Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 43.3.0. Quod legatorum.
43.2.0. Of which goods.
Dig. 43.3.0. What of legacies.
Dig. 43.6.0. Ne quid in loco sacro fiat.
43.5.0. On the exhibiting of records.
Dig. 43.6.0. That nothing be done in a sacred place.
Dig. 43.9.0. De loco publico fruendo.
43.8.0. That nothing be done in a public place or on a roadway.
Dig. 43.9.0. On enjoying a public place.
Dig. 43.12.0. De fluminibus.
43.11.0. On repairing the public road and the public right of way.
Dig. 43.12.0. On rivers.
Dig. 43.16.0. De vi et de vi armata.
43.15.0. On reinforcing the riverbank.
Dig. 43.16.0. On force and on armed force.
Dig. 43.19.0. De itinere actuque privato.
43.18.0. On superficies.
Digest. 43.19.0. On a private right of way and of driving.
Dig. 43.25.0. De remissionibus.
43.24.0. What by force or secretly.
Dig. 43.25.0. On remissions.
Dig. 43.28.0. De glande legenda.
43.27.0. On trees to be felled.
Dig. 43.28.0. On acorns to be gathered.
Dig. 43.31.0. Utrubi.
43.30.0. On children to be exhibited, likewise to be led away.
Dig. 43.31.0. Which-of-the-two.
Dig. 43.1.0. De interdictis sive extraordinariis actionibus, quae pro his competunt.
43.33.0. On the salvian interdict.
Dig. 43.1.0. On interdicts or extraordinary actions, which are competent for these.
Dig. 43.4.0. Ne vis fiat ei, qui in possessionem missus erit.
43.3.0. What pertains to legacies.
Dig. 43.4.0. That no force be done to him who will be sent into possession.
Dig. 43.7.0. De locis et itineribus publicis.
43.6.0. That nothing be done in a sacred place.
Dig. 43.7.0. On public places and public roads.
Dig. 43.10.0. De via publica et si quid in ea factum esse dicatur.
43.9.0. On enjoying a public place.
Dig. 43.10.0. On the public road and if anything is said to have been done on it.
Dig.
43.12.0. On rivers. that nothing be done in a public river or on its bank, whereby navigation is made worse.
Dig.
Dig. 43.14.0. Ut in flumine publico navigare liceat.
43.13.0. Let nothing be done in a public river whereby the water would flow otherwise, but as it flowed in the previous summer.
Dig. 43.14.0. That it be permitted to navigate in a public river.
Dig. 43.17.0. Uti possidetis.
43.16.0. On force and on armed force.
Dig. 43.17.0. As you possess.
Dig. 43.20.0. De aqua cottidiana et aestiva.
43.19.0. On the private right of way (iter) and of driving (actus).
Dig. 43.20.0. On the daily and the summer water.
Dig. 43.26.0. De precario.
43.25.0. On remissions.
Dig. 43.26.0. On precarium.
Dig. 43.29.0. De homine libero exhibendo.
43.28.0. On gathering acorns.
Dig. 43.29.0. On exhibiting a free man.
concerning the affairs of men, interdicts are rendered either about those things which are someone’s, or about those things which are no one’s. those which are no one’s are these: free persons, for the producing and leading off of whom interdicts are competent. those which are someone’s are either public or of individuals.
Interdicta autem competunt vel hominum causa vel divini iuris aut de religione, sicut est " ne quid in loco sacro fiat" vel " quod factum est restituatur" et de mortuo inferendo vel sepulchro aedificando. hominum causa competunt vel ad publicam utilitatem pertinentia vel sui iuris tuendi causa vel officii tuendi causa vel rei familiaris. publicae utilitatis causa competit interdictum " ut via publica uti liceat" et " flumine publico" et " ne quid fiat in via publica": iuris sui tuendi causa de liberis exhibendis, item de liberto exhibendo: officii causa de homine libero exhibendo: reliqua interdicta rei familiaris causa dantur.
however, interdicts are available either for the sake of men or by reason of divine law or concerning religion, such as “that nothing be done in a sacred place” or “that what has been done be restored,” and about bringing in a dead person or building a sepulcher. for the sake of men they are available either those pertaining to public utility, or for the purpose of defending one’s own right, or for the purpose of defending duty, or for the household estate. for the sake of public utility the interdict is available “that it be permitted to use a public road” and “concerning a public river” and “that nothing be done on a public road”: for defending one’s own right, about children to be produced, likewise about a freedman to be produced: for the sake of duty, about a free man to be produced: the remaining interdicts are given for the sake of the family estate.
Quaedam interdicta rei persecutionem continent, veluti de itinere actuque privato: nam proprietatis causam continet hoc interdictum. sed et illa interdicta, quae de locis sacris et de religiosis proponuntur, veluti proprietatis causam continent, item illa de liberis exhibendis, quae iuris tuendi causa diximus competere, ut non sit mirum, si, quae interdicta ad rem familiarem pertinent, proprietatis, non possessionis causam habeant.
Certain interdicts contain a prosecution of the thing, as, for example, that concerning a private way and drive; for this interdict contains the ground of ownership. But also those interdicts which are proposed concerning sacred and religious places likewise contain the ground of ownership, and likewise those concerning the producing of children, which we have said are available for the sake of protecting right, so that it is not surprising if those interdicts which pertain to the household property have the cause of ownership, not of possession.
Haec autem interdicta, quae ad rem familiarem spectant, aut apiscendae sunt possessionis aut reciperandae aut retinendae. apiscendae possessionis sunt interdicta, quae competunt his, qui ante non sunt nancti possessionem. sunt autem interdicta apiscendae possessionis " quorum bonorum": salvianum quoque interdictum, quod est de pignoribus, ex hoc genere est: et " quo itinere venditor usus est, quo minus emptor utatur, vim fieri veto". reciperandae possessionis causa proponuntur sub rubrica unde vi: aliqua enim sub hoc titulo interdicta sunt.
These interdicts, however, which pertain to the estate, are either for acquiring possession or for recovering it or for retaining it. For acquiring possession are those interdicts which are competent to those who previously have not obtained possession. Now the interdicts for acquiring possession are “quorum bonorum”; the Salvian interdict also, which is about pledges, is of this kind; and “as to the right-of-way which the seller used, I forbid force to be employed so that the buyer be hindered from using it.” For the sake of recovering possession they are set forth under the rubric unde vi: for under this title there are certain interdicts.
Interdicta noxalia ea sunt, quae ob delictum eorum, quos in potestate habemus, dantur, veluti cum vi deiecerunt aut vi aut clam opus fecerunt. sed officio iudicis continetur, ut dominum sua impensa opus restituentem absolvat: patientiam tollendo operi praestantem noxae dedere iubeat et absolvat, si non dedat, quantum impensae in tollendo opere erogatum sit, tanti condemnet: si neque patientiam praestet neque ipse tollat, cum possit, in tantum condemnet, in quantum iudex aestimaverit, atque si ipse fecisset.
Noxal interdicts are those which are granted on account of the delict of those whom we have in our power, as when they have thrown someone out by force, or have done a work by force or by stealth. But it is included in the duty of the judge that he acquit the owner who restores the work at his own expense: he should order the one affording patience for the removing of the work to surrender for the noxa and acquit; if he does not surrender, he should condemn him in as much as was expended as costs in taking down the work; if he neither affords patience nor himself takes it down, though he can, he should condemn him to such an amount as the judge shall have assessed, as if he had done it himself.
Ait praetor: " quorum bonorum ex edicto meo illi possessio data est, quod de his bonis pro herede aut pro possessore possides possideresve, si nihil usucaptum esset, quod quidem dolo malo fecisti, uti desineres possidere, id illi restituas".
The praetor says: "Of which goods possession has been given to that man by my edict, whatever of these goods you possess or would possess as heir or as possessor, if nothing had been acquired by usucaption; and whatever indeed you have done with malicious fraud, in order that you might cease to possess, that you shall restore to him."
Est autem et ipsum apiscendae possessionis et continet hanc causam, ut, quod quis legatorum nomine non ex voluntate heredis occupavit, id restituat heredi. etenim aequissimum praetori visum est unumquemque non sibi ipsum ius dicere occupatis legatis, sed ab herede petere: redigit igitur ad heredes per hoc interdictum ea, quae legatorum nomine possidentur, ut perinde legatarii possint eum convenire.
And there is also the interdict itself of acquiring possession, and it embraces this case: that what someone has seized in the name of legacies, not by the will of the heir, he must restore to the heir. For it seemed most equitable to the praetor that each person should not declare the law for himself by occupying legacies, but should seek them from the heir. Therefore he brings back to the heirs, by this interdict, those things which are possessed under the title of legacies, so that the legatees may in like manner be able to proceed against him.
Quia autem nonnumquam incertum est, utrum quis pro legato an pro herede vel pro possessore possideat, bellissime arrianus scribit hereditatis petitionem instituendam et hoc interdictum reddendum, ut, sive quis pro herede vel pro possessore sive pro legato possideat, hoc interdicto teneatur: quemadmodum solemus facere, quotiens incertum est, quae potius actio teneat: nam duas dictamus protestati ex altera nos velle consequi quod nos contingit.
Because, however, it is sometimes uncertain whether someone possesses on behalf of a legatee or on behalf of an heir or of a possessor, most excellently arrianus writes that a petition for inheritance should be instituted and that this interdict should be issued, so that, whether someone possesses as heir or as possessor or as legatee, he is held by this interdict: just as we are accustomed to do whenever it is uncertain which action rather holds; for we dictate two, having protested that by the other we wish to obtain what pertains to us.
Qui vero ex causa praeceptionis, utique tenetur hoc interdicto, sed pro ea scilicet parte, quam iure legati habet, non etiam pro ea, quam quasi heres habet. idemque erit dicendum et si alio genere legati uni ex heredibus legatum sit: nam et hic dicendum est pro ea parte, qua heres est, cessare interdictum.
But the one who, by reason of preemption, is certainly bound by this interdict is bound only for that share which he has by the right of the legacy, not also for that which he has as heir. And the same must be said even if by another kind of legacy a legacy has been left to one of the heirs: for here too it must be said that, for the share in which he is heir, the interdict ceases.
Unde est quaesitum, si usus fructus vel usus fuerit alicui relictus eumque occupaverit, an hoc interdicto restituere sit compellendus. movet, quod neque usus fructus neque usus possidetur, sed magis tenetur: potest tamen defendi competere interdictum. idem dicendum est et in servitute relicta.
Whence the question has been raised, if a usufruct or a use has been left to someone and he has occupied it, whether he is to be compelled by this interdict to restore. What prompts the doubt is that neither usufruct nor use is possessed, but rather is held; nevertheless it can be defended that the interdict is applicable. The same is to be said also in the case of a servitude left by bequest.
Quaesitum est, si quis legatorum servandorum causa missus sit in possessionem, an hoc interdicto teneatur ad restitutionem. movet illud primum, quod non possidet is qui missus est in possessionem legatorum causa, sed potius custodit, deinde quod praetorem habet huius rei auctorem. tutius tamen erit dicendum hoc interdictum competere, maxime si satisdatum sit iam legatorum nomine nec recedat: tunc enim etiam possidere videtur.
It has been asked, if someone has been sent into possession for the sake of preserving the legacies, whether he is bound under this interdict to restitution. what first moves is this, that he who has been sent into possession for the sake of the legacies does not possess, but rather keeps custody; then, that he has the praetor as the author of this matter. nevertheless it will be safer to say that this interdict lies, especially if security has already been furnished in the name of the legacies and he does not withdraw: for then he is even deemed to possess.
Quod ait praetor " voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet", ita erit interpretandum, ut, si post aditam hereditatem vel bonorum possessionem adgnitam voluntas accommodata est legatario, ut possideret, interdictum cesset: quod si ante aditam hereditatem bonorumve possessionem adgnitam hoc factum est, rectius dicetur eam voluntatem non nocere debere.
As for the praetor’s statement, “by the will of him to whom that thing pertains,” it is to be interpreted thus: if, after the inheritance has been entered upon or the bonorum possessio has been acknowledged, consent has been accommodated to the legatee for him to possess, the interdict ceases; but if this was done before the inheritance was entered upon or the bonorum possessio acknowledged, it will be more correct to say that such consent ought not to be prejudicial.
Si duae res legatae sint, altera ex voluntate occupata, altera non ex voluntate eveniet, ut altera revocari possit, altera non. idemque erit probandum et in una re, cuius pars ex voluntate, altera pars non ex voluntate occupata est: nam pars sola per interdictum auferetur.
If two things have been bequeathed, and one has been occupied by consent while the other not by consent, the result will be that one can be recalled, the other not. And the same must be approved even in a single thing, a part of which has been occupied by consent and another part not by consent: for only the part will be removed through the interdict.
Prodest autem possedisse, quotiens voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet, possideri coeptum est: sed et si postea voluntas accessit eius, ad quem ea res pertinebat, tamen prodesse possessori debere. unde si quis coepit quidem ex voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet, possidere, postea vero voluntas non perseverat, nihil nocet, quia semel possideri coepit ex voluntate.
It is, moreover, advantageous to have possessed, whenever possession was begun by the will of him to whom that thing pertains: but even if afterwards the will of him to whom that thing pertained was added, nevertheless it ought to benefit the possessor. Whence, if someone indeed began to possess by the will of him to whom that thing pertains, but afterwards the will does not persist, it does no harm, because possession was once begun by will.
Si per legatarium factum sit, quo minus satisdetur, licet cautum non sit, tenetur interdicto. sed si forte factum sit per legatarium, quo minus satisdetur, eo autem tempore, quo editur interdictum, satis accipere paratus sit, non competit interdictum, nisi satisdatum sit. item si per bonorum possessorem stetit, quo minus satisdaret, sed modo paratus est cavere, tenet interdictum: illud enim tempus inspicitur, quo interdictum editur.
If through the legatee it has come about that security is not given, although it has not been stipulated for, he is liable under the interdict. But if perchance it has happened through the legatee that security is not given, yet at the time when the interdict is issued he is ready to accept security, the interdict does not lie, unless security has been given. Likewise, if it was owing to the possessor of the goods that he did not give security, but only now he is prepared to give a caution, the interdict holds: for the time that is looked to is that at which the interdict is issued.
Ait praetor: " si quis dolo malo fecerit, quo minus quis permissu meo eiusve, cuius ea iurisdictio fuit, in possessionem bonorum sit, in eum in factum iudicium, quanti ea res fuit, ob quam in possessionem missus erit, dabo".
The praetor says: "if anyone shall have acted with malicious fraud, whereby someone, by my permission or by that of the one whose jurisdiction it was, is prevented from being in possession of the goods, I will grant against him an action on the facts, for as much as that matter was worth, on account of which he will have been sent into possession."
Est autem generale hoc edictum: pertinet enim ad omnes, qui in possessionem a praetore missi sunt: convenit enim praetori omnes, quos ipse in possessionem misit, tueri. sed sive rei servandae causa sive legatorum aut ventris nomine in possessionem missi fuerint, habent ex hoc edicto in factum actionem, sive doli sive aliter prohibuerint.
This edict is, moreover, general: for it pertains to all who have been sent into possession by the praetor; for it is fitting for the praetor to protect all whom he himself has sent into possession. But whether they have been sent into possession for the sake of preserving the thing, or in the name of legacies or of the womb (i.e., the unborn child), they have from this edict an action in factum, whether the prohibition was by fraud or otherwise.
Haec verba " quanti ea res erit, ob quam in possessionem missus erit" continent utilitatem creditoris, ut quantum eius interest possessionem habere, tantum ei qui prohibuit condemnetur. proinde si ob falsum creditum vel ob falsam petitionem missus est in possessionem vel si exceptione summoveri potuit, nihil ei debet prodesse hoc edictum, quia propter nullam causam in possessionem missus est.
These words, "for how much that matter will be worth, on account of which he will have been sent into possession," comprise the utility of the creditor, namely that, to the extent it is his interest to have possession, to that extent the one who prohibited it is condemned to him. Accordingly, if he was sent into possession on account of a false credit (debt) or on account of a false petition, or if he could have been removed by an exception, this edict ought to profit him nothing, because he was sent into possession for no cause.
Hoc edicto neque pupillum neque furiosum teneri constat, quia affectu carent. sed pupillum eum debemus accipere, qui doli capax non est: ceterum si iam doli capax sit, contra erit dicendum. ergo et si tutor dolo fecerit, in pupillum dabimus actionem, si modo solvendo sit tutor: sed et ipsum tutorem posse conveniri iulianus scribit.
It is settled that by this edict neither a pupil nor a madman is held, because they lack intent; but we ought to take “pupil” to mean one who is not capable of dolus; however, if he is already capable of dolus, the contrary must be said. Therefore even if the tutor (guardian) acted with dolus, we will grant an action against the pupil, provided only that the tutor is solvent; but Julian writes that the tutor himself also can be sued.
Hanc actionem excepta legatorum missione intra annum competere et non postea sciendum est, cum sit poenalis, nec in heredes similesque personas dabitur, nisi in id quod ad eas pervenit: sed heredi similibusque personis dabitur. nam cum prohibitus quis est legatorum vel fideicommissorum causa possessionem adipisci, tunc actio et perpetua est et in heredem dabitur, quia est in potestate successorum evitare interdictum satisdatione oblata.
One should know that this action, the missio of legatees excepted, is competent within a year and not thereafter, since it is penal, and it will not be granted against heirs and similar persons, except up to that which has come to them; but it will be granted to the heir and to persons of like kind. For when someone has been prohibited, for the sake of legacies or fideicommissa, from acquiring possession, then the action is both perpetual and will be given against the heir, because it is in the power of successors to avoid the interdict by offering security (satisdation).
Si quis missus fuerit in possessionem fideicommissi servandi causa et non admittatur, potestate eius inducendus est in possessionem, qui eum misit, aut si quis volet uti interdicto, consequens erit dicere interdictum locum habere. sed melius erit dicere extra ordinem ipsos iure suae potestatis exsequi oportere decretum suum, nonnumquam etiam per manum militarem.
If someone has been sent into possession for the purpose of preserving a fideicommiss and is not admitted, he must be inducted into possession by the authority of the one who sent him; or, if anyone wishes to use an interdict, it will be consequent to say that the interdict has place. But it will be better to say that, outside the ordinary course, they themselves ought, by the right of their own power, to execute their decree, sometimes even by military force.
Si mulier dicatur calumniae causa in possessionem venisse, quod non sit praegnas vel non ex eo praegnas, vel si de statu mulieris aliquid dicatur: ex epistula divi hadriani ad exemplum praesumptionis carboniani edicti ventri praetor pollicetur possessionem.
If it be said that a woman has come into possession for the sake of calumny, on the ground that she is not pregnant or not pregnant by him, or if anything be said about the status of the woman: from the letter of the deified Hadrian, following the example of the presumption of the Carbonian edict, the praetor promises possession on behalf of the womb.
Poena autem eius, qui non promittit vel satis non dat, haec est, ut in possessionem mittatur adversarius. sive ergo promittat, sive per eum non fiat, quo minus promittat, non tenebit interdictum repulso per exceptionem eo qui experitur.
Moreover, the penalty of one who does not promise or does not give security is this: that the adversary is sent into possession. Therefore, whether he does promise, or it is not through him that he fails to promise, the interdict will not bind, the one who brings the action being repelled by an exception.
Sed et ex alia causa hoc iudicium proposuit, si eo tempore, quo in possessionem mitti desiderabat, praetoris adeundi potestas non fuerit, scilicet ut, si, cum potestas praetoris adeundi non esset, damnum interim datum est, haberet iudicium qui damnum passus est.
But also on another cause he proposed this action: if at the time when he desired to be sent into possession there was no power of approaching the praetor, namely that, if, when there was no power of approaching the praetor, damage was in the meantime inflicted, he who suffered the damage should have an action.
Praetor ait: " quas tabulas lucius titius ad causam testamenti sui pertinentes reliquisse dicetur, si hae penes te sunt aut dolo malo tuo factum est, ut desinerent esse, ita eas illi exhibeas. item si libellus aliudve quid relictum esse dicetur, decreto comprehendam".
The praetor says: "Whatever tablets which Lucius Titius will be said to have left, pertaining to the case of his will, if these are in your possession or it has come about by your malicious fraud that they ceased to exist, then produce them to him. Likewise, if a booklet or anything else will be said to have been left, I will include it in the decree."
Sive autem valet testamentum sive non, vel quod ab initio inutiliter factum est, sive ruptum sit vel in quo alio vitio, sed etiam si falsum esse dicatur vel ab eo factum qui testamenti factionem non habuerit: dicendum est interdictum valere.
Whether, moreover, the testament is valid or not, or one which from the beginning was ineffectually made, or whether it has been revoked or is affected by some other vice, but even if it is said to be false or made by one who did not have testamentary capacity: it must be said that the interdict prevails.
Si ipse testator, dum vivit, tabulas suas esse dicat et exhiberi desideret, interdictum hoc locum non habebit, sed ad exhibendum erit agendum, ut exhibitas vindicet. quod in omnibus, qui corpora sua esse dicunt instrumentorum, probandum est.
If the testator himself, while he lives, says the tablets are his and desires that they be exhibited, this interdict will have no place, but one must proceed by the action ad exhibendum, in order that, once exhibited, he may vindicate them. This must be proved in all cases of those who say that the bodies of instruments are theirs.
Si quis dolo malo fecerit, quo minus penes eum tabulae essent, nihilo minus hoc interdicto tenebitur, nec praeiudicatur aliquid legi corneliae testamentariae, quasi dolo malo testamentum suppresserit. nemo enim ideo impune retinet tabulas, quod maius facinus admisit, cum exhibitis tabulis admissum eius magis manifestetur. et posse aliquem dolo malo facere, ut in eam legem non incidat, ut puta si neque amoverit neque celaverit tabulas, sed idcirco alii tradiderit, ne eas interdicenti exhiberet, hoc est si non supprimendi animo vel consilio fecit, sed ne huic exhiberet.
If anyone has acted with malicious fraud so that the tablets were not in his possession, nonetheless he will be held by this interdict, nor is anything prejudged to the Cornelian testamentary law, as though he had suppressed a testament by malicious fraud. For no one therefore retains the tablets with impunity because he has committed a greater crime, since, when the tablets are produced, his offense is made more manifest. And a person can act with malicious fraud so as not to fall under that law, as, for example, if he has neither removed nor concealed the tablets, but for that very reason has handed them over to another, lest he exhibit them to the party seeking the interdict—that is, if he did this not with the intention or plan of suppressing them, but so as not to exhibit them to this man.
Et si sub condicione legatum sit, quasi condicione existente sic aestimandum est, nec compelli debebit ad cavendum, ut se restituturum caveat, quidquid consecutus est, si condicio defecerit, quia poena contumaciae praestatur ab eo qui non exhibet.
And if a legacy has been left under a condition, it is to be assessed as though the condition were in existence; nor should he be compelled to give security, to the effect that he will restore whatever he has obtained if the condition should fail, because the penalty of contumacy is exacted from him who does not produce.
Inde quaeritur, si hinc consecutus aestimationem legatarius postea legatum petat, an sit audiendus. et putem, si heres idem praestitit, exceptione doli repellendum, si alius, repelli non oportere. et ideo et si heres sit, qui interdicto usus est aestimationem consecutus, eadem est distinctio.
Thence the question is raised: if a legatee, having by this means obtained the estimation, later demands the legacy, is he to be heard? And I think that, if the heir himself furnished the same, he should be repelled by the exceptio doli; if it was another, he ought not to be repelled. And therefore, even if it is the heir who, having used the interdict, has obtained the estimation, the same distinction applies.
Sed inter eas et ceteras vias militares hoc interest, quod viae militares exitum ad mare aut in urbes aut in flumina publica aut ad aliam viam militarem habent, harum autem vicinalium viarum dissimilis condicio est: nam pars earum in militares vias exitum habent, pars sine ullo exitu intermoriuntur.
But between these and the other military roads this is the distinction, that military roads have an outlet to the sea or into cities or into public rivers or to another military road, whereas the condition of these vicinal roads is dissimilar: for part of them have an outlet into the military roads, part die out without any outlet.
Praetor ait: " ne quid in loco publico facias inve eum locum immittas, qua ex re quid illi damni detur, praeterquam quod lege senatus consulto edicto decretove principum tibi concessum est. de eo, quod factum erit, interdictum non dabo".
The praetor says: "Do not do anything in a public place, nor introduce anything into that place, from which any damage would be done to it, except what has been granted to you by law, by senatorial decree, by edict, or by a decree of the emperors. Concerning that which shall have been done, I will not grant an interdict."
Et tam publicis utilitatibus quam privatorum per hoc prospicitur. loca enim publica utique privatorum usibus deserviunt, iure scilicet civitatis, non quasi propria cuiusque, et tantum iuris habemus ad optinendum, quantum quilibet ex populo ad prohibendum habet. propter quod si quod forte opus in publico fiet, quod ad privati damnum redundet, prohibitorio interdicto potest conveniri, propter quam rem hoc interdictum propositum est.
And by this provision regard is had as much to public utilities as to those of private persons. For public places assuredly serve the uses of private individuals, by the right of the city, not as though they were the property of each; and we have only so much right to occupy as anyone of the populace has to prohibit. Wherefore, if perchance some work is done in a public place which redounds to the damage of a private person, it can be met by a prohibitory interdict, for which reason this interdict has been set forth.
Hoc interdictum ad ea loca, quae sunt in fisci patrimonio, non puto pertinere: in his enim neque facere quicquam neque prohibere privatus potest: res enim fiscales quasi propriae et privatae principis sunt. igitur si quis in his aliquid faciat, nequaquam hoc interdictum locum habebit: sed si forte de his sit controversia, praefecti eorum iudices sunt.
I do not think this interdict pertains to those places which are in the patrimony of the fisc: for in these a private person can neither do anything nor prohibit; for fiscal things are as if the princeps’s own and private property. Therefore, if anyone does anything in these, by no means will this interdict have application; but if perhaps there is a controversy about these, their prefects are the judges.
Merito ait praetor " qua ex re quid illi damni detur": nam quotiensque aliquid in publico fieri permittitur, ita oportet permitti, ut sine iniuria cuiusquam fiat. et ita solet princeps, quotiens aliquid novi operis instituendum petitur, permittere.
Rightly the praetor says " from which matter what damages are to be awarded to him": for whenever something is permitted to be done in public, it ought so to be permitted that it be done without anyone’s injury. And thus the emperor is accustomed, whenever the instituting of some new work is requested, to permit it.
Si quis nemine prohibente in publico aedificaverit, non esse eum cogendum tollere, ne ruinis urbs deformetur, et quia prohibitorium est interdictum, non restitutorium. si tamen obstet id aedificium publico usui, utique is, qui operibus publicis procurat, debebit id deponere, aut si non obstet, solarium ei imponere: vectigal enim hoc sic appellatur solarium ex eo, quod pro solo pendatur.
if someone, with no one forbidding, has built on public property, he is not to be compelled to remove it, lest the city be disfigured by ruins, and because the interdict is prohibitory, not restitutory. if, however, that building obstructs public use, then indeed the one who has charge of public works ought to take it down; or, if it does not obstruct, to impose upon him a solarium (ground-rent): for this vectigal is thus called “solarium” from the fact that it is paid for the soil.
Viam publicam eam dicimus, cuius etiam solum publicum est: non enim sicuti in privata via, ita et in publica accipimus: viae privatae solum alienum est, ius tantum eundi et agendi nobis competit: viae autem publicae solum publicum est, relictum ad directum certis finibus latitudinis ab eo, qui ius publicandi habuit, ut ea publice iretur commearetur.
We call that a public way whose very soil is public: for we do not take a public way just as we do a private way; the soil of a private way is another’s, only the right of going and of driving belongs to us; but the soil of a public way is public, left in a straight course with fixed bounds of width by him who had the right of making it public, so that it might be publicly gone upon and traveled.
Vicinal roads are the roads which are in the vici or which lead into the vici: some also say that these too are public: which is thus true, if this way has not been established from a contribution of private persons. It is otherwise than if it be repaired from a contribution of private persons: for if it be repaired from a contribution of private persons, it is not necessarily private: for the refection is on that account made from the common fund, because it has a common use and utility.
Privatae viae dupliciter accipi possunt, vel hae, quae sunt in agris, quibus imposita est servitus, ut ad agrum alterius ducant, vel hae, quae ad agros ducunt, per quas omnibus commeare liceat, in quas exitur de via consulari et sic post illam excipit via vel iter vel actus ad villam ducens. has ergo, quae post consularem excipiunt in villas vel in alias colonias ducentes, putem etiam ipsas publicas esse.
Private roads can be understood in a twofold way, either those which are in the fields, upon which a servitude has been imposed, so that they lead to another’s field, or those which lead to fields, along which it is permitted for all to pass, into which one goes out from the consular road, and thus after that the way—or the path or the drive—leading to a villa takes over. Therefore, those which after the consular road take over, leading into villas or into other colonies, I think even these themselves are public.
Idem labeo scribit, si quis in suo ita aedificaverit, ut aqua in via collecta restagnet, non teneri eum interdicto, quia non immittat aquam, sed non recipit: nerva autem melius scribit utrumque teneri. plane si fundus viam publicam contingat et ex eo aqua derivata deteriorem viam faciat, quae tamen aqua ex vicini fundo in tuum veniat: si quidem necesse habeas eam aquam recipere, interdictum locum habebit adversus vicinum tuum: si autem necesse non sit, non teneri vicinum tuum, te tamen teneri: eum enim videri factum habere, qui usum eius aquae habeat. idem nerva scribit, si tecum interdicto agatur, nihil ultra te facere cogendum, quam ut arbitratu eius qui tecum experitur cum vicino experiaris: ceterum aliter observantibus futurum, ut tenearis etiam, si iam bona fide cum vicino egeris neque per te stet, quo minus arbitratu actoris cum vicino experiaris.
The same Labeo writes that if someone on his own property has so built that water collected in the roadway pools, he is not held by the interdict, because he does not let water in, but does not receive it: Nerva, however, writes better that both are held. Clearly, if an estate touches a public road and from it water derived makes the road worse, which water nevertheless comes from a neighbor’s land onto yours: if indeed you have necessity to receive that water, the interdict will have place against your neighbor: but if there is no necessity, your neighbor is not held, yet you are held: for he is deemed to have done the act who has the use of that water. The same Nerva writes that, if action by interdict is brought against you, you are to be compelled to do nothing further than, at the arbitrament of him who proceeds against you, to proceed against your neighbor: otherwise, if a different practice be observed, it will come about that you are held even if you have already dealt in good faith with your neighbor and it is not through you that it fails to happen that, at the plaintiff’s arbitrament, you proceed against your neighbor.
Deinde ait praetor: " quo ea via idque iter deterius sit fiat". hoc sive statim deterior via sit, sive postea: ad hoc enim pertinent haec verba " sic fiat": etenim quaedam sunt talia, ut statim facto suo noceant, quaedam talia, ut in praesentiarum quidem nihil noceant, in futurum autem nocere debeant.
Then the praetor says: "by which that road and that right-of-way be made worse, so let it be done." This holds whether the road become worse immediately or later; for to this the words "so let it be done" pertain: for certain things are such that they harm at once by the very act, others are such that, for the present indeed they harm nothing, but in the future, however, they ought to cause harm.
Unde ofilius putat eum, qui pro derelicto reliquit id opus quod fecit, si viam publicam corrupit et reliquit, non teneri hoc interdicto: non enim habet quod fecit. sed an in eum actio debeat dari, videbimus. et puto utile interdictum competere, ut, quod in via publica aedificavit, restituat.
Whence Ofilius thinks that he who, as abandoned, has left as derelict the work which he made—if he has damaged a public road and left it—is not held by this interdict: for he does not have what he made. But whether an action ought to be granted against him, we shall see. And I think a useful interdict lies, to the effect that he restore what he built on the public road.
Si ex fundo tuo arbor in viam publicam sic ceciderit, ut itineri sit impedimento, eamque pro derelicto habeas, non teneri labeo scribit: si tamen, inquit, actor sua impensa arborem tollere paratus fuerit, recte tecum acturum interdicto de via publica reficienda. sed si pro derelicto non habeas, recte tecum agi hoc interdicto.
If from your estate a tree has fallen into the public road in such a way as to be an impediment to travel, and you hold it as derelict, Labeo writes that you are not liable; if, however, he says, the plaintiff is ready, at his own expense, to remove the tree, he will proceed rightly against you by the interdict for restoring the public way. But if you do not hold it as derelict, it is right that you be proceeded against by this interdict.
Idem labeo scribit, si vicinus meus viam opere corruperit, quamvis opus, quod fecit, tam mihi quam ipsi utile sit, tamen si is vicinus fundi sui causa id fecerit, me tamen non posse hoc interdicto conveniri: si autem communiter hoc opus fieri curaverimus, utrumque nostrum teneri.
The same Labeo writes: if my neighbor has spoiled a road by a work, although the work which he did is as useful to me as to himself, nevertheless, if that neighbor did it for the sake of his own estate, I nevertheless cannot be sued under this interdict; but if we have taken care that this work be done in common, each of us is held liable.
Hoc interdictum locum habet etiam adversus eum, qui dolo malo fecit, quo minus possideret vel haberet: etenim parem esse condicionem oportet eius, qui quid possideat vel habeat, atque eius, cuius dolo malo factum sit, quo minus possideret vel haberet: et mihi videtur vera labeonis sententia.
This interdict has place also against him who by malicious fraud has brought it about that another not possess or have; for the condition ought to be equal for him who possesses or has something and for him by whose malicious fraud it has been done that he not possess or have; and to me Labeo’s opinion seems true.
" restituas" inquit. restituere videtur, qui in pristinum statum reducit: quod fit, sive quis tollit id quod factum est vel reponat quod sublatum est. et interdum suo sumptu: nam si ipse, quo qui interdixit, fecerit, vel iussu eius alius, aut ratum habitum sit quod fecit, ipse suis sumptibus debet restituere: si vero nihil horum intervenit, sed habet factum, tunc dicemus patientiam solam eum praestare debere.
'"restore," he says. He is deemed to restore who brings back into the pristine state: which is done whether someone removes what has been done or puts back what has been taken away. And sometimes at his own expense: for if he himself, on account of whom the one who issued the interdict acted, has done it, or another by his order, or what he did has been held ratified, he himself ought to restore at his own expenses. But if none of these has intervened, but he “has the deed,” then we shall say that he owes to furnish patience alone.'
Episkeuazein de tas hodous tas dymosias kata tyn heautou oikian hekaston kai tas hudrorroas ekkavairein tas ek tou hupaivriou kai episkeuazein ohutws, hws an my kwluy hamacan epienai. hosoi de misvwsamenoi oikousin, ean my episkeuasy ho despotys, autoi episkeuasantes hupologizesvwsan to analwma kata ton misvon.
Let each person repair the public roads along his own house, and clear out the water-drains that come from the open air, and repair them in such a way as not to hinder a wagon from passing. And as many as dwell by renting: if the owner does not make the repair, let them themselves make the repair and reckon the expense against the rent.
Viam aperire est ad veterem altitudinem latitudinemque restituere. sed et purgare refectionis portio est: purgare autem proprie dicitur ad libramentum proprium redigere sublato eo quod super eam esset. reficit enim et qui aperit et qui purgat et omnes omnino, qui in pristinum statum reducunt.
To open a road is to restore it to its former height and breadth. But clearing too is a portion of refection: to clear, properly, is said to reduce it to its proper level, with that which was upon it removed. For he performs refection both who opens and who clears, and, in general, all who bring it back to its pristine state.
Si quis in specie refectionis deteriorem viam facit, impune vim patietur. propter quod neque latiorem neque longiorem neque altiorem neque humiliorem viam sub nomine refectionis is qui intercidit potest facere, vel in viam terrenam glaream inicere aut sternere viam lapide quae terrena sit, vel contra lapide stratam terrenam facere.
If anyone under the appearance of refection makes a road worse, he will with impunity suffer force. wherefore neither a wider nor a longer nor a higher nor a lower road may he who has cut it off make under the name of refection, nor may he throw gravel onto an earthen road or strew with stone a road which is earthen, or, conversely, make earthen a road paved with stone.
Ripa autem ita recte definietur id, quod flumen continet naturalem rigorem cursus sui tenens: ceterum si quando vel imbribus vel mari vel qua alia ratione ad tempus excrevit, ripas non mutat: nemo denique dixit nilum, qui incremento suo aegyptum operit, ripas suas mutare vel ampliare. nam cum ad perpetuam sui mensuram redierit, ripae alvei eius muniendae sunt. si tamen naturaliter creverit, ut perpetuum incrementum nanctus sit, vel alio flumine admixto vel qua alia ratione, dubio procul dicendum est ripas quoque eum mutasse, quemadmodum si alveo mutato alia coepit currere.
A bank, moreover, will be rightly defined as that which contains the river, keeping the natural rigor of its course: however, if at any time it has for a time swollen either by rains or by the sea or by some other cause, it does not change its banks: no one, in fine, has said that the Nile, which by its increment covers Egypt, changes or enlarges its banks. For when it has returned to its perpetual measure, the banks of its channel must be fortified. If, however, it has naturally grown so that it has acquired a permanent increment, either with another river admixed or by some other cause, beyond doubt it must be said that it has changed its banks as well, just as if, its channel having been changed, it has begun to run elsewhere.
Si insula in publico flumine fuerit nata inque ea aliquid fiat, non videtur in publico fieri. illa enim insula aut occupantis est, si limitati agri fuerunt, aut eius cuius ripam contingit, aut, si in medio alveo nata est, eorum est qui prope utrasque ripas possident.
If an island has been born in a public river and something is done upon it, it is not considered to be done in public. For that island is either the occupant’s, if the fields have been delimited, or it is his whose bank it touches; or, if it has been born in the middle of the channel, it belongs to those who possess near to both banks.
Simili modo et si flumen alveum suum reliquit et alia fluere coeperit, quidquid in veteri alveo factum est, ad hoc interdictum non pertinet: non enim in flumine publico factum erit, quod est utriusque vicini aut, si limitatus est ager, occupantis alveus fiet: certe desinit esse publicus. ille etiam alveus, quem sibi flumen fecit, etsi privatus ante fuit, incipit tamen esse publicus, quia impossibile est, ut alveus fluminis publici non sit publicus.
In a similar manner, if a river has left its own channel and has begun to flow elsewhere, whatever has been done in the old channel does not pertain to this interdict: for it will not have been done in a public river; rather it will belong to both neighbors, or, if the land is delimited, the channel will become that of the occupier: certainly it ceases to be public. That channel also which the river has made for itself, although previously it was private, nevertheless begins to be public, because it is impossible that the channel of a public river not be public.
Item si amnis aliquid circumeat, sciendum est eius manere cuius fuit: si quid igitur illic factum est, non est factum in publico flumine. nec pertinet ad hoc interdictum, si quid in privato factum sit, ne quidem si in privato flumine fiat: nam quod fit in privato flumine, perinde est, atque si in alio privato loco fiat.
Likewise, if a river encircles something, it is to be known that it remains that of him whose it was: if, therefore, anything has been done there, it has not been done in a public river. Nor does this interdict pertain, if anything has been done on private property, not even if it be done in a private river: for what is done in a private river is just the same as if it were done in some other private place.
Non autem omne, quod in flumine publico ripave fit, coercet praetor, sed si quid fiat, quo deterior statio et navigatio fiat. ergo hoc interdictum ad ea tantum flumina publica pertinet, quae sunt navigabilia, ad cetera non pertinet. sed labeo scribit non esse iniquum etiam si quid in eo flumine, quod navigabile non sit, fiat, ut exarescat vel aquae cursus impediatur, utile interdictum competere " ne vis ei fiat, quo minus id opus, quod in alveo fluminis ripave ita factum sit, ut iter cursus fluminis deterior sit fiat, tollere demoliri purgare restituere viri boni arbitratu possit".
However, the praetor does not restrain everything that is done in a public river or on its bank, but only if something is done whereby the station (anchorage) and navigation are made worse. Therefore this interdict pertains only to those public rivers which are navigable; it does not pertain to the others. But Labeo writes that it is not inequitable that even if something is done in a river which is not navigable, so that it dries up or the course of the water is impeded, a useful interdict be available: "that no force be done to him, whereby he be hindered from being able, as to that work which has been made in the bed of the river or on its bank in such a way that the course of the river is made worse, to remove, demolish, clear, restore it at the arbitrament of a good man."
Ait praetor: " iterque navigii deterius fiat". hoc pro navigatione positum est: immo navigium solemus dicere etiam ipsam navem, iter ergo navigio potest et sic accipi " iter navi deterius fiat". navigii appellatione etiam rates continentur, quia plerumque et ratum usus necessarius est. si pedestre iter impediatur, non ideo minus iter navigio deterius fit.
The praetor says: "and let the passage of a vessel be made worse." This is set down in place of "navigation": indeed, we are accustomed to call "navigium" even the ship itself; therefore "iter navigio" can also be taken thus, "let the passage for a ship be made worse." Under the appellation of "navigium" rafts too are contained, because very often even the use of a raft is necessary. If a pedestrian way is impeded, not for that reason is the passage for a vessel any the less made worse.
Deterior statio itemque iter navigio fieri videtur, si usus eius corrumpatur vel difficilior fiat aut minor vel rarior aut si in totum auferatur. proinde sive derivetur aqua, ut exiguior facta minus sit navigabilis, vel si dilatetur, aut diffusa brevem aquam faciat, vel contra sic coangustetur, et rapidius flumen faciat, vel si quid aliud fiat quod navigationem incommodet difficilioremve faciat vel prorsus impediat, interdicto locus erit.
A station and likewise a route for a vessel are seen to be made worse, if its use is corrupted or is made more difficult, or is made smaller or rarer, or if it is taken away altogether. Accordingly, whether the water is diverted, so that, made scantier, it is less navigable; or if it is widened, or, being diffused, makes shallow water; or, conversely, is so constricted and makes the river more rapid; or if anything else is done that incommodes navigation or makes it more difficult or altogether impedes it, there will be ground for the interdict.
Labeo scribit non esse dandam exceptionem ei, qui interdicto convenitur: " aut nisi ripae tuendae causa factum sit", sed ita excipiendum ait: " extra quam si quid ita factum sit, uti de lege fieri licuit".
Labeo writes that an exception is not to be granted to him who is proceeded against by interdict: "or unless it was done for the sake of protecting the riverbank," but says it should be excepted thus: "except in so far as if anything has been done in such a manner as it was permitted by law to be done".
Ait praetor: " quo aliter aqua fluat, quam priore aestate fluxit": non omnis ergo, qui immisit vel qui fecit, tenetur, sed qui faciendo vel immittendo efficit aliter, quam priore aestate fluxit, aquam fluere. quod autem ait " aliter fluat", non ad quantitatem aquae fluentis pertinet, sed ad modum et ad rigorem cursus aquae referendum est. et generaliter dicendum est ita demum interdicto quem teneri, si mutetur aquae cursus per hoc quod factum est, dum vel depressior vel artior fiat aqua ac per hoc rapidior fit cum incommodo accolentium: et si quod aliud vitii accolae ex facto eius qui convenitur sentient, interdicto locus erit.
The praetor says: " that the water flow otherwise than it flowed in the prior summer": not everyone, therefore, who let it in or who did the work is liable, but he who by doing or by letting in brings it about that the water flows otherwise than it flowed in the prior summer. And as for his saying " let it flow otherwise," it does not pertain to the quantity of the water flowing, but must be referred to the mode and to the rigor of the course of the water. And generally it must be said that only then is someone held by the interdict, if the course of the water is changed by what has been done, in that the water becomes either lower or narrower and thereby becomes more rapid, to the inconvenience of the neighbors: and if the neighbors feel any other defect from the deed of the one who is sued, there will be a place for the interdict.
Si quis ex rivo tecto per apertum ducere velit vel contra qui ante aperto duxit, nunc operto velit, interdicto teneri placuit, si modo hoc factum eius incommodum circa colentibus adferat.
If anyone should wish to conduct from a covered channel through open [ground], or conversely, he who previously conducted in the open now wishes it covered, it has been decided that he is held by the interdict, provided only that this act of his brings inconvenience to those cultivating in the vicinity.
Sunt qui putent excipiendum hoc interdicto " quod eius ripae muniendae causa non fiet", scilicet ut, si quid fiat, quo aliter aqua fluat, si tamen muniendae ripae causa fiat, interdicto locus non sit. sed nec hoc quibusdam placet: neque enim ripae cum incommodo accolentium muniendae sunt. hoc tamen iure utimur, ut praetor ex causa aestimet, an hanc exceptionem dare debeat: plerumque enim utilitas suadet exceptionem istam dari.
There are those who think that this exception should be inserted into the interdict: “that which will be done for the sake of strengthening that bank shall not be done,” namely so that, if anything be done by which the water flows otherwise, yet if it is done for the sake of strengthening the bank, there should be no place for the interdict. But this does not please some: for banks are not to be strengthened with the inconvenience of the neighbors. Nevertheless, we use this rule, that the praetor should assess from the circumstances whether he ought to grant this exception; for, in most cases, utility urges that that exception be given.
Sed et si alia utilitas vertatur eius, qui quid in flumine publico fecit ( pone enim grande damnum flumen ei dare solitum, praedia eius depopulari), si forte aggeres vel quam aliam munitionem adhibuit, ut agrum suum tueretur eaque res cursum fluminis ad aliquid immutavit, cur ei non consulatur? plerosque scio prorsus flumina avertisse alveosque mutasse, dum praediis suis consulunt. oportet enim in huiusmodi rebus utilitatem et tutelam facientis spectari, sine iniuria utique accolarum.
But also, if some other utility accrues to the one who has done something in a public river (put, for example, that the river was wont to inflict great damage on him, to devastate his estates), if perchance he employed embankments or some other fortification to protect his land, and this matter altered the course of the river in some respect, why should provision not be made for him? I know that very many have outright diverted rivers and changed their channels, while looking out for their estates. For in matters of this kind the utility and protection of the one acting ought to be regarded, of course without injury to the neighbors.
Is autem hoc interdicto tenetur, qui aliter fecit fluere, quam priore aestate fluxit. et idcirco aiunt praetorem priorem aestatem comprehendisse, quia semper certior est naturalis cursus fluminum aestate potius quam hieme. nec ad instantem aestatem, sed ad priorem interdictum hoc refertur, quia illius aestatis fluxus indubitatior est.
But he is held by this interdict who has made it flow otherwise than it flowed in the prior summer. And therefore they say that the praetor has comprehended the prior summer, because the natural course of rivers is always more certain in summer rather than in winter. And this interdict is referred not to the present summer, but to the prior, because the flow of that summer is more indubitable.
Hoc interdictum restitutorium proponitur: superius enim prohibitorium est et pertinet ad ea, quae nondum facta sunt. si quid igitur iam factum est, per hoc interdictum restituetur: si quid ne fiat prospicitur, superiore interdicto erit utendum, et si quid post interdictum redditum fuerit factum, coercebitur.
This restitutory interdict is set forth: for the one above is prohibitory and pertains to things which have not yet been done. If, therefore, anything has already been done, it will be restored by this interdict; if provision is made that something not be done, the earlier interdict must be used; and if anything has been done after the interdict has been issued, it will be restrained.
Praetor ait: " quo minus illi in flumine publico ripave eius opus facere ripae agrive qui circa ripam est tuendi causa liceat, dum ne ob id navigatio deterior fiat, si tibi damni infecti in annos decem viri boni arbitratu vel cautum vel satisdatum est aut per illum non stat, quo minus viri boni arbitratu caveatur vel satisdetur, vim fieri veto".
The Praetor says: " I forbid force to be used, to prevent it from being permitted to that man to make a work in a public river or on its bank, for the purpose of protecting the bank or the field which is around the bank, provided that navigation is not made worse on that account, if for you, for damage not yet done, for ten years, in accordance with the decision of a good man, either security has been given or surety has been provided, or it is not through him that it is prevented that, in accordance with the decision of a good man, security be given or surety be provided."
Is autem, qui ripam vult munire, de damno futuro debet vel cavere vel satisdare secundum qualitatem personae: et hoc interdicto expressum est, ut damni infecti in annos decem viri boni arbitratu vel caveatur vel satisdetur.
Moreover, he who wishes to fortify the bank ought either to give a caution or to furnish surety for future damage, according to the quality of the person: and this is expressed by the interdict, that for damage not yet done, for ten years, by the arbitrament of a good man, either caution be given or surety be furnished.
Et si quis de area deiectus sit, sine dubio interdicto locus est: et generaliter ad omnes hoc pertinet interdictum, qui de re solo cohaerenti deiciuntur: qualisqualis enim fuerit locus, unde quis vi deiectus est, interdicto locus erit.
And if anyone has been thrown down from an area, without doubt there is ground for the interdict; and generally this interdict pertains to all who are thrown down from a thing adherent to the soil: for of whatever sort the place may have been from which someone was thrown down by force, there will be ground for the interdict.
Illud utique in dubium non venit interdictum hoc ad res mobiles non pertinere: nam ex causa furti vel vi bonorum raptorum actio competit: potest et ad exhibendum agi. plane si quae res sint in fundo vel in aedibus, unde quis deiectus est, etiam earum nomine interdictum competere non est ambigendum.
This, at any rate, does not come into doubt: that this interdict does not pertain to movable things; for an action lies on the ground of theft or for goods taken by force (rapine); one can also proceed ad exhibendum (for production). Clearly, if there are any things on the estate (fundus) or in the house (aedes) from which someone has been ejected, there is no room for doubt that the interdict likewise lies in respect of those as well.
Ait praetor: " deiecisti aut familia deiecit". merito familiae mentio habita: nam cum " deiecisti" verbum refertur ad personam eius qui deiecit nec pertineat ad eum, cuius familia deiecit ( nec enim ego videor deiecisse, si familia mea deiecerit), consequens fuit addere " aut familia tua deiecit".
The praetor says: " you ejected, or the family ejected." Rightly was mention made of the family: for since the word " you ejected" is referred to the person of him who did the ejecting and does not pertain to him whose family did the ejecting (for I do not seem to have ejected, if my family should have ejected), it was consequent to add " or your family ejected."
Quotiens verus procurator deiecerit, cum utrolibet eorum, id est sive domino sive procuratore, agi posse sabinus ait et alterius nomine alteri eximi, sic tamen, si ab altero eorum litis aestimatio fuerit praestita ( non enim excusatus est, qui iussu alicuius deiecit, non magis quam si iussu alicuius occidit): cum autem falsus est procurator, cum ipso tantum procuratore interdici debere. sabini sententia vera est.
Whenever a true procurator has ejected, Sabinus says that one can proceed with either of them, that is, either with the owner (dominus) or with the procurator, and that by the name of the one the other is to be exempted, provided, however, that the valuation of the suit (litis aestimatio) has been rendered by one of them ( for he is not excused who has ejected by someone’s order, any more than if he killed by someone’s order): but when the procurator is false, the interdict ought to be only against the procurator himself. Sabinus’s opinion is true.
Sed et si quod alius deiecit, ratum habuero, sunt qui putent secundum sabinum et cassium, qui ratihabitionem mandato comparant, me videri deiecisse interdictoque isto teneri, et hoc verum est: rectius enim dicitur in maleficio ratihabitionem mandato comparari.
But also, if I have ratified what another has thrown down, there are those who think, following Sabinus and Cassius—who assimilate ratihabition (ratification) to a mandate—that I am deemed to have thrown it down and am held by that interdict; and this is true: for it is more correct to say that, in a maleficium (wrongdoing), ratihabition is compared to a mandate.
Quod igitur additur " aut familia tua deiecit", merito scriptum est in eum casum, in quem familia mea vi deiecit. ceterum si iussit, ipse deiecit, nec gravari debet dominus qui non iussit, si servorum suorum factum praestaret, etsi non iussu eius deiecerunt: nam non gravabitur hoc nomine, quippe cum aut pervenit ad eum aliquid et restitueret, aut non pervenit et ipsos servos maleficii causa noxae dedendo indemnis erit: quod enim noxae dedere compellitur, in damno non debet reputare, cum servus hoc possit domini deteriorem condicionem facere.
Therefore the addition “or your household ejected [him]” is rightly written for that case in which my household ejected [him] by force. Moreover, if he ordered it, he himself ejected [him]; and the master who did not order [it] ought not to be burdened, if he would have to answer for the deed of his slaves, even though they ejected [him] not by his order. For he will not be burdened under this head, since either something came to him and he would restore it, or nothing came, and by surrendering those slaves for the wrongdoing, by noxal surrender, he will be held harmless. For what he is compelled to give up by noxal surrender he ought not to reckon among damages, since by this a slave can make the master’s condition worse.
Si adversus eum, qui in libertatem ex servitute vel contra petitur, post inchoatum liberale iudicium utar interdicto et liber iudicatus fuerit et apparuerit ignorante eo a servis eius vi me deiectum, in possessionem restituar.
If, against him who is claimed into freedom from servitude, or the reverse is claimed, after the liberty proceeding has been initiated I make use of the interdict, and he has been adjudged free, and it has appeared that, he being unaware, I was by force cast out by his slaves, I shall be restored into possession.
Quod servus vel procurator vel colonus tenent, dominus videtur possidere, et ideo his deiectis ipse deici de possessione videtur, etiamsi ignoret eos deiectos, per quos possidebat. et si quis igitur alius, per quem possidebam, deiectus fuerit, mihi competere interdictum nemini dubium est.
What a slave or procurator or colonus hold, the owner is deemed to possess; and therefore, these being ejected, he himself is deemed to be ejected from possession, even if he does not know that those through whom he was possessing have been ejected. And if accordingly any other person, through whom I was possessing, shall have been ejected, it is to no one doubtful that the interdict is competent to me.
Sive autem corpore sive animo possidens quis deiectus est, palam est eum vi deiectum videri. idcircoque si quis de agro suo vel de domo processisset nemine suorum relicto, mox revertens prohibitus sit ingredi vel ipsum praedium, vel si quis eum in medio itinere detinuerit et ipse possederit, vi deiectus videtur: ademisti enim ei possessionem, quam animo retinebat, etsi non corpore.
Whether someone possessing either in body or in mind has been ejected, it is plain that he is seen as ejected by force. And therefore, if someone has gone out from his field or from his house, leaving none of his people behind, and, on soon returning, is prevented from entering either the very holding; or if someone has detained him in the middle of the road and himself has taken possession, he is deemed ejected by force: for you have taken from him the possession which he was retaining in mind, even if not in body.
Vi possidere eum definiendum est, qui expulso vetere possessore adquisitam per vim possessionem optinet aut qui in hoc ipsum aptatus et praeparatus venit ut contra bonos mores auxilio, ne prohiberi possit ingrediens in possessionem, facit. sed qui per vim possessionem suam retinuerit, labeo ait non vi possidere.
To possess by force is to be defined as one who, the former possessor having been expelled, holds possession acquired by force, or one who has come equipped and prepared for this very purpose, so that, contrary to good morals and with aid, he makes it so that, on entering into possession, he cannot be prevented. But one who has retained his own possession by force, Labeo says, does not possess by force.
Idem labeo ait eum, qui metu turbae perterritus fugerit, vi videri deiectum. sed pomponius ait vim sine corporali vi locum non habere, ergo etiam eum, qui fugatus est supervenientibus quibusdam, si illi vi occupaverunt possessionem, videri vi deiectum.
The same labeo says that he who, thoroughly terrified by fear of a crowd, has fled, is considered to have been ejected by force. But pomponius says that force without corporeal force has no place; therefore even he who has been put to flight by certain supervening persons, if they occupied possession by force, is considered to have been ejected by force.
Si fundus, a quo vi expulsus sim, mihi restitutus esset, ceterae vero res, quae vi ablatae sunt, non restituantur, hic dicendum est interdictum nihilo minus tenere, quia verum est vi esse deiectum. plane si quis velit de possessione quidem rei soli per hoc interdictum experiri, de rebus vero mobilibus ad exhibendum actione, potest hoc suo arbitrio habere, et ita iulianus scribit: idem scribit et si quis vi bonorum raptorum de huiusmodi rebus velit experiri.
If the landed estate, from which I was expelled by force, has been restored to me, but the other things which were taken away by force are not restored, here it must be said that the interdict nonetheless holds, because it is true that he was ejected by force. Clearly, if someone wishes to try his case as to possession of real property by this interdict, but as to movable things by the action ad exhibendum, he can have it so at his own discretion, and thus Julianus writes; he writes the same also if someone wishes to proceed as to such things by the action for goods snatched by force.
Quod autem ait praetor: " quaeque ibi habuit", sic accipimus, ut omnes res contineantur, non solum quae propriae ipsius fuerunt, verum etiam si quae apud eum depositae vel ei commodatae vel pigneratae, quarumque usum vel usum fructum vel custodiam habuit, vel si quae ei locatae sunt: cum enim dicat praetor " habuit", omnia haec habendi verbo continentur.
But as for what the praetor says: "and whatever he had there," we thus take it, that all things are encompassed, not only those which were his own proper things, but also if any were deposited with him or lent to him by commodatum or pledged, and those of which he had use or usufruct or custody, or if any were leased to him: for since the praetor says "he had," all these are contained under the word "having."
Rectissime autem praetor addidit " tunc ibi habuit". " tunc" sic accipimus " cum deiceretur": et ideo et si quid postea desiit illic esse, dicendum erit in interdictum venire. sic fit, ut, etiamsi homines vel pecora demortua sint post deiectionem, interdicto locus sit.
Most correctly, moreover, the praetor added " tunc ibi habuit". We take " tunc" thus: " when it was thrown down"; and therefore, even if afterwards it ceased to be there, it must be said to come within the interdict. Thus it follows that, even if men or cattle have died after the throwing down, there is room for the interdict.
Denique scribit iulianus eum, qui vi deiecit ex eo praedio, in quo homines fuerant, propius esse, ut etiam sine culpa eius mortuis hominibus aestimationem eorum per interdictum restituere debeat, sicuti fur hominis etiam mortuo eo tenetur. huic consequens esse ait, ut villae quoque et aedium incendio consumptarum pretium restituere cogatur: ubi enim quis, inquit, deiecit, per eum stetisse videtur, quo minus restitueret.
Finally, Julian writes that the one who by force ejected someone from that estate in which there had been persons is more properly to be held such that, even if those persons died without his fault, he must restore their valuation through the interdict, just as a thief of a person is liable even if that person has died. He says that consequent to this it follows that he is also compelled to restore the price of a villa and of buildings consumed by fire; for where someone has ejected, it is deemed to have depended on him that restoration did not occur.
Sane quod ait praetor " ibi", quomodo accipimus? utrum in eo loco, unde quis vi deiectus est, an vero in omni possessione? et melius dicetur non ad angulum referendum vel locum, in quo fuerit, verum etiam ad omnem partem possessionis, qua quis caruit, cum deicitur.
Indeed, as the praetor says "there," how are we to take it? Is it in that place from which someone was ejected by force, or rather in the whole possession? And it will be better said that it is not to be referred to the corner or the place in which he was, but also to every part of the possession of which he was deprived when he was cast out.
Ex die, quo quis deiectus est, fructuum ratio habetur, quamvis in ceteris interdictis ex quo edita sunt, non retro, computantur. idem est et in rebus mobilibus, quae ibi erant: nam et earum fructus computandi sunt, ex quo quis vi deiectus est.
From the day on which someone was ejected, the reckoning of the fruits is taken, although in the other interdicts they are computed from the time when they were issued, not retroactively. The same holds also for the movable things that were there: for the fruits of those too are to be computed from the time when someone was ejected by force.
Non solum autem fructuum ratio in hoc interdicto habetur, verum ceterarum etiam utilitatium habenda est: nam vivianus refert in hoc interdicto omnia, quaecumque habiturus vel adsecuturus erat is qui deiectus est, si vi deiectus non esset, restitui aut eorum litem a iudice aestimari debere eumque tantum consecuturum, quanti sua interesset se vi deiectum non esse.
Not only, moreover, is account taken of the fruits in this interdict, but account must also be taken of the other benefits; for Vivianus reports that under this interdict all things whatsoever the person who was ejected was going to have or to acquire, if he had not been ejected by force, must either be restored or their claim be assessed by the judge, and that he will recover the amount of his interest in not having been ejected by force.
Interdictum hoc quia atrocitatem facinoris in se habet, quaesitum est, an liberto in patronum vel liberis adversus parentes competit. et verius est nec liberto in patronum nec in parentes liberis dandum esse meliusque erit in factum actionem his competere. aliter atque si vi armata usus sit adversus libertum patronus vel adversus liberos parens: nam hic interdictum competit.
Because this interdict carries in itself the atrocity of the deed, it has been asked whether it is available to a freedman against his patron, or to children against their parents. And the truer view is that it should be granted neither to a freedman against his patron nor to children against their parents, and it will be better that an action in factum should lie for them. Otherwise, if the patron has used armed force against the freedman, or the parent against the children: for here the interdict is available.
Non alii autem, quam ei qui possidet, interdictum unde vi competere argumentum praebet, quod apud vivianum relatum est, si quis me vi deiecerit, meos non deiecerit, non posse me hoc interdicto experiri, quia per eos retineo possessionem, qui deiecti non sunt.
But an argument affords that the interdict “unde vi” lies for no one other than the one who possesses, namely the one reported by Vivianus: if someone has ejected me by force, but has not ejected my people, I cannot try this interdict, because I retain possession through those who have not been ejected.
Idem vivianus refert: servos quosdam vi depulit, alios retinuit et vinxit aut etiam eis imperavit: vi te deiectum intellegi: desisse enim possidere, cum servi ab alio possideantur. et quod in parte servorum dictum est, idem in omnibus dici ait, si forte nemo depulsus esset, sed possideri ab eo coepissent, qui ingressus in possessionem esset.
The same Vivianus reports: he drove off certain slaves by force, he retained others and bound them, or even commanded them—that you are to be understood as having been ejected by force; for you ceased to possess, when the slaves are possessed by another. And what has been said with respect to a part of the slaves, he says the same is to be said of all, if perhaps no one had been driven off, but they had begun to be possessed by him who had entered into possession.
Uti frui autem prohibuisse is videtur, qui vi deiecit utentem et fruentem aut non admisit, cum ex fundo exisset non usus fructus deserendi causa. ceterum si quis ab initio volentem incipere uti frui prohibuit, hoc interdictum locum non habet. quid ergo est?
However, he seems to have prohibited to use and to enjoy, who cast out by force one using and enjoying, or did not admit him, when he had gone out from the estate not for the purpose of abandoning the usufruct. But if someone from the beginning forbade one willing to begin to use and to enjoy, this interdict has no place. What then is it?
Pertinet autem hoc interdictum ad eum, qui fundo uti frui prohibitus est: sed pertinebit etiam ad eum, qui aedificiis uti frui prohibetur. consequenter autem dicemus ad res mobiles hoc interdictum non pertinere, si quis uti frui prohibitus est re mobili, nisi si rei soli accedebant res mobiles: si igitur ibi fuerunt, dicendum est etiam ad eas referri hoc interdictum debere.
This interdict pertains to one who has been prohibited from using and enjoying the estate; but it will also pertain to one who is prohibited from using and enjoying buildings. Consequently, we say that this interdict does not pertain to movable things, if someone is prohibited from using and enjoying a movable thing, unless the movables acceded to the real property (were appurtenant to the thing of the soil): if therefore they were there, it must be said that this interdict should also be referred to them.
Qui usus fructus nomine qualiterqualiter fuit quasi in possessione, utetur hoc interdicto. sed si quis, posteaquam prohibitus est, capite minutus sit vel mortuus, recte dicitur heredibus et successoribus competere hoc interdictum, non ut in futurum constituatur usus fructus, sed ut praeterita causa et damnum praeteritum sarciatur.
He who, under the name of usufruct, has in any way whatsoever been as though in possession, will make use of this interdict. But if someone, after he has been prohibited, has been diminished in status (capitis deminutio) or has died, it is rightly said that this interdict is competent to the heirs and successors—not so that the usufruct may be constituted for the future, but so that the past cause and the past damage may be repaired.
In interdicto unde vi tanti condemnatio facienda est, quanti intersit possidere: et hoc iure nos uti pomponius scribit, id est tanti rem videri, quanti actoris intersit: quod alias minus esse, alias plus: nam saepe actoris pluris interesse hominem retinere, quam quanti is est, veluti cum quaestionis habendae aut rei probandae gratia aut hereditatis adeundae intersit eius eum possideri.
In the interdict unde vi the condemnation is to be made for as much as it is of interest to possess; and we employ this law, as Pomponius writes—that is, the thing is considered to be worth as much as it is in the plaintiff’s interest; which is sometimes less, sometimes more. For it is often of greater interest to the plaintiff to retain a man than the amount he is worth, for example when, for the sake of holding an inquest or of proving the matter, or of entering upon an inheritance, it is in his interest that he have him in possession.
Deiectum ab usu fructu in eandem causam praetor restitui iubet, id est in qua futurus esset, si deiectus non esset. itaque si tempore usus fructus finitus fuerit, postquam deiectus est a domino, nihilo minus cogendus erit restituere, id est usum fructum iterum constituere.
The praetor orders one ejected from a usufruct to be restored into the same condition, that is, in which he would be if he had not been ejected. Therefore, if the usufruct has ended by lapse of time after he was ejected by the owner, nonetheless he will be compelled to restore, that is, to constitute the usufruct again.
Si de fundo proprietarium et fructuarium praedo expulerit atque ob id fructuarius constituto tempore non usus perdiderit ius suum, nemo dubitat, quin dominus, sive experiatur cum fructuario adversus praedonem sive non experiatur, retinere debeat reversum ad se usum fructum et, quod fructuarius perdidit, id ad damnum eius pertineat, cuius facto periit.
If from an estate a despoiler has expelled the proprietor and the usufructuary, and on that account the usufructuary, by non-use within the appointed time, has lost his right, no one doubts that the owner, whether he proceeds with the usufructuary against the despoiler or does not proceed, ought to retain the usufruct reverted to him; and that what the usufructuary lost pertains as damage to him by whose act it perished.
Colonus eum, cui locator fundum vendiderat, cum is in possessionem missus esset, non admisit: deinde colonus vi ab alio deiectus est: quaerebatur, quis haberet interdictum unde vi. dixi nihil interesse, colonus dominum ingredi volentem prohibuisset an emptorem, cui iussisset dominus tradi possessionem, non admisit. igitur interdictum unde vi colono competiturum ipsumque simili interdicto locatori obstrictum fore, quem deiecisse tunc videretur, cum emptori possessionem non tradidit, nisi forte propter iustam et probabilem causam id fecisset.
A colonus did not admit him to whom the locator had sold the fundus, when that man had been put into possession; then the colonus was by force cast out by another. It was asked who would have the interdict unde vi. I said it makes no difference whether the colonus had prohibited the dominus, wishing to enter, or did not admit the purchaser to whom the dominus had ordered possession to be delivered. Therefore the interdict unde vi will be competent to the colonus, and he himself will be bound by a similar interdict to the locator, whom he would then be seen to have ejected, when he did not deliver possession to the purchaser, unless perhaps he did this for a just and probable cause.
Si vi me deieceris vel vi aut clam feceris, quamvis sine dolo et culpa amiseris possessionem, tamen damnandus es, quanti mea intersit, quia in eo ipso culpa tua praecessit, quod omnino vi deiecisti aut vi aut clam fecisti.
If you have ejected me by force, or have done it by force or secretly, although you may have lost possession without fraud (dolus) and fault (culpa), nevertheless you must be condemned for as much as it is of concern to me (quanti mea intersit), because in that very thing your fault has preceded, in that you altogether ejected by force or did it by force or secretly.
Qui possessionem vi ereptam vi in ipso congressu reciperat, in pristinam causam reverti potius quam vi possidere intellegendus est: ideoque si te deiecero, ilico tu me, deinde ego te, unde vi interdictum tibi utile erit.
He who recovers, by force and in the very encounter, a possession snatched away by force is to be understood to have reverted to his former condition rather than to be possessing by force: and therefore, if I eject you, immediately you eject me, and then I eject you, the interdict “unde vi” will be useful to you.
Cum fundum qui locaverat vendidisset, iussit emptorem in vacuam possessionem ire, quem colonus intrare prohibuit: postea emptor vi colonum expulit: de interdictis unde vi quaesitum est. placebat colonum interdicto venditori teneri, quia nihil interesset, ipsum an alium ex voluntate eius missum intrare prohibuerit: neque enim ante omissam possessionem videri, quam si tradita fuisset emptori, quia nemo eo animo esset, ut possessionem omitteret propter emptorem, quam emptor adeptus non fuisset. emptorem quoque, qui postea vim adhibuit, et ipsum interdicto colono teneri: non enim ab ipso, sed a venditore per vim fundum esse possessum, cui possessio esset ablata.
When the one who had leased out the estate sold it, he ordered the buyer to go into vacant possession, but the tenant-farmer (colonus) forbade him to enter; afterwards the buyer by force expelled the tenant: inquiry was made about the interdicts “whence by force” (unde vi). It was the prevailing view that the tenant was bound under the interdict to the seller (vendor), because it made no difference whether he had prohibited him himself, or another sent by his will, from entering; for he is not considered to have relinquished possession before it had been delivered to the buyer, since no one would be of a mind to let go possession on account of the buyer before the buyer had acquired it. The buyer also, who later applied force, was himself held under the interdict to the tenant; for the land had been taken by force not from him, but from the seller, from whom possession had been wrested away.
Merito iulianus respondit, si me de fundo vi deieceris, in quo res moventes fuerunt, cum mihi interdicto unde vi restituere debeas non solum possessionem soli, sed et ea quae ibi fuerunt, quamquam ego moram fecero, quo minus interdicto te convenirem, subtractis tamen mortalitate servis aut pecoribus aliisve rebus casu intercidentibus tuum tamen onus nihilo minus in eis restituendis esse, quia ex ipso tempore delicti plus quam frustrator debitor constitutus es.
Rightly Julianus replied, if you have ejected me by force from the farm on which movable things were, since by the interdict unde vi you ought to restore to me not only possession of the soil but also the things that were there, although I have caused delay, whereby I did not proceed against you by the interdict, yet with slaves removed by mortality, or herd-animals, or other things cut off by chance being deducted, nevertheless your burden is none the less to restore them, because from the very time of the delict you have been constituted a debtor more than a mere frustrator (defaulter).
Ait praetor: " uti eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto. de cloacis hoc interdictum non dabo. neque pluris, quam quanti res erit: intra annum, quo primum experiundi potestas fuerit, agere permittam".
The praetor says: "As you possess those premises about which the matter is at issue, neither by force nor by stealth nor on sufferance (precariously), one from the other, I forbid force to be used to hinder your so possessing. Concerning sewers I will not grant this interdict. And not for more than the value which the thing will be: within a year from the time when there shall first have been the power to bring suit, I will permit action."
Inter litigatores ergo quotiens est proprietatis controversia, aut convenit inter litigatores, uter possessor sit, uter petitor, aut non convenit. si convenit, absolutum est: ille possessoris commodo, quem convenit possidere, ille petitoris onere fungetur. sed si inter ipsos contendatur, uter possideat, quia alteruter se magis possidere adfirmat, tunc, si res soli sit, in cuius possessione contenditur, ad hoc interdictum remittentur.
Among the litigators, therefore, whenever there is a controversy over proprietorship, either it is agreed among the litigators which is the possessor and which the petitioner, or it is not agreed. If it is agreed, the matter is resolved: he will have the advantage of the possessor, whom it is agreed is in possession; the other will bear the burden of the petitioner. But if between themselves it is contested who possesses, because each of the two affirms that he is rather the possessor, then, if the thing is a res soli (a thing of the soil), as to the possession of which the dispute is waged, they will be referred to this interdict.
Est igitur hoc interdictum, quod volgo uti possidetis appellatur, retinendae possessionis ( nam huius rei causa redditur, ne vis fiat ei qui possidet) et consequenter proponitur post interdictum unde vi. illud enim restituit vi amissam possessionem, hoc interdictum tuetur, ne amittatur possessio, denique praetor possidenti vim fieri vetat: et illud quidem interdictum obpugnat possessorem, hoc tuetur. et ut pedius ait, omnis de possessione controversia aut eo pertinet, ut, quod non possidemus, nobis restituatur, aut ad hoc, ut retinere nobis liceat quod possidemus. restitutae possessionis ordo aut interdicto expeditur aut per actionem: retinendae itaque possessionis duplex via est, aut exceptio aut interdictum.
Therefore this is the interdict, which is commonly called uti possidetis, for retaining possession ( for the reason of this matter is rendered, lest force be done to him who possesses) and it is consequently proposed after the interdict unde vi. For that one restores possession lost by force; this interdict protects, lest possession be lost; finally the praetor forbids force to be done to one possessing: and that interdict indeed assails the possessor, this one protects him. And as Pedius says, every controversy about possession pertains either to this, that what we do not possess be restored to us, or to this, that it be permitted to us to retain what we possess. The course of restoring possession is either expedited by an interdict or through an action: accordingly the twofold way of retaining possession is either an exception or an interdict.
Quod ait praetor in interdicto: " nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis", hoc eo pertinet, ut, si quis possidet vi aut clam aut precario, si quidem ab alio, prosit ei possessio, si vero ab adversario suo, non debeat eum propter hoc quod ab eo possidet vincere: has enim possessiones non debere proficere palam est.
What the praetor says in the interdict: " nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis", tends to this effect, that if someone possesses by force or by stealth or by permission—if indeed from another—the possession benefits him; but if from his adversary, he ought not, on account of this fact that he possesses from him, to prevail: for it is clear that these possessions ought not to be of avail.
Si duo possideant in solidum, videamus, quid sit dicendum. quod qualiter procedat, tractemus, si quis proponeret possessionem iustam et iniustam. ego possideo ex iusta causa, tu vi aut clam: si a me possides, superior sum interdicto, si vero non a me, neuter nostrum vincetur: nam et tu possides et ego.
If two should possess for the whole, let us see what is to be said. As to how that should proceed, let us discuss, if someone were to allege a just and an unjust possession. I possess from a just cause, you by force or stealth: if you possess from me, I am superior by the interdict; but if not from me, neither of us will be defeated: for both you possess and I.
Item videamus, si auctor vicini tui ex fundo tuo vites in suas arbores transduxit, quid iuris sit. et ait pomponius posse te ei denuntiare et vites praecidere, idque et labeo scribit, aut uti eum debere interdicto uti possidetis de eo loco, quo radices continentur vitium: nam si tibi vim fecerit, quo minus eas vites vel praecidas vel transducas, vim tibi facere videtur, quo minus possideas: etenim qui colere fundum prohibetur, possidere prohibetur, inquit pomponius.
Likewise let us see, if the agent of your neighbor has led vines from your estate onto his own trees, what the law is. And Pomponius says that you can give him notice and cut the vines, and Labeo writes this as well; or that you should employ the interdict uti possidetis with respect to that place in which the roots of the vines are contained: for if he has used force against you so that you do not either cut or transfer those vines, he seems to be using force against you so that you do not possess: for indeed, he who is prohibited from cultivating a farm is prohibited from possessing, says Pomponius.
Item videamus, si proiectio supra vicini solum non iure haberi dicatur, an interdictum uti possidetis sit utile alteri adversus alterum. et est apud cassium relatum utrique esse inutile, quia alter solum possidet, alter cum aedibus superficiem.
Likewise let us see, if a projection above a neighbor’s soil is said to be held not by right, whether the interdict uti possidetis is useful for the one against the other. And it is reported by Cassius that it is useless for both, because one possesses the soil, the other, along with the buildings, the superficies.
Labeo quoque scribit: ex aedibus meis in aedes tuas proiectum habeo: interdicis mecum, si eum locum possideamus, qui proiecto tegetur. an, quo facilius possim retinere possessionem eius proiectionis, interdico tecum sic " uti nunc possidetis eas aedes, ex quibus proiectus est?"
Labeo also writes: I have a projection thrown out from my house into your house: do you engage in an interdict with me, if we possess that place which will be covered by the projection? Or, in order that I may more easily be able to retain possession of that projection, do I proceed by interdict with you thus: "as you now possess those houses, from which the projection has been thrown out?"
Sed si supra aedes, quas possideo, cenaculum sit, in quo alius quasi dominus moretur, interdicto uti possidetis me uti posse labeo ait, non eum qui in cenaculo moretur: semper enim superficiem solo cedere. plane si cenaculum ex publico aditum habeat, ait labeo videri non ab eo aedes possideri, qui kruptas possideret, sed ab eo, cuius aedes supra kruptas essent. verum est hoc in eo, qui aditum ex publico habuit: ceterum superficiarii proprio interdicto et actionibus a praetore utetur.
But if above the aedes which I possess there is an upper-storey (cenaculum), in which another stays as if he were master, Labeo says that I, not the one who dwells in the upper-storey, can make use of the interdict uti possidetis; for the superficies always yields to the soil. Clearly, if the upper-storey has access from the public way, Labeo says it seems that the aedes are not possessed by him who possessed the crypts, but by him whose aedes were above the crypts. This is true in the case of one who had access from the public; otherwise, the holder of a superficies will use his own interdict and the actions from the praetor.
In hoc interdicto condemnationis summa refertur ad rei ipsius aestimationem. " quanti res est" sic accipimus " quanti uniuscuiusque interest possessionem retinere". servii autem sententia est existimantis tanti possessionem aestimandam, quanti ipsa res est: sed hoc nequaquam opinandum est: longe enim aliud est rei pretium, aliud possessionis.
In this interdict the sum of the condemnation is referred to the valuation of the thing itself. " how much the thing is worth" we thus take as " how much it is in each person’s interest to retain possession". servius’s opinion, however, is that possession should be valued at as much as the thing itself is worth: but this is by no means to be thought; for the price of the thing is one thing, the price of possession another.
In summa puto dicendum et inter fructuarios hoc interdictum reddendum: et si alter usum fructum, alter possessionem sibi defendat. idem erit probandum et si usus fructus quis sibi defendat possessionem, et ita pomponius scribit. perinde et si alter usum, alter fructum sibi tueatur, et his interdictum erit dandum.
In sum, I think it must be said that this interdict is to be granted also between usufructuaries: even if one defends for himself the usufruct, the other the possession. The same is to be held also if a usufructuary asserts possession for himself, and thus Pomponius writes. Likewise, if one maintains the use (usus), the other the fruits (fructus), the interdict is to be given to them.
Ait praetor: " uti ex lege locationis sive conductionis superficie, qua de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero fruamini, quo minus fruamini, vim fieri veto. si qua alia actio de superficie postulabitur, causa cognita dabo".
The praetor says: "As under the law of letting or hiring (locatio conductio) of the superficies which is in question, provided that you enjoy it from one another neither by force nor stealth nor precariously, I forbid force to be used to prevent your enjoyment. If any other action concerning the superficies is requested, once the cause has been examined I will grant it."
Qui superficiem in alieno solo habet, civili actione subnixus est: nam si conduxit superficium, ex conducto, si emit, ex empto agere cum domino soli potest. enim si ipse eum prohibeat, quod interest agendo consequetur: sin autem ab alio prohibeatur, praestare ei actiones suas debet dominus et cedere. sed longe utile visum est, quia et incertum erat, an locati existeret, et quia melius est possidere potius quam in personam experiri, hoc interdictum proponere et quasi in rem actionem polliceri.
Whoever has a superficies on another’s soil is supported by a civil action: for if he leased the superficies, he can proceed against the owner of the soil on the lease; if he bought it, on purchase. For if the owner himself forbids him, he will obtain by action what his interest amounts to; but if he is forbidden by someone else, the owner ought to supply and assign to him his actions. But it seemed far more useful—both because it was uncertain whether an action locati would arise, and because it is better to possess rather than to proceed in personam—to put forward this interdict and to promise a quasi in rem action.
Proponitur autem interdictum duplex exemplo interdicti uti possidetis. tuetur itaque praetor eum, qui superficiem petit, veluti uti possidetis interdicto, neque exigit ab eo, quam causam possidendi habeat: unum tantum requirit, num forte vi clam precario ab adversario possideat. omnia quoque, quae in uti possidetis interdicto servantur, hic quoque servabuntur.
Moreover, a twofold interdict is proposed on the model of the interdict uti possidetis. Accordingly, the praetor protects the one who claims a right of superficies, as though by the interdict uti possidetis, nor does he demand from him what cause for possessing he has: he requires only one thing, whether perhaps he possesses from the adversary by force, stealth, or at-will (precario). Likewise, all the things that are observed in the interdict uti possidetis will be observed here as well.
Quod ait praetor " si actio de superficie postulabitur, causa cognita dabo", sic intellegendum est, ut, si ad tempus quis superficiem conduxerit, negetur ei in rem actio. et sane causa cognita ei, qui non ad modicum tempus conduxit superficiem, in rem actio competet.
As to what the praetor says, "if an action concerning the superficies is requested, with the cause examined I will grant it," it is to be understood thus: if someone has leased a superficies for a time, an action in rem is denied to him. And indeed, with the cause examined, to him who has leased the superficies not for a short time, an action in rem will lie.
Is autem, in cuius solo superficies est, utique non indiget utili actione, sed habet in rem, qualem habet de solo. plane si adversus superficiarium velit vindicare, dicendum est exceptione utendum in factum data: nam cui damus actionem, eidem et exceptionem competere multo magis quis dixerit.
But he, on whose soil the superficies is, of course does not need a useful action (actio utilis), but has an action in rem, such as he has concerning the soil. Clearly, if he should wish to vindicate against the superficarius, it must be said that an exceptio in factum granted is to be used; for one would say that to whom we grant an action, to the same party an exception all the more fittingly lies.
Hoc interdicto praetor non inquirit, utrum habuit iure servitutem impositam an non, sed hoc tantum, an itinere actuque hoc anno usus sit non vi non clam non precario, et tuetur eum, licet eo tempore, quo interdictum redditur, usus non sit. sive igitur habuit ius viae sive non habuit, in ea condicione est, ut ad tuitionem praetoris pertineat, si modo anno usus est vel modico tempore, id est non minus quam triginta diebus. neque ad praesens tempus refertur usus, quia plerumque itineribus vel via non semper utimur, nisi cum usus exegerit ita.
With this interdict the praetor does not inquire whether a servitude had been imposed by right or not, but only this: whether in this year he has used the right of way (iter) and the right of driving (actus) not by force, not secretly, not by leave (precario); and he protects him, although at the time when the interdict is delivered he has not been using it. Therefore, whether he had a right of way or did not have it, he is in such a condition as to fall under the praetor’s protection, provided only that he has used it for a year or for a modest time, that is, not less than thirty days. Nor is the use referred to the present time, because for the most part we do not always make use of journeys or the road, unless need has required it so.
Vivianus recte ait eum, qui propter incommoditatem rivi aut propterea, quia via publica interrupta erat, per proximi vicini agrum iter fecerit, quamvis id frequenter fecit, non videri omnino usum, itaque inutile esse interdictum, non quasi precario usum, sed quasi nec usum. ergo secundum hoc neutro usus videtur: multo enim minus illo usus est, per quem non ivit propter incommoditatem rivi aut propterea, quia via praerupta erat. idem erit dicendum et si non erat via publica, sed iter privatum: nam et hic eadem quaestio est.
Vivianus rightly says that one who, on account of the inconvenience of the stream or because the public road was interrupted, made his way through the field of his nearest neighbor, although he did this frequently, is not considered to have used it at all; and so the interdict is ineffectual, not as though he used it by precarium, but as though he had not used it. Therefore, according to this, he is deemed to have used neither: for much less did he use that one, along which he did not go because of the inconvenience of the stream or because the road was precipitous. The same is to be said also if it was not a public road but a private way: for here too the same question arises.
Is, cuius colonus aut hospes aut quis alius iter ad fundum fecit, usus videtur itinere vel actu vel via, et idcirco interdictum habebit: et haec ita pedius scribit et adicit etiamsi ignoravit, cuius fundus esset, per quem iret, retinere eum servitutem.
He, whose tenant-farmer or guest or someone else made a passage to the estate, is considered to have used the right of way, whether by path (iter) or by driving (actus) or by road (via), and for that reason he will have the interdict; and Pedius writes thus and adds that even if he did not know whose estate it was through which he went, he retains the servitude.
Si quis propter inundationem usus non sit itinere actuque hoc anno, cum superiore usus sit, potest repetita die hoc interdicto uti per in integrum restitutionem ex illa parte " si qua mihi iusta causa esse videbitur". sed et si per vim hoc ei contigerit, in integrum eum restitui oportere Marcellus probat. praeterea et aliis casibus interdictum repetita die competit, ex quibus in integrum quis restitutionem impetrare solet.
If someone, on account of an inundation, has not made use this year of the right of way (iter) and of driving (actus), although he used it in the previous year, he can, on the day being repeated, employ this interdict by way of restoration in full (restitutio in integrum) under that clause, "if any just cause shall seem to me to exist." But even if this befell him through force, Marcellus holds that he ought to be restored in integrum. Moreover, in other cases too the interdict on a repeated day is available, those from which one is wont to obtain restoration in integrum.
Si tibi fundum precario concessero, cui via debebatur, deinde tu a domino fundi precario rogaveris, ut ea via ad eum fundum utaris: an noceat tibi exceptio, si adversus eum velis interdicere, a quo precario viam rogasti? et magis est, ut noceat, idque colligi potest ex eo, quod iulianus scribit in specie huiusmodi. quaerit enim, si ego tibi fundum precario dedero, cui via debebatur, et tu rogaveris precario, ut ea via utaris: nihilo minus utile interdictum mihi esse, quia, sicuti me precarium rei meae non tenet, ita nec per te precario possidere intellegor: quotiens enim colonus meus aut is, cui precario fundum dedi, via utitur, ego ire intellegor, propter quod et recte dico me itinere usum.
If I should concede to you a farm by precarium, to which a way was owed, and then you should ask by precarium from the owner of the estate that you use that way to that farm: does the exception harm you, if you wish to proceed by interdict against him from whom you asked the way by precarium? And it is rather the case that it does harm, and this can be gathered from what iulianus writes in a case of this sort. For he inquires: if I have given you a farm by precarium, to which a way was owed, and you have asked by precarium to use that way, nonetheless the useful interdict is available to me, because, just as a precarium of my own thing does not bind me, so neither am I understood to possess precariously through you: for whenever my tenant or the one to whom I gave the farm by precarium uses the way, I am understood to go, on account of which I also rightly say that I have used the right of way.
what reasoning, he says, brings it about that even if I have asked for a right of way on sufferance and have given you the estate on sufferance, although you would go with this intention, as if it were owed to my estate, the interdict would be useless, and I seem to have used that route on sufferance—not without good reason: for it is not your opinion that is to be sought, but mine. you, however, I believe, will be able to make use of the interdict, even though Julian writes nothing about this.
Si quis supra dicto tempore anni non vi non clam non precario itinere usus sit, verum postea non sit usus, sed clam precariove, videndum est, an ei noceat. et magis est, ut nihil ei noceat, quod attinet ad interdictum:
If someone during the aforesaid time of the year has used the way not by force, not clandestinely, not precariously, but afterwards has not used it, rather used it clandestinely or by precarium, it must be considered whether this harms him. and the prevailing view is that it does him no harm at all, so far as concerns the interdict:
Inde etiam illud labeo scribit: si, cum a me recte via utebaris, fundum vendidero, per quem utebaris, deinde emptor te prohibuit: licet clam videaris ab eo uti ( nam qui prohibitus utitur, clam utitur), tamen interdictum tibi competere intra annum, quia hoc anno non vi non clam non precario usus es.
Hence also Labeo writes this: if, while you were rightly using a right of way from me, I shall have sold the estate through which you were using it, and then the purchaser prohibited you: although you may seem to be using it clandestinely as against him (for he who, being prohibited, uses, uses clandestinely), nevertheless the interdict lies for you within a year, because in this year you have used it not by force, not clandestinely, not precariously.
Item sciendum est non tantum eum clam via uti, qui ipse prohibitus utitur, verum eum quoque, per quem quis id ius retinebat, si eo prohibito, per quem retinebat, utatur. plane si ignoravi prohibitum et persevero uti, nihil mihi nocere dicendum est.
Likewise it must be known that not only is he using the way secretly who, having himself been prohibited, uses it, but also the person through whom someone was retaining that right, if, after that person—through whom he was retaining it—has been prohibited, he uses it. Clearly, if I was unaware of the prohibition and I persist in using it, it is to be said that it does me no harm.
Si quis ab auctore meo vi aut clam aut precario usus est, recte a me via uti prohibetur et interdictum ei inutile est, quia a me videtur vi vel clam vel precario possidere, qui ab auctore meo vitiose possidet. nam et pedius scribit, si vi aut clam aut precario ab eo sit usus, in cuius locum hereditate vel emptione aliove quo iure successi, idem esse dicendum: cum enim successerit quis in locum eorum, aequum non est nos noceri hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cuius locum successimus.
If anyone has used it against my author by force or stealth or on sufferance, he is rightly prohibited by me from using the way, and the interdict is useless to him, because, as against me, he is deemed to possess by force or stealth or on sufferance, who possesses defectively from my author. For Pedius also writes that, if he has used it by force or stealth or on sufferance against him into whose place I have succeeded by inheritance or purchase or by whatever other right, the same is to be said: for when someone has succeeded into their place, it is not equitable that we be harmed by that which did not harm him, against whom we have succeeded.
Uti videmur servitutibus etiam per servos vel colonos vel amicos vel etiam hospites et fere per eos omnes, qui nobis retinent servitutes: sed enim per fructuarium quidem servitus retinetur, per fructuarium autem interdictum hoc domino non competere iulianus ait.
As we are considered to be possessors of servitudes even through slaves or tenant-farmers or friends or even guests, and generally through all those who retain servitudes for us: yet indeed through the usufructuary a servitude is retained, but Julian says that through the usufructuary this interdict does not befit the owner.
Idem iulianus scribit, si meus usus fructus in fundo tuo, proprietas vero tua fuerit et uterque nostrum per vicini fundum ierit, utile interdictum de itinere nos habere: et sive forte ab extraneo fructuarius prohibeatur, sive etiam a domino, sed et si dominus a fructuario, competet: nam et si quilibet prohibeat ire, interdictum adversus eum competit.
The same Julian writes that, if my usufruct is in your farm, while the ownership is yours, and each of us has been going across the neighbor’s farm, we have the useful interdict concerning the right of way; and whether perchance the usufructuary is prohibited by a stranger, or even by the owner, and also if the owner by the usufructuary, it will lie; for even if anyone whatsoever forbids going, the interdict lies against him.
Ait praetor: " quo itinere actuque hoc anno non vi non clam non precario ab alio usus es, quo minus id iter actumque, ut tibi ius esset, reficias, vim fieri veto. qui hoc interdicto uti volet, is adversario damni infecti, quod per eius vitium datum sit, caveat".
The praetor says: "By whichever right of way and right of driving this year you have used over another’s, not by force, not clandestinely, not by permission, I forbid force to be employed to hinder you from repairing that way and that driving-right, so that you may have the right." Whoever will wish to use this interdict shall give security to the adversary for damnum infectum, for such damage as may be caused through his fault.
Utilitas suasit hoc quoque interdictum proponere: namque consequens erat eum qui itinere utitur interdictum proponere, ut refici iter possit: quemadmodum enim alias uti potest itinere vel actu commode, quam si refecerit? corrupto enim itinere minus commode frui aut agi potest.
Utility urged the proposing of this interdict as well: for it was consequent to issue an interdict for one who uses a right of way, so that the way might be repaired; for how otherwise can he use the way or the right of driving conveniently than if he has repaired it? for with the way damaged, enjoyment or driving can be had less conveniently.
Hoc autem a superiori distat, quod illo quidem interdicto omnes uti possunt, qui hoc anno usi sunt: hoc autem interdicto eum demum uti posse, qui hoc anno usus est et ius sibi esse reficiendi oporteat. ius autem esse videtur ei, cui servitus debetur. itaque qui hoc interdicto utitur, duas res debet docere, et hoc anno se usum et ei servitutem competere: ceterum si desit alterutrum, deficit interdictum, nec immerito.
This, however, differs from the foregoing, in that under that interdict all can avail themselves who have used it in this year; but under this interdict only he can avail himself who has used it in this year and for whom it ought to be that there is a right of repairing. Now a right is thought to exist for him to whom the servitude is owed. Therefore he who employs this interdict must demonstrate two things: both that he has used it in this year and that the servitude pertains to him; otherwise, if either is lacking, the interdict fails—and not without reason.
for he who wishes to go and to drive, meanwhile, until it be established about the servitude, ought not to have to show his right: for what does he lose who allows him to do this who has done it this year? but indeed he who wishes to repair does something new, nor ought he be permitted to undertake that on another’s property, unless he truly has the servitude.
Fieri autem potest, ut qui ius eundi habeat et agendi, reficiendi ius non habeat, quia in servitute constituenda cautum sit, ne ei reficiendi ius sit, aut sic, ut, si velit reficere, usque ad certum modum reficiendi ius sit: merito ergo ad refectionem se praetor rettulit: " ut tibi", inquit, " ius est, reficias". " uti ius est" hoc est sic uti per servitutem impositam licet.
Moreover, it can happen that one who has the right of going and of driving does not have the right of repairing, because in the establishing of the servitude it was provided that he should not have the right of repairing; or thus, that, if he wishes to repair, he has the right of repairing only up to a certain measure: with good reason, therefore, the praetor referred himself to repair: " as to you," he says, " there is a right, repair." " as there is a right to use"—that is, to use in such a way as is permitted by the servitude imposed.
Apud labeonem quaeritur, si pontem quis novum velit facere viae muniendae causa, an ei permittatur: et ait permittendum, quasi pars sit refectionis huiusmodi munitio. et ego puto veram labeonis sententiam, si modo sine hoc commeari non possit.
It is asked in Labeo whether, if someone should wish to make a new bridge for the purpose of reinforcing the road, it is to be permitted to him; and he says it should be permitted, as though such reinforcement were part of the refection (repair). And I too think Labeo’s opinion true, provided only that without this one cannot pass.
Veteres nominatim adiciebant, ut ea quoque, quae ad refectionem utilia essent, adportanti vis non fieret: quod supervacuum est, quoniam qui adportari non patitur ea, sine quibus refici iter non possit, vim facere videtur, quo minus reficiatur.
The ancients expressly added that no violence be done to one bringing in even those things which were useful for refection; which is superfluous, since he who does not allow those things to be brought in, without which the way cannot be repaired, seems to be using violence to prevent its being repaired.
Si quis autem, cum posset compendiaria adportare, quae refectioni necessaria sunt longiori itinere velit adportare, ut deteriorem causam eundi faciat, impune ei vis fiet, quia ipse sibi impedimento sit, quo minus reficiat.
But if anyone, when he could bring by a short‑cut the things which are necessary for refection, should wish to bring them by a longer journey, so as to make the case for going worse, force may be used against him with impunity, because he is himself an impediment to himself, whereby he is the less able to effect refection.
Si per fundum tuum nec vi nec clam nec precario commeavit aliquis, non tamen tamquam id suo iure faceret, sed, si prohiberetur, non facturus, inutile est ei interdictum de itinere actuque: nam ut hoc interdictum competat, ius fundi possedisse oportet.
If someone has traversed your estate neither by force, nor secretly, nor by revocable permission, yet not as though he were doing it by his own right, but such that, if he were forbidden, he would not do it, the interdict concerning right of way and of driving is of no use to him; for, in order that this interdict be available, one must have possessed the right over the land.
Duo autem genera sunt aquarum: est cottidiana, est et aestiva. cottidiana ab aestiva usu differt, non iure. cottidiana ea est, quae duci adsidue solet vel aestivo tempore vel hiberno, etiamsi aliquando ducta non est: ea quoque dicitur cottidiana, cuius servitus intermissione temporis divisa est.
There are, moreover, two kinds of waters: there is the quotidian, and there is also the aestival. The quotidian differs from the aestival in use, not in law. The quotidian is that which is accustomed to be conducted continuously either in the summer season or in winter, even if at some time it has not been conducted: that also is called quotidian, whose servitude is divided by an intermission of time.
aestival, however, is that which it is expedient to use in summer only, just as we say estival garments, estival pastures, estival camps, which we sometimes use even in winter, but for the most part in summer. I think it should be approved that, from the purpose of the user and from the nature of the places, estival water is distinguished from quotidian: for if it is water which can be conducted continuously, yet I use it only in summer, it must be said that this water is estival; again, if it is water which cannot be conducted except in summer, it will be called estival; and if the places are such as by nature do not admit water except in summer, it must be said that it is rightly called estival.
Quod autem scriptum est in interdicto: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti" hoc est: non cottidie, sed hoc anno vel una die vel nocte. ergo cottidiana quidem aqua alia est, quae cottidie duci possit, vel hieme vel aestate, etsi aliquo momento temporis ducta sit, aestiva ea, quae cottidie quidem duci possit, vel sola aestate, ducatur autem aestate tantum, non et hieme, non quia non possit et hieme, sed quia non solet.
But as for what is written in the interdict: "as in this year you have conducted water," this means: not daily, but in this year—even on a single day or night. Therefore, daily water is something different, namely that which can be conducted every day, either in winter or in summer, even if it has been conducted at some moment of time; summer water is that which indeed can be conducted every day, but only in summer—it is conducted in summer only, not also in winter, not because it cannot be in winter, but because it is not customary.
Quamquam ad perennes aquas dixerimus hoc interdictum pertinere, ad eas tamen perennes pertinet, quae duci possunt. ceterum sunt quaedam, quae, etsi perennes sunt, duci tamen non possunt, ut puta puteales et quae ita sunt summersae, ut defluere extra terram et usui esse non possint. sed huiusmodi aquis, quae duci non possint, haustus servitus imponi potest.
Although we have said that this interdict pertains to perennial waters, nevertheless it pertains to those perennial ones which can be conducted. Moreover, there are certain waters which, although perennial, nevertheless cannot be conducted, for instance well-waters and those which are so submerged that they cannot flow out beyond the ground and be of use. But upon waters of this kind, which cannot be conducted, a servitude of drawing may be imposed.
Caput aquae illud est, unde aqua nascitur: si ex fonte nascatur, ipse fons: si ex flumine vel lacu, prima incilia vel principia fossarum, quibus aquae ex flumine vel ex lacu in primum rivum compelli solent. plane si aqua sudoribus manando in aliquem primum locum effluere atque ibi apparere incipit, eius hoc caput dicemus, ubi primum emergit.
The head of the water is that from which the water is born: if it is born from a spring, the spring itself; if from a river or a lake, the first intakes or the beginnings of the ditches by which waters from the river or from the lake are wont to be driven into the first channel. Clearly, if the water, by exudations seeping, begins to flow out into some first place and to appear there, we shall call this its head, where it first emerges.
Sed etsi iure aqua non debetur alicui, si tamen iure ducere se putavit, cum non in iure, sed in facto erravit, dicendum est eoque iure utimur, ut interdicto hoc uti possit: sufficit enim, si iure se ducere putavit nec vi nec clam nec precario duxit.
But even if by right water is not owed to someone, nevertheless if he supposed that he was conducting it by right, since he erred not in law but in fact, it must be said—and we proceed on that principle—that he can make use of this interdict: for it is sufficient if he thought he was conducting it by right and conducted it neither by force nor secretly nor precariously.
Illud quaeritur, utrum ea tantum aqua his interdictis contineatur, quae ad agrum irrigandum pertinet, an vero omnis, etiam ea, quae ad usum quoque et commodum nostrum. et hoc iure utimur, ut haec quoque contineatur. propter quod etiam si in urbana praedia quis aquam ducere velit, hoc interdictum locum habere potest.
It is inquired whether only that water is contained within these interdicts which pertains to irrigating a field, or indeed all water, even that which is also for our use and convenience. And we use this law, that this too is contained. For which reason, even if someone wishes to conduct water into urban properties, this interdict can have place.
Idem labeo scribit, etiamsi praetor hoc interdicto de aquis frigidis sentiat, tamen de calidis aquis interdicta non esse deneganda: namque harum quoque aquarum usum esse necessarium: nonnumquam enim refrigeratae usum irrigandis agris praestant. his accedit, quod in quibusdam locis et cum calidae sunt, irrigandis tamen agris necessariae sunt, ut hierapoli: constat enim apud hierapolitanos in asia agrum aqua calida rigari. et quamvis ea sit aqua, quae ad rigandos non sit necessaria, tamen nemo ambiget his interdictis locum fore.
The same Labeo writes that, even if the praetor, by this interdict, has in view cold waters, nevertheless interdicts concerning hot waters are not to be denied: for the use of these waters too is necessary; for sometimes, once cooled, they furnish a use for irrigating fields. To this is added that in certain places, even when they are hot, they are nevertheless necessary for irrigating fields, as at Hierapolis: for it is agreed that among the Hierapolitans in Asia land is irrigated with hot water. And although it be water which is not necessary for irrigating, nevertheless no one will doubt that there is room for these interdicts.
Illud tamen hic intellegendum est eodem modo praetorem duci aquam iussisse, quo ducta est hoc anno. proinde neque amplioris modi, neque alia permisisse potest videri. quare si alia aqua sit, quam quis velit ducere, quam hoc anno duxit, vel eadem, per aliam tamen regionem velit ducere, impune ei vis fiet.
Nevertheless, it must here be understood that the praetor ordered the water to be led in the same manner as it was led this year. Accordingly, he can be seen to have permitted neither a greater measure nor a different water. Wherefore, if it be other water that someone wishes to lead than he led this year, or the same water, yet wishes to lead it through another region, violence may be done to him with impunity.
Illud labeo dicit omnes partes illius fundi, in quem loci aqua ducitur, eiusdem numero esse. ergo et si forte actor confinem agrum emerit et ex agro, in quem hoc anno aquam duxerit, postea fundi empti nomine velit aquam ducere, ita demum eum recte hoc interdicto ( ut de itinere actuque) uti putant, ut semel in suum ingressus inde egredi qua velit possit, nisi ei nocitum sit, ex quo aquam ducit.
Labeo says this: all parts of that fund into which the local water is conducted are counted as the same. Therefore, even if by chance the plaintiff should buy a contiguous field and wishes thereafter, under the title of the purchased fund, to conduct water from the field into which this year he has conducted water, they think that he may properly use this interdict ( as about the right-of-way and the driving), to the effect that, once having made ingress into his own, from there he may egress wherever he wishes, unless harm has been done to him in that from which he conducts the water.
Item quaeritur, si quis aquae, quam hoc anno ducebat, aliam aquam admiscuerit, an impune prohibeatur. et extat ofilii sententia existimantis recte eum prohiberi, sed eo loci, in quo primum aquam aliam in rivum admittit: et ofilius in tota aqua recte eum prohiberi ait. ego ofilio adsentio non posse dividi, quia non potest ita in parte vis fieri, ut non in tota aqua fiat.
Likewise it is asked, if someone has admixed other water to the water which he was conducting this year, whether he is prohibited with impunity. And there exists the opinion of ofilius, thinking that he is rightly prohibited, but at that place where he first admits the other water into the rivulet; and ofilius says that he is rightly prohibited in respect to the whole water. I assent to ofilius that it cannot be divided, because force cannot be applied to a part in such a way that it is not applied to the whole water.
Trebatius, cum amplior numerus pecoris ad aquam appelletur, quam debet appelli, posse universum pecus impune prohiberi, quia iunctum pecus ei pecori, cui adpulsus debeatur, totum corrumpat pecoris adpulsum. Marcellus autem ait, si quis ius habens pecoris ad aquam appellendi plura pecora adpulserit, non in omnibus pecoribus eum prohibendum: quod est verum, quia pecora separari possunt.
Trebatius [holds] that, when a larger number of cattle is driven to the water than ought to be driven, the whole herd can be prohibited with impunity, because the herd joined to that herd to which the driving is owed vitiates the entire driving of the herd. Marcellus, however, says that if someone who has the right of driving cattle to the water has driven more cattle, he is not to be prohibited as to all the cattle; which is true, because the cattle can be separated.
Idem ait eum, qui hoc anno aquam duxerit nec vi nec clam nec precario et eodem anno vitiose usus est, recte tamen hoc interdicto usurum: quod referri ad id tempus, quod sine vitio fuerit: esse enim verum hoc anno non vi non clam non precario usum.
He likewise says that he who in this year has conducted water not by force, not by stealth, not by precarium, and in the same year has used it in a vitiated manner, will nevertheless rightly avail himself of this interdict: because it is referred to that time which was without fault; for it is true that in this year he used it not by force, not by stealth, not by precarium.
Quaesitum est, si quis ante annum aquam duxit, deinde sequenti tempore, hoc est intra annum, aqua influxerit ipsa sibi me non ducente, an hoc interdicto locus sit. et refert severus valerius competere ei hoc interdictum, quasi duxisse videatur, licet penitus prospicientibus non videtur iste duxisse.
It has been asked whether, if someone conducted water more than a year ago, and then at a subsequent time, that is, within the year, the water has flowed in to him of its own accord, without my conducting it, there is room for this interdict. And Severus Valerius reports that this interdict is available to him, as though he should be seen to have conducted it, although to those looking quite thoroughly this man does not seem to have conducted it.
Item quaesitum est, si quis, dum putat tertio quoque die habere se ius aquae ducendae, duxerit una die, an recte et sine captione possessoris recte duxisse videatur, ut hoc interdictum habeat: ait enim praetor: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti" id est alternis diebus. illud autem nihil interest, utrum quinto die aqua debeatur an alternis diebus an cottidie ei, qui hoc interdicto uti velit: nam cum sufficiat vel uno die hoc anno aquam duxisse, nihil refert, qualem aquae ductum habens duxerit: dum, si quis, cum quinto quoque die uteretur, quasi alternis diebus ducens interdixerit, nihil ei prodesse videtur.
Likewise it has been asked, if someone, while he supposes that he has the right of conducting water every third day, has conducted it on a single day, whether he appears to have conducted it rightly and without captious entrapment of the possessor, so as to have this interdict: for the praetor says, “as in this year you conducted water,” that is, on alternate days. Moreover, it makes no difference whether water is owed on the fifth day, or on alternate days, or every day, to one who wishes to use this interdict: for since it is sufficient to have conducted water even on a single day in this year, it is of no moment what sort of water-conduction, having the right, he carried out; provided that, if someone, when he used it every fifth day, has proceeded to interdict as though conducting on alternate days, it seems to profit him nothing.
Labeo putat per hoc interdictum prohiberi quem, ne quid in illo fundo faciat fodiat serat succidat putet aedificet, quare ex re ea aqua, quam ille hoc anno per fundum tuum sine vitio duxit, inquinetur vitietur corrumpatur deteriorve fiat: et similiter de aestiva aqua debere interdici ait.
Labeo thinks that by this interdict someone is to be prohibited, so that he do nothing on that estate—dig, plant, cut down, prune, build—whereby, as a result, the water which he has this year conducted through your estate without fault be polluted, vitiated, corrupted, or made worse; and he says that similarly there ought to be an interdict concerning summer water.
Quia autem diximus aestivam aquam aliquo distare ab aqua cottidiana, sciendum est etiam interdictis distare, quod qui de aqua cottidiana interdicit, ita interdicit: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti", at qui de aestiva, sic: " uti priore aestate", nec immerito: nam quia hieme non utitur, referre se non ad praesentem aestatem, sed ad priorem debuit.
But since we have said that summer water differs in some respect from quotidian water, it should be known that they also differ in the interdicts, in that he who interdicts concerning quotidian water interdicts thus: "as you have conducted the water this year," but he who [interdicts] concerning summer [water], thus: "as in the prior summer," and not without reason: for since it is not used in winter, he ought to refer not to the present summer, but to the prior.
Propter hoc, si aestate interdicatur, nonnumquam annum et sex menses continere: quod ita contingit, si initio verni aequinoctii ducta sit aqua et sequenti aestate pridie aequinoctium autumnale interdicatur: et proinde, si hieme interdicatur, etiam in biennium haec res extendetur.
Because of this, if it is interdicted in summer, it will sometimes comprise a year and six months: which so happens if at the beginning of the vernal equinox the water has been conducted and in the following summer, on the day before the autumnal equinox, it is interdicted: and accordingly, if it is interdicted in winter, this matter will also be extended into a biennium.
Ait praetor: " inter heredes et emptores et bonorum possessores interdicam". haec verba non solum ad aestivam aquam, verum etiam ad cottidianam quoque referenda esse sciendum est: nam sicuti de itinere actuque et successoribus dantur interdicta et emptori, ita haec quoque danda praetor putavit.
The praetor says: "I will issue an interdict between heirs and purchasers and possessors of the goods." It should be understood that these words are to be referred not only to summer water, but also to daily water as well: for just as, concerning right of way and of driving, and for successors, interdicts are granted to the purchaser, so too the praetor thought that these should be granted.
Ait praetor: " quo ex castello illi aquam ducere ab eo, cui eius rei ius fuit, permissum est, quo minus ita uti permissum est ducat, vim fieri veto. quandoque de opere faciendo interdictum erit, damni infecti caveri iubebo".
The praetor says: "From that reservoir, since it was permitted by the one who had the right in that matter to conduct water to that man, I forbid force to be used to prevent him from conducting it in the manner it was permitted. Whenever an interdict shall be issued concerning the making of the work, I will order security to be given for damage not yet done."
Hoc interdictum necessario propositum est. namque superiora interdicta ad eos pertinent, qui a capite ducunt vel imposita servitute vel quia putant impositam: aequissimum visum est ei quoque, qui ex castello ducit, interdictum dari. id est ex eo receptaculo, quod aquam publicam suscipit.
This interdict has been necessarily proposed. For the preceding interdicts pertain to those who draw from the head (source), either because a servitude has been imposed or because they suppose it has been imposed: it seemed most equitable that an interdict be granted also to him who draws from the castellum, that is, from that receptacle which receives public water.
Et datur interdum praediis, interdum personis. quod praediis datur, persona extincta non extinguitur: quod datur personis, cum personis amittitur ideoque neque ad alium dominum praediorum neque ad heredem vel qualemcumque successorem transit. plane ei, ad quem dominium transit, impetrabile est: nam si docuerit praediis suis aquam debitam, etsi nomine eius fluxisse, a quo dominium ad se transiit, indubitate impetrat ius aquae ducendae, nec est hoc beneficium, sed iniuria, si quis forte non impetraverit.
And it is granted sometimes to estates, sometimes to persons. That which is granted to estates is not extinguished when the person is extinguished; that which is granted to persons is lost with the persons, and therefore passes neither to another owner of the estates nor to an heir or any sort of successor. Clearly, for him to whom the ownership passes, it is obtainable: for if he shall show that water is owed to his estates, even if it has flowed under the name of the one from whom the ownership passed to him, he undoubtedly obtains the right of conducting water; and this is not a benefice, but an injury, if someone perchance should fail to obtain it.
Meminisse autem debemus in hoc interdicto totam quaestionem finiri adsignationis: non enim praeparat hoc interdictum causam, ut superiora interdicta, nec ad possessionem temporariam pertinet, sed aut habet ius adsignatum sibi aut non habet, et interdictum totum finitur.
We ought, moreover, to remember that in this interdict the whole question is ended on the assignation: for this interdict does not prepare the case, as the earlier interdicts do, nor does it pertain to temporary possession, but either one has a right assigned to him or he does not, and the whole interdict is concluded.
Si aquam ex flumine publico duxeris et flumen recesserit, non potes subsequi flumen, quia ei loco servitus imposita non sit, quamvis is locus meus sit. sed si alluvione paulatim accesserit fundo tuo, subsequi potes, quia locus totus fluminis serviat ductioni. sed si circumfluere coeperit mutato alveo, non potes, quia medius locus non serviat interruptaque sit servitus.
If you have led water from a public river and the river has receded, you cannot follow the river, because no servitude has been imposed upon that place, even though that place is mine. But if by alluvion it has gradually acceded to your estate, you can follow, because the whole place of the river serves the duction. But if, the channel having been changed, it begins to flow around, you cannot, because the middle place does not serve and the servitude is interrupted.
Lucio titio ex fonte meo ut aquam duceret, cessi: quaesitum est, an et maevio cedere possim, ut per eundem aquae ductum aquam ducat: et si putaveris posse cedi per eundem aquae ductum duobus, quemadmodum uti debeant. respondit: sicut iter actus via pluribus cedi vel simul vel separatim potest, ita aquae ducendae ius recte cedetur. sed si inter eos, quibus aqua cessa est, non convenit, quemadmodum utantur, non erit iniquum utile iudicium reddi, sicut inter eos, ad quos usus fructus pertinet, utile communi dividundo iudicium reddi plerisque placuit.
I granted to Lucius Titius that he might conduct water from my spring: it was asked whether I could also grant to Maevius that he might conduct water through the same water‑duct; and, if you think it can be granted to two through the same water‑duct, how they ought to use it. He answered: just as a path, a drive, and a road can be granted to several, either simultaneously or separately, so the right of conducting water will rightly be granted. But if among those to whom the water has been granted there is no agreement as to how they shall use it, it will not be unfair that a useful action be afforded, just as among those to whom a usufruct pertains it has pleased most to grant a useful action for dividing common property.
Cum constet non solum temporibus, sed etiam mensuris posse aquam dividi, potest eodem tempore alius cottidianam, alius aestivam aquam ducere, ita ut aestate dividatur inter eos aqua, hieme solus ducat is qui cottidianae ius habeat.
Since it is settled that water can be divided not only by times but also by measures, it is possible that at the same time one draw the quotidian (daily) water and another the estival (summer) water, such that in summer the water is divided between them, while in winter he alone draws it who has the right to the daily supply.
Inter duos, qui eodem rivo aquam certis horis separatim ducebant, convenit, ut permutatis inter se temporibus aqua uterentur: quaero, cum amplius tempore servitutibus praefinito ita duxissent, ut neuter eorum suo tempore usus esset, num ius utendi amisissent. negavit amisisse.
Between two, who at set hours separately drew water from the same channel, it was agreed that, with the times exchanged between themselves, they would use the water: I ask whether, when they had drawn it for longer than the time pre-defined by the servitudes, in such a way that neither of them used it at his own time, they had lost the right of use. He denied that they had lost it.
De interdicto de aqua aestiva, item cottidiana quaerentes primum constituendum existimabamus, quae esset aqua aestiva, de qua proprium interdictum ad prioris aestatis tempus relatum reddi solet, hoc est aestiva aqua utrumne ex iure aestivo dumtaxat tempore utendi diceretur, an ex mente propositoque ducentis, quod aestate eam ducendi consilium haberet, an ex natura ipsius aquae, quod aestate tantum duci potest, an ex utilitate locorum, in quae duceretur. placebat igitur aquam ob has duas res, naturam suam utilitatemque locorum in quae deducitur, proprie appellari, ita ut, sive eius natura erit, ut nisi aestate duci non possit, etiamsi hieme quoque desideraretur, sive omni tempore anni duci eam ipsius natura permitteret, si utilitas personis, in quam ducitur, aestate dumtaxat usum eius exigeret, aestiva recte diceretur.
Concerning the interdict on summer water, likewise on daily water, as we inquired we judged that first it had to be established what “summer water” is, about which a special interdict is usually issued, referred to the time of the previous summer; that is, whether “summer water” is so called from a summer right of using it only in that season, or from the intention and proposed plan of the one conducting it, namely that he had the design of conducting it in summer, or from the nature of the water itself, namely that it can be conducted only in summer, or from the utility of the places into which it would be conducted. Accordingly it pleased us that water be properly designated on account of these two considerations, its own nature and the utility of the places into which it is led, such that, whether its nature is such that it cannot be conducted except in summer, even if it would also be desired in winter, or whether its nature would permit it to be conducted at every time of the year, if the utility for the persons for whom it is conducted demanded its use in summer only, it would rightly be called “summer.”
Si de via itinere actu aquae ductu agatur, huiusmodi cautio praestanda est, quamdiu quis de iure suo doceat, non se impediturum agentem et aquam ducentem et iter facientem. quod si neget ius esse adversario agendi aquae ducendae, cavere sine praeiudicio amittendae servitutis debebit, donec quaestio finietur, non se usurum.
If there is litigation about a road (via), a path (iter), a drive (actus), or a water‑leading (aqueduct) (aquae ductus), such a caution is to be provided: so long as anyone is demonstrating his right, he will not hinder one who is driving, conducting water, and making a way. But if he denies that the adversary has the right of driving or of conducting water, he must give security, without prejudice to the servitude’s being lost by non‑use, that he will not use it until the question is concluded.
Praetor ait: " rivos specus septa reficere purgare aquae ducendae causa quo minus liceat illi, dum ne aliter aquam ducat, quam uti priore aestate non vi non clam non precario a te duxit, vim fieri veto".
The praetor says: " to repair, to cleanse channels, conduits, enclosures for the purpose of leading water, to prevent its being permitted to him, provided that he does not conduct the water otherwise than as in the previous summer he conducted it from you, not by force, not clandestinely, not by precarium, I forbid force to be used".
Proinde et si per alium locum velit ducere, impune prohibetur: sed et si eundem rivum deprimat vel adtollat aut dilatet vel extendat vel operiat apertum vel contra. ego ceteros quidem impune prohiberi puto: at enim eum, qui operiat apertum vel contra, eum non puto prohibendum, nisi si quam maiorem utilitatem suam adversarius ostendat.
Accordingly, even if he wishes to conduct it through another place, he is lawfully prohibited; and likewise if he lowers or raises the same channel, or widens or extends it, or covers what is open, or the contrary. I, for my part, think the others may indeed be prohibited with impunity: but as for the one who covers what is open or the contrary, him I do not think should be prohibited, unless the adversary should show some greater utility of his own.
Labeo non posse ait ex aperto rivo terrenum fieri, quia commodum domino soli auferetur appellendi pecus vel hauriendi aquam: quod sibi non placere pomponius ait, quia id domino magis ex occasione quam ex iure contingeret, nisi si ab initio in imponenda servitute id actum esset.
Labeo says that from an open channel it cannot be made earthen (filled in to become ground), because the convenience to the owner of the soil of bringing in cattle or of drawing water would be taken away; which does not please Pomponius, he says, because that would befall the owner more from occasion than from right, unless from the beginning, in the imposing of the servitude, this had been provided.
Servius autem scribit aliter duci aquam, quae ante per specus ducta est, si nunc per apertum ducatur: nam si operis aliquid faciat quis, quo magis aquam conservet vel contineat, non impune prohiberi. ego et in specu contra, si non maior utilitas versetur adversarii.
Servius, however, writes that water is conducted otherwise, which previously was conducted through a tunnel, if now it is conducted through the open; for if someone makes some work by which he the more conserves or contains the water, he may not be prohibited with impunity. I, for my part, even in the case of a tunnel, hold the contrary, unless the adversary’s greater utility is at stake.
Servius et labeo scribunt, si rivum, qui ab initio terrenus fuit, quia aquam non continebat, cementicium velit facere, audiendum esse: sed et si eum rivum, qui structilis fuit, postea terrenum faciat aut partem rivi, aeque non esse prohibendum. mihi videtur urguens et necessaria refectio esse admittenda.
Servius and Labeo write that, if a watercourse, which from the beginning was earthen because it did not contain the water, one wishes to make cementitious, he ought to be heard; but also if that watercourse which was of masonry is later made earthen, or a part of the channel, likewise it is not to be prohibited. It seems to me that a pressing and necessary refectio (repair) ought to be admitted.
Si quis rivum reficienti opus novum nuntiat, belle dictum est posse contemni operis novi nuntiationem: cum enim praetor ei vim fieri vetet, absurdum est per operis novi nuntiationem eum impediri. plane per in rem actionem dicendum est posse: adversus eum vindicari " ius ei non esse" dubium non est.
If someone gives a notice of new work to one repairing a watercourse, it has been well said that the notice of new work can be contemned; for since the praetor forbids force to be done to him, it is absurd that he be impeded by a notice of new work. Clearly, it must be said that it can be done by an in rem action: that one may vindicate against him “that he has no right” is not doubtful.
De rivis reficiendis ita interdicetur, ut non quaeratur, an aquam ducere actori liceret: non enim tam necessariam refectionem itinerum quam rivorum esse, quando non refectis rivis omnis usus aquae auferretur et homines siti necarentur. et sane aqua pervenire nisi refecto rivo non potest: at non refecto itinere difficultas tantum eundi agendique fieret, quae temporibus aestivis levior esset.
Concerning the repairing of watercourses an interdict will be issued thus, that it not be inquired whether it was permitted for the plaintiff to conduct water: for the refection of roads is not so necessary as that of watercourses, since, if the watercourses are not repaired, all use of water would be taken away and people would be slain by thirst. And indeed water cannot reach unless the channel is repaired; but, if the road is not repaired, only a difficulty of going and of driving would arise, which in the summer season would be lighter.
Hoc interdictum de cisterna non competit: nam cisterna non habet perpetuam causam nec vivam aquam. ex quo apparet in his omnibus exigendum, ut viva aqua sit: cisternae autem imbribus concipiuntur. denique constat interdictum cessare, si lacus piscina puteus vivam aquam non habeat.
This interdict does not lie with respect to a cistern: for a cistern does not have a perpetual source nor living water. Whence it appears that in all these cases it must be required that there be living water: but cisterns are filled by rains. Finally, it is settled that the interdict ceases to apply if the lake, fishpond, or well does not have living water.
Deinde ait praetor: " quo minus fontem, quo de agitur, purges reficias, ut aquam coercere utique ea possis, dum ne aliter utaris, atque uti hoc anno non vi non clam non precario ab illo usus es, vim fieri veto".
Then the praetor says: "That you be not hindered from cleansing and repairing the spring about which the action is brought, so that you may in any case be able to restrain the water with it, provided that you do not use it otherwise than as in this year you have used it from him, not by force, not secretly, not precariously, I forbid force to be used."
Praetor ait: " quo minus illi cloacam quae ex aedibus eius in tuas pertinet, qua de agitur, purgare reficere liceat, vim fieri veto. damni infecti, quod operis vitio factum sit, caveri iubebo".
The Praetor says: " to prevent that man from being allowed to clean and repair the sewer which extends from his house into yours, the one which is the subject of this action, I forbid force to be used. For threatened damage, if it has been caused by defect of the work, I will order security to be given".
Quia autem cloacarum refectio et purgatio ad publicam utilitatem spectare videtur, idcirco placuit non esse in interdicto addendum " quod non vi non clam non precario ab illo usus", ut, etiamsi quis talem usum habuerit, tamen non prohibeatur volens cloacam reficere vel purgare.
Because the refection and purgation of sewers appears to pertain to public utility, it has therefore been decided that there is no need to add in the interdict “that he used it not by force, not clandestinely, not by precarious leave from him,” so that, even if someone has had such a use, nevertheless he is not prohibited, being willing, to repair or cleanse the sewer.
Deinde ait praetor " quae ex aedibus eius in tuas pertinet". aedes hic accipere debes pro omni aedificio, hoc est ex aedificio eius in tuum aedificium. hoc amplius labeo putabat hoc interdicto locum esse et si area ab utralibet parte aedium sit et si forte, inquit, cloaca ducta sit ex urbano aedificio in proximum agrum.
then the praetor says " which from his edifice pertains into yours". aedes here you must take for every edifice, that is, from his edifice into your edifice. moreover, labeo thought that there is room for this interdict even if an open area lies on either side of the buildings, and also if by chance, he says, a sewer has been led from an urban edifice into the neighboring field.
Unde fabius mela scribit competere hoc interdictum, ut in vicini aedes veniat et rescindat pavimenta purgandae cloacae gratia. verendum tamen esse pomponius scribit, ne eo casu damni infecti stipulatio committatur. sed haec stipulatio non committitur, si paratus sit restaurare id, quod ex necessitate reficiendae cloacae causa resciderat.
Whence fabius mela writes that this interdict is applicable, so that one may come into the neighbor’s house and tear up the flooring for the sake of cleaning the sewer. Nevertheless pomponius writes that it is to be feared lest in that case the stipulation for threatened damage (damni infecti) be incurred. But this stipulation is not incurred, if he is ready to restore that which he had cut away out of necessity for the purpose of repairing the sewer.
Quamquam de reficienda cloaca, non etiam de nova facienda hoc interdicto comprehendatur, tamen aeque interdicendum labeo ait, ne facienti cloacam vis fiat, quia eadem utilitas sit: praetorem enim sic interdixisse, ne vis fieret, quo minus cloacam in publico facere liceret: idque ofilio et trebatio placuisse. ipse dicendum ait, ut ne factam cloacam purgare et restituere permittendum sit per interdictum, novam vero facere is demum concedere debeat, cui viarum publicarum cura sit.
Although by this interdict provision is understood for refashioning a sewer, not also for making a new one, nevertheless Labeo says it ought equally to be interdicted that no force be used against one making a sewer, because the same utility is at stake: for the praetor interdicted thus, that force should not be used to the effect that it would not be permitted to make a sewer in a public place; and this pleased Ofilius and Trebatius. He himself says it must be stated that it is not to be permitted through the interdict to cleanse and restore a sewer already made, whereas to make a new one ought to be granted only to him who has the care of the public roads.
Prohibere autem non utique per semet ipsum necesse est, sed et si quis per servum suum vel procuratorem prohibuerit, recte videtur prohibuisse. idem etiam si mercennarius meus prohibuerit. nec quem moveat, quod per liberam personam actio adquiri non solet: nam prohibitio haec demonstrat vi te facere, quid mirum, cum et si clam tu me feceris, habeam actionem?
To prohibit, moreover, need not be done by oneself; but even if someone has prohibited through his slave or through his procurator (agent), he is rightly considered to have prohibited. The same also if my hireling has prohibited. Nor should anyone be moved by the fact that an action is not usually acquired through a free person: for this prohibition shows that you are acting with force—what wonder, since even if you should do it clandestinely against me, I have an action?
Plane si praeses vel curator rei publicae permiserit in publico facere, nerva scribit exceptionem locum non habere, quia etsi ei locorum, inquit, publicorum procuratio data est, concessio tamen data non est. hoc ita verum est, si non lex municipalis curatori rei publicae amplius concedat. sed et si a principe vel ab eo, cui princeps hoc ius concedendi dederit idem erit probandum.
Clearly, if the governor or the curator of the commonwealth has permitted it to be done in a public place, Nerva writes that the exception has no place, because, he says, although procuration of public places has been given to him, nevertheless a concession has not been given. This is true thus, unless the municipal law grants more to the curator of the commonwealth. But even if by the Prince, or by him to whom the Prince has given this right of granting, the same must be approved.
Si quis paratus sit se iudicio defendere adversus eos, qui interdicendum putant, ne opus fiat: an videatur desinere vi facere? et magis est, ut desinat, si modo satis offerat et defendere paratus est, si quis agat: et ita sabinus scribit.
If someone is prepared to defend himself by a judgment against those who think an interdict should be issued, that the work not be done: is he to be seen as ceasing to act by force? And the better view is that he does cease, provided only that he offers security and is prepared to defend himself if anyone brings an action; and thus Sabinus writes.
Aut qui aliter fecit, quam denuntiavit: vel qui decepto facit eo, ad quem pertinuit non facere: vel consulto tum denuntiat adversario, cum eum scit non posse prohibere: vel tam sero pronuntiat, ut venire prohibiturus, prius quam fiat, non possit. et haec ita labeonem probare aristo ait.
Or one who has done otherwise than he gave notice: or who acts with that person deceived, to whom it pertained that it not be done: or who deliberately then gives notice to his adversary, when he knows that he is not able to prohibit: or who announces so late that one who would come to prohibit cannot do so before it is done. And Aristo says that Labeo approves these things thus.
Si quis se denuntiaverit opus facturum, non semper non videtur clam fecisse, si post denuntiationem fecerit: debebit enim ( et ita labeo) et diem et horam denuntiatione complecti et ubi et quod opus futurum sit: neque perfusorie aut obscure dicere aut denuntiare: neque tam artare adversarium, ut intra diem occurrere ad prohibendum non possit.
If anyone shall have given notice that he will perform a work, he is not always deemed not to have done it clandestinely, if he does it after the notice: for he ought ( et ita labeo) to include in the notice both the day and the hour, and where and what work is going to be: nor to speak or give notice perfunctorily or obscurely: nor so straiten the adversary that within the day he cannot come up to prevent.
Si quid servus meus fecit, non ob id mecum actio est, sed si id meo nomine aut suo fecit: nam si tuum servum mercennarium habuero, quidquid ab eo factum fuerit meo nomine, ob id non tecum, sed mecum, cuius iussu aut nomine id opus a servo tuo factum fuerit, agendum erit hoc interdicto.
If my slave has done anything, there is not on that account an action against me, but if he did it in my name or in his own: for if I have had your slave as a hireling, whatever shall have been done by him in my name, on that account it will be not with you but with me—against the one at whose order or in whose name that work was done by your slave—proceeding must be had by this interdict.
Similiter quod iussu cuius factum erit, ob id non cum eo, sed cuius nomine iusserit, haec actio est. nam si procurator tutor curator duumvir municipii, quod eius nomine ageret, cuius negotium procuraret, fieri iusserit, ob id agendum erit cum eo, cuius nomine factum quid erit, non cum eo, qui ita iusserit. et si tibi mandavero, ut opus fieri iuberes et in ea re mihi parueris, mecum, inquit, non tecum erit actio.
Similarly, for what will have been done by the order of someone, on that account the action is not against him, but against the one in whose name he ordered. For if a procurator, tutor, curator, or duumvir of a municipium, in that which he would act in the name of him whose business he managed, should order it to be done, on that account the action will be brought against him in whose name something was done, not against him who thus ordered. And if I have mandated to you that you should order a work to be done and in that matter you have obeyed me, “with me,” he says, “not with you, will the action lie.”
Si ego tibi mandavero opus novum facere, tu alii, non potest videri meo iussu factum: teneberis ergo tu et ille: an et ego tenear, videamus. et magis est et me, qui initium rei praestiterim, teneri: sed uno ex his satisfaciente ceteri liberantur.
If I shall have mandated you to make a new work, and you (mandate) to another, it cannot seem to have been done by my order: you therefore will be held, and that man; whether I also am held, let us see. And it is more the case that I too, who have furnished the beginning of the matter, am held: but with one of these satisfying, the rest are released.
Neratius quoque scribit eum, cuius servus vi aut clam fecit, aut sua impensa ex interdicto opus restituere debere aut patientiam restituendi praestare et servum noxae dedere: plane si mortuo alienatove servo interdiceretur, patientiam dumtaxat praestare debere ait, ita ut et emptor eo interdicto possit conveniri, ut impensam praestet aut noxam det: dominoque operis sua impensa restituente aut damnato, quia non restitueret, emptorem liberari. eadem et si contra dominus servi vel opus restituisset vel litis aestimatione damnatus esset: quod si tantum noxae dedisset, adversus dominum operis utiliter interdici.
Neratius likewise writes that he, whose slave did the deed by force or clandestinely, must, under the interdict, either restore the work at his own expense or afford patience for its restoration, and surrender the slave in noxa. Clearly, if the interdict were issued after the slave had died or been alienated, he says that he need only afford patience, such that the purchaser too can be convened by that interdict to provide the expense or to give the noxa; and that, when the owner of the work restores at his own expense, or is condemned because he did not restore, the purchaser is released. The same also if, conversely, the master of the slave had either restored the work or had been condemned in the assessment of the suit; but if he had only made a noxal surrender, the interdict lies usefully against the owner of the work.
Ait iulianus: qui ante remissionem nuntiationis, contra quam prohibitus fuerit, opus fecerit, duobus interdictis tenebitur, uno, quod ex operis novi nuntiatione competit, altero quod vi aut clam. remissione autem facta intellegendus non erit vi aut clam facere, quamvis prohibeatur: licere enim debet aedificare ei, qui satisdederit, cum possessor hoc ipso constituatur: clamque facere nec ante remissionem nec postea existimandus est, cum is, qui opus novum nuntiat, non possit videri celatus et praeoccupatus, antequam controversiam faceret.
Julian says: whoever, before the remission of the notification, has done the work against which he had been prohibited, will be held by two interdicts: one which accrues from the notification of a new work, the other, the one “by force or stealth.” But once remission has been made, he is not to be understood to be acting by force or stealth, although he is prohibited: for it ought to be permitted to build to him who has given surety, since by that very act the possessor is constituted. And he is not to be deemed to act secretly either before the remission or afterwards, since he who gives notice of a new work cannot be seen to have been concealed and preempted before he raised the controversy.
Bellissime apud iulianum quaeritur, an haec exceptio noceat in hoc interdicto " quod non tu vi aut clam feceris?" ut puta utor adversus te interdicto quod vi aut clam, an possis obicere mihi eandem exceptionem: " quod non tu vi aut clam fecisti?" et ait iulianus aequissimum esse hanc exceptionem dare: nam si tu, inquit, aedificaveris vi aut clam, ego idem demolitus fuero vi aut clam et utaris adversus me interdicto, hanc exceptionem profuturam. quod non aliter procedere debet, nisi ex magna et satis necessaria causa: alioquin haec omnia officio iudicis celebrari oportet.
Most excellently it is asked in Julian whether this exception is prejudicial in this interdict, “that it was not you who did [it] by force or stealth?” For instance, if I employ against you the interdict “because by force or stealth,” can you oppose me with the same exception: “that it was not you who did [it] by force or stealth?” And Julian says it is most equitable to grant this exception: for if you, he says, have built by force or stealth, and I have demolished the same by force or stealth, and you employ the interdict against me, this exception will be of benefit. Which ought not to proceed otherwise, unless out of a great and quite necessary cause; otherwise all these matters ought to be conducted by the office of the judge.
Est et alia exceptio, de qua celsus dubitat, an sit obicienda: ut puta si incendii arcendi causa vicini aedes intercidi et quod vi aut clam mecum agatur aut damni iniuria. gallus enim dubitat, an excipi oporteret: " quod incendii defendendi causa factum non sit?" servius autem ait, si id magistratus fecisset, dandam esse, privato non esse idem concedendum: si tamen quid vi aut clam factum sit neque ignis usque eo pervenisset, simpli litem aestimandam: si pervenisset, absolvi eum oportere. idem ait esse, si damni iniuria actum foret, quoniam nullam iniuriam aut damnum dare videtur aeque perituris aedibus.
There is also another exception, about which Celsus doubts whether it should be opposed: for instance, if for the sake of warding off a conflagration the neighbor’s house be cut down, and an action is brought against me either “vi aut clam” (by force or by stealth) or for “damnum iniuria” (wrongful damage). For Gallus doubts whether one ought to plead the exception: “that it was not done for the purpose of defending against a fire.” Servius, however, says that, if a magistrate had done it, the exception should be granted; the same is not to be conceded to a private person. If, nevertheless, something was done “vi aut clam,” and the fire had not reached that point, the suit is to be assessed at a single value; if it had reached it, he ought to be absolved. He says the same holds if the action were for wrongful damage, since he seems to inflict no injury or damage upon buildings that were equally going to perish.
Notavimus supra, quod, quamvis verba interdicti late pateant, tamen ad ea sola opera pertinere interdictum placere, quaecumque fiant in solo. eum enim, qui fructum tangit, non teneri interdicto quod vi aut clam: nullum enim opus in solo facit. at qui arbores succidit, utique tenebitur, et qui harundinem et qui salictum: terrae enim et quodammodo solo ipsi corrumpendo manus infert.
We have noted above that, although the words of the interdict range widely, nevertheless it is agreed that the interdict pertains only to those works which are done on the soil. For one who handles the fruit is not held by the interdict “quod vi aut clam,” for he does no work on the soil. But he who cuts down trees will certainly be held, and he who [cuts] the reed-bed and the willow-copse: for by damaging the earth, and in a certain manner the soil itself, he lays hands upon it.
Quaesitum est, si statuam in municipio ex loco publico quis sustulerit vel vi vel clam, an hoc interdicto teneatur. et exstat cassii sententia eum, cuius statua in loco publico in municipio posita sit, quod vi aut clam agere posse, quia interfuerit eius eam non tolli: municipes autem etiam furti acturos, quia res eorum sit quasi publicata: si tamen deciderit, ipsi eam detrahunt: et haec sententia vera est.
It has been asked, if someone has lifted a statue in a municipality from a public place either by force or secretly, whether he is held by this interdict. And there exists the opinion of Cassius that the person whose statue has been set in a public place in a municipality can bring the action quod vi aut clam, because it was in his interest that it not be removed; but that the municipal citizens (municipes) will also bring an action of theft, because the thing is theirs as if made public; if, however, it has fallen down, they themselves remove it. And this opinion is true.
Si quis de monumento statuam sustulerit, an ei, ad quem ius sepulchri pertineret, agere permittitur? et placet et in his interdicto locum esse. et sane dicendum est, si qua sepulchri ornandi causa adposita sint, sepulchri esse videri.
If anyone should remove a statue from a monument, is it permitted for the person to whom the right of the sepulcher pertains to bring an action? Yes; and it is held that in these cases there is room for an interdict. And indeed it must be said that, if any things have been set up for the purpose of adorning the sepulcher, they are deemed to belong to the sepulcher.
Quod ait praetor: " quod vi aut clam factum est", ad quod tempus referatur, videamus, utrum ad praeteritum an ad praesens. quae species apud iulianum exposita est: ait enim in hoc interdicto praesentis temporis significationem accipi debere. si tamen, inquit, ex opere damnum datum fuerit aut dominus aut is, cuius fundo nocitum erit, sua impensa id sustulerit, utilius probari, quod iulianus temptat, ut et damnum sarciatur et impendia restituantur.
As the praetor says, "what has been done by force or by stealth," let us see to what time this is referred, whether to the past or to the present. This form is set out by Julian: for he says that in this interdict the signification of the present time ought to be taken. However, he says, if damage has been caused by the work, and the owner, or the one whose land has been harmed, has removed it at his own expense, it is more useful to approve what Julian attempts: that both the damage be repaired and the expenses be restored.
Interdictum complectitur id, quodcumque aut vi aut clam factum est. sed interdum evenit, ut quid et vi et clam fiat, partim et partim, in eodem opere. ut puta cum prohiberem, fundamenta posuisti: postea cum convenissem, ne reliquum opus fieret, absente et ignorante me reliquum opus perfecisti: vel contra fundamenta clam iecisti, deinde cetera prohibente me aedificasti.
The interdict encompasses whatever has been done either by force or secretly. But sometimes it happens that something is both by force and secretly done, partly one way and partly the other, in the same work. For instance, while I was prohibiting, you laid the foundations; afterwards, when I had given notice that the remaining work should not be done, you, with me absent and unaware, completed the remaining work; or, conversely, you laid the foundations secretly, and then, with me forbidding, you built the rest.
Si tutoris iussu aut curatoris factum sit, cum placeat, quod cassius probat, ex dolo tutoris vel curatoris pupillum vel furiosum non teneri, eveniet, ut in ipsum tutorem curatoremque aut utilis actio competat aut etiam utile interdictum. certe ad patientiam tollendi operis utique tenebuntur pupillus et furiosus et ad noxam.
If it was done by the order of a tutor or of a curator, since it is accepted, which Cassius approves, that from the dolus of the tutor or curator the ward or the insane person is not held, it will follow that against the tutor and curator himself either a useful action will lie or even a useful interdict. Certainly, the ward and the insane person will in any case be bound to the toleration of the removal of the work and to noxal liability.
Si postea, quam vi aut clam factum est, venierit fundus, an venditor nihilo minus hoc interdicto experiri possit, videamus. et extat sententia existimantium nihilo minus competere ei interdictum nec finiri venditione: sed nec ex empto actione quicquam ei praestandum emptori ex eo opere, quod ante venditionem factum est: satis enim esse, quod utique propter hoc opus viliori praedium distraxerit. certe etsi non viliori vendidit, idem erit probandum.
If afterward, after it has been done by force or clandestinely, the estate has been sold, let us consider whether the seller can nonetheless proceed by this interdict. And there exists the view of those who think that the interdict still lies for him and is not ended by the sale; but neither by the action ex empto is anything to be rendered to the buyer on account of that work which was done before the sale: for it is sufficient that, in any case, he sold the estate at a lower price on account of this work. Certainly, even if he did not sell it at a lower price, the same is to be maintained.
Si fundus in diem addictus sit, cui competat interdictum? et ait iulianus interdictum quod vi aut clam ei competere, cuius interfuit opus non fieri: fundo enim in diem addicto et commodum et incommodum omne ad emptorem, inquit, pertinet, antequam venditio transferatur, et ideo, si quid tunc vi aut clam factum est, quamvis melior condicio allata fuerit, ipse utile interdictum habebit: sed eam actionem sicut fructus medio tempore perceptos venditi iudicio praestare cogendum ait.
If a farm has been knocked down under an in-diem addiction, to whom does the interdict belong? And Julian says that the interdict quod vi aut clam belongs to him whose interest it was that the work not be done: for, when an estate has been knocked down in diem, every advantage and disadvantage pertains to the purchaser, he says, before the sale is transferred; and therefore, if anything was then done by force or secretly, although a better offer has been brought, he himself will have the useful interdict: but he says that he must be compelled, in the action on sale, to make over that action, just as the fruits gathered in the meantime.
Aristo autem scribit non possessori esse denuntiandum: nam si quis, inquit, fundum mihi vendiderit et necdum tradiderit et vicinus, cum opus facere vellet et sciret me emisse et in fundo morari, mihi denuntiaverit, esse eum tutum futurum, quod ad suspicionem clam facti operis pertineret: quod sane verum est.
Aristo, however, writes that notice need not be given to the possessor: for, says he, if someone has sold me a farm and has not yet delivered it, and a neighbor, when he wished to do a work and knew that I had bought it and that I was staying on the farm, were to give notice to me, he would be safe, inasmuch as it would pertain to the suspicion of a work done clandestinely: which indeed is true.
Ego, si post in diem addictionem factam fundus precario traditus sit, putem emptorem interdictum quod vi aut clam habere. si vero aut nondum traditio facta est aut etiam facta est precarii rogatio, non puto dubitandum, quin venditor interdictum habeat: ei enim competere debet, etsi res ipsius periculo non sit, nec multum facit, quod res emptoris periculo est: nam et statim post venditionem contractam periculum ad emptorem spectat et tamen antequam ulla traditio fiat, nemo dixit interdictum ei competere. si tamen precario sit in possessione, videamus, ne, quia interest ipsius, qualiter qualiter possidet, iam interdicto uti possit.
I, if after an in diem addictio has been made the estate has been handed over on precarium, would think the purchaser has the interdict “quod vi aut clam.” But if either delivery has not yet been made, or even a request for a precarium has been made, I do not think there is room for doubt that the vendor has the interdict: for it ought to lie for him, even if the thing is not at his peril, nor does it make much difference that the thing is at the purchaser’s peril; for immediately after the sale is contracted the peril looks to the purchaser, and yet before any delivery is made, no one has said that the interdict lies for him. If, however, he is in possession by precarium, let us consider whether, since it is in his interest to possess in whatever way, he can now make use of the interdict.
therefore even if he has taken it on lease, much more so: for it does not come into doubt that even a colonus (tenant farmer) can proceed by interdict. clearly, if afterwards, after a better condition has been proffered, some work has been done by force or by stealth, not even Julian would doubt that the interdict is available to the seller: for between Cassius and Julian the question is about that which happened in the meantime, not about the work which occurred thereafter.
Si ita praedium venierit, ut, si displicuisset, inemptum esset, facilius admittimus interdictum emptorem habere, si modo est in possessione: et si rescissio emptionis in alterius arbitrium conferatur, idem erit probandum: idemque et si ita venisset, ut, si aliquid evenisset, inemptum esset praedium: et si forte commissoria venierit, idem dicendum est.
If an estate has been sold on the terms that, if it should displease, it shall be as not bought, we more readily admit that the purchaser has the interdict, provided only that he is in possession; and if the rescission of the purchase is referred to another’s arbitration, the same must be approved; and likewise if it has been sold on the terms that, if something should occur, the estate would be as not bought; and if perchance it has been sold with a commissory clause, the same is to be said.
Idem ait adversus filium familias in re peculiari neminem clam videri fecisse: namque, si scit eum filium familias esse, non videtur eius celandi gratia fecisse, quem certus est nullam secum actionem habere.
The same says that, against a son in the family (filius familias), in a matter of the peculium, no one is considered to have acted clandestinely; for if he knows him to be a filius familias, he does not seem to have acted for the sake of concealing it from one whom he is certain has no action against him.
Unde apud servium amplius relatum est, si mihi concesseris, ut ex fundo tuo arbores caedam, deinde eas alius vi aut clam ceciderit, mihi hoc interdictum competere, quia ego sim cuius interest: quod facilius erit admittendum, si a te emi vel ex aliquo contractu hoc consecutus sim, ut mihi caedere liceat.
Whence it has been further related by Servius that, if you have granted me to cut trees from your estate, and then another has felled them by force or stealth, this interdict is available to me, because I am the one whose interest it is; which will be more readily admitted if I bought this from you or have obtained it by some contract, namely that it is permitted for me to cut.
Quaesitum est, si, cum praedium interim nullius esset, aliquid vi aut clam factum sit, an postea dominio ad aliquem devoluto interdicto locus sit: ut puta hereditas iacebat, postea adiit hereditatem titius, an ei interdictum competat? et est apud vivianum saepissime relatum heredi competere hoc interdictum eius, quod ante aditam hereditatem factum sit, nec referre labeo ait, quod non scierit, qui heredes futuri essent: hoc enim posse quem causari etiam post aditam hereditatem. ne illud quidem obstare labeo ait, quod eo tempore nemo dominus fuerit: nam et sepulchri nemo dominus fuit et tamen, si quid in eo fiat, experiri possum quod vi aut clam.
It has been asked whether, if, while in the meantime a tract was the property of no one, something was done by force or stealth, there is room later for the interdict when ownership has devolved upon someone: for instance, the inheritance was lying vacant, afterward Titius entered upon the inheritance—does the interdict lie for him? And it is very frequently reported in Vivianus that this interdict is competent to the heir for that which was done before the inheritance was entered; nor, Labeo says, does it matter that it was not known who the heirs would be: for this can be alleged even after the inheritance has been entered. Not even this, Labeo says, is an obstacle—that at that time no one was owner: for of a sepulcher no one is owner, and yet, if anything is done in it, I can proceed by the quod vi aut clam.
Iulianus ait: si colonus arborem, de qua controversia erat, succiderat vel quid aliud opus fecerit, si quidem iussu domini id factum sit, ambo tenebuntur, non ut patientiam praestent, sed ut impensam quoque ad restituendum praebeant: si autem dominus non iusserit, colonus quidem tenebitur, ut patientiam et impensam praestet, dominus vero nihil amplius quam patientiam praestare cogendus erit.
Julian says: if a tenant-farmer has cut down a tree about which there was a controversy, or has done some other work, if indeed this was done by the order of the owner, both will be held liable, not merely to furnish forbearance, but also to provide the expense for restoring; but if the owner did not order it, the tenant-farmer will be liable to furnish forbearance and expense, whereas the owner will be compelled to furnish nothing more than forbearance.
Nam et si servus meus ignorante me opus fecerit eumque vendidero vel manumisero, mecum in hoc solum agi poterit, ut patiar opus tolli, cum emptore autem servi, ut aut noxae dedat aut impensam, quae in restitutione facta fuerit, praestet: sed et cum ipso manumisso recte agi poterit.
For indeed, if my slave, I being unaware, has made a work and I have sold him or manumitted him, an action can be brought against me only to the effect that I permit the work to be removed; but against the buyer of the slave, that he either make noxal surrender or pay the expense that shall have been incurred in the restitution: yet an action can also rightly be brought against the manumitted man himself.
Is, cui fundum pastinandum locaveras, lapides sustulit et in vicini proiecit praedium. ait labeo te vi aut clam non teneri, nisi iussu tuo id factum sit: ego puto conductorem teneri, locatorem autem non alias, nisi aut patientiam praestare possit aut aliquam actionem habeat, quam praestet: ceterum teneri non oportere.
The man to whom you had leased out the estate for trenching removed stones and threw them onto the neighbor’s estate. Labeo says that you are not held “by force or by stealth,” unless it was done by your order; I think the lessee (conductor) is liable, but the lessor (locator) is not liable otherwise, unless either he can furnish forbearance or has some action that he can make available; otherwise, he ought not to be held.
Si in sepulchro alieno terra congesta fuerit iussu meo, agendum esse quod vi aut clam mecum labeo scribit. et si communi consilio plurium id factum sit, licere vel cum uno vel cum singulis experiri: opus enim, quod a pluribus pro indiviso factum est, singulos in solidum obligare. si tamen proprio quis eorum consilio hoc fecerit, cum omnibus esse agendum, scilicet in solidum: itaque alter conventus alterum non liberabit, quin immo perceptio ab altero: superiore etenim casu alterius conventio alterum liberat.
If in another’s sepulcher earth has been heaped up by my order, Labeo writes that the action “quod vi aut clam” must be brought against me. And if by the common counsel of several it was done, it is permitted to proceed either with one or with each individually: for the work which has been done by several pro indiviso binds individuals in solidum. If, however, each of them has done this by his own counsel, action must be with all, namely in solidum: and so, one person having been sued will not release the other—nay rather, even collection from the other will not; for in the former case the suing of one releases the other.
Et post annum non competit. annus autem cedere incipit, ex quo id opus factum perfectum est aut fieri desiit, licet perfectum non sit: alioquin si a principio operis coepti annum quis numeret, necesse est cum his, qui opus tardissime facerent, saepius agi.
And after one year it does not lie. But the year begins to run from the time when the work has been made and completed, or has ceased to be made, although it is not completed: otherwise, if someone should count the year from the beginning of the work begun, it is necessary to proceed more often against those who would do the work most slowly.
Sed si is sit locus, in quo opus factum est, qui facile non adiretur, ut puta in sepulchro vi aut clam factum est vel in abdito alio loco, sed et si sub terra fieret opus vel sub aqua, vel cloaca aliquid factum sit, etiam post annum causa cognita competit interdictum de eo quod factum est: nam causa cognita annuam exceptionem remittendam, hoc est magna et iusta causa ignorantiae interveniente.
But if the place in which the work was done is such as would not easily be approached—as, for instance, it was done in a tomb by force or by stealth, or in some other hidden place; and likewise if the work were done underground or under water, or something were done in a sewer—even after a year, once the cause has been inquired into, the interdict concerning that which has been done is available: for, the cause having been examined, the one‑year exception is to be remitted, that is, when a great and just cause of ignorance has intervened.
Si quis rei publicae causa afuisset, deinde reversus interdicto quod vi aut clam uti vellet, verius est non excludi anno eum, sed reversum annum habere. nam et si minor viginti quinque annis rei publicae causa abesse coepisset, deinde maior effectus sit, dum abest rei publicae causa, futurum, ut ex quo redit annus ei computetur, non ex quo implevit vicensimum quintum annum: et ita divus pius et deinceps omnes principes rescripserunt.
If someone had been away for the sake of the republic, then on returning wished to use the interdict quod vi aut clam, it is more correct that he not be excluded by the year, but that upon his return he have the year. For also if one under twenty-five years began to be absent for the sake of the republic, and then became of age while he is away for the sake of the republic, the result will be that the year is computed for him from the time he returns, not from when he completed his twenty-fifth year; and thus the deified Pius, and thereafter all the emperors, have written by rescript.
Hoc interdicto tanti lis aestimatur, quanti actoris interest id opus factum esse. officio autem iudicis ita oportere fieri restitutionem iudicandum est, ut in omni causa eadem condicio sit actoris, quae futura esset, si id opus, de quo actum est, neque vi neque clam factum esset.
By this interdict the dispute is assessed at as much as it is in the plaintiff’s interest that that work have been done. Moreover, by the duty of the judge it is to be adjudged that restitution ought to be made in such a way that in every case the plaintiff’s condition is the same as it would be if the work in question had been done neither by force nor clandestinely.
Ergo nonnumquam etiam dominii ratio habenda est, ut puta si propter hoc opus, quod factum est, servitutes amittantur aut usus fructus intereat. quod non tantum tunc eveniet, cum quis opus aedificaverit, verum etiam si diruisse opus proponatur et deteriorem condicionem fecisse vel servitutium vel usus fructus vel ipsius proprietatis.
Therefore sometimes regard must also be had to ownership, for example if, on account of this work which has been done, servitudes are lost or the usufruct perishes. Which will occur not only when someone has constructed a work, but also if it is alleged that he has demolished the work and has made the condition worse, whether of the servitudes, or of the usufruct, or of the ownership itself.
Si quis vi aut clam arbores non frugiferas ceciderit, veluti cupressos, domino dumtaxat competit interdictum. sed si amoenitas quaedam ex huiusmodi arboribus praestetur, potest dici et fructuarii interesse propter voluptatem et gestationem et esse huic interdicto locum.
If someone by force or secretly should fell non-fruit-bearing trees, for example cypresses, the interdict belongs only to the owner. But if a certain amenity is provided by trees of this sort, it can be said that the usufructuary also has an interest, on account of enjoyment and riding (promenade), and that there is room for this interdict in his favor.
Si ad ianuam meam tabulas fixeris et ego eas, priusquam tibi denuntiarem, refixero, deinde invicem interdicto quod vi aut clam egerimus: nisi remittas mihi, ut absolvar, condemnandum te, quasi rem non restituas, quanti mea intersit, aut certe exceptionem mihi profuturam " si non vi nec clam nec precario feceris".
If you should have fastened tablets to my door, and I, before I had given you notice, should have unfastened them, and then in turn we proceeded under the interdict “what has been done by force or by stealth”: unless you grant me remission, so that I may be acquitted, you must be condemned, as if you do not restore the thing, to the extent of my interest; or at any rate an exception will be of use to me “ si non vi nec clam nec precario feceris”.
Si stercus per fundum meum tuleris, cum id te facere vetuissem, quamquam nihil damni feceris mihi nec fundi mei mutaveris, tamen teneri te quod vi aut clam trebatius ait. labeo contra, ne etiam is, qui dumtaxat iter per fundum meum fecerit aut avem egerit venatusve fuerit sine ullo opere, hoc interdicto teneatur.
If you should carry dung through my estate, after I had forbidden you to do this, although you have caused me no loss and have not altered my estate, nevertheless you are held liable, Trebatius says, under the interdict “what was done by force or by stealth.” Labeo, on the contrary, holds that not even one who has only made a passage through my estate or has driven a bird or has hunted without any work should be held by this interdict.
Si quis proiectum aut stillicidium in sepulchrum immiserit, etiamsi ipsum monumentum non tangeret, recte cum eo agi, quod in sepulchro vi aut clam factum sit, quia sepulchri sit non solum is locus, qui recipiat humationem, sed omne etiam supra id caelum: eoque nomine etiam sepulchri violati agi posse.
If anyone should let a projection or an eaves-drip into a sepulcher, even if it did not touch the monument itself, it is proper that he be sued by the action for what has been done in a sepulcher by force or by stealth, because a sepulcher comprises not only that place which receives the humation, but also the whole sky above it; and under that designation one can also bring the action for a violated sepulcher.
Et verba praetoris ostendunt remissionem ibi demum factam, ubi nuntiatio non tenet, et nuntiationem ibi demum voluisse praetorem tenere, ubi ius est nuntianti prohibere, ne se invito fiat. ceterum sive satisdatio interveniat sive non, remissio facta hoc tantum remittit, in quo non tenuit nuntiatio. plane si satisdatum est, exinde remissio facta est, non est necessaria remissio.
And the words of the praetor show that a remission is then and only then made where the notification does not hold, and that the praetor wished the notification to hold then and only then where it is the right of the notifier to prohibit that it be done against his will. Moreover, whether a suretyship intervenes or not, a remission, once made, remits only to the extent in which the notification did not hold. Clearly, if security has been furnished, a remission has thereby been made; no further remission is necessary.
Item iuliano placet fructuario vindicandarum servitutium ius esse: secundum quod opus novum nuntiare poterit vicino et remissio utilis erit. ipsi autem domino praedii si nuntiaverit, remissio inutilis erit: neque sicut adversus vicinum, ita adversus dominum agere potest ius ei non esse invito se altius aedificare. sed si hoc facto usus fructus deterior fiat, petere usum fructum debebit.
Likewise Julian holds that the usufructuary has the right of vindicating servitudes: accordingly he will be able to announce a new work to the neighbor, and a remission will be effective. But if he gives notice to the owner of the estate himself, the remission will be ineffectual: nor, as against a neighbor, can he bring an action against the owner that he has no right to build higher against his will. But if, with this having been done, the usufruct becomes worse, he ought to sue for the usufruct.
Et naturalem habet in se aequitatem, namque precarium revocare volenti competit: est enim natura aequum tamdiu te liberalitate mea uti, quamdiu ego velim, et ut possim revocare, cum mutavero voluntatem. itaque cum quid precario rogatum est, non solum hoc interdicto uti possumus, sed etiam praescriptis verbis actione, quae ex bona fide oritur.
And it has natural equity in itself, for the right belongs to one who wishes to revoke a precarium: for it is by nature equitable that you use my liberality for as long as I wish, and that I can revoke it when I have changed my intention. Therefore, when something has been requested by way of precarium, we can employ not only this interdict, but also the action with prescribed words, which arises from good faith.
Item qui precario ad tempus rogavit, finito tempore, etiamsi ad hoc temporis non rogavit, tamen precario possidere videtur: intellegitur enim dominus, cum patitur eum qui precario rogaverit possidere, rursus precario concedere.
Likewise, he who has asked by precarium for a time, when the time is finished, even if he has not asked for this further time, nevertheless is deemed to possess by precarium: for the owner is understood, when he allows the one who has requested by precarium to possess, to be again granting by precarium.
Sed si manente adhuc precario tu in ulterius tempus rogasti, prorogatur precarium: nam nec mutatur causa possessionis et non constituitur eo modo precarium, sed in longius tempus profertur. si vero praeterita die rogas, propius est, ut soluta iam causa precarii non redintegretur, sed nova constituatur.
But if, with the precarium still remaining, you asked for a further time, the precarium is prorogated: for neither is the cause of possession changed, and in that way a precarium is not constituted, but it is carried forward to a longer time. But if indeed you ask after the day has passed, it is more proper that, with the cause of the precarium already dissolved, it not be redintegrated, but that a new one be constituted.
Iulianus ait eum, qui vi alterum deiecit et ab eodem precario rogavit, desinere vi possidere et incipere precario, neque existimare sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare, cum voluntate eius quem deiecit coeperit precario possidere: nam si ab eodem emisset, incipere etiam pro emptore posse dominium capere.
Julian says that he who has cast another out by force and then from that same person asked on precarium, ceases to possess by force and begins to possess on precarium; nor should it be thought that he himself changes for himself the cause of possession, since with the will of him whom he expelled he has begun to possess on precarium: for if he had bought it from that same person, he could even begin, as purchaser, to take dominion.
Quaesitum est, si quis rem suam pignori mihi dederit et precario rogaverit, an hoc interdictum locum habeat. quaestio in eo est, ut precarium consistere rei suae possit. mihi videtur verius precarium consistere in pignore, cum possessionis rogetur, non proprietatis, et est haec sententia etiam utilissima: cottidie enim precario rogantur creditores ab his, qui pignori dederunt, et debet consistere precarium.
It has been asked, if someone has given his own thing to me in pledge and has requested by precarium, whether this interdict has place. The question lies in this, whether a precarium can subsist over one’s own thing. It seems to me truer that a precarium subsists in a pledge, since what is requested is possession, not proprietorship; and this opinion is also most useful: for every day creditors are requested by precarium by those who have given in pledge, and the precarium ought to subsist.
Quaesitum est, si titius me rogaverit, ut re sempronii utatur, deinde ego sempronium rogavero, ut concederet, et ille, dum mihi vult praestitum, concesserit. titius a me habet precario et ego cum eo agam interdicto de precario: sempronius autem non aget cum eo, quia haec verba " ab illo precario habes" ostendunt ei demum competere interdictum, a quo quis precario rogavit, non cuius res est, an tamen sempronius mecum, quasi a me rogatus, interdictum habeat? et magis est, ne habeat, quia non habeo precario, cum non mihi, sed alii impetravi.
It has been asked: if Titius has asked me to use the property of Sempronius, then I shall have asked Sempronius to allow it, and he, wishing to oblige me, has allowed it. Titius holds from me by precarium, and I will proceed against him by the interdict de precario: but Sempronius will not proceed against him, because these words, "you have by precarium from that man," show that the interdict belongs only to the one from whom someone asked by precarium, not to the one whose the thing is. Yet does Sempronius have the interdict against me, as though asked by me? And the sounder view is that he does not have it, because I do not have by precarium, since I obtained it not for myself but for another.
Quod a titio precario quis rogavit, id etiam ab herede eius precario habere videtur: et ita et sabinus et celsus scribunt eoque iure utimur. ergo et a ceteris successoribus habere quis precario videtur. idem et labeo probat et adicit, etiamsi ignoret quis heredem, tamen videri eum ab herede precario habere.
What someone requested as a precarium from Titius, he is deemed to hold as a precarium also from his heir: and thus both Sabinus and Celsus write, and we use this rule. Therefore one is likewise deemed to hold it as a precarium from the other successors. The same is approved by Labeo, who adds that, even if one does not know who the heir is, nevertheless he is deemed to hold it as a precarium from the heir.
Illud tamen videamus quale sit, si a me precario rogaveris et ego eam rem alienavero, an precarium duret re ad alium translata. et magis est, ut, si ille non revocet, posse interdicere quasi ab illo precario habeas, non quasi a me: et si passus est aliquo tempore a se precario habere, recte interdicet, quasi a se precario habeas.
Let us, however, consider what the case is, if you have asked a precarium from me and I have alienated that thing, whether the precarium endures when the thing has been transferred to another. And the sounder view is that, if he does not revoke, you can interdict as if you possess it by precarium from him, not as if from me; and if he has permitted for some time that it be held by precarium from himself, he will interdict rightly, as if you possess it by precarium from himself.
Eum quoque precario teneri voluit praetor, qui dolo fecit, ut habere desineret. illud adnotatur, quod culpam non praestat is qui precario rogavit, sed solum dolum praestat, quamquam is, qui commodatum suscepit, non tantum dolum, sed etiam culpam praestat. nec immerito dolum solum praestat is qui precario rogavit, cum totum ex liberalitate descendat eius qui precario concessit et satis sit, si dolus tantum praestetur.
The praetor also wished him to be held liable in precarium, who by dolus contrived that he should cease to have it. It is noted that he who asked by way of precarium does not answer for culpa, but only for dolus, although he who undertook a commodatum is liable not only for dolus but also for culpa. And not without reason does he who asked by precarium answer only for dolus, since the whole descends from the liberality of him who granted by precarium, and it is sufficient if only dolus is made good.
Ex hoc interdicto restitui debet in pristinam causam: quod si non fuerit factum, condemnatio in tantum fiet, quanti interfuit actoris ei rem restitui ex eo tempore, ex quo interdictum editum est: ergo et fructus ex die interdicti editi praestabuntur.
Under this interdict he must be restored to the former condition: but if this shall not have been done, condemnation will be made to the extent of how much it was in the plaintiff’s interest that the thing be restored to him, from the time from which the interdict was issued: therefore the fruits also will be rendered from the day of the issuing of the interdict.
Et generaliter erit dicendum in restitutionem venire dolum et culpam latam dumtaxat, cetera non venire. plane post interdictum editum oportebit et dolum et culpam et omnem causam venire: nam ubi moram quis fecit precario, omnem causam debebit constituere.
And generally it must be said that, for restitution, only dolus and culpa lata come into play; the rest do not. Clearly, after the interdict has been issued, both dolus and culpa and every cause must come in: for where someone has made delay precario (on sufferance/by favor), he will have to establish every cause.
Hoc interdicto heres eius qui precario rogavit tenetur quemadmodum ipse, ut, sive habet sive dolo fecit quo minus haberet vel ad se perveniret, teneatur: ex dolo autem defuncti hactenus, quatenus ad eum pervenit.
By this interdict the heir of the one who requested by precarium is bound just as he himself is, so that, whether he has it or by fraud has brought it about that he should not have it or that it should not come to him, he is held; but for the fraud of the deceased only to this extent, insofar as it has come to him.
Cum precario aliquid datur, si convenit, ut in kalendas iulias precario possideat, numquid exceptione adiuvandus est, ne ante ei possessio auferatur? sed nulla vis est huius conventionis, ut rem alienam domino invito possidere liceat.
When something is given on precarium, if it is agreed that he may possess on precarium until the Kalends of July, is he to be aided by an exception, so that possession not be taken from him beforehand? But this convention has no force such that it would be lawful to possess another’s property against the owner’s will.
Si servus tuus tuo mandato precario rogaverit vel ratum habueris quod ille rogavit tuo nomine, teneberis, quasi precario habeas. sed si te ignorante suo nomine vel servus vel filius rogaverit, non videris tu precario habere, sed illi erit actio de peculio vel de in rem verso.
If your slave, by your mandate, has requested on a precarium, or if you have ratified what he requested in your name, you will be held, as though you yourself held it on a precarium. But if, you being unaware, either the slave or your son has requested in his own name, you are not deemed to hold on a precarium; rather, he will have an action de peculio or de in rem verso.
Eum, qui precario rogaverit, ut sibi possidere liceat, nancisci possessionem non est dubium: an is quoque possideat, qui rogatus sit, dubitatum est. placet autem penes utrumque esse eum hominem, qui precario datus esset, penes eum qui rogasset, quia possideat corpore, penes dominum, quia non discesserit animo possessione.
It is not doubtful that he who has asked by precarium that it be permitted for him to possess for himself acquires possession; whether the one who was asked also possesses has been a matter of doubt. However, it is accepted that the person who was given on precarium is under the control of both: under him who asked, because he possesses by corpus, and under the owner, because he has not departed from possession in animus.
Si is, qui pro possessore possideret, precario dominum rogaverit, ut sibi retinere rem liceret, vel is, qui alienam rem emisset, dominum rogaverit: apparet eos precario possidere. nec existimandos mutare sibi causam possessionis, quibus a domino concedatur precario possidere: nam et si id quod possideas alium precario rogaveris, videri te desinere ex prima causa possidere et incipere ex precario habere: et contra si possessorem precario rogaverit qui rem avocare ei posset, teneri eum precario, quoniam aliquid ad eum per hanc precarii rogationem pervenit, id est possessio, quae aliena sit.
If one who was possessing as a possessor should ask the owner on precarium that it be permitted to him to retain the thing, or if one who had bought another’s thing should ask the owner: it is apparent that they possess by precarium. Nor are those to whom it is conceded by the owner to possess by precarium to be thought to change for themselves the cause of possession: for even if, for that which you possess, you have asked someone else on precarium, you are deemed to cease to possess from the first cause and to begin to have by precarium; and conversely, if the one who could withdraw the thing from him should ask the possessor on precarium, he is held by precarium, since something has come to him through this asking by precarium, that is, possession, which is another’s.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate precario rogaverit, labeo ait habere eum precariam possessionem et hoc interdicto teneri. nam quo magis naturaliter possideretur, nullum locum esse tutoris auctoritati: recteque dici " quod precario habes", quia quod possideat ex ea causa possideat, ex qua rogaverit: nihilque novi per praetorem constituendum, quoniam, sive habeat rem, officio iudicis teneretur, sive non habeat, non teneatur.
If a ward, without the authority of his guardian, has requested on a precarium basis, Labeo says that he has a precarious possession and is held by this interdict. For, inasmuch as it is possessed more naturally, there is no place for the guardian’s authority; and it is rightly said “what you hold by precarium,” because he possesses on that ground on which he asked. And nothing new needs to be established by the praetor, since, whether he has the thing, he would be bound by the judge’s office, or, if he does not have it, he would not be bound.
Si arbor aedibus alienis impendeat, utrum totam arborem iubeat praetor adimi an vero id solum, quod superexcurrit, quaeritur. et rutilius ait a stirpe excidendam idque plerisque videtur verius: et nisi adimet dominus arborem, labeo ait permitti ei, cui arbor officeret, ut si vellet succideret eam lignaque tolleret.
If a tree overhangs another’s buildings, the question is whether the praetor should order the whole tree to be removed, or rather only that part which projects over. And Rutilius says it ought to be cut down from the root, and this seems truer to most; and unless the owner removes the tree, Labeo says it is permitted to the one whom the tree obstructs, that, if he wishes, he may cut it down and carry off the wood.
Quod et lex fabia prospexit. neque hoc interdictum aufert legis fabiae exsecutionem: nam et hoc interdicto agi poterit et nihilo minus accusatio legis fabiae institui: et versa vice qui egit fabia, poterit nihilo minus etiam hoc interdictum habere, praesertim cum alius interdictum, alius fabiae actionem habere possit.
Which also the Lex Fabia has provided for. Nor does this interdict take away the execution of the Lex Fabia: for both it will be possible to proceed by this interdict and nonetheless to institute an accusation under the Lex Fabia; and conversely, he who has proceeded under the Fabia will nonetheless also be able to have this interdict, especially since one person can have the interdict, another the Fabia action.
Si quis eum, quem ab hostibus redemit, retineat, in ea causa est, ut interdicto non teneatur: non enim dolo malo facit. plane si offertur pretium, interdictum locum habet. sed et si eum remisit pretio non accepto, dicendum est interdicto locum fore, si, posteaquam semel remisit, velit retinere.
If anyone retains the one whom he redeemed from the enemy, he is in such a case that he is not held by the interdict; for he does not act with malicious fraud. Plainly, if the price is offered, the interdict has place. But also, if he has released him with the price not accepted, it must be said that the interdict will have place, if, after he has once released him, he wishes to retain him.
Si eum quis retineat filium, quem non habet in potestate, plerumque sine dolo malo facere videbitur: pietas enim genuina efficit sine dolo malo retineri, nisi si evidens dolus malus intercedat. proinde et si libertum suum vel alumnum vel noxae deditum adhuc impuberem, idem erit dicendum. et generaliter qui iustam causam habet hominis liberi apud se retinendi, non videtur dolo malo facere.
If someone should detain a son whom he does not have in his power, he will for the most part be seen to act without malicious deceit: for genuine piety brings it about that he is detained without malicious deceit, unless evident malicious deceit intervenes. Accordingly, if it be his freedman or alumnus (foster-child), or one noxally surrendered who is still under age, the same must be said. And, generally, he who has a just cause for retaining a free person with himself is not seen to act with malicious deceit.
Si quis volentem retineat, non videtur dolo malo retinere. sed quid si volentem quidem retineat, non tamen sine calliditate circumventum vel seductum vel sollicitatum, neque bona vel probabili ratione hoc facit? recte dicetur dolo malo retinere.
If anyone retains a willing person, he does not seem to retain by malicious deceit. But what if he does retain one who is willing, yet not without cunning—one who has been circumvented or seduced or solicited—and he does not do this on a good or probable reason? It will rightly be said that he retains by malicious deceit.
Plane si dubitat, utrum liber an servus sit, vel facit status controversiam, recedendum erit ab hoc interdicto et agenda causa libertatis. etenim recte placuit tunc demum hoc interdictum locum habere, quotiens quis pro certo liber est: ceterum si quaeratur de statu, non oportet praeiudicium fieri alienae cognitioni.
Clearly, if there is doubt whether he is free or a slave, or a controversy of status is being made, one must withdraw from this interdict and the cause of liberty must be prosecuted. For it has been rightly decided that only then does this interdict have place, whenever someone is certainly free; but if there is inquiry about status, no prejudgment ought to be made to another’s cognition.
Sed et si mulier vel pupillus hoc interdictum desiderent pro cognato vel parente vel adfine suo solliciti, dandum esse eis interdictum dicendum est: nam et publico iudicio reos facere possunt, dum suas suorumque iniurias exsequuntur.
But also, if a woman or a ward, solicitous on behalf of her cognate or parent or affine, should desire this interdict, it must be said that the interdict is to be given to them: for they can also make persons defendants by a public action, while they pursue the injuries of themselves and of their own.
Si tamen, posteaquam hoc interdicto actum est, alius hoc interdicto agere desideret, palam erit postea alii non facile dandum, nisi si de perfidia prioris potuerit aliquid dici. itaque causa cognita amplius quam semel interdictum hoc erit movendum. nam nec in publicis iudiciis permittitur amplius agi quam semel actum est quam si praevaricationis fuerit damnatus prior accusator.
If, however, after action has been taken under this interdict, another should desire to proceed under this interdict, it will be clear that thereafter it is not readily to be granted to another, unless something can be alleged about the bad faith (perfidy) of the former. Therefore, the case having been examined, this interdict is to be moved no more than once. For neither in public prosecutions is it permitted that the matter be proceeded with more than once after it has once been acted upon, except if the prior accuser has been condemned of prevarication (collusion).
Si quis filiam suam, quae mihi nupta sit, velit abducere vel exhiberi sibi desideret, an adversus interdictum exceptio danda sit, si forte pater concordans matrimonium, forte et liberis subnixum, velit dissolvere? et certo iure utimur, ne bene concordantia matrimonia iure patriae potestatis turbentur. quod tamen sic erit adhibendum, ut patri persuadeatur, ne acerbe patriam potestatem exerceat.
If someone should wish to carry off his daughter, who is married to me, or should desire that she be produced before him, is an exception to be granted against the interdict, if perchance the father wishes to dissolve a harmonious marriage, perhaps also supported by children? And we employ a settled rule of law, lest well-concordant marriages be disturbed by the right of paternal power. Which, however, must be applied thus, that the father be persuaded not to exercise paternal power harshly.
Superiora interdicta exhibitoria sunt, hoc est pertinent ad exhibitionem liberorum ceterorumque, de quibus supra diximus: hoc autem interdictum pertinet ad ductionem, ut ducere quis possit eos, in quos habet ius ductionis. itaque prius interdictum, quod est de liberis exhibendis, praeparatorium est huius interdicti: quo magis enim quis duci possit, exhibendus fuit.
The foregoing interdicts are exhibitory, that is, they pertain to the exhibition of children and of others, about whom we spoke above: but this interdict pertains to duction, so that one may lead away those over whom he has the right of duction. And so the prior interdict, which is about children to be exhibited, is preparatory to this interdict: for, the more that someone might be able to be led away, he had to be exhibited.
Hoc autem interdictum competit non adversus ipsum filium, quem quis ducere vult, sed utique esse debet is qui eum interdicto defendat: ceterum cessat interdictum, et succedere poterit notio praetoris, ut apud eum disceptetur, utrum quis in potestate sit an non sit.
But this interdict is available not against the son himself whom someone wishes to lead away, but there must, of course, be someone to defend him by the interdict; otherwise the interdict ceases, and the praetor’s cognition can succeed, so that it may be disputed before him whether someone is under power or is not.
Iulianus ait, quotiens id interdictum movetur de filio ducendo vel cognitio et is de quo agitur impubes est, alias differri oportere rem in tempus pubertatis, alias repraesentari: idque ex persona eorum, inter quos controversia erit, et ex genere causae constituendum est. nam si is, qui se patrem dicit, auctoritatis prudentiae fidei exploratae esset, usque in diem litis impuberem apud se habebit: is vero, qui controversiam facit, humilis calumniator notae nequitiae, repraesentanda cognitio est. item si is, qui impuberem negat in aliena potestate esse, vir omnibus modis probatus, tutor vel testamento vel a praetore datus pupillum, quem in diem litis apud se habuit, tuetur, is vero, qui patrem se dicit, suspectus est quasi calumniator, differri litem non oportebit.
Julian says that whenever that interdict is set in motion about leading off a son, or a judicial inquiry is held, and the one about whom the matter is conducted is underage, sometimes the matter ought to be deferred to the time of puberty, sometimes to be brought on at once; and this must be determined from the character of the persons between whom the controversy will be, and from the kind of cause. For if the one who says he is the father is of tested authority, prudence, and good faith, he will keep the underage person with himself until the day of trial; but if the one who raises the controversy is a man of low standing, a calumniator of notorious wickedness, the inquiry must be held forthwith. Likewise, if the one who denies that the underage person is in another’s power is a man approved in every way, a tutor appointed either by testament or by the praetor, who protects the pupil (ward) whom he has had with himself until the day of trial, but the one who says he is the father is suspect as a calumniator, the suit ought not to be deferred.
but if both persons are suspect, either as infirm or as base, “it will not be out of place,” he says, to arrange with whom in the meantime the boy should be reared, and that the controversy be deferred to the time of puberty, lest through collusion or the inexperience of either of the contestants either the paterfamilias be adjudged to another’s power, or an alien son be constituted in the place of a paterfamilias.
Etiamsi maxime autem probet filium pater in sua potestate esse, tamen causa cognita mater in retinendo eo potior erit, idque decretis divi pii quibusdam continetur: optinuit enim mater ob nequitiam patris, ut sine deminutione patriae potestatis apud eam filius moretur.
Even if the father most emphatically proves that the son is under his own power, nevertheless, once the case has been examined, the mother will be preferable in retaining him, and this is contained in certain decrees of the deified Pius: for the mother obtained, on account of the father’s depravity, that the son might remain with her without any diminution of paternal power.
In hoc interdicto, donec res iudicetur, feminam, praetextatum eumque, qui proxime praetextati aetatem accedet, interim apud matrem familias deponi praetor iubet. proxime aetatem praetextati accedere eum dicimus, qui puberem aetatem nunc ingressus est. cum audis matrem familias, accipe notae auctoritatis feminam.
In this interdict, until the matter is adjudicated, the praetor orders that a woman, a praetextatus (a boy wearing the praetexta), and also him who most nearly approaches the age of the praetextatus, be in the meantime placed with a materfamilias. We say that he most nearly approaches the age of the praetextatus who has now entered the age of puberty. When you hear “materfamilias,” take it as a woman of noted authority.
Si filius sua sponte apud aliquem est, inutile hoc interdictum erit, quia filius magis apud se quam apud eum est, in quem interdicetur, cum liberam facultatem abeundi vel remanendi haberet: nisi si inter duos, qui se patres dicerent, controversia esset et alter ab altero exhiberi eum desideraret.
If a son is with someone of his own accord, this interdict will be useless, because the son is more with himself than with him against whom the interdict would be issued, since he would have the free faculty of departing or remaining: unless there were a controversy between two who claimed themselves to be fathers, and one desired that he be exhibited by the other.
Hoc interdictum de possessione rerum mobilium locum habet: sed optinuit vim eius exaequatam fuisse uti possidetis interdicto, quod de rebus soli competit, ut is et in hoc interdicto vincat, qui nec vi nec clam nec precario, dum super hoc ab adversario inquietatur, possessionem habet.
This interdict has application concerning the possession of movable things; but it has been established that its force has been equalized to the uti possidetis interdict, which pertains to things of the soil, so that he also in this interdict prevails who, while he is being disturbed in this matter by his adversary, holds possession neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium (by permission revocable at will).
Praetor ait: " si is homo, quo de agitur, non est ex his rebus, de quibus inter te et actorem convenit, ut, quae in eam habitationem qua de agitur introducta importata ibi nata factave essent, ea pignori tibi pro mercede eius habitationis essent, sive ex his rebus est et ea merces tibi soluta eove nomine satisfactum est aut per te stat, quo minus solvatur: ita, quo minus ei, qui eum pignoris nomine induxit, inde abducere liceat, vim fieri veto".
The praetor says: "If the person who is at issue is not among those things concerning which it was agreed between you and the plaintiff that whatever had been introduced into that dwelling which is at issue, brought in, born there, or made there, should be in pledge to you for the rent of that dwelling; or if he is among those things, and that rent has been paid to you or satisfaction has been rendered under that heading, or it is by you that it stands that it is not paid: then, so that it may not be lawful the less for him who brought him in under the title of pledge to lead him away from there, I forbid force to be employed."
Si pensio nondum debeatur, ait labeo interdictum hoc cessare, nisi paratus sit eam pensionem solvere. proinde si semenstrem solvit, sexmenstris debeatur, inutiliter interdicet, nisi solverit et sequentis sexmenstris, ita tamen, si conventio specialis facta est in conductione domus, ut non liceat ante finitum annum vel certum tempus migrare. idem est et si quis in plures annos conduxerit et nondum praeterierit tempus.
If the installment is not yet due, Labeo says this interdict is inoperative, unless he is ready to pay that installment. Accordingly, if he has paid a half-yearly installment, but a six-monthly is owed, he will interdict to no effect unless he also pays the following six-monthly, provided, however, that a special agreement has been made in the leasing of the house that it is not permitted to move before the year is completed or a fixed term. The same is so also if someone has leased for several years and the time has not yet passed.
Illud notandum est praetorem hic non exegisse, ut in bonis fuerit conductoris, nec ut esset pignori res illata, sed si pignoris nomine inducta sit. proinde et si aliena sint et si talia, quae pignoris nomine teneri non potuerint, pignoris tamen nomine introducta sint, interdicto hoc locus erit: quod si nec pignoris nomine inducta sint, nec retineri poterunt a locatore.
It is to be noted that the praetor here did not require that it be among the goods of the lessee (conductor), nor that the thing be brought in as a pledge, but only that it have been introduced under the name of pledge. Accordingly, even if they are another’s and even if such as could not be held under the name of pledge, nevertheless if they have been introduced under the name of pledge, there will be room for this interdict; but if they have not been introduced under the name of pledge, they cannot be retained by the lessor (locator).
Si colonus res in fundum duorum pignoris nomine intulerit, ita ut utrique in solidum obligatae essent, singuli adversus extraneum salviano interdicto recte experientur: inter ipsos vero si reddatur hoc interdictum, possidentis condicio melior erit. at si id actum fuerit, ut pro partibus res obligaretur, utilis actio et adversus extraneos et inter ipsos dari debebit, per quam dimidias partes possessionis singuli adprehendent.
If a tenant-farmer has brought goods onto the estate of two [co-owners] in the name of a pledge, in such a way that they are obligated to each for the whole (in solidum), each individual will rightly proceed against an outsider by the Salvian interdict; but as between themselves, if this interdict is applied, the condition of the possessor will be the better. But if it has been agreed that the goods be obligated according to shares (pro partibus), a useful action (utilis actio) ought to be granted both against outsiders and between themselves, by which each will take hold of half shares of the possession.
concerning the things of men, interdicts are rendered either about those which are someone’s, or about those which are no one’s. those which are no one’s are these: free persons, concerning the producing and leading of whom interdicts are competent. those which are someone’s are either public or of individuals.
Interdicta autem competunt vel hominum causa vel divini iuris aut de religione, sicut est " ne quid in loco sacro fiat" vel " quod factum est restituatur" et de mortuo inferendo vel sepulchro aedificando. hominum causa competunt vel ad publicam utilitatem pertinentia vel sui iuris tuendi causa vel officii tuendi causa vel rei familiaris. publicae utilitatis causa competit interdictum " ut via publica uti liceat" et " flumine publico" et " ne quid fiat in via publica": iuris sui tuendi causa de liberis exhibendis, item de liberto exhibendo: officii causa de homine libero exhibendo: reliqua interdicta rei familiaris causa dantur.
Interdicts, moreover, are available either for the sake of persons or of divine law or concerning religion, such as "that nothing be done in a sacred place" or "that what has been done be restored," and concerning conveying a dead person for burial or building a sepulcher. For the sake of persons they are available either as pertaining to public utility, or for the purpose of protecting one’s own right, or of protecting an office, or of the family estate. For the sake of public utility the interdict is available "that it be permitted to use a public way" and "concerning a public river" and "that nothing be done on a public way": for the sake of defending one’s own right, "for exhibiting children," likewise "for exhibiting a freedman": for the sake of office, "for exhibiting a free man": the remaining interdicts are given for the sake of family property.
Quaedam interdicta rei persecutionem continent, veluti de itinere actuque privato: nam proprietatis causam continet hoc interdictum. sed et illa interdicta, quae de locis sacris et de religiosis proponuntur, veluti proprietatis causam continent, item illa de liberis exhibendis, quae iuris tuendi causa diximus competere, ut non sit mirum, si, quae interdicta ad rem familiarem pertinent, proprietatis, non possessionis causam habeant.
Certain interdicts comprise prosecution in rem, for example about a private way and cattle‑drive; for this interdict contains a proprietary cause. But those interdicts too which are put forward concerning sacred places and religious places, as it were, contain a proprietary cause, likewise those for exhibiting children, which we have said are available for the sake of defending right; so that it is not surprising if the interdicts which pertain to the family estate have the cause of ownership, not of possession.
Haec autem interdicta, quae ad rem familiarem spectant, aut apiscendae sunt possessionis aut reciperandae aut retinendae. apiscendae possessionis sunt interdicta, quae competunt his, qui ante non sunt nancti possessionem. sunt autem interdicta apiscendae possessionis " quorum bonorum": salvianum quoque interdictum, quod est de pignoribus, ex hoc genere est: et " quo itinere venditor usus est, quo minus emptor utatur, vim fieri veto". reciperandae possessionis causa proponuntur sub rubrica unde vi: aliqua enim sub hoc titulo interdicta sunt.
these interdicts, moreover, which pertain to the household property/estate, are either for acquiring possession or for recovering it or for retaining it. interdicts for acquiring possession are those which are available to persons who have not previously gotten possession. now the interdicts for acquiring possession are “of whose goods”; the salvian interdict too, which is about pledges, is of this kind; and “as to the way which the seller used, I forbid force to be used to the extent that the buyer be hindered from using it.” interdicts for the sake of recovering possession are set forth under the rubric “whence by force”: for certain interdicts are under this title.
Interdicta noxalia ea sunt, quae ob delictum eorum, quos in potestate habemus, dantur, veluti cum vi deiecerunt aut vi aut clam opus fecerunt. sed officio iudicis continetur, ut dominum sua impensa opus restituentem absolvat: patientiam tollendo operi praestantem noxae dedere iubeat et absolvat, si non dedat, quantum impensae in tollendo opere erogatum sit, tanti condemnet: si neque patientiam praestet neque ipse tollat, cum possit, in tantum condemnet, in quantum iudex aestimaverit, atque si ipse fecisset.
Noxal interdicts are those which are granted on account of the delict of those whom we have in our power, for example when they have cast someone out by force or have made a work by force or by stealth. But it is contained in the judge’s duty that he acquit the master who restores the situation at his own expense; that he order the one who provides leave for removing the work to surrender the wrongdoer noxally and acquit him; if he does not surrender, let him condemn him in as much as was expended in removing the work; if he neither provides leave nor removes it himself, though he can, let him condemn him to the extent that the judge shall assess, as if he himself had done it.
Ait praetor: " quorum bonorum ex edicto meo illi possessio data est, quod de his bonis pro herede aut pro possessore possides possideresve, si nihil usucaptum esset, quod quidem dolo malo fecisti, uti desineres possidere, id illi restituas".
The praetor says: "For those goods, by my edict, possession has been given to that man: whatever of these goods you possess, or would be possessing, as heir or as possessor, if nothing had been acquired by usucapion—which indeed you effected by malicious fraud so that you might cease to possess—restore that to him."
Est autem et ipsum apiscendae possessionis et continet hanc causam, ut, quod quis legatorum nomine non ex voluntate heredis occupavit, id restituat heredi. etenim aequissimum praetori visum est unumquemque non sibi ipsum ius dicere occupatis legatis, sed ab herede petere: redigit igitur ad heredes per hoc interdictum ea, quae legatorum nomine possidentur, ut perinde legatarii possint eum convenire.
Now there is also that same interdict for acquiring possession, and it includes this case: that what someone has occupied in the name of legacies not by the will of the heir, he must restore to the heir. For it seemed most equitable to the praetor that each person should not declare the right for himself by legacies he has occupied, but should seek it from the heir. He therefore brings back to the heirs through this interdict those things which are possessed in the name of legacies, so that in like manner the legatees may be able to proceed against him.
Quia autem nonnumquam incertum est, utrum quis pro legato an pro herede vel pro possessore possideat, bellissime arrianus scribit hereditatis petitionem instituendam et hoc interdictum reddendum, ut, sive quis pro herede vel pro possessore sive pro legato possideat, hoc interdicto teneatur: quemadmodum solemus facere, quotiens incertum est, quae potius actio teneat: nam duas dictamus protestati ex altera nos velle consequi quod nos contingit.
Because, however, it is sometimes uncertain whether someone possesses as legatee or as heir or as possessor, Arrianus most excellently writes that a petition of inheritance should be instituted and that this interdict should be rendered, so that, whether someone possesses as heir or as possessor or as legatee, he is held by this interdict: just as we are accustomed to do whenever it is uncertain which action rather lies; for we dictate two, having protested that by the one we wish to obtain what pertains to us.
Qui vero ex causa praeceptionis, utique tenetur hoc interdicto, sed pro ea scilicet parte, quam iure legati habet, non etiam pro ea, quam quasi heres habet. idemque erit dicendum et si alio genere legati uni ex heredibus legatum sit: nam et hic dicendum est pro ea parte, qua heres est, cessare interdictum.
But he who, on the ground of praeception (preemption), is of course bound by this interdict, is bound only for that share which he has by the right of the legacy, not also for that which he has as heir. And the same must be said even if by another kind of legacy something has been bequeathed to one of the heirs: for here too it must be said that, for the share in which he is heir, the interdict ceases.
Unde est quaesitum, si usus fructus vel usus fuerit alicui relictus eumque occupaverit, an hoc interdicto restituere sit compellendus. movet, quod neque usus fructus neque usus possidetur, sed magis tenetur: potest tamen defendi competere interdictum. idem dicendum est et in servitute relicta.
Whence the question has been raised, if a usufruct or a use has been bequeathed to someone and he has taken possession of it, whether by this interdict he is to be compelled to restore. What moves the discussion is that neither usufruct nor use is possessed, but rather is held; nevertheless it can be defended that the interdict lies. The same must be said also in the case of a servitude bequeathed.
Quaesitum est, si quis legatorum servandorum causa missus sit in possessionem, an hoc interdicto teneatur ad restitutionem. movet illud primum, quod non possidet is qui missus est in possessionem legatorum causa, sed potius custodit, deinde quod praetorem habet huius rei auctorem. tutius tamen erit dicendum hoc interdictum competere, maxime si satisdatum sit iam legatorum nomine nec recedat: tunc enim etiam possidere videtur.
It has been asked whether, if someone has been sent into possession for the sake of preserving the legacies, he is held by this interdict to restitution. What moves us first is that he who is sent into possession for the sake of legacies does not possess but rather guards, and next that he has the praetor as the author of this action. Nevertheless, it will be safer to say that this interdict is applicable, especially if surety has already been given in the name of the legacies and he does not withdraw: for then he is even seen to possess.
Quod ait praetor " voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet", ita erit interpretandum, ut, si post aditam hereditatem vel bonorum possessionem adgnitam voluntas accommodata est legatario, ut possideret, interdictum cesset: quod si ante aditam hereditatem bonorumve possessionem adgnitam hoc factum est, rectius dicetur eam voluntatem non nocere debere.
What the praetor says, " voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet," is to be interpreted thus: if, after the inheritance has been entered upon or the bonorum possessio has been acknowledged, consent has been accommodated to the legatee so that he might possess, the interdict ceases; but if this was done before the inheritance was entered upon or the bonorum possessio was acknowledged, it will be more correct to say that that consent ought not to harm.
Si duae res legatae sint, altera ex voluntate occupata, altera non ex voluntate eveniet, ut altera revocari possit, altera non. idemque erit probandum et in una re, cuius pars ex voluntate, altera pars non ex voluntate occupata est: nam pars sola per interdictum auferetur.
If two things have been bequeathed, and one has been occupied with consent, the other not with consent, it will ensue that the one can be recalled, the other not. And the same must be approved also in the case of a single thing, part of which has been occupied with consent, another part not with consent: for only the part will be removed through the interdict.
Prodest autem possedisse, quotiens voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet, possideri coeptum est: sed et si postea voluntas accessit eius, ad quem ea res pertinebat, tamen prodesse possessori debere. unde si quis coepit quidem ex voluntate eius, ad quem ea res pertinet, possidere, postea vero voluntas non perseverat, nihil nocet, quia semel possideri coepit ex voluntate.
It is profitable, moreover, to have possessed, whenever possession was begun by the will of him to whom the thing pertains; and even if afterwards the will of him to whom the thing pertained was added, nevertheless it ought to profit the possessor. Whence, if someone did indeed begin to possess by the will of him to whom the thing pertains, but afterwards the will does not persist, it does no harm, because possession was once begun with will.
Si per legatarium factum sit, quo minus satisdetur, licet cautum non sit, tenetur interdicto. sed si forte factum sit per legatarium, quo minus satisdetur, eo autem tempore, quo editur interdictum, satis accipere paratus sit, non competit interdictum, nisi satisdatum sit. item si per bonorum possessorem stetit, quo minus satisdaret, sed modo paratus est cavere, tenet interdictum: illud enim tempus inspicitur, quo interdictum editur.
If by the act of the legatee it has come about that surety is not furnished (quo minus satisdetur), although no caution has been stipulated, he is bound by the interdict. But if it has happened through the legatee that surety was not furnished, yet at the time when the interdict is issued he is ready to accept surety (satis accipere paratus), the interdict does not lie unless surety has been furnished (nisi satisdatum sit). Likewise, if it was through the possessor of the goods (bonorum possessor) that he failed to furnish surety (quo minus satisdaret), but now he is prepared to give caution (paratus est cavere), the interdict holds: for the time that is considered is that at which the interdict is issued.
Ait praetor: " si quis dolo malo fecerit, quo minus quis permissu meo eiusve, cuius ea iurisdictio fuit, in possessionem bonorum sit, in eum in factum iudicium, quanti ea res fuit, ob quam in possessionem missus erit, dabo".
The praetor says: " if anyone has acted by malicious deceit, whereby someone is hindered, by my permission or by that of him whose jurisdiction that was, from being put into possession of the estate, I will grant against him an action on the facts, for as much as the matter was worth on account of which he will have been sent into possession".
Est autem generale hoc edictum: pertinet enim ad omnes, qui in possessionem a praetore missi sunt: convenit enim praetori omnes, quos ipse in possessionem misit, tueri. sed sive rei servandae causa sive legatorum aut ventris nomine in possessionem missi fuerint, habent ex hoc edicto in factum actionem, sive doli sive aliter prohibuerint.
Moreover, this edict is general: for it pertains to all who have been sent into possession by the praetor; for it befits the praetor to protect all whom he himself has sent into possession. But whether they have been sent into possession for the sake of preserving the thing, or in the name of legacies, or in the name of the womb (i.e., the unborn child), they have from this edict an action in factum, if they have been prohibited, whether by fraud or otherwise.
Haec verba " quanti ea res erit, ob quam in possessionem missus erit" continent utilitatem creditoris, ut quantum eius interest possessionem habere, tantum ei qui prohibuit condemnetur. proinde si ob falsum creditum vel ob falsam petitionem missus est in possessionem vel si exceptione summoveri potuit, nihil ei debet prodesse hoc edictum, quia propter nullam causam in possessionem missus est.
These words, "for how much that thing will be, on account of which he will have been sent into possession," contain the utility of the creditor, so that, to the extent it is of his interest to have possession, to that extent the one who prohibited is to be condemned. Accordingly, if he was sent into possession on account of a false credit-claim or a false petition, or if he could have been removed by an exception, this edict ought to profit him nothing, because he was sent into possession for no cause.
Hoc edicto neque pupillum neque furiosum teneri constat, quia affectu carent. sed pupillum eum debemus accipere, qui doli capax non est: ceterum si iam doli capax sit, contra erit dicendum. ergo et si tutor dolo fecerit, in pupillum dabimus actionem, si modo solvendo sit tutor: sed et ipsum tutorem posse conveniri iulianus scribit.
By this edict neither a pupil nor a madman is held, because they lack intent. But we ought to understand as a pupil one who is not capable of dolus; however, if he is already capable of dolus, the contrary must be said. Therefore even if the tutor acted with dolus, we will give an action against the pupil, provided only that the tutor is solvent; but Julian also writes that the tutor himself can be sued.
Hanc actionem excepta legatorum missione intra annum competere et non postea sciendum est, cum sit poenalis, nec in heredes similesque personas dabitur, nisi in id quod ad eas pervenit: sed heredi similibusque personis dabitur. nam cum prohibitus quis est legatorum vel fideicommissorum causa possessionem adipisci, tunc actio et perpetua est et in heredem dabitur, quia est in potestate successorum evitare interdictum satisdatione oblata.
It should be understood that this action, except in the case of the delivery of legacies, lies within one year and not thereafter, since it is penal; nor will it be granted against heirs and similar persons, except to the extent that something has come to them: but it will be granted to the heir and to similar persons. For when someone has been prohibited, for the sake of legacies or fideicommissa, from acquiring possession, then the action is both perpetual and will be given against the heir, because it is in the power of the successors to avoid the interdict by the offer of satisdation (security).
Si quis missus fuerit in possessionem fideicommissi servandi causa et non admittatur, potestate eius inducendus est in possessionem, qui eum misit, aut si quis volet uti interdicto, consequens erit dicere interdictum locum habere. sed melius erit dicere extra ordinem ipsos iure suae potestatis exsequi oportere decretum suum, nonnumquam etiam per manum militarem.
If someone has been sent into possession for the sake of preserving a fideicommissum and is not admitted, he must be brought into possession by the authority of the one who sent him; or, if someone wishes to make use of an interdict, it will be consequent to say that the interdict has place. But it will be better to say that, extra ordinem, they themselves ought, by the right of their own power, to execute their decree, sometimes even by the military hand.
Si mulier dicatur calumniae causa in possessionem venisse, quod non sit praegnas vel non ex eo praegnas, vel si de statu mulieris aliquid dicatur: ex epistula divi hadriani ad exemplum praesumptionis carboniani edicti ventri praetor pollicetur possessionem.
If it is said that a woman has come into possession for the sake of calumny, on the ground that she is not pregnant or not pregnant by him, or if anything is said about the status of the woman: on the basis of a letter of the deified Hadrian, after the example of the presumption of the Carbonian Edict, the praetor promises possession to the womb.
Poena autem eius, qui non promittit vel satis non dat, haec est, ut in possessionem mittatur adversarius. sive ergo promittat, sive per eum non fiat, quo minus promittat, non tenebit interdictum repulso per exceptionem eo qui experitur.
The penalty, moreover, for him who does not promise or does not give security is this: that the adversary is sent into possession. Therefore, whether he does promise, or it does not come about through him that he does not promise, the interdict will not hold, with the one who brings suit repelled by an exception.
Sed et ex alia causa hoc iudicium proposuit, si eo tempore, quo in possessionem mitti desiderabat, praetoris adeundi potestas non fuerit, scilicet ut, si, cum potestas praetoris adeundi non esset, damnum interim datum est, haberet iudicium qui damnum passus est.
But also for another cause he proposed this action, if at the time when he desired to be sent into possession there was no power of approaching the praetor, namely that, if, when there was no power of approaching the praetor, damage was in the meantime inflicted, he who suffered the damage would have an action.
Praetor ait: " quas tabulas lucius titius ad causam testamenti sui pertinentes reliquisse dicetur, si hae penes te sunt aut dolo malo tuo factum est, ut desinerent esse, ita eas illi exhibeas. item si libellus aliudve quid relictum esse dicetur, decreto comprehendam".
The praetor says: "as to the tablets which Lucius Titius shall be said to have left, pertaining to the cause of his testament, if these are in your possession, or it has been brought about by your malicious fraud that they ceased to exist, so you shall exhibit them to him. Likewise, if a little book or anything else shall be said to have been left, I will comprehend it in a decree".
Sive autem valet testamentum sive non, vel quod ab initio inutiliter factum est, sive ruptum sit vel in quo alio vitio, sed etiam si falsum esse dicatur vel ab eo factum qui testamenti factionem non habuerit: dicendum est interdictum valere.
Whether, moreover, the testament is valid or not, whether one made ineffectually from the beginning, or whether it has been broken (revoked) or is affected by some other vice, and even if it is said to be false or made by one who did not have testamentary capacity: it must be said that the interdict prevails.
Si ipse testator, dum vivit, tabulas suas esse dicat et exhiberi desideret, interdictum hoc locum non habebit, sed ad exhibendum erit agendum, ut exhibitas vindicet. quod in omnibus, qui corpora sua esse dicunt instrumentorum, probandum est.
If the testator himself, while alive, says that the tablets are his and desires that they be exhibited, this interdict will have no place; rather, one must proceed by an action ad exhibendum, so that, once exhibited, he may vindicate them. And this must be proved in all cases by those who assert that the physical bodies of the instruments are theirs.
Si quis dolo malo fecerit, quo minus penes eum tabulae essent, nihilo minus hoc interdicto tenebitur, nec praeiudicatur aliquid legi corneliae testamentariae, quasi dolo malo testamentum suppresserit. nemo enim ideo impune retinet tabulas, quod maius facinus admisit, cum exhibitis tabulis admissum eius magis manifestetur. et posse aliquem dolo malo facere, ut in eam legem non incidat, ut puta si neque amoverit neque celaverit tabulas, sed idcirco alii tradiderit, ne eas interdicenti exhiberet, hoc est si non supprimendi animo vel consilio fecit, sed ne huic exhiberet.
If anyone has acted with malicious deceit so that the tablets should not be in his keeping, nonetheless he will be held by this interdict; nor is anything prejudged against the Cornelian testamentary law, as though he had suppressed the testament by malicious deceit. For no one therefore retains the tablets with impunity because he has committed a greater crime, since, when the tablets are produced, his offense is made the more manifest. And it can happen that someone acts with malicious deceit and yet does not fall under that law—for instance, if he has neither removed nor concealed the tablets, but for that very reason has delivered them to another, so as not to produce them to the party issuing the interdict; that is, if he did it not with the purpose or plan of suppressing them, but so as not to produce them to this man.
Et si sub condicione legatum sit, quasi condicione existente sic aestimandum est, nec compelli debebit ad cavendum, ut se restituturum caveat, quidquid consecutus est, si condicio defecerit, quia poena contumaciae praestatur ab eo qui non exhibet.
And even if the legacy is under a condition, it is to be assessed as if the condition existed; nor ought he to be compelled to give security, to the effect that he will restore whatever he has obtained if the condition should fail, since the penalty for contumacy is exacted from the one who does not produce.
Inde quaeritur, si hinc consecutus aestimationem legatarius postea legatum petat, an sit audiendus. et putem, si heres idem praestitit, exceptione doli repellendum, si alius, repelli non oportere. et ideo et si heres sit, qui interdicto usus est aestimationem consecutus, eadem est distinctio.
Thence the question is asked whether, if by this means the legatee has obtained the valuation and afterwards seeks the legacy, he should be heard. And I think that, if it was the heir who paid the same, he is to be repelled by the defense of fraud (exceptio doli); if it was another, he ought not to be repelled. And therefore, even if it is the heir who, having used the interdict, has obtained the valuation, the same distinction applies.
Sed inter eas et ceteras vias militares hoc interest, quod viae militares exitum ad mare aut in urbes aut in flumina publica aut ad aliam viam militarem habent, harum autem vicinalium viarum dissimilis condicio est: nam pars earum in militares vias exitum habent, pars sine ullo exitu intermoriuntur.
But between these and the other military roads this is the difference: that military roads have an outlet to the sea, or into cities, or into public rivers, or to another military road; but the condition of these vicinal roads is dissimilar: for some of them have an outlet into military roads, some die out without any outlet.
Praetor ait: " ne quid in loco publico facias inve eum locum immittas, qua ex re quid illi damni detur, praeterquam quod lege senatus consulto edicto decretove principum tibi concessum est. de eo, quod factum erit, interdictum non dabo".
The praetor says: "Do not do anything in a public place, nor introduce into that place anything from which any damage would be caused to it, except what has been granted to you by law, by senatorial decree, by edict, or by decree of the emperors. As to what will have been done, I will not grant an interdict".
Et tam publicis utilitatibus quam privatorum per hoc prospicitur. loca enim publica utique privatorum usibus deserviunt, iure scilicet civitatis, non quasi propria cuiusque, et tantum iuris habemus ad optinendum, quantum quilibet ex populo ad prohibendum habet. propter quod si quod forte opus in publico fiet, quod ad privati damnum redundet, prohibitorio interdicto potest conveniri, propter quam rem hoc interdictum propositum est.
And provision is hereby made both for public utilities and for the interests of private persons. For public places certainly serve the uses of private persons, namely by the right of the civitas, not as though they were the property of each individual; and we have so much right to obtain/hold as anyone from the populace has to prohibit. Wherefore, if by chance some work is done in a public place which redounds to the damage of a private person, one can be proceeded against by the prohibitory interdict, for which matter this interdict has been proposed.
Hoc interdictum ad ea loca, quae sunt in fisci patrimonio, non puto pertinere: in his enim neque facere quicquam neque prohibere privatus potest: res enim fiscales quasi propriae et privatae principis sunt. igitur si quis in his aliquid faciat, nequaquam hoc interdictum locum habebit: sed si forte de his sit controversia, praefecti eorum iudices sunt.
I do not think this interdict pertains to those places which are in the patrimony of the fisc: for in these a private person can neither do anything nor prohibit; for fiscal things are as though they were the emperor’s own and private. Therefore, if anyone does anything in these, by no means will this interdict have place; but if perchance there is a controversy about these, their prefects are the judges.
Merito ait praetor " qua ex re quid illi damni detur": nam quotiensque aliquid in publico fieri permittitur, ita oportet permitti, ut sine iniuria cuiusquam fiat. et ita solet princeps, quotiens aliquid novi operis instituendum petitur, permittere.
Rightly the praetor says, "from which matter what damage is given to him": for whenever something is permitted to be done in public, it ought to be permitted in such a way that it be done without injury to anyone. And thus the princeps is accustomed, whenever the instituting of some new work is requested, to permit it.
Si quis nemine prohibente in publico aedificaverit, non esse eum cogendum tollere, ne ruinis urbs deformetur, et quia prohibitorium est interdictum, non restitutorium. si tamen obstet id aedificium publico usui, utique is, qui operibus publicis procurat, debebit id deponere, aut si non obstet, solarium ei imponere: vectigal enim hoc sic appellatur solarium ex eo, quod pro solo pendatur.
If someone, no one forbidding, has built in a public place, he is not to be compelled to remove it, lest the city be disfigured by ruins, and because the interdict is prohibitory, not restitutory. if, however, that building obstructs public use, certainly the one who has charge of public works ought to take it down; or, if it does not obstruct, to impose upon him a solarium (ground-rent): for this vectigal is thus called “solarium” from the fact that it is paid for the soil.
Viam publicam eam dicimus, cuius etiam solum publicum est: non enim sicuti in privata via, ita et in publica accipimus: viae privatae solum alienum est, ius tantum eundi et agendi nobis competit: viae autem publicae solum publicum est, relictum ad directum certis finibus latitudinis ab eo, qui ius publicandi habuit, ut ea publice iretur commearetur.
We call that a public road whose very ground is public: for we do not take a public road in the same way as a private road; the ground of a private road is another’s, only the right of going and of driving accrues to us; but the ground of a public road is public, left in straight alignment with fixed limits of width by him who had the right of publicating, so that it might be gone upon and trafficked upon publicly.
Vicinal are the roads which are in villages or which lead into villages: some also say that these too are public: which is true thus, if this thoroughfare has not been established by a contribution of private persons. Otherwise, as when it is repaired by a contribution of private persons: for if it is repaired by a contribution of private persons, it is not necessarily private: for the repair is therefore made from a common fund, because it has a common use and utility.
Privatae viae dupliciter accipi possunt, vel hae, quae sunt in agris, quibus imposita est servitus, ut ad agrum alterius ducant, vel hae, quae ad agros ducunt, per quas omnibus commeare liceat, in quas exitur de via consulari et sic post illam excipit via vel iter vel actus ad villam ducens. has ergo, quae post consularem excipiunt in villas vel in alias colonias ducentes, putem etiam ipsas publicas esse.
Private roads can be taken in a twofold way: either those which are in the fields, upon which a servitude has been imposed, so that they lead to another’s field; or those which lead to the fields, along which it is permitted for all to travel, into which one goes out from the consular road, and thus after that there follows a via or iter or actus leading to a villa. Therefore those which, after the consular road, are taken up, leading into villas or into other colonies, I think that even these themselves are public.
Idem labeo scribit, si quis in suo ita aedificaverit, ut aqua in via collecta restagnet, non teneri eum interdicto, quia non immittat aquam, sed non recipit: nerva autem melius scribit utrumque teneri. plane si fundus viam publicam contingat et ex eo aqua derivata deteriorem viam faciat, quae tamen aqua ex vicini fundo in tuum veniat: si quidem necesse habeas eam aquam recipere, interdictum locum habebit adversus vicinum tuum: si autem necesse non sit, non teneri vicinum tuum, te tamen teneri: eum enim videri factum habere, qui usum eius aquae habeat. idem nerva scribit, si tecum interdicto agatur, nihil ultra te facere cogendum, quam ut arbitratu eius qui tecum experitur cum vicino experiaris: ceterum aliter observantibus futurum, ut tenearis etiam, si iam bona fide cum vicino egeris neque per te stet, quo minus arbitratu actoris cum vicino experiaris.
The same Labeo writes that, if someone has built on his own in such a way that water collected in the road pools, he is not held by the interdict, because he does not send water in, but does not receive it; however, Nerva writes better that each is held. Clearly, if an estate touches a public road and water derived from it makes the road worse, which water, however, comes into yours from a neighbor’s estate: if indeed you must receive that water, the interdict will have place against your neighbor; but if it is not necessary, the neighbor is not held, yet you are held—for he is seen to have done the deed who has the use of that water. The same Nerva writes that, if one proceeds against you by interdict, you are to be compelled to do nothing beyond this: that, at the discretion of the one who is litigating with you, you litigate with your neighbor; otherwise, if people observe differently, it will come about that you are held even if you have already dealt with your neighbor in good faith and it is not through you that it fails to happen that, at the plaintiff’s discretion, you litigate with your neighbor.
Deinde ait praetor: " quo ea via idque iter deterius sit fiat". hoc sive statim deterior via sit, sive postea: ad hoc enim pertinent haec verba " sic fiat": etenim quaedam sunt talia, ut statim facto suo noceant, quaedam talia, ut in praesentiarum quidem nihil noceant, in futurum autem nocere debeant.
Then the praetor says: "whereby that road and that right‑of‑way may be, and be made, worse." This applies whether the road is made worse at once or later; for to this the words "so be it made" pertain: indeed, some things are such that they harm immediately by the deed itself, while others are such that, for the present, they do no harm, but in the future must cause harm.
Unde ofilius putat eum, qui pro derelicto reliquit id opus quod fecit, si viam publicam corrupit et reliquit, non teneri hoc interdicto: non enim habet quod fecit. sed an in eum actio debeat dari, videbimus. et puto utile interdictum competere, ut, quod in via publica aedificavit, restituat.
Whence ofilius thinks that he who has left as derelict the work which he made, if he corrupted a public road and left it, is not held by this interdict: for he does not have what he made. But whether an action ought to be given against him, we shall see. And I think a useful interdict is applicable, that he restore what he built on the public road.
Si ex fundo tuo arbor in viam publicam sic ceciderit, ut itineri sit impedimento, eamque pro derelicto habeas, non teneri labeo scribit: si tamen, inquit, actor sua impensa arborem tollere paratus fuerit, recte tecum acturum interdicto de via publica reficienda. sed si pro derelicto non habeas, recte tecum agi hoc interdicto.
If from your estate a tree should so fall into the public road that it is an impediment to travel, and you regard it as abandoned, Labeo writes that you are not liable: however, he says, if the plaintiff is prepared to remove the tree at his own expense, he will proceed rightly against you by the interdict for restoring the public road. But if you do not regard it as abandoned, it is proper that you be proceeded against by this interdict.
Idem labeo scribit, si vicinus meus viam opere corruperit, quamvis opus, quod fecit, tam mihi quam ipsi utile sit, tamen si is vicinus fundi sui causa id fecerit, me tamen non posse hoc interdicto conveniri: si autem communiter hoc opus fieri curaverimus, utrumque nostrum teneri.
Likewise Labeo writes that, if my neighbor has damaged the road by a work, although the work which he did is as useful to me as to himself, nevertheless, if that neighbor did it for the sake of his own estate, I cannot be proceeded against under this interdict: but if we have taken care that this work be done jointly, each of us is liable.
Hoc interdictum locum habet etiam adversus eum, qui dolo malo fecit, quo minus possideret vel haberet: etenim parem esse condicionem oportet eius, qui quid possideat vel habeat, atque eius, cuius dolo malo factum sit, quo minus possideret vel haberet: et mihi videtur vera labeonis sententia.
This interdict has place also against him who acted with malicious fraud to the effect that another was prevented from possessing or holding: for it is proper that the condition be equal for him who does possess or have something and for him by whose malicious fraud it has come about that he did not possess or have; and to me Labeo’s opinion seems true.
" restituas" inquit. restituere videtur, qui in pristinum statum reducit: quod fit, sive quis tollit id quod factum est vel reponat quod sublatum est. et interdum suo sumptu: nam si ipse, quo qui interdixit, fecerit, vel iussu eius alius, aut ratum habitum sit quod fecit, ipse suis sumptibus debet restituere: si vero nihil horum intervenit, sed habet factum, tunc dicemus patientiam solam eum praestare debere.
" restore," he says. He is deemed to restore who brings back into the pristine state: which is done whether someone removes what has been done or replaces what has been taken away. And sometimes at his own expense: for if he himself, on whose account the one who interdicted acted, has done it, or another by his order, or what he did has been ratified, he himself ought to restore at his own expense: but if none of these have intervened, but he has what was done, then we will say that he need only furnish forbearance.
Epimeleisvwsan de hopws mydeis orussy tas hodous myde xwnnuy myde ktisy eis tas hodous myden: ei de my, ho men doulos hupo tou entuxontos mastigousvw, ho de eleuveros endeiknusvw tois astunomois, ohi de astunomoi zymioutwsan kata ton nomon kai to gegonos kataluetwsan.
Let them take care that no one dig up the roads, nor dump, nor build anything into the roads: but if someone does otherwise, let the slave be flogged by whoever encounters him, while the free man is to be denounced to the astynomoi; and let the astynomoi exact penalty according to the law and remove what has been done.
Episkeuazein de tas hodous tas dymosias kata tyn heautou oikian hekaston kai tas hudrorroas ekkavairein tas ek tou hupaivriou kai episkeuazein ohutws, hws an my kwluy hamacan epienai. hosoi de misvwsamenoi oikousin, ean my episkeuasy ho despotys, autoi episkeuasantes hupologizesvwsan to analwma kata ton misvon.
Let each person repair the public roads along his own house-front and cleanse the watercourses from the open-air court, and repair them in such a way that a wagon be not hindered from passing. But as many as live there under lease, if the owner does not repair, let them, having repaired it themselves, reckon the expense against the rent.
Viam aperire est ad veterem altitudinem latitudinemque restituere. sed et purgare refectionis portio est: purgare autem proprie dicitur ad libramentum proprium redigere sublato eo quod super eam esset. reficit enim et qui aperit et qui purgat et omnes omnino, qui in pristinum statum reducunt.
To open a road is to restore it to its former height and width. But also to cleanse is a portion of refection; moreover “to cleanse” is properly said to bring it back to its proper level, with what lay upon it removed. For he too “repairs” both who opens and who cleanses, and absolutely all who bring things back into their pristine state.
Si quis in specie refectionis deteriorem viam facit, impune vim patietur. propter quod neque latiorem neque longiorem neque altiorem neque humiliorem viam sub nomine refectionis is qui intercidit potest facere, vel in viam terrenam glaream inicere aut sternere viam lapide quae terrena sit, vel contra lapide stratam terrenam facere.
If anyone, under the guise of refection, makes the road worse, he will suffer force with impunity. On account of which, he who intercidit cannot, under the name of refection, make the road either wider or longer or higher or lower, or throw gravel upon an earthen road or strew a road with stone which is earthen, or, conversely, make earthen a road paved with stone.
Ripa autem ita recte definietur id, quod flumen continet naturalem rigorem cursus sui tenens: ceterum si quando vel imbribus vel mari vel qua alia ratione ad tempus excrevit, ripas non mutat: nemo denique dixit nilum, qui incremento suo aegyptum operit, ripas suas mutare vel ampliare. nam cum ad perpetuam sui mensuram redierit, ripae alvei eius muniendae sunt. si tamen naturaliter creverit, ut perpetuum incrementum nanctus sit, vel alio flumine admixto vel qua alia ratione, dubio procul dicendum est ripas quoque eum mutasse, quemadmodum si alveo mutato alia coepit currere.
The bank, moreover, will be rightly defined as that which contains the river, keeping the natural rigor of its course: but if at any time it has swelled for a time either by rains or by the sea or by some other cause, it does not change its banks: no one, in fine, has said that the Nile, which by its increment covers Egypt, changes or amplifies its banks. For when it has returned to its perpetual measure, the banks of its channel are to be maintained. If, however, it has naturally increased so that it has obtained a perpetual increment, whether by another river being admixed or by some other cause, it is, without doubt, to be said that it has changed its banks as well, just as if, the channel having been changed, it has begun to run in another course.
Si insula in publico flumine fuerit nata inque ea aliquid fiat, non videtur in publico fieri. illa enim insula aut occupantis est, si limitati agri fuerunt, aut eius cuius ripam contingit, aut, si in medio alveo nata est, eorum est qui prope utrasque ripas possident.
If an island has been born in a public river, and something is done upon it, it is not seen as being done in public. For that island is either the occupier’s, if the fields have been delimited by boundary lines, or it is his whose bank it touches; or, if it was born in the middle of the channel, it belongs to those who possess near both banks.
Simili modo et si flumen alveum suum reliquit et alia fluere coeperit, quidquid in veteri alveo factum est, ad hoc interdictum non pertinet: non enim in flumine publico factum erit, quod est utriusque vicini aut, si limitatus est ager, occupantis alveus fiet: certe desinit esse publicus. ille etiam alveus, quem sibi flumen fecit, etsi privatus ante fuit, incipit tamen esse publicus, quia impossibile est, ut alveus fluminis publici non sit publicus.
In a similar manner, if a river has left its own channel and has begun to flow elsewhere, whatever has been done in the old channel does not pertain to this interdict: for it will not have been done in a public river; rather that channel becomes that of both neighbors, or, if the field is delimited, the bed will be that of the occupier: certainly it ceases to be public. That channel too which the river has made for itself, even if it was previously private, nevertheless begins to be public, because it is impossible that the channel of a public river not be public.
Item si amnis aliquid circumeat, sciendum est eius manere cuius fuit: si quid igitur illic factum est, non est factum in publico flumine. nec pertinet ad hoc interdictum, si quid in privato factum sit, ne quidem si in privato flumine fiat: nam quod fit in privato flumine, perinde est, atque si in alio privato loco fiat.
Likewise, if a river should go around something, it must be understood to remain his whose it was: if, therefore, anything has been done there, it has not been done in a public river. Nor does this interdict pertain to what is done on private property, not even if it be done in a private river; for what is done in a private river is just the same as if it were done in some other private place.
Non autem omne, quod in flumine publico ripave fit, coercet praetor, sed si quid fiat, quo deterior statio et navigatio fiat. ergo hoc interdictum ad ea tantum flumina publica pertinet, quae sunt navigabilia, ad cetera non pertinet. sed labeo scribit non esse iniquum etiam si quid in eo flumine, quod navigabile non sit, fiat, ut exarescat vel aquae cursus impediatur, utile interdictum competere " ne vis ei fiat, quo minus id opus, quod in alveo fluminis ripave ita factum sit, ut iter cursus fluminis deterior sit fiat, tollere demoliri purgare restituere viri boni arbitratu possit".
The praetor does not restrain everything that is done in a public river or on its bank, but only if something is done whereby the anchorage and navigation become worse. Therefore this interdict pertains only to those public rivers which are navigable; it does not pertain to the rest. But Labeo writes that it is not inequitable that even if something is done in a river which is not navigable, such that it dries up or the course of the water is impeded, a useful interdict should be available: "that no force be done to him, whereby he be hindered from being able to remove, demolish, clear, or restore, at the judgment of a good man, that work which has been made in the channel of the river or on the bank in such a way that the route of the river’s course be made worse."
Ait praetor: " iterque navigii deterius fiat". hoc pro navigatione positum est: immo navigium solemus dicere etiam ipsam navem, iter ergo navigio potest et sic accipi " iter navi deterius fiat". navigii appellatione etiam rates continentur, quia plerumque et ratum usus necessarius est. si pedestre iter impediatur, non ideo minus iter navigio deterius fit.
The praetor says: "and that the journey of a vessel be made worse." This is set in place for navigation: indeed we are accustomed to call navigium even the ship itself; therefore the journey may also be taken with respect to the navigium, thus, "that the journey for a ship be made worse." Under the appellation of navigium rafts too are contained, because often even the use of a raft is necessary. If the pedestrian way is impeded, for that reason the journey for a vessel is not made any the less worse.
Deterior statio itemque iter navigio fieri videtur, si usus eius corrumpatur vel difficilior fiat aut minor vel rarior aut si in totum auferatur. proinde sive derivetur aqua, ut exiguior facta minus sit navigabilis, vel si dilatetur, aut diffusa brevem aquam faciat, vel contra sic coangustetur, et rapidius flumen faciat, vel si quid aliud fiat quod navigationem incommodet difficilioremve faciat vel prorsus impediat, interdicto locus erit.
A station, and likewise the passage for a vessel, is deemed to have been made worse if its use is corrupted or becomes more difficult, or reduced or more infrequent, or if it is taken away altogether. Accordingly, whether the water be diverted, so that, made more scant, it is less navigable; or if it be dilated, or, being diffused, makes shallow water; or, conversely, if it be so coarcted as to make the river more rapid; or if anything else be done which incommodes navigation, or makes it more difficult, or altogether impedes it, there will be ground for the interdict.
Ait praetor: " quo aliter aqua fluat, quam priore aestate fluxit": non omnis ergo, qui immisit vel qui fecit, tenetur, sed qui faciendo vel immittendo efficit aliter, quam priore aestate fluxit, aquam fluere. quod autem ait " aliter fluat", non ad quantitatem aquae fluentis pertinet, sed ad modum et ad rigorem cursus aquae referendum est. et generaliter dicendum est ita demum interdicto quem teneri, si mutetur aquae cursus per hoc quod factum est, dum vel depressior vel artior fiat aqua ac per hoc rapidior fit cum incommodo accolentium: et si quod aliud vitii accolae ex facto eius qui convenitur sentient, interdicto locus erit.
The praetor says: " whereby the water flow otherwise than it flowed in the previous summer": not everyone therefore who has let it in or who has done something is held, but he who by doing or by letting in brings it about that the water flows otherwise than it flowed in the previous summer. But as to what he says " that it flow otherwise", this does not pertain to the quantity of the water flowing, but should be referred to the mode and to the rigor of the course of the water. And generally it must be said that only then is someone held by the interdict, if the course of the water is changed through what has been done, in that the water is made either lower or narrower and by this becomes more rapid, to the disadvantage of the neighbors: and if the neighbors sense any other defect from the act of him who is convened, there will be room for the interdict.
Si quis ex rivo tecto per apertum ducere velit vel contra qui ante aperto duxit, nunc operto velit, interdicto teneri placuit, si modo hoc factum eius incommodum circa colentibus adferat.
If someone should wish to conduct from a covered channel through an open one, or conversely he who previously conducted by an open one now should wish [to conduct] by a covered one, it has been ruled that he is held by the interdict, provided only that this act of his brings inconvenience to those cultivating in the vicinity.
Sunt qui putent excipiendum hoc interdicto " quod eius ripae muniendae causa non fiet", scilicet ut, si quid fiat, quo aliter aqua fluat, si tamen muniendae ripae causa fiat, interdicto locus non sit. sed nec hoc quibusdam placet: neque enim ripae cum incommodo accolentium muniendae sunt. hoc tamen iure utimur, ut praetor ex causa aestimet, an hanc exceptionem dare debeat: plerumque enim utilitas suadet exceptionem istam dari.
There are those who think that in this interdict an exception should be made, “that which will be done for the sake of fortifying its bank will not be [prohibited],” namely, that if anything is done by which the water would flow otherwise, yet if it is done for the purpose of fortifying the bank, the interdict should have no place. But this does not please some, either: for the banks are not to be fortified with the detriment of the neighboring residents. Nevertheless we use this rule of law, that the praetor, according to the circumstances, assess whether he ought to grant this exception: for utility for the most part counsels that that exception be given.
Sed et si alia utilitas vertatur eius, qui quid in flumine publico fecit ( pone enim grande damnum flumen ei dare solitum, praedia eius depopulari), si forte aggeres vel quam aliam munitionem adhibuit, ut agrum suum tueretur eaque res cursum fluminis ad aliquid immutavit, cur ei non consulatur? plerosque scio prorsus flumina avertisse alveosque mutasse, dum praediis suis consulunt. oportet enim in huiusmodi rebus utilitatem et tutelam facientis spectari, sine iniuria utique accolarum.
But also, if some other utility accrues to him who has done something in a public river (suppose, for instance, the river was wont to inflict great damage on him, to devastate his estates), if perchance he applied embankments or some other fortification to protect his field, and this altered the course of the river in some respect, why should he not be given consideration? I know that very many have outright diverted rivers and changed their channels, while they look after their estates. For in matters of this kind the utility and safeguarding of the doer ought to be regarded, without injury, of course, to the neighbors.
Is autem hoc interdicto tenetur, qui aliter fecit fluere, quam priore aestate fluxit. et idcirco aiunt praetorem priorem aestatem comprehendisse, quia semper certior est naturalis cursus fluminum aestate potius quam hieme. nec ad instantem aestatem, sed ad priorem interdictum hoc refertur, quia illius aestatis fluxus indubitatior est.
But he is held by this interdict who has made it flow otherwise than it flowed in the previous summer. And therefore they say that the praetor included the previous summer, because the natural course of rivers is always more certain in summer rather than in winter. And this interdict is referred not to the present summer, but to the prior one, because the flow of that summer is more indubitable.
Hoc interdictum restitutorium proponitur: superius enim prohibitorium est et pertinet ad ea, quae nondum facta sunt. si quid igitur iam factum est, per hoc interdictum restituetur: si quid ne fiat prospicitur, superiore interdicto erit utendum, et si quid post interdictum redditum fuerit factum, coercebitur.
This interdict is restitutory and is set forth: for the one above is prohibitory and pertains to things not yet done. If therefore anything has already been done, it will be restored by this interdict; if provision is made that something not be done, the superior interdict must be used; and if anything has been done after the interdict has been issued, it will be coerced.
Publicano plane, qui lacum vel stagnum conduxit, si piscari prohibeatur, utile interdictum competere sabinus consentit: et ita labeo. ergo et si a municipibus conductum habeat, aequissimum erit ob vectigalis favorem interdicto eum tueri.
Clearly, for a publican who has leased a lake or a pond, if he is forbidden to fish, Sabinus agrees that a useful interdict is competent: and so Labeo. Therefore, even if he has it leased from the municipality, it will be most equitable, in favor of the revenue (vectigal), to protect him by interdict.
Praetor ait: " quo minus illi in flumine publico ripave eius opus facere ripae agrive qui circa ripam est tuendi causa liceat, dum ne ob id navigatio deterior fiat, si tibi damni infecti in annos decem viri boni arbitratu vel cautum vel satisdatum est aut per illum non stat, quo minus viri boni arbitratu caveatur vel satisdetur, vim fieri veto".
The praetor says: "I forbid force to be used, to the effect that it be not permitted to him to make a work in a public river or on its bank, for the sake of protecting the bank or the land which is around the bank, provided that navigation is not thereby made worse, if for you, for damage not yet done, for ten years, at the arbitration of a good man either security has been provided or surety given, or it is not owing to him that, at the arbitration of a good man, security be provided or surety be given."
Is autem, qui ripam vult munire, de damno futuro debet vel cavere vel satisdare secundum qualitatem personae: et hoc interdicto expressum est, ut damni infecti in annos decem viri boni arbitratu vel caveatur vel satisdetur.
Moreover, he who wishes to fortify the bank ought, for future damage, either to give security or to furnish surety, according to the quality of the person: and this has been expressed by the interdict, that for ten years, in a case of damage not yet done (damnum infectum), by the arbitration of a good man, either security be given or surety be furnished.
Hoc interdictum non ad omnem vim pertinet, verum ad eos, qui de possessione deiciuntur. ad solam autem atrocem vim pertinet hoc interdictum, et ad eos tantum, qui de solo deiciuntur, ut puta de fundo sive aedificio: ad alium autem non pertinet.
This interdict does not pertain to every kind of force, but to those who are cast out of possession. Moreover, this interdict pertains only to atrocious (grave) force, and only to those who are cast out from the soil, as, for example, from a farm or a building: it does not pertain to any other case.
Et si quis de area deiectus sit, sine dubio interdicto locus est: et generaliter ad omnes hoc pertinet interdictum, qui de re solo cohaerenti deiciuntur: qualisqualis enim fuerit locus, unde quis vi deiectus est, interdicto locus erit.
And if anyone has been cast down from an area, without doubt there is room for the interdict; and generally this interdict pertains to all who are cast down from a thing cohering to the soil: for whatever sort the place may have been from which someone was cast down by force, there will be room for the interdict.
Illud utique in dubium non venit interdictum hoc ad res mobiles non pertinere: nam ex causa furti vel vi bonorum raptorum actio competit: potest et ad exhibendum agi. plane si quae res sint in fundo vel in aedibus, unde quis deiectus est, etiam earum nomine interdictum competere non est ambigendum.
That, of course, does not come into doubt: this interdict does not pertain to movable things; for on the ground of theft or of goods seized by force (rapine) an action lies, and one can also proceed for producing (ad exhibendum). Clearly, if there are any things on the estate or in the house from which someone has been ejected, it is not to be doubted that the interdict is available also in respect of them.
Ait praetor: " deiecisti aut familia deiecit". merito familiae mentio habita: nam cum " deiecisti" verbum refertur ad personam eius qui deiecit nec pertineat ad eum, cuius familia deiecit ( nec enim ego videor deiecisse, si familia mea deiecerit), consequens fuit addere " aut familia tua deiecit".
The praetor says: " you have ejected or the household has ejected". Mention of the household was rightly made: for since the word " you have ejected" is referred to the person who has ejected and does not pertain to him whose household has ejected (for indeed I do not seem to have ejected, if my household has ejected), it was consequent to add " or your household has ejected".
Deiecisse autem etiam is videtur, qui mandavit vel iussit, ut aliquis deieceretur: parvi enim referre visum est, suis manibus quis deiciat an vero per alium: quare et si familia mea ex voluntate mea deiecerit, ego videor deiecisse.
Moreover, he too is considered to have ejected who has mandated or ordered that someone be ejected: for it has seemed to matter little whether one ejects with his own hands or rather through another; wherefore, even if my household, in accordance with my will, has ejected, I am deemed to have ejected.
Quotiens verus procurator deiecerit, cum utrolibet eorum, id est sive domino sive procuratore, agi posse sabinus ait et alterius nomine alteri eximi, sic tamen, si ab altero eorum litis aestimatio fuerit praestita ( non enim excusatus est, qui iussu alicuius deiecit, non magis quam si iussu alicuius occidit): cum autem falsus est procurator, cum ipso tantum procuratore interdici debere. sabini sententia vera est.
Whenever a true procurator has ejected, Sabinus says that one can sue either of them, that is, either the owner or the procurator, and that in the name of the one the other is released—provided, however, that the assessment of the suit has been satisfied by either of them ( for he is not excused who ejected by someone’s order, any more than if he killed by someone’s order): but when the procurator is false, the interdict ought to be directed against the procurator alone. Sabinus’s opinion is true.
Sed et si quod alius deiecit, ratum habuero, sunt qui putent secundum sabinum et cassium, qui ratihabitionem mandato comparant, me videri deiecisse interdictoque isto teneri, et hoc verum est: rectius enim dicitur in maleficio ratihabitionem mandato comparari.
But also, if I have ratified what another has thrown down, there are those who think, following Sabinus and Cassius, who compare ratification to a mandate, that I am deemed to have thrown it down and am held by that interdict; and this is true: for it is more correct to say that, in a malefaction, ratification is compared to a mandate.
Quod igitur additur " aut familia tua deiecit", merito scriptum est in eum casum, in quem familia mea vi deiecit. ceterum si iussit, ipse deiecit, nec gravari debet dominus qui non iussit, si servorum suorum factum praestaret, etsi non iussu eius deiecerunt: nam non gravabitur hoc nomine, quippe cum aut pervenit ad eum aliquid et restitueret, aut non pervenit et ipsos servos maleficii causa noxae dedendo indemnis erit: quod enim noxae dedere compellitur, in damno non debet reputare, cum servus hoc possit domini deteriorem condicionem facere.
What, therefore, is added—“or your household ejected”—is rightly written for the case in which my household ejected someone by force. But if he ordered it, he himself ejected; nor ought the master who did not order it to be burdened, if he were to make good the act of his slaves, even though they ejected without his order: for he will not be burdened under this head, since either something has come to him and he will restore it, or nothing has come to him and, by surrendering those very slaves for the wrongdoing by way of noxal surrender, he will be held harmless; for what he is compelled to surrender noxally he ought not to reckon as loss, since by this the slave can make the master’s condition worse.
Quod servus vel procurator vel colonus tenent, dominus videtur possidere, et ideo his deiectis ipse deici de possessione videtur, etiamsi ignoret eos deiectos, per quos possidebat. et si quis igitur alius, per quem possidebam, deiectus fuerit, mihi competere interdictum nemini dubium est.
What a slave or a procurator or a colonus hold, the owner is deemed to possess; and therefore, with these persons ejected, he himself is considered to be ejected from possession, even if he is unaware that those, through whom he was possessing, have been ejected. And if, therefore, any other person through whom I was possessing should be ejected, it is doubtful to no one that the interdict is available to me.
Sive autem corpore sive animo possidens quis deiectus est, palam est eum vi deiectum videri. idcircoque si quis de agro suo vel de domo processisset nemine suorum relicto, mox revertens prohibitus sit ingredi vel ipsum praedium, vel si quis eum in medio itinere detinuerit et ipse possederit, vi deiectus videtur: ademisti enim ei possessionem, quam animo retinebat, etsi non corpore.
Whether someone possessing in body or in mind has been cast out, it is clear that he appears to have been ejected by force. And therefore, if someone had gone out from his field or from his house, leaving none of his people behind, and on soon returning is prevented from entering either the estate itself; or if someone detained him in mid-journey and himself took possession, he is deemed to have been ejected by force: for you have taken from him the possession which he was retaining in mind, even if not in body.
Vi possidere eum definiendum est, qui expulso vetere possessore adquisitam per vim possessionem optinet aut qui in hoc ipsum aptatus et praeparatus venit ut contra bonos mores auxilio, ne prohiberi possit ingrediens in possessionem, facit. sed qui per vim possessionem suam retinuerit, labeo ait non vi possidere.
To possess by force is to be defined as one who, the former possessor having been expelled, holds a possession acquired through force, or one who has come fitted and prepared for this very thing and, against good morals, by assistance acts so that, entering into possession, he cannot be prevented. But one who has retained his own possession by force, Labeo says, does not possess by force.
Idem labeo ait eum, qui metu turbae perterritus fugerit, vi videri deiectum. sed pomponius ait vim sine corporali vi locum non habere, ergo etiam eum, qui fugatus est supervenientibus quibusdam, si illi vi occupaverunt possessionem, videri vi deiectum.
The same Labeo says that one who has fled, panic-stricken by fear of a mob, is considered to have been ejected by force. But Pomponius says that force has no place without corporal force; therefore even one who has been put to flight by certain supervening persons, if they have occupied the possession by force, is deemed to have been ejected by force.
Si fundus, a quo vi expulsus sim, mihi restitutus esset, ceterae vero res, quae vi ablatae sunt, non restituantur, hic dicendum est interdictum nihilo minus tenere, quia verum est vi esse deiectum. plane si quis velit de possessione quidem rei soli per hoc interdictum experiri, de rebus vero mobilibus ad exhibendum actione, potest hoc suo arbitrio habere, et ita iulianus scribit: idem scribit et si quis vi bonorum raptorum de huiusmodi rebus velit experiri.
If the estate from which I was expelled by force were restored to me, but the other things which were taken away by force are not restored, here it must be said that the interdict nonetheless holds, because it is true that he was ejected by force. Clearly, if someone wishes to proceed as to the possession of real property by this interdict, but as to movable things by the action ad exhibendum, he can have it so at his own discretion, and thus Julianus writes: he writes the same also if someone wishes to proceed concerning matters of this kind by the action vi bonorum raptorum.
Quod autem ait praetor: " quaeque ibi habuit", sic accipimus, ut omnes res contineantur, non solum quae propriae ipsius fuerunt, verum etiam si quae apud eum depositae vel ei commodatae vel pigneratae, quarumque usum vel usum fructum vel custodiam habuit, vel si quae ei locatae sunt: cum enim dicat praetor " habuit", omnia haec habendi verbo continentur.
But as for the praetor’s statement: "and whatever he had there," we take it thus, that all things are encompassed— not only those which were his own proper goods, but also any that were deposited with him, or loaned to him for use (commodated), or pledged, and any of which he had use, or usufruct, or custody, or if any were leased to him: for since the praetor says "he had," all these are contained under the verb "to have."
Rectissime autem praetor addidit " tunc ibi habuit". " tunc" sic accipimus " cum deiceretur": et ideo et si quid postea desiit illic esse, dicendum erit in interdictum venire. sic fit, ut, etiamsi homines vel pecora demortua sint post deiectionem, interdicto locus sit.
Most rightly, moreover, the praetor added " then he had it there". We take " then" thus: " when he was being ejected"; and therefore, even if anything afterwards ceased to be there, it must be said to come under the interdict. Thus it comes about that, even if men or cattle have died after the ejection, there is place for the interdict.
Denique scribit iulianus eum, qui vi deiecit ex eo praedio, in quo homines fuerant, propius esse, ut etiam sine culpa eius mortuis hominibus aestimationem eorum per interdictum restituere debeat, sicuti fur hominis etiam mortuo eo tenetur. huic consequens esse ait, ut villae quoque et aedium incendio consumptarum pretium restituere cogatur: ubi enim quis, inquit, deiecit, per eum stetisse videtur, quo minus restitueret.
Finally, Julianus writes that it is more appropriate that the one who by force ejected from that estate on which there had been persons should be obliged, even if the persons died without his fault, to restore their valuation through the interdict, just as the thief of a person is held liable even when that person has died. He says that consequent to this he should also be compelled to restore the price of a villa and of buildings consumed by fire: for where someone has ejected, it is deemed to have been through him that restitution did not take place.
Sane quod ait praetor " ibi", quomodo accipimus? utrum in eo loco, unde quis vi deiectus est, an vero in omni possessione? et melius dicetur non ad angulum referendum vel locum, in quo fuerit, verum etiam ad omnem partem possessionis, qua quis caruit, cum deicitur.
Indeed, as to what the praetor says “there,” how do we take it? whether in that place from which someone was cast down by force, or rather in the whole possession? and it will be better said that it is not to be referred to a single angle or the spot in which he was, but also to every part of the possession of which he was deprived when he is cast out.
Ex die, quo quis deiectus est, fructuum ratio habetur, quamvis in ceteris interdictis ex quo edita sunt, non retro, computantur. idem est et in rebus mobilibus, quae ibi erant: nam et earum fructus computandi sunt, ex quo quis vi deiectus est.
From the day on which someone is cast out, an account of the fruits is had, although in the other interdicts they are computed from the time when they were issued, not retroactively. The same holds also for movable things which were there: for the fruits of those too are to be computed from the time from which someone was ejected by force.
Non solum autem fructuum ratio in hoc interdicto habetur, verum ceterarum etiam utilitatium habenda est: nam vivianus refert in hoc interdicto omnia, quaecumque habiturus vel adsecuturus erat is qui deiectus est, si vi deiectus non esset, restitui aut eorum litem a iudice aestimari debere eumque tantum consecuturum, quanti sua interesset se vi deiectum non esse.
Not only, moreover, is account taken of the fruits in this interdict, but account must also be taken of the other utilities; for Vivianus reports that under this interdict everything whatsoever which the person who has been ejected would have had or would have attained, if he had not been ejected by force, must be restored, or a suit concerning them must be assessed by the judge, and that he will recover only so much as the amount of his interest in not having been ejected by force.
Interdictum hoc quia atrocitatem facinoris in se habet, quaesitum est, an liberto in patronum vel liberis adversus parentes competit. et verius est nec liberto in patronum nec in parentes liberis dandum esse meliusque erit in factum actionem his competere. aliter atque si vi armata usus sit adversus libertum patronus vel adversus liberos parens: nam hic interdictum competit.
This interdict, because it contains the atrocity of the crime in itself, has given rise to the question whether it is available to a freedman against his patron or to children against their parents. And the truer view is that it should be given neither to a freedman against a patron nor to children against parents, and it will be better that an action in factum be available to them. It is otherwise if the patron has used armed force against the freedman or the parent against the children: for in this case the interdict lies.
Idem vivianus refert: servos quosdam vi depulit, alios retinuit et vinxit aut etiam eis imperavit: vi te deiectum intellegi: desisse enim possidere, cum servi ab alio possideantur. et quod in parte servorum dictum est, idem in omnibus dici ait, si forte nemo depulsus esset, sed possideri ab eo coepissent, qui ingressus in possessionem esset.
The same Vivianus reports: he drove off certain slaves by force, retained others and bound them, or even gave orders to them; you are understood to have been ejected by force, for you have ceased to possess, since the slaves are possessed by another. And what has been said with respect to part of the slaves, he says the same is to be said with respect to all, if perchance no one had been driven off, but they had begun to be possessed by him who had entered into possession.
Quid dicturi essemus, tractat, si aliquo possidente ego quoque ingressus sum in possessionem et non deiciam possessorem, sed vinctum opus facere cogam: quatenus res, inquit, esset? ego verius puto eum quoque deiectum videri, qui illic vinctus est.
He treats what we would say, if, with someone being in possession, I too have entered into the possession and do not eject the possessor, but compel him, bound, to do work: to what extent, he says, would the matter stand? I think it more true that he too is to be regarded as ejected who is bound there.
Uti frui autem prohibuisse is videtur, qui vi deiecit utentem et fruentem aut non admisit, cum ex fundo exisset non usus fructus deserendi causa. ceterum si quis ab initio volentem incipere uti frui prohibuit, hoc interdictum locum non habet. quid ergo est?
He is seen to have prohibited use and enjoyment who by force cast out the one using and enjoying, or did not admit him when he had gone out from the estate not for the purpose of abandoning the usufruct. But if someone from the beginning prohibited a person willing to begin to use and enjoy, this interdict has no place. What then is the case?
Pertinet autem hoc interdictum ad eum, qui fundo uti frui prohibitus est: sed pertinebit etiam ad eum, qui aedificiis uti frui prohibetur. consequenter autem dicemus ad res mobiles hoc interdictum non pertinere, si quis uti frui prohibitus est re mobili, nisi si rei soli accedebant res mobiles: si igitur ibi fuerunt, dicendum est etiam ad eas referri hoc interdictum debere.
This interdict pertains to one who has been prohibited from using and enjoying a landed estate; but it will also pertain to one who is prohibited from using and enjoying buildings. Consequently we say that this interdict does not pertain to movable things, if someone is prohibited from using and enjoying a movable thing, unless the movable things were appurtenant to the realty: if therefore they were there, it must be said that this interdict ought also to be extended to them.
Qui usus fructus nomine qualiterqualiter fuit quasi in possessione, utetur hoc interdicto. sed si quis, posteaquam prohibitus est, capite minutus sit vel mortuus, recte dicitur heredibus et successoribus competere hoc interdictum, non ut in futurum constituatur usus fructus, sed ut praeterita causa et damnum praeteritum sarciatur.
He who, under the name of usufruct, was, in whatever manner, as if in possession, will make use of this interdict. But if someone, after he has been prohibited, has been reduced in civil status or has died, it is rightly said that this interdict is available to his heirs and successors, not so that the usufruct be constituted for the future, but so that the past cause and the past damage may be repaired.
In interdicto unde vi tanti condemnatio facienda est, quanti intersit possidere: et hoc iure nos uti pomponius scribit, id est tanti rem videri, quanti actoris intersit: quod alias minus esse, alias plus: nam saepe actoris pluris interesse hominem retinere, quam quanti is est, veluti cum quaestionis habendae aut rei probandae gratia aut hereditatis adeundae intersit eius eum possideri.
In the interdict unde vi, the condemnation must be made for as much as it is in one’s interest to possess; and we employ this law, as Pomponius writes—namely, that the thing is considered to be worth as much as it concerns the plaintiff; which is sometimes less, sometimes more. For often it is of greater concern to the plaintiff to retain a man than the amount he is worth, as when it is in his interest that he possess him for the sake of holding an investigation, or proving a matter, or entering upon an inheritance.
Deiectum ab usu fructu in eandem causam praetor restitui iubet, id est in qua futurus esset, si deiectus non esset. itaque si tempore usus fructus finitus fuerit, postquam deiectus est a domino, nihilo minus cogendus erit restituere, id est usum fructum iterum constituere.
The praetor orders that one cast out from a usufruct be restored into the same condition, that is, in which he would be if he had not been cast out. itaque and so, if by lapse of time the usufruct shall have ended after he was ejected by the owner, nonetheless he will be compelled to restore, that is, to constitute the usufruct again.
Si de fundo proprietarium et fructuarium praedo expulerit atque ob id fructuarius constituto tempore non usus perdiderit ius suum, nemo dubitat, quin dominus, sive experiatur cum fructuario adversus praedonem sive non experiatur, retinere debeat reversum ad se usum fructum et, quod fructuarius perdidit, id ad damnum eius pertineat, cuius facto periit.
If a robber has expelled the proprietor and the usufructuary from a farm, and on that account the usufructuary, for failure to use within the time set, has lost his right, no one doubts that the owner—whether he brings suit with the usufructuary against the robber or does not bring suit—ought to retain the usufruct reverted to himself; and that what the usufructuary lost is to be counted as the damage of him by whose act it perished.
Colonus eum, cui locator fundum vendiderat, cum is in possessionem missus esset, non admisit: deinde colonus vi ab alio deiectus est: quaerebatur, quis haberet interdictum unde vi. dixi nihil interesse, colonus dominum ingredi volentem prohibuisset an emptorem, cui iussisset dominus tradi possessionem, non admisit. igitur interdictum unde vi colono competiturum ipsumque simili interdicto locatori obstrictum fore, quem deiecisse tunc videretur, cum emptori possessionem non tradidit, nisi forte propter iustam et probabilem causam id fecisset.
A colonus did not admit the person to whom the locator had sold the estate, when that person had been put into possession; then the colonus was by force cast out by another. It was asked who would have the interdict unde vi. I said it makes no difference whether the colonus had prevented the dominus, wishing to enter, or did not admit the buyer to whom the dominus had ordered that possession be delivered. Therefore the interdict unde vi will be competent to the colonus, and the locator himself will be bound by a similar interdict, as one who would then seem to have ejected, when he did not deliver possession to the buyer—unless perhaps he did this on account of a just and probable cause.
Si vi me deieceris vel vi aut clam feceris, quamvis sine dolo et culpa amiseris possessionem, tamen damnandus es, quanti mea intersit, quia in eo ipso culpa tua praecessit, quod omnino vi deiecisti aut vi aut clam fecisti.
If you have thrown me down by force, or have acted by force or clandestinely, although you lost possession without fraud or fault, nevertheless you are to be condemned for as much as my interest amounts to, because in that very matter your fault preceded, in that you altogether ejected by force, or acted by force or secretly.
Qui possessionem vi ereptam vi in ipso congressu reciperat, in pristinam causam reverti potius quam vi possidere intellegendus est: ideoque si te deiecero, ilico tu me, deinde ego te, unde vi interdictum tibi utile erit.
He who has recovered, by force and in the very encounter, the possession snatched away by force is to be understood to have reverted to his former position rather than to be possessing by force: and therefore, if I have ejected you, immediately you me, then I you, whereupon the interdict unde vi will be useful to you.
Cum fundum qui locaverat vendidisset, iussit emptorem in vacuam possessionem ire, quem colonus intrare prohibuit: postea emptor vi colonum expulit: de interdictis unde vi quaesitum est. placebat colonum interdicto venditori teneri, quia nihil interesset, ipsum an alium ex voluntate eius missum intrare prohibuerit: neque enim ante omissam possessionem videri, quam si tradita fuisset emptori, quia nemo eo animo esset, ut possessionem omitteret propter emptorem, quam emptor adeptus non fuisset. emptorem quoque, qui postea vim adhibuit, et ipsum interdicto colono teneri: non enim ab ipso, sed a venditore per vim fundum esse possessum, cui possessio esset ablata.
When the man who had leased out a farm had sold it, he ordered the purchaser to go into vacant possession, whom the tenant forbade to enter: afterwards the purchaser by force expelled the tenant: the question was raised concerning the interdicts unde vi. It was the prevailing view that the tenant was liable to the vendor under the interdict, because it made no difference whether he prohibited him himself or another sent by his will from entering: nor indeed was he considered to have let go of possession before it had been delivered to the purchaser, because no one would be of a mind to relinquish possession on account of the purchaser before the purchaser had acquired it. The purchaser also, who afterwards employed force, was himself liable under the interdict to the tenant: for it was not by him, but by the vendor, that the farm was possessed by force, from whom possession had been taken away.
Merito iulianus respondit, si me de fundo vi deieceris, in quo res moventes fuerunt, cum mihi interdicto unde vi restituere debeas non solum possessionem soli, sed et ea quae ibi fuerunt, quamquam ego moram fecero, quo minus interdicto te convenirem, subtractis tamen mortalitate servis aut pecoribus aliisve rebus casu intercidentibus tuum tamen onus nihilo minus in eis restituendis esse, quia ex ipso tempore delicti plus quam frustrator debitor constitutus es.
Rightly Julian answered: if you have ejected me by force from a farm, on which there were movable things, since by the interdict unde vi you ought to restore to me not only the possession of the soil but also the things that were there, although I myself have delayed, so that I did not proceed against you by the interdict, yet—with slaves removed by mortality, or cattle, or other things perishing by chance being deducted—your burden is nonetheless no less in restoring them, because from the very time of the delict you have been constituted a debtor rather than a mere frustrator.
Ait praetor: " uti eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto. de cloacis hoc interdictum non dabo. neque pluris, quam quanti res erit: intra annum, quo primum experiundi potestas fuerit, agere permittam".
The praetor says: "As you possess those buildings which are at issue, neither by force nor stealth nor by precarium (at-will leave) one from the other, I forbid force to be used to prevent you from possessing thus. About sewers I will not give this interdict. Nor for more than the amount for which the thing will be worth: within a year, from when there shall first have been the power of making trial, I will permit suit to be brought".
Inter litigatores ergo quotiens est proprietatis controversia, aut convenit inter litigatores, uter possessor sit, uter petitor, aut non convenit. si convenit, absolutum est: ille possessoris commodo, quem convenit possidere, ille petitoris onere fungetur. sed si inter ipsos contendatur, uter possideat, quia alteruter se magis possidere adfirmat, tunc, si res soli sit, in cuius possessione contenditur, ad hoc interdictum remittentur.
Among litigants, therefore, whenever there is a controversy over proprietorship, either it is agreed among the litigants which is the possessor and which the petitioner, or it is not agreed. If it is agreed, it is settled: he will enjoy the possessor’s advantage whom it is agreed to possess; the other will bear the petitioner’s burden. But if between them it is contested which one possesses, because each of the two affirms that he possesses more, then, if the thing be of the soil, as to whose possession there is contention, they will be remitted to this interdict.
Est igitur hoc interdictum, quod volgo uti possidetis appellatur, retinendae possessionis ( nam huius rei causa redditur, ne vis fiat ei qui possidet) et consequenter proponitur post interdictum unde vi. illud enim restituit vi amissam possessionem, hoc interdictum tuetur, ne amittatur possessio, denique praetor possidenti vim fieri vetat: et illud quidem interdictum obpugnat possessorem, hoc tuetur. et ut pedius ait, omnis de possessione controversia aut eo pertinet, ut, quod non possidemus, nobis restituatur, aut ad hoc, ut retinere nobis liceat quod possidemus. restitutae possessionis ordo aut interdicto expeditur aut per actionem: retinendae itaque possessionis duplex via est, aut exceptio aut interdictum.
Therefore this interdict, which is commonly called uti possidetis, is for the retaining of possession (for the cause of this is given, that force not be done to him who possesses), and consequently it is proposed after the interdict unde vi. For that one restores possession lost by force; this interdict protects, lest possession be lost; finally the praetor forbids that force be done to the possessor: and indeed that interdict attacks the possessor, this one protects. And as Pedius says, every controversy about possession tends either to this, that what we do not possess be restored to us, or to this, that it be permitted to us to retain what we possess. The order of restored possession is either expedited by interdict or through an action: therefore for retaining possession the route is twofold, either an exception or an interdict.
Quod ait praetor in interdicto: " nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero possidetis", hoc eo pertinet, ut, si quis possidet vi aut clam aut precario, si quidem ab alio, prosit ei possessio, si vero ab adversario suo, non debeat eum propter hoc quod ab eo possidet vincere: has enim possessiones non debere proficere palam est.
What the praetor says in the interdict: "neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium does the one possess from the other," pertains to this: that if someone possesses by force or by stealth or by precarium, if indeed from another, the possession profits him; but if from his adversary, he ought not, on account of this fact that he possesses from him, to prevail: for it is clear that these kinds of possession ought not to avail.
Si duo possideant in solidum, videamus, quid sit dicendum. quod qualiter procedat, tractemus, si quis proponeret possessionem iustam et iniustam. ego possideo ex iusta causa, tu vi aut clam: si a me possides, superior sum interdicto, si vero non a me, neuter nostrum vincetur: nam et tu possides et ego.
If two possess as to the whole, let us see what is to be said. And let us treat how this proceeds, if someone were to posit a just possession and an unjust one. I possess from a just cause, you by force or clandestinely: if you possess from me, I am superior by the interdict; but if not from me, neither of us will be defeated: for both you possess and I.
Item videamus, si auctor vicini tui ex fundo tuo vites in suas arbores transduxit, quid iuris sit. et ait pomponius posse te ei denuntiare et vites praecidere, idque et labeo scribit, aut uti eum debere interdicto uti possidetis de eo loco, quo radices continentur vitium: nam si tibi vim fecerit, quo minus eas vites vel praecidas vel transducas, vim tibi facere videtur, quo minus possideas: etenim qui colere fundum prohibetur, possidere prohibetur, inquit pomponius.
Likewise let us see, if the agent of your neighbor has led vines across from your farm into his own trees, what the law is. And Pomponius says that you can give him formal notice and cut the vines; and Labeo also writes this; or that you ought to use the interdict uti possidetis with respect to that place in which the roots of the vines are contained: for if he has used force against you, so that you are hindered from either cutting or leading back those vines, he seems to be using force against you to prevent you from possessing: indeed, he who is prohibited from cultivating a farm is prohibited from possessing, says Pomponius.
Item videamus, si proiectio supra vicini solum non iure haberi dicatur, an interdictum uti possidetis sit utile alteri adversus alterum. et est apud cassium relatum utrique esse inutile, quia alter solum possidet, alter cum aedibus superficiem.
Likewise let us see, if a projection above the neighbor’s soil is said to be held without right, whether the interdict uti possidetis is useful to the one against the other. And it is reported by Cassius that it is useless to both, because the one possesses the soil, the other, together with the buildings, the superficies.
Labeo quoque scribit: ex aedibus meis in aedes tuas proiectum habeo: interdicis mecum, si eum locum possideamus, qui proiecto tegetur. an, quo facilius possim retinere possessionem eius proiectionis, interdico tecum sic " uti nunc possidetis eas aedes, ex quibus proiectus est?"
Labeo also writes: I have a projection from my house into your house: do you interdict with me, if we are to possess that place which will be covered by the projection? Or, in order that I may more easily retain possession of that projection, shall I interdict with you thus, "as you now possess those premises, from which the projection has been thrown out?"
Sed si supra aedes, quas possideo, cenaculum sit, in quo alius quasi dominus moretur, interdicto uti possidetis me uti posse labeo ait, non eum qui in cenaculo moretur: semper enim superficiem solo cedere. plane si cenaculum ex publico aditum habeat, ait labeo videri non ab eo aedes possideri, qui kruptas possideret, sed ab eo, cuius aedes supra kruptas essent. verum est hoc in eo, qui aditum ex publico habuit: ceterum superficiarii proprio interdicto et actionibus a praetore utetur.
But if above the house (aedes) which I possess there is an upper room (cenaculum), in which another stays as if owner, Labeo says that I can use the interdict uti possidetis, not he who dwells in the upper room: for the surface always yields to the soil. Clearly, if the upper room has access from the public, Labeo says it seems that the house is not possessed by him who possessed the crypts, but by him whose house was above the crypts. This is true in the case of one who had access from the public; otherwise, the holder of a right of superficies (superficiarius) will use his own interdict and the actions from the praetor.
In hoc interdicto condemnationis summa refertur ad rei ipsius aestimationem. " quanti res est" sic accipimus " quanti uniuscuiusque interest possessionem retinere". servii autem sententia est existimantis tanti possessionem aestimandam, quanti ipsa res est: sed hoc nequaquam opinandum est: longe enim aliud est rei pretium, aliud possessionis.
In this interdict the sum of the condemnation is referred to the appraisal of the thing itself. " how much the thing is worth" we thus take as " how much it is of interest to each individual to retain possession". But the opinion of Servius is that possession ought to be valued at as much as the thing itself is: but this is by no means to be thought; for the price of the thing is one thing, the price of possession another.
In summa puto dicendum et inter fructuarios hoc interdictum reddendum: et si alter usum fructum, alter possessionem sibi defendat. idem erit probandum et si usus fructus quis sibi defendat possessionem, et ita pomponius scribit. perinde et si alter usum, alter fructum sibi tueatur, et his interdictum erit dandum.
In sum I think it must be said that this interdict also is to be granted among usufructuaries: namely, if one defends for himself the usufruct, and the other the possession. The same must be held also if someone, on the score of the usufruct, defends possession for himself, and thus Pomponius writes. Likewise also if one maintains the use, the other the fruits, to these the interdict is to be given.
Ait praetor: " uti ex lege locationis sive conductionis superficie, qua de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab altero fruamini, quo minus fruamini, vim fieri veto. si qua alia actio de superficie postulabitur, causa cognita dabo".
The praetor says: "That, under the law of letting or hiring, as to the superficies in question, neither by force nor by stealth nor by precarium should the one enjoy against the other; I forbid force to be employed to prevent your enjoying. If any other action concerning the superficies shall be requested, with the cause known I will grant it."
Qui superficiem in alieno solo habet, civili actione subnixus est: nam si conduxit superficium, ex conducto, si emit, ex empto agere cum domino soli potest. enim si ipse eum prohibeat, quod interest agendo consequetur: sin autem ab alio prohibeatur, praestare ei actiones suas debet dominus et cedere. sed longe utile visum est, quia et incertum erat, an locati existeret, et quia melius est possidere potius quam in personam experiri, hoc interdictum proponere et quasi in rem actionem polliceri.
He who has a superficies on another’s soil is supported by a civil action: for if he has leased the superficies, he can proceed against the owner of the soil by the action on lease (ex conducto), if he has bought it, by the action on purchase (ex empto). For if the owner himself prevents him, he will obtain by suing what his interest amounts to; but if he is prevented by someone else, the owner ought to furnish and assign to him his actions. But it seemed far more useful, both because it was uncertain whether an actio locati would lie, and because it is better to possess rather than to proceed in personam, to set forth this interdict and to promise, as it were, an action in rem.
Proponitur autem interdictum duplex exemplo interdicti uti possidetis. tuetur itaque praetor eum, qui superficiem petit, veluti uti possidetis interdicto, neque exigit ab eo, quam causam possidendi habeat: unum tantum requirit, num forte vi clam precario ab adversario possideat. omnia quoque, quae in uti possidetis interdicto servantur, hic quoque servabuntur.
A twofold interdict is moreover proposed on the example of the interdict uti possidetis. Thus the praetor protects the one who claims the superficies, as though by the interdict uti possidetis, and he does not demand from him what cause of possessing he has: he requires only one thing—whether perchance he possesses from the adversary by force, clandestinely, or precariously. All the things also that are observed in the interdict uti possidetis will likewise be observed here.
Quod ait praetor " si actio de superficie postulabitur, causa cognita dabo", sic intellegendum est, ut, si ad tempus quis superficiem conduxerit, negetur ei in rem actio. et sane causa cognita ei, qui non ad modicum tempus conduxit superficiem, in rem actio competet.
What the praetor says, "if an action concerning a superficies is requested, I will grant it after the cause has been examined," is to be understood thus: if someone has leased a superficies for a term, an action in rem is to be denied to him. And indeed, after the cause has been examined, an action in rem will be competent for him who has not leased the superficies for only a modest time.
Is autem, in cuius solo superficies est, utique non indiget utili actione, sed habet in rem, qualem habet de solo. plane si adversus superficiarium velit vindicare, dicendum est exceptione utendum in factum data: nam cui damus actionem, eidem et exceptionem competere multo magis quis dixerit.
But he, on whose soil the superficies is, certainly does not need a useful action, but has an in rem action, such as he has concerning the soil. Clearly, if he should wish to vindicate against the superficiarius, it must be said that an exceptio in factum granted is to be used; for one would say that to whom we grant an action, to that same person an exception is competent all the more.
Hoc interdicto praetor non inquirit, utrum habuit iure servitutem impositam an non, sed hoc tantum, an itinere actuque hoc anno usus sit non vi non clam non precario, et tuetur eum, licet eo tempore, quo interdictum redditur, usus non sit. sive igitur habuit ius viae sive non habuit, in ea condicione est, ut ad tuitionem praetoris pertineat, si modo anno usus est vel modico tempore, id est non minus quam triginta diebus. neque ad praesens tempus refertur usus, quia plerumque itineribus vel via non semper utimur, nisi cum usus exegerit ita.
By this interdict the praetor does not inquire whether the servitude was imposed by right or not, but only this: whether he has used the path (iter) and the drive (actus) in this year, not by force, not clandestinely, not by permission revocable at will; and he protects him, even though at the time when the interdict is delivered he has not been using it. Therefore, whether he had the right of way (ius viae) or did not, he is in such a condition as to fall under the praetor’s protection, provided only that he has used it for a year or for a modest period, that is, not less than thirty days. Nor is the use referred to the present time, because for the most part we do not always use routes or a road, unless need has thus required.
Vivianus recte ait eum, qui propter incommoditatem rivi aut propterea, quia via publica interrupta erat, per proximi vicini agrum iter fecerit, quamvis id frequenter fecit, non videri omnino usum, itaque inutile esse interdictum, non quasi precario usum, sed quasi nec usum. ergo secundum hoc neutro usus videtur: multo enim minus illo usus est, per quem non ivit propter incommoditatem rivi aut propterea, quia via praerupta erat. idem erit dicendum et si non erat via publica, sed iter privatum: nam et hic eadem quaestio est.
Vivianus rightly says that he who, on account of the inconvenience of the stream, or because the public road was interrupted, made a passage through the nearest neighbor’s field, although he did this frequently, is not seen to have made use at all; and thus the interdict is ineffective, not as though he used by precarium, but as though he did not use. Therefore, according to this, he seems to have used neither of the two ways: for much less did he use that one along which he did not go, because of the inconvenience of the stream, or because the road was precipitous. The same must be said even if it was not a public road, but a private right-of-way; for here too the same question arises.
Is, cuius colonus aut hospes aut quis alius iter ad fundum fecit, usus videtur itinere vel actu vel via, et idcirco interdictum habebit: et haec ita pedius scribit et adicit etiamsi ignoravit, cuius fundus esset, per quem iret, retinere eum servitutem.
He, whose colonus (tenant-farmer) or guest or someone else made a journey to the estate, is considered to have used the right-of-way, whether by iter or by actus or by via; and therefore he will have the interdict: and Pedius writes thus and adds that, even if he did not know whose estate it was through which he went, he retains the servitude.
Si quis propter inundationem usus non sit itinere actuque hoc anno, cum superiore usus sit, potest repetita die hoc interdicto uti per in integrum restitutionem ex illa parte " si qua mihi iusta causa esse videbitur". sed et si per vim hoc ei contigerit, in integrum eum restitui oportere Marcellus probat. praeterea et aliis casibus interdictum repetita die competit, ex quibus in integrum quis restitutionem impetrare solet.
If someone, on account of an inundation, has not had the use of the right of way and of driving this year, although he used it the previous year, he can, with the day repeated, use this interdict by restoration in integrum, from that clause " si qua mihi iusta causa esse videbitur". But even if this has happened to him through force, Marcellus approves that he ought to be restored in integrum. Moreover, in other cases too the interdict, with the day repeated, is available, from which one is accustomed to obtain restoration in integrum.
Si tibi fundum precario concessero, cui via debebatur, deinde tu a domino fundi precario rogaveris, ut ea via ad eum fundum utaris: an noceat tibi exceptio, si adversus eum velis interdicere, a quo precario viam rogasti? et magis est, ut noceat, idque colligi potest ex eo, quod iulianus scribit in specie huiusmodi. quaerit enim, si ego tibi fundum precario dedero, cui via debebatur, et tu rogaveris precario, ut ea via utaris: nihilo minus utile interdictum mihi esse, quia, sicuti me precarium rei meae non tenet, ita nec per te precario possidere intellegor: quotiens enim colonus meus aut is, cui precario fundum dedi, via utitur, ego ire intellegor, propter quod et recte dico me itinere usum.
If I have granted you an estate by precarium, to which a way was owed, and then you have asked the owner of the estate by precarium that you use that way to that estate: does the exception bar you, if you wish to seek an interdict against him from whom you asked the way by precarium? And the better view is that it does bar, and this can be gathered from what Julianus writes in a case of this sort. For he asks: if I have given you by precarium an estate to which a way was owed, and you have asked by precarium that you use that way, nonetheless a useful interdict is available to me, because, just as a precarium concerning my own thing does not bind me, so neither am I understood to possess by precarium through you: for whenever my colonus or the one to whom I gave the estate by precarium uses the way, I am understood to go, for which reason I also rightly say that I have used the right of way.
what rationale, he says, has the effect that also, if I shall have requested a way by sufferance (precario) and shall have given you the estate (fundus) by sufferance, although you go with this intention, as if it were owed to my estate, the interdict would be useless and I would seem to have used that route by sufferance (precario), not without merit: for it is not your opinion that is to be looked to, but mine. You, however, I believe, will be able to use the interdict, even though Julian writes nothing about this.
Si quis supra dicto tempore anni non vi non clam non precario itinere usus sit, verum postea non sit usus, sed clam precariove, videndum est, an ei noceat. et magis est, ut nihil ei noceat, quod attinet ad interdictum:
If someone, during the aforesaid time of the year, has used the way not by force, not in secret, not by precarious license, but afterwards has either not used it, or has used it in secret or by precarious leave, it must be considered whether this harms him. And the more cogent view is that nothing harms him, so far as concerns the interdict:
Inde etiam illud labeo scribit: si, cum a me recte via utebaris, fundum vendidero, per quem utebaris, deinde emptor te prohibuit: licet clam videaris ab eo uti ( nam qui prohibitus utitur, clam utitur), tamen interdictum tibi competere intra annum, quia hoc anno non vi non clam non precario usus es.
From this also Labeo writes the following: if, when you were rightly using a right‑of‑way from me, I were to sell the estate through which you were using it, and then the buyer prohibited you, although you may seem to be using it clandestinely as against him (for he who uses when prohibited uses clandestinely), nevertheless the interdict is available to you within a year, because in this year you have used it not by force, not clandestinely, not precariously.
Item sciendum est non tantum eum clam via uti, qui ipse prohibitus utitur, verum eum quoque, per quem quis id ius retinebat, si eo prohibito, per quem retinebat, utatur. plane si ignoravi prohibitum et persevero uti, nihil mihi nocere dicendum est.
Likewise it must be known that not only is he using the way clandestinely who, although he himself has been prohibited, uses it, but also he through whom someone was retaining that right, if, that person—through whom he was retaining it—having been prohibited, he should use it. Plainly, if I was ignorant of the prohibition and I persist in using it, it is to be said that nothing harms me.
Si quis ab auctore meo vi aut clam aut precario usus est, recte a me via uti prohibetur et interdictum ei inutile est, quia a me videtur vi vel clam vel precario possidere, qui ab auctore meo vitiose possidet. nam et pedius scribit, si vi aut clam aut precario ab eo sit usus, in cuius locum hereditate vel emptione aliove quo iure successi, idem esse dicendum: cum enim successerit quis in locum eorum, aequum non est nos noceri hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cuius locum successimus.
If someone has made use from my auctor by force or stealth or precariously, he is rightly prohibited by me from using the road, and the interdict is useless to him, because, as against me, he is deemed to possess by force or stealth or precariously, who possesses wrongfully from my auctor. For Pedius also writes that, if he has used by force or stealth or precariously against him into whose place I have succeeded by inheritance or purchase or by some other right, the same is to be said: for when one has succeeded into their place, it is not equitable that we be harmed by that which did not harm the person into whose place we have succeeded.
Uti videmur servitutibus etiam per servos vel colonos vel amicos vel etiam hospites et fere per eos omnes, qui nobis retinent servitutes: sed enim per fructuarium quidem servitus retinetur, per fructuarium autem interdictum hoc domino non competere iulianus ait.
It appears that servitudes are even retained for us through slaves, or tenant-farmers, or friends, or even guests, and generally through all those who retain servitudes for us; but indeed, through a usufructuary a servitude is retained, yet Julian says that through the usufructuary this interdict does not lie for the owner.
Idem iulianus scribit, si meus usus fructus in fundo tuo, proprietas vero tua fuerit et uterque nostrum per vicini fundum ierit, utile interdictum de itinere nos habere: et sive forte ab extraneo fructuarius prohibeatur, sive etiam a domino, sed et si dominus a fructuario, competet: nam et si quilibet prohibeat ire, interdictum adversus eum competit.
The same Julian writes: if my usufruct is in your estate, but the proprietorship is yours, and each of us has gone through the neighbor’s estate, we have the useful interdict concerning the right of way; and whether perhaps the fructuary is prohibited by a stranger, or even by the owner, and likewise if the owner by the fructuary, it will lie; for even if anyone whatsoever prohibits going, the interdict lies against him.
Ait praetor: " quo itinere actuque hoc anno non vi non clam non precario ab alio usus es, quo minus id iter actumque, ut tibi ius esset, reficias, vim fieri veto. qui hoc interdicto uti volet, is adversario damni infecti, quod per eius vitium datum sit, caveat".
The praetor says: "As to whatever right-of-way and cattle-drive you have used this year from another, not by force, not by stealth, not precariously, I forbid force to be employed to prevent your renewing that way and drive, so that you may have the right. Whoever will wish to use this interdict must give security to the adversary for damage not yet done, in so far as it may have been caused through his fault."
Utilitas suasit hoc quoque interdictum proponere: namque consequens erat eum qui itinere utitur interdictum proponere, ut refici iter possit: quemadmodum enim alias uti potest itinere vel actu commode, quam si refecerit? corrupto enim itinere minus commode frui aut agi potest.
Utility persuaded that this interdict too be proposed: for it was consequent to propose an interdict for one who uses a right of way, so that the way might be repaired; for how otherwise can he use the way or the cattle-drive conveniently, unless he has repaired it? for when the way is corrupted, it can be enjoyed or driven upon less conveniently.
Hoc autem a superiori distat, quod illo quidem interdicto omnes uti possunt, qui hoc anno usi sunt: hoc autem interdicto eum demum uti posse, qui hoc anno usus est et ius sibi esse reficiendi oporteat. ius autem esse videtur ei, cui servitus debetur. itaque qui hoc interdicto utitur, duas res debet docere, et hoc anno se usum et ei servitutem competere: ceterum si desit alterutrum, deficit interdictum, nec immerito.
But this differs from the preceding, in that by that interdict indeed all can make use who have used in this year; but by this interdict only he can make use who has used in this year and for whom it ought to be that he has a right of repairing. Now the right seems to exist for him to whom the servitude is owed. Therefore he who uses this interdict ought to demonstrate two things: both that he has used in this year and that the servitude pertains to him; but if either is lacking, the interdict fails—and not without good reason.
for he who wishes to go or to drive, meanwhile, until it is established concerning the servitude, ought not to have to demonstrate his right: for what does he lose, who allows him to do this, who has done it this year? but indeed he who wishes to repair does something new, nor ought he to be permitted to undertake that on another’s property, unless he truly has the servitude.
Fieri autem potest, ut qui ius eundi habeat et agendi, reficiendi ius non habeat, quia in servitute constituenda cautum sit, ne ei reficiendi ius sit, aut sic, ut, si velit reficere, usque ad certum modum reficiendi ius sit: merito ergo ad refectionem se praetor rettulit: " ut tibi", inquit, " ius est, reficias". " uti ius est" hoc est sic uti per servitutem impositam licet.
However, it can happen that he who has the right of going and of driving does not have the right of repairing, because in establishing the servitude it has been provided that he is not to have the right of repairing, or thus, that, if he should wish to repair, he has the right of repairing only up to a certain limit: with good reason, therefore, the praetor referred himself to refection: " as your right is", he says, " repair". " as is the right" this is: to use thus as it is permitted by the servitude imposed.
Apud labeonem quaeritur, si pontem quis novum velit facere viae muniendae causa, an ei permittatur: et ait permittendum, quasi pars sit refectionis huiusmodi munitio. et ego puto veram labeonis sententiam, si modo sine hoc commeari non possit.
With Labeo the question is raised, whether, if someone should wish to build a new bridge for the sake of paving the road, it is permitted to him; and he says it should be permitted, as though such a munitio were a part of the refection. And I too think Labeo’s opinion true, provided only that without this one cannot travel to and fro.
Si quis autem, cum posset compendiaria adportare, quae refectioni necessaria sunt longiori itinere velit adportare, ut deteriorem causam eundi faciat, impune ei vis fiet, quia ipse sibi impedimento sit, quo minus reficiat.
If, however, when he could bring by the shorter way the things which are necessary for refection, he wishes to bring them by a longer journey, so as to make a worse cause for going, force will be used against him with impunity, because he is himself an impediment to himself, whereby he is the less able to refit.
Si per fundum tuum nec vi nec clam nec precario commeavit aliquis, non tamen tamquam id suo iure faceret, sed, si prohiberetur, non facturus, inutile est ei interdictum de itinere actuque: nam ut hoc interdictum competat, ius fundi possedisse oportet.
If someone has passed through your estate neither by force, nor in secret, nor by precarium, yet not as though he were doing this by his own right, but such that, if he were prohibited, he would not do it, the interdict concerning right-of-way and driving is useless to him; for, in order that this interdict should be available, one must have possessed the right over the land.
Duo autem genera sunt aquarum: est cottidiana, est et aestiva. cottidiana ab aestiva usu differt, non iure. cottidiana ea est, quae duci adsidue solet vel aestivo tempore vel hiberno, etiamsi aliquando ducta non est: ea quoque dicitur cottidiana, cuius servitus intermissione temporis divisa est.
there are two kinds of waters: there is the quotidian, and there is also the estival. the quotidian differs from the estival in use, not in law. quotidian is that which is accustomed to be led continuously either in summer time or in winter, even if at some time it has not been led; that too is called quotidian, whose servitude is divided by an intermission of time.
aestival, however, is that which it is expedient to use in summer alone, just as we say summer garments, summer pastures, summer camps, which we sometimes use even in winter, but for the most part in summer. I think it should be approved that the aestival water be distinguished from the quotidian by the intention of the user and by the nature of the places: for if it is water that can be conducted perpetually, yet I use it only in summer, it must be said that this water is aestival; again, if it is water that cannot be conducted except in summer, it will be called aestival; and if there are places which by nature do not admit water except in summer, it will have to be said that it is rightly called aestival.
Quod autem scriptum est in interdicto: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti" hoc est: non cottidie, sed hoc anno vel una die vel nocte. ergo cottidiana quidem aqua alia est, quae cottidie duci possit, vel hieme vel aestate, etsi aliquo momento temporis ducta sit, aestiva ea, quae cottidie quidem duci possit, vel sola aestate, ducatur autem aestate tantum, non et hieme, non quia non possit et hieme, sed quia non solet.
But as for what is written in the interdict: "as you have led water this year," this means: not every day, but in this year, even for a single day or night. Therefore daily water is something else, which can be led every day, whether in winter or in summer, even if it has been led at some moment of time; “summer” water is that which indeed can be led every day, albeit only in summer; however, it is led in summer only, not also in winter, not because it cannot be also in winter, but because it is not customary.
Quamquam ad perennes aquas dixerimus hoc interdictum pertinere, ad eas tamen perennes pertinet, quae duci possunt. ceterum sunt quaedam, quae, etsi perennes sunt, duci tamen non possunt, ut puta puteales et quae ita sunt summersae, ut defluere extra terram et usui esse non possint. sed huiusmodi aquis, quae duci non possint, haustus servitus imponi potest.
Although we have said that this interdict pertains to perennial waters, nevertheless it pertains to those perennial waters which can be led (channeled). Moreover, there are certain waters which, although perennial, nevertheless cannot be led, for instance well-waters and those which are so submerged that they cannot flow out beyond the earth and be of use. But upon waters of this kind, which cannot be led, a servitude of drawing (haustus) can be imposed.
Caput aquae illud est, unde aqua nascitur: si ex fonte nascatur, ipse fons: si ex flumine vel lacu, prima incilia vel principia fossarum, quibus aquae ex flumine vel ex lacu in primum rivum compelli solent. plane si aqua sudoribus manando in aliquem primum locum effluere atque ibi apparere incipit, eius hoc caput dicemus, ubi primum emergit.
The head of the water is that from which the water is born: if it is born from a spring, the spring itself; if from a river or a lake, the first intakes or the beginnings of the ditches, by which the waters from the river or from the lake are accustomed to be driven into the first rill. Clearly, if the water, by seepages as it trickles, begins to flow out into some first place and to appear there, we shall call this its head, where it first emerges.
Sed etsi iure aqua non debetur alicui, si tamen iure ducere se putavit, cum non in iure, sed in facto erravit, dicendum est eoque iure utimur, ut interdicto hoc uti possit: sufficit enim, si iure se ducere putavit nec vi nec clam nec precario duxit.
But even if by law water is not owed to someone, nevertheless if he supposed that he was conducting it by right, since he erred not in law but in fact, it must be said—and we use that law—that he can make use of this interdict: for it suffices if he thought he was conducting it by right and did not conduct it by force, nor secretly, nor by precarium.
Illud quaeritur, utrum ea tantum aqua his interdictis contineatur, quae ad agrum irrigandum pertinet, an vero omnis, etiam ea, quae ad usum quoque et commodum nostrum. et hoc iure utimur, ut haec quoque contineatur. propter quod etiam si in urbana praedia quis aquam ducere velit, hoc interdictum locum habere potest.
The question is whether only that water is encompassed by these interdicts which pertains to irrigating a field, or rather all water, even that which pertains also to our use and convenience. And we follow this law, that this too is included. Wherefore, even if someone should wish to conduct water into urban estates, this interdict can have application.
Idem labeo scribit, etiamsi praetor hoc interdicto de aquis frigidis sentiat, tamen de calidis aquis interdicta non esse deneganda: namque harum quoque aquarum usum esse necessarium: nonnumquam enim refrigeratae usum irrigandis agris praestant. his accedit, quod in quibusdam locis et cum calidae sunt, irrigandis tamen agris necessariae sunt, ut hierapoli: constat enim apud hierapolitanos in asia agrum aqua calida rigari. et quamvis ea sit aqua, quae ad rigandos non sit necessaria, tamen nemo ambiget his interdictis locum fore.
The same Labeo writes that, even if the praetor, by this interdict, has in view cold waters, nevertheless interdicts concerning hot waters are not to be denied; for the use of these waters also is necessary: sometimes, indeed, when cooled, they provide a use for irrigating fields. To this is added that in certain places, even when they are hot, they are nevertheless necessary for irrigating fields, as at Hierapolis; for it is established that among the Hierapolitans in Asia a field is irrigated with hot water. And although it be water which is not necessary for irrigating, nevertheless no one will doubt that these interdicts will find application.
Illud tamen hic intellegendum est eodem modo praetorem duci aquam iussisse, quo ducta est hoc anno. proinde neque amplioris modi, neque alia permisisse potest videri. quare si alia aqua sit, quam quis velit ducere, quam hoc anno duxit, vel eadem, per aliam tamen regionem velit ducere, impune ei vis fiet.
It must, however, be understood here that the praetor ordered the water to be conducted in the same manner in which it was conducted this year. Accordingly, he can be seen to have permitted neither a greater measure nor anything different. Therefore, if it be other water that someone wishes to conduct than he conducted this year, or the same water, yet wishes to conduct it through another region, force may with impunity be used against him.
Illud labeo dicit omnes partes illius fundi, in quem loci aqua ducitur, eiusdem numero esse. ergo et si forte actor confinem agrum emerit et ex agro, in quem hoc anno aquam duxerit, postea fundi empti nomine velit aquam ducere, ita demum eum recte hoc interdicto ( ut de itinere actuque) uti putant, ut semel in suum ingressus inde egredi qua velit possit, nisi ei nocitum sit, ex quo aquam ducit.
Labeo says this: all parts of that estate into which water is conducted from a place are of the same kind. Therefore, even if perhaps the plaintiff has bought a bordering field and, from the field into which he has led water this year, afterwards wishes to lead water under the name of the purchased estate, they think that he then and only then rightly uses this interdict ( ut de itinere actuque), on this condition: that, having once entered into his own, he may from there go out by whatever way he wishes, provided that no harm is done to him from whom he draws the water.
Item quaeritur, si quis aquae, quam hoc anno ducebat, aliam aquam admiscuerit, an impune prohibeatur. et extat ofilii sententia existimantis recte eum prohiberi, sed eo loci, in quo primum aquam aliam in rivum admittit: et ofilius in tota aqua recte eum prohiberi ait. ego ofilio adsentio non posse dividi, quia non potest ita in parte vis fieri, ut non in tota aqua fiat.
Likewise it is asked, if someone has admixed other water to the water which he was conducting this year, whether he may be lawfully prohibited. And there exists the opinion of ofilius, thinking that he is rightly prohibited, but at that place where he first admits the other water into the channel; and ofilius says that he is rightly prohibited in respect to the whole water. I agree with ofilius that it cannot be divided, because force cannot be applied to a part in such a way that it is not applied to the whole water.
Trebatius, cum amplior numerus pecoris ad aquam appelletur, quam debet appelli, posse universum pecus impune prohiberi, quia iunctum pecus ei pecori, cui adpulsus debeatur, totum corrumpat pecoris adpulsum. Marcellus autem ait, si quis ius habens pecoris ad aquam appellendi plura pecora adpulserit, non in omnibus pecoribus eum prohibendum: quod est verum, quia pecora separari possunt.
Trebatius says that, when a larger number of cattle is driven to the water than ought to be driven, the entire herd can be prohibited with impunity, because the herd joined to that herd to which the driving is owed corrupts the whole driving of the herd. Marcellus, however, says that, if someone who has the right of driving cattle to the water has driven more cattle, he is not to be prohibited as to all the cattle; which is true, because the cattle can be separated.
Idem ait eum, qui hoc anno aquam duxerit nec vi nec clam nec precario et eodem anno vitiose usus est, recte tamen hoc interdicto usurum: quod referri ad id tempus, quod sine vitio fuerit: esse enim verum hoc anno non vi non clam non precario usum.
He likewise says that he who in this year has conducted water neither by force nor in secret nor by precarious leave, and in the same year has used it in a faulty manner, will nevertheless rightly avail himself of this interdict: because it is to be referred to that time which was without fault: for it is true that in this year he used it not by force, not in secret, not by precarious leave.
Quaesitum est, si quis ante annum aquam duxit, deinde sequenti tempore, hoc est intra annum, aqua influxerit ipsa sibi me non ducente, an hoc interdicto locus sit. et refert severus valerius competere ei hoc interdictum, quasi duxisse videatur, licet penitus prospicientibus non videtur iste duxisse.
It has been asked whether, if someone conducted water before the year, then at a subsequent time, that is within the year, the water has flowed in of itself to him, I not conducting it, there is room for this interdict. And Severus Valerius reports that this interdict is competent for him, as though he should be seen to have conducted it, although, to those looking thoroughly into it, this man does not seem to have conducted it.
Item quaesitum est, si quis, dum putat tertio quoque die habere se ius aquae ducendae, duxerit una die, an recte et sine captione possessoris recte duxisse videatur, ut hoc interdictum habeat: ait enim praetor: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti" id est alternis diebus. illud autem nihil interest, utrum quinto die aqua debeatur an alternis diebus an cottidie ei, qui hoc interdicto uti velit: nam cum sufficiat vel uno die hoc anno aquam duxisse, nihil refert, qualem aquae ductum habens duxerit: dum, si quis, cum quinto quoque die uteretur, quasi alternis diebus ducens interdixerit, nihil ei prodesse videtur.
Likewise it has been asked, if someone, while thinking that he has the right of conducting water every third day, has conducted it on a single day, whether he seems to have conducted it rightly and without chicanery against the possessor, so that he may have the benefit of this interdict; for the praetor says: "as in this year you have conducted the water," that is, on alternate days. But this makes no difference—whether the water is owed every fifth day or on alternate days or daily—to the one who wishes to use this interdict; for since it suffices to have conducted the water on even one day in this year, it does not matter what sort of right of water-conduct (aquae ductus) he had when he conducted it; provided that, if someone, while he was using it every fifth day, proceeds by interdict as though conducting it on alternate days, it seems to profit him nothing.
Praeterea illud sciendum est, si, cum aquam duxisses, adversarius te prohibuerit, deinde tu interim ius aquae ducendae amiseris, in restitutionem hoc venire, ut tibi praestetur per hoc interdictum quod amisisti: et hoc verum puto.
Furthermore, this is to be known: if, when you had conducted water, your adversary prohibited you, and thereafter in the meantime you lost the right of conducting water, this falls under restitution, namely that there be made good to you through this interdict what you lost; and I consider this true.
Competit hoc interdictum adversus eum, qui prohibet me aquam ducere, et nihil interest, utrum quis dominium fundi habeat an non. idcircoque is tenetur interdicto: nam et si servitus coepit adversus quemvis posse vindicari.
This interdict lies against him who prohibits me from conducting water, and it makes no difference whether anyone has ownership (dominium) of the estate (fundus) or not. And for that reason he is held by the interdict: for indeed a servitude has come to be capable of being vindicated against anyone whatsoever.
Labeo putat per hoc interdictum prohiberi quem, ne quid in illo fundo faciat fodiat serat succidat putet aedificet, quare ex re ea aqua, quam ille hoc anno per fundum tuum sine vitio duxit, inquinetur vitietur corrumpatur deteriorve fiat: et similiter de aestiva aqua debere interdici ait.
Labeo thinks that by this interdict a person is prohibited, that he do nothing on that estate—dig, sow, cut down, prune, build—by reason of which the water which he this year conducted through your estate without fault may be polluted, vitiated, corrupted, or become worse; and he says that similarly there ought to be an interdict concerning the summer water.
Quia autem diximus aestivam aquam aliquo distare ab aqua cottidiana, sciendum est etiam interdictis distare, quod qui de aqua cottidiana interdicit, ita interdicit: " uti hoc anno aquam duxisti", at qui de aestiva, sic: " uti priore aestate", nec immerito: nam quia hieme non utitur, referre se non ad praesentem aestatem, sed ad priorem debuit.
Because we have said that summer water differs somewhat from daily water, it should be known also to differ in the interdicts: for he who interdicts concerning daily water interdicts thus: " as you have led water this year," but he who [interdicts] concerning summer [water], thus: " as in the prior summer," and not without reason: for since he does not use it in winter, he ought to refer not to the present summer, but to the prior one.
Propter hoc, si aestate interdicatur, nonnumquam annum et sex menses continere: quod ita contingit, si initio verni aequinoctii ducta sit aqua et sequenti aestate pridie aequinoctium autumnale interdicatur: et proinde, si hieme interdicatur, etiam in biennium haec res extendetur.
Because of this, if it is interdicted in summer, it may sometimes comprise a year and six months: this so happens if at the beginning of the vernal equinox the water has been led, and in the following summer, on the day before the autumnal equinox, it is interdicted; and accordingly, if it is interdicted in winter, this matter will be extended even to a biennium.
Ait praetor: " inter heredes et emptores et bonorum possessores interdicam". haec verba non solum ad aestivam aquam, verum etiam ad cottidianam quoque referenda esse sciendum est: nam sicuti de itinere actuque et successoribus dantur interdicta et emptori, ita haec quoque danda praetor putavit.
The praetor says: " I will interdict between heirs and purchasers and possessors of goods". It should be known that these words are to be referred not only to summer water, but also to daily water as well: for just as interdicts are given concerning the right of way and of driving and to successors and to the purchaser, so the praetor thought that these too should be given.
Ait praetor: " quo ex castello illi aquam ducere ab eo, cui eius rei ius fuit, permissum est, quo minus ita uti permissum est ducat, vim fieri veto. quandoque de opere faciendo interdictum erit, damni infecti caveri iubebo".
The praetor says: "From whatever reservoir it has been permitted for that man to conduct water, by the one who had the right in that matter, I forbid force to be used to prevent him from leading it as it has been permitted. Whenever there shall be an interdict concerning the making of the work, I will order security to be given for damnum infectum (damage not yet done)."
Hoc interdictum necessario propositum est. namque superiora interdicta ad eos pertinent, qui a capite ducunt vel imposita servitute vel quia putant impositam: aequissimum visum est ei quoque, qui ex castello ducit, interdictum dari. id est ex eo receptaculo, quod aquam publicam suscipit.
This interdict has been set forth of necessity. For the preceding interdicts pertain to those who draw from the head-source, either with a servitude imposed or because they think it has been imposed: it seemed most equitable that an interdict be given also to one who draws from the castellum, that is, from that receptacle which receives the public water.
Et datur interdum praediis, interdum personis. quod praediis datur, persona extincta non extinguitur: quod datur personis, cum personis amittitur ideoque neque ad alium dominum praediorum neque ad heredem vel qualemcumque successorem transit. plane ei, ad quem dominium transit, impetrabile est: nam si docuerit praediis suis aquam debitam, etsi nomine eius fluxisse, a quo dominium ad se transiit, indubitate impetrat ius aquae ducendae, nec est hoc beneficium, sed iniuria, si quis forte non impetraverit.
And it is granted sometimes to estates, sometimes to persons. What is granted to estates is not extinguished upon the extinction of the person; what is granted to persons is lost with the persons, and therefore passes neither to another owner of the estates nor to an heir or any successor whatsoever. Plainly, for him to whom the ownership passes, it is obtainable: for if he shall prove that water was due to his estates, even if it flowed under the name of him from whom the ownership passed to himself, he undoubtedly obtains the right of conducting the water; nor is it a beneficium, but an injury, if someone perchance does not obtain it.
Meminisse autem debemus in hoc interdicto totam quaestionem finiri adsignationis: non enim praeparat hoc interdictum causam, ut superiora interdicta, nec ad possessionem temporariam pertinet, sed aut habet ius adsignatum sibi aut non habet, et interdictum totum finitur.
We must, however, remember that in this interdict the whole question of assignation is ended: for this interdict does not prepare the cause, like the preceding interdicts, nor does it pertain to temporary possession, but either he has a right assigned to him or he does not, and the interdict is wholly concluded.
Si aquam ex flumine publico duxeris et flumen recesserit, non potes subsequi flumen, quia ei loco servitus imposita non sit, quamvis is locus meus sit. sed si alluvione paulatim accesserit fundo tuo, subsequi potes, quia locus totus fluminis serviat ductioni. sed si circumfluere coeperit mutato alveo, non potes, quia medius locus non serviat interruptaque sit servitus.
If you have led water from a public river and the river has receded, you cannot follow the river, because a servitude has not been imposed upon that place, although that place is mine. But if by alluvion it has gradually been added to your estate, you can follow, because the whole place of the river serves the conduction. But if, with the channel (alveus) changed, it has begun to flow around, you cannot, because the middle place does not serve and the servitude has been interrupted.
Lucio titio ex fonte meo ut aquam duceret, cessi: quaesitum est, an et maevio cedere possim, ut per eundem aquae ductum aquam ducat: et si putaveris posse cedi per eundem aquae ductum duobus, quemadmodum uti debeant. respondit: sicut iter actus via pluribus cedi vel simul vel separatim potest, ita aquae ducendae ius recte cedetur. sed si inter eos, quibus aqua cessa est, non convenit, quemadmodum utantur, non erit iniquum utile iudicium reddi, sicut inter eos, ad quos usus fructus pertinet, utile communi dividundo iudicium reddi plerisque placuit.
I ceded to Lucius Titius, from my spring, that he might conduct water: the question was raised whether I can also cede to Maevias, that he may conduct water through the same aqueduct; and if you think it can be ceded to two through the same aqueduct, how they ought to use it. He responded: just as a right of way (iter), a driving-right (actus), and a road (via) can be ceded to several, either simultaneously or separately, so the right of leading water will rightly be ceded. But if among those to whom the water has been ceded it is not agreed how they shall use it, it will not be inequitable that a useful action be afforded, just as among those to whom the usufruct pertains it has pleased most that a useful action for partition of common property (actio communi dividundo) be afforded.
Cum constet non solum temporibus, sed etiam mensuris posse aquam dividi, potest eodem tempore alius cottidianam, alius aestivam aquam ducere, ita ut aestate dividatur inter eos aqua, hieme solus ducat is qui cottidianae ius habeat.
Since it is established that water can be divided not only by times but also by measures, it is possible that at the same time one may conduct daily (quotidian) water, another summer water, such that in summer the water is divided between them, in winter he alone conducts it who has the right to the daily (quotidian) water.
Inter duos, qui eodem rivo aquam certis horis separatim ducebant, convenit, ut permutatis inter se temporibus aqua uterentur: quaero, cum amplius tempore servitutibus praefinito ita duxissent, ut neuter eorum suo tempore usus esset, num ius utendi amisissent. negavit amisisse.
Between two, who at fixed hours were separately drawing water from the same stream, it was agreed that, with their times exchanged between themselves, they should use the water: I ask, since for longer than the period fixed for servitudes they had so drawn it that neither of them had used it at his own time, whether they had lost the right of using. He denied that they had lost it.
De interdicto de aqua aestiva, item cottidiana quaerentes primum constituendum existimabamus, quae esset aqua aestiva, de qua proprium interdictum ad prioris aestatis tempus relatum reddi solet, hoc est aestiva aqua utrumne ex iure aestivo dumtaxat tempore utendi diceretur, an ex mente propositoque ducentis, quod aestate eam ducendi consilium haberet, an ex natura ipsius aquae, quod aestate tantum duci potest, an ex utilitate locorum, in quae duceretur. placebat igitur aquam ob has duas res, naturam suam utilitatemque locorum in quae deducitur, proprie appellari, ita ut, sive eius natura erit, ut nisi aestate duci non possit, etiamsi hieme quoque desideraretur, sive omni tempore anni duci eam ipsius natura permitteret, si utilitas personis, in quam ducitur, aestate dumtaxat usum eius exigeret, aestiva recte diceretur.
Concerning the interdict about summer water, likewise about daily water, when inquiring we judged that first it must be established what summer water is, for which a specific interdict is wont to be issued, referred back to the time of the previous summer; that is, whether it is called summer water from the right of using it only in the summer season, or from the intention and plan of those conducting it, because they had the design of conducting it in summer, or from the nature of the water itself, because it can be conducted only in summer, or from the utility of the places into which it would be conducted. It therefore pleased us that water should be properly so called on account of these two factors, its own nature and the utility of the places into which it is led, so that, whether its nature is such that it cannot be conducted except in summer, even if it were desired also in winter, or its nature would permit it to be conducted at every time of the year, if the utility for the persons for whom it is led demanded its use in summer only, it would rightly be called summer water.
Si de via itinere actu aquae ductu agatur, huiusmodi cautio praestanda est, quamdiu quis de iure suo doceat, non se impediturum agentem et aquam ducentem et iter facientem. quod si neget ius esse adversario agendi aquae ducendae, cavere sine praeiudicio amittendae servitutis debebit, donec quaestio finietur, non se usurum.
If there is litigation about a road (via), a right of way (iter), a driving-way (actus), or a water-duct (aquae ductus), such a caution is to be furnished: that, so long as one is demonstrating his right, he will not hinder the person driving, leading the water, or making the journey. But if he denies that the adversary has the right of driving or of leading water, he must give security, without prejudice to the servitude’s being lost, that he will not use it until the question is concluded.
Praetor ait: " rivos specus septa reficere purgare aquae ducendae causa quo minus liceat illi, dum ne aliter aquam ducat, quam uti priore aestate non vi non clam non precario a te duxit, vim fieri veto".
The praetor says: " I forbid force to be used to prevent him from repairing or cleansing channels, specuses (tunnels/conduits), and enclosures for the sake of leading water, provided that he does not conduct the water otherwise than as in the previous summer he led it from you, not by force, not by stealth, not by precarium, I forbid force to be used".
Deinde ait praetor " reficere purgare". reficere est quod corruptum est in pristinum statum restaurare. verbo reficiendi tegere substruere sarcire aedificare, item advehere adportareque ea, quae ad eandem rem opus essent. continentur.
Then the praetor says " reficere purgare". to repair is to restore what has been corrupted to its former state. Under the term “repairing” are contained: to cover, to underbuild (underpin), to patch, to build, likewise to bring in and to carry in those things which would be needed for the same matter.
Proinde et si per alium locum velit ducere, impune prohibetur: sed et si eundem rivum deprimat vel adtollat aut dilatet vel extendat vel operiat apertum vel contra. ego ceteros quidem impune prohiberi puto: at enim eum, qui operiat apertum vel contra, eum non puto prohibendum, nisi si quam maiorem utilitatem suam adversarius ostendat.
Accordingly, even if he should wish to lead it through another place, he is prohibited with impunity; and likewise if he should depress or raise the same stream, or dilate it or extend it, or cover one that is open, or conversely. I for my part think that the others may indeed be prohibited with impunity; but as for him who covers one that is open, or conversely, I do not think he should be prohibited, unless the adversary shows some greater utility of his own.
Labeo non posse ait ex aperto rivo terrenum fieri, quia commodum domino soli auferetur appellendi pecus vel hauriendi aquam: quod sibi non placere pomponius ait, quia id domino magis ex occasione quam ex iure contingeret, nisi si ab initio in imponenda servitute id actum esset.
Labeo says that from an open stream it cannot be made ground (i.e., covered and filled in), because the convenience to the owner of the soil of driving the herd to it or of drawing water would be taken away: which does not please Pomponius, because that would befall the owner more from occasion than from right, unless from the beginning, in the imposing of the servitude, that had been agreed.
Servius autem scribit aliter duci aquam, quae ante per specus ducta est, si nunc per apertum ducatur: nam si operis aliquid faciat quis, quo magis aquam conservet vel contineat, non impune prohiberi. ego et in specu contra, si non maior utilitas versetur adversarii.
Servius, moreover, writes that water is led otherwise, which previously was conducted through a tunnel, if now it is conducted through the open: for if someone makes any work by which he conserves or contains the water more, he is not to be prohibited with impunity. I also [hold] conversely in the case of a tunnel, unless the adversary’s greater utility is at stake.
Servius et labeo scribunt, si rivum, qui ab initio terrenus fuit, quia aquam non continebat, cementicium velit facere, audiendum esse: sed et si eum rivum, qui structilis fuit, postea terrenum faciat aut partem rivi, aeque non esse prohibendum. mihi videtur urguens et necessaria refectio esse admittenda.
Servius and Labeo write that, if a rivulet which from the beginning was earthen, because it did not contain the water, he should wish to make cementitious, he ought to be heard: but also if he should thereafter make that rivulet which was built (structile) earthen, or a part of the rivulet, likewise it ought not to be prohibited. It seems to me that an urgent and necessary refection ought to be admitted.
Si quis novum canalem vel fistulas in rivo velit collocare, cum id numquam habuerit, utile ei hoc interdictum futurum labeo ait. nos et hic opinamur utilitatem eius qui ducit sine incommoditate eius cuius ager est spectandam.
If anyone should wish to collocate a new canal or pipes in a rivulet, although he has never had this, Labeo says this interdict will be useful to him. We also here are of the opinion that the utility of the one who conducts (the water) is to be regarded, without inconvenience to the one whose field it is.
Si quis rivum reficienti opus novum nuntiat, belle dictum est posse contemni operis novi nuntiationem: cum enim praetor ei vim fieri vetet, absurdum est per operis novi nuntiationem eum impediri. plane per in rem actionem dicendum est posse: adversus eum vindicari " ius ei non esse" dubium non est.
If someone serves a notice of new work upon a person repairing a watercourse, it has been well said that the notice of new work can be disregarded: for since the praetor forbids force to be used against him, it is absurd that he be hindered through a notice of new work. Clearly it must be said that it can be done by an action in rem: it is not doubtful that one may vindicate against him " that he has no right."
De rivis reficiendis ita interdicetur, ut non quaeratur, an aquam ducere actori liceret: non enim tam necessariam refectionem itinerum quam rivorum esse, quando non refectis rivis omnis usus aquae auferretur et homines siti necarentur. et sane aqua pervenire nisi refecto rivo non potest: at non refecto itinere difficultas tantum eundi agendique fieret, quae temporibus aestivis levior esset.
Concerning the repairing of channels, an interdict shall be issued thus, that it not be inquired whether it was permitted to the plaintiff to conduct water: for the refection of roads is not so necessary as that of channels, since, if the channels are not repaired, all use of water would be taken away and men would be slain by thirst. And indeed water cannot arrive unless the channel is repaired; but if the road is not repaired, there would only be a difficulty of going and of driving, which would be lighter in the summer season.
Hoc interdictum de cisterna non competit: nam cisterna non habet perpetuam causam nec vivam aquam. ex quo apparet in his omnibus exigendum, ut viva aqua sit: cisternae autem imbribus concipiuntur. denique constat interdictum cessare, si lacus piscina puteus vivam aquam non habeat.
This interdict does not apply concerning a cistern: for a cistern does not have a perpetual cause nor living water. Whence it appears that in all these cases it must be required that the water be living: cisterns, however, are filled by rain-showers. Finally, it is agreed that the interdict ceases, if a lake, pool, or well does not have living water.
Deinde ait praetor: " quo minus fontem, quo de agitur, purges reficias, ut aquam coercere utique ea possis, dum ne aliter utaris, atque uti hoc anno non vi non clam non precario ab illo usus es, vim fieri veto".
Then the praetor says: "I forbid force to be used to the end that you be hindered the less from cleansing or repairing the spring which is in question, so that by it you may in any case be able to restrain the water, provided that you do not use it otherwise, and that you use it as in this year you have used it from him, not by force, not secretly, not by precarious permission."
Praetor ait: " quo minus illi cloacam quae ex aedibus eius in tuas pertinet, qua de agitur, purgare reficere liceat, vim fieri veto. damni infecti, quod operis vitio factum sit, caveri iubebo".
The praetor says: " to prevent it from being less permitted to him to cleanse and to repair the sewer which, from his house, extends into yours, which is the subject of the action, I forbid force to be used. For damage not yet done, if it should be caused by a defect in the work, I will order security to be given".
Quia autem cloacarum refectio et purgatio ad publicam utilitatem spectare videtur, idcirco placuit non esse in interdicto addendum " quod non vi non clam non precario ab illo usus", ut, etiamsi quis talem usum habuerit, tamen non prohibeatur volens cloacam reficere vel purgare.
But because the refection and purgation of sewers seems to look to the public utility, therefore it has pleased (the jurists) that there be no addition in the interdict of “that he has used it neither by force, nor clandestinely, nor by precarium,” so that, even if someone has had such a use, nevertheless he is not prohibited, being willing, to repair or cleanse the sewer.
Deinde ait praetor " quae ex aedibus eius in tuas pertinet". aedes hic accipere debes pro omni aedificio, hoc est ex aedificio eius in tuum aedificium. hoc amplius labeo putabat hoc interdicto locum esse et si area ab utralibet parte aedium sit et si forte, inquit, cloaca ducta sit ex urbano aedificio in proximum agrum.
Then the praetor says, "what from his edifice pertains into yours." Here you must take aedes as any edifice, that is, from his edifice into your edifice. Moreover, Labeo thought that this interdict has a place even if an area lies on either side of the edifices, and, he says, if perchance a sewer has been conducted from an urban edifice into the neighboring field.
Idem labeo etiam eum, qui privatam cloacam in publicam immittere velit, tuendum, ne ei vis fiat. sed et si quis velit talem cloacam facere, ut exitum habeat in publicam cloacam, non esse eum impediendum pomponius scribit.
Likewise Labeo [holds] that even the one who wishes to discharge a private cloaca (sewer) into the public cloaca is to be protected, lest violence be done to him. But Pomponius also writes that, if anyone wishes to construct such a cloaca, so that it may have an outlet into the public cloaca, he is not to be impeded.
Unde fabius mela scribit competere hoc interdictum, ut in vicini aedes veniat et rescindat pavimenta purgandae cloacae gratia. verendum tamen esse pomponius scribit, ne eo casu damni infecti stipulatio committatur. sed haec stipulatio non committitur, si paratus sit restaurare id, quod ex necessitate reficiendae cloacae causa resciderat.
Whence Fabius Mela writes that this interdict lies, to the effect that one may come into a neighbor’s house and cut through the pavements for the sake of cleansing the sewer. Nevertheless, Pomponius writes that it is to be feared lest in that case the stipulation for damage not yet done be incurred. But this stipulation is not incurred, if he is ready to restore that which he had cut away out of the necessity of repairing the sewer.
Quamquam de reficienda cloaca, non etiam de nova facienda hoc interdicto comprehendatur, tamen aeque interdicendum labeo ait, ne facienti cloacam vis fiat, quia eadem utilitas sit: praetorem enim sic interdixisse, ne vis fieret, quo minus cloacam in publico facere liceret: idque ofilio et trebatio placuisse. ipse dicendum ait, ut ne factam cloacam purgare et restituere permittendum sit per interdictum, novam vero facere is demum concedere debeat, cui viarum publicarum cura sit.
Although this interdict is understood to cover the repairing of a sewer, not also the making of a new one, nevertheless Labeo says an interdict ought equally to be issued, that no force be used against one making a sewer, because the utility is the same: for the praetor has thus interdicted, that no force be used to prevent one from being allowed to make a sewer in a public place; and this pleased Ofilius and Trebatius. He himself says it should be stated that by the interdict it is permitted to cleanse and restore an existing sewer, but that to make a new one ought to be granted only to the person who has the care of the public roads.
Prohibere autem non utique per semet ipsum necesse est, sed et si quis per servum suum vel procuratorem prohibuerit, recte videtur prohibuisse. idem etiam si mercennarius meus prohibuerit. nec quem moveat, quod per liberam personam actio adquiri non solet: nam prohibitio haec demonstrat vi te facere, quid mirum, cum et si clam tu me feceris, habeam actionem?
To prohibit, moreover, is not necessarily to be done by oneself alone; but even if someone has prohibited through his slave or through his procurator, he is rightly deemed to have prohibited. The same also if my hireling has prohibited. Nor should anyone be troubled by the fact that an action is not usually acquired through a free person: for this prohibition shows that you are acting by force; what wonder, since even if you should do it secretly (clam) against me, I would have an action?
Plane si praeses vel curator rei publicae permiserit in publico facere, nerva scribit exceptionem locum non habere, quia etsi ei locorum, inquit, publicorum procuratio data est, concessio tamen data non est. hoc ita verum est, si non lex municipalis curatori rei publicae amplius concedat. sed et si a principe vel ab eo, cui princeps hoc ius concedendi dederit idem erit probandum.
Plainly, if the governor or the curator of the municipality has permitted something to be done in a public place, Nerva writes that the exception has no place, because although the procuration of public places has been given to him, nevertheless a concession has not been given. This is true thus, if the municipal law does not grant more to the curator of the municipality. But also if by the emperor, or by him to whom the emperor has given this right of granting, the same is to be approved.
Si quis paratus sit se iudicio defendere adversus eos, qui interdicendum putant, ne opus fiat: an videatur desinere vi facere? et magis est, ut desinat, si modo satis offerat et defendere paratus est, si quis agat: et ita sabinus scribit.
If someone is prepared to defend himself by judicial action against those who think an interdict should be issued, that the work not be done: is he to be regarded as ceasing to use force? And the better view is that he does cease, provided only that he offers security and is prepared to defend if anyone brings an action: and thus sabinus writes.
Aut qui aliter fecit, quam denuntiavit: vel qui decepto facit eo, ad quem pertinuit non facere: vel consulto tum denuntiat adversario, cum eum scit non posse prohibere: vel tam sero pronuntiat, ut venire prohibiturus, prius quam fiat, non possit. et haec ita labeonem probare aristo ait.
Or one who did otherwise than he had given notice; or who does it with that person deceived, to whom it pertained not to do it; or who purposely then gives notice to the adversary when he knows that he cannot prohibit; or gives notice so late that the one who would come to prohibit cannot arrive before it is done. And Aristo says that Labeo approves these things thus.
Si quis se denuntiaverit opus facturum, non semper non videtur clam fecisse, si post denuntiationem fecerit: debebit enim ( et ita labeo) et diem et horam denuntiatione complecti et ubi et quod opus futurum sit: neque perfusorie aut obscure dicere aut denuntiare: neque tam artare adversarium, ut intra diem occurrere ad prohibendum non possit.
If someone has given notice that he will make a work, it is not always the case that, if he does it after the notice, he is not deemed to have done it clandestinely: for he ought ( and so Labeo) to include in the notice both the day and the hour, and where and what work is going to be: nor to speak or to give notice perfunctorily or obscurely: nor to hem in the adversary so much that he cannot within the day come up to prohibit.
Si quid servus meus fecit, non ob id mecum actio est, sed si id meo nomine aut suo fecit: nam si tuum servum mercennarium habuero, quidquid ab eo factum fuerit meo nomine, ob id non tecum, sed mecum, cuius iussu aut nomine id opus a servo tuo factum fuerit, agendum erit hoc interdicto.
If my slave has done anything, there is not on that account an action against me—except if he did it in my name or in his own; for if I have had your slave as a mercenary (hired hand), whatever shall have been done by him in my name, on that account one must proceed, not with you, but with me—at whose order or in whose name that work was done by your slave—by this interdict.
Similiter quod iussu cuius factum erit, ob id non cum eo, sed cuius nomine iusserit, haec actio est. nam si procurator tutor curator duumvir municipii, quod eius nomine ageret, cuius negotium procuraret, fieri iusserit, ob id agendum erit cum eo, cuius nomine factum quid erit, non cum eo, qui ita iusserit. et si tibi mandavero, ut opus fieri iuberes et in ea re mihi parueris, mecum, inquit, non tecum erit actio.
Similarly, for what shall have been done by the order of someone, for that the action is not with him, but with the one in whose name he shall have ordered. For if a procurator, tutor, curator, or a duumvir of a municipality, as to what he was acting in the name of him whose business he was managing, shall have ordered it to be done, on that account the suit will be with the one in whose name something shall have been done, not with the one who so ordered. And if I shall have mandated to you that you should order the work to be done, and in that matter you have obeyed me, “with me,” he says, “not with you will the action be.”
Si ego tibi mandavero opus novum facere, tu alii, non potest videri meo iussu factum: teneberis ergo tu et ille: an et ego tenear, videamus. et magis est et me, qui initium rei praestiterim, teneri: sed uno ex his satisfaciente ceteri liberantur.
If I have mandated you to make a new work, and you to another, it cannot appear to have been done by my order: you, therefore, and that man will be liable; whether I also am liable, let us see. And it is more the case that I too, who have provided the inception of the matter, am held: but upon one of these giving satisfaction, the others are released.
Neratius quoque scribit eum, cuius servus vi aut clam fecit, aut sua impensa ex interdicto opus restituere debere aut patientiam restituendi praestare et servum noxae dedere: plane si mortuo alienatove servo interdiceretur, patientiam dumtaxat praestare debere ait, ita ut et emptor eo interdicto possit conveniri, ut impensam praestet aut noxam det: dominoque operis sua impensa restituente aut damnato, quia non restitueret, emptorem liberari. eadem et si contra dominus servi vel opus restituisset vel litis aestimatione damnatus esset: quod si tantum noxae dedisset, adversus dominum operis utiliter interdici.
Neratius likewise writes that the person whose slave did something by force or by stealth must, under the interdict, either restore the work at his own expense, or provide sufferance for restoring and surrender the slave by noxal surrender. Clearly, if the interdict were issued when the slave had died or had been alienated, he says that he need only provide sufferance, with the result that the buyer too can be proceeded against by that interdict, to the end that he provide the expense or give the noxa; and if the master of the work restores at his own expense, or is condemned because he did not restore, the buyer is released. The same holds also if, conversely, the master of the slave either restored the work or was condemned by the assessment of the suit; but if he had only made the noxal surrender, the interdict would lie usefully against the master of the work.
Ait iulianus: qui ante remissionem nuntiationis, contra quam prohibitus fuerit, opus fecerit, duobus interdictis tenebitur, uno, quod ex operis novi nuntiatione competit, altero quod vi aut clam. remissione autem facta intellegendus non erit vi aut clam facere, quamvis prohibeatur: licere enim debet aedificare ei, qui satisdederit, cum possessor hoc ipso constituatur: clamque facere nec ante remissionem nec postea existimandus est, cum is, qui opus novum nuntiat, non possit videri celatus et praeoccupatus, antequam controversiam faceret.
Julian says: he who, before the remission of the notice, has done the work contrary to what he was forbidden, will be held by two interdicts: one which arises from the notice of a new work, the other the interdict quod vi aut clam. But once remission has been made, he is not to be understood to act by force or by stealth, although he is prohibited: for the one who has given security ought to be allowed to build, since by that very act he is constituted possessor; nor is he to be thought to act stealthily either before the remission or thereafter, since the person who gives notice of a new work cannot be seen as having been concealed from and forestalled before he instituted the controversy.
Bellissime apud iulianum quaeritur, an haec exceptio noceat in hoc interdicto " quod non tu vi aut clam feceris?" ut puta utor adversus te interdicto quod vi aut clam, an possis obicere mihi eandem exceptionem: " quod non tu vi aut clam fecisti?" et ait iulianus aequissimum esse hanc exceptionem dare: nam si tu, inquit, aedificaveris vi aut clam, ego idem demolitus fuero vi aut clam et utaris adversus me interdicto, hanc exceptionem profuturam. quod non aliter procedere debet, nisi ex magna et satis necessaria causa: alioquin haec omnia officio iudicis celebrari oportet.
Most excellently it is asked in iulianus whether this exception has effect in this interdict, “that you did not do it by force or stealth?” For instance, I use against you the interdict “quod vi aut clam”: can you oppose to me the same exception, “that you did not do it by force or stealth?” And iulianus says it is most equitable to grant this exception: for, says he, if you have built by force or stealth, and I likewise have demolished by force or stealth, and you employ the interdict against me, this exception will be of benefit. A course which ought not to be undertaken otherwise than for a great and sufficiently necessary cause; otherwise all these matters ought to be conducted by the office of the judge.
Est et alia exceptio, de qua celsus dubitat, an sit obicienda: ut puta si incendii arcendi causa vicini aedes intercidi et quod vi aut clam mecum agatur aut damni iniuria. gallus enim dubitat, an excipi oporteret: " quod incendii defendendi causa factum non sit?" servius autem ait, si id magistratus fecisset, dandam esse, privato non esse idem concedendum: si tamen quid vi aut clam factum sit neque ignis usque eo pervenisset, simpli litem aestimandam: si pervenisset, absolvi eum oportere. idem ait esse, si damni iniuria actum foret, quoniam nullam iniuriam aut damnum dare videtur aeque perituris aedibus.
There is also another exception (exceptio), about which Celsus doubts whether it should be raised: for instance, if for the sake of warding off a fire the neighbor’s house were cut down, and a suit is brought against me under “vi aut clam” or “damni iniuria.” For Gallus doubts whether one ought to plead the exception: “that it was not done for the purpose of defending against a fire?” Servius, however, says that if a magistrate had done it, the exception should be granted, but the same is not to be conceded to a private person: nevertheless, if something was done “vi aut clam” and the fire had not reached that point, the suit is to be assessed at the single amount; if it had reached it, he ought to be acquitted. He says the same would be the case if the action were under “damni iniuria,” since he seems to inflict no wrong or damage upon buildings that were equally going to perish.
Notavimus supra, quod, quamvis verba interdicti late pateant, tamen ad ea sola opera pertinere interdictum placere, quaecumque fiant in solo. eum enim, qui fructum tangit, non teneri interdicto quod vi aut clam: nullum enim opus in solo facit. at qui arbores succidit, utique tenebitur, et qui harundinem et qui salictum: terrae enim et quodammodo solo ipsi corrumpendo manus infert.
We have noted above that, although the words of the interdict range widely, nevertheless it is held that the interdict pertains only to those works which are done on the soil. For he who touches (i.e., gathers) the fruit is not bound by the interdict quod vi aut clam: for he does no work on the soil. But he who cuts down trees will certainly be held, and he who [cuts] reed and who [cuts] a willow-bed: for by corrupting the earth, and in a certain manner the soil itself, he lays hands upon it.
Quaesitum est, si statuam in municipio ex loco publico quis sustulerit vel vi vel clam, an hoc interdicto teneatur. et exstat cassii sententia eum, cuius statua in loco publico in municipio posita sit, quod vi aut clam agere posse, quia interfuerit eius eam non tolli: municipes autem etiam furti acturos, quia res eorum sit quasi publicata: si tamen deciderit, ipsi eam detrahunt: et haec sententia vera est.
It has been asked whether, if someone has taken up a statue in a municipality from a public place either by force or by stealth, he is bound by this interdict. And there exists the opinion of Cassius that he, whose statue has been set up in a public place in a municipality, can bring the action quod vi aut clam, because it was his concern that it not be removed; but the townsmen will also bring an action of theft, because the thing is theirs as if made public; if, however, it has fallen down, they themselves remove it; and this opinion is true.
Si quis de monumento statuam sustulerit, an ei, ad quem ius sepulchri pertineret, agere permittitur? et placet et in his interdicto locum esse. et sane dicendum est, si qua sepulchri ornandi causa adposita sint, sepulchri esse videri.
If someone should remove a statue from a monument, is it permitted for the one to whom the right of the sepulcher pertains to bring an action? And the opinion is yes, and that in these matters there is room for an interdict. And indeed it must be said that, if any things have been set in place for the purpose of adorning the sepulcher, they are considered to belong to the sepulcher.
Quod ait praetor: " quod vi aut clam factum est", ad quod tempus referatur, videamus, utrum ad praeteritum an ad praesens. quae species apud iulianum exposita est: ait enim in hoc interdicto praesentis temporis significationem accipi debere. si tamen, inquit, ex opere damnum datum fuerit aut dominus aut is, cuius fundo nocitum erit, sua impensa id sustulerit, utilius probari, quod iulianus temptat, ut et damnum sarciatur et impendia restituantur.
As the praetor says: " what has been done by force or clandestinely," let us see to what time this is referred, whether to the past or to the present. This type is set out with Julian: for he says that in this interdict the signification of the present time ought to be taken. Nevertheless, he says, if from the work damage shall have been caused, and either the owner or the one whose land will have been harmed has removed it at his own expense, it is more expedient to approve, as Julian attempts, that both the damage be repaired and the expenses be reimbursed.
Interdictum complectitur id, quodcumque aut vi aut clam factum est. sed interdum evenit, ut quid et vi et clam fiat, partim et partim, in eodem opere. ut puta cum prohiberem, fundamenta posuisti: postea cum convenissem, ne reliquum opus fieret, absente et ignorante me reliquum opus perfecisti: vel contra fundamenta clam iecisti, deinde cetera prohibente me aedificasti.
The interdict embraces whatever has been done either by force or secretly. But sometimes it happens that something is done both by force and secretly, partly and partly, in the same work. For example, while I was forbidding, you laid the foundations; afterwards, when I had agreed that the remaining work not be done, with me absent and unaware you completed the remaining work; or conversely, you laid the foundations secretly, and then, while I was forbidding, you built the rest.
Si tutoris iussu aut curatoris factum sit, cum placeat, quod cassius probat, ex dolo tutoris vel curatoris pupillum vel furiosum non teneri, eveniet, ut in ipsum tutorem curatoremque aut utilis actio competat aut etiam utile interdictum. certe ad patientiam tollendi operis utique tenebuntur pupillus et furiosus et ad noxam.
If it has been done by order of a tutor or of a curator, since it is accepted, as Cassius approves, that by reason of the tutor’s or curator’s fraud the ward or the insane person is not held liable, it will follow that against the tutor or curator himself either a useful action lies or even a useful interdict. Certainly, for the toleration of taking down the work the ward and the insane person will in any case be bound, and to noxal liability as well.
An ignoscitur servo, qui obtemperavit tutori aut curatori? nam ad quaedam, quae non habent atrocitatem facinoris vel sceleris, ignoscitur servis, si vel dominis vel his, qui vice dominorum sunt, obtemperaverint. quod et in hoc casu admittendum est.
Is forgiveness granted to a slave who has obeyed a guardian or a curator? For, in regard to certain matters which do not have the atrocity of a criminal deed or wickedness, forgiveness is granted to slaves if they have obeyed either their masters or those who are in the place of masters. This is to be admitted in this case as well.
Si postea, quam vi aut clam factum est, venierit fundus, an venditor nihilo minus hoc interdicto experiri possit, videamus. et extat sententia existimantium nihilo minus competere ei interdictum nec finiri venditione: sed nec ex empto actione quicquam ei praestandum emptori ex eo opere, quod ante venditionem factum est: satis enim esse, quod utique propter hoc opus viliori praedium distraxerit. certe etsi non viliori vendidit, idem erit probandum.
If after a thing has been done by force or by stealth, the estate has been sold, let us see whether the seller can nonetheless proceed by this interdict. And there exists the opinion of those who think that the interdict nonetheless lies for him and is not ended by the sale; but neither by the action ex empto is anything to be rendered by him to the buyer on account of that work which was done before the sale: for it is sufficient that in any case on account of this work he sold the praedium at a cheaper price. Certainly, even if he did not sell it for a cheaper price, the same must be held.
Si fundus in diem addictus sit, cui competat interdictum? et ait iulianus interdictum quod vi aut clam ei competere, cuius interfuit opus non fieri: fundo enim in diem addicto et commodum et incommodum omne ad emptorem, inquit, pertinet, antequam venditio transferatur, et ideo, si quid tunc vi aut clam factum est, quamvis melior condicio allata fuerit, ipse utile interdictum habebit: sed eam actionem sicut fructus medio tempore perceptos venditi iudicio praestare cogendum ait.
If a farm has been knocked down on condition until a day (in diem addictus), to whom does the interdict belong? And Julianus says that the interdict “because by force or by stealth” (quod vi aut clam) belongs to him whose concern it was that the work not be done: for when a farm has been in diem addictus, both all the advantage and all the disadvantage pertain to the buyer, he says, before the conveyance is transferred; and therefore, if at that time something was done by force or by stealth, although a better offer has been brought, he himself will have the utile interdict. But he says that he must be compelled by the seller’s action (actio venditi) to make over that action, just as he must make good the fruits gathered in the meantime.
Aristo autem scribit non possessori esse denuntiandum: nam si quis, inquit, fundum mihi vendiderit et necdum tradiderit et vicinus, cum opus facere vellet et sciret me emisse et in fundo morari, mihi denuntiaverit, esse eum tutum futurum, quod ad suspicionem clam facti operis pertineret: quod sane verum est.
Aristo, however, writes that notice is to be given to a non-possessor: for if someone, he says, has sold me an estate and has not yet delivered it, and the neighbor, when he wished to do a work and knew that I had bought it and was staying on the estate, has given notice to me, he will be safe, so far as it pertains to the suspicion of a work done clandestinely: which indeed is true.
Ego, si post in diem addictionem factam fundus precario traditus sit, putem emptorem interdictum quod vi aut clam habere. si vero aut nondum traditio facta est aut etiam facta est precarii rogatio, non puto dubitandum, quin venditor interdictum habeat: ei enim competere debet, etsi res ipsius periculo non sit, nec multum facit, quod res emptoris periculo est: nam et statim post venditionem contractam periculum ad emptorem spectat et tamen antequam ulla traditio fiat, nemo dixit interdictum ei competere. si tamen precario sit in possessione, videamus, ne, quia interest ipsius, qualiter qualiter possidet, iam interdicto uti possit.
I, if after an in diem addictio has been made the estate has been delivered on precarium, think that the buyer has the interdict quod vi aut clam. But if either delivery has not yet been made or even a request for precarium has been made, I do not think there is any doubt that the seller has the interdict: for it ought to be competent to him, even if the thing is not at his risk, nor does it matter much that the thing is at the buyer’s risk: for immediately after the sale is contracted the risk looks to the buyer, and yet before any delivery is made, no one has said that the interdict is competent to him. If, however, he is in possession on precarium, let us consider whether, since it is to his interest to possess in whatever way, he may now be able to use the interdict.
therefore even if he leased it, much more so: for it does not come into doubt that even a colonus can pursue relief by interdict. plainly, if after a better condition has been brought forward, some work has been done by force or by stealth, neither would Julian doubt that the interdict is competent to the seller: for between Cassius and Julian the question is about that which happened in the meantime, not about that work which occurred afterwards.
Si ita praedium venierit, ut, si displicuisset, inemptum esset, facilius admittimus interdictum emptorem habere, si modo est in possessione: et si rescissio emptionis in alterius arbitrium conferatur, idem erit probandum: idemque et si ita venisset, ut, si aliquid evenisset, inemptum esset praedium: et si forte commissoria venierit, idem dicendum est.
If a praedium has been sold on the terms that, if it displeased, it would be as unbought, we more readily admit that the purchaser has the interdict, provided only that he is in possession; and if rescission of the purchase is referred to another’s arbitration, the same must be held; and the same likewise if it was sold on the terms that, if something should occur, the praedium would be as unbought; and if perchance it has been sold with a commissory clause, the same is to be said.
Unde apud servium amplius relatum est, si mihi concesseris, ut ex fundo tuo arbores caedam, deinde eas alius vi aut clam ceciderit, mihi hoc interdictum competere, quia ego sim cuius interest: quod facilius erit admittendum, si a te emi vel ex aliquo contractu hoc consecutus sim, ut mihi caedere liceat.
Whence it has been further reported by Servius that, if you have granted me to cut trees from your estate, and then someone else has felled them by force or secretly, this interdict is available to me, because I am the one whose interest it is; which will be more readily admitted if I bought this from you or obtained it from some contract, namely that it is permitted to me to cut.
Quaesitum est, si, cum praedium interim nullius esset, aliquid vi aut clam factum sit, an postea dominio ad aliquem devoluto interdicto locus sit: ut puta hereditas iacebat, postea adiit hereditatem titius, an ei interdictum competat? et est apud vivianum saepissime relatum heredi competere hoc interdictum eius, quod ante aditam hereditatem factum sit, nec referre labeo ait, quod non scierit, qui heredes futuri essent: hoc enim posse quem causari etiam post aditam hereditatem. ne illud quidem obstare labeo ait, quod eo tempore nemo dominus fuerit: nam et sepulchri nemo dominus fuit et tamen, si quid in eo fiat, experiri possum quod vi aut clam.
It has been asked, if, when a praedium meanwhile belonged to no one, something was done by force or by stealth, whether afterwards, when ownership has devolved to someone, there is room for the interdict: for instance, the inheritance was lying unclaimed, afterwards Titius entered upon the inheritance—does the interdict befit him? And it is most frequently reported by Vivianus that this interdict is competent to the heir for that which was done before the inheritance was entered; nor, Labeo says, does it matter that it was not known who the heirs would be: for one can allege this even after the inheritance has been entered. Nor, Labeo says, does even this stand in the way, that at that time no one was owner: for of a sepulchre no one is owner, and yet, if anything is done in it, I can proceed by the “what was done by force or by stealth” interdict.
Iulianus ait: si colonus arborem, de qua controversia erat, succiderat vel quid aliud opus fecerit, si quidem iussu domini id factum sit, ambo tenebuntur, non ut patientiam praestent, sed ut impensam quoque ad restituendum praebeant: si autem dominus non iusserit, colonus quidem tenebitur, ut patientiam et impensam praestet, dominus vero nihil amplius quam patientiam praestare cogendus erit.
Julian says: if a colonus (tenant) has cut down a tree about which there was a controversy, or has done some other work, if indeed this was done by the order of the owner, both will be held liable, not to furnish mere toleration, but also to supply the expense for restoring; but if the owner did not order it, the colonus will be liable to furnish toleration and expense, whereas the owner will be compelled to furnish nothing more than toleration.
Nam et si servus meus ignorante me opus fecerit eumque vendidero vel manumisero, mecum in hoc solum agi poterit, ut patiar opus tolli, cum emptore autem servi, ut aut noxae dedat aut impensam, quae in restitutione facta fuerit, praestet: sed et cum ipso manumisso recte agi poterit.
For if my slave, without my knowledge, has made a work, and I have sold or manumitted him, an action can be brought against me only to this extent: that I allow the work to be removed; but against the purchaser of the slave, that he either surrender him noxally or pay the expense which shall have been made in the restitution: and an action can also properly be brought against the manumitted man himself.
Is, cui fundum pastinandum locaveras, lapides sustulit et in vicini proiecit praedium. ait labeo te vi aut clam non teneri, nisi iussu tuo id factum sit: ego puto conductorem teneri, locatorem autem non alias, nisi aut patientiam praestare possit aut aliquam actionem habeat, quam praestet: ceterum teneri non oportere.
He, to whom you had leased the farm (fundus) for trenching (pastination), removed stones and threw them onto the neighbor’s praedium. Labeo says that you are not held under the interdict vi aut clam, unless it was done by your order: I for my part think the conductor is liable, but the locator is not otherwise, unless either he can provide sufferance or has some action which he can furnish; otherwise, he ought not to be held.
Si in sepulchro alieno terra congesta fuerit iussu meo, agendum esse quod vi aut clam mecum labeo scribit. et si communi consilio plurium id factum sit, licere vel cum uno vel cum singulis experiri: opus enim, quod a pluribus pro indiviso factum est, singulos in solidum obligare. si tamen proprio quis eorum consilio hoc fecerit, cum omnibus esse agendum, scilicet in solidum: itaque alter conventus alterum non liberabit, quin immo perceptio ab altero: superiore etenim casu alterius conventio alterum liberat.
If in another’s sepulcher earth has been heaped by my order, Labeo writes that the action “quod vi aut clam” must be brought against me. And if this was done by the common counsel of several, it is permitted to try the suit either against one or against each singly: for the work which has been done by several pro indiviso binds the individuals in solidum. If, however, any one of them did this by his own counsel, one must proceed against all, namely in solidum: and so the convening of the one will not free the other—nay rather, not even receipt from the other—whereas in the former case the convening of the one frees the other.
Et post annum non competit. annus autem cedere incipit, ex quo id opus factum perfectum est aut fieri desiit, licet perfectum non sit: alioquin si a principio operis coepti annum quis numeret, necesse est cum his, qui opus tardissime facerent, saepius agi.
And after a year it does not lie. The year, however, begins to run from the time when that work has been made and completed, or when it has ceased to be carried on, even if it is not completed: otherwise, if one were to count the year from the beginning of the work once commenced, it would be necessary to proceed more often against those who would do the work most slowly.
Sed si is sit locus, in quo opus factum est, qui facile non adiretur, ut puta in sepulchro vi aut clam factum est vel in abdito alio loco, sed et si sub terra fieret opus vel sub aqua, vel cloaca aliquid factum sit, etiam post annum causa cognita competit interdictum de eo quod factum est: nam causa cognita annuam exceptionem remittendam, hoc est magna et iusta causa ignorantiae interveniente.
But if it be a place in which the work was done that is not easily accessible, as, for instance, it was done in a tomb by force or by stealth, or in some other hidden spot, and likewise if the work were done underground or under water, or something were done in a sewer, then even after a year, once the matter has been inquired into, the interdict concerning that which has been done lies: for, the matter having been inquired into, the annual exception is to be remitted—that is, when a great and just cause of ignorance has intervened.
Si quis rei publicae causa afuisset, deinde reversus interdicto quod vi aut clam uti vellet, verius est non excludi anno eum, sed reversum annum habere. nam et si minor viginti quinque annis rei publicae causa abesse coepisset, deinde maior effectus sit, dum abest rei publicae causa, futurum, ut ex quo redit annus ei computetur, non ex quo implevit vicensimum quintum annum: et ita divus pius et deinceps omnes principes rescripserunt.
If someone had been away for the sake of the commonwealth, then upon returning wished to employ the interdict “quod vi aut clam,” the truer view is that he is not excluded by the year, but that, on returning, he has a year. For even if a person under twenty‑five years began to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, and then became of full age while he is absent on public business, it will come about that a year is computed to him from the time he returns, not from the time he completed his twenty‑fifth year: and thus the deified Pius, and thereafter all the princes, have written in rescripts.
Hoc interdicto tanti lis aestimatur, quanti actoris interest id opus factum esse. officio autem iudicis ita oportere fieri restitutionem iudicandum est, ut in omni causa eadem condicio sit actoris, quae futura esset, si id opus, de quo actum est, neque vi neque clam factum esset.
By this interdict the suit is appraised at as much as the plaintiff’s interest is that that work have been done. And by the duty of the judge it must be adjudged that restitution be made in such a way that in every case the condition of the plaintiff be the same as it would be if the work, about which there has been suit, had been done neither by force nor by stealth.
Ergo nonnumquam etiam dominii ratio habenda est, ut puta si propter hoc opus, quod factum est, servitutes amittantur aut usus fructus intereat. quod non tantum tunc eveniet, cum quis opus aedificaverit, verum etiam si diruisse opus proponatur et deteriorem condicionem fecisse vel servitutium vel usus fructus vel ipsius proprietatis.
Therefore, sometimes consideration must also be had for ownership, for example if, on account of this work which has been done, servitudes are lost or a usufruct perishes. This will occur not only when someone has built a work, but even if it is alleged that he has demolished the work and has made the condition worse, whether of the servitudes or of the usufruct or of the ownership itself.
Si quis vi aut clam arbores non frugiferas ceciderit, veluti cupressos, domino dumtaxat competit interdictum. sed si amoenitas quaedam ex huiusmodi arboribus praestetur, potest dici et fructuarii interesse propter voluptatem et gestationem et esse huic interdicto locum.
If anyone has felled trees not fruit-bearing by force or by stealth, such as cypresses, the interdict belongs only to the owner. But if a certain amenity is afforded by trees of this kind, it can be said that the usufructuary also has an interest, on account of pleasure and carriage‑riding, and that there is room for this interdict.
Si ad ianuam meam tabulas fixeris et ego eas, priusquam tibi denuntiarem, refixero, deinde invicem interdicto quod vi aut clam egerimus: nisi remittas mihi, ut absolvar, condemnandum te, quasi rem non restituas, quanti mea intersit, aut certe exceptionem mihi profuturam " si non vi nec clam nec precario feceris".
If you should fasten tablets at my door, and I, before I had given you notice, should unfasten them, then in turn we have proceeded under the interdict “what was done by force or by stealth”: unless you grant me a remission so that I may be absolved, you are to be condemned, as though you did not restore the thing, to the amount of how much it is in my interest; or at any rate an exception will profit me, “if you did not do it by force nor by stealth nor by precarium (revocable leave).”
Si stercus per fundum meum tuleris, cum id te facere vetuissem, quamquam nihil damni feceris mihi nec fundi mei mutaveris, tamen teneri te quod vi aut clam trebatius ait. labeo contra, ne etiam is, qui dumtaxat iter per fundum meum fecerit aut avem egerit venatusve fuerit sine ullo opere, hoc interdicto teneatur.
If you carry dung through my estate, when I had forbidden you to do this, although you have done me no damage nor altered my estate, nevertheless you are held under the interdict “quod vi aut clam,” so Trebatius says. Labeo, on the contrary, [holds] that not even one who has only made a passage through my estate, or has driven a bird, or has hunted without any work, is held by this interdict.
Si quis proiectum aut stillicidium in sepulchrum immiserit, etiamsi ipsum monumentum non tangeret, recte cum eo agi, quod in sepulchro vi aut clam factum sit, quia sepulchri sit non solum is locus, qui recipiat humationem, sed omne etiam supra id caelum: eoque nomine etiam sepulchri violati agi posse.
If anyone has introduced a projection or a stillicide into a sepulcher, even if he does not touch the monument itself, it is proper to proceed against him for what has been done in a sepulcher by force or stealth (vi aut clam), because a sepulcher comprises not only the place that receives inhumation but also all the sky above it; and under that title as well it is possible to bring an action for a violated sepulcher.
Et verba praetoris ostendunt remissionem ibi demum factam, ubi nuntiatio non tenet, et nuntiationem ibi demum voluisse praetorem tenere, ubi ius est nuntianti prohibere, ne se invito fiat. ceterum sive satisdatio interveniat sive non, remissio facta hoc tantum remittit, in quo non tenuit nuntiatio. plane si satisdatum est, exinde remissio facta est, non est necessaria remissio.
And the praetor’s words show that a remission was made only there where the nuntiation does not take effect, and that the praetor wished the nuntiation to hold only there where it is the right of the one giving notice to prohibit that it be done against his will. Moreover, whether satisdation intervenes or not, a remission made remits only to the extent in which the nuntiation did not hold. Clearly, if security has been furnished, from then a remission is deemed to have been made; a remission is not necessary.
Item iuliano placet fructuario vindicandarum servitutium ius esse: secundum quod opus novum nuntiare poterit vicino et remissio utilis erit. ipsi autem domino praedii si nuntiaverit, remissio inutilis erit: neque sicut adversus vicinum, ita adversus dominum agere potest ius ei non esse invito se altius aedificare. sed si hoc facto usus fructus deterior fiat, petere usum fructum debebit.
Likewise it pleases Julian that the usufructuary has the right of vindicating servitudes: according to which he will be able to announce a new work to a neighbor, and a withdrawal (remission) will be effective. But if he gives notice to the owner of the estate himself, the withdrawal will be ineffectual: nor, as against a neighbor, can he in the same way bring an action against the owner that he has no right, he himself being unwilling, to build higher. But if by this act the usufruct becomes worse, he ought to claim the usufruct.
Et naturalem habet in se aequitatem, namque precarium revocare volenti competit: est enim natura aequum tamdiu te liberalitate mea uti, quamdiu ego velim, et ut possim revocare, cum mutavero voluntatem. itaque cum quid precario rogatum est, non solum hoc interdicto uti possumus, sed etiam praescriptis verbis actione, quae ex bona fide oritur.
And it has in itself a natural equity, for it is competent to one who wishes to recall a precarium: for it is naturally equitable that you use my liberality as long as I wish, and that I be able to recall it when I have changed my will. And so, when something has been asked by precarium, we can employ not only this interdict, but also the action with prescribed words, which arises from good faith.
Item qui precario ad tempus rogavit, finito tempore, etiamsi ad hoc temporis non rogavit, tamen precario possidere videtur: intellegitur enim dominus, cum patitur eum qui precario rogaverit possidere, rursus precario concedere.
Likewise, one who has requested a precarium for a time, when the time has ended, even if he did not request it for this length of time, nevertheless is considered to possess by precarium: for the owner, when he allows him who has requested by precarium to possess, is understood to grant it again by precarium.
Sed si manente adhuc precario tu in ulterius tempus rogasti, prorogatur precarium: nam nec mutatur causa possessionis et non constituitur eo modo precarium, sed in longius tempus profertur. si vero praeterita die rogas, propius est, ut soluta iam causa precarii non redintegretur, sed nova constituatur.
But if, with the precarium still continuing, you asked for a further period, the precarium is prorogated: for neither is the cause of possession changed, and in that way a precarium is not constituted, but it is carried forward to a longer time. But if you ask after the day has passed, it is more correct that, since the cause of the precarium has already been dissolved, it is not reinstated, but a new one is constituted.
Iulianus ait eum, qui vi alterum deiecit et ab eodem precario rogavit, desinere vi possidere et incipere precario, neque existimare sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare, cum voluntate eius quem deiecit coeperit precario possidere: nam si ab eodem emisset, incipere etiam pro emptore posse dominium capere.
Julian says that one who has ejected another by force and from that same person has requested a precarium ceases to possess by force and begins to possess by precarium, nor should he suppose that he is changing the cause of possession for himself, since with the will of the one whom he ejected he has begun to possess by precarium: for if he had bought from that same person, he could likewise begin to acquire dominion as a buyer.
Quaesitum est, si quis rem suam pignori mihi dederit et precario rogaverit, an hoc interdictum locum habeat. quaestio in eo est, ut precarium consistere rei suae possit. mihi videtur verius precarium consistere in pignore, cum possessionis rogetur, non proprietatis, et est haec sententia etiam utilissima: cottidie enim precario rogantur creditores ab his, qui pignori dederunt, et debet consistere precarium.
It has been asked, if someone has given his own thing to me in pledge and has petitioned by precarium, whether this interdict has application. The question is this: whether a precarium can stand with respect to one’s own thing. It seems to me more true that a precarium can stand in a pledge, since what is requested is possession, not proprietorship; and this opinion is also most useful: for every day creditors are petitioned by precarium by those who have given things in pledge, and the precarium ought to stand.
Quaesitum est, si titius me rogaverit, ut re sempronii utatur, deinde ego sempronium rogavero, ut concederet, et ille, dum mihi vult praestitum, concesserit. titius a me habet precario et ego cum eo agam interdicto de precario: sempronius autem non aget cum eo, quia haec verba " ab illo precario habes" ostendunt ei demum competere interdictum, a quo quis precario rogavit, non cuius res est, an tamen sempronius mecum, quasi a me rogatus, interdictum habeat? et magis est, ne habeat, quia non habeo precario, cum non mihi, sed alii impetravi.
It has been asked: if Titius has requested of me that he use the property of Sempronius, then I have asked Sempronius to allow it, and he, wishing to do me a favor, has granted it. titius holds from me by precarium, and I will proceed against him by the interdict on precarium; but sempronius will not proceed against him, because these words " you have by precarium from that man" show that the interdict lies only for him from whom someone asked by precarium, not for the one whose property it is—yet does sempronius nevertheless have the interdict against me, as if he had been asked by me? And the sounder view is that he does not have it, because I do not hold by precarium, since I obtained it not for myself, but for another.
Quod a titio precario quis rogavit, id etiam ab herede eius precario habere videtur: et ita et sabinus et celsus scribunt eoque iure utimur. ergo et a ceteris successoribus habere quis precario videtur. idem et labeo probat et adicit, etiamsi ignoret quis heredem, tamen videri eum ab herede precario habere.
What someone requested by precarium from Titius, he is considered to hold by precarium also from his heir: and thus both Sabinus and Celsus write, and we make use of that rule. Therefore he is considered to hold it by precarium also from the other successors. The same Labeo approves and adds that, even if one does not know who the heir is, nevertheless he is considered to hold it by precarium from the heir.
Illud tamen videamus quale sit, si a me precario rogaveris et ego eam rem alienavero, an precarium duret re ad alium translata. et magis est, ut, si ille non revocet, posse interdicere quasi ab illo precario habeas, non quasi a me: et si passus est aliquo tempore a se precario habere, recte interdicet, quasi a se precario habeas.
Let us nevertheless see what the case is, if you have asked me by precarium and I have alienated that thing, whether the precarium endures when the thing has been transferred to another. And the more correct view is that, if he does not revoke it, the interdict can be sought as if you hold by precarium from him, not as if from me; and if he has allowed for some time that you hold by precarium from himself, the interdict will properly be issued, as if you hold by precarium from himself.
Eum quoque precario teneri voluit praetor, qui dolo fecit, ut habere desineret. illud adnotatur, quod culpam non praestat is qui precario rogavit, sed solum dolum praestat, quamquam is, qui commodatum suscepit, non tantum dolum, sed etiam culpam praestat. nec immerito dolum solum praestat is qui precario rogavit, cum totum ex liberalitate descendat eius qui precario concessit et satis sit, si dolus tantum praestetur.
The praetor also wanted him to be held under the precarium who by fraud brought it about that he ceased to have it. it is noted that the one who asked by way of precarium does not answer for fault, but answers only for fraud, although he who undertook a loan for use (commodatum) answers not only for fraud but also for fault. nor without reason does the one who asked by precarium answer only for fraud, since the whole descends from the liberality of him who granted by precarium, and it is enough if only fraud is answered for.
Ex hoc interdicto restitui debet in pristinam causam: quod si non fuerit factum, condemnatio in tantum fiet, quanti interfuit actoris ei rem restitui ex eo tempore, ex quo interdictum editum est: ergo et fructus ex die interdicti editi praestabuntur.
By this interdict he must be restored to the former condition: but if that has not been done, condemnation will be for so much as it was in the plaintiff’s interest that the thing be restored to him, from the time from which the interdict was issued: therefore the fruits also will be owed from the day the interdict was issued.
Et generaliter erit dicendum in restitutionem venire dolum et culpam latam dumtaxat, cetera non venire. plane post interdictum editum oportebit et dolum et culpam et omnem causam venire: nam ubi moram quis fecit precario, omnem causam debebit constituere.
And, generally, it must be said that, for restitution, only fraud and gross negligence come into consideration; the rest do not. Clearly, after the interdict has been issued, both fraud and fault and every cause must be admitted: for where someone has made delay while holding by precarium, he will have to establish the whole cause.
Cum precario aliquid datur, si convenit, ut in kalendas iulias precario possideat, numquid exceptione adiuvandus est, ne ante ei possessio auferatur? sed nulla vis est huius conventionis, ut rem alienam domino invito possidere liceat.
When something is given on a precarium, if it is agreed that he may possess on a precarium until the Kalends of July, is he to be aided by an exception, lest possession be taken from him before? But there is no force in this agreement, such that it be permitted to possess another’s property with the owner unwilling.
Si servus tuus tuo mandato precario rogaverit vel ratum habueris quod ille rogavit tuo nomine, teneberis, quasi precario habeas. sed si te ignorante suo nomine vel servus vel filius rogaverit, non videris tu precario habere, sed illi erit actio de peculio vel de in rem verso.
If your slave, on your mandate, has requested by precarium, or if you have ratified what he requested in your name, you will be liable as though you held it by precarium. But if, without your knowledge, either the slave or a son has requested in his own name, you are not deemed to hold by precarium; rather, he will have an actio de peculio or an actio de in rem verso.
Eum, qui precario rogaverit, ut sibi possidere liceat, nancisci possessionem non est dubium: an is quoque possideat, qui rogatus sit, dubitatum est. placet autem penes utrumque esse eum hominem, qui precario datus esset, penes eum qui rogasset, quia possideat corpore, penes dominum, quia non discesserit animo possessione.
He who has requested by precarium that it be permitted for him to possess—there is no doubt that he acquires possession; whether the one who was asked also possesses has been a matter of doubt. However, it is the accepted view that the person who was given by precarium is “with” both: with him who asked, because he possesses by the body; with the owner, because he has not departed in mind from possession.
Si is, qui pro possessore possideret, precario dominum rogaverit, ut sibi retinere rem liceret, vel is, qui alienam rem emisset, dominum rogaverit: apparet eos precario possidere. nec existimandos mutare sibi causam possessionis, quibus a domino concedatur precario possidere: nam et si id quod possideas alium precario rogaveris, videri te desinere ex prima causa possidere et incipere ex precario habere: et contra si possessorem precario rogaverit qui rem avocare ei posset, teneri eum precario, quoniam aliquid ad eum per hanc precarii rogationem pervenit, id est possessio, quae aliena sit.
If one who was possessing on behalf of a possessor should petition the owner by precarium that he be allowed to retain the thing for himself, or if one who had bought another’s thing should petition the owner, it is apparent that they are possessing by precarium. Nor are those to whom it is granted by the owner to possess by precarium to be thought to be changing for themselves the cause (ground) of their possession: for even if, as to that which you possess, you have asked another by precarium, you are deemed to cease to possess from the original cause and to begin to hold from precarium; and conversely, if the person who could call the thing back from him should petition the possessor by precarium, he is held by precarium, since something has come to him through this request for a precarium, that is, possession, which is another’s.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate precario rogaverit, labeo ait habere eum precariam possessionem et hoc interdicto teneri. nam quo magis naturaliter possideretur, nullum locum esse tutoris auctoritati: recteque dici " quod precario habes", quia quod possideat ex ea causa possideat, ex qua rogaverit: nihilque novi per praetorem constituendum, quoniam, sive habeat rem, officio iudicis teneretur, sive non habeat, non teneatur.
If a ward, without the authority of his guardian, has requested by precarium, Labeo says that he has precarious possession and is held by this interdict. For, because the possession is of the more merely natural sort, there is no place for the guardian’s authority; and it is rightly said, “what you have by precarium,” because what he possesses he possesses on that ground on which he requested; and nothing new need be established by the praetor, since, whether he has the thing, he would be bound under the judge’s duty, or, if he does not have it, he would not be bound.
Si arbor aedibus alienis impendeat, utrum totam arborem iubeat praetor adimi an vero id solum, quod superexcurrit, quaeritur. et rutilius ait a stirpe excidendam idque plerisque videtur verius: et nisi adimet dominus arborem, labeo ait permitti ei, cui arbor officeret, ut si vellet succideret eam lignaque tolleret.
If a tree should overhang another’s buildings, the question is whether the praetor ought to order the whole tree to be removed, or rather only that which over-projects. And Rutilius says it should be cut down from the stock, and this seems truer to most; and unless the owner removes the tree, Labeo says that permission is granted to him whom the tree hinders, that, if he wished, he might cut it down and carry off the wood.
Ait praetor: " si per te stat, quo minus eam adimas, quo minus illi eam arborem adimere liceat, vim fieri veto". prius itaque tibi datur adimendi facultas: si tu non facias, tunc vicino prohibet vim fieri adimere volenti.
The praetor says: " if it rests with you that you do not take it away, so that it may not be permitted to him to take away that tree, I forbid force to be used". therefore the faculty of removing is given to you first: if you do not do it, then he forbids force to be used against the neighbor who wishes to remove it.
Quod et lex fabia prospexit. neque hoc interdictum aufert legis fabiae exsecutionem: nam et hoc interdicto agi poterit et nihilo minus accusatio legis fabiae institui: et versa vice qui egit fabia, poterit nihilo minus etiam hoc interdictum habere, praesertim cum alius interdictum, alius fabiae actionem habere possit.
Which the lex Fabia has also provided for. Nor does this interdict remove the execution of the lex Fabia: for both it will be possible to proceed by this interdict, and nonetheless an accusation under the lex Fabia can be instituted; and conversely, he who has proceeded by the Fabia action will nonetheless be able also to have this interdict, especially since one person may have the interdict, another the Fabia action.
Si quis eum, quem ab hostibus redemit, retineat, in ea causa est, ut interdicto non teneatur: non enim dolo malo facit. plane si offertur pretium, interdictum locum habet. sed et si eum remisit pretio non accepto, dicendum est interdicto locum fore, si, posteaquam semel remisit, velit retinere.
If anyone retains the person whom he redeemed from the enemy, he is in such a position that he is not held by the interdict: for he does not act with malicious fraud. Clearly, if the price is offered, the interdict has place. But also, if he released him with no price accepted, it must be said that the interdict will have place, if, after he has once released him, he wishes to retain him.
Si eum quis retineat filium, quem non habet in potestate, plerumque sine dolo malo facere videbitur: pietas enim genuina efficit sine dolo malo retineri, nisi si evidens dolus malus intercedat. proinde et si libertum suum vel alumnum vel noxae deditum adhuc impuberem, idem erit dicendum. et generaliter qui iustam causam habet hominis liberi apud se retinendi, non videtur dolo malo facere.
If someone should retain a son whom he does not have in his power, he will for the most part be seen to act without bad faith; for genuine pietas brings it about that he is retained without bad faith, unless evident bad faith should intervene. Accordingly, the same must be said if he retain his freedman, or his alumnus (foster-child), or one noxally surrendered, still prepubescent. And, generally, one who has a just cause for retaining a free person with himself is not seen to act with bad faith.
Si quis volentem retineat, non videtur dolo malo retinere. sed quid si volentem quidem retineat, non tamen sine calliditate circumventum vel seductum vel sollicitatum, neque bona vel probabili ratione hoc facit? recte dicetur dolo malo retinere.
If someone detains one who is willing, he does not seem to detain by malicious deceit. But what if he does detain one who is indeed willing, yet not without craftiness—someone circumvented or seduced or solicited—and he does not do this on a good or probable ground? It will be rightly said that he detains by malicious deceit.
Plane si dubitat, utrum liber an servus sit, vel facit status controversiam, recedendum erit ab hoc interdicto et agenda causa libertatis. etenim recte placuit tunc demum hoc interdictum locum habere, quotiens quis pro certo liber est: ceterum si quaeratur de statu, non oportet praeiudicium fieri alienae cognitioni.
Clearly, if there is doubt whether he is free or a slave, or a controversy of status is made, one must withdraw from this interdict and the cause of liberty must be pursued. For indeed it has been rightly resolved that this interdict has place then and only then, whenever someone is for certain free; but if inquiry is made about status, it is not proper that a prejudgment be made to another’s cognizance.
Si tamen, posteaquam hoc interdicto actum est, alius hoc interdicto agere desideret, palam erit postea alii non facile dandum, nisi si de perfidia prioris potuerit aliquid dici. itaque causa cognita amplius quam semel interdictum hoc erit movendum. nam nec in publicis iudiciis permittitur amplius agi quam semel actum est quam si praevaricationis fuerit damnatus prior accusator.
If, however, after action has been taken under this interdict, another should desire to proceed by this interdict, it will be evident that thereafter it is not easily to be granted to another, unless something can be said about the perfidy of the former. And so, the cause having been examined, this interdict is not to be moved more than once. For neither in public trials is it permitted that there be further proceedings than once it has been acted upon, except if the prior accuser has been condemned for prevarication.
Si quis filiam suam, quae mihi nupta sit, velit abducere vel exhiberi sibi desideret, an adversus interdictum exceptio danda sit, si forte pater concordans matrimonium, forte et liberis subnixum, velit dissolvere? et certo iure utimur, ne bene concordantia matrimonia iure patriae potestatis turbentur. quod tamen sic erit adhibendum, ut patri persuadeatur, ne acerbe patriam potestatem exerceat.
If someone should wish to carry off his daughter, who is married to me, or should desire that she be produced to him, is an exception to be granted against the interdict, if perchance the father wishes to dissolve a concordant marriage, perhaps even supported by children? And we make use of a settled law, lest marriages that are well in concord be disturbed by the right of paternal power. This, however, is to be applied in such a way that the father is persuaded not to exercise his paternal power harshly.
Superiora interdicta exhibitoria sunt, hoc est pertinent ad exhibitionem liberorum ceterorumque, de quibus supra diximus: hoc autem interdictum pertinet ad ductionem, ut ducere quis possit eos, in quos habet ius ductionis. itaque prius interdictum, quod est de liberis exhibendis, praeparatorium est huius interdicti: quo magis enim quis duci possit, exhibendus fuit.
The foregoing interdicts are exhibitory, that is, they pertain to the exhibition (production) of children and of the others about whom we spoke above; but this interdict pertains to duction, so that one may be able to lead away those over whom he has the right of duction. Therefore the earlier interdict, which concerns children to be exhibited, is preparatory to this interdict: for indeed, in order that one might be able to be led away, he had to be exhibited.
Hoc autem interdictum competit non adversus ipsum filium, quem quis ducere vult, sed utique esse debet is qui eum interdicto defendat: ceterum cessat interdictum, et succedere poterit notio praetoris, ut apud eum disceptetur, utrum quis in potestate sit an non sit.
But this interdict is available not against the son himself, whom someone wishes to lead away, but there must in any case be someone who defends him by the interdict; otherwise the interdict ceases, and the praetor’s cognition can succeed, so that before him it may be disputed whether someone is in power or is not.
Iulianus ait, quotiens id interdictum movetur de filio ducendo vel cognitio et is de quo agitur impubes est, alias differri oportere rem in tempus pubertatis, alias repraesentari: idque ex persona eorum, inter quos controversia erit, et ex genere causae constituendum est. nam si is, qui se patrem dicit, auctoritatis prudentiae fidei exploratae esset, usque in diem litis impuberem apud se habebit: is vero, qui controversiam facit, humilis calumniator notae nequitiae, repraesentanda cognitio est. item si is, qui impuberem negat in aliena potestate esse, vir omnibus modis probatus, tutor vel testamento vel a praetore datus pupillum, quem in diem litis apud se habuit, tuetur, is vero, qui patrem se dicit, suspectus est quasi calumniator, differri litem non oportebit.
Julian says that whenever that interdict about leading away a son is set in motion, or a hearing is held, and the person concerned is underage, sometimes the matter ought to be deferred to the time of puberty, sometimes to be held forthwith; and this must be determined from the persona of those between whom the controversy will be, and from the kind of the case. For if he who says he is the father is of tried authority, prudence, and good faith, he will keep the underage person with him until the day of suit; but if the one who raises the controversy is a man of low station, a calumniator of notorious depravity, the hearing must be held immediately. Likewise, if he who denies that the underage is in another’s power is a man approved in every way, a tutor (guardian) appointed either by testament or by the praetor, who protects the ward whom he has had with him up to the day of suit, but he who says he is the father is suspect as a kind of calumniator, it will not be proper to defer the suit.
but if indeed both persons are suspect, either as infirm or as base, it will not be out of place, he says, to arrange with whom in the meantime the boy should be brought up, and to defer the controversy to the time of puberty, lest through collusion or the inexperience of either of the contenders either a paterfamilias be adjudged to another’s power or an alien son be constituted in the place of a paterfamilias.
Etiamsi maxime autem probet filium pater in sua potestate esse, tamen causa cognita mater in retinendo eo potior erit, idque decretis divi pii quibusdam continetur: optinuit enim mater ob nequitiam patris, ut sine deminutione patriae potestatis apud eam filius moretur.
Even if, moreover, the father most strongly proves that the son is under his own paternal power, nevertheless, with the case examined, the mother will be preferable in retaining him; and this is contained in certain decrees of the deified Pius: for the mother prevailed, on account of the father’s depravity, that the son should remain with her without diminution of the paternal power (patria potestas).
In hoc interdicto, donec res iudicetur, feminam, praetextatum eumque, qui proxime praetextati aetatem accedet, interim apud matrem familias deponi praetor iubet. proxime aetatem praetextati accedere eum dicimus, qui puberem aetatem nunc ingressus est. cum audis matrem familias, accipe notae auctoritatis feminam.
In this interdict, until the matter is adjudicated, the praetor orders that the woman, the praetextatus, and also him who most nearly approaches the age of the praetextatus be meanwhile placed with the materfamilias. We say that he most nearly approaches the praetextatus’s age who has now entered the age of puberty. When you hear “materfamilias,” understand a woman of noted authority.
Si filius sua sponte apud aliquem est, inutile hoc interdictum erit, quia filius magis apud se quam apud eum est, in quem interdicetur, cum liberam facultatem abeundi vel remanendi haberet: nisi si inter duos, qui se patres dicerent, controversia esset et alter ab altero exhiberi eum desideraret.
If a son is with someone of his own accord, this interdict will be ineffectual, because the son is rather with himself than with the one against whom the interdict is laid, since he had the free faculty of departing or remaining: unless there were a controversy between two who called themselves fathers, and one desired that he be exhibited by the other.
Hoc interdictum de possessione rerum mobilium locum habet: sed optinuit vim eius exaequatam fuisse uti possidetis interdicto, quod de rebus soli competit, ut is et in hoc interdicto vincat, qui nec vi nec clam nec precario, dum super hoc ab adversario inquietatur, possessionem habet.
This interdict has application to possession of movable things; but it has prevailed that its force has been equalized to the interdict uti possidetis, which pertains to things of the soil, so that in this interdict also he prevails who has possession neither by force, nor by stealth, nor by precarium, while he is being disturbed about this by his adversary.
Praetor ait: " si is homo, quo de agitur, non est ex his rebus, de quibus inter te et actorem convenit, ut, quae in eam habitationem qua de agitur introducta importata ibi nata factave essent, ea pignori tibi pro mercede eius habitationis essent, sive ex his rebus est et ea merces tibi soluta eove nomine satisfactum est aut per te stat, quo minus solvatur: ita, quo minus ei, qui eum pignoris nomine induxit, inde abducere liceat, vim fieri veto".
The praetor says: "If the man who is at issue is not among those things concerning which it was agreed between you and the plaintiff that whatever had been introduced or imported into that dwelling in question, or had been born or made there, would be a pledge to you for the rent of that dwelling; or if he is among those things and that rent has been paid to you, or satisfaction has been made under that head, or it is by your doing that payment is not made: then, so that it may not be unlawful for the person who brought him in under the name of pledge to lead him away from there, I forbid force to be used."
Si pensio nondum debeatur, ait labeo interdictum hoc cessare, nisi paratus sit eam pensionem solvere. proinde si semenstrem solvit, sexmenstris debeatur, inutiliter interdicet, nisi solverit et sequentis sexmenstris, ita tamen, si conventio specialis facta est in conductione domus, ut non liceat ante finitum annum vel certum tempus migrare. idem est et si quis in plures annos conduxerit et nondum praeterierit tempus.
If the installment is not yet due, Labeo says this interdict does not apply unless he is ready to pay that installment. Accordingly, if he pays a half‑year installment, while a six‑month installment is owed, he will employ the interdict to no effect unless he also pays the following six‑month installment—provided, however, that a special agreement was made in the lease of the house that it is not permitted to move out before the year is completed or before a fixed time. The same holds if someone has leased for several years and the period has not yet elapsed.
Illud notandum est praetorem hic non exegisse, ut in bonis fuerit conductoris, nec ut esset pignori res illata, sed si pignoris nomine inducta sit. proinde et si aliena sint et si talia, quae pignoris nomine teneri non potuerint, pignoris tamen nomine introducta sint, interdicto hoc locus erit: quod si nec pignoris nomine inducta sint, nec retineri poterunt a locatore.
It must be noted that the praetor did not here require that the thing be in the goods of the lessee, nor that a thing had been brought in as a pledge, but only that it had been introduced under the name of pledge. Accordingly, even if they are another’s (aliena) and even if they are of such a kind as could not be held under the name of pledge, nevertheless, if they have been introduced under the name of pledge, there will be scope for this interdict: but if they have not been introduced under the name of pledge, they cannot be retained by the lessor.
Si colonus res in fundum duorum pignoris nomine intulerit, ita ut utrique in solidum obligatae essent, singuli adversus extraneum salviano interdicto recte experientur: inter ipsos vero si reddatur hoc interdictum, possidentis condicio melior erit. at si id actum fuerit, ut pro partibus res obligaretur, utilis actio et adversus extraneos et inter ipsos dari debebit, per quam dimidias partes possessionis singuli adprehendent.
If a tenant (colonus) has brought goods into the farm of two owners by way of pledge, such that they are obligated in solidum to each, each one, against a third party, will rightly proceed by the Salvian interdict; but as between themselves, if this interdict is rendered, the condition of the possessor will be the better. But if it was arranged that the goods be obligated pro partibus (for shares), a useful action (actio utilis) ought to be given both against third parties and between themselves, by which each will take hold of half shares of the possession.