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Dig. 15.3.0. De in rem verso.
15.2.0. When the action concerning the peculium is annual.
Dig. 15.3.0. On what has been turned to the estate.
Ex ea causa, ex qua soleret servus fructuarius vel usuarius adquirere, in eum, cuius usus fructus vel usus sit, actio dumtaxat de peculio ceteraeque honorariae dantur, ex reliquis in dominum proprietatis.
From that cause on which a slave of a usufructuary or of a user would be accustomed to acquire, there is granted against the one whose the usufruct or use is only the action de peculio and the other praetorian (honorary) actions; for the remaining matters, [the action lies] against the owner of the proprietas (bare ownership).
Licet tamen praetor, si cum eo qui in potestate sit gestum sit polliceatur actionem, tamen sciendum est et si in nullius sit potestate, dari de peculio actionem, ut puta si cum servo hereditario contractum sit ante aditam hereditatem.
Nevertheless, although the praetor, if business has been transacted with someone who is under power, promises an action, still it must be understood that even if he is under no one’s power, an action de peculio is granted; for example, if a contract has been made with an hereditary slave before the inheritance has been adited.
Unde labeo scribit et si secundo tertiove gradu substitutus sit servus et deliberantibus primis heredibus cum eo contractum sit, mox repudiantibus eis ipse liber heresque exstiterit, posse dici de peculio eum conveniri et de in rem verso.
Whence Labeo writes that, even if a slave has been substituted in the second or third degree, and while the first heirs are deliberating a contract has been made with him, then, when they soon repudiate and he himself has become free and heir, it can be said that he may be sued on the peculium and on what was turned to his patrimony (de in rem verso).
Si filius familias vel servus pro aliquo fideiusserint vel alias intervenerint vel mandaverint, tractatum tum est, an sit de peculio actio. et est verius in servo causam fideiubendi vel mandandi spectandam, quam sententiam et celsus libro sexto probat in servo fideiussore. si igitur quasi intercessor servus intervenerit, non rem peculiarem agens, non obligabitur dominus de peculio.
If a son under paternal power (filius familias) or a slave has stood surety for someone (fideiussor), or otherwise has intervened, or has given a mandate, it has then been discussed whether there is an action de peculio. And it is more correct, in the case of a slave, that the cause of standing surety or of mandating should be considered—a view which Celsus also, in Book Six, approves in the case of a slave as surety. If, therefore, the slave has intervened as, so to speak, an intercessor, not acting in a matter of the peculium, the master will not be obligated under the de peculio action.
Iulianus quoque libro duodecimo digestorum scribit, si servus mandaverit, ut creditori meo solveretur, referre ait, quam causam mandandi habuerit: si pro creditore suo solvi mandavit, esse obligatum dominum de peculio: quod si intercessoris officio functus sit, non obligari dominum de peculio.
Julian also, in book 12 of the Digest, writes that, if a slave has mandated that payment be made to my creditor, he says it makes a difference what cause of mandating he had: if he mandated that payment be made on behalf of his own creditor, the master is obligated out of the peculium; but if he has performed the office of an intercessor, the master is not obligated out of the peculium.
Cui congruit, quod idem iulianus scribit, si a filio meo fideiussorem accepero, quidquid a fideiussore accepero, id me non de in rem verso, sed de peculio actione mandati praestaturum. idem accipias et in servi fideiussore, idemque si alius mihi pro filio meo debitore solvisset. quod si filius meus debitor non fuisset, exceptione doli fideiussorem usurum et, si solvisset, condicturum scribit.
Which accords with what the same Julianus writes: if I have accepted a surety (fideiussor) from my son, whatever I have received from the surety, I will make good, not under the action de in rem verso, but under de peculio and the actio mandati. You should take the same also in the case of a slave’s surety, and likewise if someone else had paid me on behalf of my son, the debtor. But if my son had not been a debtor, he writes that the surety will employ the exceptio doli, and, if he has paid, will bring a condictio.
Si servus, cum se pro libero gereret, compromiserit, quaeritur, an de peculio actio ex poena compromissi quasi ex negotio gesto danda sit, sicuti traiecticiae pecuniae datur. sed hoc et nervae filio et mihi videtur verius ex compromisso servi non dandam de peculio actionem, quia nec si iudicio condemnetur servus, datur in eum actio.
If a slave, while carrying himself as if free, has entered into a compromissum, the question is whether an action de peculio, on the penalty of the compromissum, should be granted as if from negotium gestum, just as it is given for traiecticia pecunia. But both to Nerva’s son and to me it seems truer that from a slave’s compromissum an action de peculio should not be given, because not even if the slave is condemned in a judgment is an action given against him.
Quare et ex compromisso pater tenebitur. et ita papinianus quoque libro nono quaestionum scribit nec interesse ait, ex qua causa compromiserit, utrum ex ea causa, ex qua potuit cum patre de peculio agere, an vero ex ea qua non potuit, cum ex stipulatu pater conveniatur.
Wherefore the father also will be bound by the compromise; and thus Papinian likewise writes in the ninth book of the Questions and says that it does not matter from what cause he entered into the compromise, whether from a cause on which he could have proceeded against the father concerning the peculium, or indeed from one on which he could not, since the father is proceeded against on the stipulation.
Idem scribit iudicati quoque patrem de peculio actione teneri, quod et Marcellus putat, etiam eius actionis nomine, ex qua non potuit pater de peculio actionem pati: nam sicut in stipulatione contrahitur cum filio, ita iudicio contrahi: proinde non originem iudicii spectandam, sed ipsam iudicati velut obligationem. quare et si quasi defensor condemnatus sit, idem putat.
He likewise writes that the father is also held by the action de peculio for the judgment-debt, which Marcellus also thinks—even in respect of that action on account of which the father could not have been subject to the action de peculio: for just as one contracts by stipulation with the son, so also by the judgment one is contracted; accordingly, one must look not to the origin of the suit, but to the very obligation, as it were, of the adjudged matter. Wherefore, even if he has been condemned as a sort of defender, he thinks the same.
Ex furtiva causa filio quidem familias condici posse constat. an vero in patrem vel in dominum de peculio danda est, quaeritur: et est verius, in quantum locupletior dominus factus esset ex furto facto, actionem de peculio dandam: idem labeo probat, quia iniquissimum est ex furto servi dominum locupletari impune. nam et circa rerum amotarum actionem filiae familias nomine in id quod ad patrem pervenit competit actio de peculio.
From a theft-based cause it is settled that the condictio (for theft) can indeed be brought against a filius familias. But whether against the father or against the master an action de peculio is to be given, is asked; and the truer view is that an action de peculio is to be given to the extent that the master became more enriched from the theft committed. The same is approved by Labeo, because it is most inequitable that from a slave’s theft the master be enriched with impunity. For also concerning the action for removed things (rerum amotarum), in the name of a filia familias, the action de peculio lies for that amount which came through to the father.
Si filius familias duumvir pupillo rem salvam fore caveri non curavit, papinianus libro nono quaestionum de peculio actionem competere ait. nec quicquam mutare arbitror, an voluntate patris decurio factus sit, quoniam rem publicam salvam fore pater obstrictus est.
If a son under paternal power, being a duumvir, did not take care that security be given that the ward’s property would be kept safe, Papinian, in the ninth book of the Questions, says that the action de peculio lies. Nor do I think it makes any difference whether he became a decurion with his father’s consent, since the father is bound that the commonwealth be kept safe.
Peculii est non id, cuius servus seorsum a domino rationem habuerit, sed quod dominus ipse separaverit suam a servi rationem discernens: nam cum servi peculium totum adimere vel augere vel minuere dominus possit, animadvertendum est non quid servus, sed quid dominus constituendi servilis peculii gratia fecerit.
It is not peculium that the slave has kept an account of separately from the master, but what the master himself has set apart, distinguishing his own account from the slave’s account: for since the master can take away the slave’s peculium entirely, or increase or diminish it, it must be noted, not what the slave has done, but what the master has done for the sake of constituting the slave’s peculium.
Sed hoc ita verum puto, si debito servum liberare voluit dominus, ut, etiamsi nuda voluntate remiserit dominus quod debuerit, desinat servus debitor esse: si vero nomina ita fecerit dominus, ut quasi debitorem se servo faceret, cum re vera debitor non esset, contra puto: re enim, non verbis peculium augendum est.
But I think this true only thus: if the master wished to liberate the slave from the debt, so that even if by bare volition the master remitted what was owed, the slave ceases to be a debtor; but if the master made the accounts (nomina) in such a way as to make himself, as it were, a debtor to the slave, when in truth he was not a debtor, I think the contrary: for the peculium is to be augmented in fact, not by words.
Si aere alieno dominico exhauriatur peculium servi, res tamen in causa peculiaria manent: nam si aut servo donasset debitum dominus aut nomine servi alius domino intulisset, peculium suppletur nec est nova concessione domini opus.
If the slave’s peculium is exhausted by the master’s debt, the things nevertheless remain in the peculium category: for if either the master had remitted the debt to the slave, or someone else had paid to the master in the slave’s name, the peculium is supplemented and there is no need of a new concession by the master.
Et adicit pupillum vel furiosum constituere quidem peculium servo non posse: verum ante constitutum, id est ante furorem vel a patre pupilli, non adimetur ex his causis. quae sententia vera est et congruit cum eo, quod Marcellus apud iulianum notans adicit " posse fieri, ut apud alterum ex dominis servus peculium habeat, apud alterum non, ut puta si alter ex dominis furiosus sit vel pupillus, si ( ut quidam, inquit, putant) peculium servus habere non potest nisi concedente domino. ego autem puto non esse opus concedi peculium a domino servum habere, sed non adimi, ut habeat". alia causa est peculii liberae administrationis: nam haec specialiter concedenda est.
And he adds that a ward or a madman indeed cannot establish a peculium for a slave: but one established beforehand—that is, before the madness, or by the ward’s father—will not be taken away on these grounds. This opinion is true and accords with what Marcellus, noting in Julian, adds: "it can happen that with one of the masters a slave has a peculium, with the other he does not, for instance if one of the masters is mad or a ward, if (as some, he says, think) a slave cannot have a peculium unless the master concedes it. But I, however, think it is not necessary that it be conceded by the master for a slave to have a peculium, but rather that it not be taken away, so that he may have it." Another matter is the free administration of the peculium: for this must be granted specifically.
Pupillum autem tam filium quam servum peculium habere posse pedius libro quinto decimo scribit, cum in hoc, inquit, totum ex domini constitutione pendeat. ergo et si furere coeperit servus vel filius, retinebunt peculium. in peculio autem res esse possunt omnes et mobiles et soli: vicarios quoque in peculium potest habere et vicariorum peculium: hoc amplius et nomina debitorum.
Pedius, in the fifteenth book, writes that a ward—both a son and a slave—can have a peculium, since in this, he says, the whole matter depends on the master’s constitution. Therefore even if the slave or the son begins to be insane, they will retain the peculium. Moreover, in a peculium there can be things of every kind, both movables and immovables: he can also have sub-slaves (vicarii) in the peculium, and the peculium of the sub-slaves; further, even the claims (accounts) of debtors.
Sed et id quod dominus sibi debet in peculium habebit, si forte in domini rationem impendit et dominus ei debitor manere voluit aut si debitorem eius dominus convenit. quare si forte ex servi emptione evictionis nomine duplum dominus exegit, in peculium servi erit conversum, nisi forte dominus eo proposito fuit, ut nollet hoc esse in peculium servi.
But also that which the master owes to him will be held in the peculium, if perchance he expended it on the master’s account and the master willed to remain debtor to him, or if the master brought an action against his (the slave’s) debtor. Wherefore, if perchance, from a purchase made by the slave, the master exacted the double under the head of eviction, it will be converted into the slave’s peculium, unless perhaps the master had this intention: that he did not wish this to be in the slave’s peculium.
Non statim quod dominus voluit ex re sua peculii esse, peculium fecit, sed si tradidit aut, cum apud eum esset, pro tradito habuit: desiderat enim res naturalem dationem. contra autem simul atque noluit, peculium servi desinit peculium esse.
Not immediately, from the mere fact that the master wished something out of his own property to be of the peculium, did he make it peculium, but only if he delivered it, or, when it was in his possession, he held it as if delivered; for the thing requires natural delivery. On the contrary, as soon as he is unwilling, the slave’s peculium ceases to be peculium.
Plane si conservus dedit damnum vel subripuit, in peculium videtur haberi, et ita pomponius libro undecimo scribit: nam et si quid dominus ab eo qui rem peculiarem subripuit vel consecutus est vel consequi potest, in peculium esse ei imputandum neratius libro secundo responsorum scribit.
Plainly, if a fellow-slave caused damage or stole, it is considered to be had in the peculium; and so Pomponius writes in the eleventh book: for also, if the master has either recovered, or can recover, anything from him who stole a peculium-thing, it is to be imputed to him in the peculium, as Neratius writes in the second book of his Responses.
Praeterea id etiam deducetur, quod his personis debetur, quae sunt in tutela vel cura domini vel patris vel quorum negotia administrant, dummodo dolo careant, quoniam et si per dolum peculium vel ademerint vel minuerint, tenentur: nam si semper praevenire dominus et agere videtur, cur non dicatur etiam hoc nomine eum secum egisse, quo nomine vel tutelae vel negotiorum gestorum vel utili actione tenebitur? nam ut eleganter pedius ait, ideo hoc minus in peculio est, quod domino vel patri debetur, quoniam non est verisimile dominum id concedere servo in peculium habere, quod sibi debetur. sane cum ex ceteris causis ipsum a semet ipso exegisse dicimus qui negotia vel tutelam geret, cur non etiam in specie peculiari exegerit, quod exigi debuit?
Moreover, that too will be deducted which is owed to those persons who are under the tutelage or cura of the master or father, or whose affairs they administer, provided they are free of fraud; since even if by fraud they have either taken away from or diminished the peculium, they are held liable. For if the master is always deemed to anticipate and to act, why should he not be said under this head also to have transacted with himself—under which head he will be held by an action of tutelage, or of business transacted (negotiorum gestorum), or by a useful action? For, as Pedius elegantly says, for this reason what is owed to the master or the father is the less in the peculium, since it is not plausible that the master grants the slave to have in his peculium what is owed to himself. And indeed, since in other cases we say that he who manages business or tutelage has exacted it from himself, why should he not also, in the peculiar (peculiary) case, have exacted what ought to have been exacted?
Sed et creditor servi, qui heres exstitit domino eius, deducit de peculio quod sibi debetur, si conveniatur, sive libertatem servus acceperit sive non, idemque et si legatus sit pure servus: nam quasi praevenerit et ipse secum egerit, sic deducet quod sibi debetur, licet nullo momento dominium in manumisso vel legato pure habuerit. et ita iulianus libro duodecimo scribit. certe si sub condicione servus libertatem acceperit, minus dubitanter iulianus eodem loco scribit heredem deducere: dominus enim factus est.
But also the creditor of the slave, who has emerged as heir to that slave’s master, deducts from the peculium what is owed to himself, if he is sued, whether the slave has received liberty or not; and the same holds even if the slave has been bequeathed purely: for, as though he had anticipated and transacted with himself, thus he will deduct what is owed to him, although at no moment did he have ownership in the manumitted person or in the one bequeathed purely. And thus Julian writes in the twelfth book. Certainly, if the slave has received liberty under a condition, Julian in the same place writes with less hesitation that the heir makes the deduction: for he has become owner.
Sive autem ex contractu quid domino debeat sive ex rationum reliquis, deducet dominus. sed et si ex delicto ei debeat, ut puta ob furtum quod fecit, aeque deducetur. sed est quaestionis, utrum ipsa furti aestimatio, id est id solum quod domino abest, an vero tantum, quantum, si alienus servus commisisset, id est cum furti poenis?
Whether, however, he owes the master anything from contract or from the balances of the accounts, the master will deduct it. But also if he owes him from a delict, for instance on account of a theft which he committed, it likewise will be deducted. But the question is whether it is the very estimation of the theft, that is, only that which is lacking to the master, or indeed as much as if another’s slave had committed it, that is, together with the penalties of theft?
Si ipse servus sese vulneravit, non debet hoc damnum deducere, non magis quam si se occiderit vel praecipitaverit: licet enim etiam servis naturaliter in suum corpus saevire. sed si a se vulneratum servum dominus curaverit, sumptuum nomine debitorem eum domino puto effectum, quamquam, si aegrum eum curasset, rem suam potius egisset.
If the slave himself has wounded himself, he ought not to deduct this damage, no more than if he had killed himself or hurled himself headlong: for it is permitted even to slaves, by nature, to be savage against their own body. But if the master has treated a slave wounded by himself, I consider him to have been made a debtor to the master under the name of expenses, although, if he had treated him when sick, he would rather have transacted his own affair.
Item deducetur de peculio, si quid dominus servi nomine obligatus est aut praestitit obligatus: ita si quid ei creditum est iussu domini: nam hoc deducendum iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit. sed hoc ita demum verum puto, si non in rem domini vel patris quod acceptum est pervenit: alioquin secum debebit compensare. sed et si pro servo fideiusserit, deducendum iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit.
Likewise it will be deducted from the peculium, if the master has been obligated in the name of the slave or has discharged (as one obligated); likewise if anything has been credited to him by the order of the master: for Julian writes in book 12 of the Digesta that this must be deducted. But I think this is true only if what was received did not come into the property (in rem) of the master or the father; otherwise he ought to compensate with himself. And even if he has stood surety for the slave, Julian writes in book 12 of the Digesta that it must be deducted.
But Marcellus says that in either case, if as yet nothing has been outlaid by the master, it is better to make payment to the creditor, on condition that he give security that he will repay if the master, being sued under this head, should have paid anything, rather than that there be a deduction from the outset, so that the creditor may the more obtain the inter-usury of the intervening time. But if the master, sued on the peculium, has been condemned, it ought to be deducted from the subsequent action de peculio: for the master or the father has begun to be bound as iudicatus; for even if, without being condemned, he has paid something to the creditor in the slave’s name, he would also deduct this.
Si vero adhuc in suspenso est prius iudicium de peculio et ex posteriore iudicio res iudicaretur, nullo modo debet prioris iudicii ratio haberi in posteriore condemnatione, quia in actione de peculio occupantis melior est condicio, occupare autem videtur non qui prior litem contestatus est, sed qui prior ad sententiam iudicis pervenit.
If, however, the earlier judgment concerning the peculium is still in suspense, and the matter is adjudicated by the later judgment, in no way ought regard for the earlier judgment to be had in the later condemnation; for in an action concerning the peculium the condition of the occupant is better, and he is considered to “occupy” not the one who first joined issue, but the one who first arrived at the judge’s sentence.
Sed et si quid dominus soluturum se servi nomine repromisit, deduci oportebit, quemadmodum si quid domino servus pro debitore expromiserat. idem est et si pro libertate quid domino expromisit, quasi debitor domino sit effectus, sed ita demum, si manumisso eo agatur.
But also, if the master has promised that he will pay something in the slave’s name, it must be deducted, just as if the slave had undertaken something to the master on behalf of a debtor. The same holds if he has promised something to the master for liberty, as though he had become a debtor to the master—but only then, if suit is brought after he has been manumitted.
Sed si a debitore dominico servus exegerit, an domini debitorem se fecerit, quaeritur: et iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum non aliter dominum deducturum ait, quam si ratum habuisset quod exactum est: eadem et in filio familias dicenda erunt. et puto veram iuliani sententiam: naturalia enim debita spectamus in peculii deductione: est autem natura aequum liberari filium vel servum obligatione eo quod indebitum videtur exegisse.
But if a slave has exacted from the master’s debtor, the question is whether he has made himself a debtor to the master; and Julian, in book 12 of the Digest, says that the master will make no deduction otherwise than if he has ratified what has been exacted: the same must be said in the case of a son in power. And I think Julian’s opinion true: for we look to natural debts in the deduction of the peculium; and it is by nature equitable that the son or the slave be released from the obligation, on the ground that he seems to have exacted what was not due (indebitum).
Est autem quaestionis, an id, quod dominus semel deduxit cum conveniretur, rursus si conveniatur, de peculio eximere debeat, an vero veluti solutum ei videatur semel facta deductione. et neratius et nerva putant, item iulianus libro duodecimo scribit, si quidem abstulit hoc de peculio, non debere deduci, si vero eandem positionem peculii reliquit, debere eum deducere.
There is, moreover, a question whether that which the master once deducted when he was convened (sued), if he is convened again, he ought to remove out of the peculium, or rather, once the deduction has been made, it is to be regarded as as-good-as paid to him. Both Neratius and Nerva think, and likewise Julian in the twelfth book writes, that if indeed he has taken this out of the peculium, it ought not to be deducted; but if he has left the peculium in the same position, he ought to deduct it.
Denique scribit, si servus vicarium quinque valentem in peculium habuit et domino quinque deberet, pro quibus vicarium dominus deduxisset, et mortuo postea vicario alium eiusdem pretii servus comparaverit, non desinere domini esse debitorem, quasi vicarius ille domino decesserit: nisi forte, cum eum servo ademisset et sibi solvisset, tunc decesserit.
Finally, he writes that, if a slave had in his peculium a vicarius worth five and owed five to the master, for which the master had set off the vicarius, and afterwards the vicarius died, and the slave purchased another of the same price, he does not cease to be a debtor to the master, as though that vicarius had died to the master’s loss: unless perhaps it died after he had taken it away from the slave and had applied it to himself in payment, then it died.
Idem recte ait, si, cum vicarius valeret decem, dominus conventus de peculio quinque pro servo praestitisset, quoniam quinque ipsi debebantur, mox vicarius decessisset, adversus alium agentem de peculio decem dominum deducturum, quia et in eo, quod iam pro eo solvit, debitorem servum sibi fecerit. quae sententia vera est, nisi servo ademit vicarium, ut sibi solveret.
He likewise rightly says: if, when the vicarius was worth ten, the master, having been sued under the action de peculio, had paid five on behalf of the slave, since five were owed to him, and soon thereafter the vicarius had died, then, against another bringing an action de peculio, the master will deduct ten, because also, in respect of what he has already paid for him, he has made the slave his debtor to himself. Which opinion is true, unless he took the vicarius away from the slave in order to pay himself.
Denique iulianus scribit venditorem, qui servum cum peculio vendidit, si de peculio conveniatur, non debere deducere quod sibi debetur: potuit enim hoc ex ratione peculii detrahere et nunc condicere quasi indebitum ( quoniam non est in peculio quod domino debetur). potest, inquit, etiam ex vendito agere. quod ita erit probandum, si tantum fuit in peculio cum venderet, ut satisfacere debito dominus possit: ceterum si postea quid accessit condicionibus debiti existentibus, quod dominus non distraxerat, contra erit dicendum.
Finally iulianus writes that a seller who sold a slave with his peculium, if he is convened in respect of the peculium, ought not to deduct what is owed to himself: for he could have detracted this on the rationale of the peculium and now condict as for an undue payment ( since there is not in the peculium that which is owed to the master). He says he can also sue ex vendito. This will be provable thus, if there was so much in the peculium when he sold that the master can satisfy the debt: but if afterwards something accrued, the conditions of the debt remaining, which the master had not sold off, the contrary must be said.
Idem scribit, si quis servum, cuius nomine de peculio habebat actionem, comparasset, an possit deducere quod sibi debetur, quoniam adversus venditorem habeat actionem de peculio? et recte ait posse: nam et quivis alius potest eligere, utrum cum emptore an cum venditore ageret: hunc igitur eligere pro actione deductionem. nec video quid habeant creditores quod querantur, cum possint ipsi venditorem convenire, si quid forte putant esse in peculio.
He likewise writes: if someone had purchased a slave, on whose account he had an action de peculio, whether he can deduct what is owed to himself, since he has an action de peculio against the seller? and he rightly says that he can: for even any other person can choose whether to litigate with the buyer or with the seller: let this man, therefore, choose a deduction in place of an action. nor do I see what the creditors have to complain of, since they can themselves proceed against the seller, if perhaps they think there is anything in the peculium.
Non solum autem quod ei debetur qui convenitur deducendum est, verum etiam si quid socio eius debetur, et ita iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit: nam qua ratione in solidum alteruter convenitur, pari ratione deducere eum oportet quod alteri debetur: quae sententia recepta est:
Not only must what is owed to the one who is sued be deducted, but also whatever is owed to his partner; and thus Julian writes in the twelfth book of the Digest: for by the same rationale by which either one is sued for the whole (in solidum), by the same rationale he ought to deduct what is owed to the other; which opinion has been accepted:
Sed si duo sint bonae fidei possessores, adhuc dicendum erit neutrum plus deducturum quam quod sibi debetur. idemque et si duo sunt fructuarii, quia nullam inter se habent societatem. idem dicetur interdum et in sociis, si forte separata apud se peculia habeant, ut alter alterius peculii nomine non conveniatur: ceterum si commune sit peculium, et in solidum convenientur et deducetur quod utrique debetur.
But if there are two possessors in good faith, it must still be said that neither will deduct more than what is owed to himself. And the same holds if there are two usufructuaries, because they have no partnership between themselves. The same will sometimes be said also in partners, if perhaps they have separate peculia kept with themselves, so that the one is not sued in the name of the other’s peculium: but if the peculium is common, they will be proceeded against in solidum, and what is owed to each will be deducted.
Quis ergo casus est, quo peculium servi communis ad alterum ex dominis solum pertineat? in primis si quis servi partem dimidiam vendiderit nec peculium ei concesserit: deinde si quis servo communi pecuniam vel res aliquas ea mente dederit, ut proprietatem earum retineret, administrationem autem servo concederet. Marcellus notat: est etiam ille casus, si alter ademerit: vel si omni quidem modo concesserit dominus sed in nominibus erit concessio.
What, then, is the case in which the peculium of a common slave pertains to only one of the owners? In the first place, if someone has sold a half share of the slave and has not conceded the peculium to him; then, if someone has given to the common slave money or certain things with this intention, that he should retain the proprietorship of them, but grant the administration to the slave. Marcellus notes: there is also this case, if the other has taken it away; or if indeed the master has in every way conceded it, but the concession will be in credits.
Si servus meus ordinarius vicarios habeat, id quod vicarii mihi debent an deducam ex peculio servi ordinarii? et prima illa quaestio est, an haec peculia in peculio servi ordinarii computentur. et proculus et atilicinus existimant, sicut ipsi vicarii sunt in peculio, ita etiam peculia eorum: et id quidem, quod mihi dominus eorum, id est ordinarius servus debet, etiam ex peculio eorum detrahetur: id vero quod ipsi vicarii debent, dumtaxat ex ipsorum peculio: sed et si quid non mihi, sed ordinario servo debent, deducetur de peculio eorum quasi conservo debitum: id vero, quod ipsis debet ordinarius servus, non deducetur de peculio ordinarii servi, quia peculium eorum in peculio ipsius est ( et ita servius respondit), sed peculium eorum augebitur, ut opinor, quemadmodum si dominus servo suo debeat.
If my ordinary slave should have vicarii, shall I deduct from the peculium of the ordinary slave that which the vicarii owe me? And the first question is whether these peculia are counted in the peculium of the ordinary slave. Both Proculus and Atilicinus think that, just as the vicarii themselves are in the peculium, so also their peculia: and indeed, that which their master, that is, the ordinary slave, owes to me will also be taken from their peculium; but that which the vicarii themselves owe will be taken only from their own peculium: but also, if they owe anything not to me but to the ordinary slave, it will be deducted from their peculium as a debt to a fellow-slave; but that which the ordinary slave owes to them will not be deducted from the peculium of the ordinary slave, because their peculium is within his peculium ( and so Servius answered), but, as I think, their peculium will be increased, just as if the master owed his slave.
Hinc quaeritur, si ordinarii servi nomine actum sit de peculio, an agi possit et vicariorum: et puto non posse. sed si actum sit de peculio vicarii, agi poterit et de peculio ordinarii.
Hence the question is raised: if, in the name of the ordinary slave, suit has been brought about the peculium, whether suit can also be brought about that of the vicarii; and I think it cannot. But if suit has been brought about the peculium of the vicarius, suit can also be brought about that of the ordinary slave.
Potest esse apud me duplicis iuris peculium: ut puta servus est dotalis, potest habere peculium, quod ad me respiciat, potest et quod ad mulierem, nam quod ex re mariti quaesiit vel ex operis suis, id ad maritum pertinet: et ideo, si respectu mariti heres sit institutus vel ei legatum datum, id eum non debere restituere pomponius scribit. si igitur mecum agatur ex eo contractu qui ad me respicit, utrum omne deducam quodquod debetur mihi, sive ex mea causa sive ex ea quae ad uxorem respicit? an vero separamus causas quasi in duobus peculiis, ut et causa debiti quod petitur spectetur?
There can be with me a peculium of double right: for instance, the slave is dotal, he can have a peculium that has regard to me, and he can also have one that has regard to the woman; for what he has acquired from the husband’s property or from his own works pertains to the husband: and therefore, if with respect to the husband he has been instituted heir or a legacy has been given to him, Pomponius writes that he ought not to have to restore that. If, therefore, suit is brought with me from that contract which has regard to me, do I deduct everything whatsoever is owed to me, whether on my account or on that which has regard to the wife? Or rather do we separate the causes as if in two peculia, so that the cause of the debt that is claimed is also considered?
so that, if indeed suit is brought from that peculium which pertains to the woman, I deduct that which is owed from that contract; if from that contract which regards me, I deduct what is mine? which question has been more lucidly treated in regard to the usufructuary, whether he can be sued de peculio only from that contract which pertains to himself, or from every one. And Marcellus also writes that the usufructuary is liable, and from every contract: for the one who contracts has had in view the whole peculium of the slave as, as it were, a patrimony.
He certainly says that this must by all means be admitted: that, the one first convened in court, to whom the matter has regard, the one against whom it has not been sought may be convened for the surplus; which opinion is more probable and is approved by Papinian. And the same will have to be said in the case of two good-faith purchasers. But in the case of the husband it is better to say simply that he is held liable de peculio.
but if, however, the husband has paid something in the name of such a slave, can he, against the woman suing for the dowry, deduct that? and he says that, if what was paid to the creditor pertains to peculium of both kinds, it ought to be deducted pro rata from each peculium. from which it can be understood that, if the contract pertains to one or the other peculium, at times it is to be subtracted from the wife alone, at times it is not to be subtracted—namely, if the contract pertained to that peculium which remained with the husband.
Interdum et ipsi fructuario adversus dominum datur actio de peculio, ut puta si apud eum habeat peculium, apud ipsum vero aut nihil aut minus, quam fructuario debetur. idem etiam contra eveniet, quamvis in duobus dominis sufficiat pro socio vel communi dividundo actio:
Sometimes even to the usufructuary himself an action de peculio is granted against the owner, for instance if the peculium is with him, while with the usufructuary there is either nothing, or less than is owed to the usufructuary. The same will also occur conversely, although in the case of two owners the action pro socio or the action communi dividundo is sufficient:
Summa cum ratione etiam hoc peculio praetor imputavit, quod dolo malo domini factum est, quo minus in peculio esset. sed dolum malum accipere debemus, si ei ademit peculium: sed et si eum intricare peculium in necem creditorum passus est, mela scribit dolo malo eius factum. sed et si quis, cum suspicaretur alium secum acturum, alio peculium avertat, dolo non caret.
With the utmost reason the praetor also imputed to this peculium what was done by the master’s dolus malus, whereby there was less in the peculium. But we ought to understand dolus malus if he has taken the peculium away from him; and even if he allowed him to entangle the peculium to the destruction of the creditors, Mela writes that it was done by his dolus malus. And likewise, if someone, when he suspected that another would bring an action against him, diverts the peculium elsewhere, he is not without dolus.
Si dolo tutoris vel curatoris furiosi vel procuratoris factum sit, an pupillus vel furiosus vel dominus de peculio conveniatur, videndum. et puto, si solvendo tutor sit, praestare pupillum ex dolo eius, maxime si quid ad eum pervenit, et ita pomponius libro octavo epistularum scribit. idem et in curatore et procuratore erit dicendum.
If through the fraud of a tutor or of the curator of an insane person or of a procurator something has been done, whether the ward or the insane person or the master should be sued de peculio must be considered. And I think, if the tutor is solvent, that the ward should be made to answer for his fraud, especially if anything has come to him; and so Pomponius writes in the eighth book of his Letters. The same is to be said in the case of the curator and the procurator.
Aedium autem peculiarium nomine in solidum damni infecti promitti debet, sicut vicarii nomine noxale iudicium in solidum pati, quia pro pignore ea, si non defendantur, actor abducit vel possidet.
Moreover, under the head of buildings belonging to the peculium, a stipulation for damnum infectum ought to be promised in solidum, just as, under the head of a vicarius, a noxal judgment is borne in solidum, because, as a pledge, these—if they are not defended—the plaintiff carries off or possesses.
Id vestimentum peculii esse incipit, quod ita dederit dominus, ut eo vestitu servum perpetuo uti vellet eoque nomine ei traderet, ne quis alius eo uteretur idque ab eo eius usus gratia custodiretur. sed quod vestimentum servo dominus ita dedit utendum, ut non semper, sed ad certum usum certis temporibus eo uteretur, veluti cum sequeretur eum sive cenanti ministravit, id vestimentum non esse peculii.
That garment begins to belong to the peculium which the master has given in such a way that he wished the slave to use that attire perpetually, and on that account handed it over to him, so that no one else should use it, and that it be kept by him for the sake of his use. But the garment which the master gave to the slave to be used in such a way that, not always, but for a certain use at set times he should employ it—such as when he accompanied him or ministered to him while dining—that garment does not belong to the peculium.
Si semel ex ea causa, id est quod dolo fecerit, dominus praestiterit de peculio conventus, ceteris ex eadem causa nihil praestabit. sed et si tantundem servus ei debeat quantum dolo minuit, non erit condemnandus. his consequens erit, ut manumisso quoque vel alienato servo ex causa etiam doli intra annum teneatur.
If once, on that ground—that is, because he did it by fraud (dolus)—the master, having been sued de peculio, has satisfied the claim, he will render nothing to the others on the same ground. But also, if the slave owes him as much as he has diminished by dolus, he will not be condemned. Consequent to these points it follows that, even after the slave has been manumitted or alienated, the master is held liable also on account of dolus within a year.
Et ancillarum nomine et filiarum familias in peculio actio datur: maxime si qua sarcinatrix aut textrix erit aut aliquod artificium vulgare exerceat, datur propter eam actio. depositi quoque et commodati actionem dandam earum nomine iulianus ait: sed et tributoriam actionem, si peculiari merce sciente patre dominove negotientur, dandam esse. longe magis non dubitatur, et si in rem versum est, quod iussu patris dominive contractum sit.
And in the name of slave-girls and of daughters-in-power an action is given on the peculium: especially if any be a seamstress or a weaver or exercise some common craft, an action is given on account of that. Julian also says that an action of deposit and of commodatum is to be given in their name; and likewise that the tributory action is to be given, if they do business with peculium merchandise with the father or master knowing. Much more, there is no doubt that an action is given both if there has been an in rem versum, and for what has been contracted by the order of the father or master.
Si servus alienatus sit, quamvis in eum, qui alienaverit, intra annum praetor de peculio actionem polliceatur, tamen nihilo minus et in novum dominum actio datur, et nihil interest, aliud apud eum adquisierit peculium an quod pariter cum eo emerit vel ex donatione acceperit eidem concesserit.
If a slave has been alienated, although the praetor promises within a year an action de peculio against the one who alienated him, nevertheless none the less an action is also given against the new owner; and it makes no difference whether he has acquired some other peculium in his hands, or has granted to the same slave the peculium which he bought together with him or received by donation.
Sicut autem de eo, quod ipse crediderim servo meo, non putat iulianus in emptorem alienato eo actionem mihi dari debere, ita et de eo, quod servus meus servo meo crediderit, si is, cui creditum fuerit, alienatus sit, negat permitti mihi debere cum emptore experiri.
But just as, concerning that which I myself have lent on credit to my slave, Julian does not think that, when he has been alienated, an action ought to be given to me against the purchaser, so also concerning that which my slave has lent on credit to my slave, if he to whom the credit was given has been alienated, he denies that it ought to be permitted to me to sue the purchaser.
Si quis cum servo duorum pluriumve contraxerit, permittendum est ei cum quo velit dominorum in solidum experiri: est enim iniquum in plures adversarios distringi eum, qui cum uno contraxerit: nec huius dumtaxat peculii ratio haberi debet, quod apud eum cum quo agitur is servus haberet, sed et eius quod apud alterum. nec tamen res damnosa futura est ei qui condemnatur, cum possit rursus ipse iudicio societatis vel communi dividundo quod amplius sua portione solverit a socio sociisve suis consequi. quod iulianus ita locum habere ait, si apud alterum quoque fuit peculium, quia eo casu solvendo quisque etiam socium aere alieno liberare videtur: at si nullum sit apud alterum peculium, contra esse, quia nec liberare ullo modo aere alieno eum intellegitur.
If anyone has contracted with a slave belonging to two or more masters, it should be permitted to him to sue in solidum whichever of the masters he wishes: for it is inequitable that he who contracted with one be distracted among several adversaries. And account ought to be had not only of that peculium which the slave had with the one with whom suit is brought, but also of that which he had with the other. Nevertheless the matter will not be ruinous for him who is condemned, since he can in turn, by the action of partnership or by the action for dividing common property (communi dividundo), obtain from his partner or partners what he has paid beyond his share. Julian says that this holds in this way, if there was peculium also with the other, because in that case, by paying, each person is seen also to free his partner from the debt; but if there was no peculium with the other, the contrary is the case, because he is in no way understood to free him from the debt.
Si quis servum testamento liberum esse iusserit relictis heredibus his, qui cum servo contraxerunt, possunt inter se coheredes vel de peculio agere, quia de eo quisque peculio, quod apud eum esset, quolibet alio agente teneatur.
If someone by testament has ordered a slave to be free, leaving as heirs those who had contracted with the slave, the coheirs can proceed among themselves by the de peculio action, because, with respect to that peculium which was with each one, each is held liable when any other person brings the action.
Quaesitum est, an teneat actio de peculio, etiamsi nihil sit in peculio cum ageretur, si modo sit rei iudicatae tempore. proculus et pegasus nihilo minus teneri aiunt: intenditur enim recte, etiamsi nihil sit in peculio. idem et circa ad exhibendum et in rem actionem placuit, quae sententia et a nobis probanda est.
It has been asked whether the action concerning the peculium lies, even if there is nothing in the peculium when suit is brought, provided only that there is at the time of res judicata. Proculus and Pegasus say it is nonetheless held: for the intentio is correctly framed, even if there is nothing in the peculium. The same has been approved also with respect to the ad exhibendum and the in rem action, which opinion is likewise to be approved by us.
Si cum ex parte herede domini vel patris agatur, dumtaxat de peculio condemnandum, quod apud eum heredem sit qui convenitur: idem et in rem verso pro parte, nisi si quid in ipsius heredis rem vertit: nec quasi unum ex sociis esse hunc heredem conveniendum, sed pro parte dumtaxat.
If suit is brought against a partial heir of the master or of the father, he is to be condemned only with respect to the peculium, to the extent that it is in the hands of that heir who is sued; the same also in the in rem verso, for his share, unless something has been turned into the property of that heir himself; nor is this heir to be sued as if he were one of the partners, but only for his share.
Sin vero filius sit quamvis ex parte institutus, nihilo minus in solidum actionem patietur. sed si velit pro parte nomen coheredis redimere, audiendus est: quid enim si in rem patris versum sit? cur non consequatur filius a coherede, quod in patris re est?
But if indeed the son be, although instituted only for a share, nonetheless he will undergo an action for the whole. But if he should wish to redeem, for his share, the coheir’s claim, he should be heard: for what if it has been turned into the father’s property? why should the son not recover from the coheir what is in the father’s property?
Si annua exceptione sit repulsus a venditore creditor, subveniri ei adversus emptorem debet: sed si alia exceptione, hactenus subveniri, ut deducta ea quantitate, quam a venditore consequi potuisset, ab emptore residuum consequatur.
If by the annual exception the creditor has been repelled by the seller, aid ought to be afforded him against the buyer; but if by some other exception, let aid be afforded only to this extent: that, after deducting the amount which he could have obtained from the seller, he may obtain the remainder from the buyer.
Si ex duobus vel pluribus heredibus eius, qui manumisso servo vel libero esse iusso vel alienato vel mortuo intra annum conveniri poterat, unus fuerit conventus, omnes heredes liberabuntur, quamvis non in maiorem quantitatem eius peculii, quod penes se habet qui convenitur, condemnetur, idque ita iulianus scripsit. idemque est et si in alterius rem fuerit versum. sed et si plures sint fructuarii vel bonae fidei possessores, unus conventus ceteros liberat, quamvis non maioris peculii, quam penes se est, condemnari debeat.
If, from two or more heirs of one who, when a slave had been manumitted or ordered to be free, or had been alienated, or had died, could be sued within a year, one has been sued, all the heirs will be discharged, although he is not condemned in an amount greater than that peculium which the person sued has in his possession; and Julianus wrote thus. And the same holds also if it has been turned into another’s patrimony. But likewise, if there are several usufructuaries or possessors in good faith, the suing of one releases the rest, although he ought not to be condemned for a greater peculium than that which is in his possession.
but although this happens by law, nevertheless equity dictates that an action be given against those who are freed by the occasion of the law, so that it is rather collection than the claim that frees them: for he who contracts with a slave regards the whole of his peculium, wherever it is, as if it were a patrimony.
In hoc autem iudicio licet restauretur praecedens, tamen et augmenti et decessionis rationem haberi oportet, et ideo sive hodie nihil sit in peculio sive accesserit aliquid, praesens status peculii spectandus est. quare circa venditorem quoque et emptorem hoc nobis videtur verius, quod accessit peculio posse nos ab emptore consequi, nec retrorsus velut in uno iudicio ad id tempus conventionem reducere emptoris, quo venditor conventus sit.
In this judgment, although the prior state may be restored, nevertheless account must be taken both of increase and of decrease; and therefore, whether today there is nothing in the peculium or something has been added, the present status of the peculium must be looked to. Wherefore, with respect also to the seller and the buyer, this seems to us truer: that what has been added to the peculium we can pursue from the buyer, and not retroactively, as though in a single action, to carry back the buyer’s convening to the time at which the seller was sued.
In bonae fidei contractibus quaestionis est, an de peculio an in solidum pater vel dominus tenerentur: ut est in actione de dote agitatum, si filio dos data sit, an pater dumtaxat de peculio conveniretur. ego autem arbitror non solum de peculio, sed et si quid praeterea dolo malo patris capta fraudataque est mulier, competere actionem: nam si habeat res nec restituere sit paratus, aequum est eum quanti ea res est condemnari. nam quod in servo, cui res pignori data est, expressum est, hoc et in ceteris bonae fidei iudiciis accipiendum esse pomponius scripsit.
In contracts of good faith the question is whether the father or master is held de peculio or in solidum: as was agitated in the action concerning the dowry, if a dowry has been given to the son, whether the father would be sued only de peculio. But I, for my part, judge that not only de peculio, but also, if moreover the woman has been taken in and defrauded by the father’s dolo malus, the action lies: for if he has the thing and is not prepared to restore it, it is equitable that he be condemned in the amount of what that thing is worth. For what has been expressly set forth in the case of a slave to whom a thing has been given in pledge, Pomponius wrote that this is to be accepted also in the other actions of good faith.
for if a thing has been given in pledge to a slave, not only does an action lie from the peculium and for what has been converted to his use, but it also has this addition " and if the plaintiff has been ensnared and defrauded by the malicious dolus of the master " . moreover, the master is seen to act with dolus, who, although he had the faculty of restoring, does not wish to restore.
Si servo tuo permiseris vicarium emere aureis octo, ille decem emerit et tibi scripserit se octo emisse tuque ei permiseris eos octo ex tua pecunia solvere et is decem solverit, hoc nomine duos aureos tantum vindicabis, sed hi venditori praestabuntur dumtaxat de peculio servi.
If you permit your slave to buy a vicarius for eight aurei, and he buys for ten and writes to you that he bought for eight, and you permit him to pay those eight from your money, and he pays ten, under this head you will recover only two aurei; but these will be furnished to the seller only from the slave’s peculium.
Servum communem, quem cum titio habebam, vendidi sempronio: quaesitum est, si de peculio cum titio aut cum sempronio ageretur, an eius peculii, quod apud me esset, ratio haberi deberet. dixi, si cum sempronio ageretur, numquam rationem eius peculii, quod apud me esset, haberi debere, quia is nullam adversus me actionem haberet, per quam id quod praestitisset consequi posset. sed et si cum titio post annum quam vendidissem ageretur, similiter non esse computandum peculium quod apud me est, quia iam mecum agi de peculio non posset.
I sold to Sempronius a common slave, whom I had with Titius: the question was asked, if an action de peculio were brought against Titius or against Sempronius, whether account ought to be had of that peculium which was with me. I said that, if it were brought against Sempronius, account should never be had of that peculium which was with me, because he would have no action against me by which he could recover what he had disbursed. But even if it were brought against Titius after a year from the time I had sold, likewise the peculium which is with me is not to be computed, because already it would not be possible to proceed against me de peculio.
Si actum sit de peculio cum eo qui usum fructum in servo habet et minus consecutus sit creditor, non est iniquum, ut ex universo eius peculio, sive apud fructuarium sive apud proprietarium erit, rem consequatur. nihil interest, operas suas conduxerit servus a fructuario an pecuniam mutuam ab eo acceperit. dari itaque debebit actio ei adversus dominum proprietatis deducto eo, quod servus peculii nomine apud fructuarium habet.
If suit has been brought concerning the peculium with the one who has a usufruct in the slave, and the creditor has obtained less, it is not inequitable that he achieve recovery from the entirety of his peculium, whether it be with the usufructuary or with the proprietor. It makes no difference whether the slave has let out his services to the usufructuary or has received money on loan from him. Therefore an action ought to be given to him against the owner of the proprietas, with a deduction of what the slave, under the name of peculium, has with the usufructuary.
Deposui apud filium familias decem et ago depositi de peculio. quamvis nihil patri filius debeat et haec decem teneat, nihilo magis tamen patrem damnandum existimavit, si nullum praeterea peculium sit: hanc enim pecuniam, cum mea maneat, non esse peculii. denique quolibet alio agente de peculio minime dubitandum ait computari non oportere.
I deposited ten with a son under paternal power and I bring the deposit-action de peculio. Although the son owes nothing to the father and holds this ten, nevertheless he judged that the father should not be condemned, if there is no other peculium besides: for this money, since it remains mine, is not part of the peculium. Finally, he says that, with anyone else bringing a de peculio action, there is no doubt at all that it ought not to be counted.
Si nuptura filio familias dotis nomine certam pecuniam promiserit et divortio facto agat de dote cum patre, utrumne tota promissione an deducto eo, quod patri filius debeat, liberari eam oporteret? respondit tota promissione eam liberandam esse, cum certe et si ex promissione cum ea ageretur, exceptione doli mali tueri se posset.
If a woman about to marry has promised, in the name of a dowry, a certain sum of money to a son under paternal power, and, once a divorce has been effected, brings an action regarding the dowry against the father, should she be released from the whole promise, or only after a deduction of that which the son owes to the father? He answered that she must be released from the whole promise, since certainly even if she were sued on the promise, she could protect herself by the exception of dolus malus.
Stichus habet in peculio pamphilum qui est decem, idem pamphilus debet domino quinque. si agatur de peculio stichi nomine, placebat aestimari debere pretium pamphili et quidem totum non deducto eo, quod domino pamphilus debet: neminem enim posse intellegi ipsum in suo peculio esse: hoc ergo casu damnum dominum passurum, ut pateretur, si cuilibet alii servorum suorum peculium non habenti credidisset. idque ita se habere evidentius appariturum ait, si sticho peculium legatum esse proponatur: qui certe si ex testamento agat, cogendus non est eius, quod vicarius suus debet, aliter quam ex peculio ipsius deductionem pati: alioquin futurum, ut, si tantundem vicarius domino debeat, ipse nihil in peculio habere intellegatur, quod certe est absurdum.
Stichus has in his peculium Pamphilus, who is valued at ten; the same Pamphilus owes the master five. If suit is brought concerning the peculium in Stichus’s name, it was the view that the price of Pamphilus ought to be assessed, and indeed in full, without deducting that which Pamphilus owes to the master: for no one can be understood to be himself in his own peculium. In this case, therefore, the master will bear the loss, just as he would if he had given credit to any other of his slaves who has no peculium. And he says that it will appear more clearly that this is so, if it be supposed that a peculium has been bequeathed to Stichus: who certainly, if he sues under the testament, is not to be compelled to suffer a deduction of what his vicarius owes otherwise than out of his own peculium; otherwise it would come about that, if the vicarius owes the master an equal amount, he himself would be understood to have nothing in the peculium, which is certainly absurd.
Servo quem tibi vendideram pecuniam credidi: quaesitum est, an ita mihi in te actio de peculio dari debeat, ut deducatur id, quod apud me ex eo remanserit. quod quidem minime verum est, nec intererit, intra annum quam vendiderim an postea experiar: nam nec ceteris quidem, qui tunc cum eo contraxerint, in me actio datur. in contrarium quoque agentibus mecum his, qui antea cum eo servo contraxissent, non deducam id, quod postea mihi debere coeperit.
To the slave whom I had sold to you I advanced money: the question was raised whether an action de peculio ought to be given to me against you in such a way that there be deducted that which from him has remained with me. This indeed is by no means true, nor will it make a difference whether I bring suit within a year after I sold him or later: for not even to the others, who at that time contracted with him, is an action given against me. And likewise, in suits brought contrariwise against me by those who earlier had contracted with that slave, I will not deduct that which he afterwards began to owe to me.
Quomodo autem peculium nascitur, quaesitum est. et ita veteres distinguunt, si id adquisiit servus quod dominus necesse non habet praestare, id esse peculium, si vero tunicas aut aliquid simile quod ei dominus necesse habet praestare, non esse peculium. ita igitur nascitur peculium: crescit, cum auctum fuerit: decrescit, cum servi vicarii moriuntur, res intercidunt: moritur, cum ademptum sit.
How, moreover, peculium is born has been inquired. And thus the ancients distinguish: if a slave has acquired something which the master has no necessity to furnish, that is peculium; but if tunics or something similar which the master has necessity to furnish, that is not peculium. Thus, then, peculium is born: it grows, when it has been increased: it diminishes, when vicary slaves die, when things are lost: it dies, when it has been taken away.
Nec servus quicquam debere potest nec servo potest deberi, sed cum eo verbo abutimur, factum magis demonstramus quam ad ius civile referimus obligationem. itaque quod servo debetur, ab extraneis dominus recte petet, quod servus ipse debet, eo nomine in peculium et si quid inde in rem domini versum est in dominum actio datur.
Neither can a slave owe anything, nor can anything be owed to a slave; but when we misuse that word, we indicate a fact rather than refer the obligation to the civil law. Therefore, what is owed to the slave the master will rightly demand from third parties; what the slave himself owes, on that head an action is given against the peculium, and if anything from it has been converted into the master’s estate, an action lies against the master.
Si posteaquam tecum de peculio egi, ante rem iudicatam servum vendideris, labeo ait etiam eius peculii nomine, quod apud emptorem quaesierit, damnari te debere nec succurrendum tibi: culpa enim tua id accidisse, qui servum vendidisses.
If, after I have brought an action with you concerning the peculium, before the matter has been adjudicated (res judicata) you sell the slave, Labeo says that you ought also to be condemned on account of that peculium which he has earned while with the buyer, and no relief should be afforded to you: for this happened through your fault, in that you sold the slave.
Si semel actum sit de peculio, quamvis minus inveniatur rei iudicandae tempore in peculio quam debet, cautionibus locum esse non placuit de futuro incremento peculii: hoc enim in pro socio actione locum habet, quia socius universum debet.
If once action has been brought concerning the peculium, although at the time of judgment there is found in the peculium less than is owed, it was not approved that there be room for securities regarding a future increment of the peculium: for this has place in the action pro socio, because a partner owes the whole.
Si creditor servi ab emptore esset partem consecutus, competere in reliquum in venditorem utile iudicium proculus ait, sed re integra non esse permittendum actori dividere actionem, ut simul cum emptore et cum venditore experiatur: satis enim esse hoc solum ei tribui, ut rescisso superiore iudicio in alterum detur ei actio, cum electo reo minus esset consecutus: et hoc iure utimur.
If a creditor of a slave had obtained a part from the buyer, Proculus says that a useful action would lie for the remainder against the seller; but, with the matter intact, the plaintiff must not be allowed to split his action, so as to proceed at the same time against both the buyer and the seller: for it is enough that only this be granted to him, that, the prior judgment having been rescinded, an action be given him against the other, when with the defendant elected he had obtained less: and we use this law.
Ut debitor vel servus domino vel dominus servo intellegatur, ex causa civili computandum est: ideoque si dominus in rationes suas referat se debere servo suo, cum omnino neque mutuum acceperit neque ulla causa praecesserat debendi, nuda ratio non facit eum debitorem.
That a debtor or a slave be understood as toward the master, or a master toward the slave, must be reckoned from a civil cause; and therefore, if a master records in his accounts that he owes his slave, since he has in no way received a loan nor had any cause of owing precede, a bare entry in the accounts does not make him a debtor.
Eo tempore, quo in peculio nihil est, pater latitat: in bonorum possessionem eius rei servandae causa mitti non possum, qui de peculio cum eo acturus sum, quia non fraudationis causa latitat qui, si iudicium acciperet, absolvi deberet. nec ad rem pertinet, quod fieri potest, ut damnatio sequatur: nam et si in diem vel sub condicione debeatur, fraudationis causa non videtur latitare, tametsi potest iudicis iniuria condemnari. sed fideiussorem datum eo tempore, quo nihil in peculio est, teneri putat iulianus, quoniam fideiussor futurae quoque actionis accipi possit, si tamen sic acceptus est.
At that time, when there is nothing in the peculium, the father lies hidden: I cannot be sent into possession of his goods for the sake of preserving the thing, I who am going to bring an action with him on the peculium, because he does not lie hidden for the purpose of defrauding, he who, if he were to accept the suit, ought to be acquitted. Nor does it pertain to the matter that it can happen that a condemnation follows: for even if it is owed for a future day or under a condition, he does not seem to lie hidden for the purpose of defrauding, although he can be condemned by a judge’s injustice. But Julian thinks that a fideiussor (surety) given at a time when there is nothing in the peculium is bound, since a fideiussor can be taken also for a future action, if indeed he was so accepted.
Etiam postquam dominus de peculio conventus est, fideiussor pro servo accipi potest et ideo, qua ratione, si post actionem dictatam servus pecuniam exsolverit, non magis repetere potest quam si iudicium dictatum non fuisset, eadem ratione fideiussor quoque utiliter acceptus videbitur, quia naturalis obligatio, quam etiam servus suscipere videtur, in litem translata non est.
Even after the master has been sued concerning the peculium, a surety may be accepted for the slave; and therefore, by the same reasoning, if, after the action has been dictated, the slave pays out the money, he can no more recover it than if the iudicium had not been dictated; by the same reasoning the surety too will be considered usefully accepted, because the natural obligation, which even a slave is seen to assume, has not been transferred into the suit.
Servus alienus, cum bonae fidei serviret mihi, nummos a titio mutuatos mihi dedit, ut eum manumitterem, et manumissi: creditor quaerebat, quem de peculio conveniret. dixi, quamquam creditor electionem alias haberet, tamen in proposito dominum esse conveniendum et eum ad exhibendum mecum acturum pecuniae nomine, quae ipsi esset adquisita nec in eam causam alienata, quae pro capite servi facta proponeretur: neque enim admittendum esse distinctionem existimantium, si non manumittam, domini pecuniam esse, manumissione vero secuta videri pecuniam ex re mea quaesitam mihi, quoniam magis propter rem meam, quam ex re mea pecunia mihi daretur.
Another’s slave, as he was serving me in good faith, gave me coins borrowed from Titius, in order that I might manumit him, and he was manumitted. The creditor asked whom he should sue concerning the peculium. I said that, although otherwise the creditor would have an election, nevertheless in the case proposed the master must be sued, and that he (the creditor) would bring against me an action ad exhibendum in respect of the money which had been acquired for him and had not been alienated to that purpose which would be alleged to have been done pro capite servi (for the slave’s person). For the distinction is not to be admitted of those who think that, if I do not manumit, the money is the master’s, but once manumission has followed, the money seems to have been procured for me ex re mea; since the money was given to me rather on account of my res than ex re mea.
Quod debetur servo ab extraneis, agenti de peculio non omnimodo dominus ad quantitatem debiti condemnandus est, cum et sumptus in petendo et eventus exsecutionis possit esse incertus et cogitanda sit mora temporis quod datur iudicatis, aut venditionis bonorum, si id magis faciendum erit. ergo si paratus sit actiones mandare, absolvetur. quod enim dicitur, si cum uno ex sociis agatur, universum peculium computandum quia sit cum socio actio, in eodem redibit, si actiones paratus sit praestare: et in omnibus, quos idcirco teneri dicimus quia habent actionem, delegatio pro iusta praestatione est.
As to what is owed to the slave by outsiders, in a suit de peculio the master is not in every respect to be condemned up to the quantity of the debt, since both the expenses in pursuing and the outcome of execution can be uncertain, and one must reckon with the delay of the time that is granted to judgment debtors, or with a sale of goods, if that will rather have to be done. Therefore, if he is prepared to assign the actions, he will be acquitted. For what is said—that if suit is brought against one of the partners, the entire peculium is to be computed because there is an action against the partner—comes to the same, if he is ready to furnish the actions: and in all cases where we say parties are therefore held because they have an action, delegation stands in place of a just performance.
Ex facto quaeritur: qui tutelam quasi liber administrabat, servus pronuntiatus est. an si conveniatur eius dominus a pupillo, cuius quidem potiorem causam quam creditorum ceterorum servi habendam rescriptum est, an vel id deducatur ex peculio, quod domino debetur? et si putaveris posse deduci, an intersit, utrum, cum adhuc in libertate ageret, domini debitor factus est, an postea?
From the deed it is asked: a man who was administering a tutelage as if a free man was declared a slave. Whether, if his master is sued by the pupil—whose cause, indeed, has by rescript been held to be stronger than that of the other creditors of the slave—even that which is owed to the master is to be deducted from the peculium? And if you think it can be deducted, does it make a difference whether he became a debtor of the master while he was still acting in freedom, or afterwards?
and whether an action de peculio is competent to an impubes? I responded that no privilege can be preferred to the father or to the master, when they are sued de peculio by reason of the person of the son or of the slave. Clearly, with respect to the other creditors, account must be taken of privileges: for what if the son has received a dowry, has administered a tutelage?
with good reason, therefore, even in the case of a slave who acted in place of a tutor, it has been rescripted thus, and because the condition of the one who first seizes is usually better than that of the rest, the action of the others will be inhibited. plainly, if out of the ward’s property he made credits (nomina) or deposited money in a chest, a vindication of the coins is granted to him, and a useful action against the debtors, namely if they have consumed the coins: for here he could not alienate them; and the same must be said of any tutor whatsoever. nor, however, do I think it matters when he began to owe the master, whether when he was in possession of liberty or afterwards: for even if I have lent to Titius’s slave and have begun to be his master, I shall deduct what I previously lent, if I begin to be convened concerning the peculium.
Si dos filio familias sit data vel tutelam administraverit, habenda erit ratio privilegiorum in actione de peculio dilata interim ceterorum creditorum actione vel interposita cautione, si priores agant, qui privilegium non habent, restitutum iri quod acceperunt, si inferatur postea cum patre actio privilegii.
If a dowry has been given to a filius familias, or he has administered a tutelage, regard must be had to the privileges in the actio de peculio, the action of the other creditors meanwhile being deferred, or security being interposed; and if those who do not have the privilege proceed first, what they have received must be restored, if afterward the action of privilege is brought together with the father.
Quod servus meus pro debitore meo mihi expromisit, ex peculio deduci debet et a debitore nihilo minus debetur. sed videamus, ne credendum sit peculiare fieri nomen eius, pro quo expromissum est. paulus: utique si de peculio agente aliquo deducere velit, illud nomen peculiare facit.
What my slave, on behalf of my debtor, expromised to me ought to be deducted from the peculium, and is owed no less by the debtor. But let us consider, lest it be believed that the claim (nomen) of him for whom it was expromised becomes “peculiar.” Paulus: certainly, if, in proceeding de peculio against someone, he wishes to deduct it, he makes that claim “peculiar.”
Sed eum, qui servum testamento liberum esse iubet et ei peculium legat, eius temporis peculium legare intellegi iulianus scribit, quo libertas competit: ideoque omnia incrementa peculii quoquo modo ante aditam hereditatem adquisita ad manumissum pertinere.
But as for the one who by testament orders a slave to be free and bequeaths to him the peculium, Julian writes that he is understood to bequeath the peculium of that time at which liberty accrues: and therefore all increments of the peculium, in whatever way acquired before the inheritance is entered upon, pertain to the manumitted.
At si quis extraneo peculium servi legaverit, in coniectura voluntatis testatoris quaestionem esse, et verosimilius esse id legatum quod mortis tempore in peculio fuerit ita, ut quae ex rebus peculiaribus ante aditam hereditatem accesserint debeantur, veluti partus ancillarum et fetus pecudum, quae autem servo donata fuerint sive quid ex operis suis adquisierit, ad legatarium non pertinere.
But if someone should bequeath to an outsider the peculium of a slave, the question is one of conjecturing the testator’s will, and it is more plausible that the legacy is of what was in the peculium at the time of death, in such a way that the things which have accrued from the peculiar goods before the inheritance has been accepted are owed—for instance, the issue of maidservants and the offspring of herd animals—whereas the things that have been given to the slave, or whatever he has acquired from his own labors, do not pertain to the legatee.
Uni ex heredibus praedia legavit ut instructa erant cum servis et ceteris rebus et quidquid ibi esset: hi servi domino debitores fuerunt tam ex aliis causis quam ex ratione kalendarii: quaesitum est, an ceteris heredibus adversus eum pecuniae ab his debitae actio de peculio competit. respondit non competere.
To one of the heirs he bequeathed the estates as they were furnished, with the slaves and the other things and whatever was there: these slaves were debtors to their master both from other causes and from the account of the kalendarium; the question was asked whether the other heirs have an action de peculio against him for the money owed by these men. He answered that it does not lie.
Praetor ait: " post mortem eius qui in alterius potestate fuerit, posteave quam is emancipatus manumissus alienatusve fuerit, dumtaxat de peculio et si quid dolo malo eius in cuius potestate est factum erit, quo minus peculii esset, in anno, quo primum de ea re experiundi potestas erit, iudicium dabo".
The praetor says: " after the death of one who has been in another’s power, or after he has been emancipated, manumitted, or alienated, only concerning the peculium, and if anything shall have been done by the dolus malus of him in whose power he is, whereby the peculium would be less, within the year in which there shall first be the power of bringing suit on that matter, I will grant an action".
Alienatio autem et manumissio ad servos pertinet, non ad filios, mors autem tam ad servos quam ad filios refertur, emancipatio vero ad solum filium. sed et si alio modo sine emancipatione desierit esse in potestate, annalis erit actio. sed et si morte patris vel deportatione sui iuris fuerit effectus filius, de peculio intra annum heres patris vel fiscus tenebuntur.
Alienation and manumission pertain to slaves, not to sons; death, however, is applicable both to slaves and to sons, while emancipation pertains to the son alone. But also, if in some other way without emancipation he has ceased to be in paternal power, the action will be annual. And likewise, if by the death of the father or by deportation the son has been made of his own right (sui iuris), concerning the peculium, within a year the father’s heir or the Fiscus will be held liable.
Item heres eius, qui servum legavit non cum peculio. nam si cum peculio vel legavit vel liberum esse iussit, quaestionis fuit: et mihi verius videtur non dandam neque in manumissum neque in eum, cui legatum sit peculium, de peculio actionem. an ergo teneatur heres?
Likewise, (as to) the heir of one who bequeathed a slave not with the peculium. For if he either bequeathed him with the peculium or ordered him to be free, it has been a matter of question; and to me it seems truer that the action de peculio is not to be given either against the manumitted person or against the one to whom the peculium has been bequeathed. Is the heir, then, to be held liable?
and Caecilius says that the heir is held liable, because the peculium is in his possession—the one who, by handing it over to the legatee, frees himself. Pegasus, however, says that the heir ought to be secured by a cautio from him to whom the peculium has been bequeathed, because creditors resort to him; therefore, if he has delivered without security, he will be sued.
Si praecepto servo et peculio rogatus sit heres restituere hereditatem, si de peculio conveniatur, trebelliani exceptione non utetur, ut Marcellus tractans admittit: is autem cui restituta est hereditas non tenetur, ut scaevola ait, cum peculium non habeat nec dolo fecerit quo minus haberet.
If, with a slave taken by preemption and the peculium, the heir has been asked to restore the inheritance, then, if he is proceeded against on the de peculio, he will not use the Trebellian exception, as Marcellus, in his treatment, admits: but the one to whom the inheritance has been restored is not held, as Scaevola says, since he does not have the peculium nor has he by fraud caused it that he should not have it.
Quaesitum est apud labeonem, si, cum filius viveret, tu credens eum mortuum annali actione egeris et, quia annus praeterierat, exceptione sis repulsus, an rursus experiri tibi comperto errore permittendum est. et ait permitti debere dumtaxat de peculio, non etiam de in rem verso: nam priore iudicio de in rem verso recte actum est, quia annua exceptio ad peculium, non ad in rem versum pertinet.
It was asked before Labeo, if, while the son was alive, you, believing him dead, have sued by the annual action and, because the year had elapsed, have been repulsed by an exception, whether, the error having been discovered, you should be allowed to try again. And he says that it ought to be permitted only as to the peculium, not also as to de in rem verso: for in the prior suit the matter de in rem verso was rightly dealt with, since the annual exception pertains to the peculium, not to ad in rem versum.
Cum post mortem filii familias annua adversus patrem actio est, quemadmodum adversus eum esset perpetua vivo filio, ideo si ex causa redhibitionis erat de peculio actio, sex mensum erit post mortem filii: idemque dicendum in omnibus temporalibus actionibus.
Since after the death of a son in paternal power there is an annual action against the father—whereas while the son was alive it would have been perpetual against him—therefore, if on the ground of redhibition there was an action de peculio, it will be for six months after the son’s death; and the same must be said in all temporal actions.
Definitione peculii interdum utendum est etiam, si servus in rerum natura esse desiit et actionem praetor de peculio intra annum dat: nam et tunc et accessionem et decessionem quasi peculii recipiendam ( quamquam iam desiit morte servi vel manumissione esse peculium), ut possit ei accedere ut peculio fructibus vel pecorum fetu ancillarumque partubus et decedere, veluti si mortuum sit animal vel alio quolibet modo perierit.
Sometimes the definition of peculium must be used even if the slave has ceased to exist in rerum natura and the praetor gives the action de peculio within a year: for then too both accession and decession, as if of a peculium, are to be admitted (although by the slave’s death or by manumission the peculium has already ceased to exist), so that there may accrue to it, as to a peculium, by fruits or by the offspring of cattle and by the births of maidservants, and there may be a decession, for instance if an animal has died or has perished in any other way.
Nec videtur frustra de in rem verso actio promissa, quasi sufficeret de peculio: rectissime enim labeo dicit fieri posse, ut et in rem versum sit et cesset de peculio actio. quid enim si dominus peculium ademit sine dolo malo? quid si morte servi exstinctum est peculium et annus utilis praeteriit?
Nor does the actio de in rem verso seem to have been promised in vain, as though the action de peculio were sufficient: for most rightly labeo says it can happen that both there has been an in rem versum and the action de peculio ceases. For what if the master has taken away the peculium without dolus malus? What if the peculium has been extinguished by the slave’s death and the useful year has passed?
Item si plures agant de peculio, proficere hoc ei, cuius pecunia in rem versa est, debet, ut ipse uberiorem actionem habeat. certe si praeventum sit ab aliquo et actum de peculio, de in rem verso actio an cesset, videndum. et refert pomponius iulianum existimare de peculio actione peremi de in rem verso actionem ( quia in peculium conversum est quod in domini rem erat versum et pro servo solutum est, quemadmodum si ipsi servo a domino fuisset solutum), sed ita demum, si praestiterit ex actione de peculio dominus quod servus in rem eius verterat: ceterum si non praestiterit, manet actio de in rem verso.
Likewise, if several bring suit de peculio, this ought to profit him whose money has been turned into the master’s estate, so that he himself may have the more ample action. Certainly, if someone has forestalled and has sued de peculio, it must be considered whether the action de in rem verso ceases. And Pomponius reports that Julian thinks that by the action de peculio the action de in rem verso is extinguished ( because what had been turned into the master’s estate has been converted into the peculium and has been paid on behalf of the slave, just as if it had been paid to the slave himself by the master), but only if, under the action de peculio, the master has made good what the slave had turned to his estate: otherwise, if he has not made it good, the action de in rem verso remains.
Quod si servus domino quantitatem dederit, ut manumittatur, quam a me mutuam accepit, in peculium quidem hanc quantitatem non computari, in rem autem videri versum, si quid plus sit in eo quod servus dedit quam est in servi pretio.
But if a slave should give his master an amount, in order to be manumitted, which he received from me as a loan (mutuum), this amount is not counted in the peculium; but it is regarded as having been turned to the master’s estate (in rem versum), if there is anything more in what the slave gave than is in the slave’s price.
In rem autem versum videtur, sive id ipsum quod servus accepit in rem domini convertit ( veluti si triticum acceperit et id ipsum in familiam domini cibariorum nomine consumpserit) aut si pecuniam a creditore acceptam dominico creditori solverit ( sed et si erravit in solvendo et putavit creditorem eum qui non erat, aeque in rem versum esse pomponius libro sexagensimo primo ait, quatenus indebiti repetitionem dominus haberet) sive cum servus domini negotii gerendi administrandive causa quid gessit ( veluti si mutuatus sit pecuniam, ut frumentum compararet ad familiam alendam vel si ad vestiendam) sive peculiariter mutuatus postea in rem domini vertit: hoc enim iure utimur, ut, etiamsi prius in peculium vertit pecuniam, mox in rem domini esse de in rem verso actio possit.
But a turning into the master’s estate is deemed to have occurred, either if the very thing which the slave received he converts into the master’s property ( for example, if he received wheat and consumed that very thing for the master’s household under the name of provisions) or if he pays to the master’s creditor money received from a creditor ( but even if he erred in paying and supposed as creditor one who was not, Pomponius in book 61 likewise says it is turned to the master’s estate, in so far as the master would have a repetition of the undue) or when the slave, for the purpose of managing or administering the master’s business, has done something ( for example, if he borrowed money in order to buy grain to feed the household, or to clothe it) or if, having borrowed with reference to his peculium, he afterwards turns it into the master’s estate: for we use this rule of law, that, even if he first turned the money into the peculium, presently an action de in rem verso can be brought that it is in the master’s estate.
Et regulariter dicimus totiens de in rem verso esse actionem, quibus casibus procurator mandati vel qui negotia gessit negotiorum gestorum haberet actionem quotiensque aliquid consumpsit servus, ut aut meliorem rem dominus habuerit aut non deteriorem.
And, as a rule, we say that an action de in rem verso lies as often as—in those cases in which a procurator under a mandate or one who managed affairs would have the action of mandate or the action of negotiorum gestorum—and as often as a slave has expended something, such that the master has either a better condition or at least not a worse one.
Sed si mutua pecunia accepta domum dominicam exornavit tectoriis et quibusdam aliis, quae magis ad voluptatem pertinent quam ad utilitatem, non videtur versum, quia nec procurator haec imputaret, nisi forte mandatum domini aut voluntatem habuit: nec debere ex eo onerari dominum, quod ipse facturus non esset. quid ergo est? pati debet dominus creditorem haec auferre, sine domus videlicet iniuria, ne cogendus sit dominus vendere domum, ut quanti pretiosior facta est, id praestet.
But if, with money received on loan, he adorned the master’s house with stucco-work and certain other things which pertain more to pleasure than to utility, it does not seem to have been turned to account, since not even a procurator would charge these, unless perhaps he had the owner’s mandate or will: nor ought the owner to be burdened on that account with what he himself would not have done. What then? The owner ought to allow the creditor to remove these things—without injury to the house, of course—lest the owner be compelled to sell the house, in order to pay the amount by which it has been made more valuable.
Idem labeo ait, si servus mutuatus nummos a me alii eos crediderit, de in rem verso dominum teneri, quod nomen ei adquisitum est: quam sententiam pomponius ita probat, si non peculiare nomen fecit, sed quasi dominicae rationis. ex qua causa hactenus erit dominus obligatus, ut, si non putat sibi expedire nomen debitoris habere, cedat creditori actionibus procuratoremque eum faciat.
The same Labeo says that, if a slave, having borrowed coins from me, has credited (lent) them to another, the master is held under the de in rem verso, because a claim (nomen) has been acquired for him; which opinion Pomponius approves thus: if he did not make it a peculium claim, but, as it were, of the master’s account. For which cause the master will be obligated only to this extent: that, if he does not think it expedient for himself to have the debtor’s claim (nomen debitoris), he should cede the actions to the creditor and make him his procurator.
Nec non illud quoque in rem domini versum labeo ait, quod mutuatus servus domino emit volenti ad luxuriae materiam unguenta forte, vel si quid ad delicias vel si quid ad turpes sumptus sumministravit: neque enim spectamus, an bono domini cesserit quod consumptum est, sed an in negotium domini.
Nor indeed Labeo also says that this too is turned into the master’s estate: that a borrowed slave, with the master willing, buys for the master material for luxury—perfumes perhaps—or if he supplied anything for delights or for disgraceful expenditures: for we do not look to whether what was consumed redounded to the master’s good, but whether it was in the master’s business.
Sed si sic accepit quasi in rem domini verteret nec vertit et decepit creditorem, non videtur versum nec tenetur dominus, ne credulitas creditoris domino obesse vel calliditas servi noceret. quid tamen, si is fuit servus, qui solitus erat accipiens vertere? adhuc non puto nocere domino, si alia mente servus accepit aut si, cum hac mente accepisset, postea alio vertit: curiosus igitur debet esse creditor, quo versatur.
But if he received in such a way as if he would convert it into the master’s estate and did not convert it, and deceived the creditor, it is not considered converted, nor is the master held, lest the credulity of the creditor harm the master or the slave’s cunning do damage. What, however, if he was a slave who was accustomed, upon receiving, to convert it? Still I do not think it harms the master, if the slave received with another intention, or if, although he had received with this intention, afterward he converted it elsewhere: therefore the creditor ought to be careful as to where it is being converted.
Si mutuatus sit pecuniam servus ad vestem comparandam et nummi perierint, quis de in rem verso agere possit, utrum creditor an venditor? puto autem, si quidem pretium numeratum sit, creditorem de in rem verso acturum et si vestis perierit: si autem non fuit pretium solutum, ad hoc tamen data pecunia, ut vestis emeretur et pecunia perierit, vestis tamen familiae divisa est, utique creditorem de in rem verso habere actionem. an et venditor habeat, quia res eius pervenerunt in rem domini?
If a slave has borrowed money to procure clothing and the coins have perished, who can bring the action de in rem verso, whether the creditor or the seller? I think, however, that if indeed the price has been paid, the creditor will bring the action de in rem verso even if the clothing has perished: but if the price was not paid, yet the money was given for this purpose, that the clothing might be bought, and the money has perished, yet the clothing was distributed to the household, then certainly the creditor has the action de in rem verso. Or does the seller also have it, because his property has come into the master’s estate?
Si res domino non necessarias emerit servus quasi domino necessarias, veluti servos, hactenus videri in rem eius versum pomponius scribit, quatenus servorum verum pretium facit, cum, si necessarias emisset, in solidum quanto venissent teneretur.
If a slave has bought things not necessary to the master as though necessary to the master—for example, slaves—Pomponius writes that it is to be regarded as a conversion into his estate only to this extent: in so far as it makes up the true price of the slaves; whereas, if he had bought things that were necessary, he would be liable in full for as much as they went for.
Quod servus domino emit, si quidem voluntate eius emit, potest quod iussu agi: sin vero non ex voluntate, si quidem dominus ratum habuerit vel alioquin rem necessariam vel utilem domino emit, de in rem verso actio erit: si vero nihil eorum est, de peculio erit actio.
What a slave buys for his master—if indeed he buys with his will—the action “quod iussu” can be brought; but if not with his will, then if the master has ratified it, or otherwise he bought a thing necessary or useful for the master, the action de in rem verso will lie: but if none of these applies, the action de peculio will lie.
Placet non solum eam pecuniam in rem verti, quae statim a creditore ad dominum pervenerit, sed et quae prius fuerit in peculio. hoc autem totiens verum est, quotiens servus rem domini gerens locupletiorem eum facit nummis peculiaribus. alioquin si servo peculium dominus adimat vel si vendat eum cum peculio vel rem eius peculiarem et pretium exigat, non videtur in rem versum.
It is approved that not only that money is counted as turned to the master’s property which has immediately from the creditor come to the master, but also that which previously was in the peculium. And this is true as often as the slave, managing the master’s business, makes him more wealthy with peculium-funds. Otherwise, if the master takes the peculium from the slave, or if he sells him with the peculium, or a thing belonging to his peculium and exacts the price, it is not considered to have been turned to the estate.
Idem ait et si hereditatem a servo tuo emero quae ad te pertinebat et creditoribus pecuniam solvero, deinde hanc hereditatem abstuleris mihi, ex empto actione me id ipsum consecuturum: videri enim in rem tuam versum: nam et si hereditatem a servo emero, ut quod mihi ab ipso servo debebatur compensarem, licet nihil solvi, tamen consequi me ex empto quod ad dominum pervenit. ego autem non puto de in rem verso esse actionem emptori, nisi hoc animo gesserit servus, ut in rem domini verteret.
He likewise says that, if I buy from your slave an inheritance which belonged to you and I shall have paid money to the creditors, then, if you have taken this inheritance away from me, I will obtain that very thing by the action ex empto; for it is seen as having been turned to your account (in rem tuam versum). For even if I buy an inheritance from a slave so that I might compensate what was owed to me by the slave himself, although I paid nothing, nevertheless I obtain by the action ex empto what has reached the master. But I, however, do not think there is an action de in rem verso for the buyer, unless the slave has conducted this with the intention that it be turned to the master’s account.
Si filius familias pecuniam mutuatus pro filia sua dotem dederit, in rem versum patris videtur, quatenus avus pro nepte daturus fuit. quae sententia ita demum mihi vera videtur, si hoc animo dedit ut patris negotium gerens.
If a son under paternal power, having borrowed money, should give a dowry for his daughter, it is considered to have been turned to the father’s account, to the extent that the grandfather would have given for his granddaughter. Which opinion seems to me true only if he gave with this intention, as managing his father’s business.
Quare potest dici et si de peculio actionem quasi defensor patris susceperit, teneri patrem de in rem verso usque ad peculii quantitatem: cuius sententiae id erit emolumentum, ut, si finita sit actio de peculio, de in rem verso conveniatur. ego et ante condemnationem post iudicium patris nomine acceptum de in rem verso patrem teneri puto.
Wherefore it can be said that even if he has undertaken the action de peculio as a sort of defender of the father, the father is held on the in rem verso up to the amount of the peculium: the emolument of which opinion will be this, that, if the action de peculio has been exhausted, he is proceeded against on the in rem verso. I also think that, even before condemnation, after the iudicium has been taken up in the father’s name, the father is held on the in rem verso.
Sed utrum in sortem dumtaxat tenebitur dominus an et in usuras? et si quidem promisit usuras, Marcellus libro quinto digestorum scribit dominum praestaturum: sed si non sint promissae, utique non debebuntur, quia in stipulatum deductae non sunt. plane si contemplatione domini pecuniam dedi non gerenti servo negotia domini, sed ipse gerens, negotiorum gestorum actione potero etiam de usuris experiri.
But will the master be held liable for the principal only, or also for interest? And if indeed he promised interest, Marcellus, in the fifth book of the Digesta, writes that the master will have to make it good; but if they were not promised, then of course they will not be owed, because they were not brought into the stipulation. Clearly, if in contemplation of the master I gave money, not to a slave conducting the master’s business, but I myself conducting it, I can also proceed for interest by the action for business managed (negotiorum gestorum).
Versum autem sic accipimus, ut duret versum: et ita demum de in rem verso competit actio, si non sit a domino servo solutum vel filio. si tamen in necem creditoris, id est perdituro servo vel filio solutum sit, quamvis solutum sit, desinit quidem versum, aequissimum autem est de dolo malo adversus patrem vel dominum competere actionem: nam et peculiaris debitor, si fraudulenter servo solverit quod ei debebat, non liberatur.
However, we take “versum” thus, that the “turning” endures; and only then does the action de in rem verso lie, if it has not been paid by the master in the case of the slave or by the father in the case of the son. If, however, it has been paid to the creditor’s ruin, that is, paid to a slave or a son who is about to be lost, although it has been paid, the “turning” indeed ceases; but it is most equitable that an action for dolus malus should be available against the father or the master: for even the debtor of a peculium, if he has fraudulently paid the slave what he owed to him, is not released.
Si domini debitor sit servus et ab alio mutuatus ei solverit, hactenus non vertit, quatenus domino debet: quod excedit, vertit. proinde si, cum domino deberet triginta, mutuatus quadraginta creditori eius solverit vel familiam exhibuerit, dicendum erit de in rem verso in decem competere actionem: aut si tantundem debeat, nihil videtur versum. nam, ut pomponius scribit, adversus lucrum domini videtur subventum: et ideo, sive debitor fuit domino, cum in rem verteret, nihil videri versum, sive postea debitor esse domino coeperit, desinere versum: idemque et si solverit ei. plus dicit et si tantundem ei donavit dominus, quantum creditori solvit pro se, si quidem remunerandi animo, non videri versum, si vero alias donavit, durare versum.
If a slave is a debtor to his master and, having borrowed from another, pays him, it does not count as “turned” (in rem verso) up to the extent he owes the master; what exceeds that is “turned.” Accordingly, if, when he owed the master thirty, he borrowed forty and paid the master’s creditor, or produced the household (familia), it must be said that the action de in rem verso lies for ten; but if he owes the same amount, nothing is seen to have been turned. For, as Pomponius writes, relief is regarded as being given against the master’s profit; and therefore, whether he was a debtor to the master when it was turning to the estate, nothing is seen to have been turned, or if afterwards he began to be a debtor to the master, what had been turned ceases; and the same is so if he has paid him. He further says that if the master has given him as a gift as much as he paid to the creditor on the master’s behalf, then, if with the intention of remunerating, it is not seen to have been turned; but if he gave it for other reasons, the “turning” endures.
Idem quaerit, si decem in rem domini vertit et postea tantandem summam a domino mutuatus sit, habeat praeterea et peculium decem, videndum ait, utrum desiit esse versum? an vero, quoniam est peculium, unde trahatur ^ detrahatur^ debitum, de in rem verso non tollimus actionem? an potius ex utroque pro rata detrahimus?
The same asks: if he turned ten to the master’s account and afterwards borrowed the same sum from the master, and moreover has a peculium of ten, it must be considered, he says, whether it has ceased to be “turned”; or indeed, since there is a peculium from which the debt may be drawn off ^deducted^, do we not take away the action de in rem verso; or rather do we deduct pro rata from both?
Idem tractat, an ex eventu possit in rem patris filius vertere, veluti si duo rei pater et filius fuerint et filius mutuatus suo nomine solvat, vel si filio iussu patris credidisti et filius creditum tibi solvisset. mihi videtur, si quidem pecunia ad patrem pervenerat, videri in rem versum: quod si non fuit et suum negotium gerens filius solvit, non esse de in rem verso actionem.
He likewise treats whether, from the outcome, a son can turn it to the father’s account (in rem patris vertere), for instance if father and son have been two defendants and the son, having borrowed in his own name, pays; or if you lent to the son by the father’s order and the son has paid you the loan. It seems to me that, if indeed the money has come through to the father, it is to be considered “turned to his account” (in rem versum); but if it has not, and the son, managing his own business, paid, there is no action de in rem verso.
Si fundum patri dominove emit servus vel filius familias, versum quidem esse videtur, ita tamen, ut, sive minoris sit, quam est emptus, tantum videatur in rem versum quanti dignus sit, sive pluris sit, non plus videatur in rem versum quam emptus est.
If a slave or a son-in-power (filius familias) buys a farm (fundus) for his father or master, it is indeed deemed to have been “turned” (in rem versum); but on this footing: if it is worth less than the price at which it was bought, only as much is considered to have been turned to the estate as it is worth; if it is worth more, no more is considered to have been turned to the estate than the price for which it was bought.
Si in rem alterius ex dominis versum sit, utrum is solus in cuius rem versum est, an et socius possit conveniri, quaeritur. et iulianus scribit eum solum conveniri in cuius rem versum est, sicuti cum solus iussit: quam sententiam puto veram.
If it has been turned into the property of one among the owners, the question is whether he alone, in whose property it was turned, or also his partner can be sued. And Julian writes that he alone can be sued in whose property it was turned, just as when he alone ordered it: which opinion I deem true.
Marcellus notat: interdum et propter hoc quod in rem alterius socii versum est de in rem verso cum altero agi potest, qui conventus a socio petere potest id in quo damnatus fuerit. quid enim dicemus, si peculium servo ab altero ademptum fuerit? paulus: ergo haec quaestio ita procedit, si de peculio agi non potest.
Marcellus notes: sometimes also, because that has been turned into the property of another partner, one can proceed by the action de in rem verso against the other, who, when sued, can demand from the partner the amount in which he has been condemned. For what shall we say if the slave’s peculium has been taken away by the other? paulus: therefore this question proceeds thus, if an action de peculio cannot be brought.
Si filius familias constituerit quod pater debuit, videndum est, an de in rem verso actio dari debeat. atquin non liberavit patrem: nam qui constituit, se quidem obligat, patrem vero non liberat. plane si solvat post constitutum, licet pro se videatur solvisse, hoc est ob id quod constituit, in rem tamen vertisse patris merito dicetur.
If a son under paternal power has made a constitutum for what the father owed, it must be considered whether an actio de in rem verso ought to be granted. And yet he has not liberated the father: for he who makes the constitutum obligates himself indeed, but does not liberate the father. Clearly, if he pays after the constitutum, although he may seem to have paid on his own behalf, that is, on account of that which he constituted, nevertheless it will deservedly be said that it has been turned to the father’s account.
Quidam fundum colendum servo suo locavit et boves ei dederat: cum hi boves non essent idonei, iusserat eos venire et his nummis qui recepti essent alios reparari: servus boves vendiderat, alios redemerat, nummos venditori non solverat, postea conturbaverat: qui boves vendiderat nummos a domino petebat actione de peculio aut quod in rem domini versum esset, cum boves pro quibus pecunia peteretur penes dominum essent. respondit non videri peculii quicquam esse, nisi si quid deducto eo, quod servus domino debuisset, reliquum fieret: illud sibi videri boves quidem in rem domini versos esse, sed pro ea re solvisse tantum, quanti priores boves venissent: si quo amplioris pecuniae posteriores boves essent, eius oportere dominum condemnari.
A certain man let a farm to be tilled to his slave and had given him oxen: since these oxen were not suitable, he ordered them to be sold and others to be procured with the monies that should be received. The slave had sold the oxen, had bought others, had not paid the monies to the seller, and later became insolvent. The man who had sold the oxen was seeking the monies from the master by an action de peculio or on the ground that it had been turned to the master’s account (quod in rem domini versum esset), since the oxen for which the money was being sought were in the master’s possession. He replied that nothing was seen to belong to the peculium, unless, after deducting what the slave had owed the master, there remained a surplus. He was of the opinion that the oxen indeed had been turned to the master’s account, but that for that matter the master is to be held to have paid only as much as the earlier oxen had fetched; if the later oxen were of any greater price, the master ought to be condemned for that amount.
Servus in rem domini pecuniam mutuatus sine culpa eam perdidit: nihilo minus posse cum domino de in rem verso agi existimavit. nam et si procurator meus in negotia mea impensurus pecuniam mutuatus sine culpa eam perdiderit, recte eum hoc nomine mandati vel negotiorum gestorum acturum.
A slave, having borrowed money for the master's interest, without fault lost it: nevertheless he judged that one can proceed against the master by the de in rem verso action. For even if my procurator, intending to expend the money in my affairs, should borrow money and without fault lose it, he would rightly under this head bring an action of mandate or of negotiorum gestorum.
Cum sticho vicario servi tui pamphili contraxi: actio de peculio et in rem verso ita dari debet, ut, quod vel in tuam ipsius rem vel in peculium pamphili versum sit, comprehendatur, scilicet etiamsi mortuo vel alienato sticho agatur. quod si pamphilo mortuo agam, magis est, ut, quamvis stichus vivat, tamen de eo, quod in peculio pamphili versum est, non nisi intra annum quam is decessit actio dari debeat: etenim quodammodo de peculio pamphili tum experiri videbor, sicuti si, quod iussu eius credidissem, experirer: nec nos movere debet, quod stichus de cuius peculio agitur vivat, quando non aliter ea res in peculio eius esse potest, quam si pamphili peculium maneat. eadem ratio efficiet, ut id, quod in peculio pamphili versum sit, ita praestari debere dicamus, ut prius eius, quod tibi pamphilus debuerit, deductio fiat, quod vero in tuam rem versum fuerit, praestetur etiam non deducto eo quod pamphilus tibi debet.
I contracted with Stichus, the vicarius of your slave Pamphilus: the action de peculio and in rem verso ought to be given in such a way that what has been turned either into your own estate or into the peculium of Pamphilus is included, namely even if suit is brought when Stichus is dead or has been alienated. But if I sue after Pamphilus is dead, it is rather the case that, although Stichus is alive, nevertheless, as to that which was turned into Pamphilus’s peculium, the action ought to be granted only within a year from his decease: for I will then seem in a certain way to be proceeding de peculio of Pamphilus, just as if I were proceeding on something which I had trusted on his iussum. Nor ought it to move us that Stichus, whose peculium is the subject of the action, is alive, since that thing can be in his peculium only if the peculium of Pamphilus remains. The same reasoning will bring it about that we say that what has been turned into the peculium of Pamphilus must be made good only with a prior deduction of what Pamphilus has owed to you; but what has been turned into your estate must be made good even without deducting what Pamphilus owes you.
Quamvis in eam rem pro servo meo fideiusseris, quae ita contracta est, ut in rem meam versaretur ( veluti si, cum servus frumentum emisset quo familia aleretur, venditori frumenti fideiusseris), propius est tamen, ut de peculio eo nomine, non de in rem verso agere possis, ut unius dumtaxat in quoquo contractu de in rem verso sit actio, qui id ipsum credidit quod in rem domini versum est.
Although in that matter you have stood surety for my slave, a transaction contracted in such a way that it was turned to my benefit (for example, if, when the slave purchased grain by which the household would be nourished, you stood surety to the seller of the grain), nevertheless it is more fitting that you can sue under the action de peculio on that ground, not de in rem verso, so that there is an action de in rem verso for only a single person in whatever contract, namely for him who extended credit for that very thing which was turned to the master’s advantage.
Filius familias togam emit: mortuo deinde eo pater ignorans et putans suam esse dedicavit eam in funus eius. neratius libro responsorum ait in rem patris versum videri: in actione autem de peculio quod in rerum natura non esset uno modo aestimari debere, si dolo malo eius quocum agatur factum esset. atquin si filio pater togam emere debuit, in rem patris res versa est non nunc quo funerabitur, sed quo tempore emit ( funus enim filii aes alienum patris est: et hoc neratius quoque, qui de in rem verso patrem teneri putavit, ostendit negotium hoc, id est sepulturam et funus filii patris esse aes alienum, non filii): factus est ergo debitor peculii, quamvis res non exstet, ut etiam de peculio possit conveniri, in quam actionem venit et quod in rem versum est: quae tamen adiectio tunc necessaria est, cum annus post mortem filii excessit.
A son in the family buys a toga: then, after he has died, the father, being unaware and thinking it to be his own, dedicated it to his funeral. Neratius, in his book of Responses, says it seems to have been turned to the father’s account (in rem patris versum): but in the action de peculio, a thing which was not in rerum natura ought to be estimated in only one way, if it was made so through the dolus malus of the person with whom one is litigating. And yet, if the father was bound to buy a toga for the son, the matter was turned to the father’s account not now, when he will be buried, but at the time when he bought it ( for the son’s funeral is the father’s debt, aes alienum: and this Neratius also, who thought the father is held on account of the in rem versum, shows—namely that this business, that is, the burial and funeral of the son, are the father’s aes alienum, not the son’s): therefore he became a debtor of the peculium, although the thing does not exist, so that he can also be proceeded against de peculio, into which action there likewise comes what has been turned to his account; yet that addition is necessary then, when a year has elapsed after the son’s death.
Pater pro filia dotem promisit et convenit, ut ipse filiam aleret: non praestante patre filia a viro mutuam pecuniam accepit et mortua est in matrimonio. respondi, si ad ea id quod creditum est erogatum esset, sine quibus aut se tueri aut servos paternos exhibere non posset, dandam de in rem verso utilem actionem.
A father promised a dowry on behalf of his daughter and it was agreed that he himself would nourish/support the daughter: the father not performing, the daughter received a loan of money from her husband and died in matrimony. I responded that, if what was loaned had been disbursed toward those things without which she could not either maintain/guard herself or exhibit/produce the paternal slaves, a useful action de in rem verso is to be given.
Servus absentis rei publicae causa pupilli servis pecuniam credidit subscribente tutore stipulatione in personam tutoris translata: quaesitum est, an adversus pupillum competat actio. respondi, si, cum in rem pupilli daretur, id in rem eius versum est et, quo magis actus servorum confirmaretur, tutor spopondit, posse nihilo minus dici de in rem verso cum pupillo actionem fore.
A slave of a ward who was absent on account of the commonwealth lent money to the ward’s slaves, the tutor countersigning, the stipulation having been transferred into the person of the tutor: it was asked whether an action lies against the ward. I answered that, if, when it was given for the ward’s benefit, it was turned to his account, and the tutor promised besides, in order the more to confirm the transactions of the slaves, it can nonetheless be said that there will be an action de in rem verso against the ward.
Filiam familias duxit uxorem patre dotem promittente et convenit inter omnes personas, uti eam pater aut ipsa se tueretur: maritus ei mutuos nummos dedit, cum iuste putaret patrem eius ministraturum tantum salarium, quantum dare filiae suae instituerat: eos nummos illa in usus necessarios sibi et in servos quos secum habebat consumpsit, aliquantum et ( cum ei res familiares creditae essent) ex pecunia mariti in easdem causas convertit: deinde priusquam pater salarium expleret, moritur filia: pater impensam recusat: maritus res mulieris retinet: quaero, an de in rem verso adversus patrem actio competat. respondit, si ad ea id quod creditum est erogatum esset, sine quibus aut se tueri aut servos paternos exhibere non posset, dandam de in rem verso utilem actionem.
He took a daughter-in-power as his wife, the father promising a dowry, and it was agreed among all the persons concerned that either the father should maintain her, or she should maintain herself. The husband gave her money by way of a loan, since he justly supposed that her father would furnish so much salary (allowance) as he had resolved to give his daughter. She consumed that money on necessary uses for herself and on the slaves whom she had with her, and also—since household effects had been entrusted to her—she converted some amount from the husband’s money to the same purposes. Then, before the father completed the salary, the daughter died. The father refuses the expenditure; the husband retains the woman’s goods. I ask whether an action de in rem verso lies against the father. He replied: if what was loaned was expended on those things without which she could not either maintain herself or provide for the father’s slaves, a useful action de in rem verso is to be granted.
Iussum autem accipiendum est, sive testato quis sive per epistulam sive verbis aut per nuntium sive specialiter in uno contractu iusserit sive generaliter: et ideo et si sic contestatus sit: " quod voles cum sticho servo meo negotium gere periculo meo", videtur ad omnia iussisse, nisi certa lex aliquid prohibet.
The order must be taken as effective, whether someone has ordered by testament, or by epistle, or by words, or through a messenger, whether specially in a single contract or generally: and therefore even if he has thus attested: " whatever you wish, conduct business with my slave Stichus at my risk", he is considered to have ordered for all things, unless a certain law prohibits something.
Quid ergo si fideiusserit pro servo? ait Marcellus non teneri quod iussu: quasi extraneus enim intervenit: neque hoc dicit ideo, quod tenetur ex causa fideiussionis, sed quia aliud est iubere, aliud fideiubere: denique idem scribit, etsi inutiliter fideiusserit, tamen eum non obligari quasi iusserit, quae sententia verior est.
What then if he has stood surety for a slave? Marcellus says that he is not liable under the “quod iussu,” for he intervenes as an outsider; nor does he say this for the reason that he is bound on account of the cause of suretyship (fideiussio), but because to order (iubere) is one thing, to be surety (fideiubere) is another. Finally, the same writer notes that even if he has stood surety ineffectually, nevertheless he is not obligated as though he had ordered; which opinion is the truer.
Si curatore adulescentis vel furiosi vel prodigi iubente cum servo contractum sit, putat labeo dandam quod iussu actionem in eos quorum servus fuerit: idem et in vero procuratore. sed si procurator verus non sit, in ipsum potius dandam actionem idem labeo ait.
If, at the order of the curator of a youth, or of a madman, or of a prodigal, a contract has been made with a slave, Labeo thinks the quod iussu action should be given against those whose slave he was: the same, too, in the case of a true procurator. But if the procurator is not genuine, the same Labeo says that the action should rather be given against him himself.