Gellius: NOCTES ATTICAE

I. De origine vocabuli terrae Italiae; deque ea multa, quae "suprema" appellatur, deque eius nominis ratione ac de lege Aternia; et quibus verbis antiquitus multa minima dici solita sit. I. Timaeus in historiis, quas oratione Graeca de rebus populi Romani composuit, et M. Varro in antiquitatibus rerum humanarum terram Italiam de Graeco vocabulo appellatam scripserunt, quoniam boves Graeca vetere lingua italoi vocitati sint, quorum in Italia magna copia fuerit, bucetaque in ea terra gigni pascique solita sint complurima. II. Coniectare autem possumus ob eandem causam, quod Italia tunc esset armentosissima, multam, quae appellatur "suprema", institutam in singulos dies duarum ovium, boum triginta, pro copia scilicet boum proque ovium penuria.

1. On the origin of the vocable of the land Italy; and about that mulct which is called "suprema," and about the rationale of that name and about the Aternian law; and with what words in ancient times very small mulcts used to be said. 1. Timaeus, in the histories which he composed in the Greek tongue about the affairs of the Roman people, and M. Varro in the antiquities of human matters, wrote that the land Italy was appellated from a Greek vocable, since oxen in the old Greek language used to be called italoi, of which there was a great abundance in Italy, and that very many ox-pastures were wont to be produced and grazed in that land. 2. We can conjecture moreover, for the same reason—because Italy was then most abounding in herds—that the mulct which is called "suprema" was established per each day at 2 sheep and 30 oxen, namely in proportion to the abundance of oxen and the scarcity of sheep.

Sed cum eiusmodi multa pecoris armentique a magistratibus dicta erat, adigebantur boves ovesque alias pretii parvi, alias maioris, eaque res faciebat inaequalem multae poenitionem. Idcirco postea lege Aternia constituti sunt in oves singulas aeris deni, in boves aeris centeni. "Minima" autem multa est ovis unius.

But when fines of such a kind upon livestock and herd-beasts had been pronounced by the magistrates, oxen and sheep were exacted, some of small price, others of greater, and this made the penalization by fine unequal. Therefore afterwards, by the Aternian Law, there were fixed for single sheep ten asses of bronze, for oxen one hundred asses of bronze. Moreover, the “minimum” fine is of one sheep.

III. "Suprema" multa est eius numeri, cuius diximus, ultra quem multam dicere in dies singulos ius non est, et propterea "suprema" appellatur, id est summa et maxima. IV. Quando igitur nunc quoque a magistratibus populi Romani more maiorum multa dicitur vel minima vel suprema, observari solet, ut oves genere virili appellentur; atque ita M. Varro verba haec legitima, quibus minima multa diceretur, concepit: "M. Terentio, quando citatus neque respondit neque excusatus est, ego ei unum ovem multam dico"; ac nisi eo genere diceretur, negaverunt iustam videri multam.

3. The "supreme" mulct is of that number of which we have spoken, beyond which it is not lawful to declare a mulct on individual days; and for that reason it is called "supreme," that is, highest and greatest. 4. Therefore, since now too by magistrates of the Roman people, in the custom of the ancestors, a mulct is pronounced either minimum or supreme, it is the practice to observe that sheep be named in the male gender; and thus M. Varro formulated these legitimate words, by which a minimum mulct would be declared: "For M. Terentius, since when summoned he neither answered nor has been excused, I declare upon him as a mulct one sheep"; and unless it were said in that gender, they denied the mulct to seem just.

V. Vocabulum autem ipsum multae idem M. Varro in uno vicesimo rerum humanarum non Latinum, sed Sabinum esse dicit, idque ad suam memoriam mansisse ait in lingua Samnitium, qui sunt a Sabinis orti. Sed turba grammaticorum novicia kata antiphrasin ut quaedam alia, hoc quoque dici tradiderunt. VI. Cum autem usus et mos sermonum is sit, ut ita et nunc loquamur, ut plerique veterum locuti sunt: "multam dixit" et "multa dicta est", non esse ab re putavi notare, quod M. Cato aliter dixit.

5. But the very vocable “mulct,” M. Varro likewise in the twenty-first of Human Affairs says is not Latin but Sabine, and he says that it had remained down to his own memory in the tongue of the Samnites, who are sprung from the Sabines. But a newfangled crowd of grammarians have handed down that this too is said kata antiphrasin, as certain other things. 6. And since the usage and custom of speech is such that we also now speak as most of the ancients spoke: "multam dixit" and "multa dicta est," I thought it not out of place to note that M. Cato said it otherwise.

Nam in quarto originum verba haec sunt: "Imperator noster, si quis extra ordinem depugnatum ivit, ei multam facit". VII. Potest autem videri consulta elegantia mutasse verbum, cum in castris et in exercitu multa fieret, non in comitio, nec ad populum diceretur.

For in the fourth of the Origins the words are these: "Our imperator, if anyone has gone to fight out of order, he imposes a multa upon him." 7. However, it can seem that, with a considered elegance, he changed the verb, since in the camp and in the army a multa was being made, not in the Comitium, nor was it being said before the people.

II. Quod "elegantia" apud antiquiores non de amoeniore ingenio, sed de nitidiore cultu atque victu dicebatur, eaque in vitio ponebatur.I. "Elegans" homo non dicebatur cum laude, set id fere verbum ad aetatem M. Catonis vitii non laudis fuit. II. Est namque hoc animadvertere cum in quibusdam aliis tum in libro Catonis, qui inscriptus est carmen de moribus. Ex quo libro verba haec sunt: "Avaritiam omnia vitia habere putabant: sumptuosus, cupidus, elegans, vitiosus, inritus qui habebatur, is laudabatur"; III.

2. That “elegance” among the more ancient was said not of a more pleasant disposition, but of a more polished dress and way of living, and it was placed among the vices.1. An “elegant” man was not so called with praise, but that word, in the time of M. Cato, was of fault, not of praise. 2. For this is to be noticed both in certain other places and in the book of Cato, which is entitled carmen de moribus. From which book these words are: “They thought avarice to have all the vices: sumptuous, covetous, elegant, vicious, ineffectual—he who was held such, that one was praised”; 3.

ex quibus verbis apparet "elegantem" dictum antiquitus non ab ingenii elegantia, sed qui nimis lecto amoenoque cultu victuque esset. IV. Postea "elegans" reprehendi quidem desiit, sed laude nulla dignabatur, nisi cuius elegantia erat moderatissima. Sic M. Tullius L. Crasso et Q. Scaevolae non meram elegantiam, sed multa parsimonia mixtam laudi dedit: "Crassus" inquit "erat parcissimus elegantium, Scaevola parcorum elegantissimus". V. Praeterea ex eodem libro Catonis haec etiam sparsim et intercise commeminimus: "Vestiri" inquit "in foro honeste mos erat, domi quod satis erat.

from which words it appears that "elegant" was said of old not from elegance of genius, but of one who was with too select and agreeable dress and manner of living. 4. Afterwards "elegant" indeed ceased to be reprehended, but was deemed worthy of no praise, unless whose elegance was most moderate. Thus M. Tullius gave to L. Crassus and Q. Scaevola for praise not mere elegance, but elegance mixed with much parsimony: "Crassus," he says, "was the most sparing of the elegant, Scaevola the most elegant of the sparing." 5. Moreover, from that same book of Cato we have also recalled these things, scattered and in broken fashion: "To be clothed in the forum honorably was the custom; at home, what was enough."

Equos carius quam coquos emebant. Poeticae artis honos non erat. Si quis in ea re studebat aut sese ad convivia adplicabat, "crassator" vocabatur". VI. Illa quoque ex eodem libro praeclarae veritatis sententia est: "Nam vita" inquit "humana prope uti ferrum est.

They used to buy horses at a higher price than cooks. There was no honor for the poetic art. If anyone studied in that matter or attached himself to banquets, he was called a "crassator". 6. That also from the same book is a maxim of illustrious truth: "For," he says, "human life is almost like iron.

Si exerceas, conteritur; si non exerceas, tamen robigo interficit. Item homines exercendo videmus conteri; si nihil exerceas, inertia atque torpedo plus detrimenti facit quam exercitio".

If you exercise it, it is worn down; if you do not exercise it, nevertheless rust kills it. Likewise we see men being worn down by exercising; if you exercise nothing, inertia and torpor cause more detriment than exercise".

III. Qualis quantaque sit "pro" particulae varietas; deque exemplis cius varietatis.I. Quando ab arbitriis negotiisque otium est et motandi corporis gratia aut spatiamur aut vectamur, quaerere nonnumquam aput memet ipsum soleo res eiusmodi parvas quidem minutasque et hominibus non bene eruditis aspernabiles, sed ad veterum scripta penitus noscenda et ad scientiam linguae Latinae cumprimis necessarias: velut est, quod forte nuper in Praenestino recessu vespertina ambulatione solus ambulans considerabam, qualis quantaque esset particularum quarundam in oratione Latina varietas. Quod genus est praepositio "pro". II. Aliter enim dici videbam "pontifices pro conlegio decrevisse", aliter "quempiam testem introductum pro testimonio dixisse", aliter M. Catonem in originum quarto: "proelium factum depugnatumque pro castris" scripsisse et item in quinto: "urbes insulasque omnis pro agro Illyrio esse", aliter etiam dici "pro aede Castoris", aliter "pro rostris", aliter "pro tribunali", aliter "pro contione" atque aliter "tribunum plebis pro potestate intercessisse". III. Sed has omnes dictiones qui aut omnino similes et pares aut usquequaque diversas existimaret, errare arbitrabar; nam varietatem istam eiusdem quidem fontis et capitis, non eiusdem tamen esse finis putabam.

3. Of what sort and how great the variety of the particle "pro" is; and on examples of its variety.1. When there is leisure from arbitrations and businesses, and for the sake of moving the body we either stroll or are carried, I am accustomed sometimes to inquire with myself matters of such a kind, indeed small and minute and, by men not well educated, disdainable, yet most necessary for thoroughly coming to know the writings of the ancients and for the science of the Latin tongue: such as this, which by chance recently, in a Praenestine retreat, walking alone on an evening walk, I was considering—of what sort and how great was the variety of certain particles in Latin discourse. Of which kind is the preposition "pro". 2. For I saw it said otherwise in different ways: "that the pontiffs decreed pro collegio" (in their capacity as the college), otherwise "that a certain witness, when introduced, spoke pro testimonio" (by way of testimony), otherwise that M. Cato in the fourth of the Origins wrote: "a battle was fought and fought out pro castris" (before the camp), and likewise in the fifth: "that all the cities and islands are pro agro Illyrio" (as Illyrian territory); otherwise also it is said "pro aede Castoris" (in front of the temple of Castor), otherwise "pro rostris" (before the rostra), otherwise "pro tribunali" (before the tribunal), otherwise "pro contione" (before the public assembly), and otherwise "that a tribune of the plebs interposed pro potestate" (by virtue of his power). 3. But whoever should reckon all these expressions either altogether similar and equal or everywhere diverse, I thought was in error; for I judged that variety to be of the same fount and head, yet not to be of the same end.

IV. Quod profecto facile intelleget, si quis adhibeat ad meditationem suam intentionem et habeat veteris orationis usum atque notitiam celebriorem.

4. This he will surely easily understand, if anyone apply attention to his own meditation and possess a more common use and knowledge of ancient speech.

IV. Quem in modum Q. Ennius versus Euripidi aemulatus sit.I. Euripidis versus sunt in Hecuba verbis, sententia, brevitate insignes inlustresque; II. Hecuba est ad Vlixen dicens:

4. How Q. Ennius emulated Euripides’ verses.I. Euripides’ verses in the Hecuba are distinguished and illustrious in words, in thought, and in brevity; II. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses:

τὸ δ' ἀξίωμα, κἄν κακῶς λέγηι, τὸ σὸν
νικᾶι· λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τ' ἀδοξούντων ἰὼν
κἀκ τῶν δοκούντων αὑτὸς οὐ ταὐτὸν σθένει.

But your prestige, even if he speaks badly, wins;
for a logos, going from those of no repute and from those of repute,
does not itself have the same strength.

III. Hos versus Q. Ennius, cum eam tragoediam verteret, non sane incommode aemulatus est. Versus totidem Enniani hi sunt:

3. These verses Quintus Ennius, when he was translating that tragedy, emulated not, to be sure, inappropriately. The Ennian verses, the same in number, are these:

haec tu etsi perverse dices, facile Achivos flexeris;
nam opulenti cum locuntur pariter atque ignobiles,
eadem dicta eademque oratio aequa non aeque valet.

these things, even if you speak perversely, you will easily sway the Achaeans;
for when the opulent speak equally as the ignoble,
the same sayings and the same oration, though equitable, do not prevail equally.

IV. Bene, sicuti dixi, Ennius; sed "ignobiles" tamen et "opulenti" anti adoxounton kai dokounton satisfacere sententiae non videntur; nam neque omnes ignobiles adoxousi neque omnes opulenti eudoxousin.

4. Well, just as I said, Ennius; but "ignobiles" nevertheless and "opulenti" do not seem to satisfy the sentiment in place of "the disreputable and the reputable"; for not all ignoble are disreputable, nor are all opulent of good repute.

V. De Pyrrhonis philosophis quaedam deque Academicis strictim notata; deque inter eos differentia.I. Quos Pyrrhonios philosophos vocamus, hi Graeco cognomento skeptikoi appellantur; II. id ferme significat quasi "quaesitores" et "consideratores". III. Nihil enim decernunt, nihil constituunt, sed in quaerendo semper considerandoque sunt, quidnam sit omnium rerum, de quo decerni constituique possit. IV. Ac ne videre quoque plane quicquam neque audire sese putant, sed ita pati adficique, quasi videant vel audiant, eaque ipsa, quae adfectiones istas in sese efficiant, qualia et cuiusmodi sint, cunctantur atque insistunt, omniumque rerum fidem veritatemque mixtis confusisque signis veri atque falsi ita inprensibilem videri aiunt, ut, quisquis homo est non praeceps neque iudicii sui prodigus, his uti verbis debeat, quibus auctorem philosophiae istius Pyrrhonem esse usum tradunt: ou mallon houtos echei tode ekeinos e outheteros.

5. Some things on the philosophers of Pyrrho and briefly noted on the Academics; and on the difference between them.1. Those whom we call Pyrrhonian philosophers are called in Greek by the cognomen skeptikoi; 2. that nearly signifies, as it were, “inquirers” and “considerers.” 3. For they determine nothing, they establish nothing, but are always inquiring and considering what, of all things, there may be about which a determination and establishment could be made. 4. And they think that they do not even plainly see anything nor hear anything, but that they are affected and undergo things in such a way as if they see or hear; and about the very things which produce those affections in themselves—of what sort and of what kind they are—they hesitate and stand fast; and they say that the trustworthiness and truth of all things, with the signs of the true and the false mingled and confused, seem so inapprehensible that whoever is a man not headlong nor prodigal of his own judgment ought to use those words which they hand down that Pyrrho, the author of that philosophy, used: ou mallon houtos echei tode ekeinos e outheteros.

Indicia enim rei cuiusque et sinceras proprietates negant posse nosci et percipi, idque ipsum docere atque ostendere multis modis conantur. V. Super qua re Favorinus quoque subtilissime argutissimeque decem libros composuit, quos Pyrrhoneion tropon inscribit. VI. Vetus autem quaestio et a multis scriptoribus Graecis tractata, an quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et Academicos philosophos intersit.

For they deny that the indicia of each thing and its sincere properties can be known and perceived, and they try to teach and to demonstrate that very point in many ways. 5. On which matter Favorinus also composed ten books, most subtly and most keenly, which he entitles the Pyrrhonian Mode. 6. Moreover, there is an old question, treated by many Greek writers, whether, and to what extent, there is a difference between the Pyrrhonian and the Academic philosophers.

Vtrique enim skeptikoi, ephektikoi, aporetikoi dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil adfirmant nihilque comprehendi putant. Sed ex omnibus rebus proinde visa fieri dicunt, quas phantasias appellant, non ut rerum ipsarum natura est, sed ut adfectio animi corporisve est eorum, ad quos ea visa perveniunt. VII.

For both parties are called skeptikoi, ephektikoi, aporetikoi, since both affirm nothing and think that nothing is comprehended. But they say that from all things appearances arise, which they call phantasies, not as the nature of the things themselves is, but as the affection of mind or body is in those to whom those appearances come. 7.

Itaque omnes omnino res, quae sensus hominum movent, ton pros ti esse dicunt. Id verbum significat nihil esse quicquam, quod ex sese constet, nec quod habeat vim propriam et naturam, sed omnia prorsum ad aliquid referri taliaque videri esse, qualis sit eorum species, dum videntur, qualiaque apud sensus nostros, quo pervenerunt, creantur, non apud sese, unde profecta sunt. VIII.

Accordingly, they say that absolutely all things whatsoever that move the senses of humans are “relative to something.” That term signifies that there is nothing which consists from itself, nor which has its own proper power and nature, but that all things without exception are referred straightway to something else and seem to be such as the appearance of them is, while they are seen, and such as are generated among our senses, to which they have come, not in themselves, whence they set out. 8.

Cum haec autem consimiliter tam Pyrrhonii dicant quam Academici, differre tamen inter sese et propter alia quaedam et vel maxime propterea existimati sunt, quod Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi quasi comprehendunt et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt, Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto verum videri dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.

Although the Pyrrhonians and the Academics alike say these things consimilarly, yet they have been thought to differ from each other both for certain other reasons and most of all for this: that the Academics, as it were, comprehend this very point—that nothing can be comprehended—and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided; whereas the Pyrrhonians say that not even this seems true in any way, namely, that it seems true that nothing is true.

VI. Quod mulieres Romae per Herculem non iuraverint neque viri per Castorem.I. In veteribus scriptis neque mulieres Romanae per Herculem deiurant neque viri per Castorem. II. Sed cur illae non iuraverint Herculem, non obscurum est, nam Herculaneo sacrificio abstinent. III.

6. That women at Rome have not sworn by Hercules nor men by Castor.1. In ancient writings neither do Roman women swear by Hercules nor men by Castor. 2. But why they have not sworn by Hercules is not obscure, for they abstain from the Herculean sacrifice. 3.

Cur autem viri Castorem iurantes non appellaverint, non facile dictu est. Nusquam igitur scriptum invenire est apud idoneos quidem scriptores aut "mehercle" feminam dicere aut "mecastor" virum; IV. "edepol" autem, quod iusiurandum per Pollucem est, et viro et feminae commune est. V. Sed M. Varro adseverat antiquissimos viros neque per Castorem neque per Pollucem deiurare solitos, sed id iusiurandum fuisse tantum feminarum ex initiis Eleusinis acceptum; VI. paulatim tamen inscitia antiquitatis viros dicere "edepol" coepisse factumque esse ita dicendi morem, sed "mecastor" a viro dici in nullo vetere scripto inveniri.

But why men, when swearing, did not call upon Castor is not easy to say. Nowhere, therefore, is it to be found written among reputable writers either that a woman says "mehercle" or that a man says "mecastor"; 4. "edepol," however, which is an oath by Pollux, is common to both man and woman. 5. But M. Varro asserts that the most ancient men were not wont to swear either by Castor or by Pollux, but that that oath was solely of women, received from the Eleusinian initiations; 6. gradually, however, through ignorance of antiquity, men began to say "edepol," and thus a custom of speaking so was established, but "mecastor" said by a man is found in no old writing.

VII. Verbis antiquissimis relictisque iam et desitis minime utendum.I. Verbis uti aut nimis obsoletis exculcatisque aut insolentibus novitatisque durae et inlepidae par esse delictum videtur. Sed molestius equidem culpatiusque esse arbitror verba nova, incognita, inaudita dicere quam involgata et sordentia. II. Nova autem videri dico etiam ea, quae sunt inusitata et desita, tametsi sunt vetusta.

7. Words most antique, now left behind and discontinued, are by no means to be used.1. To use words either too obsolete and trampled-out, or insolent and of a harsh and uncharming novelty, seems an equal fault. But I for my part judge it more annoying and more blameworthy to speak new words, unknown, unheard-of, than those common and sordid. 2. But I say that even those are seen as new which are unusual and abandoned, although they are very old.

III. Est adeo id vitium plerumque serae eruditionis, quam Graeci opsimathian appellant, ut, quod numquam didiceris, diu ignoraveris, cum id scire aliquando coeperis, magni facias quo in loco cumque et quacumque in re dicere. Veluti Romae nobis praesentibus vetus celebratusque homo in causis, sed repentina et quasi tumultuaria doctrina praeditus, cum apud praefectum urbi verba faceret et dicere vellet inopi quendam miseroque victu vivere et furfureum panem esitare vinumque eructum et fetidum potare, "hic" inquit "eques Romanus apludam edit et flocces bibit". IV. Aspexerunt omnes, qui aderant, alius alium, primo tristiores turbato et requirente voltu, quidnam illud utriusque verbi foret; post deinde, quasi nescio quid Tusce aut Gallice dixisset, universi riserunt.

3. So much, for the most part, is that a vice of belated erudition, which the Greeks call opsimathy, that what you have never learned, and have long been ignorant of—when you at length begin to know it—you set great store by saying it wherever and in whatever matter. For example, at Rome, with us present, an old and celebrated man in the courts, but endowed with sudden and, as it were, tumultuary learning, when he was speaking before the prefect of the city and wished to say that a certain man in want lived on wretched fare and nibbled bran-bread and drank belched-out and fetid wine, “this,” said he, “Roman knight eats apluda and drinks flocces.” 4. All who were present looked at one another, at first the grimmer, with face disturbed and inquiring what in the world the meaning of each word might be; then afterward, as though he had said I know not what in Tuscan or Gallic, they all laughed.

V. Legerat autem ille "apludam" veteres rusticos frumenti furfurem dixisse idque a Plauto in comoedia, si ea Plauti est, quae Astraba inscripta est, positum esse. VI. Item "flocces" audierat prisca voce significare vini faecem e vinaceis expressam, sicuti fraces oleis, idque aput Caecilium in Poltimenis legerat, eaque sibi duo verba ad orationum ornamenta servaverat. VII.

5. He had read, moreover, that the old rustics called the bran of grain “apluda,” and that it is set down by Plautus in a comedy—if that is Plautus’s—which is entitled Astraba. 6. Likewise he had heard that “flocces,” in an ancient word, signifies the lees of wine pressed out from the grape-marc, just as fraces with olives, and he had read that at Caecilius, in the Poltimenes; and he had kept those two words in reserve for ornaments of speeches. 7.

Alter quoque a lectionibus id genus paucis apirocalus, cum adversarius causam differri postularet: "rogo, praetor," inquit "subveni, succurre! quonam usque nos bovinator hic demoratur?" atque id voce magna ter quaterve inclamavit: "bovinator est". VIII. Commurmuratio fieri coepta est a plerisque, qui aderant, quasi monstrum verbi admirantibus.

Another, too, with a scant few readings of that kind, an apirocalus, when his adversary was requesting that the case be deferred, said: “I beg you, praetor, come to my aid, come to the rescue! How long, pray, does this bovinator keep delaying us?” and he shouted that in a great voice three or four times: “He is a bovinator.” 8. A murmuring began to arise from most who were present, marveling at the word as at a monster.

IX. At ille iactans et gestiens: "non enim Lucilium" inquit "legistis, qui tergiversatorem "bovinatorem" dicit?" Est autem in Lucili XI. versus hic: si tricosus bovinatorque ore improbus duro.

9. But he, vaunting and exulting: "for you have not read Lucilius, who calls a tergiversator a 'bovinator'?" And there is in Lucilius 11 this verse: if a quibbler and 'bovinator,' brazen with a hard mouth.

VIII.Quid senserit dixeritque M. Cato de Albino, qui homo Romanus Graeca oratione res Romanas venia sibi ante eius imperitiae petita composuit.I. Iuste venusteque admodum reprehendisse dicitur Aulum Albinum M. Cato. II. Albinus, qui cum L. Lucullo consul fuit, res Romanas oratione Graeca scriptitavit.

8.What Marcus Cato thought and said about Albinus, who, a Roman man, composed Roman affairs in the Greek tongue, having first sought pardon for his lack of skill in it for himself.1. Marcus Cato is said to have very justly and very wittily reproved Aulus Albinus. 2. Albinus, who was consul with Lucius Lucullus, kept writing Roman affairs in Greek.

III. In eius historiae principio scriptum est ad hanc sententiam: neminem suscensere sibi convenire, si quid in his libris parum composite aut minus eleganter scriptum foret; "nam sum" inquit "homo Romanus natus in Latio, Graeca oratio a nobis alienissima est", ideoque veniam gratiamque malae existimationis, si quid esset erratum, postulavit. IV. Ea cum legisset M. Cato: "Ne tu," inquit "Aule, nimium nugator es, cum maluisti culpam deprecari, quam culpa vacare.

3. At the beginning of his history it is written to this effect: that it is fitting that no one take offense at him, if anything in these books had been written somewhat without due composition or less elegantly; "for I am," he says, "a Roman man born in Latium, Greek speech is most alien to us," and therefore he requested pardon and favor for a bad estimation, if anything had erred. 4. When M. Cato had read these things: "Indeed you," he says, "Aulus, are too much a trifler, since you preferred to deprecate blame rather than to be free from blame."

Nam petere veniam solemus, aut cum inprudentes erravimus aut cum compulsi peccavimus. Tibi," inquit "oro te, quis perpulit, ut id committeres, quod, Priusquam faceres, peteres, ut ignosceretur?" V. Scriptum hoc est in libro Corneli Nepotis de inlustribus viris XIII.

For we are accustomed to seek pardon either when we have erred unwittingly or when we have sinned under compulsion. For you," he said, "I beg you, who drove you to commit that which, before you did it, you asked to be forgiven?" 5. This is written in book 13 of Cornelius Nepos’s On Illustrious Men.

IX. Historia de legatis Mileti ac Demosthene rhetore in libris Critolai reperta.I. Critolaus scripsit legatos Mileto publicae rei causa venisse Athenas, fortasse an dixerit auxilii petendi gratia. Tum qui pro sese verba facerent, quos visum erat advocavisse, advocatos, uti erat mandatum, verba pro Milesiis ad populum fecisse, Demosthenen Milesiorum postulatis acriter respondisse, neque Milesios auxilio dignos neque ex republica id esse contendisse. Rem in posterum diem prolatam.

9. A history concerning the legates of Miletus and Demosthenes the rhetor, found in the books of Critolaus.1. Critolaus wrote that legates had come to Athens from Miletus for the sake of public business—perhaps, one might say, for the sake of seeking aid. Then those who were to speak on their behalf, whom it had seemed good to call in, having been called in, as had been mandated, made a speech to the people on behalf of the Milesians; Demosthenes replied sharply to the demands of the Milesians, and contended that neither were the Milesians worthy of aid nor was that in the interest of the commonwealth. The matter was put off to the following day.

Legatos ad Demosthenen venisse magnoque opere orasse, uti contra ne diceret; eum pecuniam petivisse et, quantam petiverat, abstulisse. Postridie cum res agi denuo coepta esset, Demosthenen lana multa collum cervicesque circumvolutum ad populum prodisse et dixisse se synanchen pati; eo contra Milesios loqui non quire. Tum e populo unum exclamasse non synanchen, quod Demosthenes pateretur, sed argyranchen esse.

The envoys had come to Demosthenes and had earnestly begged that he not speak against them; he had asked for money and had carried off as much as he had asked. On the next day, when the matter had begun to be conducted anew, Demosthenes, with much wool wrapped around his neck and nape, came forward before the people and said that he was suffering synanche, and for that reason was unable to speak against the Milesians. Then one from the crowd shouted that it was not synanche that Demosthenes was suffering, but argyranche (“silver-anguish”).

II. Ipse etiam Demosthenes, ut idem Critolaus refert, non id postea concelavit, quin gloriae quoque hoc sibi adsignavit. Nam cum interrogasset Aristodemum, actorem fabularum, quantum mercedis, uti ageret, accepisset, et Aristodemus "talentum" respondisset: "at ego plus" inquit "accepi, ut tacerem".

2. Demosthenes himself also, as the same Critolaus reports, did not conceal that afterwards; indeed he even assigned this to his own glory. For when he had asked Aristodemus, an actor of plays, how much pay he had received to act, and Aristodemus had answered "a talent," "but I received more," he said, "to keep silent."

X. Quod C. Gracchus in oratione sua historiam supra scriptam Demadi rhetori, non Demostheni, adtribuit; verbaque ipsius C. Gracchi relata.I. Quod in capite superiore a Critolao scriptum esse diximus super Demosthene, id C. Gracchus in oratione, qua legent Aufeiam dissuasit, in Demaden contulit verbis hisce: II. "Nam vos, Quirites, si velitis sapientia atque virtute uti, etsi quaeritis, neminem nostrum invenietis sine pretio huc prodire. Omnes nos, qui verba facimus, aliquid petimus, neque ullius rei causa quisquam ad vos prodit, nisi ut aliquid auferat. III.

10. That Gaius Gracchus, in his speech, attributed the above-written story to the rhetorician Demades, not to Demosthenes; and the words of Gaius Gracchus himself reported.1. What in the preceding chapter we said was written by Critolaus about Demosthenes, that Gaius Gracchus, in the speech in which he dissuaded the Aufeian law from being passed, transferred onto Demades with these words: 2. "For you, Quirites, if you should be willing to make use of wisdom and virtue, even if you search, you will find none of us coming forward here without a price. All of us who make speeches ask for something, nor does anyone come before you for the sake of any matter, unless it is that he may carry something off. 3.

Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio, uti vectigalia vestra augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rempublicam administrare possitis, non gratis prodeo; verum peto a vobis non pecuniam, sed bonam existimationem atque honorem. IV. Qui prodeunt dissuasuri, ne hanc legem accipiatis, petunt non honorem a vobis, verum a Nicomede pecuniam; qui suadent, ut accipiatis, hi quoque petunt non a vobis bonam existimationem, verum a Mithridate rei familiari suae pretium et praemium; qui autem ex eodem loco atque ordine tacent, hi vel acerrimi sunt; nam ab omnibus pretium accipiunt et omnis fallunt. V. Vos, cum putatis eos ab his rebus remotos esse, inpertitis bonam existimationem; VI. legationes autem a regibus, cum putant eos sua causa reticere, sumptus atque pecunias maximas praebent, item uti in terra Graecia, quo in tempore tragoedus gloriae sibi ducebat talentum magnum ob unam fabulam datum esse, homo eloquentissimus civitatis suae Demades ei respondisse dicitur: "Mirum tibi videtur, si tu loquendo talentum quaesisti?

I myself, who am speaking among you, in order that you may increase your revenues, so that you may more easily administer your interests and the commonwealth, do not come forward gratis; rather I ask from you not money, but good estimation and honor. 4. Those who come forth to dissuade you from accepting this law seek not honor from you, but money from Nicomedes; those who advise you to accept it likewise seek not from you good estimation, but from Mithridates the price and the premium for their household estate; but those who from the same place and order keep silent, these are even the keenest; for they accept a price from all and deceive all. 5. You, when you think them removed from these matters, impart good estimation; 6. but embassies from kings, since they think they keep silent on their account, supply the greatest expenses and moneys, just as in the land of Greece, at which time, when a tragedian was reckoning it to his glory that a great talent had been given him for one play, Demades, the most eloquent man of his city, is said to have answered him: "Does it seem a wonder to you, if you by speaking have earned a talent?"

ego, ut tacerem, decem talenta a rege accepi". Item nunc isti pretia maxima ob tacendum accipiunt".

"I, in order to be silent, received ten talents from the king." Likewise now those men receive very great prices for keeping silent."

XI. Verba P. Nigidii, quibus differre dicit "mentiri" et "mendacium dicere".I. Verba sunt ipsa haec P. Nigidii, hominis in studiis bonarum artium praecellentis, quem M. Cicero ingenii doctrinarumque nomine summe reveritus est: "Inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. Qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur". II. Item hoc addidit: "Qui mentitur," inquit "fallit, quantum in se est; at qui mendacium dicit, ipse non fallit, quantum in se est". III. Item hoc quoque super eadem re dicit: "Vir bonus" inquit "praestare debet, ne mentiatur, prudens, ne mendacium dicat; alterum incidit in hominem, alterum non". IV. Varie me hercule et lepide Nigidius tot sententias in eandem rem, quasi aliud atque aliud diceret, disparavit.

11. The words of P. Nigidius, in which he says that "mentiri" and "mendacium dicere" differ.1. The very words are these of P. Nigidius, a man excelling in the studies of the good arts, whom M. Cicero highly revered for his genius and learning: "There is a difference between saying a mendacium and lying. He who lies is not himself deceived; he tries to deceive another; he who says a mendacium is himself deceived." 2. Likewise he added this: "He who lies," he says, "deceives, as far as it is in himself; but he who says a mendacium does not himself deceive, as far as it is in himself." 3. Likewise he also says this on the same matter: "A good man," he says, "ought to see to it that he does not lie; a prudent man, that he does not say a mendacium; the one befalls a man, the other does not." 4. Various, by Hercules, and wittily, did Nigidius disperse so many sentences on the same matter, as if he were saying now one thing, now another.

XII. Quod Chrysippus philosophus omne verbum ambiguum dubiumque esse dicit, Diodorus contra nullum verbum ambiguum esse putat.I. Chrysippus ait omne verbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo vel plura accipi possunt. II. Diodorus autem, cui Crono cognomentum fuit: "nullum" inquit "verbum est ambiguum, nec quisquam ambiguum dicit aut sentit, nec aliud dici videri debet, quam quod se dicere sentit is, qui dicit. III.

12. That the philosopher Chrysippus says every word is ambiguous and dubious, Diodorus on the contrary thinks no word is ambiguous.1. Chrysippus says that every word is by nature ambiguous, since from the same [word] two or more [meanings] can be received. 2. Diodorus, however, whose cognomen was Cronus: "no" says he "word is ambiguous, nor does anyone say or perceive anything ambiguous, nor ought anything to seem to be said other than what he who speaks perceives himself to be saying. 3.

At cum ego" inquit "aliud sensi, tu aliud accepisti, obscure magis dictum videri potest quam ambigue; ambigui enim verbi natura illa esse debuit, ut, qui id diceret, duo vel plura diceret. Nemo autem duo vel plura dicit, qui se sensit unum dicere".

But when I," he says, "I felt one thing, you received another, it can seem to have been said more obscurely rather than ambiguously; for the nature of an ambiguous word ought to have been this: that he who said it would be saying two or more things. But no one says two or more things, who was conscious that he was saying one."

XIII. Quid Titus Castricius de verbis deque sententia quadam C. Gracchi existimarit; quodque esse eam sine ullo sensus emolumento docuerit.I. Apud Titum Castricium, disciplinae rhetoricae doctorem, gravi atque firmo iudicio virum, legebatur oratio C. Gracchi in P. Popilium. II. In eius orationis principio conlocata verba sunt accuratius modulatiusque quam veterum oratorum consuetudo fert. III.

13. What Titus Castricius thought about the words and about a certain sentence of C. Gracchus; and that he showed it to be without any emolument of sense.1. At Titus Castricius’s, a teacher of the rhetorical discipline, a man of grave and firm judgment, a speech of C. Gracchus against P. Popilius was being read. 2. At the beginning of that speech the words are arranged more accurately and more modulated than the custom of the ancient orators warrants. 3.

Ea verba sicuti dixi conposita haec sunt: "Quae vos cupide per hosce annos adpetistis atque volvistis, ea, si temere repudiaritis, abesse non potest, quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini". IV. Cursus igitur hic et sonus rotundae volubilisque sententiae eximie nos et unice delectabat, tanto id magis, quod iam tunc C. Graccho, viro inlustri et severo, eiusmodi compositionem fuisse cordi videbamus. V. Sed enim, cum eadem ipsa verba saepius petentibus nobis lectitarentur, admoniti a Castricio sumus, ut consideraremus, quae vis quodve emolumentum eius sententiae foret, neque pateremur, ut aures nostrae cadentis apte orationis modis eblanditae animum quoque nobis voluptate inani perfunderent. Cumque nos admonitione ista adtentiores fecisset: "inspicite" inquit "penitus, quid efficiant verba haec, dicatque mihi, quaeso, aliqui vestrum, an sit ulla huiusce sententiae gravitas aut gratia: "Quae vos cupide per hosce annos adpetistis atque volvistis, ea, si temere repudiaritis, abesse non potest, quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini". VI. Cui enim omnium hominum in mentem non venit id profecto usu venire, ut, quod cupide adpetieris, cupide adpetisse et, quod temere repudiaveris, temere repudiasse dicaris?

Those words, composed just as I have said, are these: “The things which you have eagerly sought and revolved through these years, if you shall rashly repudiate them, it cannot be but that you will be said either once to have eagerly sought or now to have rashly repudiated.” 4. Therefore this course and sound of a rounded and rolling period delighted us exceedingly and uniquely, all the more because even then we saw that such composition was dear to the heart of Gaius Gracchus, an illustrious and severe man. 5. But indeed, when those very words were read and reread to us as we kept requesting them, we were admonished by Castricius to consider what force or what emolument of sense that sentence might have, and not to allow our ears, flattered by the cadences of aptly falling speech, to flood our mind as well with empty pleasure. And when that admonition had made us more attentive, “Look,” he says, “deeply into what these words effect, and let someone of you, I beg, tell me whether there is any gravity or grace in this sentence: ‘The things which you have eagerly sought and revolved through these years, if you shall rashly repudiate them, it cannot be but that you will be said either once to have eagerly sought or now to have rashly repudiated.’” 6. For to whom of all men does it not come into mind that it indeed comes to pass in practice, that what you have eagerly sought you are said to have eagerly sought, and what you have rashly repudiated you are said to have rashly repudiated?

VII. At si, opinor," inquit "ita scriptum esset: "Quae vos per hosce annos adpetistis atque volvistis, ea nunc si repudiaritis, abesse non potest, quin aut olim cupide adpetisse aut nunc temere repudiasse dicamini", VIII. si ita" inquit "diceretur, gravior scilicet solidiorque fieret sententia et acciperet aliquid iustae in audiendo expectationis; IX. nunc autem verba haec "cupide" et "temere", in quibus verbis omne momentum rei est, non in concludenda sententia tantum dicuntur, sed supra quoque nondum desiderata ponuntur, et quae nasci oririque ex ipsa rei conceptione debebant, ante omnino, quam res postulat, dicuntur.

7. But if, I suppose," he says "it had been written thus: "The things which you through these years have sought after and revolved, if now you repudiate them, it cannot fail but that you be said either formerly to have eagerly sought or now to have rashly repudiated", 8. if thus," he says "it were said, the sentence would of course become graver and more solid and would receive something of just expectation in hearing; 9. but now these words "eagerly" and "rashly", in which words is the whole moment of the matter, are said not only in the concluding of the sentence, but are also set above where they are not yet desired, and the things which ought to be born and to arise from the very conception of the matter are said altogether before the matter demands it.

Nam qui ita dicit: "si hoc feceris, cupide fecisse diceris", rem dicit sensus alicuius ratione conlectam et consertam; qui vero ita dicit: "si cupide feceris, cupide fecisse diceris", non longe secus dicit, atque si diceret: "si cupide feceris, cupide feceris". X. Haec ego" inquit "admonui, non ut C. Graccho vitio darem - dii enim mentem meliorem mihi! nam, si quicquam in tam fortis facundiae viro vitii vel erroris esse dici potest, id omne et auctoritas eius exhausit et vetustas consumpsit -, sed uti caveretis, ne vos facile praestringeret modulatus aliqui currentis facundiae sonitus atque ut vim ipsam rerum virtutemque verborum prius pensitaretis et, si quidem gravis atque integra et sincera sententia diceretur, tum, si ita videretur, gressibus quoque ipsis orationis et gestibus plauderetis, si vero frigidi et leves et futtiles sensus in verba apte numeroseque posita includerentur, non esse id secus crederetis, quam cum homines insigni deformitate ac facie deridicula imitantur histriones et gestiunt".

For he who speaks thus: "if you do this, you will be said to have done it eagerly," says a matter collected and connected by the reason of a certain sense; but he who speaks thus: "if you do it eagerly, you will be said to have done it eagerly," says not far otherwise than if he were to say: "if you do it eagerly, you do it eagerly." 10. "These things," he said, "I have admonished, not that I might impute a fault to Gaius Gracchus—may the gods grant me a better mind! for, if anything of fault or error can be said to exist in so strong a man of eloquence, all of that both his authority has drained and antiquity has consumed—but that you might beware lest some modulated sound of running eloquence easily bedazzle you, and that you first weigh the very force of the things and the virtue of the words; and if indeed a grave and integral and sincere sentence were being spoken, then, if it seemed so, you should applaud even the very steps of the speech and the gestures; but if chilly and light and futile senses were being enclosed in words aptly and rhythmically set, you should not believe that to be otherwise than when actors imitate men of conspicuous deformity and a ridiculous face and caper."

XIV. Sobria et pulcherrima Romuli regis responsio circa vini usum.I. Simplicissima suavitate et rei et orationis L. Piso Frugi usus est in primo annali, cum de Romuli regis vita atque victu scriberet. II. Ea verba, quae scripsit, haec sunt: "Eundem Romulum dicunt ad cenam vocatum ibi non multum bibisse, quia postridie negotium haberet. Ei dicunt: "Romule, si istuc omnes homines faciant, vinum vilius sit". His respondit: "immo vero carum, si, quantum quisque volet, bibat; nam ego bibi quantum volui".

14. The sober and most beautiful response of King Romulus concerning the use of wine.1. With a most simple suavity both of matter and of oration L. Piso Frugi made use in the first annal, when he was writing about the life and victual of King Romulus. 2. These are the words which he wrote: "They say that that same Romulus, invited to dinner, did not drink much there, because on the next day he would have business. They say to him: 'Romulus, if all men should do that, wine would be cheaper.' To this he replied: 'Nay rather costlier, if each drinks as much as he wishes; for I drank as much as I wished.'"

XV. De "ludibundo" et "errabundo" atque id genus verborum productionibus; et quod Laberius sic "amorabundam" dixit, ut dicitur "ludibunda" et "errabunda"; atque inibi, quod Sisenna per huiuscemodi verbum nova figura usus est.I. Laberius in Lacu Averno mulierem amantem verbo inusitatius ficto "amorabundam" dixit. II. Id verbum Caesellius Vindex in commentario lectionum antiquarum ea figura scriptum dixit, qua "ludibunda" et "ridibunda" et "errabunda" dicitur ludens et ridens et errans. III.

15. On the lengthenings of “ludibundus” and “errabundus” and words of that kind; and that Laberius thus said “amorabunda,” as “ludibunda” and “errabunda” are said; and therein, that Sisenna used by a word of this sort a new figure.1. Laberius in Lake Avernus called a loving woman, with a more unusual coined word, “amorabunda.” 2. Caesellius Vindex in a commentary of ancient readings said that word was written in that figure by which “ludibunda” and “ridibunda” and “errabunda” are said for one playing and laughing and wandering. 3.

Terentius autem Scaurus, divi Hadriani temporibus grammaticus vel nobilissimus, inter alia, quae de Caeselli erroribus conposuit, in hoc quoque verbo errasse eum scripsit, quod idem esse putaverit "ludens" et "ludibunda", "ridens" et "ridibunda", "errans" et "errabunda". "Nam "ludibunda" " inquit "et "ridibunda" et "errabunda" ea dicitur, quae ludentem vel ridentem vel errantem agit aut simulat". IV. Sed qua ratione Scaurus adductus sit, ut Caesellium in eo reprehenderet, non hercle reperiebamus. Non est enim dubium, quin haec genere ipso dumtaxat idem significent, quod ea demonstrant, a quibus producuntur. Quid esset autem ludentem agere vel imitari, non intellegere videri maluimus quam insimulare eum tamquam ipsum minus intellegentem.

Terentius Scaurus, a grammarian most noble in the times of the deified Hadrian, among other things which he composed on the errors of Caesellius, wrote that he had erred also in this word, for that he thought “ludens” and “ludibunda,” “ridens” and “ridibunda,” “errans” and “errabunda” to be the same. “For ‘ludibunda,’” says he, “and ‘ridibunda’ and ‘errabunda’ is said of that which acts or simulates one playing or laughing or wandering.” 4. But by what reasoning Scaurus was led to reprehend Caesellius in that point, by Hercules, we could not discover. For there is no doubt that these, by their very kind only, signify the same as those things which they are produced from point out. But what it would be to act or imitate one who is playing, we preferred to seem not to understand rather than to charge him as though he himself understood less.

V. Quin magis Scaurum oportuit commentaria Caeselli criminantem hoc ab eo praeteritum requirere, quod non dixerit, an quid et quantulum differret a "ludibundo" "ludens" et "ridibundo" "ridens" et "errabundo" "errans" ceteraque horum similia, an a principalibus verbis paulum aliquid distarent, et quam omnino vim haberet particula haec extrema eiusmodi vocabulis addita. VI. Hoc enim fuit potius requirendum in istiusmodi figurae tractatu, sicuti requiri solet in "vinulento" et "lutulento" et "turbulento", vacuane et inanis sit istaec productio, cuiusmodi sunt, quae paragogas Graeci dicunt, an extrema illa particula habeat aliquid suae propriae significationis. VII.

5. Nay rather, it behooved Scaurus, as he was incriminating the commentaries of Caesellius, to require from him this thing omitted: that he did not say whether, and by how small a degree, "ludens" differed from "ludibundo," "ridens" from "ridibundo," and "errans" from "errabundo," and the other things like these; whether they stood at least a little apart from the principal verbs, and what force altogether the final particle added to words of this kind might have. 6. For this was what ought rather to have been inquired in the treatment of a figure of this sort, just as it is wont to be inquired in "vinulento" and "lutulento" and "turbulento," whether this production is empty and void—of the kind which the Greeks call paragoges—or whether that final particle has something of its own proper signification. 7.

Cum reprehensionem autem illam Scauri notaremus, in memoriam nobis rediit, quod Sisenna in quarto historiarum eiusdem figurae verbo ita usus est. "Populabundus" inquit "agros ad oppidum pervenit", quod scilicet significat "cum agros popularetur", non, ut Scaurus in consimilibus verbis ait, "cum populantem ageret" vel "cum imitaretur". VIII. Sed inquirentibus nobis, quaenam ratio et origo esset huiuscemodi figurae "populabundus" et "errabundus" et "laetabundus" et "ludibundus" multorumque aliorum id genus verborum, evepibolos hercle Apollinaris noster videri sibi ait particulam istam postremam, in quam verba talia exeunt, vim et copiam et quasi abundantiam rei, cuius id verbum esset, demonstrare, ut "laetabundus" is dicatur, qui abunde laetus sit, et "errabundus", qui longo atque abundanti errore sit, ceteraque omnia ex ea figura ita dici ostendit, ut productio haec et extremitas largam et fluentem vim et copiam declararet.

While we were noting that censure of Scaurus, it came back to our memory that Sisenna in the fourth book of his Histories used a word of the same figure thus. “Populabundus,” he says, “agros ad oppidum pervenit,” which of course signifies “when he was ravaging the fields,” not, as Scaurus says in similar words, “when he acted as one ravaging” or “when he imitated.” 8. But as we were inquiring what the rationale and origin might be of this kind of figure—“populabundus” and “errabundus” and “laetabundus” and “ludibundus,” and many other words of that sort—our Apollinaris, an evepibolos, by Hercules, says it seems to him that that final particle, into which such words go out, demonstrates the force and supply and, as it were, the abundance of the thing of which that word is: so that “laetabundus” is said of one who is abundantly glad, and “errabundus” of one who is in a long and abundant wandering; and he shows that all the rest from that figure are to be said thus, in such a way that this prolongation and ending declare a bountiful and flowing force and plenty.

XVI. Quod Graecorum verborum quorundam difficillima est in Latinam linguam mutatio, velut quod Graece dicitur polypragmosyne.I. Adiecimus saepe animum ad vocabula rerum non paucissima, quae neque singulis verbis, ut a Graecis, neque, si maxime pluribus eas res verbis dicamus, tam dilucide tamque apte demonstrari Latina oratione possunt, quam Graeci ea dicunt privis vocibus. II. Nuper etiam cum adlatus esset ad nos Plutarchi liber et eius libri indicem legissemus, qui erat peri polypragmosynes, percontanti cuipiam, qui et litterarum et vocum Graecarum expers fuit, cuiusnam liber et qua de re scriptus esset, nomen quidem scriptoris statim diximus, rem, de qua scriptum fuit, dicturi haesimus. III.

16. That the change of certain Greek words into the Latin language is most difficult, as, for example, what in Greek is called polypragmosyne.1. We have often turned our mind to very many terms of things, which neither by single words, as by the Greeks, nor, even if we declare those things with more words, can be set forth in Latin speech so clearly and so aptly as the Greeks express them with their own proper single words. 2. Recently too, when a book of Plutarch had been brought to us and we had read the index of that book, which was peri polypragmosynes, to someone asking—who was devoid of Greek letters and words—whose book it was and on what matter it had been written, we immediately told the name of the writer, but when about to tell the subject about which it had been written, we hesitated. 3.

Ac tum quidem primo, quia non satis commode opinabar interpretaturum me esse, si dicerem librum scriptum "de negotiositate", aliud institui aput me exquirere, quod, ut dicitur, verbum de verbo expressum esset. IV. Nihil erat prorsus, quod aut meminissem legere me aut, si etiam vellem fingere, quod non insigniter asperum absurdumque esset, si ex multitudine et negotio verbum unum compingerem, sicuti "multiiuga" dicimus et "multicolora" et "multiformia". V. Sed non minus inlepide ita diceretur, quam si interpretari voce una velis polyphilian aut polytropian aut polysarkian. VI. Quamobrem, cum diutule tacitus in cogitando fuissem, respondi tandem non videri mihi significari eam rem posse uno nomine et idcirco iuncta oratione, quid ucliet Graecum id verbum, pararam dicere.

And then indeed at first, because I supposed I would not interpret quite commodiously if I said the book was written “on negotiosity,” I set myself to seek out something else which, as they say, would be expressed word-for-word. 4. There was absolutely nothing that either I remembered having read or, even if I wished to coin it, would not be notably rough and absurd, if from “multitude” and “business” I should hammer together a single word, just as we say “multi-yoked,” “multicolored,” and “multiform.” 5. But it would be said no less inelegantly thus, than if you should wish to translate with a single word polyphilian or polytropian or polysarkian. 6. Wherefore, after I had been for quite a while silently thinking, I answered at last that it did not seem to me that that thing could be signified by one name, and that therefore by a joined phrase I was prepared to say whatever that Greek word intends.

"Ad multas igitur res adgressio earumque omnium rerum actio polypragmosyne" inquam "Graece dicitur, de qua hunc librum conpositum esse inscriptio ista indicat". VII. Tum ille opicus verbis meis inchoatis et inconditis adductus virtutemque esse polypragmosynen ratus: "hortatur" inquit "nos profecto nescio quis hic Plutarchus ad negotia capessenda et ad res obeundas plurimas cum industria et celeritate nomenque ipsius virtutis, de qua locuturus esset, libro ipsi, sicuti dicis, non incommode praescripsit". VIII. "Minime" inquam "vero; neque enim ista omnino virtus est, cuius Graeco nomine argumentum hoc libri demonstratur, neque id, quod tu opinare, aut ego me dicere sentio aut Plutarchus facit.

"An addressing of many matters and the action of all those matters is called polypragmosyne in Greek," I said, "about which this book is composed, as that inscription indicates." 7. Then that boor, led on by my begun and unpolished words, and supposing polypragmosyne to be a virtue, said: "Surely this I-know-not-who Plutarch exhorts us to seize upon affairs and to go about very many matters with industry and celerity, and he has not inaptly prefixed to the book itself, as you say, the name of the very virtue about which he was going to speak." 8. "By no means, indeed," I said; "for that is not at all a virtue, whose Greek name shows the argument of this book, nor what you suppose do I perceive myself to be saying, nor does Plutarch do so.

Deterret enim nos hoc quidem in libro, quam potest maxime, a varia promiscaque et non necessaria rerum cuiuscemodi plurimarum et cogitatione et petitione. Sed huius" inquam "tui erroris culpam esse intellego in mea scilicet infacundia, qui ne pluribus quidem verbis potuerim non obscurissime dicere, quod a Graecis perfectissime verbo uno et planissime dicitur".

For indeed this book, so far as it can most of all, deters us from the varied, promiscuous, and unnecessary cogitation and pursuit of very many kinds of things. "But of this," I say, "your error I understand the blame to be in my, to wit, lack of eloquence, in that I could not, even with more words, say with anything but great obscurity what by the Greeks is said most perfectly in a single word and most plainly."

XVII. Quid significet in veteribus praetorum edictis: "qui flumina retanda publice redempta habent".I. Edicta veterum praetorum sedentibus forte nobis in bibliotheca templi Traiani et aliud quid requirentibus cum in manus incidissent, legere atque cognoscere libitum est. II. Tum in quodam edicto antiquiore ita scriptum invenimus: "Qui flumina retanda publice redempta habent, si quis eorum ad me eductus fuerit, qui dicatur, quod eum ex lege locationis facere oportuerit, non fecisse". III. "Retanda" igitur quid esset, quaerebatur.

17. What is signified in the old edicts of the praetors by: “those who have by public contract rivers ‘retanda’.”1. The edicts of the old praetors, as we were sitting by chance in the library of the Temple of Trajan and looking for something else, having fallen into our hands, it pleased us to read and to learn. 2. Then in a certain more ancient edict we found it written thus: “Those who have by public contract rivers ‘retanda,’ if any of them shall have been brought before me who is said not to have done what it was proper for him to do according to the law of the letting, [that he] has not done.” 3. Accordingly, what “retanda” was, was being inquired.

IV. Dixit ibi quispiam nobiscum sedens amicus meus in libro se Gavi de origine vocabulorum VII legisse "retas" vocari arbores, quae aut ex ripis fluminum eminerent aut in alveis eorum exstarent, appellatasque esse a retibus, quod praetereuntes naves inpedirent et quasi inretirent; idcircoque sese arbitrari "retanda" flumina locari solita esse, id est purganda, ne quid aut morae aut periculi navibus in ea virgulta incidentibus fieret.

4. Someone there, a friend of mine sitting with us, said that he had read in the book of Gavius On the Origin of Words 7 that trees are called "retas," which either projected from the banks of rivers or stood forth in their channels, and that they were named from the nets, because they impeded passing ships and, as it were, enmeshed them; and therefore he thought that rivers "retanda" were wont to be let out on contract, that is, to be purged, lest anything either of delay or of peril should befall ships colliding with those thickets.

XVIII. Qua poena Draco Atheniensis in legibus, quas populo Atheniensi scripsit, fures adfecerit; et qua postea Solon et qua; item decemviri nostri, qui duodecim tabulas scripserunt; atque inibi adscriptum, quod aput Aegyptios furta licita et permissa sunt, aput Lacedaemonios autem cum studio quoque adfectata et pro exercitio utili celebrata; ac praeterea M. Catonis de poeniendis furtis digna memoria sententia.I. Draco Atheniensis vir bonus multaque esse prudentia existimatus est iurisque divini et humani peritus fuit. II. Is Draco leges, quibus Athenienses uterentur, primus omnium tulit. III.

18. With what penalty Draco the Athenian, in the laws which he wrote for the Athenian people, afflicted thieves; and afterward with what Solon, and with what; likewise our decemvirs, who wrote the Twelve Tables; and there appended, that among the Egyptians thefts are lawful and permitted, but among the Lacedaemonians they are even pursued with zeal and celebrated as a useful exercise; and besides, M. Cato’s sentence on punishing thefts, worthy of memory.1. Draco the Athenian was thought to be a good man and of much prudence, and he was skilled in divine and human law. 2. That Draco first of all proposed the laws which the Athenians should use. 3.

In illis legibus furem cuiusmodicumque furti supplicio capitis poeniendum esse et alia pleraque nimis severe censuit sanxitque. IV. Eius igitur leges, quoniam videbantur impendio acerbiores, non decreto iussoque, set tacito inlitteratoque Atheniensium consensu oblitteratae sunt. V. Postea legibus aliis mitioribus a Solone compositis usi sunt.

In those laws he judged and enacted that a thief, for whatever kind of theft, must be punished with the penalty of death, and he also judged and enacted many other things too severely. 4. His laws therefore, since they seemed exceedingly harsh, were not by decree and command, but by the silent and unwritten consent of the Athenians, obliterated. 5. Afterwards they made use of other, milder laws composed by Solon.

Is Solo e septem illis inclutis sapientibus fuit. Is sua lege in fures non, ut Draco antea, mortis, sed dupli poena vindicandum existimavit. VI. Decemviri autem nostri, qui post reges exactos leges, quibus populus Romanus uteretur, in XII tabulis scripserunt, neque pari severitate in poeniendis omnium generum furibus neque remissa nimis lenitate usi sunt.

That Solon was of those seven illustrious sages. By his own law he thought that thieves were to be punished, not, as Draco earlier, with the penalty of death, but with the penalty of double restitution. 6. But our decemvirs, who, after the kings had been driven out, wrote the laws by which the Roman people should be governed on 12 tables, used neither equal severity in punishing thieves of every kind nor a lenity too remiss.

VII. Nam furem, qui manifesto furto prensus esset, tum demum occidi permiserunt, si aut, cum faceret furtum, nox esset, aut interdiu telo se, cum prenderetur, defenderet. VIII.

7. For the thief who had been caught in manifest theft, they permitted him to be killed then and only then, if either, when he was committing the theft, it was night, or in the daytime he defended himself with a weapon when he was being apprehended. 8.

Ex ceteris autem manifestis furibus liberos verberari addicique iusserunt ei, cui furtum factum esset, si modo id luci fecissent neque se telo defendissent; servos item furti manifesti prensos verberibus adfici et e saxo praecipitari, sed pueros inpuberes praetoris arbitratu verberari voluerunt noxiamque ab his factam sarciri. IX. Ea quoque furta, quae per lancem liciumque concepta essent, proinde ac si manifesta forent, vindicaverunt. X. Sed nunc a lege illa decemvirali discessum est.

But of the other manifest thieves, they ordered free persons to be beaten and to be adjudged to him to whom the theft had been done, provided only that they had done it by daylight and had not defended themselves with a weapon; likewise they wished slaves apprehended in a manifest theft to be afflicted with beatings and to be cast headlong from the rock, but boys under age to be beaten at the praetor’s discretion, and the harm done by them to be repaired. 9. They likewise proceeded against those thefts which had been discovered by the dish and the strap, just as if they were manifest. 10. But now there has been a departure from that decemviral law.

Nam si qui super manifesto furto iure et ordine experiri velit, actio in quadruplum datur. XI. "Manifestum" autem "furtum est", ut ait Masurius, "quod deprehenditur, dum fit. Faciendi finis est, cum perlatum est, quo ferri coeperat". XII.

For if anyone wishes to proceed by law and in due order concerning manifest theft, an action for quadruple is given. 11. "Manifest theft is," as Masurius says, "that which is apprehended while it is being done. The end of the doing is, when it has been carried to the place to which it had begun to be carried." 12.

Furti concepti, item oblati, tripli poena est. Sed quod sit "oblatum", quod "conceptum" et pleraque alia ad eam rein ex egregiis veterum moribus accepta neque inutilia cognitu neque iniucunda, qui legere volet, inveniet Sabrini librum, cui titulus est de furtis. XIII.

For theft "conceived" (i.e., found by search), likewise "offered" (i.e., planted), the penalty is triple. But what "offered" is, what "conceived" is, and many other things on that matter, taken from the outstanding customs of the ancients, neither useless to know nor unpleasant, whoever will wish to read will find in the book of Sabinus, whose title is On Thefts. 13.

In quo id quoque scriptum est, quod volgo inopinatum est, non hominum tantum neque rerum moventium, quae auferri occulte et subripi possunt, sed fundi quoque et aedium fieri furtum; condemnatum quoque furti colonum, qui fundo, quem conduxerat, vendito possessione eius dominum intervertisset. XIV. Atque id etiam, quod magis inopinabile est, Sabinus dicit furem esse hominis iudicatum, qui, cum fugitivus praeter oculos forte domini iret, obtentu togae tamquam se amiciens, ne videretur a domino, obstitisset.

In which this also is written, which is commonly unexpected, that theft is committed not only of men nor of movables, which can be carried off secretly and filched, but also of an estate and of buildings; and that a tenant-farmer was also condemned for theft, who, the farm which he had leased having been sold, had diverted its possession from the owner. 14. And this too, which is more unexpected, Sabinus says that a man was adjudged to be a thief, who, when a runaway was going by by chance before the master’s eyes, under the cover of his toga, as though wrapping himself so that he might not be seen by the master, stood in the way.

XV. Aliis deinde furtis omnibus, quae "nec manifesta" appellantur, poenam imposuerunt dupli. XVI. Id etiam memini legere me in libro Aristonis iureconsulti, haudquaquam indocti viri, aput veteres Aegyptios, quod genus hominum constat et in artibus reperiendis sollertes extitisse et in cognitione rerum indaganda sagaces, furta omnia fuisse licita et inpunita.

15. Then upon all the other thefts, which are called "not manifest," they imposed the penalty of double. 16. I also remember that I read in the book of Ariston the jurisconsult, a man by no means unlearned, that among the ancient Egyptians—a race of men agreed to have been skillful in discovering arts and sagacious in the investigation of matters—all thefts were lawful and unpunished.

XVII. Aput Lacedaemonios quoque, sobrios illos et acres viros, cuius rei non adeo ut Aegyptiis fides longinqua est, non pauci neque ignobiles scriptores, qui de moribus legibusque eorum memorias condiderunt, ius atque usum fuisse furandi dicunt, idque a iuventute eorum non ad turpia lucra neque ad sumptum libidini praebendum comparandamve opulentiam, sed pro exercitio disciplinaque rei bellicae factitatum, quod ea furandi sollertia et adsuetudo acueret firmaretque animos adulescentium et ad insidiarum astus et ad vigilandi tolerantiam et ad obrependi celeritatem. XVIII.

17. Among the Lacedaemonians too, those sober and keen men—a matter whose credibility is not so far‑fetched as in the Egyptians’ case—not a few nor inglorious writers, who composed memorials about their customs and laws, say that there was a right and a usage of stealing; and that this was practiced by their youth not for base lucre nor to provide expense for lust nor to amass opulence, but as an exercise and discipline of the military art, because that skill and habituation of stealing would whet and strengthen the spirits of the adolescents both for the astuteness of ambushes and for endurance in keeping watch and for celerity in creeping up. 18.

Sed enim M. Cato in oratione, quam de Praeda militibus dividenda scripsit, vehementibus et inlustribus verbis de inpunitate peculatu atque licentia conqueritur. Ea verba, quoniam nobis inpense placuerant, adscripsimus: "Fures" inquit "privatorum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt, fures publici in auro Itque in purpura". XIX. Quam caste autem ac religiose a prudentissimis viris, quid esset "furtum", definitum sit, praetereundum non puto, ne quis eum solum esse furem putet, qui occulte tollit aut clam subripit.

But indeed M. Cato, in the speech which he wrote On the Booty to be Divided among the Soldiers, laments with vehement and illustrious words about the impunity of peculation and about license. Those words, since they exceedingly pleased us, we have written down: “Thieves,” he says, “of private thefts pass their life in the stocks and in shackles; public thieves in gold, and so in purple.” 19. How chastely, moreover, and religiously by the most prudent men what “furtum” is has been defined, I do not think should be passed over, lest anyone suppose him alone to be a thief who removes stealthily or filches in secret.

XX. Verba sunt Sabini ex libro iuris civilis secundo: "Qui alienam rem adtrectavit, cum id se invito domino facere iudicare deberet, furti tenetur". XXI. Item alio capite: "Qui alienum iacens lucri faciendi causa sustulit, furti obstringitur, sive scit, cuius sit, sive nescit". XXII. Haec quidem sic in eo, quo nunc dixi, Sabinus scripsit de rebus furti faciendi causa adtrectatis.

20. The words are Sabinus’s from the second book of civil law: "He who has handled another’s property, when he ought to judge that he is doing this with the owner unwilling, is held liable for theft." 21. Likewise in another chapter: "He who has lifted another’s property lying [unattended] for the sake of making gain is bound for theft, whether he knows whose it is or does not know." 22. These, indeed, thus in that which I have now said, Sabinus wrote concerning things handled for the sake of committing theft.

XXIII. Sed meminisse debemus secundum ea, quae supra scripsi, furtum sine ulla quoque adtrectatione fieri posse sola mente atque animo, ut furtum fiat, adnitente. XXIV.

23. But we ought to remember, in accordance with the things which I have written above, that theft can come about even without any handling at all, by mind and spirit alone, with the intention striving that the theft be done. 24.

Quocirca ne id quidem Sabinus dubitare se ait, quin dominus furti sit condemnandus, qui servo suo, uti furtum faceret, imperavit.

Wherefore Sabinus says that he does not even doubt that the master who commanded his slave to commit theft is to be condemned for theft.