Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

I. Perfecto, Marceve Vitori, operis tibi dicati tertio libro et iam quarta fere laboris parte transacta, nova insuper mihi diligentiae causa et altior sollicitudo quale iudicium hominum eimererer accessit. Adhuc enim velut studia inter nos conferebamus, et si parum nostra institutio probaretur a ceteris, contenti fore domestico usu videbamur, ut tui meique filii formare disciplinam satis putaremus. II. cum vero mihi Domitianus Augustus sororis suae nepotum delegaverit curam, non satis honorem iudiciorum caelestium intellegam nisi ex hoc oneris quoque magnitudinem metiar.

1. With the third book of the work dedicated to you, Marcus Vitorius, completed, and now with almost a fourth part of the labor gone by, there has, moreover, come to me a new cause for diligence and a deeper solicitude as to what judgment of men I would encounter. For up to now we were, as it were, comparing our studies among ourselves, and if our instruction should win too little approval from others, we seemed likely to be content with private use, so that we would think it enough to shape the discipline of your son and mine. 2. But when indeed Domitian Augustus has entrusted to me the care of the nephews of his sister, I shall not sufficiently understand the honor of celestial judgments unless from this I also measure the magnitude of the burden.

III. Quis enim mihi aut mores excolendi sit modus, ut eos non inmerito probaverit sanctissimus censor, aut studia, ne fefellisse in iis videar principem ut in omnibus, ita in eloquentia quoque eminentissimum? IV. Quod si nemo miratur poetas maximos saepe fecisse ut non solum initiis operum suorum Musas invocarent, sed provecti quoque longius, cum ad aliquem graviorem venissent locum, repeterent vota et velut nova precatione uterentur, V. mihi quoque profecto poterit ignosci si, quod initio quo primum hanc materiam inchoavi non feceram, nunc omnis in auxilium deos ipsumque in primis quo neque praesentius aliud nec studiis magis propitium numen est invocem, ut, quantum nobis exspectationis adiecit, tantum ingenii adspiret dexterque ac volens adsit et me qualem esse credidit faciat.

III. For what measure is there for me of cultivating morals, such that the most holy censor may have approved them not undeservedly, or of studies, lest I seem to have deceived in these the princeps—most eminent, as in all things, so also in eloquence? IV. And if no one marvels that the greatest poets often did this: that not only at the beginnings of their works they invoked the Muses, but also, when carried further and when they had come to some weightier passage, they renewed their vows and used, as it were, a new prayer, V. assuredly it can be pardoned to me also if—what at the beginning, when I first undertook this subject, I had not done—now I invoke all the gods for aid, and him himself in the first place, than whom no other divinity is more present or more propitious to studies, in order that, as much expectation as he has added to me, so much genius he may breathe upon me; and that he be favorable and willing and present, and make me such as he believed me to be.

VI. cuius mihi religionis non haec sola ratio quae maxima est, sed alioqui sic procedit ipsum opus ut maiora praeteritis ac magis ardua sint quae ingredior. Sequitur enim ut iudicialium causarum, quae sunt maxime variae atque multiplices, ordo explicetur: quod prohoemii sit officium, quae ratio narrandi, quae probationum fides, seu proposita confirmamus sive contra dicta dissolvimus, quanta vis in perorando, seu reficienda brevi repetitione rerum memoria est iudicis, sive adfectus, quod est longe potentissimum, commovendi. VII.

6. and for this religion of mine not this rationale alone, which is the greatest, but otherwise the work itself proceeds in such a way that the things I am entering upon are greater than what has gone before and more arduous. For it follows that the order of judicial causes, which are most various and multiple, be explicated: what the office of the proem is, what the method of narrating, what the credence of proofs, whether we confirm what has been proposed or dissolve what has been said against us, how great the force in perorating, whether the judge’s memory is to be refreshed by a brief repetition of the matters, or the affections, which is by far the most powerful, are to be stirred. 7.

De quibus partibus singulis quidam separatim scribere maluerunt velut onus totius corporis veriti, et sic quoque compluris de una quaque earum libros ediderunt. Quas ego omnis ausus contexere prope infinitum laborem prospicio et ipsa cogitatione suscepti muneris fatigor. Sed durandum est, quia coepimus, et si viribus deficiemur, animo tamen perseverandum.

Concerning each of these parts, certain men have preferred to write separately, as though fearing the burden of the whole corpus; and even so, several have published books on each one of them. I, having dared to weave them all together, foresee a nearly infinite labor, and I grow weary at the very thought of the task undertaken. But we must endure, since we have begun; and if we should fail in strength, yet we must persevere in spirit.

[1] I. Quod principium Latine vel exordium dicitur, maiore quadam ratione Graeci videntur prohoemium nominasse, quia a nostris initium modo significatur, illi satis clare partem hanc esse ante ingressum rei de qua dicendum sit ostendunt. II. Nam sive propterea quod oime cantus est et citharoedi pauca illa quae antequam legitimum certamen inchoent emerendi favoris gratia canunt prohoemium cognominaverunt, oratores quoque ea quae prius quam causam exordiantur ad conciliandos sibi iudicum animos praelocuntur eadem appellatione signarunt, III. sive, quod oimon idem Graeci viam appellant, id quod ante ingressum rei ponitur sic vocare est institutum: certe prohoemium est quod apud iudicem dici prius quam causam cognoverit possit, vitioseque in scholis facimus quod exordio semper sic utimur quasi causam iudex iam noverit.

[1] 1. That which in Latin is called principium or exordium, the Greeks seem, with somewhat greater rationale, to have named the prohoemium, because by our people only an initium is signified, whereas they show clearly enough that this part is before the entry into the matter about which one must speak. 2. For whether it is because oime is “song,” and the citharoedi have named prohoemium those few things which, before they begin the legitimate contest, they sing for the sake of earning favor, orators too have designated by the same appellation those things which, before they begin the cause, they preface to win the minds of the judges for themselves, 3. or because the Greeks also call oimon “way,” it has been the practice to call in this manner that which is set before the entrance into the matter: certainly the prohoemium is that which can be said before a judge before he has learned the cause, and we do amiss in the schools in that we always use the exordium as though the judge already knew the cause.

IV. cuius rei licentia ex hoc est, quod ante declamationem illa velut imago litis exponitur. Sed in foro quoque contingere istud principiorum genus secundis actionibus potest, primis quidem raro umquam, nisi forte apud eum cui res aliunde iam nota sit dicimus.

4. the license of this thing is from this, that before the declamation that, as it were, image of the lawsuit is set forth. But in the forum too that kind of beginnings can occur in second actions, in first ones indeed rarely ever, unless perhaps we speak before someone to whom the matter is already known from elsewhere.

V. Causa principii nulla alia est quam ut auditorem quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatior praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus inter auctores plurimos constat, si benivolum attentum docilem fecerimus, non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis ut procedere ultra possimus admittimur.

5. The cause of the beginning is no other than that we may prepare the hearer so that he be more accommodating to us in the remaining parts. It is agreed among very many authors that this is chiefly brought about by three things, if we have made him benevolent, attentive, and docile—not because these are not to be guarded through the whole action, but because they are especially necessary at the beginnings, through which we are admitted into the mind of the judge so that we may be able to advance further.

VI. Benivolentiam aut a personis duci aut a causis accepimus. Sed personarum non est, ut plerique crediderunt, triplex ratio, ex litigatore et adversario et iudice: nam exordium duci nonnumquam etiam ab actore causae solet. VII.

VI. We have received that benevolence is drawn either from persons or from causes. But the account of persons is not, as most have believed, threefold—from the litigator and the adversary and the judge: for the exordium is sometimes also wont to be drawn from the advocate of the case. VII.

Quamquam enim pauciora de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur. Sic enim continget ut non studium advocati videatur adferre, sed paene testis fidem. Quare in primis existimetur venisse ad agendum ductus officio vel cognationis vel amicitiae, maximeque, si fieri poterit, rei publicae aut alicuius certe non mediocris exempli.

Although indeed he says fewer things about himself and more sparingly, yet the greatest weight for everything is placed on this, if he is believed to be a good man. For thus it will come about that he will seem to bring not the zeal of an advocate, but almost the credibility of a witness. Therefore let him be thought, first of all, to have come to plead, led by duty either of kinship or of friendship, and most of all, if it can be done, for the Republic or at any rate for some certainly no mean precedent.

Quod sine dubio multo magis ipsis litigatoribus faciendum est, ut ad agendum magna atque honesta ratione aut etiam necessitate accessisse videantur. VIII. Sed ut praecipua in hoc dicentis auctoritas, si omnis in subeundo negotio suspicio sordium aut odiorum aut ambitionis afuerit, ita quaedam in his quoque commendatio tacita, si nos infirmos, inparatos, inpares agentium contra ingeniis dixerimus, qualia sunt pleraque Messalae prohoemia.

Which without doubt must be done much more by the litigants themselves, so that they may seem to have come to plead with great and honorable reason, or even out of necessity. 8. But just as the speaker’s authority is paramount in this, if every suspicion of sordidness or hatreds or ambition has been absent in undertaking the business, so too there is a certain tacit commendation in these cases, if we declare ourselves weak, unprepared, unequal to the talents of those acting against us—such as are most of Messala’s proems.

IX. Est enim naturalis favor pro laborantibus, et iudex religiosus libentissime patronum audit quem iustitiae suae minime timet. Inde illa veterum circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio, multum ab hac nostrorum temporum iactatione diversa. X. Vitandum etiam ne contumeliosi maligni superbi maledici in quemquam hominem ordinemve videamur, praecipueque eorum qui laedi nisi adversa iudicum voluntate non possint.

9. For there is a natural favor for those laboring, and a religious (i.e., conscientious) judge most gladly hears an advocate whom he in no way fears as a threat to his own justice. Hence that simulation of the ancients about occulting eloquence, very different from the vaunting of our times. 10. It must also be avoided that we seem contumelious, malignant, proud, slanderous toward any person or order, and especially toward those who cannot be harmed except by an adverse will of the judges.

XI. Nam in iudicem ne quid dicatur non modo palam sed quod omnino intellegi possit stultum erat monere, nisi fieret. Etiam partis adversae patronus dabit exordio materiam, interim cum honore, si eloquentiam eius et gratiam nos timere fingendo ut ea suspecta sint iudici fecerimus, interim per contumeliam, sed hoc perquam raro, ut Asinius pro Vrbiniae heredibus Labienum adversarii patronum inter argumenta causae malae posuit. XII.

11. For, as regards the judge, it would be foolish to have to warn that nothing should be said against him—not only openly, but even anything that could at all be understood—unless it were actually being done. Even the patron of the adverse party will supply material for the exordium, sometimes with honor, if by feigning that we fear his eloquence and favor we make these things suspect to the judge; sometimes through contumely, but this very rarely, as when Asinius, on behalf of Urbinia’s heirs, placed Labienus, the adversary’s patron, among the arguments of a bad cause. 12.

Negat haec prohoemia esse Cornelius Celsus quia sint extra litem: sed ego cum auctoritate summorum oratorum magis ducor, tum pertinere ad causam puto quidquid ad dicentem pertinet, cum sit naturale ut iudices iis quos libentius audiunt etiam facilius credant. XIII. Ipsius autem litigatoris persona tractanda varie est: nam tum dignitas eius adlegatur, tum commendatur infirmitas.

Cornelius Celsus denies that these are proems, because they are outside the suit; but I am led rather by the authority of the greatest orators, and I think that whatever pertains to the speaker pertains to the cause, since it is natural that judges, those whom they more willingly hear, they also more easily believe. 13. Moreover, the person of the litigant himself is to be handled variously: for now his dignity is alleged, now his infirmity is commended.

Nonnumquam contingit relatio meritorum, de quibus verecundius dicendum erit sua quam aliena laudanti. Multum agit sexus aetas condicio, ut in feminis senibus pupillis, liberos parentis coniuges adlegantibus: XIV. nam sola rectum quoque iudicem inclinat miseratio.

Sometimes there occurs a relation of merits, about which it will have to be spoken more modestly by one lauding his own than another’s. Sex, age, and condition do much, as in the case of women, the elderly, and wards, when children, parents, spouses are being adduced: 14. for compassion alone inclines even an upright judge.

Degustanda tamen haec prohoemio, non consumenda. adversarii vero persona prope isdem omnibus sed e contrario ductis inpugnari solet. Nam et potentes sequitur invidia et humiles abiectosque contemptus et turpes ac nocentes odium, quae tria sunt ad alienandos iudicum animos potentissima.

These things, however, are to be tasted in the proem, not consumed. The adversary’s person is commonly attacked by nearly the same topics, but drawn in the contrary. For envy follows the powerful, and contempt the humble and abject, and hatred the base and guilty—these three are most potent for alienating the minds of the judges.

XV. Neque haec dicere sat est, quod datur etiam imperitis; pleraque augenda ac minuenda ut expediet: hoc enim oratoris est, illa causae.

15. Nor is it enough to say these things, which is granted even to the unskilled; many things are to be augmented and diminished as will be expedient: for this is the orator’s, those belong to the cause.

XVI. Iudicem conciliabimus nobis non tantum laudando eum, quod et fieri cum modo debet et est tamen parti utrique commune, sed si laudem eius ad utilitatem causae nostrae coniunxerimus, ut adlegemus pro honestis dignitatem illi suam, pro humilibus iustitiam, pro infelicibus misericordiam, pro laesis severitatem, et similiter cetera. XVII.

16. We will conciliate the judge to ourselves not only by praising him—which both ought to be done with measure and yet is common to either party—but if we have conjoined his praise to the utility of our cause, so that we allege, on behalf of the honorable, his own dignity; on behalf of the humble, justice; on behalf of the unfortunate, mercy; on behalf of the injured, severity; and similarly the rest. 17.

Mores quoque, si fieri potest, iudicis velim nosse. Nam prout asperi lenes, iucundi graves, duri remissi erant, aut adsumere in causam naturas eorum qua competent aut mitigare qua repugnabunt oportebit. XVIII.

I should also like, if it can be done, to know the judge’s mores. For according as they were harsh or lenient, jocund or grave, hard or remiss, it will behoove us either to assume into the cause their natures where they are competent, or to mitigate them where they will be repugnant. 18.

Accidit autem interim hoc quoque, ut aut nobis inimicus aut adversariis sit amicus qui iudicat: quae res utrique parti tractanda est ac nescio an etiam ei magis in quam videatur propensior. Est enim nonnumquam pravus hic ambitus, adversus amicos aut pro iis quibuscum simultates gerant pronuntiandi, faciendique iniuste ne fecisse videantur. XIX.

Meanwhile it also happens that the one who judges is either an enemy to us or a friend to the adversaries: a matter that must be handled by both parties, and I am not sure whether even more by the one toward whom he seems more propense. For sometimes there is this perverse ambition: of pronouncing against friends, or in favor of those with whom they carry on enmities, and of acting unjustly, lest they seem to have acted out of favor. 19.

fuerunt etiam quidam suarum rerum iudices. Nam et in libris observationum a Septimio editis adfuisse Ciceronem tali causae invenio, et ego pro regina Berenice apud ipsam eam dixi. Similis hic quoque superioribus ratio est: adversarius enim fiduciam partis suae iactat, patronus timet cognoscentis verecundiam.

There were even certain men who were judges of their own affairs. For in the books of observations published by Septimius I find that Cicero was present at such a case, and I too spoke on behalf of Queen Berenice before the queen herself. The rationale here likewise is similar to the preceding: for the adversary vaunts the confidence of his side, while the patron fears the modesty of the judge taking cognizance.

XX. Praeterea detrahenda vel confirmanda opinio, si quam praecipue domo videbitur iudex attulisse. Metus etiam nonnumquam est amovendus, ut Cicero pro Milone ne arma Pompei disposita contra se putarent laboravit, nonnumquam adhibendus, ut idem in Verrem facit. XXI.

20. Moreover, an opinion is to be either detracted or confirmed, if the judge will seem to have brought any particular one from home. Fear too is sometimes to be removed, as Cicero, on behalf of Milo, labored that they not think Pompey’s arms, set in array, were against him; sometimes to be applied, as the same man does in the case against Verres. 21.

Sed adhibendi modus alter ille frequens et favorabilis, ne male sentiat populus Romanus, ne iudicia transferantur, alter autem asper et rarus, quo minatur corruptis accusationem, et id quidem in consilio ampliore utcumque tutius (nam et mali inhibentur et boni gaudent), apud singulos vero numquam suaserim, nisi defecerint omnia. XXII. Quod si necessitas exiget, non erit iam ex arte oratoria, non magis quam appellare, etiamsi id quoque saepe utile est, aut antequam pronuntiet reum facere; nam et minari et deferre etiam non orator potest.

But as to the application, one mode is that frequent and favorable one: that the Roman People not take it ill, that trials not be transferred; the other, however, is harsh and rare, whereby he threatens the corrupt with an accusation; and this indeed is in a larger council in some fashion safer (for the wicked are restrained and the good rejoice), whereas before individuals I would never advise it, unless everything else has failed. 22. But if necessity shall demand it, it will now no longer be from the art of oratory, any more than to appeal, although that too is often useful, or to make an indictment before he pronounces; for both to threaten and to denounce even a non-orator can.

XXIII. Si causa conciliandi nobis iudicis materiam dabit, ex hac potissimum aliqua in usum principii quae maxime favorabilia videbuntur decerpi oportebit. Quo in loco Verginius fallitur, qui Theodoro placere tradit ut ex singulis quaestionibus singuli sensus in prohoemium conferantur.

23. If the cause gives us material for conciliating the judge to us, it will be proper to excerpt from this especially some things, for the use of the opening, which will seem most favorable. In this matter Verginius is mistaken, who transmits that it pleases Theodorus that from individual questions individual thoughts be transferred into the proemium.

XXIV. Nam ille non hoc dicit, sed ad potentissimas quaestiones iudicem praeparandum: in quo vitii nihil erat, nisi in universum id praeciperet, quod nec omnis actio patitur nec omnis causa desiderat. Nam protinus a petitore primo loco, dum ignota iudici lis est, quo modo ex quaestionibus ducemus sententias?

24. For he does not say this, but that the judge must be prepared for the most potent questions; in which there was nothing of fault, unless he were to prescribe it universally, which neither every action permits nor every cause desires. For straightaway from the petitioner, in the first place, while the suit is unknown to the judge, how are we to draw out propositions from the questions?

Nimirum res erunt indicandae prius. Demus aliquas (nam id exiget ratio nonnumquam): etiamne potentissimas omnis, id est totam causam? Sic erit in prohoemio peracta narratio.

Surely the matters must be indicated first. Let us grant some (for method will sometimes require that): but even all the most potent ones, that is, the whole cause? Thus the narration will have been completed in the proem.

XXV. Quid vero si, ut frequenter accidit, paulo est durior causa? Non benivolentia iudicis petenda ex aliis partibus erit, sed, non ante conciliato eius animo, nuda quaestionum committetur asperitas: quae si recte semper initio dicendi tractarentur, nihil prohoemio opus esset.

25. But what, indeed, if, as frequently happens, the case is a little tougher? The benevolence of the judge will have to be sought from other parts; otherwise, without his mind first being conciliated, the naked asperity of the questions will be engaged: which, if they were always handled rightly at the beginning of speaking, there would be no need of a proem.

XXVI. Aliqua ergo nonnumquam quae erunt ad conciliandum nobis iudicem potentissima non inutiliter interim ex quaestionibus in exordio locabuntur. Quae sint porro in causis favorabilia enumerare non est necesse, quia et manifesta erunt cognita cuiusque controversiae condicione et omnia colligi in tanta litium varietate non possunt.

26. Therefore, certain things which will be most powerful for conciliating the judge to us will, not uselessly, sometimes be placed in the exordium, drawn from the issues. Moreover, it is not necessary to enumerate what in causes are favorable, because they will be manifest once the condition of each controversy is known, and all cannot be collected amid so great a variety of lawsuits.

XXVII. Vt autem haec invenire et augere, ita quod laedit aut omnino repellere aut certe minuere ex causa est. Miseratio quoque aliquando ex eadem venit, sive quid passi sumus grave sive passuri.

27. Just as the task is to find and augment these things, so too whatever hurts must, on the basis of the case, be altogether repelled or at least diminished. Commiseration likewise sometimes comes from the same source, whether we have suffered something grievous or are about to suffer.

XXVIII. Neque enim sum in hac opinione qua quidam, ut eo distare prohoemium ab epilogo credam, quod in hoc praeterita, in illo futura dicantur, sed quod in ingressu parcius et modestius praetemptanda sit iudicis misericordia, in epilogo vero liceat totos effundere adfectus, et fictam orationem induere personis et defunctos excitare et pignora reorum producere: quae minus in exordiis sunt usitata. XXIX.

28. For I am not of that opinion of certain persons, so that I should believe the proem differs from the epilogue in this, that in the former the things past are spoken, in the latter the things future; but rather that at the ingress it is to be essayed more sparingly and more modestly to pre-attempt the judge’s mercy, whereas in the epilogue it is permitted to pour out the emotions wholly, and to put on a feigned oration with personae, and to rouse the deceased, and to produce the pledges of the defendants: things which are less customary in exordia. 29.

Sed haec quae supra dixi non movere tantum verum ex diverso amoliri quoque prohoemio opus est. Vt autem nostrum miserabilem si vincamur exitum, ita adversariorum superbum si vicerint utile est credi.

But these things which I have said above need not only to be moved, but, conversely, also to be removed by the proem. And just as it is useful that our outcome be believed pitiable if we are conquered, so it is useful that the adversaries’ be believed proud if they are victorious.

XXX. Sed ex iis quoque quae non sunt personarum nec causarum verum adiuncta personis et causis duci prohoemia solent. Personis adplicantur non pignora modo, de quibus supra dixi, sed propinquitates, amicitiae, interim regiones etiam civitatesque et si quid aliud eius quem defendimus casu laedi potest.

30. But proems are also wont to be derived from those things which are not of the persons nor of the cases, but are adjunct to persons and cases. To the persons there are applied not only pledges, of which I spoke above, but kinships, friendships, sometimes even regions and cities, and whatever else belonging to him whom we defend can by chance be harmed.

XXXI. Ad causam extra pertinet tempus, unde principium pro Caelio, locus, unde pro Deiotaro, habitus, unde pro Milone, opinio, unde in Verrem, deinceps, ne omnia enumerentur, fama iudiciorum, exspectatio vulgi: nihil enim horum in causa est, ad causam tamen pertinent. XXXII.

31. To the case from without pertains the time, whence the opening in defense of Caelius; the place, whence for Deiotarus; the bearing, whence for Milo; opinion, whence against Verres; next, not to enumerate everything, the fame of the courts, the expectation of the populace: for none of these is in the case, yet they pertain to the case. 32.

Adicit Theophrastus ab +oratione+ principium, quale videtur esse Demosthenis pro Ctesiphonte ut sibi dicere suo potius arbitrio liceat rogantis quam eo modo quem accusator actione praescripserit.

Theophrastus adds a beginning from the oration, such as seems to be that of Demosthenes on behalf of Ctesiphon: that it be permitted to him, as one petitioning, to speak by his own judgment rather than in the manner which the accuser has prescribed by his action.

XXXIII. Fiducia ipsa solet opinione adrogantiae laborare. Faciunt favorem et illa paene communia, non tamen omittenda vel ideo ne occupentur: optare, abominari, rogare, sollicitum agere, quia plerumque attentum iudicem facit si res agi videtur nova magna atrox, pertinens ad exemplum, praecipue tamen si iudex allit sua vice aut rei publicae commovetur: cuius animus spe metu admonitione precibus, vanitate denique, si id profuturum credemus, agitandus est.

33. Confidence itself is wont to labor under the opinion of arrogance. Favor is also won by those almost commonplaces—not to be omitted, even for this reason, lest they be pre‑empted: to wish, to abominate, to entreat, to act as one anxious; for it very often makes the judge attentive if the matter seems to be one being handled that is new, great, atrocious, bearing upon precedent—especially, however, if the judge in his own turn or on behalf of the commonwealth is moved: his mind must be stirred by hope, fear, admonition, prayers, and, finally, by vanity, if we believe that will be of use.

XXXIV. sunt et illa excitandis ad audiendum non inutilia, si nos neque diu moraturos neque extra causam dicturos existiment. Docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio, sed et illud, si breviter et dilucide summam rei de qua cognoscere debeat indicarimus (quod Homerus atque Vergilius operum suorum principiis faciunt): XXXV.

34. There are also those things not un-useful for rousing to listen, if they suppose that we will neither tarry long nor speak outside the cause. This very attention, without doubt, renders the hearer docile; but also this, if we indicate briefly and lucidly the sum of the matter about which he ought to be informed (which Homer and Vergil do in the beginnings of their works): 35.

nam is eius rei modus est ut propositioni similior sit quam expositioni, nec quo modo quidque sit actum sed de quibus dicturus sit orator ostendat. Nec video quod huius rei possit apud oratores reperiri melius exemplum quam Ciceronis pro A. Cluentio. XXXVI.

for the measure of that matter is such that it is more similar to a proposition than to an exposition, and he indicates not how each thing was done but about what things the orator is going to speak. Nor do I see that a better example of this can be found among the orators than Cicero’s For A. Cluentius. 36.

"Animadverti, iudices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse partes: quarum altera mihi niti et magno opere confidere videbatur invidia iam inveterata iudicii Iuniani, altera tantum modo consuetudinis causa timide et diffidenter attingere rationem veneficii criminum, qua de re lege est haec quaestio constituta". Id tamen totum respondenti facilius est quam proponenti, quia hic admonendus iudex, illic docendus est. XXXVII. Nec me quamquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint, ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intellegi, verum quia istud non neglegentia iudicis contingit, sed errore.

"I have observed, judges, that the whole oration of the accuser has been divided into two parts: of which the one seemed to rely upon me and to place great confidence in the already inveterate ill-will from the Junian trial, the other, merely for the sake of custom, to touch timidly and diffidently upon the rationale of the poisoning charges, on account of which matter by law this court of inquiry has been constituted." Yet all that is easier for the respondent than for the proponent, because here the judge must be admonished, there he must be taught. 37. Nor have great authorities, although they might lead me in this, led me to the point that I should not always wish to make the judge attentive and docile: not because I do not know, that which is said by them, that for a bad cause it is advantageous that what sort it is be not understood, but because that comes about not from the judge’s negligence, but from error.

XXXVIII. Dixit enim adversarius et fortasse persuasit: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione, quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docilem et intentum. Quid ergo est?

38. For the adversary has spoken and perhaps persuaded; we have need of a diverse opinion on his part, which cannot be changed unless we make him docile and intent toward the things we shall say. What, therefore, is it?

Inminuenda quaedam et elevanda et quasi contemnenda esse consentio ad remittendam intentionem iudicis quam adversario praestat, ut fecit pro Ligario Cicero. XXXIX. Quid enim agebat aliud ironia illa quam ut Caesar minus se in rem tamquam non novam intenderet?

I consent that certain things must be diminished, made light of, and as it were contemned, for the relaxing of the judge’s attention, which affords an advantage to the adversary, as Cicero did on behalf of Ligarius. 39. For what else was that irony accomplishing than that Caesar should apply himself less to the matter, as though it were not new?

Quid pro Caelio, quam ut res exspectatione minor videretur?

What did he do for Caelius, except that the matter might seem less than expectation?

XL. Verum ex iis quae proposuimus aliud in alio genere causae desiderari palam est. Genera porro causarum plurimi quinque fecerunt: honestum, humile, dubium vel anceps, admirabile, obscurum, id est endoxos, adoxos, anphidoxos, paradoxos, dysparakoloutheton: quibus recte videtur adici turpe, quod alii humili, alii admirabili subiciunt. XLI.

40. But from those things which we have set forth, it is plain that something is wanting in another kind of cause. Moreover, very many have made five kinds of causes: the honorable, the humble, the doubtful or two-edged, the admirable, the obscure, that is, endoxos, adoxos, anphidoxos, paradoxos, dysparakoloutheton; to which it seems right to add the disgraceful, which some subordinate to the humble, others to the admirable. 41.

Admirabile autem vocant quod est praeter opinionem hominum constitutum. In ancipiti maxime benivolum iudicem, in obscuro docilem, in humili attentum parare debemus. Nam honestum quidem ad conciliationem satis per se valet: in admirabili et turpi remediis opus est.

They call “admirable” what has been constituted beyond the expectation of men. In a doubtful case we must chiefly render the judge benevolent; in an obscure one, docile; in a humble one, attentive. For the honorable of itself suffices well for conciliation; in the admirable and the disgraceful there is need of remedies.

XLII. Et eo quidam exordium in duas dividunt partis, principium et insinuationem, ut sit in principiis recta benivolentiae et attentionis postulatio: quae quia esse in turpi causae genere non possit, insinuatio subrepat animis, maxime ubi frons causae non satis honesta est, vel quia res sit improba vel quia hominibus parum probetur, aut si facie quoque ipsa premitur vel invidiosa consistentis ex diverso patroni aut patris vel miserabili senis caeci infantis. XLIII.

42. And for that reason some divide the exordium into two parts, the beginning and the insinuation, such that in beginnings there is a straightforward request for goodwill and attention: which, because it cannot exist in the base kind of cause, the insinuation should steal into minds, especially where the face of the cause is not sufficiently honorable, either because the matter is wicked or because it is little approved by men, or if it is also pressed by its very appearance, or by the odiousness of one standing opposite—an advocate, or a father, or a pitiable old man, a blind man, or a child. 43.

Et quidem quibus adversus haec modis sit medendum verbosius tradunt, materiasque ipsi sibi fingunt et ad morem actionum prosecuntur: sed hae, cum oriantur ex causis, quarum species consequi omnes non possumus,nisi generaliter comprenduntur in infinitum sunt extrahendae. XLIV. Quare singulis consilium ex propria ratione nascetur.

And indeed they more verbosely hand down by what methods one should be remedied against these things, and they fashion materials for themselves and prosecute them according to the manner of pleadings: but these, since they arise from causes, the species of which we cannot all pursue, unless they are comprehended generally, must be drawn out to infinity. 44. Wherefore for each individual the counsel will arise from its own rationale.

Illud in universum praeceperim, ut ab iis quae laedunt ad ea quae prosunt refugiamus: si causa laborabimus, persona subueniat, si persona, causa; si nihil quod nos adiuvet erit, quaeramus quid adversarium laedat; nam ut optabile est plus favoris mereri, sic proximum odii minus. XLV. In iis quae negari non poterunt elaborandum ut aut minora quam dictum est aut alia mente facta aut nihil ad praesentem quaestionem pertinere aut emendari posse paenitentia aut satis iam punita videantur.

I would prescribe this in universal terms: that we flee from those things which wound to those which profit: if we struggle in the cause, let the person come to the aid; if in the person, the cause; if there will be nothing that helps us, let us seek what harms the adversary; for as it is desirable to earn more favor, so the next thing is less of hatred. 45. In those things which cannot be denied, one must labor that they seem either smaller than has been said, or done with a different mind, or to pertain nothing to the present question, or to be able to be amended by repentance, or to have already been sufficiently punished.

Ideoque agere advocato quam litigatori facilius, quia et laudat sine adrogantiae crimine et aliquando utiliter etiam reprehendere potest. XLVI. Nam se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat et auctoritatem induat vera sentientis, quo magis credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti.

And so it is easier to act as an advocate than as a litigant, because he both praises without the charge of arrogance and can sometimes even usefully reprehend. 46. For he will also at times feign that he himself is moved, as Cicero on behalf of Rabirius Postumus, while he secures access for himself to the ears and assumes the authority of one who truly feels, so that he may be the more believed, whether defending the same things or denying them.

Ideoque hoc primum intuemur, litigatoris an advocati persona sit utendum, quotiens utrumque fieri potest; nam id in schola liberum est, in foro rarum ut sit idoneus suae rei quisque defensor. XLVII. Declamaturus autem maxime positas in adfectibus causas propriis personis debet induere.

And so we first consider this, whether the persona of the litigator or of the advocate should be used, whenever both can be done; for that is free in the school, in the forum it is rare that each is a suitable defender of his own case. 47. Moreover, one about to declaim, in cases especially set upon the affections, ought to assume proper personae.

Hi sunt enim qui mandari non possunt, nec eadem vi perfertur alieni animi qua sui motus. XLVIII. His etiam de causis insinuatione videtur opus esse si adversarii actio iudicum animos occupavit, si dicendum apud fatigatos est; quorum alterum promittendo nostras probationes et adversas eludendo vitabimus, alterum spe brevitatis et iis quibus attentum fieri iudicem docuimus.

For these are indeed those which cannot be handed over, nor is another’s emotion carried through with the same force as one’s own impulse. 48. In these causes too, an insinuation seems to be needed, if the adversary’s pleading has preoccupied the minds of the judges, if one must speak before the weary; of which the former we shall avoid by promising our proofs and by parrying the adverse points, the latter by the hope of brevity and by those means by which we have taught that a judge is made attentive.

XLIX. Et urbanitas opportuna reficit animos et undecumque petita iudicis voluptas levat taedium. Non inutilis etiam est ratio occupandi quae videntur obstare, ut Cicero dicit scire se mirari quosdam quod is qui per tot annos defenderit multos, laeserit neminem, ad accusandum Verrem descenderit.

49. And timely urbanity refreshes spirits, and the judge’s pleasure, sought from wherever, lightens tedium. Not useless, too, is the method of preempting the things that seem to obstruct, as Cicero says that he is aware that some marvel that he, who for so many years has defended many and harmed no one, has descended to accuse Verres.

Deinde ostendit hanc ipsam esse sociorum defensionem: quod schema prolempsin dicitur. L. Id cum sit utile aliquando, nunc a declamatoribus quibusdam paene semper adsumitur, qui fas non putant nisi a contrario incipere.

Then he shows that this very thing is the defense of the allies: the scheme which is called prolepsis. 50. Though this is useful at times, it is now almost always assumed by certain declaimers, who do not think it lawful to begin except from the contrary.

Negant Apollodorum secuti tris esse de quibus supra diximus praeparandi iudicis partes, sed multas species enumerant, ut ex moribus iudicis, ex opinionibus ad causam extra pertinentibus, ex opinione de ipsa causa, quae sunt prope infinitae, tum iis ex quibus omnes controversiae constant, personis factis dictis causis temporibus locis occasionibus ceteris. LI. Quas veras esse fateor, sed in haec genera reccidere. Nam si iudicem benivolum attentum docilem habeo, quid amplius debeam optare non reperio: cum metus ipse, qui maxime videtur esse extra haec, et attentum iudicem faciat et ab adverso favore deterreat.

They deny, following Apollodorus, that there are three parts of preparing the judge, of which we spoke above, but they enumerate many species: from the character of the judge, from opinions extraneous to the case, from opinion about the case itself (which are almost infinite), then those from which all controversies consist—persons, deeds, sayings, causes, times, places, occasions, and the rest. 51. Which I confess to be true, but to fall back into these genera. For if I have the judge benevolent, attentive, and docile, I do not find what more I ought to wish for: since fear itself, which seems especially to lie outside these, both makes the judge attentive and deters him from favor toward the adversary.

LII. Verum quoniam non est satis demonstrare discentibus quae sint in ratione prohoemii, sed dicendum etiam quo modo perfici facillime possint, hoc adicio, ut dicturus intueatur cui, apud quem, pro quo, contra quem, quo tempore, quo loco, quo rerum statu, qua vulgi fama dicendum sit: quid iudicem sentire credibile sit antequam incipimus: tum quid aut desideremus aut deprecemur. Ipsa illum natura eo ducet ut sciat quid primum dicendum sit.

52. But since it is not enough to show to learners what things belong in the rationale of the proem, but it must also be said in what way they can be most easily perfected, I add this: that the one about to speak should consider to whom, before whom, for whom, against whom, at what time, in what place, in what condition of affairs, with what rumor of the crowd it must be spoken; what it is credible the judge feels before we begin; then what we either desire or deprecate. Nature itself will lead him there, so that he may know what must be said first.

LIII. At nunc omne quo coeperunt prohoemium putant, et ut quidque succurrit, utique si aliqua sententia blandiatur, exordium. Multa autem sine dubio sunt et aliis partibus causae communia, nihil tamen in quaque melius dicitur quam quod aeque bene dici alibi non possit.

53. But now they think whatever they have begun with is the proem, and whatever happens to occur—especially if some sententia flatters—is an exordium. Many things, however, are without doubt common to other parts of a cause; yet nothing in each part is better said than what cannot be said equally well elsewhere.

LIV. Multum gratiae exordio est quod ab actione diversae partis materiam trahit: hoc ipso quod non compositum domi sed ibi atque ex re natum et facilitate famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex proximo sermonis fidem quoque adquirit, adeo ut, etiam si reliqua scripta atque elaborata sint, tamen plerumque videatur tota extemporalis oratio cuius initium nihil praeparati habuisse manifestum est. LV. Frequentissime vero prohoemium decebit et sententiarum et compositionis et vocis et vultus modestia, adeo ut in genere causae etiam indubitabili fiducia se ipsa nimium exserere non debeat.

54. Much grace accrues to the exordium when it draws its material from the action of the opposing party: by this very fact, that it was not composed at home but was born there on the spot and from the matter itself, it both augments the reputation for ingenium by its facility and, with the appearance of a simple speech taken from what is nearest at hand, also acquires credibility—so much so that, even if the remaining parts are written and elaborated, nevertheless the whole oration often seems extemporaneous, whose beginning is manifest to have had nothing prepared. 55. Most frequently indeed the proem will be fitting through modesty of both sentences and composition and voice and countenance, to such a degree that, even in a kind of cause that is indubitable, confidence ought not to thrust itself forth too much.

Odit enim iudex fere litigantis securitatem, cumque ius suum intellegat tacitus reverentiam postulat. LVI. Nec minus diligenter ne suspecti simus ulla parte vitandum est, propter quod minime ostentari debet in principiis cura, quia videtur ars omnis dicentis contra iudicem adhiberi.

For the judge, indeed, generally hates the litigant’s self-assurance, and when he understands his own right, he silently demands reverence. 56. No less diligently must it be avoided that we be suspected in any respect, on account of which care should be least displayed at the outset, because the whole art of the speaker seems to be employed against the judge.

LVII. Sed ipsum istud evitare summae artis; nam id sine dubio ab omnibus, et quidem optime, praeceptum est, verum aliquatenus temporum condicione mutatur, quia iam quibusdam in iudiciis, maximeque capitalibus aut apud centumviros, ipsi iudices exigunt sollicitas et accuratas actiones, contemnique se nisi in dicendo etiam diligentia appareat credunt, nec doceri tantum sed etiam delectari volunt. Et est difficilis huius rei moderatio: LVIII.

LVII. But to avoid that very thing is of the highest art; for this without doubt has been prescribed by all, and indeed most excellently, yet it is somewhat altered by the condition of the times, because now in certain trials, and most of all in capital ones or before the Centumviri, the judges themselves demand solicitous and accurate pleadings, and they believe themselves despised unless diligence also appears in the speaking, and they wish not only to be taught but also to be delighted. And the moderation of this matter is difficult: LVIII.

quae tamen ita temperari potest ut videamur accurate, non callide dicere. Illud ex praeceptis veteribus manet, ne quod insolens verbum, ne audacius tralatum, ne aut ab obsoleta vetustate aut poetica licentia sumptum in principio deprehendatur. LIX.

which, however, can be tempered in such a way that we seem to speak accurately, not craftily. This remains from the ancient precepts: let no unusual word, nor one too boldly transferred, nor one taken either from obsolete antiquity or from poetic license, be detected at the beginning. 59.

Nondum enim recepti sumus et custodit nos recens audientium intentio; magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus haec libertas feretur, maximeque cum in locos fuerimus ingressi, quorum naturalis ubertas licentiam verbi notari circumfuso nitore non patitur. LX. Nec argumentis autem nec locis nec narrationi similis esse in prohoemio debet oratio, neque tamen deducta semper atque circumlita, sed saepe simplici atque inlaboratae similis nec verbis vultuque nimia promittens; dissimulata enim et, ut Graeci dicunt, anepiphantos actio melius saepe subrepit. Sed haec prout formari animum iudicum expediet.

For we have not yet been received, and the fresh attention of the hearers keeps us under guard; with minds more conciliated and now warming, this freedom will be borne, and especially when we have entered into those places whose natural ubertas does not permit the license of speech to be noted, by the radiance poured around. 60. Nor ought the oration in the proem to be similar either to the arguments, or to the loci, or to narration; nor yet always drawn out and wholly polished, but often like the simple and unlabored, and not promising too much by words and countenance; for a dissimulated and, as the Greeks say, anepiphantos delivery often steals in better. But these things should be arranged as it will be expedient to form the mind of the judges.

LXI. Turbari memoria vel continuandi verba facultate destitui nusquam turpius, cum vitiosum prohoemium possit videri cicatricosa facies: et pessimus certe gubernator qui navem dum portu egreditur impegit. LXII.

61. Nowhere is it more shameful to have the memory thrown into confusion or to be deprived of the faculty of continuing one’s words, since a faulty proem can seem a scarred face: and surely the worst helmsman is he who, while he is leaving the harbor, runs his ship aground. 62.

Modus autem principii pro causa; nam breve simplices, longius perplexae suspectaeque et infames desiderant. Ridendi vero qui velut legem prohoemiis omnibus dederunt ut intra quattuor sensus terminarentur. Nec minus evitanda est inmodica eius longitudo, ne in caput excrevisse videatur et quo praeparare debet fatiget.

The measure of the beginning is according to the cause; for the simple desire something brief, the perplexed, the suspect, and the infamous desire something longer. Laughable, indeed, are those who, as though they had given a law to all prooemia, decreed that they should be confined within four senses. No less is its immoderate length to be avoided, lest it seem to have swollen into a head and weary the very one whom it ought to prepare.

LXIII. Sermonem a persona iudicis aversum (apostrophe dicitur) quidam in totum a prohoemio summovent, nonnulla quidem in hanc persuasionem ratione ducti. Nam prorsus esse hoc magis secundum naturam confitendum est, ut eos adloquamur potissimum quos conciliare nobis studemus.

63. Speech turned away from the person of the judge (it is called apostrophe) some wholly remove from the proem, being led by certain reasoning into this persuasion. For it must indeed be confessed that this is more in accordance with nature, that we address especially those whom we are striving to win over to ourselves.

LXIV. Interim tamen et est prohoemio necessarius sensus aliquis et hic acrior fit atque vehementior ad personam derectus alterius. Quod si accidat, quo iure aut qua tanta superstitione prohibeamur dare per hanc figuram sententiae vires?

64. Meanwhile, however, there is also some sense necessary to the proem, and this becomes sharper and more vehement when directed against the person of another. If that should happen, by what right or by what such great superstition should we be forbidden to give the sentence force by means of this figure?

LXV. Neque enim istud scriptores artium quia non liceat sed quia non putent utile vetant. Ita, si vincet utilitas, propter eandem causam facere debebimus propter quam vetamur.

65. For the writers of the arts forbid this not because it is not licit, but because they do not think it useful. Thus, if utility shall prevail, we ought for that same reason to do what we are forbidden to do.

LXVI. Et Demosthenes autem ad Aeschinen orationem in prohoemio convertit, et M. tullius cum pro aliis quibusdam ad quos ei visum est, tum pro Ligario ad tuberonem: LXVII. nam erat multo futura languidior si esset aliter figurata, quod facilius cognoscet si quis totam illam partem vehementissimam cuius haec forma est: "habes igitur, tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum" et cetera convertat ad iudicem: tum enim vere aversa videatur oratio et languescat vis omnis, dicentibus nobis: "habet igitur tubero quod est accusatori maxime optandum"; illo enim modo pressit atque institit, hoc tantum indicasset.

66. And Demosthenes, moreover, turns his oration in the proem toward Aeschines, and M. Tullius, both on behalf of certain others to whom it seemed good to him, and then in behalf of Ligarius toward Tubero: 67. for it would have been much more languid if it had been shaped otherwise, which one will more easily recognize if anyone should turn to the judge that whole most vehement part whose form is this: "You have, then, Tubero, that which is most to be desired by an accuser," and the rest; for then the speech would truly seem turned away and all its force would grow faint, we saying: "Therefore Tubero has that which is most to be desired by an accuser"; for in that way he pressed and pursued, in this he would only have indicated it.

LXVIII. Quod idem in Demosthene, si flexum illi mutaveris, accidet. Quid?

68. The same will happen with Demosthenes, if you change the turn for him. What?

non Sallustius derecto ad Ciceronem, in quem ipsum dicebat, usus est principio, et quidem protinus: "graviter et iniquo animo maledicta tua paterer, M. Tulli": sicut Cicero fecerat in Catilinam: "quo usque tandem abutere"? LXIX. Ac ne quis apostrophen miretur, idem Cicero pro Scauro ambitus reo, quae causa est in commentariis (nam bis eundem defendit), prosopopoeia loquentis pro reo utitur, pro Rabirio vero Postumo eodemque Scauro reo repetundarum etiam exemplis, pro Cluentio, ut modo ostendi, partitione. LXX.

Did not Sallust use a beginning directed straight at Cicero, the very man against whom he was speaking, and indeed forthwith: "I would endure your revilings with a heavy and unfair spirit, M. Tullius": just as Cicero had done against Catiline: "how long, pray, will you abuse [us]"? 69. And lest anyone wonder at the apostrophe, the same Cicero, for Scaurus, a defendant on an ambitus charge, which case is in the Commentaries (for he defended the same man twice), employs a prosopopoeia of one speaking on behalf of the defendant; for Rabirius Postumus and likewise that same Scaurus, defendants on charges of repetundae, he also uses examples; for Cluentius, as I have just shown, a partition. 70.

Non tamen haec, quia possunt bene aliquando fieri, passim facienda sunt, sed quotiens praeceptum vicerit ratio: quo modo et similitudine, dum brevi, et tralatione atque aliis tropis, quae omnia cauti illi ac diligentes prohibent, utemur interim, nisi cui divina illa pro Ligario ironia, de qua paulo ante dixeram, displicet.

Nevertheless these things, because they can sometimes be done well, are not to be done indiscriminately, but only whenever reason shall have prevailed over precept: in like manner we will employ even similitude, so long as it be brief, and metaphor (translatio) and other tropes—which all those cautious and diligent men forbid—in the meantime, unless that divine irony in the speech For Ligarius, of which I spoke a little before, displeases someone.

LXXI. Alia exordiorum vitia verius tradiderunt. Quod in pluris causas accommodari potest, vulgare dicitur: id minus favorabile aliquando tamen non inutiliter adsumimus, magnis saepe oratoribus non evitatum; quo et adversarius uti potest, commune appellatur: quod adversarius in suam utilitatem deflectere potest, commutabile: quod causae non cohaeret, separatum: quod aliunde trahitur, tralatum: praeterea quod longum, quod contra praecepta est: quorum pleraque non principii modo sunt vitia sed totius orationis.

71. Other vices of exordia have been more truly handed down. That which can be accommodated to more causes is called vulgar: that, although less favorable, we sometimes nonetheless assume not without use, not avoided often even by great orators; that which the adversary also can use is called common; that which the adversary can deflect to his own utility, commutable; that which does not cohere with the cause, separate; that which is drawn from elsewhere, transferred; moreover, that which is long, that which is against the precepts: most of which are vices not of the beginning only but of the whole oration.

LXXII. Haec de prohoemio, quotiens erit eius usus. Non semper autem est; - nam et supervacuum aliquando est, si sit praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc iudex aut si res praeparatione non egeat.

72. So much about the proem, whenever there will be its use. But it is not always [needed]; - for it is sometimes superfluous, if the judge is sufficiently prepared even without this, or if the matter does not need preparation.

Aristoteles quidem in totum id necessarium apud bonos iudices negat. Aliquando tamen uti nec si velimus eo licet, cum iudex occupatus, cum angusta sunt tempora, cum maior potestas ab ipsa re cogit incipere. LXXIII.

Aristotle indeed denies that this is necessary at all with good judges. Sometimes, however, it is not permitted to use it even if we wish, when the judge is occupied, when the times are straitened, when a greater power compels us to begin from the matter itself. 73.

Contraque est interim prohoemii vis etiam non exordio; nam iudices et in narratione nonnumquam et in argumentis ut attendant et ut faveant rogamus, quo Prodicus velut dormitantes eos excitari putabat, quale est: LXXIV. "tum C. Varenus, qui a familia Anchariana occisus est - hoc quaeso, iudices, diligenter attendite." Vtique si multiplex causa est, sua quibusque partibus danda praefatio est, ut "audite nunc reliqua" et "transeo nunc illuc". LXXV. Sed in ipsis etiam probationibus multa funguntur prohoemii vice, ut facit Cicero pro Cluentio dicturus contra censores, pro Murena cum se Servio excusat.

And conversely, the force of the proem is sometimes even not at the exordium; for we ask the judges, both in the narration sometimes and in the arguments, to pay attention and to be favorable, whereby Prodicus thought that, as if dozing, they were roused, such as: 74. "then C. Varenus, who was killed by the Ancharian household — this, I beg you, judges, attend to diligently." In any case, if the cause is manifold, a preface must be given to each of its parts, as "listen now to the rest" and "I pass over now to that." 75. But even in the proofs themselves many things serve in the stead of a proem, as Cicero does in the Pro Cluentio when about to speak against the censors, in the Pro Murena when he excuses himself to Servius.

Verum id frequentius est quam ut exemplis confirmandum sit.

But that is more frequent than that it should be confirmed by examples.

LXXVI. Quotiens autem prohoemio fuerimus usi, tum sive ad expositionem transibimus sive protinus ad probationem, id debebit in principio postremum esse cui commodissime iungi initium sequentium poterit. LXXVII.

76. However, as often as we have made use of a proem, then, whether we pass to the exposition or straightway to the proof, that should be, at the beginning, the last thing to which the opening of what follows can most conveniently be joined. 77.

Illa vero frigida et puerilis est in scholis adfectatio, ut ipse transitus efficiat aliquam utique sententiam et huius velut praestigiae plausum petat, ut Ovidius lascivire in Metamorphosesin solet; quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, res diversissimas in speciem unius corporis colligentem: LXXVIII. oratori vero quid est necesse surripere hanc transgressionem, et iudicem favere qui ut ordini rerum animum intendat etiam commonendus est? Peribit enim prima pars expositionis si iudex narrari nondum sciet.

But that frigid and puerile affectation in the schools is, in truth, that the very transition should itself produce some sentence in any case and seek applause for this as it were prestidigitation, as Ovid is wont to frolic in the Metamorphoses; whom, however, necessity can excuse, as he gathers most diverse things into the semblance of one body: 78. but for the orator, what need is there to filch this transition, and to curry favor with the judge, who must even be reminded so that he may direct his mind to the order of things? For the first part of the exposition will perish if the judge does not yet know that a narration is going on.

LXXIX. Quapropter, ut non abrupte cadere in narrationem, ita non obscure transcendere est optimum. Si vero longior sequetur ac perplexa magis expositio, ad eam ipsam praeparandus iudex erit, ut Cicero saepius, sed et hoc loco fecit: "paulo longius exordium rei demonstrandae repetam, quod quaeso, iudices, ne moleste patiamini; principiis enim cognitis multo facilius extrema intellegetis." Haec fere sunt mihi de exordio comperta.

79. Wherefore, just as it is best not to fall abruptly into the narration, so too it is best not to transition obscurely. But if a longer and more perplexed exposition is to follow, the judge must be prepared for that very thing, as Cicero often, and also in this passage, did: "I will take up again a somewhat longer exordium for the matter to be demonstrated, which, I beg you, judges, do not take amiss; for once the beginnings are known, you will understand the latter parts much more easily." These are, for the most part, the things I have discovered about the exordium.

[2] I. Maxime naturale est, et fieri frequentissime debet, ut praeparato per haec quae supra dicta sunt iudice res de qua pronuntiaturus est indicetur: ea est narratio. II. In qua sciens transcurram subtiles nimium divisiones quorundam plura eius genera facientium. Non enim solam volunt esse illam negotii de quo apud iudices quaeritur expositionem, sed personae, ut: "M. Lollius Palicanus, humili loco Picens, loquax magis quam facundus"; loci, ut: "oppidum est in Hellesponto, Lampsacum, iudices"; temporis, ut: "vere novo, gelidus canis cum montibus umor liquitur"; causarum, quibus historici frequentissime utuntur cum exponunt unde bellum seditio pestilentia.

[2] 1. It is most natural, and ought most frequently to be done, that, with the judge prepared by those things which have been said above, the matter on which he is about to pronounce be indicated: this is the narration. 2. In which I knowingly will pass over the overly subtle divisions of certain people who make many kinds of it. For they wish it to be not only the exposition of the business about which inquiry is made before judges, but also of the person, as: "M. Lollius Palicanus, a Picene of humble station, more talkative than eloquent"; of the place, as: "there is a town in the Hellespont, Lampsacus, judges"; of the time, as: "at the new spring, the icy hoarfrost is melted, together with the moisture on the mountains"; of causes, which historians most frequently use when they set forth whence war, sedition, pestilence.

III. Praeter haec alias perfectas, alias inperfectas vocant: quod quis ignorat? Adiciunt expositionem et praeteritorum esse temporum, quae est frequentissima, et praesentium, qualis est Ciceronis de discursu amicorum Chrysogoni, postquam est nominatus, et futurorum, quae solis dari vaticinantibus potest: nam hypotyposis non est habenda narratio.

3. Besides these they call some perfect, others imperfect: who is ignorant of that? They add that exposition is both of past times—which is the most frequent—and of present, such as is Cicero’s about the running-to-and-fro of Chrysogonus’s friends, after he is named, and of future, which can be granted only to vaticinators; for a hypotyposis is not to be held as narration.

Sed nos potioribus vacemus.

But let us attend to weightier matters.

IV. Plerique semper narrandum putaverunt: quod falsum esse pluribus coarguitur. sunt enim ante omnia quaedam tam breves causae ut propositionem potius habeant quam narrationem. V. Id accidit aliquando utrique parti, cum vel nulla expositio est, vel de re constat de iure quaeritur, ut apud centumviros: "filius an frater debeat esse intestatae heres", "pubertas annis an habitu corporis aestimetur": aut cum est quidem in re narrationi locus, sed aut ante iudici nota sunt omnia aut priore loco recte exposita.

4. Most have thought that one must always narrate: which is proved false by several considerations. For, before all, there are certain causes so brief that they have a proposition rather than a narration. 5. This happens sometimes to either party, when either there is no exposition, or the matter of fact is settled and the question is of law, as before the centumvirs: "whether a son or a brother ought to be the heir of an intestate," "whether puberty should be estimated by years or by the habit of the body"; or when indeed in the matter there is room for narration, but either all things are already known to the judge or have been rightly expounded in a prior place.

VI. Accidit aliquando alteri, et saepius ab actore, vel quia satis est proponere vel quia sic magis expedit. Satis est dixisse: "certam creditam pecuniam peto ex stipulatione", "legatum peto ex testamento". Diversae partis expositio est cur ea non debeantur. VII.

6. It happens sometimes to one party, and more often on the part of the plaintiff, either because it is enough to propose or because thus it is more expedient. It is enough to have said: "I seek a certain sum of money loaned from stipulation," "I seek a legacy from a testament." It is the exposition of the opposing party why these are not owed. 7.

Et satis est actori et magis expedit sic indicare: "dico ab Horatio sororem suam interfectam". Namque et propositione iudex crimen omne cognoscit, et ordo et causa facti pro adversario magis est. VIII. Reus contra tunc narrationem subtrahet cum id quod obicitur neque negari neque excusari poterit, sed in sola iuris quaestione consistet.

And it is sufficient for the plaintiff and more expedient to indicate thus: "I say that his sister was killed by Horatius." For by the proposition the judge recognizes the whole crime, and the order and cause of the deed are more in favor of the adversary. 8. The defendant, on the contrary, will then subtract the narration when that which is objected can neither be denied nor excused, but will rest upon the question of law alone.

Vt in eo qui, cum pecuniam privatam ex aede sacra surripuerit, sacrilegii reus est confessio verecundior est quam expositio: "non negamus pecuniam de templo esse sublatam, calumniatur tamen accusator actione sacrilegii, cum privata fuerit, non sacra: vos autem de hoc cognoscitis, an sacrilegium sit admissum".

As in the case of one who, when he has surreptitiously taken private money from a sacred temple, is a defendant on a charge of sacrilege, confession is more modest than exposition: "we do not deny that money was removed from the temple; nevertheless the accuser calumniates with an action of sacrilege, since it was private, not sacred: but you take cognizance of this—whether sacrilege has been committed."

IX. Sed ut has aliquando non narrandi causas puto, sic ab illis dissentio qui non existimant esse narrationem cum reus quod obicitur tantum negat: in qua est opinione Cornelius Celsus, qui condicionis huius esse arbitratur plerasque caedis causas et omnis ambitus ac repetundarum. X. Non enim putat esse narrationem nisi quae summam criminis de quo iudicium est contineat, deinde fatetur ipse pro Rabirio Postumo narrasse Ciceronem: atqui ille et negavit pervenisse ad Rabirium pecuniam, qua de re erat quaestio constituta, et in hac narratione nihil de crimine exposuit. XI. Ego autem magnos alioqui secutus auctores duas esse in iudiciis narrationum species existimo, alteram ipsius causae, alteram in rerum ad causam pertinentium expositione.

9. But just as I sometimes reckon these to be reasons for not narrating, so I dissent from those who do not think there is a narration when the defendant merely denies what is alleged: in which opinion is Cornelius Celsus, who judges that of this condition are most cases of homicide and all charges of ambitus (electoral bribery) and repetundae (extortion). 10. For he does not think there is a narration unless it contains the sum of the crime about which the judgment is; then he himself admits that on behalf of Rabirius Postumus Cicero narrated: and yet he both denied that the money had reached Rabirius—the very matter on which the question was constituted—and in this narration he set forth nothing of the crime. 11. But I, following otherwise great authorities, think that in trials there are two kinds of narrations, one of the cause itself, the other in the exposition of things pertaining to the cause.

XII. "Non occidi hominem": nulla narratio est; convenit: sed erit aliqua et interim etiam longa contra argumenta eius criminis, de ante acta vita, de causis propter quas innocens in periculum deducatur, aliis quibus incredibile id quod obicitur fiat. XIII.

12. "I did not kill the man": there is no narration; that is agreed; but there will be some, and at times even a lengthy one, against the arguments of that charge, about the life previously conducted, about the causes on account of which an innocent person may be led into danger, and other matters by which what is alleged may be made incredible. 13.

Neque enim accusator tantum hoc dicit "occidisti", sed quibus id probet narrat: ut in tragoediis, cum Teucer Vlixem reum facit Aiacis occisi, dicens inventum eum in solitudine iuxta exanime corpus inimici cum gladio cruento, non id modo Vlixes respondet, non esse a se id facinus admissum, sed sibi nullas cum Aiace inimicitias fuisse, de laude inter ipsos certatum: deinde subiungit quo modo in eam solitudinem venerit, iacentem exanimem sit conspicatus, gladium e vulnere extraxerit. XIV. His subtexitur argumentatio.

For the accuser does not merely say this, “you killed [him],” but narrates by what proofs he establishes it: as in tragedies, when Teucer makes Ulysses a defendant for Ajax’s slaying, saying that he was found in a lonely place beside the lifeless body of his enemy with a bloody sword, Ulysses does not only reply that that crime was not committed by himself, but that he had had no enmities with Ajax, that between them there had been a contest for praise: then he subjoins how he had come into that solitude, had caught sight of him lying lifeless, and had drawn the sword from the wound. 14. Under these, the argumentation is interwoven.

Sed ne illud quidem sine narratione est, dicente accusatore: "fuisti in eo loco in quo tuus inimicus occisus est": "non fui"; dicendum enim ubi fuerit. Quare ambitus quoque causae et repetundarum hoc etiam plures huiusmodi narrationes habere poterunt quo plura crimina: in quibus ipsa quidem neganda sunt, sed argumentis expositione contraria resistendum est, interdum singulis, interdum universis. XV. An reus ambitus male narrabit quos parentes habuerit, quem ad modum ipse vixerit, quibus meritis fretus ad petitionem descenderit?

But not even that is without narration, with the accuser saying: "you were in the place where your enemy was slain"; "I was not"; for it must be said where he was. Therefore the cases of ambitus (electoral bribery) and of repetundae (extortion) will be able to have the more such narrations, the more crimes there are: in which the charges themselves indeed must be denied, but one must resist with arguments by a contrary exposition, sometimes to the individual ones, sometimes to all collectively. 15. Will a defendant on a charge of ambitus tell poorly what parents he has had, in what manner he himself has lived, relying on what merits he descended to the petition for office?

Aut qui repetundarum insimulabitur, non et ante actam vitam et quibus de causis [per] provinciam universam vel accusatorem aut testem offenderit non inutiliter exponet? XVI. Quae si narratio non est, ne illa quidem Ciceronis pro Cluentio prima, cuius est initium: "A. Cluentius Habitus". Nihil enim hic de veneficio sed de causis quibus ei mater inimica sit dicit.

Or he who will be accused of extortions, will he not also not unprofitably set forth both his previously conducted life and for what causes, [through] the whole province, he has offended either the accuser or a witness? 16. And if this is not narration, then not even that first part of Cicero’s Pro Cluentio, whose beginning is: "A. Cluentius Habitus". For here he says nothing about poisoning but about the causes for which his mother is hostile to him.

XVII. Illae quoque sunt pertinentes ad causam sed non ipsius causae narrationes, vel exempli gratia, ut in Verrem de L. Domitio, qui pastorem, quod is aprum, quem ipsi muneri optulerat, exceptum esse a se venabulo confessus esset, in crucem sustulit: XVIII. vel discutiendi alicuius extrinsecus criminis, ut pro Rabirio Postumo: "nam ut ventum Alexandream est, iudices, haec una ratio a rege proposita Postumo est servandae pecuniae, si curationem et quasi dispensationem regiam suscepisset": vel augendi, ut describitur iter Verris.

17. Those also are narratives pertaining to the case but not narratives of the case itself, either, for example, as in Against Verres concerning L. Domitius, who hoisted on the cross a shepherd, because he had confessed that the boar which he had offered him as a gift had been taken by himself with a hunting-spear: 18. or for the discussion of some extrinsic charge, as in For Rabirius Postumus: "for, when we came to Alexandria, judges, this one plan for safeguarding the money was proposed by the king to Postumus, if he should undertake the caretaking and, as it were, the royal dispensation": or for amplifying, as the journey of Verres is described.

XIX. Ficta interim narratio introduci.solet, vel ad concitandos iudices, ut pro Roscio circa Chrysogonum, cuius paulo ante habui mentionem, vel ad resolvendos aliqua urbanitate, ut pro Cluentio circa fratres Caepasios, interdum per digressionem decoris gratia, qualis rursus in Verrem de Proserpina: "in his quondam locis mater filiam quaesisse dicitur".

19. A feigned narrative is meanwhile wont to be introduced, either to incite the judges, as in the case for Roscius concerning Chrysogonus, of whom I made mention a little before, or to relax them by some urbanity, as in the case for Cluentius concerning the Caepasian brothers, sometimes by a digression for the sake of decor, such as again in Against Verres about Proserpina: "in these places once the mother is said to have sought her daughter".

Quae omnia eo pertinent ut appareat non utique non narrare eum qui negat, sed illud ipsum non narrare quod negat.

All these things pertain to this: that it may appear that he who denies does not necessarily not narrate, but that he does not narrate that very thing which he denies.

XX. Ne hoc quidem simpliciter accipiendum, quod est a me positum, supervacuam esse narrationem rei quam iudex noverit: quod sic intellegi volo, si non modo factum quid sit sciet, sed ita factum etiam ut nobis expedit opinabitur. XXI. Neque enim narratio in hoc reperta est, ut tantum cognoscat iudex, sed aliquanto magis ut consentiat.

20. Not even this is to be accepted simply, which has been posited by me, that the narration of a matter which the judge knows is superfluous: which I wish to be understood thus, if he will know not only what the deed is, but will also opine that it was done in such a way as is expedient for us. 21. For narration was not discovered for this, that the judge may only cognize, but rather, and more so, that he may consent.

Quare etiam si non erit docendus sed aliquo modo adficiendus narrabimus, cum praeparatione quadam: scire quidem eum in summam quid acti sit, tamen rationem quoque facti cuiusque cognoscere ne gravetur. XXII. Interim propter aliquem in consilium adhibitum nos repetere illa simulemus, interim ut rei quae ex adverso proponatur iniquitatem omnes etiam circumstantes intellegant.

Wherefore even if he is not to be taught but in some way to be affected, we will narrate, with a certain preparation: that he indeed know in sum what has been done, yet that he not be burdened to learn also the rationale of each particular fact. 22. Meanwhile, on account of some person brought into the council, let us simulate repeating those things, meanwhile so that all, even those standing around, may understand the iniquity of the matter which is put forward on the opposite side.

In quo genere plurimis figuris erit varianda expositio ad effugiendum taedium nota audientis, sicut "meministi" et "fortasse supervacuum fuerit hic commorari", "sed quid ego diutius cum tu optime noris?", "illud quale sit tu scias", et his similia. XXIII. Alioqui, si apud iudicem cui nota causa est narratio semper videtur supervacua, potest videri non semper esse etiam ipsa actio necessaria.

In this kind, the exposition must be varied with very many figures to escape the tedium of the hearer who knows, such as "you remember" and "perhaps it would be superfluous to linger here," "but why should I go on any longer when you know it very well?", "what that is like you know," and the like. 23. Otherwise, if before a judge to whom the case is known the narration always seems superfluous, it may seem that not always is the action itself necessary either.

XXIV. Alterum est de quo frequentius quaeritur, an sit utique narratio prohoemio subicienda: quod qui opinantur non possunt videri nulla ratione ducti. Nam cum prohoemium idcirco comparatum sit ut iudex ad rem accipiendam fiat conciliatior docilior intentior, et probatio nisi causa prius cognita non possit adhiberi, protinus iudex notitia rerum instruendus videtur.

24. The second point, about which inquiry is more frequent, is whether the narration must of course be subjoined to the proem: those who so opine cannot seem to be led by no reason. For since the proem is composed for this purpose, that the judge may become more conciliatory, more docile, more intent for receiving the matter, and since proof cannot be applied unless the case has first been known, straightway the judge seems to be to be furnished with knowledge of the facts.

XXV. Sed hoc quoque interim mutat condicio causarum, nisi forte M. tullius in oratione pulcherrima quam pro Milone scriptam reliquit male distulisse narrationem videtur tribus praepositis quaestionibus, aut profuisset exponere quo modo insidias Miloni fecisset Clodius si reum qui a se hominem occisum fateretur defendi omnino fas non fuisset, aut si iam praeiudicio senatus damnatus esset Milo, aut si Cn. Pompeius, qui praeter aliam gratiam iudicium etiam militibus armatis cluserat, tamquam adversus ei timeretur. XXVI.

25. But this too meanwhile is altered by the condition of causes, unless perhaps M. Tullius, in the most beautiful oration which he left written for Milo, seems to have ill deferred the narration by three prefixed questions; nor would it have profited to set forth in what way Clodius would have laid ambushes for Milo, if it had not at all been right to defend a defendant who confessed that he had killed a man, or if Milo had already been condemned by a prejudgment of the senate, or if Cn. Pompeius, who besides other favor had even enclosed the court with armed soldiers, were feared as adverse to him. 26.

Ergo hae quoque quaestiones vim prohoemii optinebant, cum omnes iudicem praepararent. Sed pro Vareno quoque postea narravit quam obiecta diluit. Quod fiet utiliter quotiens non repellendum tantum erit crimen, sed etiam transferendum, ut his prius defensis velut initium sit alium culpandi narratio, ut in armorum ratione antiquior cavendi quam ictum inferendi cura est.

Therefore these questions also possessed the force of a proem, since they all prepared the judge. But in the speech for Varenus he also narrated afterwards, later than he dispelled the objections. This will be done usefully whenever the charge must not only be repelled but also transferred, so that, these matters first defended, the narration may serve as a sort of beginning for blaming another, just as in the art of arms the care for warding off is prior to that of delivering a stroke.

XXVII. Erunt quaedam causae, neque id raro, crimine quidem de quo cognitio est faciles ad diluendum, sed multis ante actae vitae flagitiis et gravibus oneratae, quae prius amovenda sunt, ut propitius iudex defensionem ipsius negotii cuius propria quaestio est audiat. Vt si defendendus sit M. Caelius, nonne optime patronus occurrat prius conviciis luxuriae petulantiae inpudicitiae veneficii, in quibus solis omnis Ciceronis versatur oratio: tum deinde narret de bonis Pallae totamque de vi explicet causam, quae est ipsius actione defensa?

27. There will be certain causes—and not rarely—indeed easy to wash away as to the crime about which the inquiry is held, but laden with many and grave disgraces of a previously conducted life, which must first be removed, so that a propitious judge may hear the defense of the very matter whose proper question it is. As, for example, if M. Caelius is to be defended, will not the patron most suitably first forestall the revilings of luxury, petulance, unchastity, and poisoning, in which alone the whole oration of Cicero is engaged? Then thereafter let him narrate about the goods of Palla and unfold the whole case de vi, which is defended by its own action.

XXVIII. Sed nos ducit scholarum consuetudo, in quibus certa quaedam ponuntur (quae themata dicimus) praeter quae nihil est diluendum, ideoque narratio prohoemio semper subiungitur. Inde libertas declamatoribus, ut etiam secundo partis suae loco narrare videantur.

28. But we are led by the custom of the schools, in which certain fixed points are set (which we call themes), beyond which nothing is to be refuted, and therefore the narration is always subjoined to the proem. Thence comes a liberty for declaimers, so that they may seem even in the second place of their own side to narrate.

XXIX. Nam cum pro petitore dicunt, et expositione tamquam priores agant uti solent et contradictione tamquam respondeant, idque fit recte. Nam cum sit declamatio forensium actionum meditatio, cur non in utrumque protinus locum exerceat?

29. For when they speak for the petitioner, they are accustomed to use exposition as though they were acting as the first to proceed, and contradiction as though they were responding—and this is done rightly. For since declamation is a meditation of forensic actions, why should it not at once exercise itself in both roles?

cuius rationis ignari ex more cui adsuerunt nihil in foro putant esse mutandum. XXX. Sed in scholasticis quoque nonnumquam evenit ut pro narratione sit propositio.

Ignorant of which rationale, from the custom to which they have grown accustomed, they think that nothing in the forum ought to be changed. 30. But even in scholastic exercises it sometimes happens that, in place of the narration, there is a proposition.

Nam quid exponet quae zelotypum malae tractationis accusat aut qui Cynicum apud censores reum de moribus facit, cum totum crimen uno verbo in qualibet actionis parte posito satis indicetur? Sed haec hactenus.

For what will she set forth who accuses a jealous husband of maltreatment, or he who makes a Cynic a defendant before the censors on account of morals, since the whole crime is sufficiently indicated by a single word placed in any part of the action? But so much on these matters for now.

XXXI. Nunc quae sit narrandi ratio subiungam. Narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio, vel, ut Apollodorus finit, oratio docens auditorem quid in controversia sit.

31. Now I will subjoin what the method of narrating is. Narration is an exposition of a thing done, or as if done, useful for persuading, or, as Apollodorus defines, an oration teaching the auditor what is in controversy.

Eam plerique scriptores maximeque qui sunt ab Isocrate volunt esse lucidam brevem veri similem. Neque enim refert an pro lucida perspicuam, pro veri simili probabilem credibilemve dicamus. XXXII.

Most writers, and especially those who are from Isocrates, want it to be lucid, brief, verisimilar. Nor indeed does it matter whether, instead of lucid, we say perspicuous, and instead of verisimilar, probable or credible. 32.

Eadem nobis placet divisio, quamquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate parte in una dissenserit, praeceptum brevitatis inridens tamquam necesse sit longam esse aut brevem expositionem nec liceat ire per medium, Theodorei quoque solam relinquant ultimam partem, quia nec breviter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere. XXXIII. Quo diligentius distinguenda sunt singula, ut quid quoque loco prosit ostendam.

The same division pleases us, although Aristotle too dissented from Isocrates in one part, mocking the precept of brevity as though it were necessary for the exposition to be either long or short and not permitted to go by the middle way; the Theodoreans also leave only the last part, because it is certainly not always useful to expound either briefly or lucidly. 33. Wherefore the several points must be distinguished more carefully, so that I may show what in each place is of use.

Narratio est aut tota pro nobis aut tota pro adversariis aut mixta ex utrisque. Si erit tota pro nobis, contenti sumus his tribus partibus, per quas efficitur quo facilius iudex intellegat meminerit credat. XXXIV.

The narration is either wholly for us, or wholly for our adversaries, or mixed from both. If it will be wholly for us, we are content with these three parts, through which it is brought about that the judge may more easily understand, remember, and believe. 34.

Nec quisquam reprehensione dignum putet quod proposuerim eam quae sit tota pro nobis debere esse veri similem cum vera sit. sunt enim plurima vera quidem, sed parum credibilia, sicut falsa quoque frequenter veri similia. Quare non minus laborandum est ut iudex quae vere dicimus quam quae fingimus credat.

Nor let anyone think it worthy of reprehension that I have proposed that the narration which is wholly on our side ought to be verisimilar, even though it is true. For there are very many things indeed true, but scantily credible, just as false things too are frequently verisimilar. Wherefore, we must labor no less that the judge believe what we say truly than what we feign.

XXXV. sunt quidem hae quas supra retuli virtutes aliarum quoque partium; nam et per totam actionem vitanda est obscuritas, et modus ubique custodiendus, et credibilia esse oportet omnia quae dicuntur. Maxime tamen haec in ea parte custodienda sunt quae prima iudicem docet: in qua si acciderit ut aut non intellegat aut non meminerit aut non credat, frustra in reliquis laborabimus.

35. These virtues which I have set forth above are indeed also the virtues of the other parts; for obscurity must be avoided through the whole action, and measure must be everywhere guarded, and all the things that are said ought to be credible. Yet most of all these must be guarded in that part which first instructs the judge: in which, if it should happen that he either does not understand or does not remember or does not believe, we shall labor in vain in the remaining parts.

XXXVI.

36.

Erit autem narratio aperta ac dilucida si fuerit primum exposita verbis propriis et significantibus et non sordidis quidem, non tamen exquisitis et ab usu remotis, tum distincta rebus personis temporibus locis causis, ipsa etiam pronuntiatione in hoc accommodata, ut iudex quae dicentur quam facillime accipiat. XXXVII. Quae quidem virtus neglegitur a plurimis, qui ad clamorem dispositae vel etiam forte circumfusae multitudinis compositi non ferunt illud intentionis silentium, nec sibi diserti videntur nisi omnia tumultu et vociferatione concusserint: rem indicare sermonis cotidiani et in quemcumque etiam indoctorum cadentis existimant, cum interim quod tamquam facile contemnunt nescias praestare minus velint an possint.

However, the narration will be open and lucid if it is first set forth with proper and significant words—indeed not sordid, yet not exquisite and remote from common use—then made distinct by matters, persons, times, places, causes, with the very delivery also accommodated to this end, so that the judge may receive what will be said as easily as possible. 37. This virtue indeed is neglected by very many, who, composed for the clamor of a prearranged, or even by chance surrounding, multitude, do not endure that silence of attention, nor do they seem eloquent to themselves unless they have shaken everything with tumult and vociferation: they reckon the indicating of the matter to be a thing of everyday discourse, such as falls upon anyone, even of the unlearned, while meanwhile, as for that which they disdain as easy, you would not know whether they are less willing or less able to furnish it.

XXXVIII. Neque enim aliud in eloquentia cuncta experti difficilius reperient quam id quod se dicturos fuisse omnes putant postquam audierunt, quia non bona iudicant esse illa, sed vera: tum autem optime dicit orator cum videtur vera dicere. XXXIX.

XXXVIII. For in eloquence, even having experienced all things, they will find nothing more difficult than this: that which everyone thinks they themselves would have said after they have heard it, because they judge those things not to be good, but true; and the orator speaks most excellently when he seems to speak true things. XXXIX.

At nunc velut campum nacti expositionis hic potissimum et vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt et bracchium in latus iactant totoque et rerum et verborum et compositionis genere lasciviunt: deinde, quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non intellegitur. Verum haec omittamus, ne minus gratiae praecipiendo recta quam offensae reprendendo prava mereamur.

But now, as though having found a field for exposition, here above all they bend the voice, throw back the neck, and cast the arm upon the side, and they wanton in every kind both of matter and of words and of composition; then, in a way that is like a monster, the delivery pleases, the cause is not understood. But let us omit these things, lest we deserve less of gratitude by prescribing what is right than of offense by reprehending what is wrong.

XL. Brevis erit narratio ante omnia si inde coeperimus rem exponere unde ad iudicem pertinet, deinde si nihil extra causam dixerimus, tum etiam si reciderimus omnia quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quicquam neque utilitati detrahatur; solet enim quaedam esse partium brevitas, XLI. quae longam tamen efficit summam. "In portum veni, navem prospexi, quanti veheret interrogavi, de pretio convenit, conscendi, sublatae sunt ancorae, solvimus oram, profecti sumus". Nihil horum dici celerius potest, sed sufficit dicere: "e portu navigavi"; et quotiens exitus rei satis ostendit priora, debemus hoc esse contenti quo reliqua intelleguntur.

40. The narration will be brief before all things if we begin to set forth the matter from that point where it pertains to the judge; then if we say nothing outside the case; then also if we cut away everything, the removal of which detracts neither from cognizance nor from utility; for there is wont to be a certain brevity of the parts, 41. which nevertheless makes a long total. "I came into the harbor, I sighted a ship, I asked for how much it would carry, we agreed about the price, I boarded, the anchors were weighed, we cast off the cable, we set out." None of these can be said more swiftly, but it suffices to say: "I sailed from the harbor"; and whenever the outcome of the matter sufficiently shows the earlier things, we ought to be content with that by which the rest are understood.

XLII. Quare, cum dicere liceat: "est mihi filius iuvenis", omnia illa supervacua: "cupidus ego liberorum uxorem duxi, natum filium sustuli, educavi, in adulescentiam perduxi". Ideoque Graecorum aliqui aliud circumcisam expositionem, id est syntomon, aliud brevem putaverunt, quod illa supervacuis careret, haec posset aliquid ex necessariis desiderare. XLIII.

42. Wherefore, since it is permitted to say: "I have a son, a youth," all those things are superfluous: "eager for children I took a wife, a son having been born I took him up, I reared him, I led him into adolescence." And so certain of the Greeks thought the cut-short exposition, that is syntomon, one thing, the brief another, because the former was free of superfluities, the latter could lack something of the necessaries. 43.

Nos autem brevitatem in hoc ponimus, non ut minus sed ne plus dicatur quam oporteat. Nam iterationes quidem et tautologias et perissologias, quas in narratione vitandas quidam scriptores artium tradiderunt, transeo: sunt enim haec vitia non tantum brevitatis gratia refugienda. XLIV.

But we set brevity in this: not that less, but that no more be said than is proper. As for iterations and tautologies and perissologies, which certain writers of the arts have handed down as to be avoided in narration, I pass over them: for these are faults to be shunned not only for the sake of brevity. 44.

Non minus autem cavenda erit, quae nimium corripientes omnia sequitur, obscuritas, satiusque aliquid narrationi superesse quam deesse: nam supervacua cum taedio dicuntur, necessaria cum periculo subtrahuntur. XLV. Quare vitanda est etiam illa Sallustiana (quamquam in ipso virtutis optinet locum) brevitas et abruptum sermonis genus: quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur exspectat, cum praesertim lector non fere sit nisi eruditus, iudicem rura plerumque in decurias mittant de eo pronuntiaturum quod intellexerit, ut fortasse ubique, in narratione tamen praecipue media haec tenenda sit via dicendi: "quantum opus est et quantum satis est". XLVI.

No less, moreover, must the obscurity be guarded against, which follows upon grasping everything too hastily, and it is preferable that something be left over to the narration rather than be lacking: for superfluities are spoken with tedium, necessities are subtracted with danger. 45. Wherefore there must also be avoided that Sallustian (although in him it obtains the place of virtue) brevity and the abrupt kind of discourse: which may perhaps less elude a reader at leisure, but it flies past the hearer, nor does it wait until it be repeated; since especially the reader is almost only a learned man, whereas the countryside for the most part sends the judge into the decuries to pronounce on that which he has understood, so that perhaps everywhere, yet in narration especially, this middle way of speaking should be maintained: "as much as is needful and as much as is sufficient". 46.

Quantum opus est autem non ita solum accipi volo, quantum ad indicandum sufficit, quia non inornata debet esse brevitas, alioqui sit indocta; nam et fallit voluptas, et minus longa quae delectant videntur, ut amoenum ac molle iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus fatigat quam durum aridumque compendium. XLVII. Neque mihi umquam tanta fuerit cura brevitatis ut non ea quae credibilem faciunt expositionem inseri velim.

But I do not wish “as much as is needed” to be taken only thus, as much as suffices for indicating, because brevity ought not to be inornate, otherwise it is unlearned; for pleasure deceives, and things that delight seem less long, just as a pleasant and soft journey, even if it is of a greater span, wearies less than a hard and arid shortcut. 47. Nor has there ever been for me so great a care for brevity that I would not wish those things which make the exposition credible to be inserted.

Simplex enim et undique praecisa non tam narratio vocari potest quam confessio. sunt porro multae condicione ipsa rei longae narrationes. Quibus extrema, ut praecepi, prohoemii parte ad intentionem praeparandus est iudex, deinde curandum ut omni arte vel ex spatio eius detrahamus aliquid vel ex taedio.

For a simple account, cut short on every side, can be called not so much a narration as a confession. Moreover, there are many narrations long by the very condition of the matter. For these, as I have prescribed, in the concluding part of the proem the judge must be prepared to attention; then care must be taken that, by every art, we subtract something either from its expanse or from its tedium.

XLVIII. Vt minus longa sit efficiemus quae poterimus differendo, non tamen sine mentione eorum quae differemus: "quas causas occidendi habuerit, quos adsumpserit conscios, quem ad modum disposuerit insidias, probationis loco dicam." XLIX. Quaedam vero ex ordine praetermittenda, quale est apud Ciceronem: "moritur fulcinius; multa enim quae sunt in re, quia remota sunt a causa, praetermittam". Et partitio taedium levat: "dicam quae acta sint ante ipsum rei contractum, dicam quae in re ipsa, dicam quae postea"; L. ita tres potius modicae narrationes videbuntur quam una longa.

48. We will make it less long by deferring what we can, yet not without mention of those things which we shall defer: "what causes for killing he had, whom he took on as accomplices, in what manner he arranged the ambush, I will say by way of proof." 49. Certain things, indeed, must be omitted from the order, as in Cicero: "Fulcinius dies; for many things which are in the matter, because they are removed from the cause, I will pass over." And partition relieves weariness: "I will tell what was done before the very issue was joined, I will tell what in the matter itself, I will tell what afterwards"; 50. thus three rather moderate narratives will seem to be present rather than one long one.

Interim expediet expositionem brevi interfatione distinguere: "audistis quae ante acta sunt: accipite nunc quae insecuntur". Reficietur enim iudex priorum fine et se velut ad novum rursus initium praeparabit. LI. Si tamen adhibitis quoque his artibus in longum exierit ordo rerum, erit non inutilis in extrema parte commonitio, quod Cicero etiam in brevi narratione fecit: "adhuc, Caesar, Q. Ligarius omni culpa caret: domo est egressus non modo nullum ad bellum, sed ne ad minimam quidem belli suspicionem", et cetera.

Meanwhile it will be expedient to distinguish the exposition by a brief interjection: "you have heard the things that were done before: receive now the things which ensue". For the judge will be refreshed by the end of the former and will prepare himself, as it were, for a new beginning again. 51. If, however, even with these arts applied, the order of things should still run on into length, an admonition at the final part will not be unhelpful, which Cicero also did in a brief narration: "up to this point, Caesar, Q. Ligarius is free from all blame: he went forth from home not only to no war, but not even to the least suspicion of war," and so forth.

LII. Credibilis autem erit narratio ante omnia si prius consuluerimus nostrum animum ne quid naturae dicamus adversum, deinde si causas ac rationes factis praeposuerimus, non omnibus, sed de quibus quaeritur, si personas convenientes iis quae facta credi volemus constituerimus, ut furti reum cupidum, adulterii libidinosum, homicidii temerarium, vel his contraria si defendemus: praeterea loca, tempora, et similia. LIII.

52. The narration, moreover, will be credible before all if first we have consulted our own mind, so that we say nothing contrary to nature; then if we have set causes and reasons before the deeds—not for all, but for those about which inquiry is made—if we have established personae fitting those things which we wish to be believed to have been done, as a defendant of theft to be greedy, of adultery lustful, of homicide rash, or the contraries to these if we shall be defending: besides, places, times, and the like. 53.

Est autem quidam et ductus rei credibilis, qualis in comoediis etiam et in mimis. Aliqua enim naturaliter secuntur et cohaerent, ut si bene priora narraveris iudex ipse quod postea sis narraturus exspectet. LIV.

Moreover, there is also a certain progression of a credible matter, such as in comedies and even in mimes. For some things naturally follow and cohere, so that, if you have well narrated the earlier parts, the judge himself will expect what you are going to narrate afterward. 54.

Ne illud quidem fuerit inutile, semina quaedam probationum spargere, verum sic ut narrationem esse meminerimus, non probationem. Nonnumquam tamen etiam argumento aliquo confirmabimus quod proposuerimus, sed simplici et brevi, ut in veneficiis: sanus bibit, statim concidit, livor ac tumor confestim est insecutus. LV. Hoc faciunt et illae praeparationes, cum reus dicitur robustus armatus (paratus) contra infirmos inermis securos.

Nor will this be useless either: to scatter certain seeds of proofs, yet in such a way that we remember it is a narration, not a proof. Sometimes, however, we will even confirm what we have set forth by some argument, but simple and brief, as in poisonings: he drank while sound, he immediately collapsed, lividity and swelling straightway followed. 55. This is also effected by those preparations, when the defendant is said to be robust, armed (prepared) against the weak, unarmed, unsuspecting.

Omnia denique quae probatione tractaturi sumus, personam causam locum tempus instrumentum occasionem, narratione delibabimus. LVI. Aliquando, si destituti fuerimus his, etiam fatebimur vix esse credibile, sed verum, et hoc maius habendum scelus: nescire nos quo modo factum sit aut quare, mirari, sed probaturos.

In short, all the things which we are going to handle in the proof—the person, the cause, the place, the time, the instrument, the occasion—we shall just touch upon in the narration. 56. Sometimes, if we are deprived of these, we shall even confess that it is scarcely credible, but true; and this is to be held the greater wickedness: that we do not know in what way it was done or why, that we marvel, but that we will prove it.

LVII. Optimae vero praeparationes erunt quae latuerint. Vt a Cicerone sunt quidem utilissime praedicta omnia per quae Miloni Clodius, non Clodio Milo insidiatus esse videatur, plurimum tamen facit illa callidissima simplicitatis imitatio: "Milo autem, cum in senatu fuisset eo die quoad senatus est dimissus, domum venit, calceos et vestimenta mutavit, paulisper, dum se uxor, ut fit, comparat, commoratus est." LVIII.

57. The best preparations, in truth, will be those which have lain hidden. As by Cicero indeed all the things were most usefully pre-dicted, by which Clodius would seem to have lain in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, yet that most crafty imitation of simplicity does very much: "But Milo, since he had been in the senate that day until the senate was dismissed, came home, changed his shoes and clothes, lingered a little, while his wife, as happens, was getting herself ready." 58.

Quam nihil festinato, nihil praeparato fecisse videtur Milo! Quod non solum rebus ipsis vir eloquentissimus, quibus moras et lentum profectionis ordinem ducit, sed verbis etiam vulgaribus et cotidianis et arte occulta consecutus est: quae si aliter dicta essent, strepitu ipso iudicem ad custodiendum patronum excitassent. LIX.

How Milo seems to have done nothing hastily, nothing with preparation! Which effect the most eloquent man achieved not only by the facts themselves, by which he draws out delays and a slow order of setting out, but also by vulgar and everyday words and by an occult art: which, if they had been said otherwise, would, by their very din, have roused the judge to take the defendant into custody. 59.

Frigida videntur ista plerisque, sed hoc ipso manifestum est quo modo iudicem fefellerit, quod vix a lectore deprenditur. Haec sunt quae credibilem faciant expositionem. LX. Nam id quidem, ne qua contraria aut repugnantia in narratione dicamus?

These things seem cold to most, but by this very fact it is manifest in what manner he has deceived the judge, since it is scarcely apprehended by a reader. These are the things which make the exposition credible. 60. For this indeed—lest we say anything contrary or repugnant in the narration?

Si cui praecipiendum est, is reliqua frustra docetur, etiam si quidam scriptores artium hoc quoque tamquam occultum et a se prudenter erutum tradunt.

If to someone precepts must be given, the rest is taught to him in vain, even though certain writers of the arts hand down this too as though it were occult and prudently unearthed by themselves.

LXI. His tribus narrandi virtutibus adiciunt quidam magnificentiam, quam megaloprepeian vocant, quae neque in omnes causas cadit (nam quid in plerisque iudiciis privatis de certa credita, locato et conducto, interdictis habere loci potest supra modum se tollens oratio?), neque semper est utilis, ut vel proximo exemplo Miloniano patet. LXII.

61. To these three virtues of narrating some add magnificence, which they call megaloprepeia, which neither falls into all causes (for what place can a speech lifting itself above measure have in most private trials about a specific loan, in letting and hiring, in interdicts?), nor is it always useful, as is clear even from the very recent Milonian example. 62.

Et meminerimus multas esse causas in quibus confitendum excusandum summittendum sit quod exponimus: quibus omnibus aliena est illa magnificentiae virtus. Quare non magis proprium narrationis est magnifice dicere quam miserabiliter invidiose graviter dulciter urbane: quae cum suo quoque loco sint laudabilia, non sunt huic parti proprie adsignata et velut dedita.

And let us remember that there are many cases in which what we set forth must be confessed, excused, and toned down; to all of which that virtue of magnificence is alien. Therefore it is no more proper to narration to speak magnificently than miserably, invidiously, gravely, sweetly, urbanely: which, although praiseworthy in their own place as well, are not specifically assigned to this part and, as it were, dedicated to it.

LXIII. Illa quoque ut narrationi apta, ita ceteris quoque partibus communis est virtus quam Theodectes huic uni proprie dedit; non enim magnificam modo vult esse verum etiam iucundam expositionem. sunt qui adiciant his evidentiam, quae enargeia Graece vocatur.

63. That virtue too, though apt for narration, is nevertheless common to the other parts as well, which Theodectes assigned peculiarly to this one alone; for he wishes the exposition to be not only magnificent but also pleasant. There are those who add to these evidence—that is, vividness—which in Greek is called enargeia.

LXIV. Neque ego quemquam deceperim ut dissimulem Ciceroni quoque plures partes placere. Nam praeterquam planam et brevem et credibilem vult esse evidentem, moratam, cum dignitate.

64. Nor would I deceive anyone by dissembling that more qualities please Cicero as well. For, besides being plain and brief and credible, he wants the exposition to be evident, of character, with dignity.

Sed in oratione morata debent esse omnia, cum dignitate quae poterunt: evidentia in narratione, quantum ego intellego, est quidem magna virtus, cum quid veri non dicendum sed quodammodo etiam ostendendum est, sed subici perspicuitati potest. Quam quidam etiam contrariam interim putaverunt, quia in quibusdam causis obscuranda veritas esset. Quod est ridiculum; LXV.

But in a character-infused oration all things ought to be, and with as much dignity as they can: evidentia in narration, so far as I understand, is indeed a great virtue, when what is true must not be only said but in a certain way even shown, yet it can be subjected to perspicuity. Which some have even thought contrary at times, because in certain cases the truth ought to be obscured. Which is ridiculous; 65.

nam qui obscurare vult narrat falsa pro veris, et in iis quae narrat debet laborare ut videantur quam evidentissima.

for he who wishes to obscure narrates falsehoods for truths, and in the things that he narrates he ought to labor that they seem as most evident as possible.

LVI. Sed quatenus etiam forte quadam pervenimus ad difficilius narrationum genus, iam de iis loquamur in quibus res contra nos erit: quo loco nonnulli praetereundam narrationem putaverunt. Et sane nihil est facilius nisi prorsus totam causam omnino non agere.

56. But since by a certain chance we have also come to the more difficult kind of narrations, now let us speak about those in which the matter will be against us: at which point some have thought the narration should be passed over. And indeed nothing is easier, except downright not to conduct the whole case at all.

Sed si aliqua iusta ratione huiusmodi susceperis litem, cuius artis est malam esse causam silentio confiteri? Nisi forte tam hebes futurus est iudex ut secundum id pronuntiet quod sciet narrare te noluisse. LXVII.

But if by some just rationale you have undertaken a suit of this sort, whose art is it to confess by silence that the cause is bad? Unless perhaps the judge will be so dull as to pronounce in accordance with that which he will know you were unwilling to narrate. 67.

Neque infitias eo in narratione ut aliqua neganda, aliqua adicienda, aliqua mutanda, sic aliqua etiam tacenda: sed tacenda quae tacere oportebit et liberum erit. Quod fit nonnumquam brevitatis quoque gratia, quale illud est: "respondit quae ei visum est". LXVIII. Distinguamus igitur genera causarum.

Nor do I deny that in narration, just as some things are to be denied, some to be added, some to be changed, so also some are to be kept silent: but to be kept silent those things which it will be proper to keep silent and will be permissible. This happens sometimes also for the sake of brevity, as in that example: "he responded what seemed good to him". 68. Let us, therefore, distinguish the kinds of causes.

Namque in iis in quibus non de culpa quaeretur sed de actione, etiam si erunt contra nos themata confiteri nobis licebit: "pecuniam de templo sustulit, sed privatam, ideoque sacrilegus non est"; "virginem rapuit, non tamen optio patri dabitur"; "ingenuum stupravit et stupratus se suspendit: LXIX. non tamen ideo stuprator capite ut causa mortis punietur, sed decem milia, quae poena stupratori constituta est, dabit". Verum in his quoque confessionibus est aliquid quo invidia quam expositio adversarii fecit detrahi possit, cum etiam servi nostri de peccatis suis mollius loquantur. LXX.

For indeed in those cases in which inquiry will not be about fault but about the action, even if there will be points against us it will be permitted for us to confess: "he removed money from the temple, but money that was private, and therefore he is not guilty of sacrilege"; "he carried off a virgin, yet the choice will not be given to the father"; "he debauched a freeborn man, and the one debauched hanged himself: 69. nevertheless not on that account will the debaucher be punished with the head as the cause of death, but he will pay ten thousand, which is the penalty set for a debaucher." But even in these confessions there is something by which the odium that the adversary’s exposition produced can be lessened, since even our slaves speak more softly about their sins. 70.

Quaedam enim quasi non +narrantes+ mitigabimus: "Non quidem, ut adversarius dicit, consilium furti in templum attulit nec diu captavit eius rei tempus, sed occasione et absentia custodum corruptus et pecunia, quae nimium in animis hominum potest, victus est. Sed quid refert? Peccavit et fur est: nihil attinet id defendere cuius poenam non recusamus". LXXI.

For certain things indeed, as if not +narrating+, we will mitigate: "Not, indeed, as the adversary says, did he bring into the temple a plan of theft, nor did he for long hunt for the time of that matter; but, corrupted by the opportunity and the absence of the guards, and overcome by money, which has too much power in the minds of men. But what does it matter? He sinned and he is a thief: it is no use to defend that whose punishment we do not refuse". 71.

Interim quasi damnemus ipsi: "Vis te dicam vino inpulsum, errore lapsum, nocte deceptum? Vera sunt ista fortasse: tu tamen ingenuum stuprasti, solve decem milia." Nonnumquam propositione praemuniri potest causa, deinde exponi. LXXII.

Meanwhile, as though we ourselves condemn you: "Do you wish me to say you were impelled by wine, tripped by error, deceived by the night? These things are perhaps true: nevertheless you debauched a freeborn man; pay ten thousand." Sometimes the case can be premunited by a proposition, then expounded. 72.

Contraria sunt omnia tribus filiis qui in mortem patris coniurarant; sortiti nocte singuli per ordinem cum ferro cubiculum intrarunt patre dormiente: cum occidere eum nemo potuisset, excitato omnia indicarunt. LXXIII. Si tamen pater, qui divisit patrimonium et reos parricidii defendit, sic agat: "Quod contra legem sufficit, parricidium obicitur iuvenibus quorum pater vivit atque etiam liberis suis adest.

All things are contrary against the three sons who had conspired for their father’s death; having cast lots at night, they entered the bedroom one by one in order with iron, the father sleeping: when no one had been able to kill him, once he was awakened they disclosed everything. 73. If, however, the father, who divided the patrimony and defends the accused of parricide, should act thus: "What suffices against the law, parricide is imputed to youths whose father lives and is even present to his own children.

Ordinem rei narrare quid necesse est cum ad legem nihil pertineat? Sed si confessionem culpae meae exigitis, ego fui pater durus, et patrimonii quod iam melius ab his administrari poterat tenax custos", LXXIV. deinde subiciat stimulatos ab iis quorum indulgentiores parentes erant semper tamen eum habuisse animum qui sit eventu deprensus, ut occidere patrem non possent; neque enim iure iurando opus fuisse si alioqui hoc mentis habuissent, nec sorte nisi quod se quisque eximi voluerit: omnia haec qualiacumque placidioribus animis accipientur illa brevi primae propositionis defensione mollita.

What need is there to narrate the order of the affair, since it pertains nothing to the law? But if you demand a confession of my fault, I was a harsh father, and a tenacious custodian of the patrimony, which already could be better administered by them", 74. then let him subjoin that they were stimulated by those whose parents were more indulgent, yet that they nevertheless always had the disposition which has been caught by the event, namely, that they could not kill their father; for there would not have been need of an oath if otherwise they had had this in mind, nor of the lot except inasmuch as each wished to exempt himself: all these things, of whatever sort, will be received by calmer spirits, those having been softened by the brief defense of the first proposition.

LXXV. At cum quaeritur an factum sit vel quale factum sit, licet omnia contra nos sint, quo modo tamen evitare expositionem salva causae ratione possumus? Narravit accusator, neque ita ut quae essent acta tantum indicaret, sed adiecit invidiam, rem verbis exasperavit: accesserunt probationes, peroratio incendit et plenos irae reliquit.

75. But when it is asked whether the deed was done, or of what sort it was done, even if everything is against us, how nevertheless can we avoid the exposition with the rationale of the cause preserved? The accuser has narrated, and not so as merely to indicate what acts were done, but he added odium, exasperated the matter with words: proofs were adjoined; the peroration inflamed and left them full of ire.

LXXVI. Exspectat naturaliter iudex quid narretur a nobis. Si nihil exponimus, illa esse quae adversarius dixit et talia qualia dixit credat necesse est.

76. The judge naturally expects what may be narrated by us. If we expose nothing, it is necessary that he believe those things to be which the adversary said, and such as he said them.

Quid ergo? Eadem exponemus? Si de qualitate agetur, cuius tum demum quaestio est cum de re constat, eadem, sed non eodem modo: alias causas, aliam mentem, aliam rationem dabo.

What then? Shall we expound the same things? If the case is about the quality—a question which only then arises when the matter is established—the same things, but not in the same manner: I will furnish other causes, a different mind, a different rationale.

LXXVII. Verbis elevare quaedam licebit: luxuria liberalitatis, avaritia parsimoniae, neglegentia simplicitatis nomine lenietur, vultu denique voce habitu vel favoris aliquid vel miserationis merebor: solet nonnumquam movere lacrimas ipsa confessio. Atque ego libenter interrogem, sint illa defensuri quae non narraverint necne?

77. It will be allowable to extenuate certain things by words: luxury will be softened under the name of liberality, avarice under that of parsimony, negligence under that of simplicity; by countenance, finally by voice and bearing, I shall merit something either of favor or of compassion: the confession itself is wont sometimes to move tears. And I would gladly ask whether they mean to defend those things which they have not narrated, or not?

LXXVIII. Nam si neque defenderint neque narraverint, tota causa prodetur; at si defensuri sunt, proponere certe plerumque id quod confirmaturi sumus oportet. cur ergo non exponamus quod et dilui potest et, ut hoc contingat, utique indicandum est?

78. For if they neither should defend nor should narrate, the whole case will be betrayed; but if they are going to defend, it is surely for the most part proper to put forward that which we are going to confirm. Why, then, should we not set forth what both can be diluted and, in order that this may come about, must in any case be indicated?

LXXIX. Aut quid inter probationem et narrationem interest nisi quod narratio est probationis continua propositio, rursus probatio narrationi congruens confirmatio? Videamus ergo num expositio haec longior demum esse debeat et paulo verbosior praeparatione et quibusdam argumentis (argumentis dico, non argumentatione); cui tamen plurimum conferet frequens adfirmatio effecturos nos quod dicimus: non posse vim rerum ostendi prima expositione: exspectent et opiniones suas differant et bene sperent.

79. Or what is the difference between probation and narration, except that narration is the continuous proposition of probation, and in turn probation is a confirmation congruent with narration? Let us see, therefore, whether this exposition ought at length to be longer and a little more verbose than the preparation and certain arguments (I say arguments, not argumentation); to which, however, a frequent affirmation will contribute very much—that we shall effect what we say: that the force of the matters cannot be shown in the first exposition: let them wait and defer their opinions and hope well.

LXXX. Denique utique narrandum est quidquid aliter quam adversarius exposuit narrari potest, aut etiam prohoemia sunt in his causis supervacua: quae quid magis agunt quam ut cognitioni rerum accommodatiorem iudicem faciant? Atqui constabit nusquam esse eorum maiorem usum quam ubi animus iudicis ab aliqua contra nos insita opinione flectendus est.

80. Finally, in any case, whatever can be narrated otherwise than the adversary has set forth must be narrated; or else even proems are in these cases superfluous: what do they accomplish more than to make the judge more suited to the cognition of the matters? And yet it will be clear that nowhere is their greater use than where the mind of the judge must be bent away from some opinion implanted against us.

LXXXI. Coniecturales autem causae, in quibus de facto quaeritur, non tam saepe rei de qua iudicium est quam eorum per quae res colligenda est expositionem habent. Quae cum accusator suspiciose narret, reus levare suspicionem debeat, aliter ab hoc atque ab illo ad iudicem perferri oportet.

81. Conjectural causes, however, in which inquiry is made about the fact, have not so often an exposition of the matter about which the judgment is as of those things by which the matter is to be collected. And when the accuser narrates these suspiciously, the defendant ought to lighten the suspicion; it ought to be conveyed to the judge differently by the one and by the other.

LXXXII. At enim quaedam argumenta turba valent,diducta leviora sunt. Id quidem non eo pertinet ut quaeratur an narrandum, sed quo modo narrandum sit.

82. But indeed certain arguments have force in a mass; separated, they are lighter. This pertains not to the question whether it is to be narrated, but to how it is to be narrated.

Nam et congerere plura in expositione quid prohibet, si id utile est causae, et promittere, sed et dividere narrationem et probationes subiungere partibus atque ita transire ad sequentia? LXXXIII. Namque ne iis quidem accedo qui semper eo putant ordine quo quid actum sit esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare quo expedit.

For indeed, what forbids piling up more things in the exposition, if that is useful to the cause, and to promise, and also to divide the narration and to subjoin probations to the parts and thus to pass on to the subsequent matters? 83. For I do not side even with those who think that it must always be narrated in the order in which something was done, but I prefer to narrate in the order in which it is expedient.

Quod fieri plurimis figuris licet. Nam et aliquando nobis excidisse simulamus cum quid utiliore loco reducimus, et interim nos reddituros relicum ordinem testamur quia sic futura sit causa lucidior: LXXXIV. interim re exposita subiungimus causas quae antecesserunt.

This may be done by very many figures. For sometimes we simulate that something has slipped from us when we bring it back in a more useful place, and meanwhile we declare that we will restore the remaining order because thus the case will be clearer for what follows: 84. in the meantime, with the matter set forth, we subjoin the causes which preceded.

Neque enim est una lex defensionis certumque praescriptum: pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint, atque ut erit vulnus, ita vel curandum protinus vel, si curatio differri potest, interim deligandum. LXXXV. Nec saepius narrare duxerim nefas, quod Cicero pro Cluentio fecit, estque non concessum modo sed aliquando etiam necessarium, ut in causis repetundarum omnibusque quae simplices non sunt; amentis est enim superstitione praeceptorum contra rationem causae trahi.

For neither is there one law of defense and a fixed prescription: according to the matter, according to the time, one must look to what things will be of use; and as the wound shall be, so either it must be treated forthwith or, if treatment can be deferred, meanwhile it must be bandaged. 85. Nor would I deem it a wrong to narrate more than once—what Cicero did on behalf of Cluentius—and it is not only permitted but sometimes even necessary, as in cases of extortion and in all those which are not simple; for it is the part of a madman to be dragged, by a superstition of precepts, against the reason of the case.

LXXXVI. Narrationem ideo ante probationes ponere est institutum ne iudex qua de re quaeratur ignoret. cur igitur, si singula probanda aut refellenda erunt, non singula etiam narrentur?

86. The narration has for that reason been instituted to be placed before the proofs, lest the judge be ignorant about what matter inquiry is being made. Why, therefore, if individual points are to be proved or refuted, should not the individual points also be narrated?

Me certe, quantacumque nostris experimentis habenda est fides, fecisse hoc in foro quotiens ita desiderabat utilitas, probantibus et eruditis et iis qui iudicabant, scio: et (quod non adroganter dixerim, quia sunt plurimi quibuscum egi qui me refellere possint si mentiar) fere ponendae a me causae officium exigebatur. LXXXVII. Neque ideo tamen non saepius id facere oportebit ut rerum ordinem sequamur.

I, for my part, whatever credit is to be given to our experiments, know that I have done this in the forum as often as utility so desired, with both the learned and those who were judging approving; and (which I say not arrogantly, since there are very many with whom I have pleaded who could refute me if I lie) the office of setting forth the case was generally exacted of me. 87. Nor for that reason, however, will it not more often be proper to do this: that we follow the order of the matters.

Quaedam vero etiam turpiter convertuntur, ut si peperisse narres, deinde concepisse, apertum testamentum, deinde signatum, in quibus si id quod posterius est dixeris, de priore tacere optimum; palam est enim praecessisse.

Some things, however, are even disgracefully inverted, as if you were to relate that she had borne a child, then had conceived; an opened testament, then a sealed one; in which cases, if you have said that which is later, it is best to be silent about the earlier; for it is plain that it has preceded.

LXXXVIII. Sunt quaedam et falsae expositiones, quarum in foro duplex genus est: alterum quod instrumentis adiuvatur, ut P. Clodius fiducia testium qua nocte incestum Romae commiserat Interamnae se fuisse dicebat: alterum quod est tuendum dicentis ingenio. Id interim ad solam verecundiam pertinet, unde etiam mihi videtur dici color, interim ad quaestionem.

88. There are certain false expositions as well, of which in the forum there is a twofold kind: the one that is aided by instruments (documents), as when P. Clodius, in the confidence of witnesses, said that on the night on which he had committed incest at Rome he had been at Interamna; the other which must be defended by the speaker’s ingenuity. This sometimes pertains only to mere verecundity, whence it also seems to me it is called “color,” sometimes to the question.

LXXXIX. Sed utrumcumque erit, prima sit curarum ut id quod fingemus fieri possit, deinde ut et personae et loco et tempori congruat et credibilem rationem et ordinem habeat: si continget, etiam verae alicui rei cohaereat, aut argumento quod sit in causa confirmetur; nam quae tota extra rem petita sunt mentiendi licentiam produnt. XC. curandum praecipue, quod fingentibus frequenter excidit, ne qua inter se pugnent; quaedam enim partibus blandiuntur, sed in summam non consentiunt: praeterea ne iis quae vera esse constabit adversa sint: in schola etiam ne color extra themata quaeratur.

89. But whichever it will be, let the first of our cares be that what we will feign can happen; then that it be congruent to the persons, the place, and the time, and that it have a credible reason and order: if it comes about, let it also cohere with some true thing, or be confirmed by an argument that is in the case; for things sought wholly outside the matter betray a license of lying. 90. It must be cared for especially—what often slips those who are inventing—lest any points clash with one another; for certain things flatter the parts, but do not agree in the total; furthermore, let them not be opposed to those things which will be established as true: in the school too, let the color not be sought outside the themes.

XCI. Vtrubique autem orator meminisse debebit actione tota quid finxerit, quoniam solent excidere quae falsa sunt: verumque est illud quod vulgo dicitur, mendacem memorem esse oportere. XCII.

91. In either case, moreover, the orator ought to remember, throughout the whole action, what he has feigned, since things that are false are wont to slip out of mind: and true is that which is commonly said, that a liar ought to have a good memory. 92.

Sciamus autem, si de nostro facto quaeratur, unum nobis aliquid esse dicendum: si de alieno, mittere in plura suspiciones licere. Est tamen quibusdam scholasticis controversiis, in quibus ponitur aliquem non respondere quod interrogatur, libertas omnia enumerandi quae responderi potuissent. XCIII.

Let us know, however, that if inquiry is made about our own deed, one single thing must be said by us; if about another’s, it is permitted to cast suspicions into several directions. Yet in certain scholastic controversies, in which it is posited that someone does not respond to what he is interrogated, there is freedom to enumerate all the things that could have been responded. 93.

Fingenda vero meminerimus ea quae non cadant in testem: sunt autem haec quae a nostro ducuntur animo, cuius ipsi tantum conscii sumus, item quod a defunctis (nec hoc enim est qui neget) itemque ab eo cui idem expediet (is enim non negabit), ab adversario quoque qua non est habiturus in negando fidem. XCIV. Somniorum et superstitionum colores ipsa iam facilitate auctoritatem perdiderunt.

We should remember to invent only those things which do not fall under a witness: namely, those drawn from our own mind, of which we ourselves alone are conscious; likewise, what is from the deceased (for there is no one to deny it); likewise also from him to whom the same thing will be expedient (for he will not deny it); and also from the adversary those matters in which, in denying, he will not have credence. 94. The colorings of dreams and superstitions have by their very facility now lost authority.

Non est autem satis in narratione uti coloribus nisi per totam actionem consentiant, cum praesertim quorundam probatio sola sit in adseveratione et perseverantia: XCV. ut ille parasitus qui ter abdicatum a divite iuvenem et absolutum tamquam suum filium adserit, habebit quidem colorem quo dicat et paupertatem sibi causam exponendi fuisse, et ideo a se parasiti personam esse susceptam quia in illa domo filium haberet, et ideo illum innocentem ter abdicatum quia filius abdicantis non esset; XCVI. nisi tamen in omnibus verbis et amorem patrium atque hunc quidem ardentissimum ostenderit et odium divitis et metum pro iuvene, quem periculose mansurum in illa domo in qua tam invisus sit sciat, suspicione subiecti petitoris non carebit.

It is not, however, enough in the narration to use colors unless they consent through the whole action, especially since the proof of some lies solely in asseveration and perseverance: 95. as that parasite who claims as his own son a youth disowned three times by a rich man and acquitted; he will indeed have a color by which he may say both that poverty was the cause for him to set forth the case, and that for that reason the persona of parasite was assumed by himself because he had a son in that house, and that for that reason the innocent was three times disowned because he was not the son of the disowner; 96. unless, however, in all his words he has shown both fatherly love—and this indeed most ardent—and hatred of the rich man and fear for the youth, whom he knows would remain in peril in that house in which he is so hated, he will not be without the suspicion of a suborned claimant.

XCVII. Evenit aliquando in scholasticis controversiis, quod in foro an possit accidere dubito, ut eodem colore utraque pars utatur, deinde eum pro se quaeque defendat, ut in illa controversia: XCVIII. "uxor marito dixit appellatam se de stupro a privigno et sibi constitutum tempus et locum: eadem contra filius detulit de noverca, edito tantum alio tempore ac loco: pater in eo quem uxor praedixerat filium invenit, in eo quem filius uxorem: illam repudiavit: qua tacente filium abdicat". XCIX.

97. It sometimes happens in scholastic controversies, which I doubt whether it can occur in the forum, that both sides use the same color, and then each defends it on its own behalf, as in that controversy: 98. "The wife told her husband that she had been accused on a charge of sexual misconduct by his stepson and that a time and place had been appointed for her: the same, conversely, the son reported concerning the stepmother, only another time and place having been produced: the father found the son at that which the wife had predicted, and the wife at that which the son [had predicted]: he repudiated that woman: she keeping silence, he disinherits the son." 99.

Nihil dici potest pro iuvene quod non idem sit pro noverca; ponentur tamen etiam communia, deinde ex personarum comparatione et indicii ordine et silentio repudiatae argumenta ducentur. C. Ne illud quidem ignorare oportet, quaedam esse quae colorem non recipiant sed tantum defendenda sint, qualis est ille dives qui statuam pauperis inimici flagellis cecidit et reus est iniuriarum: nam factum eius modestum esse nemo dixerit, fortasse ut sit tutum optinebit.

Nothing can be said on behalf of the young man which is not the same on behalf of the stepmother; nevertheless the common points will also be set forth, then arguments will be drawn from a comparison of the persons and from the order of the evidence and from the silence of the repudiated wife. 100. Nor ought one to be ignorant of this either, that there are certain things which do not admit a color but only ought to be defended, such as that rich man who struck with scourges the statue of his poor enemy and is defendant in an action of injuries: for no one would say that his deed was modest; perhaps he will manage to make it safe.

CI. Quod si pars expositionis pro nobis, pars contra nos erit, miscenda sit an separanda narratio cum ipsa causae condicione deliberandum est. Nam si plura sunt quae nocent, quae prosunt obruentur. Itaque tunc dividere optimum erit, et iis quae partem nostram adiuvabunt expositis et confirmatis adversus reliqua uti remediis de quibus supra dictum est.

101. But if part of the exposition will be for us, part against us, it must be deliberated, together with the very condition of the case, whether the narration should be mixed or separated. For if there are more things which harm, the things which profit will be overwhelmed. And so then it will be best to divide, and, after those things which will aid our side have been set forth and confirmed, to use remedies against the rest, about which it has been said above.

CII. Si plura proderunt, etiam coniungere licebit, ut quae obstant in mediis velut auxiliis nostris posita minus habeant virium. Quae tamen non erunt nuda ponenda, sed ut et nostra aliqua argumentatione firmemus et diversa cur credibilia non sint adiciamus, quia nisi distinxerimus verendum est ne bona nostra permixtis malis inquinentur.

102. If more things will be to our profit, it will even be permitted to conjoin them, so that the things which obstruct, set in the midst as it were among our auxiliaries, may have less strength. Yet these are not to be set forth naked, but rather that we both strengthen them by some of our argumentation and add why the opposites are not credible, because unless we make a distinction, it is to be feared lest our good things be polluted by evils mingled in.

CIII. Illa quoque de narratione praecipi solent, ne qua ex ea fiat excursio, ne avertatur a iudice sermo, ne alienae personae vocem demus, ne argumentemur; adiciunt quidam etiam, ne utamur adfectibus: quorum pleraque sunt frequentissime custodienda, immo numquam nisi ratio coegerit mutanda. CIV.

103. Those things also are wont to be prescribed concerning the narration, that no excursion be made from it, that the discourse not be averted from the judge, that we not give a voice to an alien personage, that we not argue; some also add that we not use affections: most of which are to be most frequently observed, nay never to be changed unless reason shall have compelled. 104.

Vt sit expositio perspicua et brevis, nihil quidem tam raro poterit habere rationem quam excursio: nec umquam debebit esse nisi brevis et talis ut vi quadam videamur adfectus velut recto itinere depulsi, CV. qualis est Ciceronis circa nuptias Sasiae: "O mulieris scelus incredibile et praeter hanc unam in omni vita inauditum! O libidinem effrenatam et indomitam! O audaciam singularem!

That the exposition be perspicuous and brief, nothing indeed will be able so rarely to have a rationale as an excursion: nor should it ever exist unless brief and such that, by a certain force, we seem, as though driven from the straight road, by affections, 105. such as is Cicero’s around the nuptials of Sasia: “O the crime of a woman, incredible and, save for this one, unheard-of in all life! O unbridled and untamed lust! O singular audacity!”

Nonne timuisse, si minus vim deorum hominumque famam, at illam ipsam noctem facesque illas nuptiales, non limen cubiculi, non cubile filiae, non parietes denique ipsos, superiorum testes nuptiarum?" CVI. Sermo vero aversus a iudice et brevius indicat interim et coarguit magis: qua de re idem quod in prohoemio dixeram sentio, sicut de prosopopoeia quoque, qua tamen non Servius modo sulpicius utitur pro Aufidia: "somnone te languidum an gravi lethargo putem pressum?", sed M. quoque tullius circa navarchos (nam ea quoque rei expositio est): "ut adeas, tantum dabis" et reliqua. CVII.

"Did they not fear, if not the force of the gods and the talk of men, at least that very night itself and those nuptial torches, not the threshold of the bedchamber, not the daughter’s couch, not, finally, the very walls themselves, witnesses of earlier weddings?" 106. Discourse truly turned away from the judge and briefer at times both points out and convicts more: about which matter I hold the same opinion that I said in the proem, as also about prosopopoeia, which, however, not Servius Sulpicius alone employs on behalf of Aufidia: "Am I to think you languid from sleep, or pressed down by a heavy lethargy?"; but M. Tullius also concerning the navarchs (for that too is an exposition of the case): "In order that you may gain access, you will pay just so much," and the rest. 107.

Quid? pro Cluentio Staieni Bulbique conloquium nonne ad celeritatem plurimum et ad fidem confert? Quae ne fecisse inobservantia quadam videatur, quamquam hoc in illo credibile non est, in Partitionibus praecipit ut habeat narratio suavitatem, admirationes, exspectationes, exitus inopinatos, conloquia personarum, omnes adfectus.

What? In the case for Cluentius, does not the colloquy of Staienus and Bulbus contribute very much to celerity and to credibility? And lest he seem to have done these things by a certain inadvertence (though this is not credible in him), in the Partitions he prescribes that the narration have suavity, admirations, expectations, unexpected outcomes, colloquies of persons, all the affects (emotions).

CVIII. Argumentabimur in narratione, ut dixi, numquam: argumentum ponemus aliquando, quod facit pro Ligario Cicero cum dicit sic eum provinciae praefuisse ut ei pacem esse expediret. Inseremus expositioni et brevem cum res poscet defensionem et rationem factorum; neque enim narrandum est tamquam testi, CIX.

108. We shall never argue in the narration, as I have said; we shall sometimes set down an argument, which Cicero does in defense of Ligarius when he says that he so presided over the province that it was expedient for it to have peace. We shall insert into the exposition also a brief defense, when the matter shall require it, and a rationale of the deeds; for one must not narrate as though to a witness, 109.

sed tamquam patrono. Rei ordo per se talis est: "Q. Ligarius legatus C. Considio profectus". Quid ergo M. Tullius? "Q. enim" inquit "Ligarius, cum esset nulla belli suspicio, legatus in Africam C. Considio profectus est"; CX. et alibi: "non modo nullum ad bellum, sed ne ad minimam quidem suspicionem belli". Et cum esset indicaturo satis "Q. Ligarius nullo se inplicari negotio passus est", adiecit "domum spectans, ad suos redire cupiens". Ita quod exponebat et ratione fecit credibile et adfectu quoque implevit.

but as by an advocate. The order of the matter in itself is as follows: "Q. Ligarius, as legate, set out with C. Considius." What then does M. Tullius? "For Q.," he says, "Ligarius, when there was no suspicion of war, as legate set out into Africa with C. Considius"; 110. and elsewhere: "not only nothing toward war, but not even the least suspicion of war." And when "Q. Ligarius allowed himself to be implicated in no business" would have sufficed for one about to indicate, he added "looking homeward, eager to return to his own." Thus what he was expounding he made credible by reason and also filled it with affect.

CXI. Quo magis miror eos qui non putant utendum in narratione adfectibus. Qui si hoc dicunt "non diu neque ut in epilogo", mecum sentiunt: effugiendae sunt enim morae.

111. Wherefore I marvel all the more at those who do not think that affections should be used in narration. If they say this—"not for long nor as in the epilogue"—they feel with me: for delays must be avoided.

Ceterum cur ego iudicem nolim dum doceo etiam movere? cur, CXII. quod in summa sum actionis petiturus, non in primo statim rerum ingressu, si fieri potest, consequar?

But why should I be unwilling, while I am instructing, also to move the judge? why, 112. what I am going to seek in the conclusion of the action, should I not, at the very outset of the matters, if it can be done, achieve?

cum praesertim etiam in probationibus faciliorem sim animum eius habiturus occupatum vel ira vel miseratione. CXIII. An non M. tullius circa verbera civis Romani omnis brevissime movit adfectus, non solum condicione ipsius, loco iniuriae, genere verberum, sed animi quoque commendatione?

since especially I shall, even in the proofs, be going to find his mind more pliant, preoccupied either with wrath or with commiseration. 113. Or did not M. Tullius, concerning the scourging of a Roman citizen, very briefly stir all the emotions, not only by the condition of the man himself, the place of the injury, the kind of blows, but also by a commendation of character?

summum enim virum ostendit, qui cum virgis caederetur non ingemuerit, non rogaverit, sed tantum civem se Romanum esse cum invidia caedentis et fiducia iuris clamaverit. CXIV. Quid?

for he exhibited a man of the highest sort, who, when he was being beaten with rods, did not groan, did not beg, but only cried out that he was a Roman citizen, bringing odium upon the one beating him and with confidence in the law. 114. What?

Philodami casum nonne cum per totam expositionem incendit invidia tum in supplicio ipso lacrimis implevit, cum flentis non tam narraret quam ostenderet patrem de morte filii, filium de patris? Quid ulli epilogi possunt magis habere miserabile? CXV.

Did he not, through the whole exposition, inflame indignation at the case of Philodamus, and then in the very punishment fill it with tears, when he showed rather than narrated them weeping—the father over the death of his son, the son over the father’s? What can any epilogues have that is more pitiable? 115.

Serum est enim advocare iis rebus adfectum in peroratione quas securus narraveris: adsuevit illis iudex iamque eas sine motu mentis accipit quibus commotus novis non est; et difficile est mutare habitum animi semel constitutum.

For it is too late to summon affect in the peroration for those matters which you have narrated without care: the judge has grown accustomed to them and now receives them without movement of mind—by which, even when new, he was not stirred; and it is difficult to change the habit/disposition of the mind once established.

CXVI. Ego vero (neque enim dissimulabo iudicium meum, quamquam id quod sum dicturus exemplis magis quam praeceptis ullis continetur) narrationem, ut si ullam partem orationis, omni qua potest gratia et venere exornandam puto. Sed plurimum refert quae sit natura eius rei quam exponimus.

116. I indeed (for I will not dissimulate my judgment, although that which I am about to say is contained more by examples than by any precepts) think that narration, as any part of an oration, is to be adorned with every grace and charm it can. But it makes a very great difference what the nature is of the thing which we expound.

CXVII. In parvis ergo, quales sunt fere privatae, sit ille pressus et velut adplicitus rei cultus, in verbis summa diligentia: quae in locis impetu feruntur et circumiectae orationis copia latent, hic expressa et, ut vult Zenon, "sensu tincta" esse debebunt: compositio dissimulata quidem, sed tamen quam iucundissima: CXVIII. figurae non illae poeticae et contra rationem loquendi auctoritate veterum receptae (nam debet esse quam purissimus sermo), sed quae varietate taedium effugiant et mutationibus animum levent, ne in eundem casum, similem compositionem, pares elocutionum tractus incidamus.

117. In small matters, therefore, such as are for the most part private causes, let the style be compressed and, as it were, closely applied to the thing, with the utmost diligence in the words: those elements which in passages of elevation are carried along by impetus and lie hidden under the abundance of the surrounding oration must here be made explicit and, as Zeno wishes, "tinctured with feeling": the composition indeed dissembled, yet as pleasant as possible: 118. not those poetical figures which, contrary to the reason of speaking, have been received by the authority of the ancients (for the speech ought to be as pure as possible), but such as by variety may escape tedium and by changes may lighten the mind, lest we fall into the same cadence, a similar composition, even tracts of elocution.

Caret enim ceteris lenociniis expositio et, nisi commendetur hac venustate, iaceat necesse est. CXIX. Nec in ulla parte intentior est iudex, eoque nihil recte dictum perit.

For exposition lacks the other allurements, and, unless it be commended by this charm, it must needs lie prostrate. 119. Nor is the judge more intent in any other part, and for that reason nothing rightly said perishes.

Praeterea nescio quo modo etiam credit facilius quae audienti iucunda sunt, et voluptate ad fidem ducitur. CXX. Vbi vero maior res erit, et atrocia invidiose et tristia miserabiliter dicere licebit, non ut consumantur adfectus sed ut tamen velut primis lineis designentur, ut plane qualis futura sit imago rei statim appareat.

Moreover, somehow, he also more easily believes things that are pleasant to the audient, and by pleasure he is led to belief. 120. When indeed the matter is greater, it will be permitted to speak of atrocities invidiously and of sad things miserably—not so that the affections be consumed, but that they may nevertheless be, as it were, delineated in first outlines, so that at once it may plainly appear what the image of the thing will be.

CXXI. Ne sententia quidem velut fatigatum intentione stomachum iudicis reficere dissuaserim, maxime quidem brevi interiectione, qualis est illa: "fecerunt servi Milonis quod suos quisque servos in tali re facere voluisset", interim paulo liberiore, qualis est illa: "nubit genero socrus nullis auspicibus, nullis auctoribus, funestis ominibus omnium". CXXII. Quod cum sit factum iis quoque temporibus quibus omnis ad utilitatem potius quam ostentationem componebatur oratio et erant adhuc severiora iudicia, quanto nunc faciendum magis, cum in ipsa capitis aut fortunarum pericula inrupit voluptas?

121. Nor would I dissuade even from refreshing, as it were, the judge’s stomach fatigued by attention with a sententious saying, most of all by a brief interjection, such as this: "Milo’s slaves did what each man would have wished his own slaves to do in such a matter," at times by a somewhat freer one, such as this: "the mother-in-law weds the son-in-law, with no auspices, with no authorities, with the funeral omens of all." 122. And since this too was done in those times when speech was composed wholly for utility rather than ostentation and the judgments were still more severe, how much more should it be done now, when pleasure has broken into the very perils of life or fortunes?

cui hominum desiderio quantum dari debeat alio loco dicam: interim aliquid indulgendum esse confiteor. CXXIII. Multum confert adiecta veris credibilis rerum imago, quae velut in rem praesentem perducere audientis videtur, qualis est illa M. Caeli in Antonium descriptio: "namque ipsum offendunt temulento sopore profligatum, totis praecordiis stertentem ructuosos spiritus geminare, praeclarasque contubernales ab omnibus spondis transversas incubare et reliquas circum iacere passim: CXXIV.

to which desire of men how much ought to be given I will say in another place: meanwhile I confess that something must be indulged. 123. It contributes much, if to truths there is added a believable image of things, which seems, as it were, to lead the hearers into the present scene, such as that description by M. Caelius against Antony: "for they encounter him himself laid low by drunken slumber, snoring from the very depths of his vitals, doubling belching breaths, and his illustrious contubernals lying crosswise upon all the couches and the rest lying strewn around everywhere: 124.

quae tamen exanimatae terrore, hostium adventu percepto, excitare Antonium conabantur, nomen inclamabant, frustra a cervicibus tollebant, blandius alia ad aurem invocabat, vehementius etiam nonnulla, feriebat: quarum cum omnium vocem tactumque noscitaret, proximae cuiusque collum amplexu petebat: neque dormire excitatus neque vigilare ebrius poterat, sed semisomno sopore inter manus centurionum concubinarumque iactabatur". Nihil his neque credibilius fingi neque vehementius exprobrari neque manifestius ostendi potest.

who, nevertheless, exanimated with terror, when the advent of the enemies was perceived, were trying to rouse Antony, were calling aloud his name, were in vain lifting him by the neck, another was more coaxingly invoking at his ear, some even more vehemently were striking him: and when he recognized the voice and the touch of them all, he would seek with an embrace the neck of whoever was nearest: neither, when roused, could he sleep, nor, being inebriated, could he keep awake, but in a semi-somnolent slumber he was tossed about in the hands of the centurions and the concubines". Nothing more credible than these things can be feigned, nor more vehemently cast in one’s teeth, nor more manifestly shown can be.

CXXV. Ne illud quidem praeteribo, quantam adferat fidem expositioni narrantis auctoritas, quam mereri debemus ante omnia quidem vita, sed et ipso genere orationis: quod quo fuerit gravius ac sanctius, hoc plus habeat necesse est in adfirmando ponderis. CXXVI.

125. I will not pass over this either, how great a credence the authority of the narrator brings to the exposition, which we ought to merit before all things indeed by life, but also by the very genus of oration: which, the more grave and more sacred it shall have been, by so much the more it must have of weight in affirming. 126.

Effugienda igitur in hac praecipue parte omnis calliditatis suspicio, neque enim se usquam custodit magis iudex: nihil videatur fictum, nihil sollicitum: omnia potius a causa quam ab oratore profecta credantur. At hoc pati non possumus, CXXVII. et perire artem putamus nisi appareat, cum desinat ars esse si apparet.

Therefore in this part especially every suspicion of callidity is to be fled; for nowhere does the judge keep watch more: let nothing seem feigned, nothing studied; let all rather be believed to have proceeded from the cause than from the orator. But this we cannot endure, 127. and we think the art perishes unless it appears, whereas it ceases to be art if it appears.

Pendemus ex laude atque hanc laboris nostri ducimus summam: ita quae circumstantibus ostentare volumus, iudicibus prodimus.

We depend on praise, and we count this the sum of our labor: thus the things we wish to ostentatiously display to the bystanders, we betray to the judges.

CXXVIII. Est quaedam etiam repetita narratio, quae epidiegesis dicitur, sane res declamatoria magis quam forensis, ideo autem reperta ut, quia narratio brevis esse debet, fusius et ornatius res posset exponi, quod fit vel invidiae gratia vel miserationis. Id et raro faciendum iudico neque sic umquam ut totus ordo repetatur; licet enim per partes idem consequi.

128. There is also a certain repeated narration, which is called epidiegesis, truly a thing more declamatory than forensic; it was devised, however, so that, because the narration ought to be brief, the matter might be set forth more diffusely and more ornately, which is done either for the sake of invidiousness or of commiseration. I also judge that this should be done rarely, and never in such a way that the whole order is repeated; for it is permitted to achieve the same by parts.

Ceterum qui uti epidiegesei volet, narrationis loco rem stringat, et, contentus indicare quid facti sit, quo sit modo factum plenius se loco suo expositurum esse promittat.

Moreover, whoever will wish to use epidiegesis, let him compress the matter in place of the narration, and, content to indicate what has been done, let him promise that he will set forth more fully, in its proper place, in what way it was done.

CXXIX. Initium narrationis quidam utique faciendum a persona putant, eamque si nostra sit ornandam, si aliena infamandam statim. Hoc sane frequentissimum est, quia personae sunt inter quas litigatur.

129. Some think that the beginning of the narration must in any case be made from the person, and that, if it is ours, it should be adorned, if another’s, immediately defamed. This indeed is most frequent, since it is the persons between whom one litigates.

CXXX. Sed hae quoque interim cum suis accidentibus ponendae, cum id profuturum est, ut: "A. Cluentius Habitus fuit pater huiusce, iudices, homo non solum municipii Larinatis, ex quo erat, sed regionis illius et vicinitatis virtute existimatione nobilitate princeps"; CXXXI. interim sine his ut: "Q. enim Ligarius cum esset"; frequenter vero et a re, sicut pro tullio Cicero: "fundum habet in agro Thurino M. tullius paternum", Demosthenes pro Ctesiphonte: tou gar phokikou systantos polemou.

130. But these too are to be set forth for the time being along with their incidentals, when that will be helpful, as: “A. Cluentius Habitus was the father of this man, judges, a man who was chief not only of the municipality of Larinum, from which he was, but of that region and neighborhood in virtue, esteem, and nobility”; 131. at times without these, as: “For Q. Ligarius, since he was—”; very often indeed from the matter itself, as in Cicero’s For Tullius: “he has a farm in the Thurine countryside, the paternal estate of M. Tullius,” and in Demosthenes’ For Ctesiphon: “for when the Phocian war had arisen.”

CXXXII. De fine narrationis cum iis contentio est qui perduci expositionem volunt eo unde quaestio oritur: "his rebus ita gestis P. Dolabella praetor interdixit, ut est consuetudo, de vi hominibus armatis, sine ulla exceptione, tantum ut unde deiecisset restitueret": deinde: "restituisse se dixit: sponsio facta est: hac de sponsione vobis iudicandum est". Id a petitore semper fieri potest, a defensore non semper.

132. On the end of the narration there is contention with those who wish the exposition to be led on to that point whence the question arises: “with these things thus done, P. Dolabella, praetor, interdicted, as is the custom, on violence by armed men, without any exception, only that he restore to the place from which he had ejected him”; then: “he said that he had restored; a sponsio was made; concerning this sponsio it is for you to judge.” This can always be done by the petitioner, by the defender not always.

[3] I. Ordine ipso narrationem sequitur confirmatio; probanda sunt enim quae propter hoc exposuimus. Sed priusquam ingrediar hanc partem, pauca mihi de quorundam opinione dicenda sunt. Plerisque moris est, prolato rerum ordine, protinus utique in aliquem laetum ac plausibilem locum quam maxime possint favorabiliter excurrere.

[3] 1. In the very order, confirmation follows the narration; for the things which on this account we have set forth must be proved. But before I ingress into this part, a few things must be said by me about the opinion of certain persons. It is the custom with most, once the order of events has been produced, immediately indeed to digress as favorably as they can into some cheerful and plausible place.

II. Quod quidem natum ab ostentatione declamatoria iam in forum venit, postquam agere causas non ad utilitatem litigatorum sed ad patronorum iactationem repertum est, ne, si pressae illi qualis saepius desideratur narrationis gracilitati coniuncta argumentorum pugnacitas fuerit, dilatis diutius dicendi voluptatibus oratio refrigescat. III. In quo vitium illud est, quod sine discrimine causarum atque utilitatis hoc tamquam semper expediat aut etiam necesse sit faciunt, eoque sumptas ex iis partibus quarum alius erat locus sententias in hanc congerunt, ut plurima aut iterum dicenda sint aut, quia [alia] alieno loco dicta sunt, dici suo non possint.

2. This, indeed, born from declamatory ostentation, has now come into the forum, after it was discovered that to plead cases is not for the utility of the litigants but for the vaunting of the patrons, lest, if to that slenderness of a compressed narrative—such as is more often desired—there be joined a pugnacity of arguments, the pleasures of speaking being too long deferred, the speech grow cold. 3. In this the fault is that, without discrimination of cases and utility, they do this as though it were always expedient or even necessary, and therefore they heap into this section sentences taken from those parts whose place was another, with the result that very many things must either be said again or, because [others] were said in an alien place, cannot be said in their own.

IV. Ego autem confiteor hoc exspatiandi genus non modo narrationi sed etiam quaestionibus vel universis vel interim singulis opportune posse subiungi cum res postulat aut certe permittit, atque eo vel maxime inlustrari ornarique orationem, sed si cohaeret et sequitur, non si per vim cuneatur et quae natura iuncta erant distrahit. V. Nihil enim tam est consequens quam narrationi probatio, nisi excursus ille vel quasi finis narrationis vel quasi initium probationis est. Erit ergo illi nonnumquam locus, ut, si expositio circa finem atrox fuerit, prosequamur eam velut erumpente protinus indignatione.

4. I, however, confess that this kind of exspatiation can be opportunely subjoined not only to the narration but also to the questions, whether all of them or sometimes individual ones, when the matter demands it or at least permits it; and that by it the discourse is most especially illustrated and adorned—yet if it coheres and follows, not if it is wedged in by force and tears apart things that were by nature joined. 5. For nothing is so consequent as the proof to the narration, unless that excursus is as it were the end of the narration or as it were the beginning of the proof. Therefore it will have its place sometimes, so that, if the exposition has been dire near the end, we pursue it as though indignation were straightway bursting forth.

VI. Quod tamen ita fieri oportebit si res dubitationem non habebit: alioqui prius est quod obicias verum efficere quam magnum, quia criminum invidia pro reo est priusquam probatur; difficillima est enim gravissimi cuiusque sceleris fides. VII. Item fieri non inutiliter potest ut, si merita in adversarium aliqua exposueris, in ingratum inveharis, aut, si varietatem criminum narratione demonstraveris, quantum ob ea periculum intentetur ostendas.

VI. Yet this ought to be done thus only if the matter admits no doubt: otherwise, it is prior to make what you allege true rather than grand, because the odium of crimes is on behalf of the defendant before it is proven; for the credence of each most grave crime is most difficult. VII. Likewise it can not unusefully be done that, if you have set forth some services toward your adversary, you inveigh against him as ungrateful; or, if you have shown in the narration a variety of crimes, you show how much peril is threatened on account of these.

VIII. Verum haec breviter omnia; iudex enim ordine audito festinat ad probationem et quam primum certus esse sententiae cupit. Praeterea cavendum est ne ipsa expositio vanescat, aversis in aliud animis et inani mora fatigatis.

VIII. But all these things briefly; for the judge, the order having been heard, hastens to the proof and wishes to be certain of the sentence as soon as possible. Moreover, one must beware lest the exposition itself vanish, with minds turned aside to something else and wearied by empty delay.

IX. Sed ut non semper est necessaria post narrationem illa procursio, ita frequenter utilis ante quaestionem praeparatio, utique si prima specie minus erit favorabilis, si legem asperam tuebimur aut poenarias actiones inferemus. Est hic locus velut sequentis exordii ad conciliandum probationibus nostris iudicem, mitigandum, concitandum. Quod liberius Hic et vehementius fieri potest quia iudici nota iam causa est.

9. But just as that advance after the narration is not always necessary, so a preparation before the questioning is frequently useful—especially if at first sight it will be less favorable, if we shall be defending a harsh law or bringing penal actions. This is a place, as it were, for a following exordium, to conciliate the judge to our proofs, to soften, to stir. This can be done more freely Here and more vehemently, because the case is already known to the judge.

X. His igitur velut fomentis, si quid erit asperum,praemolliemus, quo facilius aures iudicum quae post dicturi erimus admittant, ne ius nostrum oderint; nihil enim facile persuadetur invitis. XI. Quo loco iudicis quoque noscenda natura est, iuri magis an aequo sit adpositus: proinde enim magis aut minus erit hoc necessarium. Ceterum res eadem et post quaestionem perorationis vice fungitur.

10. With these, therefore, as with poultices, if there is anything harsh,we will pre-soften it, so that the ears of the judges may more easily admit what we shall say afterwards, lest they hate our right; for nothing is easily persuaded to the unwilling. 11. At this point the nature of the judge too must be known, whether he is more attached to law or to equity: accordingly this will be more or less necessary. Moreover, this same matter also, after the questioning, serves in the stead of a peroration.

XII. Hanc partem parekbasin vocant Graeci, Latini egressum vel egressionem. Sed hae sunt plures, ut dixi, quae per totam causam varios habent excursus, ut laus hominum locorumque, ut descriptio regionum, expositio quarundam rerum gestarum vel etiam fabulosarum.

12. This part the Greeks call parekbasis, the Latins an egress or egression. But there are several of these, as I said, which throughout the whole case have various excursions, such as praise of men and of places, description of regions, an exposition of certain deeds accomplished or even of fabulous ones.

XIII. Quo ex genere est in orationibus contra Verrem compositis Siciliae laus, Proserpinae raptus, pro C. Cornelio popularis illa virtutum Cn. Pompei commemoratio: in quam in ille divinus orator, veluti nomine ipso ducis cursus dicendi teneretur, abrupto quem inchoaverat sermone devertit actutum. XIV.

13. Of which kind is, in the orations composed against Verres, the praise of Sicily, the rape of Proserpina, and, in behalf of C. Cornelius, that popular commemoration of the virtues of Cn. Pompey: into which that divine orator, as if by the very name of the leader he were held to a course of speaking, abruptly breaking off the discourse he had begun, turned aside straightway. 14.

Parekbasis est, ut mea quidem fert opinio, alicuius rei, sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis, extra ordinem excurrens tractatio. Quapropter non video cur hunc ei potissimum locum adsignent qui rerum ordinem sequitur, non magis quam illud, cur hoc nomen ita demum proprium putent si aliquid in digressu sit exponendum, cum tot modis a recto itinere declinet oratio. XV. Nam quidquid dicitur praeter illas quinque quas fecimus partes egressio est: indignatio, miseratio, invidia, convicium, excusatio, conciliatio, maledictorum refutatio, similia his, quae non sunt in quaestione: omnis amplificatio, minutio, omne adfectus genus: atque ea quae maxime iucundam et ornatam faciunt orationem, de luxuria, de avaritia, de religione, de officiis; quae cum sunt argumentis subiecta similium rerum, quia cohaerent egredi non videntur: XVI.

Parekbasis is, as my opinion indeed bears, a treatment running out of order of some matter, yet pertaining to the utility of the case. Wherefore I do not see why they assign to it especially that place which follows the order of matters, no more than this: why they think this name proper only if something is to be expounded in the digressus, since the speech declines from the straight path in so many ways. 15. For whatever is said besides those five parts which we have made is an egression: indignation, commiseration, envy, reviling, excuse, conciliation, refutation of maledictions, things similar to these, which are not in the question: every amplification, diminution, every kind of affect: and those things which make a speech most pleasant and adorned—about luxury, about avarice, about religion, about duties; which, when they are subjected to the arguments of similar matters, because they cohere, do not seem to go out: 16.

sed plurima sunt quae rebus nihil secum cohaerentibus inseruntur, quibus iudex reficitur admonetur placatur rogatur laudatur. Innumerabilia sunt haec, quorum alia sic praeparata adferimus, quaedam ex occasione vel necessitate ducimus si quid nobis agentibus novi accidit, interpellatio, interventus alicuius, tumultus. XVII.

but there are very many things that are inserted into matters with which they do not cohere at all, by which the judge is refreshed, admonished, placated, petitioned, lauded. These are innumerable, some of which we bring in thus prepared, others we derive from occasion or necessity if anything new happens while we are conducting our case: interpellation, someone’s intervention, tumult. 17.

Vnde Ciceroni quoque in prohoemio, cum diceret pro Milone, degredi fuit necesse, ut ipsa oratiuncula qua usus est patet. Potest autem paulo longius exire qui praeparat aliquid ante quaestionem et qui finitae probationi velut commendationem adicit: at qui ex media erumpit, cito ad id redire debet unde devertit.

Whence for Cicero too, in the proem, when he was speaking for Milo, it was necessary to digress, as the little oration which he employed makes evident. Moreover, he who prepares something before the question, and he who, once the proof is finished, adds as it were a commendation, may go out a little farther; but he who bursts out from the midst ought quickly to return to that from which he turned aside.

[4] I. Sunt qui narrationi propositionem subiungant tamquam partem iudicialis materiae: cui opinioni respondimus. Mihi autem propositio videtur omnis confirmationis initium: quod non modo in ostendenda quaestione principali, sed nonnumquam etiam in singulis argumentis poni solet, maximeque in iis quae epicheiremata vocantur. II. Sed nunc de priore loquimur.

[4] 1. There are those who subjoin a proposition to the narration as if it were a part of judicial matter: to which opinion we have made our reply. To me, however, the proposition seems the beginning of every confirmation: which is accustomed to be set not only in the setting forth of the principal question, but sometimes also in individual arguments, and most of all in those which are called epicheiremata. 2. But now we are speaking about the former.

Ea non semper uti necesse est. Aliquando enim sine propositione quoque satis manifestum est quid in quaestione versetur, utique si narratio ibi finem habet ubi initium quaestio, adeo ut aliquando subiungatur expositioni quae solet in argumentis esse summa conectio: "haec si ut exposui gesta sunt, iudices, insidiator superatus est, vi victa vis vel potius oppressa virtute audacia est". III. Nonnumquam valde est utilis, praecipue ubi res defendi non potest et de iure quaeritur, ut pro eo qui pecuniam privatam de templo sustulit: "sacrilegii agitur, de sacrilegio cognoscitis", ut iudex intellegat id unum esse officii sui quaerere, an id quod obicitur sacrilegium sit.

It is not always necessary to use these. For sometimes even without a proposition it is sufficiently manifest what is being handled in the question, especially if the narration has its end where the question has its beginning, to such a degree that sometimes there is subjoined to the exposition that linkage which is wont to be the chief connection in the arguments: "if these things were done as I have set forth, judges, the ambusher has been overcome, force conquered by force, or rather audacity has been oppressed by virtue." 3. Sometimes it is very useful, especially where the matter cannot be defended and inquiry is made about law, as in behalf of one who removed private money from a temple: "a charge of sacrilege is being tried; you take cognizance concerning sacrilege," so that the judge may understand that this alone is his duty to inquire, whether that which is alleged is sacrilege.

IV. Item in causis obscuris aut multiplicibus, nec semper propter hoc solum, ut sit causa lucidior, sed aliquando etiam ut magis moveat. Movet autem si protinus subtexantur aliqua quae prosint: "lex aperte scripta est, ut peregrinus qui murum ascenderit morte multetur: peregrinum te esse certum est: quin ascenderis murum non quaeritur: quid superest nisi ut te puniri oporteat?" Haec enim propositio confessionem adversarii premit et quodam modo iudicandi moram tollit, nec indicat quaestionem, sed adiuvat. V. sunt autem propositiones et simplices et duplices vel multiplices: quod accidit non uno modo.

4. Likewise in obscure or multiple cases, and not always for this reason alone, that the case may be clearer, but sometimes also that it may move more. Moreover it moves if certain things that help are at once interwoven: "the law is clearly written, that a foreigner who shall have climbed the wall be punished with death: that you are a foreigner is certain: that you climbed the wall is not in question: what remains except that you ought to be punished?" For this proposition presses the adversary’s confession and in a certain manner removes the delay of judging, nor does it indicate the issue, but it helps. 5. Now propositions are both simple and double or multiple: this occurs not in one way.

Nam et plura crimina iunguntur, ut cum Socrates accusatus est quod corrumperet iuventutem et novas superstitiones introduceret: et singula ex pluribus colliguntur, ut cum legatio male gesta obicitur Aeschini quod mentitus sit, quod nil ex mandatis fecerit, quod moratus sit, quod munera acceperit. VI. Recusatio quoque pluris interim propositiones habet, ut contra petitionem pecuniae: "male petis: procuratorem enim tibi esse non licuit: sed neque illi cuius nomine litigas habere procuratorem; sed neque est heres eius a quo accepisse mutuam dicor; sed nec ipsi debui". VII. Multiplicari haec in quantum libet possunt, sed rem ostendisse satis est.

For multiple crimes are also joined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and introducing new superstitions; and individual items are gathered from several, as when an ill-conducted embassy is alleged against Aeschines: that he lied, that he did nothing of his instructions, that he delayed, that he accepted gifts. 6. Recusation too sometimes has several propositions, as against a claim for money: "you sue wrongly; for it was not permitted to you to have a procurator; nor to him in whose name you litigate to have a procurator; nor is he the heir of the one from whom I am said to have received a loan; nor did I owe to him himself." 7. These can be multiplied as much as one pleases, but it is enough to have shown the point.

Hae si ponantur singulae subiectis probationibus, plures sunt propositiones: si coniungantur, in partitionem cadunt. VIII. Est et nuda propositio, qualis fere in coniecturalibus: "caedis ago", "furtum obicio"; est ratione subiecta, ut: "maiestatem minuit C. Cornelius; nam codicem tribunus plebis ipse pro contione legit". Praeter haec utimur propositione aut nostra, ut: "adulterium obicio", aut adversarii, ut: "adulterii mecum agitur", aut communi, ut: "inter me et adversarium quaestio est uter sit intestato propior". Nonnumquam diversas quoque iungimus: "ego hoc dico, adversarius hoc". IX. Habet interim vim propositionis, etiamsi per se non est propositio, cum exposito rerum ordine subicimus: "de his cognoscitis", ut sit haec commonitio iudicis, quo se ad quaestionem acrius intendat et velut quodam tactu excitatus finem esse, narrationis et initium probationis intellegat, et nobis confirmationem ingredientibus ipse quoque quodam modo novum audiendi sumat exordium.

These, if they are posited singly with proofs subjoined, are several propositions; if they are combined, they fall into partition. 8. There is also a naked proposition, such as is usual in conjectural causes: "I bring an action for slaying," "I charge theft"; there is one with a reason subjoined, as: "Gaius Cornelius diminished the majesty; for the tribune of the plebs himself read the statute-book before the assembly." Besides these we use a proposition either our own, as: "I charge adultery," or the adversary’s, as: "An action for adultery is being brought against me," or a common one, as: "Between me and my adversary the question is which of us is nearer in intestacy." Sometimes we also conjoin diverse ones: "I say this, the adversary this." 9. Something meanwhile has the force of a proposition, even if in itself it is not a proposition, when, the order of the matters having been set forth, we subjoin: "you take cognizance concerning these things," so that this may be an admonition to the judge, whereby he may direct himself more keenly to the question and, as if roused by a certain touch, may understand this to be the end of the narration and the beginning of the proof, and that, as we enter upon the confirmation, he too in a certain way may take a new exordium of listening.

[5] I. Partitio est nostrarum aut adversarii propositionum aut utrarumque ordine conlocata enumeratio. Hac quidam utendum semper putant, quod ea fiat causa lucidior et iudex intentior ac docilior si scierit et de quo dicimus et de quo dicturi postea sumus. II. Rursus quidam periculosum id oratori arbitrantur duabus ex causis: quod nonnumquam et excidere soleant quae promisimus et si qua in partiendo praeterimus occurrere: quod quidem nemini accidet nisi qui plane vel nullo fuerit ingenio vel ad agendum nihil cogitati praemeditatique detulerit.

[5] 1. A partition is an enumeration of our propositions, or the adversary’s, or of both, arranged in order. Some think this should always be used, because by it the cause becomes more lucid and the judge more intent and more docile, if he knows both what we are saying and what we are going to say afterward. 2. Conversely, some consider it perilous for the orator for two reasons: because the things we have promised are sometimes apt to fall out, and, if in partitioning we have passed anything by, it may occur; which indeed will befall no one except one who clearly has either no natural ingenium, or has brought to the pleading nothing thought out and premeditated.

III. Alioqui quae tam manifesta et lucida est ratio quam rectae partitionis? Sequitur enim naturam ducem adeo ut memoriae id maximum sit auxilium, via dicendi non decedere.

3. Otherwise, what method is so manifest and lucid as that of a right partition? For it follows nature as guide to such a degree that this is the greatest aid to memory: not to depart from the way of speaking.

Quapropter ne illos quidem probaverim qui partitionem vetant ultra tris propositiones extendere: quae sine dubio, si nimium sit multiplex, fugiet memoriam iudicis et turbabit intentionem, hoc tamen numero velut lege non est alliganda, cum possit causa pluris desiderare. IV. Alia sunt magis propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum: primum quia pleraque gratiora sunt si inventa subito nec domo allata sed inter dicendum ex re ipsa nata videantur, unde illa non iniucunda schemata: "paene excidit mihi" et "fugerat me" et "recte admones"; propositis enim probationibus omnis in relicum gratia novitatis praecerpitur. V. Interim vero etiam fallendus est iudex et variis artibus subeundus ut aliud agi quam quod petimus putet.

Wherefore I would not even approve those who forbid extending a partition beyond three propositions: which, without doubt, if it be too manifold, will flee the judge’s memory and disturb attention; yet it is not to be bound to this number as if by a law, since a case can require more. 4. There are other, weightier reasons why a partition should not always be used: first, because most things are more pleasing if they seem to have been discovered suddenly, not brought from home, but to have arisen during the speaking from the matter itself, whence those not unamusing schemata: "it almost slipped me" and "it had escaped me" and "you rightly admonish"; for once the proofs have been set forth, all the charm of novelty for what remains is preempted. 5. Meanwhile, indeed, the judge must even be misled and approached by various arts, so that he may think something other is being pursued than what we seek.

Nam est nonnumquam dura propositio, quam iudex si providit non aliter praeformidat quam qui ferrum medici prius quam curetur aspexit: at si re non ante proposita securum ac nulla denuntiatione in se conversum intrarit oratio, efficiet quod promittenti non crederetur. VI. Interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio: adfectibus turbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet.

For there is sometimes a hard proposition, which, if the judge has foreseen it, he dreads beforehand no otherwise than one who has looked upon the physician’s iron before he is treated: but if the oration shall have entered with the matter not previously set forth, upon one secure and by no warning turned to himself, it will accomplish what would not be believed if someone promised it. 6. At times to be shunned is not only the distinction of the questions, but the handling altogether: the hearer must be thrown into turmoil by affections and carried away from concentration. For it is not only the orator’s part to teach, but eloquence avails more with respect to moving.

Cui rei contraria est maxime tenuis illa et scrupulose in partis secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre. VII. Quid quod interim quae per se levia sunt et infirma, turba valent, ideoque congerenda sunt potius, et velut eruptione pugnandum?

Most contrary to this is that very slender and scrupulously cut-into-parts diligence of division, at the time when we are trying to take judgment away from the one taking cognizance. 7. What of the fact that, meanwhile, things which by themselves are light and infirm, in a throng have force, and therefore ought rather to be heaped together, and we must fight, as it were, by an eruption?

Quod tamen rarum esse debet et ex necessitate demum, cum hoc ipsum quod dissimile rationi est coegerit ratio.

Which, nevertheless, ought to be rare and only out of necessity, when reason has compelled this very thing which is dissimilar to reason.

VIII. Praeter haec in omni partitione est utique aliquid potentissimum, quod cum audivit iudex cetera tamquam supervacua gravari solet. Itaque, si plura vel obicienda sunt vel diluenda, et utilis et iucunda partitio est, ut quo quaque de re dicturi sumus ordine appareat; at, si unum crimen varie defendemus, supervacua.

8. Besides these, in every partition there is assuredly something most potent, which, when the judge has heard it, is wont to make the rest seem burdensome, as if superfluous. Therefore, if several things are either to be alleged or refuted, a partition is both useful and pleasant, so that the order in which we shall speak about each matter may appear; but, if we are going to defend one charge in various ways, it is superfluous.

IX. Vt si ita partiamur: "dicam non talem esse hunc quem tueor reum ut in eo credibile videri possit homicidium, dicam occidendi causam huic non fuisse, dicam hunc eo tempore quo homo occisus est trans mare fuisse": omnia quae ante id quod ultimum est exsequeris inania videri necesse est. X. Festinat enim iudex ad id quod potentissimum est, et velut obligatum promisso patronum, si est patientior, tacitus appellat: si vel occupatus vel in aliqua potestate vel etiam sic moribus compositus, cum convicio efflagitat. XI. Itaque non defuerunt qui Ciceronis illam pro Cluentio partitionem improbarent, qua se dicturum esse promisit primum neminem maioribus criminibus, gravioribus testibus in iudicium vocatum quam Oppianicum: deinde praeiudicia esse facta ab ipsis iudicibus a quibus condemnatus sit: postremo iudicium pecunia temptatum non a Cluentio, sed contra Cluentium: quia, si probari posset quod est tertium, nihil necesse fuerit dicere priora.

9. As if we were to partition thus: "I will say that this defendant whom I protect is not of such a sort that homicide could seem credible in his case, I will say that he had no cause for killing, I will say that at the time when the man was slain he was across the sea": everything that you set forth before that which is last must needs seem empty. 10. For the judge hastens to that which is most potent, and, as if the advocate were bound by his promise, if he is more patient, he silently calls upon him; if either busy or in some authority or even thus composed in character, he demands it with clamor. 11. And so there were not lacking those who disapproved that partition of Cicero in the Pro Cluentio, in which he promised that he would say, first, that no one had been called into judgment with greater charges and graver witnesses than Oppianicus; then, that prejudgments had been made by the very judges by whom he had been condemned; finally, that the court had been tempted—i.e., tampered with—by money not by Cluentius, but against Cluentius; because, if what is the third could be proved, it would have been necessary to say nothing of the former points.

XII. Rursus nemo tam erit aut iniustus aut stultus quin eum fateatur optime pro Murena esse partitum: "intellego, iudices, tris totius accusationis partis fuisse, et earum unam in reprehensione vitae, alteram in contentione dignitatis, tertiam in criminibus ambitus esse versatam". Nam sic et ostendit lucidissime causam et nihil fecit altero supervacuum.

12. Conversely, no one will be either so unjust or so foolish as not to admit that he divided things most excellently in the case For Murena: "I understand, judges, that there were three parts of the whole accusation, and that of these one was engaged in the censure of life, another in the contention of dignity, a third in the charges of ambitus (electoral bribery)." For thus he both showed the case most lucidly and made no one part redundant by another.

XIII. De illo quoque genere defensionis plerique dubitant: "si occidi, recte feci, sed non occidi"; quo enim pertinere prius si sequens firmum sit? Haec invicem obstare et utroque utentibus in neutro haberi fidem.

13. About that kind of defense too many likewise doubt: "if I killed, I did rightly, but I did not kill"; for to what does the former pertain if the latter be firm? These obstruct each other, and when both are used, credit is held in neither.

Quod sane in parte verum est, et illo sequenti, si modo indubitabile est, [sit) solo utendum; at si quid in eo quod est fortius timebimus, XIV. utraque probatione nitemur. Alius enim alio moveri solet; et qui factum putabit, iustum credere potest, qui tamquam iusto non movebitur, factum fortasse non credet: ut certa manus uno telo potest esse contenta, incerta plura spargenda sunt, ut sit et fortunae locus.

Which indeed is in part true, and that following one, if only it is indubitable, should be used alone; but if we fear something in that which is stronger, 14. we will rely on both proofs. For one person is wont to be moved by one thing, another by another; and he who will think the deed was done can believe it just, he who will not be moved as by what is just will perhaps not believe the deed was done: just as a sure hand can be content with one dart, an unsure must scatter several, so that there may be a place for fortune as well.

XV. Egregie vero Cicero pro Milone insidiatorem primum Clodium ostendit, tum addidit ex abundanti, etiam si id non fuisset, talem tamen civem cum summa virtute interfectoris et gloria necari potuisse. XVI. Neque illum tamen ordinem, de quo prius dixi, damnaverim, quia quaedam, etiam si ipsa sunt dura, in id tamen valent, ut ea molliant quae sequentur.

15. Excellently indeed Cicero, in defense of Milo, first showed Clodius to be the ambusher; then he added, over and above, that even if this had not been so, yet such a citizen could have been slain with the highest virtue and glory of the slayer. 16. Nor yet would I condemn that order of which I spoke before, because certain things, even if they themselves are harsh, nevertheless avail to this end, that they may soften the things which will follow.

Nec omnino sine ratione est quod vulgo dicitur: inicum petendum ut aecum feras. XVII. Quod tamen nemo sic accipiat ut omnia credat audenda.

Nor is what is commonly said altogether without reason: the inequitable must be asked for, that you may obtain the equitable. 17. Which, however, let no one take so as to believe that everything is to be dared.

Recte enim Graeci praecipiunt non temptanda quae effici omnino non possint. Sed quotiens hac de qua loquor duplici defensione utemur, id laborandum est, ut in illam partem sequentem fides ex priore ducatur; potest enim videri qui tuto etiam confessurus fuit mentiendi causam in negando non habere. XVIII.

For rightly do the Greeks prescribe that things which cannot at all be effected should not be attempted. But whenever we use this double defense of which I speak, it must be labored that credibility for the subsequent part be drawn from the prior; for he who would even have confessed safely can seem to have no cause for lying in denying. 18.

Et illud utique faciendum est, ut, quotiens suspicabimur iudici aliam probationem desiderari quam de qua loquimur, promittamus nos plene et statim de eo satis esse facturos, praecipueque si de pudore agetur. XIX. Frequenter autem accidit ut causa parum verecunda iure tuta sit; de quo ne inviti iudices audiant et adversi, frequentius sunt admonendi secuturam defensionem probitatis ac dignitatis: exspectent paulum et agi ordine sinant.

And that too must certainly be done: whenever we suspect that the judge desires some proof other than that about which we are speaking, let us promise that we will give complete and immediate satisfaction on that point, and especially if modesty is the matter at issue. 19. It frequently happens, however, that a case somewhat lacking in decorum is secure in law; and, lest the judges and the adversaries hear of it unwillingly, they must more often be reminded that a defense of probity and dignity will follow: let them wait a little and allow the matter to be conducted in order.

XX. Quaedam interim nos et invitis litigatoribus simulandum est dicere, quod Cicero pro Cluentio facit circa iudiciariam legem: nonnumquam quasi interpellemur ab iis subsistere: saepe avertenda ad ipsos oratio, hortandi ut sinant nos uti nostro consilio. Ita subrepetur animo iudicis, et, dum sperat probationem pudoris, asperioribus illis minus repugnabit. XXI.

20. In the meantime, we must sometimes pretend to say certain things even with the litigants unwilling, as Cicero, in the speech For Cluentius, does concerning the judicial law: sometimes to come to a halt as if we were being interpellated by them; often the discourse must be diverted to them, exhorting them to allow us to use our own counsel. Thus it will steal into the judge’s mind, and, while he hopes for a proof of pudor, he will resist the rather harsher points less. 21.

Quae cum receperit, etiam verecundiae defensioni facilior erit. Sic utraque res invicem iuvabit eritque iudex circa ius nostrum spe modestiae attentior, circa modestiam iuris probatione proclivior. XXII.

When he has received these things, he will also be more amenable to the defense of modesty. Thus each matter will help the other in turn, and the judge will be more attentive regarding our right by the hope of modesty, and, regarding modesty, more inclined by the proof of right in law. 22.

Sed ut non semper necessaria aut utilis etiam partitio est, ita opportune adhibita plurimum orationi lucis et gratiae confert. Neque enim solum id efficit, ut clariora fiant quae dicuntur, rebus velut ex turba extractis et in conspectu iudicum positis, sed reficit quoque audientem certo singularum partium fine, non aliter quam facientibus iter multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia. XXIII.

But just as partition is not always necessary or even useful, so, when applied opportunely, it contributes very much light and grace to the oration. For it not only effects that the things said become clearer, with the matters, as it were, extracted from the crowd and set in the sight of the judges, but it also refreshes the hearer by the certain end of the individual parts, no otherwise than the intervals marked by inscribed stones take away much of fatigue for those making a journey. 23.

Nam et exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati est, et hortatur ad reliqua fortius exsequenda scire quantum supersit. Nihil enim longum videri necesse est in quo quid ultimum sit certum est. XXIV.

For to know the measure of exhausted labor is a pleasure, and to know how much remains encourages us to execute the remainder more stoutly. For nothing needs to seem long where what is ultimate is certain. 24.

Nec inmerito multum ex diligentia partiendi tulit laudis Q. Hortensius, cuius tamen divisionem in digitos diductam nonnumquam Cicero leviter eludit. Nam est suus et in gestu modus et vitanda utique maxime concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio. XXV.

Nor undeservedly did Q. Hortensius carry off much praise from his diligence in partitioning, whose division, however, drawn out upon the fingers, Cicero sometimes lightly parries. For there is its own measure even in gesture, and one must by all means especially avoid a partition too concise and, as it were, articulated. 25.

Nam et auctoritati plurimum detrahunt minuta illa nec iam membra sed frusta: et huius gloriae cupidi, quo subtilius et copiosius divisisse videantur, et supervacua adsumunt et quae natura singularia sunt secant, nec tam plura faciunt quam minora: deinde cum fecerunt mille particulas, in eandem incidunt obscuritatem contra quam partitio inventa est.

For those minute bits take away very much from authority, being no longer limbs but scraps; and men eager for this glory, in order to seem to have divided more subtly and more copiously, both assume superfluities and cut apart things which by nature are singular, and they make not so much more things as smaller ones; then, when they have made a thousand particles, they fall into the same obscurity against which partition was invented.

XXVI. Et divisa autem et simplex propositio, quotiens utiliter adhiberi potest, primum debet esse aperta atque lucida (nam quid sit turpius quam id esse obscurum ipsum quod in eum solum adhibetur usum ne sint cetera obscura?), tum brevis nec ullo supervacuo onerata verbo; non enim quid dicamus sed de quo dicturi simus ostendimus. XXVII.

26. But both a divided and a simple proposition, whenever it can be usefully applied, ought first to be open and lucid (for what is more shameful than that the very thing be obscure which is employed for this sole use, lest the rest be obscure?), then brief and not burdened with any superfluous word; for we show not what we say, but what we are going to speak about. 27.

Optinendum etiam ne quid in ea desit, ne quid supersit. superest autem sic fere, cum aut in species partimur quod in genera partiri sit satis, aut genere posito subicitur species, ut "dicam de virtute iustitia continentia", cum iustitia atque continentia virtutis sint species. XXVIII.

It must also be secured that nothing in it is lacking, that nothing is superfluous. there is a surplus, however, for the most part, when either we partition into species what it would suffice to partition into genera, or, a genus having been set down, a species is subjoined, as, "I will speak about virtue, justice, continence," since justice and continence are species of virtue. XXVIII.

Partitio prima est, quid sit de quo conveniat, quid de quo ambigatur. In eo quod convenit, quid adversarius fateatur, quid nos: in eo quo de ambigitur, [quae dicturi sumus] quae nostrae propositiones, quae partis adversae. turpissimum vero non eodem ordine exsequi quo quidque proposueris.

The first partition is: what there is agreement about, what there is dispute about. In that on which there is agreement, what the adversary admits, what we [admit]: in that about which there is dispute, [what we are going to say] what our propositions are, what those of the adversary’s party are. Most disgraceful, indeed, is not to execute in the same order in which you have proposed each point.