Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem; ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem; itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem.

[1] Quintus Mucius, the augur, used to relate many things about Gaius Laelius, his father-in-law, from memory and pleasantly, and he did not hesitate to call him in every conversation a wise man; but I, after the toga of manhood was assumed, was by my father so conducted to Scaevola that, so far as I could and it was permitted, I would never depart from the old man’s side; and so I would commit to memory many things by him prudently debated, many also said briefly and commodiously, and I strove to become more learned by his prudence. When he died, I betook myself to Scaevola the pontiff, whom alone of our state I dare to call most preeminent both in genius and in justice. But about this man elsewhere; now I return to the augur.

[2] Cum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere qui tum forte multis erat in ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querella.

[2] While he often spoke on many matters, I remember him sitting at home in the hemicycle, as he was accustomed, with me present together with very few intimates, to fall upon that very topic which then by chance was on the lips of many. For you certainly remember, Atticus, and all the more because you had much to do with P. Sulpicius, when he, as tribune of the plebs, was at mortal enmity with Q. Pompeius, who then was consul, with whom he had lived in the closest and most loving union, how great was men’s either admiration or complaint.

[3] Itaque tum Scaevola cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero, C. Fannio Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne 'inquam' et 'inquit' saepius interponeretur, atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.

[3] And so then Scaevola, when he had fallen upon that very mention, set forth to us the conversation of Laelius on friendship, held by him with himself and with his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. The opinions of that disputation I committed to memory, which I have set forth in this book by my own arbitration; for I have, as it were, introduced the men themselves speaking, lest “I say” and “he says” should be more often interposed, and so that the discourse might seem to be held, as it were, face to face by those present.

[4] Cum enim saepe mecum ageres ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitus ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona quae de illa aetate loqueretur quam eius qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset, sic cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola.

[4] Since you often urged me to write something about friendship, the matter seemed to me worthy both of everyone’s cognizance and of our own familiarity. Accordingly I did so, not unwillingly, that at your request I might be of use to many. But just as in the Cato the Elder, which is written to you On Old Age, I introduced Cato, an old man, disputing—because no persona seemed more apt to speak about that age than one who had been an old man for the longest time and had in that very old age flourished beyond the rest—so, since we had received from our elders that the familiarity of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio was most memorable, the persona of Laelius seemed to me suitable to discourse on friendship, those very points which Scaevola remembered had been debated by him.

Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate, et eorum inlustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem.

But this kind of discourse, resting on the authority of men of old, and of those illustrious, seems, I know not by what method, to have more gravity; and so I myself, when reading my own works, am sometimes affected in such a way that I think Cato, not myself, is speaking.

[5] Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes.

[5] But just as then, as an old man to an old man about old age, so in this book, as a most friendly man to a friend, I have written about friendship. Then Cato spoke, than whom in those times there was scarcely anyone older, no one more prudent; now Laelius—both “the Wise” (for thus he is held) and outstanding in the glory of friendship—will speak about friendship. Do, please, turn your mind away from me for a little while, and suppose that Laelius himself is speaking.

C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

C. Fannius and Q. Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus; from these a discourse arises, Laelius responds, whose whole disputation is about friendship, which, by reading, you yourself will come to know.

[6] Fannius: Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni; scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem; sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius, quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat; multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis.

[6] Fannius: Those things are so, Laelius; for no man was better than Africanus nor more illustrious. But you ought to think that the eyes of all are directed upon you alone; they both call you wise and account you such. It was in this way ascribed to M. Cato; we know that L. Acilius was called “wise” among our fathers; but each in a somewhat different mode—Acilius, because he was thought to be prudent in civil law; Cato, because he had the use and experience of many things; many of his matters, both in the senate and in the forum, were either foreseen prudently or done steadfastly or replies given acutely, as was commonly reported; for that reason he already had, as it were, a cognomen in his old age of “the Wise.”

[7] Te autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem (nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent), Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum; hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis quod proximis Nonis cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut adsolet, venissemus, tu non adfuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

[7] But you, in some other way, are wise not only by nature and character, but also by zeal and doctrine, and not as the crowd, but as the erudite are accustomed to call one wise; such a one as, in the rest of Greece, we have learned there was no one (for those who are called the Seven, those who inquire into these matters more subtly do not hold in the number of the wise), at Athens we have acknowledged one, and him indeed judged most wise even by the oracle of Apollo; they think this to be the wisdom in you, that you reckon all your goods to be placed in yourself and deem human contingencies inferior to virtue. And so they ask me, I believe likewise this Scaevola, in what fashion you bear the death of Africanus, and all the more because at the most recent Nones, when we had come into the gardens of D. Brutus the augur for the sake of making comment, as is customary, you were not present, you who had been accustomed most diligently always to fulfill that day and that duty.

[8] Scaevola: Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem, quem acceperis cum summi viri tum amicissimi morte, ferre moderate nec potuisse non commoveri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae; quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non adfuisses, valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

[8] Scaevola: Many do indeed inquire, Gaius Laelius, as Fannius has said; but I make this reply, which I have noticed: that you bear with moderation the grief which you have received at the death both of a man of the highest eminence and of your most intimate friend, and that you could not but be moved, nor was that contrary to your humanity; but as to your not having been present on the Nones at our college, I reply that the cause was your health, not sadness.

Laelius: Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere; nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii.

Laelius: Rightly indeed, Scaevola, and truly; for I ought not, by my own inconvenience, to be drawn away from that duty which I have always exercised, so long as I was in good health, nor do I think that in any case this can befall a constant man, that any intermission of duty should occur.

[9] Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis quantum ego nec adgnosco nec postulo, facis amice; sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone; aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! memineram Paulum, videram Galum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro.

[9] You, however, Fannius, in that you say so much is attributed to me as I neither acknowledge nor demand, you act as a friend; but, as you seem to me, you do not judge rightly about Cato; for either no one—which indeed I am more inclined to believe—or, if anyone, he was a wise man. In what manner, to omit other things, he bore the death of his son! I had remembered Paulus, I had seen Gallus, but those were in the case of boys; Cato in that of a perfected and approved man.

[10] Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote:

[10] Wherefore beware of preferring to Cato not even that very man himself, whom Apollo, as you say, judged the most wise; for the deeds of this one are lauded, the sayings of that one. But as for me, that I may now speak with both of you, take it thus:

Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam, viderint sapientes; sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit; sed non egeo medicina, me ipse consolor et maxime illo solacio quod eo errore careo quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto, mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum sed se ipsum amantis est.

If I were to deny that I am moved by longing for Scipio, how rightly I should do so, let the wise consider; but surely I would be lying. For I am moved, bereft of such a friend as, in my judgment, no one ever will be—and, as I can affirm, certainly no one ever was. Yet I have no need of medicine; I console myself, and most of all with this solace: that I am free from that error by which most are wont to be afflicted at the decease of friends. I think that nothing evil has befallen Scipio; if anything has befallen, it has befallen me. But to be gravely vexed at one’s own inconveniences is the mark not of a lover of a friend, but of a lover of oneself.

[11] Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit, qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero, qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia verum etiam futura bella delevit.

[11] But who would deny that with him things were conducted most excellently? For unless he, which he least supposed, had wished to opt for immortality, what did he not attain that it is right for a man to opt for? He—who, as a youth, by incredible virtue surpassed the highest hope of the citizens which they had already had of him as a boy; who never sought the consulship, yet was made consul twice, first before the proper time, the second time for himself in his own time, though for the commonwealth almost too late; who, with two cities overthrown, most inimical to this empire, destroyed not only present but even future wars.

Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes? nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est.

What shall I say of his most accommodating manners, of his piety toward his mother, his liberality toward his sisters, his goodness toward his own, his justice toward all? They are known to you. How dear he was to the city, moreover, was indicated by the mourning of the funeral.

Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante quam est mortuus mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio.

What, then, could the accession of a few years have helped this man? For old age, although it is not grievous—as I remember Cato, the year before he died, discoursing with me and with Scipio—yet takes away that viridity in which Scipio even now was.

[12] Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit; quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur, videtis; hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

[12] Wherefore his life was such in fortune and in glory that nothing could be added; the celerity removed the sense of dying; about which kind of death it is difficult to say; what men suspect, you see; yet this may truly be said: that for P. Scipio, out of the many days which in life he saw most celebrated and most joyous, that day was the most illustrious, when, the senate having been dismissed, he was escorted home toward evening by the Conscript Fathers, the Roman people, the allies and the Latins, on the day before he departed from life, so that from so high a grade of dignity he seems to have arrived to the gods above rather than to the gods below.

[13] Neque enim assentior iis qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri; plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos, iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum.

[13] For I do not assent to those who have lately begun to discourse these things, that souls perish together with bodies and that all things are effaced by death; with me the authority of the ancients prevails more—either of our own ancestors, who granted to the dead such religious rites, which assuredly they would not have done if they judged that nothing pertained to them; or of those who were in this land and educated Great Greece, which now indeed is destroyed, but then was flourishing, by their institutes and precepts; or of him who by the oracle of Apollo was judged the wisest, who did not now this, now that, as in most, but always the same: that the souls of men are divine, and that for them, when they have departed from the body, a return into heaven lies open, and that for each man who is best and most just it is the most unimpeded.

[14] Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit.

[14] The same seemed to Scipio, who indeed, as if he were fore-sensing, a very few days before death, when both Philus and Manilius were present and several others, and you too, Scaevola, had come with me, discoursed for three days about the Republic; the conclusion of which disputation was for the most part about the immortality of souls, which he said he had heard in quiet, through a vision, from Africanus. If this is so—that the soul of each most excellent man at death most easily flies forth, as though from the custody and chains of the body—whom do we judge to have had a course to the gods easier than Scipio? Wherefore to mourn at this event of his I fear may be more the part of the envious than of a friend.

Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas dum erit laetabitur.

But if, however, those things are truer—that there is the same destruction of souls and bodies and no sense remains—then, as there is nothing good in death, so certainly nothing evil; for with sense lost it comes to the same as if he had not been born at all—yet that he was born both we rejoice, and this commonwealth, so long as it shall exist, will rejoice.

[15] Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et, id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum; quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

[15] Wherefore, with him indeed, as I said above, it went in the best way; with me, less advantageously—for it would have been more equitable that, as I had entered first, so I should depart from life first. Yet I so enjoy the recollection of our friendship that I seem to have lived happily, because I lived with Scipio, with whom my care was conjoined both for the public affair and for the private, with whom both home was shared and military service was common, and—in that wherein lies the whole force of friendship—the highest concord of wills, pursuits, and judgments. And so it is not so much that reputation for wisdom, which Fannius just now mentioned, especially as it is false, that delights me, as this: that I hope the memory of our friendship will be everlasting; and this is the more dear to my heart, because out of all ages scarcely three or four pairs of friends are named; in which class I seem to have hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.

[16] Fannius: Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris, spero item Scaevolae, si quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.

[16] Fannius: That indeed, Laelius, is of necessity so. But since you have made mention of friendship and we are at leisure, you will do me a very great favor—I hope likewise to Scaevola—if, in the manner you are accustomed concerning other matters when inquiries are made of you, so you will discourse about friendship: what you sense, of what sort you esteem it, what precepts you would give.

Scaevola: Mihi vero erit gratum; atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit. Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

Scaevola: It will indeed be gratifying to me; and that very thing, when I was trying to deal with you about it, Fannius forestalled me. For which reason you will do what is very gratifying to each of us.

[17] Laelius: Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum? aut quae est in me facultas?

[17] Laelius: I, indeed, would not be reluctant, if I confided in myself; for both it is a very illustrious matter and we are, as Fannius said, at leisure. But who am I? Or what faculty is in me?

doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum, ut iis ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito; magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas.

That is the custom of the learned—indeed, of the Greeks—that a subject be set before them on which they may dispute, however suddenly; it is a great work and requires no small exercise. Wherefore the matters that can be disputed concerning friendship, I advise you to seek from those who profess such things; I can only exhort you to set friendship before all human affairs; for nothing is so apt to nature, so convenient to affairs whether prosperous or adverse.

[18] Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes.

[18] But this first I perceive: that friendship cannot exist except among the good; nor do I cut that to the quick, as do those who discourse about these matters more subtly—perhaps truly, but with too little regard for common utility; for they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is sapient. Let it be so, by all means; but they interpret that wisdom as one which no mortal has as yet attained, whereas we ought to look to the things that are in use and in common life, not to those that are fashioned or merely wished for. Never will I say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, Tiberius Coruncanius—whom our ancestors judged wise—were wise according to the standard of those men.

Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum; concedant ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi.

Wherefore let them keep to themselves the name of sapience, both invidious and obscure; let them concede that they were good men. Not even that, indeed, will they do; they will deny that this can be conceded except to a sapient man.

[19] Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, aequitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas, libido, audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerunt modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime accederet.

[19] Let us, then, act with a “fat Minerva,” as they say. Those who so conduct themselves, so live that their fidelity, integrity, equity, and liberality are approved, and there is in them no cupidity, lust, or audacity, and that they be of great constancy, as just now those whom I named were—these men, good men, as they have been held, so also let us think they are to be called; because they follow, as far as humans can, nature, the best leader for living well. For thus I seem to discern: that we are born in such a way that there is a certain societas among all, but a greater one the nearer anyone approaches.

Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.

Therefore citizens are weightier than foreigners, kinsmen than strangers; for with these nature herself has begotten friendship—but that does not have sufficient firmness. For friendship excels propinquity in this: from propinquity benevolence can be taken away, from friendship it cannot; for when benevolence is removed, the name of friendship is taken away, that of propinquity remains.

[20] Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.

[20] How great, moreover, the force of friendship is can be understood most of all from this: that out of the infinite society of the human race, which nature herself has conciliated, the matter has been so contracted and brought into a narrow compass that all affection is joined either between two or among a few.

Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate.

For friendship is nothing else than a consensus about all divine and human matters, with benevolence and charity; and by this indeed I hardly know whether, wisdom excepted, anything better has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, others good health, others power, others honors, and many even pleasures. This last, to be sure, is of beasts; but those former things are perishable and uncertain, placed not so much in our counsels as in the rashness of Fortune.

Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.

But those who place the highest good in virtue do indeed judge excellently; yet this very virtue both engenders and contains friendship, nor can friendship by any means exist without virtue.

[21] Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos; his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.

[21] Now let us interpret virtue by the custom of our life and speech, and let us not measure it, as certain learned men do, by the magnificence of words; and let us count as good men those who are so regarded—the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Philuses; with these the common life is content; but let us set aside those who are nowhere at all to be found.

[22] Talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet quantas vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse vita 'vitalis', ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum?

[22] Such, therefore, is friendship among men that it has opportunities so great as I can scarcely say. In the first place, how can a life be 'vital,' as Ennius says, which does not come to rest in the mutual benevolence of a friend? What is sweeter than to have someone with whom you dare to speak about everything just as with yourself?

Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res quae expetuntur opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudere, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia.

What so great fruit would there be in prosperous affairs, unless you had someone who rejoiced in them as much as you yourself? Adverse things, in truth, would be difficult to bear without one who would bear them even more gravely than you. Finally, the other things that are sought are each opportune for almost single needs: wealth, that you may use it; resources, that you may be courted; honors, that you may be praised; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body; friendship contains very many things; wherever you turn yourself, it is at hand, it is excluded from no place, it is never untimely, never burdensome; and so we use friendship, as they say, in more places than water and fire.

Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum qui pauci nominantur fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

Nor am I now speaking of the vulgar or the mediocre—though even that itself both delights and profits—but of the true and the perfect, such as was that of those few who are named. For friendship makes prosperous affairs more splendid, and the adverse, by dividing and sharing them, lighter.

[23] Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum.

[23] And since friendship contains very many and very great advantages, then assuredly it excels all in this: that it pre‑illuminates good hope for the future and does not allow spirits to be debilitated or to fall. For he who looks upon a true friend looks upon, as it were, some exemplar of himself. Wherefore both the absent are present, and the needy abound, and the imbecile (the weak) are strong, and—which is more difficult to say—the dead live; so great an honor, memory, and longing of friends attends them.

Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis percipi potest.

Whence the death of those appears blessed, the life of these laudable. But if you remove from the nature of things the conjunction of benevolence, neither any house nor any city will be able to stand, not even the cultivation of the fields will endure. If that is less understood—how great the force of friendship and concord is—it can be perceived from dissensions and discords.

Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo quantum boni sit in amicitia iudicari potest.

For what house is so stable, what state so firm, that it could not be overthrown to its foundations by hatreds and dissensions? From this it can be judged how much good there is in friendship.

[24] Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus?

[24] They report that a certain learned man of Agrigentum vaticinated in Greek songs that the things which in the nature of things and in the whole world consist and are moved, friendship draws together, discord scatters. And this indeed all mortals both understand and prove by fact. And so, if ever some office of a friend has appeared in dangers either to be undergone or to be shared, who is there who does not extol it with the greatest praises?

Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula! cum ignorante rege, uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse?

What shouts from the whole auditorium lately at the new play of my host and friend M. Pacuvius! when, the king being ignorant as to which was Orestes, Pylades kept saying that he was Orestes, so that he might be killed in his stead, but Orestes, just as he was, persisted that he was Orestes. They, standing, applauded at a feigned affair; what do we think they would have done in a real one?

Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.

Nature herself easily indicated her own force, when men judged that what they themselves could not do was being done rightly in another.

Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

Thus far I think I have been able to say what I felt about friendship; if there are other things besides (and I believe there are many), inquire about them, if it seems good, from those who dispute these matters.

[25] Fannius: Nos autem a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

[25] Fannius: We, however, would rather [hear it] from you; although even from those men I have often inquired and listened, not unwillingly indeed; but there is a certain different thread of your discourse.

Scaevola: Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses. Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Scaevola: Then you would say that all the more, Fannius, if recently in the gardens of Scipio, when the Republic was being debated, you had been present. What a patron of justice he then was against the polished oration of Philus!

Fannius: Facile id quidem fuit iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

Fannius: It was indeed easy for a most just man to defend justice.

Scaevola: Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

Scaevola: What? Will not friendship be easy for the man who, on account of it, has gained the greatest glory for having preserved it with utmost good faith, constancy, and justice?

[26] Laelius: Vim hoc quidem est adferre. Quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe.

[26] Laelius: This indeed is to apply force. For what does it matter by what method you compel me? you certainly compel.

Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

For to oppose the enthusiasms of sons-in-law, especially in a good matter, is both difficult and not even equitable.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa, in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium.

Therefore, most often, when I am thinking about friendship, this especially is wont to seem to me to be considered: whether, on account of weakness and want, friendship has been desired, so that by giving and receiving merits (services) each might get from another what he could less accomplish by himself and render it in turn, or whether this indeed is proper to friendship, but there is another cause more ancient and more beautiful and more proceeding from nature herself. For Love, from which friendship has been named, is chief for conjoining benevolence. For benefits are indeed also often taken even by those who are cultivated and courted by a simulation of friendship for the sake of the occasion; but in friendship nothing is feigned, nothing simulated, and whatever there is, that is true and voluntary.

[27] Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur.

[27] Wherefore friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than from indigence, from an application of the mind with a certain sense of loving rather than from a cogitation how much utility that thing would be going to have. What sort this is can even be observed in certain beasts, which love the offspring sprung from themselves for a certain time, and are so loved by them that their feeling is easily apparent. This is much more evident in man, first from that affection which is between children and parents, which cannot be sundered except by a detestable crime; then, when a similar sense of love has arisen, if we have found someone with whose character and nature we agree, because in him we seem to perceive as it were some light of probity and virtue.

[28] Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit?

[28] For nothing is more amiable than virtue, nothing that more allures to loving; indeed, on account of virtue and probity we even in a certain manner love those whom we have never seen. Who is there who does not, with some benevolent affection, cherish the memory of Gaius Fabricius and Manius Curius, whom he has never seen? And who is there who does not hate Tarquin the Proud, Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius?

Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.

With two leaders the contest over dominion in Italy was fought out, Pyrrhus and Hannibal; from the one, on account of his probity, we do not have minds too alien, the other, on account of his cruelty, this city has always hated.

[29] Quod si tanta vis probitatis est ut eam vel in iis quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt.

[29] But if probity has such force that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, or—what is greater—even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are moved when they seem to perceive the virtue and goodness of those with whom they can be conjoined by association? Although love is strengthened both by a benefit received and by zeal perceived and by consuetude joined; when these things are applied to that first movement of mind and of love, a certain admirable magnitude of benevolence blazes forth. Which, if some think proceeds from weakness—so that there may be someone through whom each may attain what he desires—they indeed leave, so to speak, a low and least generous origin of friendship, which they wish to have been born from lack and indigence.

Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est.

But if it were so, that, as each judged there to be the least in himself, so he would be most apt for friendship; which is far otherwise.

[30] Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei?

[30] For, indeed, the more each person places the utmost confidence in himself, and the more each is thus fortified with virtue and wisdom, so as to need nothing and to judge all his own things to be placed in himself, thus he most excels in friendships to be sought and cultivated. What, indeed? Africanus, in need of me?

Minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae.

By no means, by Hercules! nor I of him either; but I loved him out of a certain admiration of his virtue, and he in turn, perhaps because of some opinion he had of my character, loved me; custom increased our benevolence. But although many and great advantages ensued, nevertheless the causes of loving did not proceed from the hope of them.

[31] Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.

[31] For just as we are beneficent and liberal, not in order to exact gratitude (for we do not farm out a benefaction at interest, but by nature we are inclined toward liberality), so we think friendship is to be sought, not led by the hope of reward, but because all its fruit resides in love itself.

[32] Ab his qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. Quam qui adpetiverunt, applicant se et propius admovent ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio.

[32] Far different are they from those who, in the manner of cattle, refer all things to pleasure, nor is it a wonder; for nothing high, nothing magnificent and divine can they look up to who have cast down all their thoughts into a thing so low and so contemptible. Wherefore let us remove these from this discourse, but let us ourselves understand that by nature there is begotten a sense of loving and the charity of benevolence by the signification through deeds of probity. Those who have aspired to this apply themselves and draw nearer, so that they may both enjoy the use of him whom they have begun to love, and be like in manners and equal in love, and more inclined to well-deserving than to demanding back; and let this be an honorable rivalry between them.

Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.

Thus both the greatest advantages will be taken from friendship, and its origin from nature rather than from imbecility will be more weighty and truer. For if utility were to conglutinate friendships, the same, once changed, would dissolve them; but because nature cannot be changed, therefore true friendships are sempiternal. You do indeed see the origin of friendship, unless perchance you wish anything further on these points.

Fannius: Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

Fannius: Do indeed proceed, Laelius; for on behalf of this man, who is younger in age, I answer by my right.

[33] Scaevola: Recte tu quidem. Quam ob rem audiamus.

[33] Scaevola: You are right indeed. Wherefore let us hear.

Laelius: Audite vero, optimi viri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere. Nam vel ut non idem expediret, incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente.

Laelius: Do indeed listen, most excellent men, to those things which most frequently were being discoursed between me and Scipio about friendship. Although he, for his part, used to say that nothing was more difficult than for friendship to endure all the way to the last day of life. For it often happens either that the same course is not expedient, or that the same opinion is not held about the Republic; he also used to say that the mores of men are often changed, at one time by adverse circumstances, at another as age grows weighty.

Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur.

And he would take an example of these things from the similitude of the beginning age, since the highest loves of boys were often laid aside together with the toga praetexta.

[34] Sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse.

[34] But if they had brought it to adolescence, nevertheless sometimes it was sundered by a contention either of matrimonial terms or of some advantage, which the same thing each could not attain. And if any had been carried further in friendship, nevertheless it was often made to totter, if they had fallen into a competition for honor; for there is no greater pest to friendships than, in most men, desire for money, in the best men, the contest for honor and for glory; whence the greatest enmities have often arisen among the most intimate friends.

[35] Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis quibus obsequi nollent. Illos autem qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorum querella inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna.

[35] Very great dissensions, and for the most part just, arise when something that would not be right is demanded from friends, namely that they be either ministers of lust or helpers to injustice; and those who refuse this, although they do it honorably, are nevertheless accused by those whom they are unwilling to comply with of deserting the law of friendship. But those who would dare to demand anything whatsoever from a friend, by the very demand profess that they will do everything for the friend’s sake. Their complaint, once inveterate, is wont not only to extinguish familiarities but also to beget sempiternal hatreds.

Haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiis ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

He would say that so many, as it were, fates impend over friendships, that to evade them all would seem to him to belong not only to sapience but even to felicity.

[36] Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vecellinum amici regnum adpetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare?

[36] Wherefore let us first see, if it please, how far love in friendship ought to advance. If Coriolanus had friends, were they bound to bear arms with Coriolanus against their fatherland? were friends to aid Vecellinus, aspiring to kingship, or to aid Maelius?

[37] Ti. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem, causam adferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego: 'Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?' 'Numquam' inquit 'voluisset id quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem.' Videtis, quam nefaria vox!

[37] We indeed saw Tiberius Gracchus, vexing the commonwealth, abandoned by Quintus Tubero and by friends of the same age. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a guest‑friend of your family, Scaevola, when he had come to me to plead for pardon—because I was present on the council with the consuls Laenas and Rupilius—was advancing this ground for me to forgive him: that he had so valued Tiberius Gracchus that he thought he ought to do whatever that man wished. Then I: 'Even if he wished you to carry torches into the Capitol?' 'Never,' he said, 'would he indeed have wished that; but if he had wished it, I would have obeyed.' You see what a nefarious utterance!

Et hercule ita fecit vel plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris.

And by Hercules, he did so, or even more than he said; for he did not obey the temerity of Tiberius Gracchus, but presided over it, nor did he offer himself as a companion of that frenzy, but as a leader. And so, terrified by this madness and by a new court of inquiry, he fled into Asia, betook himself to the enemies, and paid to the commonwealth grave and just penalties. There is therefore no excuse for a sin, if you have sinned for a friend's sake; for since the opinion of virtue has been the conciliator of friendship, it is difficult for friendship to remain, if you have defected from virtue.

[38] Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt.

[38] But if we shall have determined rightly either to concede to friends whatever they will, or to obtain from them whatever we will, if we were in perfected wisdom, the matter would have nothing of vice; but we speak of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen or about whom we have received a memory, whom communal life knows. From this number examples must be taken for us, and especially of those who come most closely to wisdom.

[39] Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse?

[39] We see that Aemilius Papus was an intimate of Luscinus (so have we received from our fathers), twice consuls together, colleagues in the censorship; then too it has been handed down to memory that M'. Curius and Ti. Coruncanius were most closely conjoined both with them and with each other. Therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of these men pressed from a friend anything that was against faith, against an oath, against the commonwealth. For, as to this, in the case of such men, what need is there to say that, if one had pressed it, he would not have obtained it?

cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater, nunc idem acerrimus.

since those men were most sanctified, and equally it is impious both to do such a thing when asked and to ask for it. But indeed Tiberius Gracchus was followed by Gaius Carbo, Gaius Cato, and least of all at that time, to be sure, his brother Gaius—now the same man is the keenest.

[40] Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae.

[40] Therefore let this law be sanctioned in friendship: that we neither ask for shameful things nor do them when asked. For it is a shameful excuse and least to be accepted, not only in other offenses, but especially if someone admits that for a friend’s sake he has done something against the republic. For indeed we are placed in such a position, Fannius and Scaevola, that it behooves us to look far ahead to the future contingencies of the republic.

Deflexit iam aliquantum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum.

The custom of the ancestors has now swerved somewhat from the course and the race-track.

[41] Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere.

[41] Tiberius Gracchus tried to seize a kingship, or indeed he actually reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen anything similar? What his friends and kinsmen, who followed him even after his death, effected against P. Scipio I am not able to say without tears.

Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid expectem, non libet augurari. Serpit deinde res; quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia.

For Carbo, by whatever way we could, we endured, on account of the recent punishment of Ti. Gracchus; but as for the tribunate of C. Gracchus, what I should expect, it does not please me to augur. Then the affair creeps; that which is proclive to perdition, once it has begun, slides downward. You see on the ballot tablet already how great a stain has been made, first by the Gabinian law, and two years afterward by the Cassian.

Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum iis resistatur.

I already seem to see the people disjoined from the senate, the greatest affairs being transacted at the arbitrament of the multitude. For more will learn by what method these things are brought about than by what method they are resisted.

[42] Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. Praecipiendum est igitur bonis ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces.

[42] To what purpose are these things? Because without allies no one attempts anything of such a kind. Therefore it must be prescribed to good men that, if unknowing they should by some chance fall into friendships of that sort, they are not to think themselves so bound that they do not withdraw from friends who are sinning in some great matter of the res publica; but for the wicked a penalty must be set, and indeed no less for those who will have followed another than for those who themselves will have been leaders of impiety.

Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit, fecit idem, quod xx annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit.

Who was more illustrious in Greece than Themistocles, who more powerful? He, when as commander in the Persian war he had freed Greece from servitude and, on account of envy, had been driven into exile, did not bear the injury of an ungrateful fatherland—which he ought to have borne—and he did the same which 20 years before among us Coriolanus had done. For neither of these men was a helper found against his country; and so each procured death for himself.

[43] Quare talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi; quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit.

[43] Wherefore such a consensus of the wicked ought not only not to be covered by the excuse of friendship, but rather should be avenged with every punishment, so that no one may think it permitted to follow a friend even when he is bringing war upon his fatherland; which indeed, as matters have begun to go, I do not know but that it will someday come to pass. For my part, it is of no less concern to me what sort the Republic will be after my death than what it is today.

[44] Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.

[44] Let this, therefore, be sanctioned as the first law of friendship: that we ask from friends honorable things, that for the sake of friends we do honorable things, let us not even wait until we are asked; zeal should always be present, hesitation absent; and let us dare to give counsel freely. Let the authority of friends who advise well prevail most in friendship, and let it be employed for admonishing not only openly but even sharply, if the matter shall demand it, and, once employed, let it be obeyed.

[45] Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus.

[45] For I think that to certain men, whom I hear were held wise in Greece, there pleased certain marvels (but there is nothing which they do not pursue with subtleties): that in part excessive friendships must be fled, lest it be necessary for one man to be solicitous on behalf of many; that to each one his own concerns are enough and more than enough, that to be too entangled in others’ affairs is troublesome; that it is most commodious to have the reins of friendship as loose as possible, which you may either draw tight, when you wish, or relax; for the chief point for living happily is security, which the mind cannot enjoy if, as though in childbirth, one person is in travail for many.

[46] Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius (quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi) praesidii adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis, amicitias esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime; ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ii qui putentur beati.

[46] But they say that others speak much more inhumanly (a point which I briefly touched a little before): that friendships are to be sought for the sake of protection and aid, not of benevolence nor of charity; and thus, the less firmness and the less strength anyone has, the more he pursues friendships; from this it comes to pass that womenfolk seek the protections of friendships more than men, and the needy more than the opulent, and the calamity‑stricken more than those who are thought blessed.

[47] O praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas?

[47] O splendid wisdom! For they seem to take the sun out of the world, who take friendship out of life—than which we have nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more pleasant. For what is that security?

Specie quidem blanda sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo; itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos.

In appearance indeed alluring, but in reality to be rejected in many respects. For it is not consonant either not to undertake, or to lay aside once undertaken, any honorable matter or action, in order that you not be solicitous. But if we flee care, virtue is to be fled, which of necessity, with some care, spurns and hates things contrary to itself, as goodness [spurns] malice, temperance lust, fortitude sloth; and so you may see that at unjust affairs the just are pained most, at unwarlike ones the brave, at flagitious ones the modest.

Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.

Therefore this is the proper mark of a well-constituted mind: both to rejoice at good things and to grieve at the contraries.

[48] Quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest motu animi sublato non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur.

[48] Wherefore, if pain of mind befalls the wise man—and assuredly it does, unless we suppose that humanity has been extirpated from his mind—what cause is there why we should utterly remove friendship from life, lest we undertake any on account of it annoyances? For what difference is there, the movement of the mind being removed, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a stump or a rock or anything of the same kind? For those men are not to be listened to who want virtue to be some hard and, as it were, iron thing; which indeed is, among many matters, in friendship tender and tractable, so that at a friend’s good things it is, as it were, diffused, and at his incommodities it is contracted.

Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias adferunt, repudientur.

Wherefore that anguish, which must often be incurred for a friend, does not so prevail as to remove friendship from life, no more than that virtues, because they bring some cares and annoyances, should be repudiated.

Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.

When, however, one contracts friendship, as I said above, if any signification of virtue shines forth, to which a similar mind may apply and adjoin itself, when that has come about, love must arise.

[49] Quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanimis rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius.

[49] For what is so absurd as to take delight in many inanimate things—such as honor, such as glory, such as a building, such as clothing and the adornment of the body—and not to be very much delighted in a living being endowed with virtue, one who can either love or, so to speak, love back? For nothing is more pleasant than the remuneration of benevolence, nothing more delightful than the reciprocity of devotions and duties.

[50] Quid, si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo? concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura.

[50] What, if we also add this—which can rightly be added—that there is nothing which so allures and attracts any thing to itself as similitude does to friendship? It will surely be conceded to be true, that the good love the good and adopt them to themselves as if joined by kinship and by nature. For nothing is more appetent of its like, nor more rapacious, than nature.

Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. Non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri iisque optime consulere soleat; quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate vulgi abhorreret.

Wherefore let this at least, Fannius and Scaevola, stand, as I think: among good men there is, as it were, a necessary benevolence between the good, which is the fountain of friendship established by nature. But the same goodness also pertains to the multitude. For virtue is not inhumane, nor exempt from obligations, nor proud; it is even wont to safeguard whole peoples and to look out for them in the best way—which assuredly it would not do, if it recoiled from affection for the common crowd.

[51] Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque abest, ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis.

[51] And moreover, it seems to me indeed that those who feign friendships for the sake of utilities remove the most lovable knot of friendship. For it is not so much the utility obtained through a friend as the friend’s love itself that delights; and then that thing which has proceeded from a friend becomes pleasant, if it has proceeded with zeal. And so far is it from the case that friendships are cultivated on account of indigence, that those who, in resources and supplies and most especially in virtue—in which there is the most safeguard—least need another, are the most liberal and most beneficent. And I hardly know whether there is even any need that nothing at all should ever be lacking to friends.

Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

For where indeed would our pursuits have flourished, if Scipio had never needed our counsel, never our service, neither at home nor in military service? Therefore friendship did not follow utility, but utility followed friendship.

[52] Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere?

[52] Therefore men wallowing in delights are not to be listened to, if ever they shall dispute about friendship, which they have known neither by use nor by reason. For who is there—by the good faith of gods and men!—who would wish that he neither love anyone nor himself be loved by anyone, to overflow with all resources and to live in the abundance of all things?

Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae.

For this assuredly is the life of tyrants, in which no faith, no charity, no confidence of stable benevolence can exist, all things always suspect and anxious, no place for friendship.

[53] Quis enim aut eum diligat quem metuat, aut eum a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum.

[53] For who either loves him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks himself feared? They are, however, courted by mere simulation only for a time. But if by chance, as for the most part happens, they have fallen, then it is understood how destitute of friends they have been.

Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt, tum exsulantem se intellexisse quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset.

They report that Tarquin said that, when he was in exile, he then understood which friends he had as faithful, which as unfaithful, since now he could render gratitude to neither.

[54] Quamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos quos complexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest.

[54] And yet I wonder whether, with that pride and importunity, he could have had anyone as a friend. And just as this man’s character, whom I mentioned, could not procure true friends, so the resources of many overmighty men shut out faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune herself blind, but she also for the most part makes blind those whom she has embraced; and so they are carried away by fastidiousness and contumacy, and nothing can become more intolerable than an insipient man who is fortunate.

Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus immutari, sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis.

And indeed this can be seen: that those who formerly were of accommodating manners are altered by command, by power, by prosperous circumstances; that old friendships are spurned by them, and new ones are indulged.

[55] Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cuius causa laborent (eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus), amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio; ut, etiamsi illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

[55] What, moreover, is more foolish than, when they can do so very much with supplies, faculties, and resources, to procure the rest—the things that are procured by money: horses, servants, excellent clothing, precious vessels—yet not to procure friends, the best and most beautiful, so to speak, furnishing of life? For indeed, when they procure the other things, they do not know whom they are obeying, nor for whose sake they toil (for each of those things belongs to him who has conquered by force); but the possession of friendships remains to each his own, stable and sure; so that, even if those things remain which are as it were the gifts of Fortune, nevertheless a life uncultivated and deserted by friends cannot be pleasant. But so much on this for now.

[56] Constituendi autem sunt qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo, unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum adfecti simus, quo erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis.

[56] Moreover, there must be established what the ends in friendship are and, as it were, the boundaries of loving. About these I see three opinions being put forward, of which I approve none: one, that we be disposed toward a friend in the same manner as toward ourselves; the second, that our benevolence toward friends should respond equally and evenly to their benevolence toward us; the third, that at as great a value as each person sets himself, at so great a value he should be valued by his friends.

[57] Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque sit, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum!

[57] Of these three opinions I assent to none at all. Nor indeed is that first true: that, in the manner in which each is toward himself, so he should be disposed toward a friend. How many things, in fact, which for our own sake we would never do, we do for the sake of friends!

precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur.

to beseech from one unworthy, to supplicate, then to inveigh more bitterly against someone and to pursue him more vehemently—things which in our own affairs are not quite honorable, in the affairs of friends are done most honorably; and there are many matters in which good men subtract much from their own advantages and allow it to be subtracted, so that friends may enjoy them rather than they themselves.

[58] Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte, ne plus reddat quam acceperit; neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur.

[58] The second opinion is that which defines friendship by equal offices and wills. This indeed is to call friendship to the reckoning too narrowly and thinly, as though the account of things received and of things given must be equal. Truer friendship seems to me richer and more affluent, and not to observe restrictively, lest it render back more than it has received; nor indeed is there anything to fear, lest something fall out, or flow down into the earth, or lest more than is equitable be heaped up into friendship.

[59] Tertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem.

[59] But that third end is truly the worst: that, to the degree each person values himself, to that degree he be valued by his friends. For often in certain people either the spirit is more abject, or the hope of amplifying their fortune is more broken. It is not, therefore, the part of a friend to be toward him such as he is toward himself, but rather to strive and bring it about that he rouse the friend’s prostrate spirit and lead it into better hope and cogitation.

Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse?

Another end of true friendship must therefore be established, if first I shall have said what Scipio was especially wont to reprehend. He said that no utterance more inimical to friendship could have been discovered than that of the man who had said that one ought to love in such a way as if at some time one were going to hate; nor indeed could he be induced to believe that this, as it was supposed, had been said by Bias, who was held wise, one of the Seven; he judged it the sentiment of some impure fellow or ambitious one, or of a man who refers all things back to his own power. For in what way will anyone be able to be a friend to him, to whom he will think that he himself can be an enemy?

quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere.

nay even, it will be necessary to desire and to wish that a friend err as very often as possible, in order that he may give to himself more, as it were, handles for reprehending; again, however, at the right deeds and advantages of friends, it will be necessary to be anguished, to grieve, to envy.

[60] Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet; illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam si minus felices in diligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

[60] Therefore this precept, whoever’s it is, avails for removing friendship; rather, this should have been prescribed: that we apply such diligence in acquiring friendships, that we never begin to love one whom we might someday hate. Nay more, even if we were less fortunate in choosing, Scipio thought that this should be borne rather than that a time of enmities be contemplated.

[61] His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiamsi qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium; quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est.

[61] Therefore I judge that we must proceed with these boundaries: that, when the morals of friends are emended, then there be among them a community of all things, counsels, wills, without any exception, such that, even if by some fortune it should happen that the less just wishes of friends ought to be aided, in matters in which either their head or their fame is at stake, one should step aside from the way, provided that the utmost disgrace does not follow; for there is a limit to which a pardon can be granted to friendship. Nor indeed is reputation to be neglected, nor ought one to reckon the goodwill of the citizens a mediocre weapon for conducting affairs; to gather it by blandishments and assenting is base; virtue, which charity follows, is least of all to be repudiated.

[62] Sed (saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse, amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos qui ad amicitias essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cuius generis est magna penuria. Et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia.

[62] But (for I often return to Scipio, whose whole discourse was about friendship) he used to complain that men were more diligent in all other matters: that they could say how many goats and sheep each one had, but could not say how many friends he had; and that in procuring those they apply care, but in selecting friends they are negligent, and do not have, as it were, certain signs and marks by which they might judge those who would be suitable for friendships. Therefore men who are firm and stable and constant must be chosen; of which kind there is great penury. And to judge is truly difficult unless one has been tried; but the trying must be in friendship itself.

Ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem.

Thus friendship anticipates judgment and removes the power of testing.

[63] Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin vero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint?

[63] Therefore it is the part of a prudent man to hold in check, as he would a course, so the impulse of benevolence, so that we may use it as with horses that have been tested; and so with friendship, after the morals of friends have in some part been put to the proof. Some are often perceived, over a small sum of money, how light and inconstant they are; others, whom small sums could not move, are recognized in a large one. But if indeed there shall be found some who deem it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who will not put honors, magistracies, commands, powers, wealth before friendship, so that, when on the one side these are set forth, and on the other the right of friendship, would they not much rather prefer those?

Imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia.

For feeble indeed is human nature to contemn power; and power, which even if, with friendship neglected, they should attain, they reckon will be obscured, because friendship would not have been neglected without great cause.

[64] Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in iis qui in honoribus reque publica versantur; ubi enim istum invenias qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatuam societates!

[64] And so true friendships are most difficult to find among those who are engaged in honors and in the republic; for where, indeed, will you find that man who will put the honor of a friend before his own? What? to omit these things, how burdensome, how difficult to most do the associations of calamities seem!

ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte:

to which it is not easy to find one who will descend. Although Ennius rightly:

Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur,

A sure friend is discerned in an uncertain affair,

tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

nevertheless these two, levity and infirmity, convict most people: either they despise in good circumstances or they desert in bad. Therefore whoever in both situations has shown himself in friendship to be grave, constant, and stable, we ought to judge him to be of a most rare kind of men and almost divine.

[65] Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides est; nihil est enim stabile quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam.

[65] But the firm foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is fidelity; for nothing is stable that is unfaithful. Moreover, it is proper to choose one who is simple, sociable, and consentient, that is, who is moved by the same things, all of which pertain to fidelity; for a multiplex and tortuous character cannot be faithful, nor indeed can one who is not moved by the same things and agrees by nature be either faithful or stable. To the same point it must be added, that he neither take delight in accusations, whether in bringing them, nor believe them when proffered, all of which pertain to that constancy which I have long been treating.

Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum.

Thus that statement comes true which I said at the beginning: that friendship cannot exist except among the good. For it is the part of a good man—whom it is permitted to call likewise a wise man—to hold these two things in friendship: first, that nothing be fictitious nor simulated; for to hate openly is more the mark of an ingenuous man than to conceal one’s opinion on the brow; then, not only to repel accusations brought by someone, but not even to be suspicious himself, always deeming that something has been violated by a friend.

[66] Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

[66] Let there be added here, as is fitting, a certain suavity of discourses and of manners, by no means a mediocre condiment of friendship. But gloom and severity in every matter do indeed have gravitas; yet friendship ought to be more relaxed, freer, sweeter, and more inclined toward all comity and facility.

[67] Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio! Non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.

[67] At this point there arises a certain somewhat-difficult question, whether sometimes new friends, worthy of friendship, ought to be preferred to old ones, as we are wont to set tender colts before old hacks. A doubt unworthy of a human being! For there ought not to be satieties of friendships as there are of other things; each that is most ancient, like those wines which bear/withstand age, ought to be the most sweet; and that saying is true, that many bushels of salt must be eaten together, so that the office of friendship be fulfilled.

[68] Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin in ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est, quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. Nec vero in hoc quod est animal, sed in iis etiam quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

[68] Novelties, however, if they bring hope, so that, as in non-fallacious herbs, the fruit appears, are not indeed to be repudiated; yet age is to be preserved in its place; for the greatest force is that of age and custom. Indeed, in the horse itself, of which I just made mention, if nothing hinders, there is no one who would not more gladly use the one to which he is accustomed than an unhandled and new one. Nor indeed only in this which is an animal, but custom prevails even in those things which are inanimate, since we are delighted by the places themselves, even mountainous and wooded, in which we have tarried longer.

[69] Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis, Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se posse esse ampliores volebat.

[69] But the greatest thing in friendship is that the superior be as a peer to the inferior. For often there are certain excellences, such as that of Scipio in our, so to speak, group. He never put himself before Philo, never before Rupilius, never before Mummius, never before friends of a lower order; indeed he honored as a superior his brother Quintus Maximus—an altogether excellent man, yet by no means equal to himself—because he was ahead in age, and he wished that all his own might be able, through himself, to be more ample and distinguished.

[70] Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. Ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum.

[70] Which ought to be done and imitated by all: that, if they have attained any pre-eminence of virtue, talent, or fortune, they impart these to their own and share them with those nearest; that, if they were born of humble parents, if they have relatives weaker either in spirit or in fortune, they increase their resources and be to them for honor and dignity. As in the tales, those who for some time, because of ignorance of their stock and lineage, were in servitude, when they are recognized and found to be sons either of gods or of kings, nevertheless retain affection for the shepherds whom they counted as fathers for many years. Which is assuredly to be done much more in the case of true and acknowledged fathers.

Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

For the fruit of genius and virtue, and of every preeminence, is then reaped at its greatest when it is conferred upon each of those nearest.

[71] Ut igitur ii qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium; quae meminisse debet is in quem conlata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit.

[71] Accordingly, just as those who are superior in the bond of friendship and conjunction ought to equalize themselves with the inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to grieve at being surpassed by their own either in genius or fortune or dignity. Of whom the majority either are always complaining about something or even exprobrate—and all the more, if they think they have something which they can say was done officiously and in a friendly way and with some labor of their own. A truly odious kind of people, those who exprobrate services; these should be remembered by the one upon whom they have been conferred, not commemorated by the one who conferred them.

[72] Quam ob rem ut ii qui superiores sunt submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis sed etiam opere levandi sunt.

[72] Wherefore, just as those who are superiors ought to submit themselves in friendship, so, in a certain way, they ought to exalt the inferiors. For there are certain persons who make friendships troublesome, when they themselves think they are being contemned; which for the most part does not occur except to those who even judge themselves to be contemptible; who, on account of this opinion, are to be relieved not only by words but also by deed.

[73] Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius L. non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere.

[73] But so much is to be allotted to each person, first, as much as you yourself can accomplish, then also as much as he whom you love and aid can sustain. For neither can you, although you excel, lead all your friends to the most ample honors—just as Scipio was able to make P. Rupilius consul, he could not do so for his brother L. And even if you could confer anything whatsoever upon another, nevertheless it must be considered what he is able to sustain.

[74] Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt; qui neglegendi quidem non sunt sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt.

[74] In general, friendships are to be judged when both dispositions and ages have now been corroborated and confirmed, nor, if some at the beginning of youth were devoted to hunting or to ball, should they hold as intimates those whom at that time they loved as endowed with the same pursuit. For in that way nurses and tutors, by the right of long standing, would demand the greatest share of goodwill; who indeed are not to be neglected, but in some other way are to be assessed. Otherwise stable friendships cannot endure.

Dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia.

For unlike morals are followed by unlike studies, whose dissimilarity dissociates friendships; nor for any other cause at all can the good be friends with the wicked, nor the wicked with the good, except that between them there is, as great as can be, a distance of morals and of studies.

[75] Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire vult, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus.

[75] It can also be rightly prescribed in friendships, that a certain intemperate benevolence—something which very often happens—should not impede the great advantages of friends. For indeed, to return to the stories, Neoptolemus could not have taken Troy, if he had wished to listen to Lycomedes, with many tears hindering his journey, in whose house he had been reared. And great circumstances often occur, such that one must part from friends; whoever wishes to impede these, because he cannot easily bear the longing, is both infirm and soft by nature, and for that very reason in friendship not quite just.

[76] Atque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari.

[76] And in every matter it is to be considered both what you ask of a friend and what you permit to be obtained from you.

Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria; iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit.

There is also a certain calamity in dismissing friendships, sometimes necessary; for now our discourse slips down from the familiarities of the wise to common friendships. The vices of friends often burst out, both upon the friends themselves and upon outsiders, whose disgrace nevertheless redounds to the friends. Such friendships, therefore, are to be washed away by a remission of intercourse and, as I heard Cato say, to be dissuaded rather than torn apart, unless some quite intolerable injury has flared up, such that it is neither right nor honorable, nor can it be otherwise, but that estrangement and separation must at once be made.

[77] Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium sed de communibus amicitiis), cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba.

[77] But if, however, some change either of morals or of studies, as is wont to happen, has been made, or a dissension has intervened in the parties of the commonwealth (for I am now speaking, as I said a little before, not of the friendships of wise men but of common friendships), care will have to be taken lest not only friendships seem to have been laid aside, but even enmities to have been undertaken. For nothing is more disgraceful than to wage war with him with whom you have lived familiarly. From the friendship of Q. Pompeius, on my account, as you know, Scipio had removed himself; on account of the dissension, however, which existed in the commonwealth, he was alienated from our colleague Metellus; he managed both gravely, with authority and without acerbity of spirit.

[78] Quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. Cavendum vero ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur. Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur iniuriam.

[78] Wherefore, first, effort must be given that no dissensions of friends arise; but if such a thing shall have happened, let the friendships seem rather extinguished than oppressed. One must truly beware lest friendships even turn themselves into grave enmities, from which wranglings, maledictions, contumelies are begotten. Which, however, if they will be tolerable, must be borne, and this honor must be paid to the old friendship: that he be in the fault who does the deed, not he who suffers the injury.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos.

Altogether, for all these vices and inconveniences there is one caution and one provision: that they not begin to love too quickly nor the unworthy.

[79] Digni autem sunt amicitia quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. Rarum genus. Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum.

[79] Worthy, moreover, of friendship are those in whom there is in themselves a cause why they should be loved. A rare kind. And indeed all things preeminent are rare, nor is anything more difficult than to find that which is in every respect perfect in its own kind.

Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos.

But most people know nothing good in human affairs except what is fruitful, and they love friends as if they were cattle, those especially from whom they hope that they themselves are going to capture the greatest profit.

[80] Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem.

[80] Thus those people lack that most beautiful and most natural friendship, sought for itself and for its own sake, nor are they themselves an example to themselves of this power of friendship, of what sort and how great it is. For each person loves himself, not so that he may exact some reward from himself for his own charity, but because each one is dear to himself in and of himself. Unless the same be transferred into friendship, a true friend will never be found; for he is one who is as though a second self.

[81] Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantis, idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura! qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus.

[81] But if this is apparent in beasts, in winged creatures, in swimmers, in field-dwellers, in the tame, in the wild—first, that they themselves love themselves (for that is born equally with every animate being), then that they seek and appetite those living beings of the same kind to whom they may attach themselves—and they do this with desire and with a certain similitude of human love—how much more does nature bring this about in man! who both himself loves and seeks another, whose mind he so mingles with his own that he effects almost one out of two.

[82] Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis quibus ceteri serviunt imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligent sed etiam verebuntur.

[82] But most men perversely, not to say impudently, wish to have such a friend as they themselves cannot be, and the things which they themselves do not bestow upon friends, these they demand from them. It is proper, however, first that the man himself be a good man, then that he seek another similar to himself. In such persons that stability of friendship, which we have long been treating, can be confirmed, since men joined by benevolence will first command the desires to which the rest are slaves, then will rejoice in equity and justice, and each will undertake all things for the other, and neither will ever demand from the other anything except what is honorable and right, and they will not only cultivate and cherish one another but will also feel reverence.

Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.

For he takes away the greatest ornament of friendship who takes away reverence from it.

[83] Itaque in iis perniciosus est error qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam; virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optumus beatissimusque comitatus.

[83] Therefore there is a pernicious error in those who suppose that in friendship license is open for lusts and all sins; the friendship of virtues has been given by nature as a helper, not as a companion of vices, so that, since solitary virtue could not reach those things which are highest, being joined and consociated with another it might reach them. And if among certain persons there is, or was, or will be such a societas, that is to be accounted the best and most blessed companionship toward the highest good of nature.

[84] Haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit et sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit.

[84] This is, I say, the society, in which are contained all the things that men think are to be sought—honorableness, glory, tranquility of mind, and pleasantness—so that both, when these are present, life is blessed, and without these it cannot be. And since this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to acquire it, effort must be given to virtue, without which we can attain neither friendship nor any thing to be sought; but when that is neglected, those who suppose they have friends then at last feel that they have erred, when some grave mischance compels them to put them to the proof.

[85] Quocirca (dicendum est enim saepius), cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.

[85] Wherefore (for it must be said more often), when you have judged, you ought to love, not, when you have loved, to judge. But since in many matters we are punished by negligence, then most of all in the matter of friends, both to be cherished and to be cultivated; for we use preposterous counsels and “do things already done,” which an old proverb forbids us. For, entangled hither and thither either by long-continued use or even by obligations, we suddenly, in mid-course, burst friendships asunder when some offense has arisen.

[86] Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. Quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment!

[86] Wherefore, all the more is so great negligence of a thing most necessary to be censured. For in human affairs there is one thing—friendship—about whose utility all with one mouth consent. Although by many virtue itself is contemned and is said to be a kind of venditation and ostentation; many despise riches, whom, content with little, a slender way of living and of dress delights; but honors, by the cupidity of which some are inflamed—how many so contemn them that they think there is nothing more inane, nothing lighter!

itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent; de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ii qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere.

and likewise the rest, which seem admirable to some, there are very many who reckon as nothing; about friendship all to a man think the same—both those who have devoted themselves to the Republic, and those who take delight in the cognition and learning of things, and those who at leisure manage their own business, and finally those who have handed themselves over whole to pleasures—that without friendship life is no life, provided only they are willing to live in some part liberally.

[87] Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet.

[87] For friendship, I know not how, creeps through the lives of all, nor does it allow any manner of spending one’s age to be devoid of itself. Nay even, if someone is of such asperity and immanity of nature as to shun and hate the congress of men—such as we are told a certain Timon at Athens was—yet he could not endure not to seek out someone before whom he may vomit forth the virus of his acerbity. And this would be judged most of all, if something of the sort could happen: that some god should lift us out of this concourse of men and place us somewhere in solitude, and there, while supplying an abundance and plenty of all things which nature desires, should take away the power of beholding a human being at all.

Quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?

Who would be so iron-hard as to be able to bear that life, and for whom solitude would not take away the fruit of all pleasures?

[88] Verum ergo illud est quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: 'si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.' Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur; quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

[88] Therefore true is that which I have heard our elders recall as having been said, as I suppose, by Archytas the Tarentine, heard by them from other elders: 'if someone had ascended into heaven and had surveyed the nature of the world and the beauty of the stars, that admiration would be insipid to him; which would have been most pleasant, if he had had someone to whom he might relate it.' Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as upon a prop; which is sweetest even in the dearest friend.

Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret, quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa sublevanda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.

But although by so many signs that same nature declares what it wills, inquires after, desires, yet somehow we grow deaf and do not hear the things by which we are warned by it. For the use of friendship is various and manifold, and many causes of suspicions and offenses are furnished, which it is the part of the wise both to avoid, to alleviate, and to bear; there is this one relief for offense, that both utility in friendship and faith be retained: for friends must often be admonished and objurgated, and these things are to be received amicably, when they are done benevolently.

[89] Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit:

[89] But somehow it is true, what in the Andria my intimate friend says:

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Obsequiousness produces friends, truth produces hatred.

Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo libenter utimur, comitas adsit, assentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur.

Troublesome is truth, since indeed from it there is born odium, which is the venom of friendship; but obsequiousness is much more troublesome, because, indulging sins, it allows a friend to be carried headlong; and the greatest fault is in him who both spurns truth and is impelled into fraud by obsequiousness. Therefore in all this matter care and diligence must be had: first, that admonition be free from acerbity, then that objurgation lack contumely; but in obsequiousness, since we gladly use the Terentian word, let comity be present, and let assentation, the helper of vices, be removed far away, which is worthy not of a friend, no, not even of a free man; for one lives in one way with a tyrant, in another with a friend.

[90] Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: 'melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam.' Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, eam capiunt qua debent vacare; peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

[90] But the one whose ears are closed to verity, so that he cannot hear the truth from a friend—his salvation is to be despaired of. For that clever saying of Cato, as many are, is this: ‘it is better in certain cases to earn bitter enemies than those friends who seem sweet; the former often speak the truth, the latter never.’ And this is absurd: that those who are admonished do not take up the annoyance which they ought to take, but they take up that of which they ought to be free; for they are not distressed that they have sinned, they bear it angrily to be objurgated; whereas the contrary were fitting—to grieve at the delinquency, to rejoice at the correction.

[91] Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem; quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.

[91] Therefore, since both to admonish and to be admonished is proper to true friendship, and the one should do it freely, not harshly, the other should accept it patiently, not with resistance, thus it must be held that there is no pest in friendships greater than adulation, blandishment, assentation; for although by many names this vice must be marked—that of frivolous and fallacious men, who speak everything to suit the will, nothing to suit the truth.

[92] Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex?

[92] Now, although simulation in all things is vicious (for it takes away the judgment of the true and adulterates it), yet it is most of all repugnant to friendship; for it deletes the truth, without which the name of friendship cannot be of avail. For since the force of friendship is in this, that, as it were, one soul be made out of many, how can that be brought about, if not even in each single person there will be one mind, the same always, but rather a variegated, changeable, multiplex one?

[93] Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

[93] For what, indeed, can be so flexible, so devious as the mind of him who turns to another’s not only sense and will but even countenance and nod?

Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi
Omnia adsentari,

Someone denies, I deny; he affirms, I affirm; at last I myself commanded myself
To assent to everything,

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est.

as the same Terence says, but he says it in the person of Gnatho, which genus of friend to employ is altogether levity.

[94] Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est assentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas.

[94] Many, however, are like Gnatho, though superior in position, fortune, and fame; the assentation of such men is irksome, when authority has been added to vanity.

[95] Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet quid intersit inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem et severum et gravem.

[95] Moreover, a blandishing friend can be separated from the true and recognized as such by diligence applied, just as all things painted-over and simulated can be distinguished from the sincere and the real. The assembly, which consists of the most unskilled, nevertheless is wont to judge what the difference is between a populist—that is, a flatterer and a lightweight citizen—and a man constant and severe and grave.

[96] Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi, di immortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas!

[96] With what blandishments Gaius Papirius was lately flowing into the ears of the assembly, when he was proposing a law on the re‑election of the tribunes of the plebs! We dissuaded it; but nothing about myself—I will more gladly speak about Scipio. How great was his gravity, immortal gods, how great his majesty in oration!

ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. Sed adfuistis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est.

so that you would easily call him a leader of the Roman people, not a companion. But you were present, and the oration is in your hands. And so the popular law was repudiated by the suffrages of the people.

Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maximo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur! cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur; atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat.

And, to return to myself, you remember, when Q. Maximus, the brother of Scipio, and L. Mancinus were consuls, how popular the law about the priesthoods of C. Licinius Crassus seemed! for the cooptation of the colleges was being transferred to the benefit of the people; and he was the first to institute conducting business with the people, facing toward the Forum. Yet, with us defending it, the religion of the immortal gods easily overcame that marketable oration.

Atque id actum est praetore me quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus; ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

And that was transacted when I was praetor, five years before I was made consul; thus that cause was defended by the matter itself rather than by the highest authority.

[97] Quod si in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum, id quam vere fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur.

[97] But if on the stage, that is, in the assembly, in which there is the utmost scope for feigned and adumbrated matters, nevertheless truth prevails, provided only that it has been laid open and illumined, what ought to be done in friendship, which is weighed wholly by truth? in which, unless, as the saying goes, you see an open heart and show your own, you have nothing trustworthy, nothing ascertained, not even to love or to be loved, since you do not know how truly that comes to pass. Although that assentation, however pernicious it may be, nevertheless can harm no one except the person who receives it and takes delight in it.

Ita fit, ut is assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet.

Thus it comes about that the man who flatters himself and most of all delights himself opens his ears most to flatterers.

[98] Omnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intellegit. Ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt.

[98] In general, virtue is a lover of itself; for it knows itself most excellently, and understands how lovable it is. But I am not speaking now about virtue, but about the opinion of virtue. For with virtue itself, not so many wish to be endowed as to seem to be.

Hos delectat assentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Assentation delights them; when a speech feigned to their own will is applied to them, they think that vain oration to be a testimonial of their praises. Therefore this is no friendship, when the one is unwilling to hear the truth, the other is prepared for lying. Nor would the assentation of parasites in comedies seem facetious to us, unless there were braggart soldiers.

Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?

Is Thais indeed giving great thanks to me?

Satis erat respondere: 'magnas'; 'ingentes' inquit. Semper auget assentator id, quod is cuius ad voluntatem dicitur vult esse magnum.

It was enough to answer: 'great'; 'immense,' he says. A flatterer always augments that which the one, to whose will it is spoken, wants to be great.

[99] Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet qui ipsi illam allectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant, ne callida assentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est; nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is qui illusus sit plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam illudi?

[99] Wherefore, although that bland vanity prevails among those who themselves allure and invite it, nevertheless even the graver and more constant must be admonished to take note, lest they be captured by cunning assentation. For everyone sees the man who flatters openly, except one who is exceedingly witless; but careful caution must be used lest that sly and hidden fellow insinuate himself; for he is not very easily recognized, since he even, by opposing, often assents, and, pretending to litigate, he flatters, and at the end he “gives his hands” and allows himself to be conquered, so that the one who has been deluded seems to have seen more. But what is more shameful than to be made sport of?

Quod ut ne accidat, magis cavendum est.

In order that this not happen, one must be all the more on guard.

Ut me hodie ante omnes comicos stultos senes
Versaris atque inlusseris lautissume.

How today, before all the foolish old men of comedy,
you have toyed with me and illuded me, most elegant one.

[100] Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est improvidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium (de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse), ad leves amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

[100] For even in fables this is the most foolish persona of improvident and credulous old men. But I know not by what manner, from the friendships of perfected men, that is, of wise men (I speak of that wisdom which seems able to fall upon a human being), the discourse has flowed down to light friendships. Wherefore let us return to those first things and bring those very things to a close at last.

Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est; ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita; quae tamen ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia, etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis.

Virtue, virtue, I say, C. Fannius, and you, Q. Mucius, both conciliates friendships and preserves them. For in it is the congruence of things, in it stability, in it constancy; which, when it has lifted itself up and displayed its own light and has looked upon and recognized the same in another, it moves itself toward that and in turn receives that which is in the other; whence either love or friendship is enkindled; for both have been said from loving; but to love is nothing else than to cherish that very one whom you love, with no indigence, with no utility sought; which, however, itself effloresces out of friendship, even if you have pursued it less.

[101] Hac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus, haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium. Vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia ex alia aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est, ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire.

[101] By this benevolence we, adolescents, loved those elders, Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio; this shines forth even more among equals, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius. In turn, however, we elders find rest in the affection of adolescents, as in yours, as in Quintus Tubero’s; for my part I am also delighted by the familiarity of the quite young Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the plan of life and of our nature is so arranged that one age arises from another, it is most to be desired that you can, with your equals, with whom as if released from the starting-gates, arrive with the same men at the finish-line, as it is said.

[102] Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae exstincta non est; nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.

[102] But since human affairs are fragile and caducous, there must always be some to be sought out whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for with charity and benevolence removed, all delight is removed from life. For me, Scipio—although he was suddenly snatched away—yet lives and will always live; for I loved the virtue of that man, which has not been extinguished; nor is it present before my eyes alone—I, who always had it in my hands—but it will be bright and conspicuous to posterity also. No one will ever undertake greater things in spirit or in hope who does not think that the memory and image of that man ought to be set before himself.

[103] Equidem ex omnibus rebus quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes.

[103] Indeed, out of all the things which either fortune or nature has bestowed on me, I have nothing which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio. In this there was for me consensus about the republic, in this counsel in private affairs, in the same a repose full of delectation. I never offended him, not even in the least matter, so far as I perceived; I myself heard nothing from him that I would not wish; there was one household, the same manner of life, and that in common, and not only military service, but also peregrinations and rustications in common.

[104] Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus. Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem.

[104] For what should I say about the studies of always coming to know and to learn something? In these, removed from the eyes of the people, we spent all our leisure time. If the recollection and memory of these things had perished together with him, I would in no way be able to bear the longing for a man most closely conjoined and most loving.

Sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adfert mihi aetas ipsa solacium. Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum. Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

But neither are those things extinguished; rather they are nourished and augmented by my cogitation and memory, and even if I were plainly bereft of them, yet age itself brings me great solace. For I cannot now remain much longer in this longing. Moreover, all things of brief duration ought to be tolerable, even if they are great.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem. Vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

These things I have had to say about friendship. But I exhort you to place virtue in such a way—without which friendship cannot exist—that, virtue excepted, you consider nothing preferable to friendship.