Pseudoplatonica: Eryxias

Quum forte ego et Eryxias Stiriaeus in porticu Iovis Liberatoris deambularemus, ad nos Critias, et Erasistratus Phaeacis Erasistrati fratris filius, venerunt: quorum Erasistratus, qui tunc recens ex Sicilia, illisque locis erat, propius accedens, dixit, Salve, o Socrates. Et tu inquam ego, salve: ecquid novi nobis referas? Maxime: sed vultis, inquit, sedeamus?

When by chance I and Eryxias the Stirian were strolling in the portico of Jove the Liberator, Critias and Erasistratus, the son of Phaeax, the brother of Erasistratus, came to us: of whom Erasistratus, who was then recently from Sicily and those regions, coming nearer, said, Hail, O Socrates. And I said, And you too, hail: do you bring us anything new? Very much: but do you wish, he said, that we sit?

Adhuc enim sum de via fessus heri Megara profectus. Ita fiat, si videtur. Quid igitur, inquit, primum ex his, quae illic sunt, vultis audire?

I am still travel-weary, you see, having set out from Megara yesterday. Let it be so, if it seems good. “What then,” he said, “do you wish to hear first from among the things that are there?”

utrum quae Siculi exerceant, an quo pacto illi erga Rempublicam nostram sint affecti? Nam mihi illi erga nos non aliter esse affecti videntur, quam sint vespae: quae si leviter irritae provocentur, fiunt invictae, donec eas aliquis aggressus funditus extinguat. Sic igitur et Syracusani sunt affecti.

whether what the Sicilians are engaged in, or in what manner they are affected toward our Republic? For they seem to me to be affected toward us no otherwise than wasps are: which, if lightly irritated and provoked, become invincible, until someone, having attacked them, utterly extinguishes them. Thus, then, the Syracusans are affected.

Nisi aliquis bellum et quidem ingens gesturus, eo cum maxima classe fuerit profectus, nunquam civitas illa in nostra ditione ac potestate est ventura: sed potius parvis hisce classibus irri tabitur ita, ut nobis quam molestissima sit futura. Nunc vero illi ad nos legatos miserunt, eo quidem (ut mihi videtur) consilio, ut nostra civitatem decipiant. Interea, dum nos ita colloqueremur, ipsi Syracusanorum legati casu advenerunt.

Unless someone, about to wage war—and indeed a huge one—shall have set out thither with a very great fleet, that commonwealth will never come into our dominion and power; but rather it will be irritated by these small fleets in such a way that it will be going to be as troublesome to us as possible. Now indeed they have sent legates to us, with the counsel (as it seems to me) to deceive our state. Meanwhile, while we were conversing thus, the legates of the Syracusans themselves arrived by chance.

Quare nobis Erasistratus unum illorum ostendens, dixit: Ille, o Socrates, Siculorum omnium, et Italorum est ditissimus. Qui vero, inquit, non sit is ditissimus, cui sit ager ita latus, ut dare facultatem possit, si quis agriculturam longe lateque velit exercere: isque talis, qualis alius in tota Graecia non ita facile reperiri posset: cuique alia, quae ad divitias pertiennt, sint separatim, mancipia, equi, aurum, et argentum. Hunc ego, videns eo adductum iam esse, ut plura de hominis opibus dicturus videretur, ita rogavi: Quid Erasistrate?

Wherefore Erasistratus, pointing out one of them to us, said: “That man, O Socrates, is the richest of all the Sicilians and of the Italians. For who, he said, would not be the richest, who has an estate so broad as to be able to give the faculty, if someone should wish to exercise agriculture far and wide; and such as another could not so easily be found in all Greece; and to whom the other things which pertain to riches belong separately—slaves, horses, gold, and silver?” I, seeing that he had now been brought to the point where he seemed about to say more about the man’s wealth, thus asked: “What, Erasistratus?”

Homo ille qualis tandem esse in Sicilia videtur? Siculorum, inquit, omnium, et Italorum tanto nequissimus videtur esse, et est, quando est et ditissimus: usque adeo, ut si quem Siculorum roges, quemnam nequissimum et ditissimum esse censeat, nemo alium atque illum esse dicat. Hunc ego arbitratus non parvis de rebus verba facere, sed de his, quae maximae videntur, virtute et divitiis: quaesivi, utrum existimaret ditiorem esse hominem, cui duo sint argenti talenta, an cui sit ager, qui duobus talentis aestimetur.

What sort of man, then, does he seem to be in Sicily? “Of all the Sicilians,” he said, “and the Italians, he seems—and is—by so much the most wicked, since he is also the richest: to such an extent that, if you were to ask any of the Sicilians whom he judges to be the most wicked and the richest, no one would say anyone other than that man.” Thinking that he was speaking not about small matters, but about those which seem greatest—virtue and riches—I asked whether he thought the richer man to be the one who has two silver talents, or the one who has a field which is estimated at two talents.

Cui sit ager, inquit, existimo. Hac igitur, inquam ego, ratione, si cui sint pallia, vel stragulae vestes, vel alia quae pluris sint, quam quae illi sunt peregrino, sit et hic ditior. Ista quoque est assensus.

“I think the one who has the field,” he says. “By this reasoning, then,” said I, “if someone have palls, or coverlet-garments, or other things which are of greater price than those which that foreigner has, this man too is richer.” To this also he gave assent.

Sed si tibi, inquam, aliquis horum daret optionem, utrum velles? Quod plurimi est, inquit. Utro te modo credens ditiorem fore?

But if, said I, someone of these were to give you the option, which would you wish? That which is worth the most, he says. In which way believing that you would be richer?

Hoc. Nunc utique nobis, ut quisque, quae plurimi sunt, possidet, ita ditissimus habendus videtur. Videtur, inquit.

This. Now certainly, for us, as each person possesses the things that are of the highest value, thus he seems to be held the richest. It seems so, he says.

Sani igitur, inquam ego, aegris sunt ditiores: si quidem sanitas pluris est quam sint aegri pecuniae. Nullus est enim, qui non malit, parum quid argenti possidens, recte valere, quam Regis magni pecunias habens, aegrotare: manifesto videlicet indicans, sanitatem sibi pluris aestimari. Neque enim praeponeret, nisi maioris esse illam pretij, quam pecunias existimaret.

Therefore, I say, the healthy are richer than the sick: since health is of more value than are a sick man’s monies. For there is no one who would not prefer, possessing a small bit of silver, to be in sound health, rather than, having a great king’s monies, to be sick: plainly, to wit, indicating that health is estimated by him as of more worth. For he would not set it before, unless he judged that to be of greater price than the monies.

Non sane quidem. Si vero constet, aliud quippiam esse, quod pluris sit, quam sanitas, isne, qui idipsum possideat, sit ditisssimus? Sit sane.

Not indeed, to be sure. But if it be settled that there is some other thing which is of more value than health, would he who possesses that very thing be the richest? Granted indeed.

Sed si iam nunc aliquis hunc accedens, nos roget, o Socrates, Eryxia, et Erasistrate, potestis mihi dicere, quid sit homini plurimi? id est, cuius possesor optime deliberet, qua ratione commodissime et sua ipsius, et amicorum negotia conficiat? quid hoc esse dicemus?

But if even now someone, approaching this man, should ask us, O Socrates, Eryxias, and Erasistratus, can you tell me what is of the greatest value to a human being? that is, the possessor of which would deliberate best by what plan he may most commodiously bring to completion both his own affairs and those of his friends? what shall we say this is?

Mihi quidem, o Socrates, homini felicitas esse plurimi v idetur. Nec, male quidem, inquam ego: sed eosne hominum felicissimos possumus existimare, qui quam optime faciant? Possumus, meo quidem iudicio.

To me indeed, O Socrates, felicity seems to be worth the most for a man. Not badly, indeed, I say; but can we consider as the happiest of men those who do things as well as possible? We can, at least in my judgment.

Nonne igitur illi optime faciunt, qui minimum et in se ipsi, et in alios homines peccant: quique plurima recte gerunt? Maxime quidem. Qui mala igitur, et bona sciunt, et quae facienda, et quae non facienda sunt, nonne ij possunt res rectissime gerere, et minimum peccare?

Do not, then, those do best who sin the least both against themselves and against other men: and who conduct very many things rightly? Most certainly. Therefore those who know evils and goods, and what things are to be done and what are not to be done, are not they able to conduct affairs most correctly and to sin the least?

Haec quoque concessit. Nunc omino iam nobis iidem videntur esse et sapientissimi viri, et qui optimi faciunt, et felicissimi, et ditissimi, si quidem sapientia esse plurimi videtur. Esto, inquit, excipiens Erasistratus: sed quae utilitas homini sit, o Socrates, si Nestore quidem sit sapientior: quae vero ad vivendum sunt necessaria, non habeat, cibos, potus, et vestes, et siquid aliud est huiusmodi?

He granted this also. Now altogether it seems to us that the same men are both the most wise men, and those who do best, and the most happy, and the most wealthy, if indeed wisdom seems to be of the greatest value. Be it so, said Erasistratus, taking it up; but what utility is there to a man, O Socrates, if he should be wiser than Nestor, yet not have the things necessary for living—foods, drinks, and garments, and whatever else there is of this sort?

Quid hic sapientia prodesse possit? vel quonam ille pacto sit ditissimus, quem nihil mendicitate prohibeat, cuique nihil eorum quae sunt necessaria, suppeditetur? Hic magnum quid dicere videbatur: Sed, inquam ego, nunquid is, qui sap ientiam teneat, si horum sit indigens, hoc, quod dicis, patiatur: siquis vero Pulytionis domum possideat, atque domus auri et argenti sit plena, rei nullius indigeat?

What could wisdom profit here? or by what manner would he be the richest, whom nothing hinders from mendicancy, and to whom nothing of the things that are necessary is supplied? He seemed to be saying something weighty: But, I said, would the man who holds wisdom, if he were in want of these things, suffer this which you say? whereas if someone should possess the house of Pulytion, and the house be full of gold and silver, would he be in need of nothing?

At illum, inquit, nihil vetat quam primum ita quidem auctionari, ut pro his, quae possideat, vel ea ipsa, quibus eadem sibi possit comparare, atque adeo statim rebus omnibus abundare. Ita sit, inquam, si quidem contingat, ut sint homines, qui malint domum huiusmodi, quam sapientiam illius habere: verum si sint ij, qui pluris viri sapientiam, et quae ab ea proficiscuntur, faciant, nae multo ille commodius poterit auctionari, si cuius rei indigebit, ob idque volet ipsam, et eius opera vendere. Nam domus quidem usus cum multus est, et necessarius: tum commoda quae ab vitam pertinent, homini magna sunt, si in tali domo potius, quam in parva, et vili casa habitet: sapientiae vero usu haud ita magni fit, et commoda parva videntur, sive sapiens, sive imperitus rerum maximarum sis, quod eam rem homines non modo emere, sed e tiam contemnant: cupressam vero, quae domui sit ornamento, et pentelicos lapides multi quasi egentes et optent, et libenter emant.

But, he says, nothing hinders him from auctioning as soon as possible, indeed in such a way that, in exchange for the things he possesses, or even those very things by which he could procure the same things for himself, he might forthwith abound in all things. So be it, I say, if indeed it happen that there are men who would prefer to have a house of this kind than to have that man’s wisdom; but if there are those who set a higher price on the man’s wisdom, and on the things that proceed from it, surely he will be able to auction far more advantageously, if he is in need of anything, and on that account will wish to sell it itself and its services. For the use of a house is both great and necessary; and the conveniences which pertain to life are great for a man, if he dwell in such a house rather than in a small and cheap hut; but the use of wisdom is not held of so great account, and its advantages seem small, whether you be wise or unskilled in the greatest matters, because men not only do not buy that thing, but even despise it; whereas a cypress, which is an ornament to a house, and Pentelic stones, many, as if in need, both desire and gladly buy.

Si quis igitur sit peritus gubernator, neque medicinam, vel aliam quampiam huiusmodi artem bene et pulchre possit pertractare, hic nulla ex his rebus, quae maxime in divitiis habentur, non erit pretiosiior, vendibliorque. Qui vero possit bene et ipse de se, et de altero deliberare, et constituere, quonam pacto optima faciat, hoc ipsum, quum volet, vendere non poterit? Excipiens autem Eryxias, et tanquam si iniuria affectus fuisset, iratus aspiciens: Tu, inquit, o Socrates, si te verum dicere oporteat, te Callia Hipponici filio ditiorem esse diceres.

If therefore there should be a skilled helmsman, yet he cannot handle medicine, or any other art of this sort, well and beautifully, will not this man be more precious and more vendible than any of those things which are held chiefly among riches? But he who can deliberate well both for himself and for another, and determine by what pact he may do the best things, will he not be able to sell this very thing whenever he wishes? But Eryxias, taking this up, and as though he had been affected by an injury, looking on in anger: “You,” he says, “O Socrates, if it were needful that you speak the truth, you would say that you are richer than Callias, son of Hipponicus.”

At quamvis nulla in re maximis te rudiorem, sed sapientiorem esse affirmares, ob id tamen nihilo esse ditior. Fortasse, inquam ego, existimas hosce sermones, quos nunc conferimus, iocosos esse: quod non vere putes ita, ut dicuntur, habere: sed potius talis quibusdam persimileis esse, quos qui ferat, facile possit collusores ita vincere, ut illi amplius non habeant , quid ad eos obiicere possint. Fortasse, inquam, et tu divitibus idem censes, rem quidem ita, ut dicitur, non habere: sed sermones quosdam huiuscemodi esse nihilo magis veros, quam falsos: quos qui dicta homo adversarios ita circumscribat, ut persuadeat, qui sint sapientissimi, eosdem etiam nobis ditissimos esse, atque id ipsum, quum mentiatur ipse, et illi vera dicant.

But although you would affirm that in no matter you are more untrained than the very greatest, but rather more wise, yet on that account you are none the richer. Perhaps, I said, you suppose these discourses which we are now exchanging to be jocose: because you do not truly think that the case stands as it is said, but rather that they are very like certain tricks, by which whoever employs them can easily so vanquish his fellow-players that they no longer have , what they can object against them. Perhaps, I say, you also judge the same about the wealthy, that the matter does not stand as it is said: but that certain discourses of this kind are no more true than false; by which sayings a man circumvents his adversaries in such a way as to persuade that those who are most wise are also for us the richest, and this very thing, though he himself is lying, and they speak truths.

Quin nihil forte mirum sit, hoc persimile esse, ac si duo de literis disputent: atque alter quidem, S, alter vero, A, primam in Socrate literam esse contendat: utrius sermo plus rationis is habeat: eiusne, qui A dicat: an illius, qui S principium esse velit? Tum vero ridens simul, et erubescens Eryxias, et eos, qui aderant, perinde quasi ipse his, quae dicta fuerant, non interfuisset, circunspiciens: Ego, inquit, o Socrates non arbitrabar oportere inter nos sermones eos haberi, quos qui dicat, neque sibi ipse prodesse, neque cuiquam ex his qui praesentes sint, persuadere quippiam possit. Qui enim mortalium unquam, qui modo sapiat, persuaderi possit, qui sapientissimi sint, eosdem nobis ditissimos esse?

Nay, perhaps it is nothing marvellous that this is much the same as if two were disputing about letters: and the one, “S,” the other, however, “A,” should contend to be the first letter in Socrates: whose discourse would have more reason—his who says “A,” or his who wishes “S” to be the beginning? Then indeed Eryxias, laughing and blushing at the same time, and looking around at those who were present, just as if he himself had not been present at what had been said: “I,” said he, “O Socrates, did not think it proper that among us there be held such conversations, which the speaker can neither make profit to himself, nor be able to persuade anything to any of those present. For what mortal ever, who has even a measure of wisdom, could be persuaded that those who are the most wise are the very same as the richest among us?”

sed eos potius, quibus, quando de acquirendis divitiis disserimus, ostendi possit, unde id honeste fiat, et utrum sit bonum, an malum. Sit sane, inquam ego, ut dicis. Nos igitur posthac cautius agemus.

but rather those, by which, whenever we discourse about acquiring riches, it can be shown whence that may be done honorably, and whether it is a good or an evil. Be it so, indeed, said I, as you say. We therefore hereafter will act more cautiously.

Et mehercule tu benfacis, qui nos mones. Sed tu ipse, qui novum inducis sermonem quique censes ea, quae prius dicta sunt, nihil ad te pertinere, cur ad dicendum non aggrederis, Virum acquirere divitias bonum, an malum esse videatur? Mihi quidem, inquit, acquirere diviatis esse bonum videtur.

And, by Hercules, you do well, in that you admonish us. But you yourself, who introduce a new discourse and who think that the things which were said before do not pertain to you, why do you not set about speaking, whether for a Man to acquire riches seems to be a good, or an evil? To me indeed, he said, to acquire riches seems to be a good.

Volentem illum adhuc nescio quid dicrere, ita Critias interpellans interrogavit: Dic mihi Eryxia, tune divitias acquirere esse bonum existimas? Insaniam profecto, inquit, si aliter existimem: quum opinor neminem esse qui non idem affirmet. Opinor ego quoque inquit alter neminem esse, quem inducere non possim, ut mecum sentiat, quibusdam hominibus malum esse, divitias acquirere.

While he was still willing to say I know not what, Critias, interrupting thus, asked: Tell me, Eryxia, do you esteem it a good to acquire riches? Madness indeed, she said, if I should think otherwise: since I opine there is no one who would not affirm the same. I too opine, said the other, that there is no one whom I cannot induce to agree with me, that for certain men it is an evil to acquire riches.

Quod si bonum prorsus esset, nunquam profecto malum esse aliquibus nostrum manifesto a ppareret. Tunc ego illis dixi: Si quidem vos de hoc dissentiretis, uter vestrum de studio equitandi veriora diceret, hoc est, quonam pacto quis optime equitet, atque ego huiusce rei peritus essem, rogarem vos, ut dissensioni finem imponeretis. Puderet enim me, nisis praesens pro mea virili vois a contentione prohiberem: vel si de alia quapiam re contendentes, inimici ex amicis facti essetis abituri, nisi in eadem re consentiretis.

But if it were absolutely a good, it would surely never be manifest that it is an evil for some of us. Then I said to them: If indeed you were disagreeing about this—namely, which of you would speak truer things about the discipline of equitation, that is, by what manner someone rides best—and I were skilled in this matter, I would ask you to put an end to the dissension. For I should be ashamed, unless, being present, I prevented you, to the best of my manly power, from contention; or if, contending about some other matter, you were about to depart enemies out of friends, unless you were to agree in that same matter.

Nunc vero, quum vos de ea re contendatis, qua tota in vita uti sit necesse, magnique referat, utrum res ea ut utilis, an ut inutilis curanda sit: atque haec non parva illa quidem, sed omnium maxima Graecis esse videantur: (quippe quum patres hoc primum filiis mandent suis, ut, quum primum ad eam aetatem pervenerint, qua sibi intelligere videnatur, iam tunc circumspiciant, unde divites fieri possint: propterea quod si quid habes, viges: sin nihil, iaces:) quum haec, inquam, tam valde expetantur, vos vero caetera quidem consentientes, hac de re ta magna di screpetis, pareterea de acquirendis divitiis dissentiatis: nec vos quidem, utrum acquirere divitias nigrum sit, an album: nec utrum leve sit, an grave, sed utrum malum sit, an bonum, et quidem ita, ut inimicitias inter vos suscepturi videamini, si perseveretis de malis et bonis contendere, atque id ipsum, quum et amicissimi, et affines sitis: Ego igitur, quantum est in me, non negligerem, nec inter vos discordes esse permitterem, si ita possem dicere, quomodo res habeat, ut vos a dissensione revocarem. Nunc vero, quando id ego ipse praeterea non possum, vestrumque uterque putat se posse alterum inducere, ut consentiat, paratus sum, quantum possim, opitulari, ut tandem inter vos, quo pacto res habet, conveniat. Tu igitur, inquam, Critias, aggredere, ut es professus, facere, ut consentiamus.

Now indeed, since you are contending about that matter which it is necessary to employ in the whole of life, and which greatly matters, whether that thing ought to be cared for as useful or as useless: and since these matters seem to the Greeks not small, indeed, but the greatest of all: (for fathers enjoin this first upon their sons, that, when they first have come to that age at which they seem to themselves to understand, even then they should look around whence they may be able to become rich: because if you have something, you thrive; but if nothing, you lie prostrate:) since, I say, these things are so greatly sought after, while you, though agreeing in other matters, about this matter disagree so greatly, and moreover disagree about acquiring riches: and you are not debating whether to acquire riches is black or white, nor whether it is light or heavy, but whether it is evil or good, and indeed so that you seem likely to incur enmities between yourselves, if you persist in contending about evils and goods, and this very thing, although you are most friendly and kinsmen by marriage: I therefore, so far as is in me, would not neglect it, nor would I permit you to be at odds, if I were able to say how the matter stands in such a way as to call you back from dissension. Now indeed, since I myself cannot accomplish this besides, and each of you supposes that he can induce the other to agree, I am prepared, as far as I am able, to succor, so that at length it may be agreed between you how the matter stands. You then, I say, Critias, set to, as you have professed, to bring it about that we agree.

At libenter, inquit, hunc ego Eryxiam, quemadmodum coepi, interrogarem. An ipsi homines iusti et iniusti esse videantur. Videntur sane, inquit, et quidem valde.

But gladly, he says, I would interrogate this Eryxias, just as I have begun. Do men themselves seem to be just and unjust? They do seem, indeed, he says, and very much so.

Quid autem iniuste agere? utrum esse tibi malum an bonum videtur? Malum, Homo, qui proximor um uxores argento civitatis, et stupret, atque id ipsum contra mores civitatis et leges, iniustene tibi agere an non, videtur?

But what about acting unjustly? does it seem to you to be an evil or a good? An evil. Man, does a fellow who, with the silver of the state, wins over the wives of his neighbors and debauches them—and this very thing against the mores of the state and the laws—seem to you to act unjustly or not?

Iniuste agere. Homo igitur, inquit, iniustus, et cupidus, si dives sit, et argentum possit impendere, facile peccat: sin dives non sit, nec habeat unde impendat, haud ita facile potest, quae cupit, perficere, ob idque minus peccat. Unde fit, ut magis expediat homini non esse divitem, si quidem minus efficiet, quae cupit, quum praesertim flagitiosa cupiat.

To act unjustly. Therefore, said he, an unjust and covetous man, if he be rich and can expend silver, sins easily; but if he be not rich, nor have whence to expend, he cannot so easily bring to completion the things he desires, and on that account he sins less. Whence it comes about that it is more expedient for a man not to be rich, since indeed he will effect less of what he desires, especially when he desires flagitious things.

Aegrotare praeterea utrum malum, an bonum esse diceres? Malum. Quid?

To be sick, moreover, would you say it is bad or good? Bad. What?

videnturne homines quidam esse intemperantes? Videntur. Si melius igitur sit huic huiusmodi homini valetudinis causa, cibo, et potu, caeterisque rebus, quae suaves putantur, abstinere, atque hic propter intemperantiam non possit, utilius omnino sit huic non esse, unde haec suppeditentur, quam magnam rerum neccessariarum abundantiam esse: sic enim ipsi nulla sit facultas peccandi, neque si maxime velit.

Do certain men seem to be intemperate? They do. If therefore it is better for such a man, for the sake of his health, to abstain from food and drink and the other things which are thought suave (pleasant), and this man cannot on account of intemperance, it will altogether be more advantageous for him not to have the wherewithal from which these are supplied, than to have a great abundance of necessary things: for thus there would be for him no faculty for sinning, not even if he most greatly wished.

Sic igitur bene et pulchre disserer e Critias videbatur. Quare Eryxias, nisis qui praesentes erant, esset veritus, nulla re prohiberi potuisset, quin surgens Critiam verberaret, adeo se magna quadam re privatum existimabat, postquam manifesto deprehendit, se prius de acquirendis divitiis non recte sensisse. Verum ego, quum Eryxiam ita esse affectum cognovissem, cavens, ne maior aliqua obiurgatio et contentio fieret: Hunc, inquam, sermonem Prodicus Ceus vir sapiens quum paulo ante in Lyceo haberet, his, qui aderant, ita visus est nugari, ut nemo illorum induci potuerit, ut vera illum dicere crederet.

Thus therefore Critias seemed to be discoursing well and beautifully. Wherefore Eryxias, if he had not been in fear of those who were present, could by nothing have been prevented from rising up to beat Critias, so greatly did he suppose himself to have been deprived of a certain great thing, after he clearly detected that previously he had not thought rightly about acquiring riches. But I, when I had recognized that Eryxias was so affected, taking care lest some greater objurgation and contention arise: This discourse, I say, when Prodicus the Cean, a wise man, was a little before delivering it in the Lyceum, seemed to those who were present to be trifling, to such a degree that none of them could be induced to believe that he was speaking truths.

Quin accessit ad eum quidam admodum adolescens, et facetus: qui, quum prope sedisset, coepit illum deridere, et illudere, et mox etiam excitare, volens ab eo rationem eorum quae dicebat, accipere. Qua quidem in re multo plus laudis ille, quam Prodicus, ab auditoribus est consecutus. An eum nobis sermonem, inquit Erasistratus, possis referre?

Nay, there approached him a certain very youthful and facetious adolescent; who, when he had sat nearby, began to deride him and to mock him, and soon even to provoke him, wishing to receive from him the rationale of the things he was saying. In this matter indeed that man obtained much more praise from the auditors than Prodicus. "Could you relate that discourse to us?" said Erasistratus.

Possim equidem, si memoria repetam. Iam res ita, ut arbitror, fuit. Illum adolescens interrogavit, quonam tandem modo divitias acquirere m alum esse putaret, et bonum.

I can indeed, if I call it back to memory. Now the matter was thus, as I think. The adolescent asked him by what way, then, he thought the acquiring of riches to be an evil, and a good.

Tunc ille respondens, Eodem quo tu nunc, modo, dixit, Honestis quidem viris, et bonis, hisque, qui ubi nummis uto oporteat, sciunt, bonum, improbis vero, et his qui nesciunt uti, malum. Res autem, inquit, etiam aliae se sic habent. Quales enim sunt, qui utuntur, tales etiam res ipsis fiat, necesse est.

Then he, responding, said, In the same way as you now: For honorable men, and good men, and for those who know where it is fitting to use monies, a good; but for the wicked, and for those who do not know how to use them, an evil. Moreover, he said, other things also are thus. For such as are those who use them, such also it is necessary that the things become for them.

Praeclare vero, inquit, mihi Archilochus illud videtur cecinisse.

"Excellently indeed," he said, "Archilochus seems to me to have sung that."