Erasmus•Moriae Encomium
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Superioribus diebus cum me ex Italia in Angliam recepissem, ne totum hoc tempus quo equo fuit insidendum amusois et illitteratis fabulis tereretur, malui mecum aliquoties uel de communibus studiis nostris aliquid agitare, uel amicorum, quos hic ut doctissimos ita et suauissimos reliqueram, recordatione frui. Inter hos tu, mi More, uel in primis occurrebas; cuius equidem absentis absens memoria non aliter frui solebam quam presentis presens consuetudine consueueram; qua dispeream si quid unquam in uita contigit mellitius. Ergo quoniam omnino aliquid agendum duxi, et id tempus ad seriam commentationem parum uidebatur accommodatum, uisum est Moriae Encomium ludere.
In the preceding days, when I had taken myself back from Italy into England, lest all this time in which it was necessary to sit a-horseback be worn away on un-Muse-like and illiterate tales, I preferred with myself at times either to agitate something about our common studies, or to enjoy the recollection of friends, whom here I had left as most learned and likewise most suave. Among these you, my More, occurred almost first; and of you, absent, I absent was accustomed to enjoy the memory no otherwise than, present to one present, I had been wont to enjoy the familiar consuetude; than which—may I perish—if ever anything in life befell more honey-sweet. Therefore, since I judged that absolutely something ought to be done, and that time seemed little accommodated to serious commentation, it seemed good to play the Moriae Encomium.
Then I suspected that this sport of my wit would be especially approved by you, because you are wont to be exceedingly delighted by jests of this kind—namely, if I am not mistaken, neither unlearned nor altogether insipid—and in general to play a certain Democritus in the common life of mortals. And yet you indeed, just as by a certain singular perspicacity of your talent you are accustomed to dissent far and wide from the crowd, so by an incredible sweetness and affability of manners you both can and rejoice to play the man-for-all-hours with everyone. Therefore you will not only gladly receive this little declamation as a mnemosynon of your comrade, but you will even undertake to defend it, as being dedicated to you and now yours, not mine.
Etenim non deerunt fortasse uitilitigatores, qui calum nientur partim leuiores esse nugas quam ut theologum deceant, partim mordaciores quam ut Christiane conueniant modestie; nosque clamitabunt ueterem comediam aut Lucianum quempiam referre atque omnia mordicus arripere. Verum quos argumenti leuitas et ludicrum offendit, cogitent uelim non meum hoc exemplum esse, sed idem iam olim a magnis auctoribus factitatum; cum ante tot secula Batrachomuomachian luserit Homerus, Maro Culicem et Moretum, Nucem Ouidius; cum Busyriden laudarit Polycrates et huius castigator Isocrates, iniustitiam Glauco, Thersiten et quartanam febrim Fauorinus, caluitiem Synesius, muscam et parasiticam Lucianus; cum Seneca Claudii luserit apotheôsin, Plutarchus Grylli cum Ulysse dialogum, Lucianus et Apuleius Asinum, et nescio quis Grunnii Coro cottae porcelli testamentum, cuius et diuus meminit Hieronymus Proinde, si uidebitur, fingant isti me laterunculis in terim animi causa lusisse, aut si malint equitasse in arundine longa. Nam que tandem est iniquitas, cum omni uite insti tuto suos lusus concedamus, studiis nullum omnino lusum permittere, maxime si nuge seria ducant, atque ita tractentur ludicra ut ex his aliquanto plus frugis referat lector non omnino naris obese, quam ex quorundam tetricis ac splendidis argumentis?
Indeed there will perhaps not be lacking wranglers, who will calumniate that the trifles are partly too light to befit a theologian, partly too mordacious to suit Christian modesty; and they will keep shouting that we revive the Old Comedy or some Lucian, and seize everything with a bite. But those whom the lightness and the ludic element of the subject offend, let them consider, I would wish, that this is not my example, but that the same has long since been practiced by great authors; since so many ages ago Homer played the Batrachomyomachia, Maro the Culex and the Moretum, Ovid the Nux; since Polycrates praised Busiris and Isocrates, his chastiser; Favorinus [praised] injustice for Glaucus, Thersites, and the quartan fever; Synesius baldness, Lucian the Fly and the Parasite; since Seneca sported with the apotheosis of Claudius, Plutarch the dialogue of Gryllus with Ulysses, Lucian and Apuleius the Ass, and I know not who the will of the piglet Grunnius Corocotta, of which even Saint Jerome makes mention. Therefore, if it shall seem good, let those fellows imagine that I meanwhile for the sake of my mind have played with little bricks, or, if they prefer, have ridden on a long reed. For what, pray, is the injustice, when we concede to every institution of life its own games, to permit no game at all to studies—especially if trifles lead to seriousness, and ludic things are handled in such a way that a reader not altogether dull-nosed brings back somewhat more fruit from these than from the grim and splendid subjects of certain people?
as, for instance, when one with a long cobbled-together oration praises rhetoric or philosophy, another describes the praises of some prince, another exhorts to set war in motion against the Turks, another foretells the future. another devises new little questions about caprine wool. for just as nothing is more trifling than to handle serious things in a trifling fashion, so nothing is more witty than to handle trifles in such a way that you seem to have been anything but a trifler.
Iam uero ut de mordacitatis cauillatione respondeam, semper hec ingeniis libertas permissa fuit, ut in communem hominum uitam salibus luderent impune, modo ne licentia exiret in rabiem. Quo magis admiror his temporibus aurium delicias que nihil iam fere nisi solennes titulos ferre possunt. Porro nonnullos adeo prepostere religiosos uideas, ut uel grauissima in Christum conuicia ferant citius quam pontificem aut principem leuissimo ioco aspergi, presertim si quid pros ta alphita id est ad questum, attinet.
Now indeed, to answer the cavillation of mordacity, this liberty has always been permitted to wits: that they might with their sallies play upon the common life of men with impunity, provided only that license not break out into rabies. Wherefore I the more marvel, in these times, at the delicacy of ears, which now can scarcely bear anything except solemn titles. Moreover, you may see some so preposterously religious that they will more readily endure the gravest invectives against Christ than that the pontiff or a prince be sprinkled with the lightest joke—especially if anything that looks pros ta alphita, that is, to profit, is at issue.
But indeed, he who thus assesses the lives of men so as to lash no one at all by name—pray, does he seem to bite, or rather to teach and admonish? Otherwise, I beseech you, by how many names do I tax myself? Moreover, he who passes over no kind of men seems to be angry with no man, but with all vices.
Therefore, if anyone shall have arisen who will cry out that he has been injured, he will either betray his own conscience or at least his fear. In this kind Saint Jerome played much more freely and more mordaciously, not sparing even names at times. We, besides the fact that we abstain from names altogether, have moreover so tempered our style that the sound-minded reader will easily understand that we have sought pleasure rather than a bite.
Nor indeed have we, after the example of Juvenal, anywhere stirred that hidden cesspool of crimes, and we have striven to recount things laughable rather than foul. Then, if there is anyone whom not even these can placate, let him at least remember this: that it is fine to be vituperated by Folly; and since we have made her speak, the decorum of the persona had to be served. But why am I saying these things to you, a patron so singular that you can defend even causes not the best, yet in the best way?
1. Vtcumque de me uulgo mortales loquuntur, neque enim sum nescia, quam male audiat STVLTITIA etiam apud stultissimos, tamen hanc esse, hanc, inquam, esse unam, quae meo numine Deos atque homines exhilaro, uel illud abunde magnum est argumentum, quod simulatque in hunc coetum frequentissimum dictura prodii, sic repente omnium uultus noua quadam atque insolita hilaritate enituerunt, sic subito frontem exporrexistis , sic laeto quodam et amabili applausistis risu, ut mihi profecto quotquot undique praesentes intueor, pariter deorum Homericorum nectare non sine nepenthe temulenti esse uideamini, cum antehac tristes ac solliciti sederitis, perinde quasi nuper e Trophonii specu reuersi. Caeterum quemadmodum fieri consueuit, ut cum primum sol formosum illud et aureum os terris ostenderit, aut ubi post asperam hiemem, nouum uer blandis adspirarit Fauoniis, protinus noua rebus omnibus facies, nouus color ac plane iuuenta quaedam redeat, ita uobis me conspecta, mox alius accessit uultus. Itaque quod magni alioqui Rhetores, uix longa diuque meditata oratione possunt efficere, nempe ut molestas animi curas discutiant, id ego solo statim adspectu praestiti.
1. However mortals commonly speak about me, for I am not unaware how ill a name STUPIDITY bears even among the most stupid, nevertheless that I am she—this, I say, I alone—who by my numen exhilarate gods and humans, even this is an abundantly great argument: that as soon as I came forth, about to speak, into this most crowded assembly, thus at once everyone’s faces shone with a certain new and unwonted cheerfulness, thus you suddenly uncreased the brow , thus with a certain joyful and amiable laughter you applauded, so that, to me indeed, as many as I behold present from every side, you seem alike to be temulent with the nectar of the Homeric gods, not without nepenthe, whereas just before you had sat sad and anxious, as if lately returned from the cave of Trophonius. Moreover, just as it is accustomed to happen, that when first the sun has shown to the lands that beautiful and golden face, or when, after a rough winter, the new spring has breathed with gentle Favonians, immediately a new visage, a new color, and plainly a certain youthfulness returns to all things, so, me once seen by you, straightway another countenance came upon you. And so what great Rhetors can scarcely effect with a long and long-meditated oration—namely, to scatter the vexatious cares of the mind—that I have furnished at once by my mere look alone.
2 Quamobrem autem hoc insolito cultu prodierim hodie, iam audietis, si modo non grauabimini dicenti praebere aures, non eas sane quas sacris Concionatoribus, sed quas fori circulatoribus, scurris ac morionibus consueuistis arrigere, quasque olim Midas ille noster exhibuit Pani. Lubitum est enim paulisper apud uos Sophistam agere, non quidem huius generis quod hodie nugas quasdam anxias inculcat pueris, ac plus quam muliebrem rixandi pertinaciam tradit, sed ueteres illos imitabor, qui quo infamem Sophorum appellationem uitarent, Sophistae uocari maluerunt. Horum studium erat, Deorum ac fortium uirorum laudes encomiis celebrare. Encomium igitur audietis, non Herculis, neque Solonis, sed meum ipsius, hoc est, STVLTITIAE
2 And why I have come forth today in this unusual attire, you shall presently hear, provided only you are not loath to lend an ear to one speaking—not, to be sure, those ears which you are wont to raise for sacred Preachers, but those which you are accustomed to cock for the marketplace tricksters, jesters, and buffoons, such as once that Midas of ours displayed to Pan. For it has pleased me for a little to play the Sophist among you—not indeed of that sort which today inculcates into boys certain anxious trifles and hands down a more-than-womanish pertinacity in wrangling—but I shall imitate those ancients who, in order to avoid the infamous appellation of “Sages,” preferred to be called “Sophists.” Their study was to celebrate with encomia the praises of the gods and of valiant men. An Encomium therefore you shall hear, not of Hercules, nor of Solon, but my own, that is, of STUPIDITY.
3. Iam uero non huius facio sapientes istos qui stultissimum et insolentissimum esse praedicant, si quis ipse laudibus se ferat. Sit sane quam uolent stultum, modo decorum esse fateantur. Quid enim magis quadrat, quam ut ipsa Moria suarum laudum sit buccinatrix, et Autê heautês aulê. Quis enim me melius exprimat quam ipsa me? Nisi si cui forte notior sim, quam egomet sum mihi.
3. But indeed I do not make any account of those sages who proclaim it most foolish and most insolent if anyone should carry himself forward with self-praise. Let it be, to whatever degree they wish, foolish—provided they confess it to be decorous. For what more squares than that Folly herself should be the trumpeter of her own praises, and “a piper to herself”? For who would express me better than I myself—unless, perchance, I should be better known to someone than I am to myself.
Although I, for my part, deem this to be, by no small measure, more modest than what the mob of optimates and “wise men” belches forth, who, by a certain perverse bashfulness, are wont to suborn either some Rhetor as a palping flatterer or a vain-loquacious Poet, a hireling taken for a fee, from whom they may hear their own praises—that is, sheer mendacities—and yet that “modest” fellow meanwhile, after the peacock’s fashion, lifts his plumes and rears his crest, while the shameless assenter equates a man of nil with the gods, sets him forth as the absolute exemplar of all virtues, from which he knows himself to be more than a dis dia pasôn (two octaves) away; when he clothes the little crow with others’ feathers; when he whitens ton Aithiopa; finally, when ec muias ton elephanta poiei. In fine, I follow that threadbare proverb of the vulgus, by which it is said that he rightly praises himself to whom no other praiser has fallen. Although here, meanwhile, I much marvel at mortals—shall I call it their ingratitude or their sloth?—of whom, though all zealously court me and gladly experience my beneficence, yet in so many ages there has arisen no one who with grateful speech has celebrated the praises of FOLLY, whereas there have not been lacking those who have exalted Busirises, Phalarises, quartan fevers, flies, baldness, and pests of that kind, with meticulous praises, worked out by night with great expense of both oil and sleep.
4. Id quod nolim existimetis ad ingenii ostentationem esse confictum, quemadmodum uulgus oratorum facit. Nam ii, sicuti nostis, cum orationem totis triginta annis elaboratam, nonnumquam et alienam proferunt, tamen triduo sibi quasi per lusum scriptam, aut etiam dictatam esse deierant. Mihi porro semper gratissmum fuit hoti an epi glôttan elthoi dicere.
4. I would not wish you to think that this has been fabricated for an ostentation of talent, as the common herd of orators does. For they, as you know, when they bring forth a speech elaborated over a full thirty years, and sometimes even someone else’s, nevertheless swear that it was written for them in three days as if for play, or even dictated. For my part, it has always been most pleasing to me to say “whatever may come to the tongue.”
But let no one now expect from me that, according to the custom of those commonplace rhetors, I should explicate myself by a definition—still less that I should divide. For each is of inauspicious omen: either to circumscribe by a boundary her whose numen lies open so broadly, or to cut up her, to whose cult every kind of thing thus consents. Although to what, pray, does it tend, to represent as it were my shadow and image by a definition, when you, being present, gaze with your eyes upon me myself present before you?
5. Quamquam quid uel hoc opus erat dicere, quasi non ipso ex uultu fronteque, quod aiunt, satis quae sim prae me feram, aut quasi si quis me Mineruam, aut Sophiam esse contendat, non statim solo possit obtutu coargui, etiam si nulla accedat oratio, minime mendax animi speculum. Nullus apud me fucis locus, nec aliud fronte simulo, aliud in pectore premo. Sumque mei undique simillima, adeo ut nec ii me dissimulare possint, qui maxime Sapientiae personam ac titulum sibi uindicant, kai tê porphura pithêkoi, kai in tê leontê onoi, obambulant.
5. Although what need was there even to say this, as if I did not, from my very face and brow, as they say, bear forth plainly enough what I am; or as if, should anyone contend that I am Minerva or Sophia, he could not at once be convicted by a look alone, even if no oration be added—the least mendacious mirror of the mind. With me there is no place for cosmetic dyes, nor do I simulate one thing on my brow and press another in my breast. And I am on all sides most like to myself, to such a degree that not even those can dissemble me who most vindicate to themselves the persona and title of Wisdom—apes in purple and asses in a lion-skin—strolling about.
Although they sedulously feign, nevertheless ears protruding from somewhere betray Midas. By Hercules, this tribe of men too is ungrateful, who, though they are most especially of our faction, yet are so ashamed among the vulgar of our cognomen that they everywhere fling it at others in the stead of a great opprobrium. Accordingly, since these are môrotatoi, yet wish to seem sophi and Thaletes, shall we not with the best right call them môrosophous?
6. Visum est enim hac quoque parte nostri temporis Rhetores imitari, qui plane Deos esse sese credunt, si hirudinum ritu bilingues appareant, ac praeclarum facinus esse ducunt, Latinis orationibus subinde Graeculas aliquot uoculas, uelut emblemata intertexere, etiam si nunc non erat his locus. Porro si desunt exotica, e putribus chartis quatuor aut quinque prisca uerba eruunt, quibus tenebras offundant lectori, uidelicet, ut qui intelligunt, magis ac magis sibi placeant: qui non intelligunt, hoc ipso magis admirentur quo minus intelligunt. Quandoquidem est sane et hoc nostratium uoluptatum genus non inelegans, quam maxime peregrina maxime suspicere.
6. For it has seemed good in this part of our own time also to imitate the Rhetors, who plainly believe themselves to be Gods, if they appear bilingual after the leech-like fashion, and they deem it a splendid exploit to interweave into Latin orations now and then some Greekish little vocables, as if emblems, even if there was at the moment no place for them. Moreover, if exotica are lacking, from putrid papers they unearth four or five ancient words, with which they obfuscate the reader, to wit, so that those who understand may be more and more pleased with themselves; those who do not understand may for this very reason admire the more, the less they understand. Since indeed this too is a not-inelegant kind of our countrymen’s pleasures: to look up most of all to what is most foreign, most peregrine.
7. Nomen igitur habetis: Viri, Quid addam epitheti? Quid nisi stultissimi? Nam quo alio honestiore cognomine Mystas suos compellet Dea STVLTITIA?
7. So you have a name: Men. What epithet shall I add? What, if not most-stupid? For by what other, more honorable cognomen does the Goddess STUPIDITY address her initiates?
But since it is not equally known to many of what sort I was begotten, I will now try, with the Muses kindly helping, to set it forth. For my father was neither Chaos, nor Saturn, nor Iapetus, nor any other of that kind of obsolete and moldy Gods. Rather Wealth himself alone—Plutus—was my father, even if Hesiod and Homer be unwilling, and even Jove himself, the father of men and gods. At whose nod alone, as once so now too, all things sacred and profane are mixed up both upwards and downwards.
By whose arbitration wars, peaces, empires, counsels, judgments, assemblies (comitia), marriages, pacts, federations, treaties, laws, arts, amusements, serious matters—already my breath fails me—briefly, all the public and private affairs of mortals are administered. Without whose aid, that whole people of the Poetic numina, to speak more boldly, even the chosen gods themselves, would either not exist at all, or certainly as oikositoi would live rather coldly. For whoever has him angry against him, for such a one not even Pallas would bring sufficient help.
On the contrary, whoever has him propitious could even slip a noose upon highest Jove, thunderbolt and all. Of this one I boast that he is my father. And indeed he begot me not from his own brain, as Jupiter did that grim and scowling Pallas, but from the Nymph Neotete, by far the most venust (charming) of all, and equally the most festive.
Nor again by being tied to that gloomy conjugal bond, in the way that that lame smith was born, but by something not a little sweeter, having been mingled in love, as our Homer says. Moreover, lest you err, it was not that Aristophanic Plutus, now coffin-ready, now blinded of eyes, whom he begot, but once upon a time still whole and warm with youth—and not with youth only, but much more with nectar, which at that time by chance at the banquet of the Gods he had quaffed more liberally and more purely.
8. Quod si locum quoque natalem requiritis, quandoquidem id hodie uel inprimis ad nobilitatem interesse putant, quo loco primos edideris uagitus, ego nec in erratica Delo, nec in undoso mari, nec en spessi glaphuroisi sum edita, sed in ipsis insulis fortunatis, ubi aspata kai anêrota omnia proueniunt. In quibus neque labor, neque senium, neque morbus est ullus, nec usquam in agris asphodelus, malua, squilla, lupinumue, aut faba, aut aliud hoc genus nugarum conspicitur. Sed passim oculis, simulque naribus adblandiuntur moly, panace, nepenthes, amaracus, ambrosia, lotus, rosa, uiola, Hyacinthus, Adonidis hortuli.
8. But if you also inquire after the natal place, since today they think this above all pertains to nobility—where you first uttered your wails—I was born neither on wandering Delos, nor in the wave-swept sea, but in the very Fortunate Islands, where all things come forth unsown and untilled. In these there is neither toil, nor old age, nor any disease at all, nor anywhere in the fields is asphodel, mallow, squill, lupine, or bean, or any other trifles of this kind seen. But everywhere there caress the eyes, and at the same time the nostrils, moly, panacea, nepenthe, amaracus, ambrosia, lotus, rose, viola, Hyacinthus, the little gardens of Adonis.
And in these delights indeed having been born, I by no means inaugurated my life with weeping, but straightway sweetly smiled upon my mother. And in truth I do not envy to the Highest Cronion his nurse-goat, since two most charming Nymphs nourished me at their own breasts, Methe, begotten of Bacchus, and Apaedia, daughter of Pan. These you see here as well in the fellowship of the rest of my companions and handmaids.
9. Haec nimirum quam sublatis superciliis conspicamini, philautia est. Huic quam uelut arridentibus oculis, ac plaudentem manibus uidetis, kolakia nomen Haec semisomnis ac dormitanti similis lêthê vocatur. Haec cubito utroque innitens, confertisque manibus, misoponia dicitur.
9. This, surely, which you behold with eyebrows raised, is philautia. To this one, whom you see as if with eyes smiling and clapping her hands, the name is kolakia This one, half-asleep and like one dozing, is called lêthê. This one, leaning on each elbow, and with her hands pressed together, is called misoponia.
This one, wreathed with a rosy garland and everywhere anointed with unguents, is hêdonê. This one, with slippery eyes wandering here and there, is called anoia. This one, with shining skin and a well-fattened body, has the name truphê. You also see Gods mingled with the girls, of whom the one they call kômon, the other nêgreton huponn.
10. Genus, educationem, et comites audistis. Nunc, ne cui sine causa uidear mihi Deae nomen usurpare, quantis commoditatibus Deos simul et homines adficiam, quamque late meum pateat numen arrectis auribus accipite. Etenim si non inscite scripsit quidam, hoc demum esse Deum, iuuare mortales, et si merito in Deorum senatum adsciti sunt, qui uinum, aut frumentum aut unam aliquam huiusmodi commoditatem mortalibus ostenderunt, cur non ego iure, Deorum omnium alpha dicar, habearque, quae una omnibus largior omnia?
10. You have heard my lineage, upbringing, and companions. Now, lest to anyone I seem without cause to usurp for myself the name of Goddess, with ears pricked receive how many commodities I bestow upon gods and men alike, and how far my numen extends. For indeed, if someone wrote not unskilfully that this is precisely to be a god: to help mortals; and if with merit they have been admitted into the senate of the gods who have shown to mortals wine, or grain, or some one such convenience, why should I not rightly be called the alpha of all the gods, and be held as she who alone to all lavishes all things?
11. Principio quid esse potest uita ipsa uel dulcius, uel pretiosius? At huius exordium cui tandem acceptum ferri conuenit, nisi mihi? Neque enim aut obrimopatrês hasta Palladis, aut nephelegeretou Iouis aegis hominum genus uel progignit, uel propagat.
11. To begin with, what can life itself be either sweeter or more precious? But to whom, pray, ought the beginning of this to be credited, if not to me? For neither the spear of Pallas, daughter of the strong‑fathered one, nor the aegis of cloud‑gathering Jove either begets or propagates the race of men.
But the Father of gods and King of men himself, who with a nod makes all Olympus tremble, must lay aside that three‑forked thunderbolt, and that Titanic countenance with which, when it pleases him, he terrifies all the gods; and plainly, in the fashion of actors, a foreign persona must be assumed by the poor fellow, whenever he should wish to do that which he never fails to do—namely, to play the child. And now indeed the Stoics aver themselves next to the gods. Yet give me a Stoic three and four times over, or, if you like, six hundred times over—still even he, if not his beard, that badge of wisdom, even if it is shared with he‑goats, at least his supercilious brow must be put down, his forehead must be smoothed, those adamantine dogmas must be thrown away, and he must for a little while play the fool and rave.
In sum, it is me—me, I say—that the sapient must summon, if only he should wish to be a father. And why should I not more openly, in my own manner, speak with you? I ask, does the head, does the face, does the breast, do the hands, does the ear—the parts which are considered honorable—progenerate gods or men?
Not, I suppose; nay rather, that part so foolish and so laughable that it cannot even be named without laughter, is the propagatrix of the human race. This is that sacred fount whence all things draw life more truly than that Pythagorean quaternity. Come now, what man, I pray, would wish to offer his mouth to the halter of matrimony, if, as those sages are accustomed to do, he first weighed with himself the inconveniences of that life? Or what woman, pray, would admit a husband, if she either knew or considered the perilous labors of childbirth, the trouble of education (upbringing)?
Furthermore, if you owe your life to marriages, and you owe marriage to anoia, the handmaid, you surely understand what you owe to me. Then what woman, having once experienced these things, would wish to repeat them anew, unless Lethe’s present name were at hand? Nor indeed would Venus herself, even with Lucretius protesting, ever deny that without the accession of our divinity, her own force is maimed and ineffectual.
Therefore from our drunken and ridiculous sport there come forth even the supercilious Philosophers, in whose place there have now succeeded those whom the vulgar crowd calls Monks, and purple-clad kings and pious priests, and thrice most-holy Pontiffs. Finally, that whole company too of the Poetic Gods, so numerous that Olympus itself now scarcely contains the throng, although most spacious.
12. At sane parum sit mihi uitae seminarium, ac fontem deberi, nisi quidquid in omni uita commodi est, id quoque totum ostendero mei muneris esse. Quid autem uita haec, num omnino uita uidetur appellanda, si uoluptatem detraxeris? Applausistis.
12. But surely it would be too little that the seedbed and fountain of life be owed to me, unless I also show that whatever in the whole of life is of advantage, that too in its entirety is my gift. And what, moreover, is this life—does it seem to be called life at all, if you take away pleasure? You have applauded.
Indeed I knew that none of you was so wise—or rather, more foolish; nay, rather, more wise—as to be of this opinion. Although not even those Stoics spurn pleasure, though they sedulously dissemble it, and with a thousand revilings tear it to pieces among the vulgar, plainly so that, others being deterred, they themselves may enjoy it more at length. But let them tell me, by Jove, what part of life is not sad, not un-festive, not un-venust, not insipid, not troublesome, unless you add pleasure, that is, the condiment of folly?
13. Principio quis nescit primam hominis aetatem multo laetissimam, multoque omnibus gratissimam esse? Quid est enim illud in infantibus, quod sic exosculamur, sic amplectimur, sic fouemus, ut hostis etiam huic aetati ferat opem, nisi stultitiae lenocinium, quod data opera prudens natura, recens natis adjunxit, ut aliquo uoluptatis uelut auctoramento, et educantium labores delinire queant, et tuentium fauores eblandiantur? Deinde quae succedit huic adolescentia, quam est apud omnes gratiosa, quam candide fauent omnes, quam studiose prouehunt, quam officiose porrigunt auxiliares manus?
13. To begin with, who does not know that the first age of a human is by much the most gladsome, and by much the most gratifying to all? For what is that in infants, which we so kiss, so embrace, so cherish, that even an enemy brings help to this age, unless it be the blandishment of folly, which prudent Nature has purposely joined to the newborn, so that with some, as it were, bounty of pleasure, they may both be able to soothe the labors of those who rear them, and to coax the favors of those who protect them? Then the adolescence which succeeds to this—how gracious is it with all, how candidly all favor it, how zealously they promote it, how dutifully they stretch forth helping hands?
But whence, I pray, that grace of youth? whence, unless from me? By whose benefaction it is as little sapient as possible, and on that account as little grimacing. I lie, unless soon, when, having become more grown, through the experience of things and the disciplines they begin to savor something virile, straightway the luster of form loses its bloom, alacrity languishes, charm grows frigid, vigor lapses.
And the farther one is withdrawn from me, the less and less he lives, until there succeeds to chalepon gêras, that is, burdensome senescence, now hateful not only to others but even to itself. Which indeed would be in no wise tolerable to any of mortals, unless I, pitying such great labors, were present again with a right hand; and just as the Gods of the Poets are wont to succor the perishing by some metamorphosis, so I likewise, when they are already next to the coffin, again, so far as it is permitted, recall them to childhood. Whence not without reason the vulgar have been accustomed to call them palimpaidas.
Moreover, if anyone should inquire the method of transforming, I would not conceal that either. To the spring of our Lethe I lead them, for it rises in the Fortunate Islands (since in the Infernal regions there only a slender rivulet glides), so that, as soon as they have there quaffed long oblivions, with the cares of the mind little by little diluted, they grow young again. But these already rave, they say, already play the fool.
Who, moreover, would endure to have commerce or consuetude with that old man who had added to so great an experience of affairs an equal vigor of mind and an acrimony of judgment? And so the old man is delirious by my gift. Yet nevertheless that delirious fellow of mine meanwhile is vacant from those wretched cares by which that wise man is tormented.
Meanwhile he is not an un-witty drinking-companion. He has not felt the tedium of life, which a more robust age scarcely tolerates. Sometimes, with the Plautine old man, he reverts to those three letters—most unlucky if he be wise. But meanwhile, by my benefit, he is happy, meanwhile agreeable to his friends, and not even un-festive to a comrade.
Since indeed also in Homer, from Nestor’s mouth the oration flows sweeter than honey, whereas Achilles’s is amarulent; and in that same poet the old men, sitting on the walls, give forth “the lily-like voice.” By this reckoning they even surpass boyhood itself—sweet indeed, but infantile—and lacking the chief delectation of life, namely garrulity. Add to this that old men also rejoice more earnestly in children, and children in turn take delight in old men, “for ever the god leads like to like.”
What, indeed, does not agree between them, except that this one is more wrinkled and counts more birthdays? Otherwise, the whiteness of the hair, an edentulous mouth, a lesser measure of body, an appetite for milk, stammering, garrulity, ineptitude, oblivion, incogitancy, briefly, all the rest are congruent. And the more they draw near to old age, the closer they return to a likeness of childhood, until, after the manner of boys, without the tedium of life, without the sense of death, they emigrate from life.
14. Eat nunc qui uolet, et hoc meum beneficium cum reliquorum Deorum metamorphosi comparet. Qui quid irati faciant, non libet commemorare: sed quibus quam maxime propitii sunt, eos solent in arborem, in auem, in cicadam aut etiam in serpentem transformare: quasi uero non istud ipsum sit perire, aliud fieri. Ego uero hominem eumdem optimae ac felicissimae uitae parti restituo.
14. Let him go now who will, and let him compare this my beneficium with the metamorphosis of the remaining Gods. What they do when angry, I do not care to recount: but those to whom they are most propitious, they are accustomed to transform into a tree, into a bird, into a cicada, or even into a serpent: as though that very thing were not to perish, to become something else. I, for my part, restore the same man to the best and most felicitous part of life.
If mortals entirely restrained themselves from every commerce with wisdom, and spent their lifetime with me perpetually, there would indeed be no senility at all; rather, they would enjoy perpetual youth, happy. Do you not see those grim fellows—addicted either to the studies of Philosophy or to serious and arduous affairs—who, for the most part, before they are even fully young, have already grown aged, namely with cares, and with the assiduous and sharp agitation of thoughts gradually draining the spirits and that vital juice? Whereas, on the contrary, my fools are a bit plump, sleek, with well-cared-for skin—plainly pigs, as they say, Acarnanian ones—never, in truth, about to feel any inconvenience of old age, unless they should be infected a little, as happens, by the contagion of the wise.
To such a degree does human life permit nothing to be blessed in every part. To these points there is added no light testimony of a common proverb, by which they keep saying that FOLLY is the one thing that both holds back youth, otherwise most fleeting, and keeps wicked old age far away. So that it has not been rashly bandied about in the popular speech concerning the Brabanters.
While for other men age is wont to bring prudence, these, the nearer they approach to old age, the more and more they grow foolish. And yet there is not another nation either more festive for the common consuetude of life, or that feels less the sadness of senectitude. To these, indeed, both in place and in the institute of life, my Hollanders are contiguous—for why should I not call them mine, so studious devotees of me that from this they have in popular parlance earned a cognomen?
of which they are so far from being ashamed that they especially vaunt themselves on this account. Let the most foolish mortals go now and hunt up Medeas, Circes, Venuses, Auroras, and some fountain, I know not what, by which they may restore youth to themselves—since I alone both can and am wont to furnish this. With me is that wonder-working juice, by which the daughter of Memnon prolonged the youth of her own grandfather Tithonus.
I am that Venus, by whose favor that Phaon grew young again, so that he was so greatly beloved by Sappho. Mine are the herbs, if there are any, mine the supplications, mine that fountain, which not only calls back youth that has slipped away, but, what is more desirable, preserves it perpetual. And if you all subscribe to this opinion, that there is nothing better than youth, nothing more detestable than old age, you see, I suppose, how much you owe to me, who retains so great a good, with so great an evil excluded.
15. Sed quid adhuc de mortalibus loquor? Coelum omne lustrate, et mihi meum nomen opprobret licebit, quicumque uolet, si quem omnino Deorum repererit non insuauem et aspernabilem, nisi meo numine commendetur. Etenim cur semper ephebus et comatus Bacchus?
15. But why am I still speaking of mortals? Survey the whole heaven, and let whoever wishes be permitted to cast reproach upon my name, if he shall find any one of the gods at all not unpleasant and not to be spurned, unless he be commended by my numen. For indeed, why is Bacchus always an ephebus and long-haired?
Surely because he is witless and temulent, spending his whole life in convivial banquets, saltations, choruses, and games, he has not even the least commerce with Pallas. Finally, so far is he from seeking to be held sapient that he rejoices to be worshiped with mockeries and jokes. Nor is he offended by the proverb which assigns to him the cognomen of “fool,” that is of this sort, moruchou môrteros.
Moreover, they changed the name to Morychus, because, sitting before the temple doors, he was accustomed to be besmeared by the lasciviousness of the farmers with must and with fresh figs. Then, indeed, what taunt does Old Comedy not hurl against this one? “O insipid god,” they say, “and worthy to have been born from the groin.”
But who would not prefer to be this fatuous and insipid fellow, always festive, always pubescent, always bringing sport and pleasure to all, rather than that crooked-counseled Jupiter, formidable to everyone, or Pan, by his tumults vitiating everything with senility, or Vulcan crammed with cinders and always filthy with the labors of the workshop, or even Pallas herself, terrible with her Gorgon and spear, and ever glaring keenly? Why is Cupid always a boy? Why?
unless because he is a trifler, and not even anything sound does he do or think? Why does he always adorn golden Venus with his form? Clearly, because he has affinity with me, whence he even recalls in his face my father’s complexion, and for this cause she is in Homer, “golden Aphrodite.” Then he laughs perpetually, if indeed we believe the Poets, or the Statuaries who emulate them.
What divinity did the Romans ever worship more religiously than Flora, the mother of all pleasures? Yet if anyone should inquire more diligently from Homer and the other Poets into the life of the grim gods, he will find everything full of folly. For what is the point of commemorating the deeds of the rest, since you know full well the loves and the play of Jupiter himself, the Thunderer?
when that severe Diana, oblivious of her sex, does nothing other than hunt, meanwhile perishing with love for Endymion? But I would prefer that they hear their own misdeeds from Momus, from whom once upon a time they used to hear more often. Yet recently, in anger, they hurled him headlong to the earth together with Ate, because with his wisdom he importunately and obstreperously clamored against the felicity of the gods.
Nor does any of mortals deign to honor the exile with hospitality, so far is it from being the case that there is a place for him in the halls of princes, in which nevertheless my kolakia holds first place, with which Momus agrees no more than wolves with a lamb. And so, with him removed, the gods now trifle much more licentiously and more suavely, truly raon agontes, as Homer says, with, to be sure, no censor. For what jests does that fig-wood Priapus not provide?
What jests does Mercury not put on display with his thefts and sleights-of-hand? Nay, even Vulcan himself at the banquets of the gods is wont to play the gelotopoion, and now by his limping, now by quips, now by ridiculous sayings he exhilarates the drinking-bout. Then too that old lover Silenus, accustomed to dance the kordax, together with Polyphemus the threttanelos, while the Nymphs dance the gymnopaedia.
Satyrs, half-goats, put on Atellan farces; Pan with some insipid little ditty moves all to laughter, which they so prefer rather than to hear the Muses themselves, especially when they have now begun to be soaked with nectar. Furthermore, what should I now commemorate of the things the Gods, well-drunk, get up to after the banquet? So, by Hercules, foolish am I, that I myself sometimes cannot keep from laughter.
16. Sed iam tempus est, ut ad Homericum exemplar relictis Coelitibus uicissim in terram demigremus, quamque ibi nihil laetum, aut felix, nisi meo munere, dispiciamus. In primis uidetis, quanta prouidentia Natura parens et humani generis opifex, illud cauerit, ne usquam deesset stultitiae condimentum? Etenim cum Stoicis definitoribus nihil aliud sit sapientia, quam duci ratione; contra stultitia, affectuum arbitrio moueri, ne plane tristis ac tetrica esset hominum uita, Iupiter quanto plus indidit affectuum quam rationis?
16. But now it is time that, after the Homeric exemplar, with the heaven-dwellers left behind, we in turn descend to the earth, and observe how there nothing is cheerful or happy except by my gift. In the first place you see with what providence Nature, the parent and artificer of the human race, has taken care of this: that the condiment of folly should nowhere be lacking. For indeed, with the Stoic definers, wisdom is nothing other than to be led by reason; contrariwise, folly is to be moved at the discretion of the affections; lest human life be altogether sad and grim, how much more did Jupiter instill of affections than of reason?
as if you were comparing a half-ounce to an as. Moreover, he relegated reason into the narrow corner of the head, and left all the rest of the body to perturbations. Then he opposed to that one two most violent tyrants: anger, which holds the citadel of the vitals, and indeed the very fountain of life, the heart; and concupiscence, which occupies with the broadest dominion down to the very lowest groin.
Against these twin forces how much reason avails, the common life of men declares well enough, since it—which alone is permitted—protests even to hoarseness, and dictates the formulas of the honorable. But they slacken the leash for their own king, and make a much more odious din, until at last he too, weary, yields of his own accord, and gives his hands in surrender.
17. Caeterum quoniam uiro administrandis rebus nato, plusculum de rationis unciola erat adspergendum, ut huic quoque pro uirili consuleret, me sicut in caeteris in consilium adhibuit, moxque consilium dedi me dignum: nempe uti mulierem adiungeret, animal, uidelicet, stultum quidem illud atque ineptum, uerum ridiculum et suaue, quo conuictu domestico, uirilis ingenii tristitiam, sua stultitia condiret atque edulcaret. Nam, quod Plato dubitare uidetur, utro in genere ponat mulierem, rationalium animantium, an brutorum, nihil aliud uoluit, quam insignem eius sexus stultitiam indicare. Quod si qua forte mulier sapiens haberi uoluit, ea nihil aliud agit quam ut bis stulta sit, perinde quasi bouem aliquis ducat ad ceroma, inuita reluctanteque, ut aiunt, Minerua.
17. However, since for a man born for administering affairs a little sprinkling of the ouncelet of reason had to be added, so that he too might consult for this to the best of his virile power, he, just as in the other matters, called me into counsel, and straightway I gave counsel worthy of me: namely, that he should adjoin a woman, an animal, to wit, indeed that foolish and inept one, yet ridiculous and suave, by whose domestic consorting he might season and edulcorate the sadness of a virile ingenium with her own stupidity. For, as to Plato’s seeming to doubt in which genus he should place woman, whether among rational animals or among brutes, he wished nothing else than to indicate the conspicuous stupidity of that sex. But if perchance any woman has wished to be held wise, she does nothing else than to be twice-stupid, just as if someone were to lead an ox to the wrestling-school (ceroma), with Minerva, as they say, unwilling and resisting.
For he doubles the vice, whoever, against nature, puts on the rouge of virtue, and deflects his native genius elsewhere. Just as, according to the Greeks’ proverb, a monkey is always a monkey, even if it be clothed in purple: so a woman is always a woman, that is, foolish, whatever persona she has assumed. Nor indeed do I judge the race of women to be so foolish that on that account they would be angry with me, because both I, a woman myself, and FOLLY, attribute folly to them.
For indeed, if they reckon the matter in the straight way, they ought to credit this very thing to Folly, that they are by many tallies more fortunate than men. First, the grace of form (beauty), which they rightly set before all things, and by the protection of which they even exercise tyranny over the tyrants themselves. Otherwise, whence that horror of form, the bristly skin, and the forest of beard—something plainly senile in the male—if not from the vice of Prudence; whereas women’s cheeks are always smooth, the voice always slender, the skin soft, as if they were imitating a kind of perpetual adolescence?
Then what else do they desire in this life than to please men as much as possible? Do not so many adornments, so many dyes, so many baths, so many coiffures, so many unguents, so many odors, so many arts of composing, painting, and fashioning the face, the eyes, and the skin, all look to this? And now, by what other name are they more commended to men than by Folly?
That this is true, no one will go into denials who has reckoned with himself what ineptitudes a man says with a woman, what trifles he enacts, whenever he has resolved to make use of feminine voluptuous pleasure. You have, therefore, the first and principal delectation of life, from what fountain it proceeds.
18. Sed sunt nonnulli, cumprimis autem senes bibaces quidem illi magis quam mulierosi, qui summam uoluptatem in compotationibus constituunt. Equidem an sit ullum lautum conuiuium, ubi mulier non adsit, uiderint alii. Illud certe constat, citra Stultitiae condimentum, nullum omnino suaue esse.
18. But there are some, especially old men—bibulous indeed rather than woman‑loving—who establish their highest pleasure in compotations. As for me, whether there is any sumptuous banquet where a woman is not present, let others see to that. This, at any rate, is agreed: without the condiment of Folly, none at all is pleasant.
To such a degree that, if there is lacking someone who, by true or by feigned STUPIDITY, may move laughter, they send for some gelotopoion even hired for a wage, or they bring in some ridiculous parasite, who with laughables—that is, foolish witticisms—may dispel the silence and gloom of the drinking-bout. For to what end was it pertinent to load the belly with so many dainties, so many luxuries, so many delicacies, unless the eyes and equally the ears, unless the whole mind, were fed with laughter, jests, and charms? But the architectrix unique of dessert-courses of this kind am I.
Although those very things now customary at convivials— to draw by lot with the tali a king of the feast, to play with the tesserae, to invite to the Philotesia, to compete in symperiphorai (toasts), to sing the Myrtus, to dance, to play the mime— were discovered not by the Seven Sages of Greece, but by us for the salvation of the human race. And indeed the nature of all things of this sort is such that the more folly they have, the more they contribute to the life of mortals, which, if it be sad, would scarcely even seem worthy to be called life. And yet it must turn out sad, unless you wipe away the kindred tedium with amusements of this kind.
I9. Sed erunt fortassis, qui hoc quoque uoluptatis genus negligant, et in amicorum caritate et consuetudine acquiescant, amicitiam dictitantes unam rebus omnibus anteponendam, quippe rem usque adeo necessariam, ut nec aer, nec ignis, nec aqua magis. Rursum adeo iucundam, ut qui hanc de medio sustulerit, solem sustulerit: adeo denique honestam, si quid tamen hoc ad rem pertinet, ut nec ipsi philosophi uereantur eam inter praecipua bona commemorare. Sed quid, si doceo me huius quoque tanti boni, et puppim esse et proram?
I9. But there will be perhaps those who neglect this genus of pleasure too, and acquiesce in the charity and consuetude of friends, declaring that friendship alone must be put before all things—indeed a thing so necessary that neither air, nor fire, nor water is more so. Again, so pleasant that whoever has taken this away from the midst has taken away the sun; so, finally, honest, if anyhow this pertains to the matter, that not even the philosophers themselves are afraid to commemorate it among the principal goods. But what if I show that I am both the stern and the prow of this so great a good as well?
I will teach, however, not by crocodilites, or Sorites of the “horned” sort, or other dialecticians’ quibbles of that kind, but with a “fat Minerva,” as they say, I will almost point the matter out with my finger. Come now, to wink at, to slip, to be half-blind, to hallucinate in regard to friends’ vices, even to love certain conspicuous vices as though they were virtues, and to admire them—does this not seem akin to folly? What when one over-kisses the nevus (birthmark) on his girlfriend, another is delighted by Agna’s polyp, when a father calls his strabismic son “pretty” (petus): what, I say, is this, if not sheer folly?
Let them cry out thrice and four times that it is stupidity; and yet this one stupidity both binds those already bound and preserves friends. I speak of mortals, of whom no one is born without vices; the best is he who is burdened by the least. Meanwhile, among those wise men—these gods—either friendship does not coalesce at all, or a certain grim and unsavory one intervenes, and even that only with a very few (for it would be impious to say with none), because the greatest part of men is foolish—nay rather, there is no one who does not in many ways rave—and a necessitude coheres only among similars. But if ever among those severe men mutual benevolence comes together, it is certainly by no means stable nor very enduring—inevitably so among morose and more-than-sufficiently sharp-eyed people, who discern in their friends’ vices as keenly as either an eagle or the Epidaurian serpent.
But they themselves—how bleary-eyed they are in their own vices, and how they do not see the knapsack hanging on their back. And so, since such is the nature of men that no temperament is found not obnoxious to great vices. Add the so great dissimilarity of ages and of studies, so many lapses, so many errors, so many contingencies of mortal life, in what way will the pleasantness of friendship stand fast even for an hour among those Arguses, unless there be added that which the Greeks admirably call euêtheia, this you may, if you please, render either as Folly or as an easiness of manners.
What then? Is not Cupid, that author and parent of every bond, downright blind in his eyes, who, just as “the things not fair have appeared fair,” likewise also brings it about among you that to each his own seems beautiful—so that an old codger loves an old crone, just as a little boy dotes on a little girl. These things everywhere both happen and are laughed at; yet these laughable things glue and couple together the pleasant society of life.
20. Porro quod de amicitia dictum est, id multo magis de coniugio sentiendum, quod quidem nihil est aliud, quam indiuidua uitae coniunctio. Deum immortalem! quae non diuortia, aut etiam diuortiis deteriora passim acciderent, nisi uiri foeminaeque domestica consuetudo, per adulationem, per iocum, per facilitatem, errorem, dissimulationem, meum utique satellitium, fulciretur alereturque?
20. Furthermore, what has been said about friendship must be felt much more about conjugal union, which indeed is nothing else than an indivisible conjunction of life. By the immortal God! what divorces, or even things worse than divorces, would everywhere befall, unless the domestic consuetude of man and woman, through adulation, through jest, through facility, error, dissimulation, my retinue assuredly, were propped up and nourished?
Good heavens, how few matrimonies would come together, if the bridegroom should prudently inquire what games that delicate—as she appears—and modest little maiden has already played long before the nuptials! Then how much fewer of those unions entered would cohere, unless very many deeds of wives lay hidden through the husband’s either negligence or stupor? And these things indeed are deservedly attributed to stupidity; yet it meanwhile procures this: that the wife be pleasant to the husband, the husband pleasant to the wife, that the house be tranquil, that affinity may remain.
21. In summa usque adeo nulla societas, nulla uitae coniunctio sine me uel iucunda, uel stabilis esse potest, ut nec populus Principem, nec seruum herus, nec heram pedissequa, nec discipulum praeceptor, nec amicus amicum, nec maritum uxor, nec locator conductorem, nec contubernalis contubernalem, nec conuictor conuictorem diutius ferat, nisi uicissim inter sese nunc errent, nunc adulentur, nunc prudentes conniueant, nunc aliquo stultitiae melle sese deliniant. Iam haec scio uideri maxima, sed audietis maiora.
21. In sum, to such an extent can no society, no conjunction of life be either pleasant or stable without me, that neither the People a Prince, nor a master a slave, nor a lady’s-maid her mistress, nor a preceptor a disciple, nor a friend a friend, nor a wife a husband, nor a lessor a lessee, nor a tentmate a tentmate, nor a table‑companion a table‑companion would longer endure, unless in turn among themselves now they err, now they flatter, now the prudent connive, now they soothe themselves with some honey of folly. Now I know these things seem very great, but you will hear greater.
22. Quaeso num quemquam amabit, qui ipse semet oderit? Num cum alio concordabit, qui secum ipse dissidet? Num ulli uoluptatem adferet, qui sibimet ipsi sit grauis ac molestus?
22. I ask, will he love anyone, who himself hates himself? Will he be in accord with another, who is at odds with himself? Will he afford pleasure to anyone, who is to himself heavy and troublesome?
That, I suppose, no one would say, unless he be more foolish than Folly herself. And yet, if you exclude me, to such a degree will no one be able to bear another that each one will even stink to himself, his own things will be sordid to him, each will be odious to himself. Since nature—stepmother rather than parent in not a few matters—has sown this evil into the ingenia of mortals, especially of the somewhat more prudent, so that each is displeased with himself.
What is youth, if it be corrupted by the ferment of senile sadness? Finally, what, in every office of life, either with yourself or among others, will you do with decorum (for it is the head not only of art, but indeed of every action, that what you do be decorous), unless this Philautia be present as your right hand, who for me deservedly holds the place of a own-sister? So strenuously does she play my parts everywhere.
Remove this condiment of life, and straightway the Orator will grow cold along with his delivery; the Musician will please no one with his numbers; the Actor will be hissed off the stage with his gesticulation; the Poet will be laughed at together with his Muses; the Painter will be sordid along with his art; the Physician will go hungry with his pharmaceuticals. Finally, instead of Nireus, Thersites; instead of Phaon, Nestor; instead of Minerva, a swine; instead of a man facund, an infant; instead of urbane, rustic will you seem. To such an extent is it necessary that each man also flatter himself, and that by some little assentation he first be commended to himself, before he can be commended to others.
Finally, since a chief part of felicity is that you should wish to be what you are, assuredly my Philautia accomplishes all this by a compendium: that no one repents of his own form, no one of his own genius, no one of his stock, no one of his place, no one of his institution, no one of his fatherland—so much so that neither would an Irishman wish to exchange with an Italian, nor a Thracian with an Athenian, nor a Scythian with the Fortunate Islands. And O the singular solicitude of nature, that in so great a variety of things she has made all equal! Where she has taken away somewhat from one’s endowments, there she is wont to add a little more of Philautia—although indeed I spoke foolishly in saying this, since this very endowment is the greatest.
23. An non omnium laudatorum facinorum seges ac fons est bellum? Porro quid stultius, quam ob causas, nescio quas, certamen eiusmodi suscipere, unde pars utraque semper plus aufert incommodi quam boni? Nam eorum qui cadunt, veluti Megarensium oudeis logos.
23. Is not war the harvest and fountain of all lauded deeds? Moreover, what is more foolish than to undertake a contest of this sort on account of I know not what causes, from which each side always carries off more incommodity than good? For as to those who fall, there is, as with the Megarians, oudeis logos.
Then, when now on both sides the iron-clad battle-lines have taken their stand, and the horns have rattled with a hoarse song, what, I pray, is the use of those Sages, who, drained by studies, scarcely draw breath with thin and chilly blood? There is need of men crass and pinguid, in whom there is as much audacity present as possible, and of mind as little as possible. Unless someone should prefer Demosthenes as a soldier, who, following Archilochus’s counsel, scarcely at the sight of the enemies, with his shield cast away, fled—so cowardly a soldier as he is a wise orator. But “counsel,” they say, “in wars has the greatest moment.”
24. Qui quidem quam sint ad omnem vitae usum inutiles, vel Socrates ipse unus Apollinis oraculo sapiens, sed minime sapienter iudicatus, documento esse potest, qui nescio quid publice conatus agere, summo cum omnium risu discessit. Quamquam viris in hoc non usquequaque desipit, quod sapientis cognomen non agnoscit, atque ipsi Deo rescribit, quodque censet sapienti a Republica tractanda abstinendum esse, nisi quod potius monere debuerat, a sapientia temperandum ei, qui velit in hominum haberi numero. Deinde quid eumdem accusatum ad cicutam bibendam adegit, nisi sapientia?
24. That these men are indeed useless for every use of life, even Socrates himself, alone wise by Apollo’s oracle, but judged least wisely, can be a proof: who, having attempted I-know-not-what to do publicly, departed amid the highest laughter of all. Although the man does not in this altogether lack sense, that he does not acknowledge the cognomen of “wise,” and even writes back to God himself, and that he judges a wise man must abstain from being handled by the Republic; except that he ought rather to have warned that one must temper oneself away from wisdom, who wishes to be held in the number of men. Then what drove that same man, when accused, to drink hemlock, if not wisdom?
For while he philosophizes about clouds and ideas, while he measures the feet of the flea, while he marvels at the voice of gnats, the things that pertain to common life he did not learn. But there stands by the preceptor, with his very head in peril, the disciple Plato, an excellent—of course—patron, who, offended by the din of the crowd, could scarcely pronounce that half period. Now what shall I say about Theophrastus?
M. Tullius, the parent of Roman eloquence, was always accustomed to begin with unseemly trepidation, just as if a sobbing boy: and Fabius interprets this as an argument of a sound-minded orator and of one intelligent of the peril. But when he says this, does he not openly confess that sapience stands in the way of conducting the affair properly? What will such men do, when the matter is carried on by iron, who are then struck breathless with fear when it is with naked words that one must contend?
And after these things there is celebrated, if it please the gods, that most illustrious sententia of Plato: that republics will be blessed, if either philosophers rule, or Emperors philosophize. Nay rather, if you consult the historians, you will find, assuredly, that no Princes have been more pestilential to the republic than when rule has fallen upon some philosopheaster or one addicted to letters. Of which matter, I suppose, the Catos furnish sufficient proof: one of whom, by insane denunciations, vexed the tranquility of the republic; the other, while vindicating the liberty of the Roman People too wisely, utterly overthrew it.
Add to these the Brutuses, the Cassii, the Gracchi, and even Cicero himself, who was no less pestilent to the Roman republic than Demosthenes to that of the Athenians. Moreover, as for Marcus Antoninus, even if we grant that he was a good emperor, I could actually wrest even this point: by that very designation he was grievous and hateful to his fellow citizens, that he was so much a philosopher. Yet granting that he was good, he was certainly more pestilent to the republic by leaving behind such a son than he had been salutary by his own administration. Since this kind of men, who have devoted themselves to the study of wisdom, is wont, both in other matters and especially in propagating children, to be most unlucky—Nature, I suppose, providing, lest this evil of wisdom spread more widely among mortals.
25. Sed utcumque ferendum si tantum ad publica munia forent onoi pros luran, nisi ad omnem prorsus vitae functionem nihil essent dexteriores. Ad convivium adhibe sapientem, aut tristi silentio, aut molestis quaestiunculis obturbabit. Ad chorum advoca, camelum saltare dices.
25. But it would somehow be bearable if they were asses before the lyre only in public duties, were it not that for absolutely every function of life they are no whit more dexterous. Invite a wise man to a banquet, and he will throw it into confusion either by sullen silence or by troublesome little questions. Call him to the chorus, and you will say a camel is dancing.
Drag him to the public games: by his very face he will obstruct the people’s pleasures, and the wise Cato will be compelled to withdraw from the theatre, since he cannot put down his supercilious brow. Should he fall into a conversation—suddenly, the wolf in the fable. If there is anything to be bought, anything to be contracted, in short, if any of those things must be transacted without which this everyday life cannot be carried on, you would call that sage a block of wood, not a man.
To such an extent he can be of use nowhere—neither to himself, nor to his fatherland, nor to his own—because he is unskilled in common affairs, and differs far and wide from popular opinion and vulgar institutions. Whence indeed it needs must be that he also incur odium, namely, on account of so great a dissimilarity of life and of minds. For what, after all, is carried on among mortals that is not full of stultity—and that by fools, and among fools?
26. Verum ut ad id quod institueram, revertar: quae vis saxeos, quernos, et agrestes illos homines in civitatem coegit, nisi adulatio? Nihil enim aliud significat illa Amphionis et Orpheil cithara. Quae res plebem Romanam iam extrema molientem, in concordiam civitatis revocavit?
26. But, to return to what I had undertaken: what force drove those stony, oaken, and rustic men into a commonwealth, if not adulation? For that cithara of Amphion and Orpheus signifies nothing else. What thing recalled the Roman plebs, already attempting extreme measures, into the concord of the state?
Just so effective was Themistocles’ like apologue about the fox and the hedgehog. What speech of a Sage could have achieved as much as that commentitious hind of Sertorius could, as much as that Spartan’s laughable contrivance about two dogs and about plucking the hairs of a horse’s tail? Not to say anything of Minos and of Numa, each of whom ruled the foolish multitude by fabulous inventions.
27. At rursum, quae civitas umquam Platonis, aut Aristotelis leges, aut Socratis dogmata recepit? Tum autem quae res Deciis persuasit, ut ultro sese Diis Manibus devoverent? Quod Q. Curtium in specum traxit, nisi inanis gloria, dulcissima quaedam Siren, sed mirum quam a Sapientibus istis damnata ? Quid enim stultius, inquiunt, quam supplicem candidatum blandiri populo, congiariis favorem emere, venari tot stultorum applausus, acclamationibus sibi placere, in triumpho veluti signum aliquod populo spectandum circumferri, aeneum in foro stare?
27. But again, what commonwealth ever received the laws of Plato or Aristotle, or the dogmas of Socrates? Then what was it that persuaded the Decii to devote themselves of their own accord to the Divine Manes? What drew Q. Curtius into the chasm, if not empty glory, a certain sweetest Siren—yet marvelously condemned by those so‑called Wise Men? For what, they say, is more foolish than for a supplicant candidate to flatter the people, to buy favor with largesses, to hunt the applauses of so many fools, to take pleasure in acclamations, to be carried about in triumph as if some emblem for the people to look upon, to stand as bronze in the forum?
Who denies it? And yet from this fountain are born the feats of brave Heroes, which are lifted to heaven by the writings of so many eloquent men. This folly begets cities; by this stand empires, magistracies, religion, counsels, judgments; nor is human life at all anything other than a certain play of folly.
28. Iam vero ut de artibus dicam, quid tandem mortalium ingenia ad excogitandas prodendasque posteris, tot egregias, ut putant disciplinas excitavit, nisi gloriae sitis? Tantis vigiliis, tantis sudoribus, famam, nescio quam, qua nihil esse potest inanius, redimendam putarunt homines vere stultissimi. Sed interim Stultitiae tot iam egregia vitae commoda debetis, quodque est longe dulcissimum, aliena fruimini insania.
28. But now indeed, to speak of the arts: what, pray, has stirred the ingenuity of mortals to think out and hand down to posterity so many excellent, as they suppose, disciplines, if not a thirst for glory? By such vigils, by such sweats, men truly most foolish have thought that fame—I know not what, than which nothing can be emptier—ought to be bought. But meanwhile you owe to Folly so many already excellent conveniences of life, and, what is by far the sweetest, you enjoy another’s insanity.
29. Ergo posteaquam mihi fortitudinis et industriae laudem vindicavi, quid si prudentiae quoque vindicem? Sed dixerit aliquis eadem opera ignem aquae misceas, licebit. Verum hoc quoque successurum, arbitror, si vos modo, quod antehac fecistis, auribus atque animis favebitis.
29. Therefore, after I have vindicated for myself the praise of fortitude and industry, what if I also vindicate prudence? But someone will say, with the same effort you might as well mix fire with water—so be it. Yet I judge that this too will succeed, if only you will, as you have done before, favor me with your ears and minds.
To begin with, if prudence consists in the use—experience—of things, to which will the honor of that cognomen more fittingly belong: to the wise man, who, partly on account of modesty, partly on account of timidity of spirit, undertakes nothing; or to the fool, whom neither shame, of which he is devoid, nor peril, which he does not weigh, deters from anything? The wise man takes refuge in the books of the Ancients, and from them learns by heart mere subtleties of words. The fool, by approaching things and by making trial of them at close quarters, gathers, unless I am deceived, true prudence.
That which Homer seems to have seen, though blind, when he says, “rechthen de te nêpios egnô”—“after the deed, the simpleton recognized you.” For there are two chief obstacles to preparing the cognition of things: shame, which casts smoke over the mind, and fear, which, once danger is shown, dissuades from approaching enterprises. But from these Folly magnificently frees one. Few mortals understand to how many other advantages it also conduces—never to be ashamed, and to dare anything whatsoever.
If they prefer to take prudence as that which consists in the judgment of things, listen, I beg, how far they are from this, who vend themselves under this name. In the first place, it is agreed that all human affairs, like Alcibiades’ Sileni, have twin faces far too dissimilar to each other. So much so that what, at the first, as they say, front is death, if you look within, is life: conversely what is life, is death: what is beautiful, deformed: what opulent, most poor: what infamous, glorious: what learned, unlearned: what robust, feeble: what generous (well-born), ignoble: what joyful, sad: what prosperous, adverse: what friendly, hostile: what salutary, noxious: in brief, you will find all suddenly reversed, if you open the Silenus.
If that perhaps seems to someone to have been said too philosophically, come, with a fatter Minerva, as it is wont to be said, I will make it plainer. Who does not acknowledge the King to be both opulent and lord? But since he is furnished with no goods of the soul, and nothing is enough for him, now, plainly, he is the poorest.
But to what purpose are these things? someone objects. Hear to what conclusion we lead the matter . If anyone should try to strip from the histrionic actors on the stage the personae (masks) as they act the fable, and to show to the spectators their true and native faces, would he not have perverted the whole play, and be thought worthy to be cast out of the theater with stones by everyone, as if crazed?
However, a new appearance of things will suddenly arise, so that he who just now was a woman, now a man; he who just now a youth, soon an old man; he who a little before a King, suddenly Dama; he who just now a God, suddenly appears a homunculus. But to take away that error is to throw the whole play into disorder. That very thing is the figment and the cosmetic that holds the spectators’ eyes.
Furthermore, what else is the whole life of mortals than a certain fable, in which some step forth covered with others’ personae (masks), and each acts his own parts, until the choragus leads them out from the proscenium? Who often, however, bids that same man to come on in different garb, so that he who just now played the purple-clad King now plays a ragged little servant. All things indeed are adumbrated, but this fable is acted in no other way.
Here if some wise man, fallen from heaven, should suddenly appear to me, and should cry out that this one whom all look up to as a God and lord is not of men, in that he is led by affections after the manner of cattle; that he is a lowest slave, in that he willingly serves so many and so foul masters; and again should bid another, who laments a deceased parent, to laugh, because only then has he begun to live, since otherwise this life is nothing else than a certain death; moreover should call another who boasts of his pedigree ignoble and a bastard, because he is far removed from virtue, which alone is the fount of nobility; and in the same way should speak about all the rest—pray, what else would he have achieved, except to seem to all to be demented and furious?
As nothing is more foolish than preposterous wisdom, so nothing is more imprudent than perverted prudence. For he acts perversely who does not accommodate himself to present things, and is unwilling to use the forum, nor at least remembers that convivial law, ê pithi, ê apithi, and postulates that the play now not be a play. By contrast, it is truly the part of a prudent man, since you are mortal, to wish to be wise in nothing beyond your lot, and, together with the whole multitude of men, either to connive gladly, or to err courteously.
30. Caeterum illud, o Dii immortales ! eloquarne, an sileam? Cur autem sileam, cum sit vero verius? Sed praestiterit fortassis in re tanta, Musas ex Helicone accersere, quas Poetae saepius ob meras nugas advocare solent.
30. But as for that, O immortal gods ! shall I speak it out, or keep silence? Why, moreover, should I be silent, since it is truer than truth? Yet perhaps it would be preferable, in a matter so great, to summon the Muses from Helicon, whom Poets are wont to call in rather often on account of mere trifles.
Be present therefore for a little while, daughters of Jove, while I show that there is no access for anyone to that distinguished wisdom, and to the citadel of felicity, as they themselves call it, unless with FOLLY as guide. Now first this is admitted: all the affections pertain to Folly. Since by this mark they distinguish the wise man from the fool—that the former is tempered by reason, the latter by affections.
And so the Stoics remove all perturbations, as though diseases, from the wise man; yet those affects not only discharge the office of pedagogues for those hastening to the harbor of wisdom, but also are wont to be present in every function of virtue as certain spurs and goads, as exhorters to act well. Although here the twice-Stoic Seneca stoutly protests, who downright takes away every affect from the wise man. But when he does this, he does not even leave a human being, but rather, as a demiurge, he fashions a certain new god, who has nowhere ever existed, nor will exist: nay, to speak more openly, he sets up a marble simulacrum of a man, stupefied, and alien from all human feeling.
Accordingly, if it so pleases, let them enjoy their wise man themselves, and let them love him without a rival, and with him let them inhabit either in Plato’s City, or, if they prefer, in the Region of Ideas, or in the gardens of Tantalus. For who would not flee and shudder at such a man as a portent and a specter, who has gone deaf to all the senses of nature, who is possessed by no affects, nor is moved either by love or by mercy any more than if he were hard flint, or stood as the Marpesian crag; whom nothing escapes, who errs in nothing, but, like some Lynceus, sees through everything, weighs everything to a nicety by the rule, forgives nothing; who alone is content with himself, alone rich, alone sound, alone king, alone free, in short, everything alone—yet by his own judgment alone; who regards no friend, himself a friend to no one; who does not hesitate to consign even the gods themselves to the noose; who condemns as madness, and laughs at, whatever is done in the whole of life? And yet such an animal is that absolute Wise Man.
Pray, if the matter were conducted by suffrages, what city would want a magistrate of that sort for itself, or what army would desire such a leader? nay rather, what woman a husband of that kind, what convivial host such a banquet-guest, what slave would either wish for or endure a master with such manners? Who, moreover, would not prefer even any single fellow from the very midst of the most foolish rabble, who, being foolish, can either command fools or obey, who pleases his likes—and indeed the very many—who is courteous toward his wife, pleasant to friends, a charming dinner-guest, an easy companion in daily life, and finally who thinks that nothing human is alien to himself?
31. Agedum, si quis velut e sublimi specula circumspiciat, ita ut Iovem Poetae facere praedicant, quot calamitatibus hominum vita sit obnoxia, quam misera, quam sordida nativitas, quam laboriosa educatio, quot iniuriis exposita pueritia, quot sudoribus adacta iuventus, quam gravis senectus, quam dura mortis necessitas, quot morborum agmina infestent, quot immineant casus, quot ingruant incommoda, quam nihil usquam non plurimo felle tinctum, ut ne commemorem ista, quae homini ab homine inferuntur mala, quod genus sunt, paupertas, carcer, infamia, pudor, tormenta, insidiae, proditio, convitia, lites, fraudes. Sed ego iam plane ton ammon anametrein aggredior. Porro quibus admissis ista commeruerint homines, aut quis Deus iratus eos in has miserias nasci coegerit, non est mihi fas in praesentia proloqui.
31. Come now, if someone, as from a lofty lookout, should survey—just as the Poets proclaim Jove to do—how many calamities the life of men is obnoxious to: how miserable, how sordid the nativity, how laborious the education, how exposed childhood is to injuries, how youth is driven to so many sweats, how grave old age, how hard the necessity of death; how many battalions of diseases infest, how many mishaps hang over, how many inconveniences come rushing in; how nothing anywhere is not dyed with a very great gall—so that I need not commemorate those evils which are inflicted on man by man, of which kind are poverty, prison, infamy, shame, torments, ambushes, treachery, revilings, lawsuits, frauds. But I am now clearly setting about to count the sands of Ammon. Moreover, by what offenses men have deserved these things, or what angry God has compelled them to be born into these miseries, it is not lawful for me at present to declare.
But whoever weighs these things with himself, will he not approve the example of the Maidens of Miletus, even if pitiable? But who, most especially, summoned fate to themselves from the tedium of life? Were they not contiguous to wisdom? Among whom—though for the moment I keep silence about Diogenes, Xenocrates, the Catos, the Cassii, and the Brutuses—that Chiron, though it was permitted him to be immortal, of his own accord preferred death.
You see, I suppose, what would happen if men were wise everywhere: namely, there would be need of another Prometheus—one for the clay, another for the potter. But I, partly through ignorance, partly through incogitancy, sometimes through oblivion of evils, at times through hope of goods, every so often sprinkling a little honey upon pleasures, so succor men amid such great evils that not even then does it please them to leave life, when, the thread of the Fates being spun out, life itself has long since left them; and the less there is cause why they ought to remain in life, so much the more it delights them to live—so far are they from being touched by any weariness of life. It is plainly my gift that you see everywhere old men of Nestorean senectitude, in whom not even the appearance of a human being remains—stammering, delirious, toothless, hoary, bald—or, to describe them more in Aristophanic words, rupôntas, kuphous, athlious, rusous, madôntas, nôdous kai psôlous—so much delighted with life, and so much neanizein, that one dyes his white hairs, another disguises baldness with apposited hair, another uses teeth on loan, perhaps taken from someone else, this one miserably pines for some girl, and in amatory silliness even surpasses any little adolescent.
For that those already shroud-clad, mere funereal fodder, should take a tender young heifer as a wife, and her both undowered and destined to be of use to others, is so frequent that it is almost even accounted to their praise. But far sweeter still, if one observe old women dead already with long senescence, so cadaverous that they might seem to have come back from the underworld, yet to have that ever on their lips, “phôs agathon,” to lisp still, and, as the Greeks are wont to say, to kaproun, and to bring on stage some Phaon hired at great wages, to smear their face continually with cosmetics, to depart nowhere from the mirror, to pluck the thicket of the lowest pubes, to display withered and rotting breasts, and with a tremulous yapping to solicit languishing Cupid, to tipple, to mingle in the choruses of girls, to write little love-letters. These things are laughed at by all as, just as they are, most foolish; but they themselves are pleased with themselves, and meanwhile are occupied with the highest delights, and anoint themselves all over with honey, happy—manifestly by my benefaction.
Moreover, for those to whom these things seem derisible, I would have them weigh with themselves whether they deem it preferable by such stultitia to pass a life plainly honey-sweet, or to seek, as they say, a beam for hanging. Furthermore, that these are commonly thought obnoxious to infamy—this is nothing to my fools, who either do not sense this evil, or, if they sense anything, easily neglect it. If a stone should fall upon the head, that indeed would be an evil.
32. Sed mihi videor audire reclamantes philosophos. Atqui hoc ipsum est, inquiunt, miserum, STULTITIA teneri, errare, falli, ignorare. Imo hoc est hominem esse.
32. But I seem to hear the philosophers protesting. And yet this itself, they say, is miserable: to be held by FOLLY, to err, to be deceived, to be ignorant. Nay rather, this is to be human.
Furthermore, why they call it miserable, I do not see, since thus you were born, thus instituted, thus constituted; that is the common lot of all. Nothing, however, is miserable that stands fast in its own genus, unless perhaps someone deems man deplorable, who can neither fly with the birds, nor go on four feet with the rest of the class of cattle, nor is armed with horns, as bulls are. But that same person, by the same token, will call even a most beautiful horse unlucky, because it has learned neither Grammar, nor feeds on cakes; a bull miserable, because it is useless for palaestric training.
Therefore, just as a horse unskilled in Grammar is not miserable, so neither is a foolish man unhappy, for the reason that these things cohere with his nature. But again the Logodaedali press the point. “There is,” they say, “peculiarly added to man a cognition of the disciplines, by the supports of which he may compensate by ingenium for that which has been diminished by nature.”
As though truly it had any semblance of truth, that Nature, who has kept so solicitous a vigil in gnats, and even in grasses and little flowers, should have slumbered in one man, so that there was need of disciplines, which that Theuth, that genius hostile to the human race, devised to utter perdition—so far from useful for felicity that they even hinder that very thing for which they are said to have been specifically discovered, as that most prudent King argues elegantly in Plato concerning the invention of letters. Therefore the disciplines, along with the remaining pestilences of human life, crept in from the same authors from whom all crimes proceed, namely the Daemons—whence even their name has been coined, as though you would call them daêmones, that is, “knowers.” For indeed that simple race of the Golden Age, armed with no disciplines, lived by Nature’s guidance and instinct alone.
For to what end was there need of Grammar, since the tongue was the same for all, and nothing else was sought in speech except that one might understand another? What use of dialectic, where there was no duel of opinions at variance among themselves? What place for rhetoric, since no one was creating trouble for another?
To what end would jurisprudence be required, since evil mores were absent, from which, without doubt, good laws have sprung? Moreover, they were more religious than to scrutinize with impious curiosity the arcana of nature, the measures of the stars, their motions and effects, the hidden causes of things, reckoning it nefarious if a mortal man should attempt to be wise beyond his lot. Already the madness of inquiring what was outside heaven did not even come into mind.
But with the purity of the golden age gradually slipping away, first the arts were invented by evil genii, as I said—but few, and these indeed received by few. Afterwards the superstition of the Chaldaeans and the idle levity of the Greeks added 600, mere crucifixions of wits, to such a degree that even a single Grammar is more than sufficient for the perpetual butchery of life.
33. Quamquam inter has ipsas disciplinas, hae potissimum in pretio sunt, quae ad sensum communem, hoc est, ad stultitiam, quam proxime accedunt. Esuriunt Theologi, frigent Physici, ridentur Astrologi, negliguntur Dialectici. Solus iatros anêr pollôn antaxios andrôn. Atque in hoc ipso genere, quo quisque indoctior, audacior, incogitantiorque, hoc pluris fit etiam apud torquatos istos Principes.
33. Although among these very disciplines, those are most of all in price which approach the common sense, that is, stupidity, as nearly as possible. Theologians go hungry, Physicists grow cold, Astrologers are laughed at, Dialecticians are neglected. Only the physician is a man worth many men. And in this very kind, the more unlearned, the more audacious, and the more incogitant, by so much the more he is valued even among those torque-wearing princes.
And yet Medicine, especially as now it is practiced by many, is nothing else than a particle of assentation, no less surely than rhetoric. After these, the next place is given to the little-lawyers (pettifoggers); and I scarcely know whether even the first, whose profession—so that I may not myself pronounce anything—the philosophers by great consensus are wont to laugh at as asinine. Yet by the arbitration of these asses the greatest and the least affairs are transacted.
Their latifundia increase, while the theologian, meanwhile, with the chests of all divinity shaken out, gnaws a lupine, waging continual war with bedbugs and lice. Therefore, the arts are the more fortunate which have a greater affinity with STUPIDITY; and by far the happiest are those to whom it has been altogether permitted to abstain from the commerce of all disciplines, and to follow nature alone as guide, who is in no part of herself maimed, unless perhaps we should wish to leap beyond the boundary-lines of mortal lot. Nature hates cosmetics and shams, and what has been violated by no art thrives much more happily.
34. Agedum, annon videtis ex unoquoque reliquorum animantium genere ea felicissime degere, quae sunt a disciplinis alienissima, nec ullius magisterio nisi naturae, ducuntur? Quid apibus aut felicius, aut mirabilius? At his ne corporis quidem omnes sensus adsunt.
34. Come now, do you not see, from each of the remaining kinds of living beings, that those live most felicitously which are most alien from disciplines, and are led by the magistery of none save Nature? What is either more happy or more marvelous than bees? Yet to these not even all the senses of the body are present.
For indeed he, not rarely, while it shames him to be conquered in contests, strains his flanks; and in wars, while he ambitiously courts a triumph, he is run through, and together with his rider he has bitten the earth with his mouth. Not to mention meanwhile the wolf-bit bridles, the spiked spurs, the prison of the stable, the scourges, clubs, bonds, the rider—briefly, that whole tragedy of servitude, to which he has voluntarily bound himself over, while, imitating brave men, he strives more earnestly to avenge himself on the foe. How much more desirable is the life of flies and little birds, living from the moment and by the mere sense of nature, provided only it be permitted, so far as men’s snares allow.
Which, if ever shut up in cages, grow accustomed to sound human tongues, it is astonishing how far they degenerate from that native luster. Thus, in every way, what nature has established is more cheerful than what art has painted over. Accordingly I could never praise enough that cock Pythagoras, who, when as one he had been everything—philosopher, man, woman, king, private citizen, fish, horse, frog, I think even a sponge—nevertheless judged no animal more calamitous than man, for the reason that all the rest were content with the boundaries of nature, while man alone tried to step beyond the limits of his own lot.
35. Rursum inter homines, idiotas multis partibus anteponit doctis ac magnis, et Gryllus ille non paulo plus sapuit, quam polumêtis Odusseus, qui maluerit in hara grunnire, quam cum illo tot miseris obiici casibus. Ab his mihi non dissentire videtur Homerus nugarum pater, qui cum mortales omnes subinde deilous kai mochthêrous appellat, tum Ulyssem illum suum sapientis exemplar, saepenumero dustênon vocat, Paridem nusquam, nec Aiacem, nec Achillem. Quamobrem id tandem?
35. Again, among humans, he puts idiots far by many parts before the learned and great, and that Gryllus was not by a little wiser than polymetis Odysseus, who preferred to grunt in the sty rather than to be exposed with him to so many miserable mishaps. From these Homer, the father of trifles, seems to me not to dissent, who, since he repeatedly calls all mortals deilous kai mochthêrous, then calls that Ulysses of his, the exemplar of the wise man, oftentimes dustênon, never Paris, nor Ajax, nor Achilles. Why, pray, is that?
Unless it be that that sly and artful fellow did nothing without Pallas’s counsel, and was too wise, withdrawing as far as possible from nature’s leading? Accordingly, among mortals, those are farthest distant from felicity who apply themselves to wisdom—assuredly in this very thing twice-fools, that, though born as men, yet, forgetful of their condition, they aspire to the life of the immortal gods, and, after the example of the Giants, with the machines of the disciplines wage war upon nature—so, in turn, those seem least miserable who approach most nearly to the disposition and stupidity of brutes, and attempt nothing beyond man. Come, let us try whether we can show this too, not by Stoic enthymemes, but by some coarse example.
And by the immortal gods, is there anything more felicitous than that genus of men whom the crowd calls jesters, stupid, fatuous, and blitean fellows, by the most beautiful, as I for my part think, cognomens? I will say a thing which at first blush may seem foolish and absurd, yet is by far the truest. To begin with, they are vacant of the fear of death, a not moderate, by Jove, evil.
In sum, they are not torn to pieces by thousands of cares, to which this life is obnoxious. They are not ashamed, they do not revere, they do not court, they do not envy, they do not love. Finally, if they should come nearer even to the insipience of brute animals, they do not even sin, with theologians for authorities.
Here now I would have you weigh for me, most foolish wise man, by how many anxieties from every side your mind is excruciated nights and days, heap into one pile all the inconveniences of your life, and then at last you will understand from how great evils I have withdrawn my fools. Add to this, that not only do they themselves perpetually rejoice, play, warble, laugh, but they also bring to all others, wherever they turn themselves, pleasure, jest, play, and laughter, as if given for this very purpose by the indulgence of the gods, to exhilarate the sadness of human life. Whence it comes about that, although men’s affection toward one another is various, they recognize all these equally as their own, seek them out, nourish, cherish, embrace, run to help, if anything should happen: they allow with impunity whatever they may have said or done.
36. Quid quod summis etiam regibus adeo sunt in delitiis, ut nonnulli sine his neque prandere, nec ingredi, nec omnino vel horam durare possint. Neque vero paullo intervallo hos bliteos suis illis tetricis sophis anteponunt, quos tamen ipsos aliquot honoris gratia solent alere. Cur autem ante ponant, nec obscurum arbitror nec mirum videri debet, cum sapientes illi nil nisi triste soleant adferre principibus, suaque doctrina freti, non vereantur aliquoties auriculas teneras mordaci radere vero.
36. What of this: that even with the highest kings they are so much in delights, that not a few without them can neither dine, nor go anywhere, nor at all endure even an hour. Nor indeed by a small interval do they set these blite‑like simpletons before their own grim sophists, whom nevertheless they are accustomed—several of them—to keep for honor’s sake. But why they put them first I judge to be neither obscure nor ought it to seem marvelous, since those wise men are wont to bring nothing but gloomy things to princes, and, relying on their doctrine, do not fear now and again to scrape their tender little ears with a mordacious truth.
For although the Alcibiadean proverb in Plato attributes truth to wine and to boyhood, yet all that praise is owed peculiarly to me, Euripides being witness, whose famous saying about us stands: môra gar môros legei. A fool, whatever he has in his breast, he bears it forth in his face, and brings it out in oration. But the wise have those two tongues, as Euripides likewise remembers, of which with the one they speak the true, with the other the things they have judged opportune for the occasion.
To these belongs to turn black into white, and from the same mouth to exhale cold and hot alike, and to have one thing laid up in the breast, another to fashion in speech. Moreover, amid such felicity, yet under this head the princes seem to me most unhappy, that there is lacking one from whom they may hear the truth, and they are compelled to have assentators for friends. But the ears of princes abhor the truth, someone will say, and for this very reason they shun those wise men, because they fear lest perhaps someone should arise more free-spoken, who would dare to speak truths rather than pleasant things.
Thus indeed the matter stands, truth is hateful to kings. Yet this very thing, wondrously, comes to pass in the case of my fools: that not truths only, but even open revilings are heard with pleasure—so much so that the same saying, which, if it should proceed from the mouth of a wise man, would have been capital, proceeding from a morion brings forth incredible delight. For truth has a certain genuine power of delighting, if nothing be added that offends; but that boon the gods have granted to fools alone.
For nearly the same reasons, women are accustomed to rejoice more earnestly in this kind of men, as being by nature more prone to pleasure and trifles. Accordingly, whatever they are wont to do with persons of this sort, even if sometimes too serious, they nevertheless interpret as jest and play—so ingenious is that sex, especially for pretexting their own committed deeds.
37. Igitur ut ad fatuorum felicitatem redeam, multa cum iucunditate peracta vita, nullo mortis vel metu, vel sensu, recta in campos Elysios demigrant, et illic pias atque otiosas animas lusibus suis delectaturi. Eamus nunc, et quemvis etiam sapientem cum huius morionis sorte conferamus. Finge quod huic opponas exemplar sapientiae, hominem qui totam pueritiam atque adolescentiam in perdiscendis disciplinis contriverit, et suavissimam vitae partem, perpetuis vigiliis, curis, sudoribus perdiderit, ne in reliqua quidem omni vita vel tantillum voluptatis degustarit, semper parcus, pauper, tristis, tetricus, sibi ipsi iniquus ac durus, aliis gravis et invisus, pallore, macie, valetudine, lippitudine, confectus senio, canitieque multo ante diem contracta, ante diem fugiens e vita.
37. Therefore, to return to the felicity of fools, their life having been passed with much jocundity, without either fear or sense of death, they migrate straight into the Elysian fields, and there are about to delight the pious and at-leisure souls with their amusements. Let us go now, and compare even any wise man with the lot of this morion. Imagine that you set over against him an exemplar of wisdom: a man who has worn out his whole boyhood and youth in thoroughly learning disciplines, and has lost the most sweet part of life in perpetual vigils, cares, sweats; who has not even in all the rest of life tasted so much as a tiny drop of pleasure; always parsimonious, poor, sad, austere, unjust and harsh to himself, burdensome and odious to others, consumed with pallor, leanness, ill‑health, blear‑eyedness, worn out with old age, and with a hoariness contracted long before his day, fleeing out of life before his day.
38. At hic rursus obganniunt mihi, hoi ek tês stôas (!) batrachoi. 'Nihil', inquiunt, 'miserius insania'. Sed insignis stultitia, vel insaniae proxima est, vel ipsa potius insa nia. Quid enim aliud est insanire, quam errare animo?
38. But here again those frogs from the Stoa (!) snarl at me. 'Nothing,' they say, 'is more miserable than insanity.' But conspicuous stupidity is either proximate to insanity, or rather is insanity itself. For what else is it to be insane than to err in mind?
But those men err all along the road. Come, let us also dissipate this syllogism, the Muses favoring us. Acute indeed are they; but, just as Socrates teaches in Plato, making two from one Venus by cutting, and two from one Cupid by dissecting, so likewise it behooved these Dialecticians to distinguish insanity from insanity, if only they themselves wished to seem sane.
For not straightway is every insanity calamitous. Otherwise Horace would not have said: 'Does a lovable insanity sport with me?'; nor would Plato have placed the furor of poets, seers (vates), and lovers among the chief goods of life; nor would that seer have called the labor of Aeneas ‘insane’. But there is a twofold genus of insanity: the one which the dread Avengers (the Dirae) send up from the underworld, whenever, by letting loose serpents, they drive into the breasts of mortals either the ardor of war, or an insatiable thirst for gold, or disgraceful and nefarious love, or parricide, incest, sacrilege, or some other pest of that kind; or when they lash a guilty and self-conscious mind with Furies and with the torches of terrors.
There is another, far dissimilar to this, which, to wit, proceeds from me, most to be desired of all. It occurs whenever a certain pleasant error of the mind at once both frees the spirit from those anxious cares and renders it imbued with manifold delight. And yet Cicero, writing to Atticus, desires this error of the mind as a certain great gift of the gods, namely, whereby he might be able to be without the sense of such great evils.
Nor did that Argive perceive amiss, who was insane to this extent: that he desired to be alone in the theater whole days, laughing, applauding, rejoicing, because he believed marvelous tragedies were being acted there, when nothing at all was being acted, while in the other duties of life he bore himself properly: “pleasant to his friends, gracious to his wife, one who could pardon servants. And, by the sign of a damaged flagon, not insane.” When, by the efforts of his kinsmen, with drugs administered, he had been lightened of the disease, and was now wholly restored to himself, expostulating with his friends in this manner: “By Pollux, you have killed me, friends, not saved me,” he says, “from whom pleasure has thus been torn away. And the most welcome error of mind has been removed by force.” And deservedly indeed: for they themselves were erring, and had more need of hellebore, who judged so happy and pleasant a madness, as if it were some evil, to be driven out by potions, whenever they had heard that foul blare of horns.
Although indeed I have not yet decided whether any and every sensation, or error of mind, is to be called by the name of insanity. For neither, if to someone bleary-eyed a mule should seem to be an ass; or if someone should admire an unlearned song as though most learned, will he forthwith appear to be insane. But if someone is deceived not only in sensation but by the judgment of his mind, and that beyond the usual custom and continually, he will finally be deemed to be akin to insanity, as for instance if someone, whenever he hears a donkey braying, should suppose himself to be hearing marvelous symphonists, or if some poor little fellow, born in the lowest rank, should believe himself to be Croesus, king of the Lydians.
But this genus of insanity, if, as it for the most part is, it verges toward pleasure, brings no mediocre delectation both to those who are held by it and to those by whom this is observed, and yet they do not go mad in the same way. For this species of insanity is patent much more widely than the vulgar crowd of men understands. But, in turn, the madman laughs at the madman, and they minister mutual pleasure to one another in turn.
39. Verum hoc quisque felicior, quo pluribus desipit modis, Stultitia iudice, modo in eo genere insaniae maneat, quod nobis est peculiare, quod quidem usque adeo late patet, ut haud sciam, an ex universa mortalium summa quempiam liceat reperire, qui omnibus horis sapiat, quique non aliquo insaniae genere teneatur. Quamquam hoc tantum interest qui cucurbitam cum videt, mulierem esse credit, huic insano nomen ponunt, propterea quod per paucis id usu veniat. Verum ubi quis uxorem suam, quam cum multis habet communem, eam plusquam Penelopen esse deierat, sibique maiorem in modum plaudit, feliciter errans, hunc nullus insanum appellat, propterea quod passim maritis hoc accidere videant.
39. But each man is the happier, the more ways he is foolish, in Folly as judge, provided only he remain in that genus of insanity which is peculiar to us; which indeed extends so widely that I hardly know whether, out of the entire sum of mortals, it is permitted to find anyone who is wise at all hours, and who is not held by some genus of insanity. And yet this only is the difference: the man who, when he sees a gourd, believes it to be a woman—on him they put the name “madman,” because this comes to pass in practice for a few. But when someone swears that his wife, whom he holds in common with many, is more than a Penelope, and applauds himself in the highest degree, happily erring, no one calls this man insane, because they see this happen everywhere to husbands.
To this order there also pertain those who, in preference to the hunting of wild beasts, contemn all things, and proclaim that they perceive an incredible pleasure of mind in the howlings of dogs. I suppose even when they smell the excrements of dogs, it seems to them cinnamon. Then what sweetness, whenever a wild beast is to be torn to pieces?
It is permitted to the lowly plebs to butcher bulls and wethers, but for a wild beast to be cut except by a well-born man is sacrilege. He, with bare head and bent knees, with a sword destined for that—indeed it is not lawful to do the same with just any blade—religiously cuts, with fixed gestures, specific parts, in a fixed order. Meanwhile the silent crowd standing around marvels as if at a new thing, although it has seen this spectacle more than 1,000 times.
Furthermore, whoever has happened to taste somewhat from the beast, he indeed thinks no small amount of nobility accrues to him. And so, although these men, by assiduous pursuit of wild beasts and by eating, achieve nothing else except that they themselves almost degenerate into beasts, yet meanwhile they suppose they are living a regal life. Very similar to them is the kind of those who burn with an insatiable zeal for building, now permuting round things for square, now square things for round.
Next to them there seem to me to come those who, by new and arcane arts, endeavor to transform the appearances of things, and by land and sea hunt after a certain quintessence. Such honeyed hope so cajoles them that they are never weary either of labors or of expenses; and with wondrous ingenuity they are always contriving something by which they may deceive themselves anew, and make the imposture pleasing to themselves, until, everything having been consumed, there is no means left with which to equip the furnace. Yet they do not cease to dream pleasant dreams, encouraging the rest, so far as they are able, toward the same felicity.
And when now they are utterly forsaken of all hope, nevertheless one sententia remains, an abundantly great solace: ‘In great affairs even to have willed is enough.’ And then they accuse the brevity of life, as that which has not sufficed for the magnitude of the enterprise. Furthermore, I somewhat doubt whether gamblers are to be admitted into our college. But yet it is an altogether foolish and ridiculous spectacle, whenever we see some so addicted that, as soon as they have heard the clatter of the dice, straightway their heart leaps and palpitates.
Then, when, with the ever-alluring hope of winning, they have made a shipwreck of all their resources, their ship dashed upon the rock of the dice, far more formidable than Malea, and have scarcely surfaced naked, they defraud anyone rather than the victor, so that, of course, they may not be considered men of too little gravity. What of it when, now old men and half-blind, they even play with glass eyes? Finally, when the proper hand-gout (chiragra) has crushed their joints, they even hire a vicar for wages to throw the dice into the tower for them?
40. Caeterum illud hominum genus haud dubie totum est nostrae farinae qui miraculis ac prodigiosis gaudent mendaciis, vel audiendis vel narrandis. Nec ulla satietas talium fabularum, cum portentosa quaedam, de spectris, de lemuribus, de larvis, de inferis, de id genus millibus miraculorum commemorantur: quae quo longius absunt a vero, hoc et creduntur lubentius et iucundiore pruritu titillant aures. Atque haec quidem non modo ad levandum horarum taedium mire conducunt, verum etiam ad quaestum pertinent, praecipue sacrificis et concionatoribus.
40. But that class of men is without a doubt wholly of our flour who rejoice in miracles and prodigious mendacities, whether to be heard or to be told. Nor is there any satiety of such fables, when certain portentous tales are recounted: about specters, about lemures, about larvae, about the infernal dead, about thousands of miracles of that kind; which, the farther they are from the true, the more gladly they are believed, and with a more pleasant itch they tickle the ears. And these things indeed not only marvelously conduce to the lightening of the tedium of the hours, but also pertain to profit, especially for sacrificers and preachers.
Next to these again are those who have put upon themselves a foolish yet pleasant persuasion: that if they should behold some wooden or painted Polyphemus-Christopher, they will not perish on that day; or that whoever shall salute a carved Barbara with the prescribed words will return from battle incolume; or that if anyone shall visit Erasmus on certain days, with certain little wax-candles and certain little prayers, he will shortly emerge rich. Now indeed they have even found a Hercules in George, as likewise another Hippolytus. His horse, most religiously adorned with trappings and bosses, they well-nigh adore, and from time to time seek to win its favor with some new little gift; to swear by his brazen helmet is plainly held a royal thing.
For what shall I say of those who with fictitious condonations of crimes most sweetly flatter themselves, and measure out the spans of Purgatory as if by clepsydras, centuries, years, months, days, hours, as though from a mathematical table, apportioning them without any error. Or of those who, relying on certain magical little notes and little prayers, which some pious impostor devised either for amusement or for gain, promise themselves nothing not to be had—wealth, honors, pleasures, satieties, health perpetually prosperous, a long-lived life, a green old age, and finally a seat next to Christ among the Supernals—yet which they would not wish to befall except very late; that is, when the pleasures of this life, holding them unwilling and, as it were, biting them fast, have nevertheless deserted them, then those delights of the Celestials may succeed. Here, imagine for me some merchant, or soldier, or judge, who, having thrown away a single coin out of so many depredations, deems the whole Lerna of his life once for all purged, and thinks that so many perjuries, so many lusts, so many drunken bouts, so many brawls, so many slaughters, so many impostures, so many perfidies, so many betrayals are, as by a pact, redeemed—and so redeemed that it is now permitted to return afresh to a new orb of crimes from the beginning.
But what is more foolish than these people, nay rather what more felicitous, who, with those seven little verses of the sacred Psalms recited daily, promise themselves more than the highest felicity? And some Demon, witty indeed, but more futile than crafty, is believed to have pointed out these magical little verses to Saint Bernard, but—poor creature—overreached by art. And these things, so foolish that I myself am almost ashamed, are nevertheless approved, and that not by the common crowd only, but even by professors of religion.
What now? does it not come almost to the same point, when individual regions claim as their own some peculiar Divine, and parcel out certain things to individuals one by one, assign to individuals their own rites of cult: that this one may succor in the torment of teeth, that one be favorable at hand to women in labor, another restore a thing carried off by theft, this one appear propitious in shipwreck, that one watch over the flock; and likewise concerning the rest. For to run through all would be very long. There are some who, each singly, are effective in more matters—especially the Deipara Virgin, to whom the common crowd of men well-nigh attributes more than to the Son.
41. Verum ab his Divis quid tandem petunt homines nisi quod ad stultitiam attinet? Agedum inter tot anathemata, quibus templorum quorumdam parietes omnes, ac testudinem ipsam refertam conspicitis, vidistisne umquam qui stultitiam effugerit, qui vel pilo sit factus sapientior? Alius enatavit incolumis.
41. But from these divinities what, pray, do men at last ask, except what pertains to stupidity? Come now, among so many anathemas, with which you behold the walls of certain temples, and the very vault itself, crammed full, have you ever seen anyone who has escaped stupidity, who has been made wiser by even a hair? Another swam out unscathed.
Another, pierced through by the foe, lived. Another, out of the battle, while the rest were fighting, escaped no less felicitously than bravely. Another, driven onto the cross, by the favor of some Divus, a friend to thieves, fell down so that he might proceed to unburden even certain persons ill-laden with riches.
Usque adeo omnis omnium Christianorum vita istiusmodi delirationibus undique scatet: quas ipsas tamen Sacrifici non gravatim et admittunt et alunt, non ignari quantum hinc lucelli soleat accrescere. Inter haec, si quis odiosus sapiens exoriatur, succinatque id, quod res est, non male peribis, sibene vixeris: peccata redimis, si nummulo addideris odium malefactorum, tum lacrymas, vigilias, precationes, ieiunia, ac totam vitae rationem commutaris: Divus hic tibi favebit, si vitam illius aemulaberis. Haec, inquam, atque id genus alia, si sapiens ille obganniat, vide a quanta felicitate repente mortalium animos in quem tumultum retraxerit?
To such an extent the whole life of all Christians everywhere teems with delirations of this sort: which very things, however, the Priests without reluctance both admit and foster, not unaware how much little lucre is wont to accrue from this. Meanwhile, if some odious wise man should arise, and chime in with this, which is the reality: you will not perish badly, if you have lived well; you redeem sins by adding a small coin; add hatred of evildoers, then tears, vigils, prayers, fastings, and alter your whole regimen of life: this Saint will favor you, if you emulate his life. These things, I say, and others of that kind, if that wise man should bark against, see from how great felicity he has suddenly dragged back the souls of mortals into what a tumult?
To this collegium pertain those who, while alive, determine with what funeral pomp they wish to be carried forth, so diligently do they decree that they even prescribe by name how many torches, how many black‑clad mourners, how many singers, how many grief‑actors they want to be present, just as if it were going to happen that any sensation of this spectacle would return to them, or that the departed would be ashamed unless the cadaver be magnificently interred, with no other zeal than if, created aediles, they were eager to exhibit games or to serve a banquet.
42. Equidem tametsi propero, tamen haud possum istos silentio praetercurrere qui cum nihil ab infimo cerdone differant, tamen inani nobilitatis titulo, mirum quam sibi blandiuntur. Alius ad Aeneam, alius ad Brutum, alius ad Arcturum genus suum refert. Ostendunt undique sculptas et pictas maiorum imagines.
42. For my part, although I hasten, yet I cannot run past in silence those who, though they differ in nothing from the lowest cobbler, nevertheless, with an empty title of nobility, it is marvelous how they flatter themselves. One refers his lineage back to Aeneas, another to Brutus, another to Arthur. They show everywhere carved and painted images of their elders.
They count their great-grandfathers and great-great-grandfathers, and commemorate ancient cognomina, while they themselves are not far removed from a mute statue, almost worse than the very effigies which they ostentatiously display. And yet, with this so sweet Philautia, they lead a positively happy life. Nor are there lacking those equally foolish, who look up to this genus of brutes just as to the Gods.
But why do I speak of one or another kind, as though this Philautia did not everywhere make very many supremely happy in wondrous ways? When this fellow, uglier than any ape, plainly seems to himself a Nireus? Another, as soon as he has drawn three lines with a compass, straightway thinks himself a Euclid: this one, a donkey to the lyre, and, ‘He does not sound any worse than the spot where the hen is bitten by her mate,’ nevertheless believes himself to be another Hermogenes.
There is, moreover, that by far most sweet kind of insanity, whereby certain people glory in whatever endowment belongs to any of their own, no otherwise than as in their own. Such was that twice-blessed rich man in Seneca, who, when about to tell some little story, kept slaves at hand to prompt the names, and would not have hesitated even to descend into a boxers’ contest—though a man otherwise so imbecile that he scarcely lived—relying on this fact, that he had at home many slaves exceedingly robust. Furthermore, as for the professors of the arts, what need is there to mention them?
since a peculiar Philautia belongs to all these, to such a degree that you would more quickly find someone willing to yield his paternal little field than his talent; but especially among actors, singers, orators, and poets, of whom, the more unlearned each one is, by so much the more arrogantly he pleases himself, the more he vaunts himself and inflates himself. And they find like—lips lettuces; nay, the more inept a thing is, the more admirers it acquires, so that the very worst things always smile upon the greatest number, for this reason that the greatest part of men, as we have said, is obnoxious to Folly. Accordingly, if a man is more unskilled, he is both much more delightful to himself and an object of admiration to more people; what reason, then, has he to prefer true erudition—first, going to cost much; then going to render him both more stuffy and more timid; and, finally, going to please far fewer?
43. Iam vero video naturam, ut singulis mortalibus suam, ita singulis nationibus, ac pene civitatibus communem quamdam insevisse Philautiam: Atque hinc fieri, ut Britanni praeter alia, formam, musicam, et lautas mensas proprie sibi vindicent. Scoti, nobilitate, et Regiae affinitatis titulo, neque non dialecticis argutiis sibi blandiantur: Galli morum civilitatem sibi sumant: Parisienses, Theologicae scientiae laudem omnibus prope submotis, sibi peculiariter arrogent: Itali bonas litteras et eloquentiam asserant: Atque hoc nomine sibi suavissime blandiantur omnes, quod soli mortalium barbari non sint. Quo quidem in genere felicitatis, Romani primas tenent, ac veterem illam Romam adhuc iucundissime somniant: Veneti nobilitatis opinione sunt felices.
43. Now indeed I see that nature, just as she has planted for individual mortals their own (share), so for individual nations, and almost for cities, she has sown a certain common Philautia: And hence it comes about that the Britons, besides other things, claim as proper to themselves beauty, music, and sumptuous tables. The Scots flatter themselves with nobility and with the title of kinship to the Royal house, and not least with dialectical subtleties: the French assume to themselves the civility of manners: the Parisians, with almost all others set aside, arrogate to themselves in particular the praise of Theological science: the Italians assert good letters and eloquence: And under this title they all most sweetly flatter themselves, that they alone of mortals are not barbarians. In which kind of felicity, the Romans hold first place, and still most pleasantly dream of that old Rome: the Venetians are happy by the repute of nobility.
The Greeks, as authors of disciplines, peddle themselves with those ancient titles of lauded heroes: The Turks and that whole truly rabble of barbarians even claim for themselves the praise of religion, mocking Christians as superstitious. But much more sweetly the Jews still steadfastly expect their Messiah, and their Moses they even today stubbornly cling to: The Spaniards yield military glory to no one: The Germans are pleased with themselves for the stature of their bodies and for knowledge of magic.
44. Ac ne singula persequar, videtis, opinor, quantum ubique voluptatis pariat singulis et universis mortalibus Philautia, cui prope par est Assentatio soror. Nihil enim aliud Philautia, quam cum quis ipse sibi palpatur. Idem si alteri facias, kolakia fuerit.
44. And not to pursue particulars one by one, you see, I suppose, how much pleasure everywhere Philautia begets for both individuals and mortals collectively, to which almost equal is her sister Assentation. For Philautia is nothing else than when someone strokes himself; do the same to another, and it will be kolakia (flattery).
But today adulation is a certain infamous thing, yet only among those who are moved more by the names of things than by the things themselves. They suppose that faith ill coheres with adulation; that the matter stands far otherwise they could be admonished even by the examples of brute animals. For what is more fawning than a dog?
Unless perhaps harsh lions, or savage tigers, or irritable pards seem rather to conduce to the life of men. Although there is indeed a certain pernicious adulation, by which some perfidious men and mockers drive the wretched into destruction. But this mine proceeds from the benignity of my disposition and from a certain candor, and is much nearer to virtue than that which is set in opposition to it: asperity, and a moroseness inconcinnate, as Horace says, and grave.
This raises more dejected spirits, soothes the sad, stimulates the languishing, rouses the stupefied, relieves the sick, softens the fierce, wins affections and retains those once won. It allures childhood to take up the studies of letters, exhilarates the old, and under the image of praise both admonishes and teaches princes without offense. In sum, it brings it about that each person is more agreeable and dearer to himself—which indeed is a part of felicity, even a principal one.
45. Sed falli, inquiunt, miserum est; imo non falli, miserrimum. Nimium enim desipiunt, qui in rebus ipsis felicitatem hominis sitam esse existimant. Ex opinionibus ea pendet: Nam rerum humanarum tanta est obscuritas, varietasque, ut nihil dilucide sciri possit, quemadmodum recte dictum est ab Academicis meis, inter philosophos quam minimum insolentibus.
45. But, they say, to be deceived is wretched; nay rather, not to be deceived is most wretched. For they are excessively foolish who esteem a man’s felicity to be situated in the things themselves. On opinions it depends: For the obscurity and variety of human affairs are so great that nothing can be known lucidly, as has been rightly said by my Academics, who among philosophers are as little insolent as possible.
Or if anything can be known, it not rarely even works against the jocundity of life. Finally, the human mind is sculpted in such a way that it is taken far more by cosmetics than by verities. If anyone seeks an experiment of this matter set forth and obvious, let him seek the assemblies and the temples, in which, if anything serious is narrated, all doze, yawn, and grow nauseated.
But if that bawler (I have slipped; I meant to say declaimer), just as they often do, begins some old-wives’ little fable, they all wake up, sit up, gape. Likewise, if there be a Saint more fabulous and poetic—if you require an example, imagine of this sort George or Christopher or Barbara—you will see him worshiped far more religiously than Peter, or Paul, or even Christ himself. But these things are not for this place.
Which nevertheless conduces just as much, or even more, to felicity. Come then, if someone eats putrid salted meats, whose very odor another could not even bear, and yet to this man they taste like ambrosia, I ask, what difference does it make for felicity? On the contrary, if sturgeon should taste nauseating to someone, what will it matter for the beatitude of life?
If someone should have a wife exceedingly deformed, who nevertheless to her husband seems able to contend even with Venus herself, would it not be just the same as if she were truly beautiful? If someone should gaze upon and marvel at a panel badly smeared with red lead and mud, being persuaded that it is a painting of Apelles or Zeuxis, would he not even be happier than the one who has bought at great price the hand of those artificers, perhaps about to receive less pleasure from that spectacle? I know a certain namesake of mine, who gave to a newly-wed bride several adulterine gems as a gift, persuading her—as he was a fluent trifler—that they were not only true and native, but even of singular and inestimable price.
I ask, what did it matter to the girl, since with glass she fed just as pleasantly both her eyes and her mind, and kept the baubles, just as if some exceptional treasure, stored by herself? The husband meanwhile both escaped the expense and enjoyed his wife’s error, nor did he have her less bound to himself than if he had given her a gift bought at great price. Do you reckon there is any difference between those who in that Platonic cave marvel at the shadows and simulacra of various things, provided they desire nothing and are no less pleased with themselves?
and that wise man who, having egressed from the cave, beholds the true realities? But if to Lucianic Mycillus it had been permitted to dream perpetually that rich and golden dream, there was no reason why he should opt for any other felicity. Either, therefore, nothing makes a difference, or, if there is any difference, the condition of fools is even preferable.
46. Porro nullius boni iucunda sine socio possessio. Quis enim nescit quanta sapientum paucitas, si modo quisquam inveniatur? quamquam ex tot saeculis Graeci septem omnino numerant, quos mehercle, si quis accuratius excutiat, dispeream, si vel semisapientem inveniet, imo si vel trientem viri sapientis.
46. Moreover, the pleasant possession of any good is not without a companion. For who does not know how great the paucity of the wise is, if only anyone can be found? although out of so many ages the Greeks number in all seven, whom, by Hercules, if anyone should examine more exactly, may I perish if he will find even a half-wise man—nay, not even a third of a wise man.
Accordingly, since among the many praises of Bacchus this is accounted the principal one, that it washes out the cares of the mind—and that only for a scant time, for as soon as you have slept it off ever so little, straightway the troubles of the spirit, as they say, run back on white four-horse chariots—how much both fuller and more present is my benefaction, I who, by a certain perpetual ebriety, fill the mind with joys, delights, and tripudiations, and that with no trouble at all? Nor do I allow any mortal whatsoever to be without my gift, whereas the remaining endowments of the divinities reach some and others others. Not everywhere is there born a generous and gentle merum, which should drive away cares, which abides with rich hope.
47. Nec vota moror, nec irascor, exposcens piamina, si quid cerimoniarum fuerit praetermissum. Nec coelum terrae misceo, si quis reliquis invitatis Diis, me domi relinquat, nec admittat ad nidorem illum victimarum. Nam caeterorum Deorum tanta in his est morositas, ut prope maius sit operae pretium, atque adeo tutius, illos negligere, quam colere.
47. I do not delay vows, nor do I grow angry, demanding expiations, if anything of the ceremonies has been omitted. Nor do I mix heaven with earth, if someone, with the rest of the Gods invited, leaves me at home, nor admits me to that reek of the victims. For the moroseness of the other Gods in these matters is so great that it is almost more worth the effort, and indeed safer, to neglect them than to cultivate them.
But this too, according to my facility, I take in good part; although I cannot even desire these things either. For what reason is there that I should require frankincense or the sacrificial meal, or a he-goat, or a sow, when all mortals everywhere among the nations render to me that cult which is wont even by theologians to be most approved? Unless perhaps I ought to envy Diana, because to her there is sacrifice with human blood.
I consider myself then to be most religiously worshiped, when everywhere, as all do, they embrace me in mind, express me in morals, and represent me in life. Which kind of worship of the gods is not very frequent even among Christians. How great a crowd of them fasten a little wax taper to the Virgin Mother of God—and that at midday, when there is no need?
Again, how few there are who strive to emulate the same by chastity of life, by modesty, by love of celestial things? For that alone is the true worship, and by far most pleasing to the Celestials. Moreover, why should I desire a temple, since this whole universe is to me a temple—unless I am mistaken—the most beautiful?
Nor indeed are mystae lacking, except where human beings are lacking. Nor am I now so exceedingly foolish as to seek stone and paint-daubed images, which sometimes hinder our cult, since by those stupid and gross fellows the statues are adored in place of the gods themselves. Meanwhile, there befalls us what is wont to befall those who are thrust out by their vicars.
I think there are as many statues erected to me as there are mortals, bearing before themselves the living image of me, even if they are unwilling. And so there is nothing in which I envy the other gods, if in other corners of the lands others are worshiped, and that on stated days: just as at Rhodes Phoebus, in Cyprus Venus, at Argos Juno, at Athens Minerva, on Olympus Jupiter, at Tarentum Neptune, at Lampsacus Priapus, provided only that to me, in common, the whole world continually offers by far better victims.
48. Atque si cui videor haec audacius quam verius dicere, agedum paulisper ipsas hominum vitas inspiciamus, quo palam fiat, et quantum mihi debeant, et quanti me faciant maximi pariter ac minimi. At non quorumlibet vitam recensebimus, nam id quidem perlongum, verum insignium tantum, unde reliquos facile sit aestimare. Quid enim attinet de vulgo, plebeculaque commemorare, quae citra controversiam tota mea est?
48. And if to anyone I seem to say these things more audaciously than truly, come now, let us for a little inspect the very lives of men, so that it may become manifest both how much they owe me and how highly they value me, the greatest and the least alike. But we will not review just anyone’s life—for that indeed would be overlong—but only those of the distinguished, whence it may be easy to estimate the rest. For what is the point of mentioning the common crowd and the plebeian rabble, which, without controversy, is wholly mine?
for it abounds on every side with so many forms of Folly, and every day devises so many new ones, that not even a thousand Democrituses would have sufficed for such laughter: although those very Democrituses would in turn have needed yet another Democritus. Nay even, it would be incredible to say what games, what delights, the little men daily provide for the gods above. For these indeed allot those sober, ante-meridian hours to quarrelsome consultations and to the hearing of vows.
There is one who, by roll-overs and borrowed money, thinks himself rich, soon to be a bankrupt. Another thinks nothing happier than if he, poor himself, should enrich his heir. This man, for a meager—and that uncertain—little lucre, flits over all the seas, committing his life to the waves and the winds, reparable by no money.
Both of whom then at last provide the gods, as spectators, with excellent amusement from themselves, when by those very people whom they try to catch they are tricked by art. The most foolish and most sordid genus of merchants, indeed, since they handle the most sordid business of all, and that by the most sordid reckonings—who, while they lie everywhere, perjure themselves, steal, defraud, and impose, yet make themselves first among all, for this reason: that they have their fingers bound with gold. Nor are wanting the adulators, the little Friars, who marvel at those men and openly call them “venerable,” naturally, so that some small portion of the ill-gotten gains may return to themselves.
Elsewhere you may see certain Pythagoreans, to whom to such a degree all things seem to be common , that whatever anywhere they have come upon unguarded, they lift with an even spirit as though it had befallen them by inheritance. There are those who are rich only in wishes, and they fashion for themselves certain pleasant dreams, and think that to be enough for felicity. Some are glad to be considered rich in public, at home they diligently go hungry.
This one hastens to pour out whatever he has, that one heaps up by fair means or foul. This one, as a candidate, canvasses for popular honors, that one amuses himself at the hearth. A good part set in motion lawsuits never to be finished, and on this side and that they vie in contention, so as to enrich the judge who keeps proroguing, and the colluding advocate.
This man is devoted to innovating affairs, that man engineers some great undertaking. There is one who goes to Jerusalem, to Rome, or to St. James, where he has no business at all, his wife and children left at home. In sum, if you should survey from the Moon the innumerable tumults of mortals, as Menippus once did, you would think you saw a swarm of flies or of gnats quarreling among themselves, warring, lying in ambush, snatching, playing, frolicking, being born, falling, dying.
49. Sed ipsa stultissima sim, planeque digna, quam multis cachinnis rideat Democritus, si pergam popularium stultitiarum, et insaniarum formas enumerare. Ad eos accingar, qui sapientiae speciem inter mortales tenent, et aureum illum ramum, ut aiunt, aucupantur, inter quos Grammatici primas tenent, genus hominum profecto, quo nihil calamitosius, nihil afflictius, nihil aeque Diis invisum foret, nisi ego miserrimae professionis incommoda dulci quodam insaniae genere mitigarem. Neque enim pente katarais, id est, quinque tantum diris obnoxii sunt isti, quemadmodum indicat epigramma Graecum, verum sexcentis, ut qui semper famelici, sordidique in ludis illis suis, in ludis dixi, imo in phrontistêriois vel pistrinis potius, ac carnificinis inter puerorum greges, consenescant laboribus, obsurdescant clamoribus, foetore paedoreque contabescant, tamen meo beneficio fit, ut sibi primi mortalium esse videantur.
49. But I myself would be most foolish, and plainly worthy to be laughed at by Democritus with many guffaws, if I go on to enumerate the forms of popular stupidities and insanities. I will gird myself rather to those who hold the semblance of wisdom among mortals and, as they say, go fowling for that Golden Bough, among whom the Grammarians hold first place—a race of men, assuredly, than which nothing more calamitous, nothing more afflicted, nothing equally hateful to the gods would exist, unless I by a certain sweet kind of insanity were to mitigate the inconveniences of that most miserable profession. For they are liable not to pente katarais, that is, to only five curses, as the Greek epigram indicates, but to six hundred, since they, always famished and filthy, in those “games” of theirs—in “schools,” I said, nay rather in phrontistêriois, or rather in grinding-mills and even slaughterhouses—amid herds of boys, grow old in labors, grow deaf from the clamor, waste away with stench and filth; yet by my benefaction it comes about that they seem to themselves to be the first of mortals.
So much do they please themselves, while they terrify the timorous crowd with a menacing countenance and voice; while they tear the wretches to pieces with ferules, rods, and thongs; and while by every method, at their own discretion, they are savage, imitating that Cumaean ass. Meanwhile those filths seem pure niceties; the stench smells of amaracinum; that most wretched servitude is thought to be a kingdom, so that they would not wish to exchange their tyranny with the rule of Phalaris or Dionysius. But they are even far happier, by a certain novel persuasion of doctrine.
Since indeed they inculcate pure deliriums into boys, yet, good gods, what Palemon is there, what Donatus, whom they do not despise in comparison with themselves? and by I know not what prestidigitations they wondrously bring it about that to foolish little mothers and idiot fathers they seem to be such as they make themselves out to be. Now add also this kind of pleasure: whenever any one of those fellows has detected Anchises’ mother, or a little word unknown to the crowd, on some rotten scrap of paper—suppose “bubsequa,” “bovinator,” or “manticulator”—or if someone has somewhere dug up a fragment of ancient stone, marked with mutilated letters: O Jupiter, what exultation then, what triumphs, what encomia, just as if they had vanquished Africa or captured Babylon!
But what when they flaunt their most frigid and most insipid little verses everywhere, nor are there lacking those who marvel, now plainly they believe that Maro’s soul has migrated into their own breast. Yet nothing of all is sweeter than when they themselves among themselves with mutual talion praise and admire one another, and scratch each other in turn. But if someone else has slipped by a mere little word, and by some chance this keener-eyed fellow has detected it—Hêrakleis—what tragedies at once, what digladiations, what revilings, what invectives?
May all Grammarians be ill-disposed toward me, if I am lying at all. I know a certain most many-skilled man, a Greek, a Latinist, a mathematician, a philosopher, a physician, and, what is more, royally so, already sixty years old, who, with the other pursuits set aside, for more than twenty years has been torturing and racking himself over Grammar, thinking he would be truly happy if only he might live long enough to determine with certainty how the eight parts of speech are to be distinguished—a thing which thus far none of the Greeks or Latins has been able fully to accomplish. Just as though the matter ought even to be vindicated by war, if someone makes a conjunction a diction belonging to the jurisdiction of adverbs.
And for this reason, since there are as many grammars as grammarians, nay more—seeing that my Aldus alone has issued a grammar more than five times—this fellow passes over none at all, however barbarously or tiresomely written, which he does not unroll and shake out; envying no one not, if anyone attempts anything, however ineptly, in this kind, miserably fearing lest someone perchance snatch away this glory, and the labors of so many years perish. Whether you prefer to call this insanity, or stupidity? For my part it matters not much, provided you admit that by my benefaction it comes to pass that the creature otherwise by far the most wretched of all is raised to such a degree of felicity that he would not wish to exchange his lot even with the kings of the Persians.
50. Minus mihi debent Poetae, tametsi vel ex professo meae sunt factionis, quippe liberum genus, ut habet proverbium, quorum omne studium non alio pertinet, quam ad demulcendas stultorum aures, idque meris nugamentis, ac ridiculis fabulis. Et tamen his freti dictu mirum, ut cum sibi polliceantur immortalitatem, et Diis parem vitam, tum aliis eamdem promittant. Huic ordini prae caeteris familiares philautia kai kolakia, nec ab ullo mortalium genere color neque simplicius, neque constantius.
50. The Poets owe me less, although they are even avowedly of my faction—indeed, a free tribe, as the proverb has it—whose whole zeal tends to nothing else than to soothing the ears of fools, and that with mere trifles and ridiculous fables. And yet, relying on these, marvelous to say, while they promise to themselves immortality and a life equal to the gods, then they promise the same to others. To this order, before the rest, self-love and flattery are familiar; nor by any kind of mortals is the color either simpler or more consistent.
Furthermore the rhetoricians, although they do somewhat prevaricate and collude with the philosophers, yet that these too belong to our faction is argued, among many other things, especially by this: that, besides other trifles, they have so accurately, so abundantly written about the method of joking. And indeed, whoever he was who wrote the art of speaking to Herennius numbers Folly herself among the species of facetiae; and with Quintilian, by far the chief of this order, the chapter on laughter is more prolix than an Iliad: and they attribute so much to Folly that very often what cannot be dissolved by any arguments is nonetheless eluded by laughter. Unless indeed someone should judge that it does not pertain to Folly to excite guffaws with ridiculous sayings, and that by art.
Of this same flour are also those who hunt for immortal fame by publishing books. These all owe me very much, but especially those who smear sheer trifles onto their sheets. For those who write eruditely for the judgment of a few learned men, and who refuse neither Persius nor Laelius as judge, seem to me more to be pitied than blessed, as men who perpetually torment themselves: they add, they alter, they take away, they put back, they repeat, they recast, they exhibit, they press their work till the ninth year, and never satisfy themselves; and they purchase at so great a price a futile reward—namely laud, and that of very few—with so many vigils, with so great a loss of sleep, the sweetest of all things, with so many sweats, so many crosses.
Add now the dispendium of health, the perdition of form, blearness of eyes, or even blindness, poverty, envy, abstinence from pleasures, a premature old age, a premature death, and whatever other things there are of the same sort. For such great evils that wise man deems ought to be bought, in order that he may be approved by one or two bleary-eyed men. But my kind of writer—how much more happily he raves!—since with no lucubration, but just as it has seemed to his mind, whatever falls upon his pen, even his dreams, he straightway brings forth into letters, with only a light loss of paper; not unaware it will come to pass that the more nugacious trifles he has written, by so much the more it will be approved by the many, that is, by all the foolish and unlearned.
For what difficulty is there in despising those three learned men, if indeed they have read these things? Or what will the ballot of so few wise men avail in so immense a crowd of those clamoring against it? But wiser still are they who publish others’ things as their own, and the glory obtained by another’s great labor they transfer by words onto themselves, relying, namely, on this: that they suppose it will come to pass that, even if they are most thoroughly convicted of plagiarism, nevertheless they will in the interim have profited by the use of some time.
It is worth the effort to see how much these men are pleased with themselves, when they are praised by the crowd, when they are pointed out with the finger in the mob, “this is that formidable one,” when they are set out for sale at the bibliopoles, when on the fronts of all the pages three names are read, especially peregrine and like those magic ones. Which, by the immortal God, what else are they than names? Then how much to be known by few, if you consider the vastness of the world: then by how many fewer to be lauded, since even the palates of the unlearned are diverse.
What of the fact that those very names are not rarely fabricated, or adopted from the books of the ancients? While one rejoices that he be called Telemachus, another Stelenus or Laertes, this man Polycrates, that one Thrasymachus: so that it now makes no difference, even if you inscribe a book to the chameleon or the gourd, or, as philosophers are wont to speak, Alpha or Beta. But this is most droll: when by mutual epistles, poems, encomia they laud one another in turn—fools [praising] fools, the unlearned [praising] the unlearned.
This one, by that one’s suffrage, goes off as an Alcaeus; that one, by this one’s, as a Callimachus: that one, for this man, is superior to Marcus Tullius; this one, for that man, more learned than Plato. Sometimes, too, they seek an antagonist, by whose emulation they may augment their fame. Here the wavering mob is split in its allegiances into opposite parties, until each leader, the affair well conducted, departs a victor, each celebrates a triumph.
51. Inter eruditos iurisconsulti sibi vel primum vindicant locum, neque quisquam sibi placet, dum Sisyphi saxum assidue volvunt, ac sexcentas leges eodem spiritu contexunt, nihil refert quam ad rem pertinentes, dumque glossematis glossemata, opiniones opinionibus cumulantes, efficiunt ut studium illud omnium difficillimum esse videatur. Quidquid enim laboriosum, idem protinus et praeclarum existimant. Adiungamus his dialecticos ac sophistas, hominum genus quovis aere Dodonaeo loquacius, ut quorum unusquivis cum vicenis delectis muleribus garrulitate decertare possit, feliciores tamen futuri, si tantum linguaces essent, non etiam rixosi, adeo ut de lana caprina pertinacissime digladientur, et nimium altercando plerumque veritatem amittant.
51. Among the erudite the jurisconsults claim for themselves even the first place, nor is anyone content with himself while they assiduously roll Sisyphus’s stone, and in the same breath weave together six hundred laws, no matter how they pertain to the matter; and while, piling gloss upon gloss, opinions upon opinions, they make it so that that pursuit seems the most difficult of all. For whatever is laborious, the same they straightway deem illustrious. Let us add to these the dialecticians and sophists, a race of men more loquacious than any Dodonaean bronze, such that any one of them could vie in garrulity with twenty select women—yet they would be more fortunate if they were only loquacious and not also quarrelsome, to such a degree that they cross swords most pertinaciously over goats’ wool, and by over-arguing for the most part lose the truth.
52. Sub hos prodeunt philosophi, barba pollioque verendi, qui se solos sapere praedicant, reliquos omnes mortales, umbras volitare. Quam vero suaviter delirant, cum innumerabiles aedificant mundos, dum solem, dum lunam, stellas, orbes, tamquam pollice filove metiuntur, dum fulminum, ventorum, eclipsium ac caeterarum inexplicabilium rerum causas reddunt, nihil usquam haesitantes, perinde quasi naturae rerum architectrici fuerint a secretis, quasive e Deorum consilio nobis advenerint: quos interim Natura cum suis coniecturis, magnifice ridet. Nam nihil apud illos esse comperti, vel illud satis magnum est argumentum, quod singulis de rebus inexplicabilis inter ipsos est digladiatio.
52. After these step forth the philosophers, to be revered for beard and pallium, who proclaim that they alone are wise, while all the other mortals flit as shadows. How sweetly indeed they rave, when they construct innumerable worlds, while they measure the sun, the moon, the stars, the spheres, as if with thumb or with thread, while they render the causes of thunderbolts, winds, eclipses, and the other inexplicable things, hesitating nowhere at all, just as if they had been privy to the secrets of Nature, architectrix of things, or had come to us from the council of the gods: whom meanwhile Nature, together with their conjectures, magnificently laughs at. For that nothing has been ascertained among them, even this is a sufficiently great proof: that about each single matter there is among themselves an inexplicable dueling.
They, though they know nothing at all, nevertheless profess that they know everything; and though they are ignorant of themselves, and do not see, every so often, a ditch or a stone lying in their path—either because most are bleary-eyed, or because their minds are wandering abroad—yet they proclaim that they see Ideas, Universals, Separate Forms, Prime Matters, Quidditities, Haecceities, things so tenuous that not even Lynceus, I suppose, could see through them. Nay rather, they especially spurn the profane vulgus, whenever, with triangles and tetragons, circles, and mathematical figures of this sort, laid one upon another and confused into the likeness of a labyrinth, and, moreover, with letters arrayed as if in a battle-line and then repeated now in one order, now in another, they cast darkness over the more unskilled. Nor are there lacking from this tribe those who also predict future things, the stars having been consulted, and promise miracles more-than-magical; and they find fortunate men who will believe these things as well.
53. Porro Theologos silentio transire fortasse praestiterit, kai tautên kamarinan ou kinein, nec hanc anagyrim tangere, utpote genus hominum mire superciliosum atque irritabile, ne forte turmatim sexcentis conclusionibus adoriantur, et ad palinodiam adigant, quod si recusem, protinus haereticam clamitent. Nam illico solent hoc terrere fulmine, si cui sunt parum propitii. Sane quamquam non alii sunt, qui minus libenter agnoscant meam in se beneficentiam, tamen hi quoque non mediocribus nominibus obstricti sunt, dum felices sua Philautia perinde quasi ipsi tertium incolant coelum, ita reliquos mortaleis omneis ut humi reptantes pecudes, e sublimi despiciunt, ac prope commiserantur, dum tanto magistralium definitionum, conclusionum, corollariorum, propositionum explicitarum et implicitarum agmine septi sunt, tot exuberant krêsphugetois, ut nec Vulcaniis vinculis sic possint irretiri, quin elabantur distinctionibus, quibus nodos omneis adeo facile secant, ut non Tenedia bipennis melius, tot nuper excogitatis vocabulis, ac prodigiosis vocibus scatent.
53. Furthermore, it would perhaps be better to pass by Theologians in silence, and not to move this Camarina, nor to touch this anagyris, seeing that this race of men is wondrously supercilious and irritable, lest perchance they assail in troops with six hundred conclusions, and drive one to a palinode; and if I refuse, they instantly cry “heretical.” For they are wont at once to terrify with this thunderbolt, if they are in the least unpropitious to anyone. Truly, although there are none who more unwillingly acknowledge my beneficence toward them, yet they too are under no mean obligations, while, happy in their Philautia, just as if they themselves inhabited the third heaven, they thus look down from on high upon all other mortals as cattle creeping on the ground, and almost commiserate them, while they are hedged round by so great a host of magisterial definitions, conclusions, corollaries, explicit and implicit propositions, and so abound in refuges, that not even by Vulcanian chains could they be so entangled as not to slip away by distinctions, with which they cut all knots so easily that not even the Tenedian double-axe does it better, teeming with so many newly-devised terms and prodigious words.
Moreover, while they explain the arcane mysteries by their own arbitrament: by what rationale the world was constituted and digested; through what channels that stain of sin was derived into posterity; by what modes, in what measure, in how small a span of time Christ was brought to completion in the Virgin’s womb; how in the synaxis the accidents subsist without a domicile. But these things are worn-out.
And what would Peter have consecrated, if he had consecrated at the time when the Corpus Christi was hanging on the cross? And whether at the same time Christ could have been called man; and whether after the Resurrection it will be lawful to eat or drink, already now preempting hunger and thirst. There are innumerable leptoleschiae, much subtler than these too, about instants, notions, relations, formalities, quidditities, haecceities, which no one can overtake with his eyes unless he be so Lyncean as to see, even through the deepest darkness, those things which are nowhere.
Add now to these gnômas, those so paradoxical that those oracles of the Stoics, which they call Paradoxes, seem downright gross by comparison, and booth-stuff, as if it were a lighter crime to butcher a thousand men than once, on the Lord’s Day, to sew a shoe for a poor man. And that it ought rather to be permitted that the whole world perish together with, as they say, its sustenance and clothing, than to utter a single little lie, however slight. Now these most subtle subtleties are rendered subtler still by so many “ways” of the Scholastics, that you would sooner extricate yourself from labyrinths than from the envelopments of the Realists, Nominalists, Thomists, Albertists, Ockhamists, Scotists—and I have not yet named them all, but only the chief ones.
In all of which there is so much erudition, so much difficulty, that I would judge the Apostles themselves would have need of another spirit, if they were compelled to join hands in combat on these matters with this new breed of Theologians. Paul could well render/perform faith, yet when he says: 'Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing': he defined it not very magisterially. The same man, although he most excellently rendered charity, yet divides or defines it not very dialectically, in the former Epistle to the Corinthians, chap.
13. And indeed they piously consecrated the synaxis, and yet, when asked about the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem; about transubstantiation; about the mode by which the same body is in diverse places; about the difference by which the body of Christ is in heaven, by which it was on the cross, by which in the sacrament of the synaxis; at what point transubstantiation takes place, since the prayer by which it is effected is, as I suppose, a discrete quantity in flux, not equal,—they would have answered with the same acumen with which the Scotists discourse and define these things. They knew the mother of Jesus, but which of them has demonstrated as philosophically how she was preserved from Adam’s stain as our Theologians have? Peter received the keys, and he received them from him who does not entrust to the unworthy, and yet whether he understood, I know not; certainly he nowhere touched the subtlety how he too should have the key of knowledge who does not have knowledge.
They were baptizing everywhere, and yet nowhere did they teach what is the formal, material, efficient, and final cause of baptism, nor was there among them any mention of a deletable or an indelible character. They did indeed adore, but in Spirit, following nothing other than that Evangelical saying, "God is spirit, and those who adore him must adore in spirit and in truth." But it does not appear to have been revealed to them then that with one and the same adoration a little image sketched in charcoal on a wall was to be adored as Christ himself, provided only that, with two fingers outstretched, with unshorn hair, and, in the boss which adheres to the occiput, it should have three marks.
For who indeed would perceive these things, unless he has worn out thirty-six whole years in physics and the ultramundane of Aristotle and the Scotists? Again and again the Apostles inculcate grace, yet those same men nowhere distinguish what difference there is between grace given gratis and grace gratifying. They exhort to good works, nor do they discern work, the work working, and the work worked.
Everywhere they inculcate charity, and yet they do not separate the infused from the acquired; nor do they explain whether it is an accident or a substance, a created thing or uncreated. They detest sin, but—may I die—if they were able scientifically to define what that is which we call sin, unless perhaps they were instructed by the spirit of the Scotists. For neither can I be induced to believe that Paul—by whose single erudition it is permitted to estimate all—would so often have condemned questions, disputations, genealogies, and, as he himself calls them, logomachies, if he had thoroughly mastered those niceties, especially since all the contentions of that time and rustic brawls were rustic and coarse, if they be compared with the subtleties of our masters, subtleties more than Chrysippean.
Although the most modest men, if anything perhaps has been written by the Apostles somewhat less tenderly and not very magisterially, do not indeed condemn it, but interpret it suitably—paying this, namely, of honor, partly to antiquity, partly to the Apostolic name. And, by Hercules, it was scarcely equitable to require such great matters of them, about which from their own preceptor they had not ever heard so much as a single word.
The same thing, if it happens in Chrysostom, Basil, Jerome, then they have enough to append: ‘He is not bound.’ And they indeed confuted the Ethnic philosophers and the Jews, most pertinacious by their very nature, but by life and miracles rather than by syllogisms, and those too against whom no one would have been fit to match even a single Quodlibet of Scotus in ingenuity. Now what Ethnic, what Heretic would not straightway yield to so most tenuous subtleties, unless he be so gross as not to grasp them, or so shameless as to hiss them down, or equipped with the same snares, so that now the fight is equal, just as if you were to pit a mage against a mage, or if someone should fight with a fortunate sword against one whose sword is fortunate: for then nothing else would happen than that the web of Penelope would be re-woven. And in my judgment Christians would be wise, if instead of those fat cohorts of soldiers, by whose means they have long been waging war with a two-sided Mars, they should send the most clamorous Scotists, and the most pertinacious Occamists, and the unconquered Albertists, together with the whole band of Sophists, against the Turks and Saracens: they would behold, I suppose, both the most delightful bout of all, and a victory not seen before.
But I seem to you to be saying all these things almost in jest. Nor, truly, is it a wonder, since there are even among the Theologians themselves some educated by better letters, who feel nausea at these frivolous, as they think, quibbles of the Theologians. There are those who execrate it as a kind of sacrilege, and deem it the height of impiety to speak with so unwashed a mouth about matters so arcane and to be adored rather than explained, to dispute with such profane subtleties of the Ethnics, to define so arrogantly, and to pollute the majesty of divine Theology with words—nay, with sentiments—so frigid, indeed sordid.
Meanwhile, they are supremely well-pleased with themselves—indeed, they applaud themselves—to such a degree that, occupied night and day with these most sweet lullabies, not even so tiny a bit of leisure remains that it be permitted even once to unroll the Gospel or the Pauline Epistles. And meanwhile, while they trifle thus in the schools, they suppose that they shore up the whole Church, otherwise about to collapse, by the props of syllogisms, not otherwise than Atlas, among the poets, bears the heaven upon his shoulders. Now tell me, what great felicity do you think it is, while they shape and reshape the arcane letters as if they were of wax at their pleasure; while they demand that their conclusions—to which already some Schoolmen have subscribed—be regarded as more than the laws of Solon, and even to be set before pontifical decrees; and while, as though censors of the world, they drag men to a palinode, if anywhere anything does not square exactly with the explicit and implicit of their conclusions, and they pronounce no otherwise than as from an oracle: 'This proposition is scandalous: this is too little reverential: this smells of heresy: this rings ill'; so that now neither Baptism, nor the Gospel, nor Paul or Peter, nor Saint Hieronymus or Augustine, nay, not even Thomas the most Aristotelizing, makes a Christian, unless the ballot of the Bachelors be added—so great is the subtlety in judging.
For who, indeed, would have perceived that he was not a Christian—the man who would say that these two sentences, 'matula putes' and 'matula putet,' likewise 'ollae fervere' and 'ollam fervere,' are equally congruous—unless those wise men had taught it? Who would have freed the Church from such darkness of errors, which no one was ever even going to read, unless these men had divulged them with great seals? But, are they not most felicitous while they do these things?
Besides, while they depict all the affairs of the underworld so exactly to the rule, as though they had been conversant for several years in that commonwealth? Besides, while at their own discretion they manufacture new orbs, with that most broad and most beautiful one added at the end: namely, lest there be lacking a place where the happy souls might conveniently either stroll, or hold a convivium, or even play at ball. With these and with two thousand trifles of that kind the heads of these men are so distended and stuffed, that I would suppose not even Jove’s brain to have been equally pregnant, when he, in travail with Pallas, implored Vulcan’s axe.
Wherefore do not marvel, if you see their head so carefully bound about with so many bandages in public disputations; otherwise, indeed, they would plainly burst asunder. This too I myself am sometimes wont to laugh at: when the Theologians then seem greatest to themselves, if they speak as barbarously and as foully as possible, and when they stammer to such a degree that they can be understood by no one unless by a stammerer, they call it acumen, because the vulgar crowd does not attain to it. For they deny it to be of the dignity of the Sacred Letters, if they are compelled to obey the laws of the grammarians.
Truly marvelous is the majesty of the theologians, if to them alone it is permitted to speak amiss, although this very thing they have in common with many cobblers. Finally, they now reckon themselves next to the gods, whenever they are saluted, as it were religiously, as Our Masters, in which name indeed they suppose there lies something of the sort that the tetragrammaton is among the Jews. And so they say it is a sacrilege to write Magister Noster otherwise than in capital letters.
54. Ad horum felicitatem proxime accedunt ii, qui se vulgo Religiosos ac Monachos appellant utroque falsissimo cognomine, cum et bona pars istorum longissime absit a Religione, et nulli magis omnibus locis sint obvii. Iis non video quid possit esse miserius, nisi ego multis modis succurrerem. Etenim cum hoc hominum genus omnes sic exsecrentur, ut fortuitum etiam occursum ominosum esse persuasum sit, tamen ipsi sibi magnifice blandiuntur.
54. To the felicity of these, those come next who commonly appell themselves Religious and Monks, by both cognomens most false, since both a good part of these are farthest absent from Religion, and none are more to be met with in all places. For these I do not see what could be more miserable, unless I in many ways should succor them. For indeed, since all so execrate this kind of men that even a fortuitous encounter is believed to be ominous, nevertheless they magnificently flatter themselves.
First, they reckon it the height of piety if they have so far touched nothing of letters that they cannot even read. Then, when they bray out their Psalms—indeed numbered, but not understood—with asinine voices in the temples, then they truly suppose they are stroking the ears of the divine ones with much delectation. And there are some of them who retail filth and beggary at a high price, and before doorways, with loud lowing, demand bread; nay, there are no inns, vehicles, or ships that they do not throw into confusion—assuredly to no small detriment of the other beggars.
And in that fashion the most suave men, by filth, ignorance, rusticity, and impudence, reproduce for us the Apostles, as they say. And what is more pleasant than that they do everything from a prescript, as if using Mathematical ratios, which it would be a sin to overstep: how many knots the shoe should have, of what color the belts, with how many partitions the garment is to be variegated, of what material, and how many straws broad the girdle, of what appearance, and how many modii in capacity the cowl, how many fingers wide the hair, how many hours are to be slept.
And who does not perceive how unequal this equality is, amid so great a variety of bodies and wits? And yet with these trifles they not only make others in themselves of naught, but also, mutually, some contemn others; and men professing apostolic charity, on account of a garment girt otherwise, on account of a color a little duskier, throw everything into wondrous tragedies. Among these you may see certain men so rigidly religious that in the outermost garment they use nothing but Cilician, the inmost Milesian; others, contrariwise, who are linen outwardly, woolen inwardly.
Again, others there are who shudder at the touch of money as at aconite, yet neither abstain from wine nor from the contact of women. In fine, a strange zeal is common to all, that nothing in the rationale of life should agree. Nor is that zeal that they may be like Christ, but that they may be unlike one another.
Moreover, a great part of their felicity lies in cognomens, while these rejoice to be called Funigeri (Rope-bearers), and among these, some Colettines, others Minors, others Minims, others Bullists. Again, these Benedictines, those Bernardines: these Brigittines, those Augustinians: these Wilhelmites, those Jacobites, as though it were truly too little to be called Christians. A great portion of these leans so far on their own ceremonies and on the petty traditions of men that it deems one heaven too little worthy as a reward for such great things, not considering that it will come to pass that Christ, all these things being held in contempt, will exact that precept of his, namely, of charity.
Another will bring forth such a heap of ceremonies as could scarcely be carried by seven cargo ships. Another will boast that for sixty years he never touched money, except with his digits fortified by a double glove. Another will thrust forward a cowl so sordid and thick that no sailor would deign it worthy of his body.
Another will commemorate that he has lived a sponge’s life for more than eleven lustra, always fixed to the same place: Another will produce a voice hoarse from assiduous chant: Another, a lethargy contracted from solitude: another, a tongue benumbed by continual silence. But Christ, the boasts—otherwise never to be ended—having been interrupted: Whence, he says, this new genus of Jews? The single law I acknowledge as truly mine—about that alone I hear nothing.
And once, openly and using no wrapper of parables, I promised the paternal inheritance, not by cowls, genuflections, or fastings, but by the offices of charity. Nor do I acknowledge those who too much acknowledge their own deeds, those who wish to seem holier even than me; let them, if it pleases, seize the heavens of the Abraxasians, or order a new heaven to be built for themselves by those whose little traditions they have preferred to my precepts. When they hear these things, and see sailors and charioteers set before them, with what faces, do you suppose, will they gaze upon one another?
But meanwhile they are happy in their own hope, not without my beneficence. And these people indeed, although set apart from the republic, yet no one dares to contemn, especially the mendicants, because they hold all the arcana of everyone, from the “confessions,” as they call them. These, however, they hold it a sacrilege to betray, unless when drunk they wish to amuse themselves with more agreeable tales; but they indicate the matter only by conjectures, with the names meanwhile kept silent.
If anyone should provoke these hornets, then in popular assemblies they thoroughly avenge themselves, and with oblique sayings they mark out the enemy—so covertly that no one fails to understand, unless he understands nothing. Nor do they make an end of barking until you have thrown a sop into their mouth. Come now, what comedian, what mountebank would you rather watch than those men, in their assemblies, rhetorizing—altogether ridiculously, yet most sweetly imitating the things which the rhetors have handed down concerning the method of speaking?
Immortal God! how they gesticulate, how aptly they change the voice, how they sing-chant, how they fling themselves about, how ever and anon they assume other faces, how they mingle everything with shouts. And this art of orating, as a thing arcane, a little brother hands down to a little brother, from hand to hand: which, although it is not lawful for me to know, yet somehow I will pursue by conjectures. In the first place they invoke, that which they have borrowed from the poets: then, when about to speak on charity, they take their exordium from the Nile, the river of Egypt, or, when about to narrate the mystery of the cross, they happily auspicate from the Babylonian dragon Bel: or, being about to dispute concerning fasting, they make their beginning from the twelve signs of the zodiac, or, about to speak words about faith, they long pre-speak about the quadrature of the circle.
I myself heard a certain man exceedingly foolish—I erred; I wished to say learned—who, in a most crowded assembly, being about to explicate the mystery of the divine Triad, in order both to ostentate his not-common doctrine and to satisfy Theological ears, entered a wholly new way: namely, from letters, syllables, and oration; then from the concord of noun and verb, of adjective and substantive, most already marveling, and some muttering to themselves that Horatian tag: 'Whither do these so putrid things tend?' At length he brought the matter to this point, that in the rudiments of the Grammarians he showed the simulacrum of the whole Triad so expressed that none of the Mathematicians could depict it more evidently in the dust. And upon this oration that most theologizing fellow had so sweated for a full eight months, that even today he is more purblind than moles, to wit, the whole battle-line of his lights drawn off to the cusp of his genius. Yet the man does not repent of his blindness, and he deems that glory bought at a small price.
Another certain octogenarian was heard by us, so much a Theologian that you would think Scotus himself reborn in him. He, about to explicate the mystery of the name of Jesus, with wondrous subtlety demonstrated that in the very letters lies hidden whatever can be said about him. For the fact that it is declined in only three cases is a manifest simulacrum of the divine ternion.
Then, because the first form Iesus ends in s, the second Iesum in m, the third Iesu in u, that an arrêton mystery lies beneath this: namely, with three little letters indicating him to be the highest, the middle, and the last. There remained a mystery more recondite than these as well, by Mathematical reasoning. Iesus is thus split into two equal portions, so that, to wit, the penthemimeres resides in the middle.
Then he taught that there is among the Hebrews that letter which they call Syn; moreover syn in the tongue of the Scots, I suppose, sounds “sin”: and hence it is openly declared that Jesus is he who would take away the sins of the world. This so novel exordium they all, mouths agape, admired, especially the Theologians, so that it was little short of happening to them what once happened to Niobe, while it very nearly befell me what happened to that figwood Priapus, who, to his great harm, watched the nocturnal rites of Canidia and Sagana. Nor, in truth, unjustly: for when did that Greek Demosthenes, or the Latin Cicero, ever devise a similar ephodos?
By them a proem was accounted defective, because it would be rather more alien from the matter: as though, forsooth, even swineherds did not also begin in this fashion, nature, plainly as teacher. But these learned men deem their preamble—so they call it—will then at last be exceedingly Rhetorical, if it has nowhere anything contiguous with the remaining argument, so that the hearer meanwhile, in amazement, murmurs to himself this: where now is he hurling himself? In the third place, in the stead of narration, they interpret somewhat from the Gospel, but cursorily and, as it were, in passing, whereas that alone ought to have been done.
In the fourth place, now with a new persona assumed, they raise a theological question, several times touching neither earth nor heaven, and they reckon that too to pertain to the art. Here at last they raise the Theological eyebrow, dinning into ears magnificent names—Solemn Doctors, Subtle Doctors, Most Subtle Doctors, Seraphic Doctors, Holy Doctors, Irrefragable Doctors. Then they brandish major syllogisms, minor ones, conclusions, corollaries, the chilliest suppositions, and more-than-scholastic trifles before the unskilled crowd.
Now the fifth act remains, in which it is fitting to display the supreme craftsman. Here they bring forward for me some foolish and unlearned fable, from the historical speculum, I suppose, or from the Deeds of the Romans, and they interpret the same allegorically, tropologically, and anagogically. And in this fashion they complete their own Chimera, such as not even Horace ever could attain when he was writing: “Humano capiti,” etc.
But they have heard from I-know-not whom that the ingress of an oration ought to be sedate and by no means clamorous. And so at the beginning they make their exordium in such a way that they themselves do not even hear their own proper voice, as if it mattered that what is said no one should understand. They have heard that sometimes, for arousing affections, exclamations are to be used.
Accordingly, though otherwise speaking in a compressed manner, ever and anon they suddenly raise their voice with plainly frenzied clamor, even when there is no need. You would swear the man had need of hellebore, just as if it made no difference whether you shout or not. Moreover, since they have heard that a discourse ought in its progress to grow fervent, after the beginnings of each part have been recited somehow indeed soberly, soon they employ a marvelous strain of voice, even if the matter is most frigid; and so at last they finish in such a way that you would think them bereft of breath.
Finally they have learned that among the rhetors mention is made of laughter, and so they too strive to sprinkle in certain jokes—ah, dear Aphrodite—so full of graces, and so in place, that you would plainly say it is not an ass to the lyre. They also bite sometimes, but in such a way as to tickle rather than to wound. Nor do they ever flatter more truly than when they are most eager to seem to be practicing parrhesia.
Finally, the whole performance is of such a sort that you would swear they had learned from the marketplace mountebanks, by whom they are far outdone. Although both parties are so like one another that no one would doubt that either these learned their rhetoric from those, or those their rhetoric from these. And yet these too, through my efforts, forsooth, find people who, when they listen to them, suppose they are hearing nothing but Demosthenes and Ciceros.
Of this kind are especially merchants and womenfolk: whose ears they strive above all to please, because those men are wont to impart some little portion of booty from ill-gotten goods, if they have been deftly flattered. Those women, for many other reasons, favor this order, but especially because into these men’s bosoms they are wont to pour whatever they are vexed with in regard to their husbands. You see, I suppose, how greatly this genus of people owes me, since with little ceremonials, ridiculous trifles, and clamors they exercise a kind of tyranny among mortals, and think themselves Pauls and Anthonies.
55. Verum ego istos histriones tam ingratos beneficiorum meorum dissimulatores, quam improbos simulatores pietatis libenter relinquo. Iamdudum enim iuvat de regibus ac principibus aulicis a quibus simplicissime color, et, ut dignum est, ingenuis, ingenue nonnihil attingere. Qui quidem si vel semiunciam sani cordis haberent, quid esset horum vita tristius aut aeque fugiendum?
55. But I gladly leave those histrions, as ungrateful dissemblers of my benefactions no less than shameless simulators of piety. For it has long pleased me to touch a little upon kings and courtly princes, with the utmost plain coloring and—as befits the freeborn—frankly. Who indeed, if they had even half an ounce of sound sense, what could be sadder than their life, or as equally to be shunned?
For neither will anyone think that an empire is to be procured by perjury and parricide, whoever has weighed with himself how immense a burden he sustains upon his shoulders who truly wishes to act the prince. He who has taken up the helm of affairs understands that he conducts a public, not a private business; that he ought to think of nothing except public advantages; that he must not depart from the laws, of which he himself is both author and enforcer, by so much as a finger-breadth; that it is incumbent on himself to ensure the integrity of all officials and magistrates; that he is one man exposed to the eyes of all, who can either, like a salutary star, by moral innocence bring the greatest salvation to human affairs, or, like a lethal comet, carry in the utmost destruction. The vices of others are neither perceived so much nor spread so widely.
The prince is in that position, that if he has deflected even lightly from the honest/right, a grave pest of life straightway spreads to a very great many men. Then, because the fortune of princes brings with it many things that are wont to draw one off from the right—of such a kind: delights, liberty, adulation, luxury—there must be a more keen striving and a more solicitous keeping watch, lest anywhere, even being deceived, he fail in his office. Lastly, to omit the ambushes, hatreds, and the other either perils or fears threatening his head, the true king is hanging over him, who shortly will exact from him an account even for every least thing committed, and this so much the more severely, the more excellently he has borne the imperium.
These things, I say, and very many of this kind, if the prince would weigh with himself—and he would weigh them, if he were wise—he could not, I suppose, take either sleep or food pleasantly. But now, by my favor, they hand over all these cares to the gods; they themselves tenderly care for themselves, nor do they admit anyone to the ear, except one who knows how to speak pleasant things, lest any solicitude arise in the mind. They believe they have properly fulfilled all the functions of a prince, if they hunt assiduously, if they nourish handsome horses, if they have sold magistracies and prefectures to their own advantage, if new schemes are every day excogitated, by which they attenuate the wealth of the citizens and divert it into their own treasury.
But they do it aptly, having found titles, so that even if it be most iniquitous, it nevertheless carries before itself some appearance of equity. They add, with deliberate effort, no small measure of adulation, by which they may, somehow, bind popular minds to themselves. Imagine for me now what they sometimes are: a man ignorant of the laws, almost an enemy of the public goods, intent upon private conveniences, addicted to pleasures, a hater of erudition, a hater of liberty and of truth, thinking of anything rather than the safety of the republic, but measuring all things by his own lust and his own interests.
Then add to him a golden torque, indicating the consensus of all the coherent virtues; then a crown adorned with gems, which indeed may admonish him that in all heroic virtues it behooves him to excel the others. Moreover, a scepter, a symbol of justice and of an incorrupt heart in every quarter. Lastly, the purple, an indication of a certain extraordinary charity toward the commonwealth.
56. Iam quid de proceribus aulicis commemorem? quorum plerisque cum nihil sit addictius, servilius, insulsius, abiectius, tamen omnium rerum primos sese videri volunt. Hac una in re tamen modestissimi, quod contenti, aurum, gemmas, purpuram, reliquaque virtutum ac sapientiae insignia corpore circumferre, rerum ipsarum studium omne concedunt aliis.
56. Now what shall I commemorate about the aulic magnates? of most of whom, though nothing could be more addicted, more servile, more insipid, more abject, nevertheless they wish to seem the first in all things. In this one matter, however, they are most modest: that, being content to carry about on the body gold, gems, purple, and the remaining insignia of virtues and wisdom, they yield the whole pursuit of the things themselves to others.
By this they seem to themselves abundantly happy: that it is permitted to call the king “master,” that they have learned to salute in three words, that they know how from time to time to inculcate civil titles—Serenity, Lordship, and Magnificence. That they have superbly brazened their face, that they wittily flatter. For these are the arts which truly befit a nobleman and a courtier.
But if you look more closely at the entire regimen of life, assuredly you will find mere Phaeacians, suitors of Penelope , you recognize the rest of the song, which Echo will repeat back to you better than I. One sleeps into the middle of the day, and there a mercenary petty priest is ready at the bedside, who, they being almost still lying down, may expeditiously perform the sacred rite. Soon to breakfast—scarcely is it finished when already luncheon interrupts.
And in this fashion, without any tedium of life, the hours, days, months, years, ages slip away. I myself sometimes go away more well-fattened, whenever I have seen those mega‑boasters: while among the Nymphs each one seems to herself the nearer to the Gods the longer a train she drags; while among the grandees one shoves another with the elbow, that he may seem nearer to Jove; while each man likes himself the more, the heavier a chain he bears on his neck, so that they may display strength as well, not wealth only.
57. Ac principum quidem institutum, Summi Pontifices, Cardinales, et Episcopi, iam pridem gnaviter aemulantur, ac prope superant. Porro si quis perpendat, quid linea vestis admoneat, niveo candore insignis, nempe vitam undiquaque inculpatam. Quid sibi velit mitra bicornis, utrumque fastigium eodem cohibente nodo, puta Novi pariter et Veteris Instrumenti absolutam scientiam.
57. And as for the institution of princes, the Supreme Pontiffs, Cardinals, and Bishops have long zealously emulated it, and they almost surpass it. Moreover, if anyone should weigh what the linen vestment, distinguished by snowy whiteness, admonishes—namely, a life in every respect blameless. What the bicorn mitre signifies, its two pinnacles restrained by the same knot—namely, the complete knowledge of the New and likewise the Old Testament.
These things, I say, and many of that kind, if anyone should ponder, would he not lead a sad and solicitous life? But now they do nicely, when they feed themselves. Besides, they entrust the care of the sheep either to Christ himself, or they cast it off onto the Brothers, as they call them, and onto vicars.
58. Ad eumdem modum Cardinales si cogitent sese in Apostolorum locum successisse, eadem ab ipsis requiri, quae illi praestiterunt. Deinde non dominos esse, sed administratores spiritalium dotium, de quibus omnibus sint paullo post exactissime reddituri rationem. Imo si vel in cultu paulisper philosophentur, atque ita secum cogitent, quid sibi vult hic vestitus candor ? Nonne summam et eximiam vitae innocentiam?
58. In the same manner, if the Cardinals would consider that they have succeeded into the place of the Apostles, the same things are required of them which those men rendered. Then that they are not lords, but administrators of spiritual endowments, concerning all of which they will shortly render a most exact account. Nay rather, if even in their attire they would philosophize for a little while, and thus think with themselves, what does this whiteness of vesture want to say? Does it not [signify] the highest and exceptional innocence of life?
Does it not indicate charity spreading itself most broadly to come to the aid of all, that is, to teach, to exhort, to reprove, to admonish, to compose wars, to resist wicked princes, and even to spend blood gladly for the Christian flock, not riches only? Although to what end are riches at all for those who bear the stead of the poor Apostles? If they would weigh these things, I say, they would not ambitiously court that place, and would gladly relinquish it, or at least would lead a life plainly laborious and anxious, of the sort those ancient Apostles lived.
59. Iam Summi Pontifices, qui Christi vices gerunt, si conentur eiusdem vitam aemulari, nempe paupertatem, labores, doctrinam, crucem, vitae contemptum, si vel Papae, id est patris nomen vel Sanctissimi cognomen cogitent, quid erit in terris afflictius? aut quis eum locum omnibus emat facultatibus: emptum, gladio, veneno, omnique vi tueatur? Quantum his abstulerit commoditatum, si semel incessiverit sapientia?
59. Now then the Supreme Pontiffs, who carry Christ’s vicariate, if they should strive to emulate his very life, to wit, poverty, labors, doctrine, the cross, contempt of life—if they should even consider the name of Pope, that is, Father, or the cognomen Most Holy—what would be more afflicted on earth? or who would buy that place with all his resources; and, once bought, guard it by the sword, by poison, and by every force? How much of their conveniences would wisdom have taken away from them, if once it set upon them?
You see what great market-days, what a harvest, what a sea of goods I have encompassed in a few words. In place of which Wisdom will introduce vigils, fasts, tears, orations, sermons, studies, sighs, and a thousand miserable labors of that kind. Nor indeed is it to be neglected, that it will come to pass that so many writers, so many copyists, so many notaries, so many advocates, so many promoters, so many secretaries, so many muleteers, so many equerries (horse-grooms), so many money-changers, so many panders—I had almost added something a bit softer, but I fear it may be harsher to the ears.
In sum, so huge a throng of men, which burdens the Roman See, I have slipped, I felt I was honoring, will be driven to hunger. Inhuman indeed is this, and an abominable deed; but much more to be detested, that the very highest Princes of the Church and the true lights of the world be called back to bag and staff. But now, for the most part, if there is any labor, it is left to Peter and Paul, for whom there is abundantly enough leisure.
Moreover, if there is any splendor or voluptuousness, they take it for themselves. And thus it comes to pass, by my own doing, to be sure, that scarcely any kind of men lives more softly and less solicitous, as those who think they have abundantly satisfied Christ, if, with mystical and almost scenic adornment, with ceremonies, with titles of beatitudes, reverences, sanctities, and with benedictions and maledictions, they play the bishops. To produce miracles: ancient and obsolete, and in no way of these times: to teach the people, laborious: to interpret the sacred letters, scholastic: to pray, otiose: to pour forth tears, wretched and womanish: to be in need, sordid: to be conquered, shameful, and little worthy of one who scarcely admits even the highest kings to the kisses of blessed feet: finally, to die, unlovely: to be lifted onto the cross, infamous.
There remain only these arms and sweet benedictions, of which Paul makes mention, and in these indeed they are assuredly very benign: interdicts, suspensions, aggravations, anathematizations, avenging pictures, and that terrific thunderbolt, by the mere nod of which they send the souls of mortals even beyond Tartarus. Yet this very thing the most holy fathers in Christ, and the vicars of Christ, wield against none more sharply than against those who, the Devil instigating, strive to diminish and gnaw away at the patrimonies of Peter. Although his utterance in the Gospel is this: ‘We have left all things and have followed you,’ yet they call his patrimony fields, towns, revenues, port-duties, dominions.
For the sake of these things, while, inflamed with the zeal of Christ, they fight with iron and fire—not without a very great expenditure of Christian blood—then at last they believe that they apostolically defend the Church of Christ, the Bride, the enemies, as they call them, having been bravely routed. As though there were any enemies of the Church more pernicious than impious pontiffs, who by silence allow Christ to grow obsolete, and bind with money-making laws, and adulterate by forced interpretations, and with a pestilent life they throttle. Furthermore, since the Christian Church has been founded by blood, confirmed by blood, augmented by blood, now—as though Christ had perished, he who, after his wont, protects his own—they conduct the affair with iron.
And although war is a thing so monstrous that it befits wild beasts, not humans; so insane that even the poets feign it to be sent in by the Furies; so pestilent that it brings in at once a universal plague of morals; so unjust that it is wont to be best administered by the worst brigands; so impious that nothing coheres with Christ—yet, everything else omitted, this one thing they pursue. Here you may see even decrepit old men exhibit the vigor of a juvenile spirit, neither taking offense at expenses, nor growing weary with labors, nor being deterred by anything, even if they mix laws, religion, peace, and all human affairs up and down. Nor are erudite flatterers lacking, who call that manifest insanity zeal, piety, fortitude, having devised a way whereby someone may draw the lethal iron and drive it into his brother’s viscera, with that highest charity nevertheless remaining, which by Christ’s precept a Christian owes to his neighbor.
60. Equidem incerta sum adhuc, utrum his rebus exemplum dederint, an potius hinc sumpserint episcopi quidam Germanorum, qui simplicius, etiam omisso cultu, omissis benedictionibus, aliisque id genus cerimoniis, plane satrapas agunt, adeo ut propemodum ignavum, parumque decorum episcopo putent, alibi, quam in acie, fortem animam Deo reddere. Iam vero vulgus Sacerdotum, nefas esse ducens, a praesulum suorum sanctimonia degenerare, euge, quam militariter pro iure decimarum, ensibus, iaculis, saxis, omnique armorum vi belligerantur: quam hic oculati, si quid ex veterum litteris possint elicere, quo plebeculam territent, et plus quam decimas deberi convincant. At interim non venit in mentem, quam multa passim legantur de officio, quod illi vicissim praestare populo debeant.
60. For my part I am still uncertain whether they gave the exemplar for these things, or rather whether certain bishops of the Germans took it from here—who, more simply, with cult even omitted, blessings omitted, and other ceremonies of that kind, plainly play the satraps—so much so that they think it almost ignoble and little decorous for a bishop to render his valiant soul to God anywhere other than in the battle-line. Now indeed the common crowd of priests, deeming it a nefas to degenerate from the sanctimony of their prelates—bravo, how militarily they wage war for the right of tithes, with swords, javelins, stones, and every force of arms: how sharp-eyed they are here, if they can elicit anything from the writings of the ancients with which to terrify the plebeian crowd, and to prove that more than tithes are owed. But meanwhile it does not come to mind how many things are read everywhere about the duty which they in turn ought to render to the people.
Nor at least does the shaven crown admonish them that a priest ought to be free from all cupidities of this world, and to meditate nothing except celestial things. But these suave men say they have duly discharged their office if they have somehow murmured through those little precations of theirs, which, by Hercules, I marvel whether any god either hears or understands, since they themselves scarcely either hear or understand, at the very time when they make a clamor with their mouth. But this indeed priests have in common with the profane: that all keep vigil for the harvest of emolument, and there no one is ignorant of the laws.
But if there is any burden, they prudently shift it onto alien shoulders, and some hand it over to others like a ball from hand to hand. For indeed lay Princes also, just as they delegate parts of administering the realm to vicars, and the vicar in turn hands it to a vicar, so for the sake of modesty they leave every zeal of piety to the plebs. The plebs casts it upon those whom they call Ecclesiastics, just as if they themselves had absolutely no commerce with the Church, as if nothing at all had been transacted by the vows of Baptism.
Again the priests, who call themselves Seculars, as if initiated into the world, not into Christ, devolve this burden upon the regulars: the regulars upon the monks: the laxer monks upon the stricter: All together upon the mendicants: the mendicants upon the Carthusians, with whom alone piety lies buried hidden, and so hidden that it is scarcely ever permitted to behold it. Likewise the pontiffs, most diligent in the pecuniary harvest, relegate those all-too apostolic labors to the bishops, the bishops to the pastors, the pastors to the vicars, the vicars to the mendicant brothers. These in turn shove it back upon those by whom the wool of the sheep is shorn.
But it is not the point of this undertaking to shake out the life of pontiffs and priests, lest to anyone I seem to weave a satire, nor to recite an encomium, nor let anyone suppose that good princes are being taxed by me while I praise the bad. But these things I have touched upon briefly for this reason: that it might be made plain there is no mortal who can live sweetly, unless he has been initiated into my sacred rites and has me propitious.
61. Nam id quo pacto fieri queat, cum ipsa etiam Rhamnusia, rerum humanarum fortunatrix , mecum adeo consentiat, ut sapientibus istis semper fuerit inimicissima? contra stultis etiam dormientibus omnia commoda adduxerit? Agnoscitis Timotheum illum, cui hinc etiam cognomen, et proverbium ê heudontos kurtos hairei.
61. For how could that be brought about, since even Rhamnusia herself, dispensatrix of human fortunes , so consents with me that she has always been most inimical to those wise men? on the contrary, to fools, even while they sleep, she has brought every advantage. You recognize that Timotheus, to whom from this, too, came his cognomen, and the proverb “the net catches while he sleeps.”
Therefore, to the matter: Fortune loves the not-very-sound-in-heart, she loves the more audacious, and those to whom that saying pleases, “let the die be cast.” But Wisdom renders men timorous, and therefore you commonly see these sages to have business with poverty, with hunger, with smoke, to live neglected, inglorious, and hated: fools to be affluent in money, to be brought to the helms of the republic, in brief, to flourish in every way. For indeed, if someone should deem it blessedness to have pleased princely men, and to consort among those my gemmed gods, what is more useless than wisdom—nay, what more damnable with this race of men?
If riches are to be procured, what profit, pray, will the negotiator make if he has followed wisdom? He will be offended at perjury; if caught in mendacity he will blush; if he so much as makes the least account of those anxious scruples of the wise about thefts and usuries. Moreover, if anyone courts Ecclesiastical honors and wealth, into them even an ass or a buffalo will penetrate more quickly than a wise man. If you are led by pleasure, girls—the greatest part of this play—are devoted with their whole breast to fools, and they shudder at and flee a wise man no otherwise than a scorpion.
Finally, whoever prepare to live a little more festively and more joyfully, exclude the wise man first of all, and admit rather any animal whatsoever. Briefly, wherever you turn yourself, among pontiffs, princes, judges, magistrates, friends, enemies, the greatest and the least, everything is procured by ready coin: which, inasmuch as the wise man contemns them, so they have been accustomed assiduously to shun him. But since there is no measure nor end of my praises, nevertheless it is necessary that the speech at some time have an end.
Therefore I will cease to speak, but only after I shall first have shown in a few words that there are not lacking great authors who have illustrated me by their letters as well as by their deeds, lest I perhaps may seem to anyone foolishly to please myself alone, and lest the legalists calumniate me for alleging nothing. To their example, therefore, we shall allege, that is, “nothing to the point.”
62. Principio illud omnibus vel notissimo proverbio persuasum est: Ubi res abest, ibi simulationem esse optimam. Eoque recte statim traditur hic versus pueris: Stultitiam simulare loco, sapientia summa est. Vos iam ipsi coniicite, quam ingens sit bonum Stultitia, cuius etiam fallax umbra, et imitatio sola tantum laudis meretur a doctis.
62. To begin with, this is persuaded to all by a most well-known proverb: Where the reality is absent, there simulation is best. And so, straightway this verse is rightly handed down to boys: To simulate Folly in its place is highest wisdom. Do you now yourselves conjecture how immense a good Folly is, whose even deceptive shadow, and mere imitation alone, merits so much praise from the learned.
But much more candidly, that pinguid and nitid (fat and sleek) pig from the herd of Epicurus bids us mix folly with counsels, although he added “brief” not very skillfully. Likewise elsewhere: ‘It is sweet to play the fool in place.’ Again in another place, he prefers ‘to seem delirious and inert, rather than to be wise and snarl.’ Even already in Homer, Telemachus, whom the poet praises in every way, is repeatedly called nêpios, and the tragic poets are wont gladly to call boys and adolescents by the same praenomen as if of a happy omen. And what does the sacred song of the Iliad contain, but the wraths of foolish kings and peoples?
63. Atqui fortassis apud Christianos horum levis est auctoritas. Proinde Sacrarum quoque Litterarum testimoniis, si videtur, laudes nostras fulciamus, sive ut docti solent, fundemus, principio veniam a Theologis praefatae, ut nobis fas esse velint, deinde quoniam arduam rem aggredimur, et fortassis improbum fuerit denuo Musas ex Helicone, ad tantum itineris revocare, praesertim cum res sit alienior, fortasse magis conveniet optare, ut interim dum Theologum ago, perque has spinas ingredior, Scoti anima paulisper ex sua Sorbona in meum pectus demigret, quovis hystrice atque erinaceo spinosior, moxque remigret quo lubebit, vel es korakas. Utinam et vultum alium liceat sumere, et ornatus adsit Theologicus.
63. And yet perhaps among Christians the authority of these is slight. Accordingly, by the testimonies of the Sacred Letters too, if it seems good, let us buttress our praises, or, as the learned are wont, found them, first, asking pardon beforehand from the Theologians, that they may be willing that it be permitted to us; then, since we are undertaking an arduous matter, and perhaps it would be overbold to recall the Muses anew from Helicon for so long a journey, especially since the matter is rather more alien, perhaps it will be more fitting to wish that, meanwhile while I play the Theologian, and as I enter upon these thorns, the soul of Scotus may for a little while migrate down from his Sorbonne into my breast, more spiny than any porcupine and hedgehog, and soon migrate back whithersoever it will please, or to the crows. Would that it were permitted also to assume another visage, and that a Theological adornment be at hand.
But this meanwhile I fear, lest someone arraign me on a charge of theft, as though I had clandestinely pillaged the scrinia of Our Masters, seeing that I hold so much of Theological matter. Yet it ought not to seem so marvelous, if from a so long-continued familiarity with the Theologians, which is to me most close, I have snatched up something—since even that fig-wood god Priapus, while his master was reading, has annotated and retained some Greek words; and the cock of Lucian, through long companionship with men, became deftly skilled in human speech.
When he exclaims: 'Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity,' what else do you believe he has meant, except, as we have said, that human life is nothing other than the sport of Folly? assuredly adding a white pebble to the Ciceronian praise, for which with the best right that saying is celebrated, which we have just reported: 'everything is full of fools.' Again, that wise Ecclesiasticus, who said: 'The fool is changed like the Moon, the wise man remains as the Sun,' what else does he intimate, except that the whole mortal race is foolish, and that to God alone the name of wise befits? Since they interpret the Moon as human nature, the Sun as the source of all light, God.
This is supported by what Christ himself denies in the Gospel: that anyone is to be called good except the one God. Furthermore, if whoever is not wise is a fool, and, according to Stoic authorities, whoever is good is the same as wise, then of necessity Folly embraces all mortals. Again, Solomon, ch.
15 'Folly,' he says, 'is joy to the fool,' namely, openly confessing that without folly nothing in life is suave. To the same point pertains also this: 'He who adds knowledge, adds pain, and with much sense, much indignation.' Does not that distinguished preacher likewise openly confess the same in chap. 7: 'The heart of the wise is where sadness is; and the heart of fools, where gladness is'? And he did not think it sufficient to have thoroughly learned wisdom, unless he had added a knowledge of me as well.
But if too little trust is put in me, take his very words, which he wrote ch. 1: 'And I gave my heart, that I might know prudence and doctrine, and errors and folly.' In which passage indeed this is to be noted, that it pertains to the praise of Stultitia (Folly), that he has placed her in the later position. Ecclesiastes wrote this, and you know this to be the ecclesiastical order: that he who is first in dignity obtains the last place—or at least here he is mindful of the Evangelic precept.
But that Folly is more outstanding than Wisdom, that Ecclesiastes—whoever he was—plainly attests in chapter 44. By Hercules, I will not bring forward his words before you have aided my introduction with a fitting response, as they do in Plato, those who dispute with Socrates. Which is it more suitable to lay up, the things that are rare and precious, or those that are common and paltry?
No, by Hercules, I think not. In the most hidden penetralia—and not even that suffices—you store those things away in the most secret corners of the most fortified chests, while you leave the mud in the open. Therefore, if what is more precious is recondited, and what is cheaper is exposed, is it not manifest that wisdom, which it forbids to be hidden, is viler than the foolishness which it bids to be stored away?
Now receive the very words of the testimony: 'Better is the man who hides his foolishness than the man who hides his wisdom.' What of the fact that the Divine Letters also attribute candor of mind to the fool, while the wise man meanwhile thinks no one like himself? Thus indeed I understand that which Ecclesiastes writes, chapter 10. 'But also, as he walks on the way, the fool—since he himself is insipient—thinks everyone to be fools.' Is not that of a certain exceptional candor, to make all equal to yourself, and, although no one fails to think grandly of himself, nevertheless to share your praises with all?
Accordingly, it did not shame so great a king of this name, when he says in chapter 30, “I am the most foolish of men.” Nor does that Paul, the doctor of the nations, writing to the Corinthians, not unwillingly acknowledge the cognomen “fool”: “As an insipient,” he says, “I say: I more,” as if it were disgraceful to be conquered in foolishness. But meanwhile certain Greeklings make a clamor against me, who strive, like crows, to transfix the eyes of so many Theologians of our time, while they pour their annotations over others as though some fumes; of which flock, if not the Alpha, certainly the Beta is my Erasmus, whom I more often name for honor’s sake. “O truly a foolish,” they say, “and one worthy of MORIA itself, citation.”
Far different is the mind of the Apostle than you dream ! For he is not doing this with these words, that he might be held more foolish than the others, but that, when he said, ‘They are ministers of Christ; and I,’ and had, as it were vaunting, equated himself with the others in this part also, by way of correction he added, ‘I more,’ perceiving himself to be not only equal to the remaining Apostles in the ministry of the Gospel, but even somewhat superior. And since he wished this thus to seem true, yet lest, as spoken more arrogantly, it should offend ears, he pre-fortified it with the pretext of foolishness: ‘As less wise I say,’ because he would say that it is the privilege of fools that they alone speak forth the truth without offense.
But what Paul thought when he wrote these things I leave to be disputed by themselves. I follow the great, fat, thick, and by the crowd most approved Theologians, with whom the greater part of the learned would rather—by Zeus—err than think well with those trilinguals. Nor does any of them value those little Greeks more than jackdaws: especially since a certain vainglorious Theologian, whose name I prudently suppress, lest our jackdaws straightway hurl at him a Greek scoff, “an ass to the lyre,” expounding this passage magisterially and theologically, from this point.
I say, as less wise: “I more,” he opens a new chapter, and, what he could not have done without consummate Dialectic, he adds a new section, interpreting in this manner: For I will adduce his very words not only in form but also in matter. “I say, as less wise, that is, if I seem to you foolish by equating myself with the Pseudo-apostles, I shall still seem to you less wise by preferring myself to them.” Although the same man a little later, as if forgetful of himself, slips away into something else.
64. Sed cur anxie me unius exemplo tueor? cum hoc publicum ius sit Theologorum, coelum, hoc est, Divinam Scripturam, ceu pellem extendere: cum apud divum Paulum pugnent Divinae Scripturae verba, quae suo loco non pugnant, si qua fides illi pentaglôttô Hieronymo, cum Athenis forte conspectum arae titulum torqueret in argumentum fidei Christianae, ac caeteris omissis, quae causae fuerant offectura, duo tantum extrema verba decerpserit, nempe haec, IGNOTO DEO, atque haec quoque nonnihil immutata, siquidem integer titulus sic habebat: DIIS ASIAE, EUROPAE, ET AFRICAE, DIIS IGNOTIS, ET PEREGRINIS. Ad huius, opinor, exemplum passim iam hoi tôn theologôn paides, hinc atque hinc revulsa, quatuor aut quinque verbula, et si quid opus est, etiam depravata ad suam accommodant utilitatem, licet ea quae praecedunt et consequuntur, aut nihil omnino faciant ad rem, aut reclament quoque.
64. But why do I anxiously shield myself by a single example? since this is the common right of Theologians, to stretch heaven, that is, Divine Scripture, like a hide: since in the divine Paul the words of Divine Scripture are at strife, which in their own place are not at strife, if any trust is due to that pentaglot Jerome, when he was twisting a title of an altar seen by chance at Athens into an argument for the Christian faith, and, omitting the rest, which would have affected the case, plucked only the last two words, namely these, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD, and these too somewhat altered, since the entire title ran thus: TO THE GODS OF ASIA, EUROPE, AND AFRICA, TO UNKNOWN AND FOREIGN GODS. After this example, I suppose, everywhere now the boys of the theologians, having torn from here and there four or five little words, and, if need be, even depraved, accommodate them to their own utility, although the things which precede and follow either have nothing at all to do with the matter, or even protest against it.
Which indeed they do with such felicitous impudence that the jurisconsults often envy the theologians. For what now does not succeed for them, after that great man—I had almost blurted out his name, but again I fear a Greek proverb—has wrung from Luke’s words a sententia as consentaneous with the mind of Christ as fire agrees with water. For when the last peril was impending, at the very time when good clients are wont most to be present to their patrons and to “fight alongside” with all the aid they can (to symmachein), Christ, aiming at this, to strip from the souls of his own all trust in protections of this sort, asked them whether they had anywhere lacked anything, when he had sent them forth so ill-provided with viaticum that he neither armed them with shoes against the injury of thorns and rocks nor added a bag against hunger.
When they had denied that anything had been lacking, he added: 'But now,' he says, 'let him who has a purse take it up, and likewise a bag; and he who does not have, let him sell his tunic and buy a sword.' Since the whole doctrine of Christ inculcates nothing else than mansuetude, tolerance, contempt of life, to whom is it not plain what he means in this place? namely, that he may yet more disarm his legates, that they not only neglect shoes and a bag, but even cast away their tunic besides, and, naked and altogether unencumbered, may undertake the Evangelical office, preparing nothing for themselves except a sword—not that with which robbers and parricides make their onslaught, but the sword of the spirit, penetrating even into the inmost folds of the breast, which once for all cuts off all affections, so that now nothing is at their heart except piety. But look, I pray, to what end that celebrated theologian twists these things: he interprets the sword as defense against persecution, the purse as a sufficient provision of supplies, just as though Christ, having changed his mind to the contrary, because his orators seemed to have been sent out not very royally equipped, were to sing a palinode of his former instruction.
Or as though forgetful that he had said they would be blessed when they were afflicted with reproaches, contumelies, and tortures, forbidding that they ever resist evil—for the meek are blessed, not the ferocious—forgetful that he had called them to the example of the sparrows and of the lilies, now he so far should not wish them to set out without a sword as to order that it be bought even with the tunic sold, and to prefer that they go naked rather than not girt with iron. Moreover, just as he thinks that under the name of “sword” is contained whatever pertains to driving off force, so under the title of “purse” he includes whatever pertains to the necessity of life. And thus the interpreter of the Divine mind leads out the Apostles equipped with lances, ballistas, slings, and bombards to the preaching of the Crucified.
Likewise he loads them with little coffers, valises, and packs, lest perhaps it be not permitted them to depart from the inn, unless without having lunched. Nor did even this move the man, that the sword, which he had so greatly ordered to be bought, presently the same, chiding, orders to be put away; and that it has never been heard tell that the Apostles used swords or shields against the violence of the Gentiles—surely they would have used them, if Christ had meant what this man interprets. There is another, whom for honor’s sake I do not name, by no means of the lowest name, who, from the tents of which Habakkuk makes mention, “the skins of the land of Midian shall be troubled,” has made out the skin of flayed Bartholomew.
I myself was lately present at a Theological disputation, (for I do that frequently). There, when someone demanded what, at length, was the authority of the Divine Letters that would order Heretics to be conquered by fire rather than refuted by disputation: a certain severe old man, and, his eyebrow itself as witness, a Theologian, replied with great indignation, that the Apostle Paul had carried this law, who said: 'Avoid a heretical man after one and a second correction.' And when he kept thundering those words again and again, and many were wondering what had come over the man, at last he explained that the heretic must be taken from life. Some laughed, nor were there lacking, however, those to whom this contrivance seemed plainly theological; but with some still protesting, there then succeeded, as they say, a Tenedian co-advocate and an irrefragable authority. 'Take the matter,' he says: It is written: 'Do not allow a malefic to live': Every Heretic is a malefic: Therefore, etc.
All who were present marveled at the man’s genius, and into that opinion it was gone by feet—indeed, with buskined ones. Nor did it come into anyone’s mind that that law pertains to sortilegers and incantators and magi, whom the Hebrews in their own tongue call mekaschephim; otherwise fornication and ebriety ought to be punished capitally.
65. Verum haec stulte persequor, tam innumera, ut nec Chrysippi, nec Didymi voluminibus omnia comprehendi possint. Illud dumtaxat admonitos volebam, cum haec divinis illis magistris licuerint, mihi quoque plane sukinê theologô, par est dare veniam, si minus omnia ad amussim citavero. Nunc tandem ad Paulum redeo: 'Libenter', inquit, 'fertis insipientes,' de sese loquens.
65. But I pursue these things foolishly, so innumerable that neither the volumes of Chrysippus nor of Didymus could comprehend them all. This only I wished to have you admonished of: since these things were permitted to those divine masters, it is fair to grant me also pardon—plainly, indulgence to the theologian—if I have not cited everything to the plumb-line. Now at last I return to Paul: “Willingly,” he says, “you bear with fools,” speaking about himself.
And again, 'receive me as though a fool.' And: 'I do not speak according to God, but as if in foolishness.' Again elsewhere: 'We,' he says, 'are fools because of Christ.' You have heard from how great an author how great proclamations of Foolishness. What of the fact that the same man openly prescribes Folly, as a thing primarily necessary and exceedingly salutary? 'He who seems to be wise among you, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.' And in Luke, he calls foolish the two disciples to whom Jesus had joined himself on the way.
I do not know whether this will seem a wonder, that that divine Paul also attributes somewhat of foolishness to God: “What is foolish of God,” he says, “is wiser than men.” Moreover Origen, the interpreter, opposes, so that you may not be able to refer this foolishness to the opinion of men—the kind of thing which is: “The word of the cross is indeed foolishness to those who are perishing.” But why do I anxiously, to no purpose, go on teaching these things with so many testimonies, when in the mystical psalms Christ himself openly speaks to the Father: “Thou knowest my senselessness?” Nor indeed is it without reason that fools have so earnestly pleased God: I suppose because, just as the highest princes hold men who are overly shrewd in suspicion and hatred—like Julius [Caesar] Brutus and Cassius, while he feared nothing from a drunken Antony; and as Nero [feared] Seneca, and Dionysius Plato—whereas they take delight in wits more gross and more simple. In like manner Christ always detests and condemns those sophous, relying on their own prudence. Paul bears witness to this by no means obscurely, when he says: “The things that are foolish of the world God has chosen,” and when he says “that it seemed good to God to save the world through foolishness,” since through wisdom it could not be restored.
Nay, he himself indicates the same sufficiently, crying through the mouth of the Prophet: 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will disapprove.' Again, when he gives thanks, that he had hidden the mystery of salvation from the wise, but to little ones, that is, to fools, had opened it. For in Greek, for 'little ones' it is nêpiois, whom he set in opposition to sophois. To this pertains that, everywhere in the Gospel, he assails the Pharisees and the scribes and the doctors of the law, but sedulously protects the unlearned vulgus.
For what else is, 'woe to you, scribes and Pharisees,' than, 'woe to you, wise men'? But he seems to have been most delighted with little ones, women, and fishermen. Indeed, even from the kind of brute living beings, those especially please Christ which are as far as possible from vulpine prudence. And for that reason he preferred to sit upon an ass, although he, if it had pleased him, could with impunity have pressed even a lion’s back.
Than this creature there is no other more foolish, as even the Aristotelian proverb bears witness, “probateion êthos” (“sheepish character”): which indeed reminds us that, taken from the stolidity of this herd-beast, it is wont to be said by way of insult against the stupid and the dull. Yet Christ professes himself the shepherd of this flock; nay more, he himself was pleased with the name of lamb, John pointing him out: “Behold the Lamb of God,” of whom there is much mention also in the Apocalypse. What do these things cry out, if not that mortals are fools, even the pious?
even Christ himself, in order to come to the aid of the stupidity of mortals, although he was the wisdom of the Father, was nevertheless in a certain manner made stupid, when, human nature having been assumed, he was found in habit as a man? just as he was also made sin, that he might heal sins. Nor did he wish to heal in any other way than through the stupidity of the cross, through apostles, idiots and thick; to whom he diligently prescribes stupidity, deterring them from wisdom, when he calls them to the example of children, of lilies, of mustard, and of sparrows—things stupid and lacking sense, and living life by the guidance of nature alone, with no art and no solicitude.
Moreover, when he forbids them to be solicitous as to what oration they would use before the presiding magistrates, and when he interdicts them from scrutinizing the times or the moments of the times, evidently, lest they trust anything to their own prudence, but with whole souls should depend upon himself. To the same point pertains that God, the architect of the orb, who menaces that they should not degust anything of the tree of science, just as if science were the venom of felicity. Although Paul openly disapproves science as inflating and pernicious.
Which the divine Bernard, I think, following, interprets that mountain on which Lucifer had set his seat as the mountain of knowledge. Perhaps that argument too should not seem to be omitted: that folly is gracious with the powers above, in that to it is fastened the pardon of errors, whereas to the wise man it is not forgiven; whence, when they beg pardon, even if the prudent have sinned, nevertheless they use folly’s pretext and patronage. For thus Aaron deprecates the wife’s penalty in the books of Numbers, if I remember well enough: ‘I beseech you, my lord, do not lay upon us this sin which we have committed foolishly.’ So too Saul pleads off his fault before David: ‘For it appears,’ he says, ‘that I have acted foolishly.’ Again David himself so coaxes the Lord: ‘But I pray, Lord, that you transfer the iniquity of your servant, because we have acted foolishly’—as though he were not going to obtain pardon unless he put forward folly and ignorance.
But that presses more sharply, that Christ on the cross, when he was praying for his enemies. 'Father, forgive them': he put forward no other excuse than imprudence, 'because they do not know', he says, 'what they are doing'. In the same way, Paul writing to Timothy: 'But for this reason I have obtained the mercy of God, because I acted ignorantly in incredulity'. What is, 'I acted ignorantly', except 'I acted through stupidity, not malice'? What is, 'for this reason I obtained mercy', except 'I would not have obtained it, had I not been commended by the patronage of stupidity'?
On our behalf also does that mystical Psalmographer plead, who did not come to mind in his proper place: “Remember not the offenses of my youth, and my ignorances.” You have heard the two things he pleads as a pretext, namely age, of which I am always wont to be a companion, and ignorances—and that in the number of a multitude—so that we might understand the enormous force of Folly.
66. Ac ne quae sunt infinita persequar, utque summatim dicam, videtur omnino Christiana religio quamdam habere cum aliqua stultitia cognationem, minimeque cum sapientia convenire. Cuius rei si desideratis argumenta primum illud animadvertite, pueros, senes, mulieres, ac fatuos sacris ac religiosis rebus praeter caeteros gaudere, eoque semper altaribus esse proximos, solo, nimirum, naturae impulsu. Praeterea videtis primos illos religionis auctores, mire simplicitatem amplexos, acerrimos litterarum hostes fuisse.
66. And lest I pursue things that are infinite, and to say it summarily, the Christian religion seems altogether to have a certain cognation with some foolishness, and by no means to agree with sapience. If you desire arguments for this matter, take note first of this: boys, old men, women, and the fatuous rejoice in sacred and religious things beyond the rest, and therefore are always nearest to the altars, by the sole, to wit, impulse of nature. Moreover, you see that those first authors of the religion, having marvellously embraced simplicity, were the keenest enemies of letters.
Finally, no jesters seem to play the fool more than those whom the ardor of Christian piety has once seized whole: to such a degree they pour out their own goods, neglect injuries, allow themselves to be deceived, make no distinction between friends and enemies, shudder at pleasure, are crammed with fasting, vigil, tears, labors, and contumelies, loathe life, and desire death alone; in brief, they seem utterly to have been benumbed to all common sense, just as if the soul lived elsewhere, not in its own body. What indeed is this, if not to be insane? so that it should seem the less marvelous if the Apostles were seen as drunk with new wine, if Paul seemed to the judge Festus to be mad.
But after once we have put on the lion’s skin, come, let us also show this: that the felicity of the Christians, which they seek with so many labors, is nothing else than a certain genus of insanity and stupidity—let envy be far from the words; weigh rather the thing itself. To begin with, Christians pretty nearly agree with the Platonists in this: that the soul is immersed and bound with corporeal bonds, and is hampered by the grossness of this [body], so that it is less able to contemplate and to enjoy the things that truly are. Accordingly, he defines Philosophy to be a meditation of death, because it leads the mind away from visible and corporeal things, which same thing death, assuredly, does.
Therefore, as long as the mind uses the organs of the body properly, so long it is called sane; but when, the bonds now broken, it tries to assert itself into liberty, and, as it were, meditates a flight from that prison, then they call it insanity. If that happens by disease and by defect of the organs, by the outright consensus of all, it is insanity. And yet we see this genus of men also foretell things to come, to know tongues and letters which they had never learned before, and altogether to bear upon themselves a certain divine something.
Nor is there doubt that this happens from the fact that the mind, a little freer from the contagion of the body, begins to exert its native force. I think the same is the cause why, for those laboring with death near at hand, something similar is wont to occur, so that, as if afflated, they speak certain prodigious things. Again, if this comes about by zeal of piety, perhaps it is not the same genus of insanity, yet nevertheless so contiguous to it that a great part of mankind judges it sheer insanity, especially when a few little homunculi dissent from the entire company of mortals for their whole life.
And so it is wont to come to them in practice, that, according to the Platonic figment, I suppose, it befalls those who, bound in the cave, marvel at the shadows of things; and to that fugitive who, having returned into the cavern, proclaims that he has seen the true realities, that those are greatly deceived who believe that besides the wretched shadows there is nothing else. For the wise man here commiserates and deplores the insanity of those who are held by so great an error. They, in turn, laugh at him as though delirious, and eject him.
Likewise the vulgar crowd of men most of all marvels at those things which are most corporeal, and thinks that these are almost the only things that are. By contrast, the pious, the nearer anything approaches to the body, so much the more they neglect it, and are wholly rapt into the contemplation of invisible things. For those people assign the first places to riches, the next to the commodities of the body, and leave the last to the soul; which, however, the majority do not even believe to exist, because it is not discerned by the eyes.
On the contrary, they first strive wholly toward God himself, the most simple of all things; second to Him—and yet in this respect, that which comes as near to Him as possible—namely, the soul: they neglect care of the body, and monies they utterly spurn and flee as mere husks. Or if they are compelled to handle any matters of this sort, they do it grudgingly and with distaste; they have as though not having, they possess as though not possessing. And there are also, in individual things, degrees much differing among them.
The pious, since all the force of their mind strives toward those things which are most alien from the coarser senses, in these they, as it were, grow brutish and are stupefied. Conversely the common crowd is strongest in these, in those as little as possible. Hence it is that we hear it has happened to some divine men that they drank oil in place of wine.
Again, among the affections of the mind, certain ones have more commerce with the fat body, such as libido, the appetence of food and sleep, iracundity, pride, envy: with these the pious wage an irreconcilable war; by contrast the common crowd does not think life to be without these. Then there are certain middle affections, as it were natural, such as a father’s love, charity toward children, toward parents, toward friends: to these the crowd grants somewhat. But those men strive to tear out even these from the soul, except insofar as they rise up to that highest part of the mind, so that now they love a parent, not as a parent—for what did he beget, except the body?—although even this very thing is owed to God the Parent—but as a good man, and as one in whom the image of that highest Mind shines, which alone they call the supreme good, and outside of which they proclaim that nothing is either to be loved or to be sought after.
By this same rule they also mete out likewise all the other offices of life, so that everywhere that which is visible, if it is not to be altogether contemned, yet they make of far less account than those things which cannot be seen. They say moreover that in the Sacraments, and in the very offices of piety, body and spirit are found. For example, in fasting they do not reckon it of great moment if someone only abstains from meats and from supper, which the common crowd thinks to be fasting complete, unless at the same time he also takes something away from the affections, so that he permits less to anger than he is wont, less to pride; and so that, as being now less burdened with the mass of the body, the spirit may strive toward the taste and fruition of heavenly goods.
Similarly also in the synaxis, although, they say, what is carried on by ceremonies is not to be spurned, nevertheless that by itself is either little conducive or even pernicious, unless that which is spiritual be added—namely, that which is represented by those visible signs. Now what is represented is the death of Christ, which Mortals ought to express, their bodily affections tamed, extinguished, and as it were buried, so that they may rise again into the newness of life, and that they may become one with him, and likewise one among themselves. These things, therefore, the pious man does; these he meditates.
On the contrary, the common crowd believes sacrifice to be nothing else than to be present at the altars, and that close by, to hear the din of voices, and to behold other little ceremonies of that kind. Nor in these only, which we have proposed merely for example, but simply in the whole of life the pious man flees from those things which are cognate to the body, he is rapt to the eternal, to the invisible, to the spiritual. Accordingly, since there is the utmost dissension between these and those about all matters, it comes to pass that each party seems to the other to be insane.
67. Quod quidem magis perspicuum fiet, si quemadmodum pollicita sum, paucis demonstraro, summum illud praemium nihil aliud esse, quam insaniam quamdam. Primum igitur existimate, Platonem tale quiddam iam tum somniasse, cum, amantium furorem omnium felicissimum esse, scriberet. Etenim qui vehementer amat iam non in se vivit, sed in eo quod amat, quoque longius a se ipso digreditur, et in illud demigrat, hoc magis ac magis gaudet.
67. This will indeed become more perspicuous, if, as I have promised, I shall demonstrate in a few words that that highest prize is nothing other than a certain insanity. Therefore, first reckon that Plato already then dreamed something of this sort, when he wrote that the furor of lovers is the most felicitous of all. For he who loves vehemently no longer lives in himself, but in that which he loves; and the further he departs from himself and migrates into that, the more and more he rejoices.
And when the mind meditates to peregrinate from the body, and does not properly make use of its own organs, you would without doubt rightly call that madness. Otherwise, what does it mean that people commonly say: 'He is not with himself, and, return to yourself, and, he has been restored to himself?' Moreover, the more absolute the love is, by so much the greater—and more felicitous—the madness is. Therefore, what will that life of the celestials be, for which pious minds sigh with such zeal?
Surely the spirit will absorb the body, as victor and stronger. And this it will do more easily, partly because it is already, as it were, in its own kingdom, partly because long ago in life it purged the body for a transformation of this kind and attenuated it. Then the spirit will be wondrously absorbed by that supreme Mind, since it is by infinite parts more potent.
Thus that already the whole man will be outside himself, nor will he be felicitous on any other account, except that, placed outside himself, he will undergo something ineffable from that highest Good, which snatches all things into itself. Now this felicity, although then at last it comes perfect, when souls, their former bodies having been received back, will be endowed with immortality: nevertheless, since the life of the pious is nothing else than a meditation of that life, and, as it were, a certain shadow, it comes to pass that they also sometimes feel a taste of that reward, or some ardor. Although this, compared to that fountain of eternal felicity, is a certain most minute little droplet, yet it far surpasses all the pleasures of the body, even if all the delights of all mortals were brought together into one.
To such a degree do spiritual things excel bodily things, the invisible the visible. This, to be sure, is what the Prophet promises: 'Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have they ascended into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love Him'. And this is the part of Folly which is not taken away by a change of life, but is perfected. Therefore, to those to whom it has been permitted to feel this—yet it befalls very few—they undergo something very similar to dementia, they speak certain things not sufficiently coherent, nor in a human manner, but give sound without mind, then ever and again they change the whole look of the face.
Now elated, now dejected, now they weep, now they laugh, now they sigh; in sum, truly they are wholly outside themselves. Soon as they have returned to themselves, they deny that they know where they have been—whether in the body or outside the body, awake or asleep—what they heard, what they saw, what they said, what they did; they do not remember, except as if through a mist and a dream; only this do they know: that they were most happy while they were thus out of their wits. And so they weep that they have come back to their senses, and of all things they would prefer nothing to this kind of insanity—to be insane perpetually.
68. Verum ego iam dudum oblita mei huper ta eskammena pêdô. Quamquam si quid petulantius aut loquacius a me dictum videbitur, cogitate et Stultitiam, et mulierem dixisse. Sed interim tamen memineritis illius Graecanici proverbii pollaki toi kai môros anêp katakairion eipen, nisi forte putatis hoc ad mulieres nihil attinere. Video vos epilogum exspectare, sed nimium desipitis, siquidem arbitramini, me quid dixerim etiam dum meminisse, cum tantam verborum farraginem effuderim.
68. But I, long since forgetful of myself, am leaping beyond the furrows. Although, if anything shall seem to have been said by me more petulantly or more loquaciously, consider that both Folly and a woman have said it. But meanwhile do remember that Greek proverb: “often even a foolish man has said something to the point,” unless perhaps you think this pertains nothing to women. I see you expect an epilogue, but you are exceedingly foolish, if indeed you suppose that I even now remember what I have said, since I have poured out such a farrago of words.