Varro: DE LINGVA LATINA

Quom oratio natura tripertita esset, ut superioribus libris ostendi cuius prima pars, quemadmodum vocabula rebus essent imposita, secunda, quo pacto de his declinata in discrimina ierint, tertia, ut ea inter se ratione coniuncta sententiam efferant, prima parte exposita de secunda incipiam hinc. Ut propago omnis natura secunda, quod prius illud rectum, unde ea, sic declinata: itaque declinatur in verbis: rectum homo, obliquum hominis, quod declinatum a recto.

When oration is by nature tripartite, as I have shown in the previous books—of which the first part [treats] how vocables were imposed upon things, the second, by what manner from these the declined forms have gone into distinctions, the third, that these, joined among themselves by reason, bring forth a sentence—with the first part set forth, about the second I shall begin from here. As every propagation is by nature secondary, because the prior is that straight, whence these are thus declined: and so in words there is declension—straight: homo, oblique: hominis—because [the latter is] declined from the straight.

De huiuscemodi, multiplici natura discriminum causae sunt hae, cur et quo et quemadmodum in loquendo declinata sunt verba. De quibus duo prima duabus causis percurram breviter, quod et tum, cum de copia verborum scribam, erit retractandum et quod de tribus tertium quod est habet suas permultas ac magnas partes.

Concerning matters of this sort, of the multiple nature of discriminations, these are the causes why and for what and in what manner, in speaking, words have been declined. Of which the first two I will run through briefly for two reasons: both because then, when I write about the copiousness of words, it will have to be taken up again, and because the third of the three has its own very many and great parts.

II.

Declinatio inducta in sermones non solum Latinos, sed omnium hominum utili et necessaria de causa: nisi enim ita esset factum, neque discere tantum numerum verborum possemus (infinitae enim sunt naturae in quas ea declinantur) neque quae didicissemus ex his, quae inter se rerum cognatio esset, appareret. At nunc ideo videmus, quod simile est, quod propagatum: legi cum de lego, declinatum est, duo simul apparent, quodam modo eadem dici et non eodem tempore factum; at si verbi gratia alterum horum diceretur Priamus, alterum Hecuba, nullam unitatem adsignificaret, quae apparet in lego et legi et in Priamus Priamo.

Declension was introduced into speeches not only Latin but of all mankind for a useful and necessary cause: for unless it had been done thus, we could neither learn so great a number of words (for the natures into which they are declined are infinite) nor would it appear from those we had learned what cognation, that is, kinship of things there is among themselves. But now we therefore see what is similar, what is propagated: legi, when from lego, is a declined form; two things at once become apparent—both that in a certain way the same things are being said, and that it was not done at the same time; but if, for the sake of example, one of these were called Priamus, the other Hecuba, it would signify no unity, which appears in lego and legi and in Priamus Priamo.

Ut in hominibus quaedam sunt agnationes ac gentilitates, sic in verbis: ut enim ab Aemilio homines orti Aemilii ac gentiles, sic ab Aemilii nomine declinatae voces in gentilitate nominali: ab eo enim, quod est impositum recto casu Aemilius, orta Aemilii, Aemilium, Aemilios, Aemiliorum et sic reliquae eiusdem quae sunt stirpis.

As among human beings there are certain agnations and gentilities, so among words: for just as men sprung from Aemilius are Aemilii and gentiles, so from the name of Aemilius the declined forms are in the nominal gentility; for from that which is set in the straight case, Aemilius, have arisen Aemilii, Aemilium, Aemilios, Aemiliorum, and so the remaining forms which are of the same stock.

Duo igitur omnino verborum principia, impositio et declinatio, alterum ut fons, alterum ut rivus. Impositicia nomina esse voluerunt quam paucissima, quo citius ediscere possent, declinata quam plurima, quo facilius omnes quibus ad usum opus esset dicerent.

Therefore, there are altogether two principles of words, imposition and declension, the one as a fountain, the other as a rivulet. They wished the imposed names to be as few as possible, so that they might the more quickly learn them by heart; the declined ones as many as possible, so that all might more easily say those which were needed for use.

Ad illud genus, quod prius, historia opus est: nisi discendo, enim aliter id non pervenit ad nos; ad reliquum genus, quod posterius, ars: ad quam opus est paucis praeceptis quae sunt brevia. Qua enim ratione in uno vocabulo declinare didiceris, in infinito numero nominum uti possis: itaque novis nominibus allatis in consuetudinem sine dubitatione eorum declinatus statim omnis dicit populus; etiam novicii servi empti in magna familia cito omnium conservorum nomina recto casu accepto in reliquos obliquos declinant.

For that kind which is earlier, history is needed; for otherwise it does not reach us except by learning. For the remaining kind, which is later, art: for which there is need of a few precepts which are brief. For by the rationale by which you have learned to decline in one word, you can apply it to an infinite number of names: and so, when new names are brought into usage, without hesitation the whole people immediately uses their inflected forms; even novice slaves purchased in a great household, once the straight case (nominative) has been taken, quickly decline the names of all their fellow-slaves into the remaining oblique cases.

Qui si non numquam offendunt, non est mirum: et enim illi qui primi nomina imposuerunt rebus fortasse an in quibusdam sint lapsi: voluisse enim putantur singularis res notare, ut ex his in multitudinem declinaretur, ab homine homines; sic mares liberos voluisse notari, ut ex his feminae declinarentur, ut est ab Terentio Terentia; sic in recto casu quas imponerent voces, ut illinc essent futurae quo declinarentur: sed haec in omnibus tenere nequisse, quod et unae et binae dicuntur scopae, et mas et femina aquila, et recto et obliquo vocabulo vis.

If these sometimes stumble, it is not a marvel: and indeed those who first imposed names upon things perhaps in some points slipped; for they are thought to have wished to mark singular things, so that from these it might be declined into the multitude, from man men; likewise they wished male children to be marked, so that from these the females might be declined, as from Terentius, Terentia; so too the vocables which they imposed in the straight (nominative) case, in order that from there there would be the future forms into which they would be declined: but that these could not be maintained in all cases, because both “one” and “two” are said with scopae, and aquila is both male and female, and vis is a word both in the straight and in the oblique.

Cur haec non tam sint in culpa quam putant, pleraque solvere non difficile, sed nunc non necesse: non enim qui potuerint adsequi sed qui voluerint, ad hoc quod propositum refert, quod nihilo minus, declinari potest ab eo quod imposuerunt, scopae scoparum, quam si imposuissent scopa, ab eo scopae, sic alia.

Why these are not so much in fault as they suppose, to resolve most of it is not difficult, but not necessary now: for, as to what has been proposed, it matters not what they could have attained, but what they wished; for nonetheless, it can be declined from what they imposed—scopae, scoparum—just as if they had imposed scopa, from that scopae; so with others.

III.

Causa, inquam, cur eas ab impositis nominibus declinarint, quam ostendi; sequitur, in quas voluerint, declinari aut noluerint, ut generatim ac summatim item informem. Duo enim genera verborum, unum fecundum, quod declinando multas ex se parit disparilis formas, ut est lego legi legam, sic alia, alterum genus sterile, quod ex se parit nihil, ut est et iam vix cras magis cur.

The cause, I say, why they have declined them from the imposed names, I have shown; what follows is, into what forms they wished them to be declined or did not wish, so that I may likewise inform generically and summarily. For there are two kinds of words: one fecund, which by declining begets from itself many disparate forms, as is lego legi legam, thus others; the other kind sterile, which from itself begets nothing, as are et iam vix cras magis cur.

Quarum rerum usus erat simplex, simplex ibi etiam vocabuli declinatus, ut in qua domo unus servus, uno servili opust nomine, in qua multi, pluribus. Igitur et in his rebus quae sunt nomina, quod discrimina vocis plura, propagines plures, et in his rebus quae copulae sunt ac iungunt verba, quod non opus fuit declinari in plura, fere singula sunt: uno enim loro alligare possis vel hominem vel equum vel aliud quod, quicquid est quod cum altero potest colligari. Sic quod dicimus in loquendo "Consul fuit Tullius et Antonius," eodem illo "et" omnis binos consules colligare, possumus, vel dicam amplius, omnia nomina, atque adeo etiam omnia verba, cum fulmentum ex una syllaba illud "et" maneat unum.

Of which things the usage was simple, there the declension of the word was simple too, as in a house where there is one slave, there is need of one servile name; where many, of more. Therefore both in those things which are names, because there are more discriminations of voice, there are more offshoots; and in those things which are copulas and join words, because there was no need to be declined into more, for the most part they are single: with one thong you can bind either a man or a horse or whatever else, whatever it is that can be bound together with another. Thus, when we say in speaking, "Consul fuit Tullius et Antonius," with that same "et" we can bind together every pair of consuls, or I will say more, all names, and indeed even all verbs, since the prop from one syllable—that "et"—remains one.

Quare duce natura factumst, quae imposita essent vocabula rebus, ne ab omnibus his declinatus putaremus.

Wherefore, with Nature as leader, it has been brought to pass that, of the vocables which were imposed upon things, we should not suppose a declension from all of them.

IV.

Quorum generum declinationes oriantur, partes orationis sunt duae, nisi item ut Dion in tris diviserimus partes res quae verbis significantur: unam quae adsignificat casus, alteram quae tempora, tertiam quae neutrum. De his Aristoteles orationis duas partes esse dicit: vocabula et verba, ut homo et equus, et legit et currit.

Of the genera from which declensions arise, the parts of speech are two, unless likewise, as Dion, we divide into three the things that are signified by words: one which signifies cases, another which signifies times, a third which neither. Concerning these Aristotle says there are two parts of speech: nouns and verbs—man and horse, and reads and runs.

Utriusque generis, et vocabuli et verbi, quaedam priora, quaedam posteriora; priora ut homo, scribit, posteriora ut doctus et docte: dicitur enim homo doctus et scribit docte. Haec sequitur locus et tempus, quod neque homo nec scribit potest sine loco et tempore esse, ita ut magis sit locus homini coniunctus, tempus scriptioni.

Of both kinds, both of the vocable and of the verb, some are prior, some posterior; prior, as “man,” “he writes,” posterior, as “learned” and “learnedly”: for one says “a learned man” and “he writes learnedly.” Place and time follow these, since neither “man” nor “he writes” can be without place and time, in such wise that place is more conjoined to man, time to writing.

Cum de his nomen sit primum (prius enim nomen est quam verbum temporale et reliqua posterius quam nomen et verbum), prima igitur nomina: quare de eorum declinatione quam de verborum ante dicam.

Since among these the name is first (for the name is prior to the temporal verb, and the remaining things are posterior to the name and the verb), therefore names are first: wherefore I will speak about their declension before that of verbs.

Nomina declinantur aut in earum rerum discrimina, quarum nomina sunt, ut ab Terentius Terentia, aut in eas res extrinsecus, quarum ea nomina non sunt, ut ab equo equiso. In sua discrimina declinantur aut propter ipsius rei naturam de qua dicitur aut propter illius usum qui dicit. Propter ipsius rei discrimina, aut ab toto aut a parte.

Names (nouns) are declined either into the distinctions of those things of which they are names, as from Terentius to Terentia, or into things external, of which they are not names, as from equus to equiso. Into their own distinctions they are declined either on account of the nature of the thing itself of which one speaks or on account of the usage of the one who speaks. On account of the distinctions of the thing itself, either from the whole or from a part.

Quae a toto, declinata sunt aut propter multitudinem aut propter exiguitatem. Propter exiguitatem, ut ab homine homunculus, ab capite capitulum; propter multitudinem, ut ab homine homines; ab eo abeo quod alii dicunt cervices et id Hortensius in poematis cervix.

Those which are from the whole are declined either on account of multitude or on account of exiguity. On account of exiguity: as from homo, homunculus; from caput, capitulum; on account of multitude: as from homo, homines; and from that I depart, which others call “cervices,” and which Hortensius in his poems (has as) “cervix.”

Quae a parte declinata, aut a corpore, ut a mamma mammosae, a manu manubria, aut ab animo, ut a prudentia prudentes, ab ingenio ingeniosi. Haec sine agitationibus; at ubi motus maiores, item ab animo aut a corpore, ut ab strenuitate et nobilitate strenui et nobiles, sic a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores. Ut aliae declinationes ab animo, aliae a corpore, sic aliae quae extra hominem, ut pecuniosi, agrarii, quod foris pecunia et ager.

Those declined from a part, either from the body, as from the mamma, mammose women, from the hand, manubria, or from the mind, as from prudence the prudent, from ingenium the ingenious. These are without agitations; but where the motions are greater, likewise from the mind or from the body, as from strenuousness and nobility, the strenuous and the nobles, so from fighting and running, pugilists and runners. As some declensions are from the mind, others from the body, so others are from what is outside the human being, such as pecunious and agrarian, because money and field are outside.

VI.

Propter eorum qui dicunt usum declinati casus, uti is qui de altero diceret, distinguere posset, cum vocaret, cum daret, cum accusaret, sic alia eiusdem modi discrimina, quae nos et Graecos ad declinandum duxerunt. Sine controversia sunt obliqui, qui nascuntur a recto: unde rectus an sit casus sunt qui quaerant. Nos vero sex habemus, Graeci quinque: quis vocetur, ut Hercules; quemadmodum vocetur, ut Hercule; quo vocetur, ut ad Herculem; a quo vocetur, ut ab Hercule; cui vocetur, ut Herculi; cuius vocetur, ut Herculis.

Because of those who speak of the use of the declined case, so that he who would speak about another might be able to distinguish, when he called, when he gave, when he accused, so too other discriminations of the same kind, which led us and the Greeks to decline. Without controversy the obliques are those which are born from the straight; whence there are those who ask whether the straight is a case. We indeed have six, the Greeks five: who be called, as Hercules; how he be called, as Hercule; whither he be called, as to ad Herculem; from whom he be called, as from ab Hercule; to whom he be called, as to Herculi; whose he be called, as of Herculis.

VII.

Propter ea verba quae erant proinde ac cognomina, ut prudens, candidus, strenuus, quod in his praeterea sunt discrimina propter incrementum, quod maius aut minus in his esse potest, accessit declinationum genus, ut a candido candidius candidissimum sic a longo, divite, id genus aliis ut fieret.

Because of those words which were just as cognomina, such as prudent, candid, strenuous, since moreover in these there are distinctions on account of increment, which can be greater or lesser in them, a kind of declension was added, so that from “candidus” [come] “candidius,” “candidissimum,” and likewise from “longus,” “dives,” and others of that kind it might be done.

Quae in eas res quae extrinsecus declinantur, sunt ab equo equile, ab ovibus ovile, sic alia: haec contraria illis quae supra dicta, ut a pecunia pecuniosus, ab urbe urbanus, ab atro atratus: ut nonnunquam ab homine locus, ab eo loco homo, ut ab Romulo Roma, ab Roma Romanus.

Those which into those things that are derived from without are: from horse, a stable; from sheep, a sheepfold, and so others: these are the opposite of those mentioned above, as from money, pecunious, from city, urban, from black, clad in black: as sometimes from a person a place, from that place a person, as from Romulus Rome, from Rome Roman.

Aliquot modis declinata ea quae foris: nam aliter qui a maioribus suis, Latonius et Priamidae, aliter quae a facto, ut a praedando praeda, a merendo merces; sic alia sunt, quae circum ire non difficile; sed quod genus iam videtur et alia urgent, omitto.

In several ways are declined those which are from without: for differently those [names] from their ancestors, Latonius and the Priamids, differently those from a deed, as from preying, prey; from meriting, wages; thus there are others, which to go around is not difficult; but since the kind now appears and other matters press, I omit.

VIII.

In verborum genere quae tempora adsignificant, quod ea erant tria, praeteritum, praesens, futurum, declinatio facienda fuit triplex, ut ab saluto salutabam, salutabo; cum item personarum natura triplex esset, qui loqueretur, ad quem, de quo, haec ab eodem verbo declinata, quae in copia verborum explicabuntur.

In the genus of words which designate times, since these were three, past, present, future, a threefold inflection had to be made, as from saluto salutabam, salutabo; since likewise the nature of persons was threefold, the one who spoke, the one to whom, the one about whom, these, inflected from the same verb, will be explained in the abundance of words.

IX.

Quoniam dictum de duobus, declinatio cur et in quas sit facta, tertium quod relinquitur, quemadmodum, nunc dicetur. Declinationum genera sunt duo, voluntarium et naturale; voluntarium est, quo ut cuiusque tulit voluntas declinavit. Sic tres cum emerunt Ephesi singulos servos, nonnunquam alius declinat nomen ab eo qui vendit Artemidorus, atque Artemam appellat, alius a regione quod ibi emit, ab Ionia Iona, alius quod Ephesi Ephesium, sic alius ab alia aliqua re, ut visum est.

Since it has been said about the two—why declination has been made and into what it has been made—the third, which remains, namely how, will now be said. The genera of declinations are two, voluntary and natural; the voluntary is that by which, as each one’s will bore him, he declined. Thus when three men bought at Ephesus individual slaves apiece, sometimes one declines the name from him who sells, Artemidorus, and calls him Artemas; another from the region because he bought there, from Ionia, Iona; another because at Ephesus, Ephesian; thus another from some other thing, as it seemed good.

Contra naturalem declinationem dico, quae non a singulorum oritur voluntate, sed a communi consensu. Itaque omnes impositis nominibus eorum item declinant casus atque eodem modo dicunt huius Artemidori et huius Ionis et huius Ephesi, sic in casibus aliis.

By contrast I speak of natural declension, which does not arise from the will of individuals, but from a common consensus. And so, with their names imposed, all likewise decline the cases and in the same way say huius Artemidori and huius Ionis and huius Ephesi, thus in the other cases.

Cum utrumque nonnunquam accidat, et ut in voluntaria declinatione animadvertatur natura et in naturali voluntas, quae, cuiusmodi sint, aperientur infra; quod utraque declinatione alia fiunt similia, alia dissimilia, de eo Graeci Latinique libros fecerunt multos, partim cum alii putarent in loquendo ea verba sequi oportere, quae ab similibus similiter essent declinata, quas appellarunt analogias, alii cum id neglegendum putarent ac potius sequendam dissimilitudinem, quae in consuetudine est, quam vocarunt anomalian, cum, ut ego arbitror, utrumque sit nobis sequendum, quod in declinatione voluntaria sit anomalia, in naturali magis analogia.

Since each sometimes happens, both that in voluntary declension nature be noticed and in natural declension will, which, of what sort they are, will be opened below; that by both declensions some things become similar, others dissimilar, about this the Greeks and the Latins made many books, in part when some thought in speaking one ought to follow those words which from similars were declined similarly, which they called analogies, others when they thought this ought to be neglected and rather the dissimilarity that is in consuetude to be followed, which they called anomaly; since, as I judge, both are to be followed by us, that in voluntary declension there is anomaly, in natural more analogy.

De quibus utriusque generis declinationibus libros faciam bis ternos, prioris tris de earum declinationum disciplina, posteriores de eius disciplinae propaginibus. De prioribus primus erit hic, quae contra similitudinem declinationum dicantur, secundus, quae contra dissimilitudinem, tertius de similitudinum forma; de quibus quae expediero singulis tribus, tum de alteris totidem scribere ac dividere incipiam.

Of the declensions of both kinds I will make six books, two sets of three: the first three on the discipline of those declensions, the latter on the propagations of that discipline. Of the former, the first will be this one, on what is said against the similitude of declensions; the second, on what is said against dissimilitude; the third, on the form of similitudes. When I shall have set forth about these in three several books, then I shall begin to write and to divide about the latter an equal number.

10.

Quod huiusce libri est dicere contra eos qui similitudinem sequuntur, quae est ut in aetate puer ad senem, puella ad anum, in verbis ut est scribo scribam, dicam prius contra universam analogiam, dein tum de singulis partibus. A natura sermonis incipiam.

What this book has to say is against those who follow similarity, which is as in age a boy to an old man, a girl to an old woman, and in verbs as there is scribo, scribam; I shall first speak against the whole Analogy, then in turn about the several parts. I shall begin from the nature of speech.

XI.

11.

Omnis oratio cum debeat dirigi ad utilitatem, ad quam tum denique pervenit, si est aperta et brevis, quae petimus, quod obscurus et longior orator est odio; et cum efficiat aperta, ut intellegatur, brevis, ut cito intellegatur, et apertam consuetudo, brevem temperantia loquentis, et utrumque fieri possit sine analogia, nihil ea opus est. Neque enim, utrum Herculi an Herculis clavam dici oporteat, si doceat analogia, cum utrumque sit in consuetudine, non neglegendum, quod aeque sunt et brevia et aperta.

Since all discourse ought to be directed to utility, which it then and only then attains if it is open and brief, as we seek, because an obscure and more prolix orator is odious; and since “open” brings it about that it be understood, “brief” that it be quickly understood, and openness comes from consuetude, brevity from the temperance of the speaker, and both can be achieved without analogy, there is no need of it. Nor indeed, if analogy should teach whether it ought to be said “Herculi” or “Herculis” club, since both are in consuetude, is either to be neglected, because they are equally both brief and open.

XII.

12.

Praeterea quoius utilitatis causa quaeque res sit inventa, si ex ea quis id sit consecutus, amplius eam scrutari cum sit nimium otiosi, et cum utilitatis causa verba ideo sint imposita rebus ut eas significent, si id consequimur una consuetudine, nihil prodest analogia.

Moreover, for whatever utility each thing was invented, if someone has attained that from it, to scrutinize it further is the part of the excessively idle; and since, for the sake of utility, words were therefore imposed upon things so that they might signify them, if we achieve that by usage alone, analogy profits nothing.

XIII.

13.

Accedit quod quaecumque usus causa ad vitam sint assumpta, in his nostrumst utilitatem quaerere, non similitudinem: itaque in vestitu cum dissimillima sit virilis toga tunicae, muliebris stola pallio, tamen inaequabilitatem hanc sequimur nihilo minus.

It is added that whatever things have been assumed for life for the sake of use, in these it is ours to seek utility, not similarity: and so in vesture, although the manly toga is most dissimilar to the tunic, the womanly stola to the pallium, nevertheless we follow this inequality none the less.

XIV.

14.

In aedificiis, quom non videamus habere ad atrium peristylon similitudinem et cubiculum ad equile, tamen propter utilitatem in his dissimilitudines potius quam similitudines sequimur: itaque et hiberna triclinia et aestiva non item valvata ac fenestrata facimus.

In buildings, when we do not see the peristyle have likeness to the atrium, nor the cubiculum to the stable, nevertheless on account of utility in these we follow dissimilarities rather than similarities: and thus we make winter triclinia and summer ones not likewise furnished with door-leaves and windows.

XV.

15.

Quare cum, ut in vestitu aedificiis, sic in supellectile cibo ceterisque omnibus quae usus causa ad vitam sunt assumpta dominetur inaequabilitas, in sermone quoque, qui est usus causa constitutus, ea non repudianda.

Wherefore, since, as in clothing and in buildings, so too in furnishings, food, and all other things which have been assumed for life for the sake of use, inequality dominates, in speech also, which has been constituted for the sake of use, that is not to be repudiated.

XVI.

16.

Quod si quis duplicem putat esse summam, ad quas metas naturae sit perveniendum in usu, utilitatis et elegantiae, quod non solum vestiti esse volumus ut vitemus frigus, sed etiam ut videamur vestiti esse honeste, non domum habere ut simus in tecto et tuto solum, quo necessitas contruserit, sed etiam ubi voluptas retineri possit, non solum vasa ad victum habilia, sed etiam figura bella atque ab artifice ficta, quod aliud homini, aliud humanitati satis est; quodvis sitienti homini poculum idoneum, humanitati nisi bellum parum; sed cum discessum est ab utilitate ad voluptatem, tamen in eo ex dissimilitudine plus voluptatis quam ex similitudine saepe capitur.

But if someone thinks there is a double chief end, the goals of nature to which one must arrive in use—utility and elegance—namely, that we wish not only to be clothed so that we may avoid cold, but also that we may seem to be clothed honorably; not to have a house so that we may be under a roof and in safety only, where necessity has crammed us, but also where pleasure can be retained; not only vessels serviceable for nourishment, but also beautiful in figure and fashioned by an artificer—because one thing suffices for a man, another for humanity; any cup is suitable for a thirsty man, but for humanity, unless it be beautiful, it is insufficient; yet when there is a departure from utility to pleasure, nevertheless in that matter more pleasure is often taken from dissimilarity than from similarity.

Quo nomine et gemina conclavia dissimiliter poliunt et lectos non omnis paris magnitudine ac figura faciunt. Quod si esset analogia petenda supellectili, omnis lectos haberemus domi ad unam formam et aut cum fulcro aut sine eo, nec cum ad tricliniarem gradum, non item ad cubicularem; neque potius delectaremur supellectile distincta quae esset ex ebore aliisve rebus disparibus figuris quam grabatis, qui ana logon, ad similem formam plerumque eadem materia fiunt. Quare aut negandum nobis disparia esse iucunda aut, quoniam necesse est confiteri, dicendum verborum dissimilitudinem, quae sit in consuetudine, non esse vitandam.

Under this rationale they also polish twin chambers in dissimilar ways and make beds not all equal in magnitude and figure. But if an analogy were to be sought from furniture, we would have all the beds at home to one form, and either with a fulcrum or without it, nor would there be some to the triclinium standard, and not likewise to the cubiculum one; nor would we rather take delight in furniture variegated, which would be of ivory and other things with unlike figures, than in pallet-beds, which, according to the analogy, for the most part are made to a similar form from the same material. Therefore either we must deny that dissimilar things are pleasant, or, since it must needs be confessed, we must say that the dissimilarity of words, which is in usage, is not to be avoided.

XVII.

17.

Quod si analogia sequenda est nobis, aut ea observanda est quae est in consuetudine aut quae non est. Si ea quae est sequenda est, praeceptis nihil opus est, quod, cum consuetudinem sequemur, ea nos sequetur; si quae non est in consuetudine, quaeremus: ut quisque duo verba in quattuor formis finxerit similiter, quamvis haec nolemus, tamen erunt sequenda, ut Iuppitri, Marspitrem? Quas si quis servet analogias, pro insano sit reprehendendus.

But if analogy is to be followed by us, either that is to be observed which is in custom or that which is not. If that which is in custom is to be followed, there is no need of precepts, because, when we follow custom, it (the analogy) will follow us; but if it is that which is not in custom, we shall be making inquiry: so that whenever someone shall have coined two words alike in four forms, although we would not want these, nevertheless they would have to be followed—like “Iuppitri, Marspitrem”? If anyone were to keep such analogies, he ought to be reprehended as insane.

Non ergo ea est sequenda.

Therefore, that is not to be followed.

XVIII.

18.

Quod si oportet id esse, ut a similibus similiter omnia declinentur verba, sequitur, ut ab dissimilibus, dissimilia debeant fingi, quod non fit: nam et ab similibus alia fiunt similia, alia dissimilia, et ab dissimilibus partim similia partim dissimilia. Ab similibus similia, ut a bono et malo bonum malum; ab similibus dissimilia, ut ab lupus lepus lupo lepori. Contra ab dissimilibus dissimilia, ut Priamus Paris, Priamo Pari: ab dissimilibus similia, ut Iupiter ovis, Iovi ovi.

But if it must be the case that, from things similar, all words are declined similarly, it follows that from things dissimilar, dissimilar things ought to be fashioned—which does not happen: for both from similars some turn out similar, others dissimilar, and from dissimilars partly similar, partly dissimilar. From similars, similars, as from bonus and malus, bonum malum; from similars, dissimilars, as from lupus lepus, lupo lepori. Conversely, from dissimilars, dissimilars, as Priamus Paris, Priamo Pari; from dissimilars, similars, as Iupiter ovis, Iovi ovi.

Eo iam magis analogias esse negandum, quod non modo ab similibus dissimilia finguntur, sed etiam ab isdem vocabulis dissimilia neque a dissimilibus similia, sed etiam eadem. Ab isdem vocabulis dissimilia fingi apparet, quod, cum duae sint Albae, ab una dicuntur Albani, ab altera Albenses; cum trinae fuerint Athenae, ab una dicti Athenaei, ab altera Athenaiis, a tertia Athenaeopolitae.

All the more must it be denied that analogies exist, because not only are dissimilar things coined from similar ones, but even from the same vocables dissimilar ones are coined, and from dissimilars not similar ones, but even the same. That dissimilar forms are coined from the same vocables is evident, since, as there are two towns named Alba, from the one they are called Albani, from the other Albenses; since there were three cities named Athenae, from the one they were called Athenaei, from another Athenaiis, from the third Athenaeopolitae.

Sic ex diversis verbis multa facta in declinando inveniuntur eadem, ut cum dico ab Saturni Lua Luam, et ab solvendo luo luam. Omnia fere nostra nomina virilia et muliebria multitudinis cum recto casu fiunt dissimilia, eadem in dandi: dissimilia, ut mares Terentiei, feminae Terentiae, eadem in dandi, vireis Terentieis et mulieribus Terentieis. Dissimile Plautus et Plautius, Marcus et Marcius; et commune, ut huius Plauti et Marci.

Thus from diverse words many things made in declining are found the same, as when I say from Saturn’s Lua, Luam, and from loosening (solvendo) luo, luam. Almost all our masculine and feminine names of the plural with the straight case (nominative) become dissimilar, the same in the case of giving (dative): dissimilar, as males Terentii, females Terentiae; the same in the case of giving, to the men Terentieis and to the women Terentieis. Dissimilar Plautus and Plautius, Marcus and Marcius; and in common, as huius Plauti and Marci.

XIX.

19.

Denique si est analogia, quod in multis verbis est similitudo verborum, sequitur, quod in pluribus est dissimilitudo, ut non sit in sermone sequenda analogia.

Finally, if there is analogy, namely that in many words there is a similarity of words, it follows that in more there is dissimilarity, so that analogy is not to be followed in discourse.

XX.

20.

Postremo, si est in oratione, aut in omnibus eius partibus est aut in aliqua: at in omnibus non est, in aliqua esse parum est, ut album esse Aethiopa non satis est quod habet candidos dentes: non est ergo analogia.

Lastly, if it exists in oration, it is either in all its parts or in some: but it is not in all, and to be in some is too little, just as it is not enough for an Ethiopian to be white because he has candid teeth: therefore there is no analogy.

XXI.

21.

Cum ab similibus verbis quae declinantur similia fore polliceantur qui analogias esse dicunt, et cum simile tum, denique dicant esse verbo verbum, ex eodem si genere eadem figura transitum de cassu in cassum similiter ostendi possit, qui haec dicunt utrumque ignorant, et in quo loco similitudo debeat esse, et quemadmodum spectari soleat, simile sit necne. Quae cum ignorant, sequitur ut, cum de analogia dicere non possint, sequi non debeamus.

Since those who say that there are analogies promise that from similar words which are declined similar forms will arise, and, as like to like, finally declare word to be to word, if from the same genus with the same figure the transition from case to case can be shown in like manner, those who say these things are ignorant in both respects: both where the similarity ought to be, and how it is wont to be considered, whether it is similar or not. Since they are ignorant of these things, it follows that, since they cannot speak about analogy, we ought not to follow them.

Quaero enim, verbum utrum dicant vocem quae ex syllabis est ficta, eam quam audimus, an quod ea significat, quam intellegimus, an utrumque. Si vox voci esse debet similis, nihil refert, quod significat mas an femina sit, et utrum nomen an vocabulum sit, quod illi interesse dicunt.

For I ask whether they call a word the voice which is formed from syllables, that which we hear, or that which it signifies, which we understand, or both. If a voice ought to be similar to a voice, it makes no difference whether what it signifies is masculine or feminine, and whether it is a name or a vocable, which they say makes a difference.

Sin illud quod significatur debet esse simile, Diona et Theona quos dicunt esse paene ipsi geminos, inveniuntur esse dissimiles, si alter erit puer, alter senex, aut unus albus et alter Aethiops, item aliqua re alia dissimiles. Sin ex utraque parte debet verbum esse simile, non cito invenietur quin in altera utra re claudicet, nec Perpenna et Alfena erit simile, quod alterum nomen virum, alterum mulierem significat. Quare quoniam ubi similitudo esse debeat nequeunt ostendere, impudentes sunt qui dicunt esse analogias.

But if that which is signified ought to be similar, Diona and Theona, whom they say are almost themselves twins, are found to be dissimilar, if one will be a boy, the other an old man, or one white and the other an Ethiopian, likewise dissimilar in some other respect. But if from both sides the word ought to be similar, it will not readily be found without its limping in one or the other respect; nor will Perpenna and Alfena be similar, because the one name signifies a man, the other a woman. Wherefore, since they cannot show where the likeness ought to be, those who say there are analogies are impudent.

XXII.

22.

Alterum illud quod dixi, quemadmodum simile spectari oporteret, ignorare apparet ex eorum praecepto, quod dicunt, cum transierit e nominandi casibus in eos quos appellant vocandi, tum denique posse dici rectos esse similis aut dissimilis: esset enim ut si quis, Menaechmos, geminos cum videat, dicat non posse iudicare similesne sint, nisi qui ex his sint nati considerarit num discrepent inter se.

That second point which I mentioned—how a likeness ought to be looked at— they plainly ignore from their precept: for they say that, when it has passed from the cases of naming into those which they call of calling (the vocative), then at last it can rightly be said to be similar or dissimilar; for it would be as if someone, “Menaechmos,” on seeing the twins, were to say that he cannot judge whether they are similar unless he has considered whether those who have been born from them differ among themselves.

Nihil, inquam, quo magis minusve sit simile quod conferas cum altero, ad iudicandum extrinsecus oportet sumi. Quare cum ignorent, quemadmodum similitudo debeat sumi, de analogia dicere non possunt. Haec apertius dixissem, nisi brevius eo nunc mallem, quod infra sunt planius usurpanda.

Nothing, I say, by which what you compare with another would be more or less similar, ought to be taken from without for judging. Wherefore, since they are ignorant how similitude ought to be taken, they cannot speak about analogy. I would have said these things more openly, did I not now prefer brevity, since what follows is to be employed more plainly below.

Quare quod ad universam naturam verborum attinet, haec attigisse modo satis est.

Wherefore, as it pertains to the universal nature of words, it is enough merely to have touched upon these things.

XXIII.

23.

Quod ad partis singulas orationis, deinceps dicam. Quoius quoniam sunt divisiones plures, nunc ponam potissimum eam qua dividitur oratio secundum naturam in quattuor partis: in eam quae habet casus et quae habet tempora et quae habet neutrum et in qua est utrumque. Has vocant quidam appellandi, dicendi, adminiculandi, iungendi.

As to the individual parts of speech, I will speak next. Since there are several divisions of it, I will now set forth especially that by which speech is divided according to nature into four parts: into that which has cases, and that which has tenses, and that which has neither, and that in which there is both. Some call these of appellation, of saying, of adminiculation, of joining.

Appellandi dicitur ut homo et Nestor, dicendi ut scribo et lego, iungendi ut scribens et legens, adminiculandi ut docte et commode.

That of appellation is said as man and Nestor, that of saying as I write and I read, that of joining as writing and reading, that of adminiculation as learnedly and commodiously.

Appellandi partes sunt quattuor, e quis dicta a quibusdam provocabula quae sunt ut quis, quae; vocabula ut scutum, gladium; nomina ut Romulus, Remus; pronomina ut hic, haec. Duo media dicuntur nominatus; prima et extrema articuli. Primum genus est infinitum, secundum ut infinitum, tertium ut finitum, quartum finitum.

The parts of appellation are four, of which are called by some “provocables,” which are such as quis, quae; “vocables” such as scutum, gladium; “names” such as Romulus, Remus; “pronouns” such as hic, haec. The two middle ones are called “nominata”; the first and the last, “articles.” The first kind is indefinite, the second as indefinite, the third as definite, the fourth definite.

Haec singulatim triplicia esse debent quod ad sexum, multitudinem, casum: sexum, utrum virile an muliebre an neutrum sit, ut doctus docta doctum; multitudinem, unum an plura significet, ut hic hi, haec hae; casum, utrum recto sit ut Marcus, an obliquo ut Marco, an communi ut ovis.

These things, taken singly, ought to be threefold with respect to sex/gender, multitude (number), case: sex/gender, whether it is masculine or feminine or neuter, as doctus docta doctum; multitude (number), whether it signifies one or more, as hic hi, haec hae; case, whether it is in the straight/direct (nominative) as Marcus, or in the oblique as Marco, or common as ovis.

XXIV.

24.

His discretis partibus singulas perspice, quo facilius nusquam esse analogias quas sequi debeamus videas. Nempe esse oportebat vocis formas ternas, ut in hoc humanus humana humanum, sed habent quaedam binas, ut cervus cerva, quaedam singulas, ut aper, et sic multa. Non ergo est in huiuscemodi generibus analogia.

With these parts separated, examine each singly, so that you may more easily see that there are nowhere analogies which we ought to follow. Indeed, there ought to have been threefold forms of the word, as in this humanus humana humanum; but certain ones have two apiece, as cervus cerva, certain ones have a single one, as aper, and many are thus. Therefore, in genera of this sort there is no analogy.

XXV.

25.

Et in multitudine ut unum significat pater, plures patres, sic omnia debuerunt esse bina. Sed et singularia solum sunt multa, ut cicer, siser: nemo enim dicit cicera, sisera; et multitudinis sunt, ut salinae balneae: non enim ab his singulari specie dicitur salina et balnea. Neque ab eo quod dicunt balneum habet multitudinis consuetudo: nam quod est ut praedium balneum, debuerunt esse plura, ut praedia balnea, quod non est: non est ergo in his quoque analogia.

And in plurality, as one is signified by pater, several by patres, so all ought to have been in pairs. But many are only singulars as well, like cicer, siser: for no one says cicera, sisera; and there are [words] of the multitude, like salinae, balneae: for from these the singular form salina and balnea is not said. Nor does the custom of plurality derive from that which they call balneum: for in that which is as praedium balneum, there ought to have been more in the plural, as praedia balnea, which is not so: therefore in these too there is no analogy.

XXVI.

26.

Alia casus habent et rectos et obliquos, alia rectos solum, alia modo obliquos habent: utrosque ut Iuno, Iunonis, rectos modo ut Iupiter, Maspiter, obliquos solum ut Iovis, Iovem: non ergo in his est analogia.

Some have cases both direct and oblique, others only direct, others only oblique: both, as Juno, of Juno; only direct, as Jupiter, Maspiter; only oblique, as of Jove, Jove: therefore in these there is no analogy.

XXVII.

27.

Nunc videamus in illa quadripertita. Primum si esset analogia in infiniteis articulis, ut est quis quoius, sic diceretur quae quaius; et ut est quis quoi, sic diceretur qua quae: nam est proportione simile: ut deae bonae quae, sic dea bona qua est; et ut est quem quis, sic quos ques. Quare quod nunc dicitur qui homines, dici oportuit ques.

Now let us examine in that quadripartite. First, if there were analogy in the indefinite articles, as there is quis quoius, thus would be said quae quaius; and as there is quis quoi, thus would be said qua quae: for it is similar by proportion: as with deae bonae, quae, so with dea bona, qua is; and as there is quem to quis, so quos to ques. Wherefore, what is now said qui homines, ought to have been said ques.

XXVIII.

28.

Praeterea ut est ab is, ei, sic ab ea eae diceretur, quod nunc dicitur ei, et pronuntiaretur ut in ieis viris, sic eais mulieribus; et ut est in rectis casibus is ea, in obliquis esset eius eaius; nunc non modo in virili sicut in muliebri dicitur eius, sed etiam in neutris articulis, ut eius viri, eius mulieris, eius pabuli, cum discriminentur in rectis casibus is ea id. De hoc genere parcius tetigi, quod librarios haec spinosiora indiligentius elaturos putavi.

Moreover, just as from is comes ei, so from ea it would be said eae, which is now said ei, and it would be pronounced as in ieis men, so eais women; and as in the straight cases it is is ea, in the oblique it would be eius eaius; now not only in the masculine as also in the feminine it is said eius, but even in the neuter articles, as eius viri, eius mulieris, eius fodder, since they are distinguished in the straight cases as is ea id. Of this kind I have touched more sparingly, because I thought the copyists would copy out these thornier matters more carelessly.

XXIX.

29.

De nominatibus qui accedunt proxime ad infinitam naturam articulorum atque appellantur vocabula, ut homo equus, eorum declinationum genera sunt quattuor: unum nominandi, ut ab equo equile, alterum casuale, ut ab equo equum, tertium augendi, ut ab albo albius, quartum minuendi, ut a cista cistula.

On the nouns which approach most nearly to the infinite nature of the articles and are called vocables, as man, horse: the kinds of their declensions are four—one of naming, as from horse a stable; a second case-based, as from horse the accusative horse; a third of augmenting, as from white whiter; a fourth of diminishing, as from chest little chest.

Primum genus, ut dixi, id est, cum ab aliqua parte orationis declinata sunt recto casu vocabula, ut a balneis balneator. Hoc fere triplices habet radices, quod et a vocabulo oritur, ut a venatore venabulum, et a nomine, ut a Tibure Tiburs, et a verbo, ut a currendo cursor. In nullo horum analogiam servari videbis.

The first kind, as I said, is this: when from some part of speech words have been derived in the straight case (nominative), as from “baths” a “bath-attendant.” This almost has threefold roots, since it arises both from a common noun, as from “hunter” a “venabulum” (hunting-spear), and from a proper name, as from “Tibur” a “Tiburs,” and from a verb, as from “running” a “runner.” In none of these will you see analogy being observed.

XXX.

30.

Primum cum dicatur ut ab ove et sue ovile et suile, sic a bove bovile non dicitur; et cum simile sit avis et ovis, neque dicitur ut ab ave aviarium ab ove oviarium, neque ut ab ove ovile ab ave avile; et cum debuerit esse ut a cubatione cubiculum sic a sessione sediculum, non est.

First, although it is said that, as from sheep and swine come ovile and suile, yet from ox one does not say bovile; and since avis and ovis are similar, neither is it said, as from avis aviarium, from ovis oviarium, nor, as from ovis ovile, from avis avile; and although it ought to be that, as from cubatio comes cubiculum, so from sessio a sediculum, it is not.

Quoniam taberna, ubi venit vinum, a vino vinaria, a creta cretaria, ab unguento unguentaria dicitur, ana logon si essent vocabula, ubi caro venit, carnaria, ubi pelles, pelliaria, ubi calcei, calcearia diceretur, non laniena ac pellesuina et sutrina. Et sicut est ab uno uni, ab tribus trini, a quattuor quadrini, sic a duobus duini, non bini diceretur; nec non ut quadrigae trigae, sic potius duigae quam bigae. Permulta sunt huiusce generis, quae quoniam admonitus perspicere potest, omitto.

Since the tavern, where wine is sold, from wine is called vinaria, from creta cretaria, from unguent unguentaria, according to analogy, if the vocabula were such, where meat is sold, carnaria; where hides, pelliaria; where shoes, calcearia would be said, not laniena and pellesuina and sutrina. And just as from one uni, from three trini, from four quadrini, so from two duini, not bini, would be said; and likewise as quadrigae, trigae, so rather duigae than bigae. There are very many of this kind, which, since one who has been admonished can perceive, I omit.

XXXI.

31.

Vocabula quae ab nominibus oriuntur, si ab similibus nominibus similia esse debent, dicemus, quoniam gemina sunt Parma Roma, ut Parmenses sic Romenses; aut quoniam est similis Roma Nola Parma, dicemus ut Romani Nolani sic Parmani; et a Pergamo, ab Ilio similiter Pergamenus Ilienus; aut ut Ilius et Ilia mas et femina, sic Pergamus et Pergama vir et mulier; et quoniam similia nomina sunt Asia Libya, dicemus Asiaticos et Libyaticos homines.

Words which arise from nouns, if from similar nouns they ought to be similar, we shall say, since Parma and Rome are a twin pair, that as Parmenses so Romenses; or since Rome, Nola, Parma are similar, we shall say that as Romani, Nolani, so Parmani; and from Pergamum, from Ilium similarly Pergamenus, Ilienus; or as Ilius and Ilia are male and female, so Pergamus and Pergama, man and woman; and since Asia and Libya are similar names, we shall say Asiatic and Libyatic men.

XXXII.

32.

Quae vocabula dicuntur a verbis, funt ut a scribendo scriptor, a legendo lector, haec quoque non servare similitudinem licet videre ex his: cum similiter dicatur ut ab amando amator, ab salutando salutator, non est a cantando cantator; et cum dicatur lassus sum metendo ferendo, ex his vocabula non reddunt proportionem, quoniam non fit ut messor fertor. Multa sunt item in hac specie in quibus potius consuetudinem sequimur quam rationem verborum.

The words that are said to come from verbs are such as: from writing, scriptor; from reading, lector; it is likewise possible to see from these that these too do not keep similarity: although it is similarly said that from loving, amator; from saluting, salutator; yet there is not, from singing, a cantator; and although one says, “I am weary from reaping, from bearing,” from these the nouns do not render a proportion, since it does not come about that there are messor and fertor. There are many likewise in this class in which we follow usage rather than the rationale of the words.

Praeterea cum sint ab eadem origine verborum vocabula dissimilia superiorum, quod simul habent casus et tempora, quo vocantur participia, et multa sint contraria ut amo amor, lego legor, ab amo et eiusmodi omnibus verbis oriuntur praesens et futurum ut amans et amaturus, ab eis verbis tertium quod debet fingi praeteriti, in lingua Latina reperiri non potest: non ergo est analogia. Sic ab amor legor et eiusmodi verbis vocabulum eius generis praeteriti temporis fit, ut amatus, neque praesentis et futuri ab his fit.

Moreover, since from the same origin of words there are words unlike the foregoing, in that they at once have cases and tenses—by which they are called participles—and since many are contraries, as amo amor, lego legor, from amo and all verbs of that sort there arise the present and the future, as amans and amaturus; but from these verbs the third, which ought to be fashioned, of the past, cannot be found in the Latin tongue: therefore there is no analogy. Thus from amor, legor, and verbs of that kind, a word of that genus of past time is made, as amatus, and of the present and the future from these is not made.

Non est ergo analogia, praesertim cum tantus numerus vocabulorum in eo genere interierit quod dicimus. In his verbis quae contraria non habent, ut loquor et venor, tamen dicimus loquens et venans, locuturus et venaturus, locutus et venatus, quod secundum analogias non est, quoniam dicimus loquor et venor, non loquo et veno, unde illa erant superiora; eo minus servantur, quod ex his quae contraria verba non habent alia efficiunt terna, ut ea quae dixi, alia bina, ut ea quae dicam: currens ambulans, cursurus ambulaturus: tertia enim praeteriti non sunt, ut cursus sum, ambulatus sum.

Therefore there is no analogy, especially since so great a number of words in that kind have disappeared, as we say. In the case of those verbs which do not have contraries, like loquor and venor, nevertheless we say loquens and venans, locuturus and venaturus, locutus and venatus—which is not according to the analogies, since we say loquor and venor, not loquo and veno, whence those former forms would have been. So much the less are they observed, that from those which do not have contrary verbs some make a threefold set, like those I have said, others a twofold set, like those I shall say: currens ambulans, cursurus ambulaturus; for there are not third forms of the preterit, such as cursus sum, ambulatus sum.

Ne in his quidem, quae saepius quid fieri ostendunt, servatur analogia: nam ut est a cantando cantitans, ab amando amitans non est et sic multa. Ut in his singularibus, sic in multitudinis: sicut enim cantitantes seditantes non dicuntur.

Not even in those, which more often show something to occur, is the analogy preserved: for as from singing there is cantitans, from loving there is not amitans, and so in many cases. As in these in the singular, so in the plural: just as cantitantes and seditantes are not said.

XXXIII.

33.

Quoniam est vocabulorum genus quod appellant compositicium et negant conferri id oportere cum simplicibus de quibus adhuc dixi, de compositis separatim dicam. Cum ab tibiis et canendo tibicines dicantur, quaerunt, si analogias sequi oporteat, cur non a cithara et psalterio et pandura dicamus citharicen et sic alia; si ab aede et tuendo aeditumus dicatur, cur non ab atrio et tuendo potius atritumus sit quam atriensis; si ab avibus capiendis auceps dicatur, debuisse aiunt a piscibus capiendis ut aucupem sic piscicupem, dici.

Since there is a class of words which they call composititious, and they deny that it ought to be compared with the simple ones about which I have spoken up to now, I will speak separately about compounds. Since from tibiae and playing tibicines are named, they ask, if one ought to follow analogies, why we do not from the cithara and the psaltery and the pandura say citharicen, and so others; if from aedes and guarding aeditumus is said, why from atrium and guarding it should not rather be atritumus than atriensis; if from catching birds auceps is said, they say it ought to have been, from catching fish, that just as auceps, so piscicupem be said.

Ubi lavetur aes aerarias, non aerelavinas nominari; et ubi fodiatur argentum argentifodinas dici, neque ubi fodiatur ferrum ferrifodinas; qui lapides caedunt lapicidas, qui ligna, lignicidas non dici; neque ut aurificem sic argentificem; non doctum dici indoctum, non salsum insulsum. Sic ab hoc quoque fonte quae profluant, analogiam non servare animadvertere est facile.

Where copper is washed, the places are named copper-works, not copper-washings; and where silver is dug, they say silver-mines, yet not where iron is dug iron-mines; those who cut stones are called lapicides, those who cut wood are not called lignicides; nor, as we say goldsmith, do we likewise say silversmith; “not learned” is expressed unlearned, “not salty” insipid. Thus, also, of what flows forth from this same source, it is easy to notice that they do not observe analogy.

XXXIV.

34.

Reliquitur de casibus, in quo Aristarchei suos contendunt nervos.

What remains is about the cases, in which the Aristarchians strain every nerve.

XXXV.

35.

Primum si in his esset analogia, dicunt debuisse omnis nominatus et articulos habere totidem casus: nunc alios habere unum solum, ut litteras singulas omnes, alios tris, ut praedium praedii praedio, alios quattuor, ut mel mellis melli melle, alios quinque, ut quintus quinti quinto quintum quinte, alios sex, ut unus unius uni unum une uno: non esse ergo in casibus analogias.

First, if there were analogy in these matters, they say that every noun and article ought to have had just as many cases: now some have only one, as all single letters; others three, as praedium praedii praedio; others four, as mel mellis melli melle; others five, as quintus quinti quinto quintum quinte; others six, as unus unius uni unum une uno: therefore there are no analogies in the cases.

XXXVI.

36.

Secundo quod Crates, cur quae singulos habent casus, ut litterae Graecae, non dicantur alpha alphati alphatos, si idem mihi respondebitur quod Crateti, non esse vocabula nostra, sed penitus barbara, quaeram, cur idem nostra nomina et Persarum et ceterorum quos vocant barbaros cum casibus dicant.

Secondly, as to Crates: why are those which have single cases, as the Greek letters, not said alpha, alphati, alphatos? If the same will be answered to me as to Crates—that they are not our vocables, but thoroughly barbarous—I shall ask why they say with cases our names and those of the Persians and of the rest whom they call barbarians.

Quare si essent in analogia, aut ut Poenicum et Aegyptiorum vocabula singulis casibus dicerent, aut pluribus ut Gallorum ac ceterorum; nam dicunt alauda alaudas et sic alia. Sin quod scribunt dicent, quod Poenicum sint, singulis casibus ideo eas litteras Graecas nominari: sic Graeci nostra senis casibus non quinis dicere debebant; quod cum non faciunt, non est analogia.

Wherefore, if they were in analogy, either they would speak them, as the words of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, with single cases, or with more, as with those of the Gauls and the others; for they say alauda alaudas, and so others. But if they will say what they write—that, because they are Phoenician, for that reason those Greek letters are named in single cases—thus the Greeks ought to speak our words with 6 cases, not 5; since they do not do this, it is not analogy.

XXXVII.

37.

Quae si esset, negant ullum casum duobus modis debuisse dici; quod fit contra. Nam sine reprehensione vulgo alii dicunt in singulari hac ovi et avi, alii hac ove et ave; in multitudinis hae puppis restis et hae puppes restes; item quod in patrico casu hoc genus dispariliter dicuntur civitatum parentum et civitatium parentium, in accusandi hos montes fontes et hos montis fontis.

If this were so, they deny that any case ought to have been said in two ways; but the opposite happens. For without censure, commonly some say in the singular hac ovi and avi, others hac ove and ave; in the plural hae puppis restis and hae puppes restes; likewise, in the patrical (genitive) case of this kind they are said in unlike fashion civitatum parentum and civitatium parentium, in the accusing (accusative) case hos montes fontes and hos montis fontis.

XXXVIII.

38.

Item cum, si sit analogia, debeant ab similibus verbis similiter declinatis similia fieri et id non fieri ostendi possit, despiciendam eam esse rationem. Atqui ostenditur: nam qui potest similius esse quam gens, mens, dens? Cum horum casus patricus et accusativus in multitudine sint dispariles: nam a primo fit gentium et gentis, utrubique ut sit I, ab secundo mentium et mentes, ut in priore solo sit I, ab tertio dentum et dentes, ut in neutro sit.

Likewise, since, if there be analogy, similar results ought to be made from similar words declined similarly, and if it can be shown that this does not happen, that rationale ought to be despised. And yet it is shown: for what can be more similar than gens, mens, dens? Since the genitive and accusative cases of the plural are dissimilar: for from the first there is formed gentium and gentis, so that in both there is I; from the second mentium and mentes, so that in the former alone there is I; from the third dentum and dentes, so that in neither is there I.

Sic item quoniam simile est recto casu surus lupus lepus, rogant, quor non dicatur proportione suro lupo lepo. Sin respondeatur similia non esse quod ea vocemus dissimiliter sure lupe lepus (sic enim respondere voluit Aristarchus Crateti: nam cum scripsisset similia esse Philomedes Heraclides Melicertes, dixit non esse similia: in vocando enim cum E brevi dici Philomedes, cum E longo Heraclide, cum A brevi Melicerta), in hoc dicunt Aristarchum non intellexisse quod quaeretur se non solvere.

Likewise, since in the rectus case surus, lupus, lepus are similar, they ask why, by proportion, one should not say suro, lupo, lepo. But if it be answered that they are not similar because we call them in addressing dissimilarly sure, lupe, lepus (for thus Aristarchus wished to respond to Crates: for when he had written that Philomedes, Heraclides, Melicertes are similar, he said they are not similar; for in calling, Philomedes is said with short E, Heraclide with long E, Melicerta with short A), in this they say that Aristarchus did not understand that he was not resolving what was being asked.

Sic enim, ut quicque in obliquis casibus discrepavit, dicere potuit propter eam rem rectos casus non esse similis; quom quaeratur duo inter se similia sint necne, non debere extrinsecus adsumi cur similia sint.

For thus, inasmuch as whatever has differed in the oblique cases, he could on that account say that the straight cases are not similar; when it is asked whether two things are similar to each other or not, it ought not to be assumed extrinsically why they are similar.

Item si esset analogia, similiter ut dicunt aves oves sues, dicerent item avium ovium suium. Si analogia est, inquit, cur populus dicit Dei Penates, Dei Consentes, cum sit ut hic reus ferreus deus, sic hei reei ferreei deei?

Likewise, if there were analogy, just as they say aves oves sues, they would likewise say avium ovium suium. “If there is analogy,” he says, “why does the people say ‘Dei Penates, Dei Consentes,’ since, as it is ‘hic reus ferreus deus,’ so it would be ‘hei reei ferreei deei’?”

Item quaerunt, si sit analogia, cur appellant omnes aedem Deum Consentium et non Deorum Consentium? Item quor dicatur mille denarium, non mille denariorum? Est enim hoc vocabulum figura ut Vatinius, Manilius, denarius: debet igitur dici ut Vatiniorum Maniliorum denariorum; et non equum puplicum mille assarium esse, sed mille assariorum: ab uno enim assario multi assarii, ab eo assariorum.

Likewise they ask, if there is analogy, why do all call the aedes Deum Consentium and not Deorum Consentium? Likewise, why is it said “mille denarium,” not “mille denariorum”? For this word has a figure like “Vatinius, Manilius, denarius”: therefore it ought to be said “Vatiniorum, Maniliorum, denariorum”; and that a public horse is not “mille assarium,” but “mille assariorum”: for from one assarius come many assarii, and from that, assariorum.

Item secundum illorum rationem debemus secundis syllabis longis Hectorem Nestorem: est enim ut quaestor praetor Nestor quaestorem praetorem Nestorem, quaestoris praetoris Nestoris; et non debuit dici quibus das, his das: est enim ut hi qui his quis, aut sicut quibus hibus.

Likewise, according to their reasoning, we ought to have the second syllables long in Hectorem and Nestorem: for it is as quaestor, praetor, Nestor; quaestorem, praetorem, Nestorem; quaestoris, praetoris, Nestoris; and it ought not to have been said quibus das, his das: for it is as hi, qui; his, quis; or just as quibus, hibus.

Cum dicatur da patri familias, si analogias sequi vellent, non debuerunt dicere hic pater familias, quod est ut Atiniae Catiniae familiae, sic una Atinia Catinia familia. Item plures patres familias dicere non debuerunt, sed, ut Sisenna scribit, patres familiarum.

Since it is said “give to the pater familias,” if they wished to follow analogies, they ought not to have said “this pater familias,” which is as “Atinian and Catinian families,” thus “one Atinian, Catinian family.” Likewise they ought not to have said “several patres familias,” but, as Sisenna writes, “patres familiarum.”

Neque oportebat consuetudinem natare alios dicere boum greges, alios boverum, et signa alios Ioum, alios Ioverum, cum esset ut Iovis bovis struis et Iovem bovem struem Iovi bovi strui; nec cum haec convenirent in obliquis casibus, dubitare debuerunt in rectis, in quibus nunc in consuetudine aliter dicere, pro Ious Iupiter, pro bous bos, pro strus strues.

Nor was it fitting to censure the custom that some say herds of oxen as boum, others as boverum, and standards some as Ioum, others as Ioverum, since it was as Iovis bovis struis and Iovem bovem struem Iovi bovi strui; nor, since these agreed in the oblique cases, ought they to have doubted in the straight cases, in which now by custom they say otherwise, instead of Ious Jupiter, instead of bous bos, instead of strus strues.

XXXIX.

39.

Deinceps dicam de altero genere vocabulorum, in quo contentiones fiunt, ut album albius albissumum, in quo item analogias non servari apparet: nam cum sit simile salsum caldum et dicatur ab his salsius caldius, salsissimum caldissimum, debuit dici, quoniam simile est bonum malum, ab his bonius et malius, bonissimum et malissimum. Nonne dicitur bonum melius optimum, malum peius pessimum?

Next I will speak about another genus of vocables, in which contentions arise, as with album albius albissumum, in which likewise it appears that analogies are not observed: for since salsum and caldum are similar, and from these are said salsius caldius, salsissimum caldissimum, it ought to have been said, since bonum and malum are similar, from these bonius and malius, bonissimum and malissimum. Is it not said bonum melius optimum, malum peius pessimum?

In aliis verbis nihil deest, ut dulcis dulcior dulcissimus, in aliis primum, ut peium a peius pessimum, in aliis medium, ut caesior a caesius caesissumus, in aliis bina sunt quae desint ab eadem voce declinata, et ea ita ut alias desint secundum et tertium, ut in hoc mane manius manissime, alias ut duo prima absint, ut ab optimum optius optum, alias ut primum et tertium desit, ut a melius melum melissumum.

In other words nothing is lacking, as sweet, sweeter, sweetest; in others the first [degree], as “peium” from “peius, pessimum”; in others the middle, as “caesior” from “caesius, caesissumus”; in others there are two which are lacking from the same vocable declined, and this in such a way that sometimes the second and the third are lacking, as in this “mane, manius, manissime,” sometimes that the first two are absent, as from “optimum, optius, optum,” sometimes that the first and the third are lacking, as from “melius, melum, melissumum.”

Praeterea si dicerentur similiter, cum similia essent macer tener et macerrimus tenerrimus, non discreparet in his macrior tenerior, neque alia trisyllaba alia quadrisyllaba fierent; et si in his dominaretur similitudo, diceremus ut candidissimus candidissima, pauperrumus pauperrima, sic candidus candida, pauper paupera; et ut dicimus doctus docta, doctissimus doctissima, sic diceremus frugalissumus frugalissima, frugalus et frugala.

Moreover, if they were said similarly, since macer and tener and macerrimus and tenerrimus are similar, macrior and tenerior would not differ among these, nor would some become trisyllabic and others quadrisyllabic; and if likeness were to rule in these, we would say, as candidissimus, candidissima, pauperrumus, pauperrima, so candidus, candida, pauper, paupera; and as we say doctus, docta, doctissimus, doctissima, so we would say frugalissumus, frugalissima, frugalus and frugala.

Et si proportione essent verba, ut uno vocabulo dicimus virum et mulierem sapientem et diligentem et sapientiorem et diligentiorem, sic diceremus item, cum pervenissemus ad summum, quod nunc facimus aliter: nam virum dicimus sapientissimum et diligentissimum, feminam sapientissimam et diligentissimam. Quod ad vocabulorum huius generis exempla pertinet, multa sunt reliqua; sed ea quae dicta, ad iudicandum satis sunt, quor analogias in collatione verborum sequi non debeamus.

And if words were in proportion, as with one vocabulary we call a man and a woman “wise” and “diligent” and “wiser” and “more diligent,” thus we would likewise say, when we had arrived at the highest degree—which now we do otherwise: for we say of a man “wisest” and “most diligent,” of a woman “wisest” and “most diligent.” As regards examples of words of this kind, many remain; but those that have been stated are sufficient for judging why we ought not to follow analogies in the collation of words.

XL.

40.

Magnitudinis vocabula cum possint esse terna, ut cista cistula cistella, in aliis media non sunt, ut in his macer macricolus macellus, niger nigricolus nigellus. Item minima in quibusdam non sunt, ut avis avicula avicella, caput capitulum capitellum. In hoc genere vocabulorum quoniam multa desunt, dicendum est non esse in eo potius sequendam quam consuetudinem rationem.

Words of magnitude can be in triples, as cista cistula cistella; in others the middle forms are not, as in these macer macricolus macellus, niger nigricolus nigellus. Likewise the least forms are not in some, as avis avicula avicella, caput capitulum capitellum. In this genus of words, since many are lacking, it must be said that in it reason is not rather to be followed than custom.

Quod ad vocabulorum genera quattuor pertinet, ut in hoc potius consuetudinem quam analogias dominari facile animadverti possit, dictum est.

As regards the four classes of vocables, it has been said, so that it may be easily observed, that in this matter custom rather than analogies is dominant.

XLI.

41.

Sequitur de nominibus, quae differunt a vocabulis ideo quod sunt finita ac significant res proprias, ut Paris Helena, cum vocabula sint infinita ac res communis designent, ut vir mulier; e quibus sunt alia nomina ab nominibus, ut Ilium ab Ilo et Ilia ab Ilio, alia a vocabulo, ut ab albo Albius, ab atro Atrius. In neutris servata est analogia: nam et cum sit a Romulo Roma, proportione non est quod debuit esse Romula, non Roma.

It follows concerning names, which differ from vocables for this reason: that they are finite and signify proper things, as Paris, Helen, whereas vocables are infinite and designate a common thing, as man, woman; of which some names are from names, as Ilium from Ilo and Ilia from Ilio, others from a vocable, as from albus Albius, from ater Atrius. In neither has analogy been preserved: for even though it is Roma from Romulus, by proportion it is not what it ought to have been—Romula, not Roma.

Item Perpenna debuit esse Perpenni filia, non Perpennae filius. Nam Perpenna mulieris nomen esse debuit et nata esse a Perpenno, quod est ut Arvernus Percelnus Perpennus, Arverna Percelna Perpenna. Quod si Marcus Perpenna virile est nomen et analogia sequenda, Lucius Aelia et Quintus Mucia virilia nomina esse debebunt; item quae dicunt ab Rhodo, Andro, Cyzico Rhodius, Andrius, Cyzicenus, similiter Cyzicius dici debebat, et civis unus quisque: non ut Athenaeus dicitur rhetor nomine, etsi non sit Atheniensis.

Likewise, Perpenna ought to be the daughter of Perpennus, not the son of Perpenna. For Perpenna ought to have been a woman’s name and to be born from Perpennus, as it is Arvernus, Percelnus, Perpennus; Arverna, Percelna, Perpenna. But if “Marcus Perpenna” is a virile name and analogy is to be followed, then “Lucius Aelia” and “Quintus Mucia” will have to be virile names; likewise, those who say from Rhodes, Andros, Cyzicus “Rhodian, Andrian, Cyzicene,” similarly “Cyzician” ought to be said, and so for each citizen individually: not as “Athenaeus” is said as a rhetor by name, although he is not an Athenian.

In hoc ipso analogia non est, quod alii nomina habent ab oppidis, alii aut non habent aut non ut debent habent.

In this very matter there is no analogy, because some have names from towns, others either do not have them, or do not have them as they ought.

Habent plerique libertini a municipio manumissi, in quo, ut societatum et fanorum servi, non servarunt proportione rationem, et Romanorum liberti debuerunt dici ut a Faventia Faventinus, ab Reate Reatinus sic a Roma Romanus, ut nominentur libertini orti a publicis servis Romani, qui manumissi ante quam sub magistratuum nomina, qui eos liberarunt, succedere coeperunt.

Most freedmen manumitted by a municipium have their designation from the municipium; in which matter, as with the slaves of societies and of shrines, they have not kept the rule of proportion; and the freedmen of the Romans ought to have been called—as from Faventia, Faventinus; from Reate, Reatinus—thus from Rome, Romanus, so that the freedmen sprung from the public slaves of the Roman people be named thus, who, when manumitted, did so before they began to pass under the names of the magistrates who freed them.

Hinc quoque illa nomina Lesas, Ufenas, Carrinas, Maecenas, quae cum essent ab loco ut Urbinas, et tamen Urbinius, ab his debuerunt dici ad nostrorum nominum similitudinem Lesius Ufenius Carrinius Maecenius ***

Hence also those names Lesas, Ufenas, Carrinas, Maecenas, which, since they were from a place like Urbinas, and yet Urbinius, from these ought to have been called, according to the similitude of our names, Lesius Ufenius Carrinius Maecenius ***