Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quàm multa, ineunte aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim, & quàm dubia sint quaecunque istis postea superextruxi, ac proinde funditus omnia semel in vitâ esse evertenda, atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum, si quid aliquando firmum & mansurum cupiam in scientiis stabilire; sed ingens opus esse videbatur, eamque aetatem expectabam, quae foret tam matura, ut capessendis disciplinis aptior nulla sequeretur. Quare tamdiu cunctatus sum ut deinceps essem in culpâ, si quod temporis superest ad agendum, deliberando consumerem. Opportune igitur hodie mentem curis

1. I noticed already some years ago how many, in my early age, false things I had admitted for true, & how doubtful are whatever things I afterward
superstructed upon them; and hence that everything must once in life be overturned utterly,
and begun anew from the first foundations, if I should at some time wish to establish something firm &
lasting in the sciences; but it seemed a huge work, and I
was awaiting that age which would be so mature that for undertaking disciplines a more apt
none would follow. Wherefore I delayed so long that thereafter I would be at fault,
if whatever time remains for acting I were to consume by deliberating. Opportunely therefore
today I have freed my mind from cares

[18] omnibus exsolvi, securum mihi otium procuravi, solus secedo, seriò tandem & libere generali huic mearum opinionum eversioni vacabo.

[18] I have freed myself from all, I have procured for myself secure leisure, I withdraw alone, I shall at last seriously & freely devote myself to this general overthrow of my opinions.

2. Ad hoc autem non erit necesse, ut omnes esse falsas ostendam, quod nunquam fortassis assequi possem; sed quia jam ratio persuadet, non minus accurate ab iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubitata, quàm ab aperte falsis assensionem esse cohibendam, satis erit ad omnes rejiciendas, si aliquam rationem dubitandi in unâquâque reperero. Nec ideo etiam singulae erunt percurrendae, quod operis esset infiniti; sed quia, suffossis fundamentis, quidquid iis superaedificatum est sponte collabitur, aggrediar statim ipsa principia, quibus illud omne quod olim credidi nitebatur.

2. To this however it will not be necessary that I demonstrate all to be false, which perhaps I could never attain; but since reason now persuades that assent must be withheld no less accurately from those things which are not plainly certain and indubitable than from those that are openly false, it will suffice for rejecting them all if I find some reason for doubting in each one. Nor therefore must the individual items be run through, which would be an infinite work; but since, the foundations being undermined, whatever has been built upon them collapses of its own accord, I shall at once attack the very principles on which all that I once believed rested.

3. Nempe quidquid hactenus ut maxime verum admisi, vel a sensibus, vel per sensus accepi; hos autem interdum fallere deprehendi, ac prudentiae est nunquam illis plane confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt.

3. Indeed whatever I have admitted up to now as most true, either from the senses, or through the senses I have received; but I have sometimes detected them to deceive, and it is prudence never to trust entirely those who have deceived us even once.

4. Sed forte, quamvis interdum sensus circa minuta quaedam & remotiora nos fallant, pleraque tamen alia sunt de quibus dubitari plane non potest, quamvis ab iisdem hauriantur: ut jam me hîc esse, fovo assidere, hyemali togâ esse indutum, chartam istam manibus contrectare, & similia. Manus verò has ipsas, totumque hoc corpus meum esse, quâ ratione posset negari? nisi me forte comparem nescio quibus insanis,

4. But perhaps, although the senses sometimes deceive us about certain minute & more remote things, yet there are many other things about which it plainly cannot be doubted, although they are drawn from those same senses: as that I am here now, sitting by the hearth, clad in a winter toga, handling that paper with my hands, & the like. But these very hands, and this whole body of mine—to exist, in what way could it be denied? unless perhaps I compare myself with I-know-not-what madmen,

[19] quorum cerebella tam contumax vapor ex atrâ bile labefactat, ut constanter asseverent vel se esse reges, cùm sunt pauperrimi, vel purpurâ indutos, cùm sunt nudi, vel caput habere fictile, vel se totos esse cucurbitas, vel ex vitro conflatos; sed amentes sunt isti, nec minùs ipse demens viderer, si quod ab iis exemplum ad me transferrem.

[19] whose brains a vapor so contumacious from black bile undermines, that they steadfastly asseverate either that they are kings, when they are most poor, or clothed in purple, when they are naked, or that they have a fictile head, or that they are entirely gourds, or cast from glass; but those men are mad, nor would I seem less demented myself, if I were to transfer any example from them to me.

5. Praeclare sane, tanquam non sim homo qui soleam noctu dormire, & eadem omnia in somnis pati, vel etiam interdum minùs verisimilia, quàm quae isti vigilantes. Quàm frequenter verò usitata ista, me hîc esse, togâ vestiri, foco assidere, quies nocturna persuadet, cùm tamen positis vestibus jaceo inter strata! Atqui nunc certe vigilantibus oculis intueor hanc chartam, non sopitum est hoc caput quod commoveo, manum istam prudens & sciens extendo & sentio; non tam distincta contingerent dormienti.

5. Admirably indeed, as though I were not a man who is wont to sleep by night, & to undergo the same things in dreams, or even sometimes things less verisimilar than those which those men do when awake. How often indeed does that usual experience, that I am here, am clothed with a toga, sit by the hearth, nocturnal rest persuade me, when nevertheless, my clothes laid aside, I lie among the bedclothes! And yet now certainly with vigilant eyes I gaze upon this paper, this head which I move is not lulled, that hand I deliberately & knowingly extend & feel; things so distinct would not befall one sleeping.

Quasi scilicet non recorder a similibus etiam cogitationibus me aliàs in somnis fuisse delusum; quae dum cogito attentius, tam plane video nunquam certis indiciis vigiliam a somno posse distingui, ut obstupescam, & fere hic ipse stupor mihi opinionem somni confirmet.

As if, forsooth, I did not recall that by similar cogitations too I have at other times been deluded in dreams; which, while I consider more attentively, I see so plainly that wakefulness can never be distinguished from sleep by certain indicia, that I am astounded, & almost this very stupor confirms for me the opinion of a dream.

6. Age ergo somniemus, nec particularia ista vera sint, nos oculos aperire, caput movere, manus extendere, nec forte etiam nos habere tales manus, nec tale totum corpus; tamen profecto fatendum est visa per quietem esse veluti quasdam pictas imagines, quae non nisi ad similitudinem rerum verarum fingi potuerunt; ideoque saltem generalia haec, oculos, caput, manus, totumque corpus, res quasdam non imaginarias, sed veras existere. Nam sane pictores ipsi, ne tum qui

6. Come then, let us dream, and let these particulars not be true—that we open our eyes, the head
move, extend the hands, nor perhaps even that we have such hands, nor such an entire
body; nevertheless it must indeed be confessed that the things seen in sleep are as it were certain painted
images, which could have been fashioned only to the likeness of true things; and therefore at least
these generals—eyes, head, hands, and the whole body—are certain things not imaginary
but real in existence. For indeed the painters themselves, even those who

[20]dem, cùm Sirenas & Satyriscos maxime inusitatis formis fingere student, naturas omni ex parte novas iis possunt assignare, sed tantummodo diversorum animalium membra permiscent; vel si forte aliquid excogitent adeo novum, ut nihil omnino ei simile fuerit visum, atque ita plane fictitium sit & falsum, certe tamen ad minimum veri colores esse debent, ex quibus illud componant. Nec dispari ratione, quamvis etiam generalia haec, oculi, caput, manus, & similia, imaginaria esse possent, necessario tamen saltem alia quaedam adhuc magis simplicia & universalia vera esse fatendum est, ex quibus tanquam coloribus veris omnes istae, seu verae, seu falsae, quae in cogitatione nostrâ sunt, rerum imagines effinguntur.

[20] For when painters, as they strive to fashion Sirens and satyrs in the most unusual forms, cannot assign to them natures entirely new in every respect, but only commingle the limbs of different animals; or if perchance they devise something so new that nothing at all like it has ever been seen, and thus it is plainly fictitious and false, nevertheless at least the colors must be real, from which they compose it. And by no different reasoning, although even these general things—eyes, head, hands, and the like—could be imaginary, nevertheless it must be confessed that at least certain other things still more simple and universal are true, from which, as from true colors, all those images of things, whether true or false, which are in our thought, are fashioned.

7. Cujus generis esse videntur natura corporea in communi, ejusque extensio; item figura rerum extensarum; item quantitas, sive earumdem magnitudo & numerus; item locus in quo existant, tempusque per quod durent, & similia.

7. Of which kind seem to be the corporeal nature in common, and its extension; likewise the figure of extended things; likewise quantity, that is, their magnitude & number; likewise the place in which they exist, and the time during which they endure, & the like.

8. Quapropter ex his forsan non male concludemus Physicam, Astronomiam, Medicinam, disciplinasque alias omnes, quae a rerum compositarum consideratione dependent, dubias quidem esse; atqui Arithmeticam, Geometriam, aliasque ejusmodi, quae nonnisi de simplicissimis & maxime generalibus rebus tractant, atque utrum eae sint in rerum naturâ necne, parum curant, aliquid certi atque indubitati continere. Nam sive vigilem, sive dormiam, duo & tria simul juncta sunt quinque, quadratumque non plura habet latera quàm quatuor; nec fieri posse videtur ut tam perspicuae veritates in suspicionem falsitatis incurrant.

8. Wherefore from these we shall perhaps not ill conclude that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all other disciplines which depend upon the consideration of composite things, are indeed doubtful; yet that Arithmetic, Geometry, and others of this sort, which deal only with the most simple and the most general things, and care little whether they exist in the nature of things or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three joined together are five, and a square has no more sides than four; nor does it seem possible that such perspicuous truths should fall into suspicion of falsity.

9. Verumtamen infixa quaedam est meae menti vetus opinio, Deum esse qui potest omnia, & a quo talis, qualis existo, sum creatus. Unde autem scio illum non fecisse ut nulla plane sit terra, nullum coelum, nulla res extensa, nulla figura, nulla magnitudo, nullus locus, & tamen haec omnia non aliter quàm nunc mihi videantur existere? Imò etiam, quemadmodum judico interdum alios errare circa ea quae se perfectissime scire arbitrantur, ita ego ut fallar quoties duo & tria simul addo, vel numero quadrati latera, vel si quid aliud facilius fingi potest?

9. Nevertheless a certain old opinion is fixed in my mind, that there is a God who can do all things, & by whom I, such as I am, have been created. But whence do I know that he has not brought it about that there is plainly no earth, no heaven, no extended thing, no figure, no magnitude, no place, & yet that all these things seem to me to exist not otherwise than as they now do? Nay even, just as I judge that at times others err concerning those things which they suppose themselves to know most perfectly, so that I also may be deceived whenever I add two & three together, or number the sides of a square, or if anything else can be more easily feigned?

At forte noluit Deus ita me decipi, dicitur enim summe bonus; sed si hoc ejus bonitati repugnaret, talem me creasse ut semper fallar, ab eâdem etiam videretur esse alienum permittere ut interdum fallar; quod ultimum tamen non potest dici.

But perhaps God did not wish me to be deceived in this way, for he is said to be supremely good; but if this would be repugnant to his goodness, to have created me such that I should always be in error, it would also seem alien to the same to permit that I be in error sometimes; yet this last cannot be said.

10. Essent verò fortasse nonnulli qui tam potentem aliquem Deum mallent negare, quàm res alias omnes credere esse incertas. Sed iis non repugnemus, totumque hoc de Deo demus esse fictitium; at seu fato, seu casu, seu continuatâ rerum serie, seu quovis alio modo me ad id quod sum pervenisse supponant; quoniam falli & errare imperfectio quaedam esse videtur, quo minùs potentem originis meae authorem assignabunt, eo probabilius erit me tam imperfectum esse ut semper fallar. Quibus sane argumentis non habeo quod respondeam, sed tandem cogor fateri nihil esse ex iis quae olim vera putabam, de quo non liceat dubitare, idque non per inconsiderantiam vel levitatem, sed propter validas & meditatas rationes; ideoque etiam ab iisdem, non minùs quàm ab aperte falsis,

10. There would be perhaps some who would prefer to deny some God so potent, rather than believe all other things to be uncertain. But let us not oppose them, and let us grant that all this about God is fictitious; rather let them suppose that by fate, or by chance, or by a continuous series of things, or by whatever other mode, I have come to that which I am; since to be deceived & to err seems to be a certain imperfection, the less potent an author of my origin they assign, the more probable it will be that I am so imperfect that I am always deceived. To which arguments indeed I have nothing to answer, but at length I am compelled to confess that there is nothing among those things which I once thought true, about which it is not permitted to doubt, and this not through inconsiderateness or levity, but on account of valid & meditated reasons; and therefore also from these same, no less than from the openly false,

[22] accurate deinceps assensionem esse cohibendam, si quid certi velim invenire.

[22] that henceforth assent is to be carefully restrained, if I wish to discover anything certain.

11. Sed nondum sufficit haec advertisse, curandum est ut recorder; assidue enim recurrunt consuetae opiniones, occupantque credulitatem meam tanquam longo usu & familiaritatis jure sibi devinctam, fere etiam me invito; nec unquam iis assentiri & confidere desuescam, quamdiu tales esse supponam quales sunt revera, nempe aliquo quidem modo dubias, ut jam jam ostensum est, sed nihilominus valde probabiles, & quas multo magis rationi consentaneum sit credere quàm negare. Quapropter, ut opinor, non male agam, si, voluntate plane in contrarium versâ, me ipsum fallam, illasque aliquandiu omnino falsas imaginariasque esse fingam, donec tandem, velut aequatis utrimque praejudiciorum ponderibus, nulla amplius prava consuetudo judicium meum a rectâ rerum perceptione detorqueat. Etenim scio nihil inde periculi vel erroris interim sequuturum, & me plus aequo diffidentiae indulgere non posse, quandoquidem nunc non rebus agendis, sed cognoscendis tantùm incumbo.

11. But it is not yet enough to have noticed these things; I must take care to remember: for the accustomed opinions keep recurring, and they preoccupy my credulity as if, by long use & the right of familiarity, bound to themselves, almost even against my will; nor shall I ever unlearn to assent & to confide in them, so long as I suppose them to be such as they really are, namely in some manner doubtful, as has just now been shown, but nonetheless very probable, & such as it is much more consonant to reason to believe than to deny. Wherefore, as I think, I shall not act amiss if, my will plainly turned in the contrary direction, I deceive myself, and for some while feign those opinions to be altogether false and imaginary, until at length, as it were with the weights of prejudgments on both sides equalized, no depraved custom any longer twists my judgment away from the right perception of things. For I know that nothing of danger or of error will in the meantime follow from this, & that I cannot indulge in too much diffidence, since now I am engaged not in things to be done, but only in things to be known.

12. Supponam igitur non optimum Deum, fontem veritatis, sed genium aliquem malignum, eundemque summe potentem & callidum, omnem suam industriam in eo posuisse, ut me falleret: putabo coelum, aërem, terram, colores, figuras, sonos, cunctaque externa nihil aliud esse quàm ludificationes somniorum, quibus insidias credulitati meae tetendit: considerabo

12. I shall suppose therefore, not the best God, the fountain of truth, but some malign genius, likewise supremely potent & crafty, to have put all his industry into this, that he might deceive me: I shall think the heaven, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things to be nothing else than ludifications of dreams, with which he has laid snares for my credulity: I shall consider

[23] meipsum tanquam manus non habentem, non oculos, non carnem, non sanguinem, non aliquem sensum, sed haec omnia me habere falsò opinantem: manebo obstinate in hac meditatione defixus, atque ita, siquidem non in potestate meâ sit aliquid veri cognoscere, at certe hoc quod in me est, ne falsis assentiar, nec mihi quidquam iste deceptor, quantumvis potens, quantumvis callidus, possit imponere, obfirmatâ mente cavebo. Sed laboriosum est hoc institutum, & desidia quaedam ad consuetudinem vitae me reducit. Nec aliter quàm captivus, qui forte imaginariâ libertate fruebatur in somnis, cùm postea suspicari incipit se dormire, timet excitari, blandisque illusionibus lente connivet: sic sponte relabor in veteres opiniones, vereorque expergisci, ne placidae quieti laboriosa vigilia succedens, non in aliquâ luce, sed inter inextricabiles jam motarum difficultatum tenebras, in posterum sit degenda.

[23] myself as though
not having hands, not eyes, not flesh, not blood, not any sense,
but falsely thinking that I have all these things: I shall remain obstinately fixed in this
meditation, and thus, if indeed it be not in my power to know anything
true, yet certainly this is within me, that I not assent to falsehoods, nor can that deceiver,
however powerful, however crafty, impose anything upon me; with my mind made firm I shall beware. But this plan is laborious,
& a certain indolence brings me back to the custom of life. Nor otherwise than
a captive, who perchance was enjoying imaginary liberty in dreams, when
afterward he begins to suspect that he is sleeping, he fears to be awakened, and to the charming illusions
he slowly winks: thus of my own accord I slide back into my old opinions, and I am afraid to awake,
lest, a toilsome vigil succeeding placid rest, life be spent hereafter not in some light, but
amid the inextricable darkness of difficulties already set in motion.