Cicero: ORATORIA

[1] Quamquam mihi semper frequens conspectus vester multo iucundissimus, hic autem locus ad agendum amplissimus, ad dicendum ornatissimus est visus, Quirites, tamen hoc aditu laudis, qui semper optimo cuique maxime patuit, non mea me voluntas adhuc, sed vitae meae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt. Nam cum antea per aetatem nondum huius auctoritatem loci attingere auderem, statueremque nihil huc nisi perfectum ingenio, elaboratum industria adferri oportere, omne meum tempus amicorum temporibus transmittendum putavi.

[1] Although the sight of you in full numbers has always been most delightful to me, and this place has seemed, Quirites, most ample for acting and most adorned for speaking, nevertheless by this approach to praise, which has always been most open to every best man, I have until now been restrained not by my own will, but by the considerations of my life undertaken from my earliest age. For when formerly on account of my age I did not yet dare to touch the authority of this place, and I had determined that nothing ought to be brought hither unless perfected by inborn talent and elaborated by industry, I thought that all my time ought to be transmitted to the occasions of my friends.

[2] Ita neque hic locus vacuus umquam fuit ab eis qui vestram causam defenderent, et meus labor, in privatorum periculis caste integreque versatus, ex vestro iudicio fructum est amplissimum consecutus. Nam cum propter dilationem comitiorum ter praetor primus centuriis cunctis renuntiatus sum, facile intellexi, Quirites, et quid de me iudicaretis, et quid aliis praescriberetis. Nunc cum et auctoritatis in me tantum sit, quantum vos honoribus mandandis esse voluistis, et ad agendum facultatis tantum, quantum homini vigilanti ex forensi usu prope cotidiana dicendi exercitatio potuit adferre, certe et si quid auctoritatis in me est, apud eos utar qui eam mihi dederunt, et si quid in dicendo consequi possum, eis ostendam potissimum, qui ei quoque rei fructum suo iudicio tribuendum esse duxerunt.

[2] Thus neither has this place ever been vacant of those who would defend your cause, and my labor, conducted chastely and integrally in the perils of private persons, has, from your judgment, obtained most ample fruit. For since, on account of the dilation of the elections, I was three times proclaimed praetor first by all the centuries, I easily understood, Quirites, both what you judged concerning me and what you prescribed for others. Now, since there is in me so much of authority as you have willed to exist by mandating honors, and so much of faculty for action as the almost quotidian exercise of speaking from forensic use could bring to a vigilant man, surely both, if there is any authority in me, I will employ it with those who gave it to me, and if I can achieve anything in speaking, I will show it most especially to those who have considered that the fruit of that matter also ought to be attributed by their judgment.

[3] Atque illud in primis mihi laetandum iure esse video, quod in hac insolita mihi ex hoc loco ratione dicendi causa talis oblata est, in qua oratio deesse nemini possit. Dicendum est enim de Cn. Pompei singulari eximiaque virtute: huius autem orationis difficilius est exitum quam principium invenire. Ita mihi non tam copia quam modus in dicendo quaerendus est.

[3] And this, first of all, I see I may rightly rejoice at, that in this manner of speaking from this place, unusual to me, a cause of such a kind has been offered, in which speech could be lacking to no one. For it must be spoken about the singular and exceptional virtue of Cn. Pompey: of this speech, however, it is more difficult to find an ending than a beginning. Thus for me not so much copiousness as measure in speaking must be sought.

[4] Atque,—ut inde oratio mea proficiscatur, unde haec omnis causa ducitur,—bellum grave et periculosum vestris vectigalibus ac sociis a duobus potentissimis regibus infertur, Mithridate et Tigrane, quorum alter relictus, alter lacessitus, occasionem sibi ad occupandam Asiam oblatam esse arbitrantur. Equitibus Romanis, honestissimis viris, adferuntur ex Asia cotidie litterae, quorum magnae res aguntur in vestris vectigalibus exercendis occupatae: qui ad me, pro necessitudine quae mihi est cum illo ordine, causam rei publicae periculaque rerum suarum detulerunt:

[4] And—and that my speech may set out from that point whence this whole cause is drawn—a grave and dangerous war is being brought upon your revenues and allies by two most powerful kings, Mithridates and Tigranes, who, the one left behind, the other provoked, think that an occasion has been offered to them to seize Asia. To the Roman Knights, most honorable men, letters are brought daily from Asia, whose great interests are engaged, being occupied in administering your revenues: who to me, by reason of the close tie which I have with that order, have reported the cause of the commonwealth and the dangers to their own affairs:

[5] Bithyniae, quae nunc vestra provincia est, vicos exustos esse compluris; regnum Ariobarzanis, quod finitimum est vestris vectigalibus, totum esse in hostium potestate; L. Lucullum, magnis rebus gestis, ab eo bello discedere; huic qui successerit non satis esse paratum ad tantum bellum administrandum; unum ab omnibus sociis et civibus ad id bellum imperatorem deposci atque expeti, eundem hunc unum ab hostibus metui, praeterea neminem.

[5] that in Bithynia, which is now your province, several villages have been burned; that the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, which is adjacent to your revenues, is entirely in the enemies’ power; that L. Lucullus, with great deeds accomplished, is departing from that war; that the one who has succeeded him is not sufficiently prepared for administering so great a war; that one man, as commander for that war, is demanded and sought by all the allies and citizens, and that this same single man is feared by the enemies, and no one else besides.

[6] Causa quae sit videtis: nunc quid agendum sit considerate. Primum mihi videtur de genere belli, deinde de magnitudine, tum de imperatore deligendo esse dicendum. Genus est belli eius modi, quod maxime vestros animos excitare atque inflammare ad persequendi studium debeat: in quo agitur populi Romani gloria, quae vobis a maioribus cum magna in omnibus rebus tum summa in re militari tradita est; agitur salus sociorum atque amicorum, pro qua multa maiores vestri magna et gravia bella gesserunt; aguntur certissma populi Romani vectigalia et maxima, quibus amissis et pacis ornamenta et subsidia belli requiretis; aguntur bona multorum civium, quibus est a vobis et ipsorum et rei publicae causa consulendum.

[6] You see what the cause is: now consider what must be done. First it seems to me that there must be speaking about the genus of the war, then about its magnitude, then about the choosing of a commander. The genus of the war is of such a sort as ought most to arouse and inflame your spirits to the zeal of pursuing it: in it is at stake the glory of the Roman people, which has been handed down to you by your ancestors as great in all matters, and as highest in the military sphere; at stake is the safety of allies and friends, for the sake of which your ancestors waged many great and grievous wars; at stake are the most certain and greatest revenues of the Roman people, the loss of which will make you seek again both the ornaments of peace and the subsidies of war; at stake are the goods of many citizens, for whom you must take counsel, both for their own sakes and for that of the commonwealth.

[7] Et quoniam semper appetentes gloriae praeter ceteras gentis atque avidi laudis fuistis, delenda est vobis ill macula Mithridatico bello superiore concepta, quae penitus iam insedit ac nimis inveteravit in populi Romani nomine,—quod is, qui uno die, tota in Asia, tot in civitatibus, uno nuntio atque una significatione [litterarum] civis Romanos necandos trucidandosque denotavit, non modo adhuc poenam nullam suo dignam scelere suscepit, sed ab illo tempore annum iam tertium et vicesimum regnat, et ita regnat, ut se non Ponti neque Cappadociae latebris occultare velit, sed emergere ex patrio regno atque in vestris vectigalibus, hoc est, in Asiae luce versari.

[7] And since you have always been appetent of glory beyond the other nations and avid for praise, that stain contracted in the former Mithridatic war must be blotted out by you, which has now sunk in deeply and has grown all too inveterate upon the name of the Roman people,—because he who, in one day, throughout all Asia, in so many cities, by one message and one signification of [letters], designated Roman citizens to be killed and butchered, has not only up to now incurred no punishment worthy of his crime, but since that time has been reigning now for the twenty-third year; and he so reigns that he does not wish to hide himself in the lurking-places of Pontus nor of Cappadocia, but to emerge from his paternal kingdom and to move about in your revenues, that is, in the light of Asia.

[8] Etenim adhuc ita nostri cum illo rege contenderunt imperatores, ut ab illo insignia victoriae, non victoriam reportarent. Triumphavit L. Sulla, triumphavit L. Murena de Mithridate, duo fortissimi viri et summi imperatores; sed ita triumpharunt, ut ille pulsus superatusque regnaret. Verum tamen illis imperatoribus laus est tribuenda quod egerunt, venia danda quod reliquerunt, propterea quod ab eo bello Sullam in Italiam res publica, Murenam Sulla revocavit.

[8] For indeed up to this point our imperators have contended with that king in such a way that they carried back from him the insignia of victory, not victory. Lucius Sulla celebrated a triumph, Lucius Murena celebrated a triumph over Mithridates, two most brave men and highest imperators; but they so triumphed that he, though driven back and overcome, continued to reign. Yet nevertheless praise is to be ascribed to those imperators for what they did; indulgence is to be granted for what they left undone, for the reason that from that war the commonwealth recalled Sulla to Italy, and Sulla recalled Murena.

[9] Mithridates autem omne reliquum tempus non ad oblivionem veteris belli, sed ad comparationem novi contulit: qui [postea] cum maximas aedificasset ornassetque classis exercitusque permagnos quibuscumque ex gentibus potuisset comparasset, et se Bosporanis finitimis suis bellum inferre similaret, usque in Hispaniam legatos ac litteras misit ad eos duces quibuscum tum bellum gerebamus, ut, cum duobus in locis disiunctissimis maximeque diversis uno consilio a binis hostium copiis bellum terra marique gereretur, vos ancipiti contentione districti de imperio dimicaretis.

[9] Moreover, Mithridates devoted all the remaining time not to an oblivion of the former war, but to the preparation of a new one: who [afterwards], when he had built and outfitted the very greatest fleets and had assembled very great armies from whatever nations he could, and was pretending that he was bringing war upon the Bosporans, his neighbors, sent legates and letters as far as Spain to those commanders with whom we were then waging war, to the end that, while in two places most far‑separated and most unlike, by a single plan war would be waged by a pair of enemy forces on land and sea, you, distracted by a two‑front contention, might fight it out for dominion.

[10] Sed tamen alterius partis periculum, Sertorianae atque Hispaniensis, quae multo plus firmamenti ac roboris habebat, Cn. Pompei divino consilio ac singulari virtute depulsum est; in altera parte ita res a L. Lucullo summo viro est administrata, ut initia illa rerum gestarum magna atque praeclara non felicitati eius, sed virtuti, haec autem extrema, quae nuper acciderunt, non culpae, sed fortunae tribuenda esse videantur. Sed de Lucullo dicam alio loco, et ita dicam, Quirites, ut neque vera laus ei detracta oratione mea neque falsa adficta esse videatur:

[10] But yet the peril of the other sector, the Sertorian and Spanish one, which had much more firmament and vigor, was driven off by the divine counsel and singular virtue of Gnaeus Pompey; on the other side the matter was so administered by L. Lucullus, a consummate man, that those beginnings of his deeds, great and most illustrious, seem to have to be attributed not to his felicity but to his virtue, while these last results, which have happened recently, seem to have to be assigned not to fault but to fortune. But about Lucullus I will speak in another place, and thus will I speak, Quirites, that neither true praise may seem to have been detracted from him by my speech nor false praise to have been affixed.

[11] de vestri imperi dignitate atque gloria—quoniam is est exorsus orationis meae— videte quem vobis animum suscipiendum putetis. Maiores nostri saepe mercatoribus aut naviculariis nostris iniuriosius tractatis bella gesserunt: vos, tot milibus civium Romanorum uno nuntio atque uno tempore necatis, quo tandem animo esse debetis? Legati quod erant appellati superbius, Corinthum patres vestri totius Graeciae lumen exstinctum esse voluerunt: vos eum regem inultum esse patiemini, qui legatum populi Romani consularem vinculis ac verberibus atque omni supplicio excruciatum necavit?

[11] concerning the dignity and glory of your imperium—since that is the beginning of my speech—see what spirit you think ought to be assumed by you. Our ancestors often waged wars when our merchants or our shipmasters had been treated more injuriously: you, when so many thousands of Roman citizens have been slain by one message and at one time, with what spirit, pray, ought you to be? Because their legates had been addressed more arrogantly, your fathers wished that Corinth, the light of all Greece, be extinguished: will you allow that king to go unavenged, who killed a legate of the Roman people, a man of consular rank, after he had been racked with chains and scourges and every punishment?

Illi libertatem imminutam civium Romanorum non tulerunt: vos ereptam vitam neglegetis? ius legationis verbo violatum illi persecuti sunt: vos legatum omni supplicio interfectum relinquetis?

They did not endure the liberty of Roman citizens diminished: will you neglect a life snatched away? They pursued the right of legation violated in word: will you leave a legate killed with every torture?

[12] Videte ne, ut illis pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit, id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse. Quid? quod salus sociorum summum in periculum ac discrimen vocatur, quo tandem animo ferre debetis?

[12] See to it lest, just as for those men it was most noble to hand down to you so great a glory of empire, so for you it be most disgraceful to be unable to defend and conserve what you have received. What then? that the safety of the allies is being called into the utmost peril and crisis— with what spirit ought you to bear it?

Regno est expulsus Ariobarzanes rex, socius populi Romani atque amicus; imminent duo reges toti Asiae non solum vobis inimicissimi, sed etiam vestris sociis atque amicis; civitates autem omnes cuncta Asia atque Graecia vestrum auxilium exspectare propter periculi magnitudinem coguntur; imperatorem a vobis certum deposcere, cum praesertim vos alium miseritis, neque audent, neque se id facere sine summo periculo posse arbitrantur.

Ariobarzanes the king, an ally and friend of the Roman people, has been expelled from his realm; two kings, most inimical not only to you but also to your allies and friends, are imminent over all Asia; moreover all the cities of all Asia and Greece are compelled, because of the magnitude of the peril, to await your aid; to demand from you a definite commander, especially since you have sent another, they neither dare, nor do they think that they can do this without the utmost danger.

[13] Vident et sentiunt hoc idem quod vos,—unum virum esse, in quo summa sint omnia, et eum propter esse, quo etiam carent aegrius; cuius adventus ipso atque nomine, tametsi ille ad maritimum bellum venerit, tamen impetus hostium repressos esse intellegunt ac retardatos. His vos, quoniam libere loqui non licet, tacite rogant, ut se quoque, sicut ceterarum provinciarum socios, dignos existimetis, quorum salutem tali viro commendetis; atque hoc etiam magis, quod ceteros in provinciam eius modi homines cum imperio mittimus, ut etiam si ab hoste defendant, tamen ipsorum adventus in urbis sociorum non multum ab hostili expugnatione differant. Hunc audiebant antea, nunc praesentem vident, tanta temperantia, tanta mansuetudine, tanta humanitate, ut ei beatissimi esse videantur, apud quod ille diutissime commoratur.

[13] They see and sense this same thing that you do,—that there is one man in whom all the highest powers are summed, and that for this reason he is the one whose lack they feel the more grievously; at whose advent itself and at his very name, although he has come for the maritime war, nevertheless they understand that the onsets of the enemies have been repressed and retarded. These men, since it is not permitted to speak freely, silently beg of you, that you too, just as the allies of the other provinces, deem them worthy, whose safety you should entrust to such a man; and this all the more, because we send into the province other men of this sort with imperium, so that, even if they defend from the enemy, nevertheless their own advent into the cities of the allies does not differ much from a hostile storming. This man they used to hear of before; now they see him present, with such temperance, such mansuetude, such humanity, that those seem most blessed among whom he stays for a very long time.

[14] Qua re si propter socios, nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti, maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt, quanto vos studio convenit iniuriis provocatos sociorum salutem una cum imperi vestri dignitate defendere, praesertim cum de maximis vestris vectigalibus agatur? Nam ceterarum provinciarum vectigalia, Quirites, tanta sunt, ut eis ad ipsas provincias tutandas vix contenti esse possimus: Asia vero tam opima est ac fertilis, ut et ubertate agrorum et varietate fructuum et magnitudine pastionis et multitudine earum rerum quae exportantur, facile omnibus terris antecellat. Itaque haec vobis provincia, Quirites, si et belli utilitatem et pacis dignitatem retinere voltis, non modo a calamitate, sed etiam a metu calamitatis est defenda.

[14] Wherefore, if on behalf of allies, when they themselves had been provoked by no injury, our ancestors waged wars with Antiochus, with Philip, with the Aetolians, with the Punics, with how great zeal does it befit you, stirred by injuries, to defend the safety of allies together with the dignity of your empire, especially since the matter concerns your very greatest revenues? For the revenues of the other provinces, Citizens, are such that with them we can scarcely be content for safeguarding the provinces themselves; Asia, however, is so opulent and fertile that, by the abundance of its fields, the variety of its fruits, the magnitude of its pasturage, and the multitude of those things which are exported, it easily excels all lands. And so this province for you, Citizens, if you wish to retain both the utility of war and the dignity of peace, must be defended not only from calamity, but even from the fear of calamity.

[15] Nam in ceteris rebus cum venit calamitas, tum detrimentum accipitur; at in vectigalibus non solum adventus mali, sed etiam metus ipse adfert calamitatem. Nam cum hostium copiae non longe absunt, etiam si inruptio nulla facta est, tamen pecuaria relinquitur, agri cultura deseritur, mercatorum navigatio conquiescit. Ita neque ex portu neque ex decumis neque ex scriptura vectigal conservari potest: qua re saepe totius anni fructus uno rumore periculi atque uno belli terrore amittitur.

[15] For in other matters, when calamity comes, then detriment is received; but in revenues not only the advent of an ill, but even fear itself brings calamity. For when the forces of the enemy are not far off, even if no irruption has been made, nevertheless stock-raising is abandoned, the cultivation of fields is deserted, the merchants’ navigation comes to rest. Thus revenue can be preserved neither from the port, nor from the tithes, nor from the grazing-tax: wherefore often the produce of an entire year is lost by a single rumor of danger and a single terror of war.

[16] Quo tandem igitur animo esse existimatis aut eos qui vectigalia nobis pensitant, aut eos qui exercent atque exigunt, cum duo reges cum maximis copiis propter adsint? cum una excursio equitatus perbrevi tempore totius anni vectigal auferre possit? cum publicani familias maximas, quas in saltibus habent, quas in agris, quas in portubus atque custodiis, magno periculo se habere arbitrentur?

[16] What, then, do you suppose to be the state of mind either of those who pay us the revenues, or of those who exercise and exact them, when two kings with very great forces are close at hand? when a single incursion of cavalry could, in a very brief time, carry off the revenue of an entire year? when the publicans think that their very large staffs—which they have in the woodlands, in the fields, in the harbors and at the customs-stations—are in great danger?

Putatisne vos illis rebus frui posse, nisi eos qui vobis fructui sunt conservaritis non solum (ut ante dixi) calamitate, sed etiam calamitatis formidine liberatos?

Do you think you can enjoy those things, unless you have preserved those who are to your profit, liberated not only (as I said before) from calamity, but also from the fear of calamity?

[17] Ac ne illud quidem vobis neglegendum est, quod mihi ego extremum proposueram, cum essem de belli genere dicturus, quod ad multorum bona civium Romanorum pertinet, quorum vobis pro vestrßa sapientia, Quirites, habenda est ratio diligenter. Nam et publicani, homines honestissimi atque ornatissimi, suas rationes et copias in illam provinciam contulerunt, quorum ipsorum per se res et fortunae vobis curae esse debent. Etenim si vectigalia nervos esse rei publicae semper duximus, eum certe ordinem, qui exercet illa, firmamentum ceterorum ordinum recte esse dicemus.

[17] And not even that ought to be neglected by you, which I had proposed to myself as the last point when I was going to speak about the kind of war, which pertains to the goods of many Roman citizens, regard for whom, in proportion to your wisdom, Quirites, must be had diligently by you. For even the publicans, most honorable and most adorned men, have transferred their accounts and resources into that province, the very affairs and fortunes of whom ought to be your concern. Indeed, if we have always deemed the revenues to be the nerves of the republic, we shall rightly say that that order which exercises them is the firmament of the other orders.

[18] Deinde ex ceteris ordinibus homines gnavi atque industrii partim ipsi in Asia negotiantur, quibus vos absentibus consulere debetis, partim eorum in ea provincia pecunias magnas conlocatas habent. Est igitur humanitatis vestrae magnum numerum eorum civium calamitate prohibere, sapientiae videre multorum civium calamitatem a re publica seiunctam esse non posse. Etenim primum illud parvi refert, nos publica his amissis vectigalia postea victoria recuperare.

[18] Then, from the other orders, there are men active and industrious: some themselves do business in Asia, for whom, being absent, you ought to look out; some have large monies invested in that province. Therefore it belongs to your humanity to prevent a great number of those citizens from calamity, and to your wisdom to see that the calamity of many citizens cannot be severed from the Republic. For, in the first place, it matters little that we, after these have been lost, should afterward by victory recover the public revenues.

Neque enim isdem redimendi facultas erit propter calamitatem, neque aliis voluntas propter timorem.

For neither will the same men have the faculty of redeeming on account of the calamity, nor will others have the will on account of fear.

[19] Deinde quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. Nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti, amiserant, scimus Romae, solutione impedita, fidem concidisse. Non enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere, ut non plures secum in eandem trahant calamitatem.

[19] Then, what that same Asia and that same Mithridates taught us at the beginning of the Asiatic War, this indeed, instructed by calamity, we ought surely to retain in memory. For then, when very many had lost great assets in Asia, we know that at Rome, with payment hindered, credit collapsed. For it cannot be that, in one city, many lose property and fortunes without dragging more along with them into the same calamity.

A quo periculo prohibete rem publicam, et mihi credite id quod ipsi videtis: haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum, quae Romae, quae in foro versatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis Asiaticis et cohaeret. Ruere illa non possunt, ut haec non eodem labefacta motu concidant. Qua re videte num dubitandum vobis sit omni studio ad id bellum incumbere, in quo gloria nominis vestri, salus sociorum, vectigalia maxima, fortunae plurimorum civium coniunctae cum re publica defendantur.

From this danger keep the republic, and trust me in what you yourselves see: this credit and this financial order of monies, which is transacted at Rome, which is carried on in the forum, is implicated with those Asiatic funds and coheres with them. Those cannot collapse without these also, undermined by the same motion, falling. Wherefore see whether you should hesitate to apply yourselves with every zeal to that war, in which the glory of your name, the safety of the allies, the greatest revenues, the fortunes of very many citizens, conjoined with the republic, are defended.

[20] Quoniam de genere belli dixi, nunc de magnitudine pauca dicam. Potest hoc enim dici, belli genus esse ita necessarium ut sit gerendum, non esse ita magnum ut sit pertimescendum. In quo maxime elaborandum est, ne forte ea vobis quae diligentissime providenda sunt, contemnenda esse videantur.

[20] Since I have spoken about the genus of the war, now I will say a few things about its magnitude. For this can be said: that the genus of the war is so necessary that it must be waged, and not so great that it must be greatly feared. In this point one must labor especially, lest perhaps those things which must be provided with the greatest diligence should seem to you to be things to be contemned.

Atque ut omnes intellegant me L. Lucullo tantum impertire laudis, quantum forti viro et sapienti homini et magno imperatori debeatur, dico eius adventu maximas Mithridati copias omnibus rebus ornatas atque instructas fuisse, urbemque Asiae clarissimam nobisque amicissimam, Cyzicenorum, obsessam esse ab ipso rege maxima multitudine et oppugnatam vehementissime, quam L. Lucullus virtute, adsiduitate, consilio, summis obsidionis periculis liberavit:

And that all may understand that I impart to L. Lucullus only so much praise as is owed to a brave man, a sapient man, and a great general, I say that at his arrival the very great forces of Mithridates, furnished and equipped with everything, and the most illustrious city of Asia and most friendly to us, that of the Cyzicenes, were besieged by the king himself with a very great multitude and most vehemently assailed, which L. Lucullus by virtue, assiduity, and counsel liberated from the utmost perils of siege:

[21] ab eodem imperatore classem magnam et ornatam, quae ducibus Sertorianis ad Italiam studio atque odio inflammata raperetur, superatam esse atque depressam; magnas hostium praeterea copias multis proeliis esse deletas, patefactumque nostris legionibs esse Pontum, qui antea populo Romano ex omni aditu clausus fuisset; Sinopen atque Amisum, quibus in oppidis erant domicilia regis, omnibus rebus ornata ac referta, ceterasque urbis Ponti et Cappadociae permultas, uno aditu adventuque esse captas; regem, spoliatum regno patrio atque avito, ad alios se reges atque ad alias gentis supplicem contulisse; atque haec omnia salvis populi Romani sociis atque integris vectigalibus esse gesta. Satis opinor haec esse laudis, atque ita, Quirites, ut hoc vos intellegatis, a nullo istorum, qui huic obtrectant legi atque causae, L. Lucullum similiter ex hoc loco esse laudatum.

[21] by that same imperator a large and well-appointed fleet, which under Sertorian leaders, inflamed by zeal and hatred, was being hurried toward Italy, was overcome and sunk; great forces of the enemy besides were destroyed in many battles, and Pontus was laid open to our legions, which previously had been closed to the Roman people from every approach; Sinope and Amisus, in which towns were the king’s domiciles, adorned with all things and crammed full, and very many of the other cities of Pontus and Cappadocia, were taken at a single approach and arrival; the king, despoiled of his paternal and ancestral kingdom, betook himself as a suppliant to other kings and to other nations; and all these things were done with the allies of the Roman people safe and with the revenues intact. I think these are praise enough, and so, Quirites, that you may understand this: that by none of those who disparage this law and this cause has L. Lucullus been praised in like manner from this place.

[22] Requiretur fortasse nunc quem ad modum, cum haec ita sint, reliquum possit magnum esse bellum. Cognoscite, Quirites. Non enim hoc sine causa quaeri videtur.

[22] It will perhaps now be inquired how, since these things are thus, the remaining war can be great. Learn, Quirites. For this does not seem to be asked without cause.

Primum ex suo regno sic Mithridates profugit, ut ex eodem Ponto Medea illa quondam profugisse dicitur, quam praedicant in fuga fratris sui membra in eis locis, qua se parens persequeretur, dissipavisse, ut eorum conlectio dispersa, maerorque patrius, celeritatem persequendi retardaret. Sic Mithridates fugiens maximam vim auri atque argenti pulcherrimarumque rerum omnium, quas et a maioribus acceperat et ipse bello superiore ex tota Asia direptas in suum regnum congesserat, in Ponto omnem reliquit. Haec dum nostri conligunt omnia diligentius, rex ipse e manibus effugit.

First from his own kingdom thus did Mithridates flee, as from that same Pontus that Medea once upon a time is said to have fled, whom they proclaim in her flight to have dissipated the members of her brother in those places through which her parent was pursuing her, so that the collection of them, scattered, and the paternal mourning might retard the speed of the pursuing. Thus Mithridates, fleeing, left in Pontus the greatest mass of gold and silver and of all the most beautiful things, which both he had received from his ancestors and which he himself in the former war, plundered from all Asia, had piled up into his own kingdom. While our men gather all these things more diligently, the king himself slipped out of their hands.

Ita illum in persequendi studio maeror, hos laetitia tardavit.

Thus grief, in the zeal of pursuit, delayed him; joy delayed these.

[23] Hunc in illo timore et fuga Tigranes rex Armenius excepit, diffidentemque rebus suis confirmavit, et adflictum erexit, perditumque recreavit. Cuius in regnum postea quam L. Lucullus cum exercitu venit, plures etiam gentes contra imperatorem nostrum concitatae sunt. Erat enim metus iniectus eis nationibus, quas numquam populus Romanus neque lacessendas bello neque temptandas putavit: erat etiam alia gravis atque vehemens opinio, quae animos gentium barbararum pervaserat, fani locupletissimi et religiosissimi diripiendi causa in eas oras nostrum esse exercitum adductum.

[23] In that fear and flight Tigranes, the Armenian king, received him, and confirmed him, diffident about his own affairs, and raised up the afflicted, and re-created the ruined. Into his kingdom, after L. Lucullus came with an army, even more nations were stirred up against our commander. For fear had been injected into those nations which the Roman people had never thought ought to be provoked by war nor to be tried; there was also another grave and vehement opinion, which had pervaded the minds of the barbarian peoples, that for the purpose of plundering a most opulent and most sacred shrine our army had been led to those shores.

Ita nationes multae atque magnae novo quodam terrore ac metu concitabantur. Noster autem exercitus, tametsi urbem ex Tigrani regno ceperat, et proeliis usus erat secundis, tamen nimia longinquitate locorum ac desiderio suorum commovebatur.

Thus many and great nations were being aroused by a certain new terror and fear. But our army, although it had captured a city from the kingdom of Tigranes and had enjoyed successful engagements, nevertheless was being agitated by the excessive longinquity of the places and by longing for their own.

[24] Hic iam plura non dicam. Fuit enim illud extremum ut ex eis locis a militibus nostris reditus magis maturus quam processio longior quaereretur. Mithridates autem et suam manum iam confirmarat, [et eorum] qui se ex ipsius regno conlegerant, et magnis adventiciis auxiliis multorum regum et nationum iuvabatur.

[24] Here now I will say no more. For this was the ultimate point: that from those regions our soldiers sought a speedier return rather than a longer advance. Mithridates, moreover, had already strengthened his own force, [and of those] who had gathered themselves from his own kingdom, and he was aided by great adventitious auxiliaries of many kings and nations.

Nam hoc fere sic fieri solere accepimus, ut regum adflictae fortunae facile multorum opes adliciant ad misericordiam, maximeque eorum qui aut reges sunt aut vivunt in regno, ut eis nomen regale magnum et sanctum esse videatur.

For we have learned that this generally is wont to happen thus: that the afflicted fortunes of kings easily allure the resources of many to compassion, and most especially of those who either are kings or live in a kingdom, so that to them the royal name seems great and sacred.

[25] Itaque tantum victus efficere potuit, quantum incolumis numquam est ausus optare. Nam cum se in regnum suum recepisset, non fuit eo contentus, quod ei praeter spem acciderat,—ut illam, postea quam pulsus erat, terram umquam attingeret,—sed in exercitum nostrum clarum atque victorem impetum fecit. Sinite hoc loco, Quirites, sicut poetae solent, qui res Romanas scribunt, praeterire me nostram calamitatem, quae tanta fuit, ut eam ad auris [Luculli] imperatoris non ex proelio nuntius, sed ex sermone rumor adferret.

[25] And so, conquered, he was able to effect as much as, being unharmed, he had never dared to hope. For when he had withdrawn into his own kingdom, he was not content with this, which had happened to him beyond hope,—that he should ever touch that land after he had been driven out,—but he made an attack upon our army, renowned and victorious. Permit me at this point, Quirites, as poets are wont, who write the Roman affairs, to pass over our calamity, which was so great that to the ears of the general [Lucullus] it was brought not by a messenger from the battle, but by rumor from conversation.

[26] Hic in illo ipso malo gravissimaque belli offensione, L. Lucullus, qui tamen aliqua ex parte eis incommodis mederi fortasse potuisset, vestro iussu coactus,—qui imperi diuturnitati modum statuendum vetere exemplo putavistis,—partem militum, qui iam stipendiis confecti erant, dimisit, partem M'. Glabrioni tradidit. Multa praetereo consulto, sed ea vos coniectura perspicite, quantum illud bellum factum putetis, quod coniungant reges potentissimi, renovent agitatae nationes, suscipiant integrae gentes, novus imperator noster accipiat, vetere exercitu pulso.

[26] Here, in that very misfortune and the most grievous setback of the war, L. Lucullus—who yet perhaps could in some part have remedied those disadvantages—compelled by your order, you who thought that a limit should be set to the long duration of command by ancient precedent, dismissed a part of the soldiers, who were now worn out with years of service, and handed over a part to M'. Glabrio. I pass over many things on purpose; but discern by conjecture this: how great you are to think that war has become, a war which the most powerful kings unite in, which the stirred-up nations renew, which untouched peoples undertake, which our new commander receives—with the old army driven back.

[27] Satis mihi multa verba fecisse videor, qua re esset hoc bellum genere ipso necessarium, magnitudine periculosum. Restat ut de imperatore ad id bellum delingendo ac tantis rebus praeficiendo dicendum esse videatur. Utinam, Quirites, virorum fortium atque innocentium copiam tantam haberetis, ut haec vobis deliberatio difficilis esset, quemnam potissimum tantis rebus ac tanto bello praeficiendum putaretis!

[27] I seem to myself to have made enough words as to why this war is by its very kind necessary, by its magnitude dangerous. It remains that it appear one must speak about the commander to be chosen for that war and to be put in charge of such great affairs. Would that, Quirites, you had so great a supply of brave and innocent men, that this deliberation would be difficult for you, as to whom you would think above all ought to be appointed over such great affairs and so great a war!

Nunc vero—cum sit unus Cn. Pompeius, qui non modo eorum hominum qui nunc sunt gloriam, sed etiam antiquitatis memoriam virtute superarit—quae res est quae cuiusquam animum in hac causa dubium facere possit?

Now indeed—since there is the one Cn. Pompeius, who by his virtue has surpassed not only the glory of the men who now are, but even the memory of antiquity—what thing is there that could make anyone’s mind doubtful in this cause?

[28] Ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere,—scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem. Quis igitur hoc homine scientior umquam aut fuit aut esse debuit? qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae disciplinam profectus est; qui extrema pueritia miles in exercitu fuit summi imperatoris, ineunte adulescentia maximi ipse exercitus imperator; qui saepius cum hoste conflixit quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit, plura bello gessit quam ceteri legerunt, plures provincias confecit quam alii concupiverunt; cuius adulescentia ad scientiam rei militaris non alienis praeceptis sed suis imperiis, non offensionibus belli sed victoriis, non stipendiis sed triumphis est erudita.

[28] For I thus think, that in a highest commander four things ought to be present,—the knowledge (science) of the military art, virtue (valor), authority, felicity (good fortune). Who, therefore, has ever been, or ought to have been, more knowledgeable than this man? who, from school and from the disciplines of boyhood, in a very great war and with most bitter enemies, set out to his father’s army and into the discipline of military service; who at the very end of boyhood was a soldier in the army of a supreme commander, and at the beginning of adolescence was himself the commander of a very great army; who has engaged with the enemy more often than anyone has contended with a personal foe, has carried on more in war than others have read of, has brought more provinces to completion than others have coveted; whose adolescence, toward a knowledge of the military art, was trained not by others’ precepts but by his own commands, not by the mishaps of war but by victories, not by terms of service but by triumphs.

Quod denique genus esse belli potest, in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna rei publicae? Civile, Africanum, Transalpinum, Hispaniense [mixtum ex civitatibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus], servile, navale bellum, varia et diversa genera et bellorum et hostium, non solum gesta ab hoc uno, sed etiam confecta, nullam rem esse declarant in usu positam militari, quae huius viri scientiam fugere possit.

What, finally, kind of war can there be, in which the fortune of the Republic has not exercised him? Civil, African, Transalpine, Spanish [mixed from communities and from the most bellicose nations], servile, naval war, various and diverse kinds both of wars and of enemies, not only waged by this one, but also finished, declare that there is no thing set in military use which could escape this man’s science.

[29] Iam vero virtuti Cn. Pompei quae potest oratio par inveniri? Quid est quod quisquam aut illo dignum aut vobis novum aut cuiquam inauditum possit adferre? Neque enim illae sunt solae virtutes imperatoriae, quae volgo existimantur,—labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providiendo: quae tanta sunt in hoc uno, quanta in omnibus reliquis imperatoribus, quos aut vidimus aut audivimus, non fuerunt.

[29] Now indeed, what speech can be found equal to the virtue of Cn. Pompey? What is there that anyone can bring forward that is either worthy of him, or new to you, or unheard-of by anyone? For the imperial virtues are not only those which are commonly supposed—labor in affairs, fortitude in dangers, industry in doing, celerity in completing, counsel in providing—virtues which in this one are so great as they have not been in all the remaining commanders, whom we have either seen or heard.

[30] Testis est Italia, quam ille ipse victor L. Sulla huius virtute et subsidio confessus est liberata. Testis est Sicilia, quam multis undique cinctam periculis non terrore belli, sed consili celeritate explicavit. Testis est Africa, quae, magnis oppressa hostium copiis, eorum ipsorum sanguine redundavit.

[30] Italy is witness, which that very victor, L. Sulla, acknowledged to have been liberated by this man’s virtue and aid. Sicily is witness, which, surrounded on every side by many dangers, he unraveled not by the terror of war, but by the celerity of counsel. Africa is witness, which, oppressed by great forces of the enemy, overflowed with the blood of those very men.

Testis est Gallia, per quam legionibus nostris iter in Hispaniam Gallorum internecione patefactum est. Testis est Hispania, quae saepissime plurimos hostis ab hoc superatos prostratosque conspexit. Testis est iterum et saepius Italia, quae cum servili bello taetro periculosoque premeretur, ab hoc auxilium absente expetivit: quod bellum exspectatione eius attenuatum atque imminutum est, adventu sublatum ac sepultum.

Gaul is witness, through which a way into Spain for our legions was laid open by the internecine slaughter of the Gauls. Spain is witness, which very often has beheld very many enemies overcome and prostrated by this man. Italy is witness again and again, which, when it was pressed by the foul and perilous servile war, sought aid from this man though absent: which war was attenuated and diminished by the expectation of him, and, at his arrival, taken away and buried.

[31] Testes nunc vero iam omnes orae atque omnes exterae gentes ac nationes, denique maria omnia cum universa, tum in singulis oris omnes sinus at portus. Quis enim toto mari locus per hos annos aut tam firmum habuit praesidium ut tutus esset, aut tam fuit abditus ut lateret? Quis navigavit qui non se aut mortis aut servitutis periculo committeret, cum aut hieme aut referto praedonum mari navigaret?

[31] Now indeed all coasts and all foreign peoples and nations are witnesses; finally all the seas, both taken as a whole, and, on the individual shores, all the bays and ports. For what place in the whole sea in these years either had so firm a garrison that it was safe, or was so hidden that it lay concealed? Who sailed who did not commit himself to the peril of either death or servitude, when he sailed either in winter or on a sea crammed with pirates?

Hoc tantum bellum, tam turpe, tam vetus, tam late divisum atque dispersum, quis umquam arbitraretur aut ab omnibus imperatoribus uno anno aut omnibus annis ab uno imperatore confici posse?

This war so great, so disgraceful, so ancient, so widely divided and dispersed—who would ever have supposed that it could be brought to completion either by all the generals in one year, or by one general in all years?

[32] Quam provinciam tenuistis a praedonibus liberam per hosce annos? quod vectigal vobis tutum fuit? quem socium defendistis?

[32] What province have you held free from pirates through these very years? what tax-revenue was safe for you? which ally did you defend?

cui praesidio classibus vestris fuistis? quam multas existimatis insulas esse desertas? quam multas aut metu relictas aut a praedonibus captas urbis esse sociorum?

For whom have you been a protection with your fleets? How many islands do you estimate to be deserted? How many cities of our allies do you estimate to have been either left behind from fear or seized by pirates?

Sed quid ego longinqua commemoro? Fuit hoc quondam, fuit proprium populi Romani, longe a domo bellare, et propugnaculis imperi sociorum fortunas, non sua tecta defendere. Sociis ego nostris mare per hos annos clausum fuisse dicam, cum exercitus vestri numquam a Brundisio nisi hieme summa transmiserint?

But why do I commemorate far-off things? This was once the case, it was proper to the Roman people to wage war far from home, and to defend the fortunes of their allies by the bulwarks of the empire, not their own roofs. Am I to say that for our allies the sea has been closed through these years, when your armies have never crossed from Brundisium except in the very height of winter?

Qui ad vos ab exteris nationibus venirent captos querar, cum legati populi Romani redempti sint? Mercatoribus tutum mare non fuisse dicam, cum duodecim secures in praedonum potestatem pervenerint?

Should I complain that those who were coming to you from external nations were seized, when the legates of the Roman people have been ransomed? Shall I say the sea was not safe for merchants, when twelve axes have come into the power of pirates?

[33] Cnidum aut Colophonem aut Samum, nobilissimas urbis, innumerabilisque alias captas esse commemorem, cum vestros portus, atque eos portus quibus vitam ac spiritum ducitis, in praedonum fuisse potestatem sciatis? An vero ignoratis portum Caietae celeberrimum ac plenissimum navium inspectante praetore a praedonibus esse direptum? ex Miseno autem eius ipsius liberos, qui cum praedonibus antea ibi bellum gesserat, a praedonibus esse sublatos?

[33] Shall I recount Cnidus or Colophon or Samos, most noble cities, and innumerable others taken, when you know that your harbors, and those harbors by which you draw life and breath, were in the power of the pirates? Or do you really not know that the harbor of Caieta, most renowned and most full of ships, was plundered by the pirates while the praetor looked on? and that from Misenum, moreover, the children of that very man who had previously waged war there with the pirates were carried off by the pirates?

Nam quid ego Ostiense incommodum atque illam labem atque ignominiam rei publicae querar, cum, prope inspectantibus vobis, classis ea, cui consul populi Romani praepositus esset, a praedonibus capta atque oppressa est? Pro di immortales! tantamne unius hominis incredibilis ac divina virtus tam brevi tempore lucem adferre rei publicae potuit, ut vos, qui modo ante ostium Tiberinum classem hostium videbatis, ei nunc nullam intra Oceani ostium praedonum navem esse audiatis?

For why should I complain of the Ostian misfortune and that blot and ignominy of the commonwealth, when, almost before your very eyes, that fleet, over which a consul of the Roman people had been set, was captured and overwhelmed by pirates? O immortal gods! Could the incredible and divine virtue of a single man bring such light to the commonwealth in so brief a time, that you, who just now were seeing the enemy’s fleet before the mouth of the Tiber, now hear that there is no ship of the pirates within the mouth of the Ocean?

[34] Atque haec qua celeritate gesta sint quamquam videtis, tamen a me in dicendo praetereunda non sunt. Quis enim umquam aut obeundi negoti aut consequendi quaestus studio tam brevi tempore tot loca adire, tantos cursus conficere potuit, quam celeriter Cn. Pompeio duce tanti belli impetus navigavit? Qui nondum tempestivo ad navigandum mari Siciliam adiit, Africam exploravit; inde Sardiniam cum classe venit, atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiis classibusque munivit;

[34] And although you see with what celerity these things have been accomplished, nevertheless they are not to be passed over by me in speaking. For who ever, from zeal either for undertaking business or for attaining gain, was able in so brief a time to visit so many places, to finish such courses, as swiftly as, with Cn. Pompey as leader, the impetus of so great a war navigated? He, with the sea not yet seasonable for sailing, went to Sicily, explored Africa; from there he came with a fleet to Sardinia, and he fortified these three grain-supply resources of the republic with the firmest garrisons and fleets;

[35] inde cum se in Italiam recepisset, duabus Hispanis et Gallia [transalpina] praesidiis ac navibus confirmata, missis item in oram Illyrici maris et in Achaiam omnemque Graeciam navibus, Italiae duo maria maximis classibus firmissimisque praesidiis adornavit; ipse autem ut Brundisio profectus est, undequinquagesimo die totam ad imperium populi Romani Ciliciam adiunxit; omnes, qui ubique praedones fuerunt, partim capti interfectique sunt, partim unius huius se imperio ac potestati dediderunt. Idem Cretensibus, cum ad eum usque in Pamphyliam legatos deprecatoresque misissent, spem deditionis non ademit, obsidesque imperavit. Ita tantum bellum, tam diuturunum, tam longe lateque dispersum, quo bello omnes gentes ac nationes premebantur, Cn. Pompeius extrema hieme apparavit, ineunte vere susceptit, media aestate confecit.

[35] thence, when he had withdrawn himself into Italy, the two Spains and Gaul [Transalpine] having been strengthened with garrisons and ships, and ships likewise having been sent to the shore of the Illyrian sea and into Achaia and all Greece, he furnished the two seas of Italy with very great fleets and the strongest garrisons; but he himself, as soon as he set out from Brundisium, on the 49th day adjoined all Cilicia to the imperium of the Roman people; all who were pirates everywhere were partly captured and killed, partly surrendered themselves to the imperium and power of this one man. The same man, to the Cretans, when they had sent to him as far as Pamphylia envoys and intercessors, did not take away the hope of surrender, and he demanded hostages. Thus so great a war, so long-enduring, so far and wide dispersed, by which war all tribes and nations were oppressed, Cn. Pompeius at the end of winter prepared, at the beginning of spring undertook, in mid-summer completed.

[36] Est haec divina atque incredibilis virtus imperatoris. Quid ceterae, quas paulo ante commemorare coeperam, quantae atque quam multae sunt? Non enim bellandi virtus solum in summo ac perfecto imperatore quaerenda est, sed multae sunt artes eximiae huius administrae comitesque virtutis.

[36] This is the divine and incredible virtue of a commander. What of the others, which I had begun to commemorate a little before—how great and how many they are! For the virtue of waging war is not the only thing to be sought in a consummate and perfect imperator, but there are many exceptional arts, handmaids and companions of this virtue.

Ac primum, quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores? quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia? quanta fide?

And first, with what great innocence ought generals to be? then, in all matters, with what great temperance? with what great fidelity?

quanta facilitate? quanto ingenio? quanta humanitate?

how great a facility? how much ingenuity? how great a humanity?

Quae breviter qualia sint in Cn. Pompeio consideremus: summa enim omnia sunt, Quirites, sed ea magis ex aliorum contentione quam ipsa per sese cognosci atque intellegi possunt.

Let us briefly consider of what sort these are in Gnaeus Pompeius: for all are summum, Quirites; but they can be more recognized and intellected from the contention/comparison of others than by themselves on their own.

[37] Quem enim imperatorem possumus ullo in numero putare, cuius in exercitu centuriatus veneant atque venierint? Quid hunc hominem magnum aut amplum de re publica cogitare, qui pecuniam, ex aerario depromptam ad bellum administrandum, aut propter cupiditatem provinciae magistratibus diviserit, aut propter avaritiam Romae in quaestu reliquerit? Vestra admurmuratio facit, Quirites, ut agnoscere videamini qui haec fecerint: ego autem nomino neminem; qua re irasci mihi nemo poterit, nisi qui ante de se voluerit confiteri.

[37] For what commander can we reckon of any account, in whose army centurionships are for sale and have been sold? What can this man think that is great or ample concerning the Republic, who has either parceled out the money, drawn from the treasury for administering the war, to magistrates because of a lust for a province, or has left it at Rome at interest because of avarice? Your murmuring, Quirites, makes it seem that you recognize those who have done these things: but I name no one; wherefore no one will be able to be angry with me, except one who has first wished to confess about himself.

Itaque propter hanc avaritiam imperatorum quantas calamitates, quocumque ventum est, nostri exercitus ferant quis ignorat?

And so, on account of this avarice of the commanders, who is ignorant of how great calamities our armies suffer, wherever they have come?

[38] Itinera quae per hosce annos in Italia per agros atque oppida civium Romanorum nostri imperatores fecerint recordamini: tum facilius statuetis quid apud exteras nationes fieri existimetis. Utrum pluris arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestrorum armis hostium urbis, an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletas? Neque enim potest exercitum is continere imperator, qui se ipse non continet, neque severus esse in iudicando, qui alios in se severos esse iudices non volt.

[38] Recall the marches which in these years in Italy, through the fields and towns of Roman citizens, our imperators have made: then you will more easily determine what you suppose to be happening among foreign nations. Do you reckon that in these years more cities of enemies have been destroyed by the arms of your soldiers, or that the cities of allies have been destroyed by the winter-quarters? For that imperator cannot contain an army who does not contain himself, nor be severe in judging, who is unwilling that others be severe judges against himself.

[39] Hic miramur hunc hominem tantum excellere ceteris, cuius legiones sic in Asiam pervenerint, ut non modo manus tanti exercitus, sed ne vestigium quidem cuiquam pacato nocuisse dicatur? iam vero quem ad modum milites hibernent cotidie sermones ac litterae perferuntur: non modo ut sumptum faciat in militem nemini vis adfertur, sed ne cupienti quidem cuiquam permittitur. Hiemis enim, non avaritiae perfugium maiores nostri in sociorum atque amicorum tectis esse voluerunt.

[39] Here we marvel that this man so excels the rest, whose legions have thus come into Asia, that not only the hand of so great an army, but not even a vestige is said to have harmed any peaceful person? Moreover, as to the way the soldiers winter, daily reports and letters are conveyed: not only is force brought to bear on no one to make an expense for a soldier, but it is not permitted even to anyone who wishes. For our ancestors willed that the roofs of allies and friends be a refuge for winter, not for avarice.

[40] Age vero: ceteris in rebus qua ille sit temperantia considerate. Unde illam tantam celeritatem et tam incredibilem cursum inventum putatis? Non enim illum eximia vis remigum aut ars inaudita quaedam gubernandi aut venti aliqui novi tam celeriter in ultimas terras pertulerunt; sed eae res quae ceteros remorari solent, non retardarunt: non avaritia ab instituto cursu ad praedam aliquam devocavit, non libido ad voluptatem, non amoenitas ad delectationem, non nobilitas urbis ad cognitionem, non denique labor ipse ad quietem; postremo signa et tabulas ceteraque ornamenta Graecorum oppidorum, quae ceteri tollenda esse arbitrantur, ea sibi ille ne visenda quidem existimavit.

[40] Come now, indeed: consider with what temperance he is in other matters. Whence do you think that so great celerity and so incredible a course was discovered? For it was not some exceptional force of oarsmen, nor some unheard-of art of steering, nor any novel winds that bore him so swiftly to the farthest lands; but those things which are accustomed to delay others did not retard him: avarice did not call him away from his established course to some booty, nor libido to pleasure, nor amenity to delectation, nor the nobility of a city to cognizance, nor, finally, toil itself to rest; at last, the statues and paintings and the other ornaments of the Greek towns, which others judge must be carried off, he deemed not even to be looked upon for himself.

[41] Itaque omnes nunc in eis locis Cn. Pompeium sicut aliquem non ex hac urbe missum, sed de caelo delapsum intuentur. Nunc denique incipiunt credere fuisse homines Romanos hac quondam continentia, quod iam nationibus exteris incredibile ac falso memoriae proditum videbatur. Nunc imperi vestri splendor illis gentibus lucem adferre coepit.

[41] Therefore now all in those places behold Gnaeus Pompeius as if someone not sent from this city, but descended from heaven. Now at last they begin to believe that there once were Roman men of such continence, a thing which already to foreign nations had seemed unbelievable and falsely handed down to memory. Now the splendor of your empire has begun to bring light to those peoples.

Nunc intellegunt non sine causa maiores suos, tum cum ea temperantia magistratus habebamus, servire populo Romano quam imperare aliis maluisse. Iam vero ita faciles aditus ad eum privatorum, ita liberae querimoniae de aliorum iniuriis esse dicuntur, ut is, qui dignitate principibus excellit, facilitate infimis par esse videatur.

Now they understand that not without cause their ancestors, at the time when we held our magistrates with such temperance, preferred to serve the Roman People rather than to command others. Moreover, the access of private persons to him is said to be so easy, and the complaints about others’ injuries so free, that he who surpasses the principal men in dignity seems equal to the lowest in affability.

[42] iam quantum consilio, quantum dicendi gravitate et copia valeat,—in quo ipso inest quaedam dignitas imperatoria,—vos, Quirites, hoc ipso ex loco saepe cognovistis. Fidem vero eius quantam inter socios existimari putatis, quam hostes omnes omnium generum sanctissimam iudicarint? Humanitate iam tanta est, ut difficile dictu sit utrum hostes magis virtutem eius pugnantes timuerint, an mansuetudinem victi dilexerint.

[42] now how powerful he is in counsel, how powerful in the gravity and copiousness of speaking,—in which very thing there resides a certain imperatorial dignity,—you, Quirites, from this very spot have often come to know. As for his good faith, how great do you suppose it to be esteemed among the allies, which all enemies of every kind have judged most sacred? In humanity he is now so great that it is difficult to say whether the enemies, fighting, feared his virtue more, or, conquered, loved his gentleness more.

Et quisquam dubitabit quin huic hoc tantum bellum transmittendum sit, qui ad omnia nostrae memoriae bella conficienda divino quodam consilio natus esse videatur?

And will anyone doubt that to this man so great a war should be entrusted, he who seems to have been born by a certain divine counsel for bringing to completion all the wars of our memory?

[43] Et quoniam auctoritas quoque in bellis administrandis multum atque in imperio militari valet, certe nemini dubium est quin ea re idem ille imperator plurimum possit. Vehementer autem pertinere ad bella administranda quid hostes, quid socii de imperatoribus nostris existiment, quis ignorat, cum sciamus homines in tantis rebus, ut aut contemnant aut metuant aut oderint aut ament, opinione non minus et fama quam aliqua ratione certa commoveri? Quod igitur nomen umquam in orbe terrarum clarius fuit?

[43] And since authority too in the administration of wars and in military command has great weight, surely no one doubts that in this respect that same commander is most capable. But that, for the conducting of wars, it matters greatly what the enemies and what the allies judge concerning our commanders, who is ignorant, since we know that in matters so great men are moved—so as either to despise or to fear or to hate or to love—by opinion and fame no less than by any certain reasoning? What name, therefore, was ever more illustrious in the whole world?

cuius res gestae pares? de quo homine vos,—id quod maxime facit auctoritatem,—tanta et tam praeclara iudicia fecistis?

whose achievements are equal? concerning what man have you,—that which most creates authority,—passed such great and so outstanding judgments?

[44] An vero ullam usquam esse oram tam desertam putatis, quo non illius diei fama pervaserit, cum universus populus Romanus, referto foro completisque omnibus templis ex quibus hic locus conspici potest, unum sibi ad commune omnium gentium bellum Cn. Pompeium imperatorem deposcit? Itaque—ut plura non dicam, neque aliorum exemplis confirmem quantum [huius] auctoritas valeat in bello—ab eodem Cn. Pompeio omnium rerum egregiarum exempla sumantur: qui quo die a vobis maritimo bello praepositus est imperator, tanta repente vilitas annonae ex summa inopia et caritate rei frumentariae consecuta est unius hominis spe ac nomine, quantum vix in summa ubertate agrorum diuturna pax efficere potuisset.

[44] Or do you truly think that there is any shore anywhere so deserted that the fame of that day has not penetrated to it, when the entire Roman people, with the forum crammed and all the temples filled from which this place can be seen, demands for itself Gnaeus Pompeius as the sole commander for the common war of all nations? And so—not to say more, nor to confirm by the examples of others how much [this man's] auctoritas avails in war—let examples of every excellent achievement be taken from that same Gnaeus Pompeius: on the very day on which he was by you put in charge as commander of the maritime war, so great a cheapness of the grain-market suddenly ensued, out of the utmost scarcity and dearness of the grain-supply, by the hope and the name of a single man, as scarcely a long peace in the highest fertility of the fields could have effected.

[45] Iam accepta in Ponto calamitate ex eo proelio, de quo vos paulo ante invitus admonui,—cum socii pertimuissent, hostium opes animique crevissent, satis firmum praesidium provincia non haberet,—amisissetis Asiam, Quirites, nisi ad ipsum discrimen eius temporis divinitus Cn. Pompeium ad eas regiones fortuna populi Romani attulisset. Huius adventus et Mithridatem insolita inflammatum victoria continuit, et Tigranem magnis copiis minitantem Asiae retardavit. Et quisquam dubitabit quid virtute perfecturus sit, qui tantum auctoritate perfecerit?

[45] Already, with a calamity in Pontus received from that battle about which a little before I unwillingly reminded you,—when the allies had been terrified, the resources and spirits of the enemies had increased, the province did not have a sufficiently firm garrison,—you would have lost Asia, Citizens, unless at the very crisis of that time, by divine agency, the Fortune of the Roman people had carried Gnaeus Pompeius to those regions. His arrival both restrained Mithridates, inflamed by an unusual victory, and delayed Tigranes, threatening Asia with great forces. And will anyone doubt what he will accomplish by valor, who has accomplished so much by authority?

aut quam facile imperio atque exercitu socios et vectigalia conservaturus sit, qui ipso nomine ac rumore defenderit?

or how easily, by his imperium and his army, will he preserve the allies and the revenues, he who has defended them by his very name and by rumor?

[46] Age vero, illa res quantam declarat eiusdem hominis apud hostis populi Romani autoritatem, quod ex locis tam longinquis tamque diversis tam brevi tempore omnes huic se uni dediderunt? quod a communi Cretensium legati, cum in eorum insula noster imperator exercitusque esset, ad Cn. Pompeium in ultimas prope terras venerunt, eique se omnis Cretensium civitates dedere velle dixerunt? Quid?

[46] Come now, indeed, how great a degree does that matter declare of this same man’s authority among the enemies of the Roman people, that from places so far distant and so diverse, in so brief a time, all surrendered themselves to this one man alone? that envoys from the common council of the Cretans, although our commander and army were in their island, came to Cn. Pompeius almost to the farthest lands, and said that all the cities of the Cretans wished to surrender themselves to him? What?

idem iste Mithridates nonne ad eundem Cn. Pompeium legatum usque in Hispaniam misit? eum quem Pompeius legatum semper iudicavit, ei quibus erat [semper] molestum ad eum potissimum esse missum, speculatorem quam legatum iudicari maluerunt. Potestis igitur iam constituere, Quirites, hanc auctoritatem, multis postea rebus gestis magnisque vestris iudiciis amplificatam, quantum apud illos reges, quantum apud exteras nationes valituram esse existimetis.

did not that same Mithridates send a legate to that same Cn. Pompeius all the way into Spain? him whom Pompeius always judged a legate, those to whom it was [always] vexatious that he had been sent to him above all others preferred that he be judged a speculator (spy) rather than a legate. You can therefore now determine, Quirites, how much this authority, afterward amplified by many exploits and by your great judgments, you consider will prevail among those kings and among foreign nations.

[47] Reliquum est ut de felicitate, quam praestare de se ipso nemo potest, meminisse et commemorare de altero possumus, sicut aequum est homines de potestate deorum timide et pauca dicamus. Ego enim sic existimo: Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, et ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata atque exercitus esse commissos. Fuit enim profecto quibusdam summis viris quaedam ad amplitudinem et ad gloriam et ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitus adiuncta fortuna.

[47] It remains that, about felicity—which no one can furnish from himself—we can remember and make mention in another, just as it is fair that we, as men, say timidly and only a few things concerning the power of the gods. For I so judge: to Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius, and the other great imperators, not only on account of virtue, but also on account of fortune, commands were more often entrusted and armies committed. For indeed there was to certain highest men a certain fortune divinely adjoined for amplitude and for glory and for carrying great affairs well.

De huius autem hominis felicitate, de quo nunc agimus, hac utar moderatione dicendi, non ut in illius potestate fortunam positam esse dicam, sed ut praeterita meminisse, reliqua sperare videamur, ne aut invisa dis immortalibus oratio nostra aut ingrata esse videatur.

But concerning the felicity of this man, about whom we are now treating, I shall use this moderation in speaking: not that I would say that fortune is placed in his power, but that we may seem to remember what is past and to hope for what remains, lest our oration appear either odious to the immortal gods or ungrateful.

[48] Itaque non sum praedicaturus quantas ille res domi militiae, terra marique, quantaque felicitate gesserit; ut eius semper voluntatibus non modo cives adsenserint, socii obtemperarint, hostes obedierint, sed etiam venti tempestatesque obsecundarint: hoc brevissime dicam, neminem umquam tam impudentem fuisse, qui ab dis immortalibus tot et tantas res tacitus auderet optare, quot et quantas di immortales ad Cn. Pompeium detulerunt. Quod ut illi proprium ac perpetuum sit, Quirites, cum communis salutis atque imperi tum ipsius hominis causa, sicuti facitis, velle et optare debetis.

[48] And so I am not going to proclaim how great things he has accomplished at home and in military service, on land and sea, and with what great felicity; how not only citizens have assented to his wishes, allies have obeyed, enemies have yielded, but even winds and storms have complied: this I will say most briefly, that no one ever was so impudent as to dare silently to wish from the immortal gods so many and so great things as the immortal gods have conferred upon Gnaeus Pompeius. And that this may be peculiar and perpetual to him, Quirites, both for the sake of the common safety and of the empire and for the sake of the man himself, you ought, as you do, to will and to desire.

[49] Qua re,—cum et bellum sit ita necessarium ut neglegi non possit, ita magnum ut accuratissime sit administrandum; et cum ei imperatorem praeficere possitis, in quo sit eximia belli scientia, singularis virtus, clarissima auctoritas, egregia fortuna,—dubitatis Quirites, quin hoc tantum boni, quod vobis ab dis immortalibus oblatum et datum est, in rem publicam conservandam atque amplificandam conferatis?

[49] Wherefore,—since both the war is so necessary that it cannot be neglected, and so great that it must be administered most accurately; and since you can set over it a commander in whom there is exceptional science of war, singular virtue, most illustrious authority, outstanding fortune,—do you hesitate, Quirites, to confer this so great a good, which has been offered and given to you by the immortal gods, upon preserving and amplifying the republic?

[50] Quod si Romae Cn. Pompeius privatus esset hoc tempore, tamen ad tantum bellum is erat deligendus atque mittendus: nunc cum ad ceteras summas utilitates haec quoque opportunitas adiungatur, ut in eis ipsis locis adsit, ut habeat exercitum, ut ab eis qui habent accipere statim possit, quid exspectamus? aut cur non ducibus dis immortalibus eidem, cui cetera summa cum salute rei publicae commissa sunt, hoc quoque bellum regium committamus?

[50] Now if at Rome Gnaeus Pompeius were a private citizen at this time, still for so great a war he ought to be selected and sent; now, since to the other supreme advantages this opportunity also is added—namely, that he be present in those very places, that he have an army, that he can immediately receive from those who have—what are we waiting for? Or why do we not, with the immortal gods as leaders, entrust this war against the king also to the same man to whom the other supreme matters have been committed together with the safety of the commonwealth?

[51] At enim vir clarissimus, amantissimus rei publicae, vestris beneficiis amplissimis adfectus, Q. Catulus, itemque summis ornamentis honoris, fortunae, virtutis, ingeni praeditus, Q. Hortensius, ab hac ratione dissentiunt. Quorum ego auctoritatem apud vos multis locis plurimum valuisse et valere oportere confiteor; sed in hac causa, tametsi cognoscitis auctoritates contrarias virorum fortissimorum et clarissimorum, tamen omissis auctoritatibus ipsa re ac ratione exquirere possumus veritatem, atque hoc facilius, quod ea omnia quae a me adhuc dicta sunt, eidem isti vera esse concedunt,—et necessarium bellum esse et magnum, et in uno Cn. Pompeio summa esse omnia.

[51] But indeed a most illustrious man, most loving of the republic, enriched by your very amplest benefactions, Q. Catulus, and likewise Q. Hortensius, endowed with the highest ornaments of honor, fortune, virtue, and talent, dissent from this line of reasoning. Whose authority I confess has on many occasions had the greatest weight with you, and ought to have; but in this case, although you recognize opposing authorities of most brave and most illustrious men, nevertheless, with authorities set aside, we can seek out the truth from the thing itself and by reason, and this the more easily, because all those things which have been said by me up to now those same men concede to be true,—both that the war is necessary and great, and that in the single Cn. Pompeius all the highest qualifications are present.

[52] Quid igitur ait Hortensius? Si uni omnia tribuenda sint, dignissimum esse Pompeium, sed ad unum tamen omnia deferri non oportere. Obsolevit iam ista oratio, re multo magis quam verbis refutata.

[52] What then does Hortensius say? If everything must be attributed to one, Pompey is most worthy, but nevertheless everything ought not to be deferred to one. That oration has now become obsolete, refuted by the reality much more than by words.

Nam tu idem, Q. Hortensi, multa pro tua summa copia ac singulari facultate dicendi et in senatu contra virum fortem, A. Gabinium, graviter ornateque dixisti, cum is de uno imperatore contra praedones constituendo legem promulgasset, et ex hoc ipso loco permuta item contra eam legem verba fecisti.

For you likewise, Q. Hortensius, said many things, drawing on your utmost abundance and singular faculty of speaking; and in the Senate you spoke gravely and ornately against a brave man, A. Gabinius, when he had promulgated a law for appointing a single imperator against the pirates, and from this very place you likewise delivered very many words against that law.

[53] Quid? tum (per deos immortalis!) si plus apud populum Romanum auctoritas tua quam ipsius populi Romani salus et vera causa valuisset, hodie hanc gloriam atque hoc orbis terrae imperium teneremus? An tibi tum imperium hoc esse videbatur, cum populi Romani legati quaestores praetoresque capiebantur?

[53] What? then (by the immortal gods!) if your authority had weighed more with the Roman People than the safety and the true cause of the Roman People itself, would we today be holding this glory and this empire of the world? Or did this seem to you to be imperium then, when the legates, quaestors, and praetors of the Roman People were being captured?

cum ex omnibus provinciis commeatu et privato et publico prohibebamur? cum ita clausa nobis erant maria omnia, ut neque privatam rem transmarinam neque publicam iam obire possemus?

when from all the provinces we were prohibited from convoy and passage, both private and public? when the seas were so closed to us all that we could no longer go about either private transmarine business or public?

[54] Quae civitas antea umquam fuit,—non dico Atheniensium, quae satis late quondam mare tenuisse dicitur; non Karthaginiensium, qui permultum classe ac maritimis rebus valuerunt; non Rhodiorum, quorum usque ad nostram memoriam disciplina navalis et gloria remansit,—sed quae civitas umquam antea tam tenuis, quae tam parva insula fuit, quae non portus suos et agros et aliquam partem regionis atque orae maritimae per se ipsa defenderet? At (hercule) aliquot annos continuos ante legem Gabiniam ille populus Romanus, cuius usque ad nostram memoriam nomen invictum in navalibus pugnis permanserit, magna ac multo maxima parte non modo utilitatis, sed dignitatis atque imperi caruit.

[54] What commonwealth was there ever before—I do not speak of the Athenians, who are said once to have held the sea quite widely; nor of the Carthaginians, who prevailed very greatly by their fleet and maritime affairs; nor of the Rhodians, whose naval discipline and glory have remained down to our memory—but what commonwealth ever before so slight, what island so small, did not by itself defend its own harbors and fields and some part of its region and maritime shore? But (by Hercules) for several consecutive years before the Gabinian law that Roman people, whose name has remained unconquered in naval battles down to our memory, was deprived, in great and by far the greatest measure, not only of utility, but of dignity and imperium.

[55] Nos, quorum maiores Antiochum regem classe Persenque superarunt, omnibus navalibus pugnis Karthaginiensis, homines in maritimis rebus exercitatissimos paratissimosque, vicerunt, ei nullo in loco iam praedonibus pares esse poteramus: nos, qui antea non modo Italiam tutam habebamus, sed omnis socios in ultimis oris auctoritate nostri imperi salvos praestare poteramus,—tum cum insula Delos, tam procul a nobis in Aegaeo mari posita, quo omnes undique cum mercibus atque oneribus commeabant, referta divitiis, parva, sine muro, nihil timebat,—eidem non modo provinciis atque oris Italiae maritimis ac portubus nostris, sed etiam Appia iam via carebamus; et eis temporibus non pudebat magistratus populi Romani in hunc ipsum locum escendere, cum eum nobis maiores nostri exuviis nauticis et classium spoliis ornatum reliquissent.

[55] We, whose ancestors overcame King Antiochus with a fleet and Perseus, and in every naval battle conquered the Carthaginians—men most thoroughly trained and most prepared in maritime affairs—could now in no place be a match for the pirates: we, who before not only kept Italy safe, but were able, by the authority of our imperium, to guarantee all our allies safe even on the farthest shores,—at a time when the island Delos, set so far from us in the Aegean Sea, whither all from every side resorted with merchandise and freight, crammed with riches, small, without a wall, feared nothing,—we, that same people, were deprived not only of the provinces and the maritime coasts of Italy and of our harbors, but even now of the Appian Way; and in those times it did not shame the magistrates of the Roman people to ascend into this very place, although our ancestors had left it to us adorned with nautical trophies and the spoils of fleets.

[56] Bono te animo tum, Q. Hortensi, populus Romanus et ceteros qui erant in eadem sententia, dicere existimavit ea quae sentiebatis: sed tamen in salute communi idem populus Romanus dolori suo maluit quam auctoritati vestrae obtemperare. Itaque una lex, unus vir, unus annus non modo nos illa miseria ac turpitudine liberavit, sed etiam effecit, ut aliquando vere videremur omnibus gentibus ac nationibus terra marique imperare.

[56] Take heart then, Q. Hortensius, the Roman people thought that you and the others who were of the same opinion were speaking the things that you felt: but yet, in the common safety, that same Roman people preferred to yield to its own grief rather than to obey your authority. And so one law, one man, one year not only freed us from that misery and disgrace, but also brought it about that at last we truly seemed to command all peoples and nations on land and sea.

[57] Quo mihi etiam indignius videtur obtrectatum esse adhuc,—Gabinio dicam anne Pompeio, an utrique, id quod est verius?—ne legaretur A. Gabinius Cn. Pompeio expetenti ac postulanti. Utrum ille, qui postulat ad tantum bellum legatum quem velit, idoneus non est qui impetret, cum ceteri ad expilandos socios diripiendasque provincias quos voluerunt legatos eduxerint; an ipse, cuius lege salus ac dignitas populo Romano atque omnibus gentibus constituta est, expers esse debet gloriae eius imperatoris atque eius exercitus, qui consilio ipsius ac periculo est constitutus?

[57] Wherefore it seems to me even more unworthy that there has been detraction up to now—shall I say of Gabinius or of Pompey, or of both, which is truer?—that A. Gabinius should not be appointed as legate to Cn. Pompey, who was seeking and demanding him. Is he who asks, for so great a war, for whatever legate he wishes, not suitable to obtain it, when the rest have led out as legates whom they wished for the spoliation of allies and the pillaging of provinces; or is he himself, by whose law the safety and dignity of the Roman people and of all nations has been constituted, to be without a share of the glory of that commander and of that army, which has been established by his counsel and by his peril?

[58] An C. Falcidius, Q. Metellus, Q. Caelius Latiniensis, Cn. Lentulus, quos omnis honoris causa nomino, cum tribuni plebi fuissent, anno proximo legati esse potuerunt: in uno Gabinio sunt tam diligentes, qui in hoc bello, quod lege Gabinia geritur, in hoc imperatore atque exercitu, quem per vos ipse constituit, etiam praecipuo iure esse deberet? De quo legando consules spero ad senatum relaturos. Qui si dubitabunt aut gravabuntur, ego me profiteor relaturum.

[58] Or did C. Falcidius, Q. Metellus, Q. Caelius Latiniensis, Cn. Lentulus—whom all I name as a matter of honor—when they had been tribunes of the plebs, have it in their power to be legates in the very next year; and yet in the single case of Gabinius are they so scrupulous, he who, in this war which is being conducted under the Gabinian law, in the matter of this commander and this army, which through you he himself established, ought even by a preeminent right to be so? About appointing him as legate I hope the consuls will bring the matter before the senate. If they hesitate or are reluctant, I openly declare that I will bring it forward myself.

Neque me impediet cuiusquam inimicum edictum, quo minus vobis fretus vestrum ius beneficiumque defendam; neque praeter intercessionem quicquam audiam, de qua (ut arbitror) isti ipsi, qui minantur, etiam atque etiam quid liceat considerabunt. Mea quidem sententia, Quirites, unus A. Gabinius belli maritimi rerumque gestarum Cn. Ponpeio socius ascribitur, propterea quod alter uni illud bellum suscipiendum vestris suffragiis detulit, alter delatum susceptumque confecit.

Nor will any man’s hostile edict hinder me, from defending, relying on you, your right and benefaction; nor will I listen to anything except an intercession, about which (as I think) those very men who threaten will again and again consider what is lawful. In my judgment, Quirites, A. Gabinius alone is ascribed as associate to Pompey in the maritime war and in his achievements, for this reason: that the one, by your suffrages, conferred that war to be undertaken upon a single man, the other, once it had been conferred and undertaken, brought it to completion.

[59] Reliquum est ut de Q. Catuli auctoritate et sententia dicendum esse videatur. Qui cum ex vobis quaereret, si in uno Cn. Pompeio omnia poneretis, si quid eo factum esset, in quo spem essetis habituri, cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum ac dignitatis, cum omnes una prope voce in [eo] ipso vos spem habituros esse dixistis. Etenim talis est vir, ut nulla res tanta sit ac tam difficilis, quam ille non et consilio regere et integritate tueri et virtute conficere possit.

[59] It remains that there seem to be things to be said about the authority and opinion of Q. Catulus. When he asked you, if you were to place everything in the one Cn. Pompeius, if anything should befall him, in whom would you be going to have hope, he reaped a great fruit of his own virtue and dignity, when you all with almost one voice said that you would have your hope in that very man. For such a man is he, that no affair is so great and so difficult that he cannot both by counsel guide it, by integrity guard it, and by virtue accomplish it.

Sed in hoc ipso ab eo vehementissime dissentio; quod, quo minus certa est hominum ac minus diuturna vita, hoc magis res publica, dum per deos immortalis licet, frui debet summi viri vita atque virtute.

But in this very point I dissent from him most vehemently; because, the less certain and the less long‑lasting the life of men is, by so much the more the Republic, so far as it is permitted by the immortal gods, ought to enjoy the life and virtue of the highest man.

[60] 'At enim ne quid novi fiat contra exempla atque instituta maiorum.' Non dicam hoc loco maiores nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati paruisse; semper ad novos casus temporum novorom consiliorum rationes adcommodasse: non dicam duo bella maxima, Punicum atque Hispaniense, ab uno imperatore esse confecta, duasque urbis potentissimas, quae huic imperio maxime minitabantur, Karthaginem atque Numantiam, ab eodem Scipione esse deletas: non commemorabo nuper ita vobis patribusque vestris esse visum, ut in uno C. Mario spes imperi poneretur, ut idem cum Iugurtha, idem cum Cimbris, idem cum Teutonis bellum administraret. In ipso Cn. Pompeio, in quo novi constitui nihil volt Q. Catulus, quam multa sint nova summa Q. Catuli voluntate constituta recordamini.

[60] 'But indeed, lest anything new be done against the examples and institutions of the ancestors.' I will not say in this place that our ancestors always in peace obeyed custom, in war utility; that they always accommodated the plans of new counsels to the new emergencies of times: I will not say that two very great wars, the Punic and the Spanish, were finished by one imperator, and that two most powerful cities, which most threatened this imperium, Carthage and Numantia, were destroyed by the same Scipio: I will not recall that recently it so seemed to you and to your fathers, that in one Gaius Marius the hope of command should be placed, that the same man should administer the war with Jugurtha, the same with the Cimbri, the same with the Teutones. In Pompey himself, in whom Q. Catulus wishes that nothing new be established, call to mind how many things new have been established with the utmost good will of Q. Catulus.

[61] Quid tam novum quam adulescentulum privatum exercitum difficili rei publicae temporare conficere? Confecit. Huic praeesse?

[61] What is so new as that a very young private citizen should raise an army at a difficult time for the republic? He raised it. To be in command of it?

Praefuit. Rem optime ductu suo gerere? Gessit.

To be in command of it? He was. To conduct the matter most excellently by his own leadership? He did.

Quid tam praeter consuetudinem quam homini peradulescenti, cuius aetas a senatorio gradu longe abesset, imperium atque exercitum dari, Siciliam permitti, atque Africam bellumque in ea provincia administrandum? Fuit in his provinciis singulari innocentia, gravitate, virtute: bellum in Africa maximum confecit, victorem exercitum deportavit. Quid vero tam inauditum quam equitem Romanum triumphare?

What is so contrary to custom as that to a very adolescent man, whose age was far distant from the senatorial grade, command and an army should be given, Sicily be entrusted, and Africa, with the war in that province, be administered? In these provinces he was of singular innocence, gravity, and virtue: he brought to completion a very great war in Africa, and brought back a victorious army. What indeed is so unheard-of as that a Roman equestrian should triumph?

At eam quoque rem populus Romanus non modo vidit, sed omnium etiam studio visendam et concelebrandam putavit.

But the Roman people not only saw that thing also, but even thought that, with the zeal of all, it ought to be visited and concelebrated.

[62] Quid tam inusitatum quam ut, cum duo consules clarissimi fortissimique essent, eques Romanus ad bellum maximum formidolosissimumque pro consule mitteretur? Missus est. Quo quidem tempore, cum esset non nemo in senatu qui diceret 'non oportere mitti hominem privatum pro consule,' L. Philippus dixisse dicitur ''non se illum sua sententia pro consule, sed pro consulibus mittere.'' Tanta in eo rei publicae bene gerendae spes constituebatur, ut duorum consulum munus unius adulescentis virtuti committeretur.

[62] What is so unusual as that, when two consuls most illustrious and most brave were in office, a Roman equestrian should be sent as proconsul to the greatest and most formidable war? He was sent. At that very time, when there were some in the senate who said “that a private man ought not to be sent as proconsul,” L. Philippus is said to have declared “that by his own proposal he was sending him not as proconsul, but in place of the consuls.” So great a hope was placed in him for the republic’s being well managed, that the office of two consuls was entrusted to the virtue of one young man.

Quid tam singulare quam ut ex senatus consulto legibus solutus consul ante fieret, quam ullum alium magistratum per leges capere licuisset? quid tam incredibile quam ut iterum eques Romanus ex senatus consulto triumpharet? Quae in omnibus hominibus nova post hominum memoriam constituta sunt, ea tam multa non sunt quam haec, quae in hoc uno homine videmus.

What so singular as that, by decree of the senate, he should become consul, loosed from the laws, before it was permitted by the laws for him to take any other magistracy? What so incredible as that a Roman equestrian should triumph again by decree of the senate? The things which among all men have been instituted as new within human memory are not so many as these which we see in this one man.

[63] Atque haec tot exempla, tanta ac tam nova, profecta sunt in eundem hominem a Q. Catuli atque a ceterorum eiusdem dignitatis amplissimorum hominum auctoritate. Qua re videant ne sit periniquum et non ferundum, illorum auctoritatem de Cn. Pompei dignitate a vobis comprobatam semper esse, vestrum ab illis de eodem homine iudicium populique Romani auctoritatem improbari; praesertim cum iam suo iure populus Romanus in hoc homine suam auctoritatem vel contra omnis qui dissentiunt possit defendere, propterea quod, isdem istis reclamantibus, vos unum illum ex omnibus delegistis quem bello praedonum praeponeretis.

[63] And these so many examples, so great and so new, have proceeded on behalf of that same man from the authority of Q. Catulus and of the other most distinguished men of the same dignity. Wherefore let them see lest it be most inequitable and intolerable, that their authority concerning the dignity of Cn. Pompeius has always been approved by you, while your judgment about that same man and the authority of the Roman people are disapproved by them; especially since now by its own right the Roman people, in the case of this man, can defend its authority even against all who dissent, for the reason that, with these same men protesting, you chose that one man alone out of all to place over the war of the pirates.

[64] Hoc si vos temere fecistis, et rei publicae parum consuluistis, recte isti studia vestra suis consiliis regere conantur. Sin autem vos plus tum in re publica vidistis, vos eis repugnantibus per vosmet ipsos dignitatem huic imperio, salutem orbi terrarum attulistis, aliquando isti principes et sibi et ceteris populi Romani universi auctoritati parendum esse fateantur. Atque in hoc bello Asiatico et regio non solum militaris illa virtus, quae est in Cn. Pompeio singularis, sed aliae quoque virtutes animi magnae et multae requiruntur.

[64] If you did this rashly, and consulted the republic too little, then those men rightly strive to steer your enthusiasms by their own counsels. But if, however, you then saw more in the republic, you yourselves, with them resisting, by your very selves brought dignity to this command and safety to the whole world, let those leading men at length confess that both they themselves and the rest must submit to the authority of the entire Roman people. And in this Asiatic and royal war there are required not only that military valor, which in Gnaeus Pompeius is unique, but also other virtues of spirit, great and many.

Difficile est in Asia, Cilicia, Syria regnisque interiorum nationum ita versari nostrum imperatorem, ut nihil nisi de hoste ac de laude cogitet. Deinde etiam si qui sunt pudore ac temperantia moderatiores, tamen eos esse talis propter multitudinem cupidiorum hominum nemo arbitratur.

It is difficult in Asia, Cilicia, Syria, and in the kingdoms of the inner nations for our commander to conduct himself in such a way as to think of nothing except the enemy and praise. Then even if there are some who are more moderate by modesty and temperance, yet no one supposes that they remain such, because of the multitude of more covetous men.

[65] Difficile est dictu, Quirites, quanto in odio simus apud exteras nationes propter eorum, quos ad eas per hos annos cum imperio misimus, libidines et iniurias. Quod enim fanum putatis in illis terris nostris magistratibus religiosum, quam civitatem sanctam, quam domum satis clausam ac munitam fuisse? Urbes iam locupletes et copiosae requiruntur, quibus causa belli propter diripiendi cupiditatem inferatur.

[65] It is difficult to say, Quirites, how much in hatred we are among foreign nations because of the lusts and injuries of those whom over these years we have sent to them with imperium. For what temple do you think in those lands has been sacrosanct to our magistrates, what city sacred, what house sufficiently closed and fortified? Already rich and copious cities are sought out, against which a cause of war is brought on account of a lust for plundering.

[66] Libenter haec coram cum Q. Catulo et Q. Hortensio, summis et clarissimis viris, disputarem. Noverunt enim sociorum volnera, vident eorum calamitates, querimonias audiunt. Pro sociis vos contra hostis exercitum mittere putatis, an hostium simulatione contra socios atque amicos?

[66] I would gladly debate these matters face to face with Q. Catulus and Q. Hortensius, men of the highest and most illustrious rank. For they know the allies’ wounds, they see their calamities, they hear their complaints. Do you suppose that you are sending an army against the enemy’s army on behalf of the allies, or, under the pretense of “enemies,” against allies and friends?

Quae civitas est in Asia quae non modo imperatoris aut legati, sed unius tribuni militum animos ac spiritus capere possit? Qua re, etiam si quem habetis qui conlatis signis exercitus regios superare posse videatur, tamen nisi erit idem, qui se a pecuniis sociorum, qui ab eorum coniugibus ac liberis, qui ab ornamentis fanorum atque oppidorum, qui ab auro gazaque regia manus, oculos, animum cohibere possit, non erit idoneus qui ad bellum Asiaticum regiumque mittatur.

What city is there in Asia that could seize the minds and spirits not only of a commander or a legate, but even of a single tribune of soldiers? Wherefore, even if you have someone who seems able, with standards brought together, to overcome the royal armies, nevertheless, unless he be the same man who can restrain his hands, eyes, and mind from the monies of the allies, from their wives and children, from the ornaments of fanes and towns, from the gold and royal treasure, he will not be fit to be sent to the Asiatic and royal war.

[67] Ecquam putatis civitatem pacatam fuisse quae locuples sit? ecquam esse locupletem quae istis pacata esse videatur? Ora maritima, Quirites, Cn. Pompeium non solum propter rei militaris gloriam, sed etiam propter animi continentiam requisivit.

[67] Do you suppose any city has been pacified that is wealthy? Is there any wealthy one that seems to those men to be pacified? The maritime coasts, Quirites, demanded Gnaeus Pompeius not only on account of the glory of military affairs, but also on account of the continence of his spirit.

Videbat enim praetores locupletari quot annis pecunia publica praeter paucos; neque eos quicquam aliud adsequi, classium nomine, nisi ut detrimentis accipiendis maiore adfici turpitudine videremur. Nunc qua cupiditate homines in provincias, quibus iacturis et quibus condicionibus proficiscantur, ignorant videlicet isti, qui ad unum deferenda omnia esse non arbitrantur? Quasi vero Cn. Pompeium non cum suis virtutibus tum etiam alienis vitiis magnum esse videamus.

For he saw the praetors becoming wealthy year after year from public money, save a few; and that they achieved nothing else, under the name of fleets, except that we seemed to be afflicted with greater disgrace by the receiving of losses. Now with what greed men go off into the provinces, with what losses and on what conditions they set out—evidently those persons are ignorant, who do not think that all things ought to be referred to a single man? As if indeed we did not see that Gnaeus Pompeius is made great not only by his own virtues but also by the vices of others.

[68] Qua re nolite dubitare quin huic uni credatis omnia, qui inter tot annos unus inventus sit, quem socii in urbis suas cum exercitu venisse gaudeant. Quod si auctoritatibus hanc causam, Quirites, confirmandam putatis, est vobis auctor vir bellorum omnium maximarumque rerum peritissimus, P. Servilius, cuius tantae res gestae terra marique exstiterunt, ut cum de bello deliberetis, auctor vobis gravior nemo esse debeat; est C. Curio, summis vestris beneficiis maximisque rebus gestis, summo ingenio et prudentia praeditus; est Cn. Lentulus, in quo omnes pro amplissimis vestris honoribus summum consilium, summam gravitatem esse cognovistis; est C. Cassius, integritate, virtute, constantia singulari. Qua re videte ut horum auctoritatibus illorum orationi qui dissentiunt, respondere posse videamur.

[68] Therefore do not hesitate to entrust everything to this one man, who alone in so many years has been found such that the allies rejoice that he has come into their cities with an army. But if, Citizens, you think this cause should be confirmed by authorities, you have as an authority the man most experienced in wars and in matters of the greatest moment, Publius Servilius, whose deeds on land and sea have been so great that, when you deliberate about war, no authority ought to be weightier for you; there is Gaius Curio, endowed with your highest benefactions and with the greatest achievements, with the highest talent and prudence; there is Gnaeus Lentulus, in whom you all, in return for your most ample honors, have recognized the highest counsel and the highest gravity; there is Gaius Cassius, of singular integrity, virtue, and constancy. Therefore see to it that, by the authorities of these men, we may seem able to reply to the speech of those who dissent.

[69] Que cum ita sint, C. Manlili, primum istam tuam et legem et voluntatem et sententiam laudo vehementissimeque comprobo: deinde te hortor, ut auctore populo Romano maneas in sententia, neve cuiusquam vim aut minas pertimescas. Primum in te satis esse animi perseverantiaeque arbitror: deinde cum tantam multitudinem cum tanto studio adesse videamus, quantam iterum nunc in eodem homine praeficiendo videmus, quid est quod aut de re aut de perficiendi facultate dubitemus? Ego autem quicquid est in me studi, consili, laboris, ingeni, quicquid hoc beneficio populi Romani atque hac potestate praetoria, quicquid auctoritate, fide, constantia possum, id omne ad hanc re conficiendam tibi et populo Romano polliceor ac defero:

[69] Since these things are so, Gaius Manilius, first I praise and most vehemently approve that law of yours and your will and your opinion: then I exhort you to remain in your opinion on the authority of the Roman People, and not to be frightened by anyone’s violence or threats. First, I judge that there is enough spirit and perseverance in you: then, since we see so great a multitude with so great zeal to be present, as great as we now again see in appointing the same man, what is there for us to doubt either about the matter or about the ability of bringing it to completion? But I—whatever there is in me of zeal, counsel, labor, talent, whatever I can by this benefit of the Roman People and by this praetorian power, whatever by authority, good faith, constancy—promise and offer all that to you and to the Roman People for the completing of this matter:

[70] testorque omnis deos, et eos maxime qui huic loco temploque praesident, qui omnium mentis eorum qui ad rem publicam adeunt maxime perspiciunt, me hoc neque rogatu facere cuiusquam, neque quo Cn. Pompei gratiam mihi per hanc causam conciliari putem, neque quo mihi ex cuiusquam amplitudine aut praesidia periculis aut adiumenta honoribus quaeram; propterea quod pericula facile, ut hominem praestare oportet, innocentia tecti repellemus, honorem autem neque ab uno neque ex hoc loco, sed eadem illa nostra laboriosissima ratione vitae, si vestra voluntas feret, consequemur.

[70] And I call to witness all the gods, and especially those who preside over this place and temple, who most clearly perceive the minds of all who approach the commonwealth, that I do this neither at anyone’s request, nor in order that I suppose the favor of Cn. Pompey to be conciliated for me by this cause, nor in order that I seek for myself from anyone’s eminence either protections against dangers or helps toward honors; because we shall easily repel dangers, as it becomes a man to show, covered by innocence, but honor we shall attain, not from one man nor from this place, but by that same most laborious method of life of ours, if your good will shall bear it.

[71] Quam ob rem quicquid in hac causa mihi susceptum est, Quirites, id ego omne me rei publicae causa suscepisse confirmo; tantumque abest ut aliquam mihi bonam gratiam quaesisse videar, ut multas me etiam simultates partim obscuras, partim apertas intellegam mihi non necessarias, vobis non inutilis suscepisse. Sed ego me hoc honore praeditum, tantis vestris beneficiis adfectum statui, Quirites, vestram voluntatem et rei publicae dignitatem et salutem provinciarum atque sociorum meis omnibus commodis et rationibus praeferre oportere.

[71] For which reason, Quirites, whatever in this cause has been undertaken by me, I affirm that I have undertaken it all for the sake of the commonwealth; and so far is it from the case that I seem to have sought any good favor for myself, that I understand I have even undertaken many enmities, partly obscure, partly open—unnecessary for me, not unprofitable for you. But I, endowed with this honor, affected by such great benefits from you, have determined, Quirites, that it is proper to prefer your will and the dignity of the commonwealth and the safety of the provinces and of the allies to all my own advantages and considerations.