Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 40.3.0. De manumissionibus quae servis ad universitatem pertinentibus imponuntur.
40.2.0. On those manumitted by the vindicta (rod).
Dig. 40.3.0. On manumissions that are imposed upon slaves belonging to a universitas (corporate body).
Dig. 40.6.0. De ademptione libertatis.
40.5.0. On fideicommissary liberties.
Dig. 40.6.0. On the removal of liberty.
Dig. 40.9.0. Qui et a quibus manumissi liberi non fiunt et ad legem aeliam sentiam.
40.8.0. Those who come to liberty without manumission.
Digest 40.9.0. Who, and by whom, the manumitted do not become free, and concerning the Lex Aelia Sentia.
Dig. 40.12.0. De liberali causa.
40.11.0. On the restoration of natal status.
Dig. 40.12.0. On a case concerning freedom.
Dig. 40.15.0. Ne de statu defunctorum post quinquennium quaeratur.
40.14.0. If he is said to be freeborn.
Dig. 40.15.0. That inquiry not be made regarding the status of the deceased after five years.
Placuit eum, qui calendis ianuariis natus est, post sextam noctis pridie kalendas, quasi annum vicensimum compleverit, posse manumittere: non enim maiori viginti annis permitti manumittere, sed minorem manumittere vetari: iam autem minor non est, qui diem supremum agit anni vicensimi.
It has been decided that he who was born on the Kalends of January, after the sixth hour of the night on the day before the Kalends, as if he had completed his twentieth year, can manumit: for it is not that one greater than twenty years is permitted to manumit, but that a minor is forbidden to manumit; now, however, he is not a minor who is spending the last day of his twentieth year.
Et primo quidem nummis suis non proprie videtur emptus dici, cum suos nummos servus habere non possit: verum coniventibus oculis credendum est suis nummis eum redemptum, cum non nummis eius, qui eum redemit, comparatur. proinde sive ex peculio, quod ad venditorem pertinet, sive ex adventicio lucro, sive etiam amici beneficio vel liberalitate vel prorogante eo vel repromittente vel se delegante vel in se recipiente debitum redemptus sit, credendum est suis nummis eum redemptum: satis est enim, quod is, qui emptioni suum nomen accommodaverit, nihil de suo impendit.
And, at first, he does not seem properly to be said to have been bought with his own monies, since a slave cannot have his own money: nevertheless, with eyes conniving, it is to be believed that he was redeemed with his own monies, since he is purchased not with the monies of him who redeems him. Accordingly, whether out of a peculium that belongs to the seller, or from adventitious gain, or even by a friend’s beneficence or liberality—whether that friend grants an extension, or repromises, or delegates himself, or takes the debt upon himself—if he has been redeemed, it is to be believed that he has been redeemed with his own monies: for it is enough that he who accommodated his name to the purchase expended nothing of his own.
Nihil autem interest, a quo quis suis nummis ematur, a fisco vel civitate vel a privato, cuiusque sit sexus is qui emit. sed et si minor sit viginti annis qui vendidit, interveniet constitutio. nec comparantis quidem aetas spectatur: nam et si pupillus emat, aequum est eum fidem implere, cum sine damno eius hoc sit futurum.
However, it makes no difference from whom someone is bought with his own money, from the fiscus or a civitas or from a private person, nor of what sex is the one who buys. But even if the one who sold was under twenty years, a constitution will intervene. Nor, indeed, is the age of the purchaser considered: for even if a pupil buys, it is equitable that he fulfill good faith, since this will be without his loss.
Si quis dicat se suis nummis emptum, potest consistere cum domino suo, cuius in fidem confugit, et queri, quod ab eo non manumittatur, romae quidem apud praefectum urbis, in provinciis vero apud praesides ex sacris constitutionibus divorum fratrum, sub ea tamen denuntiatione, ut is servus, qui hoc intenderit nec impleverit, in opus metalli detur, nisi forte dominus reddi eum sibi maluerit, utique non maiorem ex ea causa poenam constituturus.
If anyone declares that he has been bought with his own coins, he can appear with his master, in whose good faith he has taken refuge, and complain that he is not being manumitted by him—at Rome indeed before the Prefect of the City, but in the provinces before the governors—by virtue of the sacred constitutions of the deified brothers; yet under this denunciation, that the slave who has undertaken this and has not carried it through be consigned to the work of the mines, unless perhaps the master prefers that he be returned to him, assuredly not going to establish a greater penalty on that account.
Servus pecuniam ob libertatem pactus erat et eam domino dederat: dominus prius quam eum manumitteret, mortuus erat testamentoque liberum esse iusserat et ei peculium suum legaverat. consulebat, quam pecuniam domino dedisset ob libertatem, an eam sibi heredes patroni reddere deberent necne. respondit, si eam pecuniam dominus, posteaquam accepisset, in suae pecuniae rationem habuisset, statim desisse eius peculii esse: sed si interea, dum eum manumitteret, acceptum servo rettulisset, videri peculii fuisse et debere heredes eam pecuniam manumisso reddere.
A slave had bargained money for liberty and had given it to his master: the master, before he manumitted him, had died, and by his testament had ordered him to be free and had bequeathed to him his peculium. He consulted whether the money which he had given to the master for liberty the heirs of the patron ought to return to him or not. He replied: if, after receiving that money, the master had treated it as reckoned into his own funds, it at once ceased to belong to the slave’s peculium; but if in the meantime, while he was in the act of manumitting him, he had entered it as received to the slave’s account, it is seen to have been of the peculium, and the heirs ought to return that money to the manumitted man.
Duo filii familias peculiares servos separatim uterque habebant: ex his alter servulum suum peculiarem vivo patre manumisit: pater utrique testamento peculium praelegaverat. quaerebatur, servus iste utrum amborum, an eius a quo manumissus erat libertus esset. respondit, si prius testamentum pater fecisset, quam filius eum liberum esse iussisset, unius esse libertum, ideo quod eum quoque in peculio legasse videretur: sed si postea testamentum pater fecisset, non videri eam mentem eius fuisse, ut eum, qui manumissus esset, legaret eumque servum, quoniam praelegatus non esset, mortuo patre amborum servum fuisse.
Two sons under paternal power each separately had slaves belonging to their peculium: of these, one manumitted his own little slave of the peculium while his father was alive: the father by his testament had prelegated the peculium to each. The question was, whether that slave was the freedman of both, or of him by whom he had been manumitted. He answered: if the father had made the testament before the son had ordered him to be free, he is the freedman of the one, for the reason that the father also would be seen to have bequeathed him in the peculium; but if the father had made the testament afterwards, it does not seem to have been his intention to bequeath him who had been manumitted, and that slave, since he had not been prelegated, after the father’s death was the slave of both.
Aelianus debitor fiscalis euemeriam ancillam ante annos multos emerat hac lege, ut manumitteret, eamque manumiserat: procurator cum bona debitoris non sufficientia quaereret, etiam euemeriae status quaestionem faciebat. placuit non esse iuri fiscali locum, quo omnia bona debitorum iure pignoris tenerentur, quia ea lege empta est, et, si non manumitteretur, ex constitutione divi marci ad libertatem perveniret.
Aelianus, a fiscal debtor, many years before had bought the slave-girl Euemeria on this condition, that he should manumit her, and he had manumitted her; when the procurator, as he was seeking the debtor’s goods as insufficient, was also raising a status-question concerning Euemeria. It was decided that there was no place for the right of the fisc, by which all the goods of debtors are held by a right of pledge, because she was bought under that condition, and, if she were not manumitted, she would attain to freedom by the constitution of the deified Marcus.
Servus furiosi ab adgnato curatore manumitti non potest, quia in administratione patrimonii manumissio non est. si autem ex fideicommissi causa deberet libertatem furiosus, dubitationis tollendae causa ab adgnato tradendum servum, ut ab eo cui traditus esset manumittatur, octavenus ait.
A slave of an insane person cannot be manumitted by the agnate curator, because manumission is not within the administration of the patrimony. But if the insane person ought, by reason of a fideicommissum, to grant freedom, Octavenus says, for the sake of removing doubt, that the slave should be handed over by the agnate, so that he may be manumitted by the one to whom he was handed over.
Mortis causa servum manumitti posse non est dubitandum. quod non ita tibi intellegendum est, ut ita liber esse iubeatur, ut, si convaluerit dominus, non fiat liber, sed quemadmodum si vindicta eum liberaret absolute, scilicet quia moriturum se putet, mors eius exspectabitur, similiter et in hac specie in extremum tempus manumissoris vitae confertur libertas, durante scilicet propter mortis causae tacitam condicionem) voluntate manumissoris: quemadmodum cum rem ita tradiderit, ut moriente eo fieret accipientis, quae ita demum alienatur, si donator in eadem permanserit voluntate.
There should be no doubting that a slave can be manumitted mortis causa. This is not to be understood by you in such a way that he is ordered to be free on this footing, that, if the master should recover, he would not become free; rather, just as if the vindicta were to free him absolutely—namely because he supposes he is going to die—his death will be awaited; likewise, too, in this case liberty is conferred at the last moment of the manumittor’s life, with the will of the manumittor continuing (on account of the tacit condition of the mortis causa): just as when he has delivered a thing in such a way that, upon his dying, it becomes the recipient’s, which is only then alienated if the donor has persisted in the same will.
Si quis ab alio nummos acceperit, ut servum suum manumittat, etiam ab invito libertas extorqueri potest, licet plerumque pecunia eius numerata sit, maxime si frater vel pater naturalis pecuniam dedit: videbitur enim similis ei qui suis nummis redemptus est.
If someone has received coins from another, in order to manumit his slave, liberty can be extorted even from one unwilling, although for the most part his money has been counted out, especially if a brother or natural father gave the money: for he will seem similar to one who has been redeemed with his own coins.
Puellam ea lege vendidit, ut post annum ab emptore manumitteretur: quod si non manumisisset, convenit, uti manum iniceret aut decem aureos emptor daret. non servata fide nihilo minus liberam ex sententia constitutionis fieri respondit, quoniam manus iniectio plerumque auxilii ferendi causa intervenit: itaque nec pecunia petetur, cum emolumentum legis voluntatem venditoris secutum sit.
He sold the girl on this condition, that after a year she should be manumitted by the purchaser: and if he did not manumit, it was agreed that he should lay hand upon her (manus iniectio) or the purchaser should give ten aurei. With the pledge not kept, he replied that nonetheless she becomes free according to the tenor of the constitution, since manus iniectio for the most part intervenes for the sake of bringing aid: and thus neither will the money be demanded, since the emolument of the statute has followed the will of the seller.
Tempore alienationis convenit, ut homo libertatis causa traditus post quintum annum impletum manumitteretur et ut certam mercedem interea menstruam praeberet. condicionem libertati mercedes non facere, sed obsequio temporariae servitutis modum praestitutum esse respondi: neque enim in omnibus libertatis causa traditum comparari statulibero.
At the time of the alienation it was agreed that a person delivered for the sake of liberty should be manumitted after the fifth year had been completed, and that in the meantime he should provide a certain monthly payment. I answered that the payments do not impose a condition upon the liberty, but that, as a matter of obsequium, a term of temporary servitude was prescribed; for one delivered for the sake of liberty is not in all respects to be compared with a statuliber.
Gaius seius pamphilam hac lege emit, ut intra annum manumitteretur: deinde intra annum seius servus pronuntiatus est: quaero, an ex lege venditionis finito anno pamphila libertatem consecuta sit. paulus respondit, cum ea condicione ancillam emptam domino adquisitam, cum qua condicione venisse proponeretur.
gaius seius bought pamphila on this term, that she be manumitted within a year: then within the year seius was pronounced a slave: i ask whether, by the law of the vendition, when the year was finished, pamphila attained liberty. paulus responded that the slave-girl purchased on that condition was acquired to the master, since it was set forth that she had come with that condition.
Si pater filio permiserit servum manumittere et interim decesserit intestato, deinde filius ignorans patrem suum mortuum libertatem imposuerit, libertas servo favore libertatis contingit, cum non appareat mutata esse domini voluntas. sin autem ignorante filio vetuisset pater per nuntium et antequam filius certior fieret, servum manumisisset, liber non fit. nam ut filio manumittente servus ad libertatem perveniat, durare oportet patris voluntatem: nam si mutata fuerit, non erit verum volente patre filium manumisisse.
If a father has permitted his son to manumit a slave and in the meantime has died intestate, then the son, not knowing that his father is dead, has imposed liberty, liberty accrues to the slave by favor of liberty, since it does not appear that the master’s will has been changed. But if, with the son unaware, the father had forbidden it by a messenger, and before the son was made certain of this the son manumitted the slave, he does not become free. For, in order that, the son manumitting, the slave may arrive at liberty, the father’s will must endure; for if it has been changed, it will not be true that the son manumitted with the father willing.
Quotiens dominus servum manumittat, quamvis existimet alienum esse eum, nihilo minus verum est voluntate domini servum manumissum et ideo liber erit. et ex contrario si se stichus non putaret manumittentis esse, nihilo minus libertatem contingere. plus enim in re est, quam in existimatione et utroque casu verum est stichum voluntate domini manumissum esse.
As often as a master manumits a slave, although he thinks that he belongs to another, nonetheless it is true that by the will of the master the slave has been manumitted, and therefore he will be free. And conversely, if Stichus should not think himself to belong to the manumitter, nonetheless liberty accrues. For there is more in the thing than in estimation, and in either case it is true that Stichus has been manumitted by the will of the master.
Minor viginti annis dominus nec communem quidem servum sine consilio recte manumittit. paulus notat: sed si pignori obligatum sibi minor viginti annis manumitti patiatur, recte manumittitur, quia non tam manumittere is quam non impedire manumittentem intellegitur.
A master under twenty years does not rightly manumit, not even a common slave, without counsel. Paulus notes: but if a minor under twenty years allows one obligated to him in pledge to be manumitted, he is rightly manumitted, because he is understood not so much to manumit as not to impede the manumitter.
An apud se manumittere possit is qui consilium praebeat, saepe quaesitum est. ego, qui meminissem iavolenum praeceptorem meum et in africa et in syria servos suos manumisisse, cum consilium praeberet, exemplum eius secutus et in praetura et consulatu meo quosdam ex servis meis vindicta liberavi et quibusdam praetoribus consulentibus me idem suasi.
Whether one who provides counsel can manumit before himself has often been asked. I, remembering that Iavolenus, my teacher, both in Africa and in Syria had manumitted his own slaves while he was providing counsel, following his example both in my praetorship and in my consulship freed some of my slaves by the vindicta, and to certain praetors who consulted me I advised the same.
Sciendum est, qualiscumque causa probata sit et recepta, libertatem tribuere oportere: nam divus pius rescripsit causas probatas revocari non oportere, dum ne alienum servum possit quis manumittere: nam causae probationi contradicendum, non etiam causa iam probata retractanda est.
It must be known that, whatever the cause, if proved and accepted, ought to grant liberty; for the deified Pius rescripted that causes once approved are not to be revoked, provided only that no one can manumit another’s slave; for contradiction is to be made at the probation of the cause, not that a cause already proved be retracted.
Si collactaneus, si educator, si paedagogus ipsius, si nutrix, vel filius filiave cuius eorum, vel alumnus, vel capsarius ( id est qui portat libros), vel si in hoc manumittatur, ut procurator sit, dummodo non minor annis decem et octo sit, praeterea et illud exigitur, ut non utique unum servum habeat, qui manumittit. item si matrimonii causa virgo vel mulier manumittatur, exacto prius iureiurando, ut intra sex menses uxorem eam duci oporteat: ita enim senatus censuit.
If a collactaneous (milk-sibling), if an educator, if his paedagogus, if a nurse, or the son or daughter of any of them, or an alumnus, or a capsarius ( id est qui portat libros), or if he be manumitted for this purpose, that he be a procurator, provided he be not less than eighteen years old—further, this also is required: that he who manumits not have only one slave. Likewise, if for the cause of matrimony a maiden or a woman be manumitted, an oath first having been exacted, that within six months she ought to be taken as a wife: for thus the senate decreed.
Ex praeterito tempore plures causae esse possunt, veluti quod dominum in proelio adiuvaverit, contra latrones tuitus sit, quod aegrum sanaverit, quod insidias detexerit. et longum est, si exequi voluerimus, quia multa merita incidere possunt, quibus honestum sit libertatem cum decreto praestare: quas aestimare debebit is, apud quem de ea re agatur.
From past time there can be several causes, such as that he aided his master in battle, that he defended him against robbers, that he healed him when sick, that he uncovered plots. And it would be lengthy, if we wished to set them out, because many merits can occur, for which it is honorable to grant liberty by decree: which ought to be assessed by the one before whom the matter is being litigated.
Si quis minori viginti annis hac lege servum dederit aut pretio accepto vel donationis causa, ut eum liberum faciat, potest ille causam manumissionis istius probare, hoc ipsum allegans legem datam, et perducere ad libertatem: ergo hic debet ostendere hoc inter ipsos actum, ut proinde vel ex lege donationis vel ex affectione eius qui dedit res aestimetur.
If someone should give to a person less than twenty years old, under this law, a slave—either with a price received or for the cause of donation—in order that he make him free, that person can prove the cause of that manumission, alleging this very enacted law, and lead him to liberty: therefore here he ought to show that this was transacted between them, so that accordingly the matter be assessed either by the law of the donation or by the affection (intention) of him who gave.
Si rogatus sit minor viginti quinque annis manumittere per fideicommissum, incunctanter debet ei permitti, nisi si proprium servum rogatus fuit manumittere: hic enim conferenda erit quantitas emolumenti, quae ad eum pervenit ex iudicio eius qui rogavit, cum pretio eorum quos rogatus est manumittere.
If a minor of twenty-five years has been asked to manumit by fideicommissum, it ought unhesitatingly to be permitted to him, unless he has been asked to manumit his own slave: for in that case the amount of the emolument which has come to him from the disposition of the one who made the request must be brought into contribution, together with the price of those whom he is asked to manumit.
Pater ex provincia ad filium sciens romae agentem epistulam fecit, quae permisit ei, quem vellet ex servis, quos in ministerio secum hic habebat, vindicta liberare: post quam filius stichum manumisit apud praetorem: quaero, an fecerit liberum. respondi: quare non hoc concessum credamus patri, ut permittere possit filio ex his, quos in ministerio haberet, manumittere? solam enim electionem filio concessit, ceterum ipse manumittit.
A father, from the province, knowing his son to be residing at Rome, wrote an epistle to him, which permitted him to free by the vindicta whichever he wished from the slaves whom he had here with him in service; after which the son manumitted Stichus before the praetor. I ask whether he made him free. I answered: Why should we not believe this to have been granted to the father, that he can permit the son to manumit from those whom he had in service? For he granted to the son only the election; in the rest, he himself manumits.
Si tutoris habendi causa pupillus manumittat, probationi esse causam fufidius ait. nerva filius contra sentit, quod verius est: namque perabsurdum est in eligendo tutore firmum videri esse iudicium pupilli, cuius in omnibus rebus ut infirmum iudicium tutore auctore regitur.
If, for the sake of having a tutor, a pupil manumits, Fufidius says that this is a ground for approval. Nerva the son thinks the contrary, which is truer: for it is very absurd that, in choosing a tutor, the judgment of the pupil should seem firm, whose judgment in all matters, as weak, is governed under the tutor’s authority.
Illud constabit, si libertate data sic fuerit legatum " eique, si eum vindicta liberavero, heres meus decem dato", licet ex nimia suptilitate separatum est a testamento, attamen humanitatis intuitu valebit legatum, si vivus eum manumiserit.
It will be established that, if, with liberty granted, a legacy has been in these terms: " and to him, if I shall have freed him by the vindicta, let my heir give ten," although by excessive subtlety it is separated from the testament, nevertheless, out of regard for humanity the legacy will be valid, if he manumits him while alive.
Neratius scribit eius, cui libertas sic data est " si mihi nullus filius erit cum moriar, stichus liber esto", impediri libertatem postumo nato. sed dum speratur nasci, utrum in servitute remanere dicimus an vero ex postfacto respondemus retro liberum fuisse nullo filio nato? quod magis arbitror probandum.
Neratius writes that the liberty of him to whom freedom has been given thus, " if I shall have no son when I die, let stichus be free," is impeded upon a posthumous son being born. But while a birth is expected, do we say that he remains in servitude, or do we answer on an ex post facto basis that he was free retroactively, no son having been born? Which I rather judge should be approved.
Si ita sit scriptum: " stichus, si rationes diligenter tractasse videbitur, liber esto", diligentiam desiderandam, quae domino, non quae servo erit utilis, coniuncta fidei bonae et in reliquis quoque reddendis.
If it is written thus: " stichus, if he shall seem to have handled the accounts diligently, let him be free", the diligence to be demanded is that which will be useful to the master, not that which will be useful to the slave, conjoined with good faith, and also in the other things that are to be rendered.
Si peculium praelegatum est et vicarius liber esse iussus sit, liberum eum esse constat. multum enim interest inter genus et speciem: speciem enim eximi de genere placet: quod est in peculio legato et vicario manumisso.
If a peculium has been prelegated and the vicarius has been ordered to be free, it is settled that he is free. For there is much difference between genus and species: for it is approved that the species be taken out from the genus; which is the case when the peculium is left by legacy and the vicarius is manumitted.
Si servus legatus liber esse iussus est, liber est. sed si prius liber esse iussus, postea legatus sit, si quidem evidens voluntas sit testatoris, quod ademit libertatem, cum placeat hodie etiam libertatem adimi posse, legato eum cedere puto: quod si in obscuro sit, tunc favorabilius respondetur liberum fore.
If a slave who has been bequeathed has been ordered to be free, he is free. But if he was first ordered to be free and afterwards was bequeathed, if indeed the testator’s will is evident—that he took away the liberty—since it is accepted today that even liberty can be taken away, I think he must yield to the legacy; but if that is obscure, then the more favorable response is that he will be free.
Si quis libertatem sub iurisiurandi condicione reliquerit, edicto praetoris locus non erit, ut iurisiurandi condicio remittatur, et merito: nam si quis remiserit condicionem libertatis, ipsam libertatem impedit, dum competere aliter non potest, quam si paritum fuerit condicioni.
If anyone has left liberty under the condition of an oath, there will be no room by the praetor’s edict for the condition of the oath to be remitted—and with merit: for if anyone remits the condition of the liberty, he impedes liberty itself, since it cannot accrue otherwise than if the condition has been complied with.
Si ita fuerit servis duobus libertas data, si insulam aedificaverint vel si statuam posuerint, dividi haec condicio non poterit. solummodo illud habebit dubitationem, an altero faciente satisfactum voluntati videatur ideoque ad libertatem perveniat: quod magis est, nisi aliud expressit testator. faciendo tamen sibi condicionem implevit, alteri non: quin immo extinguitur ei condicio: nec enim amplius parere condicioni potest, cum semel expleta sit.
If in this way liberty has been given to two slaves, if they shall have built an apartment-house or if they shall have set up a statue, this condition cannot be divided. Only this will admit of doubt, whether, when one of them performs it, the wish seems to have been satisfied and so he attains to liberty: which is the sounder view, unless the testator expressed otherwise. However, by doing it he has fulfilled the condition for himself, not for the other; indeed rather, for the other the condition is extinguished; for he can no longer comply with the condition, since once it has been completed.
Idem quaeri potest et si fabris duobus vel pictoribus, si membrum depinxissent vel si fabricassent navem, quid adscriptum sit: nam voluntatis erit quaestio, num alteri alterius facti condicionem iunxerit: quae res efficit, ut, quod alter cessat, alteri quoque, qui facere paratus est, condicio deficiat. quod si ex his, quae scripsit vel dixit, ostenditur contentus esse testator vel alterum facere, res erit expedita: nam alter faciendo aut et sibi et socio proderit aut sibi tantum, prout voluisse testatorem apparuerit.
The same question can be raised if two craftsmen or painters, if they had painted a member or had built a ship, what has been set down: for it will be a question of intention, whether he joined to one the condition of the other’s act; which brings it about that, when the one fails, the condition also fails for the other, who is prepared to perform. But if from what he wrote or said it is shown that the testator was content for either one to do it, the matter will be settled: for by doing it the one will either benefit both himself and his partner, or himself alone, according as it appears the testator wished.
Haec quaestio et in eo tractatur, si quis libertatem dederit servis duobus, si rationes reddiderint. iulianus enim tractat, si alter reddere sit paratus, alter non sit, an alter per alterum impediatur: et rectissime ait, si quidem separatim rationes gesserunt, sufficere ad libertatem adipiscendam ei qui suas rationes reddit: si vero simul, non alias videri alterum paruisse, nisi utriusque reliqua exsolverit. in reliquis accipere debemus, ut et ipsa volumina rationum reddantur.
This question is also dealt with in the case where someone has granted freedom to two slaves on condition that they render accounts. For Julian discusses whether, if one is ready to render them and the other is not, the one is hindered by the other; and he very rightly says that, if indeed they handled the accounts separately, it suffices for acquiring freedom for the one who renders his own accounts; but if they handled them together, the one is not otherwise deemed to have complied unless he has discharged the outstanding balances of both. As to the rest, we must understand that the very volumes of the accounts are also to be produced.
Sed et si ancilla cum filiis libera esse iussa sit, etsi nullos habeat, erit libera: vel si habeat quidem, filii autem eius ad libertatem pertinere non possint, idem erit dicendum: et si ipsa libera esse non possit, filii tamen eius pervenient ad libertatem. nam haec adiectio " cum filiis" non facit condicionem, nisi mihi proponas aliam sententiam testatoris fuisse: tunc enim pro condicione erunt haec verba accipienda. condicionem autem non facere argumento est et edictum praetoris, quo ita cavetur " ventrem cum liberis in possessionem esse iubebo " : placet enim, etsi nulli liberi sint, ventrem tamen ex edicto in possessionem mittendum.
But also, if a maidservant has been ordered to be free together with her children, even if she have none, she will be free: or if indeed she have some, but her children cannot pertain to liberty, the same must be said: and if she herself cannot be free, nevertheless her children will attain to liberty. For this addition " together with her children " does not make a condition, unless you propose to me that the testator had another intention: for then these words are to be taken as by way of condition. That it does not make a condition is evidenced also by the edict of the praetor, in which provision is thus made " I will order the womb together with the children to be in possession ": for it is the settled view that, even if there are no children, nevertheless the womb must, by the edict, be sent into possession.
" stichum sempronio do lego. si sempronius stichum intra annum non manumiserit, idem stichus liber esto". quaesitum est, quid iuris sit. respondit hoc modo libertate data " si sempronius non manumiserit, stichus liber esto" sempronium, nisi manumiserit, nihil iuris in stichum habiturum, sed liberum eum futurum.
"I give and bequeath Stichus to Sempronius. If Sempronius does not manumit Stichus within a year, let that same Stichus be free." The question was asked, what the law is. He answered in this way, with liberty granted: " if Sempronius does not manumit, let Stichus be free," that Sempronius, unless he manumits, will have no right in Stichus, but that he will be free.
Si ita scriptum fuerit: " cum titius annorum triginta erit, stichus liber esto eique heres meus fundum dato" et titius, antequam ad annum trigensimum perveniret, decesserit, sticho libertas competet, sed legatum non debebitur. nam favore libertatis receptum est, ut mortuo titio tempus superesse videretur, quo impleto libertas contingeret: circa legatum defecisse condicio visa est.
If it shall have been written thus: "when titius will be thirty years old, let stichus be free, and my heir shall give him an estate," and titius, before he reached the thirtieth year, has died, liberty will accrue to stichus, but the legacy will not be owed. For in favor of liberty it has been accepted that, titius being dead, the time is considered to remain, and when it is completed liberty would ensue; as to the legacy, the condition is deemed to have failed.
Libertas, quae in ultimum vitae tempus confertur, veluti " stichus cum morietur, liber esto", nullius momenti existimanda est. haec autem scriptura " stichus si capitolium non ascenderit, liber esto" ita accipienda est " si cum primum potuerit, capitolium non ascenderit": isto enim modo perveniet stichus ad libertatem, si facultate data ascendendi capitolium abstinuerit.
Liberty which is conferred at the last time of life, such as " stichus, when he shall die, let him be free", is to be considered of no moment. But this wording " stichus, if he does not ascend the capitol, let him be free" is to be taken thus: " if, as soon as he is first able, he does not ascend the capitol": for in this way stichus will attain to liberty, if, opportunity having been given, he has abstained from ascending the capitol.
Hac scriptura testamenti " pamphilus liber esto, ita ut filiis meis rationem reddat" an sub condicione libertas data videretur, quaesitum est. respondi pure quidem datam libertatem et illam adiectionem " ita ut rationes reddat" condicionem libertati non inicere: tamen quia manifesta voluntas testantis exprimeretur, cogendum eum ad rationes reddendas.
It was asked whether by this testamentary writing " Pamphilus be free, provided that he render an account to my sons" liberty would seem to have been given under a condition. I answered that liberty was indeed given purely, and that that addition " such that he render accounts" does not impose a condition upon the liberty; nevertheless, because the manifest will of the testator was expressed, he must be compelled to render accounts.
Post annos indistincte liber esse iussus post biennium liber erit: idque et favor libertatis exigit, et verba patiuntur: nisi si aliud sensisse patrem familias manifestissimis rationibus is, a quo libertas relicta est, probaverit.
One who has been ordered to be free “after years” without distinction will be free after a biennium: and this both the favor of liberty requires and the words allow; unless the person by whom the liberty was bequeathed shall prove by most manifest reasons that the paterfamilias had conceived a different intent.
Sed multo magis haec " ad annum liber esto" vel ita accipi potest " post annum, quam moriar, liber esto" et, licet hoc modo accipiatur " post annum, quam hoc testamentum factum erit, liber esto", si evenerit, ut intra annum testator decedat, inutilis non erit.
But much more this " after a year let him be free" can also be taken thus: " after a year from my death, let him be free"; and, even if it be taken in this way, " after a year from when this testament will have been made, let him be free", if it should happen that the testator dies within a year, it will not be ineffectual.
Servos legavit et cavit ita: " rogo, si te promeruerunt, dignos eos libertate existimes". praetoris hae partes sunt, ut cogat libertatem praestari, nisi si quid tale hi servi admiserint, ut indigni sint, quo libertatem consequantur, non etiam ut talia officia ab his exigantur, pro quibus libertatem mereri debent. arbitrium tamen eius erit qui rogatus sit, quo tempore quemque velit manumittere, ita ut, si vivus non manumisisset, heres eius statim libertatem praestare cogatur.
He bequeathed slaves and provided thus: " I ask, if they have merited your favor, that you deem them worthy of liberty". These are the praetor’s parts: to compel that liberty be furnished, unless these slaves have committed something of such a kind that they are unworthy, whereby they might attain liberty—not also that such services be exacted from them, in return for which they ought to merit liberty. The discretion, however, will belong to the one who has been asked, as to the time at which he wishes to manumit each person, with this proviso: that, if he should not have manumitted while alive, his heir be compelled at once to furnish liberty.
Qui filium impuberem heredem instituit, stichum ratione argenti, quod sub cura eius esset, reddita liberum esse iusserat: is servus parte argenti subtracta cum tutore divisit atque ita tutor ei parem rationem adscripsit. consultus, an stichus liber esset, respondit non esse liberum: nam quod alioquin placeat, si statuliber pecuniam dare iussus tutori det vel per tutorem stet, quo minus condicioni pareatur, pervenire eum ad libertatem, ita accipiendum, ut bona fide et citra fraudem statuliberi et tutoris id fiat, sicut et in alienationibus rerum pupillarium servatur. itaque et si offerente statulibero pecuniam tutor in fraudem pupilli accipere nolit, non aliter libertatem contingere, quam si servus fraude careat.
He who instituted his underage son as heir had ordered Stichus to be free, after the account of the silver which was under his care had been rendered. That slave, with part of the silver subtracted, made a division with the tutor, and thus the tutor entered for him an equal account. When consulted whether Stichus was free, he replied that he was not free: for what is otherwise approved—that if a statuliber, ordered to give money, should give it to the tutor, or if it should depend upon the tutor that the condition not be complied with, he attains to freedom—is to be understood on the provision that it be done in good faith and without fraud of the statuliber and of the tutor, just as is observed in alienations of the pupil’s property. And so, even if, with the statuliber offering the money, the tutor, to the prejudice of the pupil, is unwilling to accept it, freedom does not otherwise occur than if the slave is free of fraud.
And the same is to be said also about the curator. Likewise it was asked, when one has been ordered to render an account of the silver, in what manner he is to be understood to have complied with the condition—that is, whether, if certain vessels have perished without his fault and thus he has in good faith assigned the remaining vessels to the heir, he attains liberty. He answered that he would attain it: for it is sufficient if he render an account ex aequo et bono; finally, the account which a good father of a family would accept, that, having been rendered to the heir, the condition is considered fulfilled.
Uxorem praegnatem repudiaverat et aliam duxerat: prior enixa filium exposuit: hic sublatus ab alio educatus est nomine patris vocitatus usque: ad vitae tempus patris tam ab eo quam a matre, an vivorum numero esset, ignorabatur: mortuo patre testamentoque eius, quo filius neque exheredatus neque heres institutus sit, recitato filius et a matre et ab avia paterna adgnitus hereditatem patris ab intestato quasi legitimus possidet. quaesitum est, hi qui testamento libertatem acceperunt utrum liberi an servi sint. respondit filium quidem nihil praeiudicii passum fuisse, si pater eum ignoravit, et ideo, cum in potestate et ignorantis patris esset, testamentum non valere.
He had repudiated his pregnant wife and had married another: the former, having borne a son, exposed him: this child, taken up by another, was brought up and was continually called by the father’s name: throughout the father’s lifetime, both by him and by the mother it was unknown whether he was among the living: the father having died and his testament, in which the son was neither disinherited nor instituted heir, having been read, the son, acknowledged both by his mother and by his paternal grandmother, possesses the father’s inheritance from intestacy as if legitimate. It was asked whether those who received freedom by the testament are free or slaves. He answered that the son, indeed, suffered no prejudice if the father was ignorant of him, and therefore, since he was in the power of a father who was unaware, the testament does not have force.
Servum testamento ita manumisi: " si iuraverit se cornelio filio meo decem operarum daturum, liber esto": quaeritur, quid iuris sit. et sciendum est iurando servum condicionem implere, sed non teneri operarum nomine, quia nisi post manumissionem iuret, non obligatur.
I manumitted a slave by testament in this way: " if he shall have sworn that he will give to Cornelius, my son, ten services, let him be free": the question is, what the law is. And it should be known that by swearing the slave fulfills the condition, but he is not held under the title of services, because unless he swears after manumission, he is not obligated.
" stichus servus meus, si eum heres alienaverit, liber esto": inutiliter libertas datur, quia in id tempus confertur, quo alienus futurus sit. nec contrarium est, quod statuliber, etiamsi venierit, ex testamento libertatem consequitur: quippe utiliter libertas data facto heredis non peremitur. aut quid in legato eo modo dato dicemus?
" stichus my slave, if the heir shall alienate him, let him be free": freedom is granted ineffectually, because it is conferred for that time when he will belong to another. Nor is it inconsistent that a statuliber, even if he has been sold, obtains freedom from the testament: for freedom usefully granted is not destroyed by the act of the heir. Or what shall we say in the case of a legacy given in that manner?
Sed et cum sub condicione servo libertas per fideicommissum detur et ipse praesenti die daretur, non aliter tradere eum cogetur, quam ut caveatur existente condicione libertati eum restitutum iri: nam in omnibus fere causis fideicommissas libertates pro directo datis habendas. sed ofilius aiebat, si adimendi legati causa fideicommissam libertatem testator dedisset, ea vera esse: si vero onerari heredem a testatore legatarius ostenderit, aestimationem nihilo minus legatario praestandam.
But also when, under a condition, freedom is given to a slave by fideicommissum and he himself were to be delivered on the present day, he will not be compelled to hand him over otherwise than on the stipulation being taken that, the condition having occurred, he will be restored to freedom: for in almost all cases freedoms given by fideicommissum are to be regarded as though given directly. But Ofilius said that, if the testator had given freedom by fideicommissum for the sake of taking away a legacy, this is correct; if, however, the legatee shows that the testator intended the heir to be burdened, a valuation is nonetheless to be furnished to the legatee.
Si ita fuerit libertas relicta: " stichus servus meus anno duodecimo, postquam ego mortuus ero, liber esto", verisimile est principio duodecimi anni eum liberum esse, nam hoc mortuum sensisse. et inter hos sermones " duodecimo anno" et " post duodecim annos" multum interest et ita loqui solemus. duodecimus annus est, cum quantulumlibet ex duodecimo anno venisset aut praeterisset, et qui duodecimo anno liber esse iubetur, omnibus anni diebus liber esse iussus est.
If in this way freedom has been left: " stichus my slave in the twelfth year, after I shall have died, let him be free", it is probable that at the beginning of the twelfth year he is free, for the deceased is understood to have meant this. And between these expressions " in the twelfth year" and " after twelve years" there is much difference, and thus we are accustomed to speak. The twelfth year is when ever so small a part of the twelfth year has come or has passed, and he who is ordered to be free in the twelfth year has been ordered to be free on all the days of the year.
Sed si ita sit scriptum in testamento: " stichus servus meus heredi meo mille nummos anno biennio triennio, postquam ego mortuus ero, si solverit satisve fecerit, liber esto", non potest is servus nisi triennio praeterito liber esse, nisi praesentem eam pecuniam solvat aut satisfaciat: compensanda etenim est heredi libertatis celeritas praematurae pecuniarum solutioni.
But if it be thus written in the testament: " Stichus, my slave, to my heir one thousand coins in one year, in two years, in three years, after I shall have died, if he shall pay or shall have furnished security, let him be free", that slave cannot be free unless three years have passed, unless he pays that money presently or satisfies it: for the speed of liberty must be compensated to the heir by a premature solution of the monies.
Labeo scribit, si sic libertas relicta sit: " stichus intra annum, postquam mortuus ero, liber esto", statim eum liberum esse: nam et si ita sit: " si intra annum decimum heredi meo dederit, liber esto", statim solvendo eo liberum esse sine mora futurum.
Labeo writes that, if freedom has been left thus: " stichus within a year, after I have died, let him be free," he is free at once: for even if it is thus: " if within ten years he shall have given to my heir, let him be free," immediately, upon his being solvent, he will be about to be free without delay.
Maevia decedens servis suis nomine sacco et eutychiae et irenae sub condicione libertatem reliquit his verbis: " saccus servus meus et eutychia et irene ancillae meae omnes sub hac condicione liberi sunto, ut monumento meo alternis mensibus lucernam accendant et sollemnia mortis peragant": quaero, cum adsiduo monumento maeviae saccus et eutychia et irene non adsint, an liberi esse possunt. modestinus respondit neque contextum verborum totius scripturae neque mentem testatricis eam esse, ut libertas sub condicione suspensa sit, cum liberos eos monumento adesse voluit: officio tamen iudicis eos esse compellendos testatricis iussioni parere.
maevia, departing, left liberty to her slaves by name saccus and eutychia and irene, under condition, in these words: " saccus my slave and eutychia and irene my maidservants, all be free under this condition, that at my monument they light a lamp in alternate months and perform the solemnities of death": I ask, since saccus and eutychia and irene are not assiduously present at maevia’s monument, whether they can be free. modestinus responded that neither the contexture of the words of the whole writing nor the intention of the testatrix is such that liberty is suspended under a condition, since she wished them to be free as being present at the monument: nevertheless, by the office of the judge, they are to be compelled to obey the testatrix’s order.
Aristo neratio appiano rescripsit, testamento liber esse iussus, cum annorum triginta esset, antequam ad eam aetatem perveniret si in metallum damnatus sit ac postea revocetur, sine dubitatione cum libertate legatum ad eum pertinere neque metallorum poena ius eius mutari: nec aliud, si heres esset sub condicione institutus: futurum enim eum etiam necessarium.
Aristo, in a rescript, replied to Neratius Appianus that, a man having been ordered by testament to be free when he should be thirty years of age, if before he reached that age he were condemned to the mines and afterwards recalled, without doubt the legacy together with liberty pertains to him, nor is his right changed by the penalty of the mines; nor is it otherwise if he had been instituted heir under a condition: for he will even be a necessary heir.
Sed et si condicionis implendae gratia servum institutus manumiserit ac postea filius de inofficioso agendo tenuerit vel testamentum falsum fuerit pronuntiatum, consequens erit idem in hac specie fieri, quod in falsis codicillis constitutum est.
But also, if for the sake of fulfilling a condition the instituted heir has manumitted a slave, and afterwards a son has prevailed by proceeding on an undutiful will, or the testament has been pronounced false, it will be consequent that the same be done in this species as has been established in the case of false codicils.
Si socius testamento libertatem ita dederit: " pamphilus, si eum socius manumiserit, liber esto", servius respondit socio manumittente communem fieri libertum familiae atque manumissoris: neque enim novum aut incognitum est vario iure communi mancipio libertatem optingere.
If a partner has granted freedom by will in this way: " pamphilus, if his partner shall manumit him, let him be free," Servius responded that, when the partner manumits, the freedman becomes common to the family and to the manumitter: for it is neither new nor unknown that freedom accrues, under common mancipium, by a various right.
Servos autem testamento manumissos, ut bona suscipiant, iure cautionem idoneam offerre, non minus quam ceteros defuncti libertos aut extrarios declaravit: quod beneficium, minoribus annis heredibus scriptis auxilium bonis praestitutum more solito desiderantibus, non aufertur.
He declared that slaves manumitted by a will, in order to receive the goods, rightly offer suitable security, no less than the other freedmen of the deceased or outsiders: this benefit is not taken away when heirs under age, having been instituted, desire in the usual manner the aid prescribed for the estate.
Testamento centurio servos suos venire prohibuit ac petit, prout quisque meruisset, eos manumitti. libertates utiliter datas respondit, cum, si nemo servorum offenderit, omnes ad libertatem pervenire possunt: quibusdam autem per offensam exclusis residui in libertatem perveniunt.
By his testament a centurion prohibited his slaves from being sold and requested that, as each had deserved, they be manumitted. He replied that the grants of liberty were validly made, since, if none of the slaves should offend, all can attain to liberty; but with some excluded on account of an offense, the remainder attain liberty.
Cum ita testamento adscriptum esset: " servi, qui sine offensa fuerunt, liberi sunto", condicionem adscriptam videri placuit, cuius interpretationem talem faciendam, ut de his in libertate danda cogitasse non videatur, quos poena coercuit aut ab honore ministrandi vel administrandae rei negotio removit.
When thus it had been appended in the testament: " slaves, who have been without offense, shall be free", it was held that a condition had been appended, whose interpretation is to be made such that he does not seem to have contemplated granting liberty to those whom punishment has restrained or has removed from the honor of ministering or from the business of administering the matter.
Imperatores missenio frontoni: " testamento militis his verbis adscripta libertate: " " stephanum servum meum liberum esse volo"" vel " " iubeo"" adita hereditate libertas competit: et ideo ea, quae postea adiecta sunt: " " sic tamen, ut cum herede meo sit quo usque invenis sit: quod si noluerit aut contempserit, iure servitutis teneatur"" ad revocandam libertatem, quae competit, non sunt efficacia". idem et in paganorum testamentis observatur.
Emperors to Missenius Fronto: " in a soldier’s testament, with liberty appended by these words: " "I wish my slave stephanus to be free"" or " "I order"" upon the inheritance being entered, liberty accrues: and therefore those things which were afterwards added: " "yet on this condition, that he be with my heir until he is of age: but if he should be unwilling or should contemn it, let him be held by the right of servitude"" are not effective for recalling the liberty which accrues". The same is observed also in civilians’ testaments.
Lucius titius servo libertatem dedit, si rationem actus sui ex fide dedisset gaio seio filio suo: cum annos pubertatis egressus fuisset gaius seius, a curatoribus eiusdem conventus servus etiam apud iudicem omnibus satisfecit: exacta condicione a curatoribus pronuntiatum est liberum eum esse: nunc gaius seius filius testatoris negat curatoribus suis recte pecuniam illatam: quaero, an iure soluta sit quantitas. paulus respondit curatoribus quidem adulescentis reliquam rationem, ut condicio testamento adscripta impleatur, non iure exsolutam videri: sed si praesente adulescente pecunia illata est vel in rationibus eius relata, impletam condicionem videri, ac si ipsi soluta fuisset.
lucius titius gave freedom to a slave, if he should have given an account of his transaction in good faith to gaius seius his son: when gaius seius had passed the years of puberty, with a meeting convened by his curators the slave also satisfied everything before the judge: the condition having been completed, it was pronounced by the curators that he was free: now gaius seius, the testator’s son, denies that money was properly paid in to his curators: I ask whether the amount has been duly discharged. paulus replied that to the youth’s curators the remaining account, so that the condition written in the testament be fulfilled, does not seem to have been lawfully paid; but if, with the youth present, the money was paid in or entered in his accounts, the condition seems to have been fulfilled, as if it had been paid to him himself.
Qui habebat servum cratistum, testamento ita cavit: " servus meus cratinus liber esto": quaero, an servus cratistus ad libertatem pervenire possit, cum testator servum cratinum non habebat, sed hunc solum cratistum. respondit nihil obesse, quod in syllaba errasset.
He who had a slave cratistus thus provided in his testament: " my slave cratinus, let him be free": I ask whether the slave cratistus can attain liberty, since the testator did not have a slave cratinus, but only this one cratistus. He answered that it was no obstacle that he had erred in a syllable.
Scripti testamento heredes ante aditam hereditatem pacti sunt cum creditoribus, ut parte dimidia contenti essent, et ita decreto a praetore interposito hereditatem adierunt: quaero, an libertates in eo testamento datae competierunt. respondit, si testator fraudandi consilium non habuisset, competere libertates.
The heirs written in the testament, before the inheritance was entered upon, made a pact with the creditors that they should be content with a half share, and thus, a decree having been interposed by the praetor, they entered upon the inheritance: I ask whether the liberties granted in that testament accrued. He answered, if the testator had not had a design of defrauding, the liberties take effect.
Libertate sub condicione data huc iam decursum est, ut, si per statuliberum non stet, quominus condicioni pareat, quamvis ne per heredem quidem stet, tamen ad libertatem perveniat. quod credo responderi oportere et si per fideicommissum utique hereditariis servis libertas data fuerit.
With liberty granted under a condition, the matter has now been carried to this point: if it is not through the statuliber that he fails to comply with the condition, then, although it does not even depend on the heir, nevertheless he attains to liberty. I think the same answer ought to be given even where, by a fideicommissum, liberty has in any case been given to the hereditary slaves.
De his autem, quos redimendos habebit, non iuste dubitamus, siquidem eo casu iniquum erit heredem perinde compelli debere redimere eos, atque si condicio impleta esset, quod forte dominus prohiberet condicioni parere, ut et pretium perciperet et in condicionem non rogaret.
Moreover, concerning those whom he will have to redeem, we have no just doubt, since in that case it would be inequitable for the heir to be compelled to redeem them just as if the condition had been fulfilled, because the owner might perhaps prohibit complying with the condition, so that he both receives the price and is not asked under the condition.
Si locuples egenti heres exstiterit, videamus, an ea res testamento datis libertatibus proficiat, ut creditores fraudari non videantur. et sane sunt quidam, qui, cum heres locuples existeret, tale esse crediderunt, quale, si ipse testator adauctis postea facultatibus decessisset. sed mihi traditum est hoc iure nos uti, ut ad rem non pertineat, locuples an egens heres extiterat, sed quarum facultatium testator decesserit.
If a wealthy heir has arisen for a needy testator, let us consider whether that circumstance benefits the liberties granted by the testament, so that the creditors may not seem to be defrauded. And indeed there are some who, when the heir is wealthy, have believed it to be the same as if the testator himself had later died with his means increased. But it has been handed down to me that we employ this rule of law: that it does not pertain to the matter whether the heir has turned out wealthy or needy, but with what means the testator died.
which opinion Julian follows to such a degree that he thinks not even that man would attain liberty whom one who was not solvent had ordered to be free in this way: "when the debt has been paid, let Stichus be free." but this is not consistent with the opinion of Sabinus and Cassius, which he himself also seems to follow, who think that the counsel (purpose) of each manumitter ought to be regarded: for he who orders his slave to be free under that condition orders him to be free so far without a design of fraud that he seems most openly to take care that his creditors be not defrauded.
Titia servis quibusdam et ancillis nominatim directas libertates dedit, deinde ita scripsit: " et pedisequas omnes, quarum nomina in rationibus meis scripta sunt, liberas esse volo". quaesitum est, an eutychia, quae testamenti facti tempore inter pedisequas libertatem acceperat, mortis autem tempore inveniatur actori in contubernio tradita, ex generali capite pedisequarum libertatem consequi posset. respondit nihil impediri libertatem pedisequae, quod mortis demum tempore pedisequa esse desiit.
Titia gave to certain male slaves and maidservants manumissions expressly designated by name, then wrote thus: " and all the attendants (pedisequae), whose names are written in my accounts, I will that they be free". It was asked whether Eutychia, who at the time the testament was made had received liberty among the attendants (pedisequae), but at the time of death is found to have been delivered to the steward (actor) in contubernium, could obtain liberty from the general clause concerning the attendants (pedisequae). He answered that the liberty of the attendant (pedisequa) is not impeded by the fact that only at the time of death she ceased to be an attendant (pedisequa).
Puram et directam domini sui testamento libertatem stichus acceperat et ex hereditate multa per fraudem amovisse dicitur: quaesitum est, an non ante in libertatem proclamare debeat, quam ea, quae ex hereditate amovisse probari poterit, heredibus restitueret. respondit secundum ea, quae proponerentur, eum de quo quaereretur liberum esse. claudius: videtur absolvisse et id de quo quaeritur: nam heredibus satis consultum est edicto de furtis.
Stichus had received from his master’s testament pure and direct liberty, and he is said to have removed many things from the inheritance by fraud: it was asked whether he ought not to be proclaimed into freedom before he restored to the heirs those things which could be proved to have been removed from the inheritance. He answered, according to the matters proposed, that the person about whom inquiry was made is free. claudius: He seems also to have resolved that which is asked: for the heirs are sufficiently provided for by the edict concerning thefts.
Testamento ita cavit: " eudoni boulomai dovynai nomismata xilia, epei efvasen gennyvynai meta to tyn mytera autou genesvai eleuveran" : quaero, an, si eudo non probet se post manumissionem matris suae natum, possit his verbis testamenti libertatem consequi. respondit non oportere eiusmodi consultationem praeiudicium parare.
He provided thus in his testament: " eudoni boulomai dovynai nomismata xilia, epei efvasen gennyvynai meta to tyn mytera autou genesvai eleuveran" : I ask whether, if eudo does not prove that he was born after the manumission of his mother, he can by these words of the testament obtain liberty. He responded that such a consultation ought not to prepare a prejudgment.
Scio quosdam efficere volentes, ne servi sui umquam ad libertatem perveniant, hactenus scribere solitos: " stichus cum moreretur, liber esto". sed et iulianus ait libertatem, quae in ultimum vitae tempus conferatur, nullius momenti esse, cum testator impediendae magis quam dandae libertatis gratia ita scripsisse intellegitur. et ideo etiam si ita sit scriptum: " stichus si in capitolium non ascenderit, liber esto", nullius momenti hoc esse, si apparet in ultimum vitae tempus conferri libertatem testatorem voluisse, nec mucianae cautioni locum esse.
I know that some, wishing to bring it about that their slaves never arrive at liberty, have been accustomed to write thus: " Stichus, when he is at the point of death, let him be free." But Julianus also says that a freedom which is conferred for the final time of life is of no moment, since the testator is understood to have written thus for the sake of impeding rather than granting liberty. And therefore even if it is written thus: " Stichus, if he does not ascend the Capitol, let him be free," this is of no moment, if it appears that the testator wished liberty to be conferred at the last time of life, nor is there any place for the Mucian cautio.
Si quidam ex his, qui fideicommissam libertatem debeant, praesentes sint, alii ex iusta causa absint, alii latitent, perinde is cui fideicommissaria libertas relicta est liber erit, atque si soli, qui adessent et qui ex iusta causa abessent, rogati essent: pars ergo latitantis his proficit.
If certain of those who owe the fideicommissary freedom are present, others are absent for a just cause, and others are in hiding, the one to whom fideicommissary freedom has been left will be free just as if only those who were present and those who were absent for just cause had been requested: therefore the share of the one hiding accrues to these.
Si quis intestatus decedens codicillis dedit libertates neque adita sit ab intestato hereditas, favor constitutionis divi marci debet locum habere et hoc casu, quae iubet libertatem competere servo et bona ei addici, si idonee creditoribus caverit de solido, quod cuique debetur, solvendo:
If someone, dying intestate, has given manumissions in codicils, and the ab intestato inheritance has not been entered upon, the favor of the constitution of the deified Marcus ought to have place even in this case, which orders that liberty accrue to the slave and that the goods be adjudged to him, if he has suitably given security to the creditors for payment in full (in solidum) of what is owed to each:
And if indeed some grants are pure, and some under a condition, they can of course be adjudged at once; but if all are under a condition, what will it be consistent to say? whether we must wait for the condition to exist, or rather we adjudge at once, liberty then to take effect only if the condition shall have existed? the latter is more to be approved.
With the goods therefore adjudicated, direct manumissions given purely take effect at once; those from a day, when the day has come; those conditional, when the condition has arisen: nor will it be out of place to consider that even with the condition pending upon the manumissions, although all have been given under condition, the constitution has place; for where there is hope of freedom, there it must be said that, with even a slight occasion afforded—something that will be without loss to the creditors—adjudication is to be admitted.
Si sub condicione dandorum decem libertas data sit, sive heredi dare iussus sit qui libertatem accepit sive non sit dictum cui, an dando ei cui bona addicenda sunt perveniat ad libertatem, quaeri potest: et magis est, ut ei dare debeat, cui bona addicta sint, quasi translata condicio videatur. certe si alii quam heredi dare iussus sit, ipsi, cui iussus est, dabit.
If liberty has been granted under the condition of giving ten, whether the one who received liberty has been ordered to give to the heir or it has not been said to whom, it can be asked whether, by giving to him to whom the estate is to be adjudicated, he attains to liberty: and the more correct view is that he ought to give to him to whom the estate has been adjudicated, as if the condition seems transferred. Certainly, if he has been ordered to give to someone other than the heir, he will give to the very person to whom he has been ordered.
Illud videndum: ante caveri debet creditoribus et sic addici bona, an vero sub condicione haec sunt addicenda, si fuerit cautum? et puto sic comprehendendum decreto " si omnia ex constitutione divi marci facta sint".
This must be considered: ought security to be given to the creditors beforehand and thus the goods be adjudged, or rather should these be adjudged under a condition, if security shall have been given? and I think it should be thus included in the decree " if all things have been done according to the constitution of the deified Marcus".
Hi, qui ad libertatem pervenerunt, quorum liberti fiant, constitutio ostendit, ut qui directam libertatem, orcini erunt liberti, nisi forte is qui addici sibi bona desiderat ita velit addici, ut etiam hi, qui directam libertatem acceperunt, ipsius liberti fiant.
Those who have come to liberty—of whom they are to be the freedmen—the constitution shows this: that those who have received direct liberty will be Orcinian freedmen, unless perhaps the one who desires the goods to be adjudicated to himself should wish them to be adjudicated in such a way that even those who have received direct liberty become his own freedmen.
Qui autem volunt ipsius liberti fieri, utrum manumittendi sint ab eo an vero ipsa addictione hoc comprehendendum hac condicione sibi addici bona, ut hi etiam, qui directam libertatem acceperunt, ipsius fiant liberti? et puto hoc esse probandum, ut ipsa addictione hoc comprehendatur: idque verba quoque constitutionis admittunt.
Those, however, who wish to become his freedmen—must they be manumitted by him, or should this rather be encompassed by the adjudication itself, the goods being adjudged to him on this condition: that those also who have received direct freedom become his freedmen? And I think this is what should be approved, that this be included in the adjudication itself; and the words of the constitution also admit this.
Si alienos servos rogaverat heredem manumittere, utrum dicimus constitutionem locum habere an vero cessabit constitutio? magisque est, ut locus sit constitutioni: addictis enim bonis redimere et praestare libertatem cogitur a praetore.
If he had requested the heir to manumit slaves belonging to another, do we say the constitution has application, or will the constitution rather cease? It is more correct that there is room for the constitution: for, once the goods have been adjudicated, he is compelled by the praetor to redeem and to provide liberty.
Si non heres, sed legatarius rogatus fuerit manumittere, numquid cesset constitutio, quod legatis non debitis nec libertates possunt deberi? magisque est, ut idem favor sit: omnibus enim generaliter voluit libertatem praestare, quibus competeret, si hereditas adita fuisset.
If not the heir, but a legatee has been asked to manumit, does the constitution fall away, on the ground that, legacies not being owed, neither can liberties be owed? Rather, the view is that the same favor holds: for he wished to afford liberty generally to all to whom it would be competent, if the inheritance had been entered upon.
Eadem constitutio prospexit, ut, si fiscus bona admiserit, aeque libertates competant: ergo sive iacent bona fisco spernente sive adgnoverit, constitutio locum habet. ceterum si alia ratione adgnoscat, apparet cessare debere constitutionem: quare et si caducis legionis bona delata sint, idem erit probandum.
The same constitution provided that, if the fisc should admit the goods, liberties (manumissions) likewise are competent: therefore whether the goods lie idle with the fisc spurning them or whether it has acknowledged them, the constitution has application. But if it should acknowledge them on another ground, it is clear that the constitution ought to cease: wherefore, even if the goods have been delivered as the caduca of a legion (lapsed inheritances), the same must be approved.
Si in fraudem creditorum libertas data sit ab eo, qui mortis tempore solvendo non est, an competat? et si quidem fiscus bona non adgnoverit, forte competet libertas, quia solidum creditoribus offertur: atquin si adita hereditas fuisset, non competeret. certe si fiscus adgnovit hereditatem, facilius probabitur cessare libertatem, nisi si quis verba constitutionis secutus dixerit ipsum sibi imputare debere, qui addici sibi hac condicione bona voluit, ut libertates competant.
If liberty has been granted in fraud of creditors by one who at the time of death is not solvent, does it avail? And if indeed the Fisc has not acknowledged the goods, perhaps the liberty will avail, because the full amount is offered to the creditors; but yet, if the inheritance had been entered upon, it would not avail. Certainly, if the Fisc has acknowledged the inheritance, it will be more easily proved that the liberty ceases, unless someone, following the words of the Constitution, should say that he ought to impute it to himself, who wished the goods to be adjudged to himself on this condition, that the liberties should avail.
Si bona fuerint a fisco non adgnita eaque addicta libertatis conservandae gratia, an possit fiscus postea adgnoscere? et magis est, ne possit. plane si non certioratis praefectis aerario bona fuerunt libertatis conservandae causa addicta, videndum est, an constitutioni locus sit.
If goods were not recognized by the fisc and were adjudged for the sake of conserving liberty, can the fisc afterward recognize them? And the more correct view is that he cannot. Plainly, if, with the prefects of the aerarium not having been informed, the goods were adjudged for the sake of conserving liberty, it must be considered whether there is room for the constitution.
In fideicommissariis libertatibus si absente herede praetor pronuntiasset libertatem deberi, est et liber et defuncti libertus, si et servus eius fuit, aut heredis, si servus heredis sit. immo et si sine successore heres decesserit, conservandam esse libertatem senatus hadriani temporibus censuit.
In fideicommissary manumissions, if, with the heir absent, the praetor had pronounced that liberty is owed, he is both free and the freedman of the deceased, if he also was his slave; or of the heir, if he is the heir’s slave. Indeed, even if the heir has died without a successor, the Senate in the times of Hadrian decided that liberty must be preserved.
Decem legata sunt et rogatus est legatarius stichum emere et manumittere: falcidia intervenit et minoris emi servus non potest: quidam putant dodrantem accipere debere legatarium nec emere compellendum. idem putant etiam si suum servum rogatus sit manumittere et dodrantem ex legato acceperit, non esse compellendum manumittere. videamus, ne utique in hac specie aliud dicendum sit.
Ten have been left as a legacy, and the legatee has been asked to buy Stichus and manumit him: the Falcidian (portion) intervenes, and the slave cannot be bought for a lesser price. Some think that the legatee ought to receive the dodrans (three-quarters) and not be compelled to buy. They think the same also if he has been asked to manumit his own slave and has received a dodrans from the legacy, that he is not to be compelled to manumit. Let us see whether indeed in this case something else ought to be said.
but in the preceding (case) there are those who think the legatee must be compelled to redeem the slave, and that he subjected himself to the burden when he accepts even the three-quarters (dodrant); but if he is ready to restore back what he received, whether he should be heard is to be considered. but the heir must be compelled to furnish the whole ten, just as if the testator had added that they be rendered intact.
Si cui legata sint centum ita, ut servum alienum redimat et manumittat, et bonis heredis venditis partem, non totum persequatur, non alias debet consequi legatum, quam si caverit se manumissurum ( sed hoc tunc demum, si largiatur portio quam accepit ad servi pretium paratusque ^ paratuque^ sit dominus tanti eum vendere): alioquin exceptione doli debebit legatarius repelli.
If a hundred is bequeathed to someone on this condition, that he redeem another’s slave and manumit him, and, after the heir’s goods have been sold, he pursues a part and not the whole, he ought not otherwise to obtain the legacy than if he has given security that he will manumit (but this only then, if he contributes the portion which he received toward the slave’s price, and the owner is ready ^ prepared ^ to sell him for that amount); otherwise the legatee ought to be repelled by the exceptio doli.
Cum fidei heredis commisit, ne servus alienam servitutem patiatur experiri, potest confestim, ut fuerit alienatus, petere libertatem. sed ubi alienatio non est voluntaria, sed necessitas alienandi ex causa testatoris pendeat, prope est, ut nondum debeat praestari fideicommissum, quod potest videri defunctus nihil sensisse de huiusmodi casu alienationis.
When someone has committed to the faith of the heir that the slave should not suffer to experience alien servitude, he can immediately, as soon as he has been alienated, seek liberty. But where the alienation is not voluntary, but the necessity of alienating depends on the testator’s cause, it is almost the case that the fideicommissum ought not yet to be performed, since the deceased can be seen to have conceived nothing about an alienation-case of this kind.
Quidam in testamento scripserat: " illum et illum servos meos venire nolo". si ideo eos noluit venumdari, ut, si veneant, ad libertatem perveniant, praestanda erit libertas: nam et illi videtur libertas relicta, de quo ita scriptum est: " nolo alii quam tibi serviat". secundum haec igitur si quoquo modo vendere temptaverit servum, confestim peti poterit libertas nec, quominus praestet libertatem, proderit heredi, si eum redemerit, quia semel exstitit condicio.
Someone had written in his testament: " I do not want such-and-such of my slaves to be sold". If he refused to have them sold for this reason, namely, that, if they should be sold, they might attain liberty, liberty will have to be furnished: for liberty also is considered to have been left to him about whom it is written thus: " I do not want him to serve anyone other than you". According to these things, therefore, if he in any way should attempt to sell the slave, liberty can at once be claimed; nor, so as to prevent his furnishing liberty, will it benefit the heir if he buys him back, because the condition has once arisen.
Is cui ex fideicommisso libertas debebatur ab eo qui solvendo non erat passus est se bonae fidei emptori tradi: existimas in manumissum constituendam actionem exemplo eius, qui liberi hominis emptorem simulata servitute decepit? ego quoque adducor, ut putem recte adversus venditos actionem competere et magis similem videri statulibero, qui pridie, quam ex testamento ad libertatem perveniret, idem fieri passus est.
He to whom liberty was owed from a fideicommissum allowed himself to be delivered by one who was not solvent to a good‑faith purchaser: do you think that an action should be established against the manumitted one, on the model of the case of him who deceived the buyer of a free man by a simulated servitude? I too am led to think that an action properly lies against those who have been sold, and that it seems more akin to the statu‑liber who, on the day before he would attain liberty from the testament, allowed the same thing to be done.
Si praegnas ancilla moram non studio manumissoris, sed fortuito patiatur, ne manumitteretur, liberum quidem non pariet, sed cogetur qui manumittere debuit natum matri tradere, ut per eam perveniat ad libertatem.
If a pregnant female slave suffers a delay not by the manumitter’s intention but by chance, so that she is not manumitted, she will indeed not bear a free child; but he who ought to have manumitted will be compelled to hand over the newborn to the mother, so that through her he may attain to liberty.
Lucius titius testamento facto seiam uxorem suam, item titiam filiam communem aequis portionibus scripsit heredes. item alio capite: " erotem servum meum, qui et psyllus vocatur, liberum esse volo, si uxori meae placeat". cum itaque seia uxor lucii titii abstinuerit ab eadem hereditate et ex substitutione portio eius ad titiam filiam pervenerit, quaero, an eroti, qui et psyllus vocatur, ex his verbis supra scriptis libertas competit. modestinus eroti, quod uxor testatoris hereditate se abstinuit, non obesse respondit.
Lucius Titius, having made a testament, appointed Seia his wife, and likewise Titia their common daughter, as heirs in equal portions. Likewise, in another clause: “I want my slave Eros, who is also called Psyllus, to be free, if it please my wife.” Therefore, since Seia, the wife of Lucius Titius, has abstained from the said inheritance and, by substitution, her share has come to Titia the daughter, I ask whether freedom accrues to Eros, who is also called Psyllus, from the above-written words. Modestinus answered that it does not prejudice Eros that the testator’s wife abstained from the inheritance.
Is qui ex causa fideicommissi manumissurus est nullo modo deteriorem eius servi condicionem facere potest: ideoque nec vendere eum interdum alii potest, ut ab eo cui traditus est manumittatur, et, si tradiderit, redimere illum cogitur et manumittere: interest enim nonnumquam a sene potius manumitti quam a iuvene.
He who is about to manumit on the ground of a fideicommissum can in no way make the condition of that slave worse: and therefore he cannot even, at times, sell him to another, so that he may be manumitted by the one to whom he is delivered; and, if he has delivered him, he is compelled to redeem him and manumit him: for it sometimes makes a difference to be manumitted rather by an old man than by a young man.
Libertates etiam per fideicommissum dari possunt et quidem largius quam directo: nam non tantum propriis, sed et alienis servis per fideicommissum libertas dari potest: ita tamen, ut vulgaribus verbis et quibus evidenter voluntas testatoris exprimi possit.
Freedoms (manumissions) also can be given through a fideicommissum, and indeed more liberally than directly: for liberty can be given by fideicommissum not only to one’s own slaves but even to others’ slaves—provided, however, that it be in common (vulgar) words, such as can evidently express the will of the testator.
Testamento ita cavit: " pamphilus, si bene se gesserit rationibus meis, liber esto": quaesitum est, cum manente eodem testamento post aliquot annos decesserit nec ullae querellae locus de pamphilo circa rationes patroni sit, an ex testamento libertatem sit consecutus. respondit nihil proponi, cur non sit consecutus.
He thus provided in his testament: " pamphilus, if he shall have conducted himself well in my accounts, let him be free": it was asked, since with the same testament remaining in force he died after some years and there is no place for any complaint about pamphilus concerning the patron’s accounts, whether he has obtained liberty under the testament. He responded that nothing is set forth why he should not have obtained it.
Herede instituto marito per fideicommissum libertatem servis dedit, in quibus et sticho actori mariti: quaesitum est, cum absente domino isti praesidem provinciae adierint, ut libertas sibi praestaretur, quasi ex iusta causa heres abesset, et praeses provinciae pronuntiaverit libertatem deberi, an agi cum sticho possit, ut rationem actus a se administrati reddere compellatur. respondit non posse.
With her husband instituted as heir, she granted liberty to the slaves by fideicommissum, among whom also Stichus, the husband’s actor; the question was raised, since with the master absent these persons approached the praeses of the province that liberty be afforded to them, as if the heir were absent for a just cause, and the praeses of the province had pronounced that liberty was owed, whether suit could be brought against Stichus, that he be compelled to render an account of the business administered by himself. He responded that it could not be done.
Uxori dotem et alias res plures legavit et eius fidei commisit, ut aquilinum servum proprium mulieris apud consilium manumitteret: id negat se facere debere, quod ipsius proprius esset: quaero, an libertas ei debeatur. respondit uxorem, si ex testamento non solum dotem, sed etiam cetera legata praestari sibi vellet, compellendam ex causa fideicommissi aquilinum manumittere eumque, cum liber erit, petiturum ea quae sibi legata sunt.
He bequeathed to his wife a dowry and several other things, and entrusted to her good faith, as a fideicommissum, that she manumit Aquilinus, a slave who was the woman’s own, before a council: she says she ought not do this, because he was her own property: I ask whether freedom is owed to him. He replied that the wife, if she wished to have furnished to herself from the will not only the dowry but also the other legacies, must be compelled, on the ground of the fideicommissum, to manumit Aquilinus; and that he, when he will be free, will claim the things which have been bequeathed to him.
Apud iulianum ita scriptum est: " si heres rogatus servum manumittere ex trebelliano senatus consulto hereditatem restituerit, cogi debebit manumittere, et, si latitabit vel si iusta ex causa aberit, praetor causa cognita secundum senatus consulta ad eas causas pertinentia pronuntiare debebit. si vero servum usuceperit is, cui hereditas restituta fuerit, ipsum competit manumittere et eadem in personam eius observari conveniet, quae circa emptores custodiri solent". an haec vera putes? nam ego discendi cupiditate, quam solam vivendi rationem optimam in octavum et septuagesimum annum aetatis duxi, memor sum eius sententiae, qui dixisse fertur: kan ton heteron poda en ty sorw exw, prosmavein ti bouloimyn.
It is written thus in Julian: "If an heir, being asked to manumit a slave, shall have restored the inheritance under the Trebellian senatus consultum, he must be compelled to manumit; and if he hides himself or is absent for a just cause, the praetor, the case having been heard, ought to pronounce in accordance with the senatus consulta pertaining to such cases. But if the person to whom the inheritance has been restored shall have usucapted the slave, it is for him himself to manumit, and it will be suitable that the same things be observed with respect to his person which are wont to be maintained regarding buyers." Do you think these things true? For I, out of a desire for learning—which alone I have held to be the best method of living—have carried it into the seventy-eighth year of my age, and I am mindful of that maxim of the one who is said to have said: "even if I had the other foot in the coffin, I would wish to learn something in addition."
most excellent Aristo, both you and Octavenus thought that this slave, about whom inquiry was being made, did not belong to the fideicommissary inheritance, because the testator, by requesting the heir to manumit him, does not seem to have intended his restitution; if, however, he was given by the heir through error, then the things which Julianus writes are to be said.
" rogo, ne stichus alterius servitutem experiatur". intellegi datam fideicommissam libertatem placuit principi: quid enim tam contrarium est servituti quam libertas? nec tamen quasi post mortem heredis data videbitur: quod eo pertinet, ut, si vivus eum alienaverit, confestim libertas petatur nec prosit ad impediendam libertatis petitionem, si redemerit eum, cuius semel condicio extitit. idem probandum est et si non voluntaria alienatio ab herede facta est: nec refragabitur, quod non per ipsum alienatio facta est.
" I ask, that Stichus not experience another’s servitude". it has pleased the emperor that fideicommissary liberty be understood to have been given: for what is so contrary to servitude as liberty? nor, however, will it be seen as if given after the heir’s death; which pertains to this, that, if while alive he should alienate him, liberty is to be sought at once, nor will it avail to impede the petition for liberty if he buys back him for whom the condition has once arisen. the same is to be approved even if a non-voluntary alienation has been made by the heir: nor will it be an objection that the alienation was not made by himself.
Si legatario fundi decem pretii nomine relicta sint in hoc, ut servum suum manumittat, quamvis fundi legatum adgnoverit, si tamen pecuniae propter interventum falcidiae non adgnoverit, cogendus est et pecuniam accipere habita legis falcidiae ratione et servo fideicommissariam libertatem praestare, cum semel fundi legatum adgnovit.
If to a legatee there has been left a legacy of a farm, of ten by way of price, on this condition, that he manumit his own slave, although he has acknowledged the legacy of the farm, yet if he has not acknowledged the money on account of the intervention of the Falcidian law, he is to be compelled both to accept the money, account being taken of the Lex Falcidia, and to furnish the slave with fideicommissary freedom, since he has once acknowledged the legacy of the farm.
A duobus heredibus qui tres servos habebat petit, ut duos ex his quos voluissent manumittant: altero heredum latitante alter declarat, quos velit manumittere. potest dici fieri liberos, ut perinde libertas competat, ac si praesens solus manumittere potuisset. quod si ex servis unus decesserit, sive iusta ex causa absit heres sive fari non possit a quo petitum est, decernente praetore duos qui supersunt fieri liberos convenit.
He who had three slaves asked from his two heirs that they manumit two of them, whichever they should wish: with one of the heirs lying hidden, the other declares which he wishes to manumit. It can be said that they become free, so that liberty accrues just as if, he being present, he alone could have manumitted. But if one of the slaves has died, whether the heir is absent for a just cause or the one from whom the petition was made cannot speak, with the praetor decreeing, it is agreed that the two who survive become free.
Cum is qui fideicommissam libertatem praestare debet iusta ex causa abest aut latitat: aut quidam praesentes sunt, alii ex iusta causa absunt, nonnulli frustrandi gratia fideicommissi copiam sui non faciunt: aut ei, qui libertatem debuit, heres non extitit: aut suus heres hereditate se abstinuit: praetor pronuntiare debet ex testamento lucii titii fideicommissam libertatem competere. idque senatus consulto demonstratum est, quo senatus consulto comprehensum est, ne dubium et obscurum esset, cuius libertus fieret, praetorem pronuntiare debere, qui ex iusta causa et qui detractandae libertatis gratia absit.
When the person who is bound to furnish the fideicommissary freedom is away for a just cause or is skulking: or some are present, others are away for a just cause, and some, for the sake of frustrating the fideicommissum, do not make themselves available: or to him to whom he owed the freedom no heir has arisen: or his own heir has abstained from the inheritance: the praetor ought to pronounce that the fideicommissary freedom under the testament of Lucius Titius pertains. And this has been demonstrated by a senatorial decree, in which it is included, lest it be doubtful and obscure whose freedman he should become, that the praetor ought to pronounce who is away for a just cause and who is away for the sake of evading the freedom.
Servum peculii castrensis, quem pater fideicommissi verbis a legitimis filiis heredibus liberari voluit, filium militem vel qui militavit, si patris heres extitit, manumittere cogendum respondi, quoniam proprium manumisisse defunctus post donationem in filium collatam existimavit: portionem enim a fratre domino fratrem eundemque coheredem citra damnum voluntatis redimere non cogendum. nec ob eundem errorem cetera, quae pater in militiam profecturo filio donavit, fratri, qui mansit in potestate, conferenda, cum peculium castrense filius etiam inter legitimos heredes praecipuum retineat.
I replied that the son who is a soldier, or who has served, if he has become his father’s heir, must be compelled to manumit the slave of the castrense peculium whom the father, by words of a fideicommissum, wished to be freed by the legitimate sons as heirs, since the deceased judged that, after the donation conferred upon the son, he had manumitted what was the son’s own; for the brother is not to be compelled, without prejudice to the intention, to redeem the share from his brother who is the owner and likewise coheir. Nor, on account of the same mistake, are the other things which the father gave to the son when he was about to set out for military service to be contributed to the brother who remained in his power, since the son retains the castrense peculium as a preferential portion even among the legitimate heirs.
Etiam fideicommissaria libertas a filio post certam aetatem eius data, si ad eam puer non pervenit, ab herede filii praestituta die reddatur: quam sententiam iure singulari receptam ad cetera fideicommissa relicta porrigi non placuit.
Even a fideicommissary liberty granted by a son to take effect after the boy had reached a certain age, if the boy did not attain it, is to be rendered by the son’s heir on the appointed day; but it did not seem good that this opinion, received by a singular rule of law, be extended to other fideicommissa left.
Servum a filio post quinque annos, si eo tempore mercedem diurnam filio praestitisset, manumitti voluit: biennio proximo vagatus non praestiterat: condicione defectus videbatur. si tamen heres filius ( aut tutores eius) ministerium servi per biennium elegisset, eam rem, ex praeterito quod per heredem stetisset, impedimento residuae condicioni non esse constitit.
He wished a slave to be manumitted by his son after five years, if at that time he had furnished the daily wage to the son: in the next two years, having wandered, he had not furnished it: he seemed to have failed the condition. if, however, the heir the son ( or his tutors) had chosen the service of the slave for two years, it was established that that matter, from the past, since it had depended on the heir, was not an impediment to the remaining condition.
Hostium servo si fideicommissaria libertas fuerit adscripta, potest tractari, an non sit inefficax. et fortassis quis dixerit indignum esse civem romanum fieri hostium servum: sed si in casum relinquatur, in quem noster esse incipit, quid prohibet dicere libertatem valere?
If a fideicommissary liberty has been ascribed to a slave of the enemy, it can be discussed whether it is not inefficacious. And perhaps someone would say that it is unworthy that a Roman citizen come to be a slave of the enemy; but if it be left to the contingency into which he begins to be ours, what forbids saying that the liberty is valid?
Si servus in metallum fuerit damnatus, libertatem sperare non poterit. quid ergo, si fideicommissaria libertas ei relicta sit et poena metalli indulgentia principis sit liberatus? et est rescriptum ab imperatore nostro hunc in dominium prioris domini non restitui: cuius tamen sit, non adicitur.
If a slave has been condemned to the mines, he will not be able to hope for freedom. What then, if a fideicommissary freedom has been left to him and, by the emperor’s indulgence, he has been released from the punishment of the mines? And there is a rescript from our emperor that this man is not restored into the ownership of the former master; whose he is, however, is not added.
Sed et si ita scripsit: " ne eum alienes" " ne eum vendas", idem erit dicendum, si modo hoc animo fuerit adscriptum, quod voluerit eum testator ad libertatem perduci. ceterum si alia mente id scripsit, ut puta quia consilium dabat heredi retinere talem servum vel quia coercere voluit servum et cruciare, ne meliorem dominum experiatur, vel aliqua mente, non tribuendae libertatis animo, dicendum est cessare libertatis praestationem: et ita celsus libro vicensimo tertio digestorum scribit. non tantum enim verba fideicommissi, sed et mens testatoris tribuere solet libertatem fideicommissariam.
But also if he wrote thus: " do not alienate him" " do not sell him", the same must be said, provided only that it was set down with this intention, that the testator wished him to be brought to liberty. Otherwise, if he wrote it with another mind—as, for instance, because he was giving counsel to the heir to retain such a slave, or because he wished to coerce and torture the slave, lest he experience a better master, or with some other mind, not with the intention of granting liberty—it must be said that the performance of liberty ceases; and so Celsus writes in the 23rd book of the Digest. For not only the words of the fideicommissum, but also the mind of the testator, are wont to confer fideicommissary liberty.
Si quis tutorem ideo scripserit, quia liberum putavit, certissimum est neque libertatem peti posse neque tutelam libertatis praestationi patrocinari: et ita et Marcellus libro quinto decimo digestorum et imperator noster cum patre rescripsit.
If anyone has appointed a tutor for this reason, because he supposed him to be free, it is most certain that neither can liberty be sought nor can the tutelage patronize the prestation of liberty: and so Marcellus, in the fifteenth book of the Digest, and our emperor with his father, have written in a rescript.
Si quis servo pignerato directam libertatem dederit, licet videtur iure suptili inutiliter reliquisse, attamen quasi et fideicommissaria libertate relicta servus petere potest, ut ex fideicommisso liber fiat: favor enim libertatis suadet, ut interpretemur et ad libertatis petitionem procedere testamenti verba, quasi ex fideicommisso fuerat servus liber esse iussus: nec enim ignotum est, quod multa contra iuris rigorem pro libertate sint constituta.
If anyone has given direct liberty to a pledged slave, although by subtle law he seems to have left it to no effect, nevertheless, as if a fideicommissary liberty also had been left, the slave can petition that he be made free out of the fideicommissum: for the favor of liberty persuades that we interpret the words of the testament as proceeding also to a petition for liberty, as though by a fideicommissum the slave had been ordered to be free: nor indeed is it unknown that many things have been constituted for liberty against the rigor of the law.
Si quis alienum vel suum servum rogatus sit manumittere et minus sit in eo quod accepit iudicio testatoris, plus sit in pretio servi, an cogatur vel alienum redimere vel suum manumittere, videndum est. et Marcellus scripsit, cum ceperit legatum, cogendum omnimodo suum manumittere: et sane hoc iure utimur, ut multum intersit, suum quisque rogatus sit manumittere an alienum: si suum, cogetur manumittere, etiamsi modicum accepit: quod si alienum, non alias erit cogendus, quam si tanti possit redimere, quantum ex iudicio testatoris consecutus sit.
If someone has been asked to manumit either another’s slave or his own, and the amount that he received by the testator’s judgment is less while the slave’s price is higher, it must be considered whether he is compelled either to redeem the other’s slave or to manumit his own. And Marcellus wrote that, when he has taken the legacy, he must in every way be compelled to manumit his own. And indeed we use this law: that it makes a great difference whether one has been asked to manumit his own or another’s. If his own, he will be compelled to manumit, even if he has received only a small amount; but if another’s, he will not otherwise be compelled than if he can redeem it for as much as he has obtained by the testator’s judgment.
Plane si forte minus relictum est alicui, verum crevit legatum ex aliqua causa, aequissimum erit tanti eum cogi redimere, quantum ad eum pervenit, nec causari debere, quod minus illi relictum sit, cum creverit eius legatum per testamenti occasionem: nam et si ex mora fructus usuraeve fideicommisso accessissent, dicendum est libertatem praestandam.
Plainly, if by chance less has been left to someone, but the legacy has grown from some cause, it will be most equitable that he be compelled to redeem for as much as has come to him, nor ought he to plead that less was left to him, since his legacy has grown by occasion of the testament: for even if, from delay, fruits or interest have accrued to the fideicommissum, it must be said that liberty must be provided.
Quod si legatum sit imminutum, videndum, an cogatur servum manumittere qui speravit legatum uberius consecuturum. et putem, si legatum refundere sit paratus, non esse cogendum, idcirco, quia alia contemplatione adgnovit legatum, quod ex inopinato deminutum est: parato igitur ei a legato recedere concedendum erit, nisi forte residuum legatum ad pretium sufficit.
But if a legacy has been diminished, it must be considered whether he is to be compelled to manumit the slave who hoped he would obtain a more abundant legacy. And I think that, if he is prepared to refund the legacy, he is not to be compelled, for this reason: because he acknowledged the legacy in a different consideration, which has been unexpectedly reduced; therefore permission shall be granted to him to withdraw from the legacy, unless perhaps the remaining legacy suffices for the price.
Quid ergo, si plures servos rogatus sit manumittere et ad quorundam pretium sufficiat id quod relictum est, ad omnium non sufficiat, an cogendus sit quosdam manumittere? et putem debere eum cogi vel eos, quorum pretium patitur, manumittere. quis ergo statuet, qui potius manumittitur?
What then, if he has been asked to manumit several slaves, and that which has been left suffices for the price of some but does not suffice for all—must he be compelled to manumit certain ones? And I think he ought to be compelled to manumit those whose price the remainder permits. Who, then, will determine which is to be manumitted in preference?
whether the legatee himself should choose whom he is to manumit, or the heir from whom the legacy is due? And perhaps someone would rightly say that the order of the writing should be followed: but if no order appears, either they must be assigned by lot, lest the praetor incur any suspicion of ambition or favor, or it ought to be decided upon them, with the merits of each alleged.
Si cui legatum sit relictum isque rogatus sit servum proprium manumittere eique quod legatum est praestare, an fideicommissaria libertas praestanda sit? quosdam movet, quia, si fuerit coactus ad libertatem praestandam, ex necessitate ad fideicommissi quoque praestationem erit cogendus: et sunt qui putant non esse cogendum. nam et si mihi legatum fuisset relictum et id rogatus essem titio restituere confestim et praeterea fideicommissam libertatem servo meo praestare, sine dubio diceremus non esse me cogendum ad libertatis praestationem, quia nihil pretii nomine videor accepisse. plane si forte post tempus fuerit rogatus restituere sibi legatum relictum, dici potest propter medii temporis fructum cogendum eum manumittere,
If a legacy has been left to someone and he has been asked to manumit his own slave and to furnish to him that which has been bequeathed, is fideicommissary freedom to be furnished? Some are moved to say that, because if he were compelled to furnish the freedom, by necessity he would also be compelled to the performance of the fideicommissum; and there are those who think he should not be compelled. For also, if a legacy had been left to me and I had been asked to restore it immediately to Titius and, besides, to furnish fideicommissary freedom to my slave, without doubt we would say that I am not to be compelled to the furnishing of the freedom, because I seem to have received nothing by way of price. Clearly, if by chance he has been asked, after a time, to restore to himself the legacy left, it can be said that on account of the fruits of the intervening time he is to be compelled to manumit,
Si rogatus quis alii fundum, cum morietur, alii centum praestare si tantum ex fructibus fundi perceperit, quantum est in fideicommisso, cogendum eum praestare. sic fit, ut sit in pendenti fideicommissum pecuniarium et fideicommissae libertatis praestatio.
If someone, having been asked, is to give a farm to one person when he dies, and to furnish another with one hundred, provided he has received from the fruits of the farm as much as is in the fideicommissum, he must be compelled to furnish it. Thus it comes about that both the pecuniary fideicommissum and the performance of liberty by fideicommissum remain in suspense.
Quotiens autem fideicommissaria libertas relinquitur efficaciter, in ea causa est, ut neque alienatione neque usucapione extingui possit: ad quemcumque enim pervenerit is servus, cui fideicommissa libertas relicta est, cogi eum manumittere: et ita est saepissime constitutum. cogetur igitur is, ad quem servus pervenerit, fideicommissam libertatem praestare si hoc maluit is qui rogatus est: latius enim acceptum est, ut et si sub condicione fuit ei libertas relicta et pendente condicione alienatus sit, attamen cum sua causa alienetur. quod si nolit ab eo manumitti, sed potius ab eo velit ad libertatem perduci, qui erat rogatus eum manumittere, audiri eum oportere divus hadrianus et divus pius rescripserunt.
Whenever, moreover, fideicommissary liberty is left effectively, the case is such that it can be extinguished neither by alienation nor by usucaption: for to whomever the slave shall have come, to whom fideicommissary liberty has been left, he is compelled to manumit; and so it has most frequently been established. Therefore he to whom the slave has come will be compelled to furnish the fideicommissary liberty, if he who was asked preferred this: for it has been more broadly accepted that even if liberty was left to him under a condition, and while the condition is pending he is alienated, nevertheless he is alienated with his own cause. But if he does not wish to be manumitted by that person, but rather wishes to be brought to freedom by the one who had been asked to manumit him, the deified Hadrian and the deified Pius rescripted that he ought to be heard.
Nay rather, even if he has already been manumitted, yet if he prefers to become the freedman of the one who had been asked to manumit him, he must be heard—the deified Pius wrote in a rescript. But also, if from the person of the manumitter or from whatever cause the manumitted can show that his right is being injured by the manumission or even has been injured, aid ought to be afforded to him under these constitutions, lest, contrary to the will of the deceased, a harsher condition be established for him. Clearly, if such is the will of the deceased, that he wished to be manumitted even by anyone whatsoever, it must be said that the constitutions written above cease to apply.
Cum vero is qui rogatus est non alienum servum manumittere mortalitatis necessitate vel bonorum publicatione ad alium servum perduxit, magis opinor constitutionibus esse locum, ne deterior condicio fideicommissae libertatis fiat. nam et cum quidam rogatus esset, cum moreretur, servum manumittere isque decessisset libertate servo non data, perinde eum habendum constitutum est atque si ad libertatem ab eo perductus esset: potest enim eo testamento dare libertatem utique directam. sic fit, ut, quotiens quis libertatem accepit fideicommissariam, si ab alio quam qui erat rogatus manumittatur, auxilium constitutionum habeat perindeque habeatur atque si ab eo manumissus fuisset, quoniam fideicommissis libertatibus favor exhibetur nec intercidere solet destinata fideicommissa libertas: qui enim ea donatus est, in possessionem libertatis interim esse videtur.
When, however, the one who was asked to manumit a slave who was not another’s, by the necessity of mortality or by the publication of his goods, has brought him into the condition of being another’s slave, I think rather that there is room for the constitutions, lest the condition of the fideicommissary liberty be made worse. For even when someone had been asked to manumit a slave when he should be dying, and he passed away with liberty not given to the slave, it has been established that he is to be regarded just as if he had been brought by him to liberty; for by that will he can grant liberty, namely direct liberty. Thus it comes about that whenever someone has received liberty in fideicommissary form, if he is manumitted by someone other than the one who had been asked, he has the aid of the constitutions and is treated just as if he had been manumitted by that person, since favor is shown to fideicommissary liberties and the liberty devised by fideicommissum is not wont to lapse: for the one who has been endowed with it is meanwhile considered to be in possession of liberty.
Apparet igitur subventum fideicommissis libertatibus, ut in re mora facta esse his videatur et ex die quidem, quo libertas peti potuit, matri traderentur manumittendi causa, ex die vero, quo petita est, ingenui nascantur. plerumque enim per ignaviam vel per timiditatem eorum, quibus relinquitur libertas fideicommissa, vel ignorantiam iuris sui vel per auctoritatem et dignitatem eorum, a quibus relicta est, vel serius petitur vel in totum non petitur fideicommissa libertas: quae res obesse libertati non debet. quod igitur defendimus, ita determinandum est, ut ingenui quidem exinde nascantur, ex quo mora libertati facta est, manumitti autem partum dici debeat, ex quo peti libertas potuit, quamvis non sit petita.
It therefore appears that aid has been brought to fideicommissary liberties, so that in the matter a delay seems to have been made to them, and that from the day on which the freedom could have been sought, they be handed over to the mother for the sake of manumitting, but from the day, in truth, on which it was sought, the children are born freeborn. For for the most part, through the sloth or timidity of those to whom fideicommissary freedom is left, or through ignorance of their own right, or through the authority and dignity of those by whom it has been left, the fideicommissary freedom is either sought later or not sought at all: a circumstance which ought not to harm liberty. What therefore we maintain must be determined thus: that the children are born freeborn from the time from which delay was made to the freedom, but the offspring ought to be said to have been manumitted from the time from which the freedom could have been sought, although it was not sought.
certainly for those under twenty-five years, aid is also to be afforded in this, so that there be deemed to be delay in the matter: for in the same manner in which it has been decreed and established by the deified Severus that there is delay in the matter concerning pecuniary fideicommissary bequests which have been left to minors, much more ought this same thing to be admitted also in the case of liberties (manumissions).
Cum quidam caecilius ancillam, quam pignori obligaverat, dimisso creditore per fideicommissum manumitti voluisset et heredibus creditorem non liberantibus infantes, qui postea erant editi, venissent a creditore, imperator noster cum patre rescripsit secundum ea, quae divo pio placuerint, ne pueri ingenuitate destinata fraudarentur, pretio emptori restituto perinde eos ingenuos fore, ac si mater eorum suo tempore manumissa fuisset.
When a certain Caecilius, having pledged a maidservant as a pignus, desired that she be manumitted by fideicommissum once the creditor had been discharged, but the heirs did not release the creditor, and the infants who were afterwards born had come to the creditor, our emperor, together with his father, rescripted, in accordance with what pleased the Deified Pius, that the children not be defrauded of the destined freeborn status, and that, the price being restored to the purchaser, they would be freeborn just as if their mother had been manumitted in due time.
Idem imperator noster cum patre rescripsit, si post quinquennium mortis testatoris tabulae testamenti apertae essent vel codicilli et partus medio tempore editus sit, ne fortuita mora servitutem partui irrogaverit, matri partum tradendum, ut ab ea ad libertatem perducatur.
Our same emperor, together with his father, rescripted that, if after a quinquennium from the death of the testator the tablets of the testament or the codicils were opened, and an offspring were brought forth in the meantime, lest a fortuitous delay impose servitude upon the offspring, the offspring is to be handed over to the mother, so that by her it may be brought to liberty.
Non tamen si a substituto impuberis fideicommissa libertas data sit ancillae eaque vivo impubere partum ediderit, vel si post tempus vel sub condicione libertatem acceperit et ante diem vel condicionem partum ediderit, ad libertatem partus perducetur, quia horum alia condicio est: non enim moram fortuitam, sed ex voluntate testantis passi sunt.
Nevertheless, if fideicommissary freedom has been given by the substitute of a minor to a female slave, and she, while the minor is alive, has borne offspring, or if she has received freedom after a term or under a condition and, before the day or the condition, has borne offspring, the offspring will not be brought into freedom, because the condition of these cases is different: for they have suffered not a fortuitous delay, but one arising from the will of the testator.
Si pro non scripto habitus sit servus alicui legatus, cui servo per fideicommissum libertas adscripta est, quaestionis est, num fideicommissa libertas debeat intercidere et an, si servus petat fideicommissam libertatem ab eo, penes quem remansisset pro non scripto habito legato quod erat relictum ei qui eum rogatus fuerat manumittere, vel si ipse servus, ut supra dictum est, fuit legatus, an libertas non debeat intercidere. et putem debere dici fideicommissam libertatem salvam esse, licet ad eum nihil pervenerit, qui eum rogatus erat manumittere: cogetur igitur libertatem praestare is ad quem pervenit legatum, quia libertas fideicommissa nullum impedimentum pati debet.
If a slave bequeathed to someone is treated as not written, to which slave liberty has been ascribed by fideicommissum, the question arises whether the fideicommissary liberty ought to lapse, and whether, if the slave seeks the fideicommissary liberty from him with whom it had remained, the legacy having been treated as not written that had been left to the one who had been asked to manumit him, or if the slave himself, as said above, was bequeathed, the liberty ought not to lapse. And I think it should be said that the fideicommissary liberty remains safe, although nothing has come to him who had been asked to manumit: therefore he to whom the legacy has come will be compelled to furnish the liberty, because fideicommissary liberty ought to suffer no impediment.
Subventum libertatibus est senatus consulto, quod factum est temporibus divi traiani rubrio gallo et caelio hispone consulibus in haec verba: " si hi, a quibus libertatem praestari oportet, evocati a praetore adesse noluissent, si causa cognita praetor pronuntiasset libertatem his deberi, eodem iure statum servari, ac si directo manumissi essent".
aid was afforded to claims to freedom by a senatus consultum, which was enacted in the time of the deified Trajan, when Rubrius Gallus and Caelius Hispo were consuls, in these words: "if those by whom it is proper that freedom be furnished, having been summoned by the praetor, should have been unwilling to appear, and if, the case having been heard, the praetor should have pronounced that freedom is owed to them, their status is to be maintained by the same law, as if they had been manumitted directly".
Hoc senatus consultum ad eos pertinet, quibus ex causa fideicommissi libertas debeatur. proinde si libertas non deberetur, obreptum tamen praetori est de libertate pronuntiatumque, ex hoc senatus consulto libertas non competit. et ita imperator noster cum patre suo rescripsit.
This senatorial decree pertains to those to whom liberty is owed by reason of a fideicommiss. Accordingly, if liberty was not owed, yet the praetor was imposed upon and a pronouncement about liberty was made, under this senatorial decree liberty does not accrue. And thus our emperor, together with his father, has written in a rescript.
Hoc senatus consultum ad omnes pertinet latitantes, quos fideicommissam libertatem praestare oportet. proinde sive heres rogatus sive quis alius, senatus consulto locus est: omnes enim omnino, qui deberent fideicommissam libertatem praestare, in ea causa sunt, ut ad senatus consultum pertineant.
This senatorial decree pertains to all who are in hiding, whom it behooves to furnish fideicommissary freedom. accordingly, whether it be the heir asked or anyone else, the senatorial decree has application: for absolutely all who ought to furnish fideicommissary freedom are in such a case as to fall under the senatorial decree.
Si eum servum, cui erat fideicommissa libertas relicta, distraxerit is qui erat rogatus et emptor quidem latitet, is autem qui rogatus erat praesens sit, an rubriano senatus consulto locus sit? et ait Marcellus rubrianum locum habere, quia abest quem manumittere oportet.
If he who had been asked has sold off that slave to whom freedom was left by fideicommissum, and the buyer indeed skulks in hiding, while he who had been asked is present, is there room for the Rubrian senatus consultum? And Marcellus says that the Rubrian has place, because the one who ought to be manumitted is absent.
Quorum si quosdam iusta ex causa abesse pronuntiatum fuerit, eorum, qui ex iusta causa abessent, et eorum, qui praesentes fideicommissae libertati moram non facient, perinde libertus erit atque si soli rogati ad iustam libertatem perduxissent.
If, of these, it has been pronounced that some are absent for a just cause, then, as to those who were absent for a just cause, and those who, being present, will not cause delay to the fideicommissary liberty, he will be a freedman just as if those alone who were asked had brought him to lawful freedom.
Si quis servum non hereditarium rogatus manumittere latitet, factum est senatus consultum aemilio iunco et iulio severo consulibus in haec verba: " placere, si quis ex his, qui fideicommissam libertatem ex quacumque causa deberent servo, qui mortis tempore eius qui rogavit non fuerit, isque adesse negabitur, praetor cognoscat et, si in ea causa esse videbitur, ut, si praesens esset, manumittere cogi deberet, id ita esse pronuntiet: cumque ita pronuntiasset, idem iuris erit, quod esset, si ita, ut ex fideicommisso manumitti debuisset, manumissus esset".
If anyone, having been asked to manumit a slave not of the inheritance, skulks in hiding, a senatorial decree was made, under the consuls Aemilius Iuncus and Julius Severus, in these words: "it is the pleasure that, if any of those who for whatever cause would owe fideicommissary liberty to a slave who, at the time of the death of the one who requested it, was not his, and it is denied that he is present, the praetor shall take cognizance; and, if he shall seem to be in such a case that, were he present, he ought to be compelled to manumit, he shall pronounce that this is so: and when he has so pronounced, the same right shall obtain as would be if he had been manumitted in such a way as, by fideicommissum, he ought to have been manumitted".
Ex iusta causa abesse eos demum dicendum est, qui non habent iniustam causam absentiae, cum sufficiat, quod non in fraudem libertatis absint, quo magis videantur ex iusta causa abesse: ceterum non est necesse, ut rei publicae causa absint. proinde si alibi domicilium quis habeat, alibi petatur fideicommissaria libertas, dicendum est non esse necesse evocari eum, qui fideicommissam libertatem debere dicitur, quia etiam absente eo, si constiterit libertatem deberi, pronuntiari potest iusta de causa eum abesse, nec libertum perdit: namque eos, qui apud sedes suas et domicilium suum sunt, nemo dubitabit ex iusta causa abesse.
It should be said, finally, that they are absent for a just cause who do not have an unjust cause of absence, since it suffices that they are not absent in fraud of liberty, whereby they are the more seen to be absent for a just cause; moreover, it is not necessary that they be absent for the sake of the commonwealth. Accordingly, if someone has a domicile elsewhere, and the fideicommissary liberty is sought elsewhere, it should be said that it is not necessary to summon him who is said to owe the fideicommissary liberty, because even with him absent, if it is established that liberty is owed, it can be pronounced that he is absent for a just cause, nor does he lose the freedman: for as to those who are at their homes and their domicile, no one will doubt that they are absent for a just cause.
Si quis, posteaquam in ea causa esse coeperit, ut ex fideicommisso manumitti deberet, alienatus sit, is quidem, cuius interim servus erit, manumittere cogetur: sed hic non distinguitur, iusta an non iusta causa absit: omnimodo enim libertus ei servatur.
If anyone, after he has begun to be in such a condition that he ought to be manumitted by fideicommissum, is alienated, the one, indeed, whose slave he will be in the meantime will be compelled to manumit; but here no distinction is made whether a just cause be absent or not: in every way the freedman is preserved to him.
Cum quasi absente quodam decretum fuisset interpositum ex iusta causa eum abesse, is autem mortuus iam esset, imperator noster rescripsit in heredis personam transferendum decretum eoque loco ius eius esse, quasi hunc ipsum ex eadem causa abesse pronuntiasset.
When, as though someone were absent, a decree had been entered, on the just ground that he was away, and he had already died, our emperor ruled by rescript that the decree be transferred to the person of the heir, and that his right stand in the same position as if he had declared this very man to be absent for the same cause.
Si vero pupillus tutorem habet isque nolit ad libertatem praestandam auctor esse, adeo non debet impedimento esse neque pupillo, ut libertos non habeat, neque libertati, ut divi fratres rescripserint ex causa fideicommissi libertatem praestari debere servo, perinde atque si ab ipso pupillo tutore auctore manumissus esset.
But if a ward has a guardian and he is unwilling to give his authority for the furnishing of liberty, he ought so little to be an impediment either to the ward—so as to prevent his having freedmen—or to liberty, that the deified brothers issued a rescript that, by reason of a fideicommissum, liberty ought to be furnished to the slave, just as if he had been manumitted by the ward himself with the guardian authorizing.
Adeundus est autem etiam ex hac causa praetor, praesertim cum rescripto divi pii effectum est, ut, si quidam ex rogatis praesentes sunt, alii latitent, alii ex causa absint, intercedente infantis persona non omnium libertus efficiatur, sed tantum infantis et eorum qui ex iusta causa absunt vel etiam praesentium.
The praetor must be approached also for this cause, especially since by a rescript of the deified Pius it has been effected that, if certain of those requested are present, others lie hidden, others are absent for cause, with the person of an infant intervening he not become the freedman of all, but only of the infant and of those who are absent for a just cause, as well as of those present.
Si plures heredes sunt instituti et inter eos qui fari non potest, sed non ipse rogatus sit servum manumittere, non oportere intercidere libertatem ob hoc, quod coheredibus suis vendere eum infans non possit: et exstat quidem senatus consultum vitrasianum, sed et divus pius cassio dextro rescripsit ita rem explicari, ut partes servorum, quibus per fideicommissum libertas data est, iusto pretio aestimentur atque ita servus ab his qui rogati sunt manumittatur. hi autem, qui eos manumiserunt, pretii nomine perinde fratribus et coheredibus suis obligati erunt, atque si ob eam rem ex iudicati causa cum his agi possit.
If several heirs have been instituted, and among them one who cannot speak (an infant), but he himself has not been asked to manumit the slave, liberty ought not to be forfeited on the ground that the infant cannot sell him to his coheirs. Indeed, the Senatus Consultum Vitrasianum exists; and the deified Pius also issued a rescript to Cassius Dexter that the matter be explained thus: that the shares in the slaves to whom liberty has been given by fideicommissum be appraised at a just price, and so the slave be manumitted by those who were asked. Those, however, who have manumitted them will be bound, by way of the price, to their brothers and coheirs, just as if on that account they could be sued as on the ground of a judgment-debt.
In furiosi persona divus pius rescripsit fideicommissam libertatem non impediri sub condicione scripti heredis, quem compotem mentis non esse adfirmatur. igitur si constiterit ei recte datam per fideicommissum libertatem, decretum interponetur, quo ^ quod^ id ipsum complectatur, ad exemplum infantis.
In the case of a madman, the deified Pius wrote in a rescript that fideicommissary liberty is not impeded under the condition of the named heir, who is affirmed not to be of sound mind. Therefore, if it is established that liberty has been duly given to him through a fideicommissum, a decree will be interposed, which ^ that^ encompasses this very matter, on the model of an infant.
Si alter sine successore decesserit, alter ex iusta causa absit, extat rescriptum divorum marci et veri perinde dicentium eum ad libertatem perventurum, ac si ab eo qui sine successore decessit et ab eo qui ex iusta causa abesset ad libertatem ut oportuit perductus esset.
If one has died without a successor, and the other is absent for a just cause, there exists a rescript of the deified Marcus and Verus stating to the same effect that he will attain freedom, just as if he had been brought to freedom, as was proper, by the one who died without a successor and by the one who was absent for a just cause.
Eleganter quaeri potest, cum heres sine successore decedit, utrum exspectari debet, donec certum sit heredem vel bonorum possessorem non extaturum, an vero etiam dum incertum est ( forte deliberante herede scripto) possit ad libertatem pervenire: et melius est exspectari oportere, quoad certum esse coeperit successorem non extaturum.
An elegant question can be raised: when an heir dies without a successor, whether one ought to wait until it is certain that an heir or a possessor of the goods will not appear, or whether even while it is uncertain (perhaps the named heir is deliberating) he can attain liberty; and the better view is that one ought to wait until it becomes certain that no successor will appear.
Quamquam ex irritis codicillis libertates non debeantur, attamen si heres hos codicillos ratos habuit et ex his quaedam praestitit et servos praestandae fideicommissae libertatis gratia in libertate morari voluit, ad iustam libertatem eos pervenisse rescriptum imperatoris nostri et divi patris eius declarat.
Although from invalid codicils manumissions are not owed, nevertheless if the heir has held these codicils as ratified and has performed certain things from them, and has wished the slaves, for the sake of providing the fideicommissary liberty, to remain at liberty, the rescript of our emperor and of his deified father declares that they have attained to rightful liberty.
Si is cuius servus est nolit eum vendere, ut manumitteretur, nullae praetoris partes sunt: idem est et si pluris iusto vendere velit. sin autem certo quidem pretio, quod non prima facie videtur esse iniquum, dominus servum vendere paratus est, is vero, qui rogatus est manumittere, immodicum id esse nititur, praetoris partes erunt interponendae, ut iusto pretio volenti domino dato libertas ab emptore praestetur. quod si et dominus vendere paratus sit et servus velit manumitti, cogendus est heres redimere et manumittere, nisi dominus velit servum manumittere, ut actio sibi pretii in heredem detur: idque faciendum est etiam, si heres latitet: et ita imperator antoninus rescripsit.
If he whose slave it is is unwilling to sell him, in order that he may be manumitted, there is no part for the praetor: the same is so if he wishes to sell for more than a just price. But if at a certain price, which does not prima facie seem to be inequitable, the owner is prepared to sell the slave, while the person who has been asked to manumit strives to show that it is immoderate, it will be the praetor’s part to intervene, so that, a just price being given to the willing owner, liberty may be provided by the purchaser. But if both the owner is prepared to sell and the slave wishes to be manumitted, the heir must be compelled to redeem and manumit, unless the owner is willing to manumit the slave, so that an action for the price may be given to him against the heir: and this must be done even if the heir skulks in hiding; and thus Emperor Antoninus has rescripted.
Invito tamen servo neque alii neque domino eam rem persequi concedendum est, quia non tale sit hoc fideicommissum, ex quo domino quid adquiratur: alioquin ipsi datum videretur. quod potest contingere, si testator pluris eum servum, quam quanti est, redimi ac manumitti voluit: nam tunc et domino erit fideicommissi persecutio, cuius interest praeter verum pretium id, quod plus ei iussus est dare, consequi, et servi, ut ad libertatem perveniat.
Nevertheless, with the slave unwilling, neither another nor the master should be allowed to pursue that matter, because this fideicommissum is not of such a kind that anything is acquired for the master: otherwise, it would seem to have been given to him himself. This can happen if the testator wished that the slave be bought for more than he is worth and be manumitted: for then both the master will have pursuit of the fideicommissum, whose interest it is to obtain, besides the true price, the excess which he was ordered to pay, and the slave, so that he may arrive at liberty.
Quod eveniet et si rem alienam certa pecunia redimere atque alii praestare heres vel legatarius intellegerentur: namque tunc et domino rei et ei, cui eadem praestare deberet, persecutionem esse: utriusque enim interesse et domini, ut praeter pretium accipiat, quo pluris eam testator redimi iussit, et eius cui relicta est, uti eam habeat.
Which will likewise come to pass if the heir or the legatee were understood to redeem another’s property for a fixed sum of money and to render it to someone else: for then there is an action both for the owner of the thing and for him to whom he ought to render the same; for it is the concern of both: of the owner, that he receive, in addition to the price, the amount by which the testator ordered it to be redeemed at a higher value, and of the one to whom it was left, that he have it.
Erit rubriano senatus consulto locus, etiamsi sub condicione libertas data sit, si modo per ipsum servum non fiet, quo minus condicioni pareat: nec refert in dando an in faciendo an in aliquo casu condicio consistat. immo etiam amittit libertum heres, si condicioni impedimentum fecerit, etsi filius defuncti sit, quamvis alio iure habiturus sit libertum. nonnullam enim et hic poenam patitur: nam et si in servitutem petierit aut capitis accusaverit, perdit bonorum possessionem contra tabulas.
There will be place for the Rubrian senatorial decree, even if freedom has been given under a condition, provided only that it is not through the slave himself that it comes about that he does not comply with the condition: nor does it matter whether the condition consists in giving or in doing or in some event. Nay rather, the heir also loses the freedman, if he has created an impediment to the condition, even if he is the son of the deceased, although he would have had the freedman by another right. For here too he suffers some penalty: for even if he has sued him into slavery or has accused him on a capital charge, he loses the bonorum possessio “against the will.”
Servus legatus erat calpurnio flacco isque rogatus erat eum manumittere et, si non manumisisset, idem servus titio legatus erat et is aeque rogatus erat, ut eum manumitteret: si non manumisisset, liber esse iussus erat. sabinus dicit inutiliter legatum fore et ex testamento eum continuo liberum futurum.
A slave had been bequeathed to Calpurnius Flaccus, and he had been asked to manumit him; and, if he should not manumit, the same slave had been bequeathed to Titius, and he likewise had been asked to manumit him: if he should not manumit, he was ordered to be free. Sabinus says the legacy would be ineffectual, and that under the testament he would immediately be free.
Gaii cassii non est recepta sententia existimantis et heredi et legatario remittendam interdum proprii servi manumittendi necessitatem, si vel usus tam necessarius esset, ut eo carere non expediret, veluti dispensatoris paedagogive liberorum, vel tantum delictum est, ut ultio remittenda non esset: visum est enim ipsos in sua potestate habuisse: nam potuissent discedere a causa testamenti: qua non omissa debere voluntati defuncti obsequi.
The opinion of Gaius Cassius was not accepted, who judged that both for an heir and for a legatee the necessity of manumitting their own slave should sometimes be remitted, if either the use was so necessary that it would not be expedient to do without him, as in the case of a dispensator or a pedagogue of the children, or the offense was so great that retribution ought not to be remitted: for it seemed that they themselves had it in their own power; for they could have withdrawn from the claim under the testament; which not having been omitted, they ought to comply with the will of the deceased.
Neque infantes neque furiosi neque ab hostibus capti neque hi, quos religio aut honestior causa vel calamitas aliqua vel maior res familiaris aut capitis famaeve periculum aut similis causa moretur, rubriano senatus consulto continentur: ac ne pupilli quidem, qui tutores non habent, aut eos habeant, quos earum quae causa detinet. sed nec, si hi data opera sui potestatem non faciunt, puto pupillis libertos eripi, quia et iniquum est facto tutoris, qui forsitan solvendo non sit, pupillum damno adfici, et senatus consulto non continetur alius quis quam qui ex causa fideicommissi debet praestare libertatem. quid ergo est?
Neither infants nor the insane nor those captured by enemies nor those whom religion or a more honorable cause, or some calamity, or a greater domestic concern, or danger to life or to reputation, or a similar cause detains, are encompassed by the Rubrian senatus consultum: nor even wards who have no guardians, or have guardians whom some one of these causes detains. But not even if these, deliberately, do not make themselves available (do not give access to their authority), do I think freedmen should be snatched from the wards, because it is unjust that by the act of the guardian, who perhaps is not solvent, the ward be affected with loss, and the senatus consultum includes no one other than the person who, by reason of a fideicommissum, is bound to furnish liberty. What, then, is the case?
Si pure data sit fideicommissa libertas et is servus rationes administrasse dicatur, divus marcus rescripsit moram libertati non esse faciendam, ex continenti tamen arbitrum dandum esse, qui computationem ineat. verba rescripti ita se habent: " aequius videtur trophimo ex causa fideicommissi praestari libertatem, quam sine condicione reddendarum rationum datam esse constat, neque humanum fuerit ob rei pecuniariae quaestionem libertati moram fieri. qua tamen repraesentata confestim arbiter a praetore erit dandus, apud quem rationem, quam administrasse eum apparuit, ex fide reddat". tantum igitur rationes reddere cogetur.
If fideicommissary liberty has been given purely (unconditionally), and that slave is said to have administered accounts, the deified Marcus rescripted that no delay ought to be made to the liberty; nevertheless, immediately an arbiter is to be appointed, who shall enter upon the computation. The words of the rescript are as follows: "It seems more equitable that liberty be furnished to Trophimus on the ground of the fideicommissum, since it is established that it was given without the condition of rendering accounts, nor would it be humane that, on account of a pecuniary question, delay be made to liberty. Yet, this having been presented, an arbiter shall forthwith be appointed by the praetor, before whom he shall in good faith render the account which he appears to have administered." Therefore he will be compelled only to render accounts.
but as to whether he must also restore the remainder, nothing is added, nor do I think he should be compelled: for as to that which he transacted in servitude, after freedom he cannot be proceeded against. clearly, the bodies of the accounts, and, if he detains any things or monies from these, he is to be compelled by the praetor to restore; likewise to furnish particulars item by item.
In testamento, quod perfectum non erat, alumnae suae libertatem et fideicommissa dedit. cum omnia ut ab intestato egissent, quaesiit imperator, an ut ex causa fideicommissi manumissa fuisset: et interlocutus est, etiamsi nihil ab intestato pater petisset, pios tamen filios debuisse manumittere eam, quam pater dilexisset. pronuntiavit igitur recte eam manumissam et ideo fideicommissa etiam ei praestanda.
In a testament which had not been perfected, he gave to his alumna (foster-daughter) freedom and fideicommissa. Since they had proceeded in all respects as on intestacy, the emperor inquired whether she had been manumitted on the ground of the fideicommissum; and he issued an interlocutory ruling that, even if the father had claimed nothing by intestacy, dutiful sons nevertheless ought to have manumitted her whom the father had loved. He therefore pronounced that she had been rightly manumitted, and that the fideicommissa too were to be furnished to her.
Paulus respondit, etsi alienus inveniatur servus, quem ut suum testator ab uno ex heredibus voluerit manumitti, tamen cogendum eum, qui rogatus est, redimere eum et manumittere, quoniam non putavit similem esse causam libertatis et fideicommissi pecuniarii.
Paulus responded that, even if a slave is found to belong to another, whom the testator wished to be manumitted as his own by one of the heirs, nevertheless the one who has been asked must be compelled to redeem him and manumit him, since he did not think the case of liberty and that of a pecuniary fideicommissum to be similar.
Paulus respondit his verbis " pisteuson de moi, zwile, hoti tas xaritas soi apodwsei ho uhios mou martialios kai soi kai tois sois paisin" plenam voluntatem defuncti contineri circa benefaciendum coniunctis personis zoilum: qui si servi sint, nihil est gratum his praestari posse quam libertatem ideoque praesidem debere sequi voluntatem defuncti.
Paulus responded with these words " believe me, Zoilus, that my son Martialius will repay the favors to you and also to your children" that the full will of the deceased is contained concerning beneficence toward the persons connected with Zoilus: who, if they are slaves, nothing more welcome can be bestowed upon them than liberty, and therefore the governor ought to follow the will of the deceased.
Lucius titius septiciae filiae suae naturali concordiam ancillam suam donavit: idem postea testamento filiae suae cum aliis quibusdam ancillam supra scriptam legavit, ut manumitteretur: quaero, an septicia filia naturalis ancillam supra scriptam manumittere cogi possit. paulus respondit, si vivo patre naturali donatio ancillae fuit neque patris naturalis iudicium in ceteris legatis filia adgnovit, non posse eam compelli ancillam propriam ex causa fideicommissi manumittere.
Lucius Titius gave as a gift to his natural daughter Septicia his maidservant Concordia: the same man later by testament bequeathed to his daughter, together with certain other maidservants, the aforesaid maidservant, that she be manumitted: I ask whether the natural daughter Septicia can be compelled to manumit the aforesaid maidservant. Paulus responded: if the donation of the maidservant was while the natural father was alive, and the daughter did not acknowledge the natural father’s judgment in the other legacies, she cannot be compelled to manumit her own maidservant on the ground of a fideicommissum.
" thais ancilla mea cum heredi meo servierit annos decem, volo sit mea liberta". quaeritur, cum libertam suam esse voluerit nec id heres facere potuerit nec directa pure data sit libertas, an etiam post decem annos in servitutem remaneret. respondit nihil proponi, cur non thaidi libertas debeatur.
"Thais, my maidservant, when she shall have served my heir for ten years, I wish that she be my freedwoman." It is asked, since he wished her to be his freedwoman and the heir could not accomplish that, and liberty was not granted directly and unconditionally, whether even after ten years she would remain in servitude. He responded that nothing is put forward why liberty should not be due to Thais.
Lucius titius ita cavit: " maevi fili carissime, te rogo, ut, si stichus et damas et pamphilus te promeruerint, aere alieno liberato ne alterius quam tuam servitutem experiantur": quaero, an, si per heredem steterit, quo minus aes alienum exsolveretur, ex causa fideicommissi libertatem consequi possint. respondit non quidem imputandum heredi, si pro commoditatibus rei suae administrandae aes alienum tardius exsolverit: verum si manifeste studium non solventis ei rei paratum, ut libertatibus mora fieret, probaretur, repraesentandas libertates.
Lucius titius thus provided: " maevi, dearest son, I ask you, that, if stichus and damas and pamphilus shall have earned your favor, with the debt discharged they may experience the servitude of no one other than yours": I ask whether, if it was due to the heir that the debt was not paid, they can obtain liberty on the basis of the fideicommissum. he answered that it is not, indeed, to be imputed to the heir if, for the conveniences of administering his estate, he has discharged the debt more slowly: but if it were proved that a manifest resolve of not paying had been prepared for that very purpose, so that delay might be made to the liberties, the liberties must be brought forward without delay.
Tutoris, quem et ipsum testamento liberis dederat, fidei commisit de manumittendis servis ipsius tutoris, sed is a tutela excusatus fuerat: quaero, an eisdem servis libertatem praestare deberent tutores, qui in locum excusati dati tutelam administrarent. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur libertates et ab heredibus scriptis videri datas.
He entrusted to the good faith of the guardian—whom he had also by testament appointed for the children—the matter of manumitting that guardian’s own slaves; but that man had been excused from the tutelage. I ask whether the tutors who were given in place of the excused one to administer the tutelage ought to provide liberty to the same slaves. He responded that, according to the matters proposed, the grants of freedom seem to have been given also by the instituted heirs.
" seio auri libras tres et stichum notarium, quem peto manumittas". seius eodem testamento tutor datus a tutela se excusavit: quaeritur, an nihilo minus fideicommissa libertas debeatur. respondit nihil proponi, cur non debeatur.
"To Seius three pounds of gold and Stichus the notary, whom I ask you to manumit." Seius, appointed as guardian by the same will, excused himself from the guardianship: it is asked whether nonetheless the fideicommissary liberty is owed. He responded that nothing is put forward why it should not be owed.
Sorore sua herede instituta de servis ita cavit: " boulomai kai parakalw, glukutaty mou adelfy, en parakatavyky se exein stixon kai daman tous pragmateutas mou, ohus egw ouk yleuverwsa, axris an tas qyfous apokatastyswsin: ean de kai soi areswsin, emynusa soi tyn gnwmyn mou". quaero, si paratis actoribus rationes reddere heres libertatem non praestet, dicendo eos non placere sibi, an audienda esset. respondit non spectandum, quod heredibus displiceret, sed id quod viro bono posset placere, ut libertatem consequantur.
With his sister instituted as heir he thus provided concerning the slaves: "I wish and I beseech, my sweetest sister, by way of deposit (trust), that you keep in hand and subdue my business-agents, whom I did not set free, until they restore the accounts; and if they also please you, I have indicated to you my judgment." I ask, if, with the agents prepared to render accounts, the heir should not afford liberty, saying that they do not please her, whether she ought to be heard. He replied that one should not look to what displeased the heirs, but to that which could please a good man, so that they may obtain freedom.
Lucia titia heredum fidei commisit, uti pamphilam ancillam seiae cum filiis eius redimerent et manumitterent, et iuridicus, quanti singuli essent redimendi, aestimavit: medio tempore pamphila, antequam pecunia solveretur, peperit: quaero, id quod natum est ex pamphila utrum ad heredes seiae an ad heredem titiae pertineat. respondit id, quod natum est ex pamphila, eius quidem esse, cuius ea fuerat tunc cum pareret: verum heredem, si moram fideicommissae libertati fecit, compellendum partum quoque ad libertatem perducere.
Lucia Titia entrusted to the good faith of her heirs that they should redeem and manumit Pamphila the maidservant for Seia along with her children, and the iuridicus assessed for how much each should be redeemed; in the meantime Pamphila, before the money was paid, gave birth. I ask whether that which was born from Pamphila pertains to the heirs of Seia or to the heir of Titia. He responded that that which was born from Pamphila is indeed his to whom she belonged at the time when she gave birth; but the heir, if he caused delay to the fideicommissary liberty, must be compelled to bring the offspring also to liberty.
Lucius titius ita testamento cavit: " medicos tibi commendo illum et illum: in tuo iudicio erit, ut habeas bonos libertos et medicos. quod si ego libertatem eis dedissem, veritus sum, quod sorori meae carissimae fecerunt medici servi eius manumissi ab ea, qui salario expleto reliquerunt eam": quaero, an fideicommissa libertas supra scriptis competere potest. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non necessitatem heredibus impositam, sed arbitrium permissum.
Lucius titius thus provided in his testament: " I commend to you the physicians, this one and that one: it will be in your judgment, that you have good freedmen and physicians. But if I had given liberty to them, I feared what befell my dearest sister: the physicians, her slaves manumitted by her, who, once the salary was completed, left her": I ask whether fideicommissary liberty can pertain to the above-written. He responded that, according to what was put forward, no necessity was imposed on the heirs, but discretion was permitted.
Titius sticho servo suo libertatem dedit, si rationes sic dederit: quaero, an ratio per eum gesta ita putari debeat, ut damna, quae casu contigerunt, ad onus reliquorum non pertineant. respondit in negotio, quod voluntate domini administrasse proponatur, ea damna, quae casu ita acciderint, ut servo nihil possit imputari, non pertinere ad reliquorum onus.
Titius gave liberty to his slave Stichus, if he should render the accounts thus: I ask whether an account managed by him ought to be thought of in such a way that the damages which happened by chance do not pertain to the burden of the remainder. He responded that, in a business which is put forward to have been administered by the will of the master, those damages which so occurred by chance that nothing can be imputed to the slave do not pertain to the burden of the remainder.
Item quaero, cum omne peculium reddere iussus sit, an ita peculium computari debeat, ut id solum peculii esse videatur, quod quaque ex causa domino debeat superesse. respondit in ea specie, de qua quaereretur, non debere deduci ex peculio, quod domino debeatur.
Likewise I ask, when he has been ordered to render all the peculium, whether the peculium ought to be computed in such a way that only that is seen to be peculium which, from whatever cause, ought to remain over to the master. He replied that, in the case about which inquiry was made, what is owed to the master ought not to be deducted from the peculium.
Item quaero, an, si ex reliquis in peculio aliquid converterit, deduci hoc ex peculio reddendo debeat. respondit, si id, quod ex causa quae proponeretur in peculium versum est, reliquorum nomine desolutum est, fieri satis condicioni, si id, quod reliquum est peculii, solvatur.
Likewise I ask whether, if from the remainder he has converted something into the peculium, this ought to be deducted in rendering the peculium. He responded: if that which, on the ground proposed, was turned into the peculium has been discharged on account of the rest, the condition is satisfied if what remains of the peculium is paid.
Libertatem ita testamento dedit: " cupitum servum meum, cum marcianus filius meus sedecim annos impleverit, rationibus redditis liberum esse volo": post mortem testatoris tutores cupito exactionem commiserunt isque nummos redactos expensavit eisdem tutoribus: deinde filius impubes decessit, cui mater heres extitit et tutorem tutelae iudicio filii condemnatum habuit: cupitus ad libertatem proclamat eo tempore, quo, si viveret marcianus, annos sedecim aetatis habiturus esset, offerens rationes unius anni in diem mortis testatoris, quod ceterae subscriptae fuerunt. quaesitum est, an eas quoque rationes, quas tutores periculo suo egerunt, cupitus reddere compelli debeat. respondit eum de quo quaeritur condicioni rationis reddendae ita videri paruisse, si omne ex eo, quod gessit, recte desiderari potest, reddiderit: nam alteram condicionem humaniore interpretatione ita accipi posse, ut defuncto pupillo tempus, quo, si viveret, sedecim annos impleret, exspectare satis fuerit.
He gave freedom thus in his will: "I wish my slave Cupitus, when my son Marcianus shall have completed sixteen years, upon the accounts being rendered, to be free": after the testator’s death the tutors entrusted the collection to Cupitus, and he paid out to the same tutors the moneys that had been collected: then the underage son died, whose heir was his mother, and she had the tutor condemned by an action of guardianship on the son’s behalf: Cupitus claims freedom at the time at which, if Marcianus were alive, he would have had sixteen years of age, offering the accounts for one year up to the day of the testator’s death, because the rest had been signed off. It was asked whether Cupitus ought also to be compelled to render those accounts which the tutors conducted at their own risk. He responded that the person in question seems to have complied with the condition of rendering an account if he has rendered everything that can rightly be demanded from what he has managed: for the other condition can, by a more humane interpretation, be taken thus—that, the ward having died, it was enough to wait for the time at which, if he were alive, he would have completed sixteen years.
" stichus et damas servi mei, si rationes reddideritis, liberi estote": quaesitum est, an non solum rationes, verum si qua alia consilio et fraude eorum amota sunt, praestari ab his debeant, ut ad libertatem perveniant. respondit rationum reddendarum condicioni contineri omne, quod quoquo genere servi actum fidemque respiceret.
"Stichus and Damas, my slaves, if you render accounts, be free": it was asked whether not only the accounts, but also whatever other things were removed by their plan and fraud ought to be made good by them, so that they may attain liberty. He responded that the condition of rendering accounts embraces everything which, in whatever way, was transacted by the slaves and had regard to good faith.
Intra certa tempora condicioni reddendarum rationum non paruerunt, postea parati erant: quaesitum est, an perveniant ad libertatem. respondit, si per ipsos stetisset, quo minus intra tempora praescripta condicioni parerent, non idcirco liberos fore, quod postea rationes velint reddere.
Within certain periods they did not comply with the condition of rendering accounts; afterwards they were ready: it was asked whether they would attain to freedom. he answered, if it had depended on themselves that they did not comply with the condition within the prescribed times, they would not on that account be free, because afterwards they wish to render the accounts.
" ab heredibus meis peto fideique eorum committo, cum filius meus sedecim annos impleverit, stichum rationibus redditis manumittant": quaero, an eundem servum testator in diem usque pubertatis filii sui actum agere voluerit. respondit manifestum esse testatorem huius quoque actus rationem a sticho reddi voluisse.
" I ask from my heirs and commit it to their good faith, that, when my son has completed sixteen years, they manumit Stichus, the accounts having been rendered": I ask whether the testator wished the same slave to transact business up to the day of his son's puberty. He answered that it is manifest that the testator wished that the account of this act also be rendered by Stichus.
" stichus servus meus iubeo ut det praestet filiae et uxori meae heredibus meis sine ulla controversia tot aureos: et ut ipsum manumittant, fidei eorum committo": quaesitum est, cum uxor ab hereditate abstinuerit, utrum duobus an filiae praestare debeat. respondit filiae, quae heres ex asse extitisse proponeretur, pro solido dandum.
" stichus, my slave, I order that he give and render to my daughter and to my wife, my heirs, without any controversy, so many gold pieces: and that they manumit him, I commit to their good faith": the question was asked, when the wife has abstained from the inheritance, whether he ought to render to both or to the daughter. He responded: to the daughter, who is proposed to have stood as heir of the whole, it must be given in full.
Herede filio suo ex asse instituto libertatem dedit in haec verba: " december dispensator meus, severus vilicus et victorina vilica severi contubernalis in annos octo liberi sunto: quos in ministerio filii mei esse volo: te autem, severe fili carissime, peto, uti decembrem et severum commendatos habeas, quibus praesentem libertatem non dedi, ut idonea ministeria haberes, quos spero te et libertos idoneos habiturum". quaero, cum eo tempore, quo titius testamentum faciebat, filius natus annorum fuerat novem et titius post biennium et sex menses decesserit, anni octo, in quos libertas erat dilata, ex testamenti facti tempore an vero ex mortis numerari debeant. respondit posse videri testatorem eos annos octo dilatae libertatis comprehendisse, qui computandi sunt a die testamenti facti, nisi aliud voluisse testatorem probaretur.
With his son instituted as heir of the whole, he granted freedom in these words: "let december my dispensator, severus the bailiff, and victorina the bailiff-woman, the contubernal companion of severus, be free in eight years: whom I wish to be in the service of my son: but you, severus, dearest son, I ask that you hold december and severus as commended, to whom I did not give present freedom, so that you might have suitable services, whom I hope you will find suitable even as freedmen." I ask, since at the time when titius was making his testament, the son was nine years old, and titius died after two years and six months, whether the eight years, into which freedom had been deferred, ought to be counted from the time the testament was made or rather from the death. He responded that the testator can be seen to have included those eight years of deferred freedom, which are to be computed from the day the testament was made, unless it were proved that the testator wished otherwise.
" spendophorus, cum filia mea in familia nupserit, si rationes idonee filiae meae administratas reddiderit, liber esto": filia cum adhuc pubes esset, vivo patre decessit et ex substitutione seius heres extitit: quaero, cum spendophorus rationes pupillae non administraverit et vivo patre familias desierit ipsius rationes administrare et, si viveret, titia annos haberet amplius duodecim, an ex testamento liber sit. respondit, si nullas rationes administrasset, quas reddere heredi deberet, secundum ea quae proponerentur liberum esse.
"spendophorus, since my daughter will have married in my household, if he shall render accounts of my daughter's affairs properly administered, let him be free": the daughter, while still pubescent, died with her father alive and, by the substitution of seius, became heir: I ask, since spendophorus did not administer the accounts of the ward and, while the paterfamilias was alive, ceased to administer his accounts, and, if she were living, titia would be more than twelve years old, whether he is free under the testament. he answered that, if he had administered no accounts which he ought to render to the heir, according to what is proposed he is free.
" stichum rationibus redditis manumitti volo". stichus arcarius probante domino nomina fecit et rationes a domino subscriptas exhibet nec postea nomen ullum fecit: quaero, an, si qui minus solvendo fuerint debitores, quibus alii exactores erant applicati, nondum videatur condicioni satisfactum. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non pertinere ad onus reddendarum rationum, quod solvendo non esse debitores.
"with the accounts rendered, I wish stichus to be manumitted." stichus, a cashier, with the master approving, made entries of names, and he produces the accounts countersigned by the master, and thereafter he made no entry of any name: I ask whether, if there were debtors less than solvent, to whom other collectors had been assigned, it does not yet appear that the condition has been satisfied. he replied that, according to the matters proposed, it does not pertain to the burden of rendering the accounts that the debtors are not solvent.
Antoninus augustus pius noster, quo militum suorum per omnia rata esset voluntas suprema, cum et institutus et substitutus in continenti, priusquam adirent hereditatem, decessissent, eos, quibus ab his et libertas et hereditas a milite per fideicommissum data esset, perinde liberos et heredes esse iussit, ac si utrumque directo accepissent. eorum autem, qui a pagano libertatem et hereditatem per fideicommissum acceperant, cum aeque in continenti et institutus et substitutus decessissent, satis habuit libertatem confirmare.
Antoninus, our august and pious emperor, in order that the supreme will of his soldiers might be valid in all respects, when both the instituted heir and the substitute, in the same instrument, had died before they entered upon the inheritance, ordered that those to whom by these both liberty and the inheritance had been given by the soldier through a fideicommiss should be free and heirs in like manner, just as if they had received both directly. But for those who had received liberty and inheritance through a fideicommiss from a civilian, when likewise in the same instrument both the instituted heir and the substitute had died, he deemed it sufficient to confirm the liberty.
Si debitor rogatus sit a creditore ancillam suam pigneratam manumittere, dicendum est fideicommissariam libertatem utiliter relictam a debitore. quid enim interest, certa quantitas ab eo relinquatur an fideicommissaria libertas? et sive plus sit in pretio sive minus, cogitur libertatem praestare, si modo semel adgnovit voluntatem creditoris.
If a debtor has been asked by the creditor to manumit his maidservant who has been pledged, it must be said that fideicommissary freedom has been validly left by the debtor. For what difference is there, whether a fixed quantity be left by him or fideicommissary freedom? And whether it be more in price or less, he is compelled to furnish the freedom, provided only that he has once acknowledged the will of the creditor.
We take “to have acknowledged,” however, in this way: if perchance, when he was proceeded against by the heir, he made use of an exception, or otherwise showed his will; for if the debtor is sued by the creditor’s heir, he can employ the exception of fraud to the extent of what it is in the debtor’s interest to have his own maidservant.
In fideicommissaria libertate, quamvis quis modicum legatum fuerit consecutus, necesse habet servum suum manumittere: pecuniarium enim fideicommissum si divisum fuerit, satis iniuriam facit libertati quam fideicommissario: satius est igitur eum, qui adgnovit legatum, onerari quam libertatem intercidere.
In a fideicommissary liberty, although someone has obtained only a modest legacy, he is obliged to manumit his slave: for if the pecuniary fideicommissum is divided, it does quite enough injury to liberty rather than to the fideicommissary: it is therefore better that the one who has acknowledged the legacy be burdened than that liberty should lapse.
Quotiens servo vel ancillae fideicommissaria libertas relinquitur, in ea condicione est, ut, quoad manumittatur, servilis condicionis sit: et quidem si nullam moram praestandae libertati qui praestare debet fecit, nihil de statu eorum mutatur: ideoque eos interim legari posse, sed cum sua causa, constat.
Whenever fideicommissary liberty is left to a male slave or to a maidservant, it is on this condition: that, until they are manumitted, they are of servile condition; and indeed, if the person who ought to furnish the liberty has caused no delay in furnishing it, nothing in their status is changed: and therefore it is established that in the meantime they can be left by legacy, but with their own cause (i.e., claim) attached.
Quod si ita scriptum sit " si heres voluerit", non valebit, sed ita demum, si totum in voluntate fecit heredis, si ei libuerit. ceterum si arbitrium illi quasi viro bono dedit, non dubitabimus, quin libertas debeatur: nam et eam libertatem deberi placuit " si tibi videbitur, peto manumittas": ita enim hoc accipiendum " si tibi quasi viro bono videbitur". nam et ita relictum " si voluntatem meam probaveris" puto deberi: quemadmodum " si te meruerit" quasi virum bonum vel " si te non offenderit" quasi virum bonum vel " si comprobaveris" vel " si non reprobaveris" vel " si dignum putaveris". nam et cum quidam graecis verbis ita fideicommissum dedisset: tw deini, ean dokimasys, eleuverian dovynai boulomai, a divo severo rescriptum est fideicommissum peti posse.
But if it is written thus " if the heir shall have willed," it will not be valid—yet only then, if he has made the whole matter depend on the will of the heir, " if it should please him." However, if he has given the decision to him as to an upright man, we shall not hesitate that freedom is owed: for it has also been decided that that freedom is owed when it is expressed " if it shall seem good to you, I ask that you manumit": for this is to be taken thus, " if it shall seem good to you as to an upright man." For even when it is left thus " if you shall have approved my will" I think it is owed: just as " if he shall have deserved you" as an upright man, or " if he shall not have offended you" as an upright man, or " if you shall have approved" or " if you shall not have disapproved" or " if you shall have thought him worthy." For also when someone had given a fideicommissum in Greek words thus: to you then, if you approve, I wish to give freedom, it was rescripted by the deified Severus that the fideicommissum can be claimed.
Quidam, cum tres servos legasset, fidei heredis sui commisit, ut ex his duos quos vellet manumitteret: fideicommissa libertas valebit et quos ex his vellet, heres manumittet: quare si eos vindicaret legatarius, quos heres vult manumittere, exceptione doli repelletur.
A certain person, when he had bequeathed three slaves, entrusted to the good faith of his heir that out of these he should manumit two whom he wished: the fideicommissary liberty will be valid, and the heir will manumit whichever of them he wishes: therefore, if the legatee should vindicate those whom the heir wishes to manumit, he will be repelled by the exception of fraud.
Si pater duos filios heredes instituerit et adgnatione postumi ruptum testamentum fuerit, quamvis hereditas pro duabus partibus ad eos pertineat, tamen fideicommissae libertates praestari non debent, sicuti ne legata quidem aut fideicommissa praestare coguntur.
If a father has instituted two sons as heirs, and by the adgnation of a posthumous child the testament has been broken, although the inheritance pertains to them for two parts, nevertheless the fideicommissary liberties are not to be rendered, just as they are not even compelled to render legacies or fideicommissa.
Si sticho libertas per fideicommissum data fuerit sub condicione, si rationes reddidisset, et is absente herede paratus sit reliqua solvere, praetoris officio continetur, ut virum bonum eligat, cuius arbitrio rationes computentur, et pecuniam, quae ex computatione colligitur, deponat, atque ita pronuntiet libertatem ex causa fideicommissi deberi. haec autem fieri conveniet, si heres ex iusta causa aberit: nam si latitabit, satis erit liquere praetori per servum non stare, quo minus condicioni pareat atque ita pronuntiare de libertate oportebit.
If liberty has been given to Stichus by fideicommiss under the condition that he render his accounts, and he, with the heir absent, is ready to pay what remains, it falls within the praetor’s office to choose a good man, at whose arbitration the accounts are to be computed, and that he deposit the money which is gathered from the computation, and thus to pronounce that liberty is owed on account of the fideicommiss. But it will be suitable that this be done if the heir is absent for a just cause; for if he is hiding, it will be enough that it be clear to the praetor that it is not through the slave that the condition is not complied with, and thus it will be proper to pronounce concerning the liberty.
Quaedam cum in extrema esset valetudine, praesentibus honestis viris compluribus et matre sua, ad quam legitima hereditas eius pertinebat, ita locuta est " ancillas meas maeviam et seiam liberas esse volo" et intestata decessit: quaero, si mater ex senatus consulto legitimam hereditatem eius non vindicasset et hereditas ad proximum cognatum pertinuisset, an fideicommissa libertas deberetur. respondi deberi: nam eam, quae in extremis dixisset " ancillas meas illam et illam liberas esse volo", videri ab omnibus, qui legitimi heredes aut bonorum possessores futuri essent, petisse, ut hoc fieri possit.
A certain woman, when she was in extremity of ill-health, with several honorable men and her mother present, to whom her legitimate inheritance pertained, spoke thus: " ancillas meas maeviam et seiam liberas esse volo," and died intestate. I ask, if the mother had not claimed her legitimate inheritance by virtue of the senatus consultum and the inheritance had pertained to the nearest kinsman, whether fideicommissary freedom would be owed. I answered that it is owed; for she who, on her deathbed, had said " ancillas meas illam et illam liberas esse volo," is considered to have requested from all who would be legitimate heirs or possessors of the estate that this be done.
Cum in testamento scriptum est: " stichum titio lego" vel " heres meus dato ita, ut eum titius manumittat", dixi petenti legatario stichum exceptionem doli mali obstaruram, nisi caverit se libertatem secundum voluntatem defuncti praestaturum.
When in a testament it is written: " I bequeath Stichus to Titius," or " let my heir give him on this condition, that Titius manumit him," I said that to the legatee demanding Stichus the exception of dolus malus would stand in the way, unless he gave security that he would provide liberty according to the will of the deceased.
Si is, cui servus legatus est, rogatus manumittere latitet, orcinum fieri libertum respondit: idem fore et si non legatarii, sed heredis fidei commissum esset. sed et si non omnium, sed quorundam heredum fidei commissum sit, aeque dicendum orcinum fieri: in eos autem qui latitaverint coheredibus, a quibus redimendae partes essent, utilem actionem eo nomine dari debere vel etiam familiae erciscundae iudicio recte eos acturos.
If the person to whom a slave has been bequeathed, when asked to manumit, lies hidden, he replied that the freedman becomes orcine (a freedman of the dead); the same would be so even if the fideicommiss were laid not upon the legatee but upon the heir. And even if the fideicommiss be laid not upon all the heirs but upon certain heirs, it is equally to be said that he becomes orcine. Moreover, against those who have hidden themselves, a useful action ought to be granted to the coheirs by whom the shares ought to be redeemed, or they will also proceed rightly by the suit for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae iudicium).
Si servus legatus et per fideicommissum manumissus sit, cervidius scaevola consultus putabat novissimam scripturam valere, sive libertas sit sive legatum, quia, cum libertatem datam postea placeat adimi, et per legatum constat posse adimi: sed si in obscuro sit, qua mente post libertatem legavit eundem servum, in obscuro libertatem praevalere. quae sententia mihi quoque verior esse videtur.
If a slave has been bequeathed and manumitted through a fideicommissum, Cervidius Scaevola, when consulted, thought the most recent writing should prevail, whether it be the freedom or the legacy, because, since it is the rule that a freedom once given may afterwards be taken away, it is also established that it can be taken away by a legacy: but if it is obscure with what intention he bequeathed that same slave after the freedom, in obscurity the freedom is to prevail. Which opinion seems to me also to be truer.
Et quia de heredibus tantum cautum erat, adiectum est eodem senatus consulto, ut quicumque fideicommissam libertatem ex quacumque causa pronuntiatum fuerit eum eosve abesse, perinde habeatur, atque si, ut oportet, ex causa fideicommissi manumissus esset.
And because provision had been made only concerning heirs, it was added by the same senatorial decree that, whoever, with respect to fideicommissary liberty, for whatever cause it shall have been pronounced that he or they are absent, be held the same as if, as is proper, he had been manumitted by reason of the fideicommissum.
Si quis rogatus ancillam manumittere moram fecerit, si interea enixa fuerit, constitutum est huiusmodi partum liberum nasci et quidem ingenuum. sed sunt constitutiones, quibus cavetur statim ex quo libertas deberi coeperit ingenuum nasci: et hoc magis est sine dubio sequendum, quatenus libertas non privata, sed publica res est, ut ultro is qui eam debet offerre debeat.
If anyone, having been asked to manumit a handmaid, has made delay, and meanwhile she has given birth, it is established that an offspring of this kind is born free, and indeed freeborn. But there are constitutions which provide that immediately from the time when liberty began to be owed, the offspring is born freeborn; and this is without doubt the view more to be followed, inasmuch as liberty is not a private but a public matter, so that the one who owes it ought of his own accord to offer it.
Sed si nondum debita libertate fideicommissa ancilla peperit, studio tamen heredis fuerit effectum, ut nondum libertas deberetur, veluti quod tardius adit hereditatem, ut qui nati sint ex ancilla servi eius fiant, placet manumittendos, sed tradi matri oportere, ut ab ea manumitterentur et liberti potius matris fiant: nam quos indignus est heres servos habere, ne quidem libertos habebit.
But if a maidservant, fideicommissarily destined for liberty not yet due, has borne children, and yet by the heir’s contrivance it has been brought about that liberty is not yet owed—for instance, because he enters upon the inheritance more tardily—so that those born from the maidservant become his slaves, it is the opinion that they must be manumitted, but that they ought to be delivered to their mother, in order that they be manumitted by her and become rather the freedmen of their mother: for those whom it is unworthy for the heir to have as slaves, he will not have even as freedmen.
Si mater, postquam filium accepisset, vel qui in eius locum successit praestare noluit libertatem, compellendi sunt: amplius si mater aut nollet sibi filium tradi aut in rerum natura esse desisset, non ab re est dicere, nihilo minus ita natis ab herede libertatem praestari.
If the mother, after she had received the son, or the one who succeeded in her place, was unwilling to provide liberty, they are to be compelled: moreover, if the mother either was unwilling to have the son delivered to herself or had ceased to exist in the realm of nature, it is not out of place to say that nonetheless liberty is to be provided by the heir to those thus born.
Sed et si non data opera tardius adierit, sed dum de adeunda hereditate deliberat, idem dictum est. et si postea cognovit se heredem institutum, quam ancilla peperit, placet hoc quoque casu subveniendum esse: hoc tamen casu ipse manumittere debebit, non matri tradere.
But also if he has not, by design, entered later, but while he is deliberating about entering upon the inheritance, the same has been said. And if afterwards he learned that he had been instituted as heir of the one whom the maidservant bore, it is held that help is to be afforded in this case as well: in this case, however, he ought himself to manumit, not to hand over to the mother.
Sed si directo libertas data fuerit ancillae et horum aliquid evenerit, quemadmodum natis subvenietur? nam ibi quidem petitur fideicommissa libertas et praetor parvulis subvenit: cum vero directo libertas datur, non petitur. sed etiam hoc casu puto nato subveniendum esse, ut aditus praetor in rem matri decernat actionem exemplo fideicommissariae libertatis.
But if freedom has been given directly to a female slave and one of these events should occur, how will aid be afforded to the children? For in that case, indeed, fideicommissary freedom is sought, and the praetor comes to the aid of the very young; but when freedom is given directly, it is not sought. Yet even in this case I think aid ought to be afforded to the child, so that, when approached, the praetor may grant to the mother an action in rem, on the model of fideicommissary freedom.
thus, finally, Marcellus also wrote in Book 16 of the Digests that even for those who, having been manumitted by testament, were usucaptured before the inheritance was entered upon, help must be given, so that their liberty be conserved, assuredly through the praetor, although it can even be imputed to them why they were usucaptured; but in the case of very young children no fault is discovered.
I ask for Stichus and Pamphilus, my slaves, and Eros and Diphilus, and I commit it to the good faith of the heirs, that, when my children shall have reached puberty, they should manumit them. Then in the last part he provided thus: “But if children shall not have been born to me, or shall have died before puberty, then let Mucius and Maevius be heirs in equal parts. The legacies which in the earlier testament, in which I named my sons and Seius, I have left, I wish to be performed—namely, also by the subsequent heirs.” Then in the codicils he provided thus: “Lucius Titius to the first-named heirs and to the substitutes, greeting. I ask that the things which I have provided and bequeathed in the testament, and the things which I shall provide and bequeath in the codicils, you perform.” I ask whether, since no children were born to Lucius Titius, freedom by way of a fideicommissum ought to be furnished at once to the slaves Stichus and Pamphilus and Eros and Diphilus.
Marcellus responded that the condition which had been appended to the liberty of those about whom inquiry was being made—namely, if sons had arisen as heirs—does not appear to have been repeated, and therefore liberty must forthwith be furnished both by the first and by the substitute heirs: for, as is written above, he requests that the things which he had provided in the testament be rendered, and he did provide concerning the freedom of those slaves. And yet he provided under a condition, and, if it were a condition of another kind, it would have to be awaited; but it is not likely that he conceived this in that condition, since he was committing it to the good faith of the substitutes, who could not be admitted to the inheritance if the condition were fulfilled.
Fiunt autem statuliberi vel condicione expressa vel vi ipsa. condicione expressa quid est, manifestum est. vi ipsa, cum creditoris fraudandi causa manumittuntur: nam dum incertum est, an creditor iure suo utatur, interim statuliberi sunt, quoniam fraus cum effectu in lege aelia sentia accipitur.
They become statuliber either by an expressed condition or by the fact itself. What “by an expressed condition” is, is manifest. By the fact itself, when they are manumitted for the purpose of defrauding a creditor: for while it is uncertain whether the creditor will exercise his right, in the meantime they are statuliber, since under the Aelia Sentia law fraud is taken together with its effect.
Qui statuliberi causam adprehendit, in ea condicione est, ut, sive tradatur, salva spe libertatis alienetur, sive usucapiatur, cum sua causa usucapiatur, sive manumittatur, non perdat spem orcini liberti. sed statuliberi causam non prius servus nanciscitur nisi adita vel ab uno ex institutis hereditate: ceterum ante aditionem sive tradetur sive usucapietur sive manumittetur, spes statutae libertatis intercidit.
He who has taken on the condition of a statuliber is in this situation: whether he be delivered, he is alienated with the hope of liberty preserved; whether he be usucapted, he is usucapted with his own cause; whether he be manumitted, he does not lose the hope of an orcinus freedman. But a slave does not acquire the condition of a statuliber before the inheritance has been entered upon, even by one of the instituted heirs; otherwise, before entry, whether he is delivered or usucapted or manumitted, the hope of the appointed liberty lapses.
Si primis tabulis sub condicione servus cum libertate ex parte dimidia heres sit institutus, an statuliberi causam optineat, ut adeunte coherede cum sua causa usucapiatur? cum a semetipso acceperit libertatem, non potest statuliberi causam optinere. plane si condicio hereditatis deficiat, quo casu secundum iulianum vel libertatem apiscitur, dicendum est statuliberi causam optinere, eo quod non a semetipso, sed a coherede accepisse libertatem creditur.
If in the first tablets a slave is instituted heir under a condition, with liberty, to the half share, does he obtain the case of a statuliber, so that, upon the coheir’s entering, he be acquired by usucaption together with his own cause? Since he has received liberty from himself, he cannot obtain the case of a statuliber. Indeed, if the condition of the inheritance fails, in which case according to Julian he at least acquires liberty, it must be said that he obtains the case of a statuliber, because he is considered to have received liberty not from himself, but from the coheir.
Quocumque gradu pupillo servus cum libertate substitutus sit, necessarii causam optinet: quae sententia utilitatis causa recepta est et a nobis probatur. celsus quoque putat libro quinto decimo cum libertate substitutum statuliberi causam optinere.
In whatever degree a slave has been substituted to a ward together with liberty, he holds the position of a necessary heir: which opinion, received for the sake of utility, is accepted and approved by us. Celsus also thinks, in book 15, that one substituted together with liberty holds the position of a statuliber.
Sed si in heredis persona iussus sit parere condicioni, quid dici debeat? si quidem paruit condicioni, statim liber est etiam invito herede. quod si non patitur heres pareri ( puta offert decem, quae dare iussus erat), procul dubio liber est, quia per heredem stare videtur, quo minus condicionem impleat.
But if he is ordered to comply with the condition in the person of the heir, what ought to be said? If indeed he has complied with the condition, he is immediately free, even against the heir’s will. But if the heir does not allow compliance ( say, he offers the ten which he had been ordered to give), without doubt he is free, because it appears to depend on the heir that he not fulfill the condition.
Inde quaeritur, si forte debeatur pecunia huic servo vel ab herede, quod in domini rationem plus erogaverat, vel ab extraneo, nec velit heres debitorem convenire vel statulibero solvere pecuniam: an debeat ad libertatem pervenire, quasi moram per heredem patiatur. et aut legatum huic statulibero fuit peculium aut non: si legatum peculium fuit, servius scribit moram eum libertatis passum ob hoc ipsum, quod ei aliquid ex ratione dominica deberetur nec ei ab herede praestaretur: quam sententiam et labeo probat. idem servius probat et si in eo moram faciat heres, quod nolit exigere a debitoribus: nam perventurum ad libertatem ait.
From this it is asked, if perchance money is owed to this slave either by the heir, because he had expended more on the master’s account, or by an outsider, and the heir is unwilling to sue the debtor or to pay the money to the statuliber: whether he ought to attain freedom, as if he were suffering delay (mora) through the heir. And either the peculium was left to this statuliber by legacy or not: if the peculium was left by legacy, Servius writes that he has suffered delay of liberty for this very reason, that something was owed to him from the master’s account and it was not furnished to him by the heir—which opinion Labeo also approves. The same Servius also approves, even if the heir causes delay in this respect, that he is unwilling to exact from the debtors: for he says he will come through to freedom.
It seems true to me also, what Servius says. Since therefore we think Servius’s opinion true, let us see whether the same ought to be said even if the peculium has not been bequeathed as a pre-legacy to the slave: for it is agreed that a statuliber can, by order, give from the peculium either to the heir himself or to another; and if someone prevents him from making that payment, the statuliber will attain freedom. Finally, this too is shown as a remedy for the master of the statuliber, that he should forbid him to give, by order, to an outsider, lest he lose the coins along with the statuliber.
Non solum autem si dare iussum dare prohibeat, statuliber ad libertatem pervenit, verum etiam si ascendere capitolium iussum ascendere vetet, item si capuae dare iussum capuam ire prohibeat: nam qui prohibet servum proficisci, intellegendus est impedire magis velle libertatem quam operis servi uti.
Not only, moreover, if he forbids the one who was ordered to give from giving does the statuliber attain liberty, but also if he forbids the one ordered to ascend the Capitol from ascending; likewise, if he prohibits the one ordered to give at Capua from going to Capua: for he who forbids a slave to set out is to be understood to wish rather to hinder liberty than to make use of the slave’s work.
Sed et si iussum coheredi dare non patiatur unus ex heredibus dare, aeque liber erit: sed is, cui iussus erat dare et liber esse, familiae erciscundae iudicio ab eo qui impedit consequetur, quod sua intererat prohibitum statuliberum non esse.
But also, if one of the heirs does not allow the ordered giving to the coheir to be made, he will be equally free; but the one to whom he had been ordered to give will, by the action for dividing the family property (familiae erciscundae iudicium), obtain from the one who impedes as much as it was in his interest that the statuliber should not have been prevented from being free.
Si decem iussus dare et liber esse quinque det, non pervenit ad libertatem, nisi totum det: interim igitur vindicare quinque nummos dominus eorum potest. sed si residuum fuerit solutum, tunc etiam id alienatum, cuius ante dominium non erat translatum. ita pendebit praecedentis summae alienatio, sic tamen, ut non retro nummi fiant accipientis, sed tunc, cum residua summa fuerit exsoluta.
If, being ordered to give ten and to be free, he gives five, he does not attain to liberty unless he gives the whole: meanwhile, therefore, the owner can vindicate those five coins. But if the residue has been paid, then even that is alienated, the ownership of which had not previously been transferred. Thus the alienation of the preceding sum will hang in suspense, in such a way, however, that the coins do not become the recipient’s retroactively, but then, when the remaining sum has been paid out.
Si quis servum iussum decem dare et liberum esse vendiderit sine peculio, utrum statim liber sit ( quasi prohibitus videatur de peculio dare hoc ipso, quod sine peculio distractus est) an vero cum fuerit prohibitus peculium tangere? et puto tunc demum liberum fore, cum volens dare prohibeatur, non statim ubi veniit.
If someone sells a slave who has been ordered to give ten and to be free, without a peculium, is he immediately free (as if he should seem to have been prohibited from giving out of the peculium by this very fact, that he has been alienated without a peculium), or rather only when he shall have been prohibited to touch the peculium? And I think he will only then be free, when, being willing to give, he is prohibited, not immediately upon the sale.
Si quis servum iussum decem dare et liberum esse operari prohibeat, vel si, quod ex operis suis meret, abstulerit ei heres, vel si, quod ex mercedibus suis coegit, heredi dederit, an ad libertatem perveniat? et puto, si quidem ex operis dederit vel undecumque dederit, ad libertatem perventurum: quod si prohibeatur operari, non fore liberum, quia operari domino debet. plane si ei ablata fuerit pecunia ex operis collecta, liberum fore arbitror, quia de peculio dare prohibetur.
If someone forbids a slave, who has been ordered to give ten and to be free, to work; or if the heir has taken away from him what he earns from his own works; or if he has given to the heir what he has collected from his wages—does he attain to freedom? And I think that, if indeed he has given from his works or from wherever he has given, he will arrive at freedom: but if he is prohibited from working, he will not be free, because he ought to work for his master. Clearly, if money collected from his works has been taken from him, I judge that he will be free, because he is prohibited from giving from the peculium.
Sed et si argento subtracto vel rebus aliis distractis nummos corrasos dederit, perveniet ad libertatem, quamvis, si nummos subtractos dedisset, ad libertatem non perveniret: nec enim videtur dedisse, sed magis reddidisse. sed nec si aliis subripuerit nummos et heredi dederit, ad libertatem perveniet, quia avelli nummi ei qui accepit possunt. plane si sic consumpti fuerint, ut nullo casu avelli possint, competet libertas.
But also if, with the silver subtracted or with other things alienated by sale, he should give coins scraped together, he will arrive at freedom, although, if he had given coins that were subtracted, he would not arrive at freedom: for he does not seem to have given, but rather to have given back. But nor, if he has filched coins from others and given them to the heir, will he attain freedom, because the coins can be torn away from him who received them. Clearly, if they have been consumed in such a way that in no case can they be torn away, freedom will accrue.
Non solum autem si heres moram facit libertati, sed et si tutor vel curator vel procurator vel alius quivis, in cuius persona condicioni parendum est, libertatem competere dicemus. et sane hoc iure utimur in statulibero, ut sufficiat per eum non stare, quo minus condicioni pareat.
Not only, moreover, if the heir causes delay to liberty, but even if a tutor or curator or procurator or any other person, in whose person the condition must be complied with, we shall say that liberty is competent. And indeed we use this rule in the case of a statuliber, that it suffices that it does not depend on him, such that he fails to obey the condition.
Si quis heredi in diebus triginta proximis mortis testatoris dare iussus fuerit, deinde heres tardius adierit, trebatius et labeo, si sine dolo malo tardius adierit, dantem eum intra dies triginta aditae hereditatis ad libertatem pervenire: quae sententia vera est. sed quid si data opera traxit? an ob id statim, ut adita est hereditas, ad libertatem perveniat?
If someone has been ordered to give to the heir within the thirty days next after the testator’s death, and then the heir should enter upon the inheritance later, Trebatius and Labeo say that, if he has entered later without fraud or malice, the payer comes to liberty within thirty days from the entry upon the inheritance: which opinion is true. But what if he has intentionally dragged it out? On that account does he at once, as soon as the inheritance has been entered upon, come to liberty?
Si quis sic acceperit libertatem " cum decem dare poterit, liber esto", trebatius ait, licet habuerit decem vel idoneus fuerit ad adquirendum et conservandum peculium, tamen non alias ad libertatem perventurum, nisi dederit aut per eum non steterit, quo minus det: quae sententia vera est.
If someone has thus received liberty, " when he will be able to give ten, let him be free", Trebatius says that, although he may have had ten or been idoneous for acquiring and conserving a peculium, nevertheless he will not otherwise attain to liberty unless he has given, or unless it has not depended on him that he did not give: which opinion is true.
Stichus annua bima trima die denos aureos heredi si dederit, liber esse iussus est. si prima pensione stetit per heredem, quo minus acciperet decem, exspectandam esse trimam pensionem placet, quia et tempus adiectum est et adhuc supersunt duae pensiones. sed si eadem decem sola habeat, quae optulit ad primam pensionem, an etiam ad sequentem quoque prosit, si offerat?
Stichus, if he shall have given to the heir ten aurei on the annual, biennial, and triennial day, has been ordered to be free. If at the first installment it was by the heir’s doing that he did not receive the ten, it is held that the triennial installment is to be awaited, because both time has been added and two installments still remain. But if he has only that same ten which he offered at the first installment, does it also avail for the following one as well, if he should offer?
Quid si servus, qui annua bima trima die iussus est dena dare, tota simul offerat heredi non exspectata die ? vel decem primo anno datis secundo anno viginti optulit ? benignius est eum in libertatem pervenire, cum utriusque providentia infertur et servi, quatenus maturius in libertatem perveniat, et heredis, quatenus dilatione interempta ilico accipiat, quod post tempus consequi poterat.
What if a slave, who has been ordered to give ten on the annual, biennial, or triennial day, should offer the whole to the heir at once, the day not having been awaited? Or, after ten were given in the first year, he offered twenty in the second year? It is more benign that he should come into liberty, since consideration is brought in for both—both of the slave, inasmuch as he may reach liberty earlier, and of the heir, inasmuch as, the delay being done away, he receives immediately what he could have obtained after a time.
Si ita sit libertas servo data, si quinquennio heredi servierit, deinde eum heres manumiserit, statim liber fit, quasi per eum sit effectum, quo minus ei serviat: quamvis si non pateretur eum sibi servire, non statim perveniret, quam si quinquennium praeterisset. ratio huius res evidens est: manumissus enim amplius servire non potest: at is quem quis non patitur sibi servire, postea pati potest intra quinquennii tempus. atquin iam quinquennio ei servire non potest: sed vel minus potest.
If liberty has been given to a slave on these terms—if he shall have served the heir for five years—then, if thereafter the heir manumits him, he becomes free at once, as though it were through the heir that it came about that he served him the less; although, if he did not allow him to serve him, he would not at once attain the outcome he would if the five-year period had elapsed. The rationale of this matter is evident: one who has been manumitted can no longer serve; but one whom a person does not allow to serve him can later be allowed to do so within the five-year period. And yet now he cannot serve him for five years; but he can for less.
Item iulianus libro sexto decimo digestorum scripsit, si arethusae libertas ita sit data, si tres servos pepererit, et per heredem steterit, quo minus pepererit ( puta quod ei medicamentum dedisset, ne conciperet), statim liberam futuram esse: quid enim exspectamus? idemque et si egisset heres, ut abortum faceret, quia et uno utero potuit tres edere.
Likewise Julianus wrote in the sixteenth book of the Digests, that if Arethusa’s freedom has been granted on this condition, that she should bear three slaves, and it has been owing to the heir that she did not bear (suppose that he had given her a medicament so that she would not conceive), she will be free at once: for what are we waiting? And the same [rule] also if the heir acted so that she procured an abortion, because even from one womb she could have brought forth three.
Non est statuliber, cui libertas in tam longum tempus collata est, ut eo tempore is qui manumissus est vivere non possit: aut si tam difficilem, immo paene impossibilem condicionem adiecerit, ut aliunde ea libertas optingere non possit, veluti si heredi milies dedisset aut cum moreretur, liberum esse iussisset: sic enim libertas inutiliter datur, et ita iulianus scribit, quia nec animus dandae libertatis est.
He is not a statuliber, to whom liberty has been conferred for so long a time that at that time the one manumitted cannot be alive; or if he has added so difficult, nay almost impossible, a condition that in no other way could that liberty befall, as for example if he had given to the heir a thousand times over, or had ordered him to be free when he should die: for thus liberty is given ineffectually, and thus Julian writes, because there is not even an intention of giving liberty.
Servire titio anno et liber esse iussus titio mortuo non statim liber fiet, sed cum annus transierit, quod videtur non tantum sub condicione, sed etiam ex tempore data libertas: etenim absurdum est maturius eum liberum fieri, cum condicionem non implet, quam futurus foret, si eam expleret.
One who has been ordered to serve Titius for a year and to be free, upon Titius’s death will not immediately become free, but when the year has passed, because the liberty seems to have been granted not only under a condition but also from a set time; for it is absurd that he should become free earlier, when he does not fulfill the condition, than he would be if he fulfilled it.
" stichus si titio per triennium servierit vel si illi centum operas dederit, liber esto". constat hoc modo libertatem utiliter dari posse: nam et alienus servus servire nobis potest, sicuti liber, et multo magis operas dare: nisi testator servitutis appellatione dominium magis quam operam intellexit. ideoque si prohibet heres titio servire, pervenit ad libertatem.
" stichus, if he shall have served Titius for a three-year period, or if he shall have given him one hundred services, let him be free." It is established that liberty can usefully be given in this manner: for even another’s slave can serve us, just as a free man, and much more can he give services: unless the testator, under the appellation of servitude, understood dominion rather than service. And therefore, if the heir forbids him to serve Titius, he attains to liberty.
" stichus si heredi meo anno servierit, liber esto": quaerendum est, annus quomodo accipi debeat, an qui ex continuis diebus trecentis sexaginta quinque constet an quibus ^ quibuslibet^ libet ^ ^ . sed superius magis intellegendum pomponius scribit. sed et si quibusdam diebus aut valetudo aut alia iusta causa impedimento fuerit, quo minus serviat, et hi anno imputandi sunt: servire enim nobis intelleguntur etiam hi, quos curamus aegros, qui cupientes servire propter adversam valetudinem impediuntur.
"Stichus, if he shall have served my heir for a year, let him be free": the question must be asked how a year ought to be taken, whether as that which consists of 365 continuous days, or of any days whatsoever ^ quibuslibet^ libet ^ ^ . But Pomponius writes that the former is rather to be understood. Yet even if on certain days either ill-health or another just cause has been an impediment, so that he serves the less, these too are to be reckoned in the year: for those whom we nurse when sick, who, though desirous to serve, are hindered by adverse health, are understood to be serving us.
Statuliber rationem reddere iussus reliquum quod apparet solvit, de eo, quod obscurius est, satisdare paratus est. neratius et aristo recte putant liberum fore, ne multi ad libertatem pervenire non possint incerta causa rationis et genere negotii huiusmodi.
Ordered to render an account, the statuliber paid the remainder that is apparent, and as to that which is more obscure he is prepared to give surety. Neratius and Aristo rightly think that he will be free, lest many should be unable to attain to liberty because of the uncertainty of the account and of the kind of business of this sort.
Si statulibera serva poenae facta sit et post damnationem statutae libertatis condicio exstiterit, quamvis ipsi statuliberae nihil proficiat, partui tamen proficere oportet, ut perinde liber nascatur, atque si mater damnata non esset.
If a statulibera slave‑woman has been made a slave of punishment, and after the condemnation the condition of the stipulated freedom has come to pass, although nothing profits the statulibera herself, nevertheless it ought to profit the offspring, so that it is born free just as if the mother had not been condemned.
Quid tamen si qua conceperit in servitute, deinde ab hostibus capta peperit ibi post existentem condicionem, an liberum pariat? et interim quidem quin servus hostium sit, nequaquam dubium est: sed verius est postliminio eum liberum fieri, quia, si mater in civitate esset, liber nasceretur.
What, however, if a woman has conceived in servitude, and then, after being captured by the enemies, has given birth there after that condition had come into existence—does she bear a free child? And in the meantime, indeed, that he is a slave of the enemies is by no means doubtful; but the truer view is that by postliminy he becomes free, because, if the mother were in the State, he would be born free.
Statuliber parendo condicioni in persona emptoris pervenit ad libertatem: et sciendum hoc ad statuliberos omnis sexus pertinere. non solum autem si venierit, haec condicio ad eum transit qui emit, verum etiam ad omnes, quicumque quoquo iure dominium in statulibero nacti sunt. sive igitur legatus sit tibi ab herede statuliber sive adiudicatus sive usucaptus a te sive traditus vel aliquo iure tuus factus, sine dubio dicemus parere condicioni in persona tua posse.
By obeying the condition, a statuliber comes to liberty in the person of the purchaser; and it should be known that this pertains to statulibers of every sex. Not only, moreover, if he has been sold does this condition pass to the one who buys, but also to all, whoever by whatever right have obtained ownership in the statuliber. Whether therefore the statuliber has been bequeathed to you by the heir, or adjudged, or acquired by usucapion by you, or delivered or made yours by some right, without doubt we shall say that he can comply with the condition in your person.
Si filius familias heres sit institutus et statuliber filio dare iussus est et liber esse, sive filio sive patri dando pervenit ad libertatem, quia et ad patrem hereditatis emolumentum pervenit. sed et si post mortem filii patri dederit quasi heredis heredi, liber erit: nam et si quis extraneo dare iussus sit et liber esse, deinde hic heredi heres extiterit, non quasi in extranei persona, sed quasi in heredis condicioni parebit.
If a son in the family (filius familias) is instituted heir, and a statuliber is ordered to be given to the son and to be free, then whether by giving him to the son or to the father he arrives at liberty, since the emolument of the inheritance comes to the father as well. But also, if after the son’s death he gives to the father, as from heir to the heir, he will be free: for even if one was ordered to give to a stranger and to be free, and thereafter that person became heir to the heir, he will comply not as in the person of a stranger, but as under the condition of an heir.
Si servus tuus statuliberum emerit, tibi datur, quod heredibus dare iussus est. sed et si tuo servo dederit, si modo is eum peculiari nomine emit neque ei tu peculium ademisti, puto liberum fore, scilicet ut eo modo tibi dedisse intellegatur, perinde atque si tua voluntate cuivis alii tuorum servorum dedisset.
If your slave has bought a statuliber (a conditionally-free slave), that which he was ordered to give to the heirs is given to you. But also if he should give it to your slave—provided that the latter bought him in the name of his peculium and you have not taken away his peculium—I think he will be free, namely so that in this way it is understood that he has given it to you, just as if, with your will, he had given it to any other of your slaves.
Si quis non dare decem et liber esse, sed rationibus redditis liber esse iussus sit, an ad emptorem haec condicio transeat, videamus. et alias sciendum est eas demum condiciones ad emptorem transire, quae sunt in dando: ceterum hae, quae sunt in faciendo, non transeunt, ut puta si filium eius litteras edocuerit: hae enim personis eorum cohaerent, quibus adscribuntur. rationum autem reddendarum condicio, quod ad reliqua quidem attinet, in danda pecunia consistit, quod autem ad ipsa volumina rationum tradenda percontandasque et examinandas rationes et in dispungendas atque excutiendas, factum habet.
If someone has been ordered to be free, not upon giving ten, but upon the accounts having been rendered, let us see whether this condition passes to the purchaser. And in general it must be known that only those conditions pass to the purchaser which are in giving; but those which are in doing do not pass—for instance, if he should have taught his son letters—for these are tied to the persons to whom they are ascribed. Now the condition of accounts being rendered, so far as it pertains to the remainder, consists in the giving of money; but as regards the account-books themselves being handed over and the accounts being inquired into and examined and being checked off and audited, it has the character of an act.
Perhaps, then, that the arrears indeed—by paying them to the purchaser—he attains to liberty, while the rest remain with the person of the heir? I therefore think that the payment of the remainders is transmitted also to the purchaser: thus it will come about that the condition is divided: and so Pomponius wrote in the eighth book from Sabinus.
Si partes suas quisque heredum diversis ementibus vendiderit, quas portiones heredibus dare statuliber debuit, easdem dabit emptoribus. labeo autem ait, si nomina dumtaxat heredum in testamento posita sint, viriles partes eis dandas: si vero ita " si heredibus dedit", hereditarias.
if each of the heirs has sold his shares to different purchasers, the same portions which the statuliber was bound to give to the heirs he shall give to the purchasers. labeo, however, says that if only the names of the heirs are set down in the testament, virile portions are to be given to them; but if it is thus " si heredibus dedit", hereditary portions.
Si statuliberum non eadem condicione heres vendat, causa eius immutabilis est et luere se ab eo potest simili modo ut ab herede. si tamen suppresserit condicionem statuliberi? et ex empto quidem tenetur: graviores autem etiam stellionatus crimen important ei, qui sciens dissimulata condicione statutae libertatis simpliciter eum vendiderit.
If the heir sells a statuliber not on the same condition, his status is immutable, and he can redeem himself from him in a similar manner as from the heir. If, however, the condition of the statuliber has been suppressed? he is indeed liable ex empto; moreover, graver consequences too import the charge of stellionate against the one who, knowing, with the condition of the appointed liberty concealed, has simply sold him outright.
Illud tractatum est, an liberatio contingat ei qui noxae dederit statuliberum. et octavenus putabat liberari: et idem dicebat et si ex stipulatu stichum deberet eumque statuliberum solvisset: nam et si ante solutionem ad libertatem pervenisset, extingueretur obligatio tota: ea enim in obligatione consistere, quae pecunia lui praestarique possunt, libertas autem pecunia lui non potest nec reparari potest. quae sententia mihi videtur vera.
The following was treated: whether release accrues to one who has, by noxal surrender, given a statuliber. And Octavenus thought he is released; and he said the same even if, under a stipulation, he owed Stichus and discharged the debt by delivering him as a statuliber: for even if before the payment he had come to liberty, the entire obligation would be extinguished; for obligations consist in those things which can be paid off and rendered in money, but liberty cannot be paid off with money nor can it be repaired. Which opinion seems to me true.
Statuliberi condicio ita demum immutabilis est, si adita hereditas fuerit: ceterum ante aditam hereditatem in propriam usucapitur servitutem libertatisque spes infringitur: sed adita postea hereditate spes libertatis favore sui redintegrabitur.
The condition of a statuliber is only then immutable, if the inheritance has been entered upon; otherwise, before the inheritance is entered, he is acquired by usucapion into private servitude and the hope of liberty is infringed; but after the inheritance has been entered, the hope of liberty, by its own favor, will be reintegrated.
Si decem dare iussum heres vendiderit et tradiderit dixeritque adscriptum libertati, si viginti dedisset, ex empto erit actio cum venditore, aut, si dupla promissa est, ob evictionem dumtaxat duplae repetitio erit, ex empto ob mendacium.
If an heir who was ordered to give ten has sold and delivered, and has said that he was enrolled to liberty, if he had given twenty, there will be an action ex empto with the seller, or, if double has been promised, there will be, on account of eviction only, a repetition of the double, an action ex empto on account of mendacity.
Si quis ita libertatem dedisset " stichus, si eum heres meus testamento suo non manumiserit, liber esto", secundum voluntatem defuncti hoc significari videtur " si testamento suo heres non adscripserit ei libertatem". quare si quidem heres libertatem servo testamento suo dederit, defectus condicione videtur: si non dederit, impleta condicione ultimo vitae tempore heredis ad libertatem perveniet.
If someone had thus given liberty, " stichus, if my heir shall not manumit him by his testament, let him be free," according to the intention of the deceased this seems to be signified: "if in his own testament the heir shall not have ascribed liberty to him." Wherefore, if indeed the heir has given liberty to the slave by his testament, the condition seems to have failed; if he has not given it, with the condition fulfilled, at the last moment of the heir’s life he will attain liberty.
Servus communis liber esse iussus ita " si decem dederit" ex peculio dare potest, quod quocumque modo adquisitum habuerit: nec refert, apud heredem id an apud socium fuerit et heredi an extraneo dare iussus sit. nam per omnia causae statuliberi applicatur: qui condicionis implendae gratia alienare peculiares nummos potest.
A jointly-owned slave, ordered to be free thus, " if he gives ten," can pay from his peculium whatever he has acquired in whatever way; nor does it matter whether it was in the hands of the heir or of the partner, and whether he was ordered to give to the heir or to an outsider. For in all respects the case of the statuliber is applied: for the sake of fulfilling the condition he can alienate coins belonging to his peculium.
Si duo servi rationibus redditis liberi esse iussi fuerint et separatim rationes gesserint, non dubie separatim quoque condicioni parere poterunt. sed si actus eorum communiter gestus ita immixtus fuerit, ut separari non possit, necessario alter cessando alterius libertatem impediet. nec videbitur condicio in alterius persona impleta, nisi id, quod computatione rationum habita reliquum fuerit, aut uterque aut alter totum solverit.
If two slaves, with the accounts rendered, have been ordered to be free and have managed the accounts separately, without doubt they will also be able to comply with the condition separately. But if their acts, conducted in common, have been so intermixed that they cannot be separated, then necessarily the one, by defaulting, will hinder the liberty of the other. Nor will the condition be deemed fulfilled in the person of the other, unless that which, the computation of the accounts having been made, has remained outstanding, either both or one has paid in full.
Haec scriptura " stichus cum erit annorum triginta, liber esto. stichus si decem non dederit, liber ne esto" hanc vim habet " stichus si decem dederit et ad annos triginta pervenerit, liber esto": namque ademptio libertatis vel legati sub condicione facta incipit contrariam condicionem legato vel libertati, quae prius data erat, iniecisse.
This writing " stichus when he will be thirty years of age, let him be free. stichus if he will not have given ten, let him not be free" has this force: " stichus if he will have given ten and has come to thirty years, let him be free": for a deprivation of liberty or of a legacy made under a condition is taken to have attached the contrary condition to the legacy or to the liberty that had previously been given.
Servus, qui testamento domini, cum decem heredi dedisset, liber esse iussus erat, heredi mercedem referre pro operis suis solebat: cum ex mercede heres amplius decem recepisset, servus liberum esse aiebat: de ea re consulebatur. respondit non videri liberum esse: non enim pro libertate, sed pro operis eam pecuniam dedisse nec magis ob eam rem liberum esse, quam si fundum a domino conduxisset et pro fructu fundi pecuniam dedisset.
A slave who by his master’s will had been ordered to be free upon giving ten to the heir was accustomed to render hire to the heir for his services; when from that hire the heir had received more than ten, the slave asserted that he was free; consultation was made about this matter. He responded that he did not seem to be free: for he had given that money not for liberty, but for his services, and he was no more free on that account than if he had leased a farm from his master and had given money for the produce of the farm.
Servus cum heredi annorum septem operas dedisset, liber esse iussus erat: is servus fugerat et annum in fuga fecerat. cum septem anni praeterissent, respondit non esse liberum: non enim fugitivum operas domino dedisse: quare nisi totidem dies, quot afuisset, servisset, non fore liberum. sed et si ita scriptum esset, ut tum liber esset, cum septem annis servisset, potuisse liberum esse, si tempus fugae reversus servisset.
A slave, having been ordered to be free when he had given his services to the heir for seven years, had run away and spent a year in flight. When seven years had elapsed, he replied that he was not free: for a fugitive had not given services to the master: wherefore, unless he should serve as many days as he had been absent, he would not be free. But even if it had been written thus, that he should be free then, when he had served for seven years, he could be free, if, after returning, he served the time of the flight.
Heres cum statuliberum decem dare iussum venderet, condicionem pronuntiavit et traditioni legem dixit, ut sibi potius quam emptori eadem decem darentur: quaerebatur, utri eorum statuliber pecuniam dando libertatem consequeretur. respondit heredi eum dare debere. sed et si talem legem dixisset, ut extraneo alicui statuliber pecuniam daret, respondit et hoc casu conventionem valere, quia heredi videtur solvere, qui voluntate eius alii solvit.
When the heir, selling a statuliber whom he had been ordered to give for ten, announced the condition and set a law upon the delivery, that the same ten be given to himself rather than to the buyer, it was asked to which of them the statuliber, by giving the money, would obtain freedom. He answered that he ought to give it to the heir. But also if he had set such a law, that the statuliber should give the money to some outsider, he answered that in this case too the convention is valid, because he is considered to pay the heir who, by the heir’s will, pays to another.
Si decem heredi dedisset, iussus est liber esse: decem habet et tantundem domino debet: dando haec decem non liberabitur. nam quod statulibero ex peculio suo dare explendae condicionis causa concessum est, ita interpretari debemus, ut non etiam ex eo dare possit, quod extra peculium est. nec me praeterit hos nummos peculiares posse dici, quamvis, si nihil praeterea servus habeat, peculium nullum sit.
If he has been ordered to be free, if he should give ten to the heir: he has ten and owes as much to the master: by giving these ten he will not be freed. For what has been granted to a statu‑liber to give from his own peculium for the sake of fulfilling the condition we ought to interpret thus, that he cannot also give from that which is outside the peculium. Nor does it escape me that these coins can be called “peculiar,” although, if the slave has nothing besides, there is no peculium.
but it ought not to be doubted that this was the intention of those who established it: that there should be for the slave a power of giving, as it were, out of his own patrimony under that head, because this seemed especially to be granted without injury to the masters. but if someone should go further, it will be little short of supposing that even by giving those coins which he has filched from the master, the statuliber will satisfy the condition.
Si peculium servo legatum sit, qui iussus est alii dare decem et sic liber esse, et heres eum prohibuerit dare, deinde manumissus peculium petat ex causa legati, an per doli exceptionem eam summam, quam daturus esset, deducere heres possit, ut ipsi prosit, non manumisso, quod ea pecunia data non est? an vero indignus sit heres, qui contra voluntatem defuncti fecit, eam pecuniam lucrari? et cum servo nihil absit et libertas ei competit, invidiosum est heredem fraudari.
If a peculium has been bequeathed to a slave, who was ordered to give ten to another and thus be free, and the heir prohibited him from giving it, then, after manumission, he seeks the peculium by reason of the legacy—whether by the exceptio of fraud the heir can deduct that sum which he would have given, so that it profits himself, not the manumitted man, on the ground that that money was not given? Or rather, is the heir, who acted against the will of the deceased, unworthy to profit by that money? And since nothing is lacking to the slave and freedom is owed to him, it is invidious that the heir be defrauded.
De illo quaeritur, si invito herede det aut nesciente, an faciat nummos accipientis. et iulianus vere existimat ex hac causa concessam videri statuliberis alienationem nummorum etiam invito herede et ideo facere eos accipientis pecuniam.
Concerning him the question is raised, if he should give with the heir unwilling or unaware, whether he makes the coins the recipient’s. And Julianus rightly judges that for this reason the alienation of coins is to be regarded as conceded to conditionally-freed slaves (statuliberi), even with the heir unwilling, and therefore that they make them the recipient’s money.
Is, cui servus pecuniam dare iussus est ut liber esset, decessit. sabinus, si decem habuisset parata, liberum fore, quia non staret per eum, quo minus daret. iulianus autem ait favore libertatis constituto iure hunc ad libertatem perventurum, etiamsi postea habere coeperit decem.
He, to whom the slave was ordered to give money so that he might be free, died. sabinus [holds that], if he had had the ten ready, he would be free, because it did not depend on him that he did not give. iulianus, however, says that, with the law established in favor of liberty, he would attain to freedom even if he later began to have the ten.
Moreover, he attains to freedom rather by constituted law than from the testament, to such a degree that, if a legacy also has been left to the same person, upon the death of him whom he was ordered to pay, he will indeed arrive at freedom, but will not also have the legacy: and Julian likewise thinks this, so that in this he may be similar to the other legatees. A different case is that of him whom the heir prevents from obeying the condition: for this man attains to freedom from the testament.
Quaedam condiciones natura sui nec possunt eodem tempore impleri, sed necessariam habent temporis divisionem, velut cum decem operarum iussus est dare, quia operae per singulos dies dantur. igitur et si singulos aureos det statuliber, potest dici eum implesse condicionem. alia causa est operarum, quia hae necessario singulae edendae sunt.
Certain conditions, by the nature of the thing, cannot be fulfilled at the same time, but require a division of time, as when someone has been ordered to give ten days of labor, because operae are given by single days. Therefore, even if the statuliber gives the aurei one by one, it can be said that he has fulfilled the condition. It is otherwise with operae, because these must necessarily be rendered individually.
but also if the heir is unwilling to accept, he will not be free immediately, but when the time has passed during which the quantity of services is consummated. the same must be said if he is ordered to go to Capua and to be free, and the heir forbids him to go: for then he will be free when he could have reached Capua: for time seems to be inherent both to the prestation of services and to the journey.
Si ita quis acceperit libertatem " stichus, si heres eum non manumiserit, liber esto", poterit ab herede manumitti: non contra voluntatem testatoris adimitur ei libertus. sed non tam continuum tempus exigendum est, ut praecipitari cogatur heres vel ex peregrinatione celerius reverti ad manumittendum vel administrationem rerum necessariarum intermittere, nec rursus tam longum, ut, quamdiu vivat, protrahatur manumissio, sed modicum, quo primum possit sine magno incommodo suo heres manumittere. quod si tempus adiectum fuerit, illud spectabitur.
If someone has received freedom thus: "stichus, if the heir does not manumit him, let him be free," he can be manumitted by the heir: the freedman is not taken away from him against the will of the testator. But so continuous a time is not to be demanded as to compel the heir to act precipitately, or to return more quickly from a peregrination for the purpose of manumitting, or to interrupt the administration of necessary affairs; nor, on the other hand, so long a time that the manumission is prolonged for as long as he lives, but a moderate one, within which the heir can at the first opportunity manumit without great inconvenience to himself. But if a time has been added, that will be regarded.
Labeo libro posteriorum ita refert: " calenus dispensator meus, si rationes diligenter tractasse videbitur, liber esto suaque omnia et centum habeto". diligentiam desiderare eam debemus, quae domino, non quae servo fuerit utilis. erit autem ei diligentiae coniuncta fides bona non solum in rationibus ordinandis, sed etiam in reliquo reddendo. et quod ita scriptum est " videbitur", pro hoc accipi debet " videri poterit": sic et verba legis duodecim tabularum veteres interpretati sunt " si aqua pluvia nocet", id est " si nocere poterit". et si quaereretur, cui eam diligentiam probari oporteat, heredum arbitratum viri boni more agentium sequi debebimus, veluti si is, qui certam pecuniam dedisset, liber esse iussus est, non adscripto eo, cui si dedisset, eo modo poterit liber esse, quo posset, si ita fuisset scriptum " si heredi dedisset".
Labeo in the Later Book reports thus: " calenus, my steward, if he shall seem to have handled the accounts diligently, let him be free and have all his own things and a hundred." We ought to require that diligence which would be useful to the master, not that which would have been useful to the slave. And to that diligence there will be joined good faith not only in ordering the accounts, but also in rendering the balance. And in that it is written " shall seem," this must be taken as " shall be able to seem": so too the ancients interpreted the words of the law of the Twelve Tables, " if rainwater harms," that is, " if it shall be able to harm." And if it were asked to whom that diligence ought to be proved, we should follow the judgment of the heirs acting according to the standard of a good man, as, for example, if someone who had given a certain sum of money is ordered to be free, without its having been written to whom, upon giving it, he is to be free, he will be able to be free in the same way as he would be if it had been written thus, " if he had given it to the heir."
Si is, cui dare iussus est, redemerit statuliberum eumque rursus alii vendiderit, novissimo emptori dabit: iam enim cum apud eum, cui dare iussus est, dominium quoque servi pervenit, si eum alienet, condicionem quoque ab eo ad emptorem transire iuliano placuit.
If the person to whom he was ordered to deliver should buy back the statuliber and then sell him again to another, he shall deliver to the most recent purchaser: for now, since ownership of the slave also has come to the one to whom he was ordered to deliver, if he alienates him, it pleased Julian that the condition likewise passes from him to the purchaser.
Si hereditas eius, qui servum, intra dies triginta mortis suae si rationes reddidisset, liberum esse iusserat, post dies triginta adita est, iure quidem stricto ita manumissus liber esse non potest, quoniam condicione deficitur: sed favor libertatis eo rem perduxit, ut respondeatur expletam condicionem, si per eum, cui data esset, non staret quo minus expleretur.
If the inheritance of one who had ordered a slave to be free, provided he had rendered accounts within thirty days after his death, was entered upon after thirty days, then by strict law a person thus manumitted cannot be free, since the condition fails: but the favor of liberty has brought the matter to this point, that the answer is given that the condition is deemed fulfilled, if it did not rest with the one to whom it had been given that it be prevented from being fulfilled.
Statuliber, antequam condicio libertatis optigerit, si quid comparasset, peculio legato non cessurum in libris gaii cassii scriptum est, nisi id legatum in tempus libertatis collatum esset. videamus, ne, cum peculium et accessionem et decessionem habeat, augmentum quoque eius peculii, si modo ab herede ei ablatum non sit, legato cessurum sit: et magis hoc iure utimur.
A statuliber, before the condition of liberty has fallen due, if he should have acquired anything, it is written in the books of Gaius Cassius that it would not pass to the peculium bequeathed by legacy, unless that legacy had been assigned to the time of liberty. Let us consider whether, since a peculium has both accession and decession, the augmentation also of that peculium, provided it has not been taken from him by the heir, will pass to the legatee: and this is the rule we more commonly employ.
Statuliberi a ceteris servis nostris nihilo paene differunt. et ideo quod ad actiones vel ex delicto venientes vel ex negotio gesto contractu pertinet, eiusdem condicionis sunt statuliberi cuius ceteri. et ideo in publicis quoque iudiciis easdem poenas patiuntur, quas ceteri servi.
Statuliberi differ almost not at all from our other slaves. And therefore, as regards actions either arising from delict or from the contract (quasi-contract) of negotium gestum, statuliberi are of the same condition as the rest. And so, in public trials too, they undergo the same penalties as the other slaves.
Quintus mucius scribit: pater familias in testamento scripserat " si andronicus servus meus heredi meo dederit decem, liber esto". deinde de his bonis coeperat controversia esse: qui se lege heredem aiebat esse, is eam hereditatem ad se pertinere dicebat, alter, qui hereditatem possidebat, aiebat testamento se heredem esse. secundum eum sententia dicta erat, qui testamento aiebat se heredem esse. deinde andronicus quaerebat, si ipsi viginti dedisset, quoniam secundum eum sententia dicta est, futurusne esset liber an nihil videatur sententia, qua vicit, ad eam rem valere?
Quintus Mucius writes: the pater familias had written in his testament, “if my slave Andronicus shall have given ten to my heir, let him be free.” Then a controversy began to arise about this estate: the one who said that he was heir by statute declared that that inheritance pertained to him; the other, who was in possession of the inheritance, said that he was heir by the testament. Judgment had been pronounced in favor of the one who said he was heir by the testament. Then Andronicus inquired whether, if he should give twenty to him, since judgment has been pronounced in his favor, he would be going to be free, or whether it seems that the judgment by which he prevailed does not avail for that matter.
Wherefore, if he had given twenty to the instituted heir and the matter had been adjudged against the possessor, he would be in servitude. Labeo thinks this, which Quintus Mucius writes, to be true thus: if in very truth he who prevailed was an heir by law from intestacy; for if the true instituted heir under the testament had been defeated by the injustice of the judge, nonetheless he would have obeyed the condition by giving to him, and would be free. But the truest view is that which Aristo also wrote in reply to Celsus: that money can be given to the heir from intestacy, in whose favor the sentence has been pronounced, since the Law of the Twelve Tables, by the word “purchase,” seemed to have encompassed every alienation; that it does not matter by what kind each becomes his owner, and therefore that this man too is contained under that law, in whose favor the sentence has been pronounced, and that he who gave him the money will be free.
Et ideo cum quaesitum est " stichus cum rationes dederit, cum contubernali sua liber esto" an mortuo sticho ante condicionem contubernalis eius libera esse possit: iulianus dixit quaestionem esse in hac specie, quae et in legatis agitatur " illi cum illo do", an altero deficiente alter ad legatum admittatur: quod magis sibi placere, perinde ac si ita scriptum esset " illi et illi". aliam etiam esse quaestionem, an contubernali quoque condicio iuncta sit: quod magis esset. itaque si nulla reliqua stichus habuerit, statim eam liberam esse, si habuerit reliqua, debere eam numerare pecuniam: nec tamen liciturum ex suo peculio dare, quia id illis permissum sit, qui principaliter pro sua libertate pecuniam dare iubentur.
And therefore, when it was asked, " when Stichus shall have rendered accounts, let him, together with his contubernalis, be free," whether, Stichus having died before the condition, his contubernalis could be free: Julian said the question in this type is the same as is debated in legacies, " I give to that one together with that one," whether, one failing, the other is admitted to the legacy: which he prefers, as if it had been written, " to that one and to that one." There is also another question, whether the condition is joined to the contubernalis as well: which is more likely. And so, if Stichus shall have had no remainder, she is immediately free; if he shall have had a remainder, she ought to count out the money: yet it will not be permitted to give it from her own peculium, because that is allowed to those who are principally ordered to give money for their own freedom.
Servus si heredi decem dederit, liber esse iussus est: statuliberum heres eum manumisit ac postea defunctus est. heredis heredi pecunia danda non est: quod enim placuit heredis heredi dari oportere, tunc memineris locum habere, cum prior heres dominus accepturus pecuniam fuit. quae causa facit ambulatoriam, ut ita dixerim, condicionem: duae sunt enim causae, per quas in primi heredis persona condicio impletur, dominii ratio, item personae demonstratio: prior causa transit in omnem successorem, ad quem pervenerit statuliber per dominii translati continuationem, sequens personae dumtaxat eius, qui demonstratus est, adhaeret.
If a slave has given ten to the heir, he is ordered to be free: the heir manumitted him as a statuliber, and afterward died. Money is not to be given to the heir’s heir: for what has been decided—that the heir’s heir ought to be given the money—remember holds only when the prior heir was the owner who was going to receive the money. This makes the condition, so to speak, ambulatory: for there are two causes by which, in the person of the first heir, the condition is fulfilled—namely, the rationale of ownership, and likewise the designation of the person. The former cause passes to every successor to whom the statuliber has come, by the continuation of transferred ownership; the latter adheres only to the person of him who was designated.
Imperator antoninus rescripsit iussum rationes reddere et liberum esse, si heres causabitur accipere rationes, nihilo minus liberum fore. quod rescriptum ita accipi debet, ut, si reliqua non trahat, liber sit: quod si trahat, ita demum, si optulit eam quantitatem, quae refundi debuit ex fide veritatis: non enim libertati sufficit heredem in mora fuisse, si non id fiat per statuliberum, quod remota mora libertati aditum daret. quid enim si ita manumissum " dama si in hispaniam profectus anno proximo fructus coegerit, liber esto" romae retineat heres neque proficisci patiatur?
Emperor Antoninus rescripted that one who had been ordered to render accounts is free; and if the heir should allege a pretext about accepting the accounts, nonetheless he will be free. This rescript ought to be received thus: that, if he does not drag the remaining matters into dispute, he is free; but if he does drag them, then only if he has proffered that amount which ought to be refunded according to the good faith of the truth. For it does not suffice for liberty that the heir has been in delay, if that is not done by the statuliber which, the delay removed, would give access to liberty. For what if someone were manumitted in this way: “Dama, if, having set out to Spain, he shall have collected the fruits in the next year, let him be free,” and the heir were to detain him at Rome and not allow him to set out?
Are we to say that straightway, before the fruits are gathered, he will be free? For also when at Rome a stipulation is framed thus, "Do you promise to give one hundred in Spain?", there is understood to be time in the stipulation in which he can reach Spain, and it has been decided that suit cannot be brought before then. But if the heir, after receiving the accounts and computing the rest, should proclaim that he gives those things to the statuliber, who does not have what he might pay in, or should even make it plain by letters sent to him, the condition of liberty will be deemed fulfilled.
What then, if he denies that he has drawn the remainder, and therefore, because it stood through the heir’s fault, claims that he was made free, in order that he might receive the accounts; while the heir, on the other hand, contends that he neither caused delay nor that the statuliber owes the remainder? Before the one who adjudicates concerning liberty it will be determined whether the condition has been fulfilled: by whose office it will be included to consider the delay and likewise to compute the accounts, and, if he finds that the remainder was being drawn, to pronounce that he is not free. But if he never denied that he owed the remainder, and when he approached the heir and offered to render the accounts he declared that he would refund whatever should be established to be in the remainder, and he produced someone suitable, ready to be reckoned as debtor for that money, and the heir was in delay: judgment will be given for liberty.
Non videbitur per statuliberum non stare, quo minus condicio libertatis existat, si de peculio, quod apud venditorem servus habuit, pecuniam condicionis offerre non possit: ad alienum enim peculium voluntas defuncti porrigi non potuit. idem erit et si peculio servus venierit et venditor fide rupta peculium retinuerit: quamquam enim ex empto sit actio, tamen apud emptorem peculium servus non habuit.
It will not be regarded as standing in the statuliber’s default that the condition of liberty does not come into being, if he cannot offer the money required by the condition from the peculium which the slave had with the vendor; for the will of the deceased could not be extended to another’s peculium. The same will hold if the slave was sold together with his peculium and the vendor, breaking faith, retained the peculium: for although there is an action ex empto, nevertheless the slave did not have the peculium with the purchaser.
In tabulis secundis filio servum data libertate substitutum iure statuliberi prudentes munierunt: quod utilitas recipit, scilicet ut cum sua causa alienaretur, ne patris testamentum puer filius rescindat. quae iuris auctoritas citra dilectum ordinis ad secundum quoque vel tertium substitutum porrecta est.
In the second tablets, where for the son a slave, freedom having been given, has been substituted, the jurists have protected him with the right of a statuliber; which utility admits, namely, that he be alienated along with his own cause, lest the boy, the son, rescind the father’s testament. And this authority of law, without distinction of order, has been extended to the second or even the third substitute.
" stichum attio do lego et, si is ei nummos centum dederit, liber esto". si servus ex testamento nummos attio dedisset, eos repetere heredem non posse labeo existimat, quia attius eos a servo suo acceperit, non ab heredis servo. eum autem statuliberum esse quintus mucius, gallus et ipse labeo putant: servius, ofilius non esse. superiorem sententiam probo, ita tamen, ut is servus heredis, non legatarii sit, utpote cum legatum statulibertate tollatur.
" I give and bequeath Stichus to attius, and, if he shall have given him one hundred coins, let him be free". if the slave, according to the testament, had given the money to attius, labeo thinks that the heir cannot recover them, because attius received them from his own slave, not from the heir’s slave. as for his being statuliber, quintus mucius, gallus, and labeo himself think so; servius and ofilius think not. i approve the former opinion, but only so that this slave be the heir’s, not the legatee’s, since the legacy is removed by the statuliberty.
" stichus liber esto, quando aes alienum meum solutum creditoribusve meis satisfactum erit". quamvis heres locuples extitisset, tamen non prius stichum liberum futurum, quam creditores pecuniam aut satis accepissent aliove quo modo sibi cavissent, labeo ofilius responderunt.
" let stichus be free, when my debt has been paid or satisfaction has been made to my creditors." although the heir had proved wealthy, nevertheless stichus would not be free before the creditors had received the money or security, or had in some other way provided security for themselves, labeo and ofilius answered.
Si heres servo pecuniam ad negotiandum dedisset, statuliberum eam ipsam numerando liberari ex testamento non posse labeo trebatius responderunt, quia reddere eam magis quam dare videretur. ego puto, si peculiares nummi fuerunt, ex testamento eum liberum futurum.
if the heir had given a slave money for negotiating (trade), Labeo and Trebatius answered that a statuliber cannot be freed under the testament by counting out that very money, because he would seem to be returning it rather than giving it. i think that, if the coins were of the peculium, he will be free under the testament.
" dama servus cum heredi meo annorum septem operas solverit, liber esto" et is servus intra septem annos in iudicio publico esset et septimus annus praeterisset, servius ait eum non liberari debere, labeo, et si postea solvisset annorum septem operas, liberum futurum: quod verum est.
"When the slave Dama shall have discharged seven years of services to my heir, let him be free"; and if that slave, within the seven years, was in public trial and the seventh year had passed, Servius says he ought not to be freed; Labeo, that if afterward he should discharge seven years of services, he will be free: which is true.
" si stichus attiae mille nummos dederit, liber esto". attia vivo testatore decessit: non posse stichum liberum esse labeo ofilius responderunt: trebatius, si ante testamentum factum attia decessisset, idem: si postea, eum liberum futurum. labeonis et ofilii sententia rationem quidem habet, sed hoc iure utimur, ut is servus ex testamento liber sit.
"if stichus shall have given attia a thousand coins, let him be free". attia died while the testator was alive: labeo and ofilius answered that stichus could not be free: trebatius [said] the same, if attia had died before the testament was made; if afterwards, that he would be free. the opinion of labeo and ofilius does indeed have a rationale, but we use this law, that that slave be free by the testament.
Sticho libertas data est: " ab heredibus meis peto fideique eorum committo, ut rationibus redditis stichum manumittant". quaesitum est, cum ampla pecunia exacta post mortem testatoris sibi commissa reliquetur et quasdam summas a colonis exactis rationibus non intulerit hereditatemque spoliaverit apertis clam horreis sublatisque supellectili et veste et apothecis exhaustis: an non prius ei fideicommissa libertas debeatur, quam ea, quae mala ratione reliquatus est quae furatus est, reposuerit. respondit non prius ei fideicommissam libertatem praestandam, quam et reliqua et omnia, quae per eum abessent, restituisset.
Liberty was given to Stichus: "I ask of my heirs and commit it to their good faith, that, accounts having been rendered, they manumit Stichus." It was inquired, since after the death of the testator a large sum, collected and entrusted to him, was left, and he did not enter certain sums exacted from the tenant-farmers into the accounts, and he despoiled the estate, the granaries having been opened secretly and the furnishings and clothing removed and the store-rooms emptied: whether his fideicommissary liberty is not first owed to him only after he has replaced those things which he left in arrears by bad dealing and which he stole. He replied that the fideicommissary liberty is not to be furnished to him before he has restored both the arrears and all things which were lacking through him.
" pamphilus liber esto peculio suo heredibus vere dato". quaesitum est, cum plus domino debeat quam in peculio habeat et omnes res, quas in peculio habebat, bona fide heredibus dederat, an libertas ex testamento competat. respondit nihil proponi, cur non competeret.
"Let Pamphilus be free, his peculium truly given to the heirs." It was asked whether, since he owes the master more than he has in the peculium and had in bona fide given to the heirs all the things which he had in the peculium, liberty under the testament would accrue. He replied that nothing is put forward why it should not accrue.
Pamphilo liberto, quem heredem ex parte instituerat, stichum servum praelegaverat et ei libertatem his verbis dederat: " ita ut, si tibi ex die mortis meae per annos continuos quinque menstruos sexagenos dederit, tunc eum manumittas". pamphilus ante quinquennium moriens heredibus institutis filio et uxore de eodem sticho ita cavit: " stichus servus, qui mihi testamento patroni mei certa condicione relictus est, iubeo det praestet filio et uxori meae sine ulla controversia et eum tempore peracto manumittant". quaesitum est, si stichus sexagenos nummos menstruos non praestiterit, an impleto quinquennio fideicommissa libertas ei debeatur. respondit, nisi praestitisset, fideicommissam libertatem non deberi.
To Pamphilus the freedman, whom he had instituted as heir in part, he had bequeathed in a pre-legacy the slave Stichus and had granted him freedom in these words: " on this condition, that, if he shall give you from the day of my death for five continuous years sixty coins monthly, then you shall manumit him". pamphilus, dying before the five-year term, to the instituted heirs, his son and his wife, thus made provision concerning the same Stichus: " the slave Stichus, who has been left to me in my patron’s testament under a certain condition, I order that he give and pay to my son and my wife without any controversy, and that, when the time has been completed, they manumit him". It was asked, if Stichus should not have paid the sixty coins monthly, whether, with the five-year period completed, the fideicommissary freedom would be owed to him. He responded that, unless he had paid, the fideicommissary freedom is not owed.
Servus testamento ita manumissus est: " stichus servus meus actor si rationem omnem actus sui heredi meo reddiderit eoque nomine satisfecerit, liber esto eique, cum liber erit, dari volo viginti et peculium suum". quaesitum est, an, si rationes, quas egit per multos annos sine subscriptione testatoris, heredi reddere paratus sit, liber ex testamento fiat, cum propter gravem valetudinem testator non potuerit rationibus subscribere, testamento tamen subscripserit. respondit, si ex fide ratio redderetur reliquaque inferantur, liberum fore.
A slave was manumitted by testament in this way: " stichus my slave, my actor (steward), if he shall have rendered to my heir the whole account of his management and shall have satisfied on that score, let him be free; and to him, when he will be free, I wish 20 and his peculium to be given." The question was asked whether, if he is prepared to render to the heir the accounts which he conducted over many years without the testator’s subscription, he becomes free under the testament, since on account of grave ill-health the testator was not able to subscribe the accounts, yet he subscribed the testament. He answered that, if in good faith the account were rendered and the remainder be paid in, he would be free.
Item quaero, an ea, quae exacta sunt per adiutores eius neque kalendario illata sunt aut fraudulenter acta, huic adscribi possint, cum esset is praepositus. respondit, si id esset, quod culpae eius deberet imputari, spectare ad rationis reddendae necessitatem.
Likewise I ask whether those things which were exacted by his assistants and were not entered in the kalendary or were done fraudulently can be ascribed to him, since he was the one put in charge. he responded that, if it were something which ought to be imputed to his fault, it pertains to the necessity of rendering an account.
Titius testamento servos actores singulos diversis personis legavit cum adiectione " si rationes heredi reddiderint": deinde proprio capite ita scripsit: " omnes actores, quos legavi vel manumisero, intra quartum mensem mortis meae rationes reddere volo et dominis, quibus a me legati sint, reddi". infra deinde alios actores liberos esse iussit aeque cum hac adiectione " si rationes heredi reddiderint". quaero, cum per heredem fiat, quo minus reddantur, utrum statuliberi esse desinant an nihilo minus quandoque possint reddita ratione et reliquis illatis libertatem ex testamento consequi. respondit legata quidem et libertates non alias competere, quam rationes redditae essent aut per heredem staret, quo minus redderentur: verum iudicaturo aestimandum, utrum tempus condicioni legatorum libertatiumque additum videatur an, libero tempore reddere volentibus reliqua, heredibus quattuor menses appositi sint, sollicito testatore cunctationi et moram eorum proscribente. melius autem est praesumptionem pro statuliberis esse.
Titius by testament bequeathed the slave‑actores individually to different persons with the addition “if they shall have rendered accounts to the heir”; then under a separate heading he wrote thus: “I wish all the actores whom I have bequeathed or shall manumit to render accounts within the fourth month of my death, and to be handed over to the masters to whom they have been bequeathed by me.” Lower down he then ordered other actores to be free likewise with this addition: “if they shall have rendered accounts to the heir.” I ask, when it happens through the heir that the accounts are not rendered, whether they cease to be statuliberi, or nevertheless can at some point, the account having been rendered and the balances paid in, obtain freedom from the testament. He responded that the legacies and the freedoms do not accrue otherwise than if the accounts have been rendered, or if it is due to the heir that they were not rendered; but it is for the judge to assess whether the time appears to have been added as a condition of the legacies and freedoms, or whether, for those wishing to render the remaining sums at their own free time, four months were assigned to the heirs, the testator being solicitous and proscribing their procrastination and delay. It is better, however, that the presumption be in favor of the statuliberi.
Argentarius coactor cum paene totam fortunam in nominibus haberet, servis actoribus libertatem ita dedit: " quisquis mihi heres erit, si dama servus meus actus sui, qui agitur nomine eius et pamphili conservi sui, heredi meo rationes reddiderit pariaque fecerit a die mortis meae intra mensem sextum, liber esto". quaesitum est, an haec verba " pariaque fecit" ad omnia nomina pertineant exceptis perditis, ut hoc significent " si omnem pecuniam ab omnibus exegerint et heredi solverint vel eo nomine satisfecerint" et, si in exactione nominum cessaverint intra sex menses, libertas illis non competat. respondit manifestam esse condicionem verbis testamenti supra scriptis positam: igitur ita demum liberos fore, si aut ei pareant aut per heredem stet, quo minus pareant.
A banker-collector, since he had almost all his fortune in claims, thus gave freedom to his slave agents: "whoever shall be my heir, if dama, my slave, the business of his, which is conducted in his name and that of his fellow-slave pamphilus, shall have rendered accounts to my heir and has made things equal within the sixth month from the day of my death, let him be free." It was asked whether these words "and has made things equal" pertain to all the claims except the lost ones, so that they signify this: "if they shall have exacted all the money from everyone and paid it to the heir or satisfied with respect to that account"; and that, if they have been remiss in the exaction of the claims within six months, freedom does not accrue to them. He answered that the condition set forth in the words of the testament written above is manifest: therefore only then will they be free, if either they comply with it, or it is by the heir’s doing that they do not comply.
Si servus venditus est, ut intra certum tempus manumitteretur, etiamsi sine herede decessissent et venditor et emptor, servo libertas competit: et hoc divus marcus rescripsit. sed et si mutaverit venditor voluntatem, nihilo minus libertas competit.
If a slave has been sold on the terms that he be manumitted within a certain time, even if both the seller and the buyer have died without an heir, freedom belongs to the slave; and the deified Marcus wrote back to that effect by rescript. But even if the seller has changed his intention, nonetheless freedom belongs.
Eum, qui ita venit, ut intra tempus manumitteretur, cum dies praestandae libertatis venerit vivente venditore et perseverante in eadem voluntate, perinde haberi, ac si ab eo, a quo debuit manumitti, manumissus esset: mortuo autem venditore non esse heredum eius voluntatem explorandam divus marcus cum filio suo rescripsit.
One who thus comes, that he be manumitted within a set time, when the day for the proffering of liberty has arrived, the seller being alive and persevering in the same intention, is to be treated just as if he had been manumitted by him by whom he ought to have been manumitted; but when the seller has died, the will of his heirs is not to be inquired into, as the deified Marcus, together with his son, wrote in a rescript.
Si quis obligatum servum hac lege emerit, ut manumittat, competit libertas ex constitutione divi marci, licet bona omnia quis obligaverit, quae habet habiturusve esset. tantundem dicendum est et si hac lege emerit, ne prostituatur, et prostituerit.
If anyone purchases a hypothecated slave upon this term, that he shall manumit, freedom is competent by the constitution of the deified Marcus, although one may have hypothecated all his goods, which he has or would have. The same must be said also if he purchases upon this term, that she not be prostituted, and he has prostituted her.
Imperator noster cum patre suo constituit in eo, qui, cum possit abducere prostitutam ancillam, pecunia accepta manus iniectionem vendidit, ut libera esset: nihil enim interesse, ipse abducas et prostituas an patiaris prostitutam esse pretio accepto, cum possis eximere.
Our emperor, together with his father, ruled in the case of one who, although able to carry off a prostituted maidservant, after receiving money sold his manus iniectio so that she might be free: for it makes no difference whether you yourself carry off and prostitute, or you allow her to be prostituted for a price received, when you are able to remove her.
Mancipia mater filiae donaverat, ut filia curaret ea post mortem suam esse libera: cum donationis legi non esset obtemperatum, ex sententia constitutionis divi marci libertates optingere matre consentiente respondi: quod si ante filiam mater vita decessit, omnimodo.
The mother had donated slaves to her daughter, so that the daughter should see to it that they be free after her (the mother’s) death: when the law (lex) of the donation had not been obeyed, I replied that, according to the tenor of the constitution of the deified Marcus, the liberties could be obtained with the mother consenting; but if the mother departed life before the daughter, then in any case.
Latinus largus: vendidit ancillam ita, ut manumitteretur, non addito tempore: quaero, quando ex constitutione incipit ei libertas competere cessante emptore in manumittendo. respondi: inspiciendum est, quid actum sit, utrum, cum primum potuisset, ut manumitteret, an ut in potestate esset emptoris, quando vellet manumittere. priore casu facile tempus deprehendi poterit: posteriore utique moriente emptore competit libertas.
Latinus largus: he sold a maidservant on the terms that she be manumitted, no time having been added: I ask when, under the constitution, liberty begins to accrue to her, the purchaser refraining from manumitting. I answered: it must be examined what was transacted, whether it was that, as soon as he could, he should manumit, or that it was to be in the purchaser’s power to manumit whenever he wished. In the former case the time can readily be determined; in the latter, assuredly, liberty accrues upon the purchaser’s dying.
if it does not appear what was agreed, favor will induce the earlier opinion, that is, that within two months, if both are present, both the slave and his purchaser: for with the slave absent, unless the purchaser has conferred freedom within four months, under the constitutions he is snatched into freedom.
Si optio hominis data sit vel indistincte homo legatus sit, non potest heres quosdam servos vel omnes manumittendo aut evertere aut minuere ius electionis: nam optione sive electione servi data quodammodo singuli sub condicione legati videntur.
If an option of a person has been given, or a person has been bequeathed indistinctly, the heir cannot, by manumitting some slaves or all, either overturn or diminish the right of election; for when an option or election of a slave has been granted, in a certain manner each individual seems to have been bequeathed under a condition.
Si titius nihil amplius in bonis quam stichum et pamphilum habeat eosque stipulanti maevio ita promiserit " stichum aut pamphilum dare spondes?", deinde, cum alium creditorem non haberet, stichum manumiserit: libertas per legem aeliam sentiam rescinditur. quamvis enim fuit in potestate titii, ut pamphilum daret, tamen quamdiu eum non dederit, quia interim mori possit, non sine fraude stipulatoris stichum manumisit. quod si solum pamphilum dari promisisset, non dubitarem, quin stichus ad libertatem perveniret, quamvis similiter pamphilus mori possit: multum enim interest, contineatur ipsa stipulatione is qui manumittitur an extra obligationem sit.
If Titius has nothing more among his goods than Stichus and Pamphilus, and promises them to Maevius, who stipulates thus, "Do you promise to give Stichus or Pamphilus?," then, when he had no other creditor, he manumitted Stichus: the freedom is rescinded by the Lex Aelia Sentia. For although it was in Titius’s power to give Pamphilus, nevertheless, so long as he has not given him—because meanwhile he might die—he manumitted Stichus not without fraud upon the stipulator. But if he had promised that only Pamphilus be given, I would not hesitate to say that Stichus would arrive at freedom, although likewise Pamphilus may die: for it makes much difference whether he who is manumitted is contained in the stipulatio itself or is outside the obligation.
Iulianus de eo loquitur, qui in substantia nihil aliud habeat: nam si habeat, quare non dicetur unum posse manumitti? quia et uno mortuo solvendo est, et uno manumisso solvendo est, nec adventicii casus computandi sint: alioquin et qui unum incertum ex servis suis promisit, neminem manumittet.
Julian speaks about one who has nothing else in substance; for if he does have, why will it not be said that one can be manumitted? because both with one having died he is solvent, and with one manumitted he is solvent, nor are adventitious contingencies to be computed: otherwise even he who promised one uncertain [slave] from among his slaves will manumit no one.
Si quis integris facultatibus codicillos confirmavit, deinde, cum consilium creditorum fraudandorum cepisset, libertates codicillis dederit, optineri non potest, quo minus lege libertates interpellarentur: nam consilium testatoris fraudulentum non eo tempore observatur, quo codicilli confirmantur, sed quo libertas codicillis datur.
If someone, with his assets intact, has confirmed codicils, then, after he has conceived a plan of defrauding creditors, were to grant manumissions by codicils, it cannot be maintained so as to prevent the manumissions from being challenged under the law: for the testator’s fraudulent design is regarded not at the time when the codicils are confirmed, but at the time when liberty is given by the codicils.
In fraudem creditorum manumittere videtur, qui vel iam eo tempore, quo manumittit, solvendo non est vel datis libertatibus desiturus est solvendo esse. saepe enim de facultatibus suis amplius, quam in his est, sperant homines. quod frequenter accidit his, qui transmarinas negotiationes et aliis regionibus, quam in quibus ipsi morantur, per servos atque libertos exercent: quod saepe, adtritis istis negotiationibus longo tempore, id ignorant et manumittendo sine fraudis consilio indulgent servis suis libertatem.
He seems to manumit in fraud of creditors who either already at the time when he manumits is not solvent, or, liberties having been given, is going to cease to be solvent. For men often hope for more from their faculties than is in them. This frequently happens to those who conduct transmarine negotiations and business in regions other than those in which they themselves reside, through slaves and freedmen: because often, those negotiations, worn down over a long time, they are unaware of it, and, in manumitting, without any design of fraud, they grant their slaves liberty.
Sed nec in fraudem fisci datas libertates procedere principalibus constitutionibus cavetur. sed divi fratres rescripserunt, non utique, si debitor fisci manumiserit, libertates impediuntur, sed ita, si, cum non erat solvendo, in fraudem manumisit.
But it is also provided by imperial constitutions that liberties (manumissions) given in fraud of the fisc do not proceed. But the deified brothers rescripted: not, of course, that if a debtor of the fisc has manumitted, the liberties are impeded in every case, but only thus—if, when he was not solvent, he manumitted in fraud.
Ipsa igitur quae divertit omnes omnimodo servos suos manumittere vel alienare prohibetur, quia ita verba faciunt, ut ne eum quidem servum, qui extra ministerium eius mulieris fuit vel in agro vel in provincia, possit manumittere vel alienare: quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est.
Therefore she herself who has divorced is prohibited from manumitting or alienating all her slaves in any manner, because the terms so provide that not even that slave who was outside the service of that woman, either on an estate or in a province, can she manumit or alienate: which indeed is exceedingly harsh, but thus the law is written.
Sextus caecilius recte ait angustissimum tempus legem praestitisse alienandis manumittendisve servis. finge, inquit, ream adulterii intra sexagesimum diem postulatam: quae cognitio tam facile expediri potuit adulterii, ut intra sexagesimum diem finiatur? et tamen licere mulieri quamvis postulatae adulterii servum suspectum in adulterio vel quaestioni necessarium, quod ad verba legis attinet, manumittere.
Sextus Caecilius rightly says that the law has provided a very narrow time for alienating or manumitting slaves. “Imagine,” he says, “a woman arraigned as a defendant of adultery within sixty days: what cognition of adultery could be so easily expedited as to be finished within sixty days? And yet it is permitted for a woman, although accused of adultery, to manumit a slave suspected in the adultery or necessary for the quaestio, so far as the words of the law are concerned.”
Quaesitum est, an is, qui maiestatis crimine reus factus sit, manumittere possit, quoniam ante damnationem dominus est. et imperator antoninus calpurnio critoni rescripsit ex eo tempore, quo quis propter facinorum suorum cogitationem iam de poena sua certus esse poterat, multo prius conscientia delictorum, quam damnatione ius dandae libertatis eum amisisse.
It has been asked whether one who has become a defendant on the charge of treason can manumit, since before condemnation he is master. And Emperor Antoninus wrote to Calpurnius Criton in a rescript that from the time at which someone, on account of the consideration of his own misdeeds, could already be certain about his punishment, he had lost the right of granting liberty—by the conscience of his delicts much earlier than by condemnation.
Iulianus ait, si postea, quam filio permisit pater manumittere, filius ignorans patrem decessisse manumisit vindicta, non fieri eum liberum. sed et si vivit pater et voluntas mutata erit, non videri volente patre filium manumisisse.
Julian says that if, after the father has permitted the son to manumit, the son, not knowing that the father has died, manumits by the vindicta, the slave does not become free. But also, if the father is alive and his will has changed, it is not considered that the son manumitted with the father willing.
Aristo respondit a debitore fisci, qui solvendo non erat, manumissum ita revocari in servitutem debere, si non diu in libertate fuisset, id est non minus decennio: plane ea, quae in fraudem fisci in sinus eius collata sunt, revocanda.
Aristo responded that, from a debtor of the fiscus who was not solvent, the manumitted person ought thus to be recalled into servitude, if he had not been long in liberty—that is, for not less than a decade; plainly, those things which, in fraud of the fiscus, have been conveyed into his lap are to be recalled.
Si is, cui libertas relicta est, iussus sit heredi dare tantum, quanti est, et liber esse, videamus, an adhuc fraus sit creditorum, quia heres mortis causa accepturus est, an vero, si alius pro eo vel ipse non de peculio det, nulla sit fraus. sed si heres locuples non proficit ad libertatem, nec qui dat pecuniam prodesse potest.
If the one to whom freedom has been left has been ordered to give to the heir as much as he is worth and to be free, let us see whether there is still a fraud upon the creditors, because the heir is going to receive it mortis causa; or rather, whether, if someone else pays on his behalf, or he himself pays not from his peculium, there is no fraud. But if the heir is wealthy, this does not advance the liberty, nor can the one who provides the money be of any help.
Si servo alieno libertas non consentiente domino data est, valere ex auctoritate iuris non potest, quamvis postea manumissor domino heres extitit, nam licet eius iure cognationis qui manumisit heres extitit, non ideo aditione hereditatis libertatis datio confirmatur.
If liberty has been given to another’s slave without the master consenting, it cannot be valid by the authority of the law, although afterwards the manumitter turned out to be the master’s heir; for although by right of cognation he who manumitted became his heir, not on that account is the grant of liberty confirmed by the aditio of the inheritance.
Matrimonii causa manumitti ancilla a nullo alio potest quam qui eam uxorem ducturus est. quod si alter manumiserit matrimonii causa, alter eam uxorem ducat, non erit libera, adeo ut nec si intra sex quidem menses eam repudiatam postea manumissor uxorem duxerit, liberam eam fieri iulianus respondit, quasi de his nuptiis senatus senserit, quae post manumissionem nullis aliis interpositis secutae fuerunt.
On account of marriage, a handmaid may be manumitted by no one other than the man who is going to lead her as a wife. But if one man should manumit her on account of marriage, and another should take her as wife, she will not be free—indeed, Julianus replied that she does not become free even if, within six months, the one who married her repudiates her and afterward the manumitter takes her as wife—as though the senate had in view those nuptials which, after manumission, ensued with nothing else interposed.
Si quis, habens creditores, plures manumiserit, non omnium libertas impedietur, sed qui primi sunt, liberi erunt, donec creditoribus suum solvatur. quam rationem iulianus solet dicere velut duobus manumissis, si unius libertate fraudentur, non utriusque, sed alterutrius impediri libertatem et plerumque postea scripti, nisi si quando maioris pretii sit is qui ante nominatus sit nec sufficiat posteriorem retrahi in servitutem, prior sufficiat: nam hoc casu ^ causa^ sequenti loco scriptum solum ad libertatem perventurum.
If someone, having creditors, has manumitted several, the liberty of all will not be impeded, but those who are first will be free, until what is due is paid to the creditors. Julian is accustomed to state this rationale as, for example, with two manumitted: if the creditors are defrauded by the liberty of one, the liberty is impeded not of both, but of one or the other—and most often that of those written later—unless when the one first named is of greater price and it does not suffice to drag the later back into servitude; the prior will suffice: for in this case ^ cause^ the one written in the subsequent place alone will come to liberty.
Pignori obligatum servum debitoris heres manumisit: quaesitum est, an liber esset. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur, si pecunia etiam nunc deberetur, non esse manumissione liberum factum. paulus: soluta ergo pecunia ex illa voluntate liber fit.
The heir of the debtor manumitted a slave bound in pledge: it was asked whether he was free. He responded, on the facts as proposed, that if the money were still owed even now, he had not been made free by the manumission. paulus: therefore, the money having been paid, by that intention he becomes free.
In fraudem creditorum manumittitur liberque esse prohibetur, sive dies solvendae pecuniae iam cessit, sive in diem vel sub condicione sit debitum. diversa causa est legati sub condicione relicti: nam antequam condicio extiterit, inter creditores legatarius iste non habetur. ex omni autem causa creditoribus in hac parte lex aelia sentia prospexit, inter quos fideicommissarium etiam esse placuit.
He is manumitted in fraud of the creditors and is prohibited from being free, whether the day for paying the money has already fallen due, or the debt is for a term or under a condition. The case is different with a legacy left under a condition: for before the condition has arisen, this legatee is not counted among the creditors. But in every case the Lex Aelia Sentia has made provision for the creditors in this respect, among whom it has also been decided that the fideicommissary is to be included.
Pignori datus servus, antequam debiti nomine fiat satis, sine consensu creditorum manumitti non potest. sed pupilli creditoris citra tutoris auctoritatem consensus nihil libertati prodest, sicuti non prodest, si fructuarius pupillus manumissioni similiter consentiat.
A slave given in pledge cannot be manumitted, before satisfaction is made of the debt, without the consent of the creditors. But the consent of a pupil creditor, without the authority of his tutor, brings nothing to the advantage of liberty—just as it does not avail if a pupil who is a usufructuary likewise consents to the manumission.
Si quis hac lege servum emerit, ut manumittat, et non manumittente eo servus ad libertatem pervenerit ex constitutione divi marci, an possit ut ingratum accusare, videamus. et dici potest, cum non sit manumissor, hoc ius eum non habere.
If someone should purchase a slave under this law, to manumit, and, with him not manumitting, the slave has attained to freedom by the constitution of the deified Marcus, let us see whether he can accuse him as ungrateful. And it can be said that, since he is not the manumitter, he does not have this right.
Quotiens autem patroni libertum volunt accusare, utrum omnium consensus necessarius sit an vero et unus possit, videamus. et est verius, si saltem in unum hoc commiserit, eum ut ingratum accusari, sed omnium consensum necessarium, si sint eiusdem gradus.
However, whenever the patrons wish to accuse the freedman, let us see whether the consensus of all is necessary, or indeed whether even one can. And the truer view is that, if he has committed this at least against one, he is to be accused as ungrateful; but the consensus of all is necessary, if they are of the same degree.
Is, qui operas aut in singulas eas certam summam promisit, ad hanc legem non pertinet, quoniam operas praestando potest liberari. idem octavenus probat et adicit: obligare sibi libertum, ut mercedem operarum capiat, is intellegitur, qui hoc solum agit, ut utique mercedem capiat, etiamsi sub titulo operarum eam stipulatus fuerit.
He who has promised services, or for each of them a fixed sum, does not fall under this statute, since by rendering the services he can be released. The same octavenus approves and adds: he is understood to bind a freedman to himself in order to take the hire for the services, who aims at this alone—that he take the hire in any case—even if he has stipulated it under the title of services.
Diversum in eo probatur, qui iudicatus ingenuus collusione per alium patronum detecta condicioni suae redditus alimenta sibi, quae tertius patronus reliquerat, praeberi desiderat. hunc enim etiam beneficium anulorum amittere placuit.
A different outcome is approved in the case of one who, adjudged a freeborn man, after collusion through another patron has been detected and restored to his own condition, desires that the maintenance which a third patron had bequeathed to him be furnished. for it was decided that this man also should lose the benefit of the rings.
Interdum et servi nati ex post facto iuris interventu ingenui fiunt, ut ecce si libertinus a principe natalibus suis restitutus fuerit. illis enim utique natalibus restituitur, in quibus initio omnes homines fuerunt, non in quibus ipse nascitur, cum servus natus esset. hic enim, quantum ad totum ius pertinet, perinde habetur, atque si ingenuus natus esset, nec patronus eius potest ad successionem venire.
Sometimes even those born as slaves become freeborn by the subsequent intervention of law, as—see—if a freedman has been restored by the prince to his natal status. for he is assuredly restored to those natal beginnings in which at the beginning all human beings were, not to those in which he himself was born, since he had been born a slave. for this man, so far as the whole law is concerned, is regarded just as if he had been born freeborn, and his patron cannot come to the succession.
Respondit: quaeris, an ingenuitatis iure utatur is, quem sanctissimus et nobilissimus imperator natalibus suis restituit. sed ea res nec dubitationem habet nec umquam habuit, quin exploratum sit ad omnem ingenuitatis statum restitui eum, qui isto beneficio principis utatur.
He responded: you ask whether he avails himself of the right of freeborn status, the one whom the most holy and most noble emperor has restored to his birthrights. But that matter neither has nor ever had any doubt, since it is well established that he who makes use of that beneficence of the princeps is restored to every condition of freeborn status.
Si quando is, qui in possessione servitutis constitutus est, litigare de condicione sua non patitur, quod forte sibi suoque generi vellet aliquam iniuriam inferre, in hoc casu aequum est quibusdam personis dari licentiam pro eo litigare: ut puta parenti, qui dicat filium in sua potestate esse: nam etiamsi nolit filius, pro eo litigabit. sed et si in potestate non sit, parenti dabitur hoc ius, quia semper parentis interest filium servitutem non subire.
If ever one who has been constituted in the possession of servitude does not allow litigation about his own condition, because perhaps he would wish to inflict some injury upon himself and upon his own genus, in this case it is equitable that license be given to certain persons to litigate on his behalf: for instance, to a parent, who says that the son is in his power; for even if the son is unwilling, he will litigate for him. But even if he is not in power, this right will be given to the parent, because it is always in a parent’s interest that the son not undergo servitude.
Cum vero talis nemo alius est, qui pro eo litiget, tunc necessarium est dari facultatem etiam matri vel filiabus vel sororibus eius ceterisque mulieribus quae de cognatione sunt vel etiam uxori adire praetorem et hoc indicare, ut causa cognita et invito ei succurratur.
When, however, there is no such other person who would litigate on his behalf, then it is necessary that the faculty be given even to his mother or his daughters or his sisters and the other women who are of the cognation, or even to his wife, to approach the praetor and indicate this, so that, the case having been inquired into, help may be given to him even if he is unwilling.
Liberis etiam hominibus, maxime si maiores viginti annis venum se dari passi sunt vel in servitutem quaqua ratione deduci, nihil obest, quo minus possint in libertatem proclamare, nisi forte se venum dari passi sunt, ut participaverint pretium.
Even for free persons, especially if they are over twenty years old and have allowed themselves to be put up for sale or to be led into servitude by any manner, nothing stands in the way to prevent them from proclaiming for liberty, unless perhaps they allowed themselves to be put up for sale so that they might participate in the price.
Si quis sciens liberum emerit, non denegatur vendito in libertatem proclamatio adversus eum qui eum comparavit, cuiusque sit aetatis qui emptus est, idcirco quia non est venia dignus qui emit, etiamsi scientem prudentemque se liberum emerit. sed enim si postea alius eum emerit ob hoc, qui scivit, ignorans, deneganda est ei libertas.
If anyone knowingly has bought a free person, a proclamation into liberty is not denied to the one sold against him who acquired him, of whatever age the one bought may be, because the buyer is not worthy of pardon, even if he bought one who knew and was prudent that he was himself free. But indeed, if afterwards another buys him from this man, the former having known and the latter being ignorant, liberty must be denied to him.
Si duo simul emerint partes, alter sciens, alter ignorans, videndum erit, numquid is qui scit non debeat nocere ignoranti: quod quidem magis est. sed enim illa erit quaestio, partem solam habebit is qui ignoravit an totum? et quid dicemus de alia parte?
If two should at the same time buy parts, one knowing, the other ignorant, it will have to be considered whether the one who knows ought not to harm the ignorant: which indeed is the more likely view. But then the question will be, will the one who was ignorant have only a part or the whole? And what shall we say about the other part?
Sunt et aliae causae, ex quibus in libertatem proclamatio denegatur, veluti si quis ex eo testamento liber esse dicatur, quod testamentum aperiri praetor vetat, quia testator a familia necatus esse dicatur: cum enim in eo sit iste, ut supplicio forte sit adficiendus, non debet liberale iudicium ei concedi. sed et si data fuerit, quia dubitatur, utrum nocens sit an innocens, differtur liberale iudicium, donec constet de morte eius, qui necatus est: apparebit enim, utrum supplicio adficiendus sit an non.
There are also other causes from which a proclamation for freedom is denied, for example, if someone is said to be free under that testament, the opening of which the praetor forbids because the testator is said to have been slain by the household: since indeed this person is in such a case that he may perhaps be subjected to punishment, a liberal judgment ought not to be granted to him. But even if it has been given, because it is doubted whether he is guilty or innocent, the liberal judgment is deferred until it is established concerning the death of the one who was slain; for it will appear whether he is to be subjected to punishment or not.
Si quis ex servitute in libertatem proclamat, petitoris partes sustinet: si vero ex libertate in servitutem petatur, is partes actoris sustinet qui servum suum dicit. igitur cum de hoc incertum est, ut possit iudicium ordinem accipere, hoc ante apud eum, qui de libertate cogniturus est, disceptatur, utrum ex libertate in servitutem aut contra agatur. et si forte apparuerit eum, qui de libertate sua litigat, in libertate sine dolo malo fuisse, is qui se dominum dicit actoris partes sustinebit et necesse habebit servum suum probare: quod si pronuntiatum fuerit eo tempore, quo lis praeparabatur, in libertate eum non fuisse aut dolo malo fuisse, ipse qui de sua libertate litigat debet se liberum probare.
If someone claims from slavery into freedom, he bears the role of the petitioner; but if he is claimed from freedom into slavery, he who says that the man is his slave bears the role of the plaintiff. Therefore, when this is uncertain, so that the proceeding may take on its order, this is first disputed before him who is going to inquire concerning the liberty, whether the action is brought from freedom into slavery or the contrary. And if perchance it shall have appeared that he who litigates about his liberty was in freedom without fraud, he who says himself to be the master will bear the role of plaintiff and will be under necessity to prove his slave; but if it shall have been pronounced that at the time when the suit was being prepared he was not in freedom, or that he was in freedom by fraud, he who litigates about his liberty must prove himself free.
Si plures sibi dominium servi vindicant dicentes esse communem, ad eundem iudicem mittendi erunt: et ita senatus censuit. ceterum si unusquisque suum esse in solidum, non in partem dicat, cessat senatus consultum: neque enim timor est, ne varie iudicetur, cum unusquisque solidum dominium sibi vindicet.
If several claim for themselves the dominion of a slave, saying he is common, they must be sent to the same judge: and thus the senate decreed. But if each says it is his in solidum, not in part, the senatorial decree does not apply: for there is no fear that it will be judged variously, since each claims solid dominion for himself.
Si pariter adversus eum, qui de libertate litigat, consistant fructuarius et proprietarius, fieri potest, ut alteruter absit: quo casu an praesenti soli permissurus sit praetor adversus eum agere, dubitari potest, quia non debet alterius collusione aut inertia alteri ius corrumpi. sed rectius dicitur etiam alterutri eorum permittendum agere, ut alterius ius incorruptum maneat. quod si adhuc nondum finito iudicio supervenerit, ad eundem iudicem mittetur, nisi si iustam causam adferat, quare ad eum mitti non debeat, forte si eum iudicem inimicum sibi esse adfirmet.
If the usufructuary and the proprietor together take their stand against him who litigates about freedom, it can happen that either one is absent; in which case it may be doubted whether the praetor will allow only the one present to proceed against him, because the right of one ought not to be corrupted by the collusion or inertia of the other. But it is more correct to say that it must be permitted to either of them to proceed, so that the other’s right may remain uncorrupted. And if he should arrive while the trial is not yet finished, he will be sent to the same judge, unless he brings a just cause why he ought not to be sent to him, for instance if he asserts that that judge is hostile to him.
Unde in utroque casu dispiciamus, an, si is qui prior egerit victus sit, prosit ei, quod posterior vicerit, vel contra, id est ut, cum omnino alteruter vicerit, prosit etiam alteri, sicut prodest heredi liberti, quod in fraudem patroni servi manumissi sint. si cui placeat prodesse, consequens est, ut, cum idem petat, exceptioni rei iudicatae obiciatur replicatio: si cui vero placeat non prodesse, is habebit sequentem dubitationem, utrum id, in quo quis victus est, nullius erit an eius esse debeat, cum quo actum sit, an potius eius qui vicerit? scilicet ut utilis actio detur ei qui vicerit, minime autem praetor pati debeat, ut pro parte quis servus sit.
Whence in either case let us examine whether, if the one who first brought the action has been defeated, it benefits him that the later litigant has won, or the reverse—that is, that, when in any event one or the other has won, it also benefits the other—just as it benefits the heir of a freedman that slaves were manumitted in fraud of the patron. If it pleases someone that it should benefit, it follows that, when he seeks the same thing, to the exceptio rei iudicatae a replicatio is opposed. But if it pleases someone that it should not benefit, he will have the following doubt: whether that, in which someone was defeated, will belong to no one, or ought to belong to the one with whom the action was brought, or rather to the one who won; namely, that a useful action be granted to the one who has won, and that the praetor ought by no means to allow that anyone be a slave in part.
Quod autem diximus " in libertate fuisse" sic est accipiendum non ut se liberum doceat is, qui liberale iudicium patitur, sed in possessione libertatis sine dolo malo fuisse. quid sit autem " sine dolo malo fuisse", videamus. nam iulianus ait omnes, qui se liberos putant, sine dolo malo in libertate fuisse, si modo se pro liberis gerant, quamvis servi sint. varus autem scribit eum, qui se liberum sciat, dum in fuga sit, non videri sine dolo malo in libertate esse: sed simul atque desierit quasi fugitivus se celare et pro libero agere, tunc incipere sine dolo malo in libertate esse: etenim ait eum, qui scit se liberum, deinde pro fugitivo agit, hoc ipso, quod in fuga sit, pro servo agere,
But what we said, “to have been in liberty,” is to be taken thus: not that the one who undergoes an action for liberty should prove himself free, but that he was in possession of liberty without fraud or malice. Now let us see what “to have been without fraud or malice” is. For julianus says that all who think themselves free have been in liberty without fraud or malice, provided only that they conduct themselves as free persons, although they are slaves. varus, however, writes that one who knows himself to be free, so long as he is in flight, is not seen to be in liberty without fraud or malice; but as soon as he has ceased to hide himself as a quasi-fugitive and to act as a free man, then he begins to be in liberty without fraud or malice. Indeed he says that one who knows himself to be free, and then acts as a fugitive, by this very fact, that he is in flight, is acting as a slave.
Potest et servus sine dolo malo in libertate morari, ut puta testamento accepit libertatem, quod nullius momenti esse ignorat, vel vindicta ei imposita est ab eo, quem dominum esse putavit, cum non esset, vel educatus est quasi liber, cum servus esset.
A slave too can, without fraudulent intent, remain in freedom: for example, he has received liberty by a will, which he does not know is of no effect; or the vindicta was laid upon him by one whom he supposed to be the owner, when he was not; or he has been brought up as though free, when he was a slave.
Et generaliter dicendum est, quotiens quis iustis rationibus ductus vel non iustis, sine calliditate tamen putavit se liberum et in libertate moratus est, dicendum est hunc in ea causa esse, ut sine dolo malo in libertate fuerit atque ideo possessoris commodo fruatur.
And generally it must be said that, whenever someone, led by just reasons or by not just ones, yet without craftiness, thought himself free and remained in a state of liberty, it must be said that he is in such a position that he was in liberty without fraudulent deceit, and therefore enjoys the possessor’s benefit.
Si quod damnum mihi dederit, qui ad libertatem proclamat, illo tempore, quo bona fide mihi serviebat, veluti si ego bona fide dominus noxali iudicio conventus et condemnatus litis aestimationem pro eo optuli: in id mihi condemnabitur.
If any loss has been caused to me by one who proclaims himself to freedom, at the time when he was in good faith serving me—for instance, if I, a good‑faith master, having been convened in a noxal judgment and condemned, have tendered the assessment of the suit on his behalf—he shall be condemned to me to that extent.
Illud certum est damnum hoc solum in hac in factum actione deduci, quod dolo, non etiam quod culpa factum sit. ideoque licet absolutus hoc iudicio fuerit, adhuc tamen postea cum eo poterit lege aquilia agi, cum ea lege etiam culpa teneatur.
It is certain that in this actio in factum only that damage is taken into account which was done by dolus, not also that which was done by culpa. And so, although he may have been absolved in this proceeding, nevertheless afterwards one can still bring an action against him under the Lex Aquilia, since under that law one is held also for culpa.
Quare si filius familias emit, si quidem ipse scit, pater ignoravit, non adquisiit patri actionem: hoc si peculiari nomine egerit. ceterum si patre mandante, hic quaeritur, an filii scientia noceat: et puto adhuc nocere, quemadmodum procuratoris nocet.
Wherefore, if a son of the household purchases—if indeed he himself knows, but the father was ignorant—he does not acquire an action for the father: this, if he has proceeded under the title of the peculium. But if at the father’s mandate, here it is asked whether the son’s knowledge harms; and I think it still does harm, just as the knowledge of a procurator harms.
In servo et in eo, qui mandato nostro emit, tale est, ut, si certum hominem mandavero emi sciens liberum esse, licet is cui mandatum est, ignoret, idem sit: et non competet ei actio. contra autem, si ego ignoravi, procurator scit, non est mihi deneganda.
In the case of a slave and of one who buys on our mandate, the rule is this: if I have mandated that a certain man be bought, knowing him to be free, although he to whom the mandate is given is ignorant, it is the same; and an action will not lie for him. Conversely, if I was ignorant but the procurator knows, the action is not to be denied to me.
Utique eius duplum, quod propter emptionem vel dedit vel obligatus est. secundum quae id, quod alter eorum solverit, nihil ad exonerandum alterum pertinebit, quia placuit hanc actionem poenalem esse. et ideo post annum non datur nec cum successoribus, cum sit poenalis, agetur.
In any case, double of that which, on account of the purchase, he either gave or became obligated for is due. According to which, that which one of them has paid will pertain nothing to exonerating the other, because it has been decided that this action is penal. And therefore after a year it is not given, nor will it be prosecuted with successors, since it is penal.
Sed et si plures emerint, omnes habebunt hanc actionem, sic tamen, ut, si quidem pro partibus emerint, pro parte pretii habeant actionem: enimvero si unusquisque in solidum, quisque in solidum habeat actionem. nec alterius scientia alteri nocebit, vel ignorantia proderit.
But also, if several have purchased, all will have this action, yet in such a way that, if indeed they have purchased by shares, they have an action for the part of the price; but truly if each has purchased for the whole (in solidum), each has an action for the whole (in solidum). Nor will the knowledge of one harm another, nor will ignorance benefit.
Si mater et filius de libertate litigant, aut coniungenda sunt utrorumque iudicia aut differenda est causa filii, donec de matre constet, sicut divus quoque hadrianus decrevit. nam cum apud alium iudicem mater litigabat, apud alium autem filius, augustus dixit ante de matre constare oportere, sic dein de filio cognosci.
If a mother and son litigate about liberty, either the proceedings of both must be conjoined, or the son’s cause must be deferred until it is established concerning the mother, just as the deified Hadrian also decreed. For when the mother was litigating before one judge and the son before another, Augustus said that it ought first to be settled about the mother, and thus thereafter to be inquired into concerning the son.
Ordinata liberali causa liberi loco habetur is, qui de statu suo litigat, ita ut adversus eum quoque, qui se dominum esse dicit, actiones ei non denegentur, quascumque intendere velit: quid enim si quae tales sint, ut tempore aut morte intereant? quare non concedatur ei litem contestando in tutum eas redigere?
With the cause of liberty arranged, he who is litigating about his own status is held in the place of a free man, such that actions are not denied to him even against the one who says himself to be his master, whichever he wishes to bring: for what if there are some of such a kind as to perish by lapse of time or by death? Why should it not be granted to him, by joining issue, to secure them?
Sed si cum aliis experiri velit, non est quaerendum, an lis ordinata sit, ne inveniatur ratio, quemadmodum subiecto aliquo, qui libertati controversiam moveat, interim actiones excludantur: aeque enim ex eventu iudicii liberalis aut utilis aut inanis actio eius efficietur.
But if he should wish to try an action against others, it is not to be asked whether a lawsuit has been instituted, lest a device be found whereby, with someone put forward who raises a controversy about liberty, actions are meanwhile excluded: for in any event, from the outcome of the liberty-judgment his action will be rendered either useful or void.
Sed si quas actiones inferat dominus, quaeritur, an compellendus sit suscipere iudicium. et plerique existimant, si in personam agat, suscipere ipsum ad litis contestationem, sed sustinendum iudicium, donec de libertate iudicetur: nec videri praeiudicium libertati fieri aut voluntate domini in libertate eum morari: nam ordinato liberali iudicio interim pro libero habetur, et sicut ipse agere, ita cum ipso quoque agi potest. ceterum ex eventu aut utile iudicium erit aut nullum, si contra libertatem pronuntiatum fuerit.
But if the master brings any actions, the question is whether he should be compelled to undertake the trial. And most think that, if he sues in personam, he should undertake it up to the litis contestatio, but the proceeding must be held in suspense until judgment is given on freedom; nor does it seem that any prejudice to liberty is thereby created, or that he remains in a condition of liberty by the master’s will. For, when a suit for liberty (liberale iudicium) has been set in order, in the meantime he is held as free, and just as he himself can bring suit, so too can suit be brought against him. Otherwise, from the outcome the action will be either a useful action (utile iudicium) or none at all, if it has been pronounced against liberty.
Si is, qui in libertatem proclamat, furti aut damni iniuria ab aliquo arguatur, mela ait interim eum cavere debere iudicio se sisti, ne melioris condicionis sit qui dubiae libertatis est, quam qui certae: sed sustinendum iudicium, ne praeiudicium libertati fiat. aeque si cum possessore hominis furti agi coeperit, deinde is, cuius nomine agebatur, in libertatem proclamaverit, sustinendum iudicium, ut, si liber iudicatus sit, in ipsum transferatur iudicium: et, si damnatio facta sit, iudicati actionem potius in eum dandam.
If one who proclaims into freedom is accused by someone of theft or wrongful damage, Mela says that in the meantime he ought to give security to present himself to the trial, lest he who is of doubtful freedom be in a better condition than he who is of certain; but the trial must be stayed, lest a prejudgment be made upon freedom. Likewise, if suit of theft has been begun with respect to the possessor of a man, and then he, in whose name the action was being brought, has proclaimed into freedom, the trial must be stayed, so that, if he be adjudged free, the action may be transferred onto himself: and, if a condemnation has been made, the action on the judgment ought rather to be granted against him.
Licet vulgo dicatur post ordinatum liberale iudicium hominem, cuius de statu controversia est, liberi loco esse, tamen, si servus sit, certum est nihilo minus eum, quod ei tradatur vel stipuletur, perinde domino adquirere atque si non de libertate eius quaerebatur. tantum de possessione videbimus, cum ipsum post litem ordinatam desinat dominus possidere: sed magis est, ut adquirat, licet ab eo non possideatur. et cum placuit per fugitivum quoque nos possessionem adquirere posse, quid mirum etiam per hunc, de quo quaeramus adquiri?
Although it is commonly said that, after a liberal proceeding (a freedom suit) has been arranged, a person whose status is in controversy is in the place of the free, nevertheless, if he is a slave, it is certain that none the less he acquires for the master whatever is delivered to him or stipulated by him, just as if inquiry were not being made about his liberty. Only as to possession we shall consider the case when, after the suit has been instituted, the master ceases to possess him: but the better view is that he acquires, although he is not possessed by him. And since it has been approved that we can acquire possession even through a fugitive, what wonder that acquisition is made also through this one about whom we are inquiring?
Divi fratres proculo et munatio rescripserunt: " cum romulus, de cuius statu quaeritur, pupillaris aetatis sit, an exigente varia hedone matre et consentiente vario hermete tutore ad tempus pubertatis causa differenda sit, vestrae gravitatis est ex fide personarum quod utile est pupillo, constituere".
the deified brothers wrote back to proculus and munatius: " since romulus, about whose status inquiry is made, is of pupillary age, whether, the mother varia hedone demanding it and the tutor vario hermes consenting, the case should be deferred until the time of puberty, it belongs to your gravitas, on the faithworthiness of the persons, to determine what is useful for the ward."
Si ea persona desit cognitioni, quae alicui status controversiam faciebat, in eadem causa est qui de libertate sua litigat, qua fuit, priusquam de libertate controversiam patiatur: sane hoc lucratur, quod is qui eam status controversiam faciebat amittit suam causam. nec ea res ingenuum facit eum qui non fuit: nec enim penuria adversarii ingenuitatem solet tribuere. recte atque ordine iudices puto facturos, si hanc formam fuerint consecuti, ut, ubi deest is qui in servitutem petit, electionem adversario deferant, utrum malit cognitionem circumduci an audita causa sententiam proferri.
If that person is absent from the cognition (hearing) who was creating a status controversy for someone, the one who litigates about his liberty is in the same condition in which he was before he suffers a controversy about his liberty: assuredly he gains this, that the one who was making that status controversy loses his case. Nor does that make freeborn one who was not: for a lack of an adversary is not wont to confer freeborn status (ingenuitas). I think the judges will act rightly and in order, if they follow this form, that, where he is lacking who seeks him into servitude, they defer the election to the adversary, whether he prefers the cognition to be drawn out or, the cause having been heard, for a sentence (judgment) to be delivered.
And if they have conducted an inquiry, they ought to pronounce that he does not appear to be that man’s slave; nor does this matter have any captiousness, since it is not pronounced that he is freeborn, but that he does not appear to be a slave. But if he alleges a passage from servitude into freeborn status, they will have done better if they have protracted the inquiry, lest they, without an adversary, pronounce that he appears to be freeborn, unless a weighty cause should persuade and evident proofs should suggest that a pronouncement ought to be made in favor of liberty: as is also contained in a rescript of Hadrian.
Quod si is, qui pro sua libertate litigat, desit, contradictor vero praesens sit, melius erit inaugeri causam eius sententiamque proferri: si enim liquebit, contra libertatem dabit: evenire autem potest, ut etiam absens vincat: nam potest sententia etiam secundum libertatem ferri.
But if the one who litigates for his own liberty is absent, while the contradictor is present, it will be better to inaugurate his case and to bring forth a sentence: for if it will be clear, he will give it against liberty; however, it can happen that even one absent prevails: for a sentence can also be rendered in favor of liberty.
Qui de libertate sua litigans necdum sententia data militiae se dedit, in pari causa ceteris servis habendus est nec exonerat eum, quod pro libero habeatur in quibusdam. et licet liber apparuerit, exauctoratus, id est militia remotus castris reicietur, utique qui ex servitute in libertatem petitus sit vel qui non sine dolo malo in libertate moratus est: qui vero per calumniam petitus in servitutem est, in militia retinebitur.
One who, litigating about his liberty and before sentence has been given, has given himself to military service, is to be held in the same condition as the other slaves, nor does it exonerate him that he is regarded as free in certain respects. And even if he should prove to be free, once exauctorated—that is, removed from the soldiery—he will be cast out of the camp, especially one who has sought liberty from servitude or who has remained in a state of liberty not without dolus malus; but one who has been sued into servitude through calumny will be retained in military service.
Duobus petentibus hominem in servitutem pro parte dimidia separatim, si uno iudicio liber, altero servus iudicatus est, commodissimum est eo usque cogi iudices, donec consentiant: si id non continget, sabinum refertur existimasse duci servum debere ab eo qui vicisset: cuius sententiae cassius quoque est et ego sum. et sane ridiculum est arbitrari eum pro parte dimidia duci, pro parte libertatem eius tueri. commodius autem est favore libertatis liberum quidem eum esse, compelli autem pretii sui partem viri boni arbitratu victori suo praestare.
When two persons, separately claiming a man into servitude for a half share, if in one judgment he is adjudged free, in the other adjudged a slave, it is most convenient to compel the judges until they agree: if that does not come about, it is reported that Sabinus thought the slave ought to be led away by the one who had prevailed; Cassius too holds this opinion, and so do I. And indeed it is ridiculous to suppose that he is led away for a half share, while for the other half his liberty is maintained. More suitable, however, by favor of liberty, is that he be free indeed, but be compelled to render to his victor a part of his price, at the arbitrament of an upright man.
De bonis eorum, qui ex servitute aut libertate in ingenuitatem vindicati sunt, senatus consultum factum est, quo cavetur de his quidem, qui ex servitute defensi essent, ut id dumtaxat ferrent, quod in domo cuiusque intulissent: in eorum autem bonis, qui post manumissionem repetere originem suam voluissent, hoc amplius, ut, quod post manumissionem quoque adquisissent non ex re manumissoris, secum ferant, cetera bona relinquerent illi, ex cuius familia exissent.
Concerning the goods of those who have been vindicated into ingenuous status (freeborn) from slavery or from freedom, a senatus consultum was made, which provides that, as to those who had been defended from slavery, they should take only that which each had brought into the house of each person; but as to the goods of those who, after manumission, wished to reclaim their origin, this further: that what they had also acquired after manumission, not from the property of the manumissor, they carry with them, while they leave the remaining goods to him from whose household they had gone out.
Paulus respondit, si, ut proponitur, post perfectam sine ulla condicione emptionem postea emptor ex voluntate sua litteras emisit, quibus profiteretur se post certum tempus manumissurum eum quem emerat, non videri eas litteras ad constitutionem divi marci pertinere.
Paulus responded, if, as proposed, after a purchase perfected without any condition the buyer thereafter, of his own will, issued letters in which he professed that he would manumit after a certain time the person whom he had bought, those letters do not seem to pertain to the constitution of the deified Marcus.
Idem respondit constitutionem quidem divi marci ad libertatem eorum mancipiorum pertinere, quae hac lege venierint, ut post tempus manumitterentur: sed eundem favorem libertatis consequendae causa etiam eam mereri, pro qua dominus pretium accepit, ut ancillam suam manumitteret, cum idem etiam libertam habiturus sit.
The same answered that the constitution of the deified Marcus pertains to the liberty of those slaves who have been sold under this law, that they be manumitted after a period; but that the same favor, for the sake of obtaining liberty, is also deserved by her for whom the master received a price in order to manumit his female slave, since the same man will also have her as a freedwoman.
Gaius seius stichum servum lucio titio vendidit ita, ut titius stichum post triennium manumitteret, si continuo triennio servisset: sed nondum exacto tempore trienni stichus fugit et post aliquantum temporis defuncto titio revertit: quaero, an obstet sticho ad consequendam ex venditione libertatem, quod ante triennium discesserit. paulus respondit secundum ea quae proponuntur expleto tempore, post quod stichus manumitti debuit, libertatem ei competisse.
gaius seius sold the slave stichus to lucius titius on the following terms, that titius should manumit stichus after a three-year period, if he had served for a continuous three years: but before the three-year time was completed stichus fled, and after some time, with titius having died, he returned: i ask whether it stands in the way of stichus, for obtaining liberty from the sale, that he departed before the three years. paulus responded that, according to the matters proposed, upon the completion of the time after which stichus ought to have been manumitted, liberty accrued to him.
Iudex autem, qui de libertate cognoscit, etiam de rebus amotis damnove facto cognoscere debet: fieri enim potest, ut fiducia libertatis et subripere quaedam et corrumpere atque consumere ex bonis, quibus serviebat, ausus sit.
Moreover, the judge who takes cognizance about liberty ought also to take cognizance about things removed or damage done; for it can happen that, in the confidence of liberty, he may have dared both to surreptitiously take certain things and to corrupt and consume from the goods of the one whom he was serving.
Si servus quem emeras ad libertatem proclamavit et ab iudice perperam pro eo iudicatum est et dominus eius servi post rem contra te iudicatam te heredem fecit aut alio quo nomine is tuus esse coepisset, petere eum tuum esse poteris nec tibi obstabit rei iudicatae praescriptio. iavolenus: haec vera sunt.
If a slave whom you had purchased claimed liberty, and the judge wrongly judged in his favor, and the master of that slave, after the matter had been adjudged against you, made you his heir, or if under some other title he had begun to be yours, you will be able to claim that he is yours, nor will the prescription of res judicata stand in your way. iavolenus: these are true.
De his, qui bona eorum quibus serviebant intercepissent, deinde ad libertatem proclamabant, hadrianus imperator rescripsit, cuius rescripti verba haec sunt: " sicut non est aequum fiducia libertatis, quae ex fideicommissi causa praestanda est, intercipere hereditariam pecuniam, ita nec libertati praestandae moram quaeri oportet. quam primum ergo arbitrum dare debeat, apud quem constaret, quid servari potest heredi, antequam ad servum manumittendum compelleretur".
Concerning those who had intercepted the goods of those whom they were serving, and then laid claim to liberty, Hadrian the emperor responded by rescript, the words of which rescript are these: "Just as it is not equitable, on the fiducia of the liberty which is to be furnished by reason of a fideicommissum, to intercept the hereditary money, so neither ought delay to be sought in furnishing the liberty. Therefore an arbitrator ought to be appointed as soon as possible, before whom it may be established what can be preserved for the heir, before he is compelled to manumit the slave".
Licet dubitatum antea fuit, utrum servus dumtaxat an libertus iurando patrono obligaretur in his quae libertatis causa imponuntur, tamen verius est non aliter quam liberum obligari. ideo autem solet iusiurandum a servis exigere, ut hi religione adstricti, posteaquam suae potestatis esse coepissent, iurandi necessitatem haberent, dummodo in continenti, cum manumissus est, aut iuret aut promittat.
Although it had previously been doubted whether only a slave or also a freedman was obligated to his patron by swearing an oath in those things which are imposed for the sake of liberty, nevertheless the truer view is that he is not obligated otherwise than a free man. For this reason, moreover, an oath is usually exacted from slaves, so that these, bound by religion, after they have begun to be in their own power, may have the necessity of swearing, provided that immediately, when he has been manumitted, he either swears or promises.
Minori autem viginti annis ne quidem ex causa supra scripta debet denegari libertatis proclamatio, nisi maior annis viginti factus duravit in servitute: tunc enim si pretium partitus sit, dicendum erit denegari ei debere libertatis proclamationem.
But to one under twenty years, not even on the above-written ground should the proclamation of liberty be denied, unless, once he has become over twenty years old, he has persisted in servitude: for then, if he has shared in the price, it must be said that the proclamation of liberty ought to be denied to him.
Servum quis per vim a titio accepit et testamento liberum esse iussit: quamquam solvendo decesserit, non erit ille liber: alioquin fraudabitur titius, qui non procedente quidem libertate cum herede eius agere potest, at si ad libertatem servus pervenerit, nullam actionem habiturus est, quia nihil videbitur heres ex defuncti dolo consecutus.
Someone received a slave by force from Titius and by his will ordered him to be free: although he died solvent, that man will not be free; otherwise Titius will be defrauded, who, with the freedom not taking effect, can indeed sue his heir; but if the slave should attain freedom, he will have no action, because the heir will be seen to have obtained nothing from the deceased’s fraud.
Eis, qui se passi sint venire, ad libertatem proclamandi licentiam denegari. quaero, an et ad eos, qui ex mulieribus, quae se passae sint venire, nascuntur, ita senatus consulta pertinent? dubitari non potest, quin ei quoque, quae maior annis viginti venire se passa est, ad libertatem proclamandi licentia fuerit deneganda.
To those who have allowed themselves to be sold, the license of proclaiming for freedom is denied. i ask whether the senatus consulta apply in the same way also to those who are born from women who have allowed themselves to be sold? it cannot be doubted that to her also, who being over twenty years of age allowed herself to be sold, the license of proclaiming for freedom must be denied.
Licinnius rufinus iulio paulo. is cui fideicommissa libertas debebatur post vicensimum annum veniri se passus est: quaero, denegandum sit ei ad libertatem proclamare. movet me exemplum cuiusvis liberi hominis: nam et si consecutus esset libertatem, si ^ ^ se vendidisset, denegaretur ei ad libertatem proclamare, nec debet meliori loco intellegi, quod in servitute constitutus passus est se venum dari, quam si esset libertatem consecutus.
licinnius rufinus to julius paulus. the person to whom fideicommissary liberty was owed allowed himself to be sold after the twentieth year: i ask whether it should be denied him to proclaim for liberty. the example of any free man moves me: for even if he had obtained liberty, if ^ ^ he had sold himself, it would be denied him to proclaim for liberty; nor ought it to be understood that he is in a better position because, being in servitude, he allowed himself to be put up for sale, than if he had obtained liberty.
but on the contrary it moves me, that in this case, about which inquiry is made, a sale has been established and there is one who is to be sold, whereas in the case of a free man neither has a sale been established and there is nothing that is for sale. I ask, therefore, that you instruct me most fully. he answered: a sale indeed can be contracted both of a slave and of a free man, and a stipulation concerning eviction is contracted; for we are not speaking of one who knowingly buys a free man: for against this man not even the proclamation to liberty is denied.
but he who is still a slave can be sold even unwilling, although he too is at fault in this, that he dissembles about his condition, when he has it in his own power to arrive straightway at freedom. this, indeed, cannot be imputed to one to whom freedom is not yet owed. suppose a statuliber allowed himself to be sold: no one will say, when the condition supervenes, which was not in his power, that the petition for liberty should be denied to him.
Si duo liberum hominem maiorem annis viginti emerimus, unus sciens eius condicionem, alter ignorans, non propter eum qui scit ad libertatem ei proclamare permittitur, sed propter eum qui ignorat servus efficietur, sed non etiam eius qui scit, sed tantum alterius.
If two of us have bought a free man older than twenty years, one knowing his condition, the other ignorant, it is not permitted to proclaim him toward liberty on account of the one who knows; rather, on account of the one who is ignorant he will be made a slave—but not also of the one who knows, only of the other.
Verbo autem " relinquerent" etiam hoc intellegendum est, ut quaecumque ex re eius, a quo manumissi erant, adquisita habeant, restituant. sed id quemadmodum accipiendum sit, videndum est, utrumne quae ignorantibus dominis abstulissent, item quod ex his adquisitum, reddere debeant, an vero etiam concessa et donata a manumissoribus amplexi sint: quod magis est.
By the term " relinquerent" this also is to be understood: that whatever they have acquired from the estate of him by whom they had been manumitted, they should restore. But how this is to be taken must be considered—whether they ought to return the things which they had carried off with their masters unaware, and likewise what was acquired from these, or indeed whether even things granted and donated by the manumittors are embraced: which is more likely.
Quotiens de hoc contenditur, an quis libertus sit, sive operae petantur sive obsequium desideretur sive etiam famosa actio intendatur sive in ius vocetur qui se patronum dicit sive nulla causa interveniat, redditur praeiudicium. sed et quotiens quis libertinum quidem se confitetur, libertum autem gaii seii se negat, idem praeiudicium datur. redditur autem alterutro desiderante: sed actoris partibus semper qui se patronum dicit fungitur probareque libertum suum necesse habet aut, si non probet, vincitur.
As often as it is contended concerning this, whether someone is a freedman—whether works are demanded, or obedience is desired, or even an infamous action is brought, or he who says he is the patron is called into court, or no cause at all intervenes—a preliminary judgment is rendered. And likewise, as often as someone indeed admits that he is a freedman, but denies that he is the freedman of Gaius Seius, the same preliminary judgment is given. It is rendered at the desire of either party; but he who says he is the patron always acts in the role of plaintiff and must prove that he is his freedman, or, if he does not prove it, he is defeated.
Sed interdum et intra quinquennium non licet de statu defuncti dicere: nam oratione divi marci cavetur, ut, si quis ingenuus pronuntiatus fuerit, liceat ingenuitatis sententiam retractare, sed vivo eo qui ingenuus pronuntiatus est, non etiam post mortem, in tantum, ut etiam, si coepta quaestio fuit retractationis, morte eius extinguatur, ut eadem oratione cavetur.
But sometimes even within five years it is not permitted to plead about the status of a deceased person: for it is provided by an oration of the deified Marcus that, if anyone has been pronounced freeborn, it is permitted to reconsider the judgment of ingenuitas (freeborn status), but only while he who has been pronounced freeborn is alive, not also after death, to such an extent that even if an inquiry for reconsideration had been begun, it is extinguished by his death, as is provided by the same oration.
Ne quorundam dominorum erga servos nimia indulgentia inquinaret amplissimum ordinem eo, quod paterentur servos suos in ingenuitatem proclamare liberosque iudicari, senatus consultum factum est domitiani temporibus, quo cautum est, ut, si quis probasset per collusionem quicquam factum, si iste homo servus sit, fieret eius servus qui detexisset collusionem.
Lest the excessive indulgence of certain masters toward their slaves should stain the most distinguished order, because they allowed their slaves to proclaim themselves into freeborn status and to be adjudged free, a decree of the Senate was enacted in the time of Domitian, by which it was provided that, if anyone proved that anything had been done through collusion, then, if that person be a slave, he would become the slave of the one who had detected the collusion.
Si libertinus per collusionem fuerit pronuntiatus ingenuus, collusione detecta in quibus causis quasi libertinus incipit esse. medio tamen tempore, antequam collusio detegatur et post sententiam de ingenuitate latam, utique quasi ingenuus accipitur.
If a freedman has been pronounced freeborn through collusion, once the collusion is detected, in those matters he begins to be as if a freedman. In the meantime, however, before the collusion is detected and after the sentence concerning freeborn status has been delivered, he is in any case received as if freeborn.