Seneca: DE BENEFICIIS

[1] Non referre beneficiis gratiam et est turpe et apud omnes habetur, Aebuti Liberalis; ideo de ingratis etiam ingrati queruntur, cum interim hoc omnibus haeret, quod omnibus displicet, adeoque in contrarium itur, ut quosdam habeamus infestissimos non post beneficia tantum sed propter beneficia. Hoc prauitate naturae accidere quibusdam non negauerim, pluribus, quia memoriam tempus interpositum subducit. Nam quae recentia apud illos uiguerunt, ea interiecto spatio obsolescunt; de quibus fuisse mihi tecum disputationem scio, cum tu illos non ingratos uocares sed oblitos, tamquam ea res ingratum excuset, quae facit, aut, quia hoc accidit alicui, non sit ingratus, cum hoc non accidat nisi ingrato.

[1] Not to return gratitude for benefits is both disgraceful and is held so by everyone, Aebuti Liberalis; therefore about the ungrateful even the ungrateful complain, while meanwhile this thing clings to all, which displeases all, and to such a contrary extreme is it carried, that we have certain people most hostile not after benefits only but because of benefits. This, through a depravity of nature, I would not deny happens to some; to more, because interposed time withdraws memory. For the things which, being recent, flourished among them, those, with an interval interposed, obsolesce; about which I know there was a disputation between me and you, when you would call them not ungrateful but forgetful, as though that thing excused the ingrate which makes him so, or, because this befalls someone, he were not ungrateful, since this does not befall anyone except an ingrate.

Multa sunt genera ingratorum, ut furum, ut homicidarum, quorum una culpa est, ceterum in partibus uarietas magna; ingratus <est,> qui beneficium accepisse se negat, quod accepit, ingratus est, qui dissimulat, ingratus, qui non reddit, ingratissimus omnium, qui oblitus est. Illi enim si non soluunt, tamen debent, et extat apud illos uestigium certe meritorum intra malam conscientiam inclusorum; aliquando ad referendam gratiam conuerti ex aliqua causa possunt, si illos pudor admonuerit, si subita honestae rei cupiditas, qualis solet ad tempus etiam in malis pectoribus exurgere, si inuitauerit facilis occasio; hic numquam fieri gratus potest, cui beneficium totum elapsum est. Et utrum tu peiorem uocas, apud quem gratia beneficii intercidit, an apud quem etiam memoria?

There are many kinds of the ungrateful, as of thieves, as of homicides, whose fault is one, but in the parts the variety is great; ungrateful who denies that he has received a benefaction which he received; ungrateful is he who dissimulates; ungrateful, who does not render; most ungrateful of all, he who has forgotten. For those men, if they do not pay, yet they owe, and there exists in them a trace at least of the merits shut up within an evil conscience; they can sometimes be turned to repaying gratitude for some reason, if shame shall have admonished them, if a sudden desire for an honorable thing, such as is wont for a time even to arise in evil breasts, shall have invited them, if an easy occasion shall have beckoned; this man can never become grateful, to whom the benefaction has altogether slipped away. And which do you call worse: in whose case the gratitude for a benefaction has perished, or in whose case even the memory?

Vitiosi oculi sunt, qui lucem reformidant, caeci, qui non uident; et parentes suos non amare inpietas est, non adgnoscere insania.

Vitiated eyes are those that dread the light; blind are those who do not see; and not to love one’s parents is impiety, not to acknowledge them is insanity.

[2] Quis tam ingratus est, quam qui, quod in prima parte animi positum esse debuit et semper occurrere, ita seposuit et abiecit, ut in ignorantiam uerteret? adparet illum non saepe de reddendo cogitasse, cui obrepsit obliuio. Denique ad reddendam gratiam et uirtute opus est et tempore et facultate et adspirante fortuna; qui meminit, sine inpendio gratus est.

[2] Who is so ungrateful as he who has so set aside and cast away that which ought to have been placed in the first part of the mind and to occur always, that he has turned it into ignorance? It appears that he has not often thought about repaying, upon whom forgetfulness has crept. Finally, for repaying gratitude there is need both of virtue and of time and of means and of favoring fortune; he who remembers is grateful without expenditure.

Hoc, quod non operam exigit, non opes, non felicitatem, qui non praestat, nullum habet, quo lateat, patrocinium; numquam enim uoluit gratus esse, qui beneficium tam longe proiecit, ut extra conspectum suum poneret. Quemadmodum, quae in usu sunt et manum cottidie tactumque patiuntur, numquam periculum situs adeunt, illa, quae ad oculos non reuocantur, sed extra conuersationem ut superuacua iacuerunt, sordes ipsa colligunt uetustate, ita, quidquid frequens cogitatio exercet ac renouat, memoriae numquam subducitur, quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit.

This,
which exacts not effort, not resources, not felicity—he who does not render it has no defense in which to hide;
for he never wished to be grateful, who has flung the benefaction so
far that he set it outside his own sight. Just as those things which are in use and endure the hand daily
and the touch never incur the danger of mold, whereas those things which are not recalled to the eyes, but have lain outside our intercourse
as superfluous, collect filth of themselves with age, so whatever frequent thought exercises and
renews is never withdrawn from memory, which loses nothing except that to which it has not often looked back.

[3] Praeter hanc causam aliae quoque sunt, quae nobis merita non numquam maxima euellant. Prima omnium ac potentissima, quod nouis semper cupiditatibus occupati non, quid habeamus, sed quid petamus, in id, quod adpetitur, intentis, quidquid est domi, uile est. Sequitur autem, ut, ubi quod acceperis leue nouorum cupiditas fecit, auctor quoque eorum non sit in pretio.

[3] Beyond this cause there are also others, which sometimes tear from us even the greatest benefits. The first of all and the most potent is this: being always occupied with new desires, we look not at what we have but at what we seek, and, intent upon that which is aimed at, whatever is at home is cheap. Then it follows that, when what you have received has been made light by a lust for novelties, the author of them too is not in esteem.

Amauimus aliquem et suspeximus et fundatum ab illo statum nostrum professi sumus, quamdiu nobis placebant ea, quae consecuti sumus; deinde inrumpit animum aliorum admiratio, et ad ea inpetus factus est, uti mortalibus mos est ex magnis maiora cupiendi: protinus excidit, quidquid ante apud nos beneficium uocabatur, nec ea intuemur, quae nos aliis praeposuere, sed ea sola, quae fortuna praecedentium ostentat. Non potest autem quisquam et inuidere et gratias agere, quia inuidere querentis et maesti est, gratias agere gaudentis. Deinde quia nemo nostrum nouit nisi id tempus, quod cum maxime transit, ad praeterita rari animum retorquent; sic fit, ut praeceptores eorumque beneficia intercidant, quia totam pueritiam reliquimus; sic fit, ut in adulescentiam nostram conlata pereant, quia ipsa numquam retractatur.

We have loved someone and looked up to him and professed that our condition was founded by him, so long as those things which we attained were pleasing to us; then the admiration of others bursts into the mind, and an impulse is made toward those things, as is the custom of mortals to desire greater from great: straightway there drops out whatever previously among us was called a benefaction, nor do we regard the things which set us before others, but only those which the fortune of our predecessors ostentates. Moreover, no one can both envy and give thanks, since to envy belongs to one complaining and mournful, to give thanks to one rejoicing. Then, because none of us knows anything except that time which is at this very moment passing, few turn their mind back to things past; thus it comes about that preceptors and their benefactions lapse, because we have left the whole of childhood; thus it comes about that the things conferred upon our adolescence perish, because that period itself is never reconsidered.

Nemo, quod fuit, tamquam in praeterito sed tamquam in perdito ponit, ideoque caduca memoria est futuro inminentium.

No one sets what has been as though in the past, but as though in the lost; and therefore memory is caducous for the imminent future.

[4] Hoc loco reddendum est Epicuro testimonium, qui adsidue queritur, quod aduersus praeterita simus ingrati, quod, quaecumque percipimus bona, non reducamus nec inter uoluptates numeremus, cum certior nulla sit uoluptas, quam quae iam eripi non potest. Praesentia bona nondum tota in solido sunt, potest illa casus aliquis incidere; futura pendent et incerta sunt; quod praeteriit, inter tuta sepositum est. Quomodo gratus esse quisquam aduersus beneficia potest, qui omnem uitam suam transilit praesentium totus ac futurorum?

[4] At this point testimony must be rendered to Epicurus, who assiduously complains that we are ungrateful toward the past, that, whatever good things we perceive, we do not call back nor number among pleasures, since no pleasure is more certain than that which now cannot be snatched away. Present goods are not yet wholly on solid ground, some chance may befall them; future things hang and are uncertain; what has passed is set aside among the safe things. How can anyone be grateful toward benefits, who overleaps his whole life, being wholly of present things and of future things?

Memoria gratum facit; memoriae minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum.

Memory makes one grateful; to memory he gives the least
whoever gives the most to hope.

[5] Quemadmodum, mi Liberalis, quaedam res semel perceptae haerent, quaedam, ut scias, non est satis didicisse (intercidit enim eorum scientia, nisi continuetur), geometriam dico et sublimium cursum et si qua alia propter suptilitatem lubrica sunt, ita beneficia quaedam magnitudo non patitur excidere, quaedam minora sed numero plurima et temporibus diuersa effluunt, quia, ut dixi, non subinde illa tractamus nec libenter, quid cuique debeamus, recognoscimus. Audi uoces petentium: nemo non uicturam semper in animo suo memoriam dixit, nemo non deditum se et deuotum professus est, et si quod aliud humilius uerbum, quo se obpigneraret, inuenit. Post exiguum tempus idem illi uerba priora quasi sordida et parum libera euitant; perueniunt deinde eo, quo, ut ego existimo, pessimus quisque atque ingratissimus peruenit, ut obliuiscantur.

[5] Just as, my Liberalis, certain things, once apprehended, stick, certain things, for you to know, it is not enough to have learned (for their knowledge is cut off unless it is continued), I mean geometry and the course of the heavenly bodies and, if there are any other things slippery on account of their subtlety, so certain benefits their magnitude does not allow to slip away, others, smaller but very many in number and diverse in times, flow out, because, as I said, we do not handle them repeatedly, nor do we willingly recognize what we owe to each person. Hear the voices of petitioners: there is no one who has not said that the memory would live forever in his mind, no one who has not professed himself surrendered and devoted, and, if he found any other humbler word by which he might pledge himself, he used it. After a short time these same men avoid their earlier words as if sordid and not quite free; then they come to that point to which, as I reckon, each worst and most ungrateful person comes: to forget.

Adeo enim ingratus est, qui oblitus est, ut ingratus sit, cui beneficium in mentem uenit.

For so ungrateful is he who has forgotten, that ungrateful too is he to whom a benefit comes to mind.

[6] Hoc tam inuisum uitium an inpunitum esse debeat, quaeritur, et an haec lex, quae in scholis exercetur, etiam in ciuitate ponenda sit, qua ingrati datur actio; quae uidetur aequa omnibus. 'Quidni? cum urbes quoque urbibus, quae praestitere, exprobrent et maiores conlata a posteris exigant.' Nostri maiores, maximi scilicet uiri, ab hostibus tantum res repetierunt, beneficia magno animo dabant, magno perdebant; excepta Macedonum gente non est in ulla data aduersus ingratum actio.

[6] Whether this so odious a vice ought to be unpunished is asked, and whether that law which is practiced in the schools ought also to be established in the commonwealth, by which an action is given against the ungrateful; which seems fair to all. 'Why not? since cities too upbraid cities for what they have provided, and demand from descendants the things conferred upon their elders the greater.' Our ancestors, clearly very great men, sought to recover property only from enemies; they gave benefits with a great spirit, with a great spirit they lost them; the Macedonian nation excepted, in no community was an action given against an ingrate.

Magnumque hoc argumentum est dandam non fuisse, quia aduersus maleficium omne consensimus, et homicidii, ueneficii, parricidii, uiolatarum religionum aliubi atque aliubi diuersa poena est, sed ubique aliqua, hoc frequentissimum crimen nusquam punitur, ubique inprobatur; neque absoluimus illud, sed cum difficilis esset incertae rei aestimatio, tantum odio damnauimus et inter ea reliquimus, quae ad iudices deos mittimus.

And this is a great argument that it ought not to have been granted, since we have agreed against every malefice; and for homicide, venefice (poisoning), parricide, and of violated religions there is here and there a different penalty, yet everywhere some: this most frequent crime is punished nowhere, everywhere it is disapproved; nor do we absolve it, but since the estimation of an uncertain matter was difficult, we condemned it only to hatred and left it among those things which we send to the gods as judges.

[7] Rationes autem multae mihi occurrunt, propter quas crimen hoc in legem cadere non debeat. Primum omnium pars optima beneficii periit, si actio sicut certae pecuniae aut ex conducto et locato datur. Hoc enim in illo speciosissimum est, quod dedimus uel perdituri, quod totum permisimus accipientium arbitrio; si adpello, si ad iudicem uoco, incipit non beneficium esse, sed creditum.

[7] But many reasons occur to me, on account of which this crime ought not to fall under law. First of all the best part of a benefaction perishes, if an action is given as for a fixed sum of money or from letting and hiring. For this is the most splendid thing in it, that we gave as if about to lose it, that we entrusted the whole to the recipients’ discretion; if I appeal, if I call to a judge, it begins not to be a benefaction, but a credit.

Deinde cum res honestissima sit referre gratiam, desinit esse honesta, si necessaria est; non magis enim laudabit quisquam gratum hominem, quam eum, qui depositum reddidit aut, quod debebat, citra iudicem soluit. Ita duas res, quibus in uita humana nihil pulchrius est, corrumpimus, gratum hominem et beneficium; quid enim aut in hoc magnificum est, si beneficium non dat, sed commodat, aut in illo, qui reddit, non quia uult, sed quia necesse est? Non est gloriosa res gratum esse, nisi tutum est ingratum fuisse.

Next, since it is a most honorable thing to render gratitude, it ceases to be honorable if it is made necessary; for no one will praise a grateful man any more than one who has returned a deposit or, what he owed, paid without a judge. Thus we corrupt two things than which nothing is more beautiful in human life—the grateful man and the beneficium; for what is either magnificent in this one, if he does not give a beneficium but lends it, or in that one who pays it back, not because he wants to, but because it is necessary? It is not a glorious thing to be grateful, unless it is safe to have been ungrateful.

Adice nunc, quod huic uni legi omnia fora uix sufficient. Quis erit, qui non agat? quis, cum quo non agatur?

Add now that all the fora will scarcely suffice for this one law.
Who will there be who does not bring an action? who, against whom will an action not be brought?

omnes sua extollunt, omnes etiam minima, quae in alios contulere, dilatant. Praeterea, quaecumque in cognitionem cadunt, conprendi possunt et non dare infinitam licentiam iudici; ideo melior uidetur condicio causae bonae, si ad iudicem quam si ad arbitrum mittitur, quia illum formula includit et certos, quos non excedat, terminos ponit, huius libera et nullis adstricta uinculis religio et detrahere aliquid potest et adicere et sententiam suam, non prout lex aut iustitia suadet, sed prout humanitas aut misericordia inpulit, regere. Ingrati actio non erat iudicem adligatura sed <in> regno liberrimo positura.

all exalt their own, all even the very least things,
which they have conferred upon others, they expand. Moreover, whatever
falls into cognition can be comprehended and does not
give infinite license to the judge; therefore the condition seems better
for a good cause if it is sent to a judge rather than to an arbiter,
because a formula encloses the former and sets fixed boundaries
which he may not exceed, whereas the latter’s free obligation, tied by no bonds,
can both detract something and add,
and steer his sentence, not as law or justice persuades,
but as humanity or mercy has impelled.
The action for ingratitude was not going to bind the judge but to place him <in> the freest realm.

Quid sit enim beneficium, non constat, deinde, quantum sit; refert, quam benigne illud interpretetur iudex. Quid sit ingratus, nulla lex monstrat; saepe et qui reddidit, quod accepit, ingratus est, et qui non reddidit, gratus. De quibusdam et inperitus iudex demittere tabellam potest, ubi fecisse aut non fecisse pronuntiandum est, ubi prolatis cautionibus controuersia tollitur, ubi inter disputantes ratio ius dicit; ubi uero animi coniectura capienda est, ubi id, de quo sola sapientia decernit, in controuersiam incidit, non potest sumi ad haec iudex ex turba selectorum, quem census in album et equestris hereditas misit.

For what a benefaction is is not agreed, and then, how great it is; it depends on how benignly the judge interprets it. What an ungrateful man is, no law shows; often both he who has returned what he received is ungrateful, and he who has not returned it is grateful. In certain matters even an inexpert judge can cast his tablet: where it must be pronounced that one did or did not do something, where, with the cautions (bonds/receipts) produced, the controversy is removed, where among disputants reason declares the right; but where a conjecture of the mind is to be grasped, where that falls into controversy which only wisdom decides, for these things a judge cannot be taken from the crowd of the selected, whom the census and an equestrian inheritance have sent into the album.

[8] Itaque non haec parum idonea res uisa est, quae deduceretur ad iudicem, sed nemo huic rei satis idoneus iudex inuentus est; quod non admiraberis, si excusseris, quid habiturus fuerit difficultatis, quisquis in eiusmodi reum exisset. Donauit aliquis magnam pecuniam, sed diues, sed non sensurus inpendium; donauit alius, sed toto patrimonio cessurus; summa eadem est, beneficium idem non est. Etiamnunc adice: hic pecuniam pro addicto dependit, sed cum illam domo protulisset; ille dedit eandem, sed mutuam sumpsit aut rogauit et se obligari ingenti merito passus est; eodem existimas loco esse illum, qui beneficium ex facili largitus est, et hunc, qui accepit, ut daret?

[8] Accordingly, this did not seem a thing ill-suited to be brought before a judge, but no judge was found sufficiently suitable for this matter; which you will not wonder at, if you examine what difficulty whoever undertook to try a defendant of this sort would have had. One man donated a great sum of money, but he was rich, and was not going to feel the expense; another donated, but was about to part with his whole patrimony; the sum is the same, the benefaction is not the same. Add further even now: this man paid down the money, as for an adjudged sum, but after he had brought it out from his house; that man gave the same, but he took it on loan or begged it and allowed himself to be bound by an immense obligation; do you reckon him, who bestowed the benefaction out of ease, to be in the same position as this one, who received in order to give?

Tempore quaedam magna fiunt, non summa: beneficium est donata possessio, cuius fertilitas laxare possit annonam, beneficium est unus in fame panis; beneficium est donare regiones, per quas magna flumina et nauigabilia decurrant, beneficium est arentibus siti et uix spiritum per siccas fauces ducentibus monstrare fontem. Quis inter se ista conparabit? quis expendet?

By timing certain things become great, not by their sum: it is a benefit, a donated possession whose fertility can ease the grain-supply; it is a benefit, a single loaf of bread in famine; it is a benefit to donate regions through which great and navigable rivers run; it is a benefit to show a spring to those parched with thirst and scarcely drawing breath through dry throats. Who will compare these with one another? who will weigh them?

Difficilis est sententia, quae non rem, sed uim rei quaerit; eadem licet sint, aliter data non idem pendent. Dedit hic mihi beneficium, sed non libenter, sed dedisse se questus est, sed superbius me, quam solebat, adspexit, sed tam tarde dedit, ut plus praestaturus fuerit, si cito negasset: horum quomodo iudex inibit aestimationem, cum sermo et dubitatio et uoltus meriti gratiam destruant?

Difficult is the judgment that seeks not the thing, but the force of the thing; even if they are the same, given in a different way they do not weigh the same. This man gave me a benefaction, but not willingly; rather he complained that he had given; he looked upon me more arrogantly than he was wont; he gave so late that he would have rendered more if he had quickly refused: how will a judge enter upon the estimation of these matters, since speech and hesitation and countenance destroy the grace of the merit?

[9] Quid, quod quaedam beneficia uocantur, quia nimis concupiscuntur, quaedam non sunt ex hac uolgari nota sed maiora, etiam si minus adparent? Beneficium uocas dedisse potentis populi ciuitatem, in quatuordecim deduxisse et defendisse capitis reum; quid utilia suasisse? quid retinuisse, ne in scelus rueret?

[9] What of this, that certain benefactions are so called because they are too much coveted, while certain others are not of this vulgar mark but are greater, even if less apparent? You call it a benefaction to have granted the citizenship of a powerful people, to have escorted into the Fourteen and defended a defendant on a capital charge; what of having advised what was useful? what of having held him back, lest he rush into crime?

quid gladium excussisse morituro? quid efficacibus remediis lugentem et, quos desiderabat, uolentem sequi ad uitae consilium reduxisse? quid adsedisse aegro et, cum ualetudo eius ac salus momentis constaret, excepisse idonea cibo tempora et cadentes uenas uino refecisse et medicum adduxisse morienti?

what
of having wrested the sword from one about to die?
what of, with efficacious remedies,
having brought back to the counsel of life one who was mourning and, for those whom he longed for, was willing to follow?
what of having sat by the sick man and, when
his health and safety depended on moments, having seized
fit times for food and refreshed the failing veins with wine,
and having brought a physician to the man who was dying?

Haec quis aestimabit? quis dissimilibus beneficiis iubebit beneficia pensari? 'Donaui tibi domum'; sed ego tuam supra te ruere praedixi.

Who will appraise these things? Who will bid that benefits be weighed against dissimilar benefits? 'I donated a house to you'; but I foretold that your own house would collapse upon you.

'Dedi tibi patrimonium'; sed ego naufrago tabulam. 'Pugnaui pro te et uolnera excepi'; at ego uitam tibi silentio dedi. Cum aliter beneficium detur, aliter reddatur, paria facere difficile est.

'I gave you a patrimony'; but I gave a plank to a shipwrecked man.
'I fought for you and took wounds'; but I
gave you life in silence. Since a benefit is given in one way,
it is repaid in another, it is difficult to make them equal.

[10] Dies praeterea beneficio reddendo non dicitur, sicut pecuniae creditae; itaque potest, qui nondum reddidit, reddere. Dic enim, intra quod tempus deprendatur ingratus. Maxima beneficia probationem non habent, saepe intra tacitam duorum conscientiam latent; an hoc inducimus, ut non demus beneficia sine teste?

[10] Moreover, a day is not appointed for repaying a benefit, as for money lent; and so he who has not yet repaid can repay. Say, then, within what time an ungrateful man is to be caught. The greatest benefits have no proof; often they lie hidden within the silent conscience of two; are we introducing this, that we should not give benefits without a witness?

Quam deinde poenam ingratis constituimus? unam omnibus, cum disparia sint? inaequalem et pro cuiusque beneficio maiorem, minorem?

What punishment, then, do we establish for the ungrateful? One and the same for all, since the benefits are unequal? An unequal one, and greater or lesser in proportion to each one’s benefit?

Age, intra pecuniam uersabitur taxatio: quid, quod quaedam uitae beneficia sunt et maiora uita? His quae pronuntiabitur poena? minor beneficio?

Come now, will the assessment be confined within money: what of the fact that certain benefits are of life and greater than life? For these, what penalty will be pronounced? A lesser one than the benefit?

iniqua est; par et capitalis? quid inhumanius quam cruentos esse beneficiorum exitus?

it is unjust; equal and capital? what is more inhuman than that the endings of benefactions be bloody?

[11] 'Quaedam' inquit 'priuilegia parentibus data sunt; quomodo horum extra ordinem habita ratio est, sic aliorum quoque beneficorum haberi debet.' Parentium condicionem sacrauimus, quia expediebat liberos tolli; sollicitandi ad hunc laborem erant incertam adituri fortunam. Non poterat illis dici, quod beneficia dantibus dicitur: 'Cui des, elige; ipse tecum, si deceptus es, querere; dignum adiuua.' In liberis tollendis nihil iudicio tollentium licet, tota res uoti est; itaque, ut aequiore animo adirent aleam, danda aliqua illis potestas fuit. Deinde alia condicio parentium est, qui beneficia, quibus dederunt, dant nihilo minus daturique sunt, nec est periculum, ne dedisse ipsos mentiantur; in ceteris quaeri debet, non tantum an receperint, sed an dederint, horum in confesso merita sunt, et, quia utile est iuuentuti regi, inposuimus illi quasi domesticos magistratus, sub quorum custodia contineretur.

[11] “Certain” privileges,” he says, “have been given to parents; as special regard was had to these outside the ordinary course, so regard ought to be had to other benefactions as well.” We have consecrated the condition of parents, because it was expedient that children be taken up and reared; they had to be encouraged to this labor, being about to enter upon an uncertain fortune. It could not be said to them, as it is said to those who give benefits: “Choose to whom you give; if you were deceived, complain to yourself; help the worthy.” In the taking up of children nothing is permitted to the judgment of the raisers; the whole business is a matter of a vow; and so, that they might approach the hazard with a more even mind, some power had to be given to them. Then the condition of parents is different: they give benefits to those to whom they have given, none the less are giving and will give, nor is there danger that they themselves will lie that they have given; in other cases it ought to be inquired not only whether they have received, but whether they have given; of the parents the merits are in confessed acknowledgment, and because it is useful for youth to be ruled, we have imposed upon it, as it were, domestic magistrates, under whose guardianship it might be kept.

Deinde omnium parentium unum erat beneficium, itaque aestimari semel potuit; alia diuersa sunt, dissimilia, infinitis inter se interuallis distantia; itaque sub nullam regulam cadere potuerunt, cum aequius esset omnia relinqui quam omnia aequari.

Then the benefit of all parents was one, and so it could be estimated once; other benefactions are diverse, dissimilar, distanced from each other by infinite intervals; and so they could fall under no rule, since it was more equitable that all things be left as they are than that all things be equalized.

[12] Quaedam magno dantibus constant, quaedam accipientibus magna sunt, sed gratuita tribuentibus. Quaedam amicis data sunt, quaedam ignotis; plus est, quamuis idem detur, si ei datur, quem nosse a beneficio tuo incipis. Hic auxilia tribuit, ille ornamenta, ille solacia.

[12] Some things cost the givers greatly; some are great for the recipients, yet are gratis to the bestowers. Some have been given to friends, some to unknown persons; it is more, although the same thing is given, if it is given to him whom you begin to know thanks to your benefaction. This one bestows aids, that one ornaments, that one solaces.

Inuenies, qui nihil putet esse iocundius, nihil maius quam habere, in quo calamitas adquiescat; inuenies rursus, qui dignitati suae, quam securitati consuli malit; est, qui plus ei debere se iudicet, per quem tutior est, quam ei, per quem honestior. Proinde ista maiora aut minora erunt, prout fuerit iudex aut huc aut illo inclinatus animo. Praeterea creditorem mihi ipse eligo, beneficium saepe ab eo accipio, a quo nolo, et aliquando ignorans obligor: quid facies?

You will find someone who thinks nothing to be more jocund, nothing greater than to have something in which calamity may come to rest; you will find, again, someone who would rather have his dignity consulted than his security; there is one who judges himself to owe more to him through whom he is safer than to him through whom he is more honorable. Accordingly, these things will be greater or lesser, according as the judge has been inclined in mind either this way or that. Moreover, I myself choose my creditor; I often receive a benefit from one from whom I do not wish it, and sometimes I become obligated unknowing: what will you do?

ingratum uocabis eum, cui beneficium inscio et, si scisset, non accepturo inpositum est? non uocabis eum, qui utcumque acceptum non reddidit? Aliquis dedit mihi beneficium, sed idem postea fecit iniuriam: utrum uno munere ad patientiam iniuriarum omnium adstringor, an proinde erit, ac si gratiam rettulerim, quia beneficium suum ipse insequenti iniuria rescidit?

ungrateful
will you call him, upon whom a benefit was imposed without his knowing and who, if he had known, would not have accepted it? will you not call him ungrateful, who,
however it was accepted, did not render it back? Someone gave me a benefit,
but the same man afterward did an injury: am I by one
munus bound to the patience of all injuries,
or will it be just as if I had returned gratitude, because he himself rescinded his benefit by the subsequent injury?

Quomodo deinde aestimabis, utrum plus sit, quod accepit, an quo laesus est? Dies me deficiet omnes difficultates persequi temptantem.

How, then, will you estimate whether what he received is the greater, or that by which he was harmed? The day will fail me as I attempt to pursue all the difficulties.

[13] 'Tardiores' inquit 'ad beneficia danda facimus non uindicando data nec infitiatores eorum adficiendo poena.' Sed illud quoque tibi e contrario occurrat multo tardiores futuros ad accipienda beneficia, si periculum causae dicundae adituri erunt et innocentiam sollicitiore habituri loco. Deinde erimus per hoc ipsi quoque ad danda tardiores; nemo enim libenter dat inuitis, sed quicumque ad bene faciendum bonitate inuitatus est et ipsa pulchritudine rei, etiam libentius dabit nihil debituris nisi quod uolent. Minuitur enim gloria eius officii, cui diligenter cautum est.

[13] 'We make them slower,' he says, 'to give benefits by not vindicating what was given and by not afflicting with penalty those who deny them.' But let this also, conversely, occur to you: that they will be much slower to receive benefits, if they are going to incur the danger of pleading a case and to have their innocence in a more anxious position. Then through this we ourselves also will be slower to give; for no one willingly gives to the unwilling, but whoever has been invited to do good by goodness and by the very beauty of the thing, will give even more willingly to those who will owe nothing except what they wish. For the glory of that office is diminished, for which careful provision has been taken.

[14] Deinde pauciora erunt beneficia, sed ueriora; quid autem mali est inhiberi beneficiorum temeritatem? Hoc enim ipsum secuti sunt, qui nullam legem huic constituerunt, ut circumspectius donaremus, circumspectius eligeremus eos, in quos merita conferuntur. Etiam atque etiam, cui des, considera: nulla actio erit, nulla repetitio.

[14] Then the benefits will be fewer, but truer; what harm, moreover, is there in the temerity of benefactions being checked? This very thing, in fact, is what those aimed at who established no law for this, so that we might give more circumspectly, more circumspectly choose those upon whom merits are conferred. Again and again, consider to whom you give: there will be no action, no restitution.

Erras, si existimas succursurum tibi iudicem; nulla lex te in integrum restituet, solam accipientis fidem specta. Hoc modo beneficia auctoritatem suam tenent et magnifica sunt; pollues illa, si materiam litium feceris. Aequissima uox est et ius gentium prae se ferens: 'Redde, quod debes'; haec turpissima est in beneficio: 'Redde!' Quid?

You err, if you suppose that a judge will come to your aid; no law will restitute you in full, look to the recipient’s good faith alone. In this way benefits keep their own authority and are magnificent; you will pollute them, if you make them the matter of lawsuits. The most equitable utterance, and one that bears the law of nations on its face, is: ‘Render what you owe’; this is most disgraceful in the case of a beneficium: ‘Render it back!’ What?

reddet uitam, quam debet? dignitatem? securitatem?

will he give back life, which he owes? dignity? security?

sanitatem? Reddi maxima quaeque non possunt. 'At pro iis' inquit 'aliquid, quod tanti sit.' Hoc est, quod dicebam, interituram tantae rei dignitatem, si beneficium mercem facimus.

health? The greatest things
cannot be returned. "But in return for them," he says, "something,
which is of such worth." This is what I was saying: the dignity
of so great a thing will perish, if we make a benefit merchandise.

Non est inritandus animus ad auaritiam, ad querellas, ad discordiam; sua sponte in ista fertur. Quantum possumus, resistamus et quaerenti occasiones amputemus.

The mind is not to be incited to avarice, to quarrels,
to discord; of its own accord it is carried into those. As much
as we can, let us resist and amputate the occasions it is seeking.

[15] Vtinam quidem persuadere possemus, ut pecunias creditas tantum a uolentibus acciperent! utinam nulla stipulatio emptorem uenditori obligaret nec pacta conuentaque inpressis signis custodirentur, fides potius illa seruaret et aecum colens animus! Sed necessaria optimis praetulerunt et cogere fidem quam expectare malunt.

[15] Would that we could indeed persuade them to accept loaned monies
only from the willing! Would that no stipulation would obligate the buyer
to the seller, nor pacts and covenants be kept by impressed seals,
but rather that Good Faith would keep them, and a mind cultivating the equitable!
But necessities have been preferred to the best things, and they prefer to coerce faith
rather than to await it.

Adhibentur ab utraque parte testes; ille per tabulas plurium nomina interpositis parariis facit; ille non est interrogatione contentus, nisi reum manu sua tenuit. O turpem humani generis fraudis ac nequitiae publicae confessionem! anulis nostris plus quam animis creditur.

Witnesses are brought in by both sides; he, by means of the tablets, manufactures the names of several, with intermediaries interposed; he is not content with interrogation unless he has held the defendant with his own hand. O shameful confession of the human race’s fraud and public iniquity! more credit is given to our rings than to our minds.

In quid isti ornati uiri adhibiti sunt? in quid inprimunt signa? nempe ne ille neget accepisse se, quod accepit.

For what are those adorned men brought in? For what do they impress their seals? Surely, lest he deny having received what he received.

Hos incorruptos uiros et uindices ueritatis existimas? at his ipsis non aliter statim pecuniae conmittentur. Ita non honestius erat a quibusdam fidem falli, quam ab omnibus perfidiam timeri?

Do you deem these men incorrupt and avengers of truth? Yet to these very men money will forthwith be entrusted in no different way. So then, was it not more honorable that good faith be deceived by some than that perfidy be feared by all?

Hoc unum deest auaritiae, ut beneficia sine sponsore non demus. Generosi animi est et magnifici iuuare, prodesse; qui dat beneficia, deos imitatur, qui repetit, feneratores. Quid illos, dum uindicamus, in turbam sordidissimam redigimus?

This one thing is lacking to avarice, namely that we do not give benefactions without a sponsor. It belongs to a generous and magnificent spirit to help, to be of profit; he who gives benefactions imitates the gods, he who exacts them back is a usurer. Why do we, while we vindicate them, reduce them into the most sordid crowd?

[16] 'Plures' inquit 'ingrati erunt, si nulla aduersus ingratum datur actio.' Immo pauciores, quia maiore dilectu dabuntur beneficia. Deinde non expedit notum omnibus fieri, quam multi ingrati sint; pudorem enim rei tollet multitudo peccantium, et desinet esse probri loco commune maledictum. Numquid iam ulla repudio erubescit, postquam inlustres quaedam ac nobiles feminae non consulum numero sed maritorum annos suos conputant et exeunt matrimonii causa, nubunt repudii?

[16] 'More,' he says, 'will be ingrates, if no action is given against the ingrate.' Nay rather, fewer, because benefits will be given with greater selection. Then it is not expedient that it become known to all how many are ingrates; for the multitude of sinners will remove the shame of the matter, and the common reproach will cease to be in the place of a disgrace. Does any woman now blush at repudiation, since certain illustrious and noble women compute their years not by the number of consuls but of husbands, and they go out for the sake of marriage, they wed for the sake of divorce?

Tamdiu istuc timebatur, quamdiu rarum erat; quia nulla sine diuortio acta sunt, quod saepe audiebant, facere didicerunt. Numquid iam ullus adulterii pudor est, postquam eo uentum est, ut nulla uirum habeat, nisi ut adulterum inritet? Argumentum est deformitatis pudicitia.

That thing was feared just so long as it was rare; because nothing has been done without divorce, what they often heard of they learned to do. Is there any shame of adultery now, after it has come to this point, that no woman has a husband except to provoke an adulterer? Pudicity is proof of deformity.

Quam inuenies tam miseram, tam sordidam, ut illi satis sit unum adulterorum par, nisi singulis diuisit horas? et non sufficit dies omnibus, nisi apud alium gestata est, apud alium mansit. Infrunita et antiqua est, quae nesciat matrimonium uocari unum adulterium.

What woman will you find so miserable, so sordid, that a single pair of adulterers is enough for her, unless she has divided the hours to each individual? And the day does not suffice for all, unless she has been carried to one and has remained with another. She is brazen and antiquated who does not know that marriage is called one adultery.

Quemadmodum horum delictorum iam euanuit pudor, postquam res latius euagata est, ita ingratos plures efficies et auidiores, si numerare se coeperint.

Just as the shame of these crimes has now
vanished, after the matter has spread more widely, so
you will make more people ungrateful and more greedy, if they begin to
keep count.

[17] 'Quid ergo? inpunitus erit ingratus?' Quid ergo, inpunitus erit inpius? quid malignus?

[17] 'What then? Will the ingrate be unpunished?' What then, will the impious be unpunished? what of the malignant?

quid auarus? quid inpotens? quid crudelis?

what of the avaricious? what of the uncontrolled? what of the cruel?

Inpunita tu credis esse, quae inuisa sunt, aut ullum supplicium grauius existimas publico odio? Poena est, quod non audet ab ullo beneficium accipere, quod non audet ulli dare, quod omnium designatur oculis aut designari se iudicat, quod intellectum rei optimae ac dulcissimae amisit. An tu infelicem uocas, qui caruit acie, cuius aures morbus obstruxit, non uocas miserum eum, qui sensum beneficiorum amisit?

Do you believe unpunished are the things that are hated, or do you reckon any punishment graver than public hatred?
It is a penalty that he does not dare to receive a benefit from anyone, that he does not dare to give one to anyone, that he is designated to the eyes of all or judges himself to be designated, that he has lost the understanding of the best and sweetest thing.
Or do you call unhappy the man who has been deprived of eyesight, whose ears a sickness has blocked, do you not call wretched him who has lost the sense of benefits?

Testes ingratorum omnium deos metuit, urit illum et angit intercepti beneficii conscientia; denique satis haec ipsa poena magna est, quod rei, ut dicebam, iocundissimae fructum non percipit. At quem iuuat accepisse, aequali perpetuaque uoluptate fruitur et animum eius, a quo accepit, non rem intuens gaudet. Gratum hominem semper beneficium delectat, ingratum semel.

He fears all the gods as witnesses of the ungrateful; the conscience of an intercepted benefit burns and vexes him; finally, this very penalty is great enough, that he does not grasp the fruit of a thing, as I was saying, most jocund. But he whom it helps to have received enjoys with an equable and perpetual pleasure, and rejoices looking not at the thing but at the mind of him from whom he received. A grateful man a benefit delights always; an ingrate, once.

Conparari autem potest utriusque uita, cum alter tristis sit et sollicitus, qualis esse infitiator ac fraudulentus solet, apud quem non parentium, qui debet, honor est, non educatoris, non praeceptorum, alter laetus, hilaris, occasionem referendae gratiae expectans et ex hoc ipso adfectu gaudium grande percipiens nec quaerens, quomodo decoquat, sed quemadmodum plenius uberiusque respondeat non solum parentibus et amicis, sed humilioribus quoque personis? Nam etiam si a seruo suo beneficium accepit, aestimat, non a quo, sed quid acceperit.

Moreover, the life of each can be compared: the one is sad and anxious, such as a denier and a fraudulent man is wont to be, with whom there is not the honor due to parents, nor to the fosterer, nor to preceptors; the other cheerful, lively, awaiting an occasion for returning a favor, and from this very affection receiving great joy, and not seeking how he may become insolvent, but how he may respond more fully and more bountifully not only to parents and friends, but also to persons more humble? For even if he has received a benefit from his own slave, he judges not from whom, but what he has received.

[18] Quamquam quaeritur a quibusdam, sicut ab Hecatone, an beneficium dare seruus domino possit. Sunt enim, qui ita distinguant, quaedam beneficia esse, quaedam officia, quaedam ministeria; beneficium esse, quod alienus det (alienus est, qui potuit sine reprehensione cessare); officium esse filii, uxoris, earum personarum, quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem iubet; ministerium esse serui, quem condicio sua eo loco posuit, ut nihil eorum, quae praestat, inputet superiori. [Lacuna?] Praeterea seruum qui negat dare aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris humani; refert enim, cuius animi sit, qui praestat, non cuius status.

[18] Although it is asked by certain people, as by Hecato, whether a slave can give a beneficium to his master. For there are those who distinguish thus: that some things are beneficia, some officia, some ministeria; a beneficium is that which an alien gives (an alien is one who could have refrained without reprehension); an officium is that of a son, a wife, those persons whom necessitudo arouses and bids to bring aid; a ministerium is that of a slave, whom his condition has placed in that position, such that he imputes none of the things which he renders to his superior. [Lacuna?] Moreover, he who denies that a slave ever gives a beneficium to his master is ignorant of human law; for it matters of what spirit the one who renders it is, not of what status.

Nulli praeclusa uirtus est; omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes inuitat, et ingenuos et libertinos et seruos et reges et exules; non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est. Quid enim erat tuti aduersus repentina, quid animus magnum promitteret sibi, si certam uirtutem fortuna amitteret? Si non dat beneficium seruus domino, nec regi quisquam suo nec duci suo miles; quid enim interest, quali quis teneatur imperio, si summo tenetur?

Virtue is closed to no one; it stands open to all, admits all, invites all, both freeborn and freedmen and slaves and kings and
exiles; it chooses neither household nor wealth, being content with the man stripped bare. For what protection was there against sudden events,
what great thing could the soul promise itself, if assured virtue could be lost to fortune? If a slave does not give a benefit to his
master, then neither does anyone to his king nor a soldier to his commander; for what does it matter by what sort of command one is held, if he
is held by the highest?

Nam si seruo, quo minus in nomen meriti perueniat, necessitas obstat et patiendi ultima timor, idem istuc obstabit et ei, qui regem habet, et ei, qui ducem, quoniam sub dispari titulo paria in illos licent. Atqui dant regibus suis, dant imperatoribus beneficia: ergo et dominis. Potest seruus iustus esse, potest fortis, potest magni animi: ergo et beneficium dare potest; nam et hoc uirtutis est.

For if, in the case of a slave, necessity and the fear of the utmost things to be endured stand in the way, so that he does not arrive at the name of merit, that same thing will stand in the way both for him who has a king and for him who has a general, since, under a different title, equal things are licit against them. And yet they give benefits to their kings, they give benefits to their commanders: therefore also to their masters. A slave can be just, he can be brave, he can be magnanimous: therefore he can also give a benefit; for this too is of virtue.

Adeo quidem dominis serui beneficia possunt dare, ut ipsos saepe beneficii sui fecerint.

To such a degree, indeed, can slaves give benefits to their masters, that they have often made them beneficiaries of their own benefit.

[19] Non est dubium, quin seruus beneficium dare possit cuilibet; quare ergo non et domino suo possit? 'Quia non potest' inquit 'creditor domini sui fieri, si pecuniam illi dederit. Alioqui cottidie dominum suum obligat: peregrinantem sequitur, aegro ministrat, rus eius labore summo colit; omnia tamen ista, quae alio praestante beneficia dicerentur, praestante seruo ministeria sunt.

[19] There is no doubt that a slave can give a benefaction to anyone; why, then, should he not be able to his own master as well? ‘Because he cannot,’ he says, ‘become his master’s creditor, if he should give him money. Otherwise he obligates his master every day: he follows him when traveling abroad, he ministers to him when sick, he cultivates his country estate with the utmost toil; yet all those things, which, if another were providing them, would be called benefactions, when a slave provides them are services.

Beneficium enim id est, quod quis dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare; seruus autem non habet negandi potestatem; ita non praestat, sed paret, nec id se fecisse iactat, quod non facere non potuit.' Iam sub ista ipsa lege uincam et eo perducam seruum, ut in multa liber sit; interim dic mihi, si tibi ostendero aliquem pro salute domini sui sine respectu sui dimicantem et confossum uolneribus reliquias tamen sanguinis ab ipsis uitalibus fundentem et, ut ille effugiendi tempus habeat, moram sua morte quaerentem, hunc tu negabis beneficium dedisse, quia seruus est? Si tibi ostendero aliquem, ut secreta domini prodat, nulla tyranni pollicitatione corruptum, nullis territum minis, nullis cruciatibus uictum auertisse, quantum potuerit, suspiciones quaerentis et inpendisse spiritum fidei, hunc tu negabis beneficium domino dedisse, quia seruus est? Vide, ne eo maius sit, quo rarius est exemplum uirtutis in seruis, eoque gratius, quod, cum fere inuisa imperia sint et omnis necessitas grauis, commune seruitutis odium in aliquo domini caritas uicit.

For a benefaction is, in fact, that which someone has given when it was also permitted him not to give; but a slave does not have the power of refusing; thus he does not bestow, but obeys, nor does he vaunt that he has done what he could not but do.' Now under this very rule I will prevail and bring the slave to the point that he is free in many respects; meanwhile tell me, if I show you someone fighting for his master’s safety without regard for himself, and, run through with wounds, yet pouring out the remnant of his blood from his very vitals, and, in order that the other may have time to escape, seeking delay by his own death—will you deny that this man has given a benefaction, because he is a slave? If I show you someone whom no promise of a tyrant could corrupt to betray his master’s secrets, whom no menaces frightened, whom no torments overcame, who, so far as he was able, turned aside the inquirer’s suspicions and expended his life-breath for loyalty—will you deny that this man has given a benefaction to his master, because he is a slave? See whether it is not the greater for this very reason, that the example of virtue is rarer among slaves, and all the more welcome, because, since commands are commonly odious and every compulsion grievous, the common hatred of servitude has in some man been overcome by love for his master.

Ita non ideo beneficium non est, quia a seruo profectum est, sed ideo maius, quia deterrere ab illo ne seruitus quidem potuit.

Thus it is not therefore not a beneficence, because it proceeded from a slave, but therefore the greater, because not even servitude could deter him from it.

[20] Errat, si quis existimat seruitutem in totum hominem descendere. Pars melior eius excepta est: corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis, mens quidem sui iuris, quae adeo libera et uaga est, ut ne ab hoc quidem carcere, cui inclusa est, teneri queat, quo minus inpetu suo utatur et ingentia agat et in infinitum comes caelestibus exeat. Corpus itaque est, quod domino fortuna tradidit; hoc emit, hoc uendit; interior illa pars mancipio dari non potest.

[20] He errs, if anyone thinks that servitude descends upon the whole human being. The better part of him is excepted: bodies are obnoxious and assigned to masters, but the mind indeed is sui iuris, which is so free and wandering that not even by this prison in which it is enclosed can it be held, from using its own impetus and doing vast things and going out into the infinite as a companion to the celestial. It is therefore the body which Fortune has handed over to the master; this he buys, this he sells; that inner part cannot be given by mancipation.

Ab hac quidquid uenit, liberum est; nec enim aut nos omnia iubere possumus aut in omnia serui parere coguntur: contra rem publicam imperata non facient, nulli sceleri manus commodabunt.

From this, whatever comes, is free; for neither can we order everything nor are slaves compelled to obey in everything: against the Republic what is commanded they will not do; to no crime will they lend a hand.

[21] Quaedam sunt, quae leges nec iubent nec uetant facere; in iis seruus materiam beneficii habet. Quam diu praestatur, quod a seruo exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi plus, quam quod seruo necesse est, beneficium est; ubi in adfectum amici transit, desinit uocari ministerium. Est aliquid, quod dominus praestare seruo debeat, ut cibaria, ut uestiarium; nemo hoc dixit beneficium; at indulsit, liberalius educauit, artes, quibus erudiuntur ingenui, tradidit: beneficium est.

[21] There are certain things which the laws neither bid nor forbid to do; in these the slave has the material for a benefit. As long as that which is wont to be exacted from a slave is rendered, it is service; where there is more than what is necessary for a slave, it is a benefit; where it passes into the affection of a friend, it ceases to be called service. There are some things which a master ought to furnish to a slave, such as food-rations, such as clothing; no one has called this a benefit; but if he has indulged him, has brought him up more liberally, has handed down the arts by which the freeborn are educated: it is a benefit.

Idem e contrario fit in persona serui: quidquid est, quod seruilis officii formulam excedit, quod non ex imperio, sed ex uoluntate praestatur, beneficium est, si modo tantum est, ut hoc uocari potuerit quolibet alio praestante.

The same, conversely, happens in the person of the slave: whatever there is that exceeds the form of servile duty, that which is not by command but is rendered by will, is a benefit, provided only that it is of such weight that it could be called this with any other bestowing it.

[22] Seruus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est. Quemadmodum ille beneficium dat, ubi plus praestat, quam quod operas locauit, sic seruus, ubi beneuolentia erga dominum fortunae suae modum transit et altius aliquid ausus, quod etiam felicius natis decori esset, spem domini antecessit, beneficium est intra domum inuentum. An aecum uidetur tibi, quibus, si minus debito faciant, irascimur, non haberi gratiam, si plus debito solitoque fecerint?

[22] A slave, as Chrysippus holds, is a perpetual hireling. Just as that man confers a benefit when he renders more than that for which he has hired out his services, so a slave—when, out of benevolence toward his master, he passes the measure of his fortune and, having dared something higher, anticipates his master’s expectation with something that would be to the credit even of the better-born—is a benefit found within the household. Or does it seem fair to you that those at whom we grow angry if they do less than is owed should not receive gratitude if they have done more than what is owed and customary?

Vis scire, quando non sit beneficium? ubi dici potest: 'Quid, si nollet?' Vbi uero id praestitit, quod nolle licuit, uoluisse laudandum est. Inter se contraria sunt beneficium et iniuria; potest dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam accipere.

Do you wish to know when it is not a benefit? where it can be said: 'What, if he were unwilling?'
But when indeed he has rendered that which it was permitted to refuse, his having willed it is to be praised.
Benefit and injury are contrary to each other; he can give a benefit to the master, if he can receive an injury from the master.

Atqui de iniuriis dominorum in seruos qui audiat positus est, qui et saeuitiam et libidinem et in praebendis ad uictum necessariis auaritiam conpescat. Quid ergo? beneficium dominus a seruo accipit?

And yet someone has been appointed to hear the injuries of masters against slaves, who restrains both cruelty and libido and, in furnishing the necessities for victuals, avarice. What then? Does the master receive a benefaction from a slave?

immo homo ab homine. Denique, quod in illius potestate fuit, fecit: beneficium domino dedit; ne a seruo acceperis, in tua potestate est. Quis autem tantus est, quem non fortuna indigere etiam infimis cogat?

nay, a man from a man. Finally, what was in that one’s power, he did: he gave a benefit to his master; it is in your power not to receive it from a slave. Who, moreover, is so great that Fortune does not compel him to need even the lowliest?

[23 Multa iam beneficiorum exempla referam et dissimilia et quaedam inter se contraria. Dedit aliquis domino suo uitam, dedit mortem, seruauit periturum et, hoc si parum est, pereundo seruauit; alius mortem domini adiuuit, alius decepit. Claudius Quadrigarius in duodeuicensimo annalium tradit, cum obsideretur Grumentum et iam ad summam desperationem uentum esset, duos seruos ad hostem transfugisse et operae pretium fecisse.

[23 I will now recount many examples of benefactions, both dissimilar and some mutually contrary. Someone gave to his lord life, someone gave death; he saved one who was about to perish and, if that be too little, by perishing he saved; another aided his master’s death, another cheated it. Claudius Quadrigarius, in the 18th of the Annals, relates that, when Grumentum was being besieged and it had already come to the utmost desperation, two slaves deserted to the enemy and did a deed worth the effort.

Deinde urbe capta passim discurrente uictore illos per nota itinera ad domum, in qua seruierant, praecucurrisse et dominam suam ante egisse; quaerentibus, quaenam esset, dominam et quidem crudelissimam ad supplicium ab ipsis duci professos esse. Eductam deinde extra muros summa cura celasse, donec hostilis ira consideret; deinde, ut satiatus miles cito ad Romanos mores rediit, illos quoque ad suos redisse et dominam sibi ipsos dedisse. Manu misit utrumque e uestigio illa nec indignata est ab his se uitam accepisse, in quos uitae necisque potestatem habuisset.

Then, the city having been captured, with the victor running about everywhere,
they hurried ahead by familiar routes to the house in which they had served,
and drove their mistress before them; when people asked who she was,
they declared that it was their mistress, and indeed a most cruel one,
being led to punishment by themselves. Then, having led her out beyond the walls,
they concealed her with the utmost care until the hostile ire should subside; then, as the soldier,
satiated, quickly returned to Roman mores, they too returned to their own,
and restored their mistress to themselves. She manumitted both on the spot,
nor was she indignant to have received her life from those over whom she would have had
the power of life and death.

Potuit sibi hoc uel magis gratulari; aliter enim seruata munus notae et uolgaris clementiae habuisset, sic seruata nobilis fabula et exemplum duarum urbium fuit. In tanta confusione captae ciuitatis cum sibi quisque consuleret, omnes ab illa praeter transfugas fugerunt; at hi, ut ostenderent, quo animo facta esset prior illa transitio, a uictoribus ad captiuam transfugerunt personam parricidarum ferentes; quod in illo beneficio maximum fuit, tanti iudicauerunt, ne domina occideretur, uideri dominam occidisse. Non est, mihi crede, condicio seruilis animi egregium factum fama sceleris emisse.

She could even more congratulate herself on this; for preserved otherwise she would have had the office of a known and vulgar clemency, preserved thus it was a noble fable and an example for two cities. In so great a confusion of a captured community, when each consulted for himself, all fled from her except the turncoats; but these, to show with what spirit that earlier crossing-over had been done, defected from the victors to the captive, bearing the persona of parricides; which was the greatest thing in that beneficium, they judged it worth so much that, lest the mistress be slain, they should seem to have slain the mistress. It is not, believe me, the condition of a servile spirit to have purchased an egregious deed with the fame of a crime.

Vettius, praetor Marsorum, ducebatur ad Romanum imperatorem; seruus eius gladium militi illi ipsi, a quo trahebatur, eduxit et primum dominum occidit, deinde: 'Tempus est' inquit 'me et mihi consulere! iam dominum manu misi', atque ita traiecit se uno ictu. Da mihi quemquam, qui magnificentius dominum seruauerit.

Vettius, praetor of the Marsi, was being led to the Roman
emperor; his slave drew the sword from that very soldier
by whom he was being dragged, and first killed his master,
then said: 'It is time,' he says, 'to consult myself and for myself!
I have now manumitted my master by my hand,' and thus he pierced himself through with one
blow. Give me anyone who has preserved his master more magnificently.

[24] Corfinium Caesar obsidebat, tenebatur inclusus Domitius; imperauit medico eidemque seruo suo, ut sibi uenenum daret. Cum tergiuersantem uideret: 'Quid cunctaris' inquit, 'tamquam in tua potestate totum istud sit? mortem rogo armatus.' Tum ille promisit et medicamentum innoxium bibendum illi dedit; quo cum sopitus esset, accessit ad filium eius et: 'Iube' inquit 'me adseruari, dum ex euentu intellegas, an uenenum patri tuo dederim.' Vixit Domitius et seruatus a Caesare est; prior tamen illum seruus seruauerat.

[24] Caesar was besieging Corfinium, Domitius was held shut in; he ordered his physician and likewise his own slave to give him poison. When he saw him tergiversating: 'Why do you delay,' he said, 'as though the whole of this were in your power? I ask for death, armed.' Then he promised and gave him an innocuous medicament to drink; when he had been lulled to sleep by it, he approached his son and said: 'Order me to be kept under guard, until from the outcome you understand whether I have given poison to your father.' Domitius lived and was saved by Caesar; yet his slave had saved him first.

[25] Bello ciuili proscriptum dominum seruus abscondit et, cum anulos eius sibi aptasset ac uestem induisset, speculatoribus occurrit nihilque se deprecari, quo minus imperata peragerent, dixit et deinde ceruicem porrexit. Quanti uiri est pro domino eo tempore mori uelle, quo rara erat fides dominum mori nolle! in publica crudelitate mitem inueniri, in publica perfidia fidelem!

[25] In the civil war a servant hid his proscribed master and, when he had fitted his rings to himself and had put on his garment, he met the executioners and said that he begged nothing to prevent them from carrying out the commands, and then he stretched out his neck. What a man’s worth it is, to wish to die for his master at that time, when fidelity that would not have the master die was rare! To be found mild in public cruelty, faithful in public perfidy!

cum praemia proditionis ingentia ostendantur, praemium fidei mortem concupiscere!

when vast rewards of treachery are displayed, to desire death as the reward of fidelity!

[26] Nostri saeculi exempla non praeteribo. Sub Tib. Caesare fuit accusandi frequens et paene publica rabies, quae omni ciuili bello grauius togatam ciuitatem confecit; excipiebatur ebriorum sermo, simplicitas iocantium; nihil erat tutum; omnis saeuiendi placebat occasio, nec iam reorum expectabantur euentus, cum esset unus.

[26] I will not pass by examples of our age. Under Tiberius Caesar there was a frequent and almost public frenzy of accusing, which wore down the toga-clad citizenry more grievously than any civil war; the talk of the drunken was seized upon, the simplicity of those jesting; nothing was safe; every occasion for savagery pleased, nor now were the outcomes of the accused awaited, since there was one.

Cenabat Paulus praetorius in conuiuio quodam imaginem Tib. Caesaris habens ectypa et eminente gemma. Rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc uerba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam illum matellam sumpsisse; quod factum simul et Maro ex notis illius temporis uestigatoribus notauit et seruus eius, quoi nectebantur insidiae, ei ebrio anulum extraxit.

Paulus the praetorian was dining at a certain convivium, having a likeness of Tiberius Caesar, cast in relief and with a projecting gem. I shall have done a most inept thing if I now go seeking words for how I should say that he took up a chamber-pot; a deed which both Maro noted from the notorious investigators of that time, and his slave—against whom snares were being woven—pulled the ring off him while he was inebriated.

Et cum Maro conuiuas testaretur admotam esse imaginem obscenis et iam subscriptionem conponeret, ostendit in manu sua seruus anulum. Si quis hunc seruum uocat, et illum conuiuam uocabit.

And when Maro was attesting to the dinner-guests
that the image had been brought near to obscenities and
was already composing the subscriptio, the slave showed the ring
in his own hand. If someone summons this slave, he will also summon that
dinner-guest.

[27] Sub diuo Augusto nondum hominibus uerba sua periculosa erant, iam molesta. Rufus, uir ordinis senatorii, inter cenam optauerat, ne Caesar saluus rediret ex ea peregrinatione, quam parabat; et adiecerat idem omnes et tauros et uitulos optare. Fuerunt, qui illa diligenter audirent.

[27]
Under the deified Augustus men’s own words were not yet perilous, already troublesome. Rufus, a man of the senatorial order,
during dinner had wished that Caesar not return safe
from that peregrination which he was preparing; and he had added that likewise all,
both the bulls and the bull-calves, wish it. There were those who listened to those
things diligently.

Vt primum diluxit, seruus, qui cenanti ad pedes steterat, narrat, quae inter cenam ebrius dixisset, et hortatur, ut Caesarem occupet atque ipse se deferat. Vsus consilio descendenti Caesari occurrit et, cum malam mentem habuisse se pridie iurasset, id ut in se et in filios suos recideret, optauit et Caesarem, ut ignosceret sibi rediretque in gratiam secum, rogauit. Cum dixisset se Caesar facere: 'Nemo' inquit 'credet te mecum in gratiam redisse, nisi aliquid mihi donaueris', petitque non fastidiendam etiam a propitio summam et inpetrauit.

As soon as it grew light, the slave, who
had stood at his feet while he was dining, reports what during dinner
he had said while drunk, and urges him to forestall Caesar and
to denounce himself. Following the counsel, he met Caesar as he was coming down
and, when he had sworn that he had had an evil intention the day before,
he wished that it should recoil upon himself and upon his sons,
and he asked Caesar to forgive him and to return into favor
with him. When Caesar said that he would do this: 'No one,'
he says, 'will believe that you have returned into favor with me, unless you give
me something,' and he asked for a sum not to be scorned even
from one propitious, and obtained it.

Caesar ait: 'Mea causa dabo operam, ne umquam tibi irascar.' Honeste fecit Caesar, quod ignouit, quod liberalitatem clementiae adiecit; quicumque hoc audierit exemplum, necesse est Caesarem laudet, sed cum seruum ante laudauerit. Non expectas, ut tibi narrem manu missum, qui hoc fecerat; nec tamen gratis: pecuniam pro libertate eius Caesar numerauerat.

Caesar said: 'For my part I will take pains that I may never be angry with you.' Honorably did Caesar act, in that he forgave, in that he added the liberality of clemency; whoever shall have heard this example must praise Caesar, but after he has first praised the slave. You do not expect that I should tell you he was manumitted, the one who had done this; nor, however, for free: Caesar had paid money for his freedom.

[28] Post tot exempla num dubium est, quin beneficium aliquando a seruo dominus accipiat? Quare potius persona rem minuat, quam personam res ipsa cohonestet? Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo; nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium et artibus bonis aptius.

[28] After so many examples, is there any doubt that a master sometimes receives a benefit from a slave? Why should the person rather diminish the matter, than the matter itself ennoble the person? The same principles and the same origin are common to all; no one is more noble than another, except the one whose disposition is more upright and more apt for good arts.

Qui imagines in atrio exponunt et nomina familiae suae longo ordine ac multis stemmatum inligata flexuris in parte prima aedium conlocant, non noti magis quam nobiles sunt? Vnus omnium parens mundus est, siue per splendidos siue per sordidos gradus ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur. Non est, quod te isti decipiant, qui, cum maiores suos recensent, ubicumque nomen inlustre <de>fecit, illo deum <in>fulciunt.

Those who set out portraits in the atrium and
place the names of their family in a long order and, bound with many windings of pedigrees,
in the front part of the house—are they not more well-known than noble? One parent of all
is the world; whether through splendid or through sordid steps, to this the first origin of each
is traced. Do not let those fellows deceive you, who, when they review their ancestors,
wherever an illustrious name has failed, there prop it up with a god.

Neminem despexeris, etiam si circa illum obsoleta sunt nomina et parum indulgente adiuta fortuna. Siue libertini ante uos habentur siue serui siue exterarum gentium homines, erigite audacter animos et, quidquid in medio sordidi iacet, transilite; expectat uos in summo magna nobilitas. Quid superbia in tantam uanitatem adtollimur, ut beneficia a seruis indignemur accipere et sortem eorum spectemus obliti meritorum?

Despise no one, even if about him the names are worn and Fortune, not very indulgent, has given little help. Whether freedmen are held before you or slaves or men of foreign nations, lift up your spirits boldly and leap over whatever of sordidness lies in the midst; a great nobility awaits you at the summit. Why, through pride, are we lifted up into such vanity that we disdain to receive benefits from slaves and look to their lot, forgetful of their merits?

Seruum tu quemquam uocas, libidinis et gulae seruus et adulterae, immo adulterarum commune mancipium? Seruum uocas quemquam tu? Quo tandem ab istis gerulis raperis cubile istud tuum circumferentibus? quo te penulati in militum quidem non uolgarem cultum subornati, quo, inquam, te isti efferunt?

Do you call anyone a slave, you, a slave of lust and
of gluttony and of the adulteress—nay, the common chattel of adulteresses?
Do you call anyone a slave? Whither, pray,
are you being carried by those litter-bearers who tote that litter of yours around? whither do those men, penula-cloaked, arrayed in a soldiery garb indeed not
common, where, I say, do those fellows carry you out?

ad ostium alicuius ostiarii, ad hortos alicuius ne ordinarium quidem habentis officium; et deinde negas tibi a seruo tuo beneficium dari posse, cui osculum alieni serui beneficium est? Quae est tanta animi discordia? eodem tempore seruos despicis et colis, imperiosus intra limen atque inpotens, humilis foris et tam contemptus quam contemnens; neque enim ulli magis abiciunt animos, quam qui inprobe tollunt, nullique ad calcandos alios paratiores, quam qui contumelias facere accipiendo didicerunt.

to the doorway of some doorkeeper, to the gardens of someone
not even having an ordinary office; and then
you deny that a benefit can be given to you by your slave, for whom
the kiss of another man’s slave is a benefit? What so great a discord of mind
is this? at the same time you despise and you cultivate your slaves, domineering
within the threshold and powerless, humble outside and
as much despised as despising; for none cast down their spirits more
than those who raise them improperly, and none are more ready to trample others
than those who have learned to commit insults by receiving them.

[29] Dicenda haec fuerunt ad contundendam insolentiam hominum ex fortuna pendentium uindicandumque ius beneficii dandi seruis, ut filiis quoque uindicaretur. Quaeritur enim, an aliquando liberi maiora beneficia dare parentibus suis possint, quam acceperint. Illud conceditur multos filios maiores potentioresque extitisse quam parentes suos; aeque et illud meliores fuisse.

[29] These things had to be said to crush the insolence of men depending on fortune and to vindicate the right of giving a beneficium to slaves, so that it might be vindicated for sons as well. For the question is raised whether at any time children can give greater benefits to their parents than they have received. This is conceded: that many sons have turned out greater and more potent than their parents; and likewise this too, that they were better.

Quod si constat, potest fieri, ut meliora tribuerint, cum et fortuna illis maior esset et melior uoluntas. 'Quidquid' inquit 'est, quod det patri filius, utique minus est, quia hanc ipsam dandi facultatem patri debet. Ita numquam beneficio uincitur, cuius beneficium est ipsum, quod uincitur.' Primum quaedam initium ab aliis trahunt et tamen initiis suis maiora sunt; nec ideo aliquid non est maius eo, quo coepit, quia non potuisset in tantum procedere, nisi coepisset.

If that is agreed, it can come about that they have bestowed better things, since both their fortune was greater and their will better. 'Whatever,' he says, 'it is that a son gives to his father, it is assuredly less, because he owes to his father this very faculty of giving. Thus he is never overcome in benefaction, he whose benefaction is the very thing by which he is overcome.' First, certain things draw their beginning from others and yet are greater than their beginnings; nor on that account is something not greater than that from which it began, because it could not have proceeded to such an extent unless it had begun.

Nulla non res principia sua magno gradu transit. Semina omnium rerum causae sunt et tamen minimae partes sunt eorum, quae gignunt. Adspice Rhenum, adspice Euphraten, omnes denique inclutos amnes: quid sunt, si illos illic, unde effluunt, aestimes?

No thing fails to pass beyond its beginnings by a great stride.
Seeds are the causes of all things, and yet
they are the smallest parts of the things they beget. Look at
the Rhine, look at the Euphrates, and, finally, all the illustrious
rivers: what are they, if you appraise them there, where they flow forth?

quidquid est, quo timentur, quo nominantur, in processu parauerunt. Adspice trabes, siue proceritatem aestimes, altissimas, siue crassitudinem spatiumque ramorum, latissime fusas: quantulum est his conparatum illud, quod radix tenui fibra conplectitur? Tolle radicem: nemora non surgent, nec tanti montes uestientur.

whatever it is, by which they are feared, by which they are named, they have prepared in their progress. Look at the tree-trunks, whether you estimate their height—the loftiest—or their thickness and the span of the branches, spread most widely: how small, compared with these, is that which the root with a slender fiber grasps? Take away the root: the groves will not rise, nor will such great mountains be clothed.

Innituntur fundamentis suis templa excelsa urbis; tamen, quae in firmamentum totius operis iacta sunt, latent. Idem in ceteris euenit: principia sua semper sequens magnitudo obruet. Non potuissem quicquam consequi, nisi parentum beneficium antecessisset; sed non ideo, quidquid consecutus sum, minus est eo, sine quo consecutus non essem.

The lofty temples of the city rest upon their own foundations;
yet the things that have been laid for the support of the whole structure lie hidden.
The same happens in other matters: their beginnings the greatness that follows will always overwhelm.
I could not have attained anything, unless the benefit of my parents had gone before; but not on that account is whatever I have attained less than that without which I would not have attained it.

Nisi me nutrix aluisset infantem, nihil eorum, quae consilio ac manu gero, facere potuissem nec in hanc emergere nominis claritatem, quam ciuili ac militari industria merui; numquid tamen ideo maximis operibus praeferes nutricis officium? Atqui quid interest, cum aeque sine patris beneficio quam sine nutricis non potuerim ad ulteriora procedere? Quod si initio meo, quidquid iam possum, debeo, cogita non esse initium mei patrem, ne auum quidem; semper enim erit ulterius aliquid, ex quo originis proximae origo descendat.

Unless my nurse had nourished me
as an infant, I could have done nothing of those things which I carry out by counsel and by hand,
nor emerge into this clarity of name which I have merited by civil and military industry; will you then
for that reason prefer to the greatest works the office of the nurse? And yet what difference is there, since equally without the father’s
benefit as without the nurse’s I could not have been able to proceed to further things?
But if to my beginning I owe whatever I can already do,
consider that my father is not my beginning, nor even my grandfather; for there will always be something ulterior, from which
the origin of the proximate origin descends.

Atqui nemo dicet me plus debere ignotis et ultra memoriam positis maioribus quam patri; plus autem debeo, si hoc ipsum, quod genuit me pater meus, maioribus debet.

And yet no one will say that I owe more to my ancestors unknown and set beyond memory than to my father; yet I do owe more, if this very thing—that my father begot me—is owed to the ancestors.

[30] 'Quidquid praestiti patri, etiam si magnum est, infra aestimationem paterni muneris est, quia non esset, si non genuisset.' Isto modo etiam, si quis patrem meum aegrum ac moriturum sanauerit, nihil praestare ei potero, quod non beneficio eius minus sit; non enim genuisset me pater, nisi sanatus esset. Sed uide, ne illud uerius sit aestimari, an id, quod potui, et id, quod feci, meum sit, mearum uirium, meae uoluntatis. Illud, quod natus sum, per se intuere, quale sit: animaduertis exiguum et incertum et boni malique communem materiam, sine dubio primum ad omnia gradum, sed non ideo maiorem omnibus, quia primus est.

[30] 'Whatever I have rendered to my father, even if it is great, is beneath the estimation of the paternal munus, because it would not exist, if he had not begotten me.' In this way too, even if someone should heal my father, sick and about to die, I shall be able to render nothing to him which is not less than his benefaction; for my father would not have begotten me, unless he had been healed. But see whether this is not the truer thing to be judged: whether that which I was able, and that which I did, is mine—of my powers, of my will. That fact, that I was born, consider by itself what sort it is: you observe an exiguous and uncertain thing and the common material of good and of evil, without doubt a first step toward all things, but not therefore greater than all, because it is first.

Seruaui patrem meum et ad summam prouexi dignitatem et principem urbis suae feci nec tantum rebus a me gestis nobilitaui, sed ipsi quoque gerendarum ingentem ac facilem nec tutam minus quam gloriosam dedi materiam; honores, opes, quidquid humanos ad se animos rapit, congessi, et cum supra omnes starem, infra illum steti. Dic nunc: 'Hoc ipsum, quod ista potuisti, patris munus est'; respondebo tibi: 'Est prorsus, si ad ista facienda nasci satis est; sed si ad bene uiuendum minima portio est uiuere et id tribuisti, quod cum feris mihi et animalibus quibusdam minimis, quibusdam etiam foedissimis commune est, noli tibi adserere, quod non ex tuis beneficiis, etiam <si non> sine tuis, oritur.'

I saved my father and advanced him to the highest dignity and made him the leading man of his city, and I not only ennobled him by deeds done by me, but also gave to him himself material for doing great things, easy and no less safe than glorious; honors, wealth, whatever draws human minds to itself, I heaped up, and when I stood above all, I stood beneath him. Say now: 'This very fact, that you were able to do those things, is your father's gift'; I will answer you: 'It is indeed, if to be born is sufficient for doing those things; but if, for living well, the least portion is to live, and you bestowed that which is common to me with beasts and with certain very small animals, with certain even most foul, do not claim to yourself that which does not arise from your benefactions, even <si non> without yours.'

[31] Puta me uitam pro uita reddidisse: sic quoque munus tuum uici, cum ego dederim sentienti, cum sentiens me dare, cum uitam tibi non uoluptatis meae causa aut certe per uoluptatem dederim, cum tanto maius sit retinere spiritum quam accipere, quanto leuius mori ante mortis metum. Ego uitam dedi statim illa usuro, tu nescituro, an uiueret; ego uitam dedi mortem timenti, tu uitam dedisti, ut mori possem; ego tibi uitam dedi consummatam, perfectam, tu me expertem rationis genuisti, onus alienum. Vis scire, quam non sit magnum beneficium uitam sic dare?

[31] Suppose me to have rendered life for life: thus too I have outdone your gift, since I gave to one who feels, with the recipient aware that I give, since I gave life to you not for the sake of my pleasure or at any rate through pleasure, since it is by as much greater to retain the breath than to receive it, as it is lighter to die before the fear of death. I gave life to one who would straightway use it, you to one who would not know whether he would live; I gave life to one fearing death, you gave life so that I might be able to die; I gave you life consummated, perfect, you begot me devoid of reason, an alien burden. Do you wish to know how not great a benefit it is to give life in this way?

exposuisses; nempe iniuria erat genuisse. Quo quid colligo? minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nisi accesserunt alia, quae prosequerentur hoc initium muneris et aliis officiis ratum facerent.

you would have exposed me; surely it was an injustice to have begotten. From which what do I gather? that the coupling of father and mother is the least benefaction, unless other things have been added which would follow up this beginning of the benefit and make it ratified by other duties.

Non est bonum uiuere, sed bene uiuere. At bene uiuo. Sed potui et male; ita hoc tantum est tuum, quod uiuo.

It is not a good to live, but to live well.
Yet I live well. But I could also have lived badly;
thus this only is yours, that I live.

Si uitam inputas mihi per se, nudam, egentem consilii, et id ut magnum bonum iactas, cogita te mihi inputare muscarum ac uermium bonum. Deinde, ut nihil aliud dicam, quam bonis artibus me studuisse et cursum ad rectum iter uitae derexisse, in ipso beneficio tuo maius, quam quod dederas, recepisti; tu enim me mihi rudem, inperitum dedisti, ego tibi filium, qualem genuisse gauderes.

If you reckon life to my account in itself, bare, needy of counsel, and you flaunt that as a great good, consider that you are reckoning to me the good of flies and worms. Then, to say nothing else than this, that I have pursued good arts and directed my course to the straight path of life, in that very benefit of yours you received back something greater than what you had given; for you gave me to myself raw, unskilled, I to you a son such as you would rejoice to have begotten.

[32] Aluit me pater. Si idem praesto, plus reddo, quia non tantum ali se, sed a filio ali gaudet et maiorem ex animo meo quam ex ipsa re percipit uoluptatem, illius alimenta ad corpus tantum meum peruenerunt. Quid?

[32] My father nourished me. If I render the same, I render more, because he rejoices not only to be nourished, but to be nourished by his son, and he perceives a greater pleasure from my spirit than from the thing itself; his aliments reached only my body. What?

si quis in tantum processit, ut aut eloquentia per gentes notesceret aut iustitia aut bellicis rebus et patri quoque ingentem circumfunderet famam tenebrasque natalium suorum clara luce discuteret, non inaestimabile in parentes suos beneficium contulit? An quisquam Aristonem et Gryllum nisi propter Xenophontem ac Platonem filios nosset? Sophroniscum Socrates expirare non patitur.

if someone has advanced to such an extent, that
either by eloquence he were made known among the nations, or by justice, or
by warlike matters and were to pour around even upon his father a vast
fame and were to scatter the darknesses of his birth with bright light,
has he not conferred an inestimable benefaction upon his parents?
Or would anyone have known Ariston and Gryllus except
on account of their sons Xenophon and Plato? Socrates does not allow
Sophroniscus to expire.

Ceteros enumerare longum est, qui durant ob nullam aliam causam, quam quod illos liberorum eximia uirtus tradidit posteris. Vtrum maius beneficium dedit M. Agrippae pater ne post Agrippam quidem notus, an patri dedit Agrippa nauali corona insignis, unicum adeptus inter dona militaria decus, qui tot in urbe maxima opera excitauit, quae et priorem magnificentiam uincerent et nulla postea uincerentur? Vtrum Octauius maius beneficium dedit filio an patri diuus Augustus, quamuis illum umbra adoptiui patris abscondit?

To enumerate the rest is long, who endure for no other cause than that the extraordinary virtue of their children transmitted them to posterity. Which bestowed the greater benefaction: Marcus Agrippa’s father—unknown even after Agrippa—or did Agrippa bestow it upon his father, he distinguished by the naval crown, having attained the unique honor among military gifts, who raised so many works in the greatest city as both to surpass prior magnificence and to be surpassed by none thereafter? Whether did Octavius give a greater benefaction to his son, or did the deified Augustus give it to his father, although the shadow of his adoptive father hides him?

Quantam cepisset uoluptatem, si illum post debellata arma ciuilia uidisset securae paci praesidentem, non adgnoscens bonum suum nec satis credens, quotiens ad se respexisset, potuisse illum uirum in domo sua nasci! Quid nunc ceteros persequar, quos iam consumpsisset obliuio, nisi illos filiorum gloria e tenebris eruisset et adhuc in luce retineret? Deinde, cum quaeramus, non quis filius patri maiora beneficia reddiderit, quam a patre acceperat, sed an aliquis possit maiora reddere, etiam si, quae rettuli, exempla nondum satis faciunt nec beneficia parentium suorum superiaciunt: capit tamen hoc natura, quod nondum ulla aetas tulit.

How great a pleasure would he have taken
if he had seen him, after the civil arms were subdued, presiding over a secure peace,
not recognizing his own good
nor believing enough, whenever he looked back upon himself, that that man could have been born in his own house! Why should I now pursue the rest,
whom oblivion would already have consumed, had not the glory of their sons
drawn them out of the darkness and still kept them in the light?
Then, since we ask, not which son
has repaid to his father greater benefits than he had received from his father,
but whether anyone can repay greater, even if
the examples I have recounted do not yet suffice nor surpass the benefits
of their parents: yet nature admits this,
which no age has yet brought forth.

Si singula paternorum meritorum magnitudinem exuperare non possunt, plura in unum congesta superabunt.

If the individual things cannot outstrip the magnitude of parental merits, more, heaped together into one, will surpass.

[33] Seruauit in proelio patrem Scipio et praetextatus in hostes ecum concitauit. Parum est, quod, ut perueniret ad patrem, tot pericula maximos duces cum maxime prementia contempsit, tot obpositas difficultates, quod ad primam pugnam exiturus tiro per ueteranorum corpora cucurrit, quod annos suos transiluit? Adice, ut idem patrem reum defendat et conspirationi inimicorum potentium eripiat, ut alterum illi consulatum ac tertium aliosque honores etiam consularibus concupiscendos congerat, ut pauperi raptas belli iure opes tradat et, quod est militaribus uiris speciosissimum, diuitem illum spoliis etiam hostilibus faciat.

[33] Scipio saved his father in battle and, still in the praetexta, spurred his horse against the enemies. It is too little that, in order to reach his father, he despised so many dangers pressing most upon the greatest commanders, so many difficulties set in his way; that, a raw recruit going out to his first battle, he ran through the bodies of the veterans; that he overleaped his years? Add this, that this same man defends his father as a defendant and snatches him from the conspiracy of powerful enemies; that he heaps up for him a second consulship and a third and other honors to be coveted even by consular men; that to a poor man he hands over riches seized by the right of war and, what is most specious for military men, makes that man rich with even hostile spoils.

Si adhuc parum est, adice, ut prouincias et extraordinaria imperia continuet, adice, ut dirutis maximis urbibus Romani imperii sine aemulo ad ortus occasusque uenturi defensor et conditor maiorem nobilitatem nobili uiro adiciat, dici Scipionis patrem: dubium est, quin generandi uolgare beneficium uicerit eximia pietas et uirtus ipsi urbi nescio utrum maius praesidium adferens an decus? Deinde, si hoc parum est, finge aliquem tormenta patris discussisse, finge in se transtulisse. Licet tibi, in quantum uelis, extendere beneficia filii, cum paternum munus et simplex sit et facile et danti uoluptarium, quod necesse est ille multis dederit, etiam quibus dedisse se nescit, in quo consortem habet, in quo spectauit legem, patriam, praemia patrum, domus ac familiae perpetuitatem, omnia potius quam eum, quoi dabat.

If this is still too little, add that he continues provinces and extraordinary imperia; add that, with the greatest cities razed, as the defender and founder of the Roman Empire—without a rival—destined to reach to the risings and the settings, he adds greater nobility to a noble man by being called the father of Scipio: there is no doubt that extraordinary pietas and virtus, bringing to the city itself I know not whether a greater safeguard or a distinction, have surpassed the vulgar benefit of generating. Then, if this is too little, imagine someone to have shaken off the torments of his father, imagine to have transferred them onto himself. You are allowed, as far as you wish, to extend the beneficia of the son, since the paternal munus is both simple and easy and pleasurable to the giver—something which he must have given to many, even to those to whom he does not know that he has given—, in which he has a partner, in which he looked to the law, the fatherland, the rewards of the fathers, the perpetuity of house and family, everything rather than him to whom he was giving.

Quid? si quis sapientiam consecutus hanc patri tradiderit, etiamnunc disputabimus, an maius aliquid iam dederit, quam acceperat, cum uitam beatam patri reddiderit, acceperit tantum uitam?

What then? If someone, having attained wisdom, should hand this down to his father, shall we still debate whether he has already given something greater than he had received, since he has rendered to his father a blessed life, while he had received only life?

[34] 'Sed patris' inquit 'beneficium est, quidquid facis, quidquid praestare illi potes.' Et praeceptoris mei, quod institutis liberalibus profeci; ipsos tamen, qui tradiderunt illa, transcendimus, utique eos, qui prima elementa docuerunt, et quamuis sine illis nemo quicquam adsequi posset, non tamen, quantumcumque quis adsecutus est, infra illos est. Multum inter prima ac maxima interest, nec ideo prima maximorum instar sunt, quia sine primis maxima esse non possunt.

[34] 'But "it is the father's benefit," he says, "whatever you do, whatever you can render to him." And it is the preceptor’s, that by liberal studies I have made progress; yet we surpass the very men who handed those down, especially those who taught the first elements, and although without them no one could attain anything, nevertheless, however much one has attained, he is not beneath them. There is much difference between first things and greatest things, nor therefore are the first on a par with the greatest, because without the first the greatest cannot be.

[35] Iam tempus est quaedam ex nostra, ut ita dicam, moneta proferre. Qui id beneficium dedit, quo est aliquid melius, potest uinci. Pater dedit filio uitam, est autem aliquid uita melius: ita pater uinci potest, quia dedit beneficium, quo est aliquid melius.

[35] Now it is time to bring out, so to speak, some coinage of our own. He who has given that benefit, for which there is something better, can be outdone. A father gave life to his son, however there is something better than life: thus the father can be outdone, because he gave a benefit for which there is something better.

Etiamnunc, qui dedit alicui uitam, si et semel et iterum liberatus est mortis periculo, maius accepit beneficium quam dedit; pater autem uitam dedit: potest ergo, si saepius periculo mortis liberatus a filio fuerit, maius beneficium accipere quam dedit. Qui beneficium accipit, maius accipit, quo magis eo indiget; magis autem indiget uita, qui uiuit, quam qui natus non est, ut qui ne indigere quidem omnino possit: maius ergo beneficium accipit pater, si uitam a filio accipit, quam filius a patre, quod natus est. 'Patris beneficia uinci a filii beneficiis non possunt.

Even now, one who gave someone life, if both once and again he has been freed from the danger of death, has received a greater benefit than he gave; but the father gave life: therefore he can, if he has more often been freed from the danger of death by his son, receive a greater benefit than he gave. He who receives a benefit receives the greater, the more he needs it; but he who lives needs life more than one who has not been born, as one who indeed cannot be in need at all: therefore the father receives a greater benefit, if he receives life from his son, than the son from the father, namely the fact that he was born. 'The father’s benefits cannot be overcome by a son’s benefits.'

Quare? Quia uitam accepit a patre, quam nisi accepisset, nulla dare beneficia potuisset.' Hoc commune est patri cum omnibus, qui uitam alicui dederunt; non potuissent enim referre gratiam, nisi uitam accepissent. Ergo nec medico gratia in maius referri potest (solet enim et medicus uitam dare), nec nautae, si naufragum sustulit.

Why? Because he received life from his father, which, unless he had received, he would have been able to give no benefactions.' This is common to a father with all who have given life to someone; for they could not have returned thanks, unless they had received life. Therefore neither can gratitude be returned in greater measure to the medic (for a medic too is wont to give life), nor to the sailor, if he has rescued a castaway.

Atqui et horum et aliorum, qui aliquo modo nobis uitam dederunt, beneficia uinci possunt: ergo et patrum possunt. Si quis mihi beneficium dedit, quod multorum beneficiis adiuuandum esset, ego autem illi beneficium dedi id, quod nullius egeret adiutorio, maius dedi quam accepi; pater filio uitam dedit perituram, nisi multa accessissent, quae illam tuerentur; filius patri si dedit uitam, dedit eam, quae nullius desideraret auxilium in hoc, ut permaneret: ergo maius beneficium accepit a filio pater, qui uitam accepit, quam ipse illi dedit.

And yet both of these and of others who in some way have given us life, their benefits can be overcome: therefore those of fathers also can be. If someone gave me a benefit which would have to be assisted by the benefits of many, but I gave him a benefit such as would need the assistance of no one, I gave a greater than I received; a father gave a son a life that would perish, unless many things had been added to protect it; if a son gave life to his father, he gave it such as would desire no aid in this, that it should remain: therefore the father, who received life, received a greater benefit from the son than he himself gave him.

[36] Haec non destruunt parentium uenerationem nec deteriores illis liberos faciunt, immo etiam meliores; natura enim gloriosa uirtus est et anteire priores cupit. Alacrior erit pietas, si ad reddenda beneficia cum uincendi spe uenerit. Ipsis patribus id uolentibus laetisque contigerit, quoniam pleraque sunt, in quibus nostro bono uincimur.

[36] These things do not destroy the veneration of parents nor do they make children worse than they, nay even better; for virtue is glorious by nature and desires to go before its predecessors. Piety will be more eager, if, for rendering benefits, it shall come with the hope of conquering it. With the fathers themselves willing and glad, this will happen, since there are many things in which we are conquered to our good.

Vnde certamen tam optabile? unde tantam felicitatem parentibus, ut fateantur ipsos liberorum beneficiis inpares? Nisi hoc ita iudicamus, excusationem damus liberis et illos segniores ad referendam gratiam facimus, quibus stimulos adicere debemus et dicere:

Whence so desirable a contest? whence such felicity to parents, that they confess themselves unequal to the benefactions of their children? Unless we judge this thus, we give an excuse to the children and make them more sluggish at returning gratitude, to whom we ought to add spurs and to say:

'Hoc agite, optimi iuuenes! Proposita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint maiora an receperint. Non ideo uicerunt, quia occupauerunt; sumite modo animum, qualem decet, et deficere nolite: uincetis optantes.

'Do this, finest youths! An honest contention has been proposed between parents and children, whether they have given greater things or received them. They have not therefore conquered because they were first to the field; only take the spirit as befits you, and do not fail: you will conquer—with them wishing it.

Nec desunt tam pulchro certamini duces, qui ad similia uos cohortentur ac per uestigia sua ire ad uictoriam saepe iam partam ex parentibus iubeant.

Nor are leaders lacking for so fair a contest, who exhort you to like deeds and bid you, in their footsteps, to go on to a victory already often won against your parents.

[37] Vicit Aeneas patrem, ipse eius infantia leue tutumque gestamen, grauem senio per media hostium agmina et per cadentis circa se urbis ruinas ferens, cum conplexus sacra ac penates deos religiosus senex non simplici uadentem sarcina premeret; tulit illum per ignes et (quid non pietas potest?) pertulit colendumque inter conditores Romani imperii posuit. Vicere Siculi iuuenes: cum Aetna maiore ui peragitata in urbes, in agros, in magnam insulae partem effudisset incendium, uexerunt parentes suos; discessisse creditum est ignes et utrimque flamma recedente limitem adapertum, per quem transcurrerent iuuenes dignissimi, qui magna tuto auderent. Vicit Antigonus, qui, cum ingenti proelio superasset hostem, praemium belli ad patrem transtulit et imperium illi Cypri tradidit; hoc est regnum nolle regnare, cum possis.

[37] Aeneas outdid his father, he himself in his infancy his light and safe burden, bearing him, heavy with old age, through the midst of the enemy ranks and through the ruins of the city falling around him, when the religious old man, embracing the sacra and the Penate gods, weighed him down as he went with no simple load; he carried him through the fires and (what cannot piety do?) bore him through and placed him to be venerated among the founders of the Roman empire. The Sicilian youths won: when Etna, agitated with greater force, had poured a conflagration into the cities, into the fields, into a great part of the island, they conveyed their parents; it was believed that the fires withdrew and, the flame receding on both sides, a pathway was opened, through which the most worthy youths ran across, who dared great things safely. Antigonus won, who, when he had overcome the enemy in a huge battle, transferred the prize of war to his father and handed over to him the rule of Cyprus; this is kingship: to be unwilling to reign, when you can.

Vicit patrem imperiosum quidem Manlius, qui, cum ante ad tempus relegatus esset a patre ob adulescentiam brutam et hebetem, ad tribunum plebis, qui patri suo diem dixerat, uenit petitoque tempore, quod ille dederat sperans fore proditorem parentis inuisi, (et bene meruisse se de iuuene credebat, cuius exilium pro grauissimo crimine inter alia Manlio obiciebat) nanctus adulescens secretum stringit occultatum sinu ferrum et: "Nisi iuras" inquit "te diem patri remissurum, hoc te gladio transfodiam. In tua potestate est, utro modo pater meus accusatorem non habeat." Iurauit tribunus nec fefellit et causam actionis omissae contioni reddidit. Nulli alii licuit inpune tribunum in ordinem redigere.

He conquered his father—imperious indeed—Manlius, who, when beforehand he had been relegated by his father on account of a brutish and hebetate adolescence, to the tribune of the plebs, who had named a day for his father, came; and, the time having been requested, which that man had granted, hoping there would be a betrayer of the hated parent (and he believed he had deserved well of the adolescent, whose exile he was charging against Manlius, among other things, as a most grave crimen), having obtained a private interview, the adolescent draws the iron hidden in his bosom and says: “Unless you swear that you will remit the day to my father, I will transfix you with this sword. It is in your power, in either way, that my father should not have an accuser.” The tribune swore and did not fail, and he rendered to the assembly the cause of the action having been omitted. To no other was it permitted with impunity to bring a tribune into order.

[38] Alia ex aliis exempla sunt eorum, qui parentes suos periculis eripuerint, qui ex infimo ad summum protulerint et e plebe aceruoque ignobili numquam tacendos saeculis dederint. Nulla ui uerborum, nulla ingenii facultate exprimi potest, quantum opus sit, quam laudabile quamque numquam memoria hominum exiturum, posse hoc dicere: "Parentibus meis parui, cessi imperio eorum, siue aecum siue inicum ac durum fuit, obsequentem submissumque me praebui; ad hoc unum contumax fui, ne beneficiis uincerer." Certate, obsecro uos, et fessi quoque restituite aciem. Felices, qui uincent, felices, qui uincentur!

[38] Other out of other are the examples of those who have snatched their parents from perils, who have brought them forth from the lowest to the highest, and from the plebs and ignoble heap have given them to the ages as never to be silent. By no force of words, by no faculty of genius can it be expressed how great a work it is, how laudable and how never to pass out of the memory of men, to be able to say this: "I obeyed my parents, I yielded to their imperium, whether it was equitable or inequitable and hard; I showed myself compliant and submissive; in this one thing I was contumacious, that I might not be conquered by benefactions." Strive, I beseech you, and even when weary restore the battle-line. Happy they who will conquer, happy they who will be conquered!

Quid eo adulescente praeclarius, qui sibi ipsi dicere poterit (neque enim est fas alteri dicere): "Patrem meum beneficiis uici"? Quid eo fortunatius sene, qui omnibus ubique praedicabit a filio se suo beneficiis uictum? Quid autem est felicius quam ibi cedere?'

What more preeminent than that adolescent,
who will be able to say to himself (for it is not right for another
to say): "I have overcome my father by benefactions"? What more fortunate
than that old man, who will proclaim everywhere to all
that he has been overcome by his own son's benefactions? What, moreover, is happier
than to yield there?'