Hugo of St. Victor: DIDASCALICON

[770C] Multi sunt quos ipsa adeo natura ingenio destitutos reliquit ut ea etiam quae facilia sunt intellectu vix capere possint, et horum duo genera mihi esse videntur. [770D] nam sunt quidam, qui, licet suam hebetudinem non ignorent, eo tamen quo valent conamine ad scientiam anhelant, et indesinenter studio insistentes, quod minus habent effectu operis, obtinere merentur effectu voluntatis. ast alii quoniam summa se comprehendere nequaquam posse sentiunt, minima etiam negligunt, et quasi in suo torpore securi quiescentes eo amplius in maximis lumen veritatis perdunt, quo minima quae intelligere possent discere fugiunt.

[770C] Many are those whom nature itself has left so destitute of talent that they can scarcely grasp even the things that are easy to the intellect, and of these there seem to me to be two genera. [770D] For there are certain men who, although they are not ignorant of their own dullness, yet with such effort as they are able aspire to science, and, persisting unceasingly in study, what they have less in the effect of work they deserve to obtain by the effect of will. But others, since they perceive that they can by no means comprehend the highest things, neglect even the least, and, as if secure, reposing in their own torpor, so much the more in the greatest matters they lose the light of truth, the more they shun learning the least things which they could understand.

unde psalmista: Noluerunt, inquit, intelligere ut bene agerent. longe enim aliud est nescire atque aliud nolle scire. nescire siquidem infirmitatis est, scientiam vero detestari, pravae voluntatis.

whence the psalmist: They were unwilling, he says, to understand so that they might act well. for by far it is one thing not to know and another to be unwilling to know. not to know, to be sure, is of infirmity; but to detest knowledge, of a depraved will.

est aliud hominum genus quos admodum natura ingenio ditavit et facilem ad veritatem veniendi aditum praestitit, quibus, [771A] etsi impar sit valitudo ingenii, non eadem tamen omnibus virtus aut voluntas est per exercitia et doctrinam naturalem sensum excolendi. nam sunt plerique qui negotiis huius saeculi et curis super quam necesse sit impliciti aut vitiis et voluptatibus corporis dediti, talentum Dei terra obruunt, et ex eo nec fructum sapientiae, nec usuram boni operis quaerunt, qui profecto valde detestabiles sunt. rursus aliis rei familiaris inopia et tenuis census discendi facultatem minuit.

There is another kind of men whom nature has exceedingly endowed with inborn talent and has provided an easy access for coming to truth, to whom, [771A] though the robustness of the wit be unequal, nevertheless not the same in all is the virtue or the will of cultivating the natural sense through exercises and doctrine. For there are very many who, entangled in the businesses of this age and in cares beyond what is necessary, or given over to the vices and pleasures of the body, bury the talent of God in the earth, and from it seek neither the fruit of wisdom nor the interest of good work—who indeed are assuredly very detestable. Again, for others the poverty of household resources and a slender income diminishes the faculty of learning.

quos tamen plene per hoc excusari minim posse credimus, cum plerosque fame siti nuditate laborantes ad scientiae fructum pertingere videamus. [771B] et tamen aliud est cum non possis, aut ut verius dicam, facile non possis discere, atque aliud posse et nolle scire. sicut enim gloriosius est, cum nullae suppetant facultates, sola virtute sapientiam apprehendere, sic profecto turpius est vigere ingenio, divitiis affluere, et torpere otio.

whom nevertheless we believe can scarcely be fully excused on this account, since we see very many laboring under hunger, thirst, and nakedness attain to the fruit of knowledge. [771B] and yet it is one thing when you cannot, or, to speak more truly, when you cannot easily learn, and another to be able and to be unwilling to know. for just as it is more glorious, when no faculties are at hand, to apprehend wisdom by virtue alone, so indeed it is more disgraceful to thrive in native talent, to overflow with riches, and to be torpid in idleness.

[741A] Duae praecipue res sunt quibus quisque ad scientiam instruitur, videlicet lectio et meditatio, e quibus lectio priorem in doctrina obtinet locum, et de hac tractat liber iste dando praecepta legendi. tria autem sunt praecepta magis lectioni necessaria: primum, ut sciat quisque quid legere debeat, secundum, quo ordine legere debeat, id est, quid prius, quid postea, tertium, quomodo legere debeat. de his tribus per singula agitur in hoc libro.

[741A] There are two things especially by which each person is instructed toward knowledge, namely reading and meditation, of which reading holds the prior place in doctrine; and this book treats of this by giving precepts for reading. But there are three precepts more necessary for reading: first, that each one know what he ought to read; second, in what order he ought to read, that is, what first, what afterwards; third, how he ought to read. Concerning these three, each in turn is treated in this book.

instruit autem tam saecularium quam divinarum scripturarum lectorem. unde et in duas partes dividitur, quarum unaquaeque tres habet distinctiones. [741B] in prima parte docet lectorem artium, in secunda parte divinum lectorem.

it instructs the reader of both secular and divine Scriptures. whence also it is divided into two parts, each of which has three distinctions. [741B] in the first part it teaches the reader of the arts, in the second part the divine reader.

docet autem hoc modo, ostendendo primum quid legendum sit, deinde quo ordine et quomodo legendum sit. ut autem sciri possit quid legendum sit aut quid praecipue legendum sit, in prima parte primum numerat originem omnium artium deinde descriptionem et partitionem earum, id est, quomodo unaquaeque contineat aliam, vel contineatur ab alia, secans philosophiam a summo usque ad ultima membra. deinde enumerat auctores artium et postea ostendit quae ex his videlicet artibus praecipue legendae sint.

He teaches, moreover, in this way: by showing first what is to be read, then in what order and how it is to be read. And so that it may be known what is to be read, or what is chiefly to be read, in the first part he first sets forth the origin of all the arts, then their description and partition—that is, how each one contains another, or is contained by another—dividing philosophy from the highest all the way down to the last members. Then he enumerates the authors of the arts, and afterward shows which of these, namely the arts, ought chiefly to be read.

deinde etiam quo ordine et quomodo legendae sint, aperit. postremo legentibus vitae suae disciplinam praescribit, et sic finitur prima pars. [741C] in secunda parte determinat quae scripturae divinae appellandae sint, deinde numerum et ordinem divinorum librorum et auctores eorum et interpretationes nominum.

then he also opens up in what order and how they are to be read. finally, he prescribes to readers the discipline of their life, and thus the first part is finished. [741C] in the second part he determines which writings are to be called divine Scriptures, then the number and order of the divine books and their authors, and the interpretations of the names.

postea agit de quibusdam proprietatibus divinae scripturae quae magis sunt necessariae. deinde docet qualiter legere debeat sacram scripturam is qui in ea correctionem morum suorum et formam vivendi quaerit. ad ultimum docet illum qui propter amorem scientiae eam legit, et sic secunda quoque pars finem accipit.

Afterwards he treats of certain properties of Divine Scripture which are more necessary. Then he teaches how he ought to read Sacred Scripture who in it seeks the correction of his morals and a form of living. At the last he instructs him who reads it for love of knowledge, and thus the second part likewise receives its end.

LIBER PRIMUS

BOOK ONE

CAPUT I

CHAPTER 1

De origine artium.

On the origin of the arts.

Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia, in qua perfecti boni forma consistit. sapientia illuminat hominem ut seipsum agnoscat, qui ceteris similis fuit cum se prae ceteris factum esse non intellexit. [741D] immortalis quippe animus sapientia illustratus respicit principium suum et quam sit indecorum agnoscit, ut extra se quidquam quaerat, cui quod ipse est, satis esse poterat.

Of all things to be sought, the first is wisdom, in which the form of the perfect good consists. wisdom illuminates man so that he may recognize himself, who had been similar to the rest when he did not understand that he had been made preeminent over the rest. [741D] for the immortal soul, illumined by wisdom, looks back to its principle and recognizes how indecorous it is to seek anything outside itself, for whom what he himself is could have been sufficient.

scriptum legitur in tripode Apollinis: gnoti seauton, id est, cognosce te ipsum, quia nimirum homo si non originis suae immemor esset, omne quod mutabilitati obnoxium est, quam sit nihil, agnosceret. probata apud philosophos sententia animam ex cunctis naturae partibus asserit esse compactam. et Timaeus Platonis ex dividua et individua mixtaque substantia, itemque eadem et diversa, et ex utroque commixta natura, quo universitas designatur, entelechiam formavit.

it is read to have been written on the tripod of Apollo: gnoti seauton, that is, know yourself, because surely if man were not forgetful of his origin, he would recognize how everything that is obnoxious to mutability is nothing. an opinion approved among the philosophers asserts that the soul is compacted from all the parts of nature. and the Timaeus of Plato, from divisible and indivisible and mixed substance, likewise the same and the different, and from both a commingled nature, by which the universe is designated, formed an entelechy.

[742A] ipsa namque et initia et quae initia consequuntur capit, quia et invisibiles per intelligentiam rerum causas comprehendit, et visibiles actualium formas per sensuum passiones colligit, sectaque in orbes geminos motum glomerat, quia sive per sensus ad sensibilia exeat sive per intelligentiam ad invisibilia ascendat. ad seipsam rerum similitudines trahens regyrat, et hoc est quod eadem mens, quae universorum capax est, ex omni substantia atque natura, quo similitudinis repraesentet figuram, coaptatur. Pythagoricum namque dogma erat similia similibus comprehendi, ut scilicet anima rationalis nisi ex omnibus composita foret, nullatenus omnia comprehendere posset, [742B] secundum quod dicit quidam:

[742A] for it itself grasps both the beginnings and the things that follow the beginnings, because it comprehends the invisible causes of things through intelligence, and collects the visible forms of actual things through the passions of the senses; and, cleft into twin orbs, it compacts its motion, because whether it goes out through the senses to sensibles or ascends through intelligence to invisibles, drawing the likenesses of things to itself it gyres back; and this is why the same mind, which is capable of all things, is coapted from every substance and nature, in order that it may represent the figure of likeness. For the Pythagorean dogma was that like things are comprehended by like things, so that the rational soul, unless it were composed out of all things, could by no means comprehend all things, [742B] according to what a certain one says:

Terram terreno comprehendimus, aethera flammis, Humorem liquido, nostro spirabile flatu.

We comprehend the earth by the earthy, the aether by flames, Moisture by the liquid, the breathable by our breath.

nec tamen existimare debemus viros in omni rerum natura peritissimos hoc de simplici essentia sensisse, quod ulla se partium quantitate distenderet, sed, ut apertius mirabilem eius demonstrarent potentiam, dicebant ex omnibus naturis constare, non secundum compositionem sed secundum compositionis rationem. neque enim haec rerum omnium similitudo aliunde aut extrinsecus animae advenire credenda est, sed ipsa potius eam in se et ex se nativa quadam potentia et propria virtute capit. nam sicut Varro in Periphysion dicit: Non omnis varietas extrinsecus rebus accidit, [742C] ut necesse sit quidquid variatur, aut amittere aliquid quod habuit, aut aliquid aliud et diversum extrinsecus quod non habuit assumere.

nor, however, ought we to suppose that men most expert in the whole nature of things thought this of the simple essence, namely, that it is stretched out by any quantity of parts; but, in order more openly to demonstrate its marvelous potency, they used to say that it consists of all natures, not according to composition but according to the rationale of composition. for this similitude of all things is not to be believed to come to the soul from elsewhere or from without, but rather she grasps it in herself and from herself by a certain native potency and by her proper virtue. for, as Varro says in the Periphysion: Not every variety befalls things from without, [742C] so that it is necessary that whatever is varied either lose something which it had, or assume from without something other and different which it did not have.

videmus cum paries extrinsecus adveniente forma imaginis cuiuslibet similitudinem accipit. cum vero impressor metallo figuram imprimit, ipsum quidem non extrinsecus, sed ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate aliud iam aliquid representare incipit. sic nimirum mens, rerum omnium similitudine in signita, omnia esse dicitur, atque ex omnibus compositionem suscipere, non integraliter, sed virtualiter atque potentialiter continere, et haec est illa naturae nostrae dignitas quam omnes aeque naturaliter habent, sed non omnes aeque noverunt.

we see that when a wall, with the form of any image arriving from without, receives a likeness. but when the stamper impresses a figure on metal, it itself begins to represent something else, not extrinsically, but from its own proper virtue and natural habilitation. thus indeed the mind, stamped with the similitude of all things, is said to be all things, and to assume a composition from all—not integrally, but to contain them virtually and potentially—and this is that dignity of our nature which all equally have by nature, but not all equally know.

animus enim, corporeis passionibus consopitus et per sensibiles formas extra semetipsum abductus, oblitus est quid fuerit, et, [724D] quia nil aliud fuisse se meminit, nil praeter quod videtur esse credit. reparamur autem per doctrinam, ut nostram agnoscamus naturam, et ut discamus extra non quaerere quod in nobis possumus invenire. summum igitur in vita solamen est studium sapientiae, quam qui invenit felix est, et qui possidet beatus.

the mind, indeed, lulled to sleep by bodily passions and abducted outside itself through sensible forms, has forgotten what it was; and, [724D] since it remembers itself to have been nothing else, it believes itself to be nothing other than what is seen. We are repaired, however, through doctrine, that we may recognize our nature, and that we may learn not to seek outside what we can find within ourselves. Therefore the highest solace in life is the study of wisdom, and he who finds it is fortunate, and he who possesses it is blessed.

CAPUT II

CHAPTER 2

Quod studium sapientiae philosophia sit.

That philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom.

Primus omnium Pythagoras studium sapientiae philosophiam nuncupavit, maluitque philosophos dici, nam antea sophos, id est, [743A] sapientes dicebantur. pulchre quidem inquisitores veritatis non sapientes sed amatores sapientiae vocat, quia nimirum adeo latet omne verum, ut eius amore quantumlibet mens ardeat, quantumlibet ad eius inquisitionem assurgat, difficile tamen ipsam ut est veritatem comprehendere queat. philosophiam autem earum rerum, quae vere essent suique immutabilem substantiam sortirentur, disciplinam constituit.

First of all Pythagoras named the pursuit of wisdom philosophy, and he preferred that they be called philosophers, for previously they were called sophos, that is, [743A] wise men. beautifully indeed he calls the inquisitors of truth not wise men but lovers of wisdom, because assuredly every truth lies so hidden that, however much the mind may burn with love of it, however much it may rise up to its inquiry, nevertheless it can with difficulty grasp truth itself as it is. moreover, he established philosophy as the discipline of those things which truly are and which obtain a substance of their own that is immutable.

Est autem philosophia amor et studium et amicitia quodammodo sapientiae, sapientiae vero non huius, quae in ferramentis quibusdam, et in aliqua fabrili scientia notitiaque versatur, sed illius sapientiae, quae nullius indigens, vivax mens et sola rerum primaeva ratio est. est autem hic amor sapientiae, intelligentis animi [743B] ab illa pura sapientia illuminatio, et quodammodo ad seipsam retractio atque advocatio, ut videatur sapientiae studium divinitatis et purae mentis illius amicitia. haec igitur sapientia cuncto animarum generi meritum suae divinitatis imponit, et ad propriam naturae vim puritatemque reducit.

Moreover, philosophy is a love and a zeal and, in a certain manner, a friendship of wisdom—not of that wisdom which is occupied with certain tools and with some fabrile science and knowing, but of that Wisdom which, needing no one, is a vivacious mind and the sole primeval Reason of things. This love of wisdom is, moreover, the illumination of an intelligent mind [743B] by that pure Wisdom, and, in a certain manner, a retraction and an advocation back to itself, so that the zeal for wisdom may be seen as a friendship of divinity and of that pure Mind. This Wisdom, therefore, imposes upon the whole race of souls the merit of its divinity, and brings them back to the proper force and purity of nature.

hinc nascitur speculationum cogitationumque veritas, et sancta puraque actuum castimonia. quoniam vero humanis animis hoc excellentissimum bonum philosophiae comparatum est, ut viae filo quodam procedat oratio, ab ipsis animae efficientiis ordiendum est.

Hence is born the truth of speculations and cogitations, and the holy and pure chastity of acts. Since indeed for human souls this most excellent good of philosophy has been provided, so that discourse may proceed by a certain thread of the way, it must be begun from the very efficient powers of the soul.

CAPUT III

CHAPTER 3

De triplici vi animae et solum hominem ratione praeditum.

On the threefold power of the soul and that only man is endowed with reason.

Triplex omnino animae vis in vegetandis corporibus deprehenditur, quarum una quidem vitam solum corpori subministrat, [743C] ut nascendo crescat, alendoque subsistat. alia vero sentiendi iudicium praebet. tertia vi mentis et ratione subnixa est.

A triple power of the soul is altogether apprehended in the vegetative functions of bodies, of which one indeed supplies only life to the body, [743C] so that by being born it may grow, and by being nourished it may subsist. another, in truth, furnishes the judgment of sensing. the third is supported by the force of mind and by reason.

quarum quidem primae id officium est, ut creandis, nutriendis alendisque corporibus praesto sit, nullum vero praestet rationis sensusve iudicium. haec autem est herbarum atque arborum, et quidquid terrae radicitus affixum tenetur. secunda vero composita atque coniuncta est, ac primam sibi sumens, et in partem constituens varium de quibus potest capere, ac multiforme iudicium capit.

of which indeed the first has this office: to be at hand for creating, nourishing, and sustaining bodies, yet to render no judgment of reason or of sense. This is the one belonging to herbs and trees, and to whatever is held fast to the earth by its roots. The second, however, is composite and conjoined, and, taking the first to itself and constituting it as a part, it takes a various and multiform judgment about the things it is able to grasp.

omne enim animal, quod sensu viget, idem et nascitur, et nutritur, et alitur. sensus vero diversi sunt, et usque ad quinarium numerum crescunt ita quidquid tantum alitur, non etiam sentit, [743D] quidquid vero sentire potest, etiam alitur, ei prima quoque vis animae, nascendi scilicet atque nutriendi, probatur esse subiecta. quibus vero sensus adest, non tantum eas rerum capiunt formas quibus sensibili corpore feriuntur praesente, sed abscedente quoque sensu sensibilibusque sepositis, cognitarum sensu formarum imagines tenent, memoriamque conficiunt, et prout quodque animal valet, longius breviusque custodit.

For every animal that is vigorous by sense is likewise both born and nourished and fed. But the senses are diverse, and increase up to the number five; thus whatever is only fed does not also sense, [743D] whereas whatever can sense is also fed, and the first power of the soul—namely, of being born and of being nourished—is shown to be subject to it. And to those in whom sense is present, they not only grasp the forms of things by which they are struck when a sensible body is present, but even with sense withdrawing and sensible things set apart, they hold the images of forms known by sense, and they fashion memory, and, according as each animal is strong, they keep it for a longer or shorter time.

sed eas imaginationes confusas atque inevidentes sumunt, ut nihil ex earum coniunctione ac compositione efficere possint, atque idcirco meminisse quidem nec aeque omnia, amissam vero oblivionem recolligere ac revocare non possunt. futuri vero his nulla cognitio est. sed vis animae tertia, quae secum priores [744A] alendi ac sentiendi trahit, hisque velut famulis atque obedientibus utitur, eadem tota in ratione est constituta, eaque vel in rerum praesentium firmissima conclusione, vel in absentium intelligentia, vel in ignotarum inquisitione versatur.

but they take those imaginations as confused and non-evident, such that they can effect nothing from their conjunction and composition, and therefore they do indeed remember, yet not all things equally; but they cannot re-collect and call back what has been lost to oblivion. moreover, there is for them no cognition of the future. but the third power of the soul, which draws along with itself the prior powers [744A] of nourishing and sensing, and uses these as servants and obedient attendants, this same is wholly constituted in reason, and is occupied either in the firmest conclusion of things present, or in the intelligence of things absent, or in the inquisition of things unknown.

haec tantum humano generi praesto est, quae non solum sensus imaginationesque perfectas et non inconditas capit, sed etiam pleno actu intelligentiae, quod imaginatio suggessit, explicat atque confirmat. itaque, ut dictum est, huic divinae naturae non ea tantum in cognitione sufficiunt, quae subiecta sensibus comprehendit, verum etiam ex sensibilibus imaginatione concepta, et absentibus rebus nomina indere potest, et quod intelligentiae ratione comprehendit, vocabulorum quoque positionibus aperit. [744B] illud quoque ei naturae proprium est, ut per ea quae sibi nota sunt, ignota vestiget, et non solum unumquodque an sit, sed quid sit etiam, et quale sit, nec non et cur sit, oportet agnoscere.

This alone is at hand for the human race, which not only takes in the senses and the imaginations as perfect and not incondite, but also, by the full act of intelligence, unfolds and confirms what imagination has suggested. Therefore, as has been said, for this divine nature not only those things suffice in cognition which it comprehends as subjected to the senses, but also things conceived from sensibles by imagination; and it can assign names to absent things, and what it comprehends by the reasoning of intelligence it also lays open by the positions of vocables. [744B] That, too, is proper to that nature: that through the things known to itself it investigate the unknown, and it ought to recognize not only whether each thing is, but also what it is, and of what kind it is, and likewise why it is.

quam triplicem animae vim sola, ut dictum est, hominum natura sortita est, cuius animae vis intelligentiae motibus non caret, qua in his quattuor proprie vim rationis exercet. aut enim aliquid an sit inquirit, aut si esse constiterit, quid sit addubitat. quod, si etiam utriusque scientiam ratione possidet, quale sit unumquodque vestigat, atque in eo cetera accidentium momenta perquirit.

which threefold power of the soul the nature of human beings alone, as has been said, has been allotted; whose soul’s power does not lack the motions of intelligence, by which it properly exercises the power of reason in these four matters. For it either inquires whether something is, or, if it has been established to be, questions what it is. And if it also possesses by reason the knowledge of both, it investigates of what quality each thing is, and therein thoroughly inquires into the other moments of accidents.

quibus cognitis, cur ita sit quaerit, et ratione nihilominus vestigat. cum igitur hic actus sit humani animi, ut semper in praesentium comprehensione, aut in absentium intelligentia, [744C] aut in ignotarum inquisitione atque inventione versetur, duo sunt in quibus omnem operam vis animae ratiocinantis impendit, unum quidem ut rerum naturas inquisitionis ratione cognoscat, alterum vero, ut ad scientiam prius veniat, quod post gravitas moralis exerceat.

with these things having been known, it asks why it is so, and nonetheless investigates by reason. Since therefore this is the act of the human animus, that it is always engaged either in the comprehension of present things, or in the intelligentia of absent things, [744C] or in the inquisition and invention of unknowns, there are two matters on which the power of the ratiocinating soul expends all its effort: the one, that it may know the natures of things by the reasoning of inquisition; the other, that it may first come to science, which afterward moral gravitas may put into practice.

CAPUT IV

CHAPTER 4

Quae res ad philosophiam pertineant.

What things pertain to philosophy.

Sed ut video, inextricabilem iam ipso loquendi ordine labyrinthum incidimus, ubi nobis non perplexus sermo, sed res obscura difficultatem pariat. quia enim de studio sapientiae loqui suscepimus, idque solis hominibus quodam naturae privilegio competere attestati sumus, consequenter nunc omnium humanorum actuum moderatricem quandam sapientiam posuisse videmur. [744D] si enim brutorum aninalium natura, quae nullo regitur rationis iudicio, motus suos secundum solas sensuum passiones diffundit, et in appetendo seu fugiendo aliquid non intelligentiae utitur discretione, sed caeco quodam carnis affectu impellitur, restat ut rationalis animae actus caeca cupiditas non rapiat, sed moderatrix semper sapientia praecedat.

But, as I see it, we have now fallen into an inextricable labyrinth by the very order of speaking, where for us not a perplexed discourse, but an obscure matter, begets difficulty. For since we have undertaken to speak about the pursuit of wisdom, and have attested that it belongs to human beings alone by a certain privilege of nature, consequently we now seem to have posited wisdom as a certain moderatrix of all human acts. [744D] For if the nature of brute animals, which is governed by no judgment of reason, diffuses its motions according solely to the passions of the senses, and in desiring or in fleeing something does not use the discretion of intelligence, but is driven by a certain blind affection of the flesh, it remains that the acts of the rational soul are not snatched away by blind cupidity, but that moderating wisdom should always go before.

quod si verum esse constiterit, iam non solum ea studia in quibus vel de rerum natura vel disciplina agitur morum, verum etiam omnium humanorum actuum seu studiorum rationes, non incongrue ad philosophiam pertinere dicemus. secundum quam acceptionem sic philosophiam definire possumus: Philosophia est disciplina omnium rerum humanarum atque divinarum rationes plene investigans. [745A] nec movere debet quod supra diximus philosophiam esse amorem et studium sapientiae, non huius quae instrumentis explicatur, ut est architectura, agricultura, et cetera huiusmodi, sed eius sapientiae quae sola rerum primaeva ratio est.

If this is established to be true, then we shall say that not only those studies in which either the nature of things or the discipline of morals is treated, but even the rationales of all human actions or pursuits, not incongruously pertain to philosophy. According to which acceptation we can define philosophy thus: Philosophy is the discipline fully investigating the reasons of all human and divine things. [745A] Nor should it trouble us that above we said philosophy is the love and study of wisdom, not of that which is explained by instruments, as are architecture, agriculture, and other things of this sort, but of that wisdom which alone is the primeval rationale of things.

potest namque idem actus et ad philosophiam pertinere secundum rationem suam, et ab ea excludi secundum administrationem, verbi gratia, ut de praesenti loquamur: agriculturae ratio philosophi est, administratio rustici. praeterea, opera artificum, etsi natura non sint, imitantur tamen naturam, et sui exemplaris formam, quae natura est, qua imitantur, ratione exprimunt. vides iam qua ratione cogimur philosophiam in omnes actus hominum diffundere, [745B] ut iam necesse sit tot esse philosophiae partes quot sunt rerum diversitates, ad quas ipsam pertinere constiterit.

for the same act can both pertain to philosophy according to its reason, and be excluded from it according to its administration; for example, to speak of the present: the rationale of agriculture is the philosopher’s, the administration the rustic’s. moreover, the works of artificers, although they are not natural, nevertheless imitate nature, and by reason express the form of their exemplar—which is nature—by which they imitate. you see now by what reason we are compelled to diffuse philosophy into all acts of men, [745B] so that now it is necessary that there be as many parts of philosophy as there are diversities of things to which it has been established that it pertains.

CAPUT V

CHAPTER 5

De ortu theoricae, practicae, mechanicae.

On the origin of the theoretical, the practical, and the mechanical.

Omnium autem humanarum actionum seu studiorum, quae sapientia moderatur, finis et intentio ad hoc spectare debet, ut vel naturae nostrae reparetur integritas vel defectuum, quibus praesens subiacet vita, temperetur necessitas. dicam apertius quod dixi. duo sunt in homine, bonum et malum, natura et vitium.

But of all human actions or studies, which wisdom moderates, the end and the intention ought to look to this, that either the integrity of our nature be restored, or the necessity of the defects to which the present life is subject be tempered. I will say more openly what I have said. There are two things in man, the good and the evil, nature and vice.

bonum quia natura est, quia corruptum est, quia minus est, exercitio reparandum est. malum quia vitium est, quia corruptio est, quia natura non est, excludendum est. quod si funditus exterminari non potest, saltem adhibito remedio temperandum est.

The good, because it is nature, because it is corrupt, because it is diminished, is to be repaired by exercise. The evil, because it is vice, because it is corruption, because it is not nature, is to be excluded. But if it cannot be utterly exterminated, at least, with a remedy applied, it is to be tempered.

hoc est omnino quod agendum est, [745C] ut natura reparetur et exeludatur vitium. integritas vero naturae humanae duobus perficitur, scientia et virtute, quae nobis cum supernis et divinis substantiis similitudo sola est. nam homo, cum simplex natura non sit, sed gemina compactus substantia, secundum unam partem suam quae potior est, et, ut apertius id quod oportet dicam, quae ipse est, immortalis est.

this is altogether what must be done, [745C] that nature be repaired and vice be excluded. The integrity of human nature is perfected by two things, science and virtue, which is our sole likeness with the supernal and divine substances. For man, since he is not of simple nature but compacted of a twin substance, according to one part of himself which is the stronger—and, to say more openly that which it is fitting to say, which he himself is—he is immortal.

secundum alteram vero partem quae caduca est, quae sola his, qui nisi sensibus fidem praestare nesciunt, cognita est, mortalitati et mutabilitati obnoxius est, ubi toties mori necesse est, quoties amittere id quod est. et haec est ultima pars rerum, quae principium et finem habet.

according to the other part, however, which is caducous, which alone is known to those who know not how to grant credence except to the senses, he is subject to mortality and mutability, where it is necessary to die as many times as one loses that which one is. And this is the ultimate part of things, which has a beginning and an end.

CAPUT VI

CHAPTER 6

De tribus rerum maneriis.

On the three manners of things.

Sunt namque in rebus alia quae nec principium habent nec finem, [745D] et haec aeterna nominantur, alia quae principium quidem habent, sed nullo fine clauduntur, et dicuntur perpetua, alia quae et initium habent et finem, et haec sunt temporalia. in primo ordine id constituimus cui non est aliud esse, et id quod est id est, cuius causa et effectus diversa non sunt, quod non aliunde sed a semetipso subsistere habet, ut est solus naturae genitor et artifex. illud vero cui aliud est esse, et id quod est, id est quod aliunde ad esse venit, et ex causa praecedente in actum profluxit, ut esse inciperet, natura est, quae mundum continet omnem.

There are, namely, in things, some which have neither beginning nor end, [745D] and these are named eternal; others which indeed have a beginning, but are closed by no end, and are called perpetual; others which both have a beginning and an end, and these are temporal. in the first order we establish that to which there is not another being, and what it is, that it is; whose cause and effect are not diverse; which has to subsist not from elsewhere but from itself, as is the sole begetter and artificer of nature. that, however, for which being is other, and what it is—that is, that it came from elsewhere into being, and flowed forth into act from a preceding cause, so that it might begin to be—is nature, which contains the whole world.

idque in gemina secatur. est quiddam, quod a causis suis primordialibus ut esse incipiat, nullo movente ad actum prodit, solo divinae voluntatis arbitrio, [746A] ibique immutabile omnis finis atque vicissitudinis expers consistit. eiusmodi sunt rerum substantiae, quas Graeci ousias dicunt, et cuncta superlunaris mundi corpora, quae etiam ideo, quod non mutentur, divina appellata sunt.

and this too is divided into a twin part. There is a certain thing which, from its primordial causes, so that it may begin to be, with no mover, comes forth into act by the judgment of the divine will alone, [746A] and there, immutable, devoid of every end and vicissitude, it stands. Of this sort are the substances of things, which the Greeks call ousiai, and all the bodies of the superlunar world, which also for this reason, because they are not changed, have been called divine.

tertia pars rerum est quae principium et finem habent, et per se ad esse non veniunt, sed sunt opera naturae, quae oriuntur super terram sub lunari globo, movente igne artifice, qui vi quadam descendit in res sensibiles procreandas. de illis ergo dictum est: Nihil in mundo moritur, eo quod nulla essentia pereat. non enim essentiae rerum transeunt, sed formae.

the third part of things is that which has a beginning and an end, and does not come to being by itself, but is the work of nature, which arises upon the earth under the lunar globe, the artificer fire being the mover, which by a certain force descends into sensible things for procreation. concerning these, therefore, it has been said: Nothing in the world dies, because no essence perishes. for it is not the essences of things that pass away, but the forms.

cum vero forma transire dicitur, non sic intelligendum est, [746B] ut aliqua res existens perire omnino et esse suum amittere credatur, sed variari potius, vel sic fortassis ut quae iuncta fuerant, ab invicem separentur, vel quae separata erant, coniungantur, vel quae hic erant, illuc transeant, vel quae nunc erant, tunc subsistant, in quibus omnibus esse rerum nihil detrimenti patitur. de his dictum est: Omnia orta occidunt, et aucta senescunt, eo quod cuncta naturae opera, sicut principium habent, ita etiam finis aliena non sunt. de illis dictum est:

however, when form is said to pass, it is not to be understood thus, [746B] as though some existing thing should be believed utterly to perish and to lose its being, but rather to be varied; or perhaps thus: that the things which had been joined are separated from one another, or that the things which had been separated are joined, or that the things which were here pass there, or that the things which are now then subsist—in all of which the being of things suffers no detriment. Of these it was said: All things that have arisen decline, and things augmented grow old, for all the works of nature, just as they have a beginning, so also are not alien to an end. Of those it was said:

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti,

From nothing, nothing, into nothing nothing is able to revert,

eo quod omnis natura et primordialem habet causam et subsistentiam perpetuam. de his dictum est:

because every nature has both a primordial cause and a perpetual subsistence. Of these it has been said:

Et redit ad nihilum, quod fuit ante nihil,

And it returns to nothing, which was before nothing,

eo quod omne opus naturae sicut temporaliter ex occulta causa [746C] in actum profluit, ita eodem actu temporaliter destructo, eo unde venerat reversurum sit.

because every work of nature, just as it flows forth temporally into act from an occult cause [746C], so, with that same act temporally destroyed, is going to return to that whence it had come.

CAPUT VII

CHAPTER 7

De mundo superlunari et sublunari.

On the superlunar and sublunar world.

Hinc est quod mathematici mundum in duas partes diviserunt: in eam videlicet partem quae est a circulo lunae sursum, et in eam quae deorsum est. et superlunarem mundum, eo quod ibi omnia primordiali lege consistant, naturam appellabant, sublunarem, opus naturae, id est, superioris, quia omnium genera animantium, quae in eo vitalis spiritus infusione vegetantur, a superioribus per invisibiles meatus infusum nutrimentum accipiunt, non solum ut nascendo crescant, sed etiam ut alendo subsistant. [746D] eundem etiam superiorem mundum tempus vocabant, propter cursum et motum siderum quae in eo sunt, inferiorem, temporalem, quia secundum motus superiores agitur.

Hence it is that the mathematicians divided the world into two parts: namely into that part which is upward from the circle of the moon, and into that which is downward. And they called the superlunar world, because there all things stand by a primordial law, Nature; the sublunar, the work of Nature, that is, of the higher, because all kinds of living beings, which in it are quickened by the infusion of vital spirit, receive nourishment poured in from the superiors through invisible channels, not only that by being born they may grow, but also that by being nourished they may subsist. [746D] They also called that same higher world Time, on account of the course and motion of the stars which are in it; the lower, Temporal, because it is governed according to the higher motions.

item superlunarem, propter perpetuam lucis et quietis tranquillitatem, elysium, hunc autem propter inconstantiam et confusionem rerum fluctuantium, infernum nuncupabant.

likewise the superlunar, on account of the perpetual tranquility of light and of rest, they named Elysium, but this one, on account of the inconstancy and confusion of fluctuating things, they called Infernum.

Haec paulo latius prosecuti sumus ut ostendamus hominem, qua in parte mutabilitatis particeps est, in ea quoque necessitati esse obnoxium, in ea vero, qua immortalis est, divinitati esse cognatum. ex quo colligi potest id quod supra dictum est, quod videlicet omnium humanarum actionum ad hunc finem concurrit intentio, ut vel divinae imaginis similitudo in nobis restauretur, [747A] vel huius vitae necessitudini consulatur, quae quo facilius laedi potest adversis, eo magis foveri et conservari indiget.

These things we have pursued a little more broadly, that we might show that man, in that part in which he is a participant in mutability, is in that part also subject to necessity, but in that part in which he is immortal, he is akin to divinity. From which there can be gathered what was said above, namely that the intention of all human actions converges to this end: either that the likeness of the divine image be restored in us, [747A] or that provision be made for the necessity of this life, which, the more easily it can be harmed by adversities, by so much the more it needs to be cherished and preserved.

CAPUT VIII

CHAPTER 8

In quo homo similis sit Deo.

Wherein man is similar to God.

Duo vero sunt quae divinam in homine similitudinem reparant, id est, speculatio veritatis et virtutis exercitium. quia in hoc homo Deo similis est, quod sapiens et iustus est, sed iste mutabiliter, ille immutabiliter et sapiens et iustus est. illarum vero actionum quae huius vitae necessitati deserviunt, trimodum genus est, primum, quod naturae nutrimentum administrat, secundum, quod contra molesta, quae extrinsecus accidere possunt, munit, tertium, quod contra iam illata praestat remedium.

Two things indeed are what repair the divine similitude in man, that is, the speculation of truth and the exercise of virtue. For in this a man is similar to God, that he is wise and just; but the former is wise and just mutably, the latter immutably. Of those actions, however, which serve the necessity of this life, there is a threefold kind: first, that which administers nature’s nutriment; second, that which fortifies against the troublesome things which can happen from without; third, that which provides a remedy against things already inflicted.

[747B] cum igitur ad reparandam naturam nostram intendimus, divina actio est, cum vero illi quod infirmum in nobis est necessaria providemus, humana. omnis igitur actio vel divina est vel humana. possumus autem non incongrue illam, eo quod de superioribus habeatur, intelligentiam appellare, hanc vero, quia de inferioribus habetur, et quasi quodam consilio indiget, scientiam vocare.

[747B] therefore, when we aim at the repairing of our nature, it is a divine action; but when we provide the necessities to that which is weak in us, it is human. every action, then, is either divine or human. moreover, we may not inaptly call the former, in that it is derived from the higher things, intelligence; but the latter, because it is derived from lower things and, as it were, stands in need of a certain counsel, science.

si igitur sapientia, ut supra dictum est, cunctas quae ratione fiunt moderatur actiones, consequens est iam ut sapientiam has duas partes continere, id est, intelligentiam et scientiam, dicamus. rursus intelligentia, quoniam et in investigatione veritatis et in morum consideratione laborat, eam in duas species dividimus, [747C] in theoricam, id est, speculativam, et practicam, id est, activam, quae etiam ethica, id est, moralis appellatur. scientia vero, quia opera humana prosequitur, congrue mechanica, id est, adulterina vocatur.

if therefore wisdom, as was said above, moderates all actions which are done by reason, it follows now that we say wisdom contains these two parts, that is, intelligence and science. again, intelligence, since it labors both in the investigation of truth and in the consideration of morals, we divide it into two species, [747C] into the theoretic, that is, speculative, and the practical, that is, active, which is also called ethical, that is, moral. science indeed, because it pursues human works, is fittingly called mechanical, that is, adulterine.

CAPUT IX

CHAPTER 9

De tribus operibus.

On the three works.

Sunt etenim tria opera, id est, opus Dei, opus naturae, opus artificis imitantis naturam. opus Dei est, quod non erat creare. unde illud: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.

For there are three works, that is, the work of God, the work of nature, the work of the artificer imitating nature. the work of God is to create what was not. whence that: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.

opus naturae, quod latuit ad actum producere. unde illud: Producat terra herbam virentem etc. opus artificis est disgregata coniungere vel coniuncta segregare.

the work of nature is to produce into act what lay hidden. whence that: “Let the earth produce green herb,” etc. the work of the artificer is to conjoin things disgregated or to segregate things conjoined.

unde illud: Consuerunt sibi perizomata. neque enim potuit vel terra caelum creare, [747D] vel homo herbam producere, qui nec palmum ad staturam suam addere potest. in his tribus operibus convenienter opus humanum, quod natura non est sed imitatur naturam, mechanicum, id est, adulterinum nominatur, quemadmodum et clavis subintroducta mechanica dicitur.

whence that: “They sewed for themselves perizomata.” For neither could the earth create the heaven, [747D] nor could man produce a blade of grass, who cannot add even a palm to his stature. Among these three works, fittingly, the human work—which is not nature but imitates nature—is called mechanical, that is, adulterine, just as a clandestinely introduced key is called mechanical.

qualiter autem opus artificis imitetur naturam, longum est et onerosum prosequi per singula. possumus tamen exempli causa in paucis id demonstare. qui statuam fudit, hominem intuitus est.

But how the work of an artificer imitates nature, it is long and onerous to pursue point by point. We can, however, for example’s sake, demonstrate this in a few particulars: he who cast a statue had a man in view.

qui domum fecit, montem respexit. quia enim, ut ait propheta, qui emittis fontes in convallibus, intra medium montium perstransibunt aquae. eminentia montium aquas non retinet.

he who made a house looked to the mountain. For indeed, as the prophet says, you who send forth fountains in the valleys, within the midst of the mountains the waters will pass through. The eminence of the mountains does not retain the waters.

ita domus in altum quoddam cacumen levanda fuit, [748A] ut irruentium tempestatum molestias tuto excipere posset. qui usum vestimentorum primus adinvenit, consideravit quod singula quaeque nascentium propria quaedam habeant munimenta quibus naturam suam ab incommodis defendunt. cortex ambit arborem, penna tegit velucrem, piscem squama operit, lana ovem induit, pilus iumenta et feras vestit, concha testudinem excipit, ebur elephantem iacula non timere facit.

thus the house had to be lifted to a certain high summit, [748A] so that it might safely withstand the annoyances of rushing tempests. he who first invented the use of garments considered that each and every one of the things that are born has certain proper muniments by which it defends its nature from incommodities. bark encircles the tree, the feather covers the winged creature, the scale overlays the fish, wool clothes the sheep, hair garments beasts of burden and wild animals, the shell receives the tortoise, ivory makes the elephant not fear javelins.

nec tamen sine causa factum est quod, cum singula animantium naturae suae arma secum nata habeant, solus homo inermis nascitur et nudus. oportuit enim ut illis, quae sibi providere nesciunt, natura consuleret, homini autem ex hoc etiam maior experiendi occasio praestaretur, cum illa, [748B] quae ceteris naturaliter data sunt, propria ratione sibi inveniret. multo enim nunc magis enitet ratio hominis haec eadem inveniendo quam habendo claruisset.

nor, however, was it done without cause that, although the individual living beings have, born with them, the arms of their own nature, man alone is born unarmed and naked. for it was fitting that nature should take counsel for those who do not know how to provide for themselves, but for man from this also a greater occasion for experimenting be afforded, since those things, [748B] which are naturally given to the others, he would find for himself by his own reason. for the reason of man now shines forth much more by inventing these same things than it would have been illustrious by having them.

nec sine causa proverbium sonat quod:

nor without cause does the proverb say that:

Ingeniosa fames omnes excuderit artes.

Ingenious hunger has hammered out all the arts.

hac equidem ratione illa quae nunc excellentissima in studiis hominum vides, reperta sunt. hac eadem pingendi, texendi, sculpendi, fundendi, infinita genera exorta sunt, ut iam cum natura ipsum miremur artificem.

By this very method indeed, those things which you now see most excellent in the studies of men have been discovered. By this same method, infinite kinds of painting, weaving, sculpting, and founding have arisen, so that now, together with nature, we marvel at man himself as an artificer.

CAPUT X

CHAPTER 10

Quid sit natura.

What nature is.

Quia vero iam toties naturam nominavimus, licet, ut ait Tullius, Naturam definire difficile sit, non tamen huius vocabuli significatio omnino silentio praetereunda videtur. [748C] neque, quia non omnia quae volumus dicere possumus, id quod possumus tacere debemus. plura veteres de natura dixisse inveniuntur, sed nihil ita ut non aliquid restare videatur.

Because indeed we have now so often named nature, although, as Tullius says, to define Nature is difficult, nevertheless the signification of this vocable does not seem to be altogether to be passed over in silence. [748C] nor, because we cannot say all the things we wish to say, ought we to keep silent about that which we can. more things are found to have been said by the ancients about nature, but nothing in such a way that it does not seem that something remains.

quantum tamen ego ex eorum dictis conicere possum, tribus maxime modis huius vocabuli significatione uti solebant, singulis suam definitionem assignando.

however much I can conjecture from their sayings, they were wont to use the signification of this word in three chief modes, assigning to each its own definition.

Primo modo per hoc nomen significare voluerunt illud archetypum exemplar rerum omnium, quod in mente divina est, cuius ratione omnia formata sunt, et dicebant naturam esse unius cuiusque rei primordialem causam suam, a qua non solum esse sed etiam talis esse habeat. huic significationi talis definitio assignatur: Natura est quae unicuique rei suum esse attribuit. [748D] secundo modo naturam esse dicebant proprium esse uniuscuiusque rei.

In the first mode they wished by this name to signify that archetypal exemplar of all things, which is in the divine mind, according to whose ratio all things have been formed, and they used to say that nature is the primordial proper cause of each thing, from which it has not only being but also to be such as it is. To this signification such a definition is assigned: Nature is that which attributes to each thing its own being. [748D] In a second mode they said nature is the proper essence of each thing.

cui significationi talis definitio assignatur: Natura unamquamque rem informans propria differentia dicitur. secundum quam significationem dicere solemus: Natura est omnia pondera ad terram vergere, levia alta petere, ignem urere, aquam humectare. tertia definitio talis est: Natura est ignis artifex, ex quadam vi procedens in res sensibiles procreandas.

to which signification such a definition is assigned: Nature is said to be that informing each thing by its proper differentia. according to which signification we are accustomed to say: Nature is that all weights incline toward the earth, light things seek the heights, fire burns, water moistens. the third definition is such: Nature is a crafting fire, proceeding from a certain power toward the procreation of sensible things.

physici namque dicunt, omnia ex calore et humore procreari. unde Vergilius Oceanum patrem appellat et Valerius Soranus in quodam versu de Iove in significatione ignis aetherei dicit:

For the physicists say that all things are procreated from heat and moisture. Whence Vergil calls Ocean the father, and Valerius Soranus, in a certain verse about Jove, in the signification of aetherial fire, says:

Iuppiter omnipotens rerum regumque repertor, Progenitor genitrixque Deum verum unus et idem.

Jupiter omnipotent, discoverer of things and of kings, Progenitor and genitrix of the Gods, true one and the same.

CAPUT XI

CHAPTER 11

De ortu logicae. [749A]

On the origin of logic. [749A]

Postquam igitur theoricae et practicae et mechanicae ortum demonstravimus, superest logicae quoque originem investigare, quam idcirco ultimam annumero quia postremo inventa est. ceterae prius repertae fuerant, sed necesse fuit logicam quoque inveniri, quoniam nemo de rebus convenienter disserere potest. nisi prius recte et veraciter loquendi rationem agnoverit.

After, therefore, we have demonstrated the origin of the theoretical and the practical and the mechanical, it remains to investigate the origin of logic as well, which for this reason I number last because it was discovered last. The others had been found earlier, but it was necessary that logic too be discovered, since no one can discourse suitably about things, unless he has first recognized the method of speaking rightly and veraciously.

nam sicut dicit Boethius: Cum primitus antiqui circa naturas rerum et morum qualitates investigandas operam impenderent, necesse fuit saepe falli eos, quia vocum et intellectuum discretionem non habebant, ut in multis evenit Epicuro, qui atomis mundum consistere putat [749B] et honestum voluptatem mentitur.

For, as Boethius says: When at first the ancients devoted effort to investigating the natures of things and the qualities of morals, it was necessary that they often be mistaken, because they did not have the discretion of words and intellects, as in many matters befell Epicurus, who thinks the world consists of atoms [749B] and feigns that the honorable is pleasure.

Hoc autem idcirco huic atque aliis accidisse manifestum est, quoniam per imperitiam disputandi, quidquid ratiocinatione comprehenderant, hoc in res quoque ipsas evenire arbitrabantur. hic vero magnus est error. neque enim sese res ut in numeris, ita etiam in ratiocinationibus habent.

This, however, is manifest to have happened to him and to others, since, through inexperience of disputation, whatever they had comprehended by ratiocination, this they supposed to occur also in the things themselves. Here indeed is a great error. For things are not constituted in ratiocinations as they are in numbers.

in numeris enim quidquid in digitis recte computantis evenerit, id sine dubio in res quoque ipsas evenire necesse est, ut si ex calculo centum contigerit, centum quoque res illi numero subiectas esse necesse est. hoc vero non aeque in disputatione servatur. neque enim quidquid sermonum decursus invenerit, id in natura fixum tenetur.

for in numbers whatever has occurred on the fingers of one computing rightly, that must without doubt also occur to the things themselves, as, if from the reckoning a hundred has resulted, it is necessary that the things subjected to that number be a hundred as well. but this is not equally observed in disputation. for not whatever the course of discourses has discovered is held fixed in nature.

[749C] quare necesse est falli, qui abiecta scientia disputandi, de rerum natura perquirerent. nisi enim prius ad scientiam venerit, quae ratiocinatio veram teneat semitam disputandi, quae verisimilem, et agnoverit quae fida, quae possit esse suspecta, rerum incorrupta veritas ex ratiocinatione non potest inveniri. cum igitur veteres saepe multis lapsi erroribus, falsa quaedam sibi et contraria in disputatione colligerent, atque id fieri impossibile videretur, ut de eadem re contraria conclusione facta, utraque essent vera, quae sibi dissentiens ratiocinatio conclusisset, cuive ratiocinationi credi oporteret, esset ambiguum, visum est prius disputationis ipsius veram atque integram considerare naturam.

[749C] Wherefore it is necessary that those be deceived who, the science of disputing having been cast aside, would inquire into the nature of things. For unless one first come to the science which ratiocination holds the true path of disputation, which the verisimilar, and has recognized which are trustworthy and which may be suspect, the incorrupt truth of things cannot be found from ratiocination. Therefore, since the ancients, often having slipped in many errors, were gathering to themselves certain false and contrary things in disputation, and it seemed impossible that, concerning the same matter, with a contrary conclusion having been made, both should be true which a ratiocination dissenting from itself had concluded, and it was ambiguous to which ratiocination it ought to be believed, it seemed best first to consider the true and entire nature of disputation itself.

qua cognita, tum illud quoque, quod per disputationem inveniretur, [749D] an vere comprehensum esset, posset intelligi. hinc igitur profecta logicae peritia disciplinae, quae disputandi modos atque ipsas ratiocinationes internoscendi vias parat, ut quae ratiocinatio nunc quidem vera, nunc autem falsa, quae vero semper falsa, quae numquam falsa possit agnosci. haec tempore quidem postrema est, sed ordine prima.

with this known, then that also which might be found through disputation, [749D] whether it had been truly comprehended, could be understood. Hence, therefore, there proceeded the expertise of the logical discipline, which prepares the modes of disputation and the ways of distinguishing the ratiocinations themselves, so that it may be recognized which ratiocination is now indeed true, now however false; which, in truth, is always false; which is never false. This is indeed last in time, but first in order.

haec enim incohantibus philosophiam prima legenda est, propterea quod in ea docetur vocum et intellectum natura, sine quibus nullus philosophiae tractatus rationabiliter explicari potest.

for this, for those beginning philosophy, must be read first, because in it the nature of words and of intellections is taught, without which no tractate of philosophy can be rationally explicated.

Logica dicitur a Graeco logos, quod nomen geminam habet interpretationem. [750A] dicitur enim logos sermo sive ratio, et inde logica sermocinalis sive rationalis scientia dici potest. logica rationalis, quae dissertiva dicitur, continet dialecticam et rhetoricam.

Logic is said from the Greek logos, which name has a twofold interpretation. [750A] For logos is said to be discourse or reason, and from this logic can be called the sermocinal (of speech) or rational science. Rational logic, which is called dissertative, contains dialectic and rhetoric.

logica sermocinalis genus est ad grammaticam, dialecticam atque rhetoricam, et continet sub se dissertivam. et haec est logica sermocinalis, quam quartam post theoricam, practicam, mechanicam annumeramus. nec putandum est ideo logicam, id est, sermocinalem dici, quod ante eius inventionem nulli fuerint sermones, et quasi homines mutuas locutiones prius non habuerint.

Sermocinal logic is a genus with respect to grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, and it contains under itself the dissertive. And this is the sermocinal logic, which we reckon as the fourth after the theoretical, the practical, and the mechanical. Nor must it be thought that logic—namely, the sermocinal—is so called for this reason: that before its invention there were no discourses, as though men had not previously had mutual speech.

erant prius et sermones communes et litterae, sed nondum ratio sermonum et litterarum in artem redacta fuerat. nulla adhuc recte loquendi vel disputandi praecepta data erant. omnes enim scientiae prius erant in usu quam in arte.

There were earlier both common discourses and letters, but the reason/method of discourses and of letters had not yet been reduced into an art. No precepts for speaking correctly or for disputing had yet been given. For all sciences were earlier in use than in art.

sed considerantes deinde homines usum in artem posse converti [750B] et quod vagum fuerat et licentiosum prius certis regulis et praeceptis posse restringi, coeperunt, ut dictum est, consuetudinem quae partim casu, partim natura exorta fuerat, ad artem reducere, id quod pravum usus habebat emendantes, quod minus habebat supplentes, quod superfluum habebat resecantes, et de cetero singulis certas regulas et praecepta praescribentes.

but then men, considering that use could be converted into art [750B] and that what had been vague and licentious before could be restrained by certain rules and precepts, began, as has been said, to bring custom—which had arisen partly by chance, partly by nature—back to art, emending what faulty usage contained, supplementing what it lacked, cutting away what was superfluous, and thereafter prescribing to each particular certain rules and precepts.

Huiusmodi fuit origo omnium artium; hoc per singula currentes verum invenimus. priusquam esset grammatica et scribebant et loquebantur homines. priusquam esset dialecta, ratiocinando verum a falso discernebant.

Of this kind was the origin of all the arts; this, running through the particulars, we find to be true. Before there was grammar, men both wrote and spoke. Before there was dialectic, by ratiocinating they distinguished the true from the false.

priusquam esset rhetorica, iura civilia tractabant. priusquam esset arithmetica, scientiam numerandi habebant. [750C] priusquam esset musica, canebant.

before there was rhetoric, they dealt with civil law. before there was arithmetic, they had the knowledge of numeration. [750C] before there was music, they sang.

priusquam esset geometria, agros mensurabant. priusquam esset astronomia, per cursus stellarum discretiones temporum capiebant. sed venerunt artes, quae licet ab usu principium sumpserint, usu tamen meliores sunt.

before there was geometry, they measured fields. before there was astronomy, through the courses of the stars they grasped the distinctions of times. but the arts came, which, although they took their beginning from use, yet by use are better.

hic locus esset exponere qui fuerint singularum artium inventores, quando extiterint aut ubi, aut quomodo per eos disciplinae exordium sumpserint, sed volo quadam prius philosophiae divisione singulas a se invicem discernere.

This would be the place to set forth who were the inventors of the several arts, when they arose or where, or how the disciplines took their exordium through them; but I wish first, by a certain division of philosophy, to discern each from the others.

Oportet ergo breviter recapitulare quae supradicta sunt, ut facilior fiat transitus ad sequentia. quattuor tantum diximus esse scientias, quae reliquas omnes continent, [750D] id est, theoricam, quae in speculatione veritatis laborat, et practicam, quae morum disciplinam considerat, et mechanicam, quae huius vitae actiones dispensat, logicam quoque, quae recte loquendi et acute disputandi scientiam praestat. hic itaque non absurde ille quaternarius animae intelligi potest, quem ob reverentiam sui antiqui in ius iurandum asciverant. unde et illud dictum est:

It is meet, therefore, briefly to recapitulate the things aforesaid, that an easier passage be made to the following. We have said that there are only four sciences, which contain all the rest, [750D] that is, the theoretic, which labors in the speculation of truth, and the practical, which considers the discipline of morals, and the mechanical, which dispenses the actions of this life, and logic also, which furnishes the science of speaking rightly and disputing acutely. Here, therefore, that quaternity of the soul can not absurdly be understood, which the ancients, out of reverence for it, adopted into an oath. Whence also that saying was uttered:

Per qui nostrae animae numerum dedit ille quaternum.

Through whom that one gave to our soul the fourfold number.

hae qualiter sub philosophia contineantur, et rursum quas sub se contineant, repetita breviter definitione philosophiae ostendemus.

we will show how these are contained under philosophy, and in turn what they contain under themselves, the definition of philosophy briefly repeated.