Bacon: NOVUM ORGANUM

De statu scientiarum, quod non sit foelix aut majorem in modum auctus; quodque alia omnino quam prioribus cognita fuerit via aperienda sit intellectui humano, et alia comparanda auxilia, ut mens suo jure in rerum naturam uti possit.

On the state of the sciences, that it is not felicitous nor augmented in any great measure; and that a way altogether other than those known to the former ages must be opened to the human intellect, and other auxiliaries be procured, so that the mind may, in its own right, make use of the nature of things.

Videntur nobis homines nec opes nec vires suas bene nosse; verum de illis majora quam par est, de his minora credere. Ita fit, ut aut artes receptas insanis pretiis aestimantes nil amplius quaerant, aut seipsos plus aequo contemnentes vires suas in levioribus consumant, in iis quae ad summum rei faciant non experiantur. Quare sunt et suae scientiis columnae tanquam fatales; cum ad ulterius penetrandum homines nec desiderio nec spe excitentur.

It seems to us that men neither well know their own resources nor their own forces; rather, about the former they believe greater things than is fitting, about the latter less. Thus it comes about that either, estimating the received arts at insane prices, they seek nothing further; or, contemning themselves more than is fair, they consume their forces on lighter matters, and do not make trial in those things which make to the summit of the matter. Wherefore there are for the sciences also their own pillars, as it were fatal; since for penetrating further men are excited neither by desire nor by hope.

Atque cum opinio copiae inter maximas causas inopiae sit; quumque ex fiducia praesentium vera auxilia negligantur in posterum; ex usu est, et plane ex necessitate, ut ab illis quae adhuc inventa sunt in ipso operis nostri limine (idque relictis ambagibus et non dissimulanter) honoris et admirationis excessus tollatur; utili monito, ne homines eorum aut copia aut utilitatem in majus accipiant aut celebrent. Nam si quis in omnem illam librorum varietatem qua artes et scientiae exultant diligentius introspiciat, ubique inveniet ejusdem rei repetitiones infinitas, tractandi modis diversas, inventione praeoccupatas; ut omnia primo intuitu numerosa, facto examine pauca reperiantur. Et de utilitate aperte dicendum est, sapientiam istam quam a Graecis potissimum hausims pueritiam quandam scientiae videri, atque habere quod proprium est puerorum, ut ad garriendum prompta, ad generandum invalida et immatura sit.

And since the opinion of abundance is among the greatest causes of want; and since, from confidence in present things, true aids for the future are neglected; it is expedient, and plainly of necessity, that, from those things which have thus far been discovered, at the very threshold of our work (and that with circumlocutions laid aside and without dissembling), the excess of honor and admiration be removed; with a useful warning, lest men take or celebrate either their abundance or their utility in an exaggerated degree. For if anyone were to look more diligently into all that variety of books wherein the arts and sciences exult, everywhere he will find infinite repetitions of the same matter, diverse in modes of handling, forestalled in invention; so that all things numerous at first glance, upon examination are found few. And as to utility, it must be said openly, that this wisdom which we have imbibed chiefly from the Greeks seems a certain puerility of knowledge, and has what is proper to children, namely, that it is ready for garrulity, but weak and immature for generating.

Controversiarum enim ferax, operum effoeta est. Adeo ut fabula illa de Scylla in literarum statum, qualis habetur, ad vivum quadrare videatur; quae virginis os et vultum extulit, ad uterum vero monstra latrantia succingebantur et adhaerebant. Ita habent et scientiae quibus insuevimus generalia quaedam blandientia et speciosa, sed cum ad particularia ventum sit, veluti ad partes generationis, ut fructum et opera ex se edant, tum contentiones et oblatrantes disputationes exoriuntur, in quas desinunt, et quae partus locum obtinent.

For it is fertile of controversies, effete of works. So much so that the fable of Scylla seems to fit to the life the state of letters as it is held; which displayed the mouth and countenance of a maiden, but about the womb barking monsters were girt and clung. So too the sciences to which we have become inured have certain flattering and specious generalities; but when it comes to particulars, as it were to the parts of generation, so that they may bring forth fruit and works from themselves, then contentions and barking disputations arise, into which they end, and which take the place of birth.

Praeterea, si hujusmodi scientiae plane res mortua non essent, id minime videtur eventurum fuisse quod per multa jam saecula usu venit, ut illae suis immotae fere haereant vestigiis, nec incrementa genere humano digna sumant: eo usque, ut saepenumero non solum assertio maneat assertio sed etiam quaestio maneat quaestio, et per disputationes non solvatur sed figatur et alatur, omnisque traditio et successio disciplinarum repraesentet et exhibeat personas magistri et auditoris, non inventoris et ejus qui inventis aliquid eximium adjiciat. In artibus autem mechanicis contrarium evenire videmus; quae, ac si aurae cujusdam vitalis forent participes, quotidie crescunt et perficiuntur, et in primis authoribus rudes plerunque et fere onerosae et informes apparent, postea vero novas virtutes et commoditatem quandam adipiscuntur, eo usque, ut citius studia hominum et cupiditates deficiant et mutentur, quam illae ad culmen et perfectionem suam pervenerint. Philosophia contra et scientiae intellectuales, statuarum more, adorantur et celebrantur, sed non promoventur.

Moreover, if sciences of this kind were not plainly a dead thing, it seems least likely that what has now for many ages come to pass in practice would have happened: that they cling almost unmoved to their own footprints, nor take increments worthy of the human race; to such a point that very often not only an assertion remains an assertion, but even a question remains a question, and by disputations it is not resolved but fixed and nourished; and every tradition and succession of disciplines represents and exhibits the persons of the master and the auditor, not of the inventor and of him who adds something exceptional to the inventions. In the mechanical arts, however, we see the contrary happen: which, as if they were partakers of a certain vital aura, grow and are perfected day by day; and in their first authors they commonly appear rude, and almost onerous and unshapely, but afterwards they acquire new virtues and a certain commodiousness—so far that the studies and desires of men fail and change sooner than they have arrived at their summit and perfection. Philosophy, by contrast, and the intellectual sciences, after the manner of statues, are adored and celebrated, but are not advanced.

Quin etiam in primo nonnunquam authore maxime vigent, et deinceps degenerant. Nam postquam homines dedititii facti sint et in unius sententiam (tanquam pedarii senatores) coierint, scientiis ipsis amplitudinem non addunt, sed in certis authoribus ornandis et stipandis servili officio funguntur. Neque illud afferat quispiam, scientias paullatim succrescentes tandem ad statum quendam pervenisse, et tum demum (quasi confectis spatiis legitimis) in operibus paucorum sedes fixas posuisse; atque postquam nil melius inveniri potuerit, restare scilicet ut quae inventa sint exornentur et colantur.

Nay even, sometimes they flourish most in the first author, and thereafter degenerate. For after men have been made as dediticii and have coalesced into the judgment of a single person (like pedarian senators), they do not add amplitude to the sciences themselves, but discharge a servile office in adorning and thronging about certain authors. Nor let anyone allege this: that the sciences, growing little by little, have at length arrived at a certain settled state, and then at last (as if the lawful courses were run) have set fixed seats in the works of a few; and that, after nothing better could be discovered, it of course remains that the things discovered be adorned and cultivated.

Atque optandum quidem esset haec ita se habuisse. Rectius illud et verius, istas scientiarum mancipationes nil aliud esse quam rem ex paucorum hominum confidentia et reliquorum socordia et inertia natam. Postquam enim scientiae per partes diligenter fortasse excultae et tractatae fuerint, tum forte exortus est aliquis, ingenio audax et propter methodi compendia acceptus et celebratus, qui specie tenus artem constituerit, revera veterum labores corruperit.

And indeed it would have been to be desired that matters had thus stood. Rather, this is more correct and truer: those mancipations of the sciences are nothing else than a thing born from the confidence of a few men and the sloth and inertia of the rest. For after the sciences have perhaps been diligently cultivated and handled in parts, then perchance someone has arisen—bold in wit, and, on account of compendia of method, accepted and celebrated—who has established the art in appearance only, but in reality has corrupted the labors of the ancients.

Id tamen posteris gratum esse solet, propter usum operis expeditum et inquisitionis novae taedium et impatientiam. Quod si quis consensu jam inveterato tanquam temporis judicio moveatur, sciat se ratione admodum fallaci et infirma niti. Neque enim nobis magna ex parte notum est, quid in scientiis et artibus, variis saeculis et locis, innotuerit et in publicum emanarit; multo minus, quid a singulis tentatum sit et secreto agitatum.

Yet that is wont to be pleasing to posterity, on account of the expeditious use of the work and the tedium and impatience of new inquiry. But if anyone is moved by a consent now inveterate as though by the judgment of time, let him know that he relies upon a reasoning exceedingly fallacious and infirm. For to a great extent it is not known to us what in the sciences and arts, in various ages and places, has become known and has emanated into the public; much less what has been attempted by individuals and agitated in secret.

Itaque nec temporis partus nec abortus extant in fastis. Neque ipse consensus ejusque diuturnitas magni prorsus aestimandus est. Utcunque enim varia sint genera politiarum, unicus est status scientiarum, isque semper fuit et mansurus est popularis.

Therefore neither the offspring of time nor its miscarriages appear in the annals. Nor is consensus itself, and its long duration, by any means to be greatly esteemed. For however diverse the kinds of polities, there is a single status of the sciences, and it always has been and will remain popular.

Atque apud populum plurimum vigent doctrinae aut contentiosae et pugnaces aut speciosae et inanes, quales videlicet assensum aut illaqueant aut demulcent. Itaque maxima ingenia proculdubio per singulas aetates vim passa sunt; dum viri captu et intellectu non vulgares, nihilo secius existimationi suae consulentes, temporis et multitudinis judicio se submiserint. Quamobrem altiores contemplationes si forte usquam emicuerint, opinionum vulgarium ventis subinde agitatae sunt et extinctae.

And among the populace, the doctrines flourish most which are either contentious and pugnacious or specious and empty—such as, namely, either ensnare assent or soothe it. Therefore the greatest minds, without doubt, through each age have suffered constraint; while men not vulgar in grasp and intellect, nonetheless consulting their reputation, have submitted themselves to the judgment of the time and of the multitude. Wherefore, if perchance loftier contemplations have anywhere flashed forth, they have again and again been tossed by the winds of vulgar opinions and extinguished.

Adeo ut Tempus, tanquam fluvius, levia et inflata ad nos devexerit, gravia et solida demerserit. Quin et illi ipsi authores qui dictaturam quandam in scientiis invaserunt et tanta confidentia de rebus pronuntiant, cum tamen per intervalla ad se redeunt, ad querimonias de subtilitate naturae, veritatis recessibus, rerum obscuritate, causarum implicatione, ingenii humani infirmitate, se convertunt; in hoc nihilo tamen modestiores, cum malint communem hominum et rerum conditionem causari quam de seipsis confiteri. Quin illis hoc fere solenne est, ut quicquid ars aliqua non attingat id ipsum ex eadem arte impossibile esse statuant.

So much so that Time, like a river, has borne down to us the light and puffed-up, and has submerged the heavy and solid. Nay, even those very authors who have usurped a certain dictatorship in the sciences and with such confidence pronounce on matters—yet, when at intervals they return to themselves, they turn to complaints about the subtlety of nature, the recesses of truth, the obscurity of things, the implication of causes, the infirmity of the human wit; in this, however, not a whit more modest, since they prefer to plead the common condition of men and things rather than to confess about themselves. Moreover, it is almost a set practice with them, that whatever some art does not attain, that very thing they decree to be impossible from that same art.

Neque vero damnari potest ars, quum ipsa disceptet et judicet. Itaque id agitur, ut ignorantia etiam ab ignominia liberetur. Atque quae tradita et recepta sunt ad hunc fere modum se habent: quoad opera sterilia, quaestionum plena; incrementis suis tard et languida; perfectionem in tot simulantia, sed per partes male impleta; delectu autem popularia et authoribus ipsis suspecta, ideoque artificiis quibusdam munita et ostentata.

Nor indeed can the art be condemned, since it itself disputes and judges. Therefore the aim is, that ignorance also be freed from ignominy. And the things handed down and received stand about in nearly this fashion: as regards works—sterile, full of questions; in their increments slow and languid; simulating perfection in the whole, but in the parts ill-filled; in selection popular, and to the authors themselves suspect, and therefore fortified by certain artifices and ostentatiously displayed.

Qui autem et ipsi experiri et se scientiis addere earumque fines proferre statuerunt, nec illi a receptis prorsus desciscere ausi sunt, nec fontes rerum petere. Verum se magnum quiddam consequutos putant si aliquid ex proprio inserant et adjiciant; prudenter secum reputantes, se in assentiendo modestiam, in adjiciendo libertatem tueri posse. Verum dum opinionibus et moribus consulitur, mediocritates istae laudatae in magnum scientiarum detrimentum cedunt.

Those, however, who have resolved both to make trial themselves and to attach themselves to the sciences and to carry forward their bounds, have neither dared utterly to depart from the received, nor to seek the fountains of things. Rather, they think they have achieved something great if they insert and add something of their own; prudently reckoning with themselves that in assenting they can maintain modesty, in adding liberty. But while heed is paid to opinions and to customs, these lauded mediocrities turn to the great detriment of the sciences.

Vix enim datur authores simul et admirari et superare. Sed fit aquarum more, quae non altius ascendunt quam ex quo descenderunt. Itaque hujusmodi homines emendant nonnulla sed parum promovent, et proficiunt in melius non in majus.

For scarcely is it granted to both admire and surpass authors at the same time. But it happens after the manner of waters, which do not ascend higher than that whence they have descended. Therefore men of this kind amend some things but promote little, and they make progress for the better, not into the greater.

Neque tamen defuerunt, qui ausu majore omnia integra sibi duxerunt, et ingenii impetu usi, priora prosternendo et destruendo aditum sibi et placitis suis fecerunt; quorum tumultu non magnopere profectum est: quum philosophiam et artes non re ac opere amplificare, sed placita tantum permutare atque regnum opinionum in se transferre contenderint; exiquo sane fructu, quum inter errores oppositos errandi causae sint fere communes. Si qui autem nec alienis nec propriis placitis obnoxii, sed libertati faventes, ita animati fuere ut alios secum simul quaerere cuperent; illi sane affectu honesti, sed conatu invalidi fuerunt. Probabiles enim tantum rationes secuti videntur, et argumentorum vertigine circumaguntur, et promiscua quaerendi licentia severitatem inquisitionis enervarunt.

Nor, however, have there been lacking those who, with greater audacity, took everything as intact for themselves, and, using the impetus of their genius, by prostrating and destroying what came before made an access for themselves and for their own tenets; from whose tumult not much was advanced: since they strove not to amplify philosophy and the arts in thing and in work, but only to permute tenets and to transfer to themselves the kingdom of opinions; with truly exiguous fruit, since between opposed errors the causes of erring are almost common. But if there were any who, subject neither to others’ nor to their own tenets, but favoring liberty, were so animated that they desired others to seek together with them; they, indeed, were honorable in affection, but weak in endeavor. For they seem to have followed only probable reasons, and are whirled around by the vertigo of arguments, and by a promiscuous license of seeking have enervated the severity of inquiry.

Nemo autem reperitur, qui in rebus ipsis et experientia moram fecerit legitimam. Atque nonnulli rursus qui experientiae undis se commisere et fere mechanici facti sunt, tamen in ipsa experientia erraticam quandam inquisitionem exercent, nec ei certa lege militant. Quin et plerique pusilla quaedam pensa sibi proposuere, pro magno ducentes si unum aliquod inventurm eruere possint; instituto non minus tenui, quam imperito.

No one, however, is found who has made a legitimate delay in the things themselves and in experience. And some, again, who have committed themselves to the waves of experience and have become almost mechanical, yet within experience itself exercise a certain erratic inquisition, nor do they serve it under a fixed law. Nay more, very many have proposed to themselves certain petty tasks, counting it a great thing if they can dig out some single invention; a plan no less thin than unskilled.

Nemo enim rei alicujus naturam in ipsa re recte aut foeliciter perscrutatur; verum post laboriosam experimentorum variationem non acquiescit, sed invenit quod ulterius quaerat. Neque illud imprimis omttendum est, quod omnis in experiendo industria statim ab initio opera quaedam destinata praepropero et intempestivo studio captavit; fructifera (inquam) experimenta, non lucifera, quaesivit; nec ordinem divinum imitata est, qui primo die lucem tantum creavit, eique unum diem integrum attribuit; neque illo die quicquam materiati operis produxit, verum sequentibus diebus ad ea descendit. At qui summas dialecticae partes tribuerunt ateque inde fidissima scientiis praesidia comparari putarunt, verissime et optime viderunt intellectum humanum sibi permissum merito suspectum esse debere.

For no one indeed searches out the nature of any thing in the very thing itself rightly or felicitously; rather, after a laborious variation of experiments he does not rest, but finds something further to seek. Nor must this, first of all, be omitted: that all industry in experimenting straightway from the beginning has snatched at certain predetermined works with a premature and untimely zeal; it has sought fructiferous (I say) experiments, not luciferous; nor has it imitated the divine order, which on the first day created light only, and assigned to it one whole day; nor on that day produced anything of material work, but on the following days descended to those things. But they who have attributed the highest roles to dialectic, and from thence have thought that the most trustworthy presidia for the sciences might be procured, have most truly and excellently seen that the human intellect, when permitted to itself, ought deservedly to be held suspect.

Verum infirmior omnino est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali expers. Siquidem dialectica quae recepta est, licet ad civilia et artes quae in sermone et opinione positae sunt rectissime adhibeatur, naturae tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit; et prensando quod non capit, ad errores potius stabiliendos et quasi figendos quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.

But altogether weaker is the medicine than the malady; nor is it itself free from the malady. For the dialectic which is received, although it may most rightly be applied to civil matters and to the arts which are set in discourse and opinion, yet by a long interval it does not attain to the subtlety of nature; and by grasping at what it does not comprehend, it has served rather for establishing errors and, as it were, fixing them, than for opening a way to truth.

Quare, ut quae dicta sunt complectamur, non videtur hominibus aut aliena fides aut industria propria circa scientias hactenus foeliciter illuxisse; praesertim quum et in demonstrationibus et in experimentis adhuc cognitis parum sit praesidii. Aedificium autem hujus universi, structura sua, intellectui humano contemplanti, instar labyrinthi est; ubi tot ambigua viarum, tam fallaces rerum et signorum similitudines, tam obliquae et implexae naturarum spirae et nodi, undequaque se ostendunt. Iter autem sub incerto sensus lumine, interdum affulgente, interdum se condente, per experientiae et rerum particularium sylvas perpetuo faciendum est.

Wherefore, to gather together what has been said, neither the authority of others nor one’s own industry seems thus far to have shone favorably upon the sciences; especially since both in demonstrations and in the experiments hitherto known there is little of succor. But the edifice of this universe, by its structure, is to the human intellect contemplating it like a labyrinth; where so many ambiguities of paths, so fallacious similitudes of things and of signs, so oblique and implexed coils and knots of natures, present themselves on every side. The journey, moreover, under the uncertain light of sense—now flashing forth, now hiding itself—must be perpetually made through the forests of experience and of particular things.

Quin etiam duces itineris (ut dictum est) qui se offerunt, et ipsi implicantur, atque errorum et errantium numerum augent. In rebus tam duris, de judicio hominum ex vi propria, aut etiam de foelicitate fortuita, desperandum est. Neque enim ingeniorum quantacunque excellentia, neque experiendi alea saepius repetita, ista vincere queat.

Indeed, even the guides of the journey (as has been said) who offer themselves are themselves entangled, and they increase the number of errors and of those erring. In matters so hard, one must despair of the judgment of men from their own native force, or even of fortuitous felicity. For neither the excellence of intellects, however great, nor the alea of experimenting, though repeated again and again, can conquer these things.

Vestigia filo regenda sunt: omnisque via, usque a primis ipsis sensuum perceptionibus, certa ratione munienda. Neque haec ita accipienda sunt, ac si nihil omnino tot saeculis, tantis laboribus, actum sit. Neque enim eorum quae inventa sunt nos poenitet.

Our steps must be guided by a thread; and every path, all the way from the very first perceptions of the senses, must be fortified by sure reason. Nor are these things to be taken as though nothing at all had been accomplished in so many centuries and by such labors. For we do not regret the things that have been discovered.

Atque antiqui certe, in iis quae in ingenio et meditatione abstracta posita sunt, mirabiles se viros praestitere. Verum quemadmodum saeculis prioribus, cum homines in navigando per stellarum tantum observationes cursum dirigebant, veteris sane continentis oras legere potuerunt, aut maria aliqua minora et mediterranea trajicere; priusquam autem oceanus trajiceretur et novi orbis regiones detegerentur, necesse fuit usum acus nauticae, ut ducem viae magis fidum et certum, innotuisse: simili prorsus ratione, quae hucusque in artibus et scientiis inventa sunt, ea hujusmodi sunt ut usu, meditatione, observando, argumentando, reperiri potuerint; utpote quae sensibus propiora sint et communibus notionibus fere subjaceant; antequam vero ad remotiora et occultiora naturae liceat appellere, necessario requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectus humani usus et adoperatio introducatur.

And certainly the ancients, in those things which are placed in ingenuity and abstract meditation, proved themselves marvelous men. But just as in prior ages, when men in sailing directed their course solely by observations of the stars, they could indeed skirt the shores of the old continent, or traverse certain smaller and mediterranean seas; before, however, the ocean could be crossed and the regions of the New World discovered, it was necessary that the use of the nautical needle, as a guide of the way more trustworthy and certain, should have become known: in precisely the same way, the things that have hitherto been discovered in the arts and sciences are of such a kind as could have been found by use, meditation, observing, and arguing, inasmuch as they are nearer to the senses and for the most part lie under common notions; but before it be permitted to make for the more remote and more hidden parts of nature, it is necessarily required that a better and more perfect use and operation of the human mind and intellect be introduced.

Nos certe, aeterno veritatis amore devicti, viarum incertis et arduis et solitudinibus nos commisimus; et divino auxilio freti et innixi, mentem nostram et contra opinionum violentias et quasi instructas acies, et contra proprias et internas haesitationes et scrupulos, et contra rerum caligines et nubes et undequaque volantes phantasias, sustinuimus; ut tandem magis fida et secura indicia viventibus et posteris comparare possemus. Qua in re si quid profecerimus, non alia sane ratio nobis viam aperuit quam vera et legitima spiritus humani humiliatio. Omnes enim ante nos, qui ad artes inveniendas se applicuerunt, conjectis paulisper in res et exempla et experientiam oculis, statim, quasi inventio nil aliud esset quam quaedam excogitatio, spiritus proprios ut sibi oracula exhiberent quodammodo invocarunt.

We assuredly, overcome by an eternal love of truth, have committed ourselves to the uncertainties and arduities and solitudes of the ways; and, relying and leaning on divine aid, we have borne up our mind both against the violence of opinions and their, as it were, marshalled battle-lines, and against our own and inward hesitations and scruples, and against the mists of things and the clouds and the phantasms flying from every side; so that at length we might be able to provide more faithful and secure indications for the living and for posterity. In which matter, if we have made any progress, no other method truly opened the way for us than a true and legitimate humbling of the human spirit. For all before us who applied themselves to discovering the arts, having cast their eyes for a little while upon things and examples and experience, straightway, as if discovery were nothing else than a certain excogitation, invoked their own spirits in such a way that they might, as it were, exhibit oracles to themselves.

Nos vero inter res caste et perpetuo versantes, intellectum longius a rebus non abstrahimus quam ut rerum imagines et radii (ut in sensu fit) coire possint; unde fit, ut ingenii viribus et excellentiae non multum relinquatur. Atque quam in inveniendo adhibemus humilitatem, eandem et in docendo sequuti sumus. Neque enim aut confutationum triumphis, aut antiquitatis advocationibus, aut authoritatis usurpatione quadam, aut etiam obscuritatis velo, aliquam his nostris inventis majestatem imponere aut conciliare conamur; qualia reperire non difficile esset ei, qui nomini suo non animis aliorum lumen affundere conaretur.

But we, conversing among things chastely and continually, do not abstract the intellect farther from things than that the images and rays of things (as in sense) can cohere; whence it comes to pass that not much is left to the forces and excellence of genius. And the same humility which we employ in discovering we have likewise followed in teaching. For we do not endeavor to impose or conciliate any majesty for these our inventions either by the triumphs of confutations, or by the advocations of antiquity, or by a certain usurpation of authority, or even by the veil of obscurity; such aids it would not be difficult to find for one who strove to pour light upon his own name, and not upon the minds of others.

Non (inquam) ullum aut vim aut insidias hominum judiciis fecimus aut paramus; verum eos ad res ipsas et rerum foedera adducimus; ut ipsi videant quid habeant, quid arguant, quid addant atque in commune conferant. Nos autem si qua in re vel male credidimus, vel obdormivimus et minus attendimus, vel defecimus in via et inquisitionem abrupimus, nihilominus iis modis res nudas et apertas exhibemus, ut errores nostri, antequam scientiae massam altius inficiant, notari et separari possint; atque etiam ut facilis et expedita sit laborum nostrorum continuatio. Atque hoc modo inter empiricam et rationalem facultatem (quarum morosa et inauspicata divortia et repudia omnia in humana familia turbavere) conjugium verum et legitimum in perpetuum nos firmasse existimamus.

Not (I say) have we either done or are we preparing any force or plots upon the judgments of men; rather we lead them to the things themselves and to the bonds and compacts of things, that they themselves may see what they have, what they may argue, what they may add and confer to the common stock. But if in any matter we have either believed amiss, or have fallen asleep and attended less, or have failed on the way and broken off the inquiry, nonetheless we exhibit things naked and open in such ways that our errors, before they infect more deeply the mass of science, may be noted and separated; and also that the continuation of our labors may be easy and expeditious. And in this way, between the empirical and the rational faculty (whose morose and ill‑omened divorces and repudiations have thrown everything into confusion in the human family), we think that we have established forever a true and legitimate marriage.

Quamobrem, quum haec arbitrii nostri non sint, in principio operis, ad Deum Patre, Deum Verbum, Deum Spiritum, presces fundimus humillimas et ardentissimas, ut humani generis aerumnarum memores et peregrinationis istius vitae in qua dies paucos et malos terimus, novis suis eleemosynis, per manus nostras, familiam humanam dotare dignentur. Atque illud insuper supplices rogamus, ne humana divinis officiant, neve ex reseratione viarum sensus et accensione majore luminis naturalis aliquid incredulitatis et noctis animis nostris erga divina mysteria oboriatur: sed potius, ut ab intellectu puro, a phantasiis et vanitate repurgato et divinis oraculis nihilominus subdito et prorsus dedititio, fidei dentur quae fidei sunt. Postremo, ut scientiae veneno a serpente infuso, quo animus humanus tumet et inflatur, deposito, nec altum sapiamus nec ultra sobrium, sed veritatem in charitate colamus.

Wherefore, since these things are not within our own arbitration, at the beginning of the work we pour forth most humble and most ardent prayers to God the Father, God the Word, God the Spirit, that, mindful of the afflictions of the human race and of the pilgrimage of this life in which we wear out a few and evil days, they may deign by their new alms, through our hands, to endow the human family. And moreover we suppliantly ask this: that human things may not do disservice to divine things, nor that from the unbarring of the ways of sense and the greater kindling of natural light there arise in our souls any unbelief and night toward the divine mysteries: but rather, that from an intellect pure, purged from phantasies and vanity and nonetheless subject and altogether surrendered to the divine oracles, there be given to faith the things that are faith’s. Finally, that, laying aside the poison of knowledge infused by the serpent, whereby the human mind swells and is puffed up, we may neither be wise in high things nor beyond what is sober, but may cultivate truth in charity.

Peractis autem votis, ad homines conversi, quaedam et salutaria monemus et aequa postulamus. Monemus primum (quod etiam precati sumus) ut homines sensum in officio, quoad divina, contineant. Sensus enim (instar solis) globi terrestris faciem aperit, coelestis claudit et obsignat.

However, our vows completed, turning to men we offer certain salutary admonitions and ask for equitable things. We admonish first (which also we have prayed) that men keep sense in its office, as regards divine matters. For sense (in the likeness of the sun) opens the face of the terrestrial globe, and shuts and seals that of the celestial.

Rursus, ne hujusce mali fuga in contrarium peccent; quod certe fiet, si naturae inquisitionem ulla ex parte veluti interdicto separatam putant. Neque enim pura illa et immaculata scientia naturalis, per quam Adam nomina ex proprietate rebus imposuit, principium aut occasionem lapsui dedit. Sed ambitiosa illa, et imperativa scientiae moralis, de bono et malo dijudicantis, cupiditas, ad hoc ut Homo a Deo deficeret et sibi ipsi leges daret, ea demum ratio atque modus tentationis fuit.

Again, let them not, in flight from this very evil, sin into the contrary; which surely will happen, if they suppose the inquiry of nature to be in any part, as it were by an interdict, separated. For that pure and immaculate natural science, by which Adam imposed names upon things from their properties, gave neither the beginning nor the occasion of the lapse. But that ambitious and imperious desire for moral science, adjudicating of good and evil—unto this end, that Man should fall away from God and give laws to himself—this at last was the very rationale and method of the temptation.

De scientiis autem quae naturam contemplantur sanctus ille philosophus pronuntiat, Gloriam Dei esse celare rem; gloriam regis autem rem invenire: non aliter ac si divina natura innocenti et benevolo purorum ludo delectaretur, qui ideo se abscondunt ut inveniantur; atque animam humanam sibi collusorem in hoc ludo pro sua in homines indulgentia et bonitate cooptaverit. Postremo omnes in universum monitos volumus, ut scientiae veros fines cogitent; nec eam aut animi causa petant, aut ad contentionem, aut ut alios despiciant, aut ad commodum, aut ad famam, aut ad potentiam, aut hujusmodi inferiora; sed ad meritum et usus vitae; eamque in charitate perficiant et regant. Ex appetitu enim potentiae angeli lapsi sunt; ex appetitu scientiae, homines; sed charitatis non est excessus; neque angelus aut homo per eam unquam in periculum venit.

But concerning the sciences which contemplate nature, that holy philosopher pronounces: The glory of God is to conceal a thing; but the glory of the king is to find a thing: as though the divine nature took delight in the innocent and benevolent play of the pure, who therefore hide themselves in order to be found; and had, for its indulgence and kindness toward men, co-opted the human soul as its playfellow in this game. Lastly, we wish all men in general to be admonished to consider the true ends of science; and not to seek it either for its own sake, or for contention, or that they may despise others, or for advantage, or for fame, or for power, or for other such inferior things; but for the merit and the uses of life; and to perfect it and to govern it in charity. For from appetite of power the angels fell; from appetite of knowledge, men; but of charity there is no excess; nor has either angel or man ever through it come into danger.

Postulata autem nostra quae afferimus talis sunt. De nobis ipsis silemus: de re autem quae agitur petimus, ut homines eam non opinionem sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non sectae nos alicujus aut placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis aequi, exutis opinionum zelis et praejudiciis, in commune consulant; ac ab erroribus viarum atque impedimentis, nostris praesidiis et auxiliis, liberati et muniti, laborum qui restant et ipsi in partem veniant.

Our postulates, however, which we bring forward, are of this kind. About ourselves we are silent: but about the matter which is in hand we ask, that men think it to be not opinion but work; and hold for certain that we are attempting to lay the foundations, not of some sect or tenet, but of human utility and amplitude. Then, that, fair as regards their own advantages, with the zeal and prejudices of opinions stripped off, they may consult for the common good; and, from the errors of the ways and the impediments, by our protections and aids, being freed and fortified, they themselves also may come into a share of the labors which remain.

Praeterea, ut bene sperent; neque Instaurationem nostram, ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale, fingant et animo concipiant; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus; mortalitatis autem et humanitatis non sit immemor; quum rem non intra unius aetatis curriculum omnino perfici posse confidat, sed successioni destinet; denique scientias, non per arrogantiam in humani ingenii cellulis, sed submisse in mundo majore quaerat. Vasta vero ut plurimum solent esse, quae inania: solida contrahuntur maxime, et in parvo sita sunt. Postremo etiam petendum videtur (ne forte quis rei ipsius periculo nobis iniquus esse velit) ut videant homines, quatenus ex eo quod nobis asserere necesse sit (si modo nobis ipsi constare velimus) de his nostris opinandi aut sententiam ferendi sibi jus permissum putent: quum nos omnem istam rationem humanam praematuram, anticipantem, et a rebus temere et citius quam oportuit abstractam, (quatenus ad inquisitionem naturae) ut rem variam et perturbatam et male extructam rejiciamus.

Furthermore, that they should hope well; and let them not fashion and conceive in mind our Instauration as something infinite and beyond mortal; since in truth it is the end of infinite error and a legitimate terminus; nor is it unmindful of mortality and humanity; since it is confident that the matter cannot altogether be perfected within the course of a single age, but assigns it to succession; finally, that it seek the sciences, not through arrogance in the cells of human ingenuity, but humbly in the greater world. Vast, indeed, for the most part are wont to be the things that are empty: the solid are most contracted, and are situated in little. Lastly, it also seems to be to be asked (lest perhaps anyone should wish to be unjust to us to the peril of the thing itself) that men see how far, from that which it is necessary for us to assert (if only we wish to be consistent with ourselves), they think a right is permitted to themselves of opining or passing sentence about these our matters: since we reject all that human reasoning which is premature, anticipatory, and abstracted from things rashly and sooner than was fitting (so far as concerns the inquisition of nature), as a thing various and perturbed and ill-constructed.

Neque postulandum est ut ejus judicio stetur, quae ipsa in judicium vocatur.

Nor should it be demanded that one stand by the judgment of that which is itself summoned into judgment.