Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Volentes in rebus quae factae sunt ad cognoscendum eum a quo factae sunt exercere lectorem iam peruenimus ad eius imaginem quod est homo in eo quo ceteris animalibus antecellit, id est ratione uel intellegentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationali uel intellectuali dici potest quod pertineat ad eam rem quae mens uocatur uel animus. Quo nomine nonnulli auctores linguae latinae id quod excellit in homine et non est in pecore ab anima quae inest et pecori suo quodam loquendi mores distinguunt. Supra haec ergo naturam si quaerimus aliquid et uerum quaerimus, deus est, natura scilicet non creata, sed creatrix.

[1 1] Wishing, in the things that have been made, to exercise the reader for the knowing of Him by whom they have been made, we have now come to His image, which is the human being, in that wherein he surpasses the other animals, that is, by reason or intelligence, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul which pertains to that thing which is called mind or animus. By this name, some authors of the Latin tongue, by a certain usage of speaking, distinguish that which excels in the human and is not in cattle from the soul which is present and is in cattle. Above these, then, if we seek some nature—and we seek the true—it is God, a nature namely not created, but creative.

Quae utrum sit trinitas non solum credentibus diuinae scripturae auctoritate, uerum etiam intellegentibus aliqua si possumus ratione iam demonstrare debemus. Cur autem 'si possumus' dixerim res ipsa cum quaeri disputando coeperit melius indicabit.

Whether this be a Trinity we ought now to demonstrate, not only to believers on the authority of divine Scripture, but also to those who understand, if we can, by some reasoning. But why I said “if we can,” the matter itself, when it begins to be inquired by disputation, will indicate better.

[II 2] Deus quippe ipse quem quaerimus adiuuabit, ut spero, ne sit infructuosus labor noster et intellegamus quemadmodum dictum sit in psalmo sancto: Laetetur cor quaerentium dominum. Quaerite dominum et confirmamini; quaerite faciem eius semper. Videtur enim quod semper quaeritur numquam inueniri, et quomodo iam laetabitur et non potius contristabitur cor quaerentium si non potuerint inuenire quod quaerunt?

[2 2] For God himself whom we seek will help, as I hope, lest our labor be infructuous, and let us understand how it was said in the holy psalm: Let the heart of those seeking the Lord rejoice. Seek the Lord and be confirmed; seek his face always. For it seems that what is always sought is never found, and how will the heart of those seeking already rejoice and not rather be saddened, if they cannot find what they seek?

Non enim ait: Laetetur cor 'inuenientium' sed quaerentium dominum. Et tamen deum dominum inueniri posse dum quaeritur testatur Esaias propheta cum dicit: Quaerite dominum et mox ut inueneritis inuocate eum, et cum appropinquauerit uobis derelinquat impius uias suas et uir iniquus cogitationes suas. Si ergo quaesitus inueniri potest, cur dictum est: Quaerite faciem eius semper?

For he did not say: Let the heart of the ‘finding’ rejoice, but of those seeking the Lord. And yet the prophet Isaiah bears witness that God the Lord can be found while he is being sought, when he says: Seek the Lord, and at once, when you have found him, call upon him; and when he has drawn near to you, let the impious abandon his ways and the iniquitous man his thoughts. If therefore, once sought, he can be found, why was it said: Seek his face always?

An et inuentus fortasse quaerendus est? Sic enim sunt incomprehensibilia requirenda ne se existimet nihil inuenisse qui quam sit incomprehensibile quod quaerebat potuerit inuenire. Cur ergo sic quaerit si incomprehensibile comprehendit esse quod quaerit nisi quia cessandum non est quamdiu in ipsa incomprehensibilium rerum inquisitione proficitur, et melior meliorque fit quaerens tam magnum bonum quod et inueniendum quaeritur et quaerendum inuenitur?

Or is it perhaps that even when found he must be sought? For thus are the incomprehensibles to be sought again, lest he think he has found nothing, who has been able to find how incomprehensible that which he was seeking is. Why, therefore, does he seek thus, if he comprehends that what he seeks is incomprehensible, unless because one must not cease so long as progress is made in the very inquisition of incomprehensible things, and the seeker becomes better and better by so great a good, which both is sought as to-be-found and, when found, is discovered to be still to-be-sought?

Nam et quaeritur ut inueniatur dulcius et inuenitur ut quaeratur auidius. Secundum hoc accipi potest quod dictum est in libro ecclesiastico dicere sapientiam: Qui me manducant adhuc esurient et qui bibunt me adhuc sitient. Manducant enim et bibunt quia inueniunt, et quia esuriunt ac sitiunt adhuc quaerunt.

For it is sought that it may be found more sweetly, and it is found that it may be sought more avidly. According to this may be taken what is said in the Ecclesiastical book, Wisdom speaking: Those who eat me will still hunger, and those who drink me will still thirst. For they eat and drink because they find, and because they hunger and thirst they still seek.

Fides quaerit, intellectus inuenit; propter quod ait propheta: Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis. Et rursus intellectus eum quem inuenit adhuc quaerit: Deus enim respexit super filios hominum, sicut in psalmo sacro canitur, ut uideret si est intellegens aut requirens deum. Ad hoc ergo debet esse homo intellegens ut requirat deum.

Faith seeks, intellect finds; on account of which the prophet says: Unless you believe, you will not understand. And again intellect still seeks him whom it has found: for God looked upon the sons of men, as is sung in the sacred psalm, to see if there is one intelligent or seeking God. To this end, therefore, a man ought to be intelligent, that he may seek God.

[3] Satis itaque remorati fuerimus in his quae deus fecit ut per ea cognosceretur ipse qui fecit: Inuisibilia enim eius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Vnde arguuntur in libro sapientiae qui de his quae uidentur bona non potuerunt scire eum qui est neque operibus attendentes agnouerunt artificem, sed aut ignem aut spiritum aut citatum aerem aut gyrum stellarum aut uiolentiam aquarum aut luminaria caeli rectores orbis terrarum deos putauerunt. Quorum quidem si specie delectati haec deos putauerunt, sciant quanto dominator eorum melior est; species enim generator creauit ea. Aut si uirtutem et operationem eorum mirati sunt, intellegant ab his quanto qui haec constituit fortior est.

[3] Enough, then, we shall have lingered upon those things which God made, so that through them He who made might be known: For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that have been made, are seen. Whence they are reproved in the Book of Wisdom who, from these visible good things, could not know Him who Is, nor, paying heed to the works, recognized the Artificer, but either fire or spirit or the swift air or the gyration of the stars or the violence of the waters or the luminaries of heaven—the rulers of the world—they supposed to be gods. Of whom indeed, if, delighted by the beauty, they supposed these to be gods, let them know how much better their Dominator is; for the Begetter of beauty created them. Or if they admired their virtue and operation, let them understand from these how much stronger is He who constituted them.

A magnitudine enim speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit horum creator uideri. Haec de libro sapientiae propterea posui ne me fidelium quispiam frustra et inaniter existimet in creatura prius per quasdam sui generis trinitates quodam modo gradatim donec ad mentem hominis peruenirem quaesisse indicia summae illius trinitatis quam quaerimus cum deum quaerimus.

For from the magnitude of beauty and of creation the Creator of these can be seen intelligibly. These things from the Book of Wisdom I have set down for this reason, lest anyone of the faithful suppose me, to no purpose and inanely, to have sought in creation first, through certain trinities of its own kind, in a certain manner step by step until I should arrive at the mind of man, the indices of that supreme Trinity which we seek when we seek God.

[III 4] Sed quoniam diserrendi et ratiocinandi necessitas per quattuordecim libros multa nos compulit dicere quae cuncta simul aspicere non ualemus ut ad id quod apprehendere uolumus ea celeri cogitatione referamus, faciam quantum domino adiuuante potuero ut quidquid in singulis uoluminibus ad cognitionem disputatione perduxi remota disputatione breuiter congeram, et tamquam sub uno mentis aspectu non quemadmodum res quaeque persuasit sed ipsa quae persuasa sunt ponam ne tam longe sint a praecedentibus consequentia ut obliuionem praecedentium faciat inspectio consequentium, aut certe si fecerit, cito possit quod exciderit relegendo recolligi.

[3 4] But since the necessity of discoursing and ratiocinating through fourteen books has compelled us to say many things which we are not able to behold all at once, so that we may refer them by swift cogitation to that which we wish to apprehend, I shall do, as far as I shall be able with the Lord aiding, this: whatever in the several volumes I have led forward to cognition by disputation, with the disputation removed, I shall briefly compile; and, as it were under a single aspect of the mind, I shall set down not the manner in which each matter persuaded, but the very things that have been persuaded, lest the consequents be so far from the antecedents that the inspection of the consequents produce oblivion of the antecedents, or at least, if it does, that what has slipped out may quickly be recollected by rereading.

[5] In primo libro secundum scripturas sanctas unitas et aequalitas summae illius trinitatis ostenditur. In secundo et tertio et quarto eadem, sed de filii missione et spiritus sancti diligenter quaestio pertractata tres libros fecit, demonstratumque est non ideo minorem mittente qui missus est quia ille misit, hic missus est cum trinitas quae per omnia aequalis est pariter quoque in sua natura immutabilis et inuisibilis et ubique praesens inseparabiliter operetur.

[5] In the first book, according to the holy Scriptures, the unity and equality of that highest Trinity is shown. In the second and third and fourth, the same; but the question concerning the sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, carefully handled, made three books, and it was demonstrated that the one who was sent is not therefore lesser than the one sending because that one sent and this one was sent, since the Trinity, which is equal through all things, likewise also in its own nature immutable and invisible and everywhere present, works inseparably.

In quinto propter eos quibus ideo uidetur non eandem patris et filii esse substantiam quia omne quod de deo dicitur secundum substantiam dici putant, et propterea gignere et gigni uel genitum esse et ingenitum quoniam diuersa sunt contendunt substantias esse diuersas, demonstratur non omne quod de deo dicitur secundum substantiam dici sicut secundum substantiam dicitur bonus et magnus et si quid aliud ad se dicitur, sed dici etiam relatiue, id est non ad se sed ad aliquid quod ipse non est, sicut pater ad filium dicitur uel dominus ad creaturam sibi seruientem; ubi si quid relatiue, id est ad aliquid quod ipse non est, etiam ex tempore dicitur sicuti est: Domine, refugium factus es nobis, nihil ei accidere quo mutetur sed omnino ipsum in natura uel essentia sua immutabilem permanere.

In the fifth, on account of those to whom it therefore seems that the Father and the Son do not have the same substance because they think that everything said of God is said according to substance, and therefore they contend that to beget and to be begotten or to be begotten and to be ingenerate, since they are diverse, are diverse substances, it is shown that not everything said of God is said according to substance, just as good and great are said according to substance and whatever else is said with respect to himself; but that things are also said relatively, that is, not with respect to himself but to something which he himself is not, as Father is said with respect to Son, or Lord with respect to the creature serving him; where, if anything is said relatively, that is, with respect to something which he himself is not, even from time, as in: Lord, you have been made a refuge for us, nothing befalls him by which he is changed, but he altogether remains immutable in his nature or essence.

In sexto quomodo dictus sit Christus ore apostolico dei uirtus et dei sapientia sic disputatur ut differatur eadem quaestio diligentius retractanda, utrum a quo est genitus Christus non sit ipse sapientia sed tantum sapientiae suae pater, an sapientia sapientiam genuerit. Sed quodlibet horum esset etiam in hoc libro apparuit trinitatis aequalitas, et non deus triplex sed trinitas; nec quasi aliquid duplum esse patrem et filium ad simplum spiritum sanctum ubi nec tria plus aliquid sunt quam unum horum. Disputatum est etiam quomodo possit intellegi quod ait Hilarius episcopus: Aeternitas in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere.

In the sixth it is argued in such a way, about how Christ is called by the apostolic mouth the power of God and the wisdom of God, that the same question is deferred for a more diligent re-examination: whether he by whom Christ was begotten is not himself Wisdom but only the Father of his Wisdom, or whether Wisdom begot Wisdom. But whichever of these it might be, even in this book the equality of the Trinity appeared, and not a triple god but the Trinity; nor are the Father and the Son as though something double in comparison to the simple Holy Spirit, where the three are not anything more than one of these. It was also disputed how what Bishop Hilary says can be understood: Eternity in the Father, Form in the Image, Use in the Gift.

In septimo quaestio quae dilata fuerat explicatur ita ut deus qui genuit filium non solum sit pater uirtutis et sapientiae suae sed etiam ipse uirtus atque sapientia, sic et spiritus sanctus; nec tamen simul tres sint uirtutes aut tres sapientiae sed una uirtus et una sapientia sicut unus deus et una essentia. Deinde quaesitum est quomodo dicantur una essentia, tres personae, uel ut a quibusdam graecis, una essentia, tres substantiae; et inuentum est elocutionis necessitate dici ut aliquo uno nomine enuntiaretur cum quaeritur quid tres sint, quos tres esse ueraciter confitemur, patrem scilicet et filium et spiritum sanctum.

In the seventh, the question which had been deferred is unfolded, to wit, that God who begot the Son is not only the Father of his own Virtue and Wisdom, but is himself also Virtue and Wisdom—and so too the Holy Spirit; nor yet are they together three virtues or three wisdoms, but one Virtue and one Wisdom, just as one God and one Essence. Then it was inquired how they are said to be one essence, three persons, or, as by certain Greeks, one essence, three substances; and it was found that, by necessity of elocution, it is so said, in order that by some one name it might be enunciated, when it is asked what the three are—whom we truly confess to be three—namely, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

In octauo ratione etiam reddita intellegentibus clarum est in substantia ueritatis non solum patrem filio non esse maiorem, sed nec ambos simul aliquid maius esse quam solum spiritum sanctum, aut quoslibet duos in eadem trinitate maius esse aliquid quam unum, aut omnes simul tres maius aliquid esse quam singulos. Deinde per ueritatem quae intellecta conspicitur et per bonum summum a quo est omne bonum et per iustitiam propter quam diligitur animus iustus ab animo etiam nondum iusto ut natura non solum incorporalis uerum etiam immutabilis quod est deus quantum fieri potest intellegeretur admonui, et per caritatem quae in scripturis sanctis deus dicta est, per quam coepit utcumque etiam trinitas intellegentibus apparere sicut sunt amans et quod amatur et amor.

In the eighth, with the rationale also rendered, it is clear to the intelligent that in the substance of truth not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but neither are both together anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone, nor are any two in the same trinity anything greater than one, nor are all three together anything greater than each singly. Then, through the truth which, once understood, is beheld, and through the highest good from which is every good, and through justice on account of which the just soul is loved by a soul not yet just, I admonished so that the nature—not only incorporeal but also immutable—which is God might, as far as can be, be understood; and through charity which in the holy Scriptures is called God, through which the trinity also began, in some manner, to appear to the understanding, as there are the lover, that which is loved, and love.

In nono ad imaginem dei quod est homo secundum mentem peruenit disputatio, et in ea quaedam trinitas inuenitur, id est mens et notitia qua se nouit et amor quo se notitiamque suam diligit, et haec tria aequalia inter se et unius ostenduntur esse essentiae. In decimo hoc idem diligentius subtiliusque tractatum est atque ad id perductum ut inueniretur in mente euidentior trinitas eius, in memoria scilicet et intellegentia et uoluntate. Sed quoniam et hoc compertum est quod mens numquam esse ita potuerit ut non sui meminisset, non se intellegeret et diligeret, quamuis non semper se cogitaret, cum autem cogitaret non se a corporalibus rebus eadem cogitatione discerneret, dilata est de trinitate cuius haec imago est disputatio ut in ipsis etiam corporalibus uisis inueniretur trinitas et distinctius in ea lectoris exerceretur intentio.

In the ninth the disputation came to the image of God, which is man according to the mind, and in it a certain trinity is found, that is, the mind and the knowledge by which it knows itself and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge; and these three are shown to be equal among themselves and to be of one essence. In the tenth this same thing was handled more diligently and more subtly and was brought to this: that a more evident trinity of it might be found in the mind, namely in memory and intelligence and will. But since this also was ascertained, that the mind could never have been so as not to remember itself, not to understand itself and to love itself—although it does not always think itself, and when it does think itself it does not by the same thought distinguish itself from corporeal things—the disputation about the Trinity, of which this is an image, was deferred, in order that even in the very corporeal things seen a trinity might be found, and that the reader’s attention might be exercised more distinctly in it.

In undecimo ergo electus est sensus oculorum in quo id quod inuentum esset etiam in ceteris quattuor sensibus corporis et non dictum posset agnosci, atque ita exterioris hominis trinitas primo in his quae cernuntur extrinsecus, ex corpore scilicet quod uidetur et forma quae inde in acie cernentis imprimitur et utrumque copulantis intentione uoluntatis, apparuit. Sed haec tria non inter se aequalia nec unius esse substantiae claruerunt. Deinde in ipso animo ab his quae extrinsecus sensa sunt uelut introducta inuenta est altera trinitas ubi apparerent eadem tria unius esse substantiae, imaginatio corporis quae in memoria est et inde informatio cum ad eam conuertitur acies cogitantis et utrumque coniungens intentio uoluntatis.

In the eleventh, therefore, the sense of the eyes was chosen, in which what had been discovered could also be recognized in the other four senses of the body, though not stated; and thus the trinity of the exterior man first appeared in those things which are perceived from without—namely, from the body which is seen, and the form which from it is imprinted upon the gaze of the beholder, and the intention of the will that couples both. But it became clear that these three are neither equal among themselves nor of one substance. Then, in the mind itself, from those things which were sensed from without and, as it were, introduced, another trinity was found, where the same three appear to be of one substance: the imagination of the body which is in memory, and from it a formation when the gaze of the thinker is turned toward it, and the intention of the will joining both.

Sed ideo et ista trinitas ad exteriorem hominem reperta est pertinere quia de corporibus inlata est quae sentiuntur extrinsecus.

But for that reason this trinity too has been found to pertain to the exterior man, because it is introduced from bodies which are sensed extrinsically.

In duodecimo discernenda uisa est sapientia ab scientia, et in ea quae proprie scientia nuncupatur quia inferior est prius quaedam sui generis trinitas inquirenda, quae licet ad interiorem hominem iam pertineat, nondum tamen imago dei uel appellanda sit uel putanda. Et hoc agitur in tertio decimo per commendationem fidei christianae. In quarto decimo autem de sapientia hominis uera, id est dei munere in eius ipsius dei participatione donata, quae ab scientia distincta est disputatur, et eo peruenit disputatio ut trinitas appareat in imagine dei quod est homo secundum mentem quae renouatur in agnitione dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit hominem ad imaginem suam et sic percipit sapientiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum.

In the twelfth, wisdom was seen as needing to be distinguished from science; and in that which is properly called science, because it is lower, first a certain trinity of its own kind is to be inquired, which, although it already pertains to the inner man, is not yet either to be called or to be thought the image of God. And this is carried out in the thirteenth through the commendation of the Christian faith. In the fourteenth, moreover, there is discussion concerning the true wisdom of man, that is, bestowed by the gift of God in the participation of that very God, which is distinct from science; and the discussion comes to this point, that a trinity may appear in the image of God, which is man according to the mind that is renewed in the recognition of God according to the image of him who created man to his own image, and thus he perceives wisdom where the contemplation of the eternal things is.

[IV 6] Iam ergo in ipsis rebus aeternis, incorporalibus et immutabilibus in quarum perfecta contemplatione nobis beata quae non nisi aeterna est uita promittitur trinitatem quae deus est inquiramus. Neque enim diuinorum librorum tantummodo auctoritas esse deum praedicat, sed omnis quae nos circumstat, ad quam nos etiam pertinemus, uniuersa ipsa rerum natura proclamat habere se praestantissimum conditorem qui nobis mentem rationemque naturalem dedit qua uiuentia non uiuentibus, sensu praedita non sentientibus, intellegentia non intellegentibus, immortalia mortalibus, impotentibus potentia, iniustis iusta, speciosa deformibus, bona malis, incorruptibilia corruptibilibus, immutabilia mutabilibus, inuisibilia uisibilibus, incorporalia corporalibus, beata miseris praeferenda uideamus. Ac per hoc quoniam rebus creatis creatorem sine dubitatione praeponimus, oportet ut eum et summe uiuere et cuncta sentire atque intellegere, et mori, corrumpi mutarique non posse; nec corpus esse sed spiritum omnium potentissimum, iustissimum, speciosissimum, optimum beatissimumque fateamur.

[4 6] Now therefore, in the very eternal, incorporeal, and immutable realities, in the perfect contemplation of which there is promised to us the blessed life, which is none other than eternal, let us inquire the Trinity which is God. For not only does the authority of the divine books proclaim that God exists, but the whole nature of things itself, which surrounds us and to which we also pertain, cries aloud that it has a most outstanding Founder, who gave to us mind and natural reason, by which we see that things living are to be preferred to things not living, things endowed with sense to things not sensing, things with intelligence to things not understanding, immortals to mortals, the powerful to the powerless, things just to the unjust, things fair to the deformed, goods to evils, incorruptibles to corruptibles, immutables to mutables, invisibles to visibles, incorporeals to corporeals, the blessed to the wretched. And therefore, since we without doubt set the Creator before created things, it is meet that we confess Him both to live supremely and to perceive and understand all things, and to be unable to die, to be corrupted, or to be changed; and that He is not a body but spirit, most powerful of all, most just, most beautiful, best, and most blessed.

[V 7] Sed haec omnia quae dixi et quaecumque alia simili more locutionis humanae digne de deo dici uidentur et uniuersae trinitati qui est unus deus et personis singulis in eadem trinitate conueniunt. Quis enim uel unum deum, quod est ipsa trinitas, uel patrem uel filium uel spiritum sanctum audeat dicere aut non uiuentem aut nihil sentientem uel intellegentem, aut in ea natura qua inter se praedicantur aequales quemquam eorum esse mortalem siue corruptibilem siue mutabilem siue corporeum? Aut quisquam ibi neget aliquem potentissimum, iustissimum, speciosissimum, optimum, beatissimum?

[V 7] But all these things which I have said, and whatever else in a similar manner of human locution seem worthy to be said about God, are fitting both to the whole Trinity, who is one God, and to the individual persons in the same Trinity. For who would dare to say either the one God, which is the Trinity itself, or the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, to be either not living, or perceiving nothing or understanding, or—in that nature in which they are predicated equal among themselves—that any of them is mortal, or corruptible, or mutable, or corporeal? Or would anyone there deny anyone to be most powerful, most just, most beautiful, best, most blessed?

Si ergo haec atque huiusmodi omnia et ipsa trinitas et in ea singuli dici possunt, ubi aut quomodo trinitas apparebit?

If therefore these and all things of this sort can be predicated both of the Trinity itself and of the individual persons in it, where, or how, will the Trinity appear?

Redigamus itaque prius haec plurima ad aliquam paucitatem. Quae uita enim dicitur in deo ipsa est essentia eius atque natura. Non itaque deus uiuit nisi uita quod ipse sibi est.

Let us therefore first reduce these very many things to some paucity. For what is called life in God is his very essence and nature. Therefore God does not live except by the life which he is to himself.

Haec autem uita non talis est qualis inest arbori ubi nullus intellectus, nullus est sensus. Nec talis qualis inest pecori; habet enim uita pecoris sensum quinquepertitum sed intellectum habet nullum, at illa uita quae deus est sentit atque intellegit omnia, et sentit mente, non corpore quia spiritus est deus. Non autem sicut animalia quae habent corpora per corpus sentit deus; non enim ex anima constat et corpore, ac per hoc simplex illa natura sicut intellegit sentit, sicut sentit intellegit, idemque sensus qui intellectus est illi.

This life, however, is not such as is in a tree, where there is no intellect, there is no sense. Nor such as is in cattle; for the life of cattle has fivefold sense, but has no intellect; but that life which God is both senses and understands all things, and senses with mind, not with body, because God is spirit. Nor, however, does God sense through a body like animals which have bodies; for he does not consist of soul and body, and therefore that nature is simple: just as he understands he senses, just as he senses he understands, and the sense which is intellect is the same to him.

Nec ita ut aliquando esse desistat aut coeperit; immortalis est enim. Nec frustra de illo dictum est quod solus habeat immortalitatem. Nam immortalitas eius uere immortalitas est in cuius natura nulla est commutatio.

Nor is it so that he ever ceases to be or begins; for he is immortal. Nor was it said of him in vain that he alone has immortality. For his immortality is true immortality, in whose nature there is no change.

Ipsa est etiam uera aeternitas qua est immutabilis deus sine initio, sine fine, consequenter et incorruptibilis. Vna ergo eademque res dicitur siue dicatur aeternus deus siue immortalis siue incorruptibilis siue immutabilis, itemque cum dicitur uiuens et intellegens quod est utique sapiens, hoc idem dicitur. Non enim percepit sapientiam quia esset sapiens, sed ipse sapientia est.

This is also the true eternity, whereby God is immutable, without beginning, without end, and consequently incorruptible. One and the same thing is said whether God be called eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or immutable; likewise, when he is called living and intelligent—which is, of course, wise—the same is said. For he did not receive wisdom so that he might be wise, but he himself is wisdom.

Et haec uita eademque uirtus siue potentia, eademque species qua potens atque speciosius dicitur. Quid enim potentius et speciosius sapientia quae attingit a fine usque in finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter? Bonitas etiam atque iustitia numquid inter se in dei natura sicut in eius operibus distant tamquam duae diuersae sint qualitates dei, una bonitas, alia iustitia?

And this life is the same virtue or potency, and the same beauty by which he is called powerful and more beautiful. For what is more powerful and more beautiful than Wisdom, which reaches from end unto end mightily and arranges all things sweetly? Goodness also and justice—do they differ from each other in the nature of God as in his works, as though there were two diverse qualities of God, one goodness, the other justice?

Non utique. Sed quae iustitia ipsa bonitas, et quae bonitas ipsa beatitudo. Incorporalis autem uel incorporeus ideo dicitur deus ut spiritus credatur uel intellegatur esse, non corpus.

Not, to be sure. But the justice is the goodness itself, and the goodness is the beatitude itself. Moreover, God is called incorporeal or incorporeous for this reason: that he may be believed or understood to be spirit, not body.

[8] Proinde si dicamus: 'Aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, immutabilis, uiuus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, iustus, bonus, beatus, spiritus,' horum omnium nouissimum quod posui quasi tantummodo uidetur significare substantiam cetera uero huius substantiae qualitates; sed non ita est in illa ineffabili simplicique natura. Quidquid enim secundum qualitates illic dici uidetur secundum substantiam uel essentiam est intellegendum. Absit enim ut spiritus secundum substantiam dicatur deus et bonus secundum qualitatem, sed utrumque secundum substantiam.

[8] Accordingly, if we say: 'eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable, living, sapient, potent, beautiful, just, good, blessed, spirit,' the last of all these which I have set down seems, as it were, to signify only the substance, while the rest the qualities of this substance; but it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever there seems to be said there according to qualities is to be understood according to substance or essence. For far be it that he be called 'spirit' according to substance and 'good' according to quality, but both according to substance.

Sic omnia cetera quae commemorauimus unde in superioribus libris multa iam diximus. De quattuor igitur primis quae modo a nobis enumerata atque digesta sunt id est aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, immutabilis, unum aliquid eligamus quia unum quattuor ista significant sicut iam disserui, ne per multa distendatur intentio, et illud potius quod positum est prius, id est aeternus. Hoc faciamus et de quattuor secundis quae sunt uiuus, sapiens, potens, speciosus.

Thus all the other things which we have recalled, about which in the earlier books we have already said many things. Of the first four, therefore, which have just now been enumerated and digested by us—that is, eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable—let us choose some one thing, since one thing signifies these four, as I have already discoursed, lest the attention be stretched out through many, and rather choose that which was set first, that is, eternal. Let us do this also with the second four, which are living, wise, powerful, beautiful.

Et quoniam uita qualiscumque inest et pecori cui sapientia non inest, duo uero ista, sapientia scilicet atque potentia, ita sunt inter se in homine comparata ut sancta scriptura diceret: Melior est sapiens quam fortis, speciosa porro etiam corpora dici solent; unum ex his quattuor quod eligimus sapiens eligatur, quamuis haec quattuor in deo non aequalia dicenda sint; nomina enim quattuor, res autem una est. De tertiis uero ultimis quattuor, quamuis in deo idem sit iustum esse quod bonum, quod beatum, idemque spiritum esse quod iustum et bonum et beatum esse, tamen quia in hominibus potest esse spiritus non beatus, potest et iustus et bonus nondum beatus, qui uero beatus est profecto et iustus et bonus et spiritus est; hoc potius eligamus quod nec in hominibus esse sine illis tribus potest, quod est beatus.

And since life of whatever sort is present even in cattle, to which sapience is not present, the two indeed—sapience and power, to wit—are so compared with one another in a human that Holy Scripture would say: “The wise man is better than the strong,” and moreover even bodies are wont to be called beautiful; let one of these four, the one we choose, be chosen as “wise,” although these four in God are not to be said unequal; for the names are four, but the thing is one. But as to the third set, the last four, although in God to be just is the same as to be good, as to be blessed, and likewise to be spirit is the same as to be just and good and blessed, nevertheless, because in human beings there can be a spirit not blessed, and one can be just and good and not yet blessed, whereas whoever is blessed is assuredly also just and good and is spirit, let us rather choose that which cannot exist in human beings without those three, which is “blessed.”

[VI 9] Num igitur cum dicimus: 'Aeternus, sapiens, beatus,' haec tria sunt trinitas quae appellatur deus? Redigimus quidem illa duodecim in istam paucitatem trium, sed eo modo forsitan possumus et haec tria in unum aliquid horum. Nam si una eademque res in dei natura potest esse sapientia et potentia aut uita et sapientia, cur non una eademque res esse possit in dei natura aeternitas et sapientia aut beatitudo et sapientia?

[VI 9] Then is it the case that, when we say: 'Eternal, wise, blessed,' these three are the Trinity which is called God? We do indeed reduce those twelve into this paucity of three, but in like manner perhaps we can also reduce these three into one of these. For if one and the same reality in the nature of God can be wisdom and power, or life and wisdom, why cannot one and the same reality in the nature of God be eternity and wisdom, or beatitude and wisdom?

Ac per hoc sicut nihil intererat utrum illa duodecim an ista tria diceremus quando illa multa in istam redegimus paucitatem, ita nihil interest utrum tria ista dicamus an illud unum in cuius singularitate duo cetera similiter redigi posse monstrauimus.

And therefore, just as it made no difference whether we said those twelve or these three, when we reduced those many to this paucity, so it makes no difference whether we say these three or that one, in whose singularity we have shown that the other two can similarly be reduced.

Quis itaque disputandi modus, quaenam tandem uis intellegendi atque potentia, quae uiuacitas rationis, quae acies cogitationis ostendet, ut alia iam taceam, hoc unum quod sapientia dicitur deus quomodo sit trinitas? Neque enim sicut nos de illo percipimus sapientiam ita deus de aliquo, sed sua est ipse sapientia quia non est aliud sapientia eius, aliud essentia cui hoc est esse quod sapientiam esse. Dicitur quidem in scripturis sanctis Christus dei uirtus, et dei sapientia, sed quemadmodum sit intellegendum ne patrem filius uideatur facere sapientem in libro septimo disputatum est, et ad hoc ratio peruenit ut sic sit filius sapientia de sapientia quemadmodum lumen de lumine, deus de deo.

What, then, mode of disputation, what at length force and potency of understanding, what vivacity of reason, what edge of cogitation will show—so that I now keep silence about other things—this one thing: how God, who is called Wisdom, is a Trinity? For neither, as we perceive wisdom concerning him, does God receive it from something, but he himself is his own Wisdom, because his wisdom is not one thing and his essence another—for him this is to be: to be wisdom. Indeed, in the holy scriptures Christ is called the power of God and the wisdom of God; but how this is to be understood, lest the Son seem to make the Father wise, was argued in Book 7, and reason came to this: that the Son is Wisdom from Wisdom, just as Light from Light, God from God.

Nec aliud potuimus inuenire spiritum sanctum nisi et ipsum esse sapientiam, et simul omnes unam sapientiam sicut unum deum, unam essentiam. Hanc ergo sapientiam quod est deus, quomodo intellegimus esse trinitatem? Non dixi: 'Quomodo redimus?' (nam hoc inter fideles non debet habere quaestionem), sed si aliquo modo per intellegentiam possumus uidere quod credimus, quis iste erit modus?

Nor could we find the holy spirit to be anything other than that he himself is wisdom, and at the same time all are one wisdom just as one god, one essence. Therefore this wisdom, which is god, how do we understand to be a trinity? I did not say: 'How do we return?' (for this ought not to be a question among the faithful), but if in some way through understanding we can see what we believe, what will this mode be?

[10] Si enim recolamus ubi nostro intellectui coeperit in his libris trinitas apparere, octauus occurrit. Ibi quippe ut potuimus disputando erigere temptauimus mentis intentionem ad intellegendam illam praestantissimam immutabilemque naturam quod nostra mens non est. Quam tamen sic intuebamur ut nec longe a nobis esset et supra nos esset, non loco sed ipsa sui uenerabili mirabilique praestantia ita ut apud nos esse suo praesenti lumine uideretur.

[10] For if we recall where in these books the Trinity began to appear to our intellect, the eighth occurs. There indeed, as we were able, by disputation we attempted to raise the intention of the mind toward understanding that most preeminent and immutable nature, which our mind is not. Yet we were regarding it thus: that it was neither far from us and was above us, not in place but by its own venerable and marvelous preeminence, so that it seemed to be with us by its present light.

In qua tamen nobis adhuc nulla trinitas apparebat quia non ad eam quaerendam in fulgore illo firmam mentis aciem tenebamus; tantum quia non erat aliqua moles ubi credi oporteret magnitudinem duorum uel trium plus esse quam unius cernebamus utcumque. Sed ubi uentum est ad caritatem quae in sancta scriptura deus dicta est eluxit paululum trinitas, id est amans et quod amatur et amor. Sed quia lux illa ineffabilis nostrum reuerberabat obtutum et ei nondum posse contemperari nostrae mentis quodam modo conuincebatur infirmitas, ad ipsius nostrae mentis secundum quam factus est homo ad imaginem dei uelut familiariorem considerationem reficiendae laborantis intentionis causa inter coeptum dispositumque refleximus, et inde in creatura quod nos sumus ut inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt conspicere intellecta possemus immorati sumus a nono usque ad quartum decimum librum.

In which, however, no Trinity yet appeared to us, because we were not holding a firm edge of mind in that brilliance for seeking it; only this we somehow perceived: since there was no mass where it ought to be believed that the magnitude of two or three is more than that of one. But when we came to charity, which in Holy Scripture is called God, the Trinity gleamed forth a little—namely, the lover, and that which is loved, and love. But because that ineffable light reverberated our gaze, and the infirmity of our mind was in a certain manner proved not yet able to be con-tempered to it, we bent back to the consideration of our very mind itself, according to which man was made to the image of God, as to something more familiar, for the sake of refreshing our toiling intention, between what had been begun and what had been set in order; and thence, in the creature which we are, in order that we might be able to behold the invisible things of God through the things that have been made, having been understood, we tarried from Book 9 up to Book 14.

Et ecce iam quantum necesse fuerat aut forte plus quam necesse fuerat exercitata in inferioribus intellegentia ad summam trinitatem quae deus est conspiciendam nos erigere uolumus nec ualemus. Num enim sicut certissimas uidemus trinitates, siue quae forinsecus de rebus corporalibus fiunt, siue cum ea ipsa quae forinsecus sensa sunt cogitantur; siue cum illa quae oriuntur in animo nec pertinent ad corporis sensus sicut fides, sicut uirtutes quae sunt artes agendae uitae manifesta ratione cernuntur et scientia continentur; siue cum mens ipsa qua nouimus quidquid nosse nos ueraciter dicimus sibi cognita est uel se cogitat; siue cum aliquid quod ipsa non est, aeternum atque incommutabile conspicit; num ergo sicut in his omnibus certissimas uidemus trinitates quia in nobis fiunt uel in nobis sunt, cum ista meminimus, aspicimus, uolumus ita uidemus etiam trinitatem deum quia et illic intellegendo conspicimus tamquam dicentem et uerbum eius, id est patrem et filium, atque inde procedentem caritatem utrique communem, sanctum scilicet spiritum? An trinitates istas ad sensus nostros uel animum pertinentes uidemus potius quam credimus, deum uero esse trinitatem credimus potius quam uidemus?

And behold now, inasmuch as it had been necessary, or perhaps more than had been necessary, the intelligence exercised in lower things, we wish to raise ourselves to behold the supreme Trinity which is God, and we are not able. For do we, just as we see most certain trinities, whether those which from without are made from corporeal things, or when those very things which have been sensed from without are thought upon; or when those which arise in the mind and do not pertain to the senses of the body—such as faith, such as the virtues which are the arts of conducting life—are discerned by manifest reason and are contained by science; or when the mind itself, by which we know whatever we truly say that we know, is known to itself or thinks itself; or when it beholds something which it itself is not, eternal and incommutable; do we therefore, just as in all these we see most certain trinities because they are made in us or are in us, when we remember, behold, will these things, thus also see the Trinity God, because there too by understanding we behold as it were the One speaking and His Word, that is, the Father and the Son, and thence proceeding the Charity common to both, namely the Holy Spirit? Or do we see these trinities pertaining to our senses or to the mind rather than believe them, but that God is a Trinity do we believe rather than see?

Quod si ita est, profecto aut inuisibilia eius per ea quae facta sunt nulla intellecta conspicimus, aut si ulla conspicimus, non in eis conspicimus trinitatem, et est illic quod conspiciamus, est quod etiam non conspectum credere debeamus. Conspicere autem nos immutabile bonum quod nos non sumus liber octauus ostendit, et quartus decimus cum de sapientia quae homini ex deo est loqueremur admonuit. Cur itaque ibi non agnoscimus trinitatem?

If this is so, assuredly either we behold none of his invisibles, understood through the things that have been made; or, if we behold any, we do not behold the Trinity in them; and there is there what we may behold, there is also what, though not beheld, we ought to believe. But that we behold the immutable Good which we ourselves are not, Book 8 has shown, and Book 14, when we were speaking about the wisdom which is to man from God, has admonished. Why, therefore, do we not recognize the Trinity there?

An haec sapientia quae deus dicitur non se intellegit, non se diligit? Quis hoc dixerit? Aut quis est qui non uideat ubi nulla scientia est nullo modo esse sapientiam?

Or does this Wisdom which is called God not understand itself, not love itself? Who would say this? Or who is there who does not see that where there is no science there is in no way wisdom?

Aut uero putandum est sapientiam quae deus est scire alia et nescire se ipsam, uel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam? Quae siue dici siue credi stultum et impium est. Ecce ergo trinitas, sapientia scilicet et notitia sui et dilectio sui.

Or indeed is it to be thought that the wisdom which is God knows other things and does not know itself, or loves other things and does not love itself? Which it is foolish and impious either to say or to believe. Behold therefore the trinity: wisdom, to wit, and knowledge of itself, and love of itself.

Sic enim et in homine inuenimus trinitatem, id est mentem et notitiam qua se nouit et dilectionem qua se diligit.

For thus also in man we find a trinity, that is, the mind and the knowledge by which it knows itself and the love by which it loves itself.

[VII 11] Sed haec tria ita sunt in homine ut non ipsa sint homo. Homo est enim sicut ueteres definierunt animal rationale, mortale. Illa ergo excellunt in homine, non ipsa sunt homo.

[7 11] But these three are thus in the human being that they themselves are not man. For man is, as the ancients defined, a rational, mortal animal. Those things therefore excel in man; they are not themselves man.

Et una persona, id est singulus quisque homo, habet illa tria in mente uel mentem. Quod si etiam sic definiamus hominem, ut dicamus: 'Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore,' non est dubium hominem habere animam quae non est corpus, habere corpus quod non est anima. Ac per hoc illa tria non homo sunt sed hominis sunt uel in homine sunt.

And one person, that is, each individual human, has those three in the mind, or the mind itself. But if we also define the human thus, that we say: “A human is a rational substance consisting of soul and body,” there is no doubt that the human has a soul which is not a body, and has a body which is not a soul. And therefore those three are not the human, but are of the human or are in the human.

Detracto etiam corpore si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid eius est mens tamquam caput eius uel oculus uel facies, sed non haec ut corpora cogitanda sunt. Non igitur anima sed quod excellit in anima mens uocatur. Numquid autem possumus dicere trinitatem sic esse in deo ut aliquid dei sit nec ipsa sit deus?

Even with the body removed, if the soul alone is considered, the mind is something of it, as it were its head or its eye or its face; but these are not to be thought of as bodies. Therefore it is not the soul, but that which excels in the soul, that is called mind. But can we possibly say that the Trinity is so in God that it is something of God and yet is not itself God?

Quapropter singulus quisque homo qui non secundum omnia quae ad naturam pertinent eius sed secundum solam mentem imago dei dicitur una persona est et imago est trinitatis in mente. Trinitas uero ila cuius imago est nihil aliud est tota quam deus, nihil aliud est tota quam trinitas. Nec aliquid ad naturam dei pertinet quod ad illam non pertineat trinitatem, et tres personae sunt unius essentiae non sicut singulus quisque homo una persona.

Wherefore each individual human, who is called the image of God not according to all the things that pertain to his nature but according to mind alone, is one person and is an image of the Trinity in the mind. But that Trinity, whose image it is, is wholly nothing else than God, wholly nothing else than the Trinity. Nor does anything pertain to the nature of God which does not pertain to that Trinity, and the three persons are of one essence, not as each individual human is one person.

[12] Itemque in hoc magna distantia est quod siue mentem dicamus in homine eiusque notitiam et dilectionem, siue memoriam, intellegentiam, uoluntatem, nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam nec intellegimus nisi per intellegentiam nec amamus nisi per uoluntatem. At uero in illa trinitate quis audeat dicere patrem nec se ipsum nec filium nec spiritum sanctum intellegere nisi per filium, uel diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum, per se autem meminisse tantummodo uel sui uel filii uel spiritus sancti; eodemque modo filium nec sui nec patris meminisse nisi per patrem, nec diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum, per se autem non nisi intellegere et patrem et se ipsum et spiritum sanctum; similiter et spiritum sanctum per patrem meminisse et patris et filii et sui, et per filium intellegere et patrem et filium et se ipsum, per se autem non nisi diligere et se et patrem et filium, tamquam memoria sit pater et sua et filii et spiritus sancti, filius autem intellegentia et sua et patris et spiritus sancti, spiritus uero sanctus caritas et sua et patris et filii?

[12] Likewise in this there is a great difference: for whether we speak of the mind in man and its knowing and loving, or of memory, intelligence, will, we recall nothing of the mind except through memory, nor do we understand except through intelligence, nor do we love except through will. But indeed in that Trinity who would dare to say that the Father neither understands himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Son, or loves except through the Holy Spirit, but through himself only remembers either himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit; and in the same way that the Son does not remember either himself or the Father except through the Father, nor love except through the Holy Spirit, but through himself does nothing except understand both the Father and himself and the Holy Spirit; similarly also that the Holy Spirit through the Father remembers both the Father and the Son and himself, and through the Son understands both the Father and the Son and himself, but through himself does nothing except love both himself and the Father and the Son—as though the Father were memory, both his own and that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the Son, however, intelligence, both his own and that of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, while the Holy Spirit indeed is charity, both his own and that of the Father and of the Son?

Quis haec in illa trinitate opinari uel affirmare praesumat? Si enim solus ibi filius intellegit et sibi et patri et spiritui sancto, ad illam reditur absurditatem ut pater non sit sapiens de se ipso sed de filio, nec sapientia sapientiam genuerit sed ea sapientia pater dicatur sapiens esse quam genuit. Vbi enim non est intellegentia nec sapientia potest esse, ac per hoc si pater non intellegit ipse sibi sed filius intellegit patri, profecto filius patrem sapientem facit.

Who would presume to opine or to affirm these things in that Trinity? For if only the Son there understands, both for himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, one returns to that absurdity: that the Father is not wise of himself but of the Son, and that Wisdom has not begotten Wisdom, but that by that wisdom which he begot the Father is said to be wise. For where there is no intelligence, neither can wisdom be; and therefore, if the Father does not understand for himself, but the Son understands for the Father, surely the Son makes the Father wise.

Et si hoc est deo esse quod sapere et ea illi essentia est quae sapientia, non filius a patre, quod uerum est, sed a filio potius habet pater essentiam, quod absurdissimum atque falsissimum est. Hanc absurditatem nos in libro septimo discussisse, conuicisse, abiecisse certissimum est. Est ergo deus pater sapiens ea qua ipse sua est sapientia, et filius sapientia patris de sapientia quod est pater de quo est genitus filius.

And if for God to be is to be wise, and that essence is his which is Wisdom, then the Father has essence not from the Father (which is true) but rather from the Son—a thing most absurd and most false. It is most certain that we examined, refuted, and cast aside this absurdity in Book 7. Therefore God the Father is wise by that whereby he himself is his own Wisdom, and the Son is the Father’s Wisdom from the Wisdom which the Father is, from whom the Son is begotten.

Quocirca consequenter est et intellegens pater ea qua ipse sua est intellegentia; neque nim esset sapiens qui non esset intellegens. Filius autem intellegentia patris de intellegentia genitus quod est pater. Hoc et de memoria non inconuenienter dici potest.

Wherefore, consequently, the Father also is intelligent by that whereby he himself is his Intelligence; nor indeed would he be wise who was not intelligent. But the Son is the Father’s Intelligence, begotten from the Intelligence which is the Father. This too can be said not incongruently concerning Memory.

Quomodo est enim sapiens qui nihil meminit, uel sui non meminit? Proinde quia sapientia pater, sapientia filius, sicut sibi meminit pater ita et filius; et sicut sui et filii meminit pater memoria non filii sed sua, ita sui et patris meminit filius memoria non patris sed sua. Dilectio quoque ubi nulla est quis ullam dicat esse sapientiam?

For how is he wise who remembers nothing, or does not remember himself? Accordingly, since the father is wisdom, the son is wisdom, just as the father remembers himself, so too the son; and just as the father remembers himself and the son by a memory not of the son but his own, so the son remembers himself and the father by a memory not of the father but his own. And where there is no dilection, who would say there is any wisdom?

Ex quo colligitur ita esse patrem dilectionem suam ut intellegentiam et memoriam suam. Ecce ergo tria illa, id est memoria, intellegentia, dilectio seu uoluntas in illa summa et immutabili essentia quod est deus, non pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt, sed pater solus. Et quia filius quoque sapientia est genita de sapientia, sicut nec pater ei nec spiritus sanctus intellegit sed ipse sibi, ita nec pater ei meminit nec spiritus sanctus ei diligit sed ipse sibi; sua enim est et ipse memoria, sua intellegentia, sua dilectio, sed ita se habere de patre illi est de quo natus est.

From which it is gathered that the Father is his own love just as his own intelligence and his own memory. Behold therefore those three, that is, memory, intelligence, love or will, in that highest and immutable essence which is God, are not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone. And because the Son too is Wisdom begotten of Wisdom, just as neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit understands on his behalf, but he himself for himself, so neither does the Father remember on his behalf nor does the Holy Spirit love on his behalf, but he himself for himself; for his memory too is his own, his intelligence his own, his love his own; yet it is his to have them thus from the Father, from whom he was born.

Spiritus etiam sanctus quia sapientia est procedens de sapientia non patrem habet memoriam et filium intellegentiam et se dilectionem; neque enim sapientia esset si alius ei meminisset eique alius intellegeret ac tantummodo sibi ipse diligeret; sed ipse habet haec tria et ea sic habet ut haec ipsa ipse sit. Verumtamen ut ita sit inde illi est unde procedit.

The Holy Spirit also, because he is Wisdom proceeding from Wisdom, does not have the Father as memory and the Son as intelligence and himself as dilection; for neither would he be Wisdom if one person remembered for him and another understood for him, and he alone merely loved himself; but he himself has these three, and he has them in such a way that he himself is these very things. Nevertheless, that he be thus is to him from that whence he proceeds.

[13] Quis ergo hominum potest istam sapientiam qua nouit deus omnia ita ut nec ea quae dicuntur praeterita ibi praetereant, nec ea quae dicuntur futura quasi desint exspectentur ut ueniant, sed et praeterita et futura cum praesentibus sint cuncta praesentia; nec singula cogitentur et ab aliis ad alia cogitando transeatur, sed in uno conspectu simul praesto sint uniuersi; quis, inquam, hominum comprehendit istam sapientiam eandemque prudentiam eandemque scientiam quandoquidem a nobis nec nostra comprehenditur? Ea quippe quae uel sensibus uel intellegentiae nostra adsunt possumus utcumque conspicere; ea uero quae absunt et tamen adfuerunt per memoriam nouimus, quae obliti non sumus. Nec ex futuris praeterita sed futura ex praeteritis non tamen firma cognitione conicimus.

[13] Who then of men can grasp that wisdom whereby God knows all things in such a way that neither the things called past pass away there, nor the things called future are awaited as though they were lacking until they come, but both past and future together with the present are all present; nor are particulars thought one by one and, by thinking, a passage made from some to others, but in one view the whole is at once at hand; who, I say, of men comprehends that wisdom and the same prudence and the same science, since by us not even our own things are comprehended? For the things which are present to our senses or to our understanding we can somehow behold; but the things which are absent and yet have been present we know through memory, which we have not forgotten. Nor from future things do we conjecture the past, but the future from past things, yet not with firm cognition.

nam quasdam cogitationes nostras quas futuras uelut manifestius atque certius proximas quasque prospicimus memoria faciente id agimus cum agere ualemus quantum ualemus, quae uidetur non ad ea quae futura sunt sed ad praeterita pertinere. Quod licet experiri in eis dictis uel canticis quorum seriem momoriter reddimus; nisi enim praeuideremus cogitatione quod sequitur non utique diceremus. Et tamen ut praeuideamus non prouidentia nos instruit sed memoria.

for certain of our thoughts, which we foresee as going to be—more manifestly and more certainly the nearer they are—and which we anticipate, we accomplish by memory’s doing, when we are able to act as much as we are able; which seems to pertain not to the things that are future, but to the past. This may be experienced in those sayings or canticles whose series we render from memory; for unless we were to prevision in thought what follows, we would not, to be sure, speak it. And yet, so that we may foresee, it is not providence that instructs us, but memory.

Nam donec finiatur omne quod dicimus siue canimus nihil est quod non prouisum prospectumque proferatur. Et tamen cum id agimus non dicimur prouidenter sed momoriter canere uel dicere, et qui hoc in multis ita proferendis ualent plurimum, non solet eorum prouidentia sed memoria praedicari.

For until everything that we say or sing is finished, there is nothing that is not brought forth as prevised and foreseen. And yet, when we do this, we are said not to sing or to speak providently but from memory, and those who are most strong in bringing forth many things in this way, it is not their providence but their memory that is usually proclaimed.

Fieri ista in animo uel ab animo nostro nouimus et certissimi sumus. Quomodo autem fiant quanto attentius uoluerimus aduertere tanto magis noster et sermo succumbit et ipsa non perdurat intentio ut ad liquidum aliquid nostra intellegentia etsi non lingua perueniat. Et putamus nos utrum dei prouidentia eadem sit quae memoria et intellegentia qui non singula cogitando aspicit sed una, aeterna et immutabili atque ineffabili uisione complectitur cuncta quae nouit, tanta mentis infirmitate posse comprehendere?

We know and are most certain that these things happen in the mind or from our mind. But the more attentively we have wished to advert to how they happen, the more both our discourse succumbs and the very intention does not endure, so that our intelligence, even if not our tongue, might reach something clear. And do we suppose that we, with so great infirmity of mind, are able to comprehend whether the providence of God is the same as memory and intelligence—who does not regard individual things by thinking them one by one, but with one, eternal, immutable, and ineffable vision embraces all the things that He knows?

In hac igitur difficultate et angustiis libet exclamare ad deum uiuum: Mirificata est scientia tua ex me; inualuit, et non potero ad illam. Ex me quippe intellego quam sit mirabilis et incomprehensibilis scientia tua qua me fecisti quando nec me ipsum comprehendere ualeo quem fecisti, et tamen in meditatione mea exardescit ignis ut quaeram faciem tuam semper.

In this difficulty, therefore, and these straits, it pleases me to exclaim to the living God: Wondrous has your knowledge been for me; it has prevailed, and I shall not be able to attain to it. From myself indeed I understand how marvelous and incomprehensible is your knowledge by which you made me, since I am not able to comprehend even myself whom you made, and yet in my meditation a fire blazes up that I may seek your face always.

[VIII 14] In corporalem substantiam scio esse sapientiam et lumen esse in quo uidentur quae oculis carnalibus non uidentur, et tamen uir tantus tamque spiritalis: Videmus nunc inquit, per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum si quaeramus, profecto illud occurrit quod in speculo nisi imago non cernitur. Hoc ergo facere conati sumus ut per hanc imaginem quod nos sumus uideremus utcumque a quo facti sumus tamquam per speculum.

[8 14] I know wisdom to be in an incorporeal substance and to be a light in which things are seen that are not seen by carnal eyes; and yet so great and so spiritual a man: “We see now, he says, through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face.” If we ask of what sort and what this mirror is, surely this occurs: that in a mirror nothing is discerned except an image. Therefore we have tried to do this, that through this image—what we are—we might somehow see the One by whom we were made, as through a mirror.

Hoc significat etiam illud quod ait idem apostolus: Nos autem reuelata facie gloriam domini speculantes in eandem imaginem transformamur de gloria in gloriam tamquam a domini spiritu.

This also signifies that which the same apostle says: But we, with unveiled face, beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.

Speculantes dixit, per speculum uidentes, non de specula prospicientes. Quod in graeca lingua non est ambiguum unde in latinam translatae sunt apostolicae litterae. Ibi quippe speculum ubi apparent imagines rerum ab specula de cuius altitudine longius aliquid intuemur etiam sono uerbi distat omnino.

Speculantes, he said: seeing through a mirror, not looking out from a watchtower. Which in the Greek language is not ambiguous, whence the apostolic letters have been translated into Latin. For there “speculum,” where the images of things appear, differs altogether—even in the sound of the word—from “specula,” from whose height we gaze upon something farther off.

Satisque apparet apostolum ab speculo, non ab specula dixisse gloriam domini speculantes. Quod uero ait, in eandem imaginem transformamur, utique imaginem dei uult intellegi eandem dicens, istam scilicet id est quam speculamur, quia eadem imago est et gloria dei sicut alibi dicit: Vir quidem non debet uelare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei, de quibus uerbis iam in libro duodecimo disseruimus. Transformamur ergo dixit, de forma in formam mutamur atque transimus de forma obscura in formam lucidam, quia et ipsa obscura imago dei est, et si imago, profecto etiam et gloria in qua homines creati sumus praestantes ceteris animalibus.

And it quite appears that the apostle said “beholding the glory of the Lord” from a mirror, not from a lookout. But as to what he says, “we are transformed into the same image,” he surely wants “image of God” to be understood by “the same,” namely this one, that is, the one which we behold, because the same is both the image and the glory of God, as he says elsewhere: “A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God,” about which words we have already discoursed in the twelfth book. Therefore he said “we are transformed”: we are changed from form to form and we pass over from an obscure form to a lucid form, because even that obscure one is an image of God; and if an image, assuredly also a glory, in which human beings were created, excelling the other animals.

De ipsa quippe natura humana dictum est: Vir quidem non debet uelare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei. Quae natura in rebus creatis excellentissima cum a suo creatore ab impietate iustificatur a deformi forma formosam transformatur in formam. Est quippe et in ipsa impietate quanto magis damnabile uitium tanto certius natura laudabilis.

Concerning human nature itself, indeed, it has been said: “A man ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God.” Which nature, most excellent among created things, when by its Creator it is justified from impiety, is transformed from a deformed form into a beautiful form. For indeed even in impiety itself, the more damnable the vice, the more surely the nature is laudable.

Et propter hoc addidit de gloria in gloriam, de gloria creationis in gloriam iustificationis. Quamuis possit hoc et aliis modis intellegi quod dictum est de gloria in gloriam: de gloria fidei in gloriam speciei, de gloria qua filii dei sumus in gloriam qua similes ei erimus quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est. Quod uero adiunxit, tamquam a domini spiritu, ostendit gratia dei nobis conferri tam optabilis transformationis bonum.

And on account of this he added from glory into glory, from the glory of creation into the glory of justification. Although this can also be understood in other ways, what was said from glory into glory: from the glory of faith into the glory of vision, from the glory by which we are sons of God into the glory by which we shall be like him, since we shall see him as he is. But that he added, as from the Spirit of the Lord, shows that, by the grace of God, the good of so desirable a transformation is conferred upon us.

[IX 15] Haec dicta sunt propter quod ait apostolus nunc per speculum nos uidere. Quia uero addidit in aenigmate, multis hoc incognitum est qui eas litteras nesciunt in quibus est doctrina quaedam de locutionum modis quos graeci 'tropos' uocant eoque graeco uocabulo etiam nos utimur pro latino. Sicut enim 'schemata' usitatius dicimus quam 'figuras' ita usitatius 'tropos' quam 'modos.' Singulorum autem modorum siue troporum nomina ut singulis singula referantur difficillimum est et insolentissimum latine enuntiare.

[9 15] These things have been said on account of what the apostle says, that now we see through a mirror. But because he added in an enigma, this is unknown to many who do not know those letters in which there is a certain doctrine about the modes of locution which the Greeks call 'tropos,' and we too make use of that Greek vocable in place of a Latin one. For just as we more usually say 'schemata' than 'figures,' so we more usually say 'tropes' than 'modes.' But to enunciate in Latin the names of the individual modes or tropes, so that individual things may have individual names referred to them, is very difficult and most unusual.

Vnde quidam interpretes nostri quod ait apostolus, quae sunt in allegoria, nolentes graecum uocabulum ponere circumloquendo interpretati sunt dicentes, 'quae sunt aliud ex alio significantia.'

Whence certain interpreters of ours, because the apostle says, which are in allegory, not wishing to put the Greek vocable, interpreted it by circumlocution, saying, 'which are signifying one thing from another.'

Huius autem tropi, id est allegoriae, plures sunt species in quibus est etiam quod dicitur aenigma. Definitio autem ipsius nominis generalis omnes etiam species complectatur necesse est. Ac per hoc sicut omnis equus animal est, non omne animal equus est, ita omne aenigma allegoria est, non omnis allegoria aenigma est.

Of this trope, that is, of allegory, there are several species, among which is also what is called an enigma. Moreover, it is necessary that the definition of the general name itself also comprehend all the species. And therefore, just as every horse is an animal, not every animal is a horse, so every enigma is an allegory, not every allegory is an enigma.

Quid est ergo allegoria nisi tropus ubi ex alio aliud intellegitur, quale illud est ad thessalonicenses: Itaque non dormiamus sicut et ceteri sed uigilemus et sobrii simus. Nam qui dormiunt nocte dormiunt, et qui inebriantur nocte ebrii sunt; nos autem qui diei sumus sobrii simus? Sed haec allegoria non est aenigma.

What, then, is allegory if not a trope where from one thing another is understood, such as that to the Thessalonians: “Therefore let us not sleep as the rest do, but let us keep watch and be sober. For those who sleep, sleep at night, and those who are inebriated are inebriated at night; but let us, who are of the day, be sober”? But this allegory is not an enigma.

Nam nisi multum tardis iste sensus in promptu est. Aenigma est autem ut breuiter explicem obscura allegoria sicuti est: Sanguisugae tres erant filiae, et quaecumque similia. Sed ubi allegoriam nominauit apostolus non in uerbis eam reperit sed in facto cum ex duobus filiis Abrahae, uno de ancilla, altero de libera, quod non dictum sed etiam factum fuit duo testamenta intellegenda monstrauit.

For, unless one be very slow, this sense is at hand. An enigma is, however, to explain briefly, an obscure allegory, as, for instance: The leech had three daughters, and whatever things of the like sort. But when the Apostle named an allegory, he found it not in words but in a fact, since from the two sons of Abraham, one of the slave-girl, the other of the freewoman—which was not only said but also done—he showed that two Testaments are to be understood.

Quod antequam exponeret obscurum fuit. Proinde allegoria talis, quod est generale nomen, posset specialiter aenigma nominari.

Which, before he explained it, was obscure. Accordingly, such an allegory, which is a general name, could be specially named “enigma.”

[16] Sed quia non soli qui eas litteras nesciunt quibus discuntur tropi quaerunt quid dixerit apostolus nunc in aenigmate nos uidere, uerum etiam qui sciunt, tamen quod sit illud aenigma ubi nunc uidemus, nosse desiderant; ex utroque una est inuenienda sententia, et ex illo scilicet quod ait, uidemus nunc per speculum, et, et ex isto quod addidit, in aenigmate. Vna est enim cum tota sic dicitur: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Proinde quantum mihi uidetur sicut nomine speculi imaginem uoluit intellegi, ita nomine aenigmatis quamuis similitudinem tamen obscuram et ad perspiciendum difficilem.

[16] But because not only those who do not know the letters by which tropes are learned ask what the apostle meant by “we now see in an enigma,” but also those who do know nevertheless desire to know what that enigma is wherein we now see; from both a single sense is to be found, both from that, namely, which he says, “we see now through a mirror,” and, and from this which he added, “in an enigma.” For it is one when the whole is thus said: “We see now through a mirror in an enigma.” Accordingly, so far as it seems to me, just as by the name of “mirror” he wished an image to be understood, so by the name of “enigma” a similitude indeed, yet obscure and difficult to discern.

Cum igitur speculi et aenigmatis nomine quaecumque similitudines ab apostolo significate intellegi possint quae accommodatae sunt ad intellegendum deum eo modo quo potest, nihil tamen est adcommodatius quam id quod imago eius non frustra dicitur.

Since therefore, under the name of the mirror and of the enigma, whatever similitudes can be understood to be signified by the apostle, which are accommodated to understanding God in the way in which it is possible, nevertheless nothing is more apt than that which is not said in vain to be his image.

Nemo itaque miretur etiam in isto uidendi modo qui concessus est huic uitae, per speculum scilicet in aenigmate, laborare nos ut quomodocumque uideamus. Nomen quippe hic non sonaret aenigmatis si esset facilitas uisionis. Et hoc est grandius aenigma ut non uideamus quod non uidere non possumus.

Therefore let no one marvel that even in this mode of seeing which has been granted to this life—namely, through a mirror, in an enigma—we labor so that we may see in whatever way we can. For the name of “enigma” would not sound here if there were ease of vision. And this is the greater enigma: that we do not see that which we cannot not see.

Quis enim non uidet cogitationem suam? Et quis uidet cogitationem suam (non oculis carnalibus dico sed ipso interiore conspectu)? Quis non eam uidet, et quis eam uidet? Quandoquidem cogitatio uisio est animi quaedam siue adsint ea quae oculis quoque corporalibus uideantur uel ceteris sentiantur sensibus, siue non adsint et eorum similitudines cogitatione cernantur; siue nihil eorum sed ea cogitentur quae nec corporalia sunt nec corporalium similitudines sicut uirtutes et uitia, sicut ipsa denique cogitatio cogitatur; siue illa quae per disciplinas traduntur liberalesque doctrinas; siue omnium istorum causae superiores atque rationes in natura immutabili cogitentur; siue etiam mala et uana ac falsa cogitemus uel non consentiente sensu uel errante consensu.

For who does not see his cogitation? And who sees his cogitation (I do not say with carnal eyes but with the very interior sight)? Who does not see it, and who sees it? Since cogitation is a certain vision of the mind, whether those things are present which are also seen by corporeal eyes or sensed by the other senses, or whether they are not present and their similitudes are discerned by cogitation; whether none of those, but things are cogitated which are neither corporeal nor similitudes of corporeals, such as virtues and vices, just as, finally, cogitation itself is cogitated; whether those things which are handed down through disciplines and liberal doctrines; whether the higher causes and reasons of all these are cogitated in immutable nature; or even whether we cogitate evil and vain and false things, either with sense not consenting or with a consent that errs.

[X 17] Sed nunc de his loquamur quae nota cogitamus et habemus in notitia etiam si non cogitemus, siue ad contemplatiuam scientiam pertineant quam proprie sapientiam, siue ad actiuam quam proprie scientiam nuncupandam esse disserui. Simul enim utrumque mentis est unius et imago dei una. Cum uero de inferiore distinctius et seorsus agitur tunc non est uocanda imago dei quamuis et tunc in ea nonnulla reperiatur similitudo illius trinitatis, quod in tertio decimo uolumine ostendimus.

[10 17] But now let us speak about those things which we think as known and which we have in knowledge even if we do not think them: whether they pertain to contemplative science, which I have argued is properly to be called wisdom, or to active science, which I have argued is properly to be named science. For at once both are of one mind, and the image of God is one. But when the lower is treated more distinctly and separately, then it is not to be called the image of God, although even then there is found in it some likeness of that Trinity, which we showed in the thirteenth volume.

Nunc ergo simul de uniuersa scientia hominis loquimur in qua nobis nota sunt quaecumque sunt nota, quae utique uera sunt alioquin nota non essent. Nemo enim falsa nouit nisi cum falsa esse nouit. Quod si nouit, uerum nouit; uerum est enim quod illa falsa sint.

Now therefore together we speak of the universal science of man, in which whatever things are known to us, whatever are known, are assuredly true; otherwise they would not be known. For no one knows false things unless he knows that they are false. But if he knows that, he knows a truth; for it is true that those things are false.

De his ergo nunc disserimus quae nota cogitamus et nota sunt nobis etiam si non cogitentur a nobis. Sed certe si ea dicere uelimus, nisi cogitata non possumus. Nam etsi uerba non sonent, in corde suo dicit utique qui cogitat.

Therefore we now discourse concerning those things which, known, we cogitate, and which are known to us even if they are not being cogitated by us. But certainly, if we should wish to say them, we cannot unless they are cogitated. For even if the words do not sound, he who cogitates surely speaks in his heart.

Vnde illud est in libro sapientiae: Dixerunt apud se cogitantes non recte. Exposuit enim quid sit, dixerunt apud se, cum addidit cogitantes. Huic simile est in euangelio quod quidam scribae cum audissent a domino dictum paralytico: Confide, fili, remittuntur tibi peccato tua.

Whence that statement is in the Book of Wisdom: ‘They said within themselves, thinking not rightly.’ For he expounded what ‘they said within themselves’ is, when he added ‘thinking.’ Similar to this is in the Gospel, that certain scribes, when they had heard what was said by the Lord to the paralytic: ‘Take heart, son, your sins are remitted to you.’

Dixerunt intra se: Hic blasphemat. Quid est enim, Dixerunt intra se, nisi cogitando? Denique sequitur: Et cum uidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum dixit: Vtquid cogitatis mala in cordibus uestris?

They said within themselves: This man blasphemes. For what is, They said within themselves, except by cogitating? Finally, it follows: And when Jesus had seen their cogitations he said: Why do you cogitate evil in your hearts?

Sic Matthaeus. Lucas autem hoc idem ita narrat: Coeperunt cogitare scribae et pharisaei dicentes: Quis est hic qui loquitur blasphemias? Quis potest dimittere peccata nisi solus deus?

Thus Matthew. But Luke narrates this same thing thus: They began to think, the scribes and the pharisees, saying: Who is this who speaks blasphemies? Who can forgive sins except god alone?

Vt cognouit autem Iesus cogitationes eorum respondens dixit ad illos: Quid cogitatis in cordibus uestris? Quale est in libro sapientiae, dixerunt cogitantes, tale hic est, cogitauerunt dicentes. Et illic enim et hic ostenditur intra se atque in corde suo dicere id esse cogitando dicere.

But when Jesus had known their cogitations, responding he said to them: Why do you cogitate in your hearts? Just as it is in the book of Wisdom, “they said, cogitating,” so here it is, “they cogitated, saying.” For both there and here it is shown that to say within themselves and in his heart is to say by cogitating.

Dixerunt quippe intra se, et dictum est eis: Quid cogitatis? Et de illo diuite cuius uberes fructus ager attulit ait ipse dominus: Et cogitabat intra se dicens.

For they indeed said within themselves, and it was said to them: Why do you cogitate? And about that rich man whose field brought forth abundant fruits the Lord himself says: And he was cogitating within himself, saying.

[18] Quaedam ergo cogitationes locutiones sunt cordis ubi et os esse dominus ostendit cum ait: Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem, sed quod procedit ex ore, hoc coinquinat hominem. Vna sententia duo quaedam hominis ora complexus est, unum corporis, alterum cordis. Nam utique unde illi hominem putauerant inquinari in os intrat corporis; unde autem dominus dixit inquinari hominem de cordis ore procedit.

[18] Therefore certain cogitations are locutions of the heart, where the Lord also showed there to be a mouth when he says: Not what enters into the mouth defiles the man, but what proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles the man. With one sentence he embraced two mouths of the human, one of the body, the other of the heart. For indeed that by which they had supposed the man to be defiled enters into the mouth of the body; but that by which the Lord said the man is defiled proceeds from the mouth of the heart.

Ita quippe exposuit ipse quod dixerat. Nam paulo post de hac re discipulis suis: Adhuc et uos, inquit, sine intellectu estis? Non intellegitis quia omne quod in os intrat in uentrem uadit et in secessum emittitur?

Thus indeed he himself expounded what he had said. For a little later, about this matter, to his disciples: “Even now,” he says, “are you without intellect? Do you not understand that everything which enters into the mouth goes into the belly and is emitted into the privy?”

Hic certe apertissime demonstrauit os corporis. At in eo quod sequitur os cordis ostendens: Quae autem procedunt, inquit, de ore de corde exeunt et ea coinquinant hominem. De corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae, et cetera.

Here certainly he most openly demonstrated the mouth of the body. But in that which follows, showing the mouth of the heart: “But the things which proceed,” he says, “out of the mouth go forth from the heart, and these defile the man.” For from the heart go forth evil cogitations, and the rest.

Quid hac expositione lucidius? Nec tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes ideo non sunt etiam uisiones exortae de notitiae uisionibus quando uerae sunt. Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt aliud est locutio, aliud uisio; intus autem cum cogitamus utrumque unum est.

What is more lucid than this exposition? Nor, however, because we say that the locutions of the heart are cogitations, are they therefore not also visions, arisen from the visions of knowledge when they are true. For outside, when through the body these things occur, locution is one thing, vision another; but within, when we cogitate, both are one.

Sicut auditio et uisio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus corporis, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud uidere et audire. Ac per hoc cum locutio foris non uideatur sed potius audiatur, locutiones tamen interiores, hoc est cogitationes, uisas dixit a domino sanctum euangelium, non auditas. Dixerunt, inquit, intra se: Hic blasphemat, deinde subiunxit: Et cum uidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum.

Just as audition and vision are two certain things distinct from each other in the senses of the body, yet in the mind it is not one thing and another to see and to hear. And therefore, since speech outwardly is not seen but rather heard, nevertheless interior locutions, that is, thoughts, the holy Gospel said—by the Lord—to have been seen, not heard. “They said,” he declares, “within themselves: This man blasphemes,” then he subjoined: “And when Jesus had seen their thoughts.”

Vidit ergo quod dixerunt. Vidit enim cogitatione sua cogitationes eorum quas illi soli se putabant uidere.

He therefore saw what they said. For he saw, by his own cogitation, their cogitations which they supposed that they alone saw.

[19] Quisquis igitur potest intellegere uerbum non solum antequam sonet, uerum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione uoluantur (hoc est enim quod ad nullam pertinet linguam, earum scilicet quae linguae appellantur gentium quarum nostra latina est), quisquis, inquam, hoc intellegere potest iam potest uidere per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate aliquam uerbi illius similitudinem de quo dictum est: In principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum.

[19] Whoever therefore can understand the word not only before it sounds, but even before the images of its sounds are turned over in thought (for this is that which pertains to no tongue, namely of those which are called tongues of the nations, of which our Latin is one), whoever, I say, can understand this already can see through this mirror and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of which it was said: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.

Necesse est enim cum uerum loquimur, id est quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus nascatur uerbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino cuiusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus uerbum est quod in corde dicimus, quod nec graecum est nec latinum nec linguae alicuius alterius, sed cum id opus est in eorum quibus loquimur perferre notitiam aliquod signum quo significetur assumitur. Et plerumque sonus, aliquando etiam nutus, ille auribus, ille oculis exhibetur ut per signa corporalia etiam corporis sensibus uerbum quod mente gerimus innotescat.

It is necessary; for when we speak true, that is, we speak what we know, from the very science which we hold in memory there is born a word which is altogether of such a sort as that knowledge of which it is born. For a thought formed by the thing which we know is the word that we speak in the heart, which is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other language; but when there is need to carry over its acquaintance to those to whom we speak, some sign by which it may be signified is assumed. And for the most part it is a sound, sometimes also a gesture: the one is presented to the ears, the other to the eyes, so that through bodily signs the word which we carry in mind may become known also to the senses of the body.

Nam et innuere quid est nisi quodam modo uisibiliter dicere? Est in scripturis sanctis huius sententiae testimonium. Nam in euangelio secundum Iohannem ita legitur: Amen, amen dico uobis quia unus ex uobis tradet me. Aspiciebant ergo ad inuicem discipuli haesitantes de quo diceret.

For even to make a sign by a nod—what is it if not to speak in a certain manner visibly? There is in the sacred scriptures a testimony of this sentiment. For in the Gospel according to John it is read thus: Amen, amen I say to you that one of you will hand me over. Therefore the disciples were looking at one another, hesitating about whom he was speaking.

Erat ergo unus ex discipulis eius in sinu Iesu quem diligebat Iesus. Innuit ergo huic Simon Petrus et dicit ei: Quis est de quo dicit? Ecce innuendo dixit quod sonando dicere non audebat.

There was therefore one of his disciples in the bosom of Jesus, whom Jesus loved. Therefore Simon Peter signals to this one and says to him: Who is it about whom he speaks? Behold, by nodding he said what he did not dare to say by sounding.

Sed haec atque huiusmodi signa corporalia siue auribus siue oculis praesentibus quibus loquimur exhibemus. Inuentae sunt etiam litterae per quas possemus et cum absentibus conloqui, sed ista signa sunt uocum, cum ipsae uoces in sermone nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sint rerum.

But these and signs of this sort, corporeal, we exhibit to the ears or to the eyes of those present, by which we speak. Letters too have been invented, by which we might converse even with the absent; but those are signs of voices, since the voices themselves in our discourse are signs of the things which we cogitate.

[XI 20] Proinde uerbum quod foris sonat signum est uerbi quod intus lucet cui magis uerbi competit nomen. Nam illud quod profertur carnis ore uox uerbi est, uerbumque et ipsum dicitur propter illud a quo ut foris appareret assumptum est. Ita enim uerbum nostrum uox quodam modo corporis fit assumendo eam in qua manifestetur sensibus hominum sicut uerbum dei caro factum est assumendo eam in qua et ipsum manifestaretur sensibus hominum.

[11 20] Accordingly, the word which sounds outwardly is a sign of the word which shines inwardly, to which the name “word” more properly belongs. For that which is brought forth by the mouth of flesh is the voice of the word, and it too is called “word” on account of that from which it was assumed, in order that it might appear outwardly. For thus our word becomes, in a certain way, a voice of the body by assuming that in which it is manifested to the senses of men, just as the Word of God was made flesh by assuming that in which even it itself would be manifested to the senses of men.

Et sicut uerbum nostrum fit uox nec mutatur in uocem, ita uerbum dei caro quidem factum est, sed absit ut mutaretur in carnem. Assumendo quippe illam, non in eam se consumendo, et hoc nostrum uox fit et illud caro factum est.

And just as our word becomes voice and is not changed into a voice, so the word of God indeed was made flesh, but far be it that it was changed into flesh. For by assuming that, not by consuming itself into it, both this our word becomes voice and that was made flesh.

Quapropter qui cupit ad qualemcumque similitudinem dei uerbi quamuis per multa dissimilem peruenire non intueatur uerbum nostrum quod sonat in auribus nec quando uoce profertur nec quando silentio cogitatur. Omnium namque sonantium uerba linguarum etiam in silentio cogitantur, et carmina percurruntur animo tacente ore corporis, nec solum numeri syllabarum uerum etiam modi cantilenarum cum sint corporales et ad eum qui uocatur auditus sensum corporis pertinentes per incorporeas quasdam imagines suas praesto sunt cogitantibus et tacite cuncta ista uoluentibus. Sed transeunda sunt haec ut ad illud perueniatur hominis uerbum per cuius qualemcumque similitudinem sicut in aenigmate uideatur utcumque dei uerbum.

Therefore, whoever desires to arrive at whatever similitude of God’s Word, however through many dissimilarities, let him not look upon our word that sounds in the ears, neither when it is brought forth by voice nor when it is thought in silence. For all the sounding words of tongues are also thought in silence, and songs are run through by the mind with the mouth of the body being silent; and not only the numbers of syllables but also the modes of melodies, although they are bodily and pertain to the sense of the body which is called hearing, are present by certain incorporeal images of theirs to those who are thinking and silently revolving all these things. But these things must be passed over, that one may arrive at that word of man, through whose whatever kind of similitude, as in an enigma, God’s Word may be seen in some fashion.

Non illud quod factum est ad illud uel illum prophetam (et de quo dictum est: Verbum autem dei crescebat et multiplicabatur, et de quo iterum dictum est: Igitur fides ex auditu, auditus autem per uerbum Christi, et iterum: Cum accepissetis a nobis uerbum auditus dei, accepistis non ut uerbum hominum sed sicuti est uere uerbum dei. Et innumerabilia similiter in scripturis dicuntur de dei uerbo quod in sonis multarum diuersarumque linguarum per corda et ora disseminatur humana. Ideo autem uerbum dei dicitur quia doctrina diuina traditur, non humana). Sed illud uerbum dei quaerimus qualitercumque per hanc similitudinem nunc uidere de quo dictum est: Deus erat uerbum; de quo dictum est: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt; de quo dictum est: Et uerbum caro factum est; de quo dictum est: Fons sapientiae uerbum dei in excelsis.

Not that which came to this or that prophet (and about which it was said: “But the word of God was growing and was being multiplied,” and about which again it was said: “Therefore faith is from hearing, but hearing through the word of Christ,” and again: “When you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men but, as it truly is, the word of God.” And things innumerable are said similarly in the Scriptures about the word of God which is disseminated, in the sounds of many and diverse tongues, through human hearts and mouths. And it is called the word of God because divine doctrine is delivered, not human). But we seek that word of God to see it now, however by this likeness, about which it was said: “The Word was God”; about which it was said: “All things were made through him”; about which it was said: “And the Word was made flesh”; about which it was said: “The fountain of wisdom is the word of God on high.”

Perueniendum est ergo ad illud uerbum hominis, ad uerbum rationalis animantis, ad uerbum non de deo natae sed a deo factae imaginis dei, quod neque prolatiuum est in sono neque cogitatiuum in similitudine soni quod alicuius linguae esse necesse sit, sed quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit et gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo quando eadem scientia intus dicitur sicuti est. Simillima est enim uisio cogitationis uisioni scientiae. Nam quando per sonum dicitur uel per aliquod corporale signum, non dicitur sicuti est sed sicut potest uideri audiriue per corpus.

We must therefore come to that word of man, to the word of the rational animal, to the word of the image of God—not born of God but made by God—which is neither uttered in sound nor cogitative in a likeness of sound such that it must belong to some language, but which precedes all the signs by which it is signified and is generated from the science that abides in the mind when that same science is said inwardly just as it is. For the vision of thought is most similar to the vision of science. For when it is spoken through sound or through some bodily sign, it is not spoken as it is, but as it can be seen or heard through the body.

Quando ergo quod est in notitia hoc est in uerbo, tunc est uerum uerbum et ueritas qualis exspectatur ab homine ut quod est in ista, hoc sit et in illo; quod non est in ista, non sit et in illo. Hic agnoscitur: Est, est; non, non. Sic accedit quantum potest ista similitudo imaginis factae ad illam similitudinem imaginis natae qua deus filius patri per omnia substantialiter similis praedicatur.

When therefore what is in knowledge is in the word, then it is a true word and a truth such as is expected from a man: that what is in this, this also be in that; what is not in this, not be in that either. Here it is recognized: Yes, yes; no, no. Thus, so far as it can, this similitude of the made image approaches that similitude of the begotten image, by which God the Son is proclaimed substantially similar to the Father in all things.

Animaduertenda est in hoc aenigmate etiam ista uerbi dei similitudo quod sicut de illo uerbo dictum est: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, ubi deus per unigenitum uerbum suum praedicatur uniuersa fecisse, ita hominis opera nulla sunt quae non prius dicantur in corde. Vnde scriptum est: Initium omnis operis uerbum. Sed etiam hic cum uerum uerbum est, tunc est initium boni operis.

It must be noticed in this enigma also this similitude of the word of God: that just as of that word it was said, “All things were made through him,” wherein God is proclaimed to have made all things through his only-begotten word, so there are no works of man which are not first spoken in the heart. Whence it is written: “The beginning of every work is the word.” But even here, when the word is true, then it is the beginning of a good work.

Verum autem uerbum est cum de scientia bene operandi gignitur ut etiam ibi seruetur: Est, est; non, non, ut si est in ea scientia qua uiuendum est, sit et in uerbo per quod operandum est; si non, non; alioquin mendacium erit uerbum tale, non ueritas, et inde peccatum, non opus rectum. Est et haec in ista similitudine uerbi nostri similitudo uerbi dei quia potest esse uerbum nostrum quod non sequatur opus; opus autem esse non potest nisi praecedat uerbum sicut uerbum dei potuit esse nulla exsistente creatura; creatura uero nulla esse posset nisi per ipsum per quod facta sunt omnia. Ideoque non deus pater, non spiritus sanctus, non ipsa trinitas, sed solus filius quod est uerbum dei caro factum est quamuis trinitate faciente, ut sequente atque imitante uerbo nostro eius exemplum recte uiueremus, hoc est nullum habentes in uerbi nostri uel contemplatione uel operatione mendacium.

But a true word is when it is generated from the knowledge of doing well, so that there too it is observed: Yes, yes; no, no; so that if it is in that knowledge by which one must live, it may also be in the word by which one must act; if not, not; otherwise such a word will be a lie, not truth, and from it sin, not a right work. And there is also this likeness of our word to the Word of God, because our word can exist which no work follows; but a work cannot exist unless the word precedes, just as the Word of God could exist with no creature existing; but no creature could exist except through him by whom all things were made. Therefore neither God the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the Trinity itself, but the Son alone, which is the Word of God, was made flesh—though with the Trinity making—so that, our word following and imitating his example, we might live rightly, that is, having no falsehood in the contemplation or in the operation of our word.

Verum haec huius imaginis est quandoque futura perfectio. Ad haec consequendam nos erudit magister bonus fide christiana pietatisque doctrina ut reuelata facie a legis uelamine quod est umbra futurorum gloriam domini speculantes, per speculum scilicet intuentes, in eandem imaginem transformemur de gloria in gloriam tamquam a domini spiritu secundum superiorem de his uerbis disputationem.

But in truth, this is the sometime future perfection of this image. For the attaining of these things the good Master trains us by the Christian faith and the doctrine of piety, so that, the face unveiled from the veil of the Law—which is the shadow of things to come—beholding the glory of the Lord, namely looking through a mirror, we may be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord, according to the foregoing disputation on these words.

[21] Cum ergo hac transformatione ad perfectum fuerit haec imago renouata similes deo erimus quoniam uidebimus eum non per speculum sed sicuti est, quod dicit Paulus apostolus, facie ad faciem. Nunc uero in hoc speculo, in hoc aenigmate, in hac qualicumque similitudine quanta sit etiam dissimilitudo quis potest explicare? Attingam tamen aliqua ut ualeo quibus id possit aduerti.

[21] Therefore, when by this transformation this image shall have been renewed to the perfect, we shall be similar to God, because we shall see him not through a mirror but just as he is—what the Apostle Paul says—face to face. Now, however, in this mirror, in this enigma, in this whatever-kind-of similitude, who can explain how great the dissimilitude also is? Yet I will touch on some things, as I am able, by which this may be noticed.

[XII] Primo ipsa scientia de qua ueraciter cogitatio nostra formatur quando quae scimus loquimur, qualis aut quanta potest homini prouenire quamlibet peritissimo atque doctissimo? Exceptis enim quae in animum ueniunt a sensibus corporis in quibus tam multa aliter sunt quam uidentur ut eorum uerisimilitudine nimium constipatus sanus sibi uideatur esse qui insanit (unde academica philosophia sic inualuit ut de omnibus dubitans multo miserius insaniret), his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in animum ueniunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus sicut nos uiuere scimus? In quo prorsus non metuimus ne aliqua uerisimilitudine forte fallamur quoniam certum est etiam eum qui fallitur uiuere, nec in eis uisis habetur hoc quae obiciuntur extrinsecus ut in eo sic fallatur oculus quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus uidetur infractus et nauigantibus turris moueri et alia sexcenta quae aliter sunt quam uidentur, quia nec per oculum carnis hoc cernitur.

[12] First, the very scientia by which our cogitation is formed veraciously when we speak what we know—of what sort or how great can it come to a human being, however most expert and most learned? For excepting the things that come into the mind from the senses of the body—in which so many things are otherwise than they seem, that, too-heavily compressed by their verisimilitude, he who is mad appears to himself to be sane (whence Academic philosophy so prevailed that, doubting about everything, it went insane much more miserably)—these, then, being excepted, which come into the mind from the body’s senses, how much of things remains that we know in such a way as we know that we live? In which we do not at all fear lest by some verisimilitude we be perchance deceived, since it is certain that even the one who is deceived lives; nor is this held among those appearances which are thrown at us from without, so that the eye be thus deceived in it, just as it is deceived when in water an oar seems broken and, to those sailing, a tower seems to move, and six hundred other things which are otherwise than they seem, because this is not discerned through the eye of flesh.

Intima scientia est qua nos uiuere scimus ubi ne illud quidem academicus dicere potest: 'Fortasse dormis et nescis et in somnis uides.' Visa quippe somniantium simillima esse uisis uigilantium quis ignorat? Sed qui certus est de suae uitae scientia non in ea dicit: 'Scio me uigilare,' sed: 'Scio me uiuere.' Siue ergo dormiat siue uigilet, uiuit. Nec in ea scientia per somnia falli potest quia et dormire et in somnis uidere uiuentis est.

The intimate knowledge is that by which we know that we live, where not even the Academic can say: 'Perhaps you are sleeping and do not know, and you see in dreams.' For who is ignorant that the visions of those dreaming are most similar to the visions of those awake? But he who is certain concerning the knowledge of his life does not say therein: 'I know that I am keeping vigil,' but: 'I know that I live.' Whether, therefore, he sleeps or keeps vigil, he lives. Nor can he be deceived in that knowledge by dreams, because both to sleep and to see in dreams belong to one who lives.

Nec illud potest academicus aduersus istam scientiam dicere: 'Furis fortassis et nescis quia sanorum uisis simillima sunt etiam uisa furentium, sed qui furit uiuit.' Nec contra academicos dicit: 'Scio me non furere,' sed: 'Scio me uiuere.' Numquam ergo falli nec mentiri potest qui se uiuere dixerit scire. Mille itaque fallacium uisorum genera obiciantur ei qui dicit: 'Scio me uiuere.' Nihil horum timebit quando et qui fallitur uiuit.

Nor can the Academic say this against that science: 'Perhaps you are raving and do not know it, because the visions of the sane are most similar to the visions even of those raving; but he who raves lives.' Nor does he say against the Academics: 'I know that I am not raving,' but: 'I know that I am living.' Therefore he who has said that he knows himself to live can never be deceived nor lie. Let a thousand genera of fallacious visions, then, be objected to him who says: 'I know that I am living.' He will fear none of these, since even he who is deceived lives.

Sed si talia sola pertinent ad humanam scientiam, perpauca sunt nisi quia in unoquoque genere ita multiplicantur ut non solum pauca non sint, uerum etiam reperiantur per infinitum numerum tendere. Qui enim dicit: 'Scio me uiuere,' unum aliquid scire se dicit. Proinde si dicat: 'Scio me scire me uiuere,' duo sunt.

But if such things alone pertain to human science, they are very few, except that in each kind they are multiplied in such a way that not only are they not few, but are even found to tend toward an infinite number. For he who says: 'I know that I live,' says that he knows one thing. Accordingly, if he says: 'I know that I know that I live,' there are two.

Iam hoc uero quod scit haec duo tertium scire est. Sic potest addere et quartum et quintum et innumerabilia si sufficiat. Sed quia innumerabilem numerum uel comprehendere singula addendo uel dicere innumerabiliter non potest, hoc ipsum certissime comprehendit ac dicit, et uerum hoc esse et tam innumerabile ut uerbi eius infinitum numerum non possit comprehendere ac dicere.

Now indeed the fact that he knows these two is to know a third. Thus he can add also a fourth and a fifth and things without number, if he be sufficient. But since he cannot either comprehend an innumerable number by adding single items, or express it in an innumerable fashion, this very thing he most certainly comprehends and says: both that this is true and that it is so innumerable that he cannot comprehend and say the infinite number of its word.

Hoc et in uoluntate certa similiter aduerti potest. Quis est enim cui non impudenter respondeatur, 'forte falleris,' dicenti: 'Volo beatus esse'? Et si dicat: 'Scio me hoc uelle et hoc me scire scio,' iam his duobus et tertium potest addere quod haec duo sciat; et quartum quod haec duo scire se sciat, et similiter in infinitum numerum pergere. Item si quispiam dicat: 'Errare nolo,' nonne siue erret siue non erret, errare tamen eum nolle uerum erit?

This too can likewise be observed in a certain will. For who is there to whom it would not be impudently answered, 'perhaps you are in error,' when he says: 'I will to be blessed'? And if he says: 'I know that I will this, and I know that I know this,' already to these two he can add also a third, that he knows these two; and a fourth, that he knows himself to know these two, and similarly proceed into an infinite number. Likewise, if someone says: 'I do not wish to err,' will it not be true that he does not wish to err, whether he errs or does not err?

Quis est qui huic non impudentissime dicat: 'Forsitan falleris,' cum profecto ubicumque fallatur, falli se tamen nolle non fallitur. Et si hoc scire se dicat, addit quantum uult rerum numerum cognitarum et numerum esse perspicit infinitum. Qui enim dicit: 'Nolo me falli et hoc me nolle scio et hoc me scire scio,' iam etsi non commoda elocutione potest hinc infinitum numerum ostendere.

Who is there who would not most impudently say to this man, 'Perhaps you are in error,' when assuredly, wherever he may be mistaken, yet he is not mistaken in that he does not wish to be deceived. And if he says that he knows this, he adds as much as he wishes to the number of things known, and he perceives the number to be infinite. For he who says: 'I do not wish to be deceived, and I know that I do not wish this, and I know that I know this,' already, even if not with commodious elocution, can from this point show an infinite number.

Et alia reperiuntur quae aduersus academicos ualeant qui nihil ab homine sciri posse contendunt.

And other things are found which might avail against the Academics, who contend that nothing can be known by man.

Sed modus adhibendus est praesertim quia opere isto non hoc suscepimus. Sunt inde libri tres nostri primo nostrae conuersionis tempore scripti, quos qui potuerit et uoluerit legere lectosque intellexerit, nihil eum profecto quae ab eis contra perceptionem ueritatis argumenta multa inuenta sunt permouebunt. Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sensum corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quae per se ipsum, multa illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per se ipsum perceptiones rerum uerarum, quale illud est quod dixi: 'Scio me uiuere,' nequaquam in dubium uocare potuerunt.

But a measure must be applied, especially since in this work we have not undertaken this. Accordingly there are three books of ours, written at the first time of our conversion, which whoever shall have been able and willing to read and shall have understood when read, assuredly none of the many arguments that have been devised by them against the perception of truth will move him. For since there are two kinds of things that are known, one of those which the mind perceives through the sense of the body, the other of those which it [perceives] through itself, those philosophers chattered much against the senses of the body; but the mind’s certain most firm perceptions of true things through itself, such as that which I said: 'I know that I live,' they were by no means able to call into doubt.

Sed absit a nobis ut ea quae per sensus corporis didicimus uera esse dubitemus. Per eos quippe didicimus caelum et terram et ea quae in eis nota sunt nobis quantum ille qui et nos et ipsa condidit innotescere nobis uoluit. Absit etiam ut scire nos negemus quae testimonio didicimus aliorum; alioquin esse nescimus oceanum; nescimus esse terras atque uerbes quas celeberrima fama commendat; nescimus fuisse homines et opera eorum quae historica lectione didicimus; nescimus quae quotidie undecumque nuntiantur et indiciis consonis constantibusque firmantur; postremo nescimus in quibus locis uel ex quibus hominibus fuerimus exorti, quia haec omnia testimoniis credidimus aliorum.

But far be it from us to doubt that the things which we have learned through the senses of the body are true. For through them we have learned heaven and earth and the things in them known to us, as much as He who created both us and them willed to be made known to us. Far be it also that we deny we know what we have learned by the testimony of others; otherwise we do not know that the Ocean exists; we do not know that there are lands and cities which most celebrated fame commends; we do not know that there were men and their works which we have learned by historical lection; we do not know the things which every day are reported from wherever and are confirmed by consonant and consistent evidences; finally, we do not know in what places or from what persons we have been born, because all these things we have believed on the testimonies of others.

Quod si absurdissimum est dicere, non solum nostrorum uerum etiam et alienorum corporum sensus plurimum addidisse nostrae scientiae confitendum est.

But if it is most absurd to say otherwise, it must be confessed that not only the senses of our own bodies, but also those of others’ bodies, have added very greatly to our knowledge.

[22] Haec igitur omnia, et quae per se ipsum et quae per sensus sui corporis et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro memoriae condita tenet. Ex quibus gignitur uerbum uerum quando quod scimus loquimur, sed uerbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni. Tunc enim est uerbum simillimum rei notae, de qua gignitur et imago eius quoniam de uisione scientiae uisio cogitationis exoritur, quod est uerbum linguae nullius, uerbum uerum de re uera, nihil de suo habens sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur.

[22] Therefore all these things—both those which through itself and those which through the senses of its body and those which, perceived by the testimonies of others, the human mind knows—it keeps laid up in the treasury of memory. From these there is begotten a true word when we speak what we know, but a word before every sound, before every cogitation of sound. For then the word is most similar to the known thing, from which there are begotten both the word and its image, since from the vision of knowledge the vision of thought arises: which is a word of no tongue, a true word about a real thing, having nothing of its own but wholly from that knowledge from which it is born.

Nec interest quando id didicerit qui quod scit loquitur (aliquando enim statim ut discit hoc dicit), dum tamen uerbum sit uerum, id est de notis rebus exortum.

Nor does it matter when the one who speaks what he knows has learned it (for sometimes immediately as he learns it he says this), provided, however, that the word be true, that is, arisen from known things.

[XIII] Sed numquid deus pater de quo natum est uerbum de deo deus, numquid ergo deus pater in ea sapientia quod est ipse sibi alia didicit per sensum corporis sui, alia per se ipsum? Quis hoc dicat qui non animal rationale sed supra animam rationalem deum cogitat quantum ab eis cogitari potest qui eum omnibus animalibus et omnibus animis praeferunt, quamuis per speculum et in aenigmate coniciendo uideant, nondum facie ad faciem sicuti est? Numquid deus pater ea ipsa quae non per corpus quod ei nullum est sed per se ipsum scit aliunde ab aliquo didicit aut nuntiis uel testibus ut ea sciret indiguit?

[13] But surely God the Father, from whom the Word was born—God from God—did God the Father, then, in that Wisdom which is himself, learn some things for himself through the sense of his body, and other things through himself? Who would say this—one who does not think of a rational animal, but thinks of God as above the rational soul, as far as he can be thought by those who prefer him to all animals and all souls, although they see by a mirror and in an enigma by conjecturing, not yet face to face as he is? Did God the Father perchance learn those very things which he knows not through a body (of which he has none) but through himself, from somewhere else, from someone; or did he need messengers or witnesses in order to know them?

Non utique. Ad omnia quippe scienda quae scit sufficit sibi illa perfectio. Habet quidem nuntios, id est angelos, non tamen qui ei quae nescit annuntient (non enim sunt ulla quae nesciat), sed bonum eorum est de operibus suis eius consulere ueritatem, et hoc est quod ei dicuntur nonnulla nuntiare, non ut ipse ab eis discat sed ut ab illo ipsi per uerbum eius sine corporali sono.

By no means. For indeed, that perfection suffices him for knowing all the things that he knows. He does indeed have messengers, that is, angels, yet not ones to announce to him things he is ignorant of (for there are none that he does not know), but their good is to consult his truth concerning their works; and this is what they are said to announce certain things to him, not that he might learn from them, but that they themselves may learn from him through his Word without corporeal sound.

Nuntiant etiam quod uoluerit ab eo missi ad quos uoluerit totum ab illo per illud uerbum eius audientes, id est in eius ueritate inuenientes quid sibi faciendum, quid, quibus, quando nuntiandum sit.

They also announce what he has willed, being sent by him to those whom he has willed, all hearing everything from him through that his Word, that is, finding in his Truth what is to be done by themselves, what is to be announced, to whom, and when.

Nam et nos oramus eum, nec tamen necessitates nostras docemus eum. Nouit enim, ait uerbum eius, pater uester quid uobis necessarium sit priusquam petatis ab eo. Nec ista ex aliquo tempore cognouit ut nosset, sed futura omnia temporalia atque in eis etiam quid et quando ab illo petituri fueramus et quos et de quibus rebus uel exauditurus uel non exauditurus esset sine initio ante praesciuit. Vniuersas autem creaturas suas et spiritales et corporales non quia sunt ideo nouit, sed ideo sunt quia nouit.

Nam we too pray to him, and yet we do not instruct him about our necessities. For he knows, his Word says, your Father, what is necessary for you before you ask from him. Nor did he come to know these things from some point in time so as to know, but all future temporal things—and among them also what and when we were going to ask from him, and whom, and about what matters, he would be going to hear or not to hear—he foreknew beforehand without beginning. Moreover, all his creatures, both spiritual and corporal, he knows not because they are, therefore he knows them, but therefore they are because he knows.

Non enim nesciuit quae fuerat creaturus. Quia ergo sciuit creauit, non quia creauit sciuit. Nec aliter ea sciuit creata quam creanda; non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis exsistentibus sicut oportebat et quando oportebat illa mansit ut erat.

For he was not ignorant of what he was going to create. Therefore because he knew, he created, not because he created did he know. Nor did he know them otherwise when created than when yet to be created; for nothing was added to his wisdom from them, but with those things existing as was opportune and when it was opportune, it remained as it was.

Ita et scriptum est in libro ecclesiastico: Antequam crearentur omnia nota sunt illi, sic et postquam consummata sunt. Sic, inquit, non aliter; et antequam crearentur et postquam consummata sunt sic ei nota sunt.

Thus also it is written in the ecclesiastical book: Before all things were created, they are known to him; so also after they have been consummated. Thus, he says, not otherwise; both before they were created and after they have been consummated, thus they are known to him.

Longe est igitur huic scientiae scientia nostra dissimilis. Quae autem scientia dei est ipsa et sapientia, et quae sapientia ipsa essentia siue substantia quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili non est aliud sapere, aliud esse, sed quod est sapere hoc est et esse sicut et in superioribus libris saepe iam diximus. Nostra uero scientia in rebus plurimis propterea et amissibilis est et receptibilis quia non hoc est nobis esse quod scire uel sapere, quoniam esse possumus etiam si nesciamus neque sapiamus ea quae aliunde didicimus.

Largely distant, therefore, from this Science is our science. But the Science of God is itself also Wisdom, and that Wisdom is the very Essence or Substance; because in the wondrous simplicity of that Nature it is not one thing to know, another to be, but what it is to know, this also it is to be, as we have often already said in the preceding books. Our science, however, in very many matters is for that reason both losable and receivable, because for us to be is not the same as to know or to be wise, since we can exist even if we neither know nor are wise regarding the things which we have learned from elsewhere.

Propter hoc sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae dei, sic et nostrum uerbum quod nascitur de nostra scientia dissimile est illi uerbo dei quod natum est de patris essentia. (Tale est autem ac si dicerem, 'de patris scientia, de patris sapientia'; uel quod est expressius, 'de patre scientia, de patre sapientia.')

On account of this, just as our knowledge is dissimilar to that knowledge of God, so also our word which is born from our knowledge is dissimilar to that word of God which is born from the Father's essence. (But it is such as if I were to say, 'from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom'; or, what is more express, 'from the Father knowledge, from the Father wisdom.')

[XIV 23] Verbum ergo dei patris unigenitus filius per omnia patri similis et aequalis, deus de deo, lumen de lumine, sapientia de sapientia, essentia de essentia, est hoc omnino quod pater, non tamen pater quia iste filius, ille pater. Ac per hoc nouit omnia quae nouit pater, sed ei nosse de patre est sicut esse. Nosse enim et esse ibi unum est.

[14 23] Therefore the Word of God the Father, the only-begotten Son, through all things similar and equal to the Father—God from God, Light from Light, Wisdom from Wisdom, Essence from Essence—is wholly that which the Father is, yet not the Father, because this one is Son, that one Father. And hence he knows all the things that the Father knows, but for him to know is from the Father just as to be; for to know and to be there are one.

Et ideo patri sicut esse non est a filio ita nec nosse. Proinde tamquam se ipsum dicens pater genuit uerbum sibi aequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius uerbo quam in ipso.

And therefore, for the Father, just as being is not from the Son, so neither is knowing. Accordingly, as if saying Himself, the Father begot the Word equal to Himself in all things. For He would not have spoken Himself integrally and perfectly if there were anything less or more in His Word than in Himself.

Ibi summe illud agnoscitur, est, est; non, non. Et ideo uerbum hoc uere ueritas est quoniam quidquid est in ea scientia de qua est genitum et in ipso est; quod autem in ea non est nec in ipso est. Et falsum habere aliquid hoc uerbum numquam potest quia immutabiliter sic se habet ut se habet de quo est.

There supremely that is recognized, it is, it is; not, not. And therefore this Word is truly Truth, because whatever is in that science (knowledge) from which it is begotten is in him as well; but what is not in it is not in him either. And this Word can never have anything false, because immutably it is as he is, of whom it is.

Non enim potest filius a se facere quidquam nisi quod uiderit patrem facientem. Potenter hoc non potest, nec est infirmitas ista sed firmitas quia falsa esse non potest ueritas. Nouit itaque omnia deus pater in se ipso, nouit in filio, sed in se ipso tamquam se ipsum, in filio tamquam uerbum suum quod est de his omnibus quae sunt in se ipso.

For the son cannot do anything of himself except what he sees the father doing. He cannot do this by power; nor is that an infirmity but a firmness, because truth cannot be false. Therefore God the father knows all things in himself; he knows [them] in the son—but in himself as himself, in the son as his word, which is of all those things that are in himself.

Omnia similiter nouit et filius, in se scilicet tamquam ea quae nata sunt de his quae pater nouit in se ipso, in patre autem tamquam ea de quibus nata sunt quae ipse filius nouit in se ipso. Sciunt ergo inuicem pater et filius, sed ille gignendo, ille nascendo. Et omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, in eorum sapientia, in eorum essentia unusquisque eorum simul uidet, non particulatim aut singillatim uelut alternante conspectu hinc illuc et inde huc et rursus inde uel inde in aliud atque aliud ut aliqua uidere non possit nisi non uidens alia, sed ut dixi simul omnia uidet quorum nullum est quod non semper uidet.

The Son likewise knows all things, in himself, to wit, as the things which are born from those things which the Father knows in himself; but in the Father, as the things from which are born the things which the Son himself knows in himself. Therefore the Father and the Son know one another mutually—he by begetting, he by being born. And all the things that are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence, each of them sees at once, not piecemeal or singly, as though with an alternating gaze now from here to there and from there to here and again from there or from there to another and another, so that he could not see certain things except by not seeing others; but, as I said, he sees all things at once, of which there is none that he does not always see.

[24] Verbum autem nostrum, illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni, sed eius rei quam uidendo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est atque inde utcumque simile est in hoc aenigmate illi uerbo dei quod etiam deus est quoniam sic et hoc de nostra nascitur quemadmodum et illud de scientia patris natum est. Nostrum ergo tale uerbum quod inuenimus esse utcumque illi simile, quantum sit etiam dissimile sicut a nobis dici potuerit non pigeat intueri.

[24] But our word, that which has neither sound nor the cogitation of sound, but of the thing which, by seeing within, we speak, and therefore belongs to no language, and hence is somehow similar in this enigma to that Word of God which also is God, since thus this too is born from our knowledge, just as that was born from the knowledge of the Father. Therefore, as for such a word of ours as we have found to be somehow similar to that, let it not be irksome to look into how much it is also dissimilar, so far as it can be said by us.

[XV] Numquid uerbum nostrum de sola scientia nostra nascitur? Nonne multa dicimus etiam quae nescimus? Nec dubitantes ea dicimus sed uera esse arbitrantes.

[15] Is our word born from our knowledge alone? Do we not also say many things which we do not know? And we say them not doubting, but judging them to be true.

Quae si forte uera sunt, in ipsis rebus de quibus loquimur non in uerbo nostro uera sunt quia uerbum uerum non est nisi quod de re quae scitur gignitur. Falsum est ergo isto modo uerbum nostrum non cum mentimur sed cum fallimur. Cum autem dubitamus nondum est uerbum de re de qua dubitamus, sed de ipsa dubitatione uerbum est.

If perchance these are true, they are true in the very things about which we speak, not in our word, because a true word is only that which is begotten from a thing that is known. Therefore, in this way, our word is false not when we lie but when we are deceived. But when we doubt, there is not yet a word about the thing about which we doubt, but there is a word about the doubt itself.

Quamuis enim non nouerimus an uerum sit unde dubitamus, tamen dubitare nos nouimus, ac per hoc cum hoc dicimus uerum uerbum est quoniam quod nouimus dicimus. Quid quod etiam mentiri possumus? Quod cum facimus utique uolentes et scientes falsum uerbum habemus ubi uerum uerbum est mentiri nos; hoc enim scimus.

Although indeed we do not know whether that about which we doubt is true, nevertheless we know that we doubt, and through this, when we say this, the word is true, since we say what we know. What of the fact that we can also lie? When we do this, assuredly willing and knowing, we have a false word, whereas the true word is that we are lying; for this we know.

Et cum mentitos nos esse confitemur uerum dicimus; quod scimus enim dicimus. Scimus namque nos esse mentitos. Verbum autem illud quod est deus et potentius est nobis hoc non potest.

And when we confess that we have lied, we speak true; for we say what we know. For we know that we have lied. But that Word which is God and is more powerful than we are cannot do this.

Non enim potest facere quidquam nisi quod uiderit patrem facientem. Et non a se ipso loquitur sed a patre illi est omne quod loquitur cum ipsum pater unice loquitur. Et magna illius uerbi potentia est non posse mentiri quia non potest esse illic est et non sed est, est; non, non.

For he cannot do anything except what he has seen the Father doing. And he does not speak from himself, but from the Father is everything that he speaks, since the Father uniquely speaks him himself. And great is the potency of that Word: to be unable to lie, because it cannot be there “yes and no,” but “yes, yes; no, no.”

'At enim nec uerbum dicendum est quod uerum non est.' Sic ita libens assentior. Quid cum uerum est uerbum nostrum et ideo recte uerbum uocatur, numquid sicut dici potest uel uisio de uisione uel scientia de scientia, ita dici potest essentia de essentia sicut illud dei uerbum maxime dicitur maximeque dicendum est? Quid ita?

'But indeed no word ought to be spoken which is not true.' Thus, in this way, I gladly assent. What then, when our word is true and therefore is rightly called a word, can it, just as one can say either ‘vision from vision’ or ‘science from science,’ likewise be said ‘essence from essence,’ as that word of God is most especially said and most especially ought to be said? Why thus?

Quia non hoc est nobis esse quod nosse. Multa quippe nouimus quae per memoriam quodam modo uiuunt, ita et obliuione quodam modo moriuntur, atque ideo cum illa iam non sint in notitia nostra, nos tamen sumus, et cum scientia nostra animo lapsa perierit a nobis, nos tamen uiuimus.

Because for us, to be is not the same as to know. For we know many things which, by memory, in a certain manner live, and likewise by oblivion in a certain manner die; and therefore, when those things are no longer in our cognition, we nevertheless are, and when our science, having slipped from the mind, has perished from us, we nevertheless live.

[25] Illa etiam quae ita sciuntur ut numquam excidere possint quoniam praesentia sunt et ad ipsius animi naturam pertinent ut illud quod nos uiuere scimus; manet enim hoc quamdiu animus manet, et quia semper manet animus et hoc semper manet; id ergo et si qua reperiuntur similia in quibus imago dei potius intuenda est, etiam si semper sciuntur, tamen quia non semper etiam cogitantur, quomodo de his dicatur uerbum sempiternum, cum uerbum nostrum nostra cogitatione dicatur, inuenire difficile est. Sempiternum est enim animo uiuere, sempiternum est scire quod uiuit, nec tamen sempiternum est cogitare uitam suam uel cogitare scientiam uitae suae quoniam cum aliud atque aliud coeperit hoc desinet cogitare quamuis non desinat scire. Ex quo fit ut si test esse in animo aliqua scientia sempiterna, et sempiterna esse non potest eiusdem scientiae cogitatio, et uerbum uerum nostrum intimum nisi nostra cogitatione non dicitur, solus deus intellegatur habere uerbum sempiternum sibique coaeternum.

[25] Those things also which are known in such a way that they can never fall away, since they are present and pertain to the very nature of the mind itself—like that fact that we know we live; for this remains as long as the mind remains, and because the mind remains always, this too remains always; therefore that, and if any similar things are found in which the image of God is rather to be beheld, even if they are always known, nevertheless, because they are not always also cogitated, how an eternal (sempiternal) word may be said of these, since our word is said by our cogitation, is difficult to find. For it is sempiternal for the mind to live, it is sempiternal to know that it lives, and yet it is not sempiternal to think its own life or to think the knowledge of its life, since when it has begun to think now one thing now another, it will cease to think this, although it does not cease to know. Whence it comes to be that, if there is some sempiternal knowledge in the mind, and the cogitation of that same knowledge cannot be sempiternal, and our true inmost word is not spoken except by our cogitation, let God alone be understood to have a sempiternal word coeternal with himself.

Nisi forte dicendum est ipsam possibilitatem cogitationis, quoniam id quod scitur etiam quando non cogitatur potest tamen ueraciter cogitari, uerbum esse tam perpetuum quam scientia ipsa perpetua est. Sed quomodo est uerbum quod nondum in cogitationis uisione formatum est? Quomodo erit simile scientiae de qua nascitur si eius non habet formam et ideo iam uocatur uerbum quia potest habere?

Unless perhaps it must be said that the very possibility of cogitation, since that which is known, even when it is not being cogitated, can nevertheless be veraciously cogitated, is a word as perpetual as the science itself is perpetual. But how is it a word that has not yet been formed in the vision of cogitation? How will it be like the science from which it is born, if it does not have its form, and is it therefore already called a word because it can have it?

Tale est enim ac si dicatur ideo iam uocandum esse uerbum quia potest esse uerbum.

For it is such as if it were said that for that reason it is already to be called a word, because it can be a word.

Sed quid est quod potest esse uerbum et ideo iam dignum est uerbi nomine? Quid est, inquam, hoc formabile nondumque formatum nisi quiddam mentis nostrae quod hac atque hac uolubili quadam motione iactamus cum a nobis nunc hoc, nunc illud sicut inuentum fuerit uel occurrerit cogitatur? Et tunc fit uerum uerbum quando illud quod nos dixi uolubili motione iactare ad id quod scimus peruenit atque inde formatur eius omnimodam similitudinem capiens ut quomodo res quaeque scitur sic etiam cogitetur, id est sine uoce, sine cogitatione uocis quae profecto alicuius linguae est sic in corde dicatur.

Sed what is that which can be a word and is therefore already worthy of the name of word? What, I say, is this formable and not-yet-formed thing, unless it is a certain something of our mind which we toss about this way and that with a certain voluble motion, when by us now this, now that, as it shall have been found or as it shall have occurred, is cogitated? And then it becomes a true word when that which, as I said, we toss with a voluble motion arrives at that which we know, and from there is formed, taking on its all-around similitude, so that as each thing is known, thus also it is cogitated—that is, without voice, without a cogitation of voice (which indeed belongs to some language), thus it is said in the heart.

Ac per hoc etiam si concedamus, ne de controuersia uocabuli laborare uideamur, iam uocandum esse uerbum quiddam illud mentis nostrae quod de nostra scientia formari potest etiam priusquam formatum sit quia iam ut ita dicam formabile est, quis non uideat quanta hic sit dissimilitudo ab illo dei uerbo quod in forma dei sic est ut non ante fuerit formabile postque formatum, nec aliquando esse possit informe, sed sit forma simplex et simpliciter aequalis ei de quo est et cui mirabiliter coaeterna est?

And therefore, even if we concede, so that we may not seem to labor over a controversy of the term, that already that certain thing of our mind which can be formed from our knowledge is to be called a word even before it has been formed, because already, so to speak, it is formable, who does not see how great a dissimilarity there is here from that Word of God, which is in the form of God in suchwise that it was not first formable and afterwards formed, nor can it ever be unformed, but is a simple form and simply equal to him of whom it is, and to whom it is wondrously coeternal?

[XVI] Quapropter ita dicitur illud dei uerbum ut dei cogitatio non dicatur nec aliquid esse quasi uolubile credatur in deo, quod nunc accipiat, nunc recipiat formam ut uerbum sit eamque possit amittere atque informiter quodam modo uolutari. Bene quippe nouerat uerba et uim cogitationis inspexerat locutor egregius qui dixit in carmine:

[16] Wherefore that word of God is so spoken of that it not be called God’s cogitation, nor be anything believed in God as if voluble, which now should receive, now take up a form in order to be a word, and could also lose it and be rolled about formlessly in a certain manner. For indeed the distinguished speaker who said this in verse had well known words and had examined the force of cogitation:

secumque uolutat Euentus belli uarios; id est, cogitat. Non ergo ille dei filius cogitatio dei sed uerbum dei dicitur. Cogitatio quippe nostra perueniens ad id quod scimus atque inde formata uerbum nostrum uerum est.

and he revolves with himself the various Events of war; that is, he cogitates. Therefore that son of God is not called the cogitation of God but is called the word of God. For indeed our cogitation, arriving at that which we know and from there being formed, is our true word.

Et ideo uerbum dei sine cogitatione dei debet intellegi ut forma ipsa simplex intellegatur, non aliquid habens formabile quod esse etiam possit informe. Dicuntur quidem etiam in scripturis sanctis cogitationes dei sed eo locutionis modo quo ibi et obliuio dei dicitur, quae utique ad proprietatem in deo nulla est.

And therefore the word of God ought to be understood without a thought of God, so that the very simple form may be understood, not something having a formable element which could also be formless. Indeed “thoughts” of God are spoken of even in the sacred scriptures, but in that mode of locution in which there, too, “oblivion” of God is spoken of— which assuredly, as a propriety, is none in God.

[26] Quamobrem cum tanta sit nunc in isto aenigmate dissimilitudo dei et uerbi dei in qua tamen nonnulla similitudo comperta est, illud quoque fatendum est quod etiam cum similes ei erimus quando eum uidebimus sicuti est (quod utique qui dixit hanc procul dubio quae nunc est dissimilitudinem attendit), nec tunc natura illi erimus aequales. Semper enim natura minor est faciente quae facta est. Et tunc quidem uerbum nostrum non erit falsum quia neque mentiemur neque fallemur.

[26] Wherefore, since there is now in this enigma so great a dissimilarity of God and of the word of God, in which nevertheless some similarity has been discovered, this also must be confessed: that even when we shall be like him, when we shall see him just as he is (which assuredly the one who said it without doubt had regard to this dissimilarity which now is), not even then shall we be equal to him in nature. For always the nature which has been made is less than the Maker by whom it was made. And then indeed our word will not be false, because neither shall we lie nor shall we be deceived.

Fortassis etiam non erunt uolubiles nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu uidebimus. Tamen cum et hoc fuerit, si et hoc fuerit, formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit ut nihil iam desit eius formae ad quam peruenire deberet; sed tamen coaequanda non erit illi simplicitati ubi non formabile aliquid formatum uel reformatum est sed forma. Neque informis neque formata ipsa ibi aeterna est immutabilisque substantia.

Perhaps too our cogitations will not be rolling, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall behold all our knowledge in one simultaneous glance. Yet even when this too has come to be, if this too has come to be, the creature which was formable will be formed, so that nothing now is lacking to that form to which it ought to have come; but nevertheless it will not be to be equated with that simplicity where what is, is not some formable thing formed or reformed, but form. There the eternal and immutable substance itself is neither formless nor formed.

[XVII 27] Satis de patre et filio quantum per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate uidere potuimus locuti sumus.

[17 27] We have spoken sufficiently about the Father and the Son, insofar as we were able to see through this mirror and in this enigma.

Nunc de spiritu sancto quantum deo donante uidere conceditur disserendum est. Qui spiritus sanctus secundum scripturas sanctas nec patris est solius nec filii solius sed amborum, et ideo communem qua inuicem se diligunt pater et filius nobis insinuat caritatem. Vt autem nos exerceret sermo diuinus non res in promptu sitas sed in abdito scrutandas et ex abdito eruendas maiore studio fecit inquiri.

Now, concerning the Holy Spirit, we must discourse as far as it is permitted to see, God granting it. The Holy Spirit, who according to the sacred Scriptures is neither the Father’s alone nor the Son’s alone but of both, therefore insinuates to us the common charity whereby the Father and the Son love one another in turn. But in order to exercise us, the divine discourse has caused to be sought not things set in the open, but those in the hidden to be scrutinized, and from the hidden to be brought forth, with greater zeal.

Non itaque dixit scriptura: 'Spiritus sanctus caritas est,' quod si dixisset non paruam partem quaestionis istius abstulisset, sed dixit: Deus caritas est, ut incertum sit et ideo requirendum utrum deus pater sit caritas, an deus filius, an deus spiritus sanctus, an deus ipsa trinitas. Neque enim dicturi sumus non propterea deum dictam esse caritatem quod ipsa caritas sit ulla substantia quae dei digna sit nomine, sed quod donum sit dei sicut dictum est deo: Quoniam tu es patientia mea. Non utique propterea dictum est quia dei substantia est nostra patientia, sed quod ab ipso nobis est sicut alibi legitur: Quoniam ab ipso est patientia mea.

Accordingly Scripture did not say: 'The Holy Spirit is charity,' which, if it had said, would have removed no small part of this question; but it said: God is charity, so that it is uncertain and therefore to be inquired whether God the Father is charity, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit, or God the Trinity itself. Nor indeed are we going to say that God is for this reason called charity, namely, that charity itself is some substance worthy of the name of God, but that it is a gift of God, just as it has been said to God: 'For thou art my patience.' Not, to be sure, was this said because our patience is the substance of God, but because it is from him to us, just as elsewhere it is read: 'For from him is my patience.'

Hunc quippe sensum facile refellit scripturarum ipsa locutio. Tale est enim tu es patientia mea quale est domine, spes mea et deus meus misericordia mea et multa similia. Non est autem dictum 'domine, caritas mea' aut 'tu es caritas mea' aut 'deus, caritas mea,' sed ita dictum est: Deus caritas est sicut dictum est: Deus spiritus est.

Indeed, the very locution of the Scriptures easily refutes this sense. For such is ‘you are my patience’ as is ‘Lord, my hope, and my God, my mercy,’ and many similar [things]. But it has not been said ‘Lord, my charity’ or ‘you are my charity’ or ‘God, my charity,’ but it has been said thus: God is charity, just as it has been said: God is spirit.

Hoc qui non discernit intellectum a domino, non expositionem quaerat a nobis; non enim apertius quidquam possumus dicere.

He who does not discern this understanding from the Lord, let him not seek an exposition from us; for we can say nothing more plainly.

[28] Deus ergo caritas est. Vtrum autem pater an filius an spiritus sanctus an ipsa trinitas quia et ipsa non tres dii sed deus est unus, hoc quaeritur. Sed iam in hoc libro superius disputaui non sic accipiendam esse trinitatem quae deus est ex illis tribus quae in trinitate nostrae mentis ostendimus ut tamquam memoria sit omnium trium pater et intellegentia omnium trium filius et caritas omnium trium spiritus sanctus, quasi pater non intellegat sibi nec diligat, sed ei filius intellegat et spiritus sanctus ei diligat, ipse autem et sibi et illis tantum meminerit; et filius nec meminerit nec diligat sibi, sed meminerit ei pater et diligat ei spiritus sanctus, ipse autem et sibi et illis tantummodo intellegat; itemque spiritus sanctus nec meminerit nec intellegat sibi, sed meminerit ei pater et intellegat ei filius, ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligat; sed sic potius ut omnia tria et omnes et singuli habeant in sua quisque natura.

[28] God therefore is charity. But whether it is the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit or the Trinity itself—since that too is not three gods but one God—this is the question. But already above in this book I have argued that the Trinity which is God is not to be taken from those three which we have shown in the trinity of our mind in such a way as that, as it were, Memory be of all three the Father, and Intelligence of all three the Son, and Charity of all three the Holy Spirit, as though the Father did not understand for himself nor love, but that the Son understood for him and the Holy Spirit loved for him, while he himself only remembered both for himself and for them; and that the Son neither remembered nor loved for himself, but that the Father remembered for him and the Holy Spirit loved for him, while he himself only understood both for himself and for them; and likewise that the Holy Spirit neither remembered nor understood for himself, but that the Father remembered for him and the Son understood for him, while he himself for himself and for them did nothing but love; but rather thus: that all three—both all together and each singly—have all three in each one’s own nature.

Nec distent in eis ista, sicut in nobis aliud est memoria, aliud intellegentia, aliud dilectio siue caritas; sed unum aliquid sit quod omnia ualeat sicut ipsa sapientia, et sic habetur in uniuscuiusque natura ut qui habet hoc sit quod habet sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia. Si ergo haec

Nor let these be sundered in them, as in us memory is one thing, intelligence another, dilection or charity another; but let there be some one thing which is able for all, like wisdom itself, and thus it is possessed in the nature of each single one, that he who has this is what he has, as an immutable and simple substance. If therefore these

ntellecta sunt et quantum nobis in rebus tantis uidere uel coniectare concessum est uera esse claruerunt, nescio cur non sicut sapientia et pater dicitur et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes non tres sed una sapientia, ita et caritas et pater dicatur et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes una caritas. Sic enim et pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, et simul omnes unus deus.

They have been understood, and, insofar as it has been granted to us in matters so great to see or to conjecture, they have become manifest as true; I do not know why, just as wisdom is said both of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and together all are not three but one wisdom, so also charity should be said both of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and together all one charity. For thus both the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, and together all are one God.

[29] Et tamen non frustra in hac trinitate non dicitur uerbum dei nisi filius, nec donum dei nisi spiritus sanctus, nec de quo genitum est uerbum et de quo procedit principaliter spiritus sanctus nisi deus pater. Ideo autem addidi, principaliter, quia et de filio spiritus sanctus procedere reperitur. Sed hoc quoque illi pater dedit (non iam exsistenti et nondum habenti), sed quidquid unigenito uerbo dedit gignendo dedit.

[29] And yet not without purpose in this Trinity none is called the Word of God except the Son, nor the Gift of God except the Holy Spirit, nor is he, of whom the Word is begotten and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds, anyone but God the Father. But I added “principally,” because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But this too the Father gave to him (not to one already existing and not yet possessing), but whatever he gave to the Only-begotten Word he gave by begetting.

Sic ergo cum genuit ut etiam de illo donum commune procederet et spiritus sanctus spiritus esset amborum. Non est igitur accipienda transeunter sed diligenter intuenda inseparabilis trinitatis ista distinctio. Hinc enim factum est ut proprie dei uerbum etiam dei sapientia diceretur, cum sit sapientia et pater et spiritus sanctus.

Thus therefore when he begot, it was so that from him also the common gift would proceed, and that the Holy Spirit would be the Spirit of both. Therefore this distinction of the inseparable Trinity is not to be received in passing, but to be carefully contemplated. For hence it came about that the Word of God was properly also called the Wisdom of God, since both the Father and the Holy Spirit are Wisdom.

Si ergo proprie aliquid horum trium caritas nuncupanda est, quid aptius quam ut hoc sit spiritus sanctus? Vt scilicet in illa simplici summaque natura non sit aliud substantia et aliud caritas, sed substantia ipsa sit caritas et caritas ipsa substantia siue in patre siue in filio siue in spiritu sancto, et tamen proprie spiritus sanctus caritas nuncupetur.

If therefore any of these three is properly to be named Charity, what more apt than that this be the Holy Spirit? Namely, that in that simple and highest nature there be not one thing substance and another charity, but that the substance itself be charity and charity itself substance, whether in the Father or in the Son or in the Holy Spirit, and yet that properly the Holy Spirit be named Charity.

[30] Sicut legis nomine aliquando simul omnia ueteris instrumenti sanctarum scripturarum significantur eloquia. Nam ex propheta Esaia testimonium ponens apostolus ubi ait: In aliis linguis et in aliis labiis loquar populo huic, praemisit tamen: In lege scriptum est. Et ipse dominus: In lege, inquit, eorum scriptum est quia oderunt me gratis, cum hoc legatur in psalmo.

[30] Just as by the name of law (lex) sometimes all at once the utterances of the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament are signified. For when setting a testimony from the prophet Isaiah, the apostle, where he says: “In other tongues and with other lips I will speak to this people,” nevertheless prefaced: “In the law it is written.” And the Lord himself: “In their law,” he says, “it is written that they hated me gratis,” although this is read in a psalm.

Aliquando autem proprie uocatur lex quae data est per Moysen, secundum quod dictum est: Lex et prophetae usque ad Iohannem, et: In his duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae. Hic utique proprie lex appellata est de monte Sina. Prophetarum autem nomine etiam psalmi significati sunt, et tamen alio loco ipse saluator: Oportebat, inquit, impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege et in prophetis et in psalmis de me. Hic rursus prophetarum nomen exceptis psalmis intellegi uoluit.

Sometimes, however, the name “law” is properly applied to the law which was given through Moses, according as it is said: The Law and the Prophets until John, and: On these two precepts the whole Law hangs, and the Prophets. Here, assuredly, the Law from Mount Sinai is what is properly meant by “Law.” By the name of the prophets, moreover, the Psalms also are signified, and yet elsewhere the Savior himself says: It was necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the Law and in the Prophets and in the Psalms concerning me. Here again he wished the name of the prophets to be understood with the Psalms excepted.

Dicitur ergo lex uniuersaliter cum prophetis et psalmis, dicitur et proprie quae per Moysen data est. Item dicuntur communiter prophetae simul cum psalmis, dicuntur et proprie praeter psalmos. Et multis aliis exemplis doceri potest multa rerum uocabula et uniuersaliter poni et proprie quibusdam rebus adhiberi nisi in re aperta uitanda sit longitudo sermonis.

Therefore the Law is said universally along with the Prophets and the Psalms, and it is also said properly of that which was given through Moses. Likewise, the Prophets are spoken of commonly together with the Psalms, and they are spoken of properly apart from the Psalms. And by many other examples it can be shown that many terms of things are both used universally and applied properly to certain things—unless, the matter being evident, the length of discourse should be avoided.

Hoc ideo dixi ne quisquam propterea nos inconuenienter existimet caritatem appellare spiritum sanctum quia et deus pater et deus filius potest caritas nuncupari.

I have said this for this reason, lest anyone therefore think us to give the appellation “charity” to the Holy Spirit inappropriately, since both God the Father and God the Son also can be named “charity.”

[31] Sicut ergo unicum dei uerbum proprie uocamus nomine sapientiae, cum sit uniuersaliter et spiritus sanctus et pater ipse sapientia, ita spiritus proprie nuncupatur uocabulo caritatis, cum sit et pater et filius uniuersaliter caritas. Sed dei uerbum, id est unigenitus dei filius, aperte dictus est dei sapientia ore apostolico ubi ait: Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam. Spiritus autem sanctus ubi sit dictus caritas inuenimus si diligenter Iohannis apostoli scrutemur eloquium, qui cum dixisset: Dilectissimi, diligamus inuicem quia dilectio ex deo est, secutus adiuxit: Et omnis qui diligit ex deo natus est.

[31] Thus, just as we properly call the unique Word of God by the name Wisdom, although universally both the Holy Spirit and the Father himself are Wisdom, so the Spirit is properly named by the appellation Charity, although both Father and Son are universally Charity. But the Word of God, that is, the Only-Begotten Son of God, has openly been called the Wisdom of God by the apostolic mouth where he says: “Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God.” And where the Holy Spirit is called Charity we find if we diligently scrutinize the eloquium of the apostle John, who, when he had said: “Beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God,” went on to add: “And everyone who loves has been born of God.”

Qui non diligit non cognouit deum quia deus dilectio est. Hic manifestauit eam se dixisse dilectionem deum quam dixit ex deo. Deus ergo ex deo est dilectio.

He who does not love has not known God, because God is love. Here he made it manifest that by “love” he meant God, the same which he said is from God. Therefore God, from God, is love.

Sed quia et filius ex deo patre natus est et spiritus sanctus ex deo patre procedit, quem potius eorum hic debeamus accipere dictum esse dilectionem deum merito quaeritur. Pater enim solus ita deus est ut non sit ex deo, ac per hoc dilectio quae ita deus est ut ex deo sit aut filius est aut spiritus sanctus. Sed in consequentibus cum dei dilectionem commemorasset, non qua nos eum sed qua nos ipse dilexit et misit filium suum litatorem pro peccatis nostris, et hinc exhortatus esset ut et nos inuicem diligamus atque ita deus in nobis maneat quia utique dilectionem deum dixerat, statim uolens de hac re apertius aliquid eloqui: In hoc, inquit, cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis.

Sed because both the Son was born from God the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, it is rightly asked which of them we ought rather to take as having been called here “love is God.” For the Father alone is so God as not to be from God; and therefore the love which is so God as to be from God is either the Son or the Holy Spirit. But in what follows, when he had commemorated the love of God—not by which we love him, but by which he himself loved us and sent his Son a propitiator for our sins—and from this had exhorted that we also love one another, and thus God may abide in us, because assuredly he had said that love is God, immediately, wishing to say something more openly about this matter: “In this,” he says, “we know that we abide in him and he in us, because of his Spirit he has given to us.”

Sanctus itaque spiritus de quo dedit nobis facit nos in deo manere et ipsum in nobis. Hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipse est igitur deus dilectio.

Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom He has given to us, makes us abide in God and Him in us. Now this is what love effects. He Himself, therefore, is God—Love.

Denique paulo post cum hoc ipsum repetisset atque dixisset: Deus dilectio est, continuo subiecit: Et qui manet in dilectione in deo manet, et deus in eo manet, unde supra dixerat: In hoc cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis. Ipse ergo significatur ubi legitur: Deus dilectio est. Deus igitur spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex deo cum datus fuerit homini accendit eum in dilectionem dei et proximi, et ipse dilectio est.

Finally, a little after, when he had repeated this very thing and had said: God is dilection, he immediately subjoined: And whoever abides in dilection abides in God, and God abides in him, whence he had said above: In this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit. He himself, therefore, is signified where it is read: God is dilection. Therefore God the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God, when he has been given to a human being, kindles him into the dilection of God and of the neighbor, and he himself is dilection.

Non enim habet homo unde deum diligat nisi ex deo. Propter quod paulo post dicit: Nos diligamus quia ipse prior dilexit nos. Apostolus quoque Paulus: Dilectio, inquit, dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.

For a human does not have whence to love God except from God. Wherefore a little later he says: Let us love, because he first loved us. The Apostle Paul also: “The love of God,” he says, “has been diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”

[XVIII 32] Nullum est isto dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod diuidit inter filios regni aeterni et filios perditionis aeternae. Dantur et alia per spiritum munera, sed sine caritate nihil prosunt.

[18 32] There is no gift of God more excellent than this. It alone is that which divides between the children of the eternal kingdom and the children of eternal perdition. Other gifts also are given through the Spirit, but without charity they profit nothing.

Nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuique spiritus sanctus ut eum dei et proximi faciat amatorem, a sinistra non transfertur ad dextram. Nec spiritus proprie dicitur donum nisi propter dilectionem quam qui non habuerit si linguis hominum loquatur et angelorum, sonans aeramentum est et cymbalum tinniens; et si habuerit prophetiam et scierit omnia sacramenta et omnem scientiam et habuerit omnem fidem ita ut montes transferat, nihil est; et si distribuerit omnem substantiam suam et si tradiderit corpus suum ut ardeat, nihil ei prodest. Quantum ergo bonum est sine quo ad aeternam uitam neminem bona tanta perducunt?

Unless, then, the Holy Spirit be imparted to each one to such a degree that he make him a lover of God and of neighbor, he is not transferred from the left to the right. Nor is the Spirit properly called a gift except on account of dilection; which whoever shall not have, even if he speak with the tongues of men and of angels, is a sounding bronze and a clanging cymbal; and if he have prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and have all faith so that he may transfer mountains, he is nothing; and if he distribute all his substance, and if he deliver up his body that it may burn, it profits him nothing. How great, then, is the good without which such great goods lead no one to eternal life?

Ipsa uero dilectio siue caritas (nam unius rei est nomen utrumque), si habeat eam qui non loquitur linguis nec habet prophetiam nec omnia scit sacramenta omnemque scientiam nec distribuit omnia sua pauperibus uel non habendo quod distribuat uel aliqua necessitate prohibitus, nec tradit corpus suum ut ardeat si talis passionis nulla temptatio est, perducit ad regnum ita ut ipsam fidem non faciat utilem nisi caritas. Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse sed non et prodesse. Propter quod et apostolus Paulus: In Christo, inquit, Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid ualet neque praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur, sic eam discernens ab ea fide qua et daemones credunt et contremescunt.

But love itself, or charity (for both are names of one and the same thing)—if he has it who does not speak with tongues, nor has prophecy, nor knows all the sacraments and all science, nor distributes all his goods to the poor, either because he does not have what to distribute or is prevented by some necessity, nor delivers up his body to be burned if there is no temptation of such a passion—leads to the kingdom, in such wise that not even faith itself is made useful except by charity. Without charity, to be sure, faith can indeed exist, but not also profit. Wherefore also the Apostle Paul says: “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything nor uncircumcision, but faith which operates through love,” thus discerning it from that faith by which even the demons believe and tremble.

Dilectio igitur quae ex deo est et deus est proprie spiritus sanctus est per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris dei caritas per quam nos tota inhabitet trinitas. Quocirca rectissime spiritus sanctus, cum sit deus, uocatur etiam donum dei. Quod donum proprie quid nisi caritas intellegenda est quae perducit ad deum et sine qua quodlibet aliud dei donum non perducit ad deum?

Therefore the love which is from God and is God is, properly, the Holy Spirit, through whom the charity of God is poured into our hearts, by which the whole Trinity dwells in us. Wherefore, most rightly, the Holy Spirit, since he is God, is also called the gift of God. Which gift, properly, what is to be understood except charity, which leads to God, and without which any other gift of God does not lead to God?

[XIX 33] An et hoc probandum est donum dei dictum esse in sacris litteris spiritum sanctum? Si et hoc exspectatur, habemus in euangelio secundum Iohannem domini Christi uerba dicentis: Si quis sitit, ueniat ad me et bibat. Qui credit in me sicut dicit scriptura flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae.

[19 33] Or is this also to be proved, that in the sacred letters the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God? If this too is expected, we have in the Gospel according to John the words of the Lord Christ saying: If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink. He who believes in me, as the Scripture says, rivers of living water will flow from his belly.

Porro euangelista secutus adiunxit: Hoc autem dixit de spiritu quem accepturi erant credentes in eum. Vnde dicit etiam Paulus apostolus: Et omnes unum spiritum potauimus. Vtrum autem donum dei sit appellata aqua ista quod est spiritus sanctus hoc quaeritur.

Moreover the evangelist, following on, appended: But he said this about the Spirit which those believing in him were going to receive. Whence the apostle Paul also says: And we have all drunk of one Spirit. Whether, however, this water—which is the Holy Spirit—has been called the gift of God, this is what is being inquired.

Sed sicut hic inuenimus hanc aquam spiritum sanctum esse, ita inuenimus alibi in ipso euangelio hanc aquam dei donum appellatam. Nam dominus idem quando cum samaritana muliere ad puteum loquebatur cui dixerat: Da mihi bibere, cum illa respondisset quod iudaei non couterentur samaritanis, respondit Iesus et dixit ei: Si scires donum dei et quis est qui dicit tibi: Da mihi bibere, tu forsitan petisses ab eo et dedisset tibi aquam uiuam. Dicit ei mulier: Domine, neque in quo haurias habes et puteus altus est.

But just as here we find that this water is the Holy Spirit, so we find elsewhere in the Gospel itself that this water is called the gift of God. For the same Lord, when he was speaking with the Samaritan woman at the well, to whom he had said: Give me to drink, when she had replied that the Jews do not have dealings with Samaritans, Jesus answered and said to her: If you knew the gift of God and who it is who says to you, Give me to drink, you perhaps would have asked from him, and he would have given you living water. The woman says to him: Lord, you have nothing with which to draw, and the well is deep.

Vnde ergo habes aquam uiuam?, et cetera. Respondit Iesus et dixit ei: Omnis qui biberit ex aqua hac sitiet iterum; qui autem biberit ex aqua quam ego dabo ei non sitiet in aeternum, sed aqua quam dabo ei fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in uitam aeternam. Quia ergo haec aqua uiua sicut euangelista exposuit spiritus sanctus est, procul dubio spiritus donum dei est de quo hic dominus ait: Si scires donum dei et quis est qui dicit tibi: Da mihi bibere, tu forsitan petisses ab eo et dedisset tibi aquam uiuam.

Whence then do you have living water?, et cetera. Jesus answered and said to her: Everyone who drinks from this water will thirst again; but whoever drinks of the water which I will give him will not thirst forever, but the water which I will give him will become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life. Since therefore this living water, just as the evangelist explained, is the Holy Spirit, beyond doubt the Spirit is the gift of God, about which here the Lord says: If you knew the gift of God and who it is who says to you: Give me to drink, you perhaps would have asked of him, and he would have given you living water.

Nam quod ibi ait: Flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae, hoc in isto loco: Fiet, inquit, in eo fons aquae salientis in uitam aeternam.

For what he says there: "Rivers of living water will flow from his belly," this in this place: "It will become," he says, "in him a fount of water springing up into eternal life."

[34] Paulus quoque apostolus: Vnicuique, inquit, nostrum datur gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi, atque ut donationem Christi sanctum spiritum ostenderet secutus adiunxit: Propter quod dicit: Ascendit in altum, captiuauit captiuitatem, dedit dona hominibus. Notissimum est autem dominum Iesum cum post resurrectionem a mortuis ascendisset in caelum dedisse spiritum sanctum quo impleti qui crediderant linguis omnium gentium loquebantur. Nec moueat quod ait dona, non donum; id enim testimonium de psalmo posuit.

[34] The apostle Paul also: “To each one, he says, grace is given according to the measure of the donation of Christ,” and, in order to show that the donation of Christ is the Holy Spirit, he added, following: “Wherefore he says: He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men.” But it is most well known that when the Lord Jesus, after the resurrection from the dead, had ascended into heaven, he gave the Holy Spirit, with which, being filled, those who had believed were speaking with the tongues of all nations. Nor let it trouble that he says gifts, not gift; for he set that testimony from the Psalm.

Hoc autem in psalmo ita legitur: Ascendisti in altum, captiuasti captiuitatem, accepisti dona in hominibus. Sic enim plures codices habent et maxime graeci, et ex hebraeo sic interpretatum habemus. Dona itaque dixit apostolus quemadmodum propheta, non donum; sed cum propheta dixerit, accepisti in hominibus, apostolus mauit dicere, dedit hominibus, ut ex utroque scilicet uerbo, uno prophetico, apostolico altero, quia in utroque est diuini sermonis auctoritas, sensus plenissimus redderetur.

But in the psalm it is read thus: You ascended on high, you took captivity captive, you received gifts among men. For thus do several codices have it, and especially the Greek, and from the Hebrew we have it interpreted thus. Therefore the apostle said gifts just as the prophet, not gift; but whereas the prophet said, you received among men, the apostle preferred to say, he gave to men, so that from both words, namely the one prophetic and the other apostolic—since in both there is the authority of the divine discourse—the most full sense might be rendered.

Vtrumque enim uerum est, et quia dedit hominibus et quia accepit in hominibus. Dedit hominibus tamquam caput membris suis; accepit in hominibus idem ipse utique in membris suis, propter quae membra sua clamauit de caelo: Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris?, et de quibus membris suis ait: Quando uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis. Ipse ergo Christus et dedit de caelo et accepit in terra.

For both are true, both that he gave to men and that he received in men. He gave to men as the head to his members; he received in men, the same one surely in his members, on account of which his members he cried out from heaven: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?”, and of which his members he says: “When you did it to one of the least of mine, you did it to me.” Therefore Christ himself both gave from heaven and received on earth.

Porro autem dona ob hoc ambo dixerunt et propheta et apostolus quia per donum quod est spiritus sanctus in commune omnibus membris Christi multa dona quae sint quibusque propria diuiduntur. Non enim singuli quique habent omnia, sed hi illa, alii alia, quamuis ipsum donum a quo cuique propria diuiduntur omnes habeant, id est spiritum sanctum. Nam et alibi cum multa dona commemorasset: Omnia, inquit, haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus diuidens propria unicuique prout uult.

Furthermore, both the prophet and the apostle said “gifts” for this reason: because through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, in common to all the members of Christ, many gifts, which are proper to each, are divided. For not do individuals each have all things, but these have those, others others, although the gift itself, from which proper things are divided to each, all have, that is, the Holy Spirit. For elsewhere also, when he had commemorated many gifts: “All these,” he says, “are operated by one and the same Spirit, dividing proper things to each as he wills.”

Quod uerbum et in epistula quae ad hebraeos est inuenitur ubi scriptum est: Attestante deo signis et ostentis et uariis uirtutibus et spiritus sancti diuisionibus. Et hic cum dixisset, ascendit in altum, captiuauit captiuitatem, dedit dona hominibus: Quod autem ascendit, ait, quid est nisi quia et descendit in inferiores pares terrae? Qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes caelos ut adimpleret omnia.

Which word is also found in the Epistle which is to the Hebrews, where it is written: God attesting with signs and portents and various powers and divisions of the Holy Spirit. And here, when he had said, “He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men”: “But that he ascended,” he says, “what is it except that he also descended into the lower parts of the earth?” He who descended, he himself is also he who ascended above all the heavens, that he might fulfill all things.

Et ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, quosdam uero euangelistas, quosdam autem pastores et doctores. Ecce quare dicta sunt dona. Quia sicut alibi dicit: Numquid omnes apostoli, numquid omnes prophetae?, et cetera; hic autem adiunxit: Ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi.

And he himself gave some indeed as apostles, some moreover as prophets, some truly as evangelists, some moreover as pastors and doctors. Behold why they were called gifts. Because, as elsewhere he says: Are all apostles, are all prophets?, and the rest; but here he added: For the consummation of the saints into the work of ministry, into the edification of the body of Christ.

Haec est domus quae sicut psalmus canit aedificatur post captiuitatem quoniam qui sunt a diabolo eruti a quo captiui tenebantur, de his aedificatur corpus Christi, quae domus appellatur ecclesia. Hanc autem captiuitatem ipse captiuauit qui diabolum uicit. Et ne illa quae futura erant sancti capitis membra in aeternum supplicium secum traheret, eum iustitiae prius deinde potentiae uinculis alligauit.

This is the house which, as the psalm sings, is built after the captivity, since those who have been rescued from the devil, by whom they were held captive, from these the body of Christ is built, which house is called the church. But this captivity he himself led captive, who conquered the devil. And lest he drag with himself into eternal punishment those who were to be the members of the holy head, he bound him with bonds—first of justice, then of power.

Ipse itaque diabolus est appellata captiuitas quam captiuauit qui ascendit in altum et dedit dona hominibus uel accepit in hominibus.

Therefore the captivity itself has been called the Devil, the captivity which he who ascended on high led captive, and he gave gifts to men, or received among men.

[35] Petrus autem apostolus sicut in eo libro canonico legitur ubi scripti sunt actus apostolorum, loquens de Christo commotis corde iudaeis et dicentibus: Quid ergo faciemus, fratres? Monstrate nobis, dixit ad eos: Agite poenitentiam et baptizetur unusquisque uestrum in nomine Iesu Christi in remissionem peccatorum, et accipietis donum spiritus sancti. Itemque in eodem libro legitur Simonem magum apostolis dare uoluisse pecuniam ut ab eis acciperet potestatem qua per impositionem manus eius daretur spiritus sanctus.

[35] But Peter the apostle, as is read in that canonical book where the Acts of the Apostles are written, speaking about Christ to the Jews moved in heart and saying: What then shall we do, brothers? Show us—said to them: Repent, and let each one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. Likewise in the same book it is read that Simon Magus wished to give money to the apostles so that he might receive from them the power by which, through the imposition of his hand, the Holy Spirit would be given.

Cui Petrus idem: Pecunia, inquit, tua tecum sit in perditionem quia donum dei aestimasti te per pecuniam possidere. Et alio eiusdem libri loco cum Petrus Cornelio et eis qui cum illo fuerant loqueretur annuntians et praedicans Christum ait scriptura: Adhuc loquente Petro uerba haec cecidit spiritus sanctus super omnem qui audiebant uerbum, et obstuperunt qui ex circumcisione fideles simul cum Petro uenerant quia et in nationes donum spiritus sancti effusum est. Audiebant enim illos loquentes linguis et magnificantes deum.

To whom Peter likewise said: “May your money be with you into perdition, because you estimated that you might possess the gift of God through money.” And in another place of the same book, when Peter was speaking to Cornelius and to those who had been with him, announcing and preaching Christ, Scripture says: “While Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who were hearing the word; and the faithful from the circumcision who had come together with Peter were astonished, because upon the nations also the gift of the Holy Spirit had been poured out. For they were hearing them speaking with tongues and magnifying God.”

De quo facto suo quod incircumcisos baptizauerat quia priusquam baptizarentur ut nodum quaestionis huius auferret in eos uenerat spiritus sanctus, cum Petrus postea redderet rationem fratribus qui erant Hierosolymis et hac re audita mouebantur ait post cetera: Cum coepissem autem loqui ad illos, cecidit spiritus sanctus in illos sicut et in nos in initio, memoratusque sum uerbi domini sicut dicebat: Quia Iohannes quidem baptizauit aqua, uos uero baptizabimini spiritu sancto. Si igitur aequale donum dedit illis sicut et nobis qui credidimus in dominum Iesum Christum, ego quis eram qui possem prohibere deum non dare illis spiritum sanctum? Et multa alia sunt testimonia scripturarum quae concorditer attestantur donum dei esse spiritum sanctum in quantum datur eis qui per eum diligunt deum.

Concerning this his deed, that he had baptized the uncircumcised—because, before they were baptized, so that he might remove the knot of this question, the Holy Spirit had come upon them—when Peter afterward was rendering an account to the brothers who were in Jerusalem and, this matter having been heard, were being stirred, he said after the rest: But when I had begun to speak to them, the Holy Spirit fell upon them just as also upon us in the beginning, and I was reminded of the word of the Lord, as he used to say: For John indeed baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit. If therefore he gave an equal gift to them just as also to us who have believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was I that I could hinder God from giving them the Holy Spirit? And there are many other testimonies of the Scriptures which concordantly attest that the gift of God is the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is given to those who through him love God.

Sed nimis longum est cuncta colligere. Et quid eis satis est quibus haec quae diximus satis non sunt?

But it is too long to gather all things. And what is sufficient for those for whom the things we have said are not sufficient?

[36] Sane admonendi sunt quandoquidem donum dei iam uident dictum spiritum sanctum ut cum audiunt donum spiritus sancti, illud genus locutionis agnoscant quod dictum est in exspoliatione corporis carnis. Sicut enim corpus carnis nihil aliud est quam caro, sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam spiritus sanctu. In tantum ergo donum dei est in quantum datur eis quibus datur.

[36] Truly they must be admonished, since they now see that the gift of God has been called the Holy Spirit, that when they hear “the gift of the Holy Spirit,” they may recognize that genus of locution which was spoken in “the despoiling of the body of flesh.” For just as “the body of flesh” is nothing other than flesh, so “the gift of the Holy Spirit” is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. To that extent, then, it is the gift of God inasmuch as it is given to those to whom it is given.

Apud se autem deus est etsi nemini detur quia deus erat patri et filio coaeternus antequam cuiquam daretur. Nec quia illi dant, ipse datur, ideo minor est illis. Ita enim datur sicut dei donum ut etiam se ipsum det sicut deus.

In himself, however, he is God, even if he be given to no one, because he was God, coeternal with the Father and the Son, before he was given to anyone. Nor, because they give and he is given, is he therefore lesser than they. For thus is he given as the gift of God, that he also gives his very self as God.

Non enim dici potest non esse suae potestatis de quo dictum est: Spiritus ubi uult spirat, et apud apostolum quod iam supra commemoraui: Omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus diuidens propria unicuique prout uult. Non est illic conditio dati et dominatio dantium sed concordia dati et dantium.

For it cannot be said that he is not of his own power, of whom it was said: The Spirit breathes where he wills; and in the Apostle, that which I have already commemorated above: But all these things the one and the same Spirit works, apportioning to each his own as he wills. There is not there a condition of the thing given and a domination of the givers, but a concord of the thing given and of the givers.

[37] Quapropter sicut sancta scriptura proclamat: Deus caritas est, illaque ex deo est et in nobis id agit ut in deo maneamus et ipse in nobis, et hoc inde cognoscimus quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis, ipse spiritus eius est deus caritas. Deinde si in donis dei nihil maius est caritate et nullum est maius donum dei quam spiritus sanctus, quid consequentius quam ut ipse sit caritas quae dicitur et deus et ex deo? Et si caritas qua pater diligit filium et patrem diligit filius ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum, quid conuenientius quam ut ille proprie dicatur caritas qui spiritus est communis ambobus?

[37] Wherefore, just as Holy Scripture proclaims: God is Charity, and that is from God and in us effects this, that we may abide in God and he in us; and this we know from this, that of his Spirit he has given to us—that very Spirit of his is God, Charity. Then, if among the gifts of God nothing is greater than Charity, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what is more consequent than that he himself be the Charity which is said to be both God and from God? And if the Charity by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father ineffably demonstrates the communion of both, what is more fitting than that he who is the Spirit common to both be properly called Charity?

Hoc enim sanius creditur uel intellegitur ut non solus spiritus sanctus caritas sit in illa trinitate, sed non frustra proprie caritas nuncupetur propter illa quae dicta sunt. Sicut non solus est in illa trinitate uel spiritus uel sanctus quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus, quod non ambigit pietas; et tamen ipse non frustra proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus. Quia enim est communis ambobus, id uocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter.

For this is more soundly believed or understood: that not the Holy Spirit alone is charity in that Trinity, but he is not called charity in a proper sense without cause on account of the things that have been said. Just as he is not the only one in that Trinity either spirit or holy, because both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father holy and the Son holy, which piety does not doubt; and yet he himself is not in vain properly called the Holy Spirit. For since he is common to both, he himself is properly called by that which both are called in common.

Alioquin si in illa trinitate solus spiritus sanctus est caritas, profecto et filius non solius patris uerum etiam spiritus sancti filius inuenitur. Ita enim locis innumerabilibus dicitur et legitur filius unigenitus dei patris ut tamen et illud uerum sit quod apostolus ait de deo patre: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae. Non dixit, 'filii sui,' quod si diceret, uerissime diceret quemadmodum quia saepe dixit uerissime dixit; sed ait, filii caritatis suae.

Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is charity, surely the Son is found to be the Son not of the Father alone but also of the Holy Spirit. For in innumerable places the Only-begotten Son of God the Father is so said and read, so that yet this too be true which the Apostle says about God the Father: 'Who delivered us from the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his charity.' He did not say, 'of his Son,' which, if he had said it, he would have said most truly, just as, because he often said it, he spoke most truly; but he says, 'of the Son of his charity.'

Filius ergo est etiam spiritus sancti si non est in illa trinitate caritas dei nisi spiritus sanctus. Quod si absurdissimum est, restat ut non solus ibi sit caritas spiritus sanctus, sed propter illa de quibus satis disserui proprie sic uocetur. Quod autem dictum est, filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intellegatur quam filii sui dilecti, quam filii postremo substantiae suae.

The Son, therefore, is also the Holy Spirit, if in that Trinity the charity of God is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. But if this is most absurd, it remains that charity there is not the Holy Spirit alone, but that he is properly so called on account of those things about which I have sufficiently discoursed. And as for what was said, “of the Son of his charity,” let it be understood as nothing else than “of his beloved Son,” or, finally, “of the Son of his substance.”

Caritas quippe patris quae in natura eius est ineffabiliter simplici nihil est aliud quam eius ipsa natura atque substantia ut saepe iam diximus et saepe iterare non piget. Ac per hoc filius caritatis eius nullus est alius quam qui de substantia eius est genitus.

Indeed, the father’s charity, which is in his ineffably simple nature, is nothing other than his very nature and substance, as we have already often said and it does not weary us to repeat it often. And therefore the son of his charity is none other than the one who is begotten from his substance.

[XX 38] Quocirca redenda est dialectica Eunomii a quo eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt. Qui cum non potuisset intellegere nec credere uoluisset unigenitum dei uerbum per quod facta sunt omnia filium dei esse natura, hoc est de substantia patris genitum, non naturae uel substantiae siue essentiae dixit esse filium sed filium uoluntatis dei, accidentem scilicet deo, uolens asserere uoluntatem qua gigneret filium; uidelicet ideo quia nos aliquid aliquando uolumus quod antea non uolebamus, quasi non propter ista mutabilis intellegatur nostra natura, quod absit ut in deo esse credamus. Neque enim ob aliud scriptum est: Multae cogitationes in corde uiri; consilium autem domini manet in aeternum, nisi ut intellegamus siue credamus sicut aeternum deum, ita aeternum eius esse consilium, ac per hoc immutabile sicut ipse est.

[20 38] Wherefore the dialectic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics took their rise, must be refuted. Since he was not able to understand nor willing to believe that the only-begotten Word of God, through whom all things were made, is Son of God by nature, that is, begotten of the substance of the Father, he said that he is Son not of nature or substance or essence, but Son of the will of God—an accident, forsooth, to God—wishing to assert a will by which he would beget a Son; namely, for this reason, because we at some time will something which previously we did not will, as though on account of these things our nature were not understood to be mutable—which far be it that we should believe to be in God. For neither for any other reason is it written: Many thoughts are in the heart of a man; but the counsel of the Lord remains forever, except that we might understand or believe that, just as God is eternal, so his counsel is eternal, and therefore immutable as he himself is.

Quod autem de cogitationibus, hoc etiam de uoluntatibus uerissime dici potest: 'Multae uoluntates in corde uiri; uoluntas autem domini manet in aeternum.' Quidam ne filium consilii uel uoluntatis dei dicerent unigenitum uerbum, ipsum consilium seu uoluntatem patris idem uerbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius quantum existimo dicitur consilium de consilio et uoluntas de uoluntate sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia, ne absurditate illa quam iam refellimus filius patrem dicatur facere sapientem uel uolentem si non habet pater in substantia sua consilium uel uoluntatem.

But what has been said about thoughts, this too can be said most truly about wills: 'Many wills in the heart of a man; but the will of the Lord remains forever.' Certain people, so as not to call the Only-begotten Word the son of God’s counsel or will, said that the Word itself is the very counsel or will of the Father. But better, as far as I think, it is said counsel from counsel and will from will, just as substance from substance, wisdom from wisdom, lest by that absurdity which we have already refuted the Son be said to make the Father wise or willing, if the Father does not have in his substance counsel or will.

Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico uersutissime interroganti utrum deus filium uolens an nolens genuerit, ut si diceretur, 'nolens,' absurdissima dei miseria sequeretur; si autem, 'uolens,' continuo quod intendebat uelut inuicta ratione concluderet non naturae esse filium sed uoluntatis. At ille uigilantissime uicissim quaesiuit ab eo utrum deus pater uolens an nolens sit deus, ut si responderet, 'nolens,' sequeretur illa miseria quam de deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret, 'uolens,' responderetur ei: 'Ergo et ipse uoluntate sua deus est non natura.' Quid ergo restabat nisi ut obmutesceret et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili uinculo se uideret? Sed uoluntas dei si et proprie dicenda est aliqua in trinitate persona, magis hoc nomen spiritui sancto competit sicut caritas.

A certain man indeed answered acutely to a heretic most cunningly asking whether God begot the Son willing or unwilling, so that, if ‘unwilling’ were said, the most absurd misery of God would follow; but if ‘willing,’ he would immediately conclude, as though by invincible reason, what he intended: that the Son is not of nature but of will. But he, most watchfully, in turn asked him whether God the Father is God willing or unwilling, so that if he answered ‘unwilling,’ that misery would follow which it is great madness to believe of God; but if he said ‘willing,’ it would be answered to him: ‘Therefore he too is God by his own will, not by nature.’ What then remained, except that he be struck dumb and see himself, by his own question, bound with an insoluble bond? But the will of God, if even any person in the trinity is to be properly so called, this name more befits the Holy Spirit, just as ‘charity.’

Nam quid est aliud caritas quam uoluntas?

For what else is charity than will?

[39] Video me de spiritu sancto in isto libro secundum scripturas sanctas hoc disputasse quod fidelibus sufficit iam scientibus deum esse spiritum sanctum nec alterius substantiae nec minorem quam est pater et filius, quod in superioribus libris secundum easdem scripturas uerum esse docuimus. De creatura etiam quam fecit deus quantum ualuimus admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt ut inuisibilia eius per ea quae facta sunt sicut possent intellecta conspicerent, et maxime per rationalem uel intellectualem creaturam quae facta est ad imaginem dei, per quod uelut speculum quantum possent, si possent, cernerent trinitatem deum in nostra memoria, intellegentia, uoluntate. Quae tria in sua mente naturaliter diuinitus instituta quisquis uiuaciter perspicit et quam magnum sit in ea unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intellegentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem, profecto reperit illius summae trinitatis imaginem.

[39] I see that in this book about the Holy Spirit I have disputed, according to the holy scriptures, that which suffices for the faithful who already know that the Holy Spirit is God, neither of another substance nor lesser than are the Father and the Son, which in the preceding books we have taught to be true according to the same scriptures. Concerning the creature also which God made, so far as we were able, we admonished those who demand a reason about such matters, that through the things that have been made they might, as they were able, behold his invisible things as understood, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature which has been made to the image of God, through which, as through a mirror, as far as they could, if they could, they might discern the Trinity, God, in our memory, intelligence, will. Whoever vividly discerns these three, divinely instituted by nature in his own mind, and how great is that in it whereby even the eternal and immutable nature can be recalled, beheld, and desired (he recollects by memory, intuits by intelligence, embraces by dilection, assuredly finds the image of that supreme Trinity.

Ad quam summam trinitatem reminiscendam, uidendam, diligendam ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur totum debet referre quod uiuit. Verum ne hanc imaginem ab eadem trinitate factam, et suo uitio in deterius commutatam ita eidem comparet trinitati ut omni modo existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat quantum satis esse uidebatur admonui.

To that supreme Trinity, to be remembered, to be seen, to be loved—so that he may recall it, contemplate it, and take delight in it—he ought to refer his whole life. But, lest he so compare this image—made by the same Trinity and by its own fault changed for the worse—to that same Trinity as to think it similar in every way, I have rather admonished that, in whatever likeness this bears, he should also discern a great unlikeness, as much as seemed sufficient.

[XXI 40] Sane deum patrem et deum filium, id est deum genitorem qui omnia quae substantialiter habet in coaeterno sibi uerbo suo dixit quodam modo, et ipsum uerbum eius deum qui nec plus nec minus aliquid habet etiam ipse substantialiter quam quod est in illo qui uerbum non mendaciter sed ueraciter genuit, quemadmodum potui, non ut illud iam facie ad faciem, sed per hanc similitudinem in aenigmate quantulumcumque coniciendo uideretur in memoria et intellegentia mentis nostrae significare curaui, memoriae tribuens omne quod scimus etiamsi non inde cogitemus, intellegentiae uero proprio modo quandam cogitationis informationem. Cogitando enim quod uerum inuenerimus, hoc maxime intellegere dicimur et hoc quidem in memoria rursus relinquimus. Sed illa est abstrusior profunditas nostrae memoriae ubi hoc etiam primum cum cogitaremus inuenimus et gignitur intimum uerbum quod nullius linguae sit tamquam scientia de scientia et uisio de uisione et intellegentia quae apparet in cogitatione de intellegentia quae in memoria iam fuerat sed latebat, quamquam et ipsa cogitatio quandam suam memoriam nisi haberet, non reuerteretur ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat cum alia cogitaret.

[21 40] Certainly God the Father and God the Son, that is, God the Begetter who, in a certain way, has said in his coeternal Word with himself all the things that he has substantially, and that very Word of his, God, who also himself has substantially neither more nor less than what there is in him who begot the Word not mendaciously but truthfully, as I was able—not as that now face to face, but through this likeness in an enigma, by conjecturing ever so little—I have taken care should seem to signify in the memory and intelligence of our mind, assigning to memory everything that we know, even if we are not thinking from it, but to intelligence, in its proper mode, a certain information of thought. For by thinking what we have found to be true, this most of all we are said to understand, and this indeed we leave again in memory. But that is the more abstruse depth of our memory, where we also first found this when we were thinking, and an inmost word is begotten, which belongs to no tongue, as it were knowledge from knowledge and a vision from a vision, and an intelligence which appears in thought from an intelligence which had already been in memory but lay hidden, although unless thought itself had a certain memory of its own, it would not return to the things which it had left in memory when it was thinking other things.

[41] De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmate quod ei simile uideretur ostendi nisi uoluntatem nostram, uel amorem seu dilectionem quae ualentior est uoluntas, quoniam uoluntas nostra quae nobis naturaliter inest sicut ei res adiacuerint uel occurrerint quibus allicimur aut offendimur ita uarias affectiones habet. Quid ergo est? Numquid dicturi sumus uoluntatem nostram quando recta est nescire quid appetat, quid deuitet?

[41] But concerning the Holy Spirit, I showed in this enigma nothing that would seem similar to him except our will, or love, or dilection, which is will in a stronger sense; since our will, which is naturally in us, according as things are adjacent to it or occur to it by which we are allured or offended, thus has various affections. What then? Are we to say that our will, when it is right, does not know what it ought to desire, what to avoid?

Porro si scit profecto inest ei sua quaedam scientia, quae sine memoria et intellegentia esse non possit. An uero audiendus est quispiam dicens caritatem nescire quid agat quae non agit perperam? Sicut ergo inest intellegentia, inest dilectio illi memoriae principali in qua inuenimus paratum et reconditum ad quod cogitando possumus peruenire quia et duo ista inuenimus ibi quando nos cogitando inuenimus et intellegere aliquid et amare quae ibi erant et quando inde non cogitabamus.

Moreover, if it knows, assuredly there is in it a certain science of its own, which cannot exist without memory and intelligence. Or indeed is anyone to be listened to who says that charity does not know what it does—charity which does not act amiss? Thus, therefore, as intelligence is in it, so dilection is in that principal memory in which we find prepared and laid up that which by thinking we can arrive at; for we also find those two there when, by thinking, we find both to understand something and to love—things which were there even when we were not thinking from it.

Et sicut inest memoria, inest dilectio huic intellegentiae quae cogitatione formatur, quod uerbum uerum sine ullius gentis lingua intus dicimus quando quod nouimus dicimus. Nam nisi reminiscendo non redit ad aliquid, et nisi amando redire non curat nostrae cogitationis intuitus. Ita dilectio quae uisionem in memoria constitutam et uisionem cogitationis inde formatam quasi parentem prolemque coniungit, nisi haberet appetendi scientiam quae sine memoria et intellegentia non potest esse, quid recte diligeret ignoraret.

And just as memory is present, so dilection is present to this intelligence which is formed by cogitation—the true word which we inwardly speak without the tongue of any nation when we say what we know. For unless by recollecting it returns to something, and unless by loving it cares to return, the gaze of our cogitation does not. Thus dilection, which as it were conjoins the vision constituted in memory and the vision of cogitation formed from it as parent and offspring, unless it had a knowledge of appetition, which cannot be without memory and intelligence, would not know what it ought rightly to love.

[XXII 42] Verum haec quando in una sunt persona sicut est homo potest nobis quispiam dicere: 'Tria ista, memoria, intellectus et amor mea sunt, non sua; nec sibi sed mihi agunt quod agunt, immo ego per illa. Ego enim memini per memoriam, intellego per intellegentiam, amo per amorem. Et quando ad memoriam meam aciem cogitationis aduerto ac sic in corde meo dico quod scio uerbumque uerum de scientia mea gignitur, utrumque meum est et scientia utique et uerbum.

[22 42] But when these are in one person, as man is, someone can say to us: 'These three, memory, intellect, and love, are mine, not theirs; nor do they do what they do for themselves but for me; indeed I act through them. For I remember through memory, I understand through intelligence, I love through love. And when I turn the edge of thought to my memory and thus in my heart I say what I know, and a true word is begotten from my knowledge, both are mine, both the knowledge, to be sure, and the word.'

Ego enim scio, ego dico in emo corde quod scio. Et quando in memoria mea cogitando inuenio iam me intellegere, iam me amare aliquid, qui intellectus et amor ibi erant et antequam inde cogitarem, intellectum meum et amorem meum inuenio in memoria mea quo ego intellego, ego amo, non ipsa. Item quando cogitatio mea memor est et uult redire ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat eaque intellecta conspicere atque intus dicere, mea memoria memor est et mea uult uoluntate, non sua.

I, for my part, know; I say in my heart what I know. And when, by cogitating in my memory, I find that I already understand, that I already love something—intellect and love which were there even before I should think from thence—I find my intellect and my love in my memory, by which I understand, I love, not it itself. Likewise, when my cogitation is mindful and wills to return to the things which it had left in memory, and to behold them as understood and to speak within, my memory is mindful and wills by my will, not its own.

Ipse quoque amor meus cum meminit atque intellegit quid appetere debeat, quid uitare, per meam, non per suam memoriam meminit. Et per intellegentiam meam, non suam, quidquid intellegenter amat intellegit.'

My love itself also, when it remembers and understands what it ought to appetite, what to avoid, remembers through my memory, not its own. And through my intelligence, not its own, it understands whatever it loves intelligently.'

Quod breuiter dici potest: 'Ego per omnia illa tria memini, ego intellego, ego diligo, qui nec memoria sum nec intellegentia nec dilectio, sed haec habeo.' Ista ergo dici possunt ab una persona quae habet haec tria, non ipsa est haec tria. In illius uero summae simplicitate naturae quae deus est, quamuis unus sit deus, tres tamen personae sunt, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus.

What can be said briefly: 'I, by means of all those three, remember, I understand, I love—I who am neither memory nor intelligence nor love, but have these.' Accordingly, these things can be said by one person who has these three; not that she herself is these three. But in the supreme simplicity of that nature which is God, although God is one, nevertheless there are three persons, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[43] Aliud est itaque trinitas res ipsa, aliud imago trinitatis in re alia. Propter quam imaginem simul et illud in quo sunt haec tria imago dicitur, sicut imago dicitur simul et tabula et quod in ea pictum est, sed propter picturam quae in ea est simul et tabula nomine imaginis appellatur.

[43] Therefore the Trinity is one thing, the thing itself; the image of the Trinity in another thing is another. On account of which image, both that in which these three are is likewise called an image, just as an image is said of both the panel and what is painted on it; but on account of the painting which is on it, the panel also is called by the name of image.

[XXIII] Verum in illa summa trinitate quae incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit tanta est inseparabilitas ut cum trinitas hominum non possit dici unus homo, illa unus deus et dicatur et sit, nec in uno deo sit illa trinitas, sed unus deus. Nec rursus quemadmodum ista imago quod est homo habens illa tria una persona est ita est illa trinitas, sed tres personae sunt, pater filii et filius patris et spiritus patris et filii. Quamuis enim memoria hominis et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est qua res intellegibiles ita continentur ut non in eam per sensus corporis uenerint, habeat pro modulo suo in hac imagine trinitatis incomparabiliter quidem imparem sed tamen qualemcumque similitudinem patris, itemque intellegentia hominis quae per intentionem cogitationis inde formatur quando quod scitur dicitur et nullius linguae cordis uerbum est habeat in sua magna disparilitate nonnullam similitudinem filii, et amor hominis de scientia procedens et memoriam intellegentiamque coniungens tamquam parenti prolique communis, unde nec parens intellegitur esse nec proles, habeat in hac imagine aliquam licet ualde imparem similitudinem spiritus sancti; non tamen sicut in ista imagine trinitatis non haec tria unus homo sed unius hominis sunt, ita in ipsa summa trinitate cuius haec imago est unius dei sunt illa tria, sed unus deus est et tres sunt illae, non una persona.

[23] But in that supreme trinity which incomparably excels all things, so great is the inseparability that, whereas a trinity of men cannot be called one man, that one both is and is called one god; nor is that trinity in one god, but rather is one god. Nor again, just as this image—that is, the human being having those three—is one person, is that trinity so; but there are three persons: the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. For although the memory of a human being—and especially that kind which beasts do not have, that is, by which intelligible things are contained in such a way that they have not come into it through the senses of the body—has, according to its own measure in this image of the trinity, an incomparably unequal yet nonetheless some likeness of the Father; likewise the intelligence of a human being, which is formed by the intent of thought from thence when what is known is spoken and is a word of the heart of no tongue, has in its great disparity some likeness of the Son; and the love of a human being proceeding from knowledge and conjoining memory and intelligence as something common to parent and offspring—whence it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring—has in this image some, albeit very unequal, likeness of the Holy Spirit; nevertheless, not as in this image of the trinity these three are not one man but are of one man, so in the very supreme trinity, of which this is the image, those three are not of one god, but one god is, and they are three, not one person.

Quod sane mirabiliter ineffabile est uel ineffabiliter mirabile, cum sit una persona haec imago trinitatis, ipsa uero summa trinitas tres personae sint, inseparabilior est illa trinitas personarum trium quam haec unius. Illa quippe in natura diuinitatis, siue id melius dicitur deitatis, quod est hoc est, atque incommutabiliter inter se ac semper aequalis est, nec aliquando non fuit aut aliter fuit, nec aliquando non erit aut aliter erit.

It is indeed wonderfully ineffable, or ineffably wonderful, that although this image of the Trinity is one person, yet the very supreme Trinity is three persons, and that Trinity of three persons is more inseparable than this of one. For that, in the nature of divinity—or, if it is better said, of deity—what it is, this it is, and it is unchangeably and always equal with itself; nor was it ever not, or otherwise; nor will it ever not be, or be otherwise.

Ista uero tria quae sunt in impari imagine, etsi non locis quoniam non sunt corpora, tamen inter se nunc in ista uita magnitudinibus separantur. Neque enim quia moles nullae ibi sunt ideo non uidemus in alio maiorem esse memoriam quam intellegentiam, in alio contra; in alio duo haec amoris magnitudine superari siue sint ipsa duo inter se aequalia siue non sint. Atque ita a singulis bina et a binis singula et a singulis singula maioribus minora uincuntur.

I ndeed these three which are in the unequal image, although not by places since they are not bodies, yet among themselves now in this life are separated by magnitudes. For not because there are no masses there do we therefore fail to see that in one person memory is greater than intelligence, in another the contrary; in another these two are surpassed by the magnitude of love, whether the two themselves are equal between themselves or are not. And thus, by singles the pairs, and by pairs the single, and by singles the singles, the lesser are conquered by the greater.

Et quando inter se aequalia fuerint ab omni languore sanata, nec tunc aequabitur rei natura immutabili ea res quae per gratiam non mutatur quia non aequatur creatura creatori, et quando ab omni languore sanabitur mutabitur.

And when, healed from every languor, they shall be equal among themselves, not even then will it be equated to the immutable nature of the reality which is not changed by grace—for the creature is not equated to the Creator—and when it shall be healed from every languor, it will be changed.

[44] Sed hanc non solum incorporalem uerum etiam summe inseparabilem uereque immutabilem trinitatem cum uenerit uisio quae facie ad faciem nobis promittitur, multo clarius certiusque uidebimus quam nunc eius imaginem quod nos sumus. Per quod tamen speculum et in quo aenigmate qui uident sicut in hac uita uidere concessum est non illi sunt qui ea quae digessimus et commendauimus in sua mente conspiciunt, sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem uident ut possint ad eum cuius imago est quomodocumque referre quod uident et per imaginem quam conspiciendo uident etiam illud uidere coniciendo quoniam nondum possunt facie ad faciem. Non enim ait apostolus: 'Videmus nunc speculum,' sed: 'Videmus per speculum.'

[44] But this Trinity, not only incorporeal but also supremely inseparable and truly immutable, when the vision shall have come which is promised to us face to face, we shall see much more clearly and more certainly than now its image—which we are. Yet through that mirror and in that enigma those who see, as it has been granted to see in this life, are not they who in their own mind behold the things which we have digested and commended, but they who see it as an image, so that they can in some manner refer what they see to him of whom it is an image, and through the image which by beholding they see, to see that also by conjecturing, since they are not yet able face to face. For the Apostle does not say: "We see now a mirror," but: "We see through a mirror."

[XXIV] Qui ergo uident suam mentem quomodo uideri potest et in ea trinitatem istam de qua multis modis ut potui disputaui, nec tamen eam credunt uel intellegunt esse imaginem dei. Speculum quidem uident, sed usque adeo non uident per speculum qui est per speculum nunc uidendus ut nec ipsum speculum quod uident sciant esse speculum, id est imaginem. Quod si scirent, fortassis et eum cuius est hoc speculum per hoc quaerendum et per hoc utcumque interim uidendum esse sentirent fide non ficta corda mundante ut facie ad faciem possit uideri qui per speculum nunc uidetur.

[24] Those, therefore, who see their own mind as it can be seen, and in it this Trinity about which I have disputed in many ways as I was able, yet do not believe or understand it to be the image of God. They do indeed see the mirror; but they to such a degree do not see, through the mirror, him who is now to be seen through a mirror, that they do not even know the mirror itself which they see to be a mirror, that is, an image. But if they knew this, perhaps they would also sense that he of whom this mirror is must be sought through this, and through this somehow meanwhile be seen, with unfeigned faith cleansing hearts, so that he who is now seen through a mirror may be able to be seen face to face.

Qua fide cordium mundatrice contempta quid agunt intellegendo quae de natura mentis humanae subtilissime disputantur nisi ut ipsa quoque intellegentia sua teste damnentur? In qua utique non laborarent et uix ad certum aliquid peruenirent nisi poenalibus tenebris inuoluti et onerati corpore corruptibili quod aggrauat animam. Quo tandem merito inflicto malo isto nisi peccati?

By despising that faith, the purifier of hearts, what do they accomplish by understanding the things that are most subtly disputed about the nature of the human mind, except that by their very intelligence, with their own self as witness, they are condemned? In which, to be sure, they would not toil and would hardly arrive at anything certain, unless they were wrapped in penal darkness and burdened with a corruptible body which aggravates the soul. By what desert, then, was this evil inflicted, if not by that of sin?

Vnde tanti mali magnitudine admoniti sequi deberent agnum qui tollit peccatum mundi.

Whence, admonished by the magnitude of so great an evil, they ought to follow the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world.

[XXV] Ad eum namque pertinentes etiam longe istis ingenio tardiores quando fine uitae huius resoluuntur a corpore ius in eis retinendis non habent inuidae potestates. Quas ille agnus sine ullo ab eis peccati debito occisus non potentia potestatis priusquam iustitia sanguinis uicit. Proinde liberi a diaboli potestate suscipiuntur ab angelis sanctis a malis omnibus liberati per mediatorem dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum, quoniam consonantibus diuinis scripturis et ueteribus et nouis et per quas praenuntiatus et per quas annuntiatus est Christus, non est aliud nomen sub caelo in quo oportet homines saluos fieri.

[25] For those who pertain to him, even far slower than these in natural capacity, when at the end of this life they are released from the body, the envious powers have no right to hold. Which powers that Lamb, slain with no debt of sin owed to them, conquered not by the potency of power, but rather by the justice of the blood. Accordingly, free from the power of the devil, they are received by the holy angels, liberated from all evils through the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, since, with the divine Scriptures consonant, both the old and the new—by which Christ was pre-announced and by which he was announced—there is no other name under heaven by which it is necessary for human beings to be saved.

Constituuntur autem purgati ab omni contagione corruptionis in placidis sedibus donec recipiant corpora sua, sed iam incorruptibilia quae ornent non onerent. Hoc enim placuit optimo et sapientissimo creatori ut spiritus hominis deo pie subditus habeat feliciter subditum corpus et sine fine permaneat ipsa felicitas.

Moreover, those purged from every contagion of corruption are established in peaceful seats until they receive their bodies, but now incorruptible—bodies that adorn, not burden. For this pleased the best and most wise Creator: that the spirit of man, piously subject to God, should have a body happily subject, and that this very felicity should remain without end.

[45] Ibi ueritatem sine ulla difficultate uidebimus eaque clarissima et certissima perfruemur. Nec aliquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cernemus quare non sit filius spiritus sanctus, cum de patre procedat. In illa luce nulla erit quaestio.

[45] There we shall see the truth without any difficulty, and we shall enjoy it most clear and most certain. Nor shall we seek anything with a mind ratiocinating, but, contemplating, we shall discern why the Holy Spirit is not a Son, since he proceeds from the Father. In that light there will be no question.

Hic uero ipsa experientia tam mihi apparuit esse difficilis, quod et illis qui haec diligenter atque intellegenter legent procul dubio similiter apparebit, ut cum me in secundo huius operis libro alio loco inde dicturum esse promiserim, quotienscumque in ea creatura quae nos sumus aliquid illi rei simile ostendere uolui, qualemcumque intellectum meum sufficiens elocutio mea secuta non fuerit, quamuis et in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum, et in una quidem persona quod est homo inuenisse imaginem summae illius trinitatis, et in re mutabili tria illa ut facilius intellegi possint etiam per temporalia interualla maxime in libro nono monstrare uoluisse. Sed tria unius personae non sicut humana poscit intentio tribus illis personis conuenire potuerunt sicut in hoc libro quinto decimo demonstrauimus.

Here, however, the experience itself appeared to me to be so difficult—as without doubt it will similarly appear to those who read these things diligently and intelligently—that although in the 2nd book of this work I promised to speak elsewhere about it, whenever I wished to show in that creature which we are something similar to that reality, my sufficient elocution did not follow whatever understanding I had, although even in the understanding itself I felt that I had more of an attempt than an effect; and indeed in one person, that is, the human being, I found an image of that highest Trinity, and in a mutable reality I wished especially in Book 9 to demonstrate those three, so that they might be able to be understood more easily even through temporal intervals. But the three of one person could not, as human intention demands, be able to agree with those three persons, as we have shown in this Book 15.

[XXVI] Deinde in illa summa trinitate quae deus est interualla temporum nulla sunt per quae possit ostendi aut saltem requiri utrum prius de patre natus sit filius et postea de ambobus processerit spiritus sanctus quoniam scriptura sancta spiritum eum dicit amborum. Ipse est enim de quo dicit apostolus: Quoniam autem estis filii, misit deus spiritum filii sui in corda nostra, et ipse est de quo dicit idem filius: Non enim uos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris uestri qui loquitur in uobis. Et multis aliis diuinorum eloquiorum testimoniis comprobatur patris et filii esse spiritum qui proprie dicitur in trinitate spiritus sanctus, de quo item dicit ipse filius: Quem ego mitto uobis a patre, et alio loco: Quem mittet pater in nomine meo.

[26] Then in that highest Trinity which is God there are no intervals of times through which it could be shown, or at least inquired, whether the Son was earlier born of the Father and afterward the Holy Spirit has proceeded from both, since Holy Scripture calls him the Spirit of both. For he is the one of whom the apostle says: “But since you are sons, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts,” and he is the one of whom the same Son says: “For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you.” And by many other testimonies of the divine oracles it is proved that he is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, who in the Trinity is properly called the Holy Spirit, of whom the Son likewise says: “Whom I myself send to you from the Father,” and in another place: “Whom the Father will send in my name.”

De utroque autem procedere sic docetur quia ipse filius ait: De patre procedit, et cum resurrexisset a mortuis et apparuisset discipulis suis, insufflauit et ait: Accipite spiritum sanctum, ut eum etiam de se procedere ostenderet, et ipsa est uirtus quae de illo exibat sicut legitur in euangelio, et sanabat omnes.

But that he proceeds from both is thus taught, because the Son himself says: “He proceeds from the Father,” and when he had risen from the dead and had appeared to his disciples, he breathed upon them and said: “Receive the Holy Spirit,” so that he might show that he also proceeds from himself; and it is the very power that was going out from him, as is read in the Gospel, and it was healing all.

[46] Quid uero fuerit causae ut post resurrectionem suam et in terra prius daret et de caelo postea mitteret spiritum sanctum, hoc ego existimo quia per ipsum donum diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris qua diligamus deum et proximum secundum duo illa praecepta in quibus tota lex pendet et prophetae. Hoc significans dominus Iesus bis dedit spiritum sanctum, semel in terra propter dilectionem proximi et iterum de caelo propter dilectionem dei. Et si forte alia ratio reddatur de bis dato spiritu sancto, eundem tamen spiritum datum cum insufflasset Iesus de quo mox ait: Ite, baptizate gentes in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, ubi maxime commendatur haec trinitas, ambigere non debemus.

[46] But what indeed was the cause that, after his resurrection, he should first give on earth and afterwards send from heaven the Holy Spirit, this I reckon to be because by that very gift charity is poured forth in our hearts whereby we may love God and neighbor according to those two precepts on which the whole law and the prophets hang. Signifying this, the Lord Jesus gave the Holy Spirit twice: once on earth on account of the love of neighbor, and again from heaven on account of the love of God. And if perchance another reason be rendered for the Holy Spirit having been given twice, yet we ought not to doubt that it was the same Spirit that was given when Jesus had breathed, of whom he soon says: Go, baptize the nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, where this Trinity is most of all commended.

Ipse est igitur qui etiam de caelo datus est die pentecostes, id est post dies decem quam dominus ascendit in caelum.

He himself, therefore, is the one who also was given from heaven on the day of Pentecost, that is, ten days after the Lord ascended into heaven.

Quomodo ergo deus non est qui dat spiritum sanctum? Immo quantus deus est qui dat deum? Neque enim aliquis discipulorum eius dedit spiritum sanctum.

How then is he not God who gives the Holy Spirit? Rather, how great a God is he who gives God? For none of his disciples gave the Holy Spirit.

Orabant quippe ut ueniret in eos quibus manum imponebant, non ipsi eum dabant. Quem morem in suis praepositis etiam nunc seruat ecclesia. Denique et Simon magus offerens apostolis pecuniam, non ait: Date et mihi hanc potestatem ut 'dem spiritum sanctum,' sed: cuicumque, inquit, imposuero manus accipiat spiritum sanctum, quia neque scriptura superius dixerat: 'Videns autem Simon quod apostoli darent spiritum sanctum,' sed dixerat: Videns autem Simon quod per impositionem manuum apostolorum datur spiritus sanctus.

For indeed they were praying that he would come upon those upon whom they were laying a hand, they themselves were not giving him. Which custom the church even now observes in its own provosts. Finally, even Simon the Magus, offering money to the apostles, did not say: Give to me also this power that 'I may give the Holy Spirit,' but: to whomever, he says, I shall have laid hands, let him receive the Holy Spirit, because neither had Scripture above said: 'But Simon, seeing that the apostles were giving the Holy Spirit,' but had said: But Simon, seeing that through the imposition of the hands of the apostles the Holy Spirit is given.

Propter hoc et dominus ipse Iesus spiritum sanctum non solum dedit ut deus sed etiam accepit ut homo, propterea dictus est plenus gratia. Et manifestius de illo scriptum est in actibus apostolorum: Quoniam unxit eum deus spiritu sancto, non utique oleo uisibili sed dono gratiae quod uisibili significatur unguento quo baptizatos ungit ecclesia. Nec sane tunc unctus est Christus spiritu sancto quando super eum baptizatum uelut columba descendit; tunc enim corpus suum, id est ecclesiam suam, praefigurare dignatus est in qua praecipue baptizati accipiunt spiritum sanctum.

Because of this, the Lord Jesus himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God but also received it as man, for which reason he was said to be full of grace. And more manifestly it is written of him in the Acts of the Apostles: “Because God anointed him with the Holy Spirit,” surely not with visible oil but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible unguent with which the Church anoints the baptized. Nor, to be sure, was Christ then anointed with the Holy Spirit when, after he had been baptized, it descended upon him like a dove; for then he deigned to prefigure his body, that is, his Church, in which especially the baptized receive the Holy Spirit.

Sed ista mystica et inuisibili unctione tunc intellegendus est unctus quando uerbum dei caro factum est, id est quando humana natura sine ullis praecedentibus bonorum operum meritis deo uerbo est ut utero uirginis copulata ita ut cum illo fieret una persona. Ob hoc eum confitemur natum de spiritu sancto et uirgine Maria. Absurdissimum est enim ut credamus eum cum iam triginta esset annorum (eius enim aetatis a Iohanne baptizatus est) accepisse spiritum sanctum, sed uenisse ad illud baptisma sicut sine ullo omnino peccato ita non sine spiritu sancto.

But by that mystical and invisible unction he must be understood to have been anointed when the Word of God was made flesh, that is, when human nature, without any preceding merits of good works, was so coupled to the Word of God in the womb of the Virgin that with him there came to be one person. On this account we confess him born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. For it is most absurd that we should believe that he, when he was already thirty years of age (for at that age he was baptized by John), received the Holy Spirit; rather, he came to that baptism, just as he was without any sin whatsoever, so also not without the Holy Spirit.

Si enim de famulo eius et praecursore ipso Iohanne scriptum est: Spiritu sancto replebitur iam inde ab utero matris suae, quoniam quamuis seminatus a patre, tamen spiritum sanctum in utero formatus accepit, quid de homine Christo intellegendum est uel credendum cuius carnis ipsa conceptio non carnalis sed spiritalis fuit? In eo etiam quod de illo scriptum est, quod acceperit a patre promissionem spiritus sancti et effunderit utraque natura monstrata est, et humana scilicet et diuina. Accepit quippe ut homo, effudit ut deus.

For if of his servant and precursor himself, John, it is written: “He will be filled with the Holy Spirit already from his mother’s womb,” since, although sown by his father, nevertheless, formed in the womb, he received the Holy Spirit, what is to be understood or believed concerning the man Christ, whose flesh’s very conception was not carnal but spiritual? Also in that which is written of him, that he received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit and poured it out, both natures are shown, namely the human and the divine. For he received as man, he poured forth as God.

Nos autem accipere quidem hoc donum possumus pro modulo nostro; effundere autem super alios non utique possumus, sed ut hoc fiat deum super eos a quo id efficitur inuocamus.

But we, for our part, indeed can receive this gift according to our measure; to pour it forth upon others, however, we certainly cannot; rather, that this may be done, we invoke upon them God, by whom it is effected.

[47] Numquid ergo possumus quaerere utrum iam processerat de patre spiritus sanctus quando natus est filius, an nondum processerat et illo nato de utroque processit ubi nulla sunt tempora sicut potuimus quaerere ubi inuenimus tempora uoluntatem prius de humana mente procedere ut quaeratur quod inuentum proles uocetur, quia iam parta seu genita uoluntas illa perficitur eo fine requiescens ut qui fuerat appetitus quaerentis sit amor fruentis qui iam de utroque, id est de gignente mente et de genita notione, tamquam de parente ac prole procedat? Non possunt prorsus ista ibi quaeri ubi nihil ex tempore inchoatur ut consequenti perficiatur in tempore. Quapropter qui potest intellegere sine tempore generationem filii de patre intellegat sine tempore processionem spiritus sancti de utroque.

[47] Can we then ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or had not yet proceeded, and, when that One was born, from both He proceeded, where there are no times—as we were able to ask, where we find times, that the will proceeds first from the human mind in order that what is sought may be found, which, when found, is called offspring—because that will, now brought forth or begotten, is perfected, resting in that end, so that what had been the appetite of the seeker is the love of the one enjoying, which now proceeds from both, that is, from the begetting mind and the begotten notion, as from parent and progeny? By no means can such things be asked there, where nothing is begun from time so that by what follows it may be perfected in time. Wherefore, whoever can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, let him understand the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time.

Et qui potest intellegere in eo quod ait filius: Sicut habet pater uitam in semetipso sic dedit filio uitam patrem dedisse sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse ut uita quam pater filio gignendo dedit coaeterna sit uitae patris qui dedit, intellegat sicut habet pater in semetipso ut et de illo procedat spiritus sanctus sic dedisse filio ut de illo procedat idem spiritus sanctus et utrumque sine tempore, atque ita dictum spiritum sanctum de patre procedere ut intellegatur quod etiam procedit de filio, de patre esse filio. Si enim quidquid habet de patre habet filius, de patre habet utique ut et de illo procedat spiritus sanctus. Sed nulla ibi tempora cogitentur quae habent prius et posterius quia ibi omnino nulla sunt.

And whoever can understand, in that which the Son says: “Just as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life [in himself],” that the Father gave, but that he begot him without time, so that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave it, let him understand that, just as the Father has in himself that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him, so he gave to the Son that from him the same Holy Spirit proceeds—and both without time—and thus the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, so that it may be understood that he also proceeds from the Son, being from the Father to the Son. For if whatever the Son has he has from the Father, he assuredly has from the Father that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him. But let no times be thought there which have a before and an after, because there absolutely are none there.

Quomodo ergo non absurdissime filius diceretur amborum cum sicut filio praestat essentiam sine initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de patre generatio, ita spiritui sancto praestet essentiam sine ullo initio temporis, sine ulla mutabilitate naturae de utroque processio? Ideo enim cum spiritum sanctum genitum non dicamus, dicere tamen non audemus ingenitum ne in hoc uocabulo uel duos patres in illa trinitate uel duos qui non sunt de alio quispiam suspicetur. Pater enim solus non est de alio, ideo solus appellatur ingenitus, non quidem in scripturis sed in consuetudine disputantium et de re tanta sermonem qualem ualuerint proferentium.

How then would it not be most absurd for the Son to be called “of both,” when just as to the Son essence is afforded without any beginning of time, without any mutability of nature, by generation from the Father, so to the Holy Spirit essence is afforded without any beginning of time, without any mutability of nature, by procession from both? For this reason, although we do not call the Holy Spirit “begotten” (genitus), yet we do not dare to say “unbegotten” (ingenitus), lest in this word someone suspect either two Fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not “of another.” For the Father alone is not “of another”; therefore He alone is called “unbegotten”—not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the custom of disputants and of those who, speaking about so great a matter, have brought forth such discourse as they were able.

Filius autem de patre natus est, et spiritus sanctus de patre principaliter, et ipso sine ullo interuallo temporis dante, communiter de utroque procedit. Diceretur autem filius patris et filii si, quod abhorret ab omnium sanorum sensibus, eum ambo genuissent. Non igitur ab utroque est genitus sed procedit ab utroque amborum spiritus.

The Son, however, is born from the Father, and the Holy Spirit, principally from the Father, and—with Him granting it without any interval of time—proceeds in common from both. He would, moreover, be called the son of the Father and of the Son if, which is abhorrent to the sense of all the sane, both had begotten him. Therefore he is not begotten of both, but the Spirit of both proceeds from both.

[XXVII 48] Verum quia in illa coaeterna et aequali et incorporali et ineffabiliter immutabili atque inseparabili trinitate difficillimum est generationem a processione distinguere, sufficiat interim eis qui extendi non ualent amplius id quod de hac re in sermone quodam proferendo ad aures populi christiani diximus dictumque conscripsimus. Inter cetera enim cum per scripturarum sanctarum testimonia docuissem de utroque procedere spiritum sanctum: Si ergo, inquam, et de patre et de filio procedit spiritus sanctus, cur filius dixit: De patre procedit? Cur, putas, nisi quemadmodum solet ad eum referre et quod ipsius est de quo et ipse est?

[27 48] But because in that coeternal, equal, incorporeal, ineffably immutable, and inseparable Trinity it is most difficult to distinguish generation from procession, let it suffice for the time being, for those who are not able to be extended further, what we have said on this matter in a certain discourse brought forth to the ears of the Christian people, and what was said we have conscribed in writing. For among other things, when by testimonies of the holy Scriptures I had taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both: Therefore, say I, if the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, why did the Son say: “He proceeds from the Father”? Why, do you think, except in the manner he is wont to refer also to him even that which is his, of the one from whom he himself is?

Vnde illud est quod ait: Mea doctrina non est mea sed eius qui me misit. Si igitur hic intellegitur eius doctrina quam tamen dixit non suam sed patris, quanto magis illic intellegendus est et de ipso procedere spiritus sanctus ubi sic ait: De patre procedit, ut non diceret: 'De me non procedit'? A quo autem habet filius ut sit deus (est enim de deo deus), ab illo habet utique ut etiam de illo procedat spiritus sanctus, ac per hoc spiritus sanctus ut etiam de filio procedat sicut procedit de patre ab ipso habet patre. Hic utcumque etiam illud intellegitur quantum a talibus quales nos sumus intellegi potest cur non dicatur natus esse sed potius procedere spiritus sanctus quoniam si et ipse filius diceretur, amborum utique filius diceretur, quod absurdissimum est.

Whence is that which he says: My doctrine is not mine but his who sent me. If therefore here is understood as his doctrine, which nevertheless he said was not his own but the Father’s, how much more there must the Holy Spirit be understood also to proceed from him, where he thus says: He proceeds from the Father, so that he did not say: 'From me he does not proceed'? And from whom does the Son have that he is God (for he is God from God), from him he assuredly has that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him; and through this the Holy Spirit has from the Father himself that he also proceeds from the Son, just as he proceeds from the Father. Here somehow this also is understood, so far as it can be understood by such as we are: why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born but rather to proceed, since, if he too were called Son, he would assuredly be called the Son of both, which is most absurd.

Filius quippe nullus est duorum nisi patris et matris. Absit autem ut inter deum patrem et deum filium tale aliquid suspicemur quia nec filius hominum simul et ex patre et ex matre procedit, sed cum in matrem procedit ex patre non tunc procedit ex matre, et cum in hanc lucem procedit ex matre non tunc procedit ex patre. Spiritus autem sanctus non de patre procedit in filium et de filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam, sed simul de utroque procedit, quamuis hoc filio pater dederit ut quemadmodum de se ita de illo quoque procedat.

For indeed there is no son of two except of a father and a mother. But far be it that we suspect anything of that sort between God the Father and God the Son, since neither does a son of men proceed at the same time both from the father and from the mother; rather, when he proceeds into the mother from the father, then he does not proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds into this light from the mother, then he does not proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creature; rather, he proceeds simultaneously from both, although the Father has given this to the Son: that just as from Himself, so also from him he proceeds.

Neque enim possumus dicere quod non sit uita spiritus sanctus cum uita pater, uita sit filius. Ac per hoc sicut pater cum habeat uitam in semetipso dedit et filio habere uitam in semetipso, sic ei dedit uitam procedere de illo sicut procedit et de ipso. Haec de illo sermone in hunc librum transtuli sed fidelibus non infidelibus loquens.

For neither can we say that the Holy Spirit is not life, since the Father is life, the Son is life. And therefore, just as the Father, since he has life in himself, gave also to the Son to have life in himself, so he gave to him that Life proceed from him, just as it proceeds also from himself. These things from that discourse I have transferred into this book, but speaking to the faithful, not to the faithless.

[49] Verum si ad hanc imaginem contuendam et ad uidenda ista quam uera sint quae in eorum mente sunt nec tria sic sunt ut tres personae sint sed omnia tria hominis sunt quae una persona est minus idonei sunt, cur non de illa summa trinitate quae deus est credunt potius quod in sacris litteris inuenitur quam poscunt liquidissimam reddi sibi rationem quae ab humana mente tarda scilicet infirmaque non capitur? Et certe cum inconcusse crediderint scripturis sanctis tamquam ueracissimis testibus, agant orando et quaerendo et bene uiuendo ut intellegant, id est ut quantum uideri potest uideatur mente quod tenetur fide. Quis hoc prohibeat?

[49] But if they are less fit for beholding this image and for seeing how true those things are which are in their mind, and that the three are not thus as to be three persons, but all three are of the human being, who is one person, why do they not, concerning that supreme Trinity which is God, rather believe what is found in the sacred letters than demand that a most limpid reasoning be rendered to them, which is not grasped by the human mind, slow and feeble, to wit? And surely, when they have believed unshakenly the holy Scriptures as most truthful witnesses, let them do what they ought—by praying and seeking and living well—that they may understand, that is, that, so far as it can be seen, there may be seen by the mind what is held by faith. Who forbids this?

Immo uero ad hoc quis non hortetur? Si autem propterea negandum putant ista esse quia ea non ualent caecis mentibus cernere, debent et illi qui ex natiuitate sua caeci sunt esse solem negare. Lux ergo lucet in tenebris, quod si eam tenebrae non comprehendunt, inluminentur dei dono prius ut sint fideles et incipiant esse lux in comparatione infidelium, atque hoc praemisso fundamento aedificentur ad uidenda quae credunt ut aliquando possint uidere.

Nay rather, who would not exhort to this? But if they think that therefore these things must be denied to exist because blind minds are not able to discern them, then those who are blind from their birth ought likewise to deny that the sun exists. The Light therefore shines in the darkness; and if the darkness does not comprehend it, let them be illumined by the gift of God first, that they may be faithful and begin to be light in comparison with infidels; and with this foundation premised, let them be edified toward seeing the things which they believe, so that at length they may be able to see.

Sunt enim quae ita creduntur ut uideri iam omnino non possint. Non enim Christus iterum in cruce uidendus est, sed nisi hoc credatur quod ita factum atque uisum est ut futurum ac uidendum iam non speretur, non peruenitur ad Christum qualis sine fine uidendus est. Quantum uero attinet ad illam summam, ineffabilem, incorporalem immutabilemque naturam per intellegentiam utcumque cernendam, nusquam se melius regente duntaxat fidei regula acies humanae mentis exerceat quam in eo quod ipse homo in sua natura melius ceteris animalibus, melius etiam ceteris animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens cui quidam rerum inuisibilium tributus est uisus, et cui tamquam in loco superiore atque interiore honorabiliter praesidenti iudicanda omnia nuntiant etiam corporis sensus, et qua non est superior cui subdita regenda est nisi deus.

For there are things which are believed in such a way that they can now in no wise be seen. For Christ is not to be seen again on the cross; but unless this be believed—that which was done and seen in such a way that, as future and to-be-seen, it is now no longer to be hoped for—one does not attain to Christ as he is to be seen without end. But as much as pertains to that highest, ineffable, incorporeal and immutable nature, to be discerned somehow by intelligence, nowhere should the keen edge of the human mind exercise itself better, with the rule of faith alone guiding, than in that which man himself has in his nature better than the other animals, better also than the other parts of his soul, which is the mind itself, to which a certain sight of invisible things has been allotted, and to which, as though presiding honorably in a higher and inner place, even the senses of the body report all things to be judged, and above which there is no superior to whom, being subject, it is to be governed, unless God.

[50] Verum inter haec quae multa iam dixi et nihil illius summae trinitatis ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audeo profiteri, sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam eius ex me inualuisse nec potuisse me ad illam. O tu, anima mea, ubi te esse sentis, ubi iaces aut ubi stas donec ab eo qui propitius factus est omnibus iniquitatibus tuis sanentur omnes languores tui? Agnoscis te certe in illo esse stabulo quo samaritanus ille perduxit eum quem reperit multis a latronibus inflictis uulneribus semiuiuum.

[50] But among these things, of which many I have already spoken, I dare to profess that I have said nothing worthy of the ineffability of that supreme Trinity, but rather to confess that its knowledge, made-wonderful, has prevailed beyond me, and that I could not attain unto it. O you, my soul, where do you feel yourself to be, where do you lie or where do you stand, until all your languors are healed by him who has been made propitious to all your iniquities? You surely recognize yourself to be in that inn to which that Samaritan led the man whom he found half‑dead, with many wounds inflicted by robbers.

Et tamen multa uera uidisti, non his oculis quibus uidentur corpora colorata, sed eis pro quibus orabat qui dicebat: Oculi mei uideant aequitatem. Nempe ergo multa uera uidisti eaque discreuisti ab illa luce qua tibi lucente uidisti. Attolle oculos in ipsam lucem et eos in ea fige si potes.

And yet you saw many true things, not with those eyes with which colored bodies are seen, but with those for which he prayed who said: “Let my eyes see equity.” Surely then you saw many true things, and you distinguished them from that light, by whose shining upon you you saw. Lift up your eyes to the light itself, and fix them in it if you can.

Sic enim uidebis quid distet natiuitas uerbi dei a processione doni dei propter quod filius unigenitus non de patre genitum, alioquin frater eius esset, sed procedere dixit spiritum sanctum. Vnde cum sit communio quaedam consubstantialis patris et filii amborum spiritus, non amborum, quod absit, dictus est filius. Sed ad hoc dilucide perspicueque cernendum non potes ibi aciem figere.

For thus you will see what the nativity of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God on account of: the Only-begotten Son is said to be begotten of the Father—otherwise he would be his brother—whereas he said that the Holy Spirit proceeds. Whence, since the Spirit of both is a certain consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, he is not called the son of both (far be it). But for discerning this dilucidly and perspicuously, you cannot fix your keen gaze there.

Scio, non potes. Verum dico, mihi dico, quid non possim scio. Ipsa tibi tamen ostendit in te tria illa in quibus te summae ipsius quam fixis oculis contemplari nondum uales imaginem trinitatis agnosceres.

I know, you cannot. I speak truth— I say it to myself— I know what I cannot do. Yet she herself has shown to you, in yourself, those three things in which, since you are not yet able to contemplate the Highest itself with eyes so fixed, you might recognize the image of the Trinity.

Ipsa ostendit tibi uerbum uerum esse in te quando de scientia tua gignitur, id est quando quod scimus dicimus, etsi nullius gentis lingua significantem uocem uel proferamus uel cogitemus; sed ex illo quod nouimus cogitatio nostra formetur, sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet uelut parentem ac prolem tertia uoluntate siue dilectione iungente. Quam quidem uoluntatem de cognitione procedere (nemo enim uult quod omnino quid uel quale sit nescit), non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem, et ideo quandam in hac re intellegibili natiuitatis et processionis insinuari distantiam quoniam non hoc est cogitatione conspicere quod appetere uel etiam perfrui uoluntate, cernit discernitque qui potest. Potuisti et tu quamuis non potueris neque possis explicare sufficienti eloquio quod inter nubila similitudinum corporalium quae cogitationibus humanis occursare non desinunt uix uidisti.

She herself shows you that the word is true in you when it is begotten from your science, that is, when we say what we know, even if in the tongue of no nation we either utter or think a significant voice; but from that which we know let our thought be formed, and let there be, in the keen edge of the thinker, an image most similar to the cognition which memory was containing, these two, namely, as it were parent and offspring, a third, the will or love, joining them. Which will indeed proceeds from cognition (for no one wills what he altogether does not know what it is or of what sort it is), yet is not an image of cognition, and therefore in this intelligible matter a certain distance of nativity and of procession is insinuated, since to behold by thought is not the same as to appetite or even to enjoy by will—he who can sees and discerns it. You also were able, although you could not and cannot unfold with sufficient eloquence what, amid the clouds of bodily similitudes which do not cease to run up against human thoughts, you scarcely saw.

Sed illa lux quae non est quod tu et hoc tibi ostendit aliud esse illas incorporeas similitudines corporum et aliud esse uerum quod eis reprobatis intellegentia contuemur. Haec et alia similiter certa oculis tuis interioribus lux illa monstrauit. Quae igitur causa est cur acie fixa ipsam uidere non possis nisi utique infirmitas, et quis eam tibi fecit nisi utique iniquitas?

But that Light, which is not what you are, showed you this too: that those incorporeal similitudes of bodies are one thing, and the true thing which, those being rejected, we behold with intelligence, is another. This and other similarly certain things that Light showed to your inner eyes. What then is the cause why, with your gaze fixed, you cannot see it itself, if not assuredly infirmity? And who made that infirmity for you, if not assuredly iniquity?

Quis ergo sanat omnes languores tuos nisi qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis? Librum itaque istum iam tandem aliquando precatione melius quam disputatione concludam.

Who then heals all your languors except the one who is propitious for all your iniquities? Therefore I will at last finally conclude this book by prayer rather than by disputation.

[XXVIII 51] Domine deus noster, credimus in te patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum. Neque enim diceret ueritas: Ite, baptizate gentes in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti nisi trinitas esses. Nec baptizari nos iuberes, domine deus, in eius nomine qui non est dominus deus.

[28 51] Lord our God, we believe in you, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For neither would Truth say: Go, baptize the nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, unless you were the Trinity. Nor would you command us, Lord God, to be baptized in the name of one who is not Lord God.

Nec diceretur uoce diuina: Audi, Israhel: Dominus deus tuus deus unus est nisi trinitas ita esses ut unus dominus deus esses. Et si tu deus pater ipse esses et filius uerbum tuum Iesum Christus ipse esses et donum uestrum spiritus sanctus, non legeremus in litteris ueritatis: Misit deus filium suum, nec tu, unigenite, diceres de spiritu sancto: Quem mittet pater in nomine meo, et: Quem ego mittam uobis a patre. Ad hanc regulam fidei dirigens intentionem meam quantum potui, quantum me posse fecisti, quaesiui te et desideraui intellectu uidere quod credidi et multum disputaui et laboraui.

Nor would it be said by the divine voice: Hear, Israel: the Lord your God is one God, unless you were Trinity in such a way that you were one Lord God. And if you, God the Father, yourself were the Son, your Word, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit were your gift, we would not read in the writings of truth: God sent his Son; nor would you, Only-begotten, say of the Holy Spirit: Whom the Father will send in my name, and: Whom I will send to you from the Father. To this rule of faith directing my intention as much as I could, as much as you made me able, I have sought you and have desired to see with the intellect what I have believed, and I have much disputed and labored.

Domine deus meus, una spes mea, exaudi me ne fatigatus nolim te quaerere, sed quaeram faciem tuam semper ardenter. Tu da quaerendi uires, qui inueniri te fecisti et magis magisque inueniendi te spem dedisti. Coram te est firmitas et infirmitas mea; illam serua, istam sana.

Lord my God, my one hope, hear me lest, fatigued, I should be unwilling to seek you, but may I seek your face always ardently. Do you grant the strength for seeking, you who have made yourself to be found and have given the hope of finding you more and more. Before you are my firmness and my infirmity; preserve the former, heal the latter.

Coram te est scientia et ignorantia mea; ubi mihi aperuisti suscipe intrantem; ubi clausisti aperi pulsanti. Meminerim tui; intellegam te; diligam te. Auge in me ista donec me reformes ad integrum.

Before you is my knowledge and my ignorance; where you have opened to me, receive the one entering; where you have closed, open to the one knocking. Let me remember you; let me understand you; let me love you. Increase these things in me until you reform me to integrity.

Scio scriptum esse: In multiloquio non effugies peccatum. Sed utinam praedicando uerbum tuum et laudando te tantummodo loquerer. Non solum fugerem peccatum sed meritum bonum adquirerem quamlibet multum sic loquerer.

I know it is written: In much-speaking you will not escape sin. But would that, by preaching your word and by praising you, I spoke only. Not only would I flee sin, but I would acquire good merit, however much I spoke thus.

Neque enim homo de te beatus peccatum praeciperet germano in fide filio suo cui scripsit dicens: Praedica uerbum; insta opportune, importune. Numquid dicendum est istum non multum locutum qui non solum opportune uerum etiam importune uerbum tuum, domine, non tacebat? Sed ideo non erat multum quia tantum erat necessarium.

For neither would a man blessed in you command sin to his genuine son in the faith, to whom he wrote, saying: Preach the word; press on opportunely, importunely. Is it to be said that this man did not speak much, who not only opportunely but even importunely did not keep silence about your word, Lord? But for that very reason it was not “much,” because it was only what was necessary.

Libera me, deus meus, a multiloquio quod patior intus in anima mea misera in conspectu tuo et confugiente ad misericordiam tuam. Non enim cogitationibus taceo etiam tacens uocibus. Et si quidem non cogitarem nisi quod placeret tibi, non utique rogarem ut me ab hoc multiloquio liberares.

Free me, my God, from the multiloquy which I suffer within, in my wretched soul, in your sight and fleeing for refuge to your mercy. For I am not silent in my cogitations even when silent in voices. And indeed, if I thought nothing except what would please you, surely I would not be asking that you free me from this multiloquy.

Sed multae sunt cogitationes meae tales quales nosti cogitationes hominum quoniam uanae sunt. Dona mihi non eis consentire, et si quando me delectant, eas nihilominus improbare nec in eis uelut dormitando immorari. Nec in tantum ualeant apud me ut aliquid in opera mea procedat ex illis, sed ab eis mea saltem sit tuta sententia, tuta conscientia te tuente.

But many are my cogitations, such as you know the cogitations of men to be, since they are vain. Grant me not to consent to them; and if at any time they delight me, nonetheless to disapprove them, and not to linger in them as though by dozing. Nor let them have such strength with me that anything in my works should proceed from them; but let at least my judgment be safe from them, and my conscience safe, with you protecting.

Sapiens quidam cum de te loqueretur in libro suo qui ecclesiasticus proprio nomine iam uocatur: Multa, inquit, dicimus et non peruenimus, et consummatio sermonum uniuersa est ipse. Cum ergo peruenerimus ad te, cessabunt multa ista quae dicimus et non peruenimus, et manebis unus omnia in omnibus, et sine fine dicemus unum laudantes te in unum et in te facti etiam nos unum. Domine deus une, deus trinitas, quaecumque dixi in his libris de tuo agnoscant et tui; si qua de meo, et tu ignosce et tui.

A certain wise man, when he was speaking about you in his book, which by its proper name is now called Ecclesiasticus, said: “Many things we say, and we do not arrive; and the consummation of discourses, the whole, is He himself.” When therefore we shall have arrived at you, these many things which we say and do not arrive shall cease, and you will remain One, all in all; and without end we shall say one thing, praising you as One, and made one in you we too shall be one. Lord God One, God Trinity, whatever I have said in these books that is of yours, let both you and yours acknowledge; if anything is of my own, both do you forgive, and yours as well.

Amen.