Pseudoplatonica: Hipparchus

So. Do you see whether you know that they are of no price, or whether you are ignorant? For if you are ignorant, you call them mad, desirous of lucre.

Am. At non amentes appello, sed callidos, atque improbos, et victos a lucro, cognoscentes nullius pretii esse, ex quibus lucrari audeant, et tamen audent lucrari per imprudentiam.

Am. But I do not call them mad, but crafty and dishonest, and overcome by profit, cognoscentes nullius pretii esse, from which they dare to profit, and yet they dare to profit through imprudence.

So. Nam huiuscemodi lucri cupidum vocas, veluti si agricola plantans, cognoscensque nullius pretii plantam esse, dignum tamen putet ex ea lucrari? Talemne ipsum nuncupas?

So. For do you call one greedy of this kind of gain, as if a farmer, planting and knowing the plant to be of no price, should nevertheless deem it worthy to profit from it? Do you call that very man so named?

Am. Undecumque, o Socrates, lucri cupidus quaerendum censet.

Am. From whatever quarter, O Socrates, eager for profit, he thinks it must be sought.

So. Ne adeo temere verba effundas, veluti alicui propter acceptam iniuriam infensus: sed ad me potius attendens responde, ac si a principio rursus interrogarem. Confiteris lucri cupidum cognoscere, quanti sit, unde lucrari dignum putat?

So. Do not so rashly pour forth words, as if enraged at someone on account of an injury received; but rather attending to me, answer, and as if I were again questioning from the beginning. You confess yourself eager for profit, to know how great it is—whence do you think it worthy to derive gain?

Am. Confiteor.

Am. I confess.

So. Quis peritus est circa plantarum dignitatem, qua in regione ac tempore plantare dignum sit? Ut aliquid et nos sapientum verborum, quibus elegantes causidici utuntur, in medium afferamus.

So. Who is skilled regarding the dignity of plants, by which region and season it is worthy to plant? That we may also bring into the midst some of the wise words which elegant advocates use.

Am. Agricolam arbitror.

Am. I think him a farmer.

So. Num dignum lucro vocas aliud, quam lucrandum esse existimare?

So. Do you call anything else worthy of profit than to think that it ought to be profited from?

Am. Id ipsum.

Am. The very same.

So. Ne me coneris decipere virum iam seniorem, cum adeo iuvenis sis, respondens, quemadmodum nunc, quae ipse minime putas: sed responde quam verissime potes. An censes agricultorem quempiam, cognoscentem quod arbor nullo modo plantatione digna sit, putare ex ipsa se lucraturum?

So. Do not try to ensnare me about a man already old, since you are so young, by answering as you now do, in ways which you yourself least suppose: but answer as truly as you can. Do you think that any farmer, knowing that a tree is in no way fit for planting, would suppose that he would profit from it?

Am. Non per Iovem.

Am. Not by Jupiter.

So. Equestrem praeterea virum, intelligentem nullius pretii pabulum se equo praebere, ignorare censes quod equum perdit?

So. Do you suppose moreover that a cavalryman, knowing that he supplies his horse fodder of no value, is ignorant that he is ruining the horse?

Am. Nequaquam.

Am. By no means.

So. Non igitur putat ab huiusmodi pabulis lucraturum.

So. He therefore does not think that he will profit from such fodder.

Am. Minime.

Am. By no means.

So. Gubernatorem vero, qui temone et velis nullius existimationis navem munierit, ignorare censes quod damno afficietur et periculum incurret, ne ipse simul et navis, et quaecumque in navi sunt, perdantur?

So. But do you suppose that the helmsman, who with tiller and sails has fortified a ship of no repute, does not reckon that he will be stricken with loss and incur danger, lest he himself together with the ship, and whatever are in the ship, be destroyed?

Am. Non certe.

Am. Certainly not.

So. Haud igitur putat se ex instrumentis nullius pretii lucraturum.

So. He therefore does not suppose that he will profit from instruments of no value.

Am. Minime.

Am. By no means.

So. Item belli dux, cernens exercitum vilibus armis confisum, speratne ac dignum putat, ex iis lucrum aliquod assequi?

So. Likewise, does the leader of war, seeing the army trusting in vile arms, hope and deem it fit to derive any profit from them?

Am. Nullum.

Am. None.

So. Eodem modo tibicen tibiam et citharista citharam et arcifer arcum, et ut brevi complectar, quicumque artifex, aut alius quisquam vir peritus, organa ac reliquum apparatum nullius pretii habeat, putatne ex iis aliquando se lucraturum?

So. In the same way the piper his pipe and the citharist his cithara and the bow-bearer his bow, and to embrace briefly, whoever an artisan, or any other skilled man, has instruments and the remaining apparatus of no value, does he think that from them at any time he will profit himself?

Am. Non, ut apparet.

Am. No, as it appears.

So. Quos itaque lucri cupidos nuncupas? Neque enim eos, quos supra retulimus, qui ex rebus nulla ratione dignis rentur oportere lucrari.

So. Whom, then, do you call desirers of profit? For indeed not those whom we have recounted above, who from things by no reason are deemed worthy, ought to make gain.

Am. At hoc modo, o mirifice vir, quo ipse loqueris, nullus hominum lucri cupidus esset. Sed ego eos lucri cupidos esse intellego, qui propter inexplebilem aviditatem minima aeque atque vilia et nullius pretii mirum in modum sitiunt, et in iis etiam lucrum quaerunt.

Am. But in this way, O wondrous man, as you yourself speak, no man would be desirous of gain. Yet I understand those to be desirous of gain who, on account of insatiable avidity, thirst for the smallest and the cheap and of no price in a remarkable manner, and even in these seek profit.

So. Non tamen, o vir optime, discernunt, ista nullius esse pretii. Iam enim nos ipsos in hoc, quia esset impossibile, rationibus redarguimus.

So. Yet they do not discern, O most excellent man, that these things are of no price. For we ourselves already refute this in this matter by reasons, since it would be impossible.

Am. Mihi sane videtur.

Am. It certainly seems so to me.

So. Si non cognoscunt, ignorant igitur: opinantur tamen, quae nullius pretii sunt, multi facienda esse.

So. If they do not know, they are therefore ignorant: yet many suppose that things of no value ought to be done.

Am. Apparet.

Am. It appears.

So. Lucri cupidi nonne lucrum cupiunt?

So. Do the profit‑hungry not crave profit?

Am. Profecto.

Am. Certainly.

So. Lucrum vero damno contrarium?

So. Is profit truly contrary to loss?

Am. Est.

Am. It is.

So. Estne bonum alicui damno affici?

So. Is it good for anyone to be harmed?

Am. Nemini.

Am. To no one.

So. Malum autem?

So. But is it an evil?

Am. Prorsus.

Am. Absolutely.

So. Laeduntur itaque damno homines?

So. Are men therefore harmed by damage?

Am. Laeduntur.

Am. They are harmed.

So. Malum igitur damnum?

So. Is loss then an evil?

Am. Malum.

Am. An evil.

So. Contrarium damno lucrum?

So. Is profit the opposite of harm?

Am. Contrarium.

Am. The contrary.

So. Bonumque igitur lucrum?

So. And then is lucre good?

Am. Certe.

Am. Certainly.

So. Bonum igitur amantes, lucri cupidos nuncupas?

So. Do you therefore call lovers, desirous of lucre, good?

Am. Videtur.

Am. It seems.

So. Non insanos quidem, o amice, lucri cupidos dicis, sed tu ipse utrum amas quod bonum est, an non amas?

So. You do not indeed call lovers of lucre insane, O friend, but you yourself—do you love what is good, or do you not love it?

Am. Amo equidem.

Am. I do indeed love.

So. An est bonum quicquam, quod non affectes, sed malum?

So. Is there any good which you do not desire, but which is evil?

Am. Non per Iovem.

Am. Not by Jupiter.

So. At forsitan omnia bona affectas.

So. But perhaps you strive after all good things.

Am. Omnia.

Am. All things.

So. Interroga insuper et me, utrum et ipse. Bona equidem amare me confitebor. Sed praeter me ac te, nonne reliqui homines omnes amant bona, mala oderunt?

So. Question also me further, whether I myself likewise. I will indeed confess that I love good things. But apart from you and me, do not all the remaining men love good things and hate evils?

Am. Videntur.

Am. They seem.

So. Lucrum autem nonne bonum esse confessi sumus?

So. But have we not admitted that profit is good?

Am. Nempe.

Am. Indeed.

So. Omnes igitur lucri cupidi videntur hoc modo: quo vero prius diximus, nullus lucri cupidus esset. Utra igitur istarum rationum aliquis utens non aberrabit?

So. All therefore desirous of gain seem in this way: whereas, as we said a little before, no one would be desirous of gain. Which then of these lines of reasoning, if anyone uses either, will not go astray?

Am. Si quis, o Socrates, recte lucri cupidum definiat, eum, ut puto, lucri cupidum arbitrabitur, qui studet iis et decens existimat in iis lucrum quaerere, ex quibus boni viri lucrari numquam auderent.

Am. If anyone, O Socrates, defines rightly "desirous of gain," he, I think, will reckon desirous of gain him who strives after those things and deems it proper to seek profit in those things from which good men would never dare to profit.

So. An non tenes, quod paulo ante inter nos convenit, lucrari scilicet esse utilitate affici?

So. Do you not hold that which a little while ago we agreed between us, namely that to gain (lucrari) is to be affected by utility?

Am. Quid tum?

Am. What then?

So. Quod etiam in hoc consensimus, omnes semper bonum velle.

So. Which also in this we agreed upon, that all always wish the good.

Am. Confessi sumus.

Am. We have confessed.

So. Nonne et boni viri omne lucrum expetent, si quidem huiusmodi omne bonum est?

So. Surely good men also will desire every gain, if indeed every thing of this sort is a good?

Am. Non tamen ea lucra, quibus laedi possint.

Am. Not, however, those lucre by which they could be harmed.

So. Laedi vocas damnum pati, an aliud quippiam?

So. Do you call "laedi" to suffer damage, or rather something else?

Am. Nil aliud, quam pati damnum.

Am. Nothing else, than to suffer loss.

So. A lucrone damno afficiuntur homines, an adamno potius?

So. Are men affected by lucre or by damage, or rather by ruin?

Am. Ab utrisque, etenim a damno et a turpi lucro damno afficiuntur.

Am. By both; for indeed they are afflicted by loss, and by dishonourable gain they are harmed.

So. Num tibi videtur aliquid utile ac bonum turpe existere?

So. Do you think that anything useful and good can be disgraceful?

Am. Minime.

Am. By no means.

So. Nonne paulo ante concessimus, lucrum damno, malo existenti, esse bonum?

So. Did we not just now concede that profit, to one suffering loss, to one existing in evil, is good?

Am. Concessimus.

Am. We have conceded.

So. Ergo, ut vides, me conaris decipere, de industria contraria iis asserens, quae supra confessi sumus.

So. Therefore, as you see, you are attempting to deceive me, deliberately asserting the contrary to those things which we have confessed above.

Am. Non per Iovem, o Socrates: sed econtra tu me decipis, ac nescio quomodo in disputando rem sursum deorsumque convertis.

Am. Not by Jove, O Socrates: but on the contrary you deceive me, and I do not know how in disputing you turn the matter up and down.

So. Bona verba, quae

So. Good words, which

So. Neque enim recte facerem, nisi viro bono et sapienti parerem.

So. For I would not act rightly unless I obeyed a good and wise man.

Am. Cuinam? Aut quid hoc tandem?

Am. To whom? Or what is this, then?

So. Concivi meo et tuo, Hipparcho Pisistrati Philaedonici filio, qui filiorum Pisitrati et maior natu erat et sapientior, qui multa praeclara opera sapientiae edidit, et Homeri libros primus in hanc urbem invexit, coegitque poetas cantores carminum apud Athenienses referre per ordinem: quod etiam his temporibus observant. Et Anacreontis Teium missa navi quinquaginta remorum in hanc urbem accersivit. Simonidem praeterea Chium apud se semper habuit, amplis cum muneribus ornans.

So. To our concivus, Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus Philaedonici, who was both greater in birth and wiser than Pisistratus’ sons, who produced many preeminent works of sapientia, and first brought Homer’s books into this city, and compelled the poets, singers of carmina, to recite them among the Athenians in order — which they even in these times observe. And he fetched Anacreon of Teium to this city by a ship sent of fifty oars. Moreover he always kept Simonides the Chian with him, adorning him with ample munera.

Haec autem agebat omnia, cives suos instruere volens, ut illis quam optime viventibus imperaret, ratus minime oportere alicui sapientiam invidere, quippe qui honestus ac bonus existeret. Cum vero cives abunde eruditi essent, atque eius sapientiam admirarentur: convertit animum ad agricolas et peregrinos erudiendos. Atque ideo columnas sive quadratos lapides in singulis urbis triviis erexit: ex ea postmodum sapientia, quam partim didicerat, partim ipse invenerat, eliciens potiora, elegis inclusit carminibus, et instituta sapientiae inscripsit: adeo ut cives haud amplius admirarentur egregia illa epigrammata Delphica, Cognosce te ipsum, Nihil nimis, et reliqua huiuscemodi, sed Hipparchi praecepta veluti sapientiora venerarentur: deinde hac atque illac praetereuntes, ac legendo illius sapientiam degustantes, ex agris et silvis ad reliqua doctrinae instituta pergebant.

But he did all these things desiring to instruct his citizens, that he might command them to live as well as possible, thinking it by no means fitting to envy anyone wisdom, since he himself was honorable and good. But when the citizens were abundantly taught and admired his wisdom, he turned his mind to instructing farmers and wayfarers. And therefore he set up columns or squared stones at every city’s crossroads: from these afterwards he distilled the wisdom, which he had partly learned and partly himself discovered, choosing out the better parts, enclosing them in elegies and inscribing the institutes of wisdom; so that the citizens no longer marveled chiefly at those famous Delphic epigrams, Cognosce te ipsum, Nihil nimis, and the rest of that kind, but revered Hipparchus’s precepts as if more wise; then passing hither and thither and tasting his wisdom by reading, they would go from the fields and woods on to the remaining institutes of learning.

Erant autem epigrammata duo in quibusdam ad sinistram cuiusque columnae, quae inscribebatur Mercurius loquens, quaeve in medio urbis ac populi extabat. In quibusdam vero ad dextram, Monumentum hoc Hipparchi: Per ordinem perge, iusta cogitans. Item et alia carmina plura atque praeclara in ceteris columnis intueri licebat.

There were moreover two epigrams on certain columns to the left of each, which were inscribed “Mercury speaking,” and which stood in the middle of the city and of the people. On some, however, to the right,

Monumentum hoc Hipparchi: Per ordinem perge, iusta cogitans. — “This is the monument of Hipparchus: Proceed in order, pondering just things.”
Also many other poems, more and illustrious, could be seen on the remaining columns.

Sed in via Stiriaca inscriptum id erat: Monumentum hoc Hipparchi, Ne amicum decipias. Quamobrem ego te mihi amicum fallere numquam auderem, et illi tanto viro repugnare: quo vita functo, tres annos sub fratre illius Hippia tyrannide pressi Athenienses fuerunt. Ipse vero ab omnibus senioribus accepisti, solum id triennium in hac urbe tyrannidem viguisse.

But on the Stiriac road that was inscribed:

This monument of Hipparchus: Do not deceive a friend.
Wherefore I would never dare to deceive you as my friend, nor to resist that man of such note:
upon his death, the Athenians were oppressed for three years under the Hippian tyranny of his brother.
You yourself, moreover, have heard from all the elders that in this city the tyranny lasted only that three-year period.

Reliquis autem temporibus, eodem paene modo, quo Saturno regnante, Athenienses vixerunt. Tradutur autem ab elegantioribus viris, mortis eius causam exstitisse non eam quae vulgo fertur, sororis scilicet Canephoriae contemptum: nam id credere absurdum est. Sed Harmodium amatum eruditumque ab Aristogitone fuisse tradunt, magnum quiddam futurm ex hac educatione sperante.

In the remaining times, almost in the same manner as when Saturn reigned, the Athenians lived. It is reported by the more elegant men that the cause of his death was not that which is commonly carried about, namely the contempt of his sister Canephoria: for it is absurd to believe that. But they relate that Harmodius was loved and instructed by Aristogiton, hoping that something great would arise from this education.

Forte namque Hipparchum adversarium arbitrabatur. Interim contigisse, ut Harmodius nobilem quendam, cuius nomen non satis teneo, amaret. Qui primum Harmodium et Aristogitonem veluti sapientes admirabatur, verum deinde familiaris factus Hipparcho, contemnere illos coepit: quo illi indignati Hipparchum interemerunt.

For by chance he considered Hipparchus an adversary. Meanwhile it befell that Harmodius loved a certain nobleman, whose name I do not quite retain. This man at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton as if they were sages, but afterwards, having become familiar with Hipparchus, he began to scorn them; whereupon they, indignant, put Hipparchus to death.

Am. Videris ergo, o Socrates, vel amicum me non putare: vel, si putas amicum, Hipparcho minime credere. Ego enim quo modo me non decipias disserendo, persuaderi abs te nequeo.

Am. You will therefore appear, O Socrates, either not to deem me a friend; or, if you deem me a friend, to trust Hipparchus not at all. For in what manner you do not deceive me by debating, I am not able to be persuaded by you.

So. Atqui volo tibi, perinde ac si talis luderem, retractare quicquid ex superioribus libet, ne te deceptum existimes. Visne illud immutari, quod diximus, omnes homines bona appetere?

So. And yet I wish for you, just as if I were playing such a part, to retrace whatever of the foregoing pleases, so that you may not think yourself deceived. Do you want that that—which we said—be altered, that all men appetite goods?

Am. Nolo.

Am. I do not wish.

So. Quid vero illud, quod damnum, ac damno affici, malum esse concessimus?

So. But what of that which we have conceded to be a harm, and to be harmed by harm—is it an evil?

Am. Neque id mutari volo.

Am. Nor do I wish that it be changed.

So. Sed quid illud, quod lucrum atque lucrari, et ipsi damno, et ei quod est damnum pati, contraria sunt?

So. But what of that, that "lucrum" and "lucrari" are contrary both to damnum itself and to that which is to suffer damage?

Am. Neque istud quidem.

Am. Nor that either.

So. At illud forsitan, quod lucrari, utpote malo contrarium, bonum est?

So. But perhaps that thing — to gain (lucrari), being, as it were, contrary to evil — is good?

Am. Neque id retractes.

Am. Nor will you retract that.

So. Videtur igitur mihi, ut apparet, aliquod lucrum bonum esse, aliquod vero malum?

So. It therefore seems to me, as it appears, that some gain (lucrum) is good, but some indeed is evil?

Am. Mihi vero.

Am. As for me, indeed.

So. Retracto itaque tibi hoc. Esto enim lucrum aliud bonum, malum aliud: nihil tamen magis hoc, quma illud, lucrum est, nonne?

So. I therefore retract this from you. For suppose profit one thing, good another, evil another: nevertheless nothing is more a profit than this rather than that, is it not?

Am. Quid interrogas?

Am. What do you ask?

So. Dic

So. Say.

Am. Cibus et bonus est et malus.

Am. Food is both good and bad.

Am. Est.

Am. It is.

So. Estne magis cibus alter altero? An similiter cibi sunt ambo, neque, in quantum cibus, unus ab altero differt: sed in quantum unus quidem bonus, altere vero malus?

So. Is one food more than the other? Or are both foods alike, and not, inasmuch as they are food, does one differ from the other: but inasmuch as one indeed is good, the other, however, bad?

Am. Est ut dicis.

Am. It is as you say.

So. Nonne et potus, et reliqua omnia quaecumque in specie eadem existentia talia sunt, ut partim bona, partim mala sint; nihil inter se differunt secundum id quo eadem sunt: quemadmodum homo quidem unus bonus, malus alius?

So. Are not drink too, and all other things whatever that exist in the same species such that some are good, some bad; they do not differ among themselves according to that by which they are the same: just as one man indeed is good, another bad?

Am. Sic est.

Am. Thus it is.

So. Ceterum neuter illorum, ut arbitror, magis aut minus homo est, quam alius, neque bonus malo, neque bono malus.

So. Moreover neither of them, as I judge, is more or less a man than the other, nor is a good man bad, nor is a bad man good.

Am. Vera dicis.

Am. You speak the truth.

So. Nonne de lucro similiter iudicabimus, quod pariter lucrum tam bonum quam malum sit?

So. Shall we likewise judge about profit, that profit is equally both good and bad?

Am. Necesse est.

Am. It is necessary.

So. Nil igitur magis lucratur, qui bonum lucrum assequitur, quam qui malum: neque istorum aliquid malus lucrum apparet, ut iam convenit.

So. Therefore nothing is gained more by him who attains a good gain than by him who attains a bad one; nor does any of those gains appear a bad gain, as has now been agreed.

Am. Profecto.

Am. Indeed.

So. Neutro enim aut magis, aut minus adest?

So. To neither, then, is it either more or less present?

Am. Neutro.

Am. Neither.

So. Tali autem re, cui neutrum horum competit, quomodo quis magis vel minus aliquid aut ageret, aut etiam pateretur?

So. But in such a matter, to which neither of these pertains, how could anyone act or even suffer anything more or less?

Am. Impossibile.

Am. Impossible.

So. Postquam lucra et utilia sunt similiter ambo, hoc deinceps animadvertendum restat, propter quid utraque ipsa lucrum appellas? Quidnam idem in utrisque aspicis? Veluti si ipse modo me rogavisses, quare cibum, seu bonum sive malum, similiter cibum appellem: respondissem utique, quoniam uterque sicca est corporis esca, ideo utrumque cibum nomino: quod quidem et tu nobis concederes.

So. After profits and utilities are both alike, this remains next to note: for what reason do you call each of them by the name profit? What same thing do you behold in both? For example, if you had but just asked me why I call food — whether good or bad — equally “food,” I would surely have answered, because each is nourishment of the body, and therefore I name both food: which indeed you would concede to us.

Nonne?

Is it not so?

Am. Fateor.

Am. I confess.

So. Et circa potum eadem rursus respondendi ratio esset, quod humido corporis alimento, seu bonum sive malum sit, id nomen potus imponitur, et in aliis eodem modo. Enitere itaque me sic respondentem imitari. Quidnam idem in lucro bono et malo cernis, propter cuius praesentiam utrumque lucrum nominas?

So. And concerning potus (drink) the same rationale for replying would again hold, namely that to a moist nourishment of the body, whether it be good or bad, the name potus is assigned, and in other things in the same way. Strive therefore to imitate me in answering thus. What, then, do you perceive the same in lucrum (profit) good and bad, on account of whose presence you call both kinds lucrum?

Quod si tibi desit, quod mihi respondeas, me dicente attende. Num lucrum appellas omnem possessionem, quam quis adquisiverit, vel nihil expendens, vel expendens parum, cum plus accipiat?

But if it be lacking to you to answer me, attend to me speaking. Do you call profit every possession which anyone has acquired, either spending nothing or spending little, when he receives more?

Am. Id lucrum vocare mihi videor.

Am. I seem to call that profit.

So. An huiusmodi dicis, seu si quis nihil expendens abunde epulatus sit, et ex epulis morbum adquisiverit?

So. Do you say something of this sort, or if someone, spending nothing, has feasted abundantly, and from the feasts has contracted a disease?

Am. Non per Iovem.

Am. Not by Jove.

So. At bonam valetudinem ex epulis adeptus, lucrumne an damnum nancisceretur?

So. But having gained good health from the feasts, would he reap profit or incur loss?

Am. Lucrum.

Am. Profit.

So. Non est igitur lucrum, quodlibet adquirere.

So. It is therefore not profitable to acquire whatever.

Am. Non certe.

Am. Certainly not.

So. Numquid ita se habet, ut non lucretur qui quodvis assequitur, sive bonum, seu malum?

So. Is it then the case that he does not gain who attains anything whatsoever, whether good or evil?

Am. Apparet.

Am. It is evident.

So. Neque in damnum incurrat, qui in quodvis incurrit, sive bonum seu malum?

So. Nor does he incur damnum who incurs into anything, whether good or malum?

Am. Mihi quidem videtur.

Am. To me, indeed, it seems so.

So. Cernis ergo, quod circa idem revolveris? Lucrum enim bonum, damnum vero malum apparet.

So. Do you then see what you are revolving about that same thing? For profit indeed appears good, but loss truly appears evil.

Am. Ignoro quid dicam.

Am. I do not know what to say.

So. Et iure quidem. Sed praeterea hoc mihi responde. Si quis minus expendens plus acceperit, lucrari hunc diceres?

So. And rightly so. But besides that, answer me this: if someone, spending less, received more, would you say that he gained?

Am. Non malum dico; verum si auri vel argenti minus erogans, plus accipiat.

Am. I do not say it is bad; but if, paying out less of gold or silver, he receives more.

So. Enimvero hoc insuper interrogabo: Si quis dimidiam auri libram erogans, duplum reportaret argenti, lucrumne an damnum esset?

So. Indeed, moreover, I shall ask this further: If anyone, paying a half-pound of gold, were to bring back double the silver, would that be a profit or a loss?

Am. Damnum profecto, o Socrates. Nam pro duodecuplo duplum solummodo recipit.

Certainly a loss, O Socrates. For on a twelvefold he receives only a double.

So. Verumtamen plus accepit. An non plus est duplum dimidio?

So. Yet he received more. Is not “more” the double of a half?

Am. Non eiusdem dignitatis ac pretii est argentum, cuius est aurum.

Am. Silver is not of the same dignity and value as gold is.

So. Ergo oportet hoc lucro adiicere, aestimationem scilicet ac pretium. Nunc utique argentum plus existens, quam aurum, haud aeque aestimandum ac pretium dicis: et aurum minus existens, pretiosum quoque ac dignum.

So. Therefore one ought to add to this lucro an estimation, namely an appraisal and a price. Now indeed you say that silver, being more abundant than gold, is not to be valued and priced equally; and that gold, being less abundant, is likewise precious and worthy.

Am. Et maxime, sic enim se res habet.

Am. And especially, for thus the matter stands.

So. Ipsa ergo aestimatio dignitasque lucrum continet, sive parva res sive magna sit: indignum vero aestimatione sine lucro est.

So. Estimation itself, then, and dignity contain profit, whether the thing be small or great: but estimation without profit is unworthy.

Am. Profecto.

Am. Indeed.

So. Ipsum pretiosum ac dignum, vocasne aliter dignum, quam adeptione dignum?

So. The very thing precious and worthy — do you call it worthy otherwise than worthy by acquisition?

Am. Adeptione.

Am. By acquisition.

So. Dignum autem adeptione, utile an inutile?

So. Worthy, however, by acquisition—useful or useless?

Am. Utile.

Am. Useful.

So. Utile nonne bonum?

So. Is the useful not good?

Am. Est.

Am. It is.

So. O vir omnium fortissime, nonne iam tertio et quarto conclusum a nobis est, lucrum bonum esse?

So. O man most brave of all, has it not now been concluded by us for the third and fourth time that profit is good?

Am. Videtur.

Am. It seems.

So. Memoria tenes, unde sermo hic incidit?

So. Do you remember from where this conversation here left off?

Am. Arbitror.

Am. I think.

So. At si minus ipse memineris, ego in memoriam reduc

So. But if you yourself recall less, I will bring it back into memory.

Am. Ex eo enim, quod dubitares, ne boni viri quaelibet acceptare nolint, sed ex lucris bona dumtaxat, mala vero nequaquam.

Am. For from that — namely your doubt — that good men would not accept quaelibet (anything at random), but only goods from lucre, and bad things by no means.

Am. Hinc sane.

Am. Hence indeed.

So. Nonne lucra omnia esse bona, seu magna sive parva sint, ratio nos fateri coÎgit?

So. Does not reason compel us to confess that all lucrative gains are good, whether great or small?

Am. CoÎgit certe, o Socrates, me magis, quam persuasit. Sed forsitan deinceps persuadebit.

Am. It certainly compels me, O Socrates, more than it persuades me. But perhaps hereafter it will persuade.

So. Nunc tamen, sive persuasus fueris, seu quomodocumque aliter sis affectus, consentis nobiscum, lucra omnia, et ampla et exigua, bona esse?

So. Now then, whether you have been persuaded, or however otherwise you are affected, do you agree with us that all gains, both ample and scant, are good?

Am. Consentio.

Am. I agree.

So. Et bonos viros omnes bona omnia velle fateris? Necne?

So. And do you admit that good men all wish for all good things? Or not?

Am. Fateor.

Am. I confess.

So. Malos autem dicebas omnia lucra, tam exigua quam magna, cupere.

So. But you were saying that bad men desire all gains, both the small and the great.

Am. Dicebam.

Am. I was saying.

So. Nonne igitur secundum sermonem tuum universi homines, et boni pariter atque mali, lucri cupidi essent?

So. Would not, then, according to your speech, all men — both good and bad alike — be desirous of gain?

Am. Videtur.

Am. It seems.

So. Non recte igitur vituperabit quispiam lucri cupidos, cum ipse quoque lucri cupidus sit.

So. Will anyone therefore rightly blame someone desirous of gain, when he himself too is desirous of gain?