Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Multa mihi supersunt de Dei attributis, multa de meî ipsius sive mentis meae naturâ investiganda; sed illa forte aliàs resumam, jamque nihil magis urgere videtur (postquam animadverti quid cavendum atque agendum sit ad assequendam veritatem), quàm ut ex dubiis, in quae superioribus diebus incidi, coner emergere, videamque an aliquid certi de rebus materialibus haberi possit.

1. Many things remain to me concerning the attributes of God, many concerning myself namely, the nature of my mind, to be investigated; but those I shall perhaps another time resume, and now nothing seems more urgent (after I have observed what is to be avoided and what is to be done for the attaining of truth), than that from the doubts, into which in the previous days I fell, I try to emerge, and see whether anything certain concerning material things can be had.

2. Et quidem, priusquam inquiram an aliquae tales res extra me existant, considerare debeo illarum ideas, quatenus sunt in meâ cogitatione, & videre quaenam ex iis sint distinctae, quaenam confusae.E]

2. And indeed, before I inquire whether any such things exist outside me, I ought to consider their ideas, insofar as they are in my thought, & to see which of them are distinct, which confused.E]

3. Nempe distincte imaginor quantitatem, quam vulgo Philosophi appellant continuam, sive ejus quantitatis aut potius rei quantae extensionem in longum, latum & profundum; numero in eâ varias partes; quaslibet istis partibus magnitudines, figuras, situs, & motus locales, motibusque istis quaslibet durationes assigno.

3. Indeed I distinctly imagine quantity, which Philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth & depth of that quantity, or rather of a quantitative thing; by number in it various parts; to these parts any magnitudes, figures, positions, & local motions; and to those motions I assign whatever durations.

4. Nec tantùm illa, sic in genere spectata, mihi plane nota & perspecta sunt, sed praeterea etiam particularia innumera de figuris, de numero, de motu, & similibus, attendendo percipio, quorum veritas adeo aperta

4. Not only are those things, thus considered in general, plainly known and seen through to me, but moreover I also, by attending, perceive innumerable particulars about figures, about number, about motion, & the like, whose truth is so manifest

[64] est & naturae meae consentanea, ut, dum illa primùm detego, non tam videar aliquid novi addiscere, quàm eorum quae jam ante sciebam reminisci, sive ad ea primùm advertere, quae dudum quidem in me erant, licet non prius in illa obtutum mentis convertissem.

[64] it is, and is consonant with my nature, that, while I first uncover these, I seem not so much to be learning something new as to be reminiscing of things which I already knew, or to be first turning my attention to those which indeed were long since within me, although I had not previously turned the mind’s gaze upon them.

5. Quodque hîc maxime considerandum puto, invenio apud me innumeras ideas quarumdam rerum, quae, etiam si extra me fortasse nullibi existant, non tamen dici possunt nihil esse; & quamvis a me quodammodo ad arbitrium cogitentur, non tamen a me finguntur, sed suas habent veras & immutabiles naturas. Ut cùm, exempli causâ, triangulum imaginor, etsi fortasse talis figura nullibi gentium extra cogitationem meam existat, nec unquam extiterit, est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sive essentia, sive forma, immutabilis & aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente meâ dependet; ut patet ex eo quòd demonstrari possint variae proprietates de isto triangulo, nempe quòd ejus tres anguli sint acquales duobus rectis, quòd maximo ejus angulo maximum latus subtendatur, & similes, quas velim nolim clare nunc agnosco, etiamsi de iis nullo modo antea cogitaverim, cùm triangulum imaginatus sum, nec proinde a me fuerint effictae.

5. And what I think is above all to be considered here, I find in myself innumerable ideas of certain things which, even if perhaps they exist nowhere outside me, nonetheless cannot be said to be nothing; & although they are in a certain manner thought by me at will, they are not however feigned by me, but have their own true & immutable natures. As when, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps such a figure exists nowhere in the world outside my thought, nor ever has existed, nevertheless there is assuredly a certain determinate nature, or essence, or form, immutable & eternal, which has not been fashioned by me, nor does it depend on my mind; as is clear from the fact that various properties can be demonstrated of this triangle, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that to its greatest angle the greatest side is subtended, & the like, which, whether I will it or not, I now clearly recognize, even if I had in no way previously thought about them when I imagined a triangle, and therefore were not fashioned by me.

6. Neque ad rem attinet, si dicam mihi forte a rebus externis per organa sensuum istam trianguli ideam advenisse, quia nempe corpora triangularem figuram habentia interdum vidi; possum enim alias innumeras figuras excogitare, de quibus nulla suspicio esse potest quòd mihi unquam per sensus illapsae sint, & tamen

6. Nor does it concern the matter, if I should say that perhaps from external things through
the organs of the senses this idea of the triangle has come to me, since indeed I have sometimes seen bodies having a triangular
figure; for I can devise countless other figures,
about which there can be no suspicion that they have ever slid into me through the senses,
& yet

[65] varias de iis, non minus quàm de triangulo, proprietates demonstrare. Quae sane omnes sunt verae, quandoquidem a me clare cognoscuntur, ideoque aliquid sunt, non merum nihil: patet enim illud omne quod verum est esse aliquid; & jam fuse demonstravi illa omnia quae clare cognosco esse vera. Atque quamvis id non demonstrassem, ea certe est natura mentis meae ut nihilominus non possem iis non assentiri, saltem quamdiu ea clare percipio; meminique me semper, etiam ante hoc tempus, cùm sensuum objectis quam maxime inhaererem, ejusmodi veritates, quae nempe de figuris, aut numeris, aliisve ad Arithmeticam vel Geometriam vel in genere ad puram atque abstractam Mathesim pertinentibus, evidenter agnoscebam, pro omnium certissimis habuisse.

[65] of these I can demonstrate various properties, no less than of the triangle. Which indeed are all true, since they are clearly known by me, and therefore they are something, not mere nothing: for it is evident that everything which is true is something; and now I have at length demonstrated those things which I clearly cognize to be true. And although I had not demonstrated this, certainly such is the nature of my mind that nonetheless I could not but assent to them, at least as long as I clearly perceive them; and I remember that I have always, even before this time, when I clung as much as possible to the objects of the senses, truths of this sort, which namely concern figures, or numbers, or other things pertaining to Arithmetic or Geometry or in general to pure and abstract Mathematics, I evidently recognized, and held as the most certain of all.

7. Jam verò si ex eo solo, quòd alicujus rei ideam possim ex cogitatione meâ depromere, sequitur ea omnia, quae ad illam rem pertinere clare & distincte percipio, revera ad illam pertinere, nunquid inde haberi etiam potest argumentum, quo Dei existentia probetur? Certe ejus ideam, nempe entis summe perfecti, non minus apud me invenio, quàm ideam cujusvis figurae aut numeri; nec minus clare & distincte intelligo ad ejus naturam pertinere ut semper existat, quàm id quòd de aliquâ figurâ aut numero demonstro ad ejus figurae aut numeri naturam etiam pertinere; ac proinde, quamvis non omnia, quae superioribus hisce diebus meditatus sum, vera essent, in eodem ad minimum certitudinis gradu esse deberet apud me Dei existen

7. Now indeed, if from this alone, that I can draw forth the idea of some thing from my cogitation, it follows that all those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive to pertain to that thing do truly pertain to it; can an argument also be had from this, by which the existence of God is proved? Surely his idea, namely of a supremely perfect being, I find in me no less than the idea of any figure or number; nor do I less clearly and distinctly understand it to pertain to his nature that he always exist, than that what I demonstrate of some figure or number pertains also to the nature of that figure or of that number; and therefore, although not all the things which in these preceding days I have meditated were true, the existence of God ought to be with me in the same, at least, degree of certainty existen

[66]tia, in quo fuerunt hactenus Mathematicae veritates.

[66]ence, in which the Mathematical truths have hitherto been.

8. Quanquam sane hoc primâ fronte non est omnino perspicuum, sed quandam sophismatis speciem refert. Cùm enim assuetus sim in omnibus aliis rebus existentiam ab essentiâ distinguere, facile mihi persuadeo illam etiam ab essentiâ Dei sejungi posse, atque ita Deum ut non existentem cogitari. Sed tamen diligentius attendenti fit manifestum, non magis posse existentiam ab essentiâ Dei separari, quàm ab essentiâ trianguli magnitudinem trium ejus angulorum acqualium duobus rectis, sive ab ideâ montis ideam vallis: adeo ut non magis repugnet cogitare Deum (hoc est ens summe perfectum) cui desit existentia (hoc est cui desit aliqua perfectio), quàm cogitare montem cui desit vallis.

8. Although indeed this is not altogether clear at first blush, but bears a certain appearance of sophism. For since I am accustomed in all other things to distinguish existence from essence, I easily persuade myself that it also can be severed from the essence of God, and thus that God can be conceived as not existing. Yet, paying more diligent attention, it becomes manifest that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than, from the essence of a triangle, the magnitude of its three angles equal to two right angles, or from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley: so that it is no more repugnant to think God (that is, a being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is, to whom some perfection is lacking), than to think of a mountain to which a valley is lacking.

9. Verumtamen, ne possim quidem cogitare Deum nisi existentem, ut neque montem sine valle, at certe, ut neque ex eo quòd cogitem montem cum valle, ideo sequitur aliquem montem in mundo esse, ita neque ex eo quòd cogitem Deum ut existentem, ideo sequi videtur Deum existere: nullam enim necessitatem cogitatio mea rebus imponit; & quemadmodum imaginari licet equum alatum, etsi nullus equus habeat alas, ita forte Deo existentiam possum affingere, quamvis nullus Deus existat.

9. Nevertheless, I cannot even think God except as existing, just as neither a mountain without a valley; but certainly, just as neither from the fact that I think a mountain with a valley does it therefore follow that some mountain exists in the world, so neither from the fact that I think God as existing does it seem therefore to follow that God exists: for my thought imposes no necessity upon things; & just as it is permitted to imagine a winged horse, even if no horse has wings, so perhaps I can ascribe existence to God, although no God exists.

10. Imo sophisma hîc latet; neque enim, ex eo quòd non possim cogitare montem nisi cum valle, sequitur alicubi montem & vallem existere, sed tantùm mon

10. Nay rather, a sophism lies hidden here; for from the fact that I cannot think a mountain except with a valley, it does not follow that somewhere a mountain and a valley exist, but only moun

[67]tem & vallem, sive existant, sive non existant, a se mutuo sejungi non posse. Atqui ex eo quòd non possim cogitare Deum nisi existentem, sequitur existentiam a Deo esse inseparabilem, ac proinde illum reverà existere; non quòd mea cogitatio hoc efficiat, sive aliquam necessitatem ulli rei imponat, sed contrà quia ipsius rei, nempe existentiae Dei, necessitas me determinat ad hoc cogitandum: neque enim mihi liberum est Deum absque existentiâ (hoc est ens summe perfectum absque summâ perfectione) cogitare, ut liberum est equum vel cum alis vel sine alis imaginari.

[67]a mountain & a valley, whether they exist or do not exist, cannot be separated from one another mutually. But from the fact that I cannot think God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and accordingly that he truly exists; not because my thought brings this about or imposes any necessity upon any thing, but on the contrary because the necessity of the thing itself, namely of the existence of God, determines me to think this: for it is not within my liberty to think God without existence (that is, a supremely perfect being without the highest perfection), as it is free to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings.

11. Neque etiam hîc dici debet, necesse quidem esse ut ponam Deum existentem, postquam posui illum habere omnes perfectiones, quandoquidem existentia una est ex illis, sed priorem positionem necessariam non fuisse; ut neque necesse est me putare figuras omnes quadrilateras circulo inscribi, sed posito quòd hoc putem, necesse erit me fateri rhombum circulo inscribi, quod aperte tamen est falsum. Nam, quamvis non necesse sit ut incidam unquam in ullam de Deo cogitationem, quoties tamen de ente primo & summo libet cogitare, atque ejus ideam tanquam ex mentis meae thesauro depromere, necesse est ut illi omnes perfectiones attribuam, etsi nec omnes tunc enumerem, nec ad singulas attendam: quae necessitas plane sufficit ut postea, cùm animadverto existentiam esse perfectionem, recte concludam ens primum & summum existere: quemadmodum non est necesse me ullum triangulum unquam imaginari, sed quoties volo figuram rectilineam tres tantùm angulos habentem considerare, necesse est ut illi ea tribuam, ex qui

11. Nor should it be said here that indeed it is necessary that I posit God as existing, after I have posited him to have all perfections, since existence is one of them, but that the prior position was not necessary; just as it is not necessary that I suppose all quadrilateral figures to be inscribed in a circle, yet, that supposed, it would be necessary for me to admit that a rhombus is inscribed in a circle, which nevertheless is plainly false. For although it is not necessary that I ever fall into any thought about God, yet whenever it pleases me to think of the first and highest being, and to draw forth his idea as from the treasury of my mind, it is necessary that I attribute to him all perfections, even if I neither then enumerate them all nor attend to each one: which necessity plainly suffices so that afterwards, when I notice that existence is a perfection, I rightly conclude that the first and highest being exists: just as it is not necessary that I ever imagine any triangle, but whenever I wish to consider a rectilinear figure having only three angles, it is necessary that I attribute to it those things out of which

[68]bus recte infertur ejus tres angulos non majores esse duobus rectis, etiamsi hoc ipsum tunc non advertam. Cùm verò examino quaenam figurae circulo inscribantur, nullo modo necesse est ut putem omnes quadrilateras ex eo numero esse; imò etiam idipsum nequidem fingere possum, quamdiu nihil volo admittere nisi quod clare & distincte intelligo. Ac proinde magna differentia est inter ejusmodi falsas positiones, & ideas veras mihi ingenitas, quarum prima & praecipua est idea Dei.

[68]from which it is rightly inferred that its three angles are not greater than two right angles, even if I do not notice this at that time. But when I examine which figures are inscribed in a circle, it is in no way necessary that I suppose all quadrilaterals to be of that number; indeed I cannot even feign that same thing, so long as I wish to admit nothing except what I clearly and distinctly understand. And therefore there is a great difference between false positions of this sort and true ideas innate to me, of which the first and principal is the idea of God.

Nam sane multis modis intelligo illam non esse quid fictitium a cogitatione meâ dependens, sed imaginem verae & immutabilis naturae: ut, primo, quia nulla alia res potest a me excogitari, ad cujus essentiam existentia pertineat, praeter solum Deum; deinde, quia non possum duos aut plures ejusmodi Deos intelligere, & quia, posito quòd jam unus existat, plane videam esse necessarium ut & ante ab aeterno extiterit, & in aeternum sit mansurus; ac denique, quòd multa alia in Deo percipiam, quorum nihil a me detrahi potest nec mutari.

For indeed in many ways I understand that it is not something fictitious dependent on my cogitation, but an image of a true and immutable nature: namely, first, because no other thing can be devised by me to whose essence existence pertains, except God alone; then, because I cannot understand two or more Gods of this kind; and because, given that now one exists, I plainly see it to be necessary that he also has existed from eternity, and will remain for eternity; and finally, that I perceive many other things in God, of which nothing can be detracted by me nor changed.

12. Sed verò, quâcumque tandem utar probandi ratione, semper eò res redit, ut ea me sola plane persuadeant, quae clare & distincte percipio. Et quidem ex iis quae ita percipio, etsi nonnulla unicuique obvia sint, alia verò nonnisi ab iis qui propiùs inspiciunt & diligenter investigant deteguntur, postquam tamen detecta sunt, haec non minus certa quàm illa existimantur. Ut quamvis non tam facile appareat in triangulo rectan

12. But indeed, by whatever method of proving I at length employ, the matter always returns to this: that those things alone plainly persuade me which I perceive clearly and distinctly. And indeed among those things which I thus perceive, although some are obvious to everyone, others are discovered only by those who look more closely and diligently investigate; yet after they have been detected, these are judged no less certain than those. For example, although it does not so easily appear in a right-angled triangle

[69]gulo quadratum basis aequale esse quadratis laterum, quàm istam basim maximo ejus angulo subtendi, non tamen minùs creditur, postquam semel est perspectum. Quod autem ad Deum attinet, certe nisi praejudiciis obruerer, & rerum sensibilium imagines cogitationem meam omni ex parte obsiderent, nihil illo prius aut facilius agnoscerem; nam quid ex se est apertius, quàm summum ens esse, sive Deum, ad cujus solius essentiam existentia pertinet, existere?

[69] Although it does not so easily appear in a right triangle that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the sides, as that this base is subtended by its greatest angle, yet it is believed no less, after once it has been seen through. But as regards God, surely, unless I were overwhelmed by prejudices, & the images of sensible things were besieging my cogitation on every side, I would acknowledge nothing earlier or more easily than Him; for what is more self-evident than that the supreme being, or God, to whose essence alone existence pertains, exists?

13. Atque, quamvis mihi attentâ consideratione opus fuerit ad hoc ipsum percipiendum, nunc tamen non modo de eo aeque certus sum ac de omni alio quod certissimum videtur, sed praeterea etiam animadverto caeterarum rerum certitudinem ab hoc ipso ita pendere, ut absque eo nihil unquam perfecte sciri possit.

13. And although I needed attentive consideration to perceive this very thing, nevertheless now I am not only as certain of it as of anything else that seems most certain, but moreover I also observe that the certainty of the other things depends upon this itself in such a way that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known.

14. Etsi enim ejus sim naturae ut, quamdiu aliquid valde clare & distincte percipio, non possim non credere verum esse, quia tamen ejus etiam sum naturae ut non possim obtutum mentis in eandem rem semper defigere ad illam clare percipiendam, recurratque saepe memoria judicii ante facti, cùm non amplius attendo ad rationes propter quas tale quid judicavi, rationes aliae afferri possunt quae me, si Deum ignorarem, facile ab opinione dejicerent, atque ita de nullâ unquam re veram & certam scientiam, sed vagas tantùm & mutabiles opiniones, haberem. Sic, exempli causâ, cùm naturam trianguli considero, evidentissime quidem mihi, utpote Geometriae principiis imbuto, apparet ejus tres angulos aequales esse duobus rectis, nec possum non credere id verum esse, quamdiu ad

14. For although I am of such a nature that, so long as I very clearly
& distinctly perceive something, I cannot not believe it to be true; yet because
I am also of such a nature that I cannot fix the gaze of the mind upon the same thing always
for perceiving it clearly, and the memory of a judgment previously made often recurs,
when I no longer attend to the reasons on account of which I judged such a thing,
other reasons can be adduced which, if I were ignorant of God, would easily
dislodge me from my opinion; and thus I would have about nothing ever true
& certain science, but only wandering & changeable opinions,
Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of a triangle,
it appears to me most evidently, since I am imbued with the principles of Geometry, that
its three angles are equal to two right angles, nor can I not believe that
this is true, so long as

[70] ejus demonstrationem attendo; sed statim atque mentis aciem ab illâ deflexi, quantumvis adhuc recorder me illam clarissime perspexisse, facile tamen potest accidere ut dubitem an sit vera, si quidem Deum ignorem. Possum enim mihi persuadere me talem a naturâ factum esse, ut interdum in iis fallar quae me puto quàm evidentissime percipere, cùm praesertim meminerim me saepe multa pro veris & certis habuisse, quae postmodum, aliis rationibus adductus, falsa esse judicavi.

[70] I attend to its demonstration; but immediately as soon as
I have turned aside the mind’s gaze from it, however much I still recall that I perceived it most clearly,
yet it can easily happen that I doubt whether it is true, if indeed I am ignorant of God. For I can persuade
myself that I have been made by nature of such a kind that I am sometimes deceived in those things which I think I perceive most evidently,
especially since I remember that I have often held many things for true and certain, which afterwards, being led by other reasons, I judged to be false.

15. Postquam verò percepi Deum esse, quia simul etiam intellexi caetera omnia ab eo pendere, illumque non esse fallacem; atque inde collegi illa omnia, quae clare & distincte percipio, necessariò esse vera; etiamsi non attendam amplius ad rationes propter quas istud verum esse judicavi, modo tantùm recorder me clare & distincte perspexisse, nulla ratio contraria afferri potest, quae me ad dubitandum impellat, sed veram & certam de hoc habeo scientiam. Neque de hoc tantùm, sed & de reliquis omnibus quae memini me aliquando demonstrasse, ut de Geometricis & similibus. Quid enim nunc mihi opponetur?

15. After I perceived that God exists, because at the same time I also understood that all other things depend on him, and that he is not a deceiver; and from this I concluded that all those things which I perceive clearly & distinctly are necessarily true; even if I no longer attend to the reasons on account of which I judged that to be true, provided only that I remember that I have clearly & distinctly perceived it, no contrary reason can be brought forward which might impel me to doubt, but I have true & certain knowledge of this. Nor of this only, but also of all the rest which I remember to have at some time demonstrated, as of the Geometrical and the like. For what now will be opposed to me?

Mene talem factum esse ut saepe fallar? At jam scio me in iis, quae perspicue intelligo, falli non posse. Mene multa aliàs pro veris & certis habuisse, quae postea falsa esse deprehendi?

Am I made of such a sort that I often err? But now I know that, in those things which I perspicuously understand, I cannot be deceived. That I at other times held many things for true and certain, which afterwards I discovered to be false?

Atqui nulla ex iis clare & distincte perceperam, sed hujus regulae veritatis ignarus ob alias causas forte credideram, quas postea minus firmas esse detexi. Quid ergo dicetur? Anne (ut nuper mihi objiciebam) me forte somniare, sive illa omnia, quae jam cogito, non magis vera esse quàm ea quae dormienti occurrunt?

And yet I had perceived none of these clearly & distinctly,
but, ignorant of this rule of truth, I had perhaps believed them for other reasons, which afterwards I detected to be less firm. What then will be said? Is it (as I was lately objecting to myself) that I am perhaps dreaming, or that all those things which I now think are no more true than those which occur to one sleeping?

Imò etiam hoc nihil mutat; nam certe,

Nay rather, even this changes nothing; for certainly,

[71] quamvis somniarem, si quid intellectui meo sit evidens, illud omnino est verum.

[71] although I might be dreaming, if anything is evident to my intellect, that is altogether true.

16. Atque ita plane video omnis scientiae certitudinem & veritatem ab unâ veri Dei cognitione pendere, adeo ut, priusquam illum nossem, nihil de ullâ aliâ re perfecte scire potuerim. Jam verò innumera, tum de ipso Deo aliisque rebus intellectualibus, tum etiam de omni illâ naturâ corporeâ, quae est purae Matheseos objectum, mihi plane nota & certa esse possunt.

16. And thus I plainly see that the certitude & truth of all science depend upon the sole knowledge of the true God, to such a degree that, before I knew him, I could not have known anything perfectly about any other thing. Now indeed innumerable things, both about God himself and other intellectual matters, and also about the whole corporeal nature which is the object of pure Mathematics, can be plainly known & certain to me.