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Dig. 44.3.0. De diversis temporalibus praescriptionibus et de accessionibus possessionum.
44.2.0. On the exception of res judicata.
Dig. 44.3.0. On diverse temporal prescriptions and on accessions of possessions.
Dig. 44.6.0. De litigiosis.
44.5.0. On those things for which an action is not granted.
Dig. 44.6.0. On matters in litigation.
Sane solemus dicere quasdam exceptiones esse dilatorias, quasdam peremptorias: ut puta dilatoria est exceptio, quae differt actionem, veluti procuratoria exceptio dilatoria est: nam qui dicit non licere procuratorio nomine agi, non prorsus litem infitiatur, sed personam evitat.
Surely we are accustomed to say that certain exceptions are dilatory, certain peremptory: as, for example, a dilatory exception is one which defers the action, just as the procuratorial exception is dilatory: for he who says that it is not permitted to proceed in a procurator’s name does not altogether deny the lawsuit, but avoids the person.
Exceptiones aut perpetuae et peremptoriae sunt aut temporales et dilatoriae. perpetuae atque peremptoriae sunt, quae semper locum habent nec evitari possunt, qualis est doli mali et rei iudicatae et si quid contra legem senatusve consultum factum esse dicetur, item pacti conventi perpetui, id est ne omnino pecunia petatur. temporales atque dilatoriae sunt, quae non semper locum habent, sed evitari possunt, qualis est pacti conventi temporalis, id est ne forte intra quinquennium ageretur: procuratoriae quoque exceptiones dilatoriae sunt, quae evitari possunt.
Exceptions are either perpetual and peremptory or temporal and dilatory. perpetual and peremptory are those which always have place and cannot be avoided, such as of dolus malus and res judicata, and if it shall be said that anything was done against a law or a senatorial decree, likewise of a perpetual pact and convention, that is, that money not be demanded at all. temporal and dilatory are those which do not always have place, but can be avoided, such as of a temporal pact and convention, that is, that perchance suit not be brought within five years: procuratorial exceptions also are dilatory, which can be avoided.
Exceptiones, quae personae cuiusque cohaerent, non transeunt ad alios, veluti ea quam socius habet exceptionem " quod facere possit", vel parens patronusve, non competit fideiussori: sic mariti fideiussor post solutum matrimonium datus in solidum dotis nomine condemnatur.
Exceptions that cohere to each person do not pass to others; for example, the exception which a partner has, "that he is able to perform," or which a parent or a patron has, does not belong to a surety: thus the husband's surety, given after the marriage has been dissolved, is condemned for the whole amount under the name of the dowry.
Rei autem cohaerentes exceptiones etiam fideiussoribus competunt, ut rei iudicatae, doli mali, iurisiurandi, quod metus causa factum est. igitur et si reus pactus sit in rem, omnimodo competit exceptio fideiussori. intercessionis quoque exceptio, item quod libertatis onerandae causa petitur, etiam fideiussori competit.
But the exceptions adhering to the defendant are likewise available to fidejussors (sureties), such as of res judicata, of dolus malus, of oath, and of what was done by reason of fear. Therefore even if the defendant has entered into a pact in rem, the exception in every way is available to the fidejussor. The exception of intercession also, likewise the exception that it is sought for the purpose of burdening liberty, is available to the fidejussor as well.
Likewise it is said even if someone has stood surety for a son under paternal power, contrary to a senatus consultum, or for a minor under 25 years who has been overreached: but if he has been deceived in the matter, then neither does he himself have a remedy before he has been restored, nor is an exceptio to be granted to the surety.
Modestinus respondit: res inter alios iudicata aliis non obest, nec si is, contra quem iudicatum est, heres exstiterit ei, contra quem nihil pronuntiatum est, hereditariam ^ hereditarium^ ei litem inferenti praescribi ex ea sententia posse, quam proprio nomine disceptans, antequam heres exstiterit, excepit.
Modestinus replied: a res judicata between others does not prejudice others; nor, if the one against whom judgment has been given has become the heir of him against whom nothing was pronounced, can a defense be pleaded from that judgment against him when he brings a hereditary ^ hereditary^ action—the very judgment which, while disputing in his own name before he became heir, he had pleaded by way of exception.
Qui adgnitis instrumentis, quasi vera essent, solvit post sententiam iudicis, quaero, si postea cognita rei veritate et repertis falsis instrumentis accusare velit et probare falsa esse instrumenta, ex quibus conveniebatur, cum instrumentis subscripserat ex praecepto sive interlocutione iudicis, an praescriptio ei opponi possit? cum et principalibus constitutionibus manifeste cavetur, etsi res iudicata esset ex falsis instrumentis, si postea falsa inveniantur, nec rei iudicatae praescriptionem opponi. modestinus respondit ob hoc, quod per errorem solutio facta est vel cautio de solvendo interposita proponitur ex his instrumentis, quae nunc falsa dicuntur, praescriptioni locum non esse.
He who, the instruments having been acknowledged, as if they were true, paid after the judge’s judgment, I ask whether, if afterward, the truth of the matter having been learned and the instruments found to be false, he should wish to accuse and to prove that the instruments on the basis of which he was being convened are false—since he had signed the instruments by the precept or interlocution of the judge—whether a plea of prescription can be opposed to him? since also by the principal constitutions it is plainly provided that, even if there were a res judicata on the basis of false instruments, if they are afterward found false, the prescription of res judicata is not to be opposed. Modestinus answered that for this reason—because the payment was made through error or a security for paying was interposed, which is put forward on the basis of those instruments which now are said to be false—there is no place for prescription.
Si post litem de hereditate contestatam res singulae petantur, placet non obstare exceptionem " quod praeiudicium hereditati non fiat " : futuri enim iudicii, non facti nomine huiusmodi exceptiones comparatae sunt.
If, after issue has been joined in a suit concerning the inheritance, individual items are demanded, it is held that the exception "that no prejudice be done to the inheritance" does not stand in the way: for exceptions of this kind are contrived under the title of a future judgment, not under that of a fact.
Filius familias peculiarem servum vendidit, pretium stipulatus est: is homo redhibitus et postea mortuus est. et pater eius pecuniam ab emptore petebat, quam filius stipulatus erat. placuit aequum esse in factum exceptionem eum obicere: " quod pecunia ob hominem illum expromissa est, qui redhibitus est".
A son under paternal power sold a slave belonging to his peculium and stipulated the price: that man was redhibited and afterwards died. And his father was demanding from the buyer the money which the son had stipulated. It was held equitable for him to raise an exceptio in factum: " that the money was promised on account of that man who was redhibited".
Fundum titianum possides, de cuius proprietate inter me et te controversia est, et dico praeterea viam ad eum per fundum sempronianum, quem tuum esse constat, deberi. si viam petam, exceptionem " quod praeiudicium praedio non fiat" utilem tibi fore putavit, videlicet quod non aliter viam mihi deberi probaturus sim, quam prius probaverim fundum titianum meum esse.
You possess the Titian estate, about the ownership of which there is a controversy between me and you, and I say moreover that a way (right of way) to it is owed through the Sempronian estate, which is established to be yours. If I should sue for the way, he thought the exception “that no prejudgment be made concerning the estate” would be useful to you, namely because I will not be able to prove that a way is owed to me otherwise than if I shall first have proved that the Titian estate is mine.
Fundi, quem tu proprium tuum esse dicis, partem a te peto et volo simul iudicio quoque communi dividundo agere sub eodem iudice: item si eius fundi, quem tu possideas et ego proprium meum esse dicam, fructus condicere tibi velim: quaesitum est an exceptio " quod praeiudicium fundo partive eius non fiat" obstet an deneganda sit. et utrubique putat intervenire praetorem debere nec permittere petitori, priusquam de proprietate constet, huiusmodi iudiciis experiri.
Of an estate, which you say is your own proper property, I claim a part from you, and I wish at the same time also to proceed by the iudicium communi dividundo before the same judge: likewise, if of that estate which you possess and I say is my own proper property, I should wish to bring a condictio against you for the fruits: the question was raised whether the exception “that no prejudgment be made concerning the estate or any part of it” stands in the way, or should be denied. And in both cases he thinks the praetor ought to intervene and not permit the claimant, before ownership is established, to try actions of this kind.
Exceptiones opponuntur aut quia factum sit quod fieri oportet aut quia factum sit quod fieri non oportuit, aut quia factum non sit quod fieri debuerat. quia factum est, quod fieri oportuit, datur exceptio rei venditae et traditae et rei iudicatae: quia factum est, quod fieri non oportuit, datur exceptio doli mali: quia non factum est, quod fieri debuit, ut bonorum possessionis non datae.
Exceptions are pleaded either because what ought to be done has been done, or because what ought not to be done has been done, or because what ought to have been done has not been done. because what ought to be done has been done, the exception of a thing sold and delivered (exceptio rei venditae et traditae) and the exception of res iudicata are granted; because what ought not to be done has been done, the exception of dolus malus is granted; because what ought to have been done has not been done, as in the case of bonorum possessio not granted.
Cum res inter alios iudicatae nullum aliis praeiudicium faciant, ex eo testamento, ubi libertas data est vel legato agi potest, licet ruptum, vel irritum aut non iustum dicatur testamentum: nec si superatus fuerit legatarius, praeiudicium libertati fit.
Since matters adjudged between others make no prejudice to others, from that testament, where liberty has been given or an action can be brought for a legacy, one may proceed, although the testament be said to be broken, or void or not lawful: nor, if the legatee should be defeated, is prejudice done to the liberty.
Qui cum herede eius egit, qui filium praeterierat, et exceptione summotus est " ac si non in ea causa sint tabulae testamenti, ut contra eas bonorum possessio dari possit": omittente emancipato filio bonorum possessionem non inique restituetur, ut agat cum herede: et ita iulianus libro quarto digestorum scripsit.
He who sued the heir of one who had passed over his son, and was removed by an exception, “as if the tablets of the testament are not in such a condition that bonorum possessio can be given against them”: if the emancipated son omits bonorum possessio, restitution will not unjustly be afforded, so that he may sue the heir; and thus Julian wrote in the fourth book of the Digests.
Iulianus libro tertio digestorum respondit exceptionem rei iudicatae obstare, quotiens eadem quaestio inter easdem personas revocatur: et ideo et si singulis rebus petitis hereditatem petat vel contra, exceptione summovebitur.
Julian, in the third book of the Digests, responded that the exception of res judicata bars whenever the same question is recalled between the same parties: and therefore, even if, after individual things have been claimed, he seeks the inheritance, or conversely, he will be barred by the exception.
De eadem re agere videtur et qui non eadem actione agat, qua ab initio agebat, sed etiam si alia experiatur, de eadem tamen re: ut puta si quis mandati acturus, cum ei adversarius iudicio sistendi causa promisisset, propter eandem rem agat negotiorum gestorum vel condicat, de eadem re agit. recteque ita definietur eum demum " de ea re" non agere, qui prorsus rem ipsam non persequitur: ceterum cum quis actionem mutat et experitur, dummodo de eadem re experiatur, etsi diverso genere actionis quam instituit, videtur " de ea re" agere.
It is seen to be proceeding “ about the same matter” even when one does not proceed by the same action with which he was proceeding from the beginning, but even if he tries another, still about the same matter: for instance, if someone, intending to bring an action of mandate, when his adversary had given him a promise for the purpose of appearing in the suit, brings, on account of the same matter, the action of negotiorum gestorum or brings a condictio, he is proceeding about the same matter. And it will be correctly defined that only he is not “ about that matter” proceeding who in no way pursues the matter itself; but otherwise, when someone changes the action and proceeds, provided he proceeds about the same matter, even by a different kind of action than he instituted, he is seen to be “ about that matter” proceeding.
Singulis controversiis singulas actiones unumque iudicati finem sufficere probabili ratione placuit, ne aliter modus litium multiplicatus summam atque inexplicabilem faciat difficultatem, maxime si diversa pronuntiarentur. parere ergo exceptionem rei iudicatae frequens est.
It has been approved on a reasonable rationale that for individual controversies individual actions and a single final adjudication suffice, lest otherwise the measure of lawsuits, when multiplied, make a massive and inextricable difficulty, especially if divergent pronouncements were delivered. parere therefore to the exception of res judicata is common.
Si quis, cum totum petisset, partem petat, exceptio rei iudicatae nocet, nam pars in toto est: eadem enim res accipitur et si pars petatur eius, quod totum petitum est. nec interest, utrum in corpore hoc quaeratur an in quantitate vel in iure. proinde si quis fundum petierit, deinde partem petat vel pro diviso vel pro indiviso, dicendum erit exceptionem obstare.
If someone, after having claimed the whole, then claims a part, the exception of res judicata applies, for a part is in the whole: for the same thing is deemed to be at issue even if a part is claimed of that which was claimed in its entirety. Nor does it matter whether this is sought in the corpus (the thing itself) or in the quantity or in the right. Accordingly, if someone has claimed a tract of land (fundus), and thereafter claims a part, either for a divided share (pro diviso) or an undivided one (pro indiviso), it must be said that the exception stands in the way.
accordingly, even if you posit that I am claiming a definite place out of that estate which was claimed, the exception will obstruct. the same must be held also if two bodies (corpora) were claimed, and soon either one body is claimed: for the exception will be harmful. likewise, if someone has claimed an estate, and soon claims the trees cut down from that estate; or if he has claimed an insula, then claims the site; or claims the beams or the stones: likewise, if I have claimed a ship, thereafter I vindicate the individual planks; if I have claimed a pregnant maidservant, and after the suit has been joined (litis contestatio) she conceives and gives birth, and soon I claim her offspring: whether I seem to be claiming the same thing or something else is a great question.
In his igitur fere omnibus exceptio nocet: sed in cementis et tignis diversum est: nam is, qui insulam petit, si cementa vel tigna vel quid aliud suum petat, in ea condicione est, ut videatur aliud petere: etenim cuius insula est, non utique et cementa sunt: denique ea, quae iuncta sunt aedibus alienis, separata dominus vindicare potest.
In almost all these cases, therefore, the exception is prejudicial: but in the case of cement-work and beams it is otherwise: for he who seeks a tenement, if he claims the cement or the beams or anything else as his own, is in such a condition as to seem to be seeking something different: for the person whose tenement it is does not thereby also have the cement: finally, those things which have been joined to another’s house, once separated, the owner can vindicate.
De fructibus eadem quaestio est et de partu: haec enim nondum erant in rebus humanis, sed ex ea re sunt, quae petita est: magisque est, ut ista exceptio non noceat. plane si in restitutionem vel fructus vel etiam partus venerunt aestimatique sunt, consequens erit dicere exceptionem obiciendam.
About the fruits the same question arises as about the offspring: for these were not yet in the sphere of human affairs, but are from the thing that is sued for; and it is rather the case that that exception should not prejudice. Clearly, if in the restitution either the fruits or even the offspring have come and have been appraised, it will follow to say that the exception is to be set up.
Et generaliter, ut iulianus definit, exceptio rei iudicatae obstat, quotiens inter easdem personas eadem quaestio revocatur vel alio genere iudicii. et ideo si hereditate petita singulas res petat vel singulis rebus petitis hereditatem petat, exceptione summovebitur.
And generally, as Julian defines, the exception of res judicata bars the way whenever between the same persons the same question is brought up again, even under another kind of judgment; and therefore, if, the inheritance having been claimed, he should claim individual things, or, individual things having been claimed, he should claim the inheritance, he will be precluded by the exception.
Idem erit probandum et si quis debitum petierit a debitore hereditario, deinde hereditatem petat, vel contra si ante hereditatem petierit et postea debitum petat: nam et hic obstabit exceptio: nam cum hereditatem peto, et corpora et actiones omnes, quae in hereditate sunt, videntur in petitionem deduci.
The same is to be proved also if someone has demanded the debt from the hereditary debtor and then claims the inheritance, or conversely if he has first claimed the inheritance and afterwards demands the debt: for here too the exception will stand in the way; for when I claim the inheritance, both the corporeal things and all the actions which are in the inheritance are seen to be drawn into the petition.
Si a te hereditatem petam, cum nihil possideres, deinde, ubi coeperis aliquid possidere, hereditatem petam, an noceat exceptio ista? et putem, sive fuit iudicatum hereditatem meam esse, sive adversarius, quia nihil possidebat, absolutus est, non nocere exceptionem.
If I claim the inheritance from you, when you were possessing nothing, then, when you begin to possess something, I claim the inheritance, does that exception harm? And I think that, whether it was adjudged that the inheritance is mine, or the adversary was absolved because he possessed nothing, the exception does not harm.
Si quis fundum, quem putabat se possidere, defenderit, mox emerit: re secundum petitorem iudicata an restituere cogatur? et ait neratius, si actori iterum petenti obiciatur exceptio rei iudicatae, replicare eum oportere de re secundum se iudicata.
If someone has defended a landed estate which he thought he possessed, and soon after bought it: with the matter adjudged in favor of the claimant, is he compelled to restore it? And Neratius says that, if the exception of res judicata is objected to the plaintiff suing again, he ought to replicate that the matter was adjudged in his favor.
Iulianus scribit exceptionem rei iudicatae a persona auctoris ad emptorem transire solere, retro autem ab emptore ad auctorem reverti non debere. quare si hereditariam rem vendideris, ego eandem ab emptore petiero et vicero, petenti tibi non opponam exceptionem " at si ea res iudicata non sit inter me et eum, cui vendidisti".
Iulianus writes that the exception of res judicata is accustomed to pass from the person of the seller to the buyer, but ought not to revert back from the buyer to the seller. Therefore, if you have sold an hereditary thing, and I shall have claimed the same from the buyer and prevailed, I will not oppose to you, when you sue, the exception " at if that matter be not adjudged between me and him to whom you sold".
Si mater filii impuberis defuncti ex senatus consulto bona vindicaverit idcirco, quia putabat rupto patris eius testamento neminem esse substitutum, victaque fuerit, quia testamentum patris ruptum non erat, postea autem apertis pupillaribus tabulis apparuit non esse ei substitutum: si peteret rursus hereditatem, obstaturam exceptionem rei iudicatae neratius ait. ego exceptionem obesse ei rei iudicatae non dubito: sed ex causa succurrendum erit ei, quae unam tantum causam egit rupti testamenti.
If the mother of an under‑pubes son who has died should, by virtue of a senatus consultum, claim the estate for this reason, that she supposed that, the will of his father having been broken, no one had been substituted, and she should be defeated because the father’s will was not broken, but afterwards, when the pupillary tablets were opened, it appeared that no substitute had been appointed for him: if she were to seek the inheritance again, Neratius says the exception of res judicata would stand in the way. I do not doubt that the exception of res judicata would prejudice her; but relief should be afforded to her on equitable grounds, since she pleaded only a single ground, that of a broken will.
Item iulianus scribit: cum ego et tu heredes titio exstitissemus, si tu partem fundi, quem totum hereditarium dicebas, a sempronio petieris et victus fueris, mox eandem partem a sempronio emero, agenti tibi mecum familiae erciscundae exceptio obstabit, quia res iudicata sit inter te et venditorem meum: nam et si ante eandem partem petissem et agerem familiae erciscundae, obstaret exceptio " quod res iudicata sit inter me et te"
Likewise Julian writes: when you and I had become heirs to Titius, if you were to claim from Sempronius a part of the farm which you alleged to be wholly hereditary and were defeated, and soon thereafter I purchase the same part from Sempronius, then, when you bring against me the action for partition of the inheritance, the exception will stand in your way, because the matter is res judicata between you and my vendor: for even if I had earlier claimed the same part and were bringing the action for partition of the inheritance, the exception would stand, “that the matter has been adjudged between me and you.”
Eandem causam facit etiam origo petitionis. ceterum si forte petiero fundum vel hominem, mox alia causa nova post petitionem mihi accesserit, quae mihi dominium tribuat, non me repellet ista exceptio, nisi forte intermissum dominium in medio tempore rediit quodam postliminio. quid enim, si homo, quem petieram, ab hostibus fuerit captus, mox postliminio receptus?
The origin of the petition likewise makes the same cause. But if perchance I should have sued for a farm or a slave, and soon thereafter some other new cause, after the petition, should accrue to me which grants me ownership, that exception will not repel me, unless perhaps the ownership, having been interrupted, in the meantime returned by a kind of postliminium. For what, indeed, if the slave whom I had claimed had been captured by the enemy, and soon was received back by postliminium?
here I shall be removed by the exception, because it is understood to be the same thing. But if from another cause I shall have gotten dominion, the exception will not harm: and therefore, if perchance a thing shall have been bequeathed to me under a condition, then in the meantime, dominion having been acquired, I sue; soon, the condition of the legacy existing, I sue again, I would think the exception does not obstruct: for another cause was that of the prior dominion; this new one has now been added.
Itaque adquisitum quidem postea dominium aliam causam facit. mutata autem opinio petitoris non facit. ut puta opinabatur ex causa hereditaria se dominium habere: mutavit opinionem et coepit putare ex causa donationis: haec res non parit petitionem novam: nam qualecumque et undecumque dominium adquisitum habuit, vindicatione prima in iudicium deduxit.
Accordingly, ownership acquired afterwards does indeed make a different cause (of action). But a changed opinion of the claimant does not. For instance, he was of the opinion that he had ownership on an hereditary cause; he changed his opinion and began to think it was on the cause of a donation: this circumstance does not beget a new petition; for whatever sort and from whatever source he had ownership acquired, he brought it into judgment by the first vindication.
Hoc iure utimur, ut ex parte actoris in exceptione rei iudicatae hae personae continerentur, quae rem in iudicium deducunt: inter hos erunt procurator, cui mandatum est, tutor, curator furiosi vel pupilli, actor municipum: ex persona autem rei etiam defensor numerabitur, quia adversus defensorem qui agit, litem in iudicium deducit.
We employ this law, that on the plaintiff’s side, in the exception of res judicata, those persons are included who bring the matter into judgment: among these will be the procurator, to whom a mandate has been given, the tutor, the curator of a madman or of a ward, the actor of the municipes: but on the defendant’s side the defensor will also be counted, because he who sues against a defensor brings the suit into judgment.
Si egero cum vicino aquae pluviae arcendae, deinde alteruter nostrum praedium vendiderit et emptor agat vel cum eo agatur, haec exceptio nocet, sed de eo opere, quod iam erat factum, cum iudicium acciperetur.
If I have proceeded against my neighbor by the action for warding off rain‑water, and then either one of us sells his praedium, and the purchaser either brings an action or is proceeded against, this exception is effective—but in respect of that work which had already been done when the action was received.
Item si rem, quam a te petierat, titius pignori seio dederit, deinde seius pigneraticia adversus te utatur, distinguendum erit, quando pignori dedit titius: et si quidem antequam peteret, non oportet ei nocere exceptionem: nam et ille petere debuit et ego salvam habere debeo pigneraticiam actionem. sed si posteaquam petit, pignori dedit, magis est, ut noceat exceptio rei iudicatae.
Likewise, if the thing which he had demanded from you titius gave in pledge to seius, and then seius employs the pignoratitious action against you, a distinction must be made as to when titius gave it in pledge: and if indeed before he brought the claim, the exception ought not to harm him; for both he ought to have brought the claim and I ought to have the pignoratitious action preserved. But if after he sued he gave it in pledge, it is rather the case that the res judicata exception should harm.
Et an eadem causa petendi et eadem condicio personarum: quae nisi omnia concurrunt, alia res est. idem corpus in hac exceptione non utique omni pristina qualitate vel quantitate servata, nulla adiectione deminutioneve facta, sed pinguius pro communi utilitate accipitur.
And whether there is the same cause of demanding and the same condition of the persons: unless all these concur, it is a different matter. The same corpus, in this exception, is not, to be sure, taken only if every former quality or quantity has been preserved, with no addition or diminution made, but is taken more liberally for the common utility.
Actiones in personam ab actionibus in rem hoc differunt, quod, cum eadem res ab eodem mihi debeatur, singulas obligationes singulae causae sequuntur nec ulla earum alterius petitione vitiatur: at cum in rem ago non expressa causa, ex qua rem meam esse dico, omnes causae una petitione adprehenduntur. neque enim amplius quam semel res mea esse potest, saepius autem deberi potest.
Actions in personam differ from actions in rem in this respect: when the same thing is owed to me by the same person, individual obligations follow individual causes, and none of them is vitiated by the petition for another; but when I sue in rem without the cause expressed on which I say the thing is mine, all causes are comprehended in one petition. For a thing cannot be mine more than once, but it can be owed more frequently.
Si inter me et te controversia de hereditate sit et quasdam res ex eadem tu possides, quasdam ego: nihil vetat et me a te et invicem te a me hereditatem petere. quod si post rem iudicatam a me petere coeperis, interest, utrum meam esse hereditatem pronuntiatum sit an contra: si meam esse, nocebit tibi rei iudicatae exceptio, quia eo ipso, quod meam esse pronuntiatum est, ex diverso pronuntiatum videtur tuam non esse: si vero meam non esse, nihil de tuo iure iudicatum intellegitur, quia potest nec mea hereditas esse nec tua.
If between me and you there is a controversy concerning an inheritance, and you possess certain things from the same and I others, nothing prevents both my claiming the inheritance from you and, in turn, your claiming it from me. But if, after the matter has been adjudged, you begin to claim from me, it matters whether it has been pronounced that the inheritance is mine or the contrary: if that it is mine, the exception of res judicata will harm you, because by that very fact, that it has been pronounced to be mine, it is seen conversely to have been pronounced that it is not yours; but if that it is not mine, it is understood that nothing has been adjudged concerning your right, because it is possible that the inheritance is neither mine nor yours.
Duobus diversis temporibus eandem rem pignori dedit: egit posterior cum priore pigneraticia et optinuit: mox ille agere simili actione instituit: quaesitum est, an exceptio rei iudicatae obstaret. si opposuerat exceptionem rei sibi ante pigneratae et nihil aliud novum et validum adiecerit, sine dubio obstabit: eandem enim quaestionem revocat in iudicium.
He gave the same thing in pledge at two different times: the later creditor brought a pignoratitious action against the earlier and prevailed; soon that one began to proceed by a similar action: it was asked whether the exception of res judicata would obstruct. If he had set up the exception that the thing had previously been pledged to himself, and has added nothing else new and valid, without doubt it will bar; for he calls the same question back into judgment.
Si ex testamento actum sit cum herede ab eo, qui, cum totum argentum ei legatum erat, mensas dumtaxat sibi legatas putaret earumque dumtaxat aestimationem in iudicio fecisset: postea eundem petiturum de argento quoque legato trebatius ait nec obstaturam ei exceptionem, quod non sit petitum, quod nec actor petere putasset nec iudex in iudicio sensisset.
If, under a will, an action has been brought against the heir by someone who, although all the silverware had been bequeathed to him, supposed that only the tables had been bequeathed to him and had in the action made only an estimation of their value: Trebatius says that afterward the same man will also sue concerning the silver likewise bequeathed, and that the exception that it was not sought will not stand in his way, since neither would the plaintiff have thought to seek it nor would the judge have perceived it in the trial.
Si, cum argentum mihi testamento legatum esset, egerim cum herede et postea codicillis prolatis vestem quoque mihi legatam esse appareat, non est deducta in superius iudicium vestis causa, quia neque litigatores neque iudex de alio quam de argento actum intellegant.
If, when silver had been bequeathed to me by testament, I have litigated with the heir, and afterwards, codicils having been produced, it appears that clothing too had been bequeathed to me, the matter of the clothing is not regarded as having been brought into the prior suit, because neither the litigants nor the judge understand the action to have concerned anything other than the silver.
Si fundum meum esse petiero, deinde postea usum fructum eiusdem fundi petam, qui ex illa causa, ex qua fundus meus erat, meus sit: exceptio mihi obstabit, quia qui fundum habet, usum fructum suum vindicare non potest. sed si usum fructum, cum meus esset, vindicavi, deinde proprietatem nanctus iterum de usu fructu experiar, potest dici alia res esse, quoniam postquam nanctus sum proprietatem fundi, desinit meus esse prior usus fructus et iure proprietatis quasi ex nova causa rursus meus esse coepit.
If I shall have claimed that a tract (fundus) is mine, and then afterwards I claim the usufruct of the same tract to be mine from that same cause by which the tract was mine: an exception will stand in my way, because he who has the tract cannot vindicate his own usufruct. But if I vindicated the usufruct, when it was mine, and then, having obtained the ownership (proprietas), I again bring suit concerning the usufruct, it can be said to be a different matter, since after I acquired the ownership of the tract, the prior usufruct ceases to be mine, and by right of ownership, as if from a new cause, it began again to be mine.
Si cum uno herede depositi actum sit, tamen et cum ceteris heredibus recte agetur nec exceptio rei iudicatae eis proderit: nam etsi eadem quaestio in omnibus iudiciis vertitur, tamen personarum mutatio, cum quibus singulis suo nomine agitur, aliam atque aliam rem facit. et si actum sit cum herede de dolo defuncti, deinde de dolo heredis ageretur, exceptio rei iudicatae non nocebit, quia de alia re agitur.
If an action on deposit has been brought against one heir, nevertheless it will also be rightly brought against the other heirs, nor will the exception of res judicata benefit them: for although the same question is in issue in all the trials, nevertheless the change of persons, with whom individually it is litigated in their own name, makes a different matter each time. And if action has been brought against the heir concerning the fraud of the deceased, then, if suit is brought concerning the heir’s own fraud, the exception of res judicata will not harm, because a different matter is being litigated.
Si in iudicio actum sit usuraeque solae petitae sint, non est verendum, ne noceat rei iudicatae exceptio circa sortis petitionem: quia enim non competit, nec opposita nocet. eadem erunt et si quis ex bonae fidei iudicio velit usuras tantum persequi: nam nihilo minus futuri temporis cedunt usurae: quamdiu enim manet contractus bonae fidei, current usurae.
If in a trial the matter has been litigated and only interest has been sought, it is not to be feared that the exception of res judicata will harm with respect to the demand for the principal: since indeed it does not lie, nor, when opposed, does it harm. The same will hold also if someone, from a good‑faith action, should wish to pursue interest only: for nonetheless interest accrues for the time to come: for as long as the good‑faith contract remains, interest will run.
Est in potestate emptoris intra sex menses, redhibitoria agere mallet an ea quae datur, quanti minoris homo cum veniret fuerit. nam posterior actio etiam redhibitionem continet, si tale vitium in homine est, ut eum ob id actor empturus non fuerit: quare vere dicetur eum, qui alterutra earum egerit, si altera postea agat, rei iudicatae exceptione summoveri.
It is within the buyer’s power, within six months, whether he would prefer to bring the redhibitory action, or the action that is given for how much less the slave was worth at the time of sale; for the latter action also contains redhibition, if there is such a defect in the slave that on that account the plaintiff would not have bought him: wherefore it will be rightly said that he who has proceeded by either of them, if he later brings the other, is barred by the exception of res judicata.
Si te negotiis meis optuleris et fundum nomine meo petieris, deinde ego hanc petitionem tuam ratam non habuero, sed mandavero tibi, ut ex integro eundem fundum peteres, exceptio rei iudicatae non obstabit: alia enim res facta est interveniente mandatu. idem est, si non in rem, sed in personam actum fuerit.
If you have offered yourself to my affairs and have claimed the estate in my name, and then I have not ratified this your claim, but have mandated you to claim the same estate afresh, the exception of res judicata will not stand in the way: for a different matter has been made by the intervention of a mandate. The same is so if the action has been brought not in rem but in personam.
Egi tecum ius mihi esse aedes meas usque ad decem pedes altius tollere: post ago ius mihi esse usque ad viginti pedes altius tollere: exceptio rei iudicatae procul dubio obstabit. sed et si rursus ita agam ius mihi esse altius ad alios decem pedes tollere, obstabit exceptio, cum aliter superior pars iure haberi non possit, quam si inferior quoque iure habeatur.
I litigated with you that I have the right to raise my house higher up to ten feet: afterwards I bring suit that I have the right to raise it higher up to twenty feet: the exceptio of res iudicata will without doubt obstruct. But even if I again thus bring suit that I have the right to raise it higher by another ten feet, the exception will obstruct, since the upper part cannot be held by right otherwise than if the lower also is held by right.
Cum de hoc, an eadem res est, quaeritur, haec spectanda sunt: personae, id ipsum de quo agitur, causa proxima actionis. nec iam interest, qua ratione quis eam causam actionis competere sibi existimasset, perinde ac si quis, posteaquam contra eum iudicatum esset, nova instrumenta causae suae repperisset.
When the question is raised whether it is the same matter, the following must be considered: the persons, the very thing at issue, and the proximate cause of the action. Nor does it now matter by what rationale someone had supposed that that cause of action was available to him, just as if, after judgment had been given against him, he had discovered new instruments (documents) of his case.
Iudicatae quidem rei praescriptio coheredi, qui non litigavit, obstare non potest, nec in servitutem videtur peti post rem pro libertate iudicatam nondum ex causa fideicommissi manumissus: sed praetoris oportet in ea re sententiam servari, quam pro parte victi praestari non potest: nam et cum alterum ex coheredibus inofficiosi quaestio tenuit aut etiam duobus separatim agentibus alter optinuit, libertates competere placuit, ita tamen, ut officio iudicis indemnitati victoris futurique manumissoris consulatur.
Indeed, the prescription of an adjudged matter cannot obstruct a coheir who did not litigate; nor does it seem that a person can be claimed into servitude after the matter has been adjudged for liberty, although he has not yet been manumitted by reason of a fideicommissum: but in that matter the praetor’s sentence ought to be observed, which cannot be enforced with respect to the share of the defeated. For even when the inofficiosum inquiry held against one of the coheirs, or even when, with two proceeding separately, the one prevailed, it has been held that the manumissions are competent—yet in such a way that, by the office of the judge, provision is made for the indemnity of the victor and of the future manumittor.
Si debitor de dominio rei, quam pignori dedit, non admonito creditore causam egerit et contrariam sententiam acceperit, creditor in locum victi successisse non videbitur, cum pignoris conventio sententiam praecesserit.
If the debtor, concerning the dominion of the thing which he gave in pledge, with the creditor not having been admonished, prosecutes the case and receives an adverse judgment, the creditor will not be deemed to have succeeded into the place of the defeated, since the agreement of pledge preceded the judgment.
Ex sextante heres institutus, qui intestato legitimus heres esse potest, cum de iure testamenti faceret quaestionem, ab uno ex institutis dimidiam partem hereditatis petiit nec optinuit. videtur in illa petitione etiam partem sextantis vindicasse et ideo, si coeperit ab eodem ex testamento eandem portionem petere, obstabit ei exceptio rei iudicatae.
An heir instituted for a sextans (one-sixth), who can be the lawful heir in intestacy, when he litigated about the right under the testament, claimed from one of the instituted heirs half of the inheritance and did not prevail. it seems that in that claim he also asserted the portion of the sextans, and therefore, if he begins to seek the same portion from that same person on the basis of the testament, the plea of res judicata will bar him.
Latinus largus: cum de hereditate inter maevium, ad quem pertinebat, et titium, qui controversiam moverat, transigeretur, traditio rerum hereditariarum maevio heredi a titio facta est, in qua traditione etiam fundum ei suum proprium, quem ante multos annos avo eiusdem maevii heredis obligaverat quemque alii postea in obligationem deduxerat, ex causa pacti tradidit. his gestis posterior titii creditor ius suum persecutus est et optinuit. post hoc iudicium maevius heres repperit in rebus avitis chirographum eiusdem titii ante multos annos conscriptum, per quod apparuit eum fundum, qui in causam transactionis venerat, etiam avo suo ab eodem titio fuisse obligatum.
Latinus largus: when a settlement concerning an inheritance was being concluded between maevium, to whom it belonged, and titium, who had set the controversy in motion, a delivery (traditio) of the hereditary assets was made by titium to maevium the heir; and in that delivery he also, on the ground of a pact, delivered to him his own proper fundus (estate), which many years before he had obligated to the grandfather of that same maevium the heir, and which he had afterwards brought into obligation to another. With these acts done, a later creditor of titium pursued his right and prevailed. After this judgment, maevium the heir found among the ancestral effects a chirograph of that same titium drawn up many years before, by which it appeared that the fundus which had come into the matter of the transaction had also been obligated to his own grandfather by that same titium.
since therefore it is established that earlier the same estate was given in obligation to Maevus the heir’s grandfather, in regard to which Maevus was defeated, I ask whether he can pursue his grandfather’s right, which at the time when suit was being brought about the same estate he did not know, no exception having been opposed. I replied: if the dispute is about the proprietorship of the estate and a judgment had been pronounced in favor of the plaintiff, we would say that the plea of res judicata would bar the demander who was defeated in the prior trial, since inquiry is deemed to have been made into his right also, when the plaintiff makes good his claim. But if the possessor, having been acquitted, after losing possession were to demand the same thing from the same person who previously did not prevail, the exception would not harm him: for nothing in his own case would seem to have been determined about his right.
but when a pignoratitious action has been brought against the prior creditor, it can happen that no inquiry has been made into the possessor’s right, because, not as in a question of property—where what is mine is not another’s—so in obligation it by no means follows that what this man will prove to be held for himself is not pledged to another. And it is more probable to say that the exception does not obstruct, since inquiry was not made into the possessor’s right, but only into the obligation. In the question proposed, however, this moves me more: whether the right of pledge has been extinguished by ownership having been acquired; for a pledge cannot persist when the owner has been constituted the creditor.
Quia tractatus de utilibus diebus frequens est, videamus, quid sit experiundi potestatem habere. et quidem in primis exigendum est, ut sit facultas agendi. neque sufficit reo experiundi secum facere potestatem, vel habere eum qui se idonee defendat, nisi actor quoque nulla idonea causa impediatur experiri.
Because the discussion about useful days is frequent, let us see what it is to have the power of proceeding. And indeed, first of all it must be required that there be the faculty of acting. Nor is it sufficient for the defendant to afford with himself the power of proceeding, or to have someone who may suitably defend him, unless the plaintiff also is not hindered by any adequate cause from proceeding.
accordingly, whether he be among enemies, or be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, or be in chains, or if by a tempest he is detained in some place or in some region, so that he can neither bring suit nor give a mandate, he does not have the power of bringing suit. clearly, he who is hindered by ill-health, in such wise that he can give a mandate, is in such a case that he has the power of bringing suit. this, to be sure, escapes no one: that he does not have the power of bringing suit who has not had access to the praetor; accordingly, those days count on which the praetor renders justice.
In tempore constituto iudicatis an intercalaris dies proficere iudicato nec ne debeat, quaeritur. item de tempore, quo lis perit, sic sine dubio existimandum est, ut auctum litis tempus intercalari die existimetur, veluti si de usucapione sit quaestio, quae tempore constituto expleri solet, aut de actionibus, quae certo tempore finiuntur, ut aediliciae pleraeque actiones. et si quis fundum ea lege vendiderit, ut, nisi in diebus triginta pretium esset solutum, inemptus esset fundus, dies intercalaris proficiet emptori.
As to time fixed for judgments, the question is raised whether the intercalary day ought to be of avail to the judgment creditor or not. Likewise concerning the time at which a suit perishes, it is to be thought without doubt thus: that the time of the suit is deemed augmented by the intercalary day, for instance if the question is about usucapion, which is accustomed to be completed at a set time, or about actions which are finished at a fixed time, as most aedilician actions. And if someone has sold a farm on this condition, that unless the price were paid within thirty days the farm would be unbought, the intercalary day will profit the buyer.
Si servus hereditarius aut eius, qui in hostium potestate sit, satis acceperit, continuo dies satisdationis cedere incipiet: intueri enim debemus, an experiundi potestas fuerit adversus eum, qui obligatus est, non an is agere potuerit, qui rem in obligationem deduxerit: alioquin erit iniquissimum ex condicione actorum obligationes reorum extendi, per quos nihil factum erit, quo minus cum his agi possit.
If an hereditary slave, or the slave of one who is in the power of the enemy, has received surety, immediately the days of the satisdation will begin to run: for we must look to whether there was the power of bringing suit against him who is obligated, not whether he who brought the matter into obligation was able to sue; otherwise it would be most inequitable that, from the condition of the plaintiffs, the obligations of the defendants be extended, when nothing has been done by them to hinder action from being brought against them.
An vitium auctoris vel donatoris eiusve qui mihi rem legavit mihi noceat, si forte auctor meus iustum initium possidendi non habuit, videndum est. et puto neque nocere neque prodesse: nam denique et usucapere possum, quod auctor meus usucapere non potuit.
Whether a defect of the author or donor or of him who bequeathed the thing to me should harm me, if perhaps my author did not have a just inception of possessing, must be considered. And I think it neither harms nor benefits: for, after all, I too can acquire by usucapion what my author could not acquire by usucapion.
Ex facto propositum est quendam, cum rem pignori dedisset, eandem distraxisse heredemque eius redemisse: quaeritur, an heres adversus pignoris persecutionem exceptione longae possessionis uti possit. dicebam hunc heredem, qui pignus ab extraneo redemit, posse exceptione uti, quia in extranei locum successit, non in eius qui pignori dederat, quemadmodum si ante redemisset, sic deinde heres exstitisset.
From the stated facts it is put forward that a certain person, after he had given a thing in pledge, sold the same, and his heir bought it back: the question is whether the heir can use the exception of long possession against the pursuit of the pledge. I said that this heir, who redeemed the pledge from a stranger, can use the exception, because he has succeeded to the position of the stranger, not of the one who had given it in pledge, just as if he had redeemed it beforehand and had thereafter become heir.
Si duobus eandem rem separatim vendiderim, ea possessio, quae utramque venditionem praecesserit, soli priori emptori, cui et tradita sit, proficit. denique et si, quam rem tibi vendiderim, rursus a te emam et titio vendam, et meam omnem et tuam possessionem titio accessuram, videlicet quod et tu mihi et ego ei possessionem praestare debeamus.
if I have sold the same thing separately to two persons, that possession which has preceded both sales benefits only the prior buyer, to whom it has also been delivered. finally, even if the thing which I sold to you I then buy back from you and sell to titius, the whole of my possession and yours will accrue to titius, namely because both you must furnish possession to me and I to him.
Vendidi tibi servum et convenit, ut, nisi certa die pecunia soluta esset, inemptus esset: quod cum evenerit, quaesitum est, quid de accessione tui temporis putares. respondit id quod servetur, cum redhibitio sit facta: hunc enim perinde haberi ac si retrorsus homo mihi venisset, ut scilicet, si venditor possessionem postea nactus sit, et hoc ipsum tempus et quod venditionem praecesserit et amplius accessio haec ei detur cum eo, quod apud eum fuit, a quo homo redhibitus sit.
I sold you a slave, and it was agreed that, unless the money were paid on a certain day, he would be as unbought: when this occurred, the question was asked what you thought about the accession (tacking) of your time. He replied that the rule which is observed when a redhibition has been effected applies; for he is treated just as if the man had come back to me back again, namely that, if the seller has afterward obtained possession, both this very time and that which preceded the sale, and, moreover, this accession be granted to him together with that time which was with the one from whom the man has been redhibited.
Intra quattuor annos vacantium bonorum delator facta denuntiatione destitit: post quattuor annos secundo delatori venienti prior nuntiatio, quo minus praescriptione temporis summoveatur, non proderit, nisi prioris praevaricatio detegetur: quo declarato praescriptio, sed et negotii quaestio peremetur.
Within four years the informer of vacant goods, after a denunciation has been made, ceased; after four years, for a second informer who comes, the prior notification will not avail, so as to prevent his being removed by the prescription of time, unless the collusion of the former is uncovered: once that is declared, the prescription—and indeed the very question of the matter—will be perempted.
Quadriennii tempus, quod bonis vacantibus nuntiandis praescriptum est, non ex opinione hominum, sed de substantia vacantium bonorum dinumeratur. quattuor autem anni post irritum testamentum factum et intestati possessionem ab omnibus repudiatam, qui gradatim petere potuerunt, vel temporis finem, quod singulis praestitutum est, computabuntur.
The four-year period which is prescribed for announcing vacant goods is counted not from the opinion of men, but from the substance of the vacant goods. Moreover, the four years will be computed after a will has been made void and the possession of the intestate estate has been repudiated by all who could have sought it in order, or after the end of the time which has been prescribed for each individual.
Cum heres in ius omne defuncti succedit, ignoratione sua defuncti vitia non excludit, veluti cum sciens alienum illum illo vel precario possedit: quamvis enim precarium heredem ignorantem non teneat nec interdicto recte conveniatur, tamen usucapere non poterit, quod defunctus non potuit. idem iuris est, cum de longa possessione quaeritur: neque enim recte defendetur, cum exordium ei bonae fidei ratio non tueatur.
When the heir succeeds to all the right of the deceased (defunct), he does not, by his own ignorance, exclude the defects of the deceased; for example, when the deceased, knowing it to be another’s, possessed that thing either on that basis or by precarium: for although a precarium does not bind an ignorant heir, nor is he properly proceeded against by interdict, nevertheless he will not be able to acquire by usucapion what the deceased could not. The same law holds when long possession is in question: for he will not be rightly defended, since the inception is not supported for him by the reason of good faith.
Et si mihi pignori dederis et ego eandem rem alii pigneravi, meus creditor utetur accessione tui temporis tam adversus extraneum quam adversus te ipsum, quamdiu pecuniam mihi non exsolveris: nam qui me potior est, cum ego te superaturus sim, multo magis adversus te optinere debet. sed si pecuniam mihi solveris, hoc casu accessione tua non utetur.
And if you have given me something in pledge, and I have pledged the same thing to another, my creditor will use the accession of your time both against a stranger and against you yourself, so long as you do not pay out the money to me: for he who is superior to me, since I am about to prevail over you, ought much more to prevail against you. But if you pay the money to me, in this case he will not use your accession.
Item si mihi pignori dederis et convenerit, nisi pecuniam solvisses, licere ex pacto pignus vendere idque vendiderim, emptori accessio tui temporis dari debebit, licet invito te pignora distracta sint: iam enim illo in tempore, quo contrahebas, videri concessisse venditioni, si pecuniam non intulisses.
Likewise, if you have given me something in pledge and it has been agreed that, unless you had paid the money, it would be permitted by pact to sell the pledge, and I have sold it, the buyer ought to be given the accession of your time, although the pledges have been sold off against your will: for already at that time, when you were contracting, you are deemed to have conceded to the sale, if you did not pay the money.
Accessio possessionis fit non solum temporis, quod apud eum fuit, unde is emit, sed et qui ei vendidit, unde tu emisti. sed si medius aliquis ex auctoribus non possederit, praecedentium auctorum possessio non proderit, quia coniuncta non est, sicut nec ei, qui non possidet, auctoris possessio accedere potest.
Accession of possession comes about not only from the time which was with him from whom he bought, but also from him who sold to him, from whom you bought. But if some intermediate person among the authors has not possessed, the possession of the preceding authors will not be of advantage, because it is not conjoined—just as the possession of an author cannot accede to one who does not possess.
Item adiciendum est, unde emisti, aut unde is emit, cui tu emendum mandaveras, et quod apud eum, qui vendendum mandavit. quod si is quoque, cui mandatum erat, alii vendendum mandaverit, non aliter huius, qui postea mandaverat, dandam accessionem labeo ait, quam si id ipsum dominus ei permiserit.
Likewise it must be added, from whom you bought, or from whom he bought, to whom you had given a mandate to buy, and likewise as regards him who gave a mandate to sell. But if he too, to whom the mandate had been given, has in turn given to another a mandate to sell, Labeo says that an accession is to be granted to the one who gave the later mandate only if the owner has permitted that very thing to him.
Item danda est accessio cum eo, quod apud pupillum fuit, a cuius tutore, cum is tutelam eius administraret, emisti. idemque in eo, qui a curatore pupilli furiosive emerit, servandum est: et si ventris nomine aut eius, quae rei servandae causa in possessione esset dotis suae nomine, deminutio facta sit: nam id quoque temporis accedit.
Likewise, an accession is to be given together with the time during which the thing was with a ward, from whose tutor, while he was administering his tutelage, you bought. And the same is to be observed in the case of one who has bought from the curator of a ward or of a madman; and if a diminution has been made in the name of the unborn child, or of a woman who was in possession for the sake of preserving the thing in the name of her dowry: for that time too is added.
Hae autem accessiones non tam late accipiendae sunt quam verba earum patent, ut etiam, si post venditionem traditionemque rei traditae apud venditorem res fuerit, proficiat id tempus emptori, sed illud solum quod ante fuit, licet venditionis tempore eam rem venditor non habuerat.
These accessions, however, are not to be received as broadly as their words extend, such that even, if after the vendition and the tradition (delivery) of the thing delivered the thing was with the seller, that time should profit the purchaser; but only that which was before, although at the time of the vendition the seller did not have that thing.
Quo lucidius intellegi possit haec exceptio, prius de causa videamus, quare proposita sit, deinde, quemadmodum dolo fiat, per quae intellegemus, quando obstet exceptio: deinde adversus quas personas locum habeat. novissime inspiciemus, intra quae tempora competit exceptio.
So that this exception may be understood more lucidly, let us first consider the ground on which it has been set forth; then, how it is effected by fraud, by means of which we shall understand when the exception stands as an obstacle; next, against what persons it has place. Lastly, we shall examine within what time-limits the exception lies.
Sequitur, ut videamus, in quibus causis locum habeat exceptio et quibus personis obiciatur. et quidem illud adnotandum est, quod specialiter exprimendum est, de cuius dolo quis queratur, non in rem " si in ea re nihil dolo malo factum est", sed sic " si in ea re nihil dolo malo actoris factum est". docere igitur debet is, qui obicit exceptionem, dolo malo actoris factum, nec sufficiet ei ostendere in re esse dolum: aut si alterius dicat dolo factum, eorum personas specialiter debebit enumerare, dummodo hae sint, quarum dolus noceat.
It follows that we should see in what cases the exception has a place and against which persons it is objected. And indeed this is to be noted: it must be expressed specifically whose deceit one complains of, not in rem "if in that matter nothing was done with malicious dolus," but thus "if in that matter nothing was done with the malicious dolus of the plaintiff." Therefore he who objects the exception ought to show that the act was done by the plaintiff’s malicious dolus, nor will it suffice for him to show that there is dolus in the matter; or, if he says that it was done by the dolus of another, he must specifically enumerate their persons, provided these are such as whose dolus would prejudice.
Circa primam speciem, quibus ex causis exceptio haec locum habeat, haec sunt, quae tractari possunt. si quis sine causa ab aliquo fuerit stipulatus, deinde ex ea stipulatione experiatur, exceptio utique doli mali ei nocebit: licet enim eo tempore, quo stipulabatur, nihil dolo malo admiserit, tamen dicendum est eum, cum litem contestatur, dolo facere, qui perseveret ex ea stipulatione petere: et si cum interponeretur, iustam causam habuit, tamen nunc nullam idoneam causam habere videtur. proinde et si crediturus pecuniam stipulatus est nec credidit et si certa fuit causa stipulationis, quae tamen aut non est secuta aut finita est, dicendum erit nocere exceptionem.
Concerning the first form, as to the causes from which this exception has place, these are the points that can be treated. If someone has stipulated from another without cause, and then proceeds to sue on that stipulation, the exception of fraud (dolus malus) will certainly harm him: for although at the time when he was stipulating he committed nothing in bad fraud, nevertheless it must be said that, when he joins issue, he acts fraudulently, if he persists in claiming on that stipulation; and even if, when it was interposed, he had a just cause, nevertheless now he seems to have no suitable cause. Accordingly, also, if, being about to lend money, he stipulated and did not lend, and if there was a definite cause of the stipulation which, however, either did not ensue or has come to an end, it will have to be said that the exception harms him.
Item quaeritur, si quis pure stipulatus sit certam quantitatem, quia hoc actum sit, sed post stipulationem interpositam pactus sit, ne interim pecunia usque ad certum diem petatur, an noceat exceptio doli. et quidem et de pacto convento excipi posse nequaquam ambigendum est: sed et si hac quis exceptione uti velit, nihilo minus poterit: dolo enim facere eum, qui contra pactum petat, negari non potest.
Likewise it is asked, if someone has purely stipulated a certain quantity, since this has been agreed, but after the stipulation has been interposed he has made a pact that in the meantime the money is not to be demanded up to a certain day, whether the exceptio doli would be of harm. And indeed it is by no means to be doubted that one may also plead on the ground of the pactum conventum; but even if someone should wish to use this exception, nonetheless he will be able: for it cannot be denied that he acts with dolus who demands contrary to the pact.
Et generaliter sciendum est ex omnibus in factum exceptionibus doli oriri exceptionem, quia dolo facit, quicumque id, quod quaqua exceptione elidi potest, petit: nam et si inter initia nihil dolo malo facit, attamen nunc petendo facit dolose, nisi si talis sit ignorantia in eo, ut dolo careat.
And generally it is to be known that from all in factum exceptions an exception of dolus arises, because he acts with deceit, whoever seeks that which can be defeated by any exception: for even if at the outset he does nothing with evil dolus, nevertheless by now suing he acts deceitfully, unless his ignorance is such that he is free from dolus.
Non male dictum est, si creditor usuras in futurum acceperit, deinde pecuniam nihilo minus petat, antequam id tempus praetereat, cuius temporis usuras accepit, an doli exceptione repellatur. et potest dici dolo eum facere: accipiendo enim usuras distulisse videtur petitionem in id tempus, quod est post diem usurarum praestitarum, et tacite convenisse interim se non petiturum.
It is not wrongly said that, if a creditor has taken interest for the future and then nonetheless demands the money before the time has elapsed for which he received the interest, he is to be repelled by the exception (plea) of dolus. And it can be said that he acts in dolus: for by accepting the interest he seems to have deferred his demand to that time which is after the day for which the interest was paid, and to have tacitly agreed not to sue in the meantime.
Item quaeritur: si statuliberum mercatus quis fuerit iussum decem dare, cum hoc ignoraret, et duplam stipulatus fuerit, deinde decem acceperit evicto eo in libertatem agere ex duplae stipulatione potest, sed nisi decem, quae implendae condicionis causa acceperit, deduxerit, exceptione summovendus erit: et haec ita iulianus quoque scripsit. si tamen ex re emptoris vel ex peculio, quod ad emptorem pertinebat, pecuniam dederit statuliber, potest dici exceptionem non nocere, quia dolo non faceret.
Likewise it is asked: if someone has purchased a conditionally free person, who had been ordered to give ten, while he was ignorant of this, and he has stipulated for the double, then has received the ten—upon that person being “evicted” into freedom he can sue on the stipulation for the double; but unless he deducts the ten which he received for the sake of fulfilling the condition, he must be repelled by an exception: and Julian also wrote thus. If, however, the conditionally free person gave the money from the buyer’s property or from the peculium which belonged to the buyer, it can be said that the exception should not harm him, because he would not be acting with dolus.
Apud celsum quaeritur, si, cum titio mandassent creditores hereditarii, ut adiret hereditatem, unus non mandasset decipiendi eius causa, mandaturus alioquin, si non foret hic aditurus, deinde agat, an exceptione repellatur: et ait celsus doli eum exceptione repellendum.
It is asked in Celsus: if, when the creditors of the inheritance had commissioned Titius to enter upon the inheritance, one did not commission for the purpose of deceiving him—who would otherwise have been about to commission, if he were not going to enter upon it—then brings an action, is he repelled by an exception? And Celsus says he is to be repelled by the exception of dolus (fraud).
Iulianus scripsit, si quis, cum aeger esset, centum aureos uxoris suae consobrino spopondisset, volens scilicet eam pecuniam ad mulierem pervenire, deinde convaluerit, an exceptione uti possit, si conveniatur. et refert labeoni placuisse doli mali uti eum posse.
Julian wrote: if someone, when he was ill, had stipulated a hundred gold coins to his wife’s cousin—intending, of course, that that money should reach the woman—then recovered, whether he can use an exception if he is sued. And he reports that it was Labeo’s view that he can use the exception of dolus malus.
Item quaeritur, si cum eo, a quo tibi sexaginta deberentur, compromiseris, deinde per imprudentiam poenam centum stipulatus fueris. labeo putat convenire officio arbitri iubere tantum tibi dari, quantum re vera debeatur, et, si non fiat, non vetare, ne quid amplius petatur: sed etiamsi id omissum fuerit, peti posse quod debetur labeo dicit, et si forte poena petatur, doli mali exceptionem profuturam.
Likewise it is asked, if you have compromised with the one by whom sixty were owed to you, and then through imprudence you have stipulated a penalty of one hundred. labeo thinks it accords with the office of the arbiter to order that there be given to you only as much as is in reality owed, and, if this is not done, not to forbid that anything further be sought: but even if that has been omitted, labeo says that what is owed can be sought, and if by chance the penalty is demanded, the exception of bad fraud will be of use.
Si quis pupillo solverit sine tutoris auctoritate id quod debuit exque ea solutione locupletior factus sit pupillus, rectissime dicitur exceptionem petentibus nocere: nam et si mutuam acceperit pecuniam vel ex quo alio contractu locupletior factus sit, dandam esse exceptionem. idemque et in ceteris erit dicendum, quibus non recte solvitur: nam si facti sint locupletiores, exceptio locum habebit.
If anyone pays to a pupil without the tutor’s authority that which he owed, and from that payment the pupil has been made more affluent (enriched), it is most correct to say that an exception will prejudice those who are suing: for even if he has received money by way of a loan (mutuum), or from any other contract has been made more affluent, the exception is to be given. And the same must be said also in other cases in which payment is not rightly made: for if they have been made more affluent, the exception will have a place.
Item labeo scribit, si quis fugitivum esse sciens emerit servum et si stipulatus fuerit fugitivum non esse, deinde agat ex stipulatu, non esse eum exceptione repellendum, quoniam hoc convenit ( quamvis ex empto actionem non haberet): sed, si non convenisset, exceptione repelletur.
Likewise Labeo writes: if someone, knowing that a slave is a fugitive, has bought him, and if he has stipulated that he is not a fugitive, then, when he brings an action on the stipulation, he is not to be repelled by an exception, since this was agreed (although he would not have an action from the purchase): but, if it had not been agreed, he will be repelled by an exception.
Quod si is, cui pecunia debeatur, cum debitore decidit et nomen eius vendidit seio, cui debitor mandaverat, ut nomen emeret, deque ea re emptor stipulatus est, deinde creditor eam pecuniam retinet, quam per iudicem abstulit, an emptor ex stipulatu possit experiri? et ofilius putat, si venditor nominis paratus non sit reddere, quantum ab emptore acceperit, non nocituram exceptionem doli mali: et puto sententiam ofilii veram.
But if the one to whom money is owed settles with the debtor and sells his claim (nomen) to Seius, whom the debtor had instructed to buy the claim, and concerning this the buyer has stipulated; then the creditor retains the money which he carried off through the judge—can the buyer proceed ex stipulatu? And Ofilius thinks that, if the seller of the claim is not prepared to return as much as he received from the buyer, the exceptio doli mali will not harm; and I consider Ofilius’s opinion true.
Labeo ait, si de homine petitio secundum actorem fuerit iudicatum et iussu iudicis satisdatum sit hominem intra certum diem tradi, et, si traditus non fuisset, poenam stipulatus sit, petitorem, qui et hominem vindicat et poenam petit, exceptione esse repellendum: iniquum enim esse et hominem possidere et poenam exigere.
Labeo says that, if in a suit concerning a man it has been adjudged in favor of the actor, and by the judge’s order security has been furnished that the man be delivered within a certain day, and, if he were not delivered, a penalty has been stipulated, the claimant, who both vindicates the man and seeks the penalty, is to be repelled by an exceptio: for it is inequitable both to possess the man and to exact the penalty.
Item quaeritur, si uniones tibi pignori dedero et convenerit, ut soluta pecunia redderentur, et hi uniones culpa tua perierint et pecuniam petas. exstat nervae et atilicini sententia dicentium ita esse excipiendum: " si inter me et te non convenit, ut soluta pecunia uniones mihi reddantur": sed est verius exceptionem doli mali nocere debere.
Likewise it is asked, if I have given pearls to you as a pledge and it has been agreed that, once the money is paid, they are to be returned, and these pearls have perished through your fault, and you demand the money. There exists the opinion of Nerva and Atilicinus, saying that the exception should be framed thus: "if between me and you it was not agreed that, once the money is paid, the pearls be returned to me": but the truer view is that the exception of dolus malus ought to be operative against you.
Si quis ex uncia heres sit scriptus, ex qua ducenta consequi potuit, deinde propter hoc legatum, in quo centum erant, praetulit, ne molestiis hereditariis implicaretur: an, si legatum petat, exceptione doli mali summoveatur? et ait iulianus non esse eum summovendum. quod si a substituto pretium accepit vel quod pretii loco haberi posset, ne adeat hereditatem, petens legatum dolo, inquit, facere intellegetur ac per hoc doli exceptione repelletur.
If someone is instituted heir for a twelfth-share, from which he could have obtained 200, then, on account of this, preferred the legacy, in which there were 100, so that he might not be entangled in the burdens of the inheritance: whether, if he seeks the legacy, he is to be barred by the exception of dolus malus? And Julianus says that he is not to be barred. But if he received a price from the substitute, or what could be held in place of a price, so that he not enter upon the inheritance, then, he says, in seeking the legacy he is understood to act with dolus, and through this he will be repelled by the exception of dolus.
Marcellus ait adversus doli exceptionem non dari replicationem doli. labeo quoque in eadem opinione est: ait enim iniquum esse communem malitiam petitori quidem praemio esse, ei vero, cum quo ageretur, poenae esse, cum longe aequum sit ex eo, quod perfide gestum est, actorem nihil consequi.
Marcellus says that a replication of fraud is not given against an exception of fraud. Labeo too is of the same opinion: for he says it is inequitable that a common malice be a reward to the plaintiff, but a penalty to the one against whom suit is brought, since it is far more equitable that, from that which has been carried out perfidiously, the plaintiff should obtain nothing.
Labeo et si ex stipulatu actio competat propter doli clausulam, tamen nocere doli exceptionem ait, si adversus ea inquit, factum erit: posse enim petitorem, antequam stipulatio committatur, nihil dolo malo fecisse et tunc facere cum petat: propter quod exceptionem esse necessariam.
Labeo says that even if an action ex stipulatu is competent by reason of a dolus-clause, nevertheless the exception of dolus will be harmful, if, he says, it has been done contrary to those terms: for the claimant can, before the stipulation is triggered, have done nothing by fraud and then do so when he sues; on which account the exception is necessary.
Adversus parentes patronosque neque doli exceptio neque alia quidem, quae patroni parentisve opinionem apud bonos mores suggillet, competere potest: in factum tamen erit excipiendum, ut, si forte pecunia non numerata dicatur, obiciatur exceptio pecuniae non numeratae. nihil autem interest, utrum patronus ex suo contractu an vero ex alieno conveniatur: semper enim reverentia ei exhibenda est tam vivo quam defuncto. si autem cum herede liberti patronus agat, puto excipere debere de dolo patroni heredem liberti.
Against parents and patrons neither the exception of fraud (exceptio doli) nor indeed any other which stigmatizes the reputation of a patron or parent in the eyes of good morals can be available; however, a fact-based exception (in factum) will be admitted, so that, if perhaps it is said that money was not counted out, the exception of uncounted money (exceptio pecuniae non numeratae) may be raised. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the patron is proceeded against on his own contract or in truth on another’s: for reverence must always be shown to him both while living and when deceased. But if the patron brings an action against the heir of a freedman, I think the heir of the freedman ought to be allowed to plead an exception on account of the patron’s fraud.
However, a freedman, as to the patron’s fraud, even if he is sued by his heir, will by no means raise the exception: for it is agreed that to a patron, both living and dead, honor is to be exhibited by the freedman. In a stipulation, plainly, the clause of fraud is not to be removed, because from the clause of fraud no action for fraud is intended, but from the stipulation.
In hac exceptione et de dolo servi vel alterius personae iuri nostro subiectae excipere possumus et de eorum dolo, quibus adquiritur. sed de servorum et filiorum dolo, si quidem ex peculiari eorum negotio actio intendatur, in infinitum exceptio obicienda est: si autem non ex peculiari causa, tum de eo dumtaxat excipi oportet, qui admissus sit in ipso negotio quod geritur, non etiam si postea aliquis dolus intervenisset: neque enim esse aequum servi dolum amplius domino nocere, quam in quo opera eius esset usus.
In this exception we can plead both about the fraud (dolus) of a slave or of another person subject to our authority, and about the fraud (dolus) of those through whom acquisition is made to us. But as to the fraud (dolus) of slaves and of sons, if indeed the action is framed from a transaction of their peculium, the exception is to be opposed without limit; but if not from a peculium cause, then one ought to except only with respect to him who has been admitted in the very transaction that is being conducted, not also if some fraud (dolus) has intervened afterwards; for it is not equitable that a slave’s fraud (dolus) harm the master more than in that matter in which he has made use of the slave’s services.
Quaesitum est, an de procuratoris dolo, qui ad agendum tantum datus est, excipi possit. et puto recte defendi, si quidem in rem suam procurator datus sit, etiam de praeterito eius dolo, hoc est si ante acceptum iudicium dolo quid fecerit, esse excipiendum, si vero non in rem suam, dolum praesentem in exceptionem conferendum. si autem is procurator sit, cui omnium rerum administratio concessa est, tunc de omni dolo eius excipi posse neratius scribit.
It has been asked whether, on account of the procurator’s fraud, who has been appointed only for bringing suit, an exception can be taken. And I think it is rightly maintained that, if indeed a procurator has been appointed in his own interest (in rem suam), then even for his past fraud—that is, if before the case was accepted he did anything by fraud—an exception should be allowed; but if he is not in his own interest, the present fraud is to be brought into the exception. If, however, he is a procurator to whom the administration of all matters has been granted, then Neratius writes that an exception can be taken for all his fraud.
Item quaeritur, si debitor meus te circumveniebat teque mihi reum dederit egoque abs te stipulatus fuero, deinde petam, an doli mali exceptio obstet. et magis est, ut non tibi permittatur de dolo debitoris mei adversus me excipere, cum non ego te circumvenerim: adversus ipsum autem debitorem meum poteris experiri.
Likewise it is asked, if my debtor was circumventing you and has given you to me as defendant, and I have stipulated from you, then I bring suit, whether the exceptio of dolus malus stands in the way. And the sounder view is that you are not permitted to plead against me the dolus of my debtor, since it was not I who circumvented you; but against my debtor himself you will be able to proceed.
Apud iulianum quaesitum est, si heres soceri, a quo dos peteretur, exciperet de dolo mariti et mulieris, cui pecunia quaereretur, an obstatura esset exceptio ex persona mulieris. et ait iulianus, si maritus ex promissione dotis ab herede soceri petat et heres excipiat de dolo filiae, cui ea pecunia adquireretur, exceptionem obstare: dos enim, quam maritus ab herede soceri petit, intellegitur, inquit, filiae adquiri, cum per hoc dotem sit habitura. illud non explicat iulianus, an et de dolo mariti excipi possit: puto autem eum hoc sentire, ut etiam de dolo mariti noceat exceptio, licet videatur nulla dos filiae, ut ait, quaeri.
It was asked in Julian: if the heir of the father-in-law, from whom the dowry was being sought, should plead an exception on account of the fraud (dolus) of the husband and of the woman for whom the money was being sought, would the exception arising from the person of the woman be obstructive? And Julian says that, if the husband, on the promise of the dowry, should claim from the heir of the father-in-law, and the heir should plead an exception for the fraud of the daughter to whom that money would be acquired, the exception bars: for the dowry which the husband seeks from the heir of the father-in-law is understood, he says, to be acquired to the daughter, since by this she will have a dowry. Julian does not explain whether one can also except on account of the husband’s fraud; but I think he holds this—that an exception for the husband’s fraud also harms, although it seems that, as he says, no dowry of the daughter is being sought.
Illa etiam quaestio ventilata est apud plerosque, an de dolo tutoris exceptio pupillo experienti nocere debeat. et ego puto utilius, etsi per eas personas pupillis favetur, tamen dicendum esse, sive quis emerit a tutore rem pupilli sive contractum sit cum eo in rem pupilli, sive dolo quid tutor fecerit et ex eo pupillus locupletior factus est, pupillo nocere debere, nec illud esse distinguendum, cautum sit ei an non, solvendo sit an non tutor, dummodo rem administret: unde enim divinat is, qui cum tutore contrahit? plane si mihi proponas collusisse aliquem cum tutore, factum suum ei nocebit.
That question too has been ventilated among many, whether an exception on account of the guardian’s fraud ought to harm the ward who is bringing suit. And I for my part think it more useful, although by those persons favor is shown to wards, nevertheless to say that, whether someone has bought a thing of the ward from the guardian, or has contracted with him in a matter for the ward’s interest, or the guardian has done something by fraud and from it the ward has been made more wealthy (enriched), it ought to harm the ward; nor should this be distinguished on the ground whether security has been provided for him or not, whether the guardian is solvent or not, so long as he is administering the matter: for whence is he to divine who contracts with the guardian? Clearly, if you put to me that someone has colluded with the guardian, his own act will harm him.
Si quis non tutor, sed pro tutore negotia gerat, an dolus ipsius noceat pupillo, videamus. et putem non nocere: nam si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, rem vendiderit et usucapta sit, exceptionem non nocere pupillo rem suam persequenti, etiamsi ei cautum sit, quia huic rerum pupilli administratio concessa non fuit.
If someone who is not a guardian, but acts as a guardian, conducts the affairs, let us see whether his dolus harms the ward. And I think it does not harm: for if the one who was acting as a guardian has sold a thing and it has been acquired by usucapion, the exception does not harm the ward pursuing his own property, even if security (cautio) has been given to him, because the administration of the ward’s affairs had not been granted to this man.
De dolo autem ipsius minoris viginti quinque annis exceptio utique locum habebit: nam et de pupilli dolo interdum esse excipiendum nequaquam ambigendum, est ex ea aetate, quae dolo non careat. denique iulianus quoque saepissime scripsit doli pupillos, qui prope pubertatem sunt, capaces esse. quid enim, si debitor ex delegatu pupilli pecuniam creditori eius solvit?
But as to the fraud of the minor under twenty‑five years, an exception will certainly have place: for that one must sometimes be excepted to on account of the fraud of a pupil (ward) is by no means to be doubted, since he is of an age which does not lack fraud. denique, iulianus also very often wrote that pupils who are near puberty are capable of fraud. What, for instance, if a debtor, by the delegation of the pupil, pays money to his creditor?
De auctoris dolo exceptio emptori non obicitur. si autem accessione auctoris utitur, aequissimum visum est ei, qui ex persona auctoris utitur accessione, pati dolum auctoris: et peraeque traditur rei quidem cohaerentem exceptionem etiam emptori nocere, eam autem, quae ex delicto personae oriatur, nocere non oportere.
The exception on account of the auctor’s fraud is not opposed to the purchaser. If, however, he avails himself of the auctor’s accession, it has seemed most equitable that he who uses an accession from the person of the auctor should bear the auctor’s fraud; and it is likewise handed down that an exception adhering to the thing does indeed harm even the purchaser, but that one which arises from the delict of the person ought not to harm.
Si, cum legitima hereditas gaii seii ad te perveniret et ego essem heres institutus, persuaseris mihi per dolum malum, ne adeam hereditatem, et posteaquam ego repudiavi hereditatem, tu eam sempronio cesseris pretio accepto isque a me petat hereditatem: exceptionem doli mali eius, qui ei cessit, non potest pati.
If, when the lawful (intestate) inheritance of Gaius Seius would come to you and I had been instituted as heir, you persuaded me by malicious fraud not to enter upon the inheritance, and after I repudiated the inheritance you transferred it to Sempronius for a price received, and he seeks the inheritance from me: he cannot be met with the defense of malicious fraud of the one who assigned it to him.
Si quis autem ex causa legati vindicet aut is, cui ex causa donationis res praestita est, vindicet, an de dolo exceptionem patiatur ex causa eius, in cuius locum successerit? et magis putat pomponius summovendum: et ego puto exceptione eos esse repellendos, cum lucrativam causam sint nancti: aliud est enim emere, aliud ex his causis succedere.
If, however, someone vindicates by reason of a legacy, or he to whom a thing has been furnished by reason of a donation vindicates, whether he should suffer an exception for fraud on the basis of the cause of him into whose place he has succeeded? And Pomponius thinks rather that he should be removed; and I too think they are to be repelled by the exception, since they have come by a lucrative cause: for it is one thing to buy, another to succeed under these causes.
Auctoris autem dolus, sicut diximus, emptori non obicitur. sed hoc in emptore solo servabimus: item in eo, qui permutaverit vel in solutum accepit: item in similibus, qui vicem emptorum continent. ceterum si noxae deditus quis sit, pomponius putat passurum exceptionem, quam ille pateretur, qui noxae dedit.
But the fraud of the vendor, as we have said, is not set up against the purchaser. But we shall maintain this in the purchaser alone: likewise in him who has bartered or has accepted in payment: likewise in similar persons who occupy the place of purchasers. Moreover, if someone has been surrendered noxae, Pomponius thinks he will undergo the exception which he would undergo who gave him up noxae.
accordingly, from whatever other cause which has an acquisition nearly lucrative, if someone appears to have acquired, he will undergo the defense of fraud from the person into whose place he has succeeded: for it suffices that he who gave the price or in the place of the price, since he is a good‑faith buyer, not suffer the defense of fraud from the person of the author, especially if he himself is free from fraud. but if he himself is not free from fraud, it will come to the defense of fraud, and he will undergo the exception on account of his own fraud.
Si a titio fundum emeris qui sempronii erat isque tibi traditus fuerit pretio soluto, deinde titius sempronio heres extiterit et eundem fundum maevio vendiderit et tradiderit: iulianus ait aequius esse praetorem te tueri, quia et, si ipse titius fundum a te peteret, exceptione in factum comparata vel doli mali summoveretur et, si ipse eum possideret et publiciana peteres, adversus excipientem " si non suus esset" replicatione utereris, ac per hoc intellegeretur eum fundum rursum vendidisse, quem in bonis non haberet.
If you buy a parcel of land from Titius which was Sempronius’s, and it has been delivered to you with the price paid, then Titius becomes Sempronius’s heir and sells and delivers the same land to Maevius: Julian says it is fairer for the praetor to protect you, because both, if Titius himself were to claim the land from you, he would be warded off by an exceptio in factum framed for the case or by an exceptio doli mali; and, if he himself were possessing it and you were suing by the Publician action, against one pleading “if it were not his own” you would use a replication; and from this it would be understood that he sold again a piece of land which he did not have among his goods.
Metus causa exceptionem cassius non proposuerat contentus doli exceptione, quae est generalis: sed utilius visum est etiam de metu opponere exceptionem. etenim distat aliquid doli exceptione, quod exceptio doli personam complectitur eius, qui dolo fecit: enimvero metus causa exceptio in rem scripta est " si in ea re nihil metus causa factum est", ut non inspiciamus, an is qui agit metus causa fecit aliquid, sed an omnino metus causa factum est in hac re a quocumque, non tantum ab eo qui agit. et quamvis de dolo auctoris exceptio non obiciatur, verumtamen hoc iure utimur, ut de metu non tantum ab auctore, verum a quocumque adhibito exceptio obici possit.
cassius had not proposed an exception by reason of fear, being content with the exception of fraud, which is general: but it seemed more useful also to oppose an exception on account of fear. for indeed it differs somewhat from the exception of fraud, because the exception of fraud embraces the person of him who acted by fraud; but the exception by reason of fear is in rem, “if in that matter nothing was done by reason of fear,” so that we do not look to whether he who sues did anything by reason of fear, but whether at all in this matter something was done by reason of fear by anyone, not only by him who sues. and although an exception “on the author’s fraud” is not objected, nevertheless we use this law, that an exception on account of fear may be objected not only with respect to the author, but against anyone employed.
Illud sciendum est hanc exceptionem de metu eum obicere debere, qui metum non a parente passus est, in cuius fuit potestate: ceterum parenti licere deteriorem condicionem liberorum in rebus peculiariis facere. sed si se abstinuerit hereditate paterna, succurrendum ei erit, ut alioquin succurritur.
It must be known that this exception on account of fear ought to be put forward by him who did not suffer fear from the parent in whose power he was; moreover, it is permitted to the parent to make the children’s condition worse in peculium matters. But if he has abstained from the paternal inheritance, assistance must be given him, as assistance is otherwise given.
Pure mihi debes decem: ea tibi sub condicione legavi. interim heres si petat, doli exceptione non est summovendus, cum possit etiam deficere condicio: itaque legatorum stipulationem interponere debebit. sed si non caveat heres, doli exceptione summovebitur: expedit enim legatario retinere summam, quam mitti in possessionem rerum hereditariarum.
You owe me 10 outright: I have bequeathed it to you under a condition. Meanwhile, if the heir should seek it, he is not to be removed by the exception (defense) of fraud, since the condition might also fail: accordingly he ought to interpose the stipulation concerning legacies. But if the heir does not give security, he will be removed by the exception of fraud: for it is expedient for the legatee to retain the sum rather than to be sent into possession of the hereditary goods.
Si donavi alicui rem nec tradidero, et ille cui donavi non tradita possessione in eo loco aedificaverit me sciente, et cum aedificaverit, nanctus sim ego possessionem, et petat a me rem donatam, et ego excipiam, quod supra legitimum modum facta est: an de dolo replicandum est? dolo enim feci, qui passus sum eum aedificare et non reddo impensas.
If I have donated a thing to someone and have not delivered it, and he to whom I donated, possession not having been delivered, has built in that place with my knowing; and when he has built, I have obtained possession; and he seeks from me the donated thing, and I plead by way of exception that it was done beyond the lawful measure: is a replication on fraud to be made? For I acted with fraud, in that I allowed him to build and do not return the expenses.
Si servus veniit ab eo, cui hoc dominus permisit, et redhibitus sit domino: agenti venditori de pretio exceptio opponitur redhibitionis, licet iam is qui vendidit domino pretium solverit ( etiam mercis non traditae exceptione summovetur et qui pecuniam domino iam solvit) et ideo is qui vendidit agit adversus dominum. eandem causam esse pedius ait eius, qui negotium nostrum gerens vendidit.
If a slave is sold by one to whom the master permitted this, and is redhibited to the master: to the vendor suing for the price the exception of redhibition is opposed, although the one who sold has already paid the price to the master (he is also removed by the exception of goods not delivered, even if he has already paid the money to the master), and therefore the one who sold brings an action against the master. Pedius says the same case exists for him who, conducting our business, sold.
Si eum, qui volebat mihi donare supra legitimum modum, delegavero creditori meo, non poterit adversus petentem uti exceptione, quoniam creditor suum petit. in eadem causa est maritus: nec hic enim debet exceptione summoveri, qui suo nomine agit. numquid ergo nec de dolo mulieris excipiendum sit adversus maritum, qui dotem petit, non ducturus uxorem, nisi dotem accepisset ^ accepissit^? nisi iam divertit.
If I have delegated to my creditor the one who wished to make me a donation beyond the lawful measure, he will not be able to use an exception against the claimant, since the creditor seeks what is his. in the same case is the husband: for neither should he be removed by an exception, who acts in his own name. is it then that not even on account of the woman’s fraud should an exception be taken against the husband, who demands the dowry, not going to take a wife unless he had received the dowry ^ accepissit^? unless he has already divorced.
Non sicut de dolo actio certo tempore finitur, ita etiam exceptio eodem tempore danda est: nam haec perpetuo competit, cum actor quidem in sua potestate habeat, quando utatur suo iure, is autem cum quo agitur non habeat potestatem, quando conveniatur.
Not as the action on fraud is terminated within a fixed time, thus also the exception must be granted within the same time: for this is available perpetually, since the plaintiff indeed has in his own power when he exercises his right, whereas the one against whom suit is brought does not have the power over when he is sued.
Idem iulianus ait, si ei, quem creditorem tuum putabas, iussu tuo pecuniam, quam me tibi debere existimabam, promisero, petentem doli mali exceptione summoveri debere, et amplius agendo cum stipulatore consequar, ut mihi acceptam faciat stipulationem. et habet haec sententia iuliani humanitatem, ut etiam adversus hunc utar exceptione et condictione, cui sum obligatus.
The same Julian says: if, to him whom you supposed to be your creditor, by your order I have promised money which I supposed myself to owe to you, the claimant ought to be repelled by the exceptio doli mali; and further, by proceeding against the stipulator I shall obtain that he make the stipulation accepted for me (acceptilation). And this opinion of Julian has humanity, namely, that I may also use the exceptio and the condictio against this man to whom I am obligated.
Si procurator rei pecunia accepta damnari se passus sit et cum domino iudicati agatur, tuebitur se doli mali exceptione. nec hoc, quod acceperit procurator, auferri ab eo potest: nam turpiter accepta pecunia iustius penes eum est qui deceptus sit quam qui decepit.
If the procurator of the matter, after money has been accepted, has allowed himself to be condemned, and action on the judgment is brought against the master, he will protect himself by the exception of dolus malus. Nor can that which the procurator has received be taken away from the giver: for money shamefully accepted is more justly in the hands of him who has been deceived than of him who deceived.
Si procurator agit, de dolo eius excipi non debet, quia aliena lis est isque rei extraneus, neque alienus dolus nocere alteri debet. si post litem contestatam dolo quid fecerit, an exceptio eo nomine in iudicium obicienda sit, dubitari potest, quia litis contestatione res procuratoris fit eamque suo iam quodammodo nomine exequitur. et placet de procuratoris dolo excipiendum esse.
If a procurator acts, an exception on account of his fraud ought not to be pleaded, because the suit is another’s and he is a stranger to the matter, nor ought another’s fraud to harm someone else. If after the litis contestatio he has done something by fraud, it can be doubted whether an exception under that head should be raised in the trial, because by the litis contestatio the affair becomes the procurator’s and he now prosecutes it, in a certain manner, in his own name. And the accepted view is that an exception should be taken for the procurator’s fraud.
Liberis exheredatis, qui nihil ex patris iudicio meruerunt, rupto testamento ius suum conservandum est, nec opponetur doli mali exceptio. quod non solum in persona eorum, sed in heredibus in persona liberorum quoque eorum optinendum est.
For children disinherited, who in their father’s judgment have merited nothing, with the testament broken their right must be conserved, nor will the plea of fraud (exceptio doli mali) be set up. This must be maintained not only in their own person, but also in their heirs, in the person of their children as well.
Fideiussor evictionis nomine condemnatus id praedium, quod evictum est, et omnia praestare paratus est, quae iure empti continentur: quaero, an agentem emptorem exceptione ex causa iudicati doli mali summovere potest. respondit exceptionem quidem opponi posse, iudicem autem aestimaturum, ut pro damnis emptori satisfiat.
A surety, condemned under the head of eviction, is prepared to make good that estate which has been evicted, and everything that is contained under the right of purchase: I ask whether he can remove the purchaser, who is acting (as plaintiff), by an exceptio on the ground of a judgment (ex causa iudicati) of dolus malus. He replied that the exception can indeed be opposed, but that the judge will assess matters so that the purchaser is satisfied for his damages.
Pater pro filia dotem promiserat et pactus erat, ut ipse aleret filiam suam eiusque omnes: idem homo rusticanus genero scripsit quasi usuras praeteritas ex dotis promissione: quaesitum est, cum ipse filiam suam exhibuerit et maritus nullam impensam fecerit, an ex chirographo ex stipulatu agenti genero exceptio obstare debeat. respondit, si, ut proponatur, pater, cum exhiberet, per errorem promisisset, locum fore doli mali exceptioni.
The father had promised a dowry for his daughter and had agreed that he himself would maintain his daughter and all her people; the same man, a rustic, wrote to his son-in-law as though for past-due usury on account of the promise of the dowry. The question was asked, since he himself had produced his daughter and the husband had made no expense, whether an exceptio ought to obstruct the son-in-law suing ex stipulatu on the chirograph. He responded that, if, as is posited, the father, while producing her, had through error promised, there would be room for the exceptio of dolus malus.
Avus nepotibus ex filia legavit singulis centena et adiecit haec verba: " ignoscite, nam potueram vobis amplius relinquere, nisi me fronto pater vester male accepisset, cui dederam mutua quindecim, quae ab eo recipere non potui: postremo hostes, qui mihi fere omnem substantiam abstulerunt". quaesitum est, an, si avi heres ab his nepotibus patris sui heredibus petat quindecim, contra voluntatem defuncti facere videatur et doli mali exceptione summoveatur. respondit exceptionem obstaturam.
A grandfather bequeathed to his grandsons through his daughter one hundred each, and added these words: " forgive me, for I could have left you more, if your father Fronto had not received me badly, to whom I had given a loan of fifteen, which I was not able to recover from him: finally, enemies, who took away from me almost my entire substance." It was asked whether, if the heir of the grandfather should demand fifteen from these grandsons, the heirs of their father, he would seem to act against the will of the deceased and be removed by the exception of malicious deceit. He replied that the exception would obstruct.
Ex quadrante heres scriptus a coherede ex dodrante instituto emit portionem certa quantitate, ex qua aliquam summam in nominibus ex kalendario uti daret, stipulanti spopondit: defuncto venditore hereditatis falsum testamentum septicius accusare coepit et hereditatem ab emptore petit et ne quid ex ea minueret, impetravit: quaesitum est, cognitione falsi pendente an heredes ex stipulatu petentes doli exceptione summoventur. respondit heredes venditoris, si ante eventum cognitionis pergant petere, exceptione doli mali posse summoveri.
An heir written for a quarter bought from a coheir instituted for three-quarters the portion for a fixed amount, and to the stipulator he promised that, from it, he would pay some sum in notes (nomina) on the calendarium (ledger): after the seller of the inheritance died, Septicius began to accuse the testament as false and sought the inheritance from the buyer, and he obtained that nothing be diminished from it; it was asked whether, while the inquiry into the falsum is pending, the heirs suing on the stipulation are removed by the exception of dolus. He replied that the heirs of the seller, if they proceed to sue before the outcome of the inquiry, can be warded off by the exception of dolus malus.
Marito et filio communi ex parte dimidia scriptis heredibus filiam suam ex priore matrimonio ita heredem instituit: " maevia filia mea ex sex unciis heres mihi esto, si cum coheredibus tuis parem rationem feceris pro mea portione in diem mortis meae eius actus, qui pendet ex tutela tua, quam titius pater meus, avus tuus administravit". quaesitum est, an, quia sub condicione instituta filia esset, si omitteret hereditatem, uti salvam tutelae actionem haberet, legata sibi a matre data consequi possit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur eam, de qua quaereretur, contra voluntatem petere et ideo exceptionem doli obstaturam.
With the husband and the common son written as coheirs for the half share, she instituted her daughter from a prior marriage as heir in this way: " mevia, my daughter, be my heir out of six ounces, if you shall have made an equal reckoning with your coheirs, for my portion, as of the day of my death, of that action which hangs upon your guardianship, which Titius, my father, your grandfather, administered." It was asked whether, since the daughter was instituted under a condition, if she should forgo the inheritance, so as to keep safe the action of guardianship, she could obtain the legacies given to her by her mother. He answered that, according to what was proposed, she about whom the question was asked would be claiming against the intention, and therefore the exceptio doli would stand in the way.
Si manumisero eum servum, qui negotia mea gesserat in servitute, deinde stipulatus ab eo fuero, quod negotia mea gesserit, quidquid ob eam rem, si tunc liber fuisset, eum mihi dare oporteret, id dari, deinde ex stipulatu agam, non summoveri me exceptione: neque enim oneratum se hoc nomine potest queri libertus, si lucrum abruptum ex re patroni non faciat.
If I shall have manumitted that slave who had managed my business while in servitude, and then shall have stipulated from him, for the fact that he managed my business, that whatever on that account, if he had then been free, he ought to give to me, be given, and then I bring an action ex stipulatu, I am not to be dislodged by an exception: for the freedman cannot complain that he is burdened under this head, if he does not make a profit torn away from the patron’s affair.
Quae onerandae libertatis causa stipulatus sum, a liberto exigere non possum. onerandae autem libertatis causa facta bellissime ita definiuntur, quae ita imponuntur, ut, si patronum libertus offenderit, petantur ab eo semperque sit metu exactionis ei subiectus, propter quem metum quodvis sustineat patrono praecipiente.
What I have stipulated for the purpose of burdening liberty I cannot exact from a freedman. Moreover, things done for the purpose of burdening liberty are most excellently defined thus: those which are imposed in such a way that, if the freedman should offend the patron, they are demanded from him, and he is always subjected to the fear of exaction, on account of which fear he endures whatever the patron orders.
In summa si in continenti impositum quid sit liberto, quod epaiwroumenon oneret eius libertatem, dicendum est exceptioni locum facere. sed si post intervallum, habet quidem dubitationem, quia nemo eum cogebat hoc promittere: sed idem erit probandum et hic, tamen causa cognita, si liquido appareat libertum metu solo vel nimia patrono reverentia ita se subiecisse, ut vel poenali quadam stipulatione se subiceret.
In sum, if something is imposed upon the freedman immediately, which, being superadded, burdens his freedom, it must be said that there is room for an exception. But if after an interval, it does indeed admit of doubt, because no one compelled him to promise this; yet the same must be approved here as well, however with the matter investigated, if it clearly appears that the freedman, by fear alone or by excessive reverence toward his patron, so subjected himself that he even subjected himself by a certain penal stipulation.
Exceptionem onerandae libertatis causa, sicut et ceteras fideiussori non esse denegandas sciendum est, nec ei quidem, qui rogatu liberti reus factus est: sed et ipsi liberto, sive procurator ad defendendum a reo datus fuerit sive heres ei exstiterit. cum enim propositum sit praetori in huiusmodi obligationibus reo succurrere, non servaturum propositum suum, nisi fideiussorem quoque et eum, qui rogatu liberti reus factus fuerit, adversus patronum defenderit: etenim parvi refert, protinus libertus patrono cogatur dare an per interpositam fideiussoris vel rei personam.
It must be understood that the exception on account of the burdening of freedom, just like the other exceptions, is not to be denied to a surety, nor even to him who has become defendant at the request of the freedman; but also to the freedman himself, whether a procurator to defend has been appointed by the defendant, or whether an heir has succeeded to him. For since it is the praetor’s purpose in obligations of this kind to aid the defendant, he would not maintain his purpose unless he also protected the surety and the one who has become defendant at the request of the freedman against the patron: for it matters little whether the freedman is compelled to give to the patron directly, or through the interposed person of a surety or of a defendant.
Quod si patronus libertum suum delegaverit creditori, an adversus creditorem, cui delegatus promisit libertatis causa onerandae, exceptione ista uti possit, videamus. et cassius existimasse urseium refert creditorem quidem minime esse submovendum exceptione, quia suum recepit: verumtamen libertum patrono posse condicere, si non transigendae controversiae gratia id fecit.
But if a patron has delegated his freedman to a creditor, let us see whether he can use that exception against the creditor to whom the delegate promised for the purpose of burdening his freedom. And urseius reports that cassius thought the creditor ought by no means to be removed by the exception, because he received what was his own; nevertheless, that the freedman can bring a condiction against the patron, if he did not do this for the sake of settling the controversy.
Si servus promittat domino pecuniam, ut manumittatur, cum alias non esset manumissurus dominus, eamque liber factus spondeat: dicitur non obstare exceptionem patrono, si eam petat: non enim onerandae libertatis causa haec pecunia promissa est. alioquin iniquum est, dominum et servo carere et pretio eius. totiens ergo onerandae libertatis causa pecunia videtur promitti, quotiens sua sponte dominus manumisit et propterea velit libertum pecuniam promittere, ut non exigat eam, sed ut libertus eum timeat et obtemperet ei.
If a slave promises his master money in order to be manumitted, when otherwise the master would not have manumitted, and, once made free, he promises it by stipulation: it is said that the exception does not stand in the patron’s way if he demands it; for this money was not promised for the purpose of burdening the liberty. Otherwise it is inequitable that the master be without both the slave and his price. Therefore money is deemed to be promised for the purpose of burdening the liberty as often as the master manumits of his own accord and for that reason wants the freedman to promise money, not that he exact it, but that the freedman may fear him and obey him.
Si inter primum et secundum sit lis contestata et ego a tertio emero, qui nullam controversiam patiebatur, videamus, an exceptioni locus sit. et putem subveniendum mihi, quia is, qui mihi vendidit, nullam litem habuit et quod fieri potest, ut duo in necem eius litem inter se iungant, qui cum ipso litigare non poterant. si tamen cum procuratore tutore curatoreve alicuius iudicium acceptum sit, consequens erit dicere, quasi cum ipso litigetur, ita eum ad exceptionem pertinere.
If between the first and the second the suit has been joined, and I purchase from a third, who was suffering no controversy, let us see whether there is room for an exception. And I think relief should be afforded to me, because he who sold to me had no suit, and because it can occur that two, to his undoing, unite a lawsuit between themselves, who could not litigate with him himself. If, however, a proceeding has been undertaken with someone’s procurator, tutor, or curator, it will follow to say that, as though litigation were with the person himself, so it pertains to him for the exception.
Si servus cum emerit scit, ignoravit autem dominus, vel contra, videndum est, cuius potius spectanda sit scientia. et magis est, ut scientia inspicienda sit eius qui comparavit, non eius, cui adquiretur, et ideo poena litigiosi competit, sic tamen, si non mandatu domini emit: nam si mandatu, etiamsi scit servus, dominus autem ignoravit, scientia non nocet: et ita iulianus in re litigiosa scribit.
If a slave, when he has bought, knows, but the master was ignorant, or conversely, it must be considered whose knowledge ought rather to be regarded. And the better view is that the knowledge to be inspected is that of the one who made the purchase, not that of the one for whom it is being acquired; and therefore the penalty of the litigious party is incurred—however, only if he did not buy by the mandate of the master. For if by mandate, then even if the slave knows while the master was ignorant, the knowledge does not harm; and so Julianus writes in the matter of a litigious thing.
Rem de qua controversia est prohibemur in sacrum dedicare: alioquin dupli poenam patimur, nec immerito, ne liceat eo modo duriorem adversarii condicionem facere. sed duplum utrum fisco an adversario praestandum sit, nihil exprimitur: fortassis autem magis adversario, ut id veluti solacium habeat pro eo, quod potentiori adversario traditus est.
We are forbidden to dedicate to the sacred a thing about which there is controversy; otherwise we suffer the penalty of the double, and not without merit, lest it be permitted in that way to make the adversary’s condition harsher. But whether the double is to be rendered to the fisc (imperial treasury) or to the adversary is not expressed; perhaps, however, rather to the adversary, so that he may have it as a sort of solace for the fact that he has been delivered over to a more powerful adversary.
Re contrahitur obligatio mutui datione. mutui autem datio consistit in his rebus, quae pondere numero mensurave constant, veluti vino oleo frumento pecunia numerata, quas res in hoc damus, ut fiant accipientis, postea alias recepturi eiusdem generis et qualitatis.
An obligation is contracted by the thing, by the giving of a mutuum. Now the giving of a mutuum consists in those things which are determined by weight, number, or measure, such as wine, oil, grain, and counted money, which things we give for this purpose: that they become the recipient’s, and afterward we are to receive others of the same kind and quality.
Et ille quidem qui mutuum accepit, si quolibet casu quod accepit amiserit, nihilo minus obligatus permanet: is vero qui utendum accepit, si maiore casu, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest, veluti incendio ruina naufragio, rem quam accepit amiserit, securus est. alias tamen exactissimam diligentiam custodiendae rei praestare compellitur, nec sufficit ei eandem diligentiam adhibere, quam suis rebus adhibet, si alius diligentior custodire poterit. sed et in maioribus casibus, si culpa eius interveniat, tenetur, veluti si quasi amicos ad cenam invitaturus argentum, quod in eam rem utendum acceperit, peregre proficiscens secum portare voluerit et id aut naufragio aut praedonum hostiumve incursu amiserit.
And he indeed who has received a mutuum (a loan for consumption), if by any chance event he should lose what he received, remains nonetheless obligated; but he who has received something to be used (a loan for use), if by a greater casualty, to which human weakness cannot resist—such as fire, collapse, or shipwreck—he should lose the thing which he received, is free from liability. Otherwise, however, he is compelled to furnish the most exact diligence for the safekeeping of the thing, nor is it sufficient for him to apply the same diligence that he applies to his own goods, if another more diligent person could guard it. But even in greater casualties, if his fault intervenes, he is held, as for instance if, being about to invite, so to speak, friends to dinner, he should wish, when setting out abroad, to carry with him the silver which he had received to be used for that purpose, and should lose it either by shipwreck or by the incursion of robbers or of enemies.
Is quoque, apud quem rem aliquam deponimus, re nobis tenetur: qui et ipse de ea re quam acceperit restituenda tenetur. sed is etiamsi neglegenter rem custoditam amiserit, securus est: quia enim non sua gratia accipit, sed eius a quo accipit, in eo solo tenetur, si quid dolo perierit: neglegentiae vero nomine ideo non tenetur, quia qui neglegenti amico rem custodiendam committit, de se queri debet. magnam tamen neglegentiam placuit in doli crimine cadere.
He too, with whom we deposit some thing, is bound to us by the thing; and he likewise is bound to restore the thing which he has received. But even if he should lose the thing kept through negligence, he is secure; for he receives not for his own sake, but for that of the one from whom he receives; he is bound only in this respect, if anything has perished by fraud. Under the name of negligence, however, he is not held for this reason: because he who entrusts a thing to be kept to a negligent friend ought to complain of himself. Nevertheless, it is settled that gross negligence falls under the charge of fraud.
Sed aut proprio nomine quisque obligatur aut alieno: qui autem alieno nomine obligatur, fideiussor vocatur. et plerumque ab eo, quem proprio nomine obligamus, alios accipimus, qui eadem obligatione teneantur, dum curamus, ut quod in obligationem deduximus, tutius nobis debeatur.
But each person is obligated either in his own name or in another’s: and he who is obligated in another’s name is called a surety. and for the most part, from him whom we obligate in his own name, we take others who are held by the same obligation, while we take care that what we have brought under obligation be owed to us more securely.
Si id, quod dari stipulemur, tale sit, ut dari non possit, palam est naturali ratione inutilem esse stipulationem, veluti si de homine libero vel iam mortuo vel aedibus deustis facta sit stipulatio inter eos, qui ignoraverint eum hominem liberum esse vel mortuum esse vel aedes deustas esse. idem iuris est, si quis locum sacrum aut religiosum dari sibi stipulatus fuerit.
If that which we stipulate to be given is of such a kind that it cannot be given, it is clear by natural reason that the stipulation is useless, for example if a stipulation has been made about a free man or one already dead or houses burned down, between parties who were unaware that the man was free or was dead or that the houses had been burned. The same law holds if someone has stipulated that a sacred or religious place be given to him.
Sed et de surdo idem dicitur, quia, etiamsi loqui possit, sive promittit, verba stipulantis exaudire debet, sive stipuletur. debet exaudire verba promittentis. unde apparet non de eo nos loqui, qui tardius exaudit, sed qui omnino non exaudit.
But the same is said of a deaf person as well, because, even if he can speak, whether he promises, he must hear the words of the stipulator; or whether he stipulates, he must hear the words of the promisor. whence it appears that we are not speaking of one who hears rather slowly, but of one who does not hear at all.
Non satis autem est dantis esse nummos et fieri accipientis, ut obligatio nascatur, sed etiam hoc animo dari et accipi, ut obligatio constituatur. itaque si quis pecuniam suam donandi causa dederit mihi, quamquam et donantis fuerit et mea fiat, tamen non obligabor ei, quia non hoc inter nos actum est.
it is not sufficient, moreover, that the coins be the giver’s and become the recipient’s for an obligation to arise, but they must also be given and accepted with this intention, that an obligation be constituted. accordingly, if someone has given his money to me by way of donation, although it was the donor’s and becomes mine, nevertheless I shall not be obligated to him, because this was not agreed between us.
Ex maleficio nascuntur obligationes, veluti ex furto, ex damno, ex rapina, ex iniuria. quae omnia unius generis sunt: nam hae re tantum consistunt, id est ipso maleficio, cum alioquin ex contractu obligationes non tantum re consistant, sed etiam verbis et consensu.
From a malefice obligations arise, for example from theft, from damage, from rapine, from injury. All of these are of one and the same kind: for these consist in the thing only, that is, in the malefice itself, whereas obligations from contract consist not only in the thing, but also in words and in consent.
Si quis absentis negotia gesserit, si quidem ex mandatu, palam est ex contractu nasci inter eos actiones mandati, quibus invicem experiri possunt de eo, quod alterum alteri ex bona fide praestare oportet: si vero sine mandatu, placuit quidem sane eos invicem obligari eoque nomine proditae sunt actiones, quas appellamus negotiorum gestorum, quibus aeque invicem experiri possunt de eo, quod ex bona fide alterum alteri praestare oportet. sed neque ex contractu neque ex maleficio actiones nascuntur: neque enim is qui gessit cum absente creditur ante contraxisse, neque ullum maleficium est sine mandatu suscipere negotiorum administrationem: longe magis is, cuius negotia gesta sunt, ignorans aut contraxisse aut deliquisse intellegi potest: sed utilitatis causa receptum est invicem eos obligari. ideo autem id ita receptum est, quia plerumque homines eo animo peregre proficiscuntur quasi statim redituri nec ob id ulli curam negotiorum suorum mandant, deinde novis causis intervenientibus ex necessitate diutius absunt: quorum negotia disperire iniquum erat, quae sane disperirent, si vel is, qui obtulisset se negotiis gerundis, nullam habiturus esset actionem de eo, quod utiliter de suo impendisset, vel is, cuius gesta essent, adversus eum, qui invasisset negotia eius, nullo iure agere posset.
If anyone has managed the affairs of one absent, then indeed, if by a mandate, it is clear that from the contract actions of mandate arise between them, by which they can sue one another in turn concerning that which one ought to render to the other according to good faith; but if without a mandate, it has nonetheless been approved that they are mutually bound, and under that title actions have been introduced which we call negotiorum gestorum, by which likewise they can sue one another in turn concerning that which, in good faith, one ought to render to the other. But actions arise neither from contract nor from malefice: for neither is he who managed with the absent man believed to have previously contracted, nor is it any malefice to undertake the administration of affairs without a mandate; much more can he whose affairs were managed, being ignorant, be understood neither to have contracted nor to have committed a delict: but for the sake of utility it has been received that they are mutually bound. And this has been received thus for this reason, because for the most part men set out abroad with the disposition as if about to return immediately, and on that account entrust to no one the care of their affairs; then, with new causes supervening, from necessity they are absent longer: it would be inequitable that their affairs should perish, which surely would perish if either he who had offered himself for the managing of the affairs would have no action for that which he had usefully expended from his own, or he whose affairs had been managed could by no right sue against him who had invaded his affairs.
Tutelae quoque iudicio qui tenentur, non proprie ex contractu obligati intelleguntur ( nullum enim negotium inter tutorem et pupillum contrahitur): sed quia sane non ex maleficio tenentur, quasi ex contractu teneri videntur. et hoc autem casu mutuae sunt actiones: non tantum enim pupillus cum tutore, sed et contra tutor cum pupillo habet actionem, si vel impenderit aliquid in rem pupilli vel pro eo fuerit obligatus aut rem suam creditori eius obligaverit.
Those who are held by the guardianship action are not understood to be bound strictly from contract (for no negotium is contracted between a tutor and a pupil); but since indeed they are not held from maleficium, they seem to be held quasi from contract. And in this case too the actions are mutual: for not only does the pupil have an action against the tutor, but conversely the tutor also has an action against the pupil, if he has either expended something on the pupil’s res, or has been obligated on his behalf, or has pledged his own property to the pupil’s creditor.
Is quoque, qui non debitum accipit per errorem solventis, obligatur quidem quasi ex mutui datione et eadem actione tenetur, qua debitores creditoribus: sed non potest intellegi is, qui ex ea causa tenetur, ex contractu obligatus esse: qui enim solvit per errorem, magis distrahendae obligationis animo quam contrahendae dare videtur.
He also who receives what is not owed through the payer’s error is indeed obligated as if from the giving of a loan and is held by the same action by which debtors are to creditors; but it cannot be understood that he who is held on that ground is obligated from a contract; for he who pays by mistake seems to give with an intention rather of dissolving an obligation than of contracting one.
Is quoque, ex cuius cenaculo ( vel proprio ipsius vel conducto vel in quo gratis habitabat) deiectum effusumve aliquid est ita, ut alicui noceret, quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur: ideo autem non proprie ex maleficio obligatus intellegitur, quia plerumque ob alterius culpam tenetur ut servi aut liberi. cui similis est is, qui ea parte, qua volgo iter fieri solet, id positum aut suspensum habet, quod potest, si ceciderit, alicui nocere. ideo si filius familias seorsum a patre habitaverit et quid ex cenaculo eius deiectum effusumve sit sive quid positum suspensumve habuerit, cuius casus periculosus est, iuliano placuit in patrem neque de peculio neque noxalem dandam esse actionem, sed cum ipso filio agendum.
He too, from whose upper-room (whether his own, or hired, or one in which he was living gratis) something has been thrown down or poured out in such a way that it harmed someone, is considered to be held as if from a maleficium; however, he is not understood to be bound properly from a maleficium, because for the most part he is held on account of another’s fault, as that of a slave or of a child in power. Similar is he who has placed or suspended in that part where a way is commonly made something which, if it should fall, can harm someone. Therefore, if a son-in-power has lived separately from his father and something from his upper-room has been thrown down or poured out, or he has had something placed or suspended whose fall is dangerous, it pleased Julian that no action be given against the father, neither de peculio nor noxal, but that suit be brought against the son himself.
Item exercitor navis aut cauponae aut stabuli de damno aut furto, quod in nave aut caupona aut stabulo factum sit, quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur, si modo ipsius nullum est maleficium, sed alicuius eorum, quorum opera navem aut cauponam aut stabulum exerceret: cum enim neque ex contractu sit adversus eum constituta haec actio et aliquatenus culpae reus est, quod opera malorum hominum uteretur, ideo quasi ex maleficio teneri videtur.
Likewise the operator of a ship, or of an inn, or of a stable is considered to be held liable, as if from a delict, for loss or theft that was committed in the ship or inn or stable, provided that there is no wrongdoing of his own, but of one of those by whose agency he was operating the ship or inn or stable; for since this action is not established against him ex contractu, and he is to some extent answerable for fault, because he made use of the services of bad men, therefore he is deemed to be held as if from a delict.
Sub hac condicione " si volam" nulla fit obligatio: pro non dicto enim est, quod dare nisi velis cogi non possis: nam nec heres promissoris eius, qui numquam dare voluerit, tenetur, quia haec condicio in ipsum promissorem numquam exstitit.
Under this condition " si volam" no obligation arises: for it is as though not said, since you cannot be compelled to give unless you are willing: for neither is the heir of that promisor liable, who has never been willing to give, because this condition has never existed with respect to the promisor himself.
Qui cum herede egit, exceptione summotus est hac: " si non in ea causa tabulae testamenti sint, ut contra eas emancipato bonorum possessio dari possit " . emancipato omittente bonorum possessionem non inique postulabit creditor restitui sibi actionem adversus scriptum heredem: nam quamdiu bonorum possessio contra tabulas filio dari potest, heres quodammodo debitor non est.
He who brought suit against the heir has been removed by this exception: " if the tablets of the will are not in such a condition that bonorum possession can be given to the emancipated son against them " . With the emancipated son omitting bonorum possession, the creditor will not unjustly demand that the action be restored to him against the instituted heir: for as long as bonorum possession can be given to the son against the tablets, the heir is, in a certain way, not a debtor.
Qui a servo herditario mutuam pecuniam accepit et fundum vel hominem pignoris causa ei tradiderat et precario rogavit, precario possidet: nam servus hereditarius sicuti per traditionem accipiendo proprietatem hereditati adquirit, ita precario dando efficit, ne res usucapi possit. nam et si commodaverit vel deposuerit rem peculiarem, commodati et depositi actionem hereditati adquiret. haec ita, si peculiare negotium contractum est: nam ex hac causa etiam possessio adquisita intellegi debet.
He who has received a loan of money from an hereditary slave and had delivered to him a tract of land or a slave by way of pledge and requested to hold by precarium, holds by precarium: for an hereditary slave, just as by receiving through delivery he acquires ownership for the inheritance, so by giving by precarium he brings it about that the thing cannot be usucapted. For even if he has lent for use or deposited a thing belonging to the peculium, he will acquire for the inheritance the actions of commodatum and deposit. These things are so, if a peculium transaction has been contracted: for from this ground even possession ought to be understood to have been acquired.
Si is, qui stichum dari stipulatus fuerat, heres exstiterit ei, cui ex testamento idem stichus debebatur: si ex testamento stichum petierit, non consumet stipulationem, et contra si ex stipulatu stichum petierit, actionem ex testamento salvam habebit, quia initio ita constiterint hae duae obligationes, ut altera in iudicium deducta altera nihilo minus integra remaneret.
If the one who had stipulated that Stichus be given has become heir to him to whom that same Stichus was owed under a testament: if he should claim Stichus under the testament, he will not consume the stipulation; and conversely, if he should claim Stichus under the stipulation, he will have the action under the testament safe, because from the beginning these two obligations were so constituted that, with the one brought into judgment, the other nonetheless remained intact.
Ex promissione dotis: non videtur lucrativa causa esse, sed quodammodo creditor aut emptor intellegitur, qui dotem petit. porro cum creditor vel emptor ex lucrativa causa rem habere coeperit, nihilo minus integras actiones retinent, sicut ex contrario qui non ex causa lucrativa rem habere coepit, eandem non prohibetur ex lucrativa causa petere.
From a promise of dowry: it does not seem to be a lucrative cause, but in a certain way he who seeks the dowry is understood as a creditor or a buyer. Furthermore, when a creditor or a buyer has begun to have the thing from a lucrative cause, nonetheless they retain their actions intact; just as conversely, he who has not begun to have the thing from a lucrative cause is not prohibited from seeking the same by a lucrative cause.
Servus non in omnibus rebus sine poena domino dicto audiens esse solet, sicuti si dominus hominem occidere aut furtum alicui facere servum iussisset. quare quamvis domini iussu servus piraticam fecisset, iudicium in eum post libertatem reddi oportet. et quodcumque vi fecisset, quae vis a maleficio non abesset, ita oportet poenas eum pendere.
A slave is not, in all matters, accustomed to be obedient to his master without penalty, as, for instance, if the master had ordered the slave to kill a man or to commit theft against someone. Therefore, although at the master’s command the slave committed piracy, it is proper that judgment be rendered against him after liberty. And whatever he did by force—such force not being apart from malefaction—he ought accordingly to pay the penalties.
but if some brawl had arisen out of lawsuits and contention, or some force had been employed for the sake of retaining a right, and a crime was absent from these matters, then it does not befit the praetor, because the slave had done it by his master’s order, to grant, in that matter, a free-standing action.
Traiecticiae pecuniae nomine, si ad diem soluta non esset, poena ( uti adsolet) ob operas eius qui eam pecuniam peteret in stipulationem erat deducta: is qui eam pecuniam petebat parte exacta petere desierat, deinde interposito tempore interpellare instituerat. consultus respondit eius quoque temporis, quo interpellatus non esset, poenam peti posse: amplius etiamsi omnino interpellatus non esset: nec aliter non committi stipulationem, quam si per debitorem non stetisset, quo minus solveret: alioquin dicendum et si is, qui interpellare coepisset, valetudine impeditus interpellare desisset, poenam non committi. de illo sane potest dubitari, si interpellatus ipse moram fecerit, an, quamvis pecuniam postea offerat, nihilo minus poena committatur: et hoc rectius dicitur.
Under the head of sea‑loan (trajectitious) money, if it was not paid on the day, a penalty (as is customary) had been brought into the stipulation on account of the services of him who would demand that money; the man who was demanding that money, after a part had been exacted, had ceased to demand, then, time having intervened, set about to interpellate. Being consulted, he replied that the penalty could be sought even for the time during which he had not been interpellated; further, even if he had not been interpellated at all; nor is the stipulation not incurred otherwise than if it had not depended on the debtor, that he should pay; otherwise one would have to say that, if he who had begun to interpellate, hindered by ill‑health, had ceased to interpellate, the penalty would not be incurred. On this point indeed it can be doubted, if, after being interpellated, he himself made delay, whether, although he afterward offers the money, nevertheless the penalty is incurred; and this is more correctly said.
for also, if an arbiter, by a compromissum, has ordered money to be given on a certain day, and it has not been due to him who was ordered to give, he replied that the penalty is not incurred: to such a degree that Servius too most correctly judged this, that, if ever the day on which the money was to be given were not included in the sentence of the arbiter, a modest interval is to be deemed to have been granted. the same is to be said also when something has been sold on that condition, that, unless the price has been paid by the day, the thing becomes unbought.
Si a furioso, cum eum compotem mentis esse putarem, pecuniam quasi mutuam acceperim eaque in rem meam versa fuerit, condictio furioso adquiritur: nam ex quibus causis ignorantibus nobis actiones adquiruntur, ex isdem etiam furiosi nomine incipit agi posse: veluti cum servus eius stipulatur, cum furtum ei fit, aut damnum ei dando in legem aquiliam committitur, aut si forte, cum creditor fuerat, fraudandi eius causa debitor alicui rem tradiderit. idemque erit, si legetur ei vel fideicommissum ei relinquatur.
If from a madman, when I supposed him to be of sound mind, I received money as if by a loan and it was converted to my own use, a condictio is acquired to the madman: for from those causes by which, even without our knowing, actions are acquired to us, from the same it also becomes possible to proceed in the madman’s name: for example, when his slave stipulates, when theft is committed against him, or, by causing him loss, a delict under the Aquilian Law is committed, or if perchance, he having been a creditor, a debtor, for the purpose of defrauding him, has delivered a thing to someone. And the same will hold, if a legacy is bequeathed to him or a fideicommissum is left to him.
Actionum genera sunt duo, in rem, quae dicitur vindicatio, et in personam, quae condictio appellatur. in rem actio est, per quam rem nostram, quae ab alio possidetur, petimus: et semper adversus eum est qui rem possidet. in personam actio est, qua cum eo agimus, qui obligatus est nobis ad faciendum aliquid vel dandum: et semper adversus eundem locum habet.
there are two genera of actions, in rem, which is called vindicatio, and in personam, which is called condictio. an in rem action is that by which we claim our property, which is possessed by another: and it is always against him who possesses the thing. an in personam action is that by which we proceed against him who is obligated to us to do something or to give something: and it always lies against that same person.
Actionum autem quaedam ex contractu, quaedam ex facto, quaedam in factum sunt. ex contractu actio est, quotiens quis sui lucri causa cum aliquo contrahit, veluti emendo vendendo locando conducendo et ceteris similibus. ex facto actio est, quotiens ex eo teneri quis incipit, quod ipse admisit, veluti furtum vel iniuriam commisit vel damnum dedit.
As to actions, some are from contract, some from a deed, some in factum. An action from contract is whenever someone, for the sake of his own profit, contracts with another, as by buying, selling, letting, hiring, and other similar things. An action from a deed is whenever someone begins to be held liable from that which he himself has committed, as when he has committed theft or an injury, or has caused damage.
Lucio titio cum ex causa iudicati pecunia deberetur et eidem debitori aliam pecuniam crederet, in cautione pecuniae creditae non adiecit sibi praeter eam pecuniam debitam sibi ex causa iudicati: quaero, an integrae sint utraeque lucio titio petitiones. paulus respondit nihil proponi, cur non sint integrae.
When money was owed to Lucius Titius by reason of a judgment, and he lent other money to the same debtor, in the bond for the money lent he did not add for himself anything besides that money owed him by reason of the judgment: I ask whether both claims of Lucius Titius are unimpaired. Paulus replied that nothing is put forward why they should not be unimpaired.
Non solum stipulationes impossibili condicioni applicatae nullius momenti sunt, sed etiam ceteri quoque contractus, veluti emptiones locationes, impossibili condicione interposita aeque nullius momenti sunt, quia in ea re, quae ex duorum pluriumve consensu agitur, omnium voluntas spectetur, quorum procul dubio in huiusmodi actu talis cogitatio est, ut nihil agi existiment adposita ea condicione, quam sciant esse impossibilem.
Not only are stipulations applied to an impossible condition of no moment, but the other contracts as well, such as sales and leases, are equally of no moment when an impossible condition is interposed; for in a matter which is conducted by the consensus of two or more, the will of all is regarded, and without doubt, in a transaction of this sort, they have this thought: that nothing is being done upon the addition of that condition which they know to be impossible.
Qui servum alienum iniuriose verberat, ex uno facto incidit et in aquiliam et in actionem iniuriarum: iniuria enim ex affectu fit, damnum ex culpa et ideo possunt utraeque competere. sed quidam altera electa alteram consumi. alii per legis aquiliae actionem iniuriarum consumi, quoniam desiit bonum et aequum esse condemnari eum, qui aestimationem praestitit: sed si ante iniuriarum actum esset, teneri eum ex lege aquilia.
He who injuriously beats another’s slave, from one and the same act incurs both the Aquilian action and the action for injuries: for injury arises from intent, damage from fault, and therefore both can be competent. But some say that, once the one is chosen, the other is consumed. Others say that by the action of the Lex Aquilia the action for injuries is consumed, since it has ceased to be good and equitable that he be condemned who has paid the valuation; but if before there had been an action for injuries, he is held under the Lex Aquilia.
but even this opinion is to be inhibited by the praetor, unless suit is brought for that which affords a greater recovery under the Lex Aquilia. therefore it is more reasonable that this opinion be admitted: that it be permitted to him to exercise first whichever action he shall have wished, and that whatever is more in the other, this also he may execute.
Hinc de colono responsum est, si aliquid ex fundo subtraxerit, teneri eum condictione et furti, quin etiam ex locato: et poena quidem furti non confunditur, illae autem inter se miscentur. et hoc in legis aquiliae actione dicitur, si tibi commodavero vestimenta et tu ea ruperis: utraeque enim actiones rei persecutionem continent. et quidem post legis aquiliae actionem utique commodati finietur: post commodati an aquiliae remaneat in eo, quod in repetitione triginta dierum amplius est, dubitatur: sed verius est remanere, quia simplo accedit: et simplo subducto locum non habet.
Hence it has been answered about a tenant farmer that, if he has subtracted anything from the estate, he is liable by condiction and for theft, and indeed also from the letting; and the penalty of theft, to be sure, is not confounded, but those others are mingled with each other. And this is said likewise in the action of the Aquilian law, if I shall have lent you garments on loan and you have torn them: for both actions contain a prosecution for the thing. And indeed, after the action of the Aquilian law, certainly the commodatum will be brought to an end; after the commodatum, whether the Aquilian action remains for that which is more in the repetition at thirty days, is doubted: but the truer view is that it remains, because it accrues over and above the single amount; and, the single amount being deducted, it has no place.
In honorariis actionibus sic esse definiendum cassius ait, ut quae rei persecutionem habeant, hae etiam post annum darentur, ceterae intra annum. honorariae autem, quae post annum non dantur, nec in heredem dandae sunt, ut tamen lucrum ei extorqueatur, sicut fit in actione doli mali et interdicto unde vi et similibus. illae autem rei persecutionem continent, quibus persequimur quod ex patrimonio nobis abest, ut cum agimus cum bonorum possessore debitoris nostri, item publiciana, quae ad exemplum vindicationis datur.
Cassius says that it must be defined thus in honorary actions: that those which have a persecution of the thing be granted even after a year, the others within a year. And honorary actions which are not granted after a year are not to be granted against the heir either, yet so that profit be extorted from him, as happens in the action of dolus malus (fraud) and in the interdict “whence by force” (unde vi) and the like. But those contain a persecution of the thing by which we pursue what is lacking from our patrimony, as when we bring suit against the possessor of the goods of our debtor; likewise the Publician action, which is given on the exemplar of vindication.
Actionis verbo continetur in rem, in personam: directa, utilis: praeiudicium, sicut ait pomponius: stipulationes etiam, quae praetoriae sunt, quia actionum instar obtinent, ut damni infecti, legatorum et si quae similes sunt. interdicta quoque actionis verbo continentur.
By the word action are contained in rem and in personam; direct and useful; a praeiudicium, as Pomponius says; and also stipulations which are praetorian, because they hold the likeness of actions, such as for damnum infectum, of legacies, and any that are similar. Interdicts too are contained by the word action.
Circa diem duplex inspectio est: nam vel ex die incipit obligatio aut confertur in diem. ex die veluti " kalendis martiis dare spondes?" cuius natura haec est, ut ante diem non exigatur. ad diem autem " usque ad kalendas dare spondes?" placet autem ad tempus obligationem constitui non posse non magis quam legatum: nam quod alicui deberi coepit, certis modis desinit deberi.
Around a day there is a twofold consideration: for either an obligation begins from a day, or it is set for a day. From a day, as in " on the Kalends of March do you promise to give?," whose nature is this, that it is not exacted before the day. To a day, however, " up to the Kalends do you promise to give?" Moreover, it is the settled view that an obligation cannot be constituted for a term any more than a legacy: for what has begun to be owed to someone ceases to be owed only in certain ways.
clearly, after the term, the stipulator can be repelled by the exception either of pactum conventum or of dolus malus. likewise, in delivering, if someone were to say that he delivers the soil alone without the surface, he gains nothing to prevent the surface from passing as well, which by nature coheres with the soil.
Condicio vero efficax est, quae in constituenda obligatione inseritur, non quae post perfectam eam ponitur, veluti " centum dare spondes, nisi navis ex asia venerit?" sed hoc casu existente condicione locus erit exceptioni pacti conventi vel doli mali.
A truly efficacious condition is that which is inserted in the constituting of an obligation, not that which is set after it has been perfected, for example, " do you promise to give a hundred, unless a ship has come from Asia?" but in this case, with the condition existing, there will be room for the exception (defense) of an agreed pact or of malicious fraud.
Accessio vero in obligatione aut personae aut rei fit. personae, cum mihi aut titio stipulor. rei, cum mihi decem aut titio hominem stipulor: ubi quaeritur, an ipso iure fiat liberatio homine soluto titio.
accession, moreover, in an obligation occurs either of the person or of the thing. of the person, when I stipulate for myself or for Titius. of the thing, when I stipulate ten for myself or for Titius a man; where it is asked whether liberation takes place ipso iure when the man has been released to Titius.
Sed si navem fieri stipulatus sum et, si non feceris, centum, videndum, utrum duae stipulationes sint, pura et condicionalis, et existens sequentis condicio non tollat priorem? an vero transferat in se et quasi novatio prioris fiat? quod magis verum est.
But if I have stipulated that a ship be made and, if you do not make it, 100, it must be considered whether there are two stipulations, one pure and one conditional, and the occurrence of the condition in the latter does not annul the former; or rather whether it transfers it into itself and, as it were, a novation of the former comes about—which is more true.
Furiosus et pupillus, ubi ex re actio venit, obligantur etiam sine curatore vel tutoris auctoritate, veluti si communem fundum habeo cum his et aliquid in eum impendero vel damnum in eo pupillus dederit: nam iudicio communi dividundo obligabuntur.
The insane person and the ward, when an action arises out of the matter, are bound even without a curator or the authority of a tutor, for example, if I have a common estate with them and have expended something upon it, or if the ward has caused damage on it: for they will be bound by the action for dividing common property.
Arrianus ait multum interesse, quaeras, utrum aliquis obligetur an aliquis liberetur: ubi de obligando quaeritur, propensiores esse debere nos, si habeamus occasionem, ad negandum: ubi de liberando, ex diverso, ut facilior sis ad liberationem.
Arrianus says that it makes much difference whether you inquire whether someone is obligated or someone is liberated: where the question is about obligating, we ought to be more inclined, if we have the occasion, to denial; where about liberating, conversely, that you be more ready toward liberation.
Ex contractibus venientes actiones in heredes dantur, licet delictum quoque versetur, veluti cum tutor in tutela gerenda dolo fecerit aut is apud quem depositum est: quo casu etiam cum filius familias aut servus quid tale commisit, de peculio actio datur, non noxalis.
Actions arising from contracts are given against heirs, even if a delict is also involved, as when a tutor, in administering the tutelage, has acted with fraud, or the person with whom a deposit is lodged: in which case, too, when a son under paternal power or a slave has committed something of that sort, an action de peculio is granted, not a noxal one.
Quaecumque actiones servi mei nomine mihi coeperunt competere vel ex duodecim tabulis vel ex lege aquilia vel iniuriarum vel furti, eaedem durant, etiamsi servus postea vel manumissus vel alienatus vel mortuus fuerit. sed et condictio ex furtiva causa competit, nisi si nactus possessionem servi aut alienavero aut manumisero eum.
Whatever actions, in the name of my slave, began to be available to me, whether from the Twelve Tables or from the Lex Aquilia or for injuries or for theft, those same continue, even if afterwards the slave has been manumitted or alienated or has died. But a condiction also lies from a theft cause, unless, after I have obtained possession of the slave, I have either alienated or manumitted him.
In omnibus negotiis contrahendis, sive bona fide sint sive non sint, si error aliquis intervenit, ut aliud sentiat puta qui emit aut qui conducit, aliud qui cum his contrahit, nihil valet quod acti sit. et idem in societate quoque coeunda respondendum est, ut, si dissentiant aliud alio existimante, nihil valet ea societas, quae in consensu consistit.
In all negotiations being contracted, whether they are bona fide or are not, if some error intervenes, such that, for instance, the one who buys or who hires thinks one thing, and the one who contracts with them another, nothing of what has been done is valid. And the same is to be answered also in a partnership to be formed, that, if they dissent, one estimating one thing, the other another, that partnership, which consists in consent, is of no effect.
Procurator seii admisit subscriptionem ad argentarium vascularium in verba infra scripta: loukios kalandios epegnwn, kavws progegraptai: estin loipa par' hymin, ofeilomena tw deini, tosa : quaero, an gaium seium obligare potuit. respondit seium, si alioquin obligatus non esset, non propter quod ea scriptura quae proponeretur interposita sit, obligatum esse.
The procurator of Seius admitted a subscription to the banker of the dealer in vessels in the words written below: “I, Lucius Calandios, have acknowledged, as has been previously written: there remains with you, owed to So-and-so, such-and-such an amount” : I ask whether he could bind Gaius Seius. He responded that Seius, if he were not otherwise obligated, was not, by reason of the fact that the writing which was being produced had been interposed, bound.
Seia, cum salarium constituere vellet, ita epistulam emisit: " lucio titio salutem. si in eodem animo et eadem affectione circa me es, quo semper fuisti, ex continenti acceptis litteris meis distracta re tua veni hoc: tibi quamdiu vivam praestabo annuos decem. scio enim quia valde me bene ames". quaero, cum et rem suam distraxerit lucius titius et ad eam profectus sit et ex eo cum ea sit, an ei ex his epistulis salarium annuum debeatur.
Seia, when she wished to establish a salary, sent a letter thus: " lucio titio greetings. if you are in the same mind and the same affection toward me as you have always been, immediately upon receiving my letters, with your property alienated, come here for this: I will provide to you ten annually as long as I live. for I know that you love me very well." I ask, since both Lucius Titius has alienated his property and has set out to her and from that time has been with her, whether an annual salary is owed to him from these letters.