Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 29.4.0. Si quis omissa causa testamenti ab intestato vel alio modo possideat hereditatem.
29.3.0. How testaments are opened, inspected, and described.
Dig. 29.4.0. If anyone, the cause of the testament being omitted, possesses the inheritance from intestacy or in some other way.
Dig. 29.7.0. De iure codicillorum.
29.6.0. If anyone has forbidden someone to make a testament or has coerced him.
Dig. 29.7.0. On the law of codicils.
Militibus liberam testamenti factionem primus quidem divus iulius caesar concessit: sed ea concessio temporalis erat. postea vero primus divus titus dedit: post hoc domitianus: postea divus nerva plenissimam indulgentiam in milites contulit: eamque traianus secutus est et exinde mandatis inseri coepit caput tale. caput ex mandatis: " cum in notitiam meam prolatum sit subinde testamenta a commilitonibus relicta proferri, quae possint in controversiam deduci, si ad diligentiam legum revocentur et observantiam: secutus animi mei integritudinem erga optimos fidelissimosque commilitones simplicitati eorum consulendum existimavi, ut quoquomodo testati fuissent, rata esset eorum voluntas.
to soldiers the free capacity for making a will was first indeed granted by the deified julius caesar: but that concession was temporary. afterwards in truth the deified titus was the first to grant it: after this domitian: afterwards the deified nerva conferred a most full indulgence upon the soldiers: and trajan followed it, and thereafter a clause of this sort began to be inserted in the mandates. a clause from the mandates: " since it has been brought to my knowledge that from time to time wills left by fellow-soldiers are produced, which could be drawn into controversy, if they were referred back to the diligence and observance of the laws: following the integrity of my mind toward my best and most most faithful fellow-soldiers, I have considered that their simplicity should be consulted, so that in whatever way they may have made a will, their will should be ratified.
Miles autem appellatur vel a militia, id est duritia, quam pro nobis sustinent, aut a multitudine, aut a malo, quod arcere milites solent, aut a numero mille hominum, ductum a graeco verbo, tractum a tagmate: nam graeci mille hominum multitudinem tagma appellant, quasi millensimum quemque dictum: unde ipsum ducem xiliarxon appellant. exercitus autem nomen ab exercitatione traxit.
Soldier (miles), however, is so called either from militia, that is, durity, which they endure for us; or from multitude; or from evil (malum), which soldiers are wont to ward off; or from the number of a thousand men, derived from a Greek word, taken from tagma: for the Greeks call a multitude of a thousand men tagma, as though each “thousandth” were said; whence they call the leader himself xiliarxon. The name army (exercitus), moreover, has been drawn from exercise (exercitatio).
for the one who wished to make a will by the common law did not thereby at once renounce the military benefice; nor is anyone to be believed to choose a mode of testation in order to impugn his own dispositions, but rather to have wished to use both kinds on account of fortuitous contingencies: just as most civilians are accustomed, when they make a will by written instrument, to add that they wish this also to be valid in the stead of codicils. nor would anyone say that, if the testament be imperfect, there are no codicils; for even the deified Marcus rescripted in accordance with our opinion.
Ex militari delicto capite damnatis testamentum facere licet super bonis dumtaxat castrensibus: sed utrum iure militari an iure communi, quaeritur. magis autem est, ut iure militari eis testandum sit: nam cum ei quasi militi tribuatur ius testandi, consequens erit dicere iure militari ei testandum. quod ita intellegi oportet, si non sacramenti fides rupta sit.
To those condemned on a capital charge from a military delict, it is permitted to make a testament concerning their castrensian goods only; but the question is whether by military law or by common law. The more correct view is that they should make their testament by military law: for since the ius testandi is granted to him as if he were a soldier, it will be consequent to say that he must testament by military law. This must be understood thus, provided that the faith of the (military) oath has not been broken.
Et deportati et fere omnes, qui testamenti factionem non habent, a milite heredes institui possunt. sed si servum poenae heredem scribat, institutio non valebit: sed si mortis tempore in civitate inveniatur, institutio incipit convalescere quasi nunc data hereditate. et generaliter in omnibus id poterit dici quos miles scribit heredes, ut institutio incipiat vires habere, si mortis tempore talis inveniatur, ut a milite institui potuerit.
And the deported and almost all who do not have testamentary capacity can be instituted by a soldier as heirs. But if he writes a penal slave as heir, the institution will not be valid; yet if at the time of death he is found to be in the status of a citizen, the institution begins to convalesce, as if the inheritance were now given. And generally, in all cases concerning those whom a soldier writes as heirs, this can be said: that the institution begins to have force, if at the time of death he is found to be such that he could have been instituted by a soldier.
Cum miles in testamento suo servo libertatem dederit eidemque et a primo et a secundo herede per fideicommissum hereditatem reliquerit, quamvis et primus heres et substitutus, priusquam adierint hereditatem, mortem obierunt, non debere intestati exitum facere imperator noster cum divo severo rescripsit: sed perinde habendum est, ac si eidem servo libertas simul et hereditas directo data esset, quae utraque ad eum pervenire testatorem voluisse negari non potest.
When a soldier in his testament gave liberty to his slave and to that same man left the inheritance by fideicommissum both from the first heir and from the second (substitute) heir, although both the first heir and the substitute, before they had entered upon the inheritance, died, our emperor, together with the deified Severus, wrote in a rescript that there ought not to be an outcome of intestacy: rather, it must be held just as if liberty and the inheritance had been given directly to that same slave at the same time—both of which it cannot be denied that the testator wished to come to him.
Tractabatur, an tale aliquid et in paganorum testamentis indulgendum esset: et placet non sine distinctione hoc fieri, sed, si quidem vivo testatore et sciente decessissent, nihil novi statuendum, si autem ignorante aut post mortem eius, omnimodo subveniendum.
It was being discussed whether something of this sort ought also to be indulged in the testaments of pagans; and it is approved that this be done not without distinction, but if indeed they had died with the testator alive and knowing, nothing new is to be decreed; if, however, with him unaware or after his death, in every way relief is to be afforded.
Sicut autem hereditatem miles nuda voluntate dare potest, ita et adimere potest. denique si cancellaverit testamentum suum vel inciderit, nullius erit momenti: si tamen testamentum cancellaverit et mox valere voluerit, valebit ex suprema voluntate. et ideo cum miles induxisset testamentum suum, mox anulo suo signasset, qui super ea re cogniturus erit considerabit, quo proposito id fecerit: nam si mutatae voluntatis eum paenituisse probabitur, renovatum testamentum intellegitur: quod si ideo, ne ea quae scripta fuerant legi possint, causa irriti facti iudicii potior existimabitur.
Just as a soldier can grant an inheritance by bare will, so too he can take it away. Finally, if he has cancelled his testament or cut it, it will be of no moment: if, however, he has cancelled the testament and soon wished it to have force, it will be valid by his final will. And therefore, when the soldier had drawn over his testament and then at once sealed it with his ring, the one who is to take cognizance in that matter will consider with what purpose he did it: for if it shall be proved that he repented of his changed intention, the testament is understood to have been renewed; but if it was for this reason—that the things which had been written might not be able to be read—the ground of the act having been made void will be judged the weightier.
Si certarum rerum heredes instituerit miles, veluti alium urbanorum praediorum, alium rusticorum, alium ceterarum rerum, valebit institutio perindeque habebitur, atque si sine partibus heredes eos instituisset resque omnes suas per praeceptionem cuique legando distribuisset.
If a soldier shall have instituted heirs of specified things, as, for example, one of the urban estates, another of the rural estates, another of the remaining things, the institution will be valid and will be regarded just as if he had instituted them as heirs without shares and had distributed all his property to each by bequeathing it by preemption.
Iulianus etiam ait, si quis alium castrensium rerum, alium ceterarum scripsisset, quasi duorum hominum duas hereditates intellegi, ut etiam in aes alienum, quod in castris contractum esset, solus is teneatur, qui castrensium rerum heres institutus esset, extra castra contracto aere alieno is solus obligetur, qui ceterarum rerum heres scriptus esset. cui scilicet conveniens videtur respondisse, ut ex quaqua causa debeatur militi, vel huic heredi vel illi ipso iure debeatur. quod si alterutra pars bonorum aeri alieno, quod ex ea causa pendebit, non sufficiat et propter hoc is qui ex parte heres institutus est non adierit, alterum qui adisset compellendum esse aut defendere totam hereditatem aut totam creditoribus solvere.
Julian also says that, if someone had written one person as heir of the camp-goods and another of the remaining goods, it is to be understood as two inheritances of two persons, so that for the debt which was contracted in camp he alone is liable who was instituted heir of the camp-goods, and for debt contracted outside the camp he alone is bound who was written heir of the other goods. To which, of course, he seems to have replied fittingly, that whatever the cause from which something is owed to the soldier, it is owed by the law itself either to this heir or to that. But if either part of the goods is not sufficient for the debt which will depend on that cause, and for this reason the one who was instituted heir of that part does not enter, the other who has entered must be compelled either to defend the whole inheritance or to pay the whole to the creditors.
Si pater a filio familias milite ex castrensi peculio heres institutus omissa causa testamenti aliquid ex peculio possidebit dolove malo fecerit, quo minus possideret, datur in eum legatorum actio.
If a father, instituted heir by his son-in-power (filius familias), a soldier, out of the castrense peculium, setting aside the cause of the testament, should possess anything from the peculium, or should by malicious fraud have brought it about that he not possess it, the legatees’ action is given against him.
Si miles testamentum in militia fecerit, codicillos post militiam et intra annum missionis moriatur, plerisque placet in codicillis iuris civilis regulam spectari debere, quia non sunt a milite facti, nec ad rem pertinere, quod testamento confirmati sunt. ideoque in his legatis, quae testamento data sunt, legi falcidiae locum non esse, at in his, quae codicillis scripta sunt, locum esse.
If a soldier made a testament while on military service, and, as to codicils made after service, even if he dies within a year of his discharge, it pleases most that in the codicils the rule of the civil law must be looked to, because they were not made by a soldier, nor does it pertain to the matter that they were confirmed by the testament. and so, in those legacies which were given by the testament, there is no place for the Falcidian law, but in those which were written in the codicils, there is a place.
Si vero composita utraque legata, tam quae testamento quam quae codicillis data sunt, ultra dodrantem sint, quaeritur, quatenus minuantur ea, in quibus falcidia locum habet. commodissime autem id statuetur, ut ex universitate bonorum in solidum solutis legatis quae testamento miles dederat id quod supererit pro dodrante et quadrante dividatur inter heredes et eos, quibus codicillis legata data sunt.
But if, in fact, the combined legacies—both those given by testament and those given by codicils—are beyond the dodrans (three-quarters), the question arises to what extent those in which the Falcidia has place are to be diminished. Most conveniently, however, it will be determined thus: after, out of the universality of the goods, the legacies which the soldier had given by testament have been paid in solidum, what remains shall be divided, in the proportion of a dodrans and a quadrans (three-quarters and one-quarter), between the heirs and those to whom legacies were given by codicils.
Quid ergo si consumant universorum bonorum quantitatem legata quae testamento data sunt, utrum nihil ferent hi, quibus codicillis legatum est, an aliquid? et quoniam, si adhuc miles haec quoque legasset, contribuebantur omnia et pro rata ex omnibus decedebat ea portio, quam amplius legaverat quam in bonis habuerat, nunc quoque idem fiet: deinde constituta quantitate legatorum quae codicillis data sunt ex summa, quae efficiebatur debita, si aequo iure omnia deberentur, quartam deducet his solis, quibus codicillis legata sunt.
What then, if the legacies which were given by the testament consume the amount of the entire estate, will those to whom a legacy is by codicils take nothing, or something? And since, if moreover a soldier had also bequeathed these, everything used to be contributed and, pro rata, out of all there was deducted that portion by which he had legated more than he had among his goods, now too the same will happen: then, the amount of the legacies which are given by codicils having been fixed out of the total which would be made due if, on equal right, all were owed, he will deduct a fourth for these alone, to whom legacies are by codicils.
Quaerebatur, si miles, qui habebat iam factum testamentum, aliud fecisset et in eo comprehendisset se fidei heredis committere, ut priores tabulae valerent, quid iuris esset. dicebam: militi licet plura testamenta facere, sed sive simul fecerit sive separatim, utique valebunt, si hoc specialiter expresserit, nec superius per inferius rumpetur, cum et ex parte heredem instituere possit, hoc est ex parte testato, ex parte intestato decedere. quin immo et si codicillos ante fecerat, poterit eos per testamentum sequens cavendo in potestatem institutionis redigere et efficere directam institutionem, quae erat precaria.
It was asked, if a soldier, who already had a testament made, had made another and in it included that he committed it to the good faith of the heir that the prior tablets should have force, what the law would be. I said: a soldier is permitted to make several testaments, and whether he has made them at the same time or separately, they will in any case be valid, if he has expressly specified this; nor will the earlier be broken by the later, since he can also institute an heir for a part—that is, die partly testate and partly intestate. Nay rather, even if he had previously made codicils, he can, by a subsequent testament, by providing a clause, bring them into the power of institution and make a direct institution out of what was precatory.
According to these points, in the case proposed I reported that, if the soldier had this intention—that the previously made testament should be valid—then what he provided ought to be valid, and through this it is effected that there are two testaments. But in the case proposed, since it is committed to the faith of the heir that the prior testament may be valid, it appears that he did not wish it to be valid ipso iure, but rather through a fideicommissum, that is, he converted the force of the prior testament into the cause (character) of a fideicommissum and of codicils.
Utrum autem totum testamentum in eam causam conversum sit, hoc est et heredis institutio, an vero legata tantum et fideicommissa et libertates, quaeritur. sed mihi videtur non solum cetera praeter institutionem heredis, sed et ^ es^ ipsam institutionem in causam fideicommissi vertisse, nisi aliud testatorem scripsisse probetur.
Whether, moreover, the whole testament has been converted into that cause, that is, including the institution of the heir, or rather only the legacies and the fideicommissa and the liberties (manumissions), is in question. But it seems to me that not only the other things besides the institution of the heir, but that ^es^ the institution itself too has been turned into the cause of a fideicommissum, unless it is proven that the testator wrote otherwise.
Tribunus militum si intra dies certos, quam successor eius in castra venerat, manens in castris codicillos fecerit et ibi decesserit, quoniam desinit militis loco haberi, postquam successor eius in castra venit, ideo communi iure civium romanorum codicilli eius aestimandi sunt.
If a military tribune, within certain days from the time that his successor came into the camp, while remaining in the camp should make codicils and should die there, since he ceases to be held in the status of a soldier after his successor comes into the camp, therefore his codicils are to be judged by the common law of Roman citizens.
Cum aliquis facto testamento militare coeperit, id quoque testamentum, quod ante quam militare coeperit fecerat, aliquo casu intellegitur militiae tempore factum, veluti si tabulas inciderit et legerit testamentum ac rursus suo signo signaverit, amplius si et aliquid interleverit perduxerit adiecerit emendaverit: quod si nihil bonorum inciderit, testamentum eius ad privilegia militum non pertinebit.
When someone, after a testament has been made, begins to serve as a soldier, that testament also, which he had made before he began military service, is in some case understood to have been made in the time of service, for instance if he has cut open the tablets and read the will and again sealed it with his own seal; further, if he has also interlineated something, extended, added, corrected: but if none of these things has occurred, his testament will not pertain to the privileges of soldiers.
Quod constitutum est, ut testamentum militiae tempore factum etiam intra annum post missionem valeret, quantum ad verba eius ad eos dumtaxat qui mitti solent id beneficium pertinere existimavit: secundum quod neque praefectos neque tribunos aut ceteros, qui successoribus acceptis militare desinunt, hoc privilegium habituros.
What has been established—that a testament made in time of military service is valid even within a year after discharge—he judged, as to its terms, that this benefit pertains only to those who are wont to be discharged; accordingly, neither prefects nor tribunes nor the others who, once successors have been received, cease to soldier, will have this privilege.
Divus traianus statilio severo ita rescripsit: " id privilegium, quod militantibus datum est, ut quoquo modo facta ab his testamenta rata sint, sic intellegi debet, ut utique prius constare debeat testamentum factum esse, quod et sine scriptura et a non militantibus fieri potest. si ergo miles, de cuius bonis apud te quaeritur, convocatis ad hoc hominibus, ut voluntatem suam testaretur, ita locutus est, ut declararet, quem vellet sibi esse heredem et cui libertatem tribuere: potest videri sine scripto hoc modo esse testatus et voluntas eius rata habenda est. ceterum si, ut plerumque sermonibus fieri solet, dixit alicui: " ego te heredem facio", aut " tibi bona mea relinquo", non oportet hoc pro testamento observari.
The deified Trajan wrote back to Statilius Severus thus: " that privilege which has been given to soldiers, that testaments made by them in whatever way should be valid, ought to be understood thus: that in any case it must first be established that a testament has been made, which can be made even without writing and by non-soldiers. Therefore, if the soldier, about whose goods inquiry is being made before you, with men summoned for this purpose, in order to attest his will, so spoke as to declare whom he wished to be his heir and to whom to grant liberty: he can be seen to have made a testament in this way without writing, and his will must be held valid. However, if, as commonly happens in conversations, he said to someone, " I make you heir", or " I leave you my goods", this ought not to be observed as a testament.
nor is it more in the interest of any than of those themselves, to whom that privilege has been given, that an example of this sort not be admitted: otherwise, after the death of some soldier, witnesses would not be lacking who would affirm that they had heard someone saying that he was leaving his goods to whomever he pleased, and through this true judgments are subverted".
Titius priusquam tribunus legionis factus esset, testamentum fecit et postea cinctus manente eodem defunctus est: quaero, an militis testamentum videatur esse. Marcellus respondit: testamentum quod ante tribunatum fecisset, nisi postea ab eo factum dictum esse probaretur quod valere vellet, ad commune ius pertinet: constitutionibus enim principum non militum testamenta, sed quae a militibus facta sunt confirmantur: sed plane fecisse testamentum eum interpretandum est, qui se velle testamentum quod ante fecerat valere aliquo modo declaravit.
Before Titius had been made tribune of the legion, he made a testament, and afterwards, once girded (with the belt), with the same [testament] remaining, he died: I ask whether it is to be considered a soldier’s testament. Marcellus replied: The testament which he had made before the tribunate, unless it were later proved that a testament made by him was declared to be the one he wished to be valid, pertains to the common law; for by the constitutions of the princes it is not soldiers’ testaments, but those which have been made by soldiers, that are confirmed. But clearly he is to be interpreted as having made a testament who in some way declared that he wished the testament which he had made before to be valid.
Testamenta eorum, qui ignominiae causa missi sunt, statim desinunt militari iure valere, quod anni spatium testamentis eorum, qui honestam vel causariam missionem meruerunt, tribuitur. ius testandi de castrensi, quod filiis familias militantibus concessum est, ad eos, qui ignominiae causa missi sunt, non pertinet, quod hoc praemii loco merentibus tributum est.
The testaments of those who have been discharged for ignominy immediately cease to have force by military law, whereas a span of one year is granted to the testaments of those who have earned an honorable or “causaria” discharge. The right of making a testament over the castrense peculium, which has been conceded to sons under paternal power serving as soldiers, does not pertain to those who have been discharged for ignominy, because this has been bestowed by way of reward upon those who merit it.
Centurio secundo testamento postumos heredes instituit neque substitutos dedit: quibus non editis ad superius testamentum se redire testatus est. cetera, quae secundo testamento scripsit, esse irrita placuit, nisi nominatim ea confirmasset ad priorem voluntatem reversus.
A centurion, in a second testament, instituted posthumous children as heirs and did not give substitutes; when these were not born, he declared that he was returning to the earlier testament. It was decided that the other matters which he wrote in the second testament are null, unless, on reverting to the prior intention, he had confirmed them by name.
Cum filius familias miles decessisset filio impubere herede instituto eique substituisset in avi potestate manenti tutoresque dedisset, divi fratres rescripserunt substitutionem quidem valere, tutoris autem dationem non valere, quia hereditati quidem suae miles qualem vellet substitutionem facere potest, verum tamen alienum ius minuere non potest.
When a filiusfamilias who was a soldier had died, having instituted as heir his son under age and had made a substitution for him, he remaining in the power of his grandfather, and had given him tutors, the Deified Brothers issued a rescript that the substitution was indeed valid, but the appointment of a tutor was not valid, because, as to his own inheritance, a soldier can make whatever substitution he wishes, yet he cannot diminish another’s right.
Si miles titio et seio servum legaverit et eum titius manumisisset deliberante seio moxque is legatum omisisset, liberandum fore dico, quia et si heres servum alicui legatum interim manumisisset, deinde legatarius repudiasset, liber esset.
If a soldier has bequeathed a slave to Titius and to Seius, and Titius manumitted him while Seius was deliberating, and soon that one renounced the legacy, I say he is to be freed; for even if the heir had in the meantime manumitted a slave bequeathed to someone, and thereafter the legatee had repudiated it, he would be free.
Si filius familias miles fecisset testamentum more militiae, deinde post mortem patris postumus ei nasceretur, utique rumpitur eius testamentum. verum si perseverasset in ea voluntate, ut vellet adhuc illud testamentum valere, valiturum illud, quasi rursum aliud factum, si modo militaret adhuc eo tempore quo nasceretur illi postumus.
If a son in the household, a soldier, had made a testament in the military manner, and then, after the death of his father, a posthumous child were born to him, assuredly his testament is broken. However, if he persisted in that intention, wishing that that testament should still be valid, it will be valid, as though another had been made anew, provided only that he was still on military service at the time when a posthumous child was born to him.
Sed si filius familias miles fecisset testamentum, deinde postea vivo eo et adhuc avo quoque superstite nasceretur ei postumus, non rumpitur eius testamentum, quia cum id quod nasceretur in potestate eius non perveniret, non videtur suus heres adgnasci: ac ne avo quidem suo hunc nepotem postumum, cum vivo filio nasceretur, suum heredem protinus adgnasci et ideo nec avi testamentum rumpi, quoniam, licet in potestate avi protinus esse inciperet, tamen antecederet eum filius.
But if a son in paternal power, being a soldier, had made a testament, and then afterwards, while he was still alive and with his grandfather likewise still surviving, a posthumous child were born to him, his testament is not broken, because, since that which would be born would not come into his power, he is not seen to be adgnated as his own heir; nor, indeed, is this posthumous grandson, since he would be born while the son is alive, immediately adgnated as his own heir to his grandfather, and therefore the grandfather’s testament is not broken, since, although he would at once begin to be in the grandfather’s power, nevertheless the son would take precedence over him.
Secundum quae si filius familias miles testamentum fecerit et omiserit postumum per errorem, non quod volebat exheredatum, deinde postumus post mortem avi vivo adhuc filio, id est patre suo natus fuerit, omnimodo rumpet illius testamentum. sed si quidem pagano iam illo facto natus sit, nec convalescet ruptum: si vero militante adhuc natus fuerit, rumpetur, deinde, si voluerit ratum illud esse pater, convalescet sic quasi denuo factum.
According to which, if a son-in-power who is a soldier has made a testament and has omitted a posthumous child through error—not one whom he intended to be disinherited—then, if the posthumous child is born after the death of the grandfather while the son is still alive, that is, his own father, he will in every way break that testament. But if indeed he is born after that man has already become a civilian, the ruptured instrument will not be convalidated; if, however, he is born while he is still on military service, it will be broken, and then, if the father should wish that to be ratified, it will be validated thus as though newly made.
Sed et si vivo avo nascatur postumus, hic non rumpet continuo patris testamentum: si supervixerit post mortem avi vivo adhuc patre, rumpet, quod novus illi nunc primum heres adgnascitur: ita tamen, ut numquam possit duorum simul testamenta rumpere et avi et patris.
But also, if a posthumous child is born while the grandfather is alive, he will not straightway rupture the father’s testament; if he shall have survived after the death of the grandfather, the father still living, he will rupture it, because a new heir is now for the first time agnated to him; yet in such a way that he can never rupture at the same time the testaments of two persons, both the grandfather and the father.
Militia missus intra annum testamentum facere coepit neque perficere potuit: potest dici solutum ita esse testamentum quod in militia fecit, si iure militiae fuit scriptum: alioquin si valuit iure communi, non esse iure rescissum.
Discharged from military service, within a year he began to make a testament and could not complete it: it can be said that the testament which he made in military service is thereby dissolved, if it was written by the right of military service; otherwise, if it was valid by the common law, it is not rescinded by law.
Militis codicillis ad testamentum factis etiam hereditas iure videtur dari. quare si partem dimidiam hereditatis codicillis dederit, testamento scriptus ex asse heres partem dimidiam habebit, legata autem testamento data communiter debentur.
By a soldier’s codicils made in addition to the testament, even an inheritance is deemed by law to be given. Therefore, if he has given by codicils one half of the inheritance, the heir written in the testament as heir to the whole (ex asse) will have one half; however, the legacies given by the testament are owed in common.
Miles castrensium bonorum et non castrensium diversis heredibus institutis postea castrensium bonorum alios heredes instituit. prioribus tabulis tantum abstulisse videtur, quantum in posteriores contulerit: nec videtur mutare, etsi prioribus tabulis unus heres scriptus fuisset.
A soldier, having instituted different heirs for his castrensian goods and his non-castrensian goods, later instituted other heirs for the castrensian goods. He appears to have taken away from the earlier tablets only as much as he has conferred in the later; nor is the case thought to be altered, even if in the earlier tablets a single heir had been written.
Miles in supremis ordinandis ignarus uxorem esse praegnatem ventris non habuit mentionem. post mortem patris filia nata ruptum esse testamentum apparuit neque legata deberi. si qua vero medio tempore scriptus heres legata solvisset, utilibus actionibus filiae datis ob improvisum casum esse revocanda nec institutum, cum bonae fidei possessor fuerit, quod inde servari non potuisset, praestare.
A soldier, in arranging his last dispositions, being ignorant that his wife was pregnant, made no mention of the womb. After the father’s death, a daughter having been born, it appeared that the testament was ruptured and that legacies were not owed. But if in the meantime the instituted heir had paid the legacies, with useful actions granted to the daughter, they are to be recalled on account of the unforeseen case; nor must the instituted heir, since he was a possessor in good faith, make good what could not have been preserved therefrom.
Veteranus moriens testamentum iure communi tempore militiae factum irritum esse voluit et intestatus esse maluit. heredum institutiones ac substitutiones in eodem statu mansisse placuit, legata vero petens exceptione doli mali secundum ius commune summoveri, cuius exceptionis vires ex persona petentis aestimantur: et alioquin potior est in re pari causa possessoris.
A veteran, dying, wished that a testament made under the common law during the time of military service be void, and preferred to be intestate. It was decided that the institutions of heirs and the substitutions remained in the same condition; but one seeking legacies is removed by the exception of dolus malus according to the common law, the force of which exception is assessed from the person of the claimant: and otherwise, in an equal matter, the possessor’s cause is the stronger.
Si duobus a milite liberto scriptis heredibus alter omiserit hereditatem, pro ea parte intestatus videbitur defunctus decessisse, quia miles et pro parte testari potest, et competit patrono ab intestato bonorum possessio, nisi si haec voluntas defuncti probata fuerit, ut omittente altero ab alterum vellet totam redire hereditatem.
If, of two heirs written by a freedman who is a soldier, one should omit the inheritance, as to that share the deceased will be seen to have died intestate, because a soldier can also make a will for a part, and possession of the goods ab intestato belongs to the patron—unless this intention of the deceased should be proved, that, with the one omitting, he wished the whole inheritance to revert to the other.
Quod dicitur, si miles intra annum quam missus est decesserit, valere eius testamentum quod iure militari fecerat, verum est, etiamsi post annum condicio institutionis exstiterit, mortuo eo intra annum. et ideo si heredi filio substituerit, nihil interest, quando filius moriatur: sufficit enim patrem intra annum obisse.
What is said, that if a soldier should die within a year from the time he was discharged, the testament which he made by military right is valid, is true, even if after the year the condition of the institution should arise, he having died within the year. and therefore if he has substituted his son to the heir, it is of no importance when the son dies: for it is sufficient that the father has died within the year.
Miles testamentum fecerat, deinde non ignominiae causa missus rursum cinctus est in alia militia: quaerebatur, an testamentum eius, quod in militia fecerat, valeret. quaesivi, utrum iure militari an communi iure testatus est. et si quidem communi iure testatus est, nulla dubitatio est, quin valeat.
A soldier had made a testament, then, having been discharged not on account of disgrace, he was again girded for another military service: it was inquired whether his testament, which he had made while in service, would be valid. I asked whether he made his testament under military law or under common law. And if indeed he made it under common law, there is no doubt that it is valid.
but if he had made the testament as a soldier, I began to consider when he had been assumed, after he ceased to be in the numbers (on the rolls), whether within a year or after a year: I learned that he had been assumed within a year. therefore, if, while it was still valid by military law, he could again make testament under the same law, does the testament also have force if he dies after a year? what moved me was that the later service is another militia: but it is more humane to say that the testament is valid, as if the duty of military service were conjoined.
Si filius familias miles captus apud hostes decesserit, dicemus legem corneliam etiam ad eius testamentum pertinere. sed quaeramus, si pater eius prius in civitate decesserit relicto nepote ex filio, an similiter testamentum patris rumpatur. et dicendum est non rumpi testamentum, quia ex eo tempore, quo captus est, videtur decessisse.
If a filius familias, a soldier, captured among the enemy, has died, we shall say that the Cornelian law also pertains to his testament. But let us inquire whether, if his father has previously died in the city, a grandson by the son having been left, the father’s testament is likewise broken. And it must be said that the testament is not broken, because from the time at which he was captured he is deemed to have died.
Lucius titius miles notario suo testamentum scribendum notis dictavit et antequam litteris praescriberetur, vita defunctus est: quaero, an haec dictatio valere possit. respondi militibus, quoquo modo velint et quo modo possunt, testamentum facere concessum esse, ita tamen, ut hoc ita subsecutum esse legitimis probationibus ostendatur.
Lucius Titius, a soldier, dictated to his notary a testament to be written in notes (shorthand), and before it was written out in letters, he departed this life: I ask whether this dictation can be valid. I replied that to soldiers it has been conceded to make a testament in whatever manner they wish and in whatever way they can, provided, however, that it be shown by legitimate proofs that this was thereafter so followed up.
Idem respondit: lucius titius miles testamentum ita fecit: " pamphila serva mea ex asse mihi heres esto": alio deinde capite sempronio commilitoni suo eandem pamphilam reliquit, cuius fidei commisit, ut eam manumitteret: quaero, an heres esset pamphila atque si directo accepisset libertatem. respondi intellegendum militem, qui ancillam suam heredem instituerat, ignorasse posse ex ea institutione etiam libertatem ei competere et ideo sine causa postea a commilitone petisse, ut eandem manumitteret: cum ex priore scriptura libera et heres effecta est, postea nullo praeiudicio voluntati facto frustra legata est.
The same man replied: Lucius Titius, a soldier, made his testament thus: “Pamphila, my slave-girl, be my heir to the whole share (ex asse).” Then in another clause he left the same Pamphila to his fellow soldier Sempronius, entrusting it to his good faith that he should manumit her. I ask whether Pamphila was heir and whether she received freedom directly. I answered that it must be understood that the soldier, who had instituted his handmaid as heir, did not know that from that institution freedom too could accrue to her, and therefore without cause later asked of his fellow soldier that he manumit the same; since from the earlier writing she became free and heir, afterwards, with no prejudice done to his intention, she was bequeathed in vain.
Miles ita heredem scribere potest: " quoad vivit, titius heres esto, post mortem eius septicius". sed si ita scripserit: " titius usque ad annos decem heres esto" nemine substituto, intestati causa post decem annos locum habebit. et quia diximus ex certo tempore et usque ad certum tempus milites posse instituere heredem, his consequens est, ut, antequam dies veniat, quo admittatur institutus, intestati hereditas deferatur et quod in bonorum portione ei licet, hoc etiam in temporis spatio, licet non modicum sit, ex eodem privilegio competat.
A soldier can in this way write an heir: " so long as he lives, titius is to be heir; after his death, septicius." but if he should have written thus: " titius is to be heir up to ten years" with no one substituted, the case of intestacy will obtain after ten years. and since we have said that soldiers can institute an heir from a certain time and up to a certain time, it follows from this that, before the day comes on which the instituted is admitted, the intestate inheritance is devolved; and what is permitted to him in respect of a portion of the goods, this likewise, in respect of a span of time, even though it is not a small one, by the same privilege applies.
Miles et emancipato filio substituere potest: verum hoc ius in his exercebitur, quae ab ipso ad eum cui substituit pervenerint, non etiam in his, si quae habuerit vel postea adquisierit. nam et si filio suo vivo adhuc substituit, post adquisitam ei avi hereditatem nemo diceret ad substitutum pertinere.
A soldier can appoint a substitute even for an emancipated son: but this right will be exercised in respect of those things which have come from himself to the one for whom he appointed the substitute, not also in respect of those which he may have or may afterwards acquire. For even if he appoints a substitute for his own son while the son is still alive, after the grandfather’s inheritance has been acquired for him, no one would say it pertains to the substitute.
Ex eo tempore quis iure militari incipit posse testari, ex quo in numeros relatus est, ante non: proinde qui nondum in numeris sunt, licet etiam lecti tirones sint et publicis expensis iter faciunt, nondum milites sunt: debent enim in numeros referri.
From that time a person begins to be able to make a testament under military law, from the time he has been entered in the numbers; before, not. Accordingly, those who are not yet in the numbers, although even chosen recruits and traveling at public expense, are not yet soldiers: for they ought to be entered in the numbers.
Rescripta principum ostendunt omnes omnino, qui eius sunt gradus, ut iure militari testari non possint, si in hostico deprehendantur et illic decedant, quomodo velint et quomodo possint, testari, sive praeses sit provinciae sive quis alius, qui iure militari testari non potest.
The rescripts of the emperors show that all without exception who are of such a rank that they cannot make a will under military law, if they are overtaken in enemy territory and die there, may make a will in whatever manner they wish and can—whether he be the governor of a province or anyone else who cannot make a will under military law.
Si is, qui putabat se filium familias, patris iussu adierit, eum neque sibi neque ei qui iussit quaesisse hereditatem constat: quamquam is, quem pater iussit adire et decessit, si adierit iam mortuo patre, obliget se hereditati, ut iulianus libro trigesimo primo digestorum scripsit: nam eum, qui dubitat, utrum filius familias an pater familias morte patris factus sit, posse adire hereditatem magis admittit.
If someone, who supposed himself to be a filius familias, should enter upon the inheritance by his father’s order, it is agreed that he has sought the inheritance neither for himself nor for the one who ordered it; although if the person whom the father ordered to enter, after the father has died, does enter with the father now dead, he binds himself to the inheritance, as Julianus wrote in the 31st book of the Digesta: for he more readily admits that the one who is in doubt whether by the death of the father he has become a filius familias or a pater familias can enter upon the inheritance.
Sed si quis heres institutus adoptetur a filio exheredato, necessarium eum non facit, sed iuberi debet, ut adeat, quoniam mortis tempore in potestate non fuerit: nam per eum quis existere necessarius non potest qui ipse non esset exstaturus.
But if someone instituted as heir is adopted by a disinherited son, this does not make him a necessary heir, but he ought to be ordered to enter upon the inheritance, since at the time of death he was not in the power (potestas) of the testator: for a person cannot come to exist as a necessary heir through one who himself would not have come to exist as such.
More nostrae civitatis neque pupillus neque pupilla sine tutoris auctoritate obligari possunt: hereditas autem quin obliget nos aeri alieno, etiam si non sit solvendo, plus quam manifestum est. de ea autem hereditate loquimur, in qua non succedunt huiusmodi personae quasi necessariae.
By the custom of our city neither a male ward nor a female ward can be bound without the tutor’s authority: but that an inheritance binds us to debt, even if it is not solvent, is more than manifest. We are speaking, however, of that inheritance in which persons of this sort do not succeed as quasi-necessary heirs.
Pupillus si fari possit, licet huius aetatis sit, ut causam adquirendae hereditatis non intellegat, quamvis non videatur scire huiusmodi aetatis puer ( neque enim scire neque decernere talis aetas potest, non magis quam furiosus), tamen cum tutoris auctoritate hereditatem adquirere potest: hoc enim favorabiliter eis praestatur.
A ward, if he can speak, although he is of such an age that he does not understand the ground for acquiring an inheritance, although a boy of this sort of age does not seem to know (for such an age can neither know nor decide, no more than a madman), nevertheless can acquire an inheritance with the guardian’s authority: for this is favorably afforded to them.
Ei, qui se non miscuit hereditati paternae, sive maior sit sive minor, non esse necesse praetorem adire, sed sufficit se non miscuisse hereditati. et est in semenstribus vibiis soteri et victorino rescriptum, non esse necesse pupillis in integrum restitui ex avito contractu, quorum pater constituerat non adgnoscere hereditatem neque quicquam amoverat vel pro herede gesserat.
For him who has not intermeddled with the paternal inheritance, whether he be major or minor, it is not necessary to go to the praetor, but it suffices that he has not mixed himself with the inheritance. And it has been rescripted in the half‑yearly rescripts to Vibius Soter and to Victorinus, that it is not necessary for wards to be restored in integrum from a contract of the grandfather, whose father had determined not to acknowledge the inheritance and had removed nothing nor acted as heir.
Is qui heres institutus est vel is cui legitima hereditas delata est repudiatione hereditatem amittit. hoc ita verum est, si in ea causa erat hereditas, ut et adiri posset: ceterum heres institutus sub condicione si ante condicionem existentem repudiavit, nihil egit, qualisqualis fuit condicio, etsi in arbitrium collata est.
He who has been instituted heir, or he to whom the legitimate inheritance has been conferred, loses the inheritance by repudiation. This is true thus, if the inheritance was in such a condition that it could also be entered upon: but if an heir instituted under a condition repudiated before the condition existed, he has done nothing, whatever sort the condition was, even if it was referred to discretion.
Heres institutus idemque legitimus si quasi institutus repudiaverit, quasi legitimus non amittit hereditatem: sed si quasi legitimus repudiavit, si quidem scit se heredem institutum, credendus est utrumque repudiasse: si ignorat, ad neutrum ei repudiatio nocebit neque ad testamentariam, quoniam hanc non repudiavit, neque ad legitimam, quoniam nondum ei fuerat delata.
An heir who is both instituted and legitimate: if he repudiates in the capacity of instituted heir, he does not lose the inheritance in his capacity as legitimate; but if he repudiated as legitimate, if indeed he knows that he was instituted heir, he is to be deemed to have repudiated both; if he is ignorant, the repudiation will prejudice him in neither—neither with respect to the testamentary, since he did not repudiate this, nor with respect to the legitimate, since it had not yet been devolved upon him.
Pro herede gerere videtur is, qui aliquid facit quasi heres. et generaliter iulianus scribit eum demum pro herede gerere, qui aliquid quasi heres gerit: pro herede autem gerere non esse facti quam animi: nam hoc animo esse debet, ut velit esse heres. ceterum si quid pietatis causa fecit, si quid custodiae causa fecit, si quid quasi non heres egit, sed quasi alio iure dominus, apparet non videri pro herede gessisse.
He is considered to act as heir who does something as if an heir. And generally Julian writes that only he acts as heir who carries on something as if an heir: moreover, to act as heir is not a matter of deed so much as of intention; for he must be of this mind, that he wills to be heir. But if he has done anything for the sake of piety, if he has done anything for the sake of custody, if he has acted as though not an heir, but as an owner by some other right, it appears that he is not seen to have acted as heir.
Et ideo solent testari liberi, qui necessarii existunt, non animo heredis se gerere quae gerunt, sed aut pietatis aut custodiae causa aut pro suo. ut puta patrem sepelivit vel iusta ei fecit: si animo heredis, pro herede gessit: enimvero si pietatis causa hoc fecit, non videtur pro herede gessisse. servos hereditarios pavit iumenta aut pavit aut distraxit: si hoc ut heres, gessit pro herede: aut si non ut heres, sed ut custodiat, aut putavit sua, aut dum deliberat, quid fecit consulens ut salvae sint res hereditariae, si forte ei non placuerit pro herede gerere, apparet non videri pro herede gessisse.
And therefore the children who are necessary heirs are accustomed to attest that they do not conduct what they conduct with the animus of an heir, but either for the sake of piety or of custody, or on their own account. For instance, he buried his father or performed the due rites for him: if with the animus of an heir, he managed as heir; but indeed if he did this for the sake of piety, he does not seem to have managed as heir. He fed the hereditary slaves, or either fed or sold the beasts of burden: if he did this as heir, he managed as heir; but if not as heir, but in order to guard, or he thought them his own, or while he deliberates he did something taking counsel that the hereditary goods be safe, if perchance it should not please him to manage as heir, it appears he is not considered to have managed as heir.
accordingly, even if he leased out estates or houses, or shored them up, or did anything else, not with the intention, as if he were acting as heir, but while he was providing for the one who has been substituted or who is going to be heir by intestacy, or he sold off things that would perish with time: he is in the position that he has not acted as heir, because he did not have that intention.
Si quid tamen quasi heres petit, sed ex his, quae ad heredem extraneum non transeunt, videamus, an oneribus se immerserit hereditariis. ut puta a liberto parentis operas petit: has heres extraneus petere non potuit, hic tamen petendo consequi potest. et constat pro herede eum non gessisse, cum petitio earum etiam creditoribus competat et maxime futurarum.
If, however, he demands something as if an heir, but from among those things which do not pass to an extraneous heir, let us see whether he has immersed himself in hereditary burdens. For instance, he demands services from his parent’s freedman: an extraneous heir could not demand these, yet this man, by demanding, can obtain them. And it is agreed that he has not acted as heir, since the claim for them even belongs to creditors, and especially for those of the future [services].
Papinianus scribit filium heredem institutum qui se bonis paternis abstinuit volgo putare quosdam, si a statulibero pecuniam accepit, a creditoribus conveniendum, sive nummi peculiares fuerint sive non fuerint, quia ex defuncti voluntate accipitur, quod condicionis implendae causa datur. iulianus autem et si non abstinuit, idem existimavit. ita demum autem pro herede gessisse ait papinianus, si solus heres sit: ceterum si coheredem habeat et coheres adiit, non est cogendus, inquit, is qui accepit a statulibero actiones creditorum suscipere: nam cum se filius abstinet, idem debebit consequi iure praetorio, quod emancipatus consequitur qui hereditatem repudiavit, quo facto statuliber filio nominatim pecuniam dare iussus potuisset non heredi dando ad libertatem pervenire.
Papinian writes that, where a son instituted as heir abstained from the paternal goods, it is commonly thought by some that, if he received money from a statuliber (a conditionally freed slave), he is to be sued by the creditors, whether the money was from the peculium or not, because what is given for the sake of fulfilling the condition is taken to be received from the will of the deceased. But Julian also held the same even if he did not abstain. Papinian says, however, that he has acted as heir only if he be the sole heir; but if he has a coheir and the coheir has entered, the one who received from the statuliber, he says, is not compelled to assume the actions of the creditors. For since the son abstains, he ought to obtain the same by praetorian law which an emancipated son obtains who has repudiated the inheritance, with the result that a statuliber ordered to give money specifically to the son could have attained liberty by giving to one who is not the heir.
Si quis partem ex qua institutus est ignoravit, iulianus scribit nihil ei nocere, quominus pro herede gereret. quod et cassius probat, si condicionem, sub qua heres institutus est, non ignorat, si tamen exstitit condicio, sub qua substitutus est. quid tamen si ignorat condicionem exstitisse ? puto posse adire hereditatem, quemadmodum si ignoret, an coheredis, cui substitutus est, repudiatione portio ei delata sit.
If someone has been ignorant of the portion in respect of which he was instituted, Julianus writes that it does him no harm so as to prevent him from acting as heir. This Cassius also approves, if he does not ignore the condition under which he was instituted heir, provided, however, that the condition under which he was substituted has in fact existed. But what if he is ignorant that the condition has come to pass? I think he can enter upon the inheritance, just as if he is unaware whether, by the repudiation of the coheir to whom he was substituted, a portion has been delated to him.
Si is, ad quem legitima hereditas pertinet, putaverit defunctum servum suum esse et quasi peculium eius nactus sit, placet non obligari eum hereditati. idem ergo dicemus, ut ait pomponius, si quasi libertini sui, cum ingenuus esset, bona eius occupavit. nam ut quis pro herede gerendo obstringat se hereditati, scire debet, qua ex causa hereditas ad eum pertinet: veluti adgnatus proximus iusto testamento scriptus heres, antequam tabulae proferantur, cum existimaret intestato patrem familias mortuum, quamvis omnia pro domino fecerit, heres tamen non erit.
If the person to whom the legitimate inheritance pertains has thought that the deceased was his slave and, as it were, has come into possession of his peculium, it is agreed that he is not bound to the inheritance. Therefore we will say the same, as Pomponius says, if, on the footing that he was his libertinus, when in fact he was ingenuus, he has seized his goods. For, in order that someone, by acting as heir, bind himself to the inheritance, he must know on what ground the inheritance pertains to him: for example, the nearest agnate, although an heir has been instituted by a valid testament, before the tablets are produced, when he supposed the paterfamilias had died intestate, although he has done everything as owner, nevertheless will not be heir.
Fuit quaestionis, an pro herede gerere videatur, qui pretium hereditatis omittendae causa capit, et optinuit hunc pro herede quidem non gerere, qui ideo accepit, ne heres sit, in edictum tamen praetoris incidere. sive igitur a substituto non heres accepit sive a legitimo, mortis causa accepisse videtur. idemque erit et si non accepit, sed promissa sit ei pecunia: nam et stipulando mortis causa capit.
There was a question whether he is seen to act as heir who takes a price for the sake of omitting the inheritance, and it has prevailed that such a one does not indeed act as heir, who for this reason accepted, in order that he not be heir, yet he falls under the praetor’s edict. Whether therefore a non-heir received from a substitute or from a statutory heir, he is deemed to have received by reason of death. And the same will be if he did not receive but money was promised to him: for even by stipulating he takes by reason of death.
An nominatim de vivi hereditate mandari possit, quaeritur: sed ego non puto recipiendum, ut de vivi hereditate mandetur. plane si rumor fuit lucium titium decessisse, poterit ei mandare, ut, si scripsit eum, adeat: aut si clusae adhuc tabulae sunt et sit incertum, an filius scriptus sit heres.
It is asked whether it can be mandated expressly about the inheritance of a living man; but I do not think it should be admitted that a mandate be given concerning the inheritance of one who is alive. Clearly, if there was a rumor that Lucius Titius had died, he will be able to give him a mandate that, if he has appointed him, he should enter upon it; or if the tablets are still sealed and it is uncertain whether the son has been written as heir.
Sed si mandavit quasi ex asse instituto et inveniatur ex parte, non puto ex iussu adisse. quod si ex parte iussit, potest ex asse adire. aliter atque si mandavit quasi ab intestato et ex testamento adiit: nam non puto quicquam egisse.
But if he gave a mandate as though [he had been] instituted for the whole, and he is found to be [heir] for a part, I do not think he has entered by order. But if he ordered [acceptance] for a part, he can enter for the whole. It is otherwise than if he mandated as though [he would take] intestate and he entered under a testament: for I do not think he has done anything.
Qui heres institutus prohibeatur ab eo, qui una institutus iam hereditatem adiit, tabulas litteras rationes inspicere mortui, unde scire posset an sibi adeunda esset hereditas, non videtur pro herede gerere.
He who, having been instituted heir, is prohibited by the one who was instituted together and has already entered upon the inheritance from inspecting the tablets, letters, and accounts of the deceased—whence he could know whether the inheritance ought to be entered upon by himself—is not considered to be acting as heir.
Cum quidam legationis causa absens filium heredem institutum non potuisset iubere adire in provincia agentem, divus pius rescripsit consulibus subvenire ei oportere mortuo filio, eo quod rei publicae causa aberat.
When a certain man, absent on account of a legation, had not been able to order his son, instituted as heir, to enter upon the inheritance, the son being engaged in a province, the deified Pius wrote back to the consuls that they ought to come to his aid, after the son had died, because he was absent for the sake of the commonwealth.
Quod dicitur: " proximus a filio postumo heres, dum mulier praegnas est aut putatur esse, adire hereditatem non potest: sed si scit non esse praegnatem, potest" accipe proximus a ventre, qui suum heredem pariturus est. et non solum ad testatos haec verba, verum ad intestatos quoque pertinent. et in eo ventre idem accipias, qui legitimum vel consanguineum pariturus est, quoniam mortis tempore qui in utero est, quantum ad moram faciendam inferioribus et sibi locum faciendum si fuerit editus, pro iam nato habetur.
What is said: "the heir next after a posthumous son, while the woman is pregnant or is thought to be, cannot enter upon the inheritance; but if he knows she is not pregnant, he can"—understand it as "the one next after the womb," which is going to bring forth his own heir. And these words pertain not only to testate cases but to intestate ones as well. And by that "womb" understand likewise one that is going to bring forth a legitimate or consanguine heir, since at the time of death one who is in the uterus, so far as concerns making delay for inferiors and making a place for himself if he shall be brought forth, is held as already born.
Sive igitur putem praegnatem sive sit re vera praegnas, quae eum paritura est qui suus futurus est, adire hereditatem non possum, quoniam in eo est, ut rumpatur testamentum, nisi si proponas ventrem institutum vel exheredatum.
Therefore, whether I suppose her to be pregnant or she is in truth pregnant, she who is going to bear him who will be a suus-heir, I cannot enter upon the inheritance, since it stands so that the testament would be broken, unless you posit the womb (i.e., the unborn) as instituted or as disinherited.
Suum heredem certum est ex asse heredem esse, etsi putat esse praegnatem mulierem, quae non est praegnas. quid si unum in utero habeat, an ex parte dimidia sit heres, sive institutum postumum proponas sive intestatum patrem decessisse? quod et sextum pomponium opinatum tertullianus libro quarto quaestionum refert: putasse enim, sicuti cum vacuo utero suus ex asse heres est, ita et cum unum gerit nec per naturam humanae condicionis alium partum formare potest ( quod quidem post certum tempus conceptionis eveniet), ex parte dimidia et ignorantem fore heredem, non ex quarta, ut iulianus putat.
It is certain that a suus heir is heir to the whole (ex asse), even if it is supposed that there is a pregnant woman who is not in fact pregnant. But if she has one in the womb, is he heir for a half share (ex parte dimidia), whether you posit an instituted posthumous child or that the father died intestate? And Tertullianus reports in book four of the Questions that Sextus Pomponius held this opinion as well: for he thought that, just as when the womb is empty the suus is heir to the whole (ex asse), so also when she is carrying one and, by the nature of the human condition, cannot form another birth (which indeed will occur after a certain time from conception), he will be heir for a half share and, though unaware, will be heir, not for a quarter (ex quarta), as Julianus thinks.
Scientia autem vel opinio, si filius familias vel servus instituti sunt, utrum ipsorum an domini vel patris accipienda sit? finge patrem putasse praegnatem, filium certum esse fingere et sic adire, an adquirat hereditatem? puto adquirere: sed contra non adquirere.
Knowledge, however, or opinion: if a son under paternal power or a slave have been instituted as heirs, is it their own knowledge or opinion that is to be taken, or that of the master or the father? Suppose the father has thought a woman to be pregnant, but assume the son to be certain and thus to enter upon the inheritance—does he acquire the inheritance? I think he acquires; but in the contrary case, he does not acquire.
Sed et si de sua condicione quis dubitet, an filius familias sit, posse eum adquirere hereditatem iam dictum est. cur autem, si suam ignoret condicionem, adire potest, si testatoris, non potest? illa ratio est, quod qui condicionem testatoris ignorat, an valeat testamentum dubitat, qui de sua, de testamento certus est.
But also, if anyone should doubt about his own condition, whether he is a son of the household, it has already been said that he can acquire the inheritance. But why is it that, if he is ignorant of his own condition, he can enter upon it, whereas if he is ignorant of the testator’s, he cannot? The reason is this: one who is ignorant of the testator’s condition doubts whether the testament is valid, whereas he who is uncertain about his own is certain about the testament.
Sed et si cum esset pure institutus, putavit sub condicione et impleta condicione, quam iniectam putavit, adiit, an possit adquirere hereditatem? consequens est dicere posse eum adire, maxime cum haec suspicio nihil ei offuerit nec periculum adtulerit. facilius quis admittet, si quis pure institutus putavit se sub condicione institutum condicionemque impletam quam in eventum putabat: nam in nullo haec suspicio offuit.
But also, if, although he had been instituted purely (i.e., unconditionally), he supposed himself instituted under a condition and, the condition fulfilled, which he thought had been imposed, he entered upon it—whether he can acquire the inheritance? It follows to say that he can enter, especially since this suspicion did him no harm and brought no peril. One will more readily admit it, if someone instituted purely thought himself instituted under a condition, and that the condition was fulfilled, which he supposed to be contingent on an event: for in no respect did this suspicion hinder.
Si quis heres institutus ex parte, mox titio substitutus, antequam ex causa substitutionis ei deferatur hereditas, pro herede gesserit, erit heres ex causa quoque substitutionis, quoniam invito quoque ei adcrescit portio. idem dico et si filius familias vel servus iussu domini vel patris adierint hereditatem, mox emancipatus vel manumissus ex causa substitutionis adeant: erunt namque heredes: sunt enim appendices praecedentis institutionis.
If someone is appointed heir to a share, and then Titius is substituted, and before the inheritance is tendered to the substitute by reason of the substitution he has acted as heir, he will be heir also by reason of the substitution, since the portion accrues to him even if he is unwilling. I say the same also if a son of the household or a slave, by order of the master or father, have entered upon the inheritance, and then, after being emancipated or manumitted, enter upon it by reason of the substitution: for they will be heirs: for they are appendices of the preceding institution.
Si duo sint necessarii heredes, quorum alter se abstinuit, alter posteaquam prior abstinuit immiscuit se, dicendum est hunc non posse recusare, quo minus tota onera hereditaria subeat: qui enim scit aut scire potuit illo abstinente se oneribus fore implicitum, ea condicione adire videtur.
If there are two necessary heirs, of whom one abstained, and the other, after the former had abstained, intermeddled himself, it must be said that this one cannot refuse to undergo the whole hereditary burdens: for he who knows or could have known that, with that one abstaining, he would be implicated in the burdens, is deemed to have entered on under that condition.
Quaesitum est, an, licet quis paternae hereditatis nihil attingat, aliquid tamen propter patris voluntatem habeat vel faciat, an creditoribus paternis cogatur respondere: ut puta si impuberi fuerit substitutus. in qua specie iulianus libro vicesimo sexto digestorum scripsit incidere eum in edictum, si se immiscuerit impuberis hereditati: nam qui iudicium parentis oppugnaverit, non debet ex eadem hereditate quicquam consequi. sed Marcellus eleganter distinguit multum interesse, utrum ex asse fuerit institutus in patris testamento an ex parte, ut, si ex parte, potuerit sine metu remota patris successione impuberis hereditatem amplecti.
It has been asked whether, although someone touches nothing of the paternal inheritance, yet on account of the father’s will he has or does something, he is compelled to answer the father’s creditors: for instance, if he has been substituted to a minor. In which case Julian, in the twenty-sixth book of the Digest, wrote that he falls under the edict if he has intermeddled with the minor’s inheritance; for he who has attacked the parent’s judgment ought not to obtain anything from the same inheritance. But Marcellus elegantly distinguishes that it makes much difference whether he was instituted heir as to the whole (ex asse) in the father’s testament or as to a part, so that, if as to a part, he could, with the father’s succession set aside, embrace the minor’s inheritance without fear.
Iulianus libro vicesimo sexto digestorum scripsit, si pupillus paterna hereditate se abstinuisset, deinde ei aliquis heres exstitisset, non esse eum compellendum creditoribus paternis respondere, nisi substitutus ei fuit: inclinat enim in hoc, ut putet substitutum etiam patris onera subiturum. quae sententia a Marcello recte notata est: impugnat enim utilitatem pupilli, qui ipse saltem potest habere successorem: metu enim onerum patris timidius quis etiam impuberis hereditatem adibit. alioquin, inquit, et si frater fuit, omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possidebit hereditatem et quidem impune: nec enim videtur voluisse fraudare edictum, qui sibi prospicit, ne oneribus patris pupilli hereditas implicaretur.
Julian wrote in the twenty-sixth book of the Digest, that if a ward had abstained from the paternal inheritance, and thereafter some heir had arisen to him, he is not to be compelled to answer the father’s creditors, unless a substitute had been appointed for him: for he inclines to this, to think that the substitute would also undergo the father’s burdens. Which opinion was rightly noted by Marcellus: for it impugns the utility of the ward, who at least can himself have a successor: for fear of the father’s burdens one will more timidly enter even upon the inheritance of the minor. Otherwise, he says, even if it were a brother, setting aside the matter of the testament, he will possess the inheritance ab intestato, and indeed with impunity: for he does not seem to have wished to defraud the edict, who looks out for himself, lest the ward’s inheritance be entangled with the father’s burdens.
Si in societate, quam vivo patre inchoaverat, filius post mortem patris perseveraverit, iulianus recte distinguit interesse, utrum rem coeptam sub patre perficit an novam inchoavit: nam si quid novum in societate inchoavit, non videri miscuisse hereditati patris scripsit.
If in the partnership which he had begun while his father was alive the son has continued after the father’s death, Julianus rightly distinguishes that it makes a difference whether he completes the matter begun under his father or has started something new: for if he has initiated anything new in the partnership, he wrote that he is not considered to have commingled it with his father’s inheritance.
Proponebatur filius a patre de castrensi peculio servos comparasse eosque a patre manumittere rogatus, cum heres esset ab eo institutus: quaerebatur, si se abstinuisset paterna hereditate eosque manumisisset, an miscuisse se paternae hereditati videatur. dicebamus, nisi evidenter quasi heres manumiserit, non debere eum calumniam pati, quasi se miscuerit hereditati.
It was proposed that a son, from his castrense peculium, had purchased slaves and had been asked by his father to manumit them, since he had been instituted heir by him: the question was, if he had abstained from the paternal inheritance and manumitted them, whether he would seem to have commingled himself with the paternal inheritance. We said that, unless he evidently manumitted as if in the capacity of heir, he ought not to suffer the calumny as though he had commingled himself with the inheritance.
Quotiens pupillus patri heres exstitit et abstinet se hereditate, quamvis patris bona sub creditoribus fiant, tamen rata haberi debent, quaecumque pupillus bona fide gesserit: et ideo ei, qui fundum tutore auctore a pupillo emerit, succurrendum erit: nec interest, pupillus solvendo sit nec ne.
Whenever a ward has become heir to his father and abstains from the inheritance, although the father’s goods fall under the creditors, nevertheless whatever the ward has transacted in good faith ought to be held ratified; and therefore aid must be afforded to him who has bought an estate from the ward with the tutor’s authorization; nor does it matter whether the ward is solvent or not.
Et quod a quibusdam respondetur, si liber homo, qui bona fide mihi serviebat, propter me heres institutus erit, posse eum iussu meo adire hereditatem, potest verum esse, ut intellegatur non opera sua mihi adquirere, sed ex re mea, sicut in stipulando et per traditionem accipiendo ex re mea mihi adquirat.
And as some respond, if a free man, who was serving me in good faith, is instituted heir on my account, he can, by my order, enter upon the inheritance; this can be true, so that it is understood that he is not acquiring for me by his own effort, but from my property, just as in stipulating and in receiving by tradition he acquires for me from my property.
Cum falsum testamentum diceretur, si quidem ipse heres accusaretur, quoniam certus esse debeat se falsum non fecisse, recte adibit hereditatem: sin autem alius argueretur citra conscientiam eius, non potest adire, quasi dubitet verum esse testamentum.
When a testament was said to be forged, if indeed the heir himself were accused, since he ought to be certain that he did not commit forgery, he will rightly enter upon the inheritance; but if someone else were charged without his knowledge, he cannot enter, as though he were in doubt that the testament is true.
Si quis alicui mandaverit, ut, si aestimaverit, peteret sibi bonorum possessionem, et postquam ille petit, furere coeperit, nihilo minus adquisita est ei bonorum possessio. quod si antequam ille petat, is qui mandavit petendum furere coeperit, dicendum est non statim ei adquisitam bonorum possessionem: igitur bonorum possessionis petitio ratihabitione debet confirmari.
If someone has mandated to another that, if he has judged it, he should petition for bonorum possessio for him, and after he petitions he begins to be insane, nonetheless bonorum possessio has been acquired for him. But if, before he petitions, the one who mandated the petitioning begins to be insane, it must be said that bonorum possessio is not immediately acquired for him: therefore the petition for bonorum possessio ought to be confirmed by ratihabition.
Filius familias heres scriptus patrem suum certiorem fecerat videri sibi solvendo esse hereditatem: pater rescripserat sibi parum idoneam renuntiari itaque debere eum diligentius explorare et ita adire, si idoneam comperisset: filius acceptis litteris patris adiit hereditatem: dubitatum est, an recte adisset. probabilius diceretur, quamdiu persuasum ei non sit solvendo esse hereditatem, patrem non obligasse.
A son in the family, instituted as heir, had informed his father that the inheritance seemed to him to be solvent: the father had written back that it was being reported to him as not quite suitable, and that therefore he ought to investigate more diligently and then enter upon it, if he had found it suitable: the son, after receiving his father’s letter, entered upon the inheritance: it was doubted whether he had entered rightly. It would be said more probably that, so long as he was not persuaded that the inheritance was solvent, the father had not bound him.
Cum heres institutus erat filius et habebat patrem furiosum, in cuius erat potestate, interponere se suam benivolentiam divus pius rescripsit, ut, si filius familias adierit, perinde habeatur atque si pater familias adisset, permisitque ei et servos hereditatis manumittere.
When a son had been instituted heir and had a father who was insane, in whose power he was, the deified Pius wrote back by rescript that he would interpose his benevolence, so that, if the filius familias should enter upon the inheritance, it be held just as if the paterfamilias had entered; and he also permitted him to manumit the slaves of the inheritance.
Qui ex parte heres institutus est pure, ex parte sub condicione solus, etiam pendente condicione, si adierit hereditatem, ex asse heres erit, quia solus heres futurus est omnimodo, nisi habeat in condicionalem partem substitutum.
He who has been instituted heir in part purely, and in part under a condition as sole, even while the condition is pending, if he enters upon the inheritance, will be heir for the whole (ex asse), because he is in every way going to be the sole heir, unless he has a substitute appointed for the conditional part.
Cum hereditate patris necessarius heres se abstineat, condicio coheredi sive suo sive extraneo defertur, ut aut totam adgnoscat aut a toto recedat, et ita se abstinere potest propter alium, qui per suam personam non poterat. si tamen creditores dicant se contentos esse eius portione, quia non potest exonerari, nisi deferatur condicio, et alterius parte abstinere se creditores debent, ut eius actiones ei qui convenitur dentur.
When, in his father’s inheritance, a necessary heir abstains, the condition is tendered to the coheir, whether his own or an outsider, so that he either accept the whole or recede from the whole; and thus he is able to abstain on account of another, who by his own person could not. If, however, the creditors say that they are content with his portion—because he cannot be exonerated unless the condition is tendered—then the creditors ought to abstain from the other’s share, so that his actions be given to him who is sued.
Necessariis heredibus non solum impuberibus, sed etiam puberibus abstinendi se ab hereditate proconsul potestatem facit, ut, quamvis creditoribus hereditariis iure civili teneantur, tamen in eos actio non detur, si velint derelinquere hereditatem. sed impuberibus quidem, etiamsi se immiscuerint hereditati, praestat abstinendi facultatem, puberibus autem ita, si se non immiscuerint.
To necessary heirs, not only underage but also of age, the proconsul grants the power to abstain from the inheritance, so that, although by civil law they are held to the hereditary creditors, nevertheless no action is given against them if they wish to abandon the inheritance. But to the underage, even if they have intermeddled with the inheritance, he affords the faculty of abstaining; to those of age, however, only if they have not intermeddled.
Sed tamen et puberibus minoribus viginti quinque annis, si temere damnosam hereditatem parentis appetierint, ex generali edicto quod est de minoribus viginti quinque annis succurrit, cum et si extranei damnosam hereditatem adierint, ex ea parte edicti in integrum eos restituit.
Yet even for those who have reached puberty but are under twenty-five years, if they have rashly entered upon a damaging inheritance of a parent, relief is afforded by the general edict which concerns minors under twenty-five years; since even if extraneous persons have entered upon a damaging inheritance, from that part of the edict it restores them in integrum.
Qui patri heres exstitit si idem filio impuberi substitutus est, non potest hereditatem eius praetermittere: quod sic recipiendum est etiam si vivo pupillo mortuus erit, deinde pupillus impubes decesserit. nam is qui heres exstiterit pupillo quoque heres necessario erit: nam si ipsum invitum obligat, coniungi eam paternae hereditati et adcrescendi iure adquiri cuicumque patris heredi existimandum est.
He who has stood forth as heir to the father, if the same has been substituted to the underage son, cannot pretermit that one’s inheritance: which is to be received thus even if, with the ward still alive, he shall have died, and thereafter the underage ward has deceased. For he who has become heir will also of necessity be heir to the ward: for since it obligates him even unwilling, it is to be considered that it is conjoined to the paternal inheritance and, by a right of accretion, acquired by whoever is the father’s heir.
Filium emancipatum pater solum heredem instituit et, si is heres non esset, servum liberum et heredem esse iusserat: filius, tamquam pater demens fuisset, bonorum possessionem ab intestato petit et ita hereditatem possedit. labeo ait, si probaretur sana mente pater testamentum fecisse, filium ex testamento patri heredem esse. hoc falsum puto: nam filius emancipatus cum hereditatem testamento datam ad se pertinere noluit, continuo ea ad substitutum heredem transit nec potest videri pro herede gessisse, qui, ut hereditatem omitteret, ex alia parte edicti possessionem bonorum petat.
The father appointed his emancipated son as sole heir, and, if he should not be heir, had ordered that his slave be free and heir; the son, as if the father had been insane, sought bonorum possessio from intestacy and thus possessed the inheritance. labeo says that, if it were proved that the father made the testament in sound mind, the son would be heir to his father under the testament. I think this is false: for since the emancipated son did not wish the inheritance given by the testament to pertain to himself, immediately it passes to the substitute heir, nor can he be seen to have acted as heir, who, in order to omit the inheritance, seeks bonorum possessio from another part of the edict.
Antistius labeo ait, si ita institutus sit " si iuraverit, heres esto", quamvis iuraverit, non tamen eum statim heredem futurum, antequam pro herede aliquid gesserit, quia iurando voluntatem magis suam declarasse videatur. ego puto satis eum pro herede gessisse, si ut heres iuraverit: proculus idem, eoque iure utimur.
Antistius Labeo says that, if one has been instituted thus, "if he shall have sworn, let him be heir," although he has sworn, nevertheless he will not immediately be heir before he has done something as heir, because by swearing he seems rather to have declared his will. I think he has acted sufficiently as heir if he has sworn as heir; Proculus says the same, and we use this rule.
Servus communis ab extero heres institutus si iussu unius adierit hereditatem, non pro maiore parte interim heredem eum facit, quam pro dominica, deinde ceteris sociis non iubentibus tacito iure partes ei adcrescunt.
A common slave, instituted as heir by an outsider, if at the order of one (co-owner) he enters upon the inheritance, does not meanwhile make him heir for a greater part than according to his proprietary share; thereafter, the other partners not giving an order, the shares accrue to him by tacit right.
Cum solus servus heres institutus sit, sicut licet uno tempore omnium dominorum iussu adire hereditatem, ita et separatis temporibus singulorum iussu recte adit: nam quia saepius adit, non ex testamento, sed ex iure dominorum venire utilitatis causa videtur, ne alterius festinatione alterius ius laedatur.
When a slave alone has been instituted heir, just as it is permitted at one time to enter upon the inheritance by the order of all the masters, so too at separate times he rightly enters by the command of each individually: for because he enters more often, he seems to come not from the testament, but from the ius of the masters for the sake of utility, lest by the haste of one the right of another be injured.
Quamdiu institutus admitti potest, substituto locus non est nec ante succedere potest quam excluso herede instituto. eveniet igitur, ut necessarium sit remedium praetoris et circa denegandas primo actiones et circa praestituendum tempus substituto, quia intra diem primo praestitutum neque adire hereditatem potest neque pro herede gerere. is autem, qui tertio gradu scriptus est, si primo deliberante secundus decedat, ipse potest succedere.
So long as the instituted heir can be admitted, there is no place for the substitute, nor can he succeed before the instituted heir has been excluded. It will therefore come about that the praetor’s remedy is necessary both as to denying actions at the outset and as to prescribing a time to the substitute, because within the day first prescribed he can neither enter upon the inheritance nor act as heir. But he who is written in the third degree, if, while the first is deliberating, the second dies, he himself can succeed.
In plurium heredum gradibus hoc servandum est, ut, si testamentum proferatur, prius a scriptis incipiatur, deinde transitus fiat ad eos ad quos legitima hereditas pertinet, etiamsi idem sit, ad quem utroque modo pertineat: nam hoc gradatim consequitur, ut prius ex testamento delatam, deinde legitimam repudiet. idem iuris est in bonorum possessione, ut prius scriptus repellat bonorum possessionem, deinde is qui ab intestato petere potest.
In the tiers of multiple heirs this must be observed: that, if a testament is produced, one should begin first with those written in, then a transition should be made to those to whom the legitimate inheritance pertains, even if it is the same person to whom it pertains in either way; for this follows step by step, that he first repudiates the inheritance delated from the testament, then the legitimate [inheritance]. The same law holds in bonorum possessio: that first the written-in heir refuses the bonorum possessio, then the one who can seek it ab intestato.
Si servum quis alienum ab hostibus redemerit et heredem eum cum libertate instituerit, magis puto fore eum liberum et necessarium heredem: nam cum scribit ei libertatem, vinculo suo resolvit. et in hoc solum redit iure postliminii, ut non iterum servus eius fiat, cuius erat antequam caperetur ( hoc enim satis impium est), sed ut pristino domino suam aestimationem omnimodo offerat vel maneat ei obligatus, donec pretium solvat: quod libertatis favore introductum est.
If someone has ransomed another’s slave from the enemy and has instituted him as heir with liberty, I am rather of the opinion that he will be free and a necessary heir: for when he writes liberty for him, he loosens him from his own bond. And in this alone he returns by the right of postliminy, that he does not again become the slave of him whose he was before he was captured ( for this is quite impious), but that he in every way offer his valuation to his former master or remain obligated to him until he pays the price: which has been introduced in favor of liberty.
Si quis hac lege emptus sit, ut intra certum diem manumittatur, et cum libertate heres institutus sit, an ei succurrendum sit, ut se abstineat, videamus. magisque est, ut, donec dies non exstiterit, possit ei necessarius heres effici et non possit sese abstinere: sin autem dies praeteritus fuerit, tunc non necessarius, sed voluntarius heres efficitur et potest se abstinere secundum exemplum eius, cui fideicommissaria libertas sub condicione debebatur.
If someone has been bought on this term, that he be manumitted within a fixed day, and has been instituted heir together with liberty, let us see whether aid should be afforded him, that he may abstain. And the sounder view is that, until the day has arrived, he can be made a necessary heir and cannot abstain himself; but if the day has passed, then he becomes not a necessary but a voluntary heir and can abstain, according to the precedent of one to whom fideicommissary liberty was owed under a condition.
Amovere non videtur, qui non callido animo nec maligno rem reposuit: ne is quidem, qui in re erravit, dum putat non esse hereditariam. si igitur non animo amovendi, nec ut hereditati damnum det, rem abstulit, sed dum putat non esse hereditariam, dicendum est eum amovisse non videri.
He does not seem to have removed, who, not with a crafty mind nor a malign one, took the thing back; not even he who erred in the matter, while he supposes it not to be hereditary. Therefore, if not with the intention of removing, nor in order to give loss to the inheritance, he took the thing away, but while he thinks it is not hereditary, it must be said that he does not seem to have removed.
Haec verba edicti ad eum pertinent, qui ante quid amovit, deinde se abstinet: ceterum si ante se abstinuit, deinde tunc amovit, hic videamus an edicto locus sit. magisque est, ut putem istic sabini sententiam admittendam, scilicet ut furti potius actione creditoribus teneatur: etenim qui semel se abstinuit, quemadmodum ex post delicto obligatur?
These words of the edict pertain to him who first removed something, then abstains: however, if he first abstained, and then removed something, let us see whether there is room for the edict here. And I am rather of the view that Sabinus’s opinion should be admitted here, namely, that he is held to the creditors rather by an action for theft: for he who has once abstained, how is he bound by a subsequent delict?
Si quis heres ita scriptus fuerit, ut intra certum tempus adeat hereditatem et, si non ita adierit, alius ei substituatur, prior autem heres antequam adiret decesserit: nemo dubitat, quin substitutus ultimum diem aditionis exspectare non solet.
If someone has been instituted as heir on the condition that he enter upon the inheritance within a fixed time, and that, if he does not so enter, another be substituted for him, and the prior heir has died before entering: no one doubts that the substitute does not have to wait for the last day for entry.
De eo, qui heres institutus ab aliquo dubitat, an libertas ei ex testamento domini optigerit, cum nesciat condicionem libertatis exstitisse vel hereditatem aditam, an adeundo heres fiat, videndum. iulianus hunc diceret fieri heredem.
concerning the one who, having been instituted heir by someone, is in doubt whether liberty has fallen to him from his master’s testament, since he does not know whether the condition of the liberty has come to pass or whether the inheritance has been entered upon, it must be considered whether by entering upon it he becomes heir. julian would say that this man becomes heir.
Ex semisse titius heres scriptus est: quadrantis bonorum possessionem per errorem petit. quaero, an nihil actum sit an vero perinde omnia servanda sint, ac si quadrans nominatus non sit. respondit magis nihil actum esse, quemadmodum cum ex semisse scriptus heres ex quadrante per errorem adiit hereditatem.
Appointed heir from a half share, Titius by error seeks possession of the goods for a quarter. I ask whether nothing has been effected, or rather whether everything should be maintained just as if the quarter had not been named. He responded that rather nothing has been effected, just as when an heir written from a half share entered upon the inheritance from a quarter by mistake.
Si tu ex parte sexta sub condicione institutus fuisses heres et omittente partem suam titio, cui substitutus eras, ex substitutione adisses, deinde condicio iure sextantis exstitisset, quaero, an adire necesse habueris, ne sextans tuus intereat. respondit: nihil interest, utrum ex substitutione prius adierim an ex prima institutione, cum ab utraque causa una aditio sufficiat: sextans itaque, qui sub condicione datus mihi est, ad me solum pertinet.
If you had been instituted heir as to a one-sixth share under a condition, and, with Titius—whom you had as substitute—omitting his share, you had entered by virtue of the substitution, then the condition had come to pass in right of the one-sixth, I ask whether you were obliged to enter, lest your one-sixth perish. He replied: it makes no difference whether I first entered by substitution or by the original institution, since a single entry from either cause suffices; therefore the one-sixth which was given to me under the condition pertains to me alone.
Item si tu sextantis, ex quo institutus esses heres, omiseris actionem, numquid dubitas, quin ex substitutione adeundo titianae partis habiturus partem esses? respondit: non dubito, quin, si prima institutione adeundo heres esse possim, in potestate mea sit, quam partem hereditatis aut amittere velim aut vindicare.
Likewise, if you, a sextans-heir, were to omit the action, do you have any doubt that, by going over to the substitution, you would have a share of the Titian portion? He responded: I do not doubt that, if by entering upon the first institution I can be heir, it is in my power what part of the inheritance I am willing either to lose or to vindicate.
Illud dubitari potest, an, si, cum testamento heres institutus essem ab eo, qui etiamsi intestatus decessisset, legitima hereditas eius ad me pertineret, an simul utramque hereditatem repudiare possim, quoniam antequam ex testamento hereditatem repudiarim, legitima nondum ad me pertinet. verum eodem momento intellegor et ex testamento et legitimam repudiare, sicuti, si legitimam velim ad me pertinere, cum sciam testamento mihi relictam, videbor ante repudiare testamentum et ita legitimam adquisisse.
It can be questioned whether, if I had been instituted heir by testament by one whose legitimate inheritance would pertain to me even if he had died intestate, I can repudiate both inheritances at the same time, since before I repudiate the inheritance under the testament, the legitimate has not yet pertained to me. But I am understood at the same moment to repudiate both the testamentary and the legitimate, just as, if I should wish the legitimate to pertain to me, when I know that a testamentary inheritance has been left to me, I shall be deemed first to repudiate the testament and thus to have acquired the legitimate.
Duo fratres fuerant, bona communia habuerant: eorum alter intestato mortuus suum heredem non reliquerat: frater qui supererat nolebat ei heres esse: consulebat, num ob eam rem, quod communibus, cum sciret eum mortuum esse, usus esset, hereditati se alligasset. respondit, nisi eo consilio usus esset, quod vellet se heredem esse, non adstringi. itaque cavere debet, ne qua in re plus sua parte dominationem interponeret.
There were two brothers, they had held goods in common: one of them had died intestate and had not left his own heir: the brother who survived did not wish to be his heir: he consulted whether, on account of the fact that, since the goods were common, after he knew that he was dead, he had used them, he had thereby bound himself to the inheritance. He responded that, unless he had used them with the intention that he wished to be the heir, he was not bound. And so he ought to take care not to exercise dominion beyond his share in any matter.
Placet, quotiens adquiritur per aliquem hereditas vel quid aliud ei cuius quis in potestate est, confestim adquiri ei cuius est in potestate, neque momento aliquo subsistere in persona eius per quem adquiritur et sic adquiri ei cui adquiritur.
It is settled that whenever an inheritance or anything else is acquired through someone for the one in whose power he is, it is immediately acquired by the one in whose power he is, nor does it subsist for any moment in the person through whom it is acquired, and thus it is acquired by the one for whom it is acquired.
Item si servus meus ex parte heres institutus sit pure, ex parte sub condicione, dato scilicet coherede, et iussu meo adierit, deinde eo manumisso condicio alterius portionis exstiterit, verius est non mihi esse adquisitam illam portionem, sed ipsum comitari: omnia enim paria permanere debent in id tempus, quo alterius portionis condicio exstet, ut adquiratur ei, cui prior portio adquisita est.
Likewise, if my slave has been instituted heir as to one part purely, and as to another part under condition, a co-heir having been given, and he has, by my order, entered upon the inheritance; then, after he has been manumitted, when the condition of the other portion has come to pass, the truer view is that that portion has not been acquired for me, but attends him: for all things ought to remain equal until the time when the condition of the other portion comes into existence, so that it may be acquired for him to whom the prior portion was acquired.
Si servus eius qui capere non potest heres instituatur et antequam iussu domini adeat hereditatem, manumissus alienatusve sit et nihil in fraudem legis factum esset, ipse admittitur ad hereditatem. sed et si partem capere possit dominus eius, eandem dicenda sunt de parte, quam ille capere non potest: nihil enim interest, de universo quaeratur quod capere non possit an de portione.
If the slave of one who cannot take is instituted as heir, and before, by his master’s order, he enters upon the inheritance, he has been manumitted or alienated, and nothing has been done in fraud of the law, he himself is admitted to the inheritance. But also, if his master can take a part, the same is to be said concerning the part which that man cannot take: for it makes no difference whether the inquiry is about the whole which he cannot take or about a portion.
Ventre praeterito si filius qui fuit emancipatus aut exter heres institutus sit, quamdiu rumpi testamentum potest, non defertur ex testamento hereditas. sed si vacuo ventre mulier fuit et incerto eo filius in familia retentus vita decessit, heres fuisse intellegitur: emancipatus aut exter non aliter possunt hereditatem quaerere, quam si non esse praegnatem sciant. ergo si ventre pleno sit mulier, nonne iniquum erit interea defunctum filium heredi suo relinquere nihil?
If, with the (possible) pregnancy passed over, a son who had been emancipated or an outsider has been instituted heir, so long as the testament can be broken, the inheritance is not devolved under the testament. But if the woman had an empty womb, and while that was uncertain a son retained in the family died, he is understood to have been heir: an emancipated son or an outsider can seek the inheritance only if they know that she is not pregnant. Therefore, if the woman has a full womb, will it not be inequitable, in the meantime, to leave the deceased son’s own heir nothing?
Pannonius avitus cum in cilicia procuraret heres institutus ante vita decesserat, quam heredem se institutum cognosceret. quia bonorum possessionem, quam procurator eius petierat, heredes aviti ratam habere non potuerant, ex persona defuncti restitutionem in integrum implorabant, quae stricto iure non competit, quia intra diem aditionis avitus obisset. divum tamen pium contra constituisse maecianus libro quaestionum refert in eo, qui legationis causa romae erat et filium, qui matris delatam possessionem absens amiserat, sine respectu eius distinctionis restitutionem locum habere.
Pannonius Avitus, while he was serving as procurator in Cilicia, having been instituted heir, died before he learned that he had been instituted heir. Because the bonorum possessio which his procurator had sought the heirs of Avitus were not able to ratify, they implored restitutio in integrum on the footing of the deceased’s person, which does not obtain by strict law, since Avitus had died within the day for adition. Nevertheless Maecianus, in the book of Questions, reports that the deified Pius established the contrary: that in the case of one who was at Rome on account of a legation, and of a son who, being absent, had lost the possession tendered in respect of his mother, restitution has place without regard to that distinction.
Eum bonis patris se miscere convenit, qui remoto familiae vinculo pro herede gerere videtur. et ideo filius, qui tamquam ex bonis matris, cuius hereditatem suscepit, agrum ad hereditatem patris pertinentem ut maternum ignorans possedit, abstinendi consilium, quod in bonis patris tenuit, amisisse non videtur.
It is agreed that he has mingled himself with the father’s goods who, the bond of the family having been removed, seems to act as heir. And therefore a son who, as though from the goods of his mother—whose inheritance he has undertaken—possessed a field pertaining to the father’s inheritance, in ignorance as if it were maternal, does not appear to have lost the counsel of abstention which he maintained in respect to the father’s goods.
Gerit pro herede, qui animo adgnoscit successionem, licet nihil attingat hereditarium. unde et si domum pignori datam sicut hereditariam retinuit, cuius possessio qualisqualis fuit in hereditate, pro herede gerere videtur: idemque est et si alienam rem ut hereditariam possedisset.
He acts as heir who by intention recognizes the succession, although he touches nothing of the inheritance. Whence also, if he has retained as if hereditary a house given in pledge—whose possession, such as it was, was in the inheritance—he is deemed to act as heir; and the same holds even if he had possessed another’s thing as if hereditary.
Idem respondit, si iussu avi nepos patris, qui de castrensi peculio testamentum fecit, hereditatem adisset, adquisisse ei ea de quibus pater testari potest, quia castrensia esse mutatione personae desierint.
The same responded that, if by the order of the grandfather the grandson, under his father who made a testament concerning the castrense peculium, should have entered upon the inheritance, he has acquired for him those things about which the father can make a will, because by a mutation of person they have ceased to be castrense.
Filius familias duxit uxorem: ea filiis sublatis intestata decessit: filii iussu patris, non avi adierunt hereditatem: quaero, an avo adquisita sit hereditas. paulus respondit secundum ea quae proponuntur nihil actum esse.
a son under paternal power took a wife: she, after the children had been taken up, died intestate: the sons, by the order of their father, not of their grandfather, entered upon the inheritance: I ask whether the inheritance has been acquired for the grandfather. paulus responded that, according to what is set forth, nothing has been done.
Clodius clodianus facto prius testamento postea eundem heredem in alio testamento inutiliter facto instituerat: scriptus heres cum posterius putaret valere, ex eo hereditatem adire voluit, sed postea hoc inutile repertum est. papinianus putabat repudiasse eum ex priore hereditatem, ex posteriore autem non posse adire. dicebam non repudiare eum, qui putaret posterius valere.
Clodius Clodianus, having first made a testament, later had instituted the same heir in another testament made ineffectually: the named heir, since he supposed the later one to be valid, wished to enter upon the inheritance under it, but afterward this was found to be invalid. Papinian thought that he had repudiated the inheritance under the earlier, but could not enter under the later. I said that the one who thought the later to be valid does not repudiate.
Quae neptis suae nomine, quam ex seia habebat, sempronio tot dotis nomine spoponderat et pro usuris in exhibitionem certam summam praestabat, decessit relicta seia filia et aliis heredibus: cum quibus sempronius iudicio egit condemnatique pro portionibus hereditariis singuli heredes, inter quos et seia, sempronio caverunt summam, qua quisque condemnatus erat usuris isdem, quae ad exhibitionem a testatrice praestabantur: postea excepta seia filia ceteri heredes abstinuerunt hereditate beneficio principis et tota hereditas ad seiam pertinere coepit. quaero, an in seiam, quae sola heres remansit et omnia ut sola heres erat, pro eorum quoque portionibus, qui beneficio principali hereditate abstinuerint, utilis actio dari debeat. respondit pro parte eorum, qui se abstinuissent, actiones solere decerni in eam, quae adisset et maluisset integra hereditaria onera subire.
She, in the name of her granddaughter (whom she had from seia), had promised to sempronius a certain amount as dowry, and for interest she was providing a fixed sum for maintenance (exhibitio). She died, seia her daughter and other heirs being left; with them sempronius brought suit, and the several heirs—among whom also seia—having been condemned in proportion to their hereditary shares, gave security to sempronius for the sum for which each had been condemned, with the same interest which had been provided by the testatrix for maintenance (exhibitio). Afterwards, seia the daughter excepted, the other heirs abstained from the inheritance by the benefit of the princeps, and the entire inheritance began to pertain to seia. I ask whether, against seia, who remained the sole heir and held everything as sole heir, there ought to be granted a useful action also for the portions of those who, by imperial beneficium, have abstained from the inheritance. He replied that, for the share of those who had abstained, actions are wont to be decreed against her who had entered upon the estate and preferred to undergo the entire hereditary burdens.
Aristo in decretis frontianis ita refert: cum duae filiae patri necessariae heredes exstitissent, altera se paterna abstinuerat hereditate, altera bona paterna vindicare totumque onus suscipere parata erat. sanctum cassium praetorem causa cognita actiones hereditarias utiles daturum recte pollicitum ei, quae ad hereditatem patris accesserat denegaturumque ei quae se abstinuerat.
Aristo, in the Frontinian Decrees, thus relates: when two daughters had emerged as necessary heirs to their father, one had abstained from the paternal inheritance, the other was prepared to vindicate the paternal goods and to assume the whole burden. The praetor Sanctus Cassius, the case having been examined, had rightly promised that he would grant the useful hereditary actions to her who had acceded to the father’s inheritance, and would deny them to her who had abstained.
Si dubitetur, utrum vivat an decesserit is, cuius quis quod ad causam testamenti pertinet inspici describique postulat, dicendum est praetorem causa cognita statuere id debere, ut, si liquerit eum vivere, non permittat.
If it is doubtful whether he lives or has deceased, the person with respect to whom someone requests that, as pertains to the testamentary cause, it be inspected and transcribed, it must be said that the praetor, the cause having been examined, ought to determine this: that, if it has become clear that he is living, he should not permit it.
Si quis non negans apud se tabulas esse non patiatur inspici et describi, omnimodo ad hoc compelletur: si tamen neget penes se tabulas esse, dicendum est ad interdictum rem mitti quod est de tabulis exhibendis.
If someone, not denying that he has the tablets in his possession, does not allow them to be inspected and transcribed, he will by all means be compelled to this; but if he denies that the tablets are in his possession, it must be said that the matter is to be referred to the interdict which is for the exhibiting of tablets.
Sed si quis ex signatoribus aberit, mitti debent tabulae testamenti ubi ipse sit, uti agnoscat: nam revocari eum adgnoscendi causa onerosum est. quippe saepe cum magna captione a rebus nostris revocamur et sit iniquum damnosum cuique esse officium suum. nec ad rem pertinet, unus absit an omnes.
But if any one of the signatories is absent, the testamentary tablets ought to be sent to wherever he is, so that he may acknowledge them; for to have him recalled for the sake of acknowledgment is onerous. Indeed, we are often recalled from our affairs with great detriment, and it is iniquitous that one’s own duty be damaging to him. Nor does it pertain to the matter whether one is absent or all.
and if by chance, with all absent, some cause should urge that the tablets be opened, the proconsul ought to take care that, with men of the best reputation intervening, they be opened, and after the instrument has been transcribed and recognized by those same men in whose presence they were opened, let them be sealed; then thereafter let them be sent to the place where the signatories themselves are, for the inspection of their own seals.
Praetor voluntates defunctorum tuetur et eorum calliditati occurrit, qui omissa causa testamenti ab intestato hereditatem partemve eius possident ad hoc, ut eos circumveniant, quibus quid ex iudicio defuncti deberi potuit, si non ab intestato possideretur hereditas, et in eos actionem pollicetur.
The praetor safeguards the wills of the deceased and counters the cunning of those who, with the testamentary cause set aside, possess the inheritance, or a part of it, from intestacy for this purpose: to circumvent those to whom something could have been owed by the judgment of the deceased, if the inheritance were not possessed ab intestato; and he promises an action against them.
Qui sunt in potestate statim heredes sunt ex testamento nec quod se abstinere possunt, quicquam facit. quod si postea miscuerunt, ex testamento videntur heredes: nisi si abstinuerint quidem se testamento, verum ab intestato petierint bonorum possessionem: hic enim incident in edictum.
Those who are in his power are immediately heirs under the testament, nor does the fact that they can abstain make any difference. But if afterwards they have mingled, they are deemed heirs under the testament—unless indeed they have abstained themselves from the testament, but have sought bonorum possession from intestacy; for here they fall under the edict.
Qui sub condicione institutus heres potuit parere condicioni nec paruit, cum condicio talis sit, ut in arbitrio sit heredis instituti, deinde ab intestato possideat hereditatem, debebit edicto teneri, quia eiusmodi condicio pro pura debet haberi.
One who, instituted heir under a condition, was able to comply with the condition and did not comply, when the condition is of such a kind that it lies within the discretion of the instituted heir, and then possesses the inheritance by intestacy, ought to be bound by the edict, because a condition of this sort ought to be considered as pure.
Non quaerimus, qui praetermissa causa testamenti ab intestato hereditatem possideant, utrum iure legitimo possideant an non: nam quoquo iure possideant hereditatem vel partem eius, conveniri ex edicto poterunt, utique si non ex alia causa possideant: ut puta si quis omisit quidem hereditatem, sed ex causa fideicommissi possidet missus in possessionem fideicommissorum servandorum causa: vel si proponas eum crediti servandi causa venisse in possessionem: nam nec ex hac causa legatariis respondere cogetur. totiens igitur edictum praetoris locum habebit, quotiens aut quasi heres legitimus possidet aut quia bonorum possessionem accipit ab intestato aut si forte quasi praedo possideat hereditatem fingens sibi aliquem titulum ab intestato possessionis: quocumque enim modo hereditatem lucrifacturus quis sit, legata praestabit, sane interveniente cautione " evicta hereditate legata reddi".
We do not inquire, in the case of those who, the testamentary ground having been passed over, possess the inheritance ab intestato, whether they possess by legitimate right or not: for by whatever right they possess the inheritance or a part of it, they can be sued under the edict, at any rate if they do not possess from some other cause: for instance, if someone has indeed omitted the inheritance, but possesses by reason of a fideicommissum, having been put into possession for the sake of preserving the fideicommissa; or if you suppose him to have come into possession for the sake of preserving a credit: for on this ground either he will not be compelled to answer to the legatees. Therefore the praetor’s edict will have application as often as either he possesses as though he were a legitimate heir, or because he receives bonorum possessio ab intestato, or if perchance he possesses the inheritance as a sort of depredator, feigning to himself some title of intestate possession: for in whatever way someone is going to make gain of the inheritance, he shall furnish the legacies, provided that security intervenes, " the inheritance being evicted, the legacies to be returned".
Sane quaestionis fuit, utrum is demum dolo malo facere videatur quo minus possideat, qui per dolum eam possessionem dimittat, quam aliquando habuit, an vero is quoque, qui hoc ipsum malitiose fecit, ne ab initio possidere inciperet. labeo sibi videri ait non minus delinquere eum, qui non incipiat possidere, quam eum qui desinat: quae sententia optinet.
Indeed it was a matter of question whether he is to be deemed to act with dolus malus so that he does not possess, who through deceit abandons that possession which he once had; or whether he too is so regarded who has maliciously done this very thing, in order not to begin to possess from the outset. Labeo says that it seems to him that he is no less in delict who does not begin to possess than he who ceases: which opinion prevails.
Licet pro herede gerere non videatur, qui pretio accepto praetermisit hereditatem, tamen dandam in eum actionem exemplo eius, qui omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possidet hereditatem, divus hadrianus rescripsit: proinde legatariis et fideicommissariis tenebitur.
Although he does not seem to be acting as heir, who, after receiving a price, has passed over the inheritance, nevertheless the Deified Hadrian rescripted that an action should be given against him, on the model of one who, the testamentary cause being omitted, possesses the inheritance ab intestato; accordingly, he will be liable to legatees and fideicommissaries.
Si pecuniam a substituto acceperis, ut praetermitteres, isque adierit, an danda sit legatariis actio, dubitari potest. et puto, si ipse quoque praetermiserit et, quod lege ad se rediret, possidebit hereditatem, in utrumque vestrum dandam, ut ei tamen, cui ab utroque legatum sit, in alterutrum detur actio.
If you were to receive money from the substitute in order to pass over, and he has entered, whether an action ought to be granted to the legatees may be doubted. And I think that, if he too has passed over, and (he) to whom by law it would revert will possess the inheritance, it should be granted against each of you; yet so that for him to whom a legacy has been left by both, the action be given against either one.
Si quis pecuniam non accepit, simpliciter autem omisit causam testamenti, dum vult praestitum ei qui substitutus est vel legitimo, numquid locus non sit edicto? plane indignandum est circumventam voluntatem defuncti: et ideo si liquido constiterit in necem legatariorum hoc factum, quamvis non pecunia accepta, sed nimia gratia collata, dicendum erit locum esse utili actioni adversus eum qui possidet hereditatem.
If someone did not take money, but simply abandoned the case concerning the testament, while wishing that it be granted to him who is substituted or to the lawful heir, is there perhaps no place for the edict? Clearly one must be indignant that the will (intention) of the deceased has been circumvented; and therefore, if it is plainly established that this was done to the ruin of the legatees, although not with money received, but through excessive favor bestowed, it must be said that there is room for a useful action against the one who possesses the inheritance.
Et recte dicetur, ubicumque quis, dum vult praestitum ei, qui se repudiante venturus est, non repudiaturus, nisi praestitum vellet, et maxime si ob evertenda iudicia id fecit, ibi dicendum est adversus possessorem competere actionem, sic tamen, ut, ubi quidem pecunia accepta repudiavit, ibi dicamus eum qui omisit conveniendum, ubi vero gratis, in fraudem tamen eorum quibus quid relictum est, possessorem debere conveniri utili actione.
And it will be rightly said that, wherever someone, while wishing a payment to be made to him who is going to come in upon his repudiating—not to one who would be not about to repudiate unless he wanted the payment—and especially if he did this for the purpose of overturning judgments, there it must be said that an action lies against the possessor; yet on this footing: that, where indeed, money having been accepted, he repudiated, there we say the one who omitted must be sued; but where it was done gratis, yet in fraud of those to whom something has been left, the possessor ought to be sued by a useful action.
Excusatus videtur patronus, qui institutionem praetermisit, cum aliter esset a liberto scriptus heres quam eum institui oportet: nam et si servus eius ex asse institutus fuerit et per quemcumque casum non potuerit iussu domini adire hereditatem, impune praetermittet ex testamento hereditatem.
The patron is considered excused who has omitted the institution, when he has been written as heir by his freedman otherwise than as he ought to be instituted: for even if his slave has been instituted heir for the whole share, and by whatever chance has not been able, by the master’s order, to enter upon the inheritance, he will with impunity pass over the inheritance under the testament.
Quia autem is qui ab intestato possidet hereditatem conveniri potest, si omittit causam testamenti, quaesitum est, si quasi ex voluntate testatoris videatur omisisse, an cogatur praestare. ut puta fratrem suum scripsit heredem et codicillos fecit ab intestato petitque a fratre, ut, si legitima hereditas ad eum pertinuerit, fideicommissa praestaret quibusdam: si igitur omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possideat hereditatem, videndum est, an legatariis cogatur respondere. et iulianus libro trigesimo primo digestorum scribit cogendum primum legata praestare, mox dimissis legatis si quid superfuerit ex dodrante, tunc fideicommissa cogi praestare: ceterum si legata absumant dodrantem, tunc nihil fideicommissariis praestandum: habere enim integrum quadrantem legitimum heredem oportet.
Because the one who possesses the inheritance ab intestato can be convened if he omits the cause of the testament, the question has been raised whether, if he seems to have omitted as if in accordance with the will of the testator, he is compelled to render. For instance, he wrote his brother as heir and made codicils, and he requests of his brother that, if the legitimate inheritance should pertain to him, he should furnish certain fideicommissa to some persons: if therefore, the cause of the testament having been omitted, he possesses the inheritance ab intestato, it is to be seen whether he is compelled to answer to the legatees. And Julian, in the thirty-first book of the Digest, writes that he must first be compelled to furnish the legacies, then, the legacies having been discharged, if anything shall remain of the dodrans, then he is to be compelled to furnish the fideicommissa; but if the legacies consume the dodrans, then nothing is to be furnished to the fideicommissaries; for the legitimate heir ought to have intact a quadrant.
Therefore the order applied by Julian is that legacies be rendered first, then, out of the surplus, the fideicommissa, provided that the quarter is not touched. I think Julian’s opinion is to be taken thus: if, the cause of the testament being omitted, he possesses the inheritance ab intestato, he is in any case compelled to discharge the legacies; for indeed he who leaves fideicommissa to be furnished by him ab intestato certainly did not permit him to omit the inheritance.
Quid deinde dicemus, is isdem et ex testamento legata et fideicommissa ab intestato fuerint relicta et praeterea aliis fideicommissa? an ordinem illum debeamus facere, quem iulianus monstrat, an vero contribuemus omnes fideicommissarios quasi aequales? et magis est, ut ita distinguamus multum interesse, utrum incidit in edictum heres an non.
What then shall we say, if to the same persons both legacies by testament and fideicommissa as on intestacy have been left, and, moreover, fideicommissa to others? Are we to adopt that order which Julian points out, or shall we instead make all the fideicommissaries contribute as though equals? And the better view is that we distinguish thus: it makes much difference whether the heir falls under the edict or not.
for if he does fall under it, those to whom certain things were left by testament must be preferred: but if he does not fall under it, either because this was the testator’s will, to grant him the capacity also of succeeding ab intestato, or because another cause intervened which, according to what is written above, does not offend the edict, it must be said that the fideicommissa ought to be brought into contribution as if equalized.
Non simpliciter autem praetor pollicitus est se daturum actionem, sed causa cognita: nam sive invenerit testatorem huius rei auctorem esse ipsumque permisisse ab intestato succedere aut si qua alia iusta causa omittendi intervenerit, utique non dabit actionem in eum legatorum.
But the praetor did not promise simply that he would grant an action, but after the case has been examined: for if he finds that the testator was the author of this matter and that he himself permitted succession ab intestato, or if any other just cause of omitting has intervened, he will certainly not give an action for legacies against him.
Certe si vacantia bona quis possederit et quadriennium praeterierit, indubitate conveniri poterit ex hac parte edicti, quia et omisit causam testamenti et quia ab intestato possedit et quidem sic, ut praescriptione quadriennii tutus sit.
Certainly, if someone has possessed vacant goods and a four-year period has passed, he can undoubtedly be proceeded against under this part of the edict, both because he omitted the ground of the testament and because he possessed ab intestato—and indeed in such a way that he is protected by the four-year prescription.
Si patronus ex debita sibi portione heres scriptus dato sibi coherede ex alia parte omiserit institutionem, quia debita pars eius erat exhausta, omiserit et coheres, deinde possideat patronus ab intestato legitimam hereditatem totam, dandam in eum legatorum actionem celsus libro sexto decimo digestorum ait, quae in titium competeret, sufficeretque patrono, quod integram debitam sibi portionem habeat. haec autem ita sunt, si coheres collusit cum patrono: aliter enim non esse patronum cogendum legata praestare: neque enim interdictum est, ut quis omittat hereditatem, si sine fraude id fiat.
If a patron, instituted as heir from the portion owed to him, a coheir having been given to him from another part, has omitted the institution—because his due share had been exhausted—and the coheir also has omitted, then if thereafter the patron possesses by intestacy the whole legitimate inheritance, Celsus in the Digest, book 16, says that an action for legacies is to be granted against him, such as would lie against Titius; and it would suffice for the patron that he has the entire portion owed to him. But these things are so if the coheir colluded with the patron; otherwise, the patron is not to be compelled to perform the legacies; for it is not forbidden that someone omit an inheritance, if that be done without fraud.
Hoc edictum etiam ad contra tabulas bonorum possessionem pertinere magis dicendum est, scilicet ut qui accipiendo contra tabulas bonorum possessionem liberis parentibusque legata praestaret si omiserit eam bonorum possessionem et ab intestato possideat hereditatem, cogatur ea praestare, quae praestaret, si contra tabulas possessionem accepit.
This edict is rather to be said to pertain also to bonorum possessio against the tablets, namely, that one who, by accepting bonorum possessio against the tablets, would have to render legacies to the children and to the parents—if he omits that bonorum possessio and holds the inheritance ab intestato—be compelled to render those things which he would render if he had accepted possession against the tablets.
Si quis sub condicione dandorum decem vel qua alia, quae in dando vel in faciendo fuit, heres institutus omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possideat hereditatem, videndum est, an huic, in cuius personam condicio collata est, subveniri debeat. et magis est, ne subveniatur: neque enim legatarius est.
If someone, instituted as heir under a condition of giving ten, or under some other condition which was in giving or in doing, should, the testamentary cause being omitted, possess the inheritance ab intestato, it must be considered whether aid ought to be given to the one in whose person the condition was conferred. And the better view is that he should not be aided: for he is not a legatee.
Si non solus, sed cum alio possidet hereditatem is qui omisit causam testamenti, rectissime iulianus ait, quod et Marcellus probat, dandam in ipsum quoque legatorum actionem utilem: nec enim aspernari debet obesse sibi factum heredis scripti, cui etiam profuerit. hoc autem ita est, nisi si pecuniam accepit is qui omisit causam testamenti: tunc enim in solidum tenebitur.
If the one who has omitted the cause of the testament possesses the inheritance not alone but with another, Julianus most correctly says, and Marcellus approves, that a useful action of legacies should be granted against him as well: for he ought not to reject that the act of the instituted heir be to his prejudice, to whom it has also been of benefit. But this is so, unless the one who omitted the cause of the testament received money: for then he will be liable for the whole (in solidum).
Cum substitutis ab institutis legata fuissent relicta et tam instituti quam substituti omissa causa testamenti possideant ab intestato hereditatem, divus pius rescripsit neque improbe neque imprudenter institutos legata recusare substitutis data: recte enim recusant in se dari legatorum fideive commissorum petitionem substitutio, cui liberum fuit adeunti hereditatem non fideicommissum petere, sed universa bona optinere.
When legacies had been left by the instituted heirs to the substitutes, and both the instituted and the substitutes, the cause of the testament being set aside, possess the inheritance as on intestacy, the deified Pius rescripted that it is neither improper nor imprudent for the instituted to refuse legacies given to the substitutes: for they rightly refuse that an action for legacies or for fideicommissa be directed against themselves by the substitute, to whom it was free, on entering upon the inheritance, not to seek a fideicommissum, but to obtain the entire goods.
Si duo sint heredes institutus et substitutus et ambo omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possideant hereditatem, quaestionis est, an ambo cogantur legata praestare et utrum unusquisque ea legata quae a se relicta sunt an vero ambo utraque legata cogantur praestare. ego puto in solidum adversus singulos legatorum petitionem dandam: sed utrum eorum quae a se legata sunt an vero etiam eorum quae ab altero herede, videamus. et alias proponamus institutum solum possidere hereditatem: eorum legatorum, quae sunt a se relicta, an etiam eorum, quae sunt a substituto relicta, actionem patietur?
If there are two heirs, the instituted and the substitute, and both, the ground of the testament being set aside, possess the inheritance as on intestacy, the question is whether both are compelled to provide the legacies, and whether each is compelled to provide those legacies which have been left by himself, or indeed whether both are compelled to provide both sets of legacies. I think an action for legacies is to be granted in solidum against each individual; but whether for those which have been left by himself, or even also for those which have been left by the other heir, let us consider. And let us also propose another case: that the instituted heir alone possesses the inheritance—will he be liable to an action for those legacies which have been left by himself, or even for those which have been left by the substitute?
it must be said that only then also for those [legacies], if, by the fraud of the substitute, the inheritance comes to the instituted without the money: for if the substitute has received the money, he himself will be the one to be sued. likewise, if the substitute alone were possessing, if indeed, money having been accepted, the instituted had omitted [his claim], we will say that the instituted ought to answer to his own legatees, and the substitute to his own; but if without money, we will grant an action against the substitute. now, since both possess, it will be better said that each must answer to his own legatees.
Si ab instituto et substituto eadem res mihi legata sit et omissa causa testamenti hereditatem possideant lege, etiamsi ab utroque solidum mihi debetur, tamen ab uno legatum consecutus ab altero petere non potero: eligere itaque reum potero.
If by the instituted heir and the substitute the same thing has been bequeathed to me, and, the cause of the testament being omitted, they possess the inheritance by law, even if the whole (solidum) is owed to me by each, nevertheless, having obtained the legacy from one, I shall not be able to demand it from the other: therefore I shall be able to choose the defendant.
Heredem eius, qui omissa causa testamenti ab intestato possidet hereditatem, in solidum legatorum actione teneri constat: magis est enim rei persecutionem quam poenam continere et ideo et perpetuam esse. hoc autem ita est, nisi propter dolum defuncti conveniatur heres: tunc enim in id quod ad eum pervenit conveniretur.
It is established that the heir of one who, the ground of the testament having been omitted, possesses the inheritance ab intestato, is held in solidum by the action for legacies: for it contains rather a pursuit of the thing than a penalty, and therefore is perpetual. However, this is so unless the heir is proceeded against on account of the fraud of the deceased: for then he would be proceeded against to the extent of that which has come to him.
Si quis omissa causa testamenti omnino eam hereditatem non possideat, excluduntur legatarii: nam liberum cuique esse debet etiam lucrosam hereditatem omittere, licet eo modo legata libertatesque intercidunt. sed in fideicommissariis hereditatibus id provisum est, ut, si scriptus heres nollet adire hereditatem, iussu praetoris adeat et restituat: quod beneficium his, quibus singulae res per fideicommissum relictae sint, non magis tributum est quam legatariis.
If someone, with the ground of the testament omitted, does not at all possess that inheritance, the legatees are excluded: for it ought to be free to each person to omit even a lucrative inheritance, although in that way legacies and manumissions (liberties) lapse. But in fideicommissary inheritances it has been provided that, if the instituted heir is unwilling to enter upon the inheritance, by order of the praetor he shall enter and restore it: which beneficium has not been granted to those to whom individual things have been left by fideicommissum any more than to legatees.
Si filius meus a matre sua heres scriptus fuerit et ego testamenti causa omissa bonorum possessionem eiusdem filii nomine petiero, actio legatorum in me dari debebit non secus ac si ipse heres scriptus omissa causa testamenti bonorum possessionem ab intestato accepissem.
If my son has been instituted heir by his mother, and I, with the testamentary ground omitted, seek bonorum possessio in the name of that same son, the action for legacies ought to be granted against me, just as if I myself, instituted as heir, had accepted bonorum possessio from intestacy with the testamentary ground omitted.
Si in testamento ita scriptum fuerit: " titius heres esto: si titius heres erit, maevius heres esto" et titius omissa causa testamenti hereditatem legitimam possederit, maevio adversus eum petitio hereditatis dari non debet pro parte, quam habiturus esset, si testamenti causa omissa non fuisset. cum enim omisso testamento hereditas possidetur, legatorum quidem et libertatium ratio habenda est, quia aliter quam ab herede dari non potuerunt: hereditatis vero quae ita data est rationem habere praetor non debet: sua enim culpa testator sub hac condicione hereditatis partem dedit, quam potuit pure dare.
If in a testament it has been written thus: " let titius be heir: if titius will be heir, let maevius be heir" and titius, the testamentary cause being omitted, has possessed the legitimate inheritance, an action for the inheritance ought not to be given to maevius against him for the share which he would have had, if the testamentary cause had not been omitted. For when, the testament being omitted, the inheritance is possessed, account indeed must be had of legacies and manumissions, because they could not be given otherwise than by an heir; but the inheritance which has been given in this way the praetor ought not to take into account: for by his own fault the testator gave a part of the inheritance under this condition, which he could have given purely.
Quare et si ita scriptum fuisset: " titius heres esto: quisquis mihi ex supra scriptis heres erit, stichus liber heresque esto" et titius omisso testamento hereditatem possideat, libertatem praetor stichi tueri non debet nec hereditatis petitionem ei dare.
Wherefore even if it had been written thus: " titius heres esto: quisquis mihi ex supra scriptis heres erit, stichus liber heresque esto" and Titius, the testament being suppressed, should possess the inheritance, the praetor ought not to protect the liberty of Stichus nor to grant to him the inheritance action.
Si quis hoc modo testamentum scripserit: " titius heres esto: si titius heres non erit, maevius heres esto: quisquis mihi ex supra scriptis heres erit, maevio, si mihi heres non erit, centum dato", deinde titius omisso testamento legitimam hereditatem possideat, an maevio, cuius in potestate fuit, ut ex substitutione adeundo totam hereditatem haberet, legatorum actio dari debeat, quaeritur. et placet dari, quia nihil prohibet maevium iustam causam habuisse, propter quam nollet negotiis hereditariis implicari.
If someone should write a will in this manner: " titius be heir: if titius will not be heir, maevius be heir: whoever from the above-written will be heir to me, give to maevius, if he will not be heir to me, one hundred", then titius, with the testament disregarded, takes possession of the legitimate (intestate) inheritance, the question is whether an action for legacies ought to be granted to maevius, who had it in his power that, by accepting under the substitution, he would have the whole inheritance. And it is held that it should be granted, because nothing prevents maevius from having had a just cause on account of which he did not wish to be entangled in hereditary business.
Si filius qui mansit in patris potestate, item filia heredes instituti praeterito fratre emancipato, qui contra tabulas accipere possessionem potuit, ut intestati patris possessionem acceperint, legata omnibus praestabunt nec filia dotem suam fratri conferet, cum ut scripta videatur hereditatem habere.
If a son who remained in the father’s power, and likewise a daughter, were instituted as heirs, with an emancipated brother having been passed over—who could have taken possession against the will—so that they have taken possession as of an intestate father, they will furnish the legacies to all, nor will the daughter contribute her dowry to her brother, since she is regarded as holding the inheritance as though written (as heir).
Si dolo tutoris omiserit pupillus causam testamenti et legitimam hereditatem possideat, danda est legatorum actio in pupillum, sed eatenus, quatenus hereditas ei adquisita est. quid enim, si cum alio possideat hereditatem?
If through the guardian’s fraud the ward has omitted the title of the testament and holds the legitimate inheritance, an action for legacies is to be granted against the ward, but only to that extent to which the inheritance has been acquired by him. For what, after all, if he possesses the inheritance with another?
Cui servus ipsius substitutus est, servum suum adire iussit. si idcirco fecit, ne legata praestaret, utraque praestabit, et qua heres est et qua omissa causa testamenti possidet ex substitutione hereditatem, salva falcidia ei servata.
To one for whom his own slave has been substituted, he ordered his slave to enter upon the inheritance. If he did this for the purpose of not providing the legacies, he will provide both—both in the capacity in which he is heir and in that in which, the ground of the testament being set aside, he possesses the inheritance by substitution—with the Falcidian portion saved to him.
Iulianus scribit patrem, qui filiam sibi substitutam iussit adire hereditatem, legata quae ab ipso data sunt ex sententia edicti praestaturum, quoniam filia patri substituitur in casu, non ut arbitrium eligendi relinquatur: sed si varia legata supra dodrantem data sint, eorum prius rationem habendam, quae a filia relicta sunt. non enim caret dolo pater, qui honore proprio omisso propter compendium alienam institutionem maluit.
Julian writes that a father, who ordered a daughter substituted to himself to enter upon the inheritance, will have to furnish the legacies that were given by himself in accordance with the purport of the edict, since the daughter is substituted to the father in the event, not so that a discretion of choosing be left; but if various legacies have been given beyond three-quarters, first account must be taken of those which were left by the daughter. For the father is not free from dolus who, his own honor set aside, preferred another’s institution for the sake of gain.
Institutus heres et rogatus restituere hereditatem si omissa causa testamenti legitimam hereditatem possideat, non dubie ut legata ceteraque fideicommissa, ita hereditatem quoque restituere compellendus est, libertates quoque tam directas quam fideicommissarias. sed si alienos servos rogatus sit manumittere, utique redimere eos debebit. eam autem decessionem patietur is cui restituta fuerit hereditas, quam is qui ei restituit passurus fuit.
An instituted heir who has been requested to restore the inheritance, if, setting aside the cause of the testament, he would possess the legitimate inheritance, is without doubt to be compelled, just as legacies and the other fideicommissa are restored, so also to restore the inheritance, and likewise the manumissions, both direct and fideicommissary. But if he has been requested to manumit another’s slaves, he must by all means redeem them. Moreover, the person to whom the inheritance shall have been restored will undergo that same deduction which the one who restored it to him was going to undergo.
Qui omissa causa testamenti pro emptore vel pro dote vel pro donato sive alio quolibet titulo, exceptis pro herede et pro possessore, possideat hereditatem, a legatariis et fideicommissariis non convenitur.
He who, the cause of the testament being omitted, possesses the inheritance pro emptore (as purchaser), or pro dote (for dowry), or pro donato (as donee), or under any other title whatsoever—except pro herede (as heir) and pro possessore (as mere possessor)—is not sued by legatees and fideicommissaries.
Servi appellatione etiam hi continentur, qui sub condicione legati sunt: nam medio tempore heredis sunt, nec quod condicio existens efficit, ut desinant esse heredis, facit ne videantur interim eius. idemque erit dicendum in statulibero.
Under the appellation “slaves” there are also included those who are bequeathed under a condition: for in the meantime they are the heir’s, and the fact that, when the condition comes to exist, it brings it about that they cease to be the heir’s, does not prevent their being regarded in the meantime as his. And the same will have to be said of a statuliber.
Sed in eo, cui fideicommissa libertas pure debetur, exstat rescriptum divi pii ad iuventium sabinum, quo ostenditur non esse festinandum ad tormenta eius, cui fideicommissa libertas debetur: et magis est, ne puniatur ob hoc quod sub eodem tecto fuit, nisi particeps sceleris fuerit.
But in the case of one to whom fideicommissary freedom is owed unconditionally, there exists a rescript of the deified Pius to Juventius Sabinus, which shows that one should not hasten to the torture of him to whom fideicommissary freedom is owed; and the view rather is that he is not to be punished on this account, that he was under the same roof, unless he was a participant in the crime.
Idem scaevola ait constantius defendendum herede instituto filio de his quaestionem habendam et supplicium, qui pure legati vel manumissi sunt, ante aditam hereditatem filio occiso: quamvis enim, si viveret, herede eo existente ipsius non essent futuri, attamen ubi decessit, qua extinctum legatum et libertas est, senatus consulto fore locum dicit.
The same Scaevola says it is more consistently to be maintained that, where a son has been instituted heir, an inquisition is to be held and punishment inflicted concerning those who have been unconditionally legatees or manumitted, the son having been slain before the inheritance was entered upon: for although, if he were living, with him being heir, they would not be going to be his, nevertheless when he has died—whereby the legacy and the freedom are extinguished—he says that there is room for the senatus consultum.
Si pater necatus sit, an de servis filii quaestio habeatur, si forte castrensi peculio servos habuit? et magis est quaestionem de servis filii habendam suppliciumque sumendum, licet non sit in potestate filius.
If a father has been slain, is a quaestio to be held concerning the son’s slaves, if perchance he had slaves in his military peculium (castrense peculium)? And the more correct view is that a quaestio is to be held concerning the son’s slaves and punishment exacted, although the son is not under paternal power.
Si vir aut uxor occisi esse proponantur, de servis eorum quaestio habetur, quamquam neque viri servi proprie uxoris dicantur neque uxoris proprie viri: sed quia commixta familia est et una domus est, ita vindicandum atque in propriis servis senatus censuit.
If a husband or a wife are alleged to have been slain, an inquest is held concerning their slaves, although the husband’s slaves are not properly said to be the wife’s, nor the wife’s properly the husband’s: but because the familia is commingled and there is one household, redress is to be taken accordingly, and the senate decreed as in the case of one’s own slaves.
Quod si quis puta veneno vel etiam quo alio quod clam necare soleat interemptus sit, ad hoc senatus consultum vindicta mortis eius non pertinebit: hoc idcirco, quia totiens puniendi sunt servi, quia auxilium domino non tulerunt, quotiens potuerunt ei adversus vim opem ferre et non tulerunt: ceterum quid potuerunt facere adversus eos, qui veneno vel quo alio more insidiantur?
But if someone, suppose, has been slain by poison, or even by some other means by which one is wont to kill secretly, the vengeance for his death will not pertain to this senatorial decree: and this for the reason that slaves are to be punished as often as they did not bring help to their master, whenever they could have brought aid to him against violence and did not bring it; but what could they have done against those who lie in wait with poison or by some other method?
Quid ergo, si dominus veneno non per vim necatus esse proponatur? impunitum erit factum? nullo modo: licet enim cessat senatus consultum silanianum nec quaestio suppliciumque de his qui sub eodem tecto fuerunt habeatur, tamen si qui conscii vel factores sceleris fuerunt, hi demum supplicio adficiuntur: et adiri hereditas aperirique tabulae etiam ante quaestionem habitam possunt.
What then, if it is put forward that the master was killed by poison not by force? Will the deed be unpunished? In no way: for although the Silanian senatus‑consultum ceases to apply and neither inquiry nor punishment is held regarding those who were under the same roof, nevertheless, if any were privy or perpetrators of the crime, these at length are subjected to punishment; and the inheritance may be entered upon and the will opened even before an inquiry has been held.
Si sibi manus quis intulit, senatus consulto quidem silaniano locus non est, sed mors eius vindicatur, scilicet ut, si in conspectu servorum hoc fecit potueruntque eum in se saevientem prohibere, poena adficiantur, si vero non potuerunt, liberentur.
If someone laid hands upon himself, there is indeed no place for the Silanian senatus consultum, but his death is avenged, namely that, if he did this in the sight of the slaves and they were able to prevent him as he was raging against himself, they are subjected to punishment; but if they were not able, they are released.
" eodem" autem " tecto" qualiter accipiatur, videamus, utrum intra eosdem parietes an et ultra intra eandem diaetam vel cubiculum vel eandem domum vel eosdem hortos vel totam villam. et ait sextus sic esse saepe iudicatum, ut quicumque eo loci fuerunt, unde vocem exaudire potuerunt, hi puniantur, quasi sub eodem tecto fuerunt, licet alii validioris vocis, alii exiguioris sunt nec omnes undique exaudiri possunt.
" the same" however " roof" how it is to be taken, let us see—whether within the same walls, or also beyond, within the same suite or bedroom or the same house, or the same gardens, or the whole villa. And Sextus says that it has often been adjudged thus: that whoever were in that place from which they were able to hear the voice are punished as if they were under the same roof, although some have a stronger voice, others a weaker, and not all can be heard from every side.
Iuxta hoc tamen videtur et divus hadrianus rescripsisse in haec verba: " servi quotiens dominis suis auxilium ferre possunt, non debent saluti eorum suam anteponere: potuisse autem ancillam, quae in eodem conclavi cum domina sua fuerat, auxilium rei ferre, si non corpore suo, at certe voce plorantem, ut hi, qui in domo fuerant aut vicini audirent, hoc ipso manifestum est, quod dixit percussorem sibi mortem minatum, si proclamasset. ultimum itaque supplicium pati debet vel hoc, ne ceteri servi credant in periculo dominorum sibi quemque consulere debere " .
Alongside this, however, the deified Hadrian also seems to have rescripted in these words: " slaves, whenever they are able to bring aid to their masters, ought not to put their own safety before that of their masters: but that the maidservant, who had been in the same chamber with her mistress, could have brought aid to the affair, if not with her body, then certainly by her voice, crying out, so that those who had been in the house or the neighbors might hear, is made manifest by this very thing, that she said the striker had threatened her with death if she had cried out. therefore she ought to suffer the ultimate punishment, even for this, lest the other slaves believe that, in the peril of their masters, each ought to look out for himself " .
Si quis in villa agens occisus sit, plus quam iniquum est, si forte diffusa late praedia habeat, de omnibus qui in ea regione fuerint servis et quaestionem haberi et supplicium sumi: sufficit ergo eos, qui cum ipso qui occisus dicitur fuerunt et qui suspicione caedis aut conscientia attingi videbuntur, de his quaestionem haberi.
If someone has been killed while dwelling at a villa, it is more than unjust, if perchance he has estates spread widely, that both an inquest be held and punishment exacted from all the slaves who were in that region: it suffices, therefore, that an inquiry be held concerning those who were with the very person who is said to have been killed, and those who will seem to be touched by suspicion of the slaying or by complicity.
Impuberi autem utrum in supplicio tantum parcimus an vero etiam in quaestione? et magis est, ut de impubere nec quaestio habeatur: et alias solet hoc in usu observari, ut impuberes non torqueantur: terreri tantum solent et habena et ferula vel caedi.
But as for one under puberty, do we spare him only in punishment, or indeed also in the question? And the more accepted view is that, with respect to one under puberty, no question should be held; and otherwise this is usually observed in practice, that those under puberty are not tortured: they are only accustomed to be terrified with the strap and the ferule, or to be beaten.
Tulisse autem auxilium non tantum is videtur qui servavit dominum, hoc est qui potuit ita opem ferre, ut salvus esset dominus, verum is quoque, qui quidquid potuit fecit, tametsi dominus interfectus est: veluti si quis clamavit, ut ad auxilium conveniretur, aut terruit adgressores atque si quis turbam convocavit aut si corpus suum obiecit vel alias corpore suo auxilium tulit.
Moreover, he is deemed to have brought aid not only who saved the master—that is, who was able thus to bear help, that the master might be safe—but also he who did whatever he could, although the master was killed: for instance, if someone shouted so that people might convene for aid, or terrified the aggressors, and if someone convoked a crowd, or if he threw his own body in the way or otherwise with his body brought assistance.
Quid si vulnerati sint servi, cum protegerent dominum? dicendum est parci eis debere, nisi si aut ipsi sibi vulnera ista fecerunt data opera, ne punirentur, aut talia vulnera isti acceperunt, ut possent nihilo minus opem ferre, si voluissent.
What if slaves have been wounded while protecting their master? It must be said that they ought to be spared, unless either they themselves inflicted those wounds upon themselves on purpose, so as not to be punished, or they received such wounds that they could nonetheless have brought aid, if they had wished.
Divus marcus commodus pisoni rescripsit in haec verba: " cum constiterit apud te, piso carissime, iulium donatum, posteaquam conterritus adventu latronum profugerat villam suam, vulneratum esse, mox testamento facto purgasse officium servorum suorum, nec pietas pro servis nec sollicitudo heredis optinere debet, ut ad poenam vocentur, quos absolvit dominus ipse".
The deified Marcus, together with Commodus, sent a rescript to Piso in these words: "When it has been established before you, dearest Piso, that Julius Donatus, after he had fled his villa in terror at the arrival of robbers, was wounded, and that soon, after making his testament, he cleared the officium of his slaves, neither pietas on behalf of the slaves nor the solicitude of the heir ought to prevail, that those whom the master himself absolved be called to punishment".
Si maritus uxorem noctu intra cubiculum secum cubantem necaverit vel uxor maritum, servi poena senatus consulti liberabuntur. sed si exaudissent et opem non tulissent, plectendi erunt, non tantum si proprii essent mulieris, sed etiam si mariti.
If a husband has killed his wife at night within the bedchamber while she was lying with him, or a wife her husband, the slaves will be released from the penalty of the senatus consultum. But if they heard and did not bring aid, they are to be punished, not only if they were the woman’s own, but also if the husband’s.
Si cum omnes domini adgressuram paterentur, uni servus opem tulit, an sit excusandus, an vero quia omnibus non tulit plectendus? et magis est, ut, si quidem omnibus ferre potuit, quamvis quibusdam tulit, supplicio adficiendum: si vero simul omnibus non potuit, excusandum, quia quibusdam opem tulerit. nam illud durum est dicere, si, cum duobus auxilium ferre non possit, elegit alteri esse auxilio, electione crimen eum contraxisse.
If, when all the masters were undergoing an assault, the slave brought help to one, is he to be excused, or rather to be punished because he did not bring it to all? And the sounder view is that, if indeed he was able to bring help to all, although he brought it to some, he must be subjected to punishment; but if he could not at the same time bring help to all, he is to be excused, because he brought help to some. For it is harsh to say that if, when he cannot bring aid to two, he chose to be of aid to one, he has by his choice contracted a crime.
Subvenitur eis, qui eo tempore quo dominus dominave occisa est clausi ita fuerunt sine dolo malo, ut erumpere succurrendi causa aut comprehendendi eos, qui caedem fecerint, non potuerint: nec interest, a quo clausi continebuntur: sic tamen, si non data opera voluerint se ita includi, ne opem ferre possint. clusos accipere debemus et si sunt vincti, si tamen ita vincti, ut omnino rumpere vincula et auxilio esse non potuerint.
Relief is afforded to those who, at the time when the master or mistress was slain, were confined in such a way, without malice, that they could not break out for the purpose of rendering succor or of apprehending those who committed the killing: nor does it matter by whom they were kept confined: provided, however, that they did not of set purpose wish to have themselves so shut in, so that they could not bring help. We ought also to take as “shut in” those who are bound, provided that they are so bound that they could in no way break the bonds and be of assistance.
Si ex stipulatu servus debeatur et caedem domini arguerit et pro hoc praemio liber esse iussus sit, ex stipulato actio stipulatori non datur: nam et si supplicio adfectus fuisset, non daretur. quod si sub eodem tecto non fuit, ex stipulatu actio in aestimatione servi utilis erit creditori.
If by stipulation a slave is owed, and he has accused the slaying of his master and, as a reward for this, has been ordered to be free, the action ex stipulatu is not given to the stipulator; for even if he had been visited with punishment, it would not be given. But if he was not under the same roof, an action ex stipulatu for the estimation of the slave will be available to the creditor.
Utrum autem is solus videatur indicasse vel arguisse, qui ad hoc prosilit ultro, an etiam is, qui, cum accusaretur ipse, detorsit in alium crimen? et magis est, ut ille hoc praemio dignus sit, qui ultro ad accusationem prosilit.
Whether, however, only he seems to have informed or accused who leaps forth of his own accord to this, or also he who, when he himself was being accused, turned the charge aside onto another? And the stronger view is that he is worthy of this reward who of his own accord leaps forth to the accusation.
De his, qui antequam testamentum occisi occisaeve aperiretur profugissent posteaque aperto testamento liberi scripti invenirentur, perinde ac si de servis quaestio habenda suppliciumque sumendum est: nam est aequissimum ultioni dominorum non obstare indulgentiam ipsorum, quam quisque pleniorem esset expertus, eo graviorem sceleri suo poenam merebitur.
Concerning those who, before the testament of the slain man or slain woman was opened, had fled, and afterwards, when the testament was opened, were found written as free, an inquiry must be held and punishment exacted just as if it were a matter of slaves: for it is most equitable that the indulgence of the masters should not obstruct the vengeance of the masters; and the more fully each person had experienced that indulgence, by so much the heavier a penalty he will merit for his crime.
Quod ad causam testamenti pertinens relictum erit ab eo qui occisus esse dicetur, id ne quis sciens dolo malo aperiendum recitandum describendumque curet, edicto cavetur, priusquam de ea familia quaestio ex senatus consulto habita suppliciumque de noxiis sumptum fuerit.
As to whatever pertaining to the cause of the testament shall have been left by him who is said to have been slain, it is provided by edict that no one, knowingly and with malicious fraud, should take care to have it opened, recited, and transcribed, before an inquiry concerning that household has been held by senatorial decree and punishment has been exacted from the guilty.
Si condicioni intra diem ex die mortis praestitutum parere iussi ignorantia non paruerunt, si idcirco ignoratum est, quia metu senatus consulti aperiri tabulae non potuerunt, succurritur eis ad implendam condicionem.
If those ordered to comply with the condition preappointed to be fulfilled within the day reckoned from the day of death did not comply through ignorance, if it was for that reason unknown, because, from fear of the senatus consultum, the tablets could not be opened, relief is afforded to them for the completing of the condition.
Si et aliud impedimentum sit de non adeunda hereditate vel aperiendarum tabularum, sit et senatus consulti, nihil prodesse impedimentum senatus consulti, si et aliud fuit: veluti si praegnas uxor occisi fuit vel etiam putabatur et propterea adire hereditatem institutus non potuerit.
If there is also some other impediment concerning not entering upon the inheritance or of opening the tablets, even though there be that of the senatus consultum, the impediment of the senatus consultum is of no benefit if there was also another; for example, if the wife of the slain man was pregnant or even was thought to be, and for that reason the instituted heir could not enter upon the inheritance.
Qui postumos heredes instituerat, non natis postumis uxorem secundo loco scripsit heredem: cum a familia necatus diceretur, uxor diem suum obierat: heredes mulieris actiones ex constitutione sibi dari postulabant. eos ita demum audiendos esse respondi, si mulier, quam in utero nihil gestare constabat, propter senatus consultum hereditatem adire noluit: alioquin praegnate ea defuncta nullam iniuriae querellam intervenisse.
He who had instituted posthumous heirs, the posthumous children not having been born, appointed his wife as heir in the second rank; when he was said to have been slain by his household, the wife had departed this life; the woman’s heirs were demanding that actions be granted to them for themselves under the constitution. I replied that they are to be heard only if the woman—of whom it was established that she was carrying nothing in the womb—refused to enter upon the inheritance by reason of the senatus consultum; otherwise, she having died pregnant, no complaint of injury had intervened.
Si filius familias, qui in castrensi peculio testatus est, occisus sit, omnimodo id defendendum est, ut, ex quibus casibus ad fiscum patris familias bona pertinent, his casibus et huius peculium, potius quam ad heredes, qui deliquerunt in adeundo et similibus ultive non sunt.
If a son-in-power, who has made a testament in his castrense peculium, has been slain, it must by all means be maintained that, in those cases in which the goods of a paterfamilias fall to the fisc, in those same cases this one’s peculium also [so falls], rather than to the heirs, who have been at fault in entering upon it and in similar matters, or have not taken vengeance.
Si exheredatus filius, antequam adiretur patris hereditas, occisus sit, ex eventu inspicietur, ut, si adita fuerit hereditas, quasi alieni fuisse videantur: si vero irritum testamentum factum sit, quia ipsius essent si viveret, omnia perinde aguntur ac si dominus esset.
If a disinherited son, before the father’s inheritance has been entered upon, is killed, the matter will be inspected from the outcome, so that, if the inheritance shall have been entered upon, they are seen to have been as though another’s; but if the testament has been made void, since they would be his if he were alive, everything is conducted just as if he were the owner.
In cognitione aperti adversus senatus consultum testamenti eius, qui a familia sua occisus dicatur, quinquennii tempus constitutum est senatus consulto tauro et lepido consulibus: quod tamen ad extraneos pertinet. namque eos, qui parricidii poena teneri possunt, semper accusare permittitur eodem senatus consulto.
In the inquiry concerning the opening, contrary to a senatorial decree, of the testament of one who is said to have been slain by his own household, a period of five years was established by a senatorial decree in the consulship of Taurus and Lepidus; which, however, pertains to outsiders. For as to those who can be held under the penalty of parricide, it is always permitted to bring an accusation by the same senatorial decree.
Excipiuntur senatus consulto silaniano impuberes servi. trebius autem germanus legatus etiam de impubere sumi iussit supplicium et tamen non sine ratione: nam is puer nec multum a puberi aetate aberat et ad pedes domini cubuerat cum occideretur nec postea caedem eius prodiderat. ut enim opem ferre eum non potuisse constabat, ita silentium praestitisse etiam postea certum erat, et his dumtaxat impuberibus senatus consulto parci credebat, qui tantum sub eodem tecto fuissent: qui vero ministri vel participes caedis fuissent et eius aetatis, quamquam nondum puberis, ut rei intellectum capere possent, his non magis in caede domini quam in ulla alia causa parci oportere.
By the Silanian senatorial decree underage slaves are excepted. But Trebius Germanus, the legate, even ordered punishment to be exacted from an underage person—and not without reason: for that boy was not far from puberal age, and he had lain at his master’s feet when he was slain, and afterward had not disclosed his killing. For just as it was established that he had not been able to bring help, so it was certain that he had maintained silence even afterward; and he believed that by the senatorial decree mercy was to be extended only to those underage persons who had merely been under the same roof: but those who had been ministers or participants in the killing, and of such an age, although not yet puberal, that they could grasp the understanding of the matter—these ought no more to be spared in the murder of the master than in any other case.
Propter veneni quaestionem tempus petendae possessionis non profertur, cum eo quoque suspenso crimine recte petatur. aliud senatui placuit, cum a familia dominus necatus dicitur, servorum videlicet causa, quorum libertatem quaestionis habendae gratia neglegi necesse est.
On account of a poisoning inquiry, the time for seeking possession is not extended, since even with that charge pending it is rightly sought. The senate decided otherwise when the master is said to have been killed by his household, namely for the sake of the slaves, whose liberty must be disregarded for the purpose of holding the interrogation.
Neptis, quae possessionem aviae petierat, mortem eius interfectam sciens non defenderat. fideicommissum, quod avia ex alio testamento nepti debuit, in restituendis fisco bonis non esse deducendum placuit: dolus enim heredis punitus est. si autem neglegentia mulier emolumentum bonorum amiserit, fideicommissum esse retinendum integrato iure debiti rationis est.
The granddaughter, who had sought possession of her grandmother’s estate, knowing that she had been slain, did not make a defense. It was decided that the fideicommiss, which the grandmother under another testament owed to the granddaughter, is not to be deducted in restoring the goods to the fisc: for the fraud of the heir has been punished. But if the woman lost the emolument of the goods through negligence, it is a matter of reason that the fideicommiss be retained, with the right of the debt reinstated.
Gaius seius cum languesceret, questus est se veneno occidi a servo suo et sic exspiravit: cui heres exstitit lucia titia soror et mortem eius exsequi neglexit et ipsa post annum decimum decessit: exstitit qui bona nuntiaret gaii seii: quaero, an morte titiae extinctum sit crimen. paulus respondit causam, de qua quaeritur, cum sit pecuniaria, morte ingratae heredis extinctam non videri.
gaius seius, when he was growing weak, complained that he was being killed by poison by his slave, and thus expired; his heiress was lucia titia, his sister, and she neglected to pursue his death, and she herself died after the tenth year; there appeared someone to report the goods of gaius seius; I ask whether by the death of titia the crimen has been extinguished. paulus responded that the cause about which inquiry is made, since it is pecuniary, does not seem to have been extinguished by the death of the ungrateful heiress.
Si antequam patefieret testatorem occisum, tabulae testamenti apertae essent, deinde innotuisset id admissum esse, causa cognita puto compellendum institutum adire hereditatem, quam suspectam diceret, et ex trebelliano senatus consulto restituere.
If, before it was revealed that the testator had been slain, the testamentary tablets had been opened, and then it had become known that that act had been committed, the case having been examined I think the instituted heir must be compelled to enter upon the inheritance—which he would call suspect—and to restore pursuant to the Trebellian senatus consultum.
Lege cornelia cavetur de praemio accusatoris, qui requisivit et renuntiavit eos servos, qui ex ea familia ante quaestionem fugerint, ut in singulos servos quos convicerit quinque aureos ex bonis occisi aut, si inde redigi ea quantitas non possit, ex publico accipiat. quod praemium non in omnes servos, qui sub eodem tecto locove fuerint, sed in eos solos, qui caedem admisissent, accusatori tribuitur.
By the Cornelian law it is provided concerning the accuser’s reward, for one who has sought out and reported those slaves who from that household fled before the inquiry, that for each slave whom he proves guilty he is to receive five aurei from the estate of the slain person; or, if that sum cannot be realized from there, he is to receive it from the public treasury. This reward is not granted with respect to all the slaves who were under the same roof or in the same place, but only to those who had committed the murder.
Praeterea cavetur, ut de his, qui ante quaestionem habitam fugerint, si aperto testamento liberi scripti inveniantur, lege de sicariis iudicium fiat ita, ut ex vinculis causam dicant et convicti perinde ac servi puniantur et ei qui convicerit deni aurei praemii nomine darentur ex bonis damnati.
Moreover, it is provided that, concerning those who have fled before an inquisition has been held, if, with the testament opened, children are found written therein, a judgment be held under the law on assassins, such that they plead their case in chains; and, if convicted, they be punished just like slaves; and to the one who has secured the conviction there be given, by way of reward, ten aurei from the goods of the condemned.
Ex hoc edicto actio proficiscitur contra eum, qui adversus edictum praetoris tabulas testamenti aperuisse dicetur vel si quid aliud fecisse dicetur: nam ut ex supra dictis apparet, plura sunt, propter quae poena edicti constituta est. palam est autem popularem actionem esse, cuius poena in centum aureos ex bonis damnati extenditur: et inde partem dimidiam ei, cuius opera convictus erit, praemii nomine se daturum praetor pollicetur, partem in publicum redacturum.
From this edict an action proceeds against him who shall be said to have opened the tablets of a testament contrary to the praetor’s edict, or shall be said to have done anything else; for, as appears from what was said above, there are several matters on account of which the penalty of the edict has been established. It is clear, moreover, that this is a popular action, whose penalty is extended to 100 aurei from the goods of the condemned; and of that the praetor promises that he will give one half, under the name of a reward, to the one by whose effort he shall have been convicted, and will pay the other half into the public treasury.
Fideicommissum, quod ex testamento fratris patruelis gaius seius titio debebat, ab heredibus seii titius accepit: quaesitum est, cum necem gaii seii heredes eius non vindicaverint, an titius nihilo minus eos heredes ut indignos accusare possit ob id, quod necem eius non vindicaverint, nec obsit ei, quod ab isdem fideicommissum ex testamento fratris patruelis consecutus sit. respondit nihil proponi, cur obstaret.
The fideicommissum which, under the testament of the paternal cousin, Gaius Seius owed to Titius, Titius received from Seius’s heirs: the question was raised, since the heirs of Gaius Seius had not vindicated his killing, whether Titius could nonetheless accuse those heirs as unworthy on the ground that they had not vindicated his killing, and that it should not hinder him that he had obtained the same fideicommissum from those very persons under the testament of the paternal cousin. He replied that nothing was set forth to show why it should be an obstacle.
Qui dum captat hereditatem legitimam vel ex testamento, prohibuit testamentarium introire volente eo facere testamentum vel mutare, divus hadrianus constituit denegari ei debere actiones denegatisque ei actionibus fisco locum fore.
who, while angling for an inheritance either legitimate or from a testament, prohibited the testator from entering when he wished to make or to alter a testament, the deified hadrian decreed that actions ought to be denied to him; and, actions being denied to him, that there would be room for the fisc.
Si dominus dolo fecerit, ne testamentum mutaretur, in quo servus eius scriptus erat, quamvis manumissus adierit hereditatem, actiones ei denegantur, cum et liberis eius si quid fuerit datum, denegari debeat, etsi non fuerint in potestate. sed si legatum ei relictum sit idque restituere sit rogatus, consequens erit dicere admitti eum ad legatum, quod non ipse habuisset, sed ad alium sit translaturus.
If the master has acted with dolus (fraud) so that the testament in which his slave had been written (entered) not be changed, then although, after manumission, he has entered upon the inheritance, actions are denied to him, since they ought also to be denied to his children, if anything has been given to them, even if they were not in his power. But if a legacy has been left to him and he has been asked to restore it, it will be consequent to say that he is admitted to the legacy, which he would not have had for himself, but was going to transfer to another.
Virum, qui non per vim nec dolum, quo minus uxor, contra eum mutata voluntate, codicillos faceret, intercesserat, sed ut fieri adsolet, offensam aegrae mulieris maritali sermone placaverat, in crimen non incidisse respondi, nec ei quod testamento fuerat datum auferendum.
I replied that a man who had not, by force nor by fraud, interceded so that his wife, with her will changed against him, might not make codicils, but, as is wont to happen, had calmed the offense of a sick woman by marital speech, had not fallen into crime, nor should that which had been given to him by the testament be taken away.
Saepissime rescriptum et constitutum est eum, qui testamentum facere opinatus est nec voluit quasi codicillos id valere, videri nec codicillos fecisse: ideoque quod in illo testamento scriptum est, licet quasi in codicillis poterit valere, tamen non debetur.
It has most frequently been rescripted and constituted that one who supposed he was making a testament and did not wish that it be valid as if codicils is seen not even to have made codicils; and therefore what is written in that testament, although it could be valid as if in codicils, nevertheless is not owed.
Codicillorum ius singulare est, ut quaecumque in his scribentur perinde haberentur, ac si in testamento scripta essent. ideoque servo, qui testamenti facti tempore testatoris fuisset, codicillorum tempore alienus, non recte libertas directa datur. et contra si, cum testamentum fiebat, alienus esset, codicillorum tempore testatoris, intellegitur alieno servo libertas data.
The law of codicils is a singular one, namely that whatever may be written in them is held just as if it had been written in a testament. And therefore to a slave who at the time the testament was made had been the testator’s, but at the time of the codicils was another’s, direct liberty is not rightly given. And conversely, if, when the testament was being made, he was another’s, but at the time of the codicils he belonged to the testator, it is understood that liberty has been given to another’s slave.
Si quis cum testamentum nullum habebat, codicillis fideicommissa hoc modo dedit: " quisquis mihi heres erit bonorumve possessor, eius fidei committo", fideicommissa praestari debent, quia pater familias, qui testamenti factionem habet et codicillos faceret, perinde haberi debet, ac si omnes heredes eius essent, ad quos legitima eius hereditas vel bonorum possessio perventura esset.
If someone, when he had no testament, gave fideicommissa by codicils in this way: "whoever shall be my heir or the possessor of bonorum possessio, to his good faith I commit it," the fideicommissa ought to be performed, because a paterfamilias, who has testamentary capacity and would make codicils, ought to be regarded just as if all were his heirs to whom his legitimate inheritance or bonorum possessio would be about to come.
Ante tabulas testamenti codicilli facti non aliter valent, quam si testamento quod postea factum est vel codicillis confirmentur aut voluntas eorum quocumque indicio retineatur: sed non servabuntur ea, de quibus aliter defunctus novissime iudicavit.
Codicils made before the tablets of the testament have no force except if they are confirmed by a testament made thereafter or by codicils, or if their intention is retained by any indication whatsoever; but those matters will not be observed with respect to which the deceased most recently determined otherwise.
Licet in confirmatione codicillorum pater familias adiecerit, ut non alias valere velit quam sua manu signatos et subscriptos, tamen valent facti ab eo codicilli, licet neque ab eo signati neque manu eius scripti fuerint: nam ea quae postea geruntur prioribus derogant.
Although in the confirmation of the codicils the paterfamilias added that he wished none to be valid except those signed and subscribed by his own hand, nevertheless the codicils made by him are valid, although neither signed by him nor written in his hand: for things which are carried out later derogate from prior ones.
Praeterea in illis, quae non iuris, sed facti sunt, non est perinde habendum quod codicillis scribitur, atque si ubi confirmatio scriptum fuisset: veluti si ita in codicillis scriptum erit: " vestem quae mea est", codicillorum tempus spectandum, non quo confirmantur: item " si titius vivus est" vel " si tot annis est", codicillis legavit seio, tempus codicillorum, non quo tempore fit testamentum, spectandum.
Moreover, in those matters which are not of law, but of fact, what is written in codicils is not to be treated the same as if confirmation had been written: for example, if it is written thus in the codicils: " vestment which is mine", the time of the codicils is to be considered, not that at which they are confirmed: likewise, " if titius is alive" or " if he is of so many years old", he has by codicils bequeathed to seio, the time of the codicils, not the time at which the will is made, is to be considered.
Codicilli totiens valent, quotiens quis testamentum quoque facere possit. non tamen hoc ita intellegemus, ut exigamus potuisse eum eo tempore, quo scribit eos codicillos, testamentum facere: quid enim, si sufficientium testium facultatem non habuit? sed si iure testamenti factionem habuit.
Codicils are valid as often as a person can also make a testament. We will not, however, understand this in such a way as to require that he was able, at the time when he writes those codicils, to make a testament: for what if he did not have the facility of sufficient witnesses? but if he had, in law, testamentary capacity.
Si post factum testamentum codicillos quis confirmaverit, deinde adrogandum se praebuerit et ibi codicillos fecerit atque ita emancipatus decesserit, quaeritur, an ex codicillis legata debeantur: nam et testamentum valet, sed eo tempore eos fecit, quo testamenti factionem non habuit. nec similis est muto, qui recte codicillos confirmaverit: licet enim is testamentum facere non possit, tamen testamentum quod ante fecerat in eodem statu est, huius autem testamentum sublatum est et de alienis quodammodo rebus testatur. sed dicemus codicillos valere: nam et si postumus natus ruperit testamentum et decesserit, nihilo minus codicilli valent.
If after making a testament someone has confirmed codicils, then has offered himself to be adrogated and there has made codicils, and thus, having been emancipated, has died, the question is raised whether legacies from the codicils are owed: for the testament also is valid, but he made them at a time when he did not have testamenti factio (testamentary capacity). Nor is he like a mute man, who has duly confirmed codicils: for although that man cannot make a testament, nevertheless the testament which he had previously made remains in the same condition, whereas this man’s testament has been taken away, and he is, as it were, testating about others’ goods. But we shall say the codicils stand: for even if a posthumous child, having been born, should break the testament and then die, nonetheless the codicils are valid.
Si miles testamentum quidem ante militiam, sed codicillos in militia fecerit, an iure militari valeant codicilli, quaeritur, quoniam testamentum iure communi valet, nisi si militiae tempore signavit vel quaedam adiecerit. certe codicilli militiae tempore facti non debent referri ad testamentum, sed iure militari valent.
If a soldier made a testament indeed before military service, but codicils in service, the question is raised whether the codicils are valid by military law, since the testament is valid by common law, unless he sealed it during the time of service or added certain things. Certainly codicils made during the time of service ought not to be referred back to the testament, but are valid by military law.
Si quis certi generis codicillos confirmaverit, puta " quos novissimos fecero", non utique statim quae codicillis dantur consistere videbuntur, quamdiu alii quoque fieri possint, et ideo si alii postea fiant, legata in prioribus data non valebunt.
If someone has confirmed codicils of a certain kind, for example, "those which I shall have made most recently," the things given by the codicils will certainly not at once be deemed to take effect, so long as others also can be made; and therefore, if others are later made, the legacies given in the prior ones will not be valid.
Qui gravi utero uxorem esse ignorabat, codicillis ad filium scriptis libertates dedit. nata post mortem patris filia, cum de ea nihil patrem sensisse constitisset, placuit libertates a solo filio praestari: posse.
He who did not know that his wife was with a heavy womb (pregnant) granted manumissions by codicils written to his son. A daughter having been born after the father’s death, since it had been established that the father had formed no intention concerning her, it was resolved that the manumissions be provided by the son alone: they can be.
Tractari solet de eo, qui, cum tabulas testamenti non fecisset, codicillis ita scripsit: " titium heredem esse volo". sed multum interest, utrum fideicommissariam hereditatem a legitimo per hanc scripturam, quam codicillorum instar habere voluit, reliquerit an vero testamentum facere se existimaverit: nam hoc casu nihil a legitimo peti poterit. voluntatis autem quaestio ex eo scripto plerumque declarabitur: nam si forte a titio legata reliquit, substitutum adscripsit, heres si non exstitisset, sine dubio non codicillos, sed testamentum facere voluisse intellegetur.
It is customary to treat the case of one who, although he had not made the tablets of a testament, wrote thus in codicils: " I wish Titius to be heir". But it makes a great difference whether he left a fideicommissary inheritance to be taken from the legitimate heir by this writing, which he wished to have in the likeness of codicils, or rather thought that he was making a testament; for in this case nothing can be demanded from the legitimate heir. And the question of intention will for the most part be made clear from that writing: for if perchance he left legacies to Titius, and added a substitute, in case the heir should not appear, without doubt he will be understood to have wished to make, not codicils, but a testament.
Quidam referunt, quantum repeto apud vivianum, sabini et cassii et proculi expositam esse in quaestione huiusmodi controversiam: an legata, quae posteaquam instituti mortem obierunt codicillis adscripta vel adempta sunt, a substitutis debeantur, id est an perinde datio et ademptio etiam hoc tempore codicillis facta valeat ac si testamento facta esset. quod sabinum et cassium respondisse aiunt proculo dissentiente. nimirum autem sabini et cassii collectio, quam et ipsi reddunt illa est, quod codicilli pro parte testamenti habentur observationemque et legem iuris inde traditam servent.
Certain persons report—so far as I recall, in Vivianus—that Sabinus, Cassius, and Proculus set out, in a question of this kind, the following controversy: whether legacies which, after the instituted heirs have died, have been added or adeemed in codicils are owed by the substitute heirs; that is, whether a grant and an ademption, even when made at this time by codicils, are valid just as if they had been made by testament. They say that Sabinus and Cassius answered in the affirmative, Proculus dissenting. Indeed, the inference of Sabinus and Cassius—which they themselves also set forth—is this: that codicils are regarded as part of the testament, and that they observe the practice and the rule of law handed down therefrom.
i, however, would dare to say that proculus’s opinion is the truest. for a legacy is of no moment which is given to one who, at the time of the codicils, is not in human affairs, although it had been in the testament: for there must be someone to whom it is given; then the inquiry whether the giving subsists should be made in such a way that the person is sought before the rationale of law. and therefore, in the case proposed, a legacy that has been by codicils either given or adempted after the heir’s death is of no moment, because the heir, to whom he might direct his words, is not in human affairs, and that ademption and giving will now be rendered vain.
Quod si duo instituti sint substitutis datis unusque eorum decesserit, utilia videntur legata: sed circa coheredem erit tractatus, numquid totum legatum debeat, si " quisquis mihi heres erit" legatum erit, an vero non, quia sit substitutus heres, qui partem faciat, licet ipse non debeat. idem etiam potest circa nomina expressa tractari. multoque magis solum coheredem totum debere puto, quia is adiunctus sit, qui etiam tunc cum adiungebatur in rebus humanis non erat.
But if two have been instituted, substitutes having been appointed, and one of them has died, the legacies appear to be operative: but as regards the coheir, there will be a discussion whether he ought to owe the whole legacy, if the legacy is “ whoever shall be my heir,” or rather not, because there is a substitute heir who takes a share, although he himself does not owe it. The same can also be treated with respect to names expressly stated. And much more I think that the coheir alone owes the whole, because there was adjoined to him one who, even then, when he was being adjoined, was not among the living.
Ab intestato factis codicillis relicta etiam postea natus intestati successor debebit: quicumque enim ab intestato successerit, locum habent codicilli: nam unus casus est nec interest qui succedit dum intestato succedat. ad testamentum autem quod quoquo tempore fecisset, pertinent codicilli. et ut manifestius dicam, intestato patre familias mortuo nihil desiderant codicilli, sed vicem testamenti exhibent: testamento autem facto ius sequuntur eius.
With codicils made ab intestato, the things left must also be owed by a subsequently born successor on intestacy: for whoever shall have succeeded ab intestato, codicils have their place; for it is a single case, and it does not matter who succeeds, provided he succeeds on intestacy. Moreover, codicils pertain to the testament which he may have made at whatever time. And, to speak more manifestly, when a paterfamilias has died intestate, codicils lack nothing, but exhibit the place of a testament; but when a testament has been made, they follow its law.
Plotiana celso suo salutem. lucius titius his verbis ita cavit: " si quid tabulis aliove quo genere ad hoc testamentum pertinens reliquero, ita valere volo". quaero, an codicilli, qui ante hoc testamentum scripti sunt, debeant rati esse. iuventius celsus plotianae salutem.
plotiana to her celsus, greetings. lucius titius thus provided in these words: " if I shall have left anything by tablets or by any other kind pertaining to this testament, I wish it to be valid in this way". I ask whether the codicils, which were written before this testament, ought to be valid. iuventius celsus to plotiana, greetings.
Is qui unum filium habebat, cum codicillos ad eum scripsisset, decessit intestatus herede eo et quem postea procreavit. adgnatione sui heredis nemo dixerit codicillos evanuisse: igitur si nihil tum de postumis speravit, et codicilli non evanescent et quae relicta sunt, pro parte dimidia filius, ad quem codicillus factus est, solvere compellitur, non etiam postumus. sed et si codicillos reliquisset duobus superstitibus filiis decedens, cum putaret alterum ex his prius decessisse, simili modo dici potest omnia perinde debere filium, ad quem scripti sunt codicilli, atque si solus heres exstitisset patri.
He who had one son, after he had written codicils to him, died intestate, his heir being that one and also one whom he afterwards begot. By the agnation of his own heir no one would say that the codicils have lapsed: therefore, if at that time he had no expectation of posthumous children, both the codicils will not lapse and, as to the things bequeathed, the son to whom the codicil was made is compelled to pay for a half share, not the posthumous child as well. But even if, dying with two sons surviving, he had left codicils to them, while he supposed that one of these had previously died, in a similar way it can be said that the son to whom the codicils were written ought to owe everything just as if he alone had stood as heir to his father.