodities, there will never be lacking whereby you may amuse your mind, so that now for a good Prince there is no leisure to beguile the tedium of leisure with inept pleasures.
[1,90] Quod a sapientissimis uiris praeceptum est, optimam uitae rationem esse deligendam, non iucundissimam, quod ea quae sunt optima, consuetudo denique soleat iucunda reddere, id Principi cum primis est faciendum. Si pictor ex tabula belle confecta uoluptatem capit, si agricola, si olitor, si faber suis fruitur laboribus, quid Principi debet esse iucundius, quam si contempletur Rempublicam sua opera redditam meliorem ac florentiorem? Ut negari non potest, operosam esse rem, bonum agere Principem, ita multo est operosius, malum agere Principem.
[1,90] What has been prescribed by the most wise men, that the best rule of life is to be chosen, not the most pleasant, because those things which are best custom in the end is wont to render pleasant, this is to be done by a Prince before all. If a painter takes delight from a panel well wrought, if the farmer, if the market‑gardener, if the craftsman enjoys his own labors, what should be more pleasant to a Prince than if he contemplates the Republic made by his work better and more flourishing? As it cannot be denied, that it is an operose thing to act the good Prince, so much more operose it is to act the bad Prince.
Far less trouble is had
by the things that follow nature and the reason of the honorable, than by those
that consist of paints and artifice. When within yourself you recall, “this war
I prudently escaped; well did I quell that sedition with the least blood;
by enrolling that man to a magistracy I duly provided for the Republic and for my own name,” if you are truly a Prince,
surely you feel immense delight in your spirit. And that at length
is a pleasure worthy of a Christian Prince; supply yourself with the material for this daily by good deeds,
and leave those plebeian little amusements to the cheap rabble.
[1,91] Laudatur ab omnibus Solomon, qui cum integrum esset optare quidquid uellet, protinus accepturus quidquid petisset, non optarit opum uim, non totius orbis imperium, non exitium inimicorum, non insignem famae gloriam, non uoluptates, sed sapientiam: neque quamuis sapientiam, sed eam, qua posset regnum sibi creditum cum laude administrare. E diuerso damnatur ab omnibus Mida, cui nihil auro fuerit antiquius. At cur aliud in historiis, aliud in uita iudicium?
[1,91] Solomon is praised by all, who, when it was open to him to choose whatever he wished, being straightway about to receive whatever he had asked, did not choose the might of wealth, nor the imperium of the whole world, nor the destruction of enemies, nor distinguished glory of fame, nor pleasures, but wisdom: and not just any wisdom, but that by which he could administer with praise the kingdom entrusted to him. Conversely, Midas is condemned by all, to whom nothing was more precious than gold. But why is the judgment one thing in histories, another in life?
Why do we judge nothing less to pertain to the matter than that which alone pertains to the matter?
Nay rather, there is no lack of those who believe that this very thing obstructs the function of imperium, if the Prince be wise.
It languishes, they say, the mind’s force, and is rendered more timid.
Timidity is salutary, which, while it indicates danger, teaches how to avoid it, which restrains from base and pernicious institutes. He ought to perceive thoroughly very much, who alone looks out for all: it is necessary that he be most wise, who alone consults for all. What God is in the universe, what the sun is in the world, what the eye is in the body, this the Prince ought to be in the Republic.
The ancient wise men, to whom it was the custom to use hieroglyphs, adumbrating by the enigmas of things the plan of living, represented the image of the King in this manner, that they painted an eye, with a scepter added, signifying rectitude of life, and a mind to be deflected from the honorable by no reasons, joined with highest prudence and vigilance. Others fashioned the royal scepter in this way: at the top there was a stork, a symbol of piety, at the bottom a hippopotamus, a savage and noxious animal: indicating this, namely, that if in the Prince savage passions should rage, of the kind anger, desire of vengeance, rapacity, violence, piety toward the fatherland should conquer and press down those motions. To insolence the license of fortune and the success of affairs invites, but let love of the fatherland prevail more.
[1,92] Apud Thebanos inter sacras imagines uisebantur olim, auctore Plutarcho, quae sederent sine manibus, harum prima oculis etiam carente. Quod sedent, admonet, magistratus ac iudices animo sedato esse oportere, nec ullis affectibus perturbato. Quod manibus carent, innuit, eos ab omni munerum corruptela puros et integros esse debere.
[1,92] Among the Thebans, among the sacred images there used formerly to be seen, on the authority of Plutarch, those which sat without hands, the first of these even lacking eyes. That they sit admonishes that magistrates and judges ought to be with a sedate mind, and not perturbed by any affections. That they lack hands intimates that they ought to be pure and of unimpaired integrity from every corruption by gifts.
Moreover, because the Princeps also lacks eyes, it signifies that the King is so not led away from the honorable by gifts, that he is not touched by regard for any person, whereby he receives the matter by the ears only.
Nay even, let him learn to philosophize from the very insignia with which he is adorned.
What does the Royal anointing indicate, if not the highest clemency of mind?
What does the diadem of the head signify, if not wisdom absolute in every number? What does the torque added to the neck, if not the concert and harmony of all the virtues? What do the lights of gems shining with the manifold grace of colors, if not the excellence of the virtues, and that whatever is honorable ought to be pre-eminent in the Prince?
What does the ardent purple signify, except a vehement charity toward the citizens? What do the insignia signify, except that he should either equal
or surpass the honors of his ancestors? What does the sword borne before him signify, except that by its protection
the fatherland ought to be secure, both from enemies,
and from the wicked?
The first duty of a good Prince is, to will what is best:
the next, to perceive by what methods evils may be avoided, or
removed, and, on the contrary, goods may be procured, augmented, and confirmed.
In a private man perhaps a good
mind is enough, since both he is admonished by the laws, and the magistrates prescribe
what is to be done. But in a Prince it is too little to be
endowed with a good mind, so as to will what is best, unless there be added
wisdom, which may point out by what ways that which he desires
he may be able to attain.
How little difference is there between a marble statue,
inscribed with the title of Croesus or of Cyrus, magnificently adorned with diadem and scepter,
and a Prince without heart? except
that the former stands there senseless to the disadvantage of no one, whereas this one is foolish to the great harm of the Republic.
Do not value yourself by the goods of body or of fortune, but by those of the mind.
If anyone admires eloquence, remember that that is the praise of Sophists
and Rhetors. If someone proclaims strength and the bodily powers,
know that athletes are to be praised thus, not Princes. Someone extols tallness; thus think with yourself: here he would praise me rightly, if anything from on high were to be taken away.
Namely, if he be keen-eyed equally at the back and at the front,
g-blepohn, as Homer says, g-prossoh g-kai g-opissoh, that
is, if he be as wise as possible, looking back to things past, looking forward
to things future, then whatever wisdom he has, let him be wise for the fatherland, not for himself:
although in no other way can he more be wise for himself than
if he be wise for the fatherland. If someone in this fashion praises a Physician—he is handsome,
he is robust, and with good flanks, well-moneyed
he is, a pretty fellow at dice, he dances skillfully, he sings nicely, he plays ball learnedly—
would you not straightway think with yourself, what have these to do with a Physician? But when you shall have heard the same things from foolish praisers, by much
the more consider, what have these to do with a Prince.
In a physician three things are especially required. First, that he be well-versed in the art of healing, and know the force of bodies and of diseases, and what ought to be applied to each malady. Next, that he be of good faith, and look to nothing besides the health of the patient: for ambition, or gain, brings many to this, that they administer poison in place of a remedy.
[1,94] Si potes simul esse Princeps et uir bonus, fungere pulcerrimo munere: sin minus, abiice Principem potius quam ut ea gratia uir malus fias. Virum bonum inuenire licet, qui bonum Principem non possit agere. At bonus Princeps esse non potest, qui non idem sit uir bonus.
[1,94] If you can at the same time be Prince and a good man, perform the fairest office; if not, cast off being Prince rather than, for that sake, you become a bad man. It is possible to find a good man who cannot act the part of a good Prince. But there cannot be a good Prince who is not likewise a good man.
[1,96] Absit procul ab animo Principis uox illa plus quam tyrannica: Sic uolo, sic iubeo, sit pro ratione uoluntas. Ac multo magis illa quae iam in publicam hominum exsecrationem abiit, Oderint dum metuant. Tyrannicum imo foemineum est, animi libidinem sequi, et pessimus diuturnitatis custos est, metus.
[1,96] Far be from the Prince’s mind that utterance more than tyrannical: “Thus I will, thus I command; let will be in place of reason.” And much more that other which has now passed into the public execration of men, “Let them hate, so long as they fear.” Tyrannical—nay, feminine— it is, to follow the libido of the spirit; and the worst guardian of durability is fear.
Let this be the perpetual decree of the Prince: to injure no one, to benefit all, especially his own; to either tolerate evils or to remedy them, as he shall judge to be expedient for the common weal. He who does not bring this spirit to the Republic is a Tyrant, not a Prince. If anyone should call you, in place of a Prince, a Tyrant or a robber, would you not be vehemently stirred, and prepare atrocious punishments?
[1,97] Ut bene audias, id certissima consequeris uia, si qualem te cupis praedicari, talem temet ipsum exhibeas. Non est uera laus quae extorquetur metu, aut tribuitur ab adulatoribus. Et male agitur cum fama Principis, si huius praesidium in silentio minis indicto situm est.
[1,97] That you may be well spoken of, you will attain that by the most certain way, if such as you desire to be proclaimed, such you display yourself. Praise is not true which is extorted by fear, or is bestowed by flatterers. And it goes ill with the reputation of a Prince, if the safeguard of it is placed in silence imposed by threats.
Even if, to the utmost, your own age should be silent, surely posterity will speak. Yet who was ever so formidable a Tyrant as to be able to restrain the tongues of all? First and foremost a Christian Prince must beware what has been gravely written by Seneca: Among those who are called Kings, there are found some, in comparison with whom, if you set Phalaris, Dionysius, Polycrates—whose very names have passed into the abomination of all ages—they would be unworthy to be called Tyrants.
For it does not matter by what way, but to what end you tend.
He who looks to the public commodity is a King;
he who to his own, a Tyrant. But by what name at last shall we deem
those who feed their own felicity on the fatherland’s evils, and in fact act as robbers,
Princes in name, but most falsely?
[1,98] Plato uetuit legibus suis, ne quis Deum ullius mali causam diceret, propterea quod natura bonus sit ac beneficus. At Princeps Dei simulacrum quoddam est, si uere Princeps sit. Quantum igitur abhorrent ab hoc exemplari, qui sic rem gerunt, ut quidquid malorum in Republica cooritur, id ipsorum uitio cooriatur?
[1,98] Plato forbade in his laws that anyone should say God is the cause of any evil, because by nature he is good and beneficent.
But the Prince is a certain simulacrum of God, if he be truly
a Prince. How far, then, do they shrink from this exemplar,
who manage affairs in such a way that whatever evils arise in the Republic
arise from their own fault?
[1,99] Nec audiendus est, si quis hic forte clamitet adulator: at istud est Principem in ordinem cogere. Imo qui Principi licere uult quod honestum non sit, is eum in ordinem cogit. Quid enim est aliud Principem in ordinem cogere, quam talem reddere, quale est hominum uulgus?
[1,99] Nor is he to be listened to, if perchance some adulator should here cry out: “but that is to force the Prince into order.” Nay rather, he who wishes it to be permitted to the Prince what is not honorable, he is the one who forces him into order. For what else is it to force the Prince into order than to render him such as the vulgar crowd of men is?
that he serve anger, lust, ambition, avarice, that he be subject to stupidity? A truly unworthy deed and not to be borne, if that is not permitted to the Prince which is not permitted to God. God does not demand for himself that it be permitted to act otherwise than the reason of honesty dictates; and if he were to do so, then he would no longer be God.
Accordingly, whoever wills to permit to the Prince what clashes with the nature and reason of the Prince, he, in the end, makes him—stripped of the Prince’s honor—just some one out of the common plebs. Let it not shame the Prince to obey the honorable, which God himself obeys. Nor let him think himself less a Prince, if, to the extent of his virile capacity, he has approached the image of the Highest Prince.
[1,100] Haec atque huiusmodi boni Principis semina statim inserant in rude pueri pectus, hinc parentes, hinc nutrices, hinc praeceptor, haec uolens discat, non coactus. Sic enim conuenit institui Principem, qui liberis ac uolentibus sit imperaturus. Discat amare uirtutem, horrere turpitudinem, et ab inhonestis pudore, non metu coerceatur.
[1,100] Let these, and seeds of this sort, of a good Prince be straightway implanted
into the unformed boy’s heart—here by the parents, here by the nurses,
here by the preceptor; let him learn these willingly, not compelled. For thus it
is fitting that a Prince be instituted, who is to command free and willing men.
Let him learn to love virtue, to shudder at turpitude, and let him be restrained
from dishonorable things by shame, not by fear.
And although some portion of the good Prince’s hope is set in corrected morals and moderated affections, the chief part, nevertheless, lies in right opinions. For at times even shame corrects bad morals, and depraved affections either age amends or admonition. But when it has been persuaded that that is conjoined with virtue which is far removed from the honorable, and that that is the distinguished office of a Prince which is more than tyrannical—this is, when the springs are tainted, from which all the actions of life proceed—then it will be most difficult to remedy.
Caput secundum: De adulatione uitanda Principi.
Chapter two: On adulation to be avoided by the Prince.
[2,1] Atque id fieri non potest, nisi modis omnibus arceantur assentatores, cui pesti maxime obnoxia est magnorum Principum felicitas. Iam ipsa aetatis simplicitas huic malo praecipue patet, partim quod naturae propensione blandis magis gaudeat quam ueris, partim ob rerum imperitiam, quo minus suspicatur insidias, hoc minus cauere nouit. Et ne quis hoc ceu leue malum existimet negligendum, sciat florentissima summorum Regum imperia, linguis adulatorum fuisse subuersa.
[2,1] And this cannot be done, unless by every means the assentators are warded off, a pest to which the felicity of great Princes is most subject. Already the very simplicity of age lies especially open to this evil, partly because by a propensity of nature it rejoices more in blandishments than in truths, partly on account of inexperience of affairs, by how much the less it suspects snares, by so much the less it knows how to beware. And lest anyone think this, as a light evil, to be neglected, let him know that the most flourishing empires of the highest Kings have been subverted by the tongues of adulators.
Nor do we read anywhere that the Commonwealth was oppressed by grievous tyranny where the adulators did not have the principal parts in the tragedy. Diogenes, if I am not mistaken, had a clear view of this, who, when asked what animal was of all the most noxious, said: if you mean wild beasts, the Tyrant; if tame, the Adulator. This pestilence has a certain bland poison, but so immediate, that once, by this, Princes, tamers of the world, being driven out of their wits, allowed themselves to be toyed with and ridden by the most worthless fawners; and over the lords of all things these most foul little men—freedmen, and sometimes even slaves—held dominion.
[2,2] Primum igitur prouidendum erit, ut nutrices adhibeantur, aut prorsus immunes ab hoc morbo, aut certe quam leuissime obnoxiae. Nam ipse sexus solet huic malo peculiariter obnoxius esse: deinde plerumque nutrices in matrum abeunt affectus, quarum uulgus liberorum ingenia saepenumero corrumpit indulgentia: imo totum hoc genus quoad fieri potest, arcendum a futuro Principe, natura pene ipsa duobus maximis affine malis, stultitiae et adulationi. Proxima cura erit, ut sodales adiungantur ingenio liberali, et alioqui in hoc formandi ab eo qui instituit, ut comes sint citra adulationem, ut ita consuescant urbane loqui, ne quid tamen in gratiam fingant aut mentiantur.
[2,2] Therefore, first it will have to be provided that nurses be employed,
either wholly immune from this malady, or at least as
lightly liable as possible. For the sex itself is accustomed to be peculiarly
liable to this evil; then for the most part nurses pass into the
affections of mothers, the common sort of whom often corrupt the dispositions of children
by indulgence; nay rather, this whole kind, so far as
can be done, must be kept away from the future Prince, being almost by nature itself
akin to two greatest evils, stupidity and adulation. The next care will be that companions be joined with a liberal disposition,
and otherwise be formed in this by him who institutes, so that they may be companions
without adulation, so that thus they may grow accustomed to speak urbanely,
yet not to feign or to lie anything for favor.
[2,3] Neque mediocre momentum est in ministris, qui frequenter obsecundant cupiditatibus puerorum, uel ob stultitiam, uel quod hinc emolumenti nonnihil ad se rediturum sperent. Oportebit igitur hos, quoad fieri potest, cordatos et integros ad id muneris delegare, et insuper monitis ac minis ab assentando deterrere, ac rursum praemiis inuitare, ut sancte suo fungantur officio. Qua quidem in re magnopere conducet, si qui deprehensus fuerit hoc agere, ut alloquiis et obsequiis illiberalibus, Principis animum ad ea sollicitet, quae parum digna sunt Principe, is in aliorum exemplum publice det poenas, etiam capitis si delicti modus hoc postularit.
[2,3] Nor is the importance slight in the attendants, who frequently
humor the desires of boys, either out of stupidity,
or because they hope that from this some emolument will
return to themselves. It will therefore be fitting that these, so far as can be done, sensible
and upright, be delegated to that duty, and moreover be deterred by admonitions and
menaces from assenting, and in turn be invited by rewards,
that they may sacredly discharge their office. In which matter indeed
it will greatly conduce, if anyone shall have been detected doing this,
that by illiberal addresses and obsequious services he solicits the Prince’s mind to
those things which are little worthy of a Prince, that he, for the example of others,
be punished publicly, even with the head if the measure of the delict
shall demand this.
Nor ought this to seem cruel to anyone,
if, while we punish with death a thief who, having by chance gotten a few coins, has carried them off,
and that beyond the precedent of all the ancient laws,
let the extreme punishment be exacted from him who has wished to infect that
than which the fatherland has nothing better or more precious. But if the novelty of the matter stands in the way, so that it cannot be persuaded
(although Alexander the Roman Emperor ordered that a Thurian vendor of smoke, bound to a stake, with green wood placed beneath,
be killed by smoke), it can be brought about by artifice, that an example be prepared by another way:
if someone perchance shall have been convicted of some other capital crime, nevertheless let him be punished under this title,
that he has corrupted the mind of the future Prince with pestilential adulation. If in punishments it is fitting to weigh the account of the evil inflicted,
the pestilential flatterer, who corrupts and infects that first age of the Prince with tyrannical opinions, harms the Commonwealth more
than he who has plundered the public treasury.
[2,4] Atque utinam saltem apud Christianos minus uerum esset illud Carneadis apophthegma, qui negauit quidquam recte disci a Regum filiis, praeter artem equitandi, quod caeteris in rebus omnibus omnes obsecundent et assententur: at unus equus quoniam haud intelligit, patricius insideat an plebeius, diues an pauper, Princeps an priuatus, tergo excutit, quicumque parum scite insederit. At nunc saepenumero uidemus fieri, ut non nutrices solum ac sodales Ministrique, Principum liberis adulentur: uerum et ipse praeceptor moderatorque pueritiae, suum agat negotium, non huc spectans ut Principem dimittat meliorem, sed ut ipse discedat locupletior. Ad gratiam non raro loquuntur et ii qui de rebus sacris concionantur, aucupantes Principis et aulicorum fauorem: aut si quid reprehendunt, ita mordent, ut tum maxime adulentur.
[2,4] And would that at least among Christians that apophthegm of Carneades were less true, who denied that anything is learned aright by the sons of kings, except the art of riding, because in all other matters all comply and assent to them: but
a horse alone, since he does not understand whether a patrician or a plebeian sits on him, a rich man or a poor, a Prince or a private man, throws off from his back whoever has sat not deftly enough. But now we very often
see it happen that not nurses only and playmates and Ministers fawn upon the children of princes: but even the
preceptor himself and the moderator of boyhood pursues his own business, not looking to this, that he should send forth a better Prince, but that
he himself should depart more opulent. To curry favor not rarely speak even those who harangue about sacred matters, angling for the favor of the Prince
and the courtiers: or if they reprehend anything, they bite in such a way that just then they adulate most.
I do not say these things because I deem those men to be approved who, with seditious outcries, rage riotously against the life of Princes, but because by such men, without contumely, I desire the exemplar of a good Prince to be set forth, nor that in a Christian Prince those things be approved by assentation which the pagans condemned in pagans: neither do magistrates admonish freely, nor do counselors advise with sufficient friendliness. For the grandees, since they for the most part disagree among themselves in their party-interests, all vie to court the Prince’s favor, but in order to press an adversary, or lest they furnish any handle for harming to an enemy. The priests flatter; the physicians assent.
For from Orators sent from elsewhere, to hear mere praises is now everywhere customary.
One sacred anchor remained, which also very often deceives: namely those whom the populace calls the Royal Confessors:
if these were upright and prudent, surely in that most high secrecy they could lovingly and freely admonish the Prince.
But it for the most part happens that, while each one is zealous for his own advantages, he neglects the account of the public utility.
And indeed the Poets and the Rhetors do less harm, whose practice is now unknown to no one: to measure the praises of Princes not by their merits, but by their own genius. Far more pestilential is the tribe of Magi and Diviners, who promise to Kings longevity, victories,
triumphs, pleasures, and empires. In turn they threaten others
with sudden death, calamity, molestation, exile, abusing for that end hope and fear, the two principal Tyrants of human life.
[2,5] Sed est omnium pestilentissimum adulatorum genus, qui specie libertatis assentantur, ac miro quodam artificio dum repugnant, impellunt, dura obiurgant, laudant. Hos mire depinxit Plutarchus in libello cui titulum fecit, Quomodo dignosci possit amicus ab adulatore. Sunt autem duae aetates quae potissimum expositae sunt adulationi, pueritia ob rerum inscitiam, et senectus ob animi imbecillitatem.
[2,5] But most pestilent of all is the genus of flatterers, who
under the appearance of liberty assent, and by a certain marvelous artifice, while they resist, they impel, they sternly objurgate, they praise. These Plutarch wonderfully painted in a little book to which he gave the title, How a friend can be distinguished from a flatterer. There are, moreover, two ages that are especially exposed to adulation: childhood on account of ignorance of affairs, and old age on account of imbecility of mind.
In any age, however, folly, which always leads along philauty (self-love) as a companion. But Plato rightly warned that the most perilous species of adulation is when a person is himself his own flatterer, and on that account he easily offers himself to others doing the same thing which he was already doing of his own accord.
To the same point pertain the immense Colossi, which in former times they used to erect for Emperors, beyond the measure of human magnitude. Perhaps this will seem a trifle to someone, yet there is not nothing of moment even in this: that artificers represent the Prince with that cult and habit—attire and bearing—which is most worthy of a wise and grave Prince. And it is better to portray him doing something that pertains to the Republic, rather than idle, like Alexander in the hearing of causes, closing the other ear with his hand set against it.
Or Darius holding a Punic apple (pomegranate), or Scipio restoring the betrothed woman untouched to the young man, having rejected the gold that was being offered. Of such salutary pictures it is fitting that the Prince’s halls be adorned, not with those that teach lasciviousness, arrogance, or tyranny.
[2,7] Iam in titulis haud equidem negarim Principi suum honorem esse tribuendum, malim tamen eiusmodi, qui nonnihil admoneant Principem officii sui, hoc est, malim Integerrimum, Incorruptissimum, Sapientissimum, Clementissimum, Beneficentissimum, Cordatissimum, Vigilantissimum, Moderatissimum, Patriae studiosissimum uocari, quam Inclytum, Inuictissimum, Triumphatorem, semper Augustum, ut ne commemorem interim Celsitudines, Sacras Maiestates, Diuinitates, et his etiam adulantiores titulos. Probo morem quo nunc Romanum Pontificem Sanctissimi titulo honorant. Dum enim haec audit assidue, commonefit quid ab illo praestari oporteat, et quid in illo sit pulcerrimum, non si ditissimus sit, aut latissime imperet, sed si sanctimonia praecellat.
[2,7] Now in the matter of titles I would by no means deny that to the Prince his own honor is to be rendered; yet I would prefer such as in some measure admonish the Prince of his office— that is, I would prefer him to be called Most Upright, Most Incorrupt, Most Sapient, Most Clement, Most Beneficent, Most sound‑hearted, Most Vigilant, Most Moderate, Most studious of the Fatherland, rather than Illustrious, Most Invincible, Triumphator, ever August— not to mention in the meantime Highnesses, Sacred Majesties, Divinities, and titles even more fawning than these. I approve the custom by which they now honor the Roman Pontiff with the title of Most Holy. For while he hears this continually, he is reminded what ought to be performed by him, and what in him is most beautiful— not whether he be most wealthy, or rule most widely, but whether he excels in sanctity.
[2,8] Quod si uitari non potest, quo minus haec audiat nonnumquam Princeps uel inuitus, tamen haud oportet dissimulare, quibus magis delectetur. Alexander Seuerus usque adeo fertur inuisos habuisse adulatores omnes, ut si quis salutasset abiectius, aut adulantius inflexisset caput, protinus cum conuicio submoueret hominem: quod si dignitas aut magistratus quempiam a conuicio uindicasset, hunc uultus austeritate castigabat.
[2,8] But if it cannot be avoided, that the Prince sometimes hear these things even unwilling, nevertheless it is by no means fitting to dissimulate what he takes more delight in. Alexander Severus is reported to have had all adulators so hateful, that if anyone greeted him too abjectly, or bent his head more fawningly, he would straightway remove the man with a reproof: but if dignity or magistracy had vindicated someone from the reproof, this one he chastised by the austerity of his countenance.
[2,9] Praemonendus est igitur puer, ut hos titulos quos audire cogitur, in suum sibi uertat commodum. Audit, Pater Patriae: cogitet nullum umquam titulum Principibus additum, quam Patris Patriae, qui magis proprie quadraret in bonum Principem. Id igitur sibi agendum, ut hoc titulo dignus appareat.
[2,9] The boy must therefore be pre-admonished, that he turn these titles which he is compelled to hear to his own advantage. He hears, Father of the Fatherland: let him consider that no title was ever added to Princes which more properly fits a good Prince than Father of the Fatherland. Therefore this is what he must aim at, that he appear worthy of this title.
[2,10] Inuictus dicitur, cogitet quam sit absurdum Inuictum dici, quem uincit iracundia, qui quotidie seruit libidini, quem captiuum quo lubet ducit agitque ambitio. Eum demum uere inuictum esse, qui nulli cedit affectui, nec ulla rerum specie ab honesto potest deflecti.
[2,10] He is called Unconquered; let him consider how absurd it is to be called Unconquered,
whom anger conquers, who day by day serves libido,
whom ambition, a captive, leads and drives wherever it pleases. He alone is truly Unconquered,
who yields to no affect, nor by any appearance of things can be deflected from the honorable.
[2,11]Cum Serenissimus appellatur, succurrat Principis esse officium, omnia tranquillare, omnia componere. Quod si quis per ambitionem aut iram, seditionibus ac bellorum tempestatibus perturbat ac miscet uniuersa, hune titulus Serenissimi non ornat, sed uitium illi suum exprobrat. Cum dicetur Inclytus, cogitet nullum esse uerum decus, nisi quod a uirtute recteque factis proficiscitur.
[2,11]When he is called Most Serene, let it come to mind that it is the duty of a Prince
to tranquillize all things, to compose all things. But if
anyone, through ambition or anger, by seditions and the tempests of wars,
perturbs and throws all things into confusion, this title
of Most Serene does not adorn him, but reproaches to him his own vice. When
he shall be called Illustrious, let him consider that there is no true honor, unless
that which proceeds from virtue and rightly done deeds.
[2,12] Cum audiet regionum titulos, non statim cristas erigat, ueluti tantarum rerum dominus: sed sic cogitet, quam multis bonum Principem debeo. Si Celsitudines, Maiestates, Diuinitates ingeret aliquis, meminerit haec non competere, nisi in eum qui ad Dei exemplum administre imperium, coelesti quadam animi magnitudine. Cum audiet solennes panegyricos, ne protinus credat, aut faueat suis laudibus, sed si talis nondum est, qualis praedicatur, admoneri se cogitet, detque operam ut ils laudibus aliquando respondeat.
[2,12] When he shall hear the titles of regions, let him not straightway raise his crests,
as though the master of such great matters: but thus let him think, to how many I owe myself as a good Prince. If someone thrusts upon him Highnesses, Majesties, Divinities, let him remember that these do not befit any save him who, after the example of God, administers the imperium with a certain celestial greatness of soul. When he shall hear solemn panegyrics, let him not forthwith believe, or be favorable to his own praises, but if he is not yet such as he is proclaimed, let him think himself admonished, and give effort that he may at some point answer to those praises.
When they deny that the Prince is bound by the laws, they submit themselves
to him, they bestow upon him the right over all things; let him beware lest
he straightway think that whatever has pleased his mind is lawful for him. To a good Prince
all things can be safely permitted, to a mediocre one not all things, to a bad one nothing.
[2,13]Ac prudenter quidem Demetrius Phalereus ad euoluendos libros inuitat, quod saepenumero, quae non ausint admonere Principis amici, ex his cognoscat. Verum ad hoc prius antidoto praemuniendus est ad hunc modum. Hic quem legis, Ethnicus est, tu qui legis Christianus.
[2,13] And indeed prudently Demetrius Phalereus invites one to unroll the books,
because very often the things which the Prince’s friends would not dare to admonish him about, he learns from these. But for this he must first be fortified beforehand with an antidote in this manner: This one whom you read is an Ethnic; you who read are a Christian.
For those mute letters pass over into morals and into affections,
especially if they have chanced upon a natural disposition with a proclivity to some disea—
se: for instance, a boy by nature fierce and violent will, with no great trouble,
be moved to tyranny, if, not forewarned with an antidote, he has read Achilles, or Alexander the Great, or
Xerxes, or Julius. But today we see very many taking delight in the fables of
Arthurs, Lancelots, and others of that kind, not only tyrannical, but even altogether unlearned, foolish, and
anile, so that it is more advisable to spend hours in Comedies, or in the fables of the Poets,
than in deliraments of that sort.
[2,15] Quod si quis meo uelit uti consilio, statim a tradita loquendi ratione, proponet Prouerbia Solomonis, Ecclesiasticum, et librum Sapientiae, non ut puer ab ostentatore interprete quatuor illis Theologorum sensibus torqueatur, sed ut paucis accommode commonstret, si quid ad boni Principis officium pertinet. Cum primis autem inserendus est amor et auctoris et operis. Regno destinatus es, hic regnandi docet artem.
[2,15] But if anyone is willing to use my counsel, immediately after the method of speaking has been delivered,
he will set before him the Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus,
and the Book of Wisdom, not that the boy be racked by an ostentatious interpreter
with those four senses of the Theologians, but
that in a few words he may aptly demonstrate whatever pertains to the office of a good Prince. First of all, however, there is to be implanted
love both for the author and for the work. You are destined for a kingdom; this teaches the art of reigning.
You are the son of a king, a King to be; you will listen to the wisest King of all,
what he teaches his son, whom he prepares for the succession of the kingdom. Soon the Gospels. And here
it will matter greatly by what methods the mind of the boy may be inflamed to the love of the author and of the work.
No small part also will lie in
the dexterity and aptness of the interpreter, that he teach briefly, that
clearly, that even plausibly and vividly; not
everything, but the things that most of all pertain to the Prince’s office,
and that make for the most pernicious opinions of vulgar Princes to be rooted out
from the soul. In the third place Plutarch’s
Apophthegms, then the Moralia: for nothing holier than these
can be found, whose Lives too I would rather be set forth than anyone
else’s. I would readily grant the place next to Plutarch
to Seneca, who by his writings wonderfully stimulates and inflames toward
the study of the honorable, lifts the reader’s mind from sordid cares on high,
especially everywhere un-teaching Tyranny.
[2,16] Iam uero non negauerim, ex Historicorum lectione praecipuam colligi prudentiam, uerum ex iisdem summam perniciem hauries, nisi et praemunitus, et cum delectu legeris. Vide ne tibi important celebrata seculorum consensu nomina scriptorum aut Ducum. Herodotus, Xenophon, uterque Gentilis fuit, et plerumque pessimum proponunt Principis exemplar, etiam si in hoc ipsum scripserunt historiam, ut aut delectarent narratione, aut egregii Ducis imaginem effingerent.
[2,16] Now indeed I will not deny that from the reading of Historians a preeminent prudence is gathered, but from these same you will draw the utmost perdition, unless you are both pre-armed and read with selection. See that the names celebrated by the consent of ages of writers or of Dukes do not carry weight with you. Herodotus, Xenophon, each was a Gentile, and for the most part they set forth the worst exemplar of a Prince, even if they wrote history for this very purpose, either to delight by narration, or to fashion the image of an outstanding Duke.
Sallust and Livy indeed many things excellently—I add, in all points eruditely—yet they do not approve everything they relate, and some things they approve are by no means to be approved by a Christian Prince. Beware when you hear of Achilles; beware of Xerxes, Cyrus, Darius, Julius, lest the prestige of a great name carry you away. You are hearing of great and frenzied robbers: for thus Seneca several times calls them.
[2,17] Et tamen si quid in horum gestis inciderit dignum bono Principe, id curabis ceu gemmam e sterquilinio colligere. Nullus enim umquam fuit Tyrannus usque adeo illaudatus, qui non aliqua immiscuerit, quae si uirtute gesta non sint, certe ad uirtutis exemplum queant accommodari. Permulta sunt in Phalaridis epistolis, quae sancto quoque Rege uideantur non indigna.
[2,17] And yet, if anything in the deeds of these should turn up worthy of a good
Prince, you will take care to gather it as a gem from a dung-heap. For never was there any Tyrant so utterly unpraised,
who did not mix in some things which, even if they were not done by virtue,
certainly can be fitted to an example of virtue. Very many
things are in the epistles of Phalaris, which would seem not unworthy even of a holy King
as well.
And quite regally he turned back upon Perillus, the instigator of cruelty, his own invention. Very many things Alexander did furiously, but rightly he abstained from the captive women of Darius, and rightly he ordered that a woman be led back home when he perceived her to be married. These things, therefore, out of many, are to be excerpted; and the examples of the pagans, or of illaudable men, kindle the more vehemently.
If thus a tyrant, alien from Christ, restrained himself, if, a youth and victor, he exhibited this sanctity to the women of his enemies, what is fitting for me, a Christian Prince, to do toward my own women?
If so much spirit was in a mere woman, what ought to be rendered by a man?
If that was assigned as a reproach to an Ethnic Prince, and by Ethnics, with how great zeal must it be avoided by me, professing the religion of Christ?
[2,18] Porro quibus rationibus oporteat exempla per amplificationem conferre, satis, opinor, indicauimus in libello, De Copia Rerum. Caeterum et uitiosa exempla in bonum deflecti possunt. C- Caesaris industriam, et animi sublimitatem quam ille male praestitit ambitioni, tu bene impende patriae commodis.
[2,18] Further, by what methods it is proper to apply examples through amplification,
we have, I think, indicated sufficiently in the little book, On the Copia of Things.
Moreover, even vicious examples can be deflected into good.
C. Caesar’s industry, and the sublimity of spirit
which he ill devoted to ambition, do you well expend
upon your country’s advantages.
[2,19] Quin pessimorum Principum exempla nonnumquam magis accendunt ad uirtutem, quam optimorum aut mediocrium. Quem enim non auocet ab auaritia, Titi Vespasiani uectigal e lotio collectum, et foedissimo facto par dictum Lucri bonus est odor ex re qualibet. Et exsecranda uox Neronis, qua solet mandare magistratus, scis quid mihi sit opus, et cura ne quis quid habeat.
[2,19] Indeed, the examples of the worst Princes sometimes inflame more to virtue than those of the best or the mediocre. For who would not be diverted from avarice by Titus Vespasian’s tax collected from urine, and by the saying matched to the most filthy deed, “The odor of lucre is good from any matter whatsoever.” And the execrable utterance of Nero, with which he was wont to instruct magistrates: “You know what I need, and see to it that no one have anything.”
By these reasonings it will come about that
whatever shall present itself in the historiographers is turned into
an example of doing rightly. From so great a throng of leaders, see that you select for yourself the best,
such as Aristides, Epaminondas, Octavian,
Trajan, Antoninus Pius, Alexander Mamaea; and yet
not these in such a way that you wish to reproduce them entire, but choose for yourself that which in the best
is best; otherwise, there is that which you should avoid even
in David and Solomon, kings praised by God.
[2,20] Alioqui quid fingi possit insanius, quam hominem Christi sacramentis initiatum, Alexandrum, Iulium, aut Xersem sibi proponere, quorum uitam incessunt etiam Ethnici Scriptores, si quibus iudicium fuit paulo sanius? A quibus ut superari turpissimum est, si quid recte gesserunt, ita totos imitari uelle Christianum Principem, extremae dementiae sit.
[2,20] Otherwise, what could be imagined more insane than that a man initiated into the sacraments of Christ should set before himself Alexander, Julius, or Xerxes, whose life even pagan writers assail, if any had judgment a little saner? By whom, while to be outdone is most disgraceful, if they did anything rightly, yet for a Christian Prince to wish to imitate them whole and entire is of the extremity of madness.
[2,21] Praemonendus est Princeps, ut nec ea quae in sacris uoluminibus legerit, continuo putet imitanda. Discat Hebraeorum pugnas et caedes, immanitatem in hostes, ad allegoriam esse uocanda, alioqui pestiferam esse horum lectionem. Longe aliud permissum pro ratione temporis illi populo, aliud traditum coelesti populo Christianorum.
[2,21] The Prince must be forewarned, that he not at once suppose those things which he has read in the sacred volumes to be imitable. Let him learn the battles and slaughters of the Hebrews, the savagery against enemies, are to be called to allegory, otherwise the reading of these is pestiferous. A far different thing was permitted, according to the rationale of the time, to that people, a different thing has been handed down to the celestial people of the Christians.
As often as the Prince takes a book into his hand, let him take it with this mind: not to be delighted, but to depart from the reading better. He easily finds whence he may be rendered better, who earnestly strives to become better.
A great part of goodness is to will to become good, as when someone recognizes and hates the malady of ambition, or of irascibility, or of libido, and for this he opens a book, that he may medicate his own malady; such a one easily finds whereby he may either dispel the trouble or alleviate it.
[2,22] A nullis auditur uerum sincerius, aut commodius, neque minore pudore quam a libris. Sed tamen sic amicos assuefaciat Princeps, ut qui libere monent, intelligant se gratiam inire. Est hoc quidem eorum qui cum Principe consuetudinem agunt, ut in tempore, ut commode, ut amice moneant, sed tamen conueniet etiam parum dextre monentibus ignoscere, ne recte monituri, ullo exemplo deterreantur ab officio.
[2,22] From none is the truth heard more sincerely, or more fittingly, nor with less shame, than from books. Yet let the Prince so accustom his friends, that those who admonish freely may understand that they are entering into favor. This indeed belongs to those who conduct consuetude with the Prince, to admonish in due time, fittingly, and as friends, but nevertheless it will be proper also to pardon those who admonish not very dexterously, lest those who would admonish rightly be deterred from their duty by any precedent.
[2,23] In graui tempestate quantumuis docti nautae patiuntur sese a quouis admoneri. At regno numquam deest tempestas. Quis satis laudarit Philippi Macedonum Regis ciuilem prudentiam, qui liberum esse iussit eum a quo clam submonitus est, quod pallio subducto in genu parum decore sederet.
[2,23] In a grave tempest, sailors, however learned, allow
themselves to be admonished by anyone whatsoever. But to a kingdom a tempest is never lacking. Who could sufficiently praise the civil prudence of Philip, king of the Macedonians,
who ordered to be free the man by whom he had been secretly admonished,
because, with his cloak drawn up over his knee, he was sitting with too little decorum.
Caput tertium: Artes pacis.
Chapter three: Arts of peace.
[3,1] Iam tametsi prisci Scriptores uniuersam administrandae Reipublicae rationem, in duplices artes secuerunt, pacis et belli, et prior et praecipua cura debet esse Principis instituendi in his rationibus, quae ad pacis tempora sapienter moderanda pertinent, quibus hoc pro uirili conandum est, ne belli muniis umquam sit opus. Qua quidem in re uidetur illud in primis docendus Princeps, ut ditionem suam norit: Id quod tribus rebus potissimum consequetur, Geographia, Historia, et crebra regionum et urbium lustratione. Studeat igitur in primis, regionum ac ciuitatum situm, originem, ingenium, instituta, consuetudines, leges, annales ac priuilegia cognoscere.
[3,1] Now although the ancient Writers cut the whole method of administering the Commonwealth into a twofold art, of peace and of war, the prior and principal care ought to be that of a Prince to be instructed in those principles which pertain to the wisely moderating of times of peace, in which he must, as far as lies in him, strive that there may never be any need of the duties of war. In which matter indeed, the Prince seems to be taught this before all: that he should know his own dominion; which he will most of all attain by three things, Geography, History, and frequent surveying of regions and cities. Let him therefore especially be eager to know the situation of regions and commonwealths, their origin, genius, institutions, customs, laws, annals, and privileges.
[3,2] Proximum, ut amet eam regionem cui imperat, nec aliter in eam sit adfectus, quam in auitum fundum bonus agricola, aut in suam familiam uir bonus, et illud in primis studio habeat, ut acceptam reddat meliorem, cuicumque successori traditurus: si liberi sunt, persuadeat patri pietas in filios: sin minus, persuadeat Principi pietas in patriam. Ac sibi subinde ceu faces admoueat ad excitandam in suos caritatem. Cogitet regnum nihil aliud esse quam ingens quoddam corpus, cuius ipse membrum aliquod insigne sit: dignos esse fauore, qui suas fortunas omnes, qui suam incolumitatem unius fidei commiserint.
[3,2] Next, that he love that region which he rules, and be affected toward it no otherwise than a good farmer toward his ancestral estate, or a good man toward his own family, and let him have this especially as a zeal, to render better what he has received, being about to hand it on to whatever successor: if there are children, let fatherly piety toward his sons persuade the father: if not, let piety toward the fatherland persuade the Prince. And let him from time to time apply to himself, as it were, torches for the kindling of love toward his own. Let him think a kingdom is nothing else than a certain huge body, of which he himself is some distinguished member: let those be deemed worthy of favor, who have committed all their fortunes, who their safety, to the fidelity of one.
Let him frequently suggest to himself the examples of those for whom the advantage of their citizens was dearer than life itself; finally, that it cannot come to pass that a Prince harm the Commonwealth without his harming himself. Next, by every means he will take pains that he in turn be loved by his own, but in such wise that nonetheless he be potent in authority among those same. And some most foolishly strive to win benevolence for themselves by incantations and magic rings, whereas no incantation is more efficacious than virtue itself, than which nothing can be more lovable; and as she herself is truly a good and immortal, so she procures for man true and immortal benevolence.
[3,4] Falluntur et hi qui largitionibus, epulis, praua indulgentia sibi multitudinis animos conciliant. Et paratur hisce rebus nonnulla popularis gratia potius quam beneuolentia, uerum ea neque uera, neque duratura. Alitur interea mala populi cupiditas, quae posteaquam, ut fit, in immensum increuit, iam nihil satis esse putat: et tumultuatur, nisi per omnia cupiditatibus responsum fuerit: atqui istud est corrumpere tuos, non conciliare.
[3,4] Those also are mistaken who, by largesses, banquets, and perverse indulgence
win for themselves the minds of the multitude. And by these things there is prepared
some popular favor rather than benevolence; but
it is neither true nor durable. Meanwhile the evil cupidity of the people is nourished,
which, after it has, as happens, grown to the immense,
now thinks nothing to be enough; and it riots, unless in all things
there has been a response to its desires: but indeed that is to corrupt
your own, not to conciliate.
And by these methods it usually comes to pass in practice for a Prince among the people what is wont to befall foolish husbands, who, the love of their wives—which they ought to have procured by virtue and upright deeds—try to coax by blandishments, gifts, and obsequious attentions. For it finally comes about that they are not loved, and instead of sober and well‑mannered wives they have fastidious and intractable ones, and instead of compliant ones, querulous and obstreperous. Or else what is wont to befall silly women who strive to drive their husbands to love by philters: that instead of sane men they have madmen.
[3,5] Primum discat uxor, quomodo et quibus nominibus sit amandus maritus, deinde ille talem praestet, qui recte possit amari: Ita populus adsuescat optimis, et Princeps quod optimum est, praestet. Diu diligent, qui iudicio diligere coeperint.
[3,5] First let the wife learn, in what way and by what names the husband is to be loved, then let him present himself such that he can rightly be loved: Thus let the people become accustomed to the best things, and let the Princeps present what is best. They will love long, who have begun to love by judgment.
[3,6] In primis igitur qui uolet amari a suis, eum praestet Principem, qui mereatur amari: deinde nonnihil profuerit tenere rationem, qua commodius irrepat in animos omnium. Hoc primum agat Princeps, ut qui sunt optimi, optime de se sentiant, et ab illis probetur, qui sunt omnibus probati: hos habeat familiares, hos in consilium adhibeat, hos ornet honoribus, hos plurimum apud se ualere patiatur. Ad hunc modum compendio fiet, ut omnes de Principe quam optime sentiant, qui fons est omnis beneuolentiae.
[3,6] First of all, therefore, whoever wishes to be loved by his own, let him present himself as a Princeps who deserves to be loved: next, it will be of some profit to grasp the method by which he may more conveniently insinuate himself into the minds of all. Let the Princeps do this first, that those who are best may think the best of him, and that he be approved by those who are approved by all: let him have these as familiars, let him call these into counsel, let him adorn these with honors, let him allow these to avail most with him. In this way, by a short cut, it will come to pass that all think as well as possible of the Princeps, which is the fountain of all benevolence.
New Princes not so bad in themselves, who have come into public odium for no other reason than that they allowed too great a license to those of whom the entire multitude thought ill—the people estimating the Prince’s character from the mores of these men. For my part I would wish a Prince born and educated among those over whom he is to exercise imperium, because friendship fits together and coalesces best whenever the inception of benevolence proceeds from nature. The common crowd both shudders at and hates good things that are unknown; contrariwise, known evils are sometimes loved.
This matter will bring a double advantage: for both the Princeps will be more propense toward his own, and altogether will more count them as his own, and the people will more sincerely favor, and more willingly acknowledge their own Princeps.
And for this cause the affinities of Princes with foreigners, and especially with far-removed nations, now become customary, do not equally commend themselves to me.
Lineage and fatherland have great force for conciliating benevolence, and, as it were, a certain genius common to both parties.
Of this a good part must needs perish, since the mixture of marriages confounds that genuine and native affection. But where nature has made the beginning of mutual charity, there it will be fitting to augment and confirm it likewise by other considerations; where it is otherwise, there one must strive so much the more solicitously, that by mutual offices and by manners worthy of favor, benevolence be bound together. But what happens in marriages—that at the outset the wife defer to the husband, and the husband concede somewhat and indulge the wife’s disposition, until, each known to the other, friendship gradually coalesce—the same ought to be done in the case of a Prince taken from elsewhere.
Mithridates had learned the languages of all the peoples over whom he held empire, which are reported to have been twenty-two in number. Alexander the Great, living among even very barbarian nations, at the outset imitated their dress and mores, by this way insinuating himself into their benevolence. The same has been praised in Alcibiades.
[3,7] Nihil aeque multitudinis animum alienat a Principe, quam si foris agere gaudeat, quod negligi uideatur ab eo, cui praecipue uellet esse curae. Tum quod exigitur, quoniam alibi consumitur, perire sibi putat, nec Principi dari uectigal interpretatur, sed alienis praedam obiici. Proinde neque patriae quidquam molestius aut perniciosius, neque Principi periculosius quam longinquae peregrinationes, praesertim si diutinae sint.
[3,7] Nothing so alienates the mind of the multitude from the Prince,
as if he rejoices to conduct affairs abroad, so that what it would especially wish to be his care seems to be neglected by him,
by whom it would especially wish it to be a concern. Then what is exacted, since it is consumed elsewhere,
it thinks is lost to itself, nor does it interpret the tribute as being given to the Prince, but as booty being thrown to outsiders. Accordingly neither
anything more troublesome or more pernicious to the fatherland, nor more perilous to the Prince, than long-distant peregrinations, especially
if they are long-lasting.
[3,9] Duae potissimum res sunt, ut in Politicis tradit Aristoteles, quae subuertunt imperia, odium et contemtus. Odio opponitur beneuolentia, contemtui auctoritas. Itaque Principis partes erunt diligenter obseruare, quibus haec parentur, illa uitentur.
[3,9] Two things most especially there are, as Aristotle relates in the Politics, which subvert empires: hatred and contempt. To hatred is opposed benevolence; to contempt, authority. Therefore it will be the Prince’s part to observe diligently by what means these may be procured, and those avoided.
Believe me, he is stripped of a great bodyguard who is deserted by the favor of the people. Conversely, the benevolence of the multitude is conciliated by those manners, to speak in general, which are very far removed from Tyranny: clemency, comity, equity, civility, benignity. Benignity stimulates to duty, especially if they have perceived that there is a reward with the Prince for those who deserve well of the Republic.
Clemency invites those conscious to themselves of guilt to a better fruit, while it shows the hope of pardon to those who strive to compensate the errors of a former life with new benefactions, pleasing meanwhile even to the most entirely upright by its contemplation of human nature. Civility everywhere either begets love, or at least softens hatred, but that in a great Prince is by far most pleasing to the multitude.
[3,10] Contemtus potissimum contrahitur studio uoluptatum, libidinis, uinolentiae, comessationum, aleae, morionum, scurrarum, tum autem stultitia socordiaque. Et his diuersis rebus paratur auctoritas, nimirum, prudentia, integritate, temperantia, sobrietate et uigilantia. His igitur rebus sese commendet Princeps, qui uere cupiat auctoritate pollere apud suos.
[3,10] Contempt is most of all incurred by a zeal for pleasures,
for lust, vinolence (drunkenness), revelling, dice-play, fools,
buffoons, and then moreover by stupidity and sloth. And by these diverse
things authority is procured, namely, by prudence, integrity,
temperance, sobriety, and vigilance. By these things, therefore, let the
Prince commend himself, who truly desires to be preeminent in authority
among his own.
Yet certain men, ridiculously, believe themselves to be held great among their own, if they ostentate themselves as much as possible by noise, attire, and luxury. For who thinks a Prince great because adorned with gold or gems, whom all know to have exactly as much as he pleases? And meanwhile what else does he display than the calamity of his fellow citizens, who, at their own expense, are feeding this luxury?
[3,11] Sic agat domi, ut nullius interuentu deprehendi possit. Et foris haud decet usquam Principem conspici, nisi semper aliquid agitantem, quod ad publicam faciat utilitatem. Ex oratione certius quam ex amictu Principis animus cognoscitur.
[3,11] Thus let him act at home, so that he can be caught out through no one’s intervention. And outside, it is hardly fitting anywhere for a Prince to be seen, unless always
agitating something that he may do for public utility. From
oration more surely than from attire the Prince’s spirit is known.
[3,12] Nec praetereundum est Aristotelis hac in re consilium, ut Princeps qui uolet odium suorum effugere, ac beneuolentiam alere, quae sunt odiosa, deleget aliis, quae plausibilia, per se faciat. Hoc pacto magna pars inuidiae defluet in eos, per quos res administratur, praesertim si fuerint et alias inuisi populo. Rursus in beneficiis solida gratia ad unum Principem pertinebit.
[3,12] Nor is Aristotle’s counsel in this matter to be passed over,
that the Prince who will wish to escape the hatred of his own, and to nourish benevolence,
should delegate to others the things that are odious, and the things that are applaudable,
do by himself. In this way a great part of invidious ill-will will flow off
onto those through whom the business is administered, especially if they also have been
otherwise disliked by the people. In turn, in benefactions the solid gratitude will
pertain to the one Prince.
I will add this also, that the credit of a benefit is doubled, if it be given quickly, with alacrity, of one’s own accord, and if it be commended with friendly words.
But if anything must be denied, it will be fitting that this be done gently and placidly.
If anything must be punished, somewhat should be diminished from the penalty prescribed by the laws, and punishment should be exacted in such a way that it may appear that the Princeps descended to this unwillingly.
[3,13] Neque satis est, si Princeps suos unius mores integros et incorruptos praestet Reipublicae. Non minus adnitendum, ut quoad licet, uniuersam suam familiam, proceres, amicos, ministros, magistros sui similes habeat: hi membra sunt Principis, et horum sceleribus conflatum odium in ipsum redundat Principem. At istud difficillimum est, inquiet aliquis.
[3,13] Nor is it enough if the Princeps should present to the Republic his own character alone intact and incorrupt. No less must he strive that, so far as it is permitted, he may have his whole household—the grandees, friends, ministers, magistrates—like himself: these are the members of the Princeps, and the hatred fused by their crimes redounds upon the Princeps himself. “But that is most difficult,” someone will say.
It would be easier, if he takes care to select the best into his household;
then, if he brings it about that these men understand that those things please the Prince most which are most to the advantage of the people: otherwise it often happens
that, with the Prince neglecting or even conniving at these things, the most wicked men, under the pretext of the Prince,
exercise tyranny upon the plebs; and while they seem to be doing his business, they counsel most ill for his name. Otherwise
the condition of the Republic is more tolerable where the Prince himself is bad than where the friends of the Prince are bad. One Tyrant we endure somehow.
[3,14] Omnis nouatio quoad fieri poterit, fugienda Principi. Nam etiam si quid in melius commutetur, tamen ipsa nouitas offendit. Nec umquam sine tumultu commutatus est uel Reipublicae status, uel publica ciuitatis consuetudo, uel leges olim receptae.
[3,14] Every innovation, so far as it can be done, is to be shunned by the Prince. For even if anything is changed for the better, nevertheless the novelty itself
offends. Nor has ever without tumult been changed
either the status of the Republic, or the public custom of a city,
or laws once received.
Therefore, if there will be anything of such a sort as can be borne, there must be no innovating, but it will either be fitting to tolerate it, or to deflect it commodiously to a better use. Again, if there will be anything of that kind which is not to be tolerated, that must be corrected, but by art and little by little.
[3,15] Permagni refert, quem scopum sibi proponat is qui gerit Principatum; nam si parum recte destinarit, tota aberret uia necessum est. Summum igitur boni Principis decretum esse debet, ut non solum tueatur praesentem Reipublicae felicitatem, uerum etiam florentiorem reddat quam acceperit. Caeterum cum tria sint bonorum genera, ut Peripateticorum more loquamur, uidelicet, animi, corporis, et externa, cauendum erit ne horum ratio praepostere habeatur, ut ciuitatis felicitatem externis illis bonis potissimum metiatur.
[3,15] It matters very greatly what aim or scope he sets before himself who bears the Principate; for if he has aimed not quite rightly, the whole way must needs go astray. Therefore the highest decree of a good Prince should be this: that he not only safeguard the present felicity of the Republic, but also render it more flourishing than he received it. Moreover, since there are three kinds of goods, to speak in the manner of the Peripatetics—namely, of mind, of body, and external—care must be taken lest the reckoning of these be held preposterously, namely, by measuring the city’s felicity chiefly by those external goods.
For these things indeed ought not to be procured in any other way, except insofar as they pertain to the goods of mind and body: that is, let him deem his citizens to be most happy, not if he has them richest, or with the best health of the body, but if most just and most temperate, if as little desirous as possible, if as little fierce or factious as possible, if as much as possible concordant. It must also be guarded against, lest he be deceived by the false appellations of the fairest things, from which source indeed whatever there is of evils in the world almost gushes forth and proceeds. For neither is it true felicity, when the people is dissolved in ease and luxury; nor true liberty, where to each whatever he has pleased is permitted.
Nor is it servitude to live according to the prescript of honorable laws, nor a tranquil Republic when the people obsequiously obeys every nod of the Prince, but when good laws are obeyed, and with a Prince who counsels well according to the dictate of the laws. Nor is equality the same reward for all, the same right, the same honor: nay, this is sometimes the highest inequality. This above all must the Prince, who is to be brought to the helm, be admonished: that the chief hope of the Republic is placed in the right education of boys, which Xenophon prudently taught in the Institution of Cyrus.
For the unformed age is compliant to any discipline. Therefore
first and foremost care must be taken about public and private schools, about the
instruction of maidens, so that immediately under the best and most incorrupt
preceptors they may at once imbibe both Christ, and respectable letters and those salutary to the republic. By this method it will come about that
there will be no need of many laws or punishments, surely, with the citizens
of their own accord following what is right.
[3,16] Tantam uim habet educatio, ut Plato scripserit, hominem recte institutum, in diuinum quoddam animal euadere, contra, perperam educatum, in immanissimam quamdam degenerare belluam. Nihil autem magis refert Principis, quam ut ciues suos habeat quam optimos.
[3,16] So great a power education has, that Plato has written that a man
rightly instructed, turns into a certain divine animal;
by contrast, wrongly educated, into a most monstrous
beast he degenerates. Nothing, moreover, more concerns the Prince,
than that he have his citizens as excellent as possible.
[3,17] Danda erit igitur opera, ut protinus adsuescant optimis, propterea quod quaeuis musica suauissima est adsuefactis. Et nihil est difficilius, quam reuellere hominem ab his quae longo iam usu in naturam abierunt. Nihil autem horum fuerit admodum difficile, si Princeps ipse quae sunt optima sequetur.
[3,17] Therefore effort must be applied, that forthwith they may become accustomed to the best, because any music is most sweet to the habituated. And nothing is more difficult than to wrench a man from those things which by long use have already passed over into nature (become second nature). Yet none of these things will be very difficult, if the Prince himself follows the things that are best to follow.
Tyranny it savors of, nay, it is sycophantic, thus
to handle the plebs; as they are wont to handle some monstrous beast,
the beast-fighters, whose chief zeal is this: to observe
by what things it is beguiled or provoked; then, as seems
expedient, they stir it or soothe it, as was gravely
said by Plato. For that is to abuse the affections of the plebs,
not to consult its interest. But if the people shall be intractable, and
resisting its own good, then either it must be humored for a time, and little by little be led to your plan,
either by some artifice, or by a salutary pretense.
Caput quartum: De uectigalibus et exactionibus.
Chapter four: On taxes and exactions.
More sublime is the office of a Prince than that it should be fitting for him to be a mercenary. And a good Prince possesses, whatever the citizens possess, out of love. There were many pagans who, from things well performed on behalf of the Republic, brought nothing into their own houses except glory.
There have been one or two who have despised this as well, such as Fabius Maximus and Antoninus Pius. How much more ought a Christian Prince to be content with the conscience of rectitude, especially since he serves Him who repays every right deed with the amplest rewards? There are certain men who do nothing else at the courts of Princes than, new titles being from time to time devised, that as much as possible may be drained from the people; and then they think they are providing well for the interests of Princes, precisely as if they were enemies of their own fellow-citizens.
[4,2] Hoc potius studendum, et in hoc excogitandae rationes, ut quam potest minimum exigatur a populo. Commodissima fuerit augendi uectigalis ratio, si Princeps sumtus superuacaneos amputarit, si ministeria otiosa reiecerit, si bella et his simillimas peregrinationes uitauerit, si officiorum rapacitatem cohibuerit, et si magis studeat recte administrandae ditioni suae, quam propagandae. Alioqui si exactiones auaritia metietur aut ambitione, quis tandem futurus est exigendi uel modus uel finis?
[4,2] This rather is to be aimed at, and for this purposes are to be devised,
that as little as can be be exacted from the people. The most commodious plan
for augmenting the tax will be, if the Prince cuts off superfluous expenses,
if he rejects idle ministries, if he avoids wars
and travels abroad most like them, if he restrains the rapacity of offices,
and if he studies more the right administration of his dominion than its propagation.
Otherwise, if he measures exactions by avarice or by ambition, what, then, will there be
either measure or end of exacting?
Since cupidity is infinite
and always urges and stretches what it has begun, until,
according to an old proverb, the cord, too much tensed, is snapped,
and at last, with the people’s patience overcome, it bursts forth into sedition,
a thing which brought destruction to empires once most flourishing.
[4,3] Quod si necessitas flagitat, exigi nonnihil a populo, tum boni Principis est, id his rationibus facere, ut quam minimum incommodorum perueniat ad tenues. Nam diuites ad frugalitatem uocare fortassis expedit. At pauperes ad famem et laqueum adigi, tum inhumanissimum est, tum parum tutum.
[4,3] But if necessity demands that somewhat be exacted from the people, then it is the part of a good Prince to do this by such methods, that as few inconveniences as possible reach the lowly. For to call the rich to frugality is perhaps expedient. But to drive the poor to hunger and the noose is then most inhumane, and not very safe.
Let the pious King consider this again and again with himself,
while he strives to augment his retinue, while he wishes splendidly to bestow in marriage his niece or
sister, while he makes all his children his peers,
while he enriches his nobles, while by peregrinating he would make ostentation of his wealth to the nations—how inhuman
it is that, on account of these things, so many thousands of men at home, with wives and children,
are slain by hunger, are enwrapped in alien money (debt), are driven to desperation of all things. For I would not even reckon such men among human beings,
much less among Princes, who extort from the poor what they disgracefully squander on harlots or on dice. And we hear that there are certain men of this sort
who think that this too is their right.
[4,4] Quin et illud secum expendat, quidquid semel inductum fuerit per occasionem temporum, quod ad Principis aut Procerum lucrum attinere uideatur, id numquam potest aboleri: cura sublata exigendi necessitate, non modo tollendum esset onus populi, uerum etiam sarciendum ac reponendum, quoad fieri possit, superiorum temporum dispendium. Proinde qui bene uult populo suo, cauebit exemplum pestilens inducere. Quod si gaudet calamitate suorum, aut eam negligit, nihil minus est quam Princeps, quocumque uocetur nomine.
[4,4] Nay, let him also weigh this with himself: whatever once has been introduced by the occasion of the times, which seems to pertain to the lucre of the Prince or the Peers, that can never be abolished: once, by due care, the necessity of exacting has been removed, not only ought the people’s burden to be lifted, but even the loss of former times ought, so far as can be, to be patched up and replaced. Therefore he who wishes well to his own people will beware of introducing a pestilent precedent. But if he rejoices in the calamity of his own, or neglects it, he is anything but a Prince, by whatever name he is called.
Meanwhile, care must be taken, lest there be an excessive inequality of wealth, not that I should wish anyone to be stripped of his goods by force, but that those measures must be used, lest the resources of the multitude be conferred upon a few certain persons. For Plato wishes his citizens to be neither too rich nor, on the other hand, very poor, because the poor man cannot be of use, while the rich man is unwilling to be of use by his own art.
[4,5] Quid quod ne locupletantur quidem aliquoties exactionibus huiusmodi Principes. Id qui cupit cognoscere, recenseat quanto minus proaui receperint a suis, et quanto beneficentiores fuerint, quantoque magis rebus omnibus abundarint, quod bona pars horum inter digitos exigentium et recipientium dilabatur, et minima pars ad ipsum redeat Principem.
[4,5] What of the fact that Princes are not even at times enriched by exactions of this kind? He who desires to know this, let him review how much less our great‑grandfathers received from their own people, and how much more beneficent they were, and how much more they abounded in all things, because a good part of these sums slips away between the fingers of those exacting and receiving, and the smallest part returns to the Prince himself.
[4,6] Quarum igitur rerum usus infimae quoque plebi communis est, has quam minimum grauabit bonus Princeps, ueluti frumenti, panis, ceruisiae, uini, pannorum ac caeterarum item rerum, sine quibus humana uita non potest transigi. Atqui haec nunc potissimum onerantur, idque non uno modo, primum grauissimis exactionibus quas redemptores extorquent, uulgus asisias uocat, deinde portoriis, quae et ipsa suos habent redemptores, postremo monopoliis, ex quibus ut paululum compendii redeat ad Principem, dispendio mulctantur tenues.
[4,6] Therefore, of those things whose use is common even to the lowest plebs, a good Prince will burden these as little as possible, such as grain, bread, beer, wine, cloths, and likewise the other things without which human life cannot be transacted. And yet these now above all are laden, and that not in one way: first by most grievous exactions which the contractors extort, which the common crowd calls “asisias,” then by port-dues, which also have their own contractors, and finally by monopolies, from which, so that a little gain may return to the Prince, men of slender means are mulcted with a loss.
[4,7] Igitur optime quidem, ut dictum est, augetur Principes census, contractis impendiis, et hic quoque, iuxta prouerbium, magnum uectigal parsimonia est: tamen si uitari non potest, quin exigatur aliquid, et ita res populi flagitat, onerentur Barbarae ac peregrinae merces, quae non tam ad uitae faciunt necessitatem, quam ad luxum ac delicias, et quarum usus diuitum est peculiaris, ueluti byssus, serica., purpura, piper, aromata, unguenta, gemmae, et si quid est aliud huius generis. Nam hinc incommodum sentient ii tantum, quorum fortunae ferre possint, nec ob hanc iacturam ad inopiam redigentur, sed fortasse reddentur frugaliores, ut pecuniae iactura, morum bono sarciatur. In cudenda moneta bonus Princeps praestabit eam fidem, quam et Deo debet et populo, neque sibi permittet, quod atrocissimis suppliciis punit in aliis.
[4,7] Therefore the Prince’s revenue is best increased, as has been said, by contracting expenditures, and here too, according to the proverb, parsimony is a great tax-revenue: nevertheless, if it cannot be avoided that something be exacted, and thus the condition of the people demands, let barbarian and foreign wares be burdened, which conduce not so much to the necessity of life as to luxury and delights, and whose use is peculiar to the rich, such as byssus, silk, purple, pepper, aromatics, unguents, gems, and whatever else there is of this kind. For from this only those will feel the inconvenience whose fortunes can bear it, nor will they on account of this loss be reduced to indigence, but perhaps they will be rendered more frugal, so that the loss of money may be repaired by a good of morals. In minting coin the good Prince will maintain that good faith which he owes both to God and to the people, nor will he permit to himself what he punishes with most atrocious punishments in others.
In this matter the people are wont to be despoiled in roughly four ways, a thing which we for some time observed after the death of Charles, when a long Anarchy, more pernicious than any tyranny whatsoever, was afflicting your dominion. First, when the material of the coinage is vitiated by some mixture; then, when something is subtracted from the weight; moreover, when by clipping (circumcision) it is diminished; and finally, when the valuation is now tightened, now relaxed, however it has seemed to conduce to the Prince’s fisc.
Caput quintum: De beneficentia Principis.
Chapter five: On the beneficence of the Prince.
[5,1] Cum propria bonorum Principum laus sit benignitas ac beneficentia, qua tandem fronte Principis uocabulum sibi uindicant, quibus omnium consiliorum summa huc tendit, ut cunctorum incommodo suis consulant rationibus? In hoc igitur erit ingeniosus ac uigilans Princeps, quo pacto possit de omnibus bene mereri, quae res non est tantum in dando sita. Alios iuuabit liberalitate, alios fauore subleuabit, alios afflictos auctoritate sua liberabit, nonnullis ingenio consulet.
[5,1] Since the proper praise of good Princes is benignity and beneficence, with what face, pray, do they claim for themselves the appellation of Prince, whose sum of all counsels tends hither—that they consult their own interests with the disadvantage of all? In this, therefore, will a Prince be ingenious and vigilant: by what method he can merit well of all, which matter is not situated only in giving. He will aid some by liberality, he will uphold others by favor, he will free others who are afflicted by his own authority, for not a few he will provide by ingenuity.
[5,2] Nec tamen temere collocanda est Principis liberalitas. Sunt enim qui inclementer extorqueant a bonis ciuibus, quod in moriones, delatores, et uoluptatum ministros effundant. Intelligat Respublica iis potissimum expositam Principis benignitatem, qui publicis commodis quam maxime consulant.
[5,2] Yet the Prince’s liberality is not to be bestowed rashly. For there are those who ruthlessly extort from good citizens what they pour out upon buffoons, delators, and ministers of pleasures. Let the Commonwealth understand that the Prince’s benignity is to be directed chiefly to those who most consult the public advantages.
Let the reward be for virtue, not for favor. That
kind of beneficence is most to be pursued by the Prince, which
is conjoined with no one’s inconvenience, or at least injury. For to despoil some, in order that you may enrich others; to ruin these so that you may
elevate those, is so far from being a benefaction that it is rather a double
maleficence, especially if what has been taken away from the worthy is
transferred to the unworthy.
[5,3] Non abs re fictis Poetarum fabulis proditum est, Deos nusquam accedere solitos, nisi magno quopiam bono eorum a quibus excipiebantur. At cum adueniante Principe, ciues si quid est elegantius in supellectile abdunt, filias insigni forma recludunt, adolescentes ablegant, opes dissimulant, ac modis omnibus contrahunt sese, nonne re ipsa satis indicant, quam de eo habeant opinionem, cum id faciunt, quod facerent adueniente hoste aut praedone? Cum ad Principis aduentum iis timent quae illius officii fuerat tueri, si quis forte insidias aut uim pararet?
[5,3] Not without reason has it been handed down by the fictitious fables of the Poets, that the gods
were accustomed to approach nowhere, except with some great good for those by whom they were received. But when, with the Prince approaching, the citizens
hide whatever is more elegant in their furnishings, shut away daughters of notable
beauty, send off adolescents, dissimulate their wealth,
and in all ways contract themselves, do they not by the thing itself sufficiently
indicate what opinion they have of him, when they do that which they would do
with an enemy or a robber approaching? When at
the Prince’s arrival they fear for those things which it had been his office to guard,
if perchance someone were preparing plots or force?
From some they fear ambushes,
from him violence too, while one complains he has been struck,
another that a maiden has been carried off, another that his wife has been defiled, another
that his little pay has been denied—good heavens, how far this arrival is from that image of the gods:
while the cities, in proportion as each is more flourishing, so much the more hold the Prince suspect,
when at the Prince’s arrival the more criminal leap forth, every best man and most prudent is cautious and draws himself in: so that, even if they say nothing, certainly by deeds they proclaim what opinion they have about the Prince.
But let someone reply, I cannot restrain the hands of all my men; I, for my part, do what lies in me; I stand ready. Make
your men understand that you will that very vehemently and from the heart—may I perish if they will not hold back.
And thus at last you will give the people credence that these things are done against your will, if you do not allow them to be done with impunity.
Perhaps for a Pagan Prince it was enough to be benign toward his own, and only just toward outsiders.
But it belongs to a Christian Prince to reckon no one as an outsider, except him who is alien to the Sacraments of Christ, and not even to assail these with injuries:
to acknowledge his own citizens first and foremost, but, as for the rest, to deserve well of all of whom he can.
[5,4] Quamquam illud perpetuo studendum est Principi, ne cuiquam omnino fiat iniuria, tamen iuxta Platonis sententiam, diligentius est cauendum, ne quid laedantur hospites, quam ne ciues, propterea quod hospites amicorum et cognatorum auxilio destituti, magis obnoxii sunt iniuriis, unde et Iouem ultorem habere putabantur, cui ex re Xenio fecere nomen.
[5,4] Although that ought to be the Prince’s perpetual study, that no injury at all be done to anyone, nevertheless, according to Plato’s opinion, it is to be guarded against more diligently that guests be not harmed than that citizens, because guests, deprived of the aid of friends and cognates, are more subject to injuries, whence they were also thought to have Jupiter as avenger, to whom, from the matter of hospitality, they fashioned the name Xenios.
Caput sextum: De legibus condendis aut emendandis.
Chapter 6: On laws to be enacted or amended.
[6,1] Optimae leges sub optimo Principe, praecipue beatam reddunt ciuitatem aut regnum, cuius tum felicissimus est status, cum Principi paretur ab omnibus, atque ipse Princeps paret legibus, leges autem ad archetypum aequi et honesti respondent, nec alio spectant, quam ad rem communem in melius prouehendam.
[6,1] The best laws under the best Prince, especially render the city or kingdom blessed, whose status is then most felicitous, when the Prince is obeyed by all, and the Prince himself obeys the laws; and the laws, moreover, correspond to the archetype of the equitable and the honorable, and look to nothing else than to the commonweal to be advanced for the better.
[6,2] Bonus, sapiens et incorruptus Princeps, nihil aliud est quam uiua quaedam lex. Dabit igitur operam, non ut multas condat leges, sed ut quam optimas, maximeque Reipublicae salutares. Nam bene institutae ciuitati, sub bono Principe, et integris magistratibus, paucissimae leges sufficient; sin secus fuerit, nullae quamlibet multae satis erunt.
[6,2] A good, wise, and incorrupt Prince is nothing other than a certain living law.
Therefore he will take pains, not to enact many laws, but to enact those that are the best, and most salutary to the Commonwealth.
For to a well-instituted commonwealth, under a good Prince and upright magistrates, the fewest laws will suffice; but if it be otherwise, no number, however many, will be enough.
[6,3] In condendis autem legibus illud in primis cauendum erit, ne quid oleant fisci lucrum, ne priuatam Procerum commoditatem, sed ad exemplar honesti, et ad publicam utilitatem referantur omnia, et eam utilitatem non ad uulgarem opinionem, sed ad sapientiae regulam exigant, quam oportet ubique Principibus in consilio esse: alioqui ne lex quidem erit, fatentibus et Ethnicis, ni iusta sit, ni aequa, ni publicis commodis consulens. Nec protinus lex est, quod Principi placuit, sed quod sapienti bonoque Principi placuit, cui nihil placet, nisi quod honestum et e Republica sit. Quod si distorta fuerit regula, ad quam exaequanda fuerant praua, quid futurum est, nisi ut per huiusmodi leges, etiam quae recta fuerant, deprauentur.
[6,3] In the framing of laws, moreover, this above all must be guarded: that they not smell of gain for the fisc, nor of the private convenience of the Nobles, but that all things be referred to the exemplar of the honorable, and to the public utility, and that they measure that utility not by vulgar opinion, but by the rule of wisdom, which ought everywhere to be in a Prince’s counsel: otherwise it will not even be a law, with even the Pagans confessing it, unless it be just, unless equitable, unless consulting the public advantages. Nor is it straightway a law, whatever has pleased the Prince, but what has pleased a wise and good Prince, to whom nothing pleases except what is honorable and for the Commonwealth. But if the rule be distorted, to which the crooked things had been to be made equalized, what will come to pass, except that by laws of this sort even the things which had been straight will be depraved?
And Plato wills the laws to be as few as possible,
chiefly about lighter matters, such as pacts,
commerce, and taxes. For indeed, the safety of the Republic
is not born from a multitude of laws any more than from a multitude of drugs.
Where the Prince is integral, and the magistrates discharge their office,
there is no need of many laws; where it is otherwise,
there the abuse of laws is turned to the ruin of the Republic,
while even well-framed laws are by the wickedness of these men twisted elsewhere.
[6,4] Iure notatus est Dionysius ille Syracusanus, qui tyrannico consilio plurimas tulit leges, alias super alias ingerens, easque ut fit a populo negligi patiebatur, quo cunctos ad hunc modum sibi redderet obnoxios. At istud non est leges condere, sed laqueos tendere.
[6,4] Rightly was that Dionysius of Syracuse censured, who by tyrannical counsel enacted very many laws, heaping others upon others, and he allowed them, as happens, to be neglected by the people, in order that he might render all in this way subject to himself. But that is not to establish laws, but to set snares.
[6,5] Et merito reprehensus est Epitades, qui legem tulit, ut liberum esset cuique cui uellet sua relinquere, hoc interim agens ut ipse filium quem oderat, posset exhaeredare. At primum non intelligebat populus hominis technam, uerum ea res deinde grauem perniciem attulit Reipublicae.
[6,5] And deservedly Epitades was reprehended, who carried a law that it should be free for each to leave his own to whom he wished, meanwhile doing this so that he himself could disinherit the son whom he hated. But at first the people did not understand the man’s artifice, yet that matter thereafter brought grave harm to the Republic.
[6,6] Eiusmodi leges proponat Princeps, quae non solum poenam denuncient sontibus, uerum etiam quae persua- deant non esse peccandum. Proinde elrant, qui putant, leges paucissimis uerbis esse comprehendéndas, ut tantum iube- ant, non etiam doceant, imo magis in hoc sint occupatae, ut deterreant a peccando rationibus quam poenis. Etiamsi hanc Platonis sententiam non approbat Seneca, sed audac- ter hoc quidem magis, quam erudite.
[6,6] Let the Prince propose laws of this kind, which not only
denounce punishment to the guilty, but also which persua-
de that one ought not to sin. Accordingly they err, who think, that laws
must be comprehended in the fewest words, so that they only iube-
com- mand, not also teach; nay rather, they be more occupied in this,
that they deter from sinning by reasons rather than by punishments. Even if
Seneca does not approve this opinion of Plato, yet more auda-
ciously in this indeed than learnedly.
[6,7] Idem non permittit iuuenibus disputare de aequitate legis, senioribus permittit moderate. Verum ut non est uulgi, temere censere leges Principum, ita Principis est curare, ut eas ferat leges, quae bonis omnibus placeant, ut meminerit infimis etiam sensum esse communem. Laudatus est in hoc M- Antoninus Pius, quod nihil umquam egerit, quod omnibus per litteras etiam non conatus sit approbare, redditis causis cur id iudicarit expedire Reipublicae.
[6,7] The same man does not permit youths to dispute about the equity
of the law; he permits the elders, with moderation. But just as it is not
the populace’s part to judge rashly the laws of Princes, so it is the Prince’s
part to take care that he enact such laws as may please all good men, and that
he remember that even the lowest have common sense. He was praised
in this, M- Antoninus Pius, because he never did anything which he had not
also tried to approve to all by letters, with the reasons rendered
why he had judged that to be expedient for the Republic.
[6,8] Eleganter Xenophon in Oeconomicis prodidit, caetera quoque animantia duabus rebus potissimum adduci ad obtemperandum: cibo, si quod fuerit abiectius, aut delinimento, si generosius, uelut equus: et plagis, si contumacius, uelut asinus. At homo cura sit animal omnium generosissimum, non tam minis ac suppliciis cogi, quam praemiis oportebit ad officium inuitari legibus. Leges igitur non solum poenam irrogent delinquentibus, sed praemiis quoque prouocent ad bene merendum de Republica.
[6,8] Elegantly Xenophon, in the Oeconomicus, has set forth, the other
animals also are led chiefly by two things to
obey: by food, if any be more abject; or by blandishment,
if more high-bred, as a horse; and by blows, if more contumacious,
like an ass. But since man is the most high-born of all animals,
he ought not so much to be driven by threats and punishments as by rewards
to be invited to duty by laws. Therefore let laws not
only impose penalty upon delinquents, but also by rewards
provoke to merit well of the Commonwealth.
Of which kind we see many to have existed among the ancients.
If anyone had done bravely in war, he sought a reward; and if he had fallen, his children were nourished at public expense.
If anyone had saved a citizen, if anyone had driven an enemy from the walls, if anyone had succored the Republic with a salubrious counsel, there was a reward for the service.
[6,9] Quamquam auteur egregii ciuis est uel nullo proposito praemio, quod optimum est, sequi, tamen expedit huiusmodi illectamentis, rudium adhuc ciuium animos ad honesti studium inflammare. Qui generoso sunt animo, honore magis capiuntur: qui sordidiore, lucro quoque ducuntur. Omnibus igitur hisce rationibus lex sollicitabit, honore et ignominia, lucro ac damno.
[6,9] Although moreover it is of an excellent citizen to pursue the best even with no reward proposed,
nevertheless it is expedient by allurements of this kind
to inflame the minds of citizens, as yet untrained, to a zeal for the honorable.
Those who are of a generous spirit are more captured by honor; those of a more sordid one are led also by lucre. Therefore by all these considerations the law will stir, by honor and
ignominy, by lucre and loss.
[6,10] Ad huiusmodi honoris et ignominiae sensum iam inde a pueritia adsuescant ciues, ut intelligant non opibus aut stemmatis deberi praemium, sed recte factis. In summa, huc modis omnibus spectet Principis uigilantia, non ut tantum puniantur admissa, sed illo multo magis respiciat et incumbat, hoc in primis agat, ut caueat, ne quid admittatur supplicio dignum. Ut enim melior Medicus qui morbum excludit et arcet, quam qui pharmacis expellat acceptum: Ita non paulo praestabilius est efficere, ne facinora patrentur, quam si perpetrata puniantur.
[6,10] To a sense of such honor and ignominy let the citizens be accustomed already from boyhood, so that they understand that the reward is owed not to wealth or pedigrees, but to right deeds. In sum,
to this in every way let the vigilance of the Prince look, not that the admitted offenses be only punished, but let it regard and apply itself much more to this,
and do this first of all: to take care that nothing be admitted worthy of punishment. For the better Physician is he who excludes and wards off a disease, than he who expels one once received by pharmaceuticals:
thus it is by no small degree more preferable to bring it about that crimes not be perpetrated, than if, once perpetrated, they be punished.
But this will be brought about,
if he either cuts back, where he can, the causes from which he has observed most chiefly crimes to be born,
or at any rate represses and attenuates them. First, then, from vicious opinions about things, as has been said,
as from corrupted springs the greatest part of misdeeds gushes forth. Therefore this must be done before all: that you may have citizens trained by the best rational disciplines;
then magistrates not only wise,
but also incorrupt.
[6,11] Ac recte monet Plato, nihil non tentandum, et omnem, quod aiunt, mouendum esse lapidem, priusquam ad ultimum ueniatur supplicium. Agendum argumentis, ne quis peccare uelit, deinde deterrendi metu Numinis malefactorum uindicis, praeterea minis supplicii. Quibus si nihil proficitur, ad supplicia ueniendum, sed leuiora, quae medeantur malo, non quae tollant hominem.
[6,11] And Plato rightly admonishes that nothing is not to be attempted, and that every, as they say, stone must be moved, before one comes to the ultimate punishment.
One must proceed by arguments, so that no one may wish to sin, then by deterring with the fear of the Numen, the avenger of malefactors, moreover by threats of punishment.
If by these nothing is accomplished, one must resort to punishments, but lighter ones, which may heal the evil, not those which take the man away.
[6,12] Quemadmodum fidus ac doctus medicus non adhibet sectionem aut ustionem, si malagmate, aut potione tolli malum possit, nec umquam ad illa descendit nisi morbo coactus. Ita Princeps omnia tentabit remedia, priusquam ad capitale supplicium ueniat, cogitans Rempublicam unum esse corpus: at nemo membrum amputat, si diuersa uia possit sanitati restitui. Ut probus medicus in apparandis remediis haud alio spectat quam ut quam minimo aegrotantis periculo morbus pellatur: ita bonus Princeps in condendis legibus, non alio respiciet quam ad publicam utilitatem, utque populi malis quam minimo medeatur incommodo.
[6,12] Just as a faithful and learned physician does not apply
section or cauterization, if the malady can be removed by an emollient (malagma) or a potion, nor ever descends to those unless compelled by the disease. So the Prince will try all remedies before he comes to capital punishment, thinking that the Commonwealth is one body: and no one amputates a limb, if it can be restored to health by a different way. As an upright physician, in preparing remedies, looks to nothing else than that the disease be driven out with the least possible danger to the sick man: so a good Prince, in enacting laws, will look to nothing else than the public utility, and that he may remedy the people’s ills with the least possible inconvenience.
[6,13] Bona facinorum pars hinc potissimum nascitur, quod ubique plurimi fiant diuitiae, contemta sit paupertas. Dabit igitur Princeps operam, ut sui ciues uirtute ac morbus aestimentur, non censu. Idque primum in se ipso ac suis exhibeat.
[6,13] A good portion of misdeeds springs chiefly from this, that
everywhere riches are valued most highly, and poverty is held in contempt. Therefore
the Princeps will take pains that his citizens be assessed by virtue and morals,
not by wealth. And let him exhibit this first in himself and in his own.
If they should behold the Prince flaunting riches,
and that with him, in proportion as each man is very rich, so he is held in highest esteem,
that to magistracies, to honors, to offices the way lies open to money,
by these very things the minds of the multitude are incited
to procure wealth through right and wrong alike.
[6,14] Et ut magis in genere loquamur, pleraque Rerumpublicarum omnium sentina, ex otio nascitur, quod diuersis rationibus affectant omnes, cui qui semel assueti sunt, si desit quo alant illud, ad malas artes confugiunt. Hoc igitur aget Principis uigilantia, ut quantum potest minimam habeat inter suos turbam otiosorum, et aut ad opus adigat, aut expellat e ciuitate. Plato mendicos omnes procul e sua Republica pellendos putat.
[6,14] And, to speak more in general, most of the dregs of all Republics
is born from idleness, which by diverse reasons all aim at; and those who
have once become accustomed to it, if there is lacking that by which they may sustain it,
flee to evil arts. Therefore let the Prince’s vigilance effect this: that, as much as he can, he
have among his own the smallest crowd of the idle, and either drive them to work,
or expel them from the city. Plato thinks that all beggars ought to be driven far
from his Republic.
[6,15] Sacrificulos qui ad quaestum sacra quaedam circumferebant oppidatim, quo religionis praetextu sectarentur otium ac luxum, Massilienses in ciuitatem suam non recipiebant. Et fortassis expediat Reipublicae Monasteriorum esse modum. Est enim et hoc otii genus quoddam, praesertim quorum uita parum probata fuerit, et otiosam ignauamque transigant uitam.
[6,15] The sacrifice-peddlers who, for gain, carried around certain sacred things town by town, so that under the pretext of religion they might pursue otium and luxury, the Massilienses did not admit into their city. And perhaps it may be expedient for the Republic that there be a limit of Monasteries. For this too is a certain genus of otium, especially for those whose life has been little approved, and who pass an idle and slothful life.
[6,16] Ad hoc genus pertinent, redemptores, institores, foeneratores, proxenetae, lenones, custodes uillarum, ac uiuariorum, grex ministrorum, ac stipatorum, qui apud nonnullos tantum ambitionis aluntur gratia. His cum non suppetit, quod luxus otii comes efflagitat, ad malas artes degenerant. Est et militiae negotiosum otii genus, sed multo pestilentissimum, ex quo semel omnium bonarum rerum exitium, et omnium malarum rerum colluuies proficiscitur.
[6,16] To this kind belong contractors, retail-dealers, usurers, brokers, pimps, keepers of villas and of vivaria, a gang of attendants and of bodyguards, who among some are maintained only for the sake of ambition. When for these there does not suffice what luxury, the companion of leisure, demands, they degenerate into evil arts. There is also in military service a busy kind of leisure, but by far the most pestilential, from which at one stroke the ruin of all good things, and the confluence of all evil things proceeds.
These, therefore,
seminaries of shameful deeds, if the Prince will ward them off from his own kingdom, there will be much
less that he must punish by laws. Therefore honor must be had
for useful crafts, nor is inert leisure to be endowed with the title of nobility,
that I may indicate this also in passing. Not that I would take away from the well‑born their proper
honor, if they answer to the images of their ancestors,
and excel in those things which first engendered nobility.
Otherwise, if today we see most such men, soft through leisure,
effeminized by pleasures, unskilled in all good arts,
mere revellers of war, strenuous gamblers at dice, not to say
anything more obscene, what is there, I beseech you, why this kind of men
should be preferred to shoemakers or farmers? For once to the patricians
leisure was granted from the more sordid crafts not for trifling,
but for learning those disciplines which make for administering the Republic.
[6,17] Ne sit igitur turpe si ciues opulenti aut patricii suos liberos artem doceant sedentariam. Primum dum eius studio detinentur adolescentuli, coercebuntur a multis flagitiis: deinde si nihil erit opus arte, ea neminem onerat. Sin (ut est instabilis rerum humanarum fortuna) deerit, tum artem non modo quaeuis terra, sicut habet prouerbium, sed quaeuis etiam alit fortuna.
[6,17] Let it not, therefore, be shameful if opulent citizens or patricians teach their own children a sedentary art. First, while the adolescent youths are detained by zeal for it, they will be restrained from many flagitious acts: then, if there will be no need of the art, it burdens no one. But if (since the fortune of human affairs is unstable) it should be lacking, then a craft is nourished not only by any land, as the proverb has it, but even by any fortune.
[6,18] Veteres illi quoniam intelligebant plurimum malorum nasci ex luxu et profusione, sumtuariis legibus occurrerunt, creatis in hoc Censoribus, qui immodica impendia, in conuiuiis, in uestitu, aut in aedificiis cohiberent. Id si cui durum uidetur, non licere cuique suis rebus pro sua uti et abuti libidine, cogitet multo durius esse ciuium mores per lucum eo delabi, ut capitis supplicio sit opus: et humanius esse, cogi ad frugalitatem, quam uitiis ferri in perniciem. Nihil inutilius quam ex admissis ciuium, lucrum redire ad magistratus.
[6,18] Those ancients, since they understood that very many evils are born from luxury and profusion, met them with sumptuary laws, appointing for this purpose Censors to restrain immoderate expenditures at banquets, in attire, or in buildings. If this seems harsh to anyone—that it is not permitted for each person to use and abuse his own goods according to his own lust—let him consider that it is much harsher that the morals of the citizens slip down through luxury to such a point that there is need of capital punishment; and that it is more humane to be compelled to frugality than to be borne by vices into perdition. Nothing is more useless than that, from the offenses of the citizens, profit should return to the magistrates.
[6,19] Et par est, et apud priscos fieri consueuit, ut multatitia pecunia potissimum ad eum rediret, qui laesus esset, nonnulla portio ad aerarium publicum, in uehementer odiosis nonnihil etiam ad delatorem. Verum hoc odii, non priuato cuiusquam affectu, sed Reipublicae commodo aut incommodo metiendum.
[6,19] And it is fitting, and among the ancients it was wont to be done, that the money of fines should return chiefly to him who had been injured, some portion to the public treasury, and, in matters vehemently odious, somewhat also to the informer. But this measure of odium is to be measured, not by anyone’s private affect, but by the advantage or disadvantage of the Republic.
[6,20] Illud in uniuersum spectent leges, ne cui flat iniuria, nec pauperi, nec diuiti, nec nobili, nec obscuro, nec seruo, nec libero, neque magistratui, nec priuato. Verum in hanc partem magis propendeant, ut imbecillioribus subueniatur, quod humiliorum fortuna magis exposita sit iniuriis. Quod igitur in fortunae praesidiis diminutum est, id legum exaequet humanitas.
[6,20] Let the laws look to this in universal scope: that injury be done to no one—neither to the poor, nor to the rich, neither to the noble, nor to the obscure, neither to the slave, nor to the free, neither to a magistrate, nor to a private person. But let them incline more in this direction, that the more feeble be succored, because the fortune of the humbler is more exposed to injuries. What therefore has been diminished in the protections of fortune, let the humanity of the laws equalize.
[6,21] Cum, iuxta Platonem, duplex sit poenae genus, in altero uidendum est, ne supplicium acerbius sit quam pro re commissa, ideoque non erit temere ad ultimum supplicium ueniendum: neque facinoris ratio nostris erit aestimanda cupiditatibus, sed aequo atque honesto. Cur enim passim simplex furtum capite punitur, et adulterium pene impunitum est, idque contra ueterum omnium leges, nisi quod apud omnes nimium in pretio est pecunia, et huius iacturam non ex re, sed ex suo metiuntur animo? Cur autem hodie minus saeuiatur in adulteros, in quos olim uehementer saeuiebant leges, non est huius loci, rationem reddere.
[6,21] Since, according to Plato, the kind of punishment is twofold, in the one
it must be seen that the penalty not be harsher than is proportionate to the act
committed; and so one must not rashly resort to the ultimate punishment;
nor must the reckoning of the crime be estimated by our cupidity,
but by the equitable and the honorable. For why, indeed,
is simple theft everywhere punished with the head, and adultery almost unpunished,
and that contrary to the laws of all the ancients, except that
among all, money is held in excessive price, and they measure the loss of it
not by the thing, but by their own mind? But why today there is less
severity exercised against adulterers, against whom once the laws raged vehemently,
it is not the place here to render the reason.
[6,22] Ad alterum genus, quod ille uocat exempli, perquam raro ueniendum erit, nec tam agendum, ut immanitate poenae deterreantur caeteri, quam nouitate. Nihil est enim tam horrendum, quod non contemnatur adsuetudine: nec aliud inutilius, quam ciues suppliciis adsuescere.
[6,22] To the other kind, which he calls exemplary, one must resort very rarely, and it should not be so conducted that the rest are deterred by the immanity of the punishment as by its novelty. For nothing is so horrendous that it is not contemned by habituation; nor anything more useless than that citizens grow accustomed to punishments.
[6,24] Leges inutiles si sine magno malo non queant abrogari, paulatim sunt antiquandae, aut certe corrigendae. Nam ut periculosum est temere nouare leges, ita necesse est ut curationem pro corporum ratione, sic leges ad praesentem Reipublicae statum accommodare: quaedam salubriter instituta, salubrius abrogantur.
[6,24] Useless laws, if they cannot be abrogated without great harm,
are to be gradually antiquated, or at least corrected. For
as it is perilous rashly to innovate laws, so it is necessary to
accommodate, as the cure according to the condition of bodies,
so the laws to the present state of the Republic: certain things wholesomely
instituted are more salubriously abrogated.
[6,25] Multae leges recte quidam sunt institutae, sed eas officiorum prauitas ad pessimos usus detorsit. Nihil autem perniciosius bona lege, ad malas res deflexa. Ab his igitur tollendis aut emendandis, non oportet Principem fisci factura deterreri: Nec enim compendium est, quod sit cum honesti dispendio coniunctum, maxime cum sint eius generis, ut plausibilis etiam sit earum abrogatio.
[6,25] Many laws have indeed been rightly instituted, but the depravity of officials has twisted them to the worst uses. Nihil autem is more pernicious than a good law, deflected to bad things. From these, therefore to be removed or emended, the Prince ought not to be deterred by what the treasury will make: Nor indeed is it a gain which is conjoined with a loss of honor, especially since they are of that kind, that even their abrogation is applaudable.
Nor
indeed let him flatter himself, if laws of this sort in several
places have prevailed, and by long-continued custom have now become inveterate.
For the nature of the honorable does not consist in the number of men,
and this is the more diligently to be removed, the more the evil has become inveterate.
And, to recall one or another for example’s sake,
it has been received in some places, that the goods of one dead abroad
be seized by some Prefect in the King’s name: although this was wholesomely instituted,
namely, lest persons to whom they do not pertain by right vindicate the guest’s goods to themselves,
and that meanwhile they be in the hands of the Prefect, until definite heirs exist: now it has been most iniquitously
twisted to this, that whether an heir exists or does not
exist, the guest’s goods pertain to the fisc.
[6,26] Recte quondam institutum, ut quod apud furem deprehensum repertum esset rerum, id Princeps aut huius nomine Magistratus occuparet, nimirum, ob id, ne si passim eas uindicandi ius esset, per fraudem ad alienos dominos aberrent, uerum simul atque constaret cuius essent, tum illi restituerentur. At nunc quidam, quidquid apud furem compererint, id non minus suum esse ducunt, ac si ex paterna haereditate obuenisset. Quod et ipsi satis intelligunt impudenter iniquum esse, sed honesti ratio, lucri ratione uincitur.
[6,26] Rightly was it once instituted, that whatever of goods had been detected
and found with a thief, that the Prince or the Magistrate in his
name should seize, namely, for this reason, lest, if there were everywhere a right of vindicating
them, they should through fraud stray to alien owners; but as soon as it was ascertained whose they were, then to him
they would be restored. But now certain men, whatever they have discovered with a thief,
they reckon that to be no less their own, as if it had come from paternal
inheritance. Which they themselves well enough understand to be impudently unjust, but the consideration of the honorable is, by the consideration of gain, conquered.
[6,27] Olim bono consilio fuit inductum, ut in confiniis ditionum essent Praefecti, qui importationum aut exportationum curam agerent, nimirum, quo negociator aut uiator tutus a latrociniis commearet: ut si quid cui foret ereptum, Princeps intra suae quisque ditionis limites curaret, uti nec damno plecteretur negociator, nec praedo esset impunitus: et fortasse tum ciuilitatis gratia dari coeptum est nonnihil a negociatoribus. At nunc passim huiusmodi portoriis retinetur uiator, uexantur hospites, expilantur negociatores, et cum indies crescat exactio, tamen de tuendis illis nulla mentio est: Ita cuius gratia primum constitutio nata fuit, penitus sublatum est, et res salubriter instituta, uitio administrantium prorsus in Tyrannidem uersa est. Constitutum est olim, ut res naufragio eiectae, Praefecto maris occuparentur, non ut in illius aut in Principis ius caderent, sed ut per hos caueretur, ne ab iniustis dominis occuparentur, et ita demum publicae fierent, si nullus exstaret, qui iure uindicaret.
[6,27] Formerly it was introduced with good counsel, that on the borders of jurisdictions there should be Prefects, who should have the care of importations or exportations, namely, in order that the merchant or traveler might journey safe from brigandage: so that, if anything had been snatched from anyone, the Prince, within the limits of each one’s own jurisdiction, would see to it that neither the merchant was punished with loss, nor the brigand remained unpunished: and perhaps then, for civility’s sake, it began to be given that something or other by the merchants. But now everywhere by portoria of this kind the traveler is detained, guests are vexed, merchants are plundered, and although the exaction grows daily, yet there is no mention of protecting them: Thus that for whose sake the constitution was first born has been utterly removed, and a measure healthfully instituted, by the fault of the administrators, has been altogether turned into Tyranny. It was once decreed, that goods cast ashore by shipwreck should be secured by the Prefect of the sea, not that they should fall into his right or the Prince’s, but that through these it might be safeguarded, lest they be seized by unjust claimants as owners, and only then become public property, if no one existed who by right would vindicate them.
But today, in certain places, whatever, in whatever manner, has perished in the sea, that the Prefect seizes as though his own,
more merciless than the sea itself. For what the tempest has left to the wretched,
that he, like a second tempest, snatches away. See therefore how all things have gone the opposite way.
The thief is punished,
because he has seized another’s property: and yet the same thing is done by the Magistrate,
appointed for this very purpose, that it should not be done, and through him the owner
of the property is twice despoiled, he having been established for this very thing, that no one should suffer any loss. And by
these, most of all, the merchants are vexed and despoiled, who were induced by this
policy, that the traveler might not be vexed or despoiled. And through these it comes about that the goods do not return to the just owner, whom
the law had employed for this very purpose, that they might not be in the possession of an alien owner.
There are very many constitutions of this sort, among many nations no less iniquitous than iniquity itself. But it is not of this institute to tax any republic; these, as almost common to all, and condemned by the judgment of all, we have recounted for the sake of teaching. And there are perhaps which cannot be antiquated without tumult: but the antiquation of these even conciliates favor for the Prince, and—than which no gain ought to seem greater—an honorable opinion.
[6,29] Quemadmodum Princeps, ita et lex semper esse debet propensior ad ignoscendum quam ad puniendum, siue quod per se benignius, siue quod magis respondet ad mores Dei, cuius ira lentissime ad uindictam procedit: siue quod non recte elapsus, ad poenam repeti potest, iniuste damnato succurri non potest. Is etiam si non periit, quis tamen alterius aestimabit dolorem? Legimus olim huiusmodi fuisse non Principes, sed Tyrannos, a quorum factis oportet Christianum Principem, quam longissime abesse, qui scelera commissa, suis priuatis incommodis aestimarent, ut iis leue furtum esset, si quis pauperculum bonis nudatum, una cum uxore et liberis ad laqueum aut mendicitatem adigat grauissimum uero et multis dignum crucibus, si quis Principalem fiscum, aut rapacem Quaestorem uel nummulo fraudasset.
[6,29] Just as the Princeps, so also the law ought always to be more propense to forgiving than to punishing, whether because it is more benign in itself, or because it more corresponds to the mores of God, whose wrath proceeds most slowly to vengeance: or because he who has not rightly escaped can be called back to penalty, but one unjustly condemned cannot be succored. As for him, even if he has not perished, yet who will estimate another’s pain? We read that of old such were not Princes, but Tyrants, from whose deeds it behooves a Christian Prince to be as far removed as possible, who would assess crimes committed by their own private inconveniences, so that it was a slight theft if someone, stripping a poor little man of his goods, drove him together with his wife and children to the noose or to beggary, but most grave and worthy of many crosses, if someone had defrauded the Princely fisc, or a rapacious Quaestor, even by a single coin.
Likewise they would cry “lèse‑majesté,” if anyone muttered about even the worst Prince, or spoke a little more freely about a pestilent Magistrate, whereas Hadrian the pagan Emperor, otherwise not to be reckoned among good Princes, never admitted the charge of lèse‑majesté: and not even the most cruel Nero greatly courted delations of this kind. And a certain other, crimes of this sort being wholly neglected, said, “In a free city, tongues likewise ought to be free.” Therefore to no offenses committed will a good Prince more easily and more willingly grant pardon than those that pertain to his private injury.
For to whom is it easier to contemn things of this kind than to a Prince? But for him to take vengeance, however easy it is, is just as invidious and indecorous. For since vengeance is an argument of a petty and lowly spirit, nothing less befits a Prince, whom it behooves to be of an exalted and great spirit.
It is not enough for the Prince to be absent from every crime, unless he has also been free from the suspicion and semblance of crime. Wherefore he not only weighs what he deserves who has transgressed against the Prince, but what others who are to judge will think of the Prince; and, with regard to his own dignity, he will sometimes forgive one unmeriting, and, consulting his own fame, he will grant pardon to those unworthy of pardon.
[6,30] Neque statim illud occlamet aliquis, hac ratione parum consuli Principum maiestati, quam sacrosanctam et inuiolatam esse, e Republica potissimum est. Imo non alia uia rectius consulitur illius magnitudini, si populus intelligat eum tam uigilantem, ut nihil eum fallat: tam sapientem, ut intelligat quibus in rebus sita sit uera Principis maiestas: tam clementem, ut nihil suarum iniuriarum ulturus sit, nisi cogeret utilitatis publicae ratio. Caesaris Augusti maiestatem, et clariorem et tutiorem reddidit Cinnae donata uenia, cum tot suppliciis nihil profecisset.
[6,30] Nor let someone straightway cry out that, by this reasoning, too little
care is taken for the majesty of princes, which to be sacrosanct and inviolate
is, from the Republic, most of all. Nay rather, by no other way
is that greatness more rightly provided for, if the people understand
him to be so vigilant, that nothing escapes him; so wise, that he
understands in what matters the true majesty of a Prince is situated;
so clement, that he will avenge nothing of his own injuries,
unless the consideration of public utility should compel it. The majesty of Caesar Augustus
was rendered both clearer and safer by the pardon granted to Cinna,
when by so many punishments he had accomplished nothing.
He alone truly injures the Prince’s majesty, whoever diminishes that whereby he is truly great: but he is great by the goods of the mind, and great when the people’s affairs are flourishing through his wisdom. Whoever wears these down is to be accused of majesty. For they err very greatly, nor do they at all understand the true majesty of a Prince, who think it is augmented thus, if the laws and public liberty avail as little as possible, as if the Prince and the Republic were two distinct things.
But if a comparison must be made between those things which nature has conjoined,
let not the King compare himself with any one of his own, but
with the whole body of the Republic: Thus he will see how much
more valuable that is, embracing so many outstanding men and women,
than the single head of the Prince. The Republic, even if the Prince
is lacking, will nevertheless be a Republic. For even the most ample
empires have flourished with no Prince, as in the Democracy
of the Romans and of the Athenians: but a Prince can in no way
exist without a Republic; finally, the Republic embraces the Prince,
not the other way around.
For what is it, indeed, that makes the Prince so great, if not the consensus of the obsequents? But he who is great by his own goods, that is, by virtues, will be great even with his imperium taken away. Accordingly, it is plain that those men judge most perversely, who measure the dignity of the Prince by those things which are unworthy of the Prince’s grandeur.
They call a traitor (for they want that term to be most odious) who, when the Prince is deflecting toward things which are neither decorous nor safe for himself, nor conducive to the fatherland, recalls him to better things by free counsels. But he who corrupts him with plebeian opinions, who into pleasures sordid, who into carousals, into gambling, and other disgraces of that kind hurls him headlong—does that man consult the dignity of the Prince? They call it fidelity, whenever through assentation to a foolish Prince one complies: treason, if anyone opposes base undertakings.
Nay, no one is less a friend to the Prince than he who, by base flattery, drives him mad and leads him away from the right, who entangles him in wars, who persuades the plunderings of the people, who teaches the art of tyranny, who makes him hateful to all good people: this is true treason, and not to be punished by a single penalty. Plato wants the g-nomophulakas, that is, those who are set over the preserving of the laws, to be most incorrupt. And a good Prince ought to animadvert upon none more severely than those who administer the laws corruptly, although the Prince himself is the first of the g-nomophulakohn.
It is expedient, therefore, that the laws be as few as possible, then
as most equitable and conducive to public utility,
furthermore as well known as possible to the people, whence the ancients publicly exhibited them inscribed on
tablets and on a whitened board, so that they might be conspicuous to all. For it is foul that certain men use the laws
in the stead of a snare, namely, doing this in order to entangle as many as possible, not consulting the Commonwealth, but, as it were, hunting for prey. Finally, that they be described in words open and least perplexed,
so that there be not much need of that most lucrative kind of men, who call themselves Jurisconsults and Advocates:
which profession indeed once was peculiar to men of the Optimates, and possessed very much dignity, of lucre very
little; now profit also has corrupted this, which vitiates nothing at all not at all.
Caput septimum: De magistratibus et officiis.
Chapter 7: On magistrates and offices.
[7,1] Princeps quam integritatem in se praestat, eamdem debet, aut certe proximam a suis officiariis exigere. Neque satis esse ducat, mandasse magistratus, sed plurimum refert, quomodo mandet, deinde uigilandum, ut incorrupte mandatis fungantur. Prudenter et grauiter admonet Aristoteles, frustra condi bonas leges, nisi sint quorum opera bene conditae seruentur, imo fit alioqui nonnumquam, ut optime conditae leges, uitio magistratuum in summam Reipublicae perniciem uertantur.
[7,1] The Princeps ought to exact from his officials the same integrity that he shows in himself, or at least one very near to it. Nor should he deem it enough to have commissioned magistrates, but it matters very much how he commissions them; then he must keep watch, that they discharge the mandates incorruptly. Aristotle prudently and gravely admonishes that good laws are enacted in vain, unless there are those by whose agency, being well enacted, they are preserved; indeed, otherwise it sometimes happens that laws most excellently enacted, by the fault of the magistrates, are turned to the utter ruin of the Republic.
[7,2] Quamquam magistratus non censu, non imaginibus, nec annis est eligendus, sed potius sapientia et integritate, tamen magis conuenit, ut natu grandes ad huiusmodi munia adhibeantur, unde Reipublicae pendet incolumitas, non tantum quod senibus et plus adest ex usu rerum prudentiae, et affectus sunt moderatiores, uerum etiam quod apud populum nonnihil auctoritatis illis conciliat senectus. Proinde Plato uetat, ne legum custodes adhibeantur minores annis quinquaginta, ne maiores septuaginta. Sacerdotem non uult esse minorem annis sexaginta: nam ut est aetatis maturitas quaedam, ita est aetatis processus, cui missio, muniumque omnium relaxatio debeatur.
[7,2] Although a magistrate is not to be chosen by census, not by images, nor by years, but rather by wisdom and integrity, nevertheless it more befits that those great in years be employed for duties of this sort, on which the safety of the Commonwealth hangs, not only because in old men there is more prudence from the use (experience) of things, and their affections are more moderate, but also because old age conciliates to them no small authority among the people. Accordingly Plato forbids that guardians of the laws be employed younger than 50 years, nor older than 70. He does not wish a priest to be less than 60 years: for as there is a certain maturity of age, so there is a process of age, to which discharge and the relaxation of all duties ought to be due.
[7,3] Quemadmodum chorus res est elegans, si quidem ordine constet et harmonia, contra, ridiculum spectaculum, si gesticulationes una cum uocibus confundantur: Ita praeclara quaedam res est ciuitas aut regnum, si suus cuique detur locus, si suo quisque fungatur officio, hoc est, si Princeps quod se dignum est agat, si magistratus suas obeant partes, si plebes item bonis legibus et integris magistratibus obtemperet. At ubi suum negotium agit Princeps, et magistratus nihil aliud quam compilant populum, ubi plebes non obtemperat honestis legibus, sed Principi ac magistratibus, utcumque res tulerit, adulatur, ibi turpissima quaedam rerum confusio sit, oportet.
[7,3] Just as a chorus is an elegant thing, if indeed it consists in order
and harmony, but a ridiculous spectacle if the gesticulations are confused
together with the voices: so a certain splendid thing is a city or a kingdom,
if its proper place is given to each, if each one performs his own office—that is,
if the Prince does what is worthy of himself, if the magistrates discharge their
parts, if the plebs likewise obey good laws and upright magistrates. But where
the Prince minds his own private business, and the magistrates do nothing other
than plunder the people, where the plebs does not obey honorable laws, but
flatters the Prince and the magistrates, however the matter may turn out, there
there must needs be a most disgraceful confusion of affairs.
[7,5] Princeps quid aliud est quam Medicus Reipublicae? At Medico non satis est, si ministros habeat peritos, nisi sit ipse peritissimus ac uigilantissimus: Ita Principi non sufficit, sit Magistratus habeat probos, nisi sit ipse probissimus, per quem illi et deliguntur et emendantur.
[7,5] What else is the Princeps than the Physician of the Republic? But
to the Physician it is not enough, if he have ministers skilled, unless he be
himself most skilled and most vigilant: Thus to the Princeps it does not suffice,
that he have magistrates upright, unless he himself be most upright,
through whom they both are chosen and are amended.
[7,6] Ut animi partes non omnes perinde ualent, sed quaedam imperant, aliae parent, et tamen corpus tantum paret: Ita Principem summam Reipublicae partem plurimum sapere, et ab omnibus crassis affectibus alienissimum esse oportet. Ad hunc proxime accedent magistratus, qui partim parent, partira imperant: parent Principi, imperant plebi.
[7,6] As the parts of the mind are not all equally strong, but some command, others obey, and yet the body alone obeys: thus the Prince, the highest part of the Republic, ought to be most wise, and most alien from all crass affections. Next to him draw near the magistrates, who partly obey, partly command: they obey the Prince, they command the plebs.
[7,7] Ergo praecipue Reipublicae felicitas in hoc sita est, ut pure creentur magistratus, et pure mandentur officia. Deinde sit actio male gesti muneris, quemadmodum antiquis erat actio repetundarum. Postremo statuatur in hos seuerissima animaduersio, si conuicti fuerint.
[7,7] Therefore the Commonwealth’s felicity is chiefly set in this, that
magistrates be chosen purely, and that offices be purely entrusted.
Then let there be an action for a badly-administered charge, just as among the ancients there
was the action for repetundae. Lastly, let the most severe animadversion be established against these
if they shall have been convicted.
[7,8] Pure creabuntur Magistratus, si Princeps eos adsciscat, non qui plurimo emant, non qui improbissime ambiant, non qui cognatione coniunctiores, non qui ad illius mores aut affectus cupiditatesque maxime sint accomodi, sed qui moribus sint integerrimis, et ad functionem mandati muneris aptissimi.
[7,8] Magistrates will be created purely, if the Prince enroll them, not those who buy for the very highest price, not those who most shamelessly canvass, not those more closely conjoined by cognation, not those who are most accommodated to his manners or affections and cupidities, but those who are of the most unimpaired morals, and most apt for the function of the mandated office.
[7,9] Caeterum ubi Princeps unum hoc agit, ut quam plurimo uendat officia, quid tandem ab iis exspectet, nisi ut itidem reuendant, et quomodocumque damnum suum sarciant, et cauponentur in administrando, quemadmodum negociatione sunt consecuti. Nec hoc ideo minus perniciosum Reipublicae uideri oportet, quia consuetudine pessima apud plerasque nationes receptum est, cura Ethnicis etiam fuerit improbatum, et Caesareae leges iubeant eos, qui iudiciis praesunt, Principali salario esse inuitandos, ne qua sit illis ansa faciendi quaestus.
[7,9] But when the Prince does this one thing, to sell offices for as much as possible,
what, pray, should he expect from them, except that they likewise sell again, and by any means
patch up their loss, and play the huckster in administering, just as they obtained it by
negotiation. Nor ought this therefore to seem less pernicious to the Republic, because by a most
evil custom it has been received among most nations, since it was disapproved even by the Gentiles,
and the Caesarean laws command that those who preside over judgments be invited by a princely salary,
lest there be for them any handle for making gain.
[7,10] Olim grauissimum crimen erat corrupti iudicii: at qua fronte puniet Princeps iudicem, qui muneribus corruptus pronunciauit, aut pronunciare noluit, cura ipse iudicandi murais aere uendiderit, et hanc corruptelam prior suum docuerit iudicem? Hoc praestet Princeps erga magistratus, quod illos praestare uult erga plebem.
[7,10] Formerly the gravest crime was a corrupted judgment: but with what
face will the Prince punish a judge who, corrupted by gifts (bribes),
has pronounced, or refused to pronounce, when he himself
has sold for money the office of judging, and has first taught his
own judge this corruption? Let the Prince render toward the magistrates
what he wishes them to render toward the plebeians.
[7,11] Prudenter admonet in Politicis Aristoteles, super omnia cauendum esse, ne ex magistratibus lucra proueniant iis, qui ea gerunt: alioqui geminum incommodum hinc sequi. Nam primum hac ratione fieri, ut auarissimus quisque et corruptissimus ambiat, imo occupet et inuadat magistratum, et populus duplici discrucietur molestia, tum quod ab honoribus excluditur; tum quod lucro priuatur.
[7,11] Aristotle prudently admonishes in the Politics, above all,
that it must be guarded against, lest profits arise from magistracies to those
who administer them: otherwise a twin inconvenience follows from this.
For first, in this way it comes about that each most avaricious and
most corrupt man canvasses for, nay seizes and invades, magistracy,
and the people are racked with a double vexation, both because it is
excluded from honors; and because it is deprived of profit.
Caput octauum: De foederibus.
[8,1] In pangendis foederibus, quemadmodum et caeteris in rebus, non alio spectabit bonus Princeps, quam ad publicam utilitatem. Alioqui cura hoc agitur ut commodius habeant Principes populi rebus attenuatis, non foedus est appellandum, sed conspiratio. Siquidem qui hoc sunt animo, duos populos ex uno faciunt, Procerum et plebis, quorum alter alterius malo melius habeat; uerum id ubi fit, ibi non est Respublica.
[8,1] In striking treaties, just as in the other matters, the good Prince will look to nothing other than the public utility. Otherwise, if the concern is pursued with this aim, that the Princes may have it more convenient with the people’s affairs attenuated, it is not to be called a treaty, but a conspiracy. For indeed those who are of this mind make two peoples out of one, the Grandees and the plebs, of whom the one fares better by the other’s misfortune; but where that happens, there is not a Commonwealth.
Among all Christian Princes there is the most tight and at once most sacred foedus, even on this very account, that they are Christians. To what purpose, therefore, is it to be dealing daily with so many foedera, just as if all were the enemies of all, and that by human pacts there must be procured what Christ does not procure? When a matter is transacted with many syngraphs, it is an argument that it is not being conducted in the best good faith; and we very often see it come to pass that from these there are born very many litigations, which were employed for this very purpose, that no litigations might arise. Where faith intervenes, and the matter is carried on among good men, there is no need of very many and anxious syngraphs; where the matter is carried on among the wicked and of bad faith, the syngraphs even beget the very matter of suit.
Likewise
among good and wise Princes, even if no treaty intervene,
amity stands: among fools and the wicked, from
the very treaties which were employed for this, that war
might not arise, wars are born, while among innumerable articles
someone complains that this or that has been violated. A treaty is
wont to be struck for this, that an end be imposed upon war: but today they call “treaty,”
one entered for this, that war be set in motion. Nor is
the federation of such men anything other than the machinations of war: and however
matters incline, so do the treaties go.
Such ought to be the fidelity of princes in performing those things which they undertake, that the simple
promise of these should be more sacred than any other men’s oath. How shameful, then, that there is no performance of what has been agreed by solemn treaties,
even with those things interposed, than which among Christians nothing can be more sacred? And yet we see this
come about daily in practice; I add nothing as to by whose fault: certainly without fault
it cannot happen.
[8,2] Si quid in foedere uiolatum uidebitur, non statim huc inclinandum, ut uniuersum foedus irritetur, ne uideatur occasio captata recedendi ab amicitia. Quin magis adnitendum, ut quam minimo incommodo sarciatur id quod ruptum est: quin expedit aliquoties ad quaedam conniuere, quandoquidem nec inter priuatos homines diu cohaeret necessitudo, si cuncta ad uiuum, quod aiunt, exigant. Neque statim id sequaris, quod dictat ira, sed quod publica suadet utilitas.
[8,2] If anything shall seem to have been violated in the treaty, not straightway must one incline hither
that the whole treaty be annulled, lest it seem
that an occasion has been seized for withdrawing from friendship. Nay rather one must strive,
that what has been broken may be patched with as little inconvenience as possible:
indeed it is expedient sometimes to connive at certain things,
since not even among private men does a bond long cohere
if they exact everything to the quick, as they say. Nor at once should you follow what anger dictates, but what public
utility advises.
A good and wise Prince will take pains to have peace with all, but especially with neighbors, who, if hostile, would do the most harm, but as friends would be of benefit, and without whose mutual commerce the Republic could not even endure. And friendship easily comes together and coheres among those whom a common language, the proximity of regions, and a likeness of talents and mores conciliate. There is so great a dissimilarity in all things among certain nations that it is far more advisable to have altogether abstained from commerce with them than to be bound even by the tightest treaties.
There are certain ones so far remote
distant, that even if they wish well, they can profit nothing. Finally there are some so morose, pact‑breaking, and insolent that, even if they are neighboring, nevertheless they are useless for any friendship.
With these it will have been most advisable neither to fall out in war, nor to be bound by the tighter bonds of treaties or of affinities (kinships), because both war is always ruinous, and the friendship of certain people is not much more tolerable than war.
[8,3] Haec erit igitur una Regiae sapientiae pars, gentium omnium ingenia moresque cognoscere, id partim e libris, partim e sapientum et expertorum commemoratione consequetur, ne sibi necesse putet cum Ulysse per omnes terras mariaque circumagi. Ac de caeteris quidem haud facile sit certum aliquid praescribere. Illud in genere licet pronunciare, non oportere arctius adstringi his, quos religio diuersa a nobis alienat, ueluti cum Ethnicis: aut quos naturae prouidentia, Alpibus aut Fretis interiectis, a nobis separat aut quos immensum locorum spatium penitus a nobis semouit, hi nec ad nos accersendi, nec a nobis impetendi sunt.
[8,3] This, then, will be one part of Royal wisdom: to know the natures and mores of all nations, that he will obtain partly from books, partly from the commemoration/recounting of the wise and the experienced, lest he think it necessary for himself to be carried about with Ulysses through all lands and seas. And indeed, as to the rest, it is not easy to prescribe anything certain. This in general may be pronounced: that one ought not to be more tightly bound to those whom a diverse religion alienates from us, as with the Pagans (Ethnics): or those whom the providence of nature, with Alps or Straits interposed, separates from us; or those whom an immense expanse of places has entirely removed from us—these are neither to be summoned to us, nor to be attacked by us.
Although very many examples of this matter are at hand, nevertheless one, which offers itself from what is nearest at hand, will suffice for all. The kingdom of France is indeed, in all affairs, by far the most flourishing of all: but it would be much more flourishing, if it had refrained from assailing Italy.
Caput nonum: De Principum Affinitatibus.
Chapter nine: On the Affinities of Princes.
[9,1] Equidem multo saluberrimum iudicarim Reipublicae, si Principum affinitates intra regni fines continerentur, aut si quid recedendum sit a limitibus, cum proxime finitimis dumtaxat iungerentur, sed iis, qui ad amicitiae fidem sint idonei. Atqui non decet (inquiunt) Regis filiam nisi cum Rege aut Regis filio copulari. At isti priuatorum sunt affectus, suos quantum possint euehere, a quibus oportet Principem alienissimum esse.
[9,1] Indeed I would judge it far the most salutary for the Commonwealth,
if the affinities of Princes were contained within the borders of the realm; or
if any departure from the limits must be made, that they be joined with the nearest neighbors
only, yet with those who are fit for the faith of friendship.
But “it is not seemly” (they say) “for a King’s daughter to be coupled with any save a King or a King’s son.”
Yet these are the affections of private persons, to exalt their own as much as they can, from which it behooves
a Prince to be most alien.
[9,3] Quod si placet adhibere delectum Principe dignum, seligatur ex omnibus, integritate, modestia, prudentiaque commendata, quae optimo Principi morigera sit uxor, et illi liberos utroque parente patriaque dignos generet. Satis honesta est quocumque sanguine nata, quae bono Principi bonam praestat uxorem.
[9,3] But if it pleases to make a choice worthy of the Prince, let her be selected from among all, commended for integrity, modesty, and prudence, who may be a compliant wife to the best Prince, and may beget for him children worthy of both parents and of the fatherland. Honorable enough, whatever blood she is born of, is she who proves a good wife to a good Prince.
[9,4] Illud in confesso est, nihil aeque expedire in rem omnium, atque ut Princeps uehementer amet suos, et ab iisdem uicissim ametur. Ad quod ingens habet momentum patria, communis corporum et animorum similitudo, et nescio quid natiuae fragrantiae, quam arcana quaedam geniorum affinitas addit: at hinc magna pars pereat oportet, si haec omnia confundant imparia matrimonia. Vix enim fieri potest, ut sic natos, toto pectore agnoscat patria, aut sic nati, toto pectore sint dediti patriae.
[9,4] That point is confessed: nothing is equally expedient for the interest of all as that the Prince vehemently love his own, and in turn be loved by the same. To which the fatherland contributes enormous weight, the common similarity of bodies and souls, and I know not what native fragrance, to which a certain arcane affinity of genii adds: but from here a great part must needs perish, if unequal marriages confound all these things. For it can scarcely come to pass that the fatherland recognize with all its heart those thus born, or that those thus born be with all their heart devoted to the fatherland.
And yet the populace thinks these as if adamantine bonds of public concord, though the matter itself teaches that from this arise the greatest tumults of human affairs: here someone complains bitterly that I know not what was omitted from the pacts of betrothal, here someone, offended at some matter, leads away his betrothed; that one, with his plan changed, renounces the former and leads another into the bridal chamber; another alleges some other pretext. But what have these to do with the Republic? If affinity among Princes one with another would furnish the world with tranquility, I would wish all to be bound together by six hundred affinities.
But what did affinity avail a few years ago,
to prevent James, King of the Scots, from invading with hostile forces
the borders of England? And it happens at times that, after the long tumults of wars,
after innumerable disasters, at last, an affinity having been contracted,
the matter is composed, but with each side by now wearied out by ills. This is to be done by princes: that a certain perpetual peace
come together among all, and on this let them confer their counsels.
But someone will say that by the propagation of children that conjunction is made perpetual.
Why then is war waged most especially among those between whom the greatest propinquity is?
Nay rather, through this propagation most especially there arises a commutation of kingdoms,
the right of dominion is transferred from one place to another, from here
something departs, and there it increases, from which matters the most grave
tumults are wont to arise.
Therefore by these rationales it does not come about that wars do not arise,
but rather that more atrocious and more frequent ones are stirred up. For realms are connected to realms by affinity, whenever
anyone is offended, he by the right of affinity incites even the
others, so that from any slight offense a great part of the Christian world
is straightway moved to arms, and at the cost of an immense shedding of Christian
blood the wrath of a single man is appeased. From examples I deliberately refrain,
lest I offend anyone in any respect.
In sum, by affinities of this sort, the interests of Princes perhaps are augmented, but the interests of the people are worn down and afflicted. Moreover, a good Prince judges his own interests to prosper in no other way unless care is taken for the commodities of the Commonwealth: not to mention meanwhile that by this way it is not dealt very humanely with the girls themselves, who sometimes into far-removed regions, to men most dissimilar in language, appearance, customs, and natural dispositions, are as it were relegated into exile, who would live more happily among their own people, and with somewhat less noise. Although I see this custom more received than that I should hope it can be torn up, nevertheless it seemed good to admonish, if perchance anything should happen contrary to expectation.
Caput decimum: De Principum occupationibus in pace.
Chapter ten: On the occupations of Princes in peace.
[10,1] Princeps igitur Christi decretis, et sapientiae praesidiis instructus, nihil omnium habebit carius, immo nihil aliud habebit carum, quam populi sui felicitatem, quem oportet uelut unicum corpus ex aequo, tum diligere, tum curare. Et in hoc unum omneis cogitationes, omneis conatus, omnia studia destinabit, ut ad eum modum administre prouinciam sibi creditam, ut et Christo rationem exacturo probetur, et apud mortales omnes honestissimam sui memoriam relinquat. Siue domi sit Princeps siue in secessu, laudatum illum Scipionem imitetur, qui negabat se umquam minus esse solum, quam cum solus esset, aut minus otiosum esse, quam cum esset in otio: quod is quoties uacaret a Reipublicae negotiis, semper animo secum agitabat aliquid, quod ad ciuitatis salutem aut dignitatem pertineret.
[10,1] The Prince, therefore, instructed by Christ’s decrees and the safeguards of sapience, will hold nothing of all things dearer—indeed, he will hold nothing else dear—than the felicity of his people, whom he ought to love and to care for equally as a single body. And to this one thing he will destine all thoughts, all endeavors, all studies: that he may administer the province entrusted to him in such a manner that he may be approved by Christ, who will exact an account, and may leave among all mortals a most honorable memory of himself. Whether the Prince be at home or in retirement, let him imitate that lauded Scipio, who used to say that he was never less alone than when he was alone, nor less idle than when he was at leisure: because whenever he was free from the business of the Republic, he always revolved in mind with himself something that pertained to the safety or the dignity of the civitas.
Let him imitate the Virgilian Aeneas, whom the most prudent Poet frequently, while others are sleeping, portrays as revolving many matters through the night with his own mind, so that he might more rightly take counsel for his own people. And that Homeric saying ought to be inscribed on all the walls of the Royal palace, but more on the minds of kings:
[10,2] Siue uersetur in publico, semper aliquid agat, quod ad rem communem faciat, hoc est, nusquam non Principem agat. At magis decet Principem in publicis uersari functionibus, quam abditum agere. Quoties autem prodit, aduigilet, ut ipse uultus, incessus, et praecipue sermo talis sit, ut populum reddat meliorem, memor, quidquid fecerit aut dixerit, ab omnibus obseruari cognoscique.
[10,2] Whether he be engaged in public, let him always do something that makes for the common good, that is, let him nowhere fail to act the Prince. But it more befits a Prince to be engaged in public functions than to act in seclusion. And as often as he goes forth, let him be fully vigilant, so that his very countenance, gait, and especially his speech be such as to render the people better, mindful that whatever he has done or said is observed and known by all.
For the institution of the Persians was not approved by wise men, among whom they spent their life hidden at home. And by this one way they strove to be magnified by their own people: that they were never seen, and very rarely made the people a supply of themselves. But if ever they came forth, they displayed nothing other than barbaric haughtiness and wealth immoderate to the people’s harm.
[10,3] Et sunt hodieque nonnulli, qui putent id esse parum Regium, quod solum est Regibus pulcerrimum, in publicis functionibus uersari. Quemadmodum et Episcopi nonnulli, nihil minus suum esse ducunt, quam id quod unum Episcopo dignum est, docere populum: ac miro consilio, quod peculiare est Episcoporum, id ueluti indignum in alios relegant, quod sordidissimum, id sibi potissimum uindicant. At non puduit Mithridatem, non minus eruditione quam imperio nobilem Regem, suo ore, nulloque interprete populo ius reddere, quod ut faceret, uiginti duas linguas ad plenum legitur perdidicisse.
[10,3] And there are today as well not a few who think that to be too little Regal—that very thing which alone is most beautiful for Kings—to be engaged in public functions. Just so certain Bishops
deem nothing less their own than that which alone is worthy of a Bishop: to teach the people; and by a wondrous counsel, what
is peculiar to Bishops, this they relegate to others as though unworthy, while what is most sordid, that they most especially vindicate for themselves. Yet it did not shame Mithridates, a King noble no less in erudition than in imperium,
to render law to the people with his own mouth, and with no interpreter; and, in order to do this, he is recorded to have thoroughly learned twenty-two languages.
Nor did Philip, King of the Macedonians, judge it anything less than decorous for a King, that he should sit daily for the investigation of causes (cases). Nor did Alexander the Great, his son, although otherwise ambitious even to insanity, to whom it has been handed down that he had this custom, to hear with one ear stopped by his hand, saying that he kept that other one intact for the opposite party. But the more some abhor these matters, a perverse education of Princes is the cause.
For indeed, according to the old proverb, whatever art each man knows, in this he gladly exercises himself, fleeing from those in which he understands himself to be of little strength. How, then, should it come about that one who, among assentators and womenfolk, corrupted first by opinions and then by pleasures, has consumed those first years at dice, in dances, and in hunting, should afterwards take joy in being engaged in those functions whose use required the most diligent meditation? Homer denies that a Prince has so much leisure as to sleep out the whole night, and these men study nothing else except to beguile the tedium of their whole life with ever-renewed pleasures, just as if there were absolutely nothing that Princes have to do.
[10,4] Bonis legibus occurrendum est malis moribus, corrigendae eges deprauatae, tollendae malae, prospiciendi magistratus integri, puniendi aut cohibendi corrupti. Exquirendae rationes, quibus tenuem plebeculam quam minimum grauet, quibus ditionem suam latrociniis ac maleficiis liberet, idque quam potest minimo sanguine, quibus suorum perpetuam concordiam alat ac stabiliat. Sunt his minutiora quaedam, sed non indigna quamuis magno Principe, lustrare ciuitates, sed hoc animo, ut omnia reddat meliora: quae parum tuta sunt, communiat, publicis aedificiis ornet, item pontibus, porticibus, templis, ripis, aquaeductibus, loca pestilentiae obnoxia purget, uel mutatis aedificiis, uel desiccatis paludibus.
[10,4] By good laws one must counter bad morals, the depraved laws must be corrected, the evil removed, magistrates of integrity must be provided for, the corrupt punished or restrained. Means must be sought, by which he burden the lowly plebeian commonalty as little as possible, by which he may free his dominion from robberies and malefactions, and that with as little blood as he can, by which he may nourish and stabilize the perpetual concord of his own. There are certain things more minute than these, yet not unworthy of even a great Prince, to survey the cities, but with this mind, that he render all things better: what are less than safe, let him fortify, let him adorn with public edifices, likewise with bridges, porticoes, temples, banks, aqueducts, let him purge places obnoxious to pestilence, either by altering buildings, or by drying marshes.
Let him divert rivers that flow incommodiously to another
channel. Let him, for the public convenience, either admit or
ward off the sea. Let him see to neglected fields being cultivated, so that the grain-supply may be more at hand; let him order fields tilled not very profitably to be tilled otherwise—for example,
that there be no vineyards there where wine comes forth unworthy of the cultivation, and where grain can be produced.
Of this kind there are six thousand,
which for a Prince to take care of is most beautiful, and for a good Prince even
pleasant, so that there is never any need either, through the tedium of leisure, to seek war,
or to beguile the night with dice. In those things which pertain to the Commonwealth
it makes the Prince not luxurious or profuse,
but splendid, as in public edifices, or
games, in receiving legations, if any should plead the cause of the people.
In those things which pertain to him privately he will be more frugal
and tighter, partly lest he seem to live at public expense,
partly lest he teach his citizens luxury, the parent of many evils.
[10,5] Video ueterum permultos in hoc errore fuisse, et utinam hodie nullos idem habeat error, ut huc omnes conatus suos intenderent, non ut meliorem redderent suam ditionem, sed ut maiorem: quibus illud saepenumero uidemus euenisse, ut dum propagando student imperio, etiam id perderent quod possederant. Non abs re tantopere laudata est illa Theopompi uox, qui negauit sua referre quam ingens relinqueret liberis suis imperium, modo melius ac stabilius. Et Laconicum illud prouerbium dignum mihi uidetur, quod omnium Principum insignibus adscribatur: g-Spartan g-elaches, g-tautehn g-kosmei, hoc est, Spartam sortitus es, hanc orna.
[10,5] I see that very many of the ancients were in this error—and would that today none had the same error—that they directed all their endeavors hither, not to make their dominion better, but greater; for whom we very often see this befall, that while they strive to propagate their empire, they even lose what they possessed. Not without reason was that saying of Theopompus so highly praised, who denied that it concerned him how vast an empire he would leave to his children, provided it were better and more stable. And that Laconian proverb seems to me worthy to be inscribed on the insignia of all Princes: g-Spartan g-elaches, g-tautehn g-kosmei, that is, You have been allotted Sparta; adorn it.
[10,6] Hoc sibi penitus persuasum habeat bonus Princeps, nihil a se geri posse magnificentius, quam si quidquid est hoc regni, quod sors dederit, florentius reddat, ac modis omnibus ornatius. Laudatus est a doctissimis uiris Epaminondae Ducis animus, cui cum per inuidiam magistratus esset delegatus, humilis ac uulgo contemtus, ita gessit, ut deinceps inter honestissimos habitus a maximis uiris ambiretur, negans magistratum dignitatem adferre uiro, sed uirum magistratui.
[10,6] Let a good Prince have this thoroughly persuaded within himself, that nothing can be carried on by him more magnificent than, if whatever this is of a realm which lot has given, he render more flourishing and by all methods more adorned.
The spirit of the General Epaminondas was praised by the most learned men, who, when through envy a magistracy had been assigned that was lowly and commonly despised, so conducted it that thereafter, being accounted among the most honorable, it was courted by the greatest men,
declaring that it is not the magistracy that brings dignity to the man, but the man to the magistracy.
[10,7] Id consequetur, si, quemadmodum ex parte demonstrauimus, eas res curet maxime, per quas Respublica stabilitur et illustratur: eas rursus excludat, et arceat, quae Reipublicae statum reddunt deteriorem. Adiuuatur enim maxime boni Principis exemplo, sapientia, uigilantia: magistratuum et officiorum integritate, Sacerdotum sanctimonia, ludimagistrorum delectu, aequis legibus, et ad uirtutem conducentibus studiis. In his igitur augendis et confirmandis sit omnis boni Principis cura.
[10,7] He will achieve that, if, as we have in part demonstrated,
he most of all takes care for those things by which the Republic is stabilized
and rendered illustrious: and, in turn, excludes and wards off those things which
make the state of the Republic worse. For it is helped most
by the example, wisdom, and vigilance of a good Prince; by the integrity of magistrates
and offices; by the sacerdotal sanctity of priests; by the selection of schoolmasters;
by equitable laws; and by studies conducive to virtue. Therefore, in augmenting and
confirming these things let the whole care of a good Prince be placed.
Moreover, it is harmed by diverse things,
which will the more easily be excluded from the Republic, if we shall attempt first to remove the very roots and
sources whence we have detected these to be born. In matters of this sort, to be solicitous and ingenious is the Philosophy of a Christian Prince. To conspire salubriously toward these, to bring his own counsels together for these at the same time—this at last is worthy of Christian Princes.
[10,8] Quemadmodum corpora coelestia, si uel paululum tumultuentur, aut recto cursu diuarient, non sine graui humanarum pernicie id faciunt, id quod palam uidemus in defectibus solis ac lunae. Ita summi Principes, si quid aberrent ab honesto, aut si quid ambitione, ira, stultitiaue peccent, id protinus ingenti totius orbis malo faciunt. Nec enim ulla umquam eclipsis sic afflixit hominum genus, ut Iulii Pontificis, et Lodouici Galliarum Regis dissidium, quod nuper et uidimus et fleuimus.
[10,8] Just as the celestial bodies, if even a little they fall into tumult,
or diverge from a straight course, do this not without grave
ruin to human affairs, a thing which we plainly see in
the eclipses of the sun and the moon. Thus the highest princes, if in any way
they stray from what is honorable, or if by ambition, anger, or folly
they sin, forthwith they do it with an immense harm to the whole world. Nor
indeed has any eclipse ever so afflicted the race of men as
the dissension of Julius the Pontiff and Louis, King of the Gauls,
which we lately both saw and wept.
Caput undecimum: De bello suscipiendo.
Chapter eleven: On undertaking war.
[11,1] Cum numquam oporteat Principem praecipiti esse consilio, tum haud alibi constantior erit aut circumspectior, quam in suscipiendo bello, quod aliis ex rebus alia nascantur incommoda, ex bello semel omnium bonarum rerum naufragium oriatur, omnium malarum rerum pelagus exundet: deinde quod non aliud malum haereat tenacius. Bellum e bello seritur, e minimo maximum, ex unico geminum, ex ludicro serium et cruentum nascitur: et alibi nata belli pestis in proximos etiam, immo in procul etiam dissitos propagatur.
[11,1] Since it should never be that the Prince is precipitate in counsel, then nowhere will he be more constant or more circumspect than in undertaking war, because from other matters other inconveniences may be born, but from war at once there arises the shipwreck of all good things, and the sea of all evil things overflows: next, because no other evil clings more tenaciously. War is sown from war, from the least the greatest, from one a twin, from a plaything something serious and bloody is born: and the plague of war born elsewhere is propagated into neighbors also, nay into those far off and far separated as well.
[11,2] Bonus Princeps numquam omnino bellum suscipiet, nisi cum tentatis omnibus, nulla ratione uitari potuit. Hoc animo si fuerimus, uix umquam exsistet inter ullos bellum. Denique si uitari non potest res tam pestilens, tum proxima cura fuerit Principis, ut quam minimo suorum malo, quam minimo Christiani sanguinis impendio geratur, et quam potest ocyssime finiatur.
[11,2] The good Prince will never at all undertake war, unless, with all things tried, it could by no rationale be avoided. If we shall have been of this mind, scarcely ever will war arise among any. Finally, if so pestilent a matter cannot be avoided, then the Prince’s next care will be that it be conducted with the least harm to his own, with the least expenditure of Christian blood, and that it be finished as swiftly as possible.
First let a truly Christian Prince weigh how much difference there is between the human being, born for peace and benevolence, and the wild beasts and brute animals born for predation and for war; in addition, how much difference there is between a man and a Christian man. Then let him contemplate how desirable, how honorable, and how health-giving a thing peace is. Conversely, how calamitous and at the same time how wicked a thing war is, and what a train of all evils it drags along with it, even if it be most just—if any war at all ought to be called just. Finally, passions set aside, let him for a while at least bring reason into counsel, until he has truly computed how much the war will cost, and whether that which is sought by war is worth so much, even if victory be certain, which does not always use to favor the best cause.
Weigh the cares, expenses,
the perils, the troublesome and long apparatus. The barbaric dregs of most criminal men must be summoned, and while, as a Prince toward a Prince, you wish to seem more spirited, even with money given one must fawn upon and serve the mercenary soldier, than which kind of men there is no other either more abject or more execrable. Nothing is dearer to a good Prince than that he have his own as excellent as possible.
But what greater or more present ruin of morals,
than war? Nothing is more in the wishes of the Prince than that he may see his own people
safe and sound, and flourishing in all affairs. But while he learns to wage
war, he is compelled to expose the youth to so many perils, and often in a single
hour to render so many orphans, so many widows, so many bereft old men, so many
mendicants, so many unfortunates.
[11,3] Nimio constabit orbi Principum sapientia, si quam tetra res sit bellum, pergant experimento discere, ut senex aliquando dicat, non credebam bellum esse rem adeo pestilentem. Sed, o Deum immortalem! quam innumeris totius mundi malis istam didicisti sententiam.
[11,3] At too great a price will the wisdom of Princes cost the world, if they go on to learn by experiment how foul a thing war is, so that some day an old man may say, I did not believe war to be a thing so pestilent. But, O immortal God! by how innumerable evils of the whole world did you learn that sentiment.
He will understand at some point that it was useless to have propagated the borders of the kingdom: and that what at the beginning seemed lucre was the highest detriment; but in the meantime so many thousands of men have either been extinguished or afflicted. These things are rather to be learned from books, from the commemoration of elders, from the perils of neighbors. For so many years this or that Prince has been dueling for such a dominion: how much more incommodity was there there than commodity?
A good Prince will institute measures of such a sort as may please perpetually. Things that are taken up by affection are approved only so long as we are held by that affection; but those which are undertaken by judgment, and have pleased a young man, the same will please an old man as well. Yet this is nowhere more to be observed than in undertaking war.
[11,4] Plato seditionem uocat, non bellum, quoties Graeci cum Graecis belligerarentur: idque si quando incidisset, modestissime iubet geri. Quonam igitur nomme uocandum censemus, quoties Christiani cum Christianis digladiantur, tot uinculis inter sese connexi? Quid cum id ob titulum, nescio quem, ob priuatum odium, ob stultam aut iuuenilem ambitionem et crudelissime geritur, et in multos prorogatur annos?
[11,4] Plato calls it sedition, not war, whenever Greeks wage war with Greeks; and he bids that, if this should ever have occurred, it be conducted with the utmost moderation. By what name, then, do we judge it ought to be called, whenever Christians cross swords with Christians, connected among themselves by so many bonds? What when it is carried on most cruelly on account of some title, I know not what, on account of private hatred, on account of foolish or youthful ambition, and is prolonged for many years?
[11,5] Sic Principes quidam imponunt sibi: est omnino bellum aliquod iustum, et mihi causa iusta est suscipiendi. Primum an omnino iustum sit bellum, in medio relinquemus, cui non uidetur sua causa iusta? Et inter tantas rerum humanarum mutationes ac uicissitudines, inter tot pacta foederaque nunc inita, nunc rescissa, cui possit deesse titulus, si qualiscumque titulus satis est ad mouendum bellum?
[11,5] Thus certain Princes impose upon themselves: there is indeed some just war, and for me there is a just cause for undertaking it. First, whether war is at all just, we will leave in the middle; to whom does his own cause not seem just? And amid such great changes and vicissitudes of human affairs, among so many pacts and treaties now entered, now rescinded, to whom could a title be lacking, if any sort of title is enough for setting war in motion?
The Apostles nowhere fail to disapprove:
and those very holy Doctors, by whom they wish war to have been approved in one
or another place, in how many places do they disapprove and detest the same?
Why, with all these things dissimulated, do we snatch at what may nourish our vices?
Finally, if someone should examine the matter more dili-
gently, he will find this kind of wars, with which we are now commonly afflicted, to have been approved by no one.
[11,7] Quaedam artes ob hoc reiectae sunt a legibus, quod nimium affines essent imposturae, et plerumque dolo tractarentur, uelut Astrologia et Alchimistica, quam uocant, etiam si fieri potest, ut aliquis hisce rebus recte utatur. Id longe iustius fiet in bellis, quorum etiam si possit aliquod esse iustum, tamen ut nunc sunt res mortalium, haud scio an ullum eiusmodi reperire liceat, hoc est, cuius auctor non sit ambitio, aut ira, aut ferocitas, aut libido, aut auaritia. Saepenumero fit ut Proceres profusiores quam pro re familiari, data opera, bellum suscitent, quo suorum etiam expilationibus rem augeant domi.
[11,7] Certain arts have on this account been rejected by the laws, because they were too closely
akin to imposture, and for the most part were handled with deceit,
such as Astrology and the Alchimistic art, as they call it, even
if it can happen that someone might use these things rightly. That will far more
justly be the case with wars, of which, even if some war could be
just, yet as the affairs of mortals now stand, I scarcely know whether it is
permitted to find any of such a sort—that is, whose author is not
ambition, or anger, or ferocity, or lust, or avarice. Very often it happens that the Grandees, more lavish than is proportionate to their household estate,
deliberately stir up war, in order that, even by the plunderings of their own people,
they may enlarge their resources at home.
It happens occasionally that Princes collude among themselves, and with fictitious titles conduct the affair, so that the more they may attenuate the people's strength, and by public ills stabilize their parties. Wherefore a good and Christian Prince ought to hold every war, however just, as suspect.
[11,8] At inculcant non esse ius deserendum. Primum istud ius magna ex parte ad priuatum Principis negotium pertinet, si quid illi accreuit ex affinitate. Ut iniquum sit hoc tam immensis populi malis persequi, et dum nescio quam ditionis accessionem persequeris regnum uniuersum expilare, et in extremum discrimen adducere.
[11,8] But they inculcate that a right is not to be deserted. First, that right for the most part pertains to the Prince’s private business, if anything has accrued to him from affinity. That it is iniquitous to prosecute this at such immense harms to the people, and, while you pursue I know not what accession of dominion, to pillage the whole realm, and to bring it into extreme peril.
A Prince offends a Prince
in a slight matter, and that a private one, namely in an affinity or
something similar—what is this to the whole people? A good
Prince measures all things by public commodities; otherwise he would not even be a Prince.
The right is not the same with respect to men as to
beasts.
A good part of the empire is the consensus of the people; that thing first begot Kings.
And if any dissension shall have arisen between Princes, why not rather go to arbiters?
There are so many Bishops, so many Abbots and erudite men, so many grave Magistrates,
by whose sentence it was fitting that the matter be concluded, rather than by so many slaughters, so many expilations, so many calamities of the world.
[11,9] Primum suspectum esse debet Christiano Principi suum ius, deinde si maxime constet, expendere oportet, an tantis totius orbis malis sit uindicandum. Qui sapiunt, malunt aliquoties rem perdere quam persequi, quod hic perspiciant minus esse dispendii. Mallet (opinor) Caesar concedere de iure suo, quam Monarchiam illam ueterem persequi, et ius illud quod illi deferunt Iureconsultorum litterae.
[11,9] First, a Christian Prince ought to hold his own right suspect, then, even if it be most well-established, he ought to weigh whether it should be vindicated at the cost of such great evils of the whole world. Those who are wise prefer sometimes to lose the matter rather than to prosecute it, because here they perceive there is less of expense. Caesar would prefer (I suppose) to concede of his own right, rather than to pursue that old monarchy, and that right which the letters of the Jurisconsults confer upon him.
[11,10] Mouebit et hoc Principem pium et clementem, quod perspiciat ex tam immensis malis, quae bellum omne secum inuehit, maximam partem ad eos redire, ad quos bellum nihil attinet, quique his calamitatibus sunt indignissimi. Posteaquam Princeps uniuersorum malorum subductis calculis summam collegerit (si tamen umquam colligi possit) tum ita secum cogitet, unus ego tot malorum auctor fuero? Tantum humani sanguinis, tot uiduae, tot luctu funestae domus, tot orbi senes, tot indigne egentes, tanta morum, legum, ac pietatis pernicies mihi uni imputabitur?
[11,10] This too will move the pious and clement Prince, that
he perceive from such immense evils, which every war carries with it,
that the greatest part falls back upon those to whom the war
in no way pertains, and who are most unworthy of these calamities. After the Prince, with the reckonings of all evils drawn up,
shall have gathered the sum (if indeed it can ever be gathered),
then let him thus consider with himself: Shall I alone have been the author of so many evils? So much human blood, so many widows, so many houses funereal with mourning,
so many bereft old men, so many undeservedly destitute, so great a ruin of morals,
of laws, and of piety—will be imputed to me alone?
We see, moreover, the most flourishing cities to be founded by unlearned and private persons, which the angers of princes demolish. And very often we demolish a town with greater trouble and expense than another new one could have been founded; and we set a war on foot with such cost, such expenditure, such zeal and care, that with a tenth portion of those things peace could have been secured.
[11,12] Eam gloriam semper affecte bonus Princeps, quae sit incruenta, et cum nullius coniuncta malo. In bello ut optime res eueniat, tamen alterius partis felicitas, alterius est perni- cies. Saepenumero flet et uictor nimio emptam uictoriam.
[11,12] Let a good Prince always aim at that glory which is
bloodless, and conjoined with no one’s harm. In war, even if the
affair turns out very well, nevertheless the good fortune of one party is the
destruction of the other. Very often even the victor weeps over a victory bought at too high a price.
If piety does not move us, if the calamity of the world does not, surely
let the honor of the Christian name move us. What do we suppose the
Turks and the Saracens to say about us, when they see that for so many centuries now
nothing at all comes to agreement among any Christian Princes? That
peace cohere by no treaties?
[11,13] Quam fugax, quam breuis, quam fragilis est hominum uita, et quot obnoxia calamitatibus, quippe quam tot morbi, tot casus impetunt assidue, ruinae, naufragia, terme motus, fulmina? Nihil igitur opus bellis accersere mala, et tamen hinc plus malorum quam ex omnibus illis. Concionatorum partes erant, dissidiorum affectus ex animis uulgi penitus reuellere.
[11,13] How fugacious, how brief, how fragile is the life of men,
and to how many calamities liable, indeed how many diseases,
how many chances assail it assiduously—collapses, shipwrecks, earth
motions, thunderbolts? There is therefore no need to summon evils by wars, and
yet from this there are more evils than from all those. The preachers’
office was utterly to root out from the minds of the common crowd the affections of dissensions.
Now for the most part the Englishman hates the Gaul, the Gaul the Englishman,
not for any other reason than that he is English. The Scot hates the Briton,
only because he is a Scot; the Italian the German, the Swabian the Helvetian,
and likewise of the rest; Region hateful to region,
city to city. Why do these most foolish names more
distract us than the name of Christ, common to all, glues us together?
[11,14] Ut donemus aliquod bellum esse iustum, tamen quoniam uidemus in hanc pestem insanire mortales omnes, Sacerdotum prudentiae fuit, in diuersam partem auocare plebis ac Principum animos. Nunc uidemus hos nonnumquam esse belli faces. Non pudet Episcopos uersari in castris: Illic crux, illic Christi corpus, et cum re plus quam Tartarea miscent coelestia Sacramenta, et in tam cruento dissidio adhibent summae caritatis symbola.
[11,14] Granted we allow that some war is just, nevertheless since we see all mortals running mad into this pestilence, it was the part of the Priests’ prudence to call away the minds of the plebs and of Princes into a different direction. Now we see these to be sometimes the torches of war. It does not shame Bishops to be engaged in the camps: There the cross, there the Body of Christ, and together with a matter more than Tartarean they mix the heavenly Sacraments, and in so bloody a dissension they employ the symbols of supreme charity.
[11,15] Si non tota undique Christi doctrina cum bello pugnat, si unum proferre possint illi, belli nomine commendatum, bellemus Christiani. Permissum erat Hebraeis bello conflictari, sed consulto Deo. At nostrum oraculum, quod assidue nobis in Euangelicis litteris resonat, a bello deterret, et tamen belligeramur insanius quam illi.
[11,15] If not the whole doctrine of Christ on every side fights against war,
if they can bring forward a single thing commended under the name of war,
we Christians would wage war. It was permitted to the Hebrews to engage in war,
but with God consulted. But our oracle, which resounds to us continually in the Evangelical letters, deters from war,
and yet we wage war more insanely than they.
David, by other virtues, was most pleasing to God, and yet he was forbidden to have a temple built for himself in this, for no other reason than that he was sanguinary, that is, a warrior. The pacific Solomon was chosen for this. If these things were done among the Jews, what will become of us Christians?
They had the shadow of Solomon; we have the true Solomon, that pacific Christ conciliating all things which are in the heavens and which are on the earth. I also judge that war is not to be rashly undertaken even against the Turks, first reckoning this with myself: that the dominion of Christ was born, propagated, and consolidated by a far different way. Nor perhaps is it fitting to be vindicated by other means than those by which it arose and was propagated.
And we see
that under the pretexts of wars of this kind the Christian populace has already so many times been despoiled,
and that nothing else at all has been accomplished. Now, if the business of faith
is at issue, it has been augmented and made illustrious by the tolerance/endurance of martyrs, not by the forces of soldiers;
but if the fight is about dominion, about resources, about possessions,
then we must again and again take heed,
lest that matter savor too little of Christianity. Indeed, as they now for the most part are,
those by whom wars of this sort are carried on, it will more quickly come to pass that we
degenerate into Turks, than that they through us are rendered Christians.
[11,16] Verum de belli malis alias plura conscripsimus, quae non est huius loci repetere. Tantum illud hortabor Principes Christiani nominis, ut omissis fictis titulis et fucatis praetextibus, serio totoque pectore hoc agant, ut tam diutina tamque foeda bellandi rabies inter Christianos finiatur, et inter eos quos tot copulant pignora, pax et concordia coeat. In hoc ingenium explicent suum, in hoc uires expediant, in hoc consilia conferant, in hoc neruos omnes intendant.
[11,16] But about the evils of war we have elsewhere written more, which it is not
the place here to repeat. Only this will I exhort the Princes
of the Christian name: that, with feigned titles and varnished pretexts set aside,
in earnest and with the whole breast they pursue this—that the so long-continued
and so foul rage of warring among Christians be brought to an end, and
that among those whom so many pledges couple together, peace and concord may coalesce. In this let them unfold their genius, in this let them expedite their forces,
in this let them confer their counsels, in this let them strain all sinews.
They who strive to seem great, let them in this way prove themselves great. If anyone shall have accomplished this, he will have completed a work far more splendid than if he had subdued all Africa by arms. Nor will it be excessively difficult to do, if each ceases to flatter his own cause, if, private affections set aside, we prosecute the business of the commonwealth, if Christ be with us in counsel, not the world.
[11,17] Nunc dum suum quisque negotium agit, dum Pontifices et Episcopi de ditione et opibus anxii sunt, dum Principes ambitione aut ira feruntur praecipites, dum his obsequuntur sui compendii gratia omnes, in has nimirum rerum procellas incurrimus stultitiae ductu. Quod si communi consilio, commune negotium ageremus, etiam ea quae cuique priuata sunt, magis florerent. Nunc et hoc perit, pro quo solo digladiamur.
[11,17] Now, while each man prosecutes his own business, while Pontiffs and Bishops are anxious about dominion and resources, while Princes are borne headlong by ambition or ire, while all are obsequious to these for the sake of their own gain, into these tempests of affairs we run, under the leadership of folly. But if by common counsel, we were to prosecute the common business, even the things that are private to each would flourish more. Now even this perishes, for the sake of which alone we cross swords.
[11,18] Neque mihi dubium est, Principum Illustrissime, quin hoc sis animo: sic natus es, sic ab optimis et integerrimis uiris institutus. Quod superest, precor, ut Christus optimus maximus tuos egregios conatus bene fortunare pergat. Dedit ille incruentum imperium: Idem uelit semper esse incruentum.
[11,18] Nor is it doubtful to me, Most Illustrious of Princes, that you are of this mind: thus you were born, thus instructed by the best and most upright men. What remains, I pray, is that Christ Best and Greatest may go on to prosper your outstanding endeavors. He gave a bloodless empire: may the same One will that it always be bloodless.
That Prince of peace rejoices to be called: may the same bring it to pass, that by your goodness and your wisdom at last it be permitted to take holiday from the most insane wars. Peace will be commended to us, too, by the recollection of past evils, and by the gratitude for your beneficence, the calamities of earlier times will redouble it.