Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Tam justa causa me impellit ad hoc scriptum vobis offerendum, & tam justam etiam vos habituros esse confido ad ejus deffensionem suscipiendam, postquam instituti mei rationem intelligetis, ut nullâ re melius illud hîc possim commendare, quàm si quid in eo sequutus sim paucis dicam.

1. So just a cause impels me to offer this writing to you, & I also am confident that you will have an equally just one for undertaking its defense, after you understand the rationale of my enterprise, that by nothing could I better commend it here than if I say in a few words what I have followed in it.

2. Semper existimavi duas quaestiones, de Deo & de Animâ, praecipuas esse ex iis quae Philosophiae potius quàm Theologiae ope sunt demonstrandae: nam quamvis nobis fidelibus animam humanam cum corpore non interire, Deumque existere, fide credere sufficiat, certe infidelibus nulla religio, nec fere etiam ulla moralis virtus, videtur posse persuaderi, nisi prius illis ista duo ratione naturali probentur: cùmque saepe in hac vitâ majora vitiis quàm virtutibus praemia proponantur, pauci rectum utili praeferrent, si nec Deum timerent, nec aliam vitam expectarent. Et quamvis omnino verum sit, Dei existentiam credendam esse, quoniam in sacris scripturis docetur, & vice versâ credendas sacras scripturas, quoniam habentur a Deo; quia nempe, cùm fides sit donum Dei, ille idem qui dat gratiam ad reliqua credenda, potest etiam dare, ut ipsum existere credamus; non tamen hoc infidelibus proponi potest, quia circulum esse judicarent. Et quidem animadverti non modo vos omnes aliosque Theologos affirmare Dei existentiam naturali ratione posse probari, sed & ex sacrâ Scripturâ inferri, ejus cognitionem multis, quae de rebus creatis habentur, esse faciliorem, atque omnino esse tam facilem, ut qui illam non habent sint culpandi.

2. I have always held that two questions, concerning God & the Soul, are chief among those which are to be demonstrated by the aid of Philosophy rather than Theology: for although for us the faithful it suffices by faith to believe that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, certainly to unbelievers neither any religion, nor indeed almost any moral virtue, seems able to be persuaded, unless first these two are proven to them by natural reason: and since in this life greater rewards are often held out to vices than to virtues, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they neither feared God nor expected another life. And although it is altogether true that the existence of God is to be believed, because it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, & vice versa that the sacred Scriptures are to be believed, because they are held to be from God; for since faith is a gift of God, the same one who gives grace for believing the rest can also grant that we believe that He himself exists; nonetheless this cannot be proposed to unbelievers, because they would judge it to be a circle. And indeed I have observed not only that you all and the other Theologians affirm that the existence of God can be proved by natural reason, but & that it is inferred from Sacred Scripture that knowledge of Him is easier than many things which are had concerning created things, and altogether so easy that those who do not have it are to be blamed.

Patet enim Sap. 13 ex his verbis: Nec his debet ignosci. Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent aestimare saeculum, quomodo hujus dominum non facilius invenerunt?

It is patent
indeed in Wis. 13 from these words: Nor ought these to be forgiven. For if they were able to know so much as to be able to estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its lord?

Et ad Rom. cap. I, dicitur illos esse inexcusabiles.

And in Romans, CHAPTER 1, it is said that they are inexcusable.

Atque ibidem etiam per haec verba: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis, videmur admoneri ea omnia quae de Deo sciri possunt, rationibus non aliunde petitis quàm ab ipsâmet nostrâ mente posse ostendi. Quod idcirco quomodo fiat, & quâ viâ Deus facilius & certius quàm res saeculi cognoscatur, non putavi a me esse alienum inquirere.

And in the same place also through these words: That which is known of God is manifest in them, we seem to be admonished that all the things which can be known about God can be shown by reasons sought from nowhere else than from our very own mind itself. Wherefore, how this comes to pass, & by what way God is known more easily & more certainly than the things of the world, I did not think it alien from me to inquire.

3. Atque quantum ad animam, etsi multi ejus naturam

3. And as to the soul, although many have discussed its nature

[3] non facile investigari posse judicarint, & nonnulli etiam dicere ausi sint rationes humanas persuadere illam simul cum corpore interire, solâque fide contrarium teneri, quia tamen hos condemnat Concilium Lateranense sub Leone 10 habitum, sessione 8, & expresse mandat Christianis Philosophis ut eorum argumenta dissolvant, & veritatem pro viribus probent, hoc etiam aggredi non dubitavi.

[3] although many have judged that it cannot easily be investigated, and some have even dared to say that human reasons persuade that it perishes together with the body, and that the contrary is held by faith alone, since, however, the Lateran Council held under Leo 10, in session 8, condemns these men and expressly commands Christian philosophers to dissolve their arguments and to prove the truth to the best of their powers, I did not hesitate to undertake this also.

4. Praeterea, quoniam scio plerosque impios non aliam ob causam nolle credere Deum esse, mentemque humanam a corpore distingui, quàm quia dicunt haec duo a nemine hactenus potuisse demonstrari: etsi nullo modo iis assentiar, sed contrà rationes fere omnes, quae pro his quaestionibus a magnis viris allatae sunt, cùm satis intelliguntur, vim demonstrationis habere putem, vixque ullas dari posse mihi persuadeam, quae non prius ab aliquibus aliis fuerint inventae: nihil tamen utilius in Philosophiâ praestare posse existimo, quàm si semel omnium optimae studiose quaerantur, tamque accurate & perspicue exponantur, ut apud omnes constet in posterum eas esse demonstrationes. Ac denique, quoniam nonnulli quibus notum est me quandam excoluisse Methodum ad quaslibet difficultates in scientiis resolvendas, non quidem novam, quia nihil est veritate antiquius, sed quâ me saepe in aliis non infoeliciter uti viderunt, hoc a me summopere flagitarunt: ideoque officii mei esse putavi nonnihil hac in re conari.

4. Moreover, since I know that very many impious people for no other cause are unwilling to believe that God exists, and that the human mind is distinguished from the body, than because they say these two have hitherto been able to be demonstrated by no one: although I in no way assent to them, but on the contrary think that almost all the reasons which have been brought forward by great men on behalf of these questions, when they are sufficiently understood, have the force of demonstration, and I can scarcely persuade myself that any can be produced which were not previously discovered by some others: nevertheless I judge that nothing more useful can be achieved in Philosophy than if once for all the best of all are diligently sought out, and are set forth so accurately & perspicuously that it is agreed among all hereafter that they are demonstrations. And finally, since some to whom it is known that I have cultivated a certain Method for resolving whatever difficulties in the sciences, not indeed new, because nothing is more ancient than truth, but which they have seen me often use in other matters not unhappily, have most pressingly demanded this from me: I have therefore thought it to be my duty to attempt something in this matter.

5. Quicquid autem praestare potui, totum in hoc Tractatu continetur. Non quod in eo diversas omnes rationes, quae ad eadem probanda afferri possent, colligere conatus sim, neque enim hoc videtur operae pretium esse, nisi ubi nulla habetur satis certa; sed primas tantùm & praecipuas ita prosecutus sum, ut jam pro certissimis & evidentissimis demonstrationibus illas ausim proponere. Addamque etiam tales esse, ut non putem ullam viam humano ingenio patere, per quam meliores inveniri unquam possint: cogit enim me causae necessitas, & gloria Dei, ad quam totum hoc refertur, ut hîc aliquanto liberius de meis loquar quàm mea fert consuetudo.

5. Whatever I was able to accomplish, the whole is contained in this Treatise. Not that in it I have tried to gather all the diverse reasons which could be adduced to prove the same things, for neither does this seem worth the effort, except where none is held sufficiently certain; but only the first & chief ones have I pursued in such a way that I now dare to propose them as most certain & most evident demonstrations. And I shall add that they are such that I do not think any path lies open to human ingenuity by which better ones could ever be found: for the necessity of the cause, & the glory of God, to which this whole matter is referred, compel me to speak here somewhat more freely about my own work than my custom allows.

Atqui quantumvis certas & evidentes illas putem, non tamen ideo mihi persuadeo ad omnium captum esse accommodatas: sed, quemadmodum in Geometriâ multae sunt ab Archimede, Apollonio, Pappo, aliisve scriptae, quae, etsi pro evidentibus etiam ac certis ab omnibus habeantur, quia nempe nihil plane continent quod seorsim spectatum non sit cognitu facillimum, nihilque in quo sequentia cum antecedentibus non accurate cohaereant, quia tamen longiusculae sunt, & valde attentum lectorem desiderant, non nisi ab admodum paucis intelliguntur: ita, quamvis eas quibus hîc utor, certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas aequare, vel etiam superare, existimem, vereor tamen ne a multis satis percipi non possint, tum quia etiam longiusculae sunt, & aliae ab aliis pendent, tum praecipue quia requirunt mentem a praejudiciis plane liberam, & quae se ipsam a sensuum consortio facile subducat. Nec certe plures in mundo Metaphysicis studiis quàm Geometricis apti reperiuntur. Ac

Yet although I may think them however certain & evident, I do not on that account persuade myself that they are accommodated to everyone’s grasp: but, just as in Geometry there are many things written by Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus, and others, which, although they are held by all as evident and even certain, since indeed they contain plainly nothing which, looked at separately, is not most easy to know, and nothing in which the consequents do not cohere accurately with the antecedents, yet, because they are a bit longish & demand a very attentive reader, are understood only by very few: so, although I judge those which I employ here to equal, or even surpass, the Geometrical in certainty & evidence, I nevertheless fear lest they cannot be sufficiently perceived by many, both because they too are a bit longish & some depend upon others, and especially because they require a mind altogether free from prejudices, & one which can easily withdraw itself from the fellowship of the senses. Nor surely are more people in the world found apt for Metaphysical studies than for Geometrical. And

[5] praeterea in eo differentia est, quod in Geometriâ, cùm omnibus sit persuasum nihil scribi solere, de quo certa demonstratio non habeatur, saepius in eo peccant imperiti, quod falsa approbent, dum ea videri volunt intelligere, quàm quod vera refutent: contrà verò in Philosophiâ, cùm credatur nihil esse de quo non possit in utramque partem disputari, pauci veritatem investigant, & multo plures, ex eo quod ausint optima quacque impugnare, famam ingenii aucupantur.

[5] moreover, herein there is a difference, that in Geometry,
since it is persuaded to all that nothing is wont to be written of which a certain demonstration
is not had, the unskilled more often err in this, that they approve false things, while
they wish to seem to understand them, than that they refute true things: on the contrary,
in Philosophy, since it is believed that there is nothing about which one cannot dispute on either side,
few investigate the truth, &
many more, from the fact that they dare to assail whatever is best, hunt after a fame of ingenuity.

6. Atque ideo, qualescunque meae rationes esse possint, quia tamen ad Philosophiam spectant, non spero me illarum ope magnum operae pretium esse facturum, nisi me patrocinio vestro adjuvetis. Sed cùm tanta inhaereat omnium mentibus de vestrâ Facultate opinio, tantaeque sit authoritatis SORBONAE nomen, ut non modo in rebus fidei nulli unquam Societati post sacra Concilia tantum creditum sit quàm vestrae, sed etiam in humanâ Philosophiâ nullibi major perspicacia & soliditas, nec ad ferenda judicia major integritas & sapientia esse existimetur; non dubito quin, si tantam hujus scripti curam suscipere dignemini,primo quidem, ut a vobis corrigatur: memor enim, non modo humanitatis, sed maxime etiam inscitiae meae, non affirmo nullos in eo esse errores; deinde, ut quae vel desunt, vel non satis absoluta sunt, vel majorem explicationem desiderant, addantur, perficiantur, illustrentur, aut a vobis ipsis, aut saltem a me, postquam a vobis ero admonitus; ac denique, ut postquam rationes in eo contentae, quibus Deum esse, mentemque a corpore aliam esse probatur, ad eam perspicuitatem erunt perductae, ad quam ipsas perduci posse confido, ita

6. And therefore, whatever my reasons may be, since nevertheless they pertain to Philosophy, I do not hope by their aid to accomplish any great work of value, unless you help me with your patronage. But since such an opinion about your Faculty cleaves to the minds of all, and the name of the SORBONNE is of such authority, that not only in matters of faith has so much ever been entrusted, after the sacred Councils, to no Society as to yours, but also in human Philosophy nowhere is greater perspicacity and solidity, nor, for rendering judgments, greater integrity and wisdom thought to exist; I do not doubt that, if you should deign to undertake so great a care of this writing,first indeed, that it be corrected by you: mindful, not only of humanity, but most of all of my own ignorance, I do not affirm that there are no errors in it; then, that the things which either are lacking, or are not sufficiently complete, or require a greater explication, be added, perfected, illustrated, either by you yourselves, or at least by me, after I shall have been admonished by you; and finally, that after the arguments contained in it, by which it is proved that God exists and that the mind is other than the body, shall have been brought to that perspicuity to which I trust they can be brought, thus

[6] nempe ut pro accuratissimis demonstrationibus habendae sint, hoc ipsum declarare & publice testari velitis: non dubito, inquam, quin, si hoc fiat, omnes errores, qui de his quaestionibus unquam fuerunt, brevi ex hominum mentibus deleantur. Veritas enim ipsa facile efficiet ut reliqui ingeniosi & docti vestro judicio subscribant; & authoritas, ut Athei, qui scioli magis quàm ingeniosi aut docti esse solent, contradicendi animum deponant, atque etiam ut forte rationes, quas ab omnibus ingenio praeditis pro demonstrationibus haberi scient, ipsi propugnent, ne non intelligere videantur. Ac denique caeteri omnes tot testimoniis facile credent, nemoque amplius erit in mundo, qui vel Dei existentiam, vel realem humanae animae a corpore distinctionem ausit in dubium revocare.

[6] namely that they are to be accounted as most accurate demonstrations, that you would be willing to declare and publicly attest this very thing: I do not doubt, I say, that, if this be done, all the errors which have ever been about these questions will shortly be erased from the minds of men. For Truth herself will easily bring it about that the remaining ingenious and learned subscribe to your judgment; and authority, that the Atheists, who are wont to be rather sciolists than ingenious or learned, lay aside the spirit of contradicting, and even that perchance the arguments which they will know are held by all endowed with talent as demonstrations, they themselves champion, lest they seem not to understand. And finally all the others will easily believe so many testimonies, and no one will any longer exist in the world who dares to call into doubt either the existence of God or the real distinction of the human soul from the body.

Cujus rei quanta esset utilitas, vos ipsi, pro vestrâ singulari sapientiâ, omnium optime aestimare potestis; nec deceret me vobis, qui maximum Ecclesiae Catholicae columen semper fuistis, Dei & Religionis causam pluribus hîc commendare.

Of which matter how great the utility would be, you yourselves, by your singular wisdom, can best of all appraise; nor would it be fitting for me to you, who have always been the greatest pillar of the Catholic Church, to commend here at greater length the cause of God & Religion.