Vegetius•EPITOMA REI MILITARIS LIBRI IIII
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IIII. Quemadmodum oporteat prouidere, ne seditionem milites faciant.
With how much care fodder or grain ought to be provided and preserved.
4. How one ought to provide, so that the soldiers do not commit sedition.
How the rivers which are greater should be crossed.
8. How the camp ought to be ordered.
On arranging the cavalry.
17. On the reserves, which are stationed behind the battle-line.
XXII. Quemadmodum ab hostibus recedatur, si consilium displicet pugnae.
A way of withdrawing is to be given to the enemies, so that those fleeing may be more easily destroyed.
22. How one should withdraw from the enemies, if the plan of battle is displeasing.
XXV. Quid fieri debeat, si uel pars fugerit uel totus exercitus.
How it is possible to withstand scythed four-horse chariots or elephants in the battle-line.
25. What ought to be done, if either a part flees or the whole army.
Athenienses et Lacedaemonios ante Macedonas rerum potitos prisci locuntur annales. Verum apud Athenienses non solum rei bellicae sed etiam diuersarum artium uiguit industria, Lacedaemoniis autem praecipua fuit cura bellorum. Primi denique experimenta pugnarum de euentibus colligentes artem proeliorum scripsisse firmantur usque eo, ut rem militarem, quae uirtute sola uel certe felicitate creditur contineri, ad disciplinam peritiaeque studia reuocarent ac magistros armorum, quos tacticos appellauerunt, iuuentutem suam usum uarietatemque pugnandi praeciperent edocere.
The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, before the Macedonians, are reported by the ancient annals to have held control of affairs.
In truth, among the Athenians industry flourished not only in the military sphere but also in diverse arts,
whereas among the Lacedaemonians the chief care was for wars. They first, then, collecting from outcomes the experiments (i.e., lessons) of battles, are affirmed to have written the art of engagements,
to such a degree that they recalled the military art, which is believed to be sustained by virtue (valor) alone or at any rate by good fortune,
to discipline and the studies of expertise,
and they ordered masters of arms, whom they called tacticians, to teach their youth the practice
and the variety of fighting.
O men to be praised with the highest admiration, who especially wished to learn thoroughly that art without which the other arts cannot be! Following the institutes of these, the Romans both retained by use the precepts of the work of Mars and committed them to letters. These things, scattered through diverse authors and books, unconquered Emperor, you have ordered my mediocrity to abbreviate, lest either tedium be born from very many, or the plenitude of trust be lacking in small ones.
How much, moreover, in battles the discipline of the Lacedaemonians profited, to omit the rest, is made clear by the example of Xanthippus, who, when to the Carthaginians he brought aid not by valor but by art alone, took and subdued Atilius Regulus and the Roman army—often victorious—with the armies laid low, and in a single encounter, triumphing, finished the whole war. No less did Hannibal, when he was about to seek Italy, look for a Lacedaemonian teacher of arms, by whose counsels, though inferior in number and in strength, he destroyed so many consuls and so great legions. Therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare war; he who longs for victory, let him diligently imbue his soldiers; he who chooses favorable outcomes, let him fight by art, not by chance.
I. Primus liber tironum dilectum exercitiumque deprompsit, sequens legionis institutionem disciplinamque edocuit militarem, hic tertius classicum sonat. Ideo enim illa praemissa sunt, ut haec, in quibus peritia certaminum et uictoriae summa consistit, disciplinae ordine custodito et intellegerentur celerius et amplius adiuuarent. Exercitus dicitur tam legionum quam etiam auxiliorum nec non etiam equitum ad gerendum bellum multitudo collecta.
1. The first book brought forth the levy of recruits and training, the following taught the legion’s
institution and military discipline; this third sounds the trumpet. For those things were set forth beforehand for this reason, that these matters, in which expertise of contests and the sum of victory consist, with the order of discipline maintained, might both be understood more quickly and help more amply. An army is called a multitude collected for waging war, of legions as well as also
of auxiliaries, and likewise also of cavalry.
Of this
the measure is sought from the masters of arms. For when the examples of Xerxes and Darius and Mithridates and of the other kings, who armed innumerable peoples, are re-read, it clearly appears that excessively copious armies have been pressed down more by their own multitude than by the enemies’ valor. For a larger multitude lies under more casualties; on marches, in proportion to its mass, it is always slower; and in a longer column it is even wont to suffer being fallen upon by a few; moreover, in rough places or when rivers must be crossed, on account of the delays of the impediments (baggage), it is often deceived; besides, with enormous labor fodder is gathered for the numerous animals and horses.
The difficulty of the grain-supply too, which in every expedition is to be avoided, quickly wearies larger armies. For with however great zeal the annona be prepared, so much the sooner it fails, the more it is disbursed to greater numbers. Water, finally, itself at times scarcely suffices for an excessive multitude.
But if by chance the battle line should turn its back, it is necessary that many fall from among many, and that those who have escaped, once terrified, thereafter fear the conflict. The Ancients, however, who had learned by experiments (experience) the remedies for difficulty, wished to have armies not so numerous as well-schooled in arms. And so, in lighter wars, they believed that a single legion with mixed auxiliaries—that is, 10,000 foot-soldiers and 2,000 horse—could suffice, which force the praetors, as lesser commanders, often led on expedition.
But if great forces of the enemy were reported, consular power was sent as a senior companion with 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. But if an infinite multitude from the most ferocious peoples had rebelled, then, with excessive necessity compelling, two leaders and two armies were sent with a precept of this sort: 'let them provide that the commonwealth take no detriment, both consuls or one of them.' Finally, since in diverse regions, against diverse enemies, war was waged by the Roman people in almost all years, for that reason the forces of soldiers sufficed, because they judged it more useful not so much to have great armies as to have more, with this proviso nevertheless observed: that never was there a larger multitude of allied auxiliaries in the camp than of Roman citizens.
II. Nunc, quod uel maxime prouidendum est, quemadmodum sanitas custodiatur exercitus, admonebo, hoc est locis aquis tempore medicina exercitio. Locis, ne in pestilenti regione iuxta morbosas paludes, ne aridis et sine opacitate arborum campis aut collibus, ne sine tentoriis aestate milites commorentur; ne egressi tardius et calore solis et fatigatione itineris contrahant morbum, sed potius in aestu, ante lucem coepto ininere, ad destinata perueniant; ne saeua hieme iter per niues ac pruinas noctibus faciant aut lignorum patiantur inopiam aut minor illis uestium suppetat copia; nec sanitati enim nec expeditioni idoneus miles est, qui algere conpellitur. Nec perniciosis uel palustribus aquis utatur exercitus; nam malae aqaue potus, ueneno similis, pestilentiam bibentibus generat.
2. Now, what must most especially be provided for—how the health of the army is to be preserved—I will advise: that is, by places, waters, season, medicine, exercise. As to places: let them not stay in a pestilent region near diseased marshes; nor in dry fields or hills without the shade of trees; nor in summer without tents; let them not, if they set out too late, contract illness both from the heat of the sun and the fatigue of the march, but rather, in the heat, with the journey begun before daybreak, reach the appointed destinations; let them not in savage winter make marches by night through snows and frosts, nor suffer a lack of firewood, nor have only a scant supply of clothing; for a soldier who is compelled to freeze is fit neither for health nor for an expedition. Nor let the army use pernicious or marshy waters; for the drinking of bad water, like poison, generates pestilence for those who drink it.
Now indeed, in order that in this case the sick tent‑mates may be refreshed with opportune foods and be cared for by the art of the physicians, the unceasing diligence of the headquarters, of the tribunes, and of the count himself, who sustains the greater power, is required; for it goes ill with those upon whom the necessity both of war and of sickness presses. But those skilled in military affairs have thought that daily exercises of arms profit the health of the soldiers more than physicians. And so they wished the infantry to be exercised without interruption—under a roof in rains or snows, and on the remaining days in the field.
Similarly, they ordered the cavalry not only on the plains but also on steep ground and on the yawning gaps of ditches, along the most difficult paths, to exercise themselves and their horses continually, so that nothing in the necessity of battle might befall them as unknown. From this it is understood how much more studiously the army must always be taught in the art of arms, since the habit of labor can provide for it both health in camp and, in conflict, victory. If in autumnal and summer time a multitude of soldiers remains for a longer while in the same places, from the contagion of the waters and from the foulness of the very odor, with draughts tainted and the air corrupted, a most pernicious disease arises, which cannot be prevented otherwise than by frequent change of camps.
III. Ordo postulat, ut de commeatu pabulo frumentisque dicatur. Saepius enim penuria quam pugna consumit exercitum, et ferro saeuior fames est.
3. Order requires that there be mention of supply, fodder, and grain. For more often penury than battle consumes an army, and hunger is fiercer than the sword.
Then in the remaining contingencies succor can be brought in time; foraging and annona (rations) in necessity have no remedy, unless they are laid in beforehand. In every expedition there is one and the greatest weapon: that victuals suffice for you, and that want break the enemies. Therefore, before the war is begun, there ought to be a skillful tractation concerning supplies and expenses, so that fodder, grain, and the other annona-species which custom demands from the provincials be exacted earlier, and in opportune places for conducting the operation and in the most fortified locations a measure always larger than suffices be aggregated.
If the tributes fail, everything must be procured by extending credit in gold. For the possession of riches is not secure, unless it is preserved by the defense of arms. Often, however, necessity is redoubled, and a siege often becomes longer than you would have thought, when the adversaries, hungry themselves as well, do not cease to sit around those whom they hope to conquer by famine.
Moreover, whatever in livestock or in any grain and wine the enemy, bringing war, could seize for his own victual, must be conveyed, not only with the possessors admonished by edicts but even compelled through chosen prosecutors, to suitable castles, strengthened by garrisons of armed men, or to the safest cities; and the provincials are to be urged to hide themselves and their goods within the walls before the irruption. The repair also of the walls and of all engines (torments) must be cared for beforehand. For if once the enemies have forestalled men who are preoccupied, everything is thrown into confusion by fear, and the things that must be sought from other cities are denied when the roads are cut off.
But faithful custody of the granaries and a moderate disbursement are wont to suffice for supply, especially if it is provided for from the beginning. Besides, parsimony comes late: to save when it is failing. In arduous expeditions the rations were furnished by the ancients more per head of the soldiers than by dignities, such that after the necessity they were returned to the same men by the republic.
In winter the difficulty of wood and fodder, in summer of waters, must be avoided. But the necessity of grain and of vinegar or wine, and likewise even of salt, is to be averted at all times, so that cities and forts may be defended by those soldiers who are found less prompt in the battle-line, with weapons: arrows from staff-slings, and also slings and stones, with onagers and ballistae. And let it especially be avoided, lest the incautious simplicity of the provincials be deceived by the deceit and perjuries of the adversaries.
IIII. Interdum mouet tumultum ex diuersis locis collectus exercitus et, cum pugnare nolit, irasci se simulat, cur non ducatur ad bellum; quod hi praecipue faciunt, qui in sedibus itiose delicateque uixerunt. Nam asperitate insoliti laboris offensi, quem in expeditione necesse est sustinere, praeterea metuentes proelium, qui armorum exercitia declinarant, ad eiusmodi praecipitantur audaciam.
4. Sometimes an army collected from diverse places stirs up tumult and, although it is unwilling to fight, pretends to be enraged that it is not being led to war; this is done especially by those who have lived idly and delicately in their seats. For, offended by the asperity of an unaccustomed labor, which on expedition it is necessary to sustain, and, besides, fearing battle—those who had shunned the exercises of arms—they are precipitated into an audacity of this sort.
To which wound a manifold medicine is accustomed to be applied. While as yet they are separated and in their quarters, let them be held by tribunes or by their vicarii, and also by the officers of headquarters, to every discipline with the strictest severity, and let them keep nothing else but devotion and moderation. Field‑exercise, as they themselves call it (inspection of arms), let them perform continually; let them be free for no furloughs; let them not cease to attend at roll‑call, at the standards; for shooting arrows, for aiming missiles, for casting stones either with sling or by hand, for the armatura drill, for striking with bars in imitation of swords, by thrust and by cut, they are to be kept very frequently for much of the day until they sweat.
They are likewise to be imbued by running and leaping for the crossing of ditches. Whether sea or river is near the quarters, in summer time all must be compelled to swim; furthermore, to cut forest, to make a route through thickets and precipices, to hew the timber, to open a trench, to seize some position, and—lest they be thrust off by their tent-mates—to strain, shields meeting one another, in resistance. Thus, soldiers exercised and instructed in their quarters, whether they be legionaries, auxiliaries, or cavalry, when they have come together for a campaign from different units, through emulation of virtue (valor) will have it more necessary to desire battle rather than leisure: no one thinks of tumult who bears confidence from skill or from strength.
The leader, moreover, must be attentive, that in all the legions, whether auxiliaries or vexillations, from the
tribunes, deputies, and principal officers, if there are soldiers who are turbulent or seditious, he may recognize them not by the envy of informers but by the truth of the facts, and, separated from the camp by more prudent
counsel, assign them to do something which seems almost desirable to them, or detail them to forts and cities to be fortified and guarded, with such
subtlety that, when they are being cast off, they seem to be chosen. For a multitude never bursts forth into contumacy by equal consensus, but is incited by a few, who hope for impunity of vices and crimes by sinning with the very many. But if extreme necessity shall have persuaded the remedy of iron, it is more proper, in the custom of the ancestors, to proceed against the authors of the crimes, so that fear may reach all, punishment the few.
V. Multa quidem sunt dicenda atque obseruanda pugnantibus, siquidem nulla sit neglegentiae uenia, ubi de salute certatur. Sed inter reliqua nihil magis ad uictoriam proficit quam monitis obtemperare signorum. Nam cum uoce sola inter proeliorum tumultus regi multitudo non possit et cum pro necessitate rerum plura ex tempore iubenda atque facienda sint, antiquus omnium gentium usus inuenit, quomodo quod solus dux utile iudicasset per signa totus agnosceret et sequeretur exercitus.
5. Many things indeed are to be said and observed by combatants, since there is no pardon for negligence where the contest is for safety. But among the rest nothing profits victory more than to obey the monitions of the signals. For since by voice alone amid the tumults of battles the multitude cannot be ruled, and since, according to the necessity of affairs, more things must be ordered and done on the spur of the moment, the ancient usage of all nations discovered how that what the general alone had judged useful the whole army might recognize and follow through the standards.
Therefore it is agreed that there are three kinds of signals: vocal, semivocal, mute. Of these, the vocal and semivocal are perceived by the ears, but the mute pertain to the eyes. Vocal are called those which are pronounced by the human voice, just as on watch or in battle something is said as a signal, for example “victory,” “palm,” “virtue,” “God with us,” “the emperor’s triumph,” and others, whatever he who holds the highest authority in the army may wish to give.
It must nonetheless be known that these watchwords ought to be varied daily, lest from habitual use the enemies recognize the signal and, as scouts, move among our men with impunity. Semivocal are those which are given by tuba or horn or buccina; the tuba is that which is straight; the buccina is that which bends into itself in a bronze circle; the horn, made from wild aurochs, bound with silver, tempered by art, sends forth to the hearing, by the breath of the player, a blast. For by these unmistakable sounds the army recognizes whether it ought to stand still or advance, or indeed to retreat(, whether to pursue the fleeing far or to sound the recall). Mute signs are eagles, dragons, vexilla, little flammules, tufts, plumes; for wherever the leader shall have ordered these to be carried, to that place it is necessary that the soldiers, accompanying their own standard, proceed.
There are also other mute signs,
which the commander of war orders to be kept on the horses or on the garments and on the arms themselves, so that the enemy may be discerned;
moreover, he who employs them signifies something with the hand, or with a whip in barbaric fashion,
or certainly by a garment moved. All these things, in quarters
and on marches, in every camp-exercise, let all the soldiers both follow and
understand. For continuous practice seems necessary in peace of that matter
which is to be kept in the confusion of battle.
Likewise a mute and common signal is, whenever, as the column sets out, dust, stirred up, rises in likeness to clouds and betrays the arrival of the enemies; similarly, if the forces be divided, by night with flames, by day with smoke they signify to their allies what otherwise cannot be announced. Some in the towers of castles or cities suspend beams, by which, sometimes raised, sometimes lowered, they indicate what is being carried on.
VI. Qui rem militarem studiosius didicerunt, adserunt plura in itineribus quam in ipsa acie pericula solere contingere. Nam in conflictu armati sunt omnes et hostem comminus uident et ad pugnandum animo ueniunt praeparati; in itinere minus armatus minusque adtentus est miles et superuentus impetu uel fraude subsessae repente turbatur. Ideo omni cura omnique diligentia prouidere dux debet, ne profiscens patiatur incursum uel facile ac sine damno repellat inlatum.
6. Those who have studied the military art more studiously assert that more dangers are wont to occur on marches than in the battle line itself. For in the conflict all are armed, they see the enemy at close quarters, and they come prepared in spirit for fighting; on the march the soldier is less armed and less attentive, and when an enemy comes upon him he is suddenly thrown into confusion by a rush or by the fraud of an ambush. Therefore with every care and with all diligence the leader ought to provide, that, when setting out, he not suffer an incursion, or that he repel any delivered easily and without loss.
First, he ought to have the itineraries of all the regions in which war is waged,
written down most fully, such that he learns the intervals of places not only by the number of paces
but also by the quality of the roads, considers the shortcuts, byways, mountains
rivers faithfully described, to this point: that more skillful leaders
are affirmed to have had the itineraries of the provinces, in which necessity was being carried on, not only annotated
but even drawn, so that, when about to set out, he might choose the route not only by the counsel of the mind but by the sight
of the eyes. To this end, from more prudent and honorable men and from those knowledgeable of the places,
he ought separately to inquire into everything and to collect the truth from several;
besides, (to be chosen under peril) to appoint guides of the roads who are suitable and knowing,
to instruct them, and to deliver them over to custody, with a display of punishment or of reward added. For they will be useful, when they understand that no opportunity of fleeing remains to them and that for fidelity
a reward and for perfidy punishments are prepared.
Provision must also be made, that wise and well-practiced men be sought out, lest the error of two or three beget peril for all; sometimes, however, ignorant rusticity promises more and believes itself to know what it does not know. But the head of caution is this: that, to what places or by what routes the army is going to set out, be unknown; for in expeditions it is believed safest that the things to be done be not known. On account of this the ancients had the Minotaur’s sign in the legions, so that, just as he is reported to have been hidden in the inmost and most secret labyrinth, so the leader’s counsel might always be occult.
A march is secure when the enemies least suspect what is to be done. However, because scouts sent from the other side detect the departure by suspicions or by their eyes, and sometimes deserters and betrayers are not lacking, it should be made known how one ought to meet those who are pressing on. The leader, about to set out with the column of the army, should send the most faithful and the keenest, with the most proven horses, to reconnoiter the places through which the march must be made, in front and in the rear, on the right and on the left, lest the adversaries contrive any ambushes.
More safely, however,
scouts operate by nights than by days. For in a certain way he is found to be his own betrayer whose scout has been seized by the adversaries. Therefore first
let the horsemen seize the march, then the foot-soldiers; let the baggage, the pack-animals, the camp-servants,
and the vehicles be placed in the middle, in such a way that the unencumbered part of the infantry and cavalry
follows after.
For those marching, a sudden onset is delivered sometimes indeed from the front, but more often from the rear.
From the flanks as well the baggage-train must be enclosed with an equal band of armed men; for ambushers frequently make crosswise charges.
This, however, must be observed especially: that the part to which the enemy is believed about to come
be secured by posting the choicest cavalry and light-armed troops, and also infantry archers.
But if the enemies are poured in on all sides, reserves ought to be prepared on all sides. And lest a sudden tumult do greater harm, the soldiers must be warned beforehand, that they may be ready in spirit, that they may have arms in their hands: sudden necessity terrifies; what is foreseen is not wont to be a cause of fear. The Ancients took the greatest precautions, lest the fighting soldiers be thrown into confusion by the camp-servants (calones), sometimes wounded, sometimes afraid, and by the pack-animals (sagmarii), panic-struck by shouting; lest, scattered too far or massed together more than is expedient, they hinder their own men and profit the enemies. And therefore, after the example of the soldiers, they judged that even the impedimenta (baggage-train) should be arrayed under certain standards.
Finally, from the calones themselves, whom they call “galiarii,” they used to choose men suitable and experienced by practice, whom they would set over no more than 200 pack-animals and boys. To these they gave vexilla, so that they might know to which standards they ought to gather the baggage. But the front-line fighters are separated from the baggage by some interval, lest, packed close, they be harmed in battle.
With the army marching, as the variety of places occurs, so the method of defense is varied. For on open plains the cavalry are more wont to assail than the infantry; but indeed in wooded or mountainous or marshy places the foot forces are more to be feared. And this is to be avoided: that through negligence, with some hurrying and others advancing more slowly, the battle line be broken or at least thinned; for immediately, once the line is interrupted, the enemies penetrate.
Therefore the most thoroughly trained drillmasters, deputies or tribunes, ought to be put in charge, to hold back the more alacritous and to compel those moving more sluggishly to accelerate. For those who have gone far ahead, when a sudden arrival occurs, desire not so much to return as to flee. But those who are at the very rear, deserted by their own, are overcome by the force of the enemy and by their own desperation.
It must also be known that adversaries, in those places which they judge opportune for themselves, set ambushes more covertly or make an assault in open warfare. But lest the secret measures do harm, the leader’s industry avails, for it befits him first to explore everything; and once an ambush is detected, if it is advantageously surrounded, it sustains more danger than it was preparing to inflict. Moreover, if open force is prepared in the mountains, the higher positions must be occupied by garrisons sent ahead, so that the enemy, when he arrives, is found lower and does not dare to oppose, since he discerns armed men both in front and above his head.
If the roads are narrow but nevertheless safe, it is better to send forward soldiers with axes and adzes and, with labor, open the roads, than to sustain peril on the best route. Moreover, we ought to know the enemy’s custom—whether they are wont to come upon us by night, or at daybreak, or at the hour of refreshing the weary—and to avoid that which we think they will do according to their wont. Furthermore, whether they are stronger with infantry or with cavalry, with lancers or with archers, whether they excel by the number of men or by the fortification of their arms, it befits us to know, and to arrange what is useful for us, what is shown to be adverse for them; and also to consider whether it is expedient that the march be initiated by day or by night, how great the intervals of the places are to which we desire to hasten, lest in summer a scarcity of water be harmful to those going, lest in winter difficult or impassable marshes and larger torrents occur, and the army, with the route impeded, be circumvented before it reaches the destined places.
Just as it is to our advantage wisely to avoid those things, so, if the adversaries’ inexperience or dissimulation should give us an opportunity, it ought not to be omitted, but to explore carefully, to invite traitors and deserters, so that we may recognize what the enemy is contriving in the present or for the future, and, with horsemen and light-armed troops prepared, to deceive those same men, as they are marching or seeking fodder and victuals, by unexpected terror.
VII. In transitu fluuiorum grauis molestia neglegentibus frequenter emergit. Nam si aqua uiolentior fuerit aut aluens latior, inpedimenta pueros et ipsos interdum ignauiores solet mergere bellatores.
7. In the crossing of rivers, grievous trouble often emerges for the negligent. For if the water is more violent or the channel broader, it is wont to drown the baggage, the boys, and sometimes even the more slothful soldiers themselves.
Therefore, after the ford has been reconnoitered, two lines of cavalry are arranged, separated by suitable intervals, with chosen mounts, so that through the middle the foot-soldiers and the impediments (baggage) may pass. For the upper line breaks the onrush of the waters, the lower gathers up and sets across those who have been snatched away and overturned. But when a higher swell permits neither footman nor horseman, if it runs over level ground, by cutting ditches in many places it is scattered, and, once divided, it is crossed easily.
Navigable rivers, in truth,
become passable by stakes fixed and by planking laid above, or certainly, by a makeshift
work with empty casks bound together and with beams added they afford a crossing. Light cavalry, moreover, are accustomed to make bundles out of dry reeds, upon
which they place their cuirasses and arms, lest they be wetted; they themselves and their horses cross by swimming
and haul along with them the bundles, tied with straps. But a more convenient method has been found, that
monoxyles—that is, skiffs a little broader, hollowed from single beams—made
as light as possible according to the kind of wood and the fineness, the army should carry along on wagons,
with planking likewise and iron nails prepared.
Thus, without delay, a bridge constructed
and bound with ropes—which for that reason must be kept—affords, in due time, the solidity of a stone arch. The adversaries are accustomed in haste to make ambushes or sudden arrivals at river crossings. For which necessity armed garrisons are placed on both banks, lest, with the channel intervening, being divided they be overwhelmed by the enemies.
It is, however, safer to fix stakes on both sides and to withstand, without detriment, any force that may be brought to bear. But if the bridge is necessary not only for transit but also for retreat and for supplies, then at both ends, after broader ditches have been cut and an earthwork (rampart) constructed, it ought to receive defending soldiers, by whom it should be held for as long as the necessity of the places (the terrain) demands.
VIII. Consequens uidetur, itineris obseruatione descripta, ad castrorum, in qui manendum est, uenire rationem. Non enim belli tempore ad statiuam uel mansionem ciuitas murata semper occurrit, et incautum est plenumque discriminis exercitum passim sine aliqua munitione considere, cum militibus ad capiendum cibum occupatis, ad munera facienda dispersis facile nectantur insidiae; postremo noctis obscuritas, necessitas somni, pascentium equorum dispersio occasionem superuentibus praestat.
8. It seems consequent, the observation of the march having been described, to come to the plan of the camp, in which
one must remain. For in time of war a walled city does not always present itself for a standing-camp or lodging, and it is incautious and full of peril for an army
to sit down anywhere without some fortification, since when the soldiers are occupied in taking food and dispersed to perform duties, ambushes are easily woven; finally,
the obscurity of night, the necessity of sleep, and the scattering of grazing horses provide an occasion to supervening attackers.
In the metation of camps, it does not suffice to choose a good place, unless it be such that no better can be found in its stead, lest a better one, overlooked by us and occupied by adversaries, bring inconvenience. One must also beware, in summer, lest unhealthy water be near at hand or wholesome water be farther off; in winter, lest forage or firewood be lacking; lest in sudden storms the field in which one must remain be wont to be inundated; lest, being in precipitous and out-of-the-way places, with adversaries encircling, a difficult egress be afforded; lest from higher ground missiles sent by the enemy forestall it. These things carefully and diligently provided for, according to the necessity of the site you will establish a camp either square, or round, or triangular, or oblong; nor does the form prejudice utility, yet those are thought more comely whose length exceeds the breadth by a third.
First, for the passage of a single night and a lighter occupation of the march, when the lifted sods are arranged and make a rampart, above which palisade-stakes, that is, wooden tribuli, are set out in order. The sod is cut around with iron tools, which by the roots of the grasses holds the earth together; it is made half a foot high, a foot broad, and half a foot long. But if the soil is looser, so that the sod cannot be cut off in the likeness of a brick, then, with makeshift work, a trench is cut, five feet wide and three deep, within which the rampart rises, so that the army may rest secure without fear.
Standing camps, moreover, in summer or in winter, when the enemy is near, are made firm with greater care and labor. For each century, with the drillmasters and the principal officers doing the apportioning, receives foot-allotments; and, with their shields or their packs set in a ring around their own standards, girt with the sword, they open a ditch of a width either 9 or 11 or 13 feet, or, if a greater force of adversaries is feared, 17 feet—for it is the custom to observe an odd number; then, hurdles having been laid, or stakes and branches of trees inserted, lest the earth slip away easily, a rampart is raised, above which, in the likeness of a wall, battlements and parapets are set in order. The centurions measure the work with ten-foot rods, lest anyone’s laziness should have dug or built up less; and the tribunes go the rounds and—being energetic—do not depart before all things have been completed.
Lest, however, any sudden attack fall upon those laboring, all the cavalry and that part of the infantry which is not working, by privilege of dignity, take their stand armed in battle-order before the ditch and repel the enemies as they press in. Therefore the first standards are placed in their proper locations within the camp, because nothing is more venerable to the soldiers than their majesty; the praetorium is prepared for the leader and his companions, tents are set up for the tribunes, to whom through tent-mates assigned to duties water, wood, and fodder are supplied. Then, according to rank, places in the camp are assigned to the legions and auxiliaries, to the horsemen and the foot-soldiers, in which they may pitch their pavilions, and from each century four horsemen and four foot-soldiers keep the night watch.
And because it seemed impossible for single men to remain keeping watch at the lookouts, therefore the watches were divided into four parts by the clepsydra, so that it would not be necessary to keep watch for more than three nocturnal hours. By the trumpeter all the watches are commenced, and when the hours are finished they are recalled by the horn‑blower. Nevertheless the tribunes choose suitable and most approved men to go around the watches and report back if any fault has arisen, whom they used to call “circumitores”; now it has been made a grade in military service and they are called “circitores.”
It must nevertheless be understood that the cavalry ought to keep night watches outside the rampart. By day, moreover, when the camp has been set, some in the morning, others after midday, on account of the fatigue of men and horses, conduct agrarian forays (foraging). Among the chief things it befits the leader to provide, whether he is stationed in camp or in a city, is that the pasturage of the animals, the conveyance of grain and of the other kinds of supplies, the aquation, wood-gathering, and foddering be rendered secure from the incursion of enemies.
This cannot come about otherwise, unless along suitable places where the supply-train of our men moves, presidia be arranged, whether these be cities or walled forts. But if no ancient fortification is found, in opportune places tumultuary (makeshift) forts, surrounded with greater fosses (ditches), are strengthened. For castella are named from castra by a diminutive term.
VIIII. Quisquis hos artis bellicae commentarios ex probatissimis auctoribus breuiatos legere dignabitur, quam primum rationem proelii depugnandique cupit audire praecepta. Sed conflictus publicus duarum aut trium horarum certamine definitur, post quem partis eius, quae superata fuerit, spes omnes intercidunt.
9. Whoever will deign to read these commentaries of the military art, abridged from the most approved authorities, as soon as possible desires to hear the method of battle and the precepts for fighting it out. But a public conflict is determined by a contest of two or three hours, after which all hopes of that side which has been overcome are cut off.
Therefore all things must be thought out beforehand, tried beforehand, done beforehand, before one comes to the ultimate brink. For good leaders do not by an open battle, in which there is common peril, but from the occult always attempt, so that with their own men intact, as far as they can, they may destroy the enemies or at least terrify them, in which matter I will write out in full those things very necessary that were found by the ancients. The principal art and utility of a leader is that, with men knowing war and wise men from the universal army brought in, he should more often treat of his own and the enemy’s forces, all adulation—which does the most harm—having been removed, whether his or the adversaries’ men are more armed and fortified, who are more exercised, who are stronger in necessities.
One must also inquire which side has the better horsemen and which the better foot-soldiers, and one must know that in the infantry above all the strength of the army consists; and among the horsemen themselves, which side outstrips with contati (lancers), which with archers, who puts on more cuirasses, who has brought more serviceable horses; finally, the very places in which the fighting is to be done, whether they seem advantageous to the enemy or to us; — for if we delight in cavalry, we ought to choose plains; if in infantry, to choose narrow places impeded by ditches, marshes, or trees, and at times mountainous —; for which side victuals (provisions) more abound or are lacking; for hunger, as it is said, fights from within and often conquers without iron. But above all it must be considered whether it is expedient that the necessity be prolonged or that the contest be joined more quickly; for sometimes the adversary hopes the expedition can be finished quickly, and, if it has been drawn out for a long time, either he is worn down by scarcity, or he is called back to his own by longing for them, or, accomplishing nothing great, he is compelled to depart through despair. Then, broken by toil and weariness, very many desert, some betray, some surrender themselves, because in adverse circumstances loyalty is rarer, and he who had arrived abundant begins to be stripped bare.
It pertains to the matter to know what sort of man the adversary himself or his companions and optimates are, whether rash or cautious, bold or timid, knowing the art of war or fighting from mere practice or recklessly; which nations are strong with them, which are slothful; of what fidelity our auxiliaries are and of what strengths; what spirits that force has, what our army has; which side more promises victory to itself. (For by thoughts of this kind valor is increased or broken. Moreover, for those who despair boldness grows by the exhortation of the leader, and if he himself seems to fear nothing, spirit grows; if from ambush or opportunity you have done something bravely; if adverse things begin to befall the enemies; if you have been able to overcome from among the foes those weaker or less armed.) For it must be guarded against, lest you ever lead forth to a pitched battle an army that is wavering and afraid.
It matters whether you have recruits or veteran soldiers, and whether they have been on expeditions a short time before, or have endured for several years in peace; for those who have ceased to fight for a long time are to be received as recruits. But when legions, auxiliaries, or cavalry have arrived from diverse places, the best commander ought both to have the individual units separately, through chosen tribunes whose industry is known, trained to all kinds of arms, and afterward, gathered into one as if about to fight in a public engagement, he himself will exercise them more often and will test what skill they can possess, what strength, how they agree among themselves, whether they diligently obey the warnings of the trumpets, the indications of the standards, his commands or his nod. If they err in some things, let them be trained and taught until they can be perfect.
If indeed in field-coursing, in archery, in javelin-casting, in arranging the battle line they have been instructed to the full, not even then are they to be led rashly to a public battle, but when an occasion has been seized; rather they must first be imbued by smaller skirmishes. Therefore let the leader, watchful, sober, prudent, as though about to judge a civil case between parties, with counsel taken, judge concerning his own and the adversary’s forces. And if he is found superior in many respects, let him not defer to enter the conflict when it is opportune for himself.
X. Omnes artes omniaque opera cotidiano usu et iugi exercitatione proficiunt. Quod si in paruis uerum est, quanto magis decet in maximis custodiri. Quis autem dubitet artem bellicam rebus omnibus esse potiorem, per quam libertas retinetur et dignitas, propagantur prouinciae, conseruatur imperium?
10. All arts and all works make progress by quotidian use and continual exercise. If this is true in small matters, how much more is it fitting to be kept in the greatest? Who moreover would doubt that the art of war is superior to all things, through which liberty is retained and dignity, the provinces are propagated, and the empire is preserved?
This
once, with all other doctrines left aside, the Lacedaemonians, and afterwards the Romans, cultivated; this
alone even today the barbarians think must be preserved; the rest they are confident either all stand within this art
or that through this they can attain them; this is necessary for those about to fight,
by which they may retain life and obtain victory. Therefore the leader, to whom the insignia
of so great a power are bestowed, to whose fidelity and virtue are entrusted the fortunes of the landholders,
the protection of cities, the safety of the soldiers, the glory of the Republic, ought to be solicitous not only for
the whole army but also for each individual tent-mate. For if anything befall them in war, it appears both his own fault and a public
injury.
Therefore, if he leads an army of tyros or one long unaccustomed to arms, let him diligently explore the strength, spirit, and custom of each of the legions, the auxiliaries, and even the vexillations. Let him also know, if it can be done, by name, who is a Count, who a Tribune, who a Domesticus, who a contubernal, and how much each can avail in war; let him assume the greatest authority and severity, punish all military faults by the laws, be believed to forgive none of those erring, and on diverse occasions require trials of all. These matters, as is proper, being cared for, when the enemies, scattered for plundering, roam about carelessly, then let him send approved horse or foot with the tyros or inferiors, so that, the foes routed as opportunity allows, expertise may grow in those men and boldness in the rest.
At the crossings of rivers, at the precipices of mountains, at
the narrows of forests, at the difficulties of marshes or roads, let him arrange surprise arrivals with no one knowing,
and so temper his march that, while they are taking food or
sleeping or at least at leisure, unwary, unarmed, unshod, with horses unsaddled,
suspecting nothing, he himself, prepared, may invade them, in order that in combats of this sort his men
may gather confidence. For those who for a long time before, or even never, have seen
men wounded or killed, when they first behold it, shudder and, confounded with fear,
begin to think of flight rather than of conflict. Moreover, if
the adversaries sally out, let him attack them wearied by a long march and fall upon the hindmost, or
at least come upon them unexpectedly; those also who tarry far from their own for the sake of fodder or
booty, let him seize suddenly with picked men.
For those things must first be attempted,
which, if they should turn out badly, may harm less; if well, may profit very much. To sow causes of discord among enemies is the mark of a wise leader. For no nation, however very small, can be utterly destroyed by adversaries, unless it has consumed itself by its own feuds.
For civil hatred is headlong toward the destruction of enemies,
incautious for the utility of its own defense. One point must be proclaimed in this
work: that no one should despair that the things which have been done can be done. Let
someone say: Many years have passed during which no one surrounds with ditch, embankment,
and rampart an army destined to remain in place.
It will be answered: If that caution had been in place, no nocturnal or diurnal supervening of the enemy could have harmed. The Persians, imitating the Romans, establish camps with ditches drawn; and, because almost everything is sandy, the sacks which they had carried empty they fill from the pulverulent earth that is dug out, and from its heap they make a rampart. All the barbarians, with their wagons linked in a circle in the likeness of a camp, pass nights secure from supervening attackers.
Do we fear, lest we be unable to learn what others have learned from us? These things were preserved by practice and by books in former times; but, long omitted, no one inquired after them, because, with the offices of peace flourishing, the necessity of war was far away. Yet, lest it seem impossible to repair the discipline whose use has lapsed, let us be taught by examples.
Among the ancients the military art more often fell into oblivion, but first it was taken up again from books, afterward made firm by the authority of leaders. Scipio Africanus, under other commanders, received the Spanish armies frequently defeated; these, with the rule of discipline kept, he drilled so diligently in every kind of work and in the making of trenches that he would say that those who were unwilling to be wet with the blood of enemies ought, while digging, to be stained with mud. With these very troops, finally, he so burned up the Numantines, the city having been captured, that none escaped.
Metellus in Africa, with Albinus commanding, received an army that had been sent under the yoke, which he thus corrected by ancient institutions that afterward they overcame those by whom they had been sent under the yoke. The Cimbri annihilated the legions of Caepio and Mallius within Gaul; when Gaius Marius had taken up their remnants, he so trained them by the science and art of fighting that he destroyed in pitched battle an innumerable multitude not only of the Cimbri but also of the Teutones and Ambrones. Moreover, it is easier to imbue new men with virtue (valor) than to call back the panic-stricken.
XI. Praemissis leuioribus artibus belli, ad publici conflictus incertum et ad fatalem diem nationibus ac populis ratio disciplinae militaris inuitat. Nam in euentu aperti Martis uictoriae plenitudo consistit. Hoc ergo tempus est, quo tanto magis duces debent esse solliciti, quanto maior speratur diligentibus gloria et maius periculum comitatur ignauos, in quo momento peritiae usus, pugnandi doctrina consiliumque dominatur.
11. With the lighter arts of war sent ahead, to the uncertainty of public conflict and to
the fateful day for nations and peoples the rationale of military discipline invites. For in the event of open War the plenitude of victory consists. This, therefore, is the time when leaders ought to be the more solicitous, the greater the glory hoped for the diligent and the greater the danger that accompanies the cowardly; in which moment the use of experience, the doctrine of fighting, and counsel hold sway.
In former ages it was the custom to lead out the soldiers, tended with sparing food, to the contest, so that the food taken might render them more audacious and, in a longer conflict, they would not be wearied by fasting. Furthermore, it must be observed, when the enemy is present, whether you bring them out to battle from the camp or from the city, that, since through the narrow passages of the gates the army proceeds piecemeal, it not be debilitated by enemies who are gathered and prepared. Therefore, provision must be made that, before anything else, the soldiers go out through the gates and construct the battle line before the enemy arrives.
If, however, while they remain within the city a prepared foe should arrive, either let the sally be deferred or at least let it be dissembled, so that when the adversaries begin to exult over those whom they do not think will go out, when they turn their mind to plunder or to returning, when they have loosened their ranks, then, they being stupefied, let the very choicest burst forth and, in close order, attack the unsuspecting. Moreover, it is observed that you must not drive soldiers wearied by a long distance, nor horses tired after a run, into a pitched battle; a man about to fight loses much strength by the labor of the journey. What will he do who comes to the battle line enervated?
This
both the ancients declined, and in a later, or even in our own, age, when Roman leaders through
inexperience did not take precautions—so that I say nothing further—the armies learned. An unequal
condition it is to enter conflict: the weary with the rested, the sweating with the brisk, the running with him
who has stood.
XII. Ipsa die, qua certaturi sunt milites, quid sentiant, diligenter explora. Nam fiducia uel formido ex uultu uerbis incessu motibus cernitur.
12. On the very day on which the soldiers are about to fight, diligently ascertain what they feel and think. For confidence or fear is discerned from the countenance, the words, the gait, the motions.
Do not trust overmuch, if a tyro desires battle; for to the inexperienced the fight is sweet; and know that you ought to defer it, if seasoned warriors fear to engage. Yet by the admonitions and exhortation of the leader, valor and spirit grow in the army, especially if they have received such a plan of the coming contest as makes them hope that they will easily come to victory. Then the cowardice or error of the enemies must be pointed out, or, if they have previously been overcome by us, it must be recalled.
Things must also be said by which the minds of the soldiers are moved into hatred of their adversaries by wrath and indignation. In the spirits of almost all men this naturally happens, that they grow alarmed when they have come to a conflict with the enemy. Without doubt, however, those are weaker whose minds the very aspect confounds; but by this remedy dread is softened, if, before you engage, you frequently array your army in places safer, from which they both may see the enemy and become accustomed to recognize them.
XIII. Bonum ducem conuenit nosse magnam partem uictoriae ipsum locum, in quo dimicandum est, possidere. Elabora ergo, ut conserturus manum primum auxilium captes ex loco, qui tanto utilior iudicatur, quanto superior fuerit occupatus.
13. It is fitting for a good leader to know that a great part of victory is to possess the very place in which the fight is to be waged. Strive, therefore, when you are about to join battle, to take your first aid from the position, which is adjudged the more useful, the higher it has been occupied.
For missiles descend more vehemently upon those below, and the higher side drives back those resisting with a greater impetus. He who strives on an opposing slope undergoes a double contest, with the ground and with the enemy. But there is this distinction: if you hope for victory for your foot-soldiers against the enemy’s horsemen, you ought to choose rough, unequal, mountainous places; but if you seek victory for your horsemen against the adversary’s infantry, you ought to follow places indeed a little more elevated, but level and open, impeded neither by forests nor by marshes.
XIIII. Ordinaturus aciem tria debet ante prospicere, solem puluerem uentum. Nam sol ante faciem eripit uisum, uentus contrarius tua inflectit ac deprimit, hostium adiuuat tela, puluis a fronte congestus oculos implet et claudet.
14. About to order the battle-line, one ought first to look to three things: the sun, the dust, the wind. For the sun before the face snatches away sight; a contrary wind inflects and depresses your missiles, and aids the enemy’s missiles; dust heaped up from the front fills and shuts the eyes.
These things, at the moment when the battle-line is being arrayed, even the unskilled commonly avoid; but the provident leader must beware for the future, lest after a little, as the day advances, the sun’s changed turning do harm, and lest an adverse wind arise at the accustomed hour while he is fighting. Therefore let the ranks be so constituted that these be behind our occiput, and, if it can be done, may strike the adversaries’ face. - A “battle-line” (acies) is the army drawn up in order; the “front” is that which looks toward the enemy.
These things in a pitched battle, if it is disposed wisely, help very much; if unskillfully, although they be the best warriors, they are broken by bad ordination. The law of instruction is that in the first line the seasoned and veteran soldiers be placed, whom they formerly called principes; in the second rank, archers surrounded by cataphracts and the best soldiers with javelins or lances are to be arrayed, whom previously they called hastati. Moreover, each armed man in a straight line has been accustomed to occupy three feet between themselves, that is, in 1,000 paces 1,666 foot-soldiers are arrayed in length, so that the battle line does not show through and there is space for handling arms; but between rank and rank behind, in breadth, they wished six feet to be distant, so that the fighters might have space for advancing and retreating; for missiles are cast more vehemently with a leap and a run.
In these two
ranks are placed men mature in age and confident by use (experience), and equipped also with heavier arms.
For these, in the stead of a wall, must sometimes be compelled neither to yield nor to follow (pursue),
lest they disturb the ranks, but to receive the approaching adversaries and, by standing and fighting,
to repel or rout them. The third rank is arranged from the swiftest light-armed troops (armaturae), from
youthful archers (sagittarii), from good javelin-men (iaculators), whom formerly they called Ferentarii.
Likewise a fourth order is constructed of the most expeditious shield-bearers, of younger archers, of those who fight briskly with veruta (javelins) or with mattiobarbulae, which they call plumbatae, who were called the light-armed. One must know, therefore, that while the first two orders stand fast, the third and fourth order always go out first to provoke with missiles and arrows. If they are able to turn the enemies to flight, they themselves, together with the cavalry, pursue; but if they have been driven back by the enemies, they return to the first and second battle-line and, among them, withdraw to their own places.
The fustibalus is a long cudgel four feet in length,
to the middle of which a sling of hide is fastened, and, propelled with both hands, it directs stones almost
after the manner of an onager. Slingers are those who with slings made of linen or bristles - for these, indeed, they say are better -
with the arm twisted around the head, direct stones. For those to whom shields were lacking,
whether with stones thrown by hand or with missiles, they fought in this rank, whom they called accensi as juniors and afterwards added.
The sixth order, after all the rest, was held by the firmest warriors, shield-bearing and equipped with every kind of arms; these the ancients called the Triarii. They, in order that, being rested and intact, they might attack the enemies more keenly, were accustomed to sit behind the last battle-lines. For if anything had befallen the first ranks, the whole hope of restoration depended upon the strength of these men.
XV. Explanato, qualiter debeant acies instrui, nunc podismum mensuramque ipsius ordinationis exponam. In mille passibus campi una acies mille sescentos sexaginta sex suscipiet pedites, propterea quia singuli pugnatores ternos occupant pedes. Quod si sex acies in mille passibus campi uolueris ordinare, nouem milia nongenti nonaginta sex pedites sunt necessarii.
15. Having explained how the battle-lines ought to be arrayed, I will now set forth the podism and the measure of the arrangement itself. In 1,000 paces of field one battle-line will take in 1,666 foot-soldiers, for the reason that each fighter occupies three feet. But if you wish to arrange six battle-lines in 1,000 paces of field, 9,996 foot-soldiers are necessary.
If, however, you should wish to extend this number in a triple, it comprises two thousand paces; but it is better to make more battle-lines than to scatter the soldier. We said that six feet ought to lie open from the rear in breadth between each battle-line, and the warriors themselves, standing, occupy single feet. Therefore, if you array six battle-lines, forty-two feet in breadth and one thousand paces in length will the army of ten thousand men occupy.
To this reckoning, whether there be 20,000 or 30,000 foot-soldiers, according to the podism of the measure they can be arrayed without any difficulty, nor is the leader deceived, since he knows what place can hold how many armed men. They say that, if the place be narrower or the multitude suffice, the battle-lines can even be arrayed in ten or more. For it is more expedient that they fight in close order than more widely separated; for if the battle-line has been too much thinned out, it is quickly broken through when an assault is made by the adversaries, and thereafter there can be no remedy.
XVI. Constructa acie peditum equites ponuntur in cornibus, ita ut loricati omnes et contati iuncti sint peditibus, sagittarii autem uel qui loricas non habent longius euagentur. A fortioribus namque equitibus peditum protegenda sunt latera et a uelocioribus atque expeditis hostium cornua superfundenda atque turbanda.
16. With the battle-line of infantry drawn up, the horsemen are placed on the wings, such that all the loricated and the lancers are joined to the foot, but the archers, or those who do not have cuirasses, range farther out. For by the stronger cavalry the flanks of the infantry are to be protected, and by the swifter and unencumbered the enemy’s wings are to be overrun and thrown into disorder.
A commander ought to know, against which drungos, that is, globes, of the enemy, which horsemen it is proper to be posted. For by some occult rationale, nay almost divine, some fight better against certain others, and those who had conquered stronger men are often conquered by inferiors. But if the horsemen should be unequal, according to the custom of the ancients, the swiftest infantry with light shields, trained for this very thing, ought to be mixed in with them, whom they named velites.
With this done, although the very bravest horsemen of the enemy should turn up, nevertheless they cannot be equal against a mixed formation. (This one remedy all the veteran commanders discovered: to accustom the youths to run excellently, and among the good horsemen to place, one by one, foot-soldiers from these, with lighter shields, swords, and missiles.)
XVII. Sed optima ratio est et ad uictoriam plurimum confert, ut lectissimos de peditibus et equitibus cum uicariis comitibus tribunisque uacantibus habeat dux post aciem praeparatos, alios circa cornua alios circa medium, ut, sicubi hostis uehementer insistit, ne rumpatur acies, prouolent subito et subpleant loca additaque uirtute inimicorum audaciam frangant. Hoc primi Lacones inuenerunt, imitati sunt Karthaginienses, Romani postea ubique seruarunt.
17. But the best method, and it contributes very greatly to victory, is that the leader have the choicest from the infantry and the cavalry, with vicars, counts, and tribunes who are unoccupied, prepared behind the line of battle, some around the wings, others around the center, so that, wherever the enemy presses vehemently, the battle-line not be broken, they may spring forward suddenly and fill the gaps, and, with valor added, break the audacity of the enemies. This the Laconians first discovered; the Carthaginians imitated it; the Romans afterwards observed it everywhere.
If a “saw” must be drawn, likewise it is drawn from the supernumeraries; for if you begin to transfer a soldier set in order from his own place, you will throw the whole into turmoil. If a separated mass of the enemy begins to press either your wing or some part, unless you have superfluous men whom you can oppose to the mass, whether you remove infantry or cavalry from the battle line, while you wish to defend one area, you will strip another more perilously. But if a supply of fighting men does not abound for you, it is better to have a shorter line, provided that you station very many in the reserves.
For around the middle parts of the field you ought to have the choicest of the well-armed infantry, from whom you may form a wedge and at once break the enemy’s battle line; around the wings, however, with lancers and loricated horsemen reserved for this and with the light armature of the infantry, it is fitting that you encircle the enemy’s wings.
XVIII. Dux, qui praecipuam sustinet potestatem, inter equites et pedites in parte dextra stare consueuit. Hic enim locus est, in quo tota acies gubernatur, ex quo rectus est liberque procursus.
18. The leader, who sustains the principal power, is accustomed to stand among the cavalry and the infantry on
the right side. For this is the place in which the whole battle-line is governed,
from which the forward course is straight and free.
Therefore he stands between the two, so that he may both govern by counsel and by authority be able to exhort both the cavalry and the infantry to battle. He ought, with supernumerary horsemen mixed with light-armed foot, to go around the adversaries’ left wing, which stands opposite him, and to press it continually from the rear. The second commander is placed in the middle of the infantry battle-line, to sustain and strengthen it.
Here he ought to have with him the bravest foot-soldiers and well-armed men from among those surplus ones, from whom either he himself may form a wedge and break the enemy’s battle-line, or, if the adversaries have formed a wedge, he himself may form a pair of shears, so that he can meet the wedge. On the left part of the army there ought to be a third leader, quite bellicose and provident, because the left part is more difficult and, as it were, maimed as it stands in the battle-line. He ought to have around him good supernumerary horsemen and the swiftest foot-soldiers, from whom he should always extend the left horn, lest he be encircled by the enemies.
But the clamor, which they call the barritus, ought not to be raised before both battle lines have joined. For it is of the unskilled or the cowardly to vociferate from afar, since the enemies are more terrified if, together with the stroke of the missiles, the horror of the shout has been added. You must always, moreover, strive to draw up your battle line first, because at your own discretion you can do what you judge useful to you, since no one hinders; then too you increase the confidence of your own men and diminish the confidence of the adversaries, because those who do not hesitate to provoke seem the stronger.
Enemies, however, begin to dread when they see a battle-line being ordered against them. Hence the greatest advantage is added, because you, drawn up and prepared, preoccupy an adversary who is still arranging and in trepidation. For a part of victory is to throw the enemy into disorder before you fight; excepting reinforcements or sudden incursions arising from an occasion, which a seasoned commander never loses: for on marches when already wearied, in the crossing of rivers when divided, in marshes when occupied, on the ridges of mountains when laboring, in plains when scattered and off their guard, in quarters when sleeping, an opportune battle is always brought in, when the enemy, occupied with other business, is cut down before he can prepare himself.
XVIIII. Tamen ars belli non minus in hoc aperto conflictu quam in occultis fraudibus adiuuat eruditos. Cauendum uel maxime, ne ab ala cornuque sinistro, quod saepius euenit, aut certe dextro, quod licet raro contingit, circumueniantur tui a multitudine hostium aut a uagantibus globis, quos dicunt drungos.
19. However, the art of war assists the instructed no less in this open conflict than in occult frauds. One must beware most of all, lest from the wing and left horn—which more often happens—or indeed from the right, which although it occurs rarely, your men be outflanked by a multitude of enemies or by roaming masses, which they call drungos.
But if this happens, there is one remedy: that you fold back and round the wing and the horn, to the end that your men, turned about, may defend the backs of their comrades; but at the corner of that extremity let the bravest be stationed, because there the onset is wont to become greater. Likewise, against the enemy’s wedge one resists by certain fixed methods. A wedge is called a multitude of foot-soldiers which, joined in a battle-line, advances first narrower, then broader, and breaks the adversaries’ ranks, because missiles are sent by many into one place.
Likewise a “saw” is so called, which, directed by the strenuous, is set before the front and opposed to the enemies, so that a disordered battle line may be repaired. A “globe” is the term for a mass which, separated from its own line, with a wandering onset charges the enemies; against it another globe, more populous or stronger, is sent in. It must also be observed that, at the very time when the battle is now being joined, you should not wish to change the ranks or transfer any units from their places to other positions.
XX. Depugnationum septem sunt genera uel modi, cum infesta ex utraque parte signa confligunt. Vna depugnatio est fronte longa quadro exercitu, sicut etiam nunc et prope semper solet proelium fieri. Sed hoc genus depugnationis periti armorum non optimum iudicant, quia, in prolixo spatio cum tenditur acies, non aequalis semper campus occurrit, et si hiatus aliqui in medio uel sinus aut curuatura fit, in eo loco acies frequenter inrumpitur.
20. There are seven genera or modes of pitched battles, when hostile standards from either side clash. One battle is with a long front, the army in a square formation, just as even now and almost always a battle is wont to be fought. But the experts in arms do not judge this genus of fighting the best, because, when the battle-line is stretched over a prolonged space, the field does not always present itself even, and if some hiatus in the middle, or a recess (sinus) or a curvature occurs, in that place the line is frequently broken into.
Moreover, if the adversary surpasses in multitude, he encircles from the flanks either the right or the left wing. In this there is great danger, unless you have supernumeraries who may run forward and sustain the enemy. By this kind of engagement only he ought to contend who has both more numerous and stout warriors; let him outflank the enemy from each horn and, as if into his own bosom, shut in the enemy’s army.
When the drawn-up battle-lines come to an engagement, then you will separate your left wing farther from the adversary’s right, so that neither missiles nor arrows may reach it; but you will join your right wing to his left wing and there first begin the battle, in such a way that, with the best horsemen and the most proven foot-soldiers, you attack and encircle that left part of his to which you have joined yourself, and by thrusting down and overrunning reach the enemy’s backs. And if once you begin to drive the adversaries from that point, with your own men coming up you will obtain an indubitable victory, and the part of your army which you have removed from the foe will remain secure. Moreover, in this kind of fighting the battle-lines are set together in the likeness of the letter A or of a craftsman’s level.
But if your adversary has done this to you first, those whom we said ought to be placed behind the battle-line as supernumeraries, both horsemen and footmen, you will gather to your left wing, and thus you resist the adversary with great force, lest you be driven off by stratagem. The third way of fighting is similar to the second, but in this it is worse: that from your left wing you begin to clash with his right. For their impetus is as if maimed, and plainly those who fight on the left wing approach the enemy with difficulty.
I will explain this more openly.
If ever you have your left wing by far the better, then join to it the strongest cavalry and infantry, and at the engagement bring it first to bear upon the enemy’s right wing,
and, as much as you can, make haste to drive back and to go around the adversary’s right part.
But the other part of your army, in which you know you have the worse warriors,
separate as far as possible from his left, lest it be assaulted with swords or missiles reach it.
When you have arrayed the battle line, at four hundred or five hundred paces before you reach the enemy, with him not expecting it,
it is fitting for you suddenly to incite both your wings, so that from either horn you may turn the unprepared enemies to flight and more swiftly obtain victory. But this kind of
contest, although it quickly prevails if it has put forward well-trained and very brave men, is nevertheless dangerous, because he who thus fights is compelled to lay bare the middle of his line and
to separate the army into two parts. And if at the first onset the enemy is not defeated, he has an opportunity by which he may attack both the divided wings and the middle line left unsupported.
The fifth engagement is similar to the fourth, but has this one thing more: that it places the light-armed troops and the sagittaries before the first battle line, so that, with them resisting, it cannot be broken into. For thus from his right horn he attacks the other’s left, and from his left horn the other’s right. If he can put them to flight, he conquers at once; if not, his center does not labor, because it is defended by the light-armed and the sagittaries.
The sixth engagement is best, almost similar to the second, which is used by those who despair of the number of their own and of their valor. And if they have well ordered their forces, although with fewer men they always obtain victory. For when the battle-line, drawn up, approaches the enemy, join your right wing to the enemy’s left wing, and there, by the most proven horsemen and the swiftest foot-soldiers, begin the battle.
Moreover, remove the remaining part of your army very far from the adversaries’ battle-line and stretch it out straight, as if a spit; for when you begin to cut down his left part both from the flanks and from the rear, without doubt you turn him to flight. But the adversary can come to the aid neither from his right side nor from the middle battle-line to his men who are struggling, because your battle-line is extended and stretches itself entirely in the likeness of the letter I and withdraws very far from the enemies. By this kind, on marches it is often fought.
The seventh engagement is that which aids the combatant by the benefit of the place. In this too, even with fewer and less brave men, you can sustain the adversary, that is, if you have on one side a mountain or sea or river or lake or city or marshes or precipices, from which the enemy cannot approach; draw up the rest of your army in a straight line of battle, but on that side which has no protection place all the cavalry and the javelin-bearers. Then, secure, you engage the enemy at your own discretion, because on one side the nature of the place fortifies you, and on the other a well-nigh double cavalry is posted.
This
however must be observed, than which nothing better is found: that, whether with the right wing alone
you wish to fight, you place the bravest there; or whether with the left, you collocate the most strenuous
you place; or whether you wish to make wedges in the middle, through which you may break the enemy’s battle-line,
in the wedge you station the most well‑exercised fighting ranks. For victory is wont to be effected through a few.
It is enough, that the chosen by a most wise leader in those places, in which
reason and utility demand, be ordered.
XXI. Plerique rei militaris ignari pleniorem uictoriam credunt, si aduersarios aut locorum angustiis aut armatorum multitudine circumdederint, ut aditum non inueniant abscedendi. Sed clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia, et cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido.
21. Most people ignorant of the military art believe the victory to be fuller, if they have encircled the adversaries either by the narrowness of the places or by the multitude of armed men, so that they find no access for withdrawing. But for those shut in, boldness grows out of desperation, and when there is nothing of hope, fear takes up arms.
He gladly desires to die who knows without doubt that he is going to die. And therefore the celebrated judgment of Scipio is that a way for the enemies, by which they might flee, must be made. For when, with the avenue of withdrawal laid open, the minds of all have agreed to offer their backs, they are slaughtered unavenged in the manner of cattle.
Nor is there any danger to the pursuers, since the defeated have turned aside the very weapons by which they might have been able to defend themselves. By this method, the larger the multitude, the more easily it is laid low. For numbers are not to be required there, where a spirit once terrified desires to shun not so much the enemy’s missiles as his countenance.
XXII. Digestis omnibus, quae ratio militaris experimentis et arte seruauit, unum superest edocere, quemadmodum recedatur ab hostibus. Nam disciplinae bellicae et exemplorum periti nusquam maius periculum inminere testantur.
22. Having digested all things which the military method has preserved by experiments and by art, one thing remains to instruct: how one should withdraw from the enemy. For those expert in the discipline of war and in precedents testify that nowhere does greater danger impend.
For whoever withdraws from the battle line before the engagement both diminishes his own men’s confidence and adds audacity to the enemies. But since this must more often occur, by what modes it can be done safely must be set forth. First, let your men not know that you withdraw because you decline to enter conflict, but let them believe that by some stratagem they are therefore being called back, so that the enemy may be invited to a more opportune place and be more easily overcome, or at least that, with adversaries pursuing, more secret ambushes may be arranged.
For those who perceive their leader to despair are prepared for flight. That, too, must be avoided: that the enemies sense you to be receding and immediately rush in. Therefore most placed cavalry before their own infantry, so that, running about, they would not allow the adversaries to see in what manner the foot-soldiers were withdrawing.
Likewise, by detachments, beginning with the foremost, they would withdraw individual battle-lines and call them back to the rear, while the rest remained in their rank. Some, the routes having been reconnoitered, would at night withdraw with the army, so that, when day had arisen and the enemy realized it, they could not overtake those going on ahead. Moreover, light-armed troops were sent forward to the hills, to which the whole army would suddenly be recalled; and if the enemies had wished to pursue, they were routed by the light-armed, which had previously occupied the position, with cavalry added.
For they consider nothing more perilous than if, without counsel, the pursuers are met by those who have been in
ambush or who have prepared themselves in front of them. This is the time when
ambushes are opportunely deployed, because against the fleeing boldness is greater and caution
is less. Of necessity, however, ampler security is wont to entail a graver hazard.
Upon men unprepared, taking food, weary on the march, feeding their horses, and suspecting nothing of the sort, surprises are wont to occur. This we must both avoid for ourselves, and upon the enemy in occasions of this kind destruction must be inflicted. For, when overwhelmed by this contingency, neither valor nor multitude can be of use.
Who is defeated in a public battle-line,
although even there art may profit very much, yet for his defense he can accuse Fortune; but whoever has suffered a surprise of ambushes lying in wait cannot excuse his own fault, because he could have avoided this and learned it beforehand through suitable scouts. When a retreat is being made, such a fraud is wont to be done. On the straight road a few horsemen pursue, a strong band is sent secretly through other places; when the horsemen have reached the enemy’s column, they lightly test and depart; he believes that whatever ambush there had been has passed by and, care set aside, relaxes into negligence; then that band, which had been destined by a secret route, arriving overwhelms the unaware.
Many, when they withdraw from the enemy, if they are going to pass through woods, send ahead men to occupy narrow or steep places, lest they suffer ambushes there; and again they block the roads behind them with trees cut down, which they call concaedes, so as to take away from their adversaries the faculty of pursuing. And for almost either party on the march there is a common occasion for ambushes: for he who goes before leaves behind him ambushes in suitable valleys or wooded mountains (which), when the enemy has fallen into them, he himself runs back and aids his own; but he who follows, by bypaths turned aside, sends unencumbered troops far in advance and keeps the adversary who precedes from passage, and, deceived both in front and in rear, encloses him. When the adversaries are sleeping by night, both he who has gone before can return, and he who follows, however great the distance between, can supervene by stratagem.
XXIII. Camelos aliquantae nationes apud ueteres in acie produxerunt et Vrcilliani intra Africam uel ceteri Mazices hodieque producunt. Sed genus animalium, harenis et tolerandae siti aptum, confusas etiam in puluere uento uias absque errore dirigere memoratur.
23. Several nations among the ancients brought camels into the battle-line, and the Vrcilliani within Africa, as well as the other Mazices, bring them forth even today. But this kind of animal, suited to sands and to enduring thirst, is reported to guide paths, even when confused in dust by the wind, without error.
But, apart from its novelty, if it seems among unusual things, it is ineffective in war. Cataphract horsemen, on account of the muniments which they bear, are safe from wounds, but on account of the impediment and weight of their arms they are easy to capture and frequently liable to nooses; better in combat against scattered foot-soldiers than against horsemen; yet, either placed before the legions or mixed with the legionaries, when it is fought at close quarters, that is, hand to hand, they often break the battle line of the enemy.
XXIIII. Quadrigas falcatas in bello rex Antiochus et Mithridates habuerunt. Quae ut primo magnum intulere terrorem, ita postmodum fuere derisui.
24. King Antiochus and Mithridates had scythed chariots in war. Which, just as at first they brought great terror, so afterwards were a laughingstock.
For a scythed chariot finds a level plain only with difficulty, is checked by a slight impediment, and, if a single horse is dashed down or wounded, is thrown into disorder. But most especially they perished by this stratagem of the Roman soldiers: when it came to battle, the Romans suddenly scattered caltrops over the whole field; and when the four-horse chariots, running forward, struck them, they were destroyed. A caltrop, moreover, is a little bulwark fastened together from four stakes, which, however you may throw it, stands on three prongs and, with the fourth upright, is hostile.
Elephants in battles, by the magnitude of their bodies, by the horror of their trumpeting, and by the novelty of their very form,
throw men and horses into confusion. Against the Roman army the first to deploy them in
Lucania was King Pyrrhus; afterwards Hannibal in Africa, King Antiochus in
the East, and Jugurtha in Numidia had them in copious numbers. Against these, diverse
modes of resisting were devised.
For even in Lucania a centurion with his sword cut off the “hand”—what they call the proboscis—of one; and pairs of cataphract horses were yoked to a chariot, upon which the clibanarii, sitting, aimed sarissae, that is, very long kontoi, at the elephants. For, armored in iron, they were not harmed by the archers whom the beasts were carrying, and they avoided their charge by the speed of the horses. Others sent in cataphract soldiers against the elephants, such that on their arms and on their helmets or shoulders huge spikes of iron were set, lest with its hand the elephant could seize the warrior coming against it.
Especially, however, the ancients arrayed the velites against
the elephants. Moreover, the velites were youths with light armature and an agile body,
who from horses directed missiles most excellently. These men, with the horses running past,
with broader lances or larger darts (spicula) would kill the beasts; but as boldness increased,
afterwards, gathered in greater numbers, soldiers together heaped pila—that is, missiles—upon the elephants
and brought them down with wounds.
It was added that the slingers, with staff-slings (fustibali) and with slings fitted for round stones, should strike down and slaughter the Indians, by whom the elephants were guided, together with the towers themselves—than which nothing safer is found. Moreover, when the beasts were coming on, as if they had broken into the battle line, the soldiers gave them space. When they had reached the middle of the column, with masses of armed men surrounding them on every side, they were captured with their handlers without wounds (unharmed). Carroballistae somewhat larger - for these send darts farther and more vehemently - set upon little carts with pairs of horses or mules ought to be arrayed behind the line; and, when the beasts have come within the stroke of the missile, they are transfixed by ballista arrows.
Nevertheless, against them iron is affixed more widely and more firmly, so that on great bodies the wounds may be greater. Against elephants we have recounted more examples and machinations, so that, if ever necessity shall have demanded, it may be known what must be set in opposition to such monstrous beasts.
XXV. Sciendum uero est, si pars exercitus uicerit et pars fugerit, sperandum, cum in eiusmodi necessitate ducis constantia totam sibi possit uindicare uictoriam. Innumerabilibus hoc accidit bellis, et pro superioribus sunt habiti qui minime desperarunt.
25. Truly it must be known that, if part of the army has conquered and part has fled, it is to be hoped,
that, in a necessity of this kind, the constancy of the leader can claim the whole victory for himself.
This has happened in innumerable wars, and those who did not despair at all have been held as the superiors.
For in a like condition, he is reckoned stronger whom adversities do not break. Therefore, let him be the first to seize the spoils from the slain enemies—what they themselves call “to collect the field”; let him first seem to exult with shouts and buccinas (war-trumpets). With this confidence he will so terrify the enemies, and so double confidence among his own, as if he had departed a victor from every quarter.
If by some chance the whole army is routed on the battle line, a pernicious disaster; nevertheless for many the fortune of restoration has not been lacking, and a remedy must be sought. Therefore a provident leader ought to engage in open battle under such precaution, that, if anything, by the variability of wars or the condition of human affairs, should turn out otherwise, he may free the vanquished without grave detriment. For if there are neighboring hills, if there is a fortification behind their backs, if, as the others withdraw, each of the very bravest has stood firm, they will preserve themselves and their own.
Frequently a battle-line already routed, with its strength repaired, has cut down the scattered and those pursuing everywhere.
Never does a greater crisis usually befall men exulting than when suddenly their ferocity is changed into fear.
But whatever the event, the survivors must be collected, raised for war by congruent exhortations, and revived by the instauration of their arms.
Then new levies are made, new auxiliaries are sought, and—what profits more—once opportunities have been seized, an assault must be made upon the victors themselves through hidden ambushes, and thus audacity restored. Nor is opportunity lacking, since, in prosperity, human minds are carried away more arrogantly and more incautiously. If anyone deems this reverse the last, let him consider that at the outset the outcomes of all battles have been more against those to whom victory was owed.
Against yourself
indeed you begin to be, if you imitate what he did for himself; and again whatever for
your side you may attempt will be against him, if he should wish to imitate it. In war, he who has kept more vigil in field-matters, who has labored more in exercising the soldiery,
will undergo less danger. For a soldier is not to be led forth into the battle line, of whom you have not previously made trials.
In soliciting and receiving enemies, if they come in good faith, there is great confidence, because turncoats break an adversary more than the slain. It is better after the battle line to preserve more garrisons than to scatter the soldiery more widely. He is hard to conquer who can truly judge of his own and of the adversary’s forces.
He who, with his men dispersed, rashly pursues the advantage which he himself had acquired, wishes to give victory to the adversary. He who does not prepare grain and necessaries is conquered without iron. He who surpasses in multitude and valor, let him fight with a square front, which is the first mode.
He who judges himself unequal, let him with his right wing drive the enemy’s left wing, which
is the second method. He who knows that he has the very strongest left wing, let him attack the enemy’s right wing,
which is the third method. He who has the most thoroughly trained soldiers ought to begin the battle equally on both wings,
which is the fourth method.
He who commands the best light-armed troops, let him invade both wings of the enemy, with skirmishers stationed before the battleline: this is the fifth method. He who trusts neither in the number of his soldiers nor in valor, if he is about to fight it out, from his own right let him strike the enemy’s left wing, with the rest of his men extended so as to present the semblance of a true line: this is the sixth method. He who knows that he has fewer and weaker troops, by the seventh method ought to have on one flank either a mountain or a city or the sea or a river or some support of the sort.
He who confides in cavalry should seek places more suitable for horsemen and conduct the affair more by means of the horsemen. When an enemy scout roams stealthily in the camp, let all be ordered to return to their tents by day, and the scout is immediately apprehended. When you have learned that your counsel has been betrayed to the adversaries, it is proper for you to change your disposition.
What ought to be done, discuss with many; but what you are going to do, with the very few and most faithful—or rather with yourself.
Fear and punishment correct soldiers in their quarters; on campaign, hope and rewards make them better.
Good leaders engage in pitched battle never except by opportunity or extreme necessity.
A great disposition is to press the enemy more by hunger than by iron. By what kind of battle you are going to fight, let the enemies not know, lest they attempt to oppose it with some remedies
moliantur.) About cavalry there are many precepts; but since this part of the military art has advanced by the practice of exercise,
by the kind of arms, by the nobility of the horses, I judge that nothing is to be gathered from books,
since present instruction suffices.
Digesta sunt, imperator inuicte, quae nobilissimi auctores diuersis probata temporibus per experimentorum fidem memoriae prodiderunt, ut ad peritiam sagittandi, quam in serenitate tua Persa miratur, ad equitandi scientiam uel decorem, quae Hunnorum Alanorumque natio uelit imitari, si possit, ad currendi uelocitatem, quam Saracenus Indusque non aequat, ad armaturae exercitationem, cuius campidoctores uel pro parte exampla intellexisse gaudent, regula proeliandi, immo uincendi artificium iungeretur, quatenus uirtute pariter ac dispositione mirabilis reipublicae tuae et imperatoris officium exhiberes et militis.
The things, unconquered emperor, which the most noble authors, proven in different times by the trustworthiness of experiments, have consigned to memory, have been digested, so that to the expertise of archery, which in your Serenity the Persian admires; to the knowledge or decorum of riding, which the nation of the Huns and Alans wishes to imitate, if it can; to the swiftness of running, which neither Saracen nor Indian equals; to the training of the armatura, whose drill-masters rejoice to have understood the examples even in part, there might be joined a rule for waging battle, nay the craft of conquering, to the end that, marvelous alike in valor and in disposition, for your Commonwealth you might display both the office of emperor and of soldier.