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Dig. 6.3.0. Si ager vectigalis, id est emphyteuticarius, petatur.
6.2.0. On the Publician action in rem.
Digest 6.3.0. If a vectigalian field, that is, emphyteuticary, is claimed.
Per hanc autem actionem liberae personae, quae sunt iuris nostri, ut puta liberi qui sunt in potestate, non petuntur: petuntur igitur aut praeiudiciis aut interdictis aut cognitione praetoria, et ita pomponius libro trigensimo septimo: nisi forte, inquit, adiecta causa quis vindicet: si quis ita petit " filium suum" vel " in potestate ex iure romano", videtur mihi et pomponius consentire recte eum egisse: ait enim adiecta causa ex lege quiritium vindicare posse.
By this action, however, free persons who are of our law—for instance children who are in paternal power—are not claimed: they are therefore sought either by prejudgments (praeiudicia) or by interdicts or by praetorian cognition; and so Pomponius in the thirty-seventh book: unless perhaps, he says, someone should vindicate with a cause added: if someone so claims " filium suum" or " in potestate ex iure romano", it seems to me, and Pomponius agrees, that he has proceeded rightly: for he says that, with the cause added, one can vindicate ex lege quiritium.
Per hanc autem actionem non solum singulae res vindicabuntur, sed posse etiam gregem vindicari pomponius libro lectionum vicensimo quinto scribit. idem et de armento et de equitio ceterisque, quae gregatim habentur, dicendum est. sed enim gregem sufficiet ipsum nostrum esse, licet singula capita nostra non sint: grex enim, non singula corpora vindicabuntur.
By this action, moreover, not only will individual things be vindicated, but Pomponius writes in the twenty-fifth book of the Readings that a herd too can be vindicated. The same is to be said of a cattle-herd and of a horse-stud and of the others which are kept in herds. But indeed it will suffice that the herd itself is ours, although the individual heads are not ours: for the herd, not the individual bodies, will be vindicated.
Sed si par numerus duorum interfuerit, neuter solidum gregem, sed ne partem dimidiam totius eius vindicabit. sed si maiorem numerum alter habeat, ut detracto alieno nihilo minus gregem vindicaturus sit, in restitutionem non veniunt aliena capita.
But if an equal number of the two has been involved, neither will vindicate the flock entire, nor even a half part of the whole of it. But if one has a greater number, such that, with the alien portion deducted, he would nonetheless be about to vindicate the flock, the alien heads do not come into restitution.
Marcellus libro quarto digestorum scribit: qui gregem habebat capitum trecentorum, amissis centum redemit totidem capita aliena ab eo, qui dominium eorum habebat vel aliena ab eo, qui bona fide ea possidebat: et haec utique gregis, inquit, vindicatione continebuntur. sed et si ea sola supersint capita, quae redempta sunt, adhuc eum posse gregem vindicare.
Marcellus, in the fourth book of the Digests, writes: he who had a herd of three hundred heads, after losing one hundred, bought back as many alien heads from one who had ownership of them, or alien heads from one who possessed them in good faith; and these, he says, will assuredly be included under the vindication of the herd. But even if the only heads that remain are those which were bought back, he can still vindicate the herd.
Pomponius scribit, si quid quod eiusdem naturae est ita confusum est atque commixtum, ut deduci et separari non possint, non totum sed pro parte esse vindicandum. ut puta meum et tuum argentum in massam redactum est: erit nobis commune, et unusquisque pro rata ponderis quod in massa habemus vindicabimus, etsi incertum sit, quantum quisque ponderis in massa habet.
Pomponius writes that, if something of the same nature is so confused and commixed that it cannot be drawn off and separated, it is to be vindicated not in the whole but for a share. For example, my silver and yours have been reduced into a mass: it will be common to us, and each of us will vindicate pro rata of the weight that we have in the mass, even if it is uncertain how much weight each person has in the mass.
Quo quidem casu etiam communi dividundo agi poterit: sed et furti et ad exhibendum tenebitur, qui dolo malo confundendum id argentum curavit: ita ut in ad exhibendum actione pretii ratio haberi debeat, in vindicatione vel communi dividundo actione hoc amplius ferat, cuius argentum pretiosius fuerat.
In which case indeed one can also proceed by the communi dividundo action: but he will be liable both for theft and under the actio ad exhibendum, who by dolus malus arranged for that silver to be melted down: such that in the actio ad exhibendum consideration ought to be had of the price, while in the vindicatio or in the communi dividundo action let him receive so much the more, whose silver had been more precious.
Idem pomponius scribit: si frumentum duorum non voluntate eorum confusum sit, competit singulis in rem actio in id, in quantum paret in illo acervo suum cuiusque esse: quod si voluntate eorum commixta sunt, tunc communicata videbuntur et erit communi dividundo actio.
The same Pomponius writes: if the grain of two persons has been mixed not by their will, each has an in rem action for so much as it appears, in that heap, to be his own; but if they have been mixed by their will, then they will be regarded as shared in common, and there will be an action for dividing common property.
Idem scribit, si ex melle meo, vino tuo factum sit mulsum, quosdam existimasse id quoque communicari: sed puto verius, ut et ipse significat, eius potius esse qui fecit, quoniam suam speciem pristinam non continet. sed si plumbum cum argento mixtum sit, quia deduci possit, nec communicabitur nec communi dividundo agetur, quia separari potest: agetur autem in rem actio. sed si deduci, inquit, non possit, ut puta si aes et aurum mixtum fuerit, pro parte esse vindicandum: nec quaquam erit dicendum, quod in mulso dictum est, quia utraque materia etsi confusa manet tamen.
He likewise writes that, if mulsum has been made from my honey and your wine, some have thought that that too is to be shared; but I think it truer, as he himself also indicates, that it rather belongs to the one who made it, since it does not retain its own pristine species. But if lead has been mixed with silver, because it can be drawn off, it will neither be made common nor will an action for division of common property be brought, because it can be separated; rather, an action in rem will be brought. But if, he says, it cannot be drawn off, for instance if bronze and gold have been mixed, it is to be vindicated for a share; nor at all will it be said as was said in the case of mulsum, because each material, though confused, nevertheless remains.
Si in rem aliquis agat, debet designare rem, et utrum totam an partem et quotam petat: appellatio enim rei non genus, sed speciem significat. octavenus ita definit, quod infectae quidem materiae pondus, signatae vero numerum, factae autem speciem dici oportet: sed et mensura dicenda erit, cum res mensura continebitur. et si vestimenta nostra esse vel dari oportere nobis petamus, utrum numerum eorum dicere debebimus an et colorem?
If someone brings an action in rem, he ought to designate the thing, and whether he seeks the whole or a part, and what portion; for the appellation of a thing signifies not the genus, but the species. octavenus thus defines, that for material not yet worked the weight ought to be stated, for stamped items the number, and for manufactured items the species: but a measure too will have to be stated, when the thing is contained by measure. And if we seek that garments are ours or that they ought to be given to us, must we state their number, or also their color?
and it is more proper that both be stated: for it is inhumane to compel us to say whether they are worn or new. although even in the case of vessels a difficulty arises, whether it ought to be said merely “a platter,” or also whether they are square or round, or plain or chased, which particulars themselves are difficult to add even in petitions. nor is the matter to be narrowed thus: granted that, in claiming a person, his name ought to be stated and whether he is a boy or an adolescent, especially if there are several: but if I do not know his name, a demonstration of him must be used: for example, " who is from that inheritance", " who was born from that woman". likewise, one who is going to claim an estate must state its name and in what place it is.
Pomponius libro trigensimo sexto probat, si ex aequis partibus fundum mihi tecum communem tu et lucius titius possideatis, non ab utrisque quadrantes petere me debere, sed a titio, qui non sit dominus, totum semissem. aliter atque si certis regionibus possideatis eum fundum: nam tunc sine dubio et a te et a titio partes fundi petere me debere: quotiens enim certa loca possidebuntur, necessario in his aliquam partem meam esse: et ideo te quoque a titio quadrantem petere debere. quae distinctio neque in re mobili neque in hereditatis petitione locum habet: nunquam enim pro diviso possideri potest.
Pomponius in the thirty-sixth book proves that, if an estate common to me with you in equal shares is possessed by you and lucius titius, I ought not to seek quarters from both, but from titius, who is not owner, the whole half. Otherwise than if you possess that estate in fixed regions: for then, without doubt, I ought to seek parts of the estate both from you and from titius; for whenever definite places are possessed, of necessity some part of mine is in them; and therefore you too ought to seek a quarter from titius. Which distinction has no place either in a movable thing or in the petition of an inheritance: for it can never be possessed as divided.
Officium autem iudicis in hac actione in hoc erit, ut iudex inspiciat, an reus possideat: nec ad rem pertinebit, ex qua causa possideat: ubi enim probavi rem meam esse, necesse habebit possessor restituere, qui non obiecit aliquam exceptionem. quidam tamen, ut pegasus, eam solam possessionem putaverunt hanc actionem complecti, quae locum habet in interdicto uti possidetis vel utrubi. denique ait ab eo, apud quem deposita est vel commodata vel qui conduxerit aut qui legatorum servandorum causa vel dotis ventrisve nomine in possessione esset vel cui damni infecti nomine non cavebatur, quia hi omnes non possident, vindicari non posse.
But the duty of the judge in this action will be this: that the judge inspect whether the defendant is in possession; nor will it pertain to the matter for what cause he possesses. For when I have proved that the thing is mine, the possessor who has not raised some exception will be under necessity to restore. Some, however, like Pegasus, thought that this action embraces only that possession which has a place in the interdict uti possidetis or utrubi. Finally, he says that from one with whom the thing has been deposited or lent for use, or who has hired it, or who would be in possession for the sake of preserving legacies, or in the name of dowry or of the womb (ventris nomine), or to whom security was not given under the head of damnum infectum, because all these do not possess, it cannot be vindicated (claimed by vindicatio).
Si res mobilis petita sit, ubi restitui debeat, scilicet si praesens non sit? et non malum est, si bonae fidei possessor sit is cum quo agitur, aut ibi restitui ubi res sit: aut ubi agitur: sed sumptibus petitoris, qui extra cibaria in iter vel navigationem faciendi sunt.
If a movable thing has been claimed, where ought it to be restored, namely if it is not present? And it is not improper, if the one against whom suit is brought is a possessor in good faith, that it be restored either where the thing is, or where the action is brought; but at the claimant’s expenses, which—apart from provisions—are to be incurred for the journey or for a voyage.
Si vero malae fidei sit possessor, qui in alio loco eam rem nactus sit, idem statui debet: si vero ab eo loco, ubi lis contestata est, eam substractam alio transtulerit, illic restituere debet, unde subtraxit, sumptibus suis.
If indeed the possessor be of bad faith, who has gotten that thing in another place, the same ought to be established: but if from that place where the suit has been contested (issue joined) he has transferred it elsewhere after withdrawing it, he must restore it there, to the place whence he subtracted it, at his own expense.
Non solum autem rem restitui, verum et si deterior res sit facta, rationem iudex habere debebit: finge enim debilitatum hominem vel verberatum vel vulneratum restitui: utique ratio per iudicem habebitur, quanto deterior sit factus. quamquam et legis aquiliae actione conveniri possessor possit: unde quaeritur an non alias iudex aestimare damnum debeat, quam si remittatur actio legis aquiliae. et labeo putat cavere petitorem oportere lege aquilia non acturum, quae sententia vera est.
Not only must the thing be restored, but even if the thing has been made worse, the judge ought to have regard: suppose, for instance, that a man debilitated or beaten or wounded is restored; surely consideration will be had by the judge of how much worse he has been made. Although the possessor also can be sued by the action of the Lex Aquilia: whence it is asked whether the judge ought to assess the damage otherwise than if the action of the Lex Aquilia is remitted. And Labeo thinks that the claimant ought to give security that he will not proceed under the Lex Aquilia, which opinion is true.
Si servus petitus vel animal aliud demortuum sit sine dolo malo et culpa possessoris, pretium non esse praestandum plerique aiunt: sed est verius, si forte distracturus erat petitor si accepisset, moram passo debere praestari: nam si ei restituisset, distraxisset et pretium esset lucratus.
If a claimed slave or some other animal has died without dolus malus or fault of the possessor, many say that the price is not to be provided; but the truer view is that, if perhaps the claimant would have sold it had he received it, compensation for delay ought to be afforded to one who has suffered delay: for if it had been restored to him, he would have sold it and would have realized the price.
Idem iulianus eodem libro scribit, si moram fecerit in homine reddendo possessor et homo mortuus sit, et fructuum rationem usque ad rei iudicatae tempus spectandam esse. idem iulianus ait non solum fructus, sed etiam omnem causam praestandam: et ideo et partum venire in restitutionem et partuum fructus. usque adeo autem et causae veniunt, ut iulianus libro septimo scribit, si per eum servum possessor adquisierit actionem legis aquiliae, restituere cogendum.
The same Julianus in the same book writes that, if the possessor has caused delay in returning a person and the person has died, the reckoning of fruits is to be looked to up to the time of res judicata. The same Julianus says that not only the fruits, but also every cause must be provided; and therefore both the offspring comes into restitution and the fruits of the offspring. And so far do causes also come in that Julianus, in book seven, writes that, if through that slave the possessor has acquired an action under the Lex Aquilia, he must be compelled to restore it.
But if by malicious fraud the possessor himself has ceased to possess and someone has wrongfully killed the man, he will be compelled either to pay the price of the man or to make over his own causes of action, whichever of these the plaintiff wishes. But also he ought to restore the fruits which he has received from another possessor; for he ought not to make profit from that man who has begun to be in litigation. However, he need not restore the fruits of that time during which the man was possessed by him who evicted him. But what he says about the action of the Lex Aquilia applies if, after litis contestatio, the possessor has usucapted, because he begins to have full right.
Praeterea restituere debet possessor et quae post acceptum iudicium per eum non ex re sua adquisivit: in quo hereditates quoque legataque, quae per eum servum obvenerunt, continentur. nec enim sufficit corpus ipsum restitui, sed opus est, ut et causa rei restituatur, id est ut omne habeat petitor, quod habiturus foret, si eo tempore, quo iudicium accipiebatur, restitutus illi homo fuisset. itaque partus ancillae restitui debet, quamvis postea editus sit, quam matrem eius, post acceptum scilicet iudicium, possessor usuceperit: quo casu etiam de partu, sicut de matre, et traditio et cautio de dolo necessaria est.
Moreover, the possessor ought to restore also those things which, after the judgment was accepted, he acquired through him not out of his own estate: in which are included as well inheritances and legacies which accrued through that slave. For it does not suffice that the body itself be restored, but there is need that the cause of the thing also be restored, that is, that the claimant have everything which he would have had, if at the time when the action was being accepted that man had been restored to him. Therefore the offspring of a maidservant must be restored, although he was brought forth later than the time when the possessor, after the judgment, usucapted the mother: in which case also, concerning the offspring, just as concerning the mother, both delivery and a surety against fraud are necessary.
Si a bonae fidei possessore fugerit servus, requiremus, an talis fuerit, ut et custodiri debuerit. nam si integrae opinionis videbatur, ut non debuerit custodiri, absolvendus est possessor, ut tamen, si interea eum usuceperat, actionibus suis cedat petitori et fructus eius temporis quo possedit praestet. quod si nondum eum usucepit, absolvendum eum sine cautionibus, ut nihil caveat petitori de persequenda ea re: quo minus enim petitor eam rem persequi potest, quamvis interim, dum in fuga sit, usucapiat?
If a slave has fled from a good‑faith possessor, we shall inquire whether he was of such a sort that he ought also to have been guarded. For if he appeared to be of unimpaired reputation, such that he ought not to have been guarded, the possessor is to be absolved—yet on condition that, if in the meantime he had acquired him by usucapion, he cede his actions to the claimant and provide the fruits for the time during which he possessed. But if he has not yet usucapted him, he is to be absolved without cautions, so that he gives no surety to the claimant for pursuing that matter: for what is there to hinder the claimant from pursuing that thing, although in the meantime, while the slave is in flight, he may acquire by usucapion?
nor is that inequitable, as Pomponius writes in the thirty-ninth book On the Edict. But if indeed he ought to have been guarded, he must also be condemned on his account, yet on condition that, if he has not taken him by usucapion, the plaintiff cede to him his actions. Julian, however, in those cases where the possessor is absolved on account of the slave’s flight, although he is not compelled to give security about pursuing the thing, nevertheless holds that the possessor ought to give security, if he should have gotten hold of the thing, that he will restore it; and Pomponius proves this in the thirty-fourth book of Various Readings: which is truer.
Si quis rei suae alienam rem ita adiecerit, ut pars eius fieret, veluti si quis statuae suae bracchium aut pedem alienum adiecerit, aut scypho ansam vel fundum, vel candelabro sigillum, aut mensae pedem, dominum eius totius rei effici vereque statuam suam dicturum et scyphum plerique recte dicunt.
If anyone should so add another’s thing to his own thing that it becomes a part of it—for example, if someone should add to his own statue an arm or a foot belonging to another, or to a cup a handle or a bottom, or to a candelabrum a little figure, or to a table a leg—most people rightly say that he becomes the owner of the whole thing, and that he will truly call the statue and the cup his own.
Item quaecumque aliis iuncta sive adiecta accessionis loco cedunt, ea quamdiu cohaerent dominus vindicare non potest, sed ad exhibendum agere potest, ut separentur et tunc vindicentur: scilicet excepto eo, quod cassius de ferruminatione scribit. dicit enim, si statuae suae ferruminatione iunctum bracchium sit, unitate maioris partis consumi et quod semel alienum factum sit, etiamsi inde abruptum sit, redire ad priorem dominum non posse. non idem in eo quod adplumbatum sit, quia ferruminatio per eandem materiam facit confusionem, plumbatura non idem efficit.
likewise, whatever things, when joined to or added to others, yield in the place of accession, the owner cannot vindicate so long as they cohere, but he can sue for production (ad exhibendum), so that they be separated and then vindicated: namely, with the exception of what cassius writes about ferruminatio (brazing/soldering). for he says that, if an arm has been joined to his statue by ferruminatio, it is consumed by the unity of the greater part, and that what has once been made another’s, even if it is broken off from there, cannot return to the prior owner. it is not the same in the case of what has been leaded on (adplumbatum), because ferruminatio, through the same material, brings about a confusion, whereas a lead-fastening (plumbatura) does not effect the same.
and therefore in all these cases, in which neither the action to exhibit (ad exhibendum) nor the action in rem has a place, an action on the facts (in factum) is necessary. But in those bodies which are composed from discrete bodies, it is agreed that the individual parts retain their own proper form, as individual men, individual sheep: and so I can vindicate the flock, although your ram is intermingled, and you too can vindicate the ram. This would not occur in cohering bodies: for if you were to add the arm of my statue to another’s statue, it cannot be said that the arm is yours, because the whole statue is held together by a single spirit.
Tignum alienum aedibus iunctum nec vindicari potest propter legem duodecim tabularum, nec eo nomine ad exhibendum agi nisi adversus eum, qui sciens alienum iunxit aedibus: sed est actio antiqua de tigno iuncto, quae in duplum ex lege duodecim tabularum descendit.
A foreign beam joined to a building can neither be vindicated, on account of the Law of the Twelve Tables, nor may an action for exhibiting be brought under that title except against the one who knowingly joined another’s beam to the building: but there is an ancient action concerning a joined beam, which proceeds for double under the Law of the Twelve Tables.
Item si quis ex alienis cementis in solo suo aedificaverit, domum quidem vindicare poterit, cementa autem resoluta prior dominus vindicabit, etiam si post tempus usucapionis dissolutum sit aedificium, postquam a bonae fidei emptore possessum sit: nec enim singula cementa usucapiuntur, si domus per temporis spatium nostra fiat.
Likewise, if someone has built on his own soil out of another’s cements (building‑stones), he can indeed vindicate the house; but the prior owner will vindicate the cements once they are taken apart, even if the building has been dismantled after the period of usucapion, after it has been possessed by a buyer in good faith: for the individual cements are not acquired by usucapion, even if the house becomes ours through the lapse of time.
Is qui se optulit rei defensioni sine causa, cum non possideret nec dolo fecisset, quo minus possideret: si actor ignoret, non est absolvendus, ut Marcellus ait: quae sententia vera est. sed hoc post litem contestatam: ceterum ante iudicium acceptum non decipit actorem qui se negat possidere, cum vere non possideret: nec videtur se liti optulisse qui discessit.
He who has proffered himself to the defense of the defendant without cause, when he was not possessing and had not done anything by fraud to prevent his possessing: if the plaintiff (actor) is unaware, he is not to be absolved, as Marcellus says: which opinion is true. But this is after the litis contestatio: moreover, before the iudicium is accepted, he does not deceive the plaintiff who denies that he possesses, since he truly was not possessing: nor is he seen to have proffered himself to the suit, who departed.
Possidere autem aliquis debet utique et litis contestatae tempore et quo res iudicatur. quod si litis contestationis tempore possedit, cum autem res iudicatur sine dolo malo amisit possessionem, absolvendus est possessor. item si litis contestatae temporis non possedit, quo autem iudicatur possidet, probanda est proculi sententia, ut omnimodo condemnetur: ergo et fructuum nomine ex quo coepit possidere damnabitur.
However, someone ought to be in possession both at the time of the litis contestatio and at the time when the matter is adjudicated. But if he possessed at the time of the litis contestatio, and when the matter is adjudicated he has lost possession without malice (dolus malus), the possessor must be absolved. Likewise, if he did not possess at the time of the litis contestatio, but does possess when judgment is given, Proculus’s opinion is to be approved, that he be condemned in every way: therefore he will also be condemned under the head of fruits from the time he began to possess.
Si homo petitus dolo possessoris deterior factus sit, deinde sine culpa eius ex alia causa mortuus sit, aestimatio non fiet eius, quod deteriorem eum fecerat, quia nihil interest petitoris: sed haec quantum ad in rem actionem: legis autem aquiliae actio durat.
If a man sued for has been made worse by the possessor’s fraud, and then, without his fault, has died from another cause, an estimation will not be made of that by which he had made him worse, because it is of no concern to the claimant: but this so far as concerns the in rem action: however, the action of the Lex Aquilia endures.
Sed et is, qui ante litem contestatam dolo desiit rem possidere, tenetur in rem actione: idque ex senatus consulto colligi potest, quo cautum est, ut diximus, ut dolus praeteritus in hereditatis petitionem veniat: cum enim in hereditatis petitione, quae et ipsa in rem est, dolus praeteritus fertur, non est absurdum per consequentias et in speciali in rem actione dolum praeteritum deduci.
But also he who, before issue was joined, ceased through fraud to possess the thing, is liable in an action in rem; and this can be gathered from the senatorial decree, in which it is provided, as we have said, that past fraud comes into the petition for an inheritance: for since in the petition for an inheritance, which itself is in rem, past fraud is admitted, it is not absurd, by consequence, that in the special action in rem as well past fraud be deduced.
In rem petitam si possessor ante litem contestatam sumptus fecit, per doli mali exceptionem ratio eorum haberi debet, si perseveret actor petere rem suam non redditis sumptibus. idem est etiam, si noxali iudicio servum defendit et damnatus praestitit pecuniam, aut in area quae fuit petitoris per errorem insulam aedificavit: nisi tamen paratus sit petitor pati tollere eum aedificium. quod et in area uxori donata per iudicem, qui de dote cognoscit, faciendum dixerunt. sed si puerum meum, cum possideres, erudisses, non idem observandum proculus existimat, quia neque carere servo meo debeam nec potest remedium idem adhiberi, quod in area diximus:
If, in respect of a thing claimed in rem, the possessor made expenditures before the suit was contested, an account of them ought to be had through the exception of bad fraud (dolus malus), if the claimant persists in seeking his property without the expenses being repaid. The same holds also if, in a noxal action, he defended a slave and, being condemned, paid the money, or if on a building-plot which belonged to the petitioner he built an insula by mistake: unless, however, the petitioner is prepared to allow him to remove that building. And they said that the same is to be done also in the case of a plot donated to a wife, by the judge who has cognizance concerning the dowry. But if, while you possessed him, you educated my boy (slave), Proculus thinks the same is not to be observed, because I ought neither to be deprived of my slave, nor can the same remedy be applied as we spoke of in the case of the plot.
Ceterum cum de fructibus servi petiti quaeritur, non tantum pubertas eius spectanda est, quia etiam impuberis aliquae operae esse possunt. improbe tamen desiderabit petitor fructus aestimari, qui ex artificio eius percipi potuerunt, quod artificium sumptibus possessoris didicit.
Moreover, when inquiry is made about the fruits of a slave being claimed, not only his puberty is to be considered, because even one not yet pubescent can render some services. Nevertheless, the claimant will improperly desire that there be an appraisal of those fruits which could have been taken from his art/craft, which art/craft he learned at the possessor’s expense.
Fructus non modo percepti, sed et qui percipi honeste potuerunt aestimandi sunt: et ideo si dolo aut culpa possessoris res petita perierit, veriorem putat pomponius trebatii opinionem putantis eo usque fructuum rationem habendam, quo usque haberetur, si non perisset, id est ad rei iudicandae tempus: quod et iuliano placet. hac ratione si nudae proprietatis dominus petierit et inter moras usus fructus amissus sit, ex eo tempore, quo ad proprietatem usus fructus reversus est, ratio fructuum habetur.
The fruits are to be valued not only if they have been actually taken, but also if they could have been lawfully taken: and therefore, if through the deceit or fault of the possessor the sued-for thing has perished, Pomponius judges truer the opinion of Trebatius, who thinks that account of the fruits is to be had up to the point up to which it would be had if it had not perished, that is, up to the time of adjudicating the matter: which also pleases Julian. On this reasoning, if the owner of the bare ownership has sued and, amid the delays, the usufruct has been lost, from that time at which the usufruct has reverted to the ownership, account of the fruits is had.
Ubi autem alienum fundum petii et iudex sententia declaravit meum esse, debet etiam de fructibus possessorem condemnare: eodem enim errore et de fructibus condemnaturum: non debere enim lucro possessoris cedere fructus, cum victus sit: alioquin, ut mauricianus ait, nec rem arbitrabitur iudex mihi restitui, et quare habeat quod non esset habiturus possessor, si statim possessionem restituisset?
When, however, I sued for another’s estate and the judge by his sentence declared it to be mine, he ought also to condemn the possessor for the fruits; for by the same error he is to be condemned also with respect to the fruits: for the fruits ought not to pass to the possessor’s profit, since he has been defeated; otherwise, as Mauricianus says, the judge will not even deem the thing to have been restored to me; and why should the possessor have what he would not have had, if he had restored possession at once?
Qui in rem convenitur, etiam culpae nomine condemnatur. culpae autem reus est possessor, qui per insidiosa loca servum misit, si is periit, et qui servum a se petitum in harena esse concessit, et is mortuus sit: sed et qui fugitivum a se petitum non custodit, si is fugit, et qui navem a se petitam adverso tempore navigatum misit, si ea naufragio perempta est.
He who is sued in rem is also condemned under the head of fault. And the possessor is defendant for fault who sent a slave through treacherous places, if he perished, and who allowed a slave, claimed from him, to be in the arena, and he died; and likewise he who does not guard a fugitive, claimed from him, if he escapes, and he who sent a ship, claimed from him, to sail in an adverse season, if it was destroyed by shipwreck.
Iulianus libro octavo digestorum scribit: si in aliena area aedificassem, cuius bonae fidei quidem emptor fui, verum eo tempore aedificavi, quo iam sciebam alienam, videamus, an nihil mihi exceptio prosit: nisi forte quis dicat prodesse de damno sollicito. puto autem huic exceptionem non prodesse: nec enim debuit iam alienam certus aedificium ponere: sed hoc ei concedendum est, ut sine dispendio domini areae tollat aedificium quod posuit.
Julian, in the eighth book of the Digest, writes: if I had built on another’s plot, of which I was indeed a purchaser in good faith, but I built at a time when I already knew it was another’s, let us see whether the exceptio profits me nothing; unless perhaps someone might say that the exceptio “de damno sollicito” avails. I think, however, that this exceptio does not avail him; for he ought not, being already certain it was another’s, to set a building. But this should be conceded to him: that, without detriment to the owner of the plot, he remove the building which he set up.
In fundo alieno, quem imprudens emeras, aedificasti aut conseruisti, deinde evincitur: bonus iudex varie ex personis causisque constituet. finge et dominum eadem facturum fuisse: reddat impensam, ut fundum recipiat, usque eo dumtaxat, quo pretiosior factus est, et si plus pretio fundi accessit, solum quod impensum est. finge pauperem, qui, si reddere id cogatur, laribus sepulchris avitis carendum habeat: sufficit tibi permitti tollere ex his rebus quae possis, dum ita ne deterior sit fundus, quam si initio non foret aedificatum.
On another’s estate, which you unwittingly had purchased, you built or planted, and then it is evicted: a good judge will determine variously according to the persons and the causes. Suppose even the owner would have done the same: let him return the expense, so that he may take back the estate, only up to the point by which it has been made more valuable; and if more has been added than the estate’s price, only what was expended. Suppose a poor man, who, if he were compelled to pay that back, would have to be without his household hearths and ancestral sepulchers: it is enough for you to be permitted to remove from these things what you can, provided that the estate is not worse than if it had not been built upon in the beginning.
we do, however, establish this: if the owner is prepared to give as much as the possessor will have with these things removed, let authority be granted to him; nor should malices be indulged, if, suppose, you wish to scrape off the plaster you laid on and the paintings, bringing nothing except to obstruct. suppose the owner is of the sort who, once he has recovered the estate, is soon going to sell it: unless he gives back as much as we said in the first part ought to be given back, with that deducted you are to be condemned.
Si quis hac lege emerit, ut, si alius meliorem condicionem attulerit, recedatur ab emptione, post allatam condicionem iam non potest in rem actione uti. sed et si cui in diem addictus sit fundus, antequam adiectio sit facta, uti in rem actione potest: postea non poterit.
If someone has bought on this term, that, if another should bring a better condition, there be a withdrawal from the purchase, after the condition has been brought he can no longer employ the in rem action. But also, if an estate has been knocked down to someone in diem, before an adiectio has been made, he can use the in rem action; afterwards he will not be able.
Si servus mihi vel filius familias fundum vendidit et tradidit habens liberam peculii administrationem, in rem actione uti potero. sed et si domini voluntate domini rem tradat, idem erit dicendum: quemadmodum cum procurator voluntate domini vendidit vel tradidit, in rem actionem mihi praestabit.
If a slave of mine or a son of the family sold and delivered a farm, having free administration of his peculium, I will be able to employ an action in rem. But also if, with the master’s will, he should deliver the master’s thing, the same must be said: just as, when a procurator, with the master’s will, sold or delivered, he will afford me an action in rem.
Quae religiosis adhaerent, religiosa sunt et idcirco nec lapides inaedificati postquam remoti sunt vindicari possunt: in factum autem actione petitori extra ordinem subvenitur, ut is, qui hoc fecit, restituere eos compellatur. sed si alieni sine voluntate domini inaedificati fuerint et nondum functo monumento in hoc detracti erunt, ut alibi reponerentur, poterunt a domino vindicari. quod si in hoc detracti erunt, ut reponerentur, similiter dominum eos repetere posse constat.
Things which adhere to religious things are themselves religious, and therefore not even stones built into a structure, after they have been removed, can be vindicated; however, by an action in factum, the petitioner is given relief extra ordinem, so that the one who did this is compelled to restitute them. But if another’s property, without the will of the owner, has been built in, and—with the monument not yet having performed its function—they have been taken down for this purpose, that they might be put elsewhere, they can be vindicated by the owner. And if they have been taken down for this purpose, that they be replaced, likewise it is established that the owner can reclaim them.
Haec si res praesens sit: si absens, tunc cum possessionem eius possessor nactus sit ex voluntate actoris: et ideo non est alienum non aliter litem aestimari a iudice, quam si caverit actor, quod per se non fiat possessionem eius rei non traditum iri.
This, if the thing be present: if absent, then when the possessor obtained its possession by the will of the actor (plaintiff): and therefore it is not alien for the lawsuit to be estimated by the judge otherwise than if the actor has given caution that it shall not come about through himself that the possession of that thing will not be delivered.
Sumptus in praedium, quod alienum esse apparuit, a bona fide possessore facti neque ab eo qui praedium donavit neque a domino peti possunt, verum exceptione doli posita per officium iudicis aequitatis ratione servantur, scilicet si fructuum ante litem contestatam perceptorum summam excedant: etenim admissa compensatione superfluum sumptum meliore praedio facto dominus restituere cogitur.
Expenses laid out upon an estate which turned out to be another’s, having been made by a good‑faith possessor, cannot be sought from either the one who donated the estate or from the owner; but, an exception of fraud (exceptio doli) being set up, they are safeguarded through the judge’s office by a rationale of equity—namely, if they exceed the sum of the fruits gathered before joinder of issue: for, set‑off being admitted, the owner is compelled to restore the excess of the outlay, the estate having been made better.
Cum autem fundi possessor ante litem contestatam dolo malo fundum possidere desiit, heredes eius in rem quidem actionem suscipere cogendi non sunt, sed in factum actio adversus eos reddi debebit, per quam restituere cogantur, quanto locupletes ex ea re facti fuerunt.
When, however, the possessor of the estate, before the suit was joined, ceased through malicious fraud to possess the estate, his heirs are not to be compelled to undertake an action in rem; but an action in factum ought to be given against them, by which they are compelled to restore, to the extent that they were made wealthy (enriched) from that matter.
Is a quo fundus petitus erat ab alio eiusdem fundi nomine conventus est: quaerebatur, si alterutri eorum iussu iudicis fundum restituisset et postea secundum alterum petitorem res iudicaretur, quemadmodum non duplex damnum traheret. respondi, uter prior iudex iudicaret, eum oportere ita fundum petitori restitui iubere, ut possessori caveret vel satisdaret, si alter fundum evicisset, eum praestare.
He, from whom the farm had been claimed, was sued by another in respect of the same farm: the question was raised, if by order of the judge he had restored the farm to either of them and afterwards the matter were adjudged in favor of the other petitioner, how he would not incur a double loss. I answered: whichever judge should decide first ought to order the farm to be restored to the petitioner on terms that the petitioner give security or furnish surety to the possessor, that, if the other should evict the farm, he would make it good.
A quo servus petebatur et eiusdem servi nomine cum eo furti agebatur, quaerebat, si utroque iudicio condemnatus esset, quid se facere oporteret. si prius servus ab eo evictus esset, respondit, non oportere iudicem cogere, ut eum traderet, nisi ei satisdatum esset, quod pro eo homine iudicium accepisset, si quid ob eam rem datum esset, id recte praestari. sed si prius de furto iudicium factum esset et hominem noxae dedisset, deinde de ipso homine secundum petitorem iudicium factum esset, non debere ob eam rem iudicem, quod hominem non traderet, litem aestimare, quoniam nihil eius culpa neque dolo contigisset, quo minus hominem traderet.
From whom a slave was being claimed, and on account of that same slave a theft action was being prosecuted against him, he asked what he ought to do if he had been condemned in both proceedings. If the slave had first been evicted from him, he replied that the judge ought not to compel him to hand him over, unless security were furnished to him for the fact that he had accepted the proceeding on behalf of that man; and if anything had been given on that account, that it should rightly be made good. But if judgment had first been given in the theft case and he had surrendered the man by noxal surrender, and then judgment concerning the man himself had been given for the petitioner, the judge ought not on that account to assess damages because he did not hand the man over, since nothing had occurred by his fault or fraud to prevent his handing the man over.
Habitator in aliena aedificia fenestras et ostia imposuit, eadem post annum dominus aedificiorum dempsit: quaero, is qui imposuerat possetne ea vindicare. respondit posse: nam quae alienis aedificiis conexa essent, ea quamdiu iuncta manerent, eorundem aedificiorum esse, simul atque inde dempta essent, continuo in pristinam causam reverti.
An inhabitant set windows and doors into another’s buildings; after a year the owner of the buildings removed the same. I ask whether he who had installed them could vindicate them. He answered that he could: for things that were connected to another’s edifices, so long as they remained joined, belonged to those same buildings; as soon as they were removed from there, they immediately revert to their former condition.
Minicius interrogatus, si quis navem suam aliena materia refecisset, num nihilo minus eiusdem navis maneret, respondit manere. sed si in aedificanda ea idem fecisset, non posse iulianus notat: nam proprietas totius navis carinae causam sequitur.
Minicius, when asked whether, if someone had repaired his ship with another’s materials, it would nonetheless remain the same ship, answered that it does remain. But if, in building it, he had done the same, Julian notes that it cannot be so: for the ownership of the whole ship follows the cause of the keel.
Si navis a malae fidei possessore petatur, et fructus aestimandi sunt, ut in taberna et area quae locari solent. quod non est ei contrarium, quod de pecunia deposita, quam heres non attingit, usuras praestare non cogitur: nam etsi maxime vectura sicut usura non natura pervenit, sed iure percipitur, tamen ideo vectura desiderari potest, quoniam periculum navis possessor petitori praestare non debet, cum pecunia periculo dantis faeneretur.
If a ship is claimed from a possessor in bad faith, the fruits must also be assessed, as in the case of a shop and a yard that are wont to be leased. This is not contrary to the rule that, concerning deposited money which the heir does not touch, he is not compelled to provide interest: for although freight, like interest, does not accrue by nature but is received by law, nevertheless freight can for that reason be demanded, since the possessor ought not to bear the risk of the ship toward the claimant, whereas money, being let out at interest, is at the risk of the giver.
Generaliter autem cum de fructibus aestimandis quaeritur, constat animadverti debere, non an malae fidei possessor fruitus sit, sed an petitor frui potuerit, si ei possidere licuisset. quam sententiam iulianus quoque probat.
Generally, however, when inquiry is made about assessing the fruits, it is settled that regard must be had, not to whether the possessor in bad faith has enjoyed the fruits, but whether the petitioner could have enjoyed them, if it had been permitted him to possess. Which opinion Julianus also approves.
Si culpa, non fraude quis possessionem amiserit, quoniam pati debet aestimationem, audiendus erit a iudice, si desideret, ut adversarius actione sua cedat: cum tamen praetor auxilium quandoque laturus sit quolibet alio possidente, nulla captione adficietur. ipso quoque, qui litis aestimationem perceperit, possidente debet adiuvari: nec facile audiendus erit ille, si velit postea pecuniam, quam ex sententia iudicis periculo iudicati recepit, restituere.
If someone has lost possession through fault, not through fraud, since he ought to undergo a valuation, he shall be heard by the judge, if he so desires, that the adversary cede his action; since, however, the praetor is at times going to bring aid whoever else is in possession, he will be subjected to no procedural trap. also when that very person who has received the valuation of the suit is himself the possessor, he ought to be assisted; nor shall that man be readily heard, if he should wish thereafter to restore the money which, by the judge’s sentence, he received under the peril of the iudicatum.
Emptor praedium, quod a non domino emit, exceptione doli posita non aliter restituere domino cogetur, quam si pecuniam creditori eius solutam, qui pignori datum praedium habuit, usurarumque medii temporis superfluum reciperaverit, scilicet si minus in fructibus ante litem perceptis fuit: nam eos usuris novis dumtaxat compensari sumptuum in praedium factorum exemplo aequum est.
The purchaser of an estate, which he bought from a non‑owner, when the exception of fraud is interposed, will not otherwise be compelled to restore it to the owner than if he has recovered the money paid to that man’s creditor who held the estate given in pledge, and the surplus of the interest for the intermediate time, namely if there was a deficiency in the fruits gathered before the suit: for it is equitable that these be compensated by new interest only, on the model of expenses incurred upon the estate.
Ancillam, quae non in dotem data, sed in peculium filiae concessa est, peculio filiae non legato mancipium hereditarium esse convenit. si tamen pater dotis ac peculii contemplatione filiam exheredavit et ea ratione reddita nihil ei testamento reliquit aut eo minus legavit, filiam defensio tuebitur voluntatis.
It is agreed that a maidservant who was not given into the dowry, but was granted into the daughter’s peculium, if the daughter’s peculium has not been bequeathed, is an estate asset (mancipium hereditarium). If, however, the father, in contemplation of the dowry and the peculium, disinherited his daughter and, that reason having been stated, left her nothing in the testament or on that account bequeathed her less, the defense of intention will protect the daughter.
Qui restituere iussus iudici non paret contendens non posse restituere, si quidem habeat rem, manu militari officio iudicis ab eo possessio transfertur et fructuum dumtaxat omnisque causae nomine condemnatio fit. si vero non potest restituere, si quidem dolo fecit quo minus possit, is, quantum adversarius in litem sine ulla taxatione in infinitum iuraverit, damnandus est. si vero nec potest restituere nec dolo fecit quo minus possit, non pluris quam quanti res est, id est quanti adversarii interfuit, condemnandus est.
One who, having been ordered to restore, does not obey the judge, asserting that he cannot restore—if indeed he has the thing, possession is transferred from him by military force by the judge’s office, and a condemnation is entered for the fruits at least and under every head of the cause. if, however, he cannot restore, then, if he acted with dolus so that he cannot, he is to be condemned in such amount as the adversary shall have sworn to in an oath in litem, without any taxation (assessment), to an unlimited extent. but if he neither can restore nor acted with dolus to prevent his being able, he is to be condemned in no more than the value of the thing, that is, the amount of the adversary’s interest.
Si a titio fundum emeris sempronii et tibi traditus sit pretio soluto, deinde titius sempronio heres extiterit et eundem alii vendiderit et tradiderit, aequius est, ut tu potior sis. nam et si ipse venditor eam rem a te peteret, exceptione eum summoveres. sed et si ipse possideret et tu peteres, adversus exceptionem dominii replicatione utereris.
If you should buy from titius the estate of sempronius and it be delivered to you with the price paid, then titius should afterwards become heir to sempronius and sell and deliver the same to another, it is more equitable that you be the stronger in right. For even if the seller himself were to seek that thing from you, you would remove him by an exception. But also if he himself were in possession and you were to seek it, against the exception of ownership you would employ a replication.
Incertae partis vindicatio datur, si iusta causa interveniat. iusta autem causa esse potest, si forte legi falcidiae locus sit in testamento, propter incertam detractionem ex legatis, quae vix apud iudicem examinatur: iustam enim habet ignorantiam legatarius, cui homo legatus est, quotam partem vindicare debeat: itaque talis dabitur actio. eadem et de ceteris rebus intellegemus.
Vindication of an uncertain share is given, if a just cause intervenes. a just cause, moreover, can exist, if perchance there is room for the Lex Falcidia in the testament, on account of the uncertain deduction from the legacies, which is scarcely examined before the judge: for the legatee to whom a slave is bequeathed has a just ignorance as to what portion he ought to vindicate: and so such an action will be granted. we will understand the same also concerning the other things.
Quaedam mulier fundum non marito donavit per epistulam et eundem fundum ab eo conduxit: posse defendi in rem ei competere, quasi per ipsam adquisierit possessionem veluti per colonam. proponebatur, quod etiam in eo agro qui donabatur fuisset, cum epistula emitteretur: quae res sufficiebat ad traditam possessionem, licet conductio non intervenisset.
A certain woman donated a farm by letter to someone not her husband and leased the same farm from him: it can be maintained that an action in rem belongs to him, as if he had acquired possession through her, as through a colonus (tenant-farmer). It was put forward that she had even been on that field which was being donated when the letter was sent out: which circumstance sufficed for possession to have been delivered, although no lease had intervened.
we ought to take the perception of fruits not only when they are perfect and collected, but also that, once commenced, they are perceived at the point when the fruits have ceased to be contained by the land: for example, if olives or grapes have been picked, yet wine or oil has not yet been made by anyone: for immediately he himself is to be deemed to have received the fruit.
Si hominem a me petieris et is post litem contestatam mortuus sit, fructus quoad is vixerit aestimari oportet. paulus. ita id verum esse puto, si non prius is homo in eam valetudinem inciderit, propter quam operae eius inutiles factae sunt: nam ne si vixisset quidem in ea valetudine, fructus eius temporis nomine aestimari conveniret.
If you should demand a man from me and he die after joinder of issue, the fruits ought to be assessed for as long as he lived. paulus. Thus I think that to be true, if the man had not previously fallen into such a state of health on account of which his services were rendered useless: for not even if he had lived in that state of health would it be fitting for the fruits to be assessed for that period.
In rem actionem pati non compellimur, quia licet alicui dicere se non possidere, ita ut, si possit adversarius convincere rem ab adversario possideri, transferat ad se possessionem per iudicem, licet suam esse non adprobaverit.
We are not compelled to undergo an action in rem, because although it is permitted for someone to say that he does not possess, such that, if the adversary can establish that the thing is possessed by the opponent, he may have the possession transferred to himself through the judge, although he has not proved it to be his own.
Ait praetor: " ex iusta causa petet. " qui igitur iustam causam traditionis habet, utitur publiciana: et non solum emptori bonae fidei competit publiciana, sed et aliis, ut puta ei cui dotis nomine tradita res est necdum usucapta: est enim iustissima causa, sive aestimata res in dotem data sit sive non. item si res ex causa iudicati sit tradita.
The praetor says: " he will sue on a just cause. " therefore he who has a just cause of delivery makes use of the Publician action: and not only does the Publician action belong to a buyer in good faith, but also to others, for instance to one to whom a thing has been delivered in the name of a dowry and not yet acquired by usucapion: for it is a most just cause, whether the thing given into dowry was appraised or not. Likewise if a thing has been delivered on the ground of a judgment.
Si petenti mihi rem iusiurandum detuleris egoque iuravero rem meam esse, competit publiciana mihi, sed adversus te dumtaxat: ei enim soli nocere debet iusiurandum, qui detulit. sed si possessori delatum erit iusiurandum et iuraverit rem petitoris non esse, adversus eum solum petentem exceptione utetur, non ut et habeat actionem.
If, when I am demanding the thing, you have tendered an oath to me and I have sworn that the thing is mine, the Publician action is available to me, but only against you; for the oath ought to harm him alone who tendered it. But if the oath has been tendered to the possessor and he has sworn that the thing does not belong to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will use an exception only against him, not so that he also has an action.
Ut igitur publiciana competat, haec debent concurrere, ut et bona fide quis emerit et ei res empta eo nomine sit tradita: ceterum ante traditionem, quamvis bonae fidei quis emptor sit, experiri publiciana non poterit.
Accordingly, for the Publician action to be available, the following must concur: that someone has bought in good faith, and that the thing bought has been delivered to him under that title; however, before delivery, although someone be a buyer in good faith, he cannot proceed by the Publician action.
Iulianus libro septimo digestorum scripsit traditionem rei emptae oportere bona fide fieri: ideoque si sciens alienam possessionem adprehendit, publiciana eum experiri non posse, quia usucapere non poterit. nec quisquam putet hoc nos existimare sufficere initio traditionis ignorasse rem alienam, uti quis possit publiciana experiri, sed oportere et tunc bona fide emptorem esse.
Julian, in the seventh book of the Digesta, wrote that the delivery (traditio) of a purchased thing ought to be made in good faith: and therefore, if someone, knowing it to belong to another, takes possession, he cannot proceed by the Publician action, because he will not be able to acquire by usucapion. Nor should anyone think that we consider it sufficient that, at the inception of the delivery, he was unaware that the thing was another’s, so that he might avail himself of the Publician action; rather, it is required that even then he be a buyer in good faith.
Si duobus quis separatim vendiderit bona fide ementibus, videamus, quis magis publiciana uti possit, utrum is cui priori res tradita est an is qui tantum emit. et iulianus libro septimo digestorum scripsit, ut, si quidem ab eodem non domino emerint, potior sit cui priori res tradita est, quod si a diversis non dominis, melior causa sit possidentis quam petentis. quae sententia vera est.
If someone has sold separately to two purchasers buying in good faith, let us see who can more avail himself of the Publician action, whether he to whom the thing was delivered earlier, or he who only bought. And Julian, in the seventh book of the Digest, wrote that, if indeed they bought from the same non-owner, the stronger is he to whom the thing was delivered earlier; but if from different non-owners, the condition of the possessor is better than that of the claimant. Which opinion is true.
Si servus hereditarius ante aditam hereditatem aliquam rem emerit et traditam sibi possessionem amiserit, recte heres publiciana utitur, quasi ipse possedisset. municipes quoque, quorum servo res tradita est, in eadem erunt condicione,
If a hereditary slave, before the inheritance has been entered upon, has bought some thing and has lost the possession delivered to him, the heir rightly employs the Publician (action), as if he himself had possessed. municipes also, to whose slave the thing was delivered, will be in the same condition,
Si de usu fructu agatur tradito, publiciana datur: itemque servitutibus urbanorum praediorum per traditionem constitutis vel per patientiam ( forte si per domum quis suam passus est aquae ductum transduci): item rusticorum, nam et hic traditionem et patientiam tuendam constat.
If the case concerns a usufruct established by traditio (delivery), the Publician action is granted; likewise for servitudes of urban estates constituted through traditio or through sufferance (for instance, if someone allowed a water‑duct to be led through his own house); likewise for rural [servitudes], for here too it is agreed that traditio and sufferance are to be upheld.
Interdum tamen, licet furtiva mater distracta non sit, sed donata ignoranti mihi et apud me conceperit et pepererit, competit mihi in partu publiciana, ut iulianus ait, si modo eo tempore, quo experiar, furtivam matrem ignorem.
Sometimes, however, although the stolen mother has not been sold, but has been given to me while I was unaware, and in my household she conceived and bore, the Publician action lies for me in respect of the offspring, as Julian says, provided only that at the time when I bring suit I am ignorant that the mother is stolen.
Quod tamen per alluvionem fundo accessit, simile fit ei cui accedit: et ideo si ipse fundus publiciana peti non potest, non hoc petetur, si autem potest, et ad partem, quae per alluvionem accessit: et ita pomponius scribit.
What, however, has acceded to the estate through alluvion becomes like that to which it accedes; and therefore, if the estate itself cannot be claimed by the Publician action, this will not be claimed; but if it can, then also for the part which has acceded through alluvion: and so pomponius writes.
Cum sponsus sponsae servum donasset eumque in dotem accepisset ante usucapionem, rescriptum est a divo pio divortio facto restituendum esse servum: nam valuisse donationem inter sponsum et sponsam. dabitur ergo et possidenti exceptio et amissa possessione publiciana, sive extraneus sive donator possideat.
When the bridegroom had donated a slave to the bride and she had accepted him into the dowry before usucapion, it was rescripted by the deified Pius that, a divorce having been effected, the slave must be restored: for the donation between bridegroom and bride was valid. Therefore there will be given both to the possessor a defense (exceptio) and, if possession has been lost, the Publician action, whether a stranger or the donor is in possession.
Interdum quibusdam nec ex iustis possessionibus competit publicianum iudicium: namque pigneraticiae et precariae possessiones iustae sunt, sed ex his non solet competere tale iudicium, illa scilicet ratione, quia neque creditor neque is qui precario rogavit eo animo nanciscitur possessionem, ut credat se dominum esse.
Sometimes for certain persons the Publician action does not lie even from lawful possessions: for pignoratitious and precarial possessions are lawful, but from these such an action is not usually competent, for this reason, namely, that neither the creditor nor the one who requested by precarium acquires possession with that animus, to wit, that he believes himself to be owner.
Papinianus libro sexto quaestionum scribit: si quis prohibuit vel denuntiavit ex causa venditionis tradi rem, quae ipsius voluntate a procuratore fuerat distracta, et is nihilo minus tradiderit, emptorem tuebitur praetor, sive possideat sive petat rem. sed quod iudicio empti procurator emptori praestiterit, contrario iudicio mandati consequetur: potest enim fieri, ut emptori res auferatur ab eo, qui venire mandavit, quia per ignorantiam non est usus exceptione, quam debuit opponere, veluti: " si non auctor meus ex voluntate tua vendidit. "
Papinian, in the sixth book of Questions, writes: if someone has prohibited or has given notice, on account of the sale, that a thing be delivered which, by his own will, had been sold by a procurator, and he nonetheless has delivered it, the praetor will protect the buyer, whether he possesses or seeks the thing. But whatever, in the action of purchase (iudicium empti), the procurator has provided to the buyer, he will recover by the contrary action of mandate; for it can happen that the thing is taken from the buyer by him who ordered it to be sold, because through ignorance he did not make use of the exception which he ought to have opposed, for example: " if my vendor did not sell by your will. "
Publiciana actio non ideo comparata est, ut res domino auferatur: eiusque rei argumentum est primo aequitas, deinde exceptio " si ea res possessoris non sit": sed ut is, qui bona fide emit possessionemque eius ex ea causa nactus est, potius rem habeat.
The Publician action was not therefore devised so that the thing be taken from the owner: and an argument of this is, first, equity, then the exception "if that thing be not the possessor’s": but rather, that he who bought in good faith and on that ground obtained its possession should have the thing.
Agri civitatium alii vectigales vocantur, alii non. vectigales vocantur qui in perpetuum locantur, id est hac lege, ut tamdiu pro his vectigal pendatur, quamdiu neque ipsis, qui conduxerint, neque his, qui in locum eorum successerunt, auferri eos liceat: non vectigales sunt, qui ita colendi dantur, ut privatim agros nostros colendos dare solemus.
Some lands of the cities are called vectigalian, others not. They are called vectigalian which are leased in perpetuity, that is, on this term: that a vectigal be paid for them for so long as it is not permitted that they be taken away either from those who have leased them or from those who have succeeded into their place; not vectigalian are those which are given to be cultivated in the way we are accustomed to give our private fields to be cultivated.