Caesar: COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI VII DE BELLO GALLICO CUM A. HIRTI SUPPLEMENTO

Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi. Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris. Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis.

Compelled by your assiduous calls, Balbus, since my daily refusal seemed to have not an excuse of difficulty but a plea of inertia, I undertook a very difficult task. I have woven together the Commentaries of our Caesar on the deeds of Gaul, with no earlier or later writings of his available for comparison, and I brought the newest and unfinished one, from the deeds at Alexandria, to completion right up to the end—not indeed of the civil dissension, for which we see no end, but of Caesar’s life. Would that those who will read them could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, so that I may the more easily be free from the charge of stupidity and arrogance, I who have inserted myself into the midst of Caesar’s writings.

Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur: qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur. Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus. Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum.

For it is agreed among all that nothing has been so laboriously perfected by others as not to be surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries: which have been published, lest knowledge of such great matters should be lacking to writers; and they are so approved by the judgment of all that the faculty seems to have been preempted, not proffered, to writers. Of which matter, however, our admiration is greater than that of the rest: for the others know how well and emendedly he completed them; we also know how easily and swiftly he completed them. Moreover, in Caesar there was both the highest faculty and elegance of writing, and the most exact knowledge for the explaining of his own counsels.

Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interessem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi. Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale.

Not even this befell me, that I took part in the Alexandrian and African war; which wars, although in part are known to us by Caesar’s discourse, yet we hear differently those things which, by the novelty of the events or by admiration, seize us, and differently those which we are going to say for testimony. But I, surely, while I gather all causes of excusation lest I be compared with Caesar, incur this very charge of arrogance, that I think, in the judgment of anyone, that I can be compared with Caesar. Farewell.

[1] Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere. Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cognitum esset neque ulla multitudine in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxili aut spati aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem.

[1] With all Gaul conquered, since from the previous summer Caesar had intermitted no time for waging war and wished to refresh the soldiers from such great labors with the quiet of winter quarters, it was reported that many states at the same time were renewing plans of war and forming conspiracies. A plausible cause of this was alleged: that it was known to all the Gauls that neither could resistance be made to the Romans by any multitude gathered into one place, nor, if several states had brought different wars at the same time, would the army of the Roman people have enough aid, space, or resources to pursue all; moreover, that no state ought to refuse its lot of disadvantage, if by such a delay the rest could vindicate themselves into liberty.

[2] Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat. Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.

[2] In order that this opinion of the Gauls not be confirmed, Caesar set Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, over his winter quarters; he himself, with a cavalry guard, on the day before the Kalends of January set out from the town of Bibracte to the 13th legion, which he had stationed not far from the borders of the Aedui within the borders of the Bituriges, and he joins to it the 11th legion, which had been the nearest. With two cohorts left behind to guard the baggage-train, he leads the rest of the army into the most copious fields of the Bituriges, who, since they had broad territories and many towns, could not be restrained by the winter quarters of a single legion from preparing war and making conspiracies.

[3] Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent. Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendiis terrerentur. Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas civitates aut privatis hospitiis confisi aut societate consiliorum confugerant.

[3] By Caesar’s sudden advent it happened—as it had to happen to the unprepared and scattered—that those tilling the fields, without any fear, were overborne by the cavalry before they could flee for refuge into the towns. For even that common sign of an enemy incursion, which is accustomed to be understood from the burnings of buildings, had been removed by Caesar’s interdict, lest either the supply of fodder and grain fail, if he should wish to advance farther, or the enemies be terrified by the fires. With many thousands of men captured, the Bituriges were panic-stricken; those who had been able to escape the first arrival of the Romans had fled into neighboring states, relying either on private hospitality or on an alliance of counsels.

Frustra: nam Caesar magnis itineribus omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat. Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt.

In vain: for Caesar, by great marches, confronted them in all places and gives no city space to think about another’s safety rather than about its own domestic safety; by this celerity he both retained faithful friends and led the wavering by terror to the conditions of peace. With such a condition proposed, the Bituriges, since they saw for themselves that by Caesar’s clemency a return into his friendship lay open and that the neighboring states had given hostages without any penalty and had been received into his faith, did the same.

[4] Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte. Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi querebantur. Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur.

[4] Caesar, to the soldiers, for such great labor and patience—who in wintry days, on most difficult marches and in intolerable colds, had most zealously persisted in toil—promises two hundred sesterces, and to the centurions that many thousands of coins, to be granted under the name of booty; and with the legions dismissed into winter quarters, he himself withdraws on day 40 to Bibracte. There, while he was administering justice, the Bituriges send envoys to him asking for help against the Carnutes, of whom they complained that they had brought war upon them. This matter learned, when he had delayed in the winter quarters no more than 18 days, he leads out from the winter quarters from the Arar the legions 14 and 6, which, for the purpose of explaining/expediting the grain-supply affair, it has been shown in the previous commentary were stationed there: thus with two legions he sets out to pursue the Carnutes.

[5] Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt. Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nollet, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit. Equites tamen et auxiliarios pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec frustra: nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri revertuntur.

[5] When the report of the army had been conveyed to the enemies, the Carnutes, led by the calamity of the rest, with villages and towns abandoned—which, established for the sake of enduring the winter, they were suddenly inhabiting with buildings scant to necessity (for, having been conquered recently, they had relinquished many towns)—scatter and flee. Since, with the very fiercest storms breaking out at just that time, he did not wish the soldiers to undergo them, Caesar pitches camp in the town of the Carnutes, Cenabum, and quarters the soldiers in houses, partly of the Gauls, partly those which had been quickly built by the throwing together of straw for the sake of covering the tents. Nevertheless he sends the horsemen and auxiliary infantry into all parts to which the enemies were said to have betaken themselves; nor in vain: for most often our men return having gotten great booty.

Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates.

Oppressed, the Carnutes, by the difficulty of winter and the terror of peril, since they had been driven from their roofs, dared to take their stand in no place for long, nor could they be covered by the protection of the forests against the most severe tempests; scattered, with a great part of their own lost, they are dissipated into the neighboring states.

[6] Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit; ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica meritos accipere, legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit. Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellique ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.

[6] Caesar, in a most difficult season of the year, since he reckoned it enough to dissipate the bands that were convening, lest any beginning of war be born, and, so far as reason went, had ascertained that at the time of the summer campaigns no major war could be ignited, stationed Gaius Trebonius with two legions, which he had with him, in winter quarters at Cenabum; he himself, as by frequent legations of the Remi he was made surer that the Bellovaci, who in the glory of war surpassed all the Gauls and the Belgae, and the states bordering on them, under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacan and Commius the Atrebatian, were preparing armies and massing them into one place, so that with the whole multitude they might make an irruption into the borders of the Suessiones, who had been assigned to the Remi, and since he judged it to pertain not only to his dignity but also to his safety that allies who had deserved very well of the commonwealth should incur no calamity, calls again from winter quarters the 11th legion; and he sends letters to Gaius Fabius to lead into the territory of the Suessiones the two legions which he had, and he summons from Labienus one of his two. Thus, as far as the opportunity of winter quarters and the plan of the war demanded, by his continual labor he laid upon the legions in turn the burden of expeditions.

[7] His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret. Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent remissi. A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebates; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ulteriores silvas contulisse.

[7] With these forces gathered, he sets out to the Bellovaci, and, after the camp had been placed within their borders, he sends out squadrons of cavalry in all directions to catch some people from whom he might learn the enemy’s plans. The horsemen, having performed their duty, report that few had been found in the buildings, and that these were not men who had remained for the sake of cultivating the fields (for there had been a careful removal from everywhere), but those who had been sent back for scouting. From these, when Caesar asked in what place the multitude of the Bellovaci was and what their plan was, he discovered that all the Bellovaci who could bear arms had assembled into one place, and likewise the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Veliocasses, and Atrebates; that they had chosen for a camp an elevated position in a wood surrounded by marsh; that they had transferred all their baggage-train into the farther woods.

Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita. Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.

that there were several leading men as authors of the war, but that the multitude obeyed Correus especially, because they had understood that the name of the Roman People was to him of the utmost hatred. A few days earlier Commius the Atrebatian had departed from this camp to bring in auxiliaries of the Germans, whose proximity was close and whose multitude was infinite. Moreover, the Bellovaci had decided, by the consensus of all the chiefs, with the greatest eagerness of the plebs, that if, as was said, Caesar should come with three legions, they would offer themselves to fight, lest later under a poorer and harsher condition they be forced to contend with the whole army; but if he should bring greater forces, they would remain in the place they had chosen, and would, by ambushes, prevent the Romans from foraging—fodder, which, because of the season of the year, was both scant and scattered—and from grain-collecting and the remaining commissariat.

[8] Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem. Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem. Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus expositis animos multitudinis confirmat.

[8] When Caesar had learned these things, with many consenting, and judged that the counsels being proposed were full of prudence and far removed from the temerity of the barbarians, he decided that every measure must be subserved, in order that the enemy, despising his own paucity, might come out into the battle line the more quickly. For he had the most veteran legions of singular valor, the 7th, 8th, 9th, and the 11th, of highest hope and chosen youth, which, now in its eighth year of service, yet in comparison with the rest had not yet acquired the same reputation of age and valor. And so, a council having been convened, with all those matters that had been reported to him set forth, he strengthens the spirits of the multitude.

Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima, octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent. Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.

If perchance he might be able to lure the enemy to fight with the number of three legions, he arranged the order of the column thus: that the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions should go before all; then the 11th should herd the baggage-train of all the impedimenta, which, however, was moderate, as it is accustomed to be on expeditions, lest there could occur to the enemy an appearance of a greater multitude than they themselves had demanded. By this plan, with the column arrayed in a nearly square formation, he leads the army into the enemies’ sight more quickly than they expected.

[9] Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiduciae consilia perlata, sive certaminis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt. Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert. Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, loriculam pro [haec] ratione eius altitudinis inaedificari; fossam duplicem pedum denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem trium tabulatorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes viminea loricula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur, quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permitteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegeretur.

[9] When the Gauls suddenly saw the legions, drawn up as if in battle-line, approaching at a fixed pace—whose counsels full of confidence had been conveyed to Caesar—whether from the danger of the contest, or the sudden advent, or the expectation of our plan, they draw up their forces before their camp and do not leave the higher ground. Caesar, although he had desired to fight, nevertheless, marveling at so great a multitude of the enemy, with a valley between, depressed more in altitude than spreading wide, brings his camp close to the enemy’s camp. He orders this: that the rampart be fortified to 12 feet; that a little breastwork be built onto it according to the measure of that height; that a double ditch of 15 feet be sunk with sides made straight; that towers be frequently raised to the height of three stories, to be connected by bridges thrown across and decked, whose fronts should be fortified with a wickerwork breastwork; that they be defended from the enemy by a double ditch and a double order of defenders, of which one, from the bridges—because it would be safer by reason of the height—might the more boldly and farther let missiles fly, the other, who would be stationed nearer the enemy on the rampart itself, should be covered by the bridge from missiles falling upon him.

Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit.

Upon the gates he set doors and higher towers.

[10] Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi. Interim crebro paucis utrimque procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant acriusque hostes insequebantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros longius summovebant.

[10] The plan of this fortification was duplex. For he hoped that both the magnitude of the works and their own fear (of the barbarians) would bring confidence to the barbarians, and, since it was necessary to set out farther for foddering and foraging for grain, he saw that the camp could be defended by the very fortification with small forces. Meanwhile, with a few on both sides frequently running forward, there was contention between the two camps with a marsh thrown in between; which marsh, however, at times either our auxiliaries of Gauls and Germans crossed and pursued the enemy the more keenly, or in turn the enemies, having crossed the same, were driving our men farther back.

Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificius pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur; quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.

It was happening, moreover, in the quotidian foragings (which was bound to happen, since fodder was being sought out from rare and disjected buildings), that in impeded places the scattered foragers were surrounded; which thing, although it was bringing a moderate detriment of beasts of burden and slaves to our men, nevertheless was inciting foolish cogitations of the barbarians, and all the more because Commius—whom I have explained had set out to summon the aids of the Germans—had come with cavalry; who, although in number they were not more than 500, nevertheless, at the arrival of the Germans, the barbarians were taking heart.

[11] Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine dimicatione perniciosa nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem XIlI, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret; ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.

[11] Caesar, when he observed that the enemy for many days kept themselves in a camp fortified by the marsh and by the nature of the place, and that their camp could not be assaulted without a pernicious combat, nor could the place be enclosed with fortifications unless by a greater army, sends letters to Trebonius, that he should summon as swiftly as possible the 13th Legion, which was wintering among the Bituriges with T. Sextius, legate, and so come to him with three legions by great marches; he himself sends the cavalry in turn from the Remi and the Lingones and the remaining states, a great number of whom he had evoked, as a guard for the foragings, to withstand the sudden incursions of the enemy.

[12] Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diuturnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum silvestribus locis insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggrederentur. Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites animadvertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati.

[12] Since this was happening every day and now diligence was lessened by custom, which for the most part happens with long duration, the Bellovaci, with a chosen band of infantry, having learned the daily stations of our horsemen, set ambushes in sylvan places, and on the next day they send cavalry to the same spot, to elicit our men at first, then to assault them once they were encircled. The lot of this mischief fell to the Remi, upon whom that day for discharging the duty had devolved. For these men, when they had suddenly noticed the enemy’s horse and, superior in number, had scorned their paucity, pursuing too eagerly, were surrounded on all sides by the foot-soldiers.

Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto equitum; qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat. Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto, nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis locis stationes disponere ac moderatius cedentem insequi hostem.

With this done, being perturbed, they withdrew from the equestrian battle more swiftly than custom allows, with Vertiscus, prince of the state, the prefect of cavalry, lost; who, although he could scarcely make use of a horse on account of age, nevertheless, by the custom of the Gauls, had availed himself neither of the excuse of age in taking up the prefecture nor had wished that there be fighting without himself. The spirits of the enemy are inflated and incited by the favorable battle, with the prince and prefect of the Remi slain, and our men, by the detriment, are admonished to dispose their stations more diligently, the places having been explored, and to pursue a retreating enemy more moderately.

[13] Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitusque fiebant paludis. Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistentibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut comminus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consuerant, turpiter refugerunt, nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore coacti longius profugerent. Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent.

[13] Meanwhile they do not intermit the quotidian battles in the sight of both camps, which were occurring at the fords and transits of the marsh. In this contention the Germans—whom for that reason Caesar had led across the Rhine, that, interposed among the cavalry, they might do battle—when, more constantly, they all had crossed the marsh and, with the few who resisted slain, had more pertinaciously pursued the remaining multitude, terrified not only those who were either being overborne at close quarters or wounded from afar, but even those who were accustomed to be in reserve farther back, disgracefully fled; nor did they make an end of flight, the higher positions being often lost, before they either withdrew into the camp of their own men, or some, compelled by shame, fled farther. By the peril of these, all the forces were so perturbed that it could scarcely be adjudged whether they were more insolent in favorable and very slight successes, or more timid in a moderately adverse event.

[14] Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua impedimenta. Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis instruunt castris, ne prius Romani persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum processisset. At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent.

[14] With several days spent in the same camp, when they learned that the legions and Gaius Trebonius the legate had approached nearer, the leaders of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that of Alesia, by night send away those whom they counted as inferior either in age or in strength or as unarmed, together with the remaining impedimenta. And while they are disentangling the column of these, disordered and confused (for a great multitude of wagons is accustomed to follow even Gauls on the march), overtaken by daylight they draw up the forces of armed men in front of their camp, lest the Romans begin to pursue them before the column of their baggage has advanced farther. But Caesar judged that men making resistance were not to be attacked with so great an ascent of a hill, and yet that the legions should be brought up to that point so that the barbarians, with our soldiers pressing, could not withdraw from that place without danger.

Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae transeundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, atque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur. Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in hostium cuneos conici possent.

Thus, when he saw that, with the marsh as an impediment, camp was divided from camp, and that the difficulty of crossing could retard the celerity of pursuing, and when he noticed that the ridge which, across the marsh, reached almost to the enemy’s camp was cut off from their camp by a moderate valley, he, the marsh having been overlaid with bridges, leads the legions across and quickly comes onto the topmost plain of the ridge, which was defended by a declivity on both flanks. There, with the legions drawn up, he reaches the farthest ridge and sets his battle line in that place whence missiles sent by artillery could be hurled into the enemy wedge-formations.

[15] Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt. Quorum pertinacia cognita Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco mutatis muniri iubet castra. Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit.

[15] The barbarians, trusting in the nature of the place, although they did not refuse to fight, if by chance the Romans should try to go up the hill, since they could not send out their forces in detachments little by little, lest, once scattered, they be thrown into confusion, remained in the battle line. Their pertinacity recognized, Caesar, with 20 cohorts drawn up and the camp transferred to that place, orders the camp to be fortified. The works having been completed, he stations the legions, drawn up, before the rampart, and arranges the cavalry, with their horses reined, on station.

Bellovaci, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt. Fasces, ut consueverant (namque in acie sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt. Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a conspectu texit Romanorum.

The Bellovaci, when they saw the Romans ready for pursuing and that they could neither pass the night nor remain longer in the same place without peril, adopted such a plan for their withdrawal. The fasces, as they were accustomed (for that the Gauls were wont to sit in the battle line is declared in Caesar’s earlier commentaries), bundles of straw and brushwood—of which there was the highest abundance in the camp—having been passed from hand to hand among themselves, they placed before the battle line; and at the very last part of the day, the signal having been announced, they set them on fire all at once. Thus a continuous flame suddenly covered all their forces from the sight of the Romans.

Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu refugerunt.

When this happened, the barbarians fled back with the most vehement speed.

[16] Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit. Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt. Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt.

[16] Caesar, although he could not notice the departure of the enemy because fires had been interposed, nevertheless, since he suspected that plan had been adopted with a view to flight, advances the legions, sends squadrons to pursue; he himself, fearing an ambuscade, lest perhaps the enemy should halt in the same place and try to draw our men into a disadvantageous ground, proceeds more slowly. The cavalry, since they were afraid to enter the very dense smoke and flame, and, if any had entered too eagerly, scarcely could themselves perceive the foremost parts of their own horses, fearing an ambuscade gave the Bellovaci free opportunity of recovering themselves. Thus the flight, full at once of fear and of craftiness, without any loss, after advancing not more than ten miles, the enemy pitched camp in a most strongly fortified position.

Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponerent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.

Thence, since they often deployed cavalry and infantry in ambushes, they inflicted great losses upon the Romans in their foraging-parties.

[17] Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros suspicaretur. Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.

[17] Since this was occurring more frequently, Caesar learned from a certain captive that Correus, leader of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of the bravest foot-soldiers and, out of the whole number, a thousand cavalry, to station them in ambush in that place to which he suspected the Romans would send men on account of the abundance of grain and fodder. On learning this plan he leads out more legions than he was wont, and he sends forward the cavalry, which by custom he used to dispatch as a guard for the foragers; among these he interposes supports of light-armed auxiliaries; he himself with the legions approaches as near as he can.

[18] Hostes in insidiis dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis circumdederunt. Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt. Quorum adventu cum sibi Correus oblatam occasionem rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit.

[18] The enemies, disposed in ambush, since they had selected for themselves a field for conducting the action that did not extend in any direction more than a thousand paces, fortified on every side by woods or by a most impassable river, surrounded this, as if with a hunting-net, with ambushes. The plan of the enemy having been explored, our men, ready for battle in spirit and in arms, and, with the legions following after, refusing no encounter, came by squadrons into that place. At whose arrival, when Correus judged that an occasion for carrying on the business had been offered to him, first he showed himself with a few and made an attack upon the nearest squadrons.

Nostri constanter incursum sustinent insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt; quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit, tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur.

Our men steadfastly withstand the charge of the ambushers and do not gather in greater numbers into one place; which, for the most part in cavalry battles, when it happens on account of some fear, then loss is sustained from their very multitude.

[19] Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex silvis. Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum, quae nostros coegit cedere equites.

[19] When, with the squadrons deployed, they fought by turns in sparse order and did not allow their men to be surrounded from the flanks, the rest burst out of the woods while Correus was fighting. A different battle arises with great contention. And when this was engaged for a longer time on equal terms, gradually from the woods a drawn-up multitude of foot-soldiers advances, which forced our cavalry to give ground.

Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum interpositi constanter proeliantur. Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione; deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus imprudentes acceperant detrimentum. Accedunt propius interim legiones, crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur, imperatorem instructis copiis adesse.

To these the light-armed infantry, whom I have explained were sent ahead of the legions, quickly come to the aid, and, interposed among the squadrons of our men, they fight steadfastly. The battle is fought for some time with equal contention; then, as the rationale of the fight required, those who had withstood the first onsets of the ambuscade by this very fact become superior, because, though unawares, they had received no loss from the ambushers. Meanwhile the legions draw nearer, and frequent messengers at the same time are brought both to our men and to the enemy, that the commander is present with forces drawn up.

Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent, victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur; hostes concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi tenebantur. Victi tamen perculsique maiore parte amissa consternati profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur), eum interim nulla calamitate victus Correus excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia victores in se tela conicere.

With this matter known, our men, confident in the protection of the cohorts, fight most keenly, lest, if they had conducted the affair more slowly, they might seem to have shared the glory of victory with the legions; the enemy collapse in spirit and seek flight by different routes. In vain: for by the difficulties of the terrain with which they had wished to enclose the Romans, they themselves were held. Defeated, however, and smitten, with the greater part lost, they flee in consternation, partly making for the woods, partly for the river (who nevertheless, in flight, are finished off by our men, pursuing sharply), while meanwhile Correus, overcome by no calamity, could be brought neither to withdraw from the battle and seek the woods nor to surrender at our men’s invitation, but by fighting most bravely and wounding a good many he forced the victors, carried away by wrath, to hurl their weapons at him.

[20] Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum castrorum relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu traducto progreditur. At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum beneficio casum evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo, amisso equitatu et fortissimis pcditibus, cum adventare Romanos existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur.

[20] In this way, the matter having been done, Caesar, entering upon the recent vestiges of the battle, since he judged that the enemy, conquered by so great a calamity, on a message received would abandon the camp-site, which was said to be not farther from that slaughter than about eight miles, although he saw the crossing impeded by the river, nevertheless, the army having been led across, advances. But the Bellovaci and the remaining states, suddenly, from the rout with a few recovered—and these wounded—who by the benefit of the woods had avoided the mishap, with everything adverse, the calamity known, Correus slain, their cavalry lost and their bravest infantry, when they supposed the Romans to be approaching, a council having been suddenly convened at the blast of the trumpets, cry aloud that envoys and hostages be sent to Caesar.

[21] Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat. Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Adflictas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis.

[21] With this plan approved by all, Commius the Atrebatian took refuge with those Germans, from whom for that war he had borrowed auxiliaries. The rest forthwith send legates to Caesar and ask that he be content with such a punishment of the enemy as, given his clemency and humanity, he would assuredly never have inflicted upon them while intact, if he could have imposed it without combat. The resources of the Bellovaci, they say, have been shattered by the cavalry battle; many thousands of chosen foot-soldiers have perished, scarcely the messengers of the slaughter have escaped.

Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.

Nevertheless, considering so great a calamity, the Bellovaci had in that battle attained a great advantage, namely that Correus, the author of the war, the inciter of the multitude, had been slain. For never, with him alive, could the senate have had as much weight in the state as the ignorant plebs.

[22] Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset.

[22] To the legates petitioning these things Caesar recalls: that at the same time in the previous year the Bellovaci and the other states of Gaul had undertaken war: that these, most pertinaciously of all, had remained in their resolve and had not been brought by surrender to the soundness of the rest. He knows and understands that the blame for the offense is most easily devolved upon the dead. That no one, truly, is so potent that, the leaders unwilling, the senate resisting, all the good men opposing, he could, with the feeble hand of the plebs, incite and wage war.

Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.

But nevertheless he would be content with that punishment which they themselves had incurred.

[23] Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides conficiunt. Concurrunt reliquarum civitatium legati, quae Bellovacorum speculabantur eventum; obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio, quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem. Nam superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente, cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi posse.

[23] On the night following, the envoys report the answers to their own people, they provide hostages. The envoys of the remaining states, who were watching the outcome of the Bellovaci, flock together; they give hostages, they do the things commanded, with the exception of Commius, whom fear prevented from committing his safety to anyone’s good faith. For in the previous year, while Caesar was administering justice in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, when he had found out that Commius was agitating the states and making a conspiracy against Caesar, judged that his infidelity could be suppressed without any perfidy.

Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam rem delectos idoneos ei tradit centuriones. Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat, manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit; graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit.

Since he did not think that, when summoned into the camp, he would come, lest by attempting it he make him more cautious, he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to see to it that, under the pretense of a colloquy, he be killed. For that matter he handed over to him chosen, suitable centurions. When it had come to a colloquy, and, as had been agreed, Volusenus had seized Commius’s hand, the centurion—either moved by the unusual affair or quickly prevented by Commius’s familiars—could not finish off the man; nevertheless, with the first blow he grievously struck his head with the sword.

Cum utrimque gladii destricti essent, non tam pugnandi quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum; Gallorum, quod insidiis cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo facto statuisse Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani venire.

When on both sides the swords had been drawn, the plan of both parties was not so much for fighting as for scattering: on our side, because they believed that Commius had been stricken by a death-dealing wound; on the Gauls’ side, because, the ambush having been discovered, they dreaded more things than they saw. After this deed, Commius was said to have resolved never to come into the sight of any Roman.

[24] Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam esse civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum, plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit. M. Antonium quaestorem cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis regionibus erat, satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat.

[24] With the most warlike peoples conquered, Caesar, when he saw that there was now no commonwealth preparing a war to resist him, but that some were moving down from the towns and scattering from the fields to avoid the present command, decided to send the army into several parts. He joins to himself M. Antony, quaestor, with the Twelfth Legion. He sends C. Fabius, legate, with 25 cohorts into a very different part of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were in arms, nor did he think that C. Caninius Rebilus, legate, who was in those regions, had 2 legions strong enough.

Titum Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi. Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates haberet in civitatem.

He calls Titus Labienus to himself; and the 15th legion, which had been with him in winter quarters, he sends into Togate Gaul to protect the colonies of Roman citizens, lest some like inconvenience should happen by a barbarian incursion, as had happened the previous summer to the Tergestines, who had been overpowered by their sudden brigandage and assault. He himself sets out to lay waste and depopulate the borders of Ambiorix; and when he had despaired that a thoroughly frightened and fleeing Ambiorix could be brought back into his power, he judged it nearest to his dignity to so devastate his borders in citizens, buildings, and cattle, that, through the hatred of his own people, Ambiorix—if Fortune had left any survivors—should have no return into the state on account of such great calamities.

[25] Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendiis, rapinis vastasset, magno numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in Treveros mittit, quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat.

[25] When he had sent out either legions or auxiliaries into all parts of Ambiorix’s borders and had laid everything waste with slaughters, burnings, and rapine, a great number of men having been killed or captured, he sends Labienus with 2 legions to the Treveri, whose state, on account of its nearness to Germany, hardened by daily wars, in culture and ferocity did not differ much from the Germans, and never did what was commanded unless compelled by an army.

[26] Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit. Quo cum adventaret atque ex captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito. Dumnacus, cum appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit.

[26] Meanwhile Gaius Caninius, legate, when he learned from the letters and messengers of Duratius that a great multitude of the enemy had assembled in the borders of the Pictones—he who had remained perpetually in the friendship of the Romans, although a certain part of his state had defected—hurried to the town Lemonum. When he was approaching there and learned more certainly from captives that Duratius was shut in at Lemonum and was being besieged by many thousands of men under Dumnacus, leader of the Andi, and since he did not dare to commit the weak legions to an engagement with the enemy, he pitched camp in a fortified place. Dumnacus, when he learned that Caninius was drawing near, with all his forces turned against the legions, began to attack the Roman camp.

Cum complures dies in oppugnatione consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento nullam partem munitionum convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit.

When he had spent several days in the assault and, to the great detriment of his own men, had been unable to tear away any part of the fortifications, he returns again to besiege Lemonum.

[27] Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit, obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur. Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset.

[27] At the same time the legate C. Fabius receives several states into allegiance, secures them with hostages, and by the letters of Gaius Caninius Rebilus is made more certain of what is being done among the Pictones. With these matters learned, he sets out to bring aid to Duratius. But Dumnacus, the arrival of Fabius having become known, and with safety despaired of, if at the same time he should be forced both to sustain the Roman external enemy and to look back at and fear the townspeople, suddenly withdraws from that place with his forces, nor does he think himself sufficiently safe unless he should have led his troops across the river Liger, which, on account of its magnitude, had to be crossed by a bridge.

Fabius, etsi nondum in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros. Itaque cum copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem se reciperet castra. Consecuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur.

Fabius, although he had not yet come into the sight of the enemies nor joined himself to Caninius, nevertheless, informed by those who knew the nature of the places, chiefly believed that the enemies, in their terror, would make for the very place they were seeking. Therefore he hastened with his forces to the same bridge and ordered the cavalry to advance before the column of the legions only so far as, when they had advanced, they might, without the fatigue of their horses, withdraw back into the same camp. Our cavalry, as had been instructed, come up, and they fall upon Dumnacus’s column, and, attacking on the march those who were fleeing and panic-stricken, burdened with their packs, they gain great booty, many having been slain.

Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt in castra.

Thus, the affair well conducted, they withdraw to the camp.

[28] Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse. Cuius praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum, singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium committit. Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros ferunt auxilium.

[28] In the following night Fabius sends forward the cavalry, thus prepared that they should engage and delay the whole column, until he himself might come up. That the affair might be conducted according to his instructions, Quintus Atius Varus, prefect of cavalry, a man singular both in spirit and in prudence, encourages his men; and, having overtaken the enemy’s column, he stations some squadrons in suitable places, and with a part of the horse he joins battle. The cavalry of the enemy fights more boldly, as infantry are coming up to support them, who, halting with the whole column, bring aid to their horsemen against ours.

Fit proelium acri certamine. Namque nostri contemptis pridie superatis hostibus, cum subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites proeliantur, hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem videbantur.

A battle is joined with a sharp contest. For our men, despising the enemy overcome the day before, since they remembered that the legions were following, both by the shame of yielding and by the desire to finish the battle by themselves, fight most bravely against the foot-soldiers; and the enemy, believing that no further forces would come up, as they had learned the day before, seemed to have gotten an opportunity of annihilating our cavalry.

[29] Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt. Quibus visis perculsae barbarorum turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine, magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant. At nostri equites, qui paulo ante cum resistentibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae elati magno undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo proelio interficiunt.

[29] When for some time there was fighting with the utmost exertion, Dumnacus draws up a battle-line which should be in turn a support to his own cavalry, when suddenly the close-packed legions come into the sight of the enemy. At the sight of these, the squadrons of the barbarians are struck and the battle-lines of the enemy thoroughly terrified, and with the column of the baggage-train thrown into confusion, with great shouting and running about everywhere they commit themselves to flight. But our cavalry, who a little before had most bravely clashed with those resisting, exalted by the joy of victory, with a great shout raised on all sides, surrounding the retreating, slay in that battle to just the extent that the strength of their horses avails for pursuing and their right hands for hewing down.

Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur impedimentorum.

Therefore, with more than 12,000—either armed men or those who in that fear had cast away their arms—slain, the entire multitude of the baggage-train was captured.

[30] Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est, Caninius legatus cum legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum latrociniis caperetur.

[30] From this rout it being established that Drappes the Senone—who, as soon as Gaul had defected, with desperadoes gathered from everywhere, slaves called to freedom, the exiles of all the states enrolled, and brigands received, had intercepted the impedimenta and supplies of the Romans—having collected from the flight not more than two thousand men, was making for the province, and that Lucterius the Cadurcan had taken counsel together with him (he who, as is known in the previous commentary, at the first defection of Gaul had wished to make an attack upon the province), the legate Caninius, with two legions, hastened to pursue them, lest the province, to its detriment or alarm, should incur great infamy from the brigandage of desperate men.

[31] Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco fecerat, copias esse accisas sciebat. Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante Dumnaco possent concitari. Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur.

[31] Gaius Fabius, with the remaining army, sets out into the Carnutes and the other states, whose forces he knew to have been cut down in that battle which he had fought with Dumnacus. For he did not doubt that, because of the recent calamity, they would be more submissive hereafter; but, if a space and time were granted, with that same Dumnacus instigating them, they could be concitated. In this matter the highest felicity and celerity in the receiving back of the states attends Fabius.

Nam Carnutes, qui saepe vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus Oceano coniunctae, quae Aremoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae Carnutum adventu Fabi legionumque imperata sine mora faciunt. Dumnacus suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas Galliae regiones petere est coactus.

For the Carnutes, who, often vexed, had never made mention of peace, upon hostages being given come into surrender; and the other states situated on the farthest borders of Gaul, joined to the Ocean, which are called the Aremoricae, induced by the authority of the Carnutes and by the arrival of Fabius and the legions, do the things commanded without delay. Dumnacus, driven from his own borders, wandering and lurking, alone was compelled to seek the farthest regions of Gaul.

[32] At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum. Ibi cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset, semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem haberet, oppidum Uxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi coniungit.

[32] But Drappes and together Lucterius, when they learned that the legions and Caninius were at hand and thought that they could not enter the borders of the province with the army pursuing without certain destruction, nor now had the opportunity of roaming freely and of committing brigandage, come to a halt within the borders of the Cadurci. There, since Lucterius once, in former unimpaired circumstances, had had much power among his fellow citizens, and as an originator of new counsels always had great authority among the barbarians, he seizes the town Uxellodunum, which had been in his clientage, excellently fortified by the nature of the place, with his own forces and those of Drappes, and unites the townspeople to himself.

[33] Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes oppidi partes praeruptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur, effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito cohortibus divisis trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit; a quibus paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere instituit.

[33] Thither, when Gaius Caninius had come at once and noticed that all parts of the town were fortified by most precipitous rocks—where, even with no defender, it would nevertheless be difficult for armed men to climb—and when he saw the great impedimenta of the townsmen, which, if they should try to withdraw by a clandestine flight, they could escape not only the cavalry, but not even the legions, he, the cohorts having been divided in three parts, made three camps in a most elevated position; and from these, little by little, as far as his forces allowed, he began to lead a rampart around the circuit of the town.

[34] Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaque Alesiae memoria solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus Lucterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relicta copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci. Eo consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos ex oppido Drappes et Lucterius educunt. Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum adoriuntur.

[34] When the townspeople noticed this and, made anxious by the most pitiable memory of Alesia, feared a similar mishap of a siege, and most of all Lucterius, who had made trial of that fortune, advised that a reckoning for grain must be had, they resolve by the consent of all, a part of the forces being left there, that they themselves with the unencumbered troops set out to import grain. With this plan approved, on the next night, leaving behind two thousand armed men, Drappes and Lucterius lead the rest out of the town. These men, having tarried a few days, from the borders of the Cadurci—who in part wished to relieve them in the grain-matter, and in part were not able to prevent their taking it—procure a great quantity of grain, and sometimes, with nocturnal expeditions, attack our forts.

Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in locis infirma disponat praesidia.

For which cause Gaius Caninius delays to surround the whole town with fortifications, lest he either be unable to safeguard the work once completed, or station weak garrisons in very many places.

[35] Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Lucterius non longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum supportarent. Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Lucterius agmen iumentorum ad oppidum ducit. Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum instituit.

[35] With a great supply of grain procured, Drappes and Lucterius encamp not farther than 10 miles from the town, whence they might gradually bring grain up into the town. They apportion the “provinces” between themselves: Drappes remained with part of the forces as a guard to the camp; Lucterius leads a column of pack-animals to the town. With garrisons posted there, at about the tenth hour of the night he sets about to import grain into the town by wooded and narrow routes.

Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent, exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam lucem impetum fecit. Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis Lucterius nec se recipit in castra.

When the camp’s sentries had sensed their clatter, and scouts sent out had reported what was being done, Caninius swiftly, with armed cohorts from the nearest forts, made an attack upon the grain-carriers at the very break of day. They, terrified by the sudden calamity, scatter to their own strongholds; and when our men saw this, inflamed more keenly against the armed, they allow no one of that number to be taken alive. Lucterius fled from there with a few, nor does he retire into the camp.

[36] Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum cum Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII. Qua re ex compluribus cognita, cum intellegeret fugato duce altero perterritos reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium Drappeti perferret. Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret, equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit, alteram secum expeditam ducit.

[36] With the matter well conducted, Caninius discovered from captives that a part of the forces with Drappes was in camp at a distance of not more than 12 miles. This thing having been learned from several sources, since he understood that, the other leader having been put to flight, the remaining, panic-stricken, could easily be overwhelmed, he judged it to be of great felicity that no one had fled from the slaughter into the camp to carry to Drappes a message about the calamity received. But in making trial, since he saw no danger, he sends ahead all the cavalry and the German infantry—men of the highest velocity—to the enemy’s camp; he himself distributes one legion into three camps, and leads another with him unencumbered.

Cum propius hostes accessisset, ab exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improviso advolasse proeliumque commisisse. Qua re cognita legionem armatam instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca superiora capiuntur.

When he had approached the enemy more closely, he learns from the explorers whom he had sent ahead that their camp, as is almost the custom of barbarians, the higher positions having been abandoned, had been brought down to the banks of the river; but that the Germans and the cavalry, with all taken unawares, had swooped upon them unexpectedly and had joined battle. With this learned, he brings up a legion armed and arrayed. Thus, suddenly, the signal having been given, the higher ground is seized from all sides.

Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur. Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes.

When this happened, the Germans and the horsemen, on seeing the standards of the legion, fight most vehemently. Immediately the cohorts make an assault from all sides, and with all either slain or captured they obtain great booty. Drappes himself is taken in that battle.

[37] Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad obsidendos oppidanos revertitur externoque hoste deleto, cuius timore antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum.

[37] Caninius, the affair most successfully accomplished, with scarcely any soldier wounded, returns to besiege the townspeople; and, the external enemy destroyed—by fear of whom previously he had been prevented from dividing the garrisons and surrounding the townspeople with a fortification—he orders works to be carried on on all sides. To the same place on the next day Gaius Fabius comes with his forces and takes a part of the town for besieging.

[38] Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas daretur. Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes omnium animos consolatione sanat. Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in civitate superiore commentario Caesar exposuit initium belli esse ortum, quod praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertebat, quo celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et concitatorem belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit.

[38] Caesar meanwhile leaves Marcus Antonius, quaestor, with 15 cohorts among the Bellovaci, lest any opportunity again be given to the Belgae for adopting new counsels. He himself goes to the remaining communities, orders more hostages, and heals the fearful spirits of all by consolation. When he had come among the Carnutes, in whose state Caesar in the previous commentary set forth that the beginning of the war had arisen, since he observed that they especially were afraid on account of consciousness of the deed, in order the more swiftly to free the community from fear, he demanded for punishment the princeps of that wickedness and the inciter of the war, Gutruatus.

Qui etsi ne civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus in castra perducitur. Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi feriretur.

Who, although he did not entrust himself even to his own fellow-citizens, nevertheless, quickly, sought out by the diligence of all, is brought into the camp. Caesar is compelled to his execution, against his own nature, by the very great concourse of the soldiers, who were attributing to him all the perils and detriments of the war that had been incurred, to such a degree that, his body rendered lifeless by beatings, he was struck with the axe.

[39] Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani. Quorum etsi paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem, cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur. Itaque Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium contendit.

[39] There, by frequent letters from Caninius he is made certain of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterius, and in what counsel the townsmen were persisting. Although he despised their small number, nevertheless he judged that their pertinacity ought to be visited with a great punishment, lest all Gaul should think that it was not strength that had failed them for resisting the Romans, but constancy; and lest by this example the other states, relying on the opportunity of their positions, should vindicate themselves into liberty, since he knew it was known to all the Gauls that there remained one summer of his province, which, if they had been able to withstand, they would fear no danger further. Therefore he left the legate Q. Calenus with the legions to follow by regular marches; he himself with all the cavalry hastens as swiftly as he can to Caninius.

[40] Cum contra exspectationem omnium Caesar Uxellodunum venisset oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit. Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Uxellodunum. Hoc avertere loci natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut nullam in partem depressis fossis derivari posset.

[40] When, contrary to everyone’s expectation, Caesar had come to Uxellodunum and observed the town shut in by works, and saw that on no condition could there be a withdrawal from the oppugnation, and moreover learned from fugitives that the townspeople abounded in a great supply of grain, he began to attempt to prohibit the enemy water. A river divided the lowest valley, which girded almost the whole mountain, on which the town Uxellodunum, precipitous on every side, was set. The nature of the place forbade this to be diverted: for it was carried at the very lowest roots of the mountain in such a way that it could in no direction be diverted by sunk trenches.

Erat autem oppidanis difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere possent ascensu. Qua difficultate eorum cognita Caesar sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.

Moreover, the descent there was difficult and precipitous for the townspeople, such that, with our men preventing, they could neither approach the river without wounds and peril of life, nor retire by a steep ascent. With this their difficulty recognized, Caesar, after posting archers and slingers and placing artillery engines also in certain spots opposite the easiest descents, was prohibiting the townspeople from the water of the river.

[41] Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat. Hoc fonte prohiberi posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore et continua dimicatione. Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant; non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque operibus locorum vincere difficultates.

[41] Afterwards the whole multitude of the water-carriers would gather in one place under the wall of the town itself, where a great spring of water burst forth on that side which was almost by an interval of about 300 feet free from the river’s circuit. While the rest were wishing that the townspeople could be kept from this spring, Caesar alone saw it, and he began, over against it, to drive forward vineae (mantlet-sheds) toward the mountain and to construct a ramp with great toil and continuous skirmishing. For the townspeople, from the higher position, run down and fight at long range without danger, and they wound many who persistently advance; nevertheless our soldiers are not deterred from bringing forward the vineae and by toil and works overcoming the difficulties of the terrain.

Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine suspicione hostium facere licebat. Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset. Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti consumebatur.

At the same time they drive covered tunnels from the vineae to the head of the spring; which kind of work it was permitted to do without any danger, without the enemies’ suspicion. An agger is constructed to a height of sixty feet, and on it a tower of ten stories is placed, not indeed one to equal the city-walls (for that could be accomplished by no works), but one that could overtop the spring’s crest. From it, when missiles were hurled by engines toward the approach to the spring, and the townspeople could not draw water without danger, not only the herds and beasts of burden, but even a great multitude of the enemy was consumed by thirst.

[42] Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent; eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur, ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos. Magna repente in ipsis operibus flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per locum praecipitem missa erant, ea vineis et aggere suppressa comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur.

[42] Frightened by this calamity, the townspeople fill casks with tallow, pitch, and shingles; they roll these, burning, onto the works, and at the same time they fight most fiercely, in order to deter the Romans from extinguishing the fire by the peril of combat. A great flame suddenly arose in the works themselves. For whatever had been sent down the precipitous place, being checked by the vineae and the ramp, caught hold of the very thing that was delaying them.

Milites contra nostri, quamquam periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia fortissimo sustinebant animo. Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur. Ita quam quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat.

Our soldiers, on the contrary, although they were pressed by a perilous kind of battle and by an unequal place, nevertheless bore everything with the bravest spirit. For the action was being carried on both from a lofty position and in the sight of our army, and a great clamor was arising on both sides. Thus each man, as far as he could, most conspicuous, in order that his valor might be the more known and the more attested, offered himself to the enemy’s missiles and to the flame.

[43] Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum clamorem undique iubet tollere. Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis operibus armatos murisque disponunt. Ita nostri fine proeli facto celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim restinguunt, partim interscindunt.

[43] When Caesar saw that several of his own were being wounded, he orders cohorts from all parts of the town to climb the hill, and, with a simulation of occupying the walls, he orders a clamor to be raised on all sides. This done, the townspeople, terrified, since they were kept in suspense as to what was being done in the remaining places, call back the armed men from assaulting the works and deploy them on the walls. Thus our men, with the end of the fight brought about, quickly, the works having been caught by flame, partly extinguish them, partly cut them asunder.

Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae fontis intercisae sunt atque aversae. Quo facto repente perennis exaruit fons tantamque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate coacti tradiderunt.

While the townspeople resisted pertinaciously, and even after a great part of their own had been lost to thirst they remained in their resolve, at last by tunnels the vein of the spring was cut and turned aside. This done, the perennial spring suddenly dried up and brought upon the townspeople such despair of safety that they thought it had been done not by the counsel of men, but by the will of the gods. And so, compelled by necessity, they surrendered.

[44] Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque exitum consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplici deterrendos reliquos existimavit. Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum. Drappes, quem captum esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore gravioris supplici paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit.

[44] Caesar, since he knew that his lenity was known to all and did not fear lest he should seem to have done anything too harsh by a cruelty of nature, and since he did not fail to notice what the outcome of his policies would be, if by such a method more men in different places should enter upon plans, judged that the rest must be deterred by an exemplary punishment. And so he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms and granted them life, in order that the punishment of the wicked might be more clearly attested. Drappes, whom I have shown was captured by Caninius, either by the indignity and pain of chains or by fear of a heavier punishment, within a few days abstained from food and so perished.

Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni (crebro enim mutandis locis multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet Caesarem habere), hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani, sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit.

At the same time Lacterius, whom I wrote had fled from the battle, when he had come into the power of Epasnactus the Arvernian (for by frequently changing places he was committing himself to the trust of many, because he seemed likely to linger nowhere longer without danger, since he was conscious how inimical he ought to have Caesar as an enemy), this Epasnactus the Arvernian, most friendly to the Roman people, without any hesitation led him, bound, to Caesar.

[45] Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam potestatem atque in his Surum Aeduum, qui et virtutis et generis summam nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in armis.

[45] Meanwhile Labienus among the Treveri fights a successful cavalry engagement, and, with several Treveri slain, and from the Germans—who were denying auxiliaries to none against the Romans—he brings their leading men alive into his power; and among these, Surus, an Aeduan, who possessed the highest nobility both of valor and of lineage, and he alone of the Aedui had remained in arms up to that time.

[46] Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum. Quam rem sicuti cetera celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates legatos ad Caesarem miserunt obsidesque ei dederunt.

[46] With this matter learned, Caesar, since he saw that affairs were being conducted well in all parts of Gaul and judged that in the previous summers Gaul had been vanquished and subdued—Aquitania he had never approached, though he had in some part subdued it through Publius Crassus—set out with two legions into that part of Gaul, in order to spend there the last portion of the summer season. This affair, just as the rest, he completed quickly and fortunately. For all the states of Aquitania sent envoys to Caesar and gave him hostages.

Quibus rebus gestis ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profecto est, exercitum per legatos in hiberna deduxit: quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit, quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernis, ne qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset. Paucos dies ipse in provincia moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas controversias cognosset, bene meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit hibernatque Nemetocennae.

With these things accomplished, he himself set out to Narbo with a guard of cavalry, and led the army by his legates into winter quarters: he stationed four legions in Belgium with the legates M. Antonius, C. Trebonius, and P. Vatinius, led two legions among the Aedui, whose authority he knew to be highest in all Gaul, placed two among the Turones at the borders of the Carnutes, which would hold all that region contiguous with the Ocean, and the remaining two on the borders of the Lemovices not far from the Arverni, lest any part of Gaul be void of the army. Delaying a few days himself in the province, since he had quickly run through all the assizes, had examined public controversies, had bestowed rewards upon the well-deserving (for he had the greatest capacity of knowing with what disposition each had been in the defection of all Gaul, and what fidelity and aids that province had sustained), with these matters finished he returns to the legions in Belgium and winters at Nemetocenna.

[47] Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo contendisse. Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi, semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset, parente Romanis civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniis se suosque alebat infestisque itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum, intercipiebat.

[47] There he learns that Commius the Atrebatian had contended in battle with his cavalry. For when Antony had come into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates was in obedience, Commius—who, after that wounding which I have mentioned above, had always been accustomed to be ready for all commotions for his fellow citizens, lest for those seeking counsels of war there should be lacking an instigator of arms and a leader—while the state obeyed the Romans, with his own horsemen by brigandages was sustaining himself and his men, and by making the roads hostile he intercepted numerous convoys of supplies which were being conveyed into the winter quarters of the Romans.

[48] Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium mittit. Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum odium Commi adiungebat, quo libentius id faceret quod imperabatur.

[48] There had been assigned to Antonius a prefect of cavalry, C. Volusenus Quadratus, who was wintering with him. Antonius sends this man to pursue the enemy’s cavalry. Volusenus, to that virtue/valor which was singular in him, added a great hatred of Commius, whereby he would more willingly do that which was commanded.

Itaque dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia faciebat. Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem imposita paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius permittit in praefectum. Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque nostros convertunt atque insequuntur.

And so, ambuscades having been set, having attacked his horsemen more than once, he was making favorable battles. Most recently, when the contest was more vehement, and Volusenus, from a desire of intercepting Commius himself, had more stubbornly pursued him with a few men, but he, by vehement flight, had drawn Volusenus out farther, being an enemy to the man he calls upon the faith and aid of his own men, lest his wounds, inflicted under a pledge of good faith, should be suffered to go unpunished; and, his horse turned, he, more incautiously separated from the rest, commits himself against the prefect. All his horsemen do the same, and they wheel some few of our men and pursue them.

Commius incensum calcaribus equum coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur traicit Voluseni. Praefecto vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et conversis equis hostem pellere. Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur, partim intercipiuntur; quod ubi malum dux equi velocitate evitavit, +ac si+ proelio secundo graviter ab eo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur, refertur in castra.

Commius, incensed, with spurs joins his horse to the horse of Quadratus and, with a hostile lance, with great force pierces through the middle of Volusenus’s thigh. With the prefect wounded, our men do not hesitate to resist and, their horses turned, drive the enemy back. When this happened, many of the enemy, smitten by the great impetus of our men, are wounded, and partly are trampled down in flight, partly are intercepted; when the leader avoided this disaster by the speed of his horse, and, as if after a successful engagement, the prefect, grievously wounded by him, so that he seemed about to undergo peril to life, is borne back to the camp.

Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat; unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore, veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit.

But Commius, either with his own pain expiated or with a great part of his men lost, sends legates to Antony and, with hostages, guarantees that he both will be where he shall have prescribed and will do those things which he shall have commanded; he begs this one thing, that, in concession to his fear, he may not come into the sight of any Roman. Antony, judging that this demand arose from a just fear, granted pardon to the petitioner and took hostages.

Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas. Ne quis tamen ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui.

I know that Caesar composed, for each individual year, single commentaries; which I did not think ought to be done by me, because the following year, with L. Paulus and C. Marcellus as consuls, contains no deeds of Gaul greatly accomplished. Nevertheless, lest anyone be ignorant in what places Caesar and the army were at that time, I decided that a few things should be written and joined to this commentary.

[49] Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum. Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet. Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit.

[49] While Caesar was wintering in Belgic territory, he had this one aim: to keep the states in friendship, to give to no one hope or cause for taking up arms. For he desired nothing less than that, upon his departure, some necessity of waging war be imposed on him, lest, when he was about to lead away the army, some war be left behind which all Gaul would gladly take up without present peril. Therefore, by honorably addressing the states, by bestowing the greatest rewards upon the princes, by imposing no burdens, he easily held Gaul—wearied by so many adverse battles—in peace, under a better condition of obedience.

[50] Ipse hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret, quibus M. Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem. Contendebat enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante praemiserat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere cupiebant. Hunc etsi augurem prius factum quam Italiam attingeret in itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent, simulque se et honorem suum sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser.

[50] He himself, the winter-quarters finished, contrary to custom set out into Italy by the greatest possible marches, to address the municipalities and colonies, to whom he had commended the candidacy for the priesthood of M. Antonius, his quaestor. For he was contending in influence both gladly for the man most closely conjoined to himself, whom a little before he had sent ahead for the canvass, and also keenly against the faction and power of a few, who, with M. Antonius’s rebuff, were eager to tear apart the favor of Caesar as he was stepping down. Although he had heard on the march that this man had been made augur before he touched Italy, nevertheless he judged that he had no less just a cause for approaching the municipalities and colonies, to give them thanks because they had furnished their attendance and their service to Antony, and at the same time to commend himself and his honor of the following year, for the reason that his adversaries were insolently boasting that L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus had been created consuls who would despoil all the honor and dignity of Caesar, Ser. having been snatched away.

Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.

the consulship of Servius Galba, although he had prevailed much more by favor and suffrages, because he was joined to him both by familiarity and by the consuetude of the legation.

[51] Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis incredibili honore atque amore. Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum, itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat.

[51] The arrival of Caesar was received by all the municipalities and colonies with incredible honor and love. For then for the first time he was coming back from that war of all Gaul. Nothing was left undone that could be devised for the adornment of the gates, the roads, all the places through which Caesar was about to go.

Cum liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores.

With their children, the whole multitude went forth to meet him; sacrificial victims were immolated in all places; with triclinia spread, the fora and temples were occupied, so that even the joy of a most eagerly expected triumph could be anticipated. So great was the magnificence among the more opulent, the eagerness among the more humble.

[52] Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum lustravit. T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem locorum propter salubritatem existimabat.

[52] When Caesar had run through all the regions of toga-clad Gaul, he returned with the highest celerity to the army at Nemetocenna, and, the legions having been summoned out from all the winter-quarters to the borders of the Treveri, he set out thither and there lustrated the army. He appointed T. Labienus over the toga-clad Gaul, in order that, with greater commendation, he might be won over for his petition for the consulship. He himself made only so much of marches as he judged to be sufficient for a change of places on account of salubrity.

Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen neque de Labieno credidit quicquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sententiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri. Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto liberam et sui iuris civitatem.

There, although he frequently heard that Labienus was being solicited by his enemies and was made more certain that it was being transacted by the counsels of a few, to the end that, with the authority of the senate interposed, he be despoiled of some part of his army, nevertheless he neither believed anything concerning Labienus nor could he be induced to do anything against the authority of the senate. For he judged that, by the free votes of the Conscript Fathers, his cause would be easily obtained. For Gaius Curio, tribune of the plebs, when he had undertaken that Caesar’s cause and dignity were to be defended, had often promised the senate that, if the fear of Caesar’s arms harmed anyone, and since Pompey’s domination and arms were bringing no small terror into the forum, each should withdraw from arms and dismiss his army: by that act the commonwealth would be free and of its own right.

Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed etiam se per discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules amicique Pompei +iusserunt+ atque ita rem morando discusserunt.

Nor did he promise only this, but he even began to bring it to pass by a discession; and, in order that this not be done, the consuls and the friends of Pompey gave orders, and thus by delaying they broke up the matter.

[53] Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnaret Caesaris dignitatem, contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de Caesaris provinciis, sententiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello, qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens in alia omnia transiit. Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent.

[53] This was a great testimony of the whole senate and consistent with the previous act. For Marcellus in the previous year, when he was assailing Caesar’s dignity, had, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, brought before the senate ahead of time the matter of Caesar’s provinces; and after opinions had been stated, with Marcellus—who was seeking all dignity for himself from envy of Caesar—calling for a division, the senate, in full attendance, passed over to all other business. By these things the spirits of Caesar’s enemies were not broken, but they were admonished to prepare greater necessities, by which the senate might be compelled to approve that which they themselves had determined.

[54] Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthicum legio una a Cn. Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni detrahuntur. Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat, confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero dedit. Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum suorum, Pompeio legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi.

[54] Then a senatorial decree is made, that for the Parthian war one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompey, the other by Gaius Caesar; nor was it obscure that two legions were being stripped from one man. For Gnaeus Pompey gave the First Legion—which he had sent to Caesar, composed from the levy of Caesar’s province—as though it were from his own numbers. Caesar, however, since there was least doubt about the intent of his adversaries, sent a legion back to Pompey, and in his own name ordered the Fifteenth, which he had had in Cisalpine Gaul, to be handed over in accordance with the senatorial decree.

In eius locum tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur. Ipse exercitui distribuit hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C. Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit. Sic enim existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas summa esset, exercitibus continerentur.

In his place he sends the thirteenth legion into Italy to protect the garrisons, from which garrisons the fifteenth was being drawn off. He himself distributes winter quarters to the army: he stations Gaius Trebonius with four legions in Belgic territory, he leads Gaius Fabius with as many into the Aedui. For thus he judged that Gaul would be safest, if the Belgae, whose valor was greatest, and the Aedui, whose authority was highest, were contained by armies.

Ipse in Italiam profectus est.

He himself set out into Italy.

[55] Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse. Hoc facto quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit…

[55] When he had come there, he learns through C. Marcellus, the consul, that the two legions sent back by him, which by decree of the senate ought to be led to the Parthian war, had been handed over to Gn. Pompeius and kept in Italy. By this deed, although it was doubtful to no one what was being prepared against Caesar, nevertheless Caesar decided that everything must be endured, so long as some hope was left to him of disputing the matter by right rather than of waging war. He strives…